memoirs of napoleon bonaparte, volume 1. by louis antoine fauvelet de bourrienne his private secretary edited by r. w. phipps colonel, late royal artillery 1891 contents: preface, notes and introduction chapter i. to chapter iv., 1797 preface by the editors of the 1836 edition. in introducing the present edition of m. de bourrienne's memoirs to the public we are bound, as editors, to say a few words on the subject. agreeing, however, with horace walpole that an editor should not dwell for any length of time on the merits of his author, we shall touch but lightly on this part of the matter. we are the more ready to abstain since the great success in england of the former editions of these memoirs, and the high reputation they have acquired on the european continent, and in every part of the civilised world where the fame of bonaparte has ever reached, sufficiently establish the merits of m. de bourrienne as a biographer. these merits seem to us to consist chiefly in an anxious desire to be impartial, to point out the defects as well as the merits of a most wonderful man; and in a peculiarly graphic power of relating facts and anecdotes. with this happy faculty bourrienne would have made the life of almost any active individual interesting; but the subject of which the most favourable circumstances permitted him to treat was full of events and of the most extraordinary facts. the hero of his story was such a being as the world has produced only on the rarest occasions, and the complete counterpart to whom has, probably, never existed; for there are broad shades of difference between napoleon and alexander, caesar, and charlemagne; neither will modern history furnish more exact parallels, since gustavus adolphus, frederick the great, cromwell, washington, or bolivar bear but a small resemblance to bonaparte either in character, fortune, or extent of enterprise. for fourteen years, to say nothing of his projects in the east, the history of bonaparte was the history of all europe! with the copious materials he possessed, m. de bourrienne has produced a work which, for deep interest, excitement, and amusement, can scarcely be paralleled by any of the numerous and excellent memoirs for which the literature of france is so justly celebrated. m. de bourrienne shows us the hero of marengo and austerlitz in his night-gown and slippers--with a 'trait de plume' he, in a hundred instances, places the real man before us, with all his personal habits and peculiarities of manner, temper, and conversation. the friendship between bonaparte and bourrienne began in boyhood, at the school of brienne, and their unreserved intimacy continued during the most brilliant part of napoleon's career. we have said enough, the motives for his writing this work and his competency for the task will be best explained in m. de bourrienne's own words, which the reader will find in the introductory chapter. m. de bourrienne says little of napoleon after his first abdication and retirement to elba in 1814: we have endeavoured to fill up the chasm thus left by following his hero through the remaining seven years of his life, to the "last scenes of all" that ended his "strange, eventful history," --to his deathbed and alien grave at st. helena. a completeness will thus be given to the work which it did not before possess, and which we hope will, with the other additions and improvements already alluded to, tend to give it a place in every well-selected library, as one of the most satisfactory of all the lives of napoleon. london, 1836. preface by the editor of the 1885 edition. the memoirs of the time of napoleon may be divided into two classes-those by marshals and officers, of which suchet's is a good example, chiefly devoted to military movements, and those by persons employed in the administration and in the court, giving us not only materials for history, but also valuable details of the personal and inner life of the great emperor and of his immediate surroundings. of this latter class the memoirs of bourrienne are among the most important. long the intimate and personal friend of napoleon both at school and from the end of the italian campaigns in 1797 till 1802--working in the same room with him, using the same purse, the confidant of most of his schemes, and, as his secretary, having the largest part of all the official and private correspondence of the time passed through his hands, bourrienne occupied an invaluable position for storing and recording materials for history. the memoirs of his successor, meneval, are more those of an esteemed private secretary; yet, valuable and interesting as they are, they want the peculiarity of position which marks those of bourrienne, who was a compound of secretary, minister, and friend. the accounts of such men as miot de melito, raederer, etc., are most valuable, but these writers were not in that close contact with napoleon enjoyed by bourrienne. bourrienne's position was simply unique, and we can only regret that he did not occupy it till the end of the empire. thus it is natural that his memoirs should have been largely used by historians, and to properly understand the history of the time, they must be read by all students. they are indeed full of interest for every one. but they also require to be read with great caution. when we meet with praise of napoleon, we may generally believe it, for, as thiers (consulat., ii. 279) says, bourrienne need be little suspected on this side, for although he owed everything to napoleon, he has not seemed to remember it. but very often in passages in which blame is thrown on napoleon, bourrienne speaks, partly with much of the natural bitterness of a former and discarded friend, and partly with the curious mixed feeling which even the brothers of napoleon display in their memoirs, pride in the wonderful abilities evinced by the man with whom he was allied, and jealousy at the way in which he was outshone by the man he had in youth regarded as inferior to himself. sometimes also we may even suspect the praise. thus when bourrienne defends napoleon for giving, as he alleges, poison to the sick at jaffa, a doubt arises whether his object was to really defend what to most englishmen of this day, with remembrances of the deeds and resolutions of the indian mutiny, will seem an act to be pardoned, if not approved; or whether he was more anxious to fix the committal of the act on napoleon at a time when public opinion loudly blamed it. the same may be said of his defence of the massacre of the prisoners of jaffa. louis antoine fauvelet de bourrienne was born in 1769, that is, in the same year as napoleon bonaparte, and he was the friend and companion of the future emperor at the military school of brienne-le-chateau till 1784, when napoleon, one of the sixty pupils maintained at the expense of the state, was passed on to the military school of paris. the friends again met in 1792 and in 1795, when napoleon was hanging about paris, and when bourrienne looked on the vague dreams of his old schoolmate as only so much folly. in 1796, as soon as napoleon had assured his position at the head of the army of italy, anxious as ever to surround himself with known faces, he sent for bourrienne to be his secretary. bourrienne had been appointed in 1792 as secretary of the legation at stuttgart, and had, probably wisely, disobeyed the orders given him to return, thus escaping the dangers of the revolution. he only came back to paris in 1795, having thus become an emigré. he joined napoleon in 1797, after the austrians had been beaten out of italy, and at once assumed the office of secretary which he held for so long. he had sufficient tact to forbear treating the haughty young general with any assumption of familiarity in public, and he was indefatigable enough to please even the never-resting napoleon. talent bourrienne had in abundance; indeed he is careful to hint that at school if any one had been asked to predict greatness for any pupil, it was bourrienne, not napoleon, who would have been fixed on as the future star. he went with his general to egypt, and returned with him to france. while napoleon was making his formal entry into the tuilleries, bourrienne was preparing the cabinet he was still to share with the consul. in this cabinet--our cabinet, as he is careful to call it--he worked with the first consul till 1802. during all this time the pair lead lives on terms of equality and friendship creditable to both. the secretary neither asked for nor received any salary: when he required money, he simply dipped into the cash-box of the first consul. as the whole power of the state gradually passed into the hands of the consul, the labours of the secretary became heavier. his successor broke down under a lighter load, and had to receive assistance; but, perhaps borne up by the absorbing interest of the work and the great influence given by his post, bourrienne stuck to his place, and to all appearance might, except for himself, have come down to us as the companion of napoleon during his whole life. he had enemies, and one of them--[boulay de la meurthe.]--has not shrunk from describing their gratification at the disgrace of the trusted secretary. any one in favour, or indeed in office, under napoleon was the sure mark of calumny for all aspirants to place; yet bourrienne might have weathered any temporary storm raised by unfounded reports as successfully as meneval, who followed him. but bourrienne's hands were not clean in money matters, and that was an unpardonable sin in any one who desired to be in real intimacy with napoleon. he became involved in the affairs of the house of coulon, which failed, as will be seen in the notes, at the time of his disgrace; and in october 1802 he was called on to hand over his office to meneval, who retained it till invalided after the russian campaign. as has been said, bourrienne would naturally be the mark for many accusations, but the conclusive proof of his misconduct--at least for any one acquainted with napoleon's objection and dislike to changes in office, whether from his strong belief in the effects of training, or his equally strong dislike of new faces round him--is that he was never again employed near his old comrade; indeed he really never saw the emperor again at any private interview, except when granted the naval official reception in 1805, before leaving to take up his post at hamburg, which he held till 1810. we know that his re-employment was urged by josephine and several of his former companions. savary himself says he tried his advocacy; but napoleon was inexorable to those who, in his own phrase, had sacrificed to the golden calf. sent, as we have said, to hamburg in 1805, as minister plenipotentiary to the duke of brunswick, the duke of mecklenburg-schwerin, and to the hanse towns, bourrienne knew how to make his post an important one. he was at one of the great seats of the commerce which suffered so fearfully from the continental system of the emperor, and he was charged to watch over the german press. how well he fulfilled this duty we learn from metternich, who writes in 1805: "i have sent an article to the newspaper editors in berlin and to m. de hofer at hamburg. i do not know whether it has been accepted, for m. bourrienne still exercises an authority so severe over these journals that they are always submitted to him before they appear, that he may erase or alter the articles which do not please him." his position at hamburg gave him great opportunities for both financial and political intrigues. in his memoirs, as meneval remarks, he or his editor is not ashamed to boast of being thanked by louis xviii. at st. ouen for services rendered while he was the minister of napoleon at hamburg. he was recalled in 1810, when the hanse towns were united, or, to use the phrase of the day, re-united to the empire. he then hung about paris, keeping on good terms with some of the ministers--savary, not the most reputable of them, for example. in 1814 he was to be found at the office of lavallette, the head of the posts, disguising, his enemies said, his delight at the bad news which was pouring in, by exaggerated expressions of devotion. he is accused of a close and suspicious connection with talleyrand, and it is odd that when talleyrand became head of the provisional government in 1814, bourrienne of all persons should have been put at the head of the posts. received in the most flattering manner by louis xviii, he was as astonished as poor beugnot was in 1815, to find himself on 13th may suddenly ejected from office, having, however, had time to furnish post-horses to manbreuil for the mysterious expedition, said to have been at least known to talleyrand, and intended certainly for the robbery of the queen of westphalia, and probably for the murder of napoleon. in the extraordinary scurry before the bourbons scuttled out of paris in 1814, bourrienne was made prefet of the police for a few days, his tenure of that post being signalised by the abortive attempt to arrest fouché, the only effect of which was to drive that wily minister into the arms of the bonapartists. he fled with the king, and was exempted from the amnesty proclaimed by napoleon. on the return from ghent he was made a minister of state without portfolio, and also became one of the council. the ruin of his finances drove him out of france, but he eventually died in a madhouse at caen. when the memoirs first appeared in 1829 they made a great sensation. till then in most writings napoleon had been treated as either a demon or as a demi-god. the real facts of the case were not suited to the tastes of either his enemies or his admirers. while the monarchs of europe had been disputing among themselves about the division of the spoils to be obtained from france and from the unsettlement of the continent, there had arisen an extraordinarily clever and unscrupulous man who, by alternately bribing and overthrowing the great monarchies, had soon made himself master of the mainland. his admirers were unwilling to admit the part played in his success by the jealousy of his foes of each other's share in the booty, and they delighted to invest him with every great quality which man could possess. his enemies were ready enough to allow his military talents, but they wished to attribute the first success of his not very deep policy to a marvellous duplicity, apparently considered by them the more wicked as possessed by a parvenu emperor, and far removed, in a moral point of view, from the statecraft so allowable in an ancient monarchy. but for napoleon himself and his family and court there was literally no limit to the really marvellous inventions of his enemies. he might enter every capital on the continent, but there was some consolation in believing that he himself was a monster of wickedness, and his court but the scene of one long protracted orgie. there was enough against the emperor in the memoirs to make them comfortable reading for his opponents, though very many of the old calumnies were disposed of in them. they contained indeed the nearest approximation to the truth which had yet appeared. metternich, who must have been a good judge, as no man was better acquainted with what he himself calls the "age of napoleon," says of the memoirs: "if you want something to read, both interesting and amusing, get the memoires de bourrienne. these are the only authentic memoirs of napoleon which have yet appeared. the style is not brilliant, but that only makes them the more trustworthy." indeed, metternich himself in his own memoirs often follows a good deal in the line of bourrienne: among many formal attacks, every now and then he lapses into half involuntary and indirect praise of his great antagonist, especially where he compares the men he had to deal with in aftertimes with his former rapid and talented interlocutor. to some even among the bonapartists, bourrienne was not altogether distasteful. lucien bonaparte, remarking that the time in which bourrienne treated with napoleon as equal with equal did not last long enough for the secretary, says he has taken a little revenge in his memoirs, just as a lover, after a break with his mistress, reveals all her defects. but lucien considers that bourrienne gives us a good enough idea of the young officer of the artillery, of the great general, and of the first consul. of the emperor, says lucien, he was too much in retirement to be able to judge equally well. but lucien was not a fair representative of the bonapartists; indeed he had never really thought well of his brother or of his actions since lucien, the former "brutus" bonaparte, had ceased to be the adviser of the consul. it was well for lucien himself to amass a fortune from the presents of a corrupt court, and to be made a prince and duke by the pope, but he was too sincere a republican not to disapprove of the imperial system. the real bonapartists were naturally and inevitably furious with the memoirs. they were not true, they were not the work of bourrienne, bourrienne himself was a traitor, a purloiner of manuscripts, his memory was as bad as his principles, he was not even entitled to the de before his name. if the memoirs were at all to be pardoned, it was because his share was only really a few notes wrung from him by large pecuniary offers at a time when he was pursued by his creditors, and when his brain was already affected. the bonapartist attack on the memoirs was delivered in full form, in two volumes, 'bourrienne et ses erreurs, volontaires et involontaires' (paris, heideloff, 1830), edited by the comte d'aure, the ordonnateur en chef of the egyptian expedition, and containing communications from joseph bonaparte, gourgaud, stein, etc.' --[in the notes in this present edition these volumes are referred to in brief 'erreurs'.]-part of the system of attack was to call in question the authenticity of the memoirs, and this was the more easy as bourrienne, losing his fortune, died in 1834 in a state of imbecility. but this plan is not systematically followed, and the very reproaches addressed to the writer of the memoirs often show that it was believed they were really written by bourrienne. they undoubtedly contain plenty of faults. the editor (villemarest, it is said) probably had a large share in the work, and bourrienne must have forgotten or misplaced many dates and occurrences. in such a work, undertaken so many years after the events, it was inevitable that many errors should be made, and that many statements should be at least debatable. but on close investigation the work stands the attack in a way that would be impossible unless it had really been written by a person in the peculiar position occupied by bourrienne. he has assuredly not exaggerated that position: he really, says lucien bonaparte, treated as equal with equal with napoleon during a part of his career, and he certainly was the nearest friend and confidant that napoleon ever had in his life. where he fails, or where the bonapartist fire is most telling, is in the account of the egyptian expedition. it may seem odd that he should have forgotten, even in some thirty years, details such as the way in which the sick were removed; but such matters were not in his province; and it would be easy to match similar omissions in other works, such as the accounts of the crimea, and still more of the peninsula. it is with his personal relations with napoleon that we are most concerned, and it is in them that his account receives most corroboration. it may be interesting to see what has been said of the memoirs by other writers. we have quoted metternich, and lucien bonaparte; let us hear meneval, his successor, who remained faithful to his master to the end: "absolute confidence cannot be given to statements contained in memoirs published under the name of a man who has not composed them. it is known that the editor of these memoirs offered to m. de bourrienne, who had then taken refuge in holstein from his creditors, a sum said to be thirty thousand francs to obtain his signature to them, with some notes and addenda. m. de bourrienne was already attacked by the disease from which he died a few years latter in a maison de santé at caen. many literary men co-operated in the preparation of his memoirs. in 1825 i met m. de bourrienne in paris. he told me it had been suggested to him to write against the emperor. 'notwithstanding the harm he has done me,' said he, 'i would never do so. sooner may my hand be withered.' if m. de bourrienne had prepared his memoirs himself, he would not have stated that while he was the emperor's minister at hamburg he worked with the agents of the comte de lille (louis xviii.) at the preparation of proclamations in favour of that prince, and that in 1814 he accepted the thanks of the king, louis xviii., for doing so; he would not have said that napoleon had confided to him in 1805 that he had never conceived the idea of an expedition into england, and that the plan of a landing, the preparations for which he gave such publicity to, was only a snare to amuse fools. the emperor well knew that never was there a plan more seriously conceived or more positively settled. m. de bourrienne would not have spoken of his private interviews with napoleon, nor of the alleged confidences entrusted to him, while really napoleon had no longer received him after the 20th october 1802. when the emperor, in 1805, forgetting his faults, named him minister plenipotentiary at hamburg, he granted him the customary audience, but to this favour he did not add the return of his former friendship. both before and afterwards he constantly refused to receive him, and he did not correspond with him "(meneval, ii. 378-79). and in another passage meneval says: "besides, it would be wrong to regard these memoirs as the work of the man whose name they bear. the bitter resentment m. de bourrienne had nourished for his disgrace, the enfeeblement of his faculties, and the poverty he was reduced to, rendered him accessible to the pecuniary offers made to him. he consented to give the authority of his name to memoirs in whose composition he had only co-operated by incomplete, confused, and often inexact notes, materials which an editor was employed to put in order." and meneval (iii. 29-30) goes on to quote what he himself had written in the spectateur militaire, in which he makes much the same assertions, and especially objects to the account of conversations with the emperor after 1802, except always the one audience on taking leave for hamburg. meneval also says that napoleon, when he wished to obtain intelligence from hamburg, did not correspond with bourrienne, but deputed him, meneval, to ask bourrienne for what was wanted. but he corroborates bourrienne on the subject of the efforts made, among others by josephine, for his reappointment. such are the statements of the bonaparists pure; and the reader, as has been said, can judge for himself how far the attack is good. bourrienne, or his editor, may well have confused the date of his interviews, but he will not be found much astray on many points. his account of the conversation of josephine after the death of the duc d'eughien may be compared with what we know from madame de remusat, who, by the way, would have been horrified if she had known that he considered her to resemble the empress josephine in character. we now come to the views of savary, the duc de rovigo, who avowedly remained on good terms with bourrienne after his disgrace, though the friendship of savary was not exactly a thing that most men would have much prided themselves on. "bourrienne had a prodigious memory; he spoke and wrote in several languages, and his pen ran as quickly as one could speak. nor were these the only advantages he possessed. he knew the routine of public business and public law. his activity and devotion made him indispensable to the first consul. i knew the qualities which won for him the unlimited confidence of his chief, but i cannot speak with the same assurance of the faults which made him lose it. bourrienne had many enemies, both on account of his character and of his place" (savary, i. 418-19). marmont ought to be an impartial critic of the memoirs. he says, "bourrienne . . . had a very great capacity, but he is a striking example of the great truth that our passions are always bad counsellors. by inspiring us with an immoderate ardour to reach a fixed end, they often make us miss it. bourrienne had an immoderate love of money. with his talents and his position near bonaparte at the first dawn of greatness, with the confidence and real good-will which bonaparte felt for him, in a few years he would have gained everything in fortune and in social position. but his eager impatience mined his career at the moment when it might have developed and increased" (marmont, i. 64). the criticism appears just. as to the memoirs, marmont says (ii. 224), "in general, these memoirs are of great veracity and powerful interest so long as they treat of what the author has seen and heard; but when he speaks of others, his work is only an assemblage of gratuitous suppositions and of false facts put forward for special purposes." the comte alexandre de puymaigre, who arrived at hamburg soon after bourrienne had left it in 1810, says (page 135) of the part of the memoirs which relates to hamburg, "i must acknowledge that generally his assertions are well founded. this former companion of napoleon has only forgotten to speak of the opinion that they had of him in this town. "the truth is, that he was believed to have made much money there." thus we may take bourrienne as a clever, able man, who would have risen to the highest honours under the empire had not his short-sighted grasping after lucre driven him from office, and prevented him from ever regaining it under napoleon. in the present edition the translation has been carefully compared with the original french text. where in the original text information is given which has now become mere matter of history, and where bourrienne merely quotes the documents well enough known at this day, his possession of which forms part of the charges of his opponents, advantage has been taken to lighten the mass of the memoirs. this has been done especially where they deal with what the writer did not himself see or hear, the part of the memoirs which are of least value and of which marmont's opinion has just been quoted. but in the personal and more valuable part of the memoirs, where we have the actual knowledge of the secretary himself, the original text has been either fully retained, or some few passages previously omitted restored. illustrative notes have been added from the memoirs of the successor of bourrienne, meneval, madame de remusat, the works of colonel jung on 'bonaparte et son temps', and on 'lucien bonaparte', etc., and other books. attention has also been paid to the attacks of the 'erreurs', and wherever these criticisms are more than a mere expression of disagreement, their purport has been recorded with, where possible, some judgment of the evidence. thus the reader will have before him the materials for deciding himself how far bourrienne's statements are in agreement with the facts and with the accounts of other writers. at the present time too much attention has been paid to the memoirs of madame de remusat. she, as also madame junot, was the wife of a man on whom the full shower of imperial favours did not descend, and, womanlike, she saw and thought only of the court life of the great man who was never less great than in his court. she is equally astonished and indignant that the emperor, coming straight from long hours of work with his ministers and with his secretary, could not find soft words for the ladies of the court, and that, a horrible thing in the eyes of a frenchwoman, when a mistress threw herself into his arms, he first thought of what political knowledge he could obtain from her. bourrienne, on the other hand, shows us the other and the really important side of napoleon's character. he tells us of the long hours in the cabinet, of the never-resting activity of the consul, of napoleon's dreams, no ignoble dreams and often realised, of great labours of peace as well as of war. he is a witness, and the more valuable as a reluctant one, to the marvellous powers of the man who, if not the greatest, was at least the one most fully endowed with every great quality of mind and body the world has ever seen. r. w. p. author's introduction. the trading upon an illustrious name can alone have given birth to the multitude of publications under the titles of historical memoirs, secret memoirs, and other rhapsodies which have appeared respecting napoleon. on looking into them it is difficult to determine whether the impudence of the writers or the simplicity of certain readers is most astonishing. yet these rude and ill digested compilations, filled with absurd anecdotes, fabricated speeches, fictitious crimes or virtues, and disfigured by numerous anachronisms, instead of being consigned to just contempt and speedy oblivion, have been pushed into notice by speculators, and have found zealous partisans and enthusiastic apologists. --[this introduction has been reprinted as bearing upon the character of the work, but refers very often to events of the day at the time of its first appearance.]-for a time i entertained the idea of noticing, one by one, the numerous errors which have been written respecting napoleon; but i have renounced a task which would have been too laborious to myself, and very tedious to the reader. i shall therefore only correct those which come within the plan of my work, and which are connected with those facts, to a more accurate knowledge of which than any other person can possess i may lay claim. there are men who imagine that nothing done by napoleon will ever be forgotten; but must not the slow but inevitable influence of time be expected to operate with respect to him? the effect of that influence is, that the most important event of an epoch soon sinks, almost imperceptibly and almost disregarded, into the immense mass of historical facts. time, in its progress, diminishes the probability as well as the interest of such an event, as it gradually wears away the most durable monuments. i attach only a relative importance to what i am about to lay before the public. i shall give authentic documents. if all persons who have approached napoleon, at any time and in any place, would candidly record what they saw and heard, without passion, the future historian would be rich in materials. it is my wish that he who may undertake the difficult task of writing the history of napoleon shall find in my notes information useful to the perfection of his work. there he will at least find truth. i have not the ambition to wish that what i state should be taken as absolute authority; but i hope that it will always be consulted. i have never before published anything respecting napoleon. that malevolence which fastens itself upon men who have the misfortune to be somewhat separated from the crowd has, because there is always more profit in saying ill than good, attributed to me several works on bonaparte; among others, 'les memoires secrets d'un homme qui ne l'a pas quitté', par m. b-------, and 'memoires secrets sur napoleon bonaparte, par m. de b------, and 'le precis historique sur napoleon'. the initial of my name has served to propagate this error. the incredible ignorance which runs through those memoirs, the absurdities and inconceivable silliness with which they abound, do not permit a man of honour and common sense to allow such wretched rhapsodies to be imputed to him. i declared in 1816, and at later periods in the french and foreign journals, that i had no hand in those publications, and i here formally repeat this declaration. but it may be said to me, why should we place more confidence in you than in those who have written before you? my reply shall be plain. i enter the lists one of the last. i have read all that my predecessors have published confident that all i state is true. i have no interest in deceiving, no disgrace to fear, no reward to expect. i neither wish to obscure nor embellish his glory. however great napoleon may have been, was he not also liable to pay his tribute to the weakness of human nature? i speak of napoleon such as i have seen him, known him, frequently admired and sometimes blamed him. i state what i saw, heard, wrote, and thought at the time, under each circumstance that occurred. i have not allowed myself to be carried away by the illusions of the imagination, nor to be influenced by friendship or hatred. i shall not insert a single reflection which did not occur to me at the very moment of the event which gave it birth. how many transactions and documents were there over which i could but lament!--how many measures, contrary to my views, to my principles, and to my character!--while the best intentions were incapable of overcoming difficulties which a most powerful and decided will rendered almost insurmountable. i also wish the future historian to compare what i say with what others have related or may relate. but it will be necessary for him to attend to dates, circumstances, difference of situation, change of temperament, and age,--for age has much influence over men. we do not think and act at fifty as at twenty-five. by exercising this caution he will be able to discover the truth, and to establish an opinion for posterity. the reader must not expect to find in these memoirs an uninterrupted series of all the events which marked the great career of napoleon; nor details of all those battles, with the recital of which so many eminent men have usefully and ably occupied themselves. i shall say little about whatever i did not see or hear, and which is not supported by official documents. perhaps i shall succeed in confirming truths which have been doubted, and in correcting errors which have been adopted. if i sometimes differ from the observations and statements of napoleon at st. helena, i am far from supposing that those who undertook to be the medium of communication between him and the public have misrepresented what he said. i am well convinced that none of the writers of st. helena can be taxed with the slightest deception; disinterested zeal and nobleness of character are undoubted pledges of their veracity. it appears to me perfectly certain that napoleon stated, dictated, or corrected all they have published. their honour is unquestionable; no one can doubt it. that they wrote what he communicated must therefore be believed; but it cannot with equal confidence be credited that what he communicated was nothing but the truth. he seems often to have related as a fact what was really only an idea,--an idea, too, brought forth at st. helena, the child of misfortune, and transported by his imagination to europe in the time of his prosperity. his favourite phrase, which was every moment on his lips, must not be forgotten--"what will history say--what will posterity think?" this passion for leaving behind him a celebrated name is one which belongs to the constitution of the human mind; and with napoleon its influence was excessive. in his first italian campaign he wrote thus to general clarke: "that ambition and the occupation of high offices were not sufficient for his satisfaction and happiness, which he had early placed in the opinion of europe and the esteem of posterity." he often observed to me that with him the opinion of posterity was the real immortality of the soul. it may easily be conceived that napoleon wished to give to the documents which he knew historians would consult a favourable colour, and to direct, according to his own views, the judgment of posterity on his actions: but it is only by the impartial comparison of periods, positions, and age that a well founded decision will be given. about his fortieth year the physical constitution of napoleon sustained considerable change; and it may be presumed that his moral qualities were affected by that change. it is particularly important not to lose sight of the premature decay of his health, which, perhaps, did not permit him always to possess the vigour of memory otherwise consistent enough with his age. the state of our organisation often modifies our recollections, our feelings, our manner of viewing objects, and the impressions we receive. this will be taken into consideration by judicious and thinking men; and for them i write. what m. de las casas states napoleon to have said in may 1816 on the manner of writing his history corroborates the opinion i have expressed. it proves that all the facts and observations he communicated or dictated were meant to serve as materials. we learn from the memorial that m. de las casas wrote daily, and that the manuscript was read over by napoleon, who often made corrections with his own hand. the idea of a journal pleased him greatly. he fancied it would be a work of which the world could afford no other example. but there are passages in which the order of events is deranged; in others facts are misrepresented and erroneous assertions are made, i apprehend, not altogether involuntarily. i have paid particular attention to all that has been published by the noble participators of the imperial captivity. nothing, however, could induce me to change a word in these memoirs, because nothing could take from me my conviction of the truth of what i personally heard and saw. it will be found that napoleon in his private conversations often confirms what i state; but we sometimes differ, and the public must judge between us. however, i must here make one observation. when napoleon dictated or related to his friends in st. helena the facts which they have reported he was out of the world,--he had played his part. fortune, which, according to his notions, had conferred on him all his power and greatness, had recalled all her gifts before he sank into the tomb. his ruling passion would induce him to think that it was due to his glory to clear up certain facts which might prove an unfavourable escort if they accompanied him to posterity. this was his fixed idea. but is there not some ground for suspecting the fidelity of him who writes or dictates his own history? why might he not impose on a few persons in st. helena, when he was able to impose on france and europe, respecting many acts which emanated from him during the long duration of his power? the life of napoleon would be very unfaithfully written were the author to adopt as true all his bulletins and proclamations, and all the declarations he made at st. helena. such a history would frequently be in contradiction to facts; and such only is that which might be entitled, 'the history of napoleon, written by himself'. i have said this much because it is my wish that the principles which have guided me in the composition of these memoirs may be understood. i am aware that they will not please every reader; that is a success to which i cannot pretend. some merit, however, may be allowed me on account of the labour i have undergone. it has neither been of a slight nor an agreeable kind. i made it a rule to read everything that has been written respecting napoleon, and i have had to decipher many of his autograph documents, though no longer so familiar with his scrawl as formerly. i say decipher, because a real cipher might often be much more readily understood than the handwriting of napoleon. my own notes, too, which were often very hastily made, in the hand i wrote in my youth, have sometimes also much embarrassed me. my long and intimate connection with bonaparte from boyhood, my close relations with him when general, consul, and emperor, enabled me to see and appreciate all that was projected and all that was done during that considerable and momentous period of time. i not only had the opportunity of being present at the conception and the execution of the extraordinary deeds of one of the ablest men nature ever formed, but, notwithstanding an almost unceasing application to business, i found means to employ the few moments of leisure which bonaparte left at my disposal in making notes, collecting documents, and in recording for history facts respecting which the truth could otherwise with difficulty be ascertained; and more particularly in collecting those ideas, often profound, brilliant, and striking, but always remarkable, to which bonaparte gave expression in the overflowing frankness of confidential intimacy. the knowledge that i possessed much important information has exposed me to many inquiries, and wherever i have resided since my retirement from public affairs much of my time has been spent in replying to questions. the wish to be acquainted with the most minute details of the life of a man formed on an unexampled model [?? d.w.] is very natural; and the observation on my replies by those who heard them always was, "you should publish your memoirs!" i had certainly always in view the publication of my memoirs; but, at the same time, i was firmly resolved not to publish them until a period should arrive in which i might tell the truth, and the whole truth. while napoleon was in the possession of power i felt it right to resist the urgent applications made to me on this subject by some persons of the highest distinction. truth would then have sometimes appeared flattery, and sometimes, also, it might not have been without danger. afterwards, when the progress of events removed bonaparte to a far distant island in the midst of the ocean, silence was imposed on me by other considerations,-by considerations of propriety and feeling. after the death of bonaparte, at st. helena, reasons of a different nature retarded the execution of my plan. the tranquillity of a secluded retreat was indispensable for preparing and putting in order the abundant materials in my possession. i found it also necessary to read a great number of works, in order to rectify important errors to which the want of authentic documents had induced the authors to give credit. this much-desired retreat was found. i had the good fortune to be introduced, through a friend, to the duchesse de brancas, and that lady invited me to pass some time on one of her estates in hainault. received with the most agreeable hospitality, i have there enjoyed that tranquillity which could alone have rendered the publication of these volumes practicable. fauvelet de bourrienne note. the editor of the 1836 edition had added to the memoirs several chapters taken from or founded on other works of the time, so as to make a more complete history of the period. these materials have been mostly retained, but with the corrections which later publications have made necessary. a chapter has now been added to give a brief account of the part played by the chief historical personages during the cent jours, and another at the end to include the removal of the body of napoleon from st. helena to france. two special improvements have, it is hoped, been made in this edition. great care has been taken to get names, dates, and figures rightly given,--points much neglected in most translations, though in some few cases, such as davoust, the ordinary but not strictly correct spelling has been followed to suit the general reader. the number of references to other works which are given in the notes will, it is believed, be of use to any one wishing to continue the study of the history of napoleon, and may preserve them from many of the errors too often committed. the present editor has had the great advantage of having his work shared by mr. richard bentley, who has brought his knowledge of the period to bear, and who has found, as only a busy man could do, the time to minutely enter into every fresh detail, with the ardour which soon seizes any one who long follows that enticing pursuit, the special study of an historical period. january 1885 r. w. p. memoirs of napoleon bonaparte. chapter 1 1769-1783. authentic date of bonaparte's birth--his family ruined by the jesuits--his taste for military amusements--sham siege at the college of brienne--the porter's wife and napoleon--my intimacy with bonaparte at college--his love for the mathematics, and his dislike of latin--he defends paoli and blames his father--he is ridiculed by his comrades--ignorance of the monks--distribution of prizes at brienne--madame de montesson and the duke of orleans--report of m. keralio on bonaparte--he leaves brienne. napoleon bonaparte was born at ajaccio, in corsica, on the 15th of august 1769; the original orthography of his name was buonaparte, but he suppressed the u during his first campaign in italy. his motives for so doing were merely to render the spelling conformable with the pronunciation, and to abridge his signature. he signed buonaparte even after the famous 13th vendemiaire. it has been affirmed that he was born in 1768, and that he represented himself to be a year younger than he really was. this is untrue. he always told me the 9th of august was his birthday, and, as i was born on the 9th of july 1769, our proximity of age served to strengthen our union and friendship when we were both at the military college of brienne. the false and absurd charge of bonaparte having misrepresented his age, is decidedly refuted by a note in the register of m. berton, subprincipal of the college of brienne, in which it is stated that m. napoleon de buonaparte, écuyer, born in the city of ajaccio, in corsica, on the 15th of august 1769, left the royal military college of brienne on the 17th october 1784. the stories about his low extraction are alike devoid of foundation. his family was poor, and he was educated at the public expense, an advantage of which many honourable families availed themselves. a memorial addressed by his father, charles buonaparte, to the minister of war states that his fortune had been reduced by the failure of some enterprise in which he had engaged, and by the injustice of the jesuits, by whom he had been deprived of an inheritance. the object of this memorial was to solicit a sub-lieutenant's commission for napoleon, who was then fourteen years of age, and to get lucien entered a pupil of the military college. the minister wrote on the back of the memorial, "give the usual answer, if there be a vacancy;" and on the margin are these words--"this gentleman has been informed that his request is inadmissible as long as his second son remains at the school of brienne. two brothers cannot be placed at the same time in the military schools." when napoleon was fifteen he was sent to paris until he should attain the requisite age for entering the army. lucien was not received into the college of brienne, at least not until his brother had quitted the military school of paris. bonaparte was undoubtedly a man of good family. i have seen an authentic account of his genealogy, which he obtained from tuscany. a great deal has been said about the civil dissensions which forced his family to quit italy and take refuge in corsica. on this subject i shall say nothing. many and various accounts have been given of bonaparte's youth. --[the following interesting trait of napoleon's childhood is derived from the 'memoirs of the duchesse d'arbranes':--"he was one day accused by one of his sisters of having eaten a basketful of grapes, figs, and citrons, which had come from the garden of his uncle the canon. none but those who were acquainted with the bonaparte family can form any idea of the enormity of this offence. to eat fruit belonging to the uncle the canon was infinitely more criminal than to eat grapes and figs which might be claimed by anybody else. an inquiry took place. napoleon denied the fact, and was whipped. he was told that if he would beg pardon he should be forgiven. he protested that he was innocent, but he was not believed. if i recollect rightly, his mother was at the time on a visit to m. de marbeuf, or some other friend. the result of napoleon's obstinacy was, that he was kept three whole days on bread and cheese, and that cheese was not 'broccio'. however, he would not cry: he was dull, but not sulky. at length, on the fourth day of his punishment a little friend of marianne bonaparte returned from the country, and on hearing of napoleon's disgrace she confessed that she and marianne had eaten the fruit. it was now marianne's turn to be punished. when napoleon was asked why he had not accused his sister, he replied that though he suspected that she was guilty, yet out of consideration to her little friend, who had no share in the falsehood, he had said nothing. he was then only seven years of age" (vol. i. p. 9, edit. 1883).]-he has been described in terms of enthusiastic praise and exaggerated condemnation. it is ever thus with individuals who by talent or favourable circumstances are raised above their fellow-creatures. bonaparte himself laughed at all the stories which were got up for the purpose of embellishing or blackening his character in early life. an anonymous publication, entitled the 'history of napoleon bonaparte', from his birth to his last abdication, contains perhaps the greatest collection of false and ridiculous details about his boyhood. among other things, it is stated that he fortified a garden to protect himself from the attacks of his comrades, who, a few lines lower down, are described as treating him with esteem and respect. i remember the circumstances which, probably, gave rise to the fabrication inserted in the work just mentioned; they were as follows. during the winter of 1783-84, so memorable for heavy falls of snow, napoleon was greatly at a loss for those retired walks and outdoor recreations in which he used to take much delight. he had no alternative but to mingle with his comrades, and, for exercise, to walk with them up and down a spacious hall. napoleon, weary of this monotonous promenade, told his comrades that he thought they might amuse themselves much better with the snow, in the great courtyard, if they would get shovels and make hornworks, dig trenches, raise parapets, cavaliers, etc. "this being done," said he, "we may divide ourselves into sections, form a siege, and i will undertake to direct the attacks." the proposal, which was received with enthusiasm, was immediately put into execution. this little sham war was carried on for the space of a fortnight, and did not cease until a quantity of gravel and small stones having got mixed with the snow of which we made our bullets, many of the combatants, besiegers as well as besieged, were seriously wounded. i well remember that i was one of the worst sufferers from this sort of grapeshot fire. it is almost unnecessary to contradict the story about the ascent in the balloon. it is now very well known that the hero of that headlong adventure was not young bonaparte, as has been alleged, but one of his comrades, dudont de chambon, who was somewhat eccentric. of this his subsequent conduct afforded sufficient proofs. bonaparte's mind was directed to objects of a totally different kind. he turned his attention to political science. during some of his vacations he enjoyed the society of the abby raynal, who used to converse with him on government, legislation, commercial relations, etc. on festival days, when the inhabitants of brienne were admitted to our amusements, posts were established for the maintenance of order. nobody was permitted to enter the interior of the building without a card signed by the principal, or vice-principal. the rank of officers or subofficers was conferred according to merit; and bonaparte one day had the command of a post, when the following little adventure occurred, which affords an instance of his decision of character. the wife of the porter of the school, --[this woman, named haute, was afterwards placed at malmaison, with her husband. they both died as concierges of malmaison. this shows that napoleon had a memory.--bourrienne.]-who was very well known, because she used to sell milk, fruit, etc., to the pupils, presented herself one saint louis day for admittance to the representation of the 'death of caesar, corrected', in which i was to perform the part of brutus. as the woman had no ticket, and insisted on being admitted without one, some disturbance arose. the serjeant of the post reported the matter to the officer, napoleon bonaparte, who in an imperious tone of voice exclaimed: "send away that woman, who comes here with her camp impudence." this was in 1782. bonaparte and i were eight years of age when our friendship commenced. it speedily became very intimate, for there was a certain sympathy of heart between us. i enjoyed this friendship and intimacy until 1784, when he was transferred from the military college of brienne to that of paris. i was one among those of his youthful comrades who could best accommodate themselves to his stern character. his natural reserve, his disposition to meditate on the conquest of corsica, and the impressions he had received in childhood respecting the misfortunes of his country and his family, led him to seek retirement, and rendered his general demeanour, though in appearance only, somewhat unpleasing. our equality of age brought us together in the classes of the mathematics and 'belles lettres'. his ardent wish to acquire knowledge was remarkable from the very commencement of his studies. when he first came to the college he spoke only the corsican dialect, and the sieur dupuis, --[he afterwards filled the post of librarian to napoleon at malmaison.]-who was vice-principal before father berton, gave him instructions in the french language. in this he made such rapid progress that in a short time he commenced the first rudiments of latin. but to this study he evinced such a repugnance that at the age of fifteen he was not out of the fourth class. there i left him very speedily; but i could never get before him in the mathematical class, in which he was undoubtedly the cleverest lad at the college. i used sometimes to help him with his latin themes and versions in return for the aid he afforded me in the solution of problems, at which he evinced a degree of readiness and facility which perfectly astonished me. when at brienne, bonaparte was remarkable for the dark color of his complexion (which, subsequently, the climate of france somewhat changed), for his piercing and scrutinising glance, and for the style of his conversation both with his masters and comrades. his conversation almost always bore the appearance of ill-humour, and he was certainly not very amiable. this i attribute to the misfortunes his family had sustained and the impressions made on his mind by the conquest of his country. the pupils were invited by turns to dine with father berton, the head of the school. one day, it being bonaparte's turn to enjoy this indulgence, some of the professors who were at table designedly made some disrespectful remarks on paoli, of whom they knew the young corsican was an enthusiastic admirer. "paoli," observed bonaparte, "was a great man; he loved his country; and i will never forgive my father, who was his adjutant, for having concurred in the union of corsica with france. he ought to have followed paoli's fortune, and have fallen with him." --[the duchesse d'abrantes, speaking of the personal characteristics of bonaparte in youth and manhood, says, "saveria told me that napoleon was never a pretty boy, as joseph was, for example: his head always appeared too large for his body, a defect common to the bonaparte family. when napoleon grew up, the peculiar charm of his countenance lay in his eye, especially in the mild expression it assumed in his moments of kindness. his anger, to be sure, was frightful, and though i am no coward, i never could look at him in his fits of rage without shuddering. though his smile was captivating, yet the expression of his mouth when disdainful or angry could scarcely be seen without terror. but that forehead which seemed formed to bear the crowns of a whole world; those hands, of which the most coquettish women might have been vain, and whose white skin covered muscles of iron; in short, of all that personal beauty which distinguished napoleon as a young man, no traces were discernible in the boy. saveria spoke truly when she said, that of all the children of signora laetitia, the emperor was the one from whom future greatness was least to be prognosticated" (vol. i. p. 10, edit. 1883)]-generally speaking, bonaparte was not much liked by his comrades at brienne. he was not social with them, and rarely took part in their amusements. his country's recent submission to france always caused in his mind a painful feeling, which estranged him from his schoolfellows. i, however, was almost his constant companion. during play-hours he used to withdraw to the library, where he read with deep interest works of history, particularly polybius and plutarch. he was also fond of arrianus, but did not care much for quintus gurtius. i often went off to play with my comrades, and left him by himself in the library. the temper of the young corsican was not improved by the teasing he frequently experienced from his comrades, who were fond of ridiculing him about his christian name napoleon and his country. he often said to me, "i will do these french all the mischief i can;" and when i tried to pacify him he would say, "but you do not ridicule me; you like me." father patrauld, our mathematical professor, was much attached to bonaparte. he was justly proud of him as a pupil. the other professors, in whose classes he was not distinguished, took little notice of him. he had no taste for the study of languages, polite literature, or the arts. as there were no indications of his ever becoming a scholar, the pedants of the establishment were inclined to think him stupid. his superior intelligence was, however, sufficiently perceptible, even through the reserve under which it was veiled. if the monks to whom the superintendence of the establishment was confided had understood the organisation of his mind, if they had engaged more able mathematical professors, or if we had had any incitement to the study of chemistry, natural philosophy, astronomy, etc., i am convinced that bonaparte would have pursued these sciences with all the genius and spirit of investigation which he displayed in a career, more brilliant it is true, but less useful to mankind. unfortunately, the monks did not perceive this, and were too poor to pay for good masters. however, after bonaparte left the college they found it necessary to engage two professors from paris, otherwise the college would have fallen to nothing. these two new professors, mm. durfort and desponts, finished my education; and i regretted that they did not come sooner. the oftenrepeated assertion of bonaparte having received a careful education at brienne is therefore untrue. the monks were incapable of giving it him; and, for my own part, i must confess that the extended information of the present day is to me a painful contrast with the limited course of education i received at the military college. it is only surprising that the establishment should have produced a single able man. though bonaparte had no reason to be satisfied with the treatment he received from his comrades, yet he was above complaining of it; and when he had the supervision of any duty which they infringed, he would rather go to prison than denounce the criminals. i was one day his accomplice in omitting to enforce a duty which we were appointed to supervise. he prevailed on me to accompany him to prison, where we remained three days. we suffered this sort of punishment several times, but with less severity. in 1783 the duke of orleans and madame de montesson visited brienne; and, for upwards of a month, the magnificent chateau of the comte de brienne was a versailles in miniature. the series of brilliant entertainments which were given to the august travellers made them almost forget the royal magnificence they had left behind them. the prince and madame de montesson expressed a wish to preside at the distribution of the prizes of our college. bonaparte and i won the prizes in the class of mathematics, which, as i have already observed, was the branch of study to which he confined his attention, and in which he excelled. when i was called up for the seventh time madame de montesson said to my mother, who had come from sens to be present at the distribution, "pray, madame, crown your son this time; my hands are aweary." there was an inspector of the military schools, whose business it was to make an annual report on each pupil, whether educated at the public expense or paid for by his family. i copied from the report of 1784 a note which was probably obtained surreptitiously from the war office. i wanted to purchase the manuscript, but louis bonaparte bought it. i did not make a copy of the note which related to myself, because i should naturally have felt diffident in making any use of it. it would, however, have served to show how time and circumstances frequently reversed the distinctions which arise at school or college. judging from the reports of the inspector of military schools, young bonaparte was not, of all the pupils at brienne in 1784, the one most calculated to excite prognostics of future greatness and glory. the note to which i have just alluded, and which was written by m. de keralio, then inspector of the military schools, describes bonaparte in the following terms: inspection of military schools 1784. report made for his majesty by m. de keralio. m. de buonaparte (napoleon), born 15th august 1769, height 4 feet 10 inches 10 lines, is in the fourth class, has a good constitution, excellent health, character obedient, upright, grateful, conduct very regular; has been always distinguished by his application to mathematics. he knows history and geography very passably. he is not well up in ornamental studies or in latin in which he is only in the fourth class. he will be an excellent sailor. he deserves to be passed on to the military school of paris. father berton, however, opposed bonaparte's removal to paris, because he had not passed through the fourth latin class, and the regulations required that he should be in the third. i was informed by the viceprincipal that a report relative to napoleon was sent from the college of brienne to that of paris, in which he was described as being domineering, imperious, and obstinate. --[napoleon remained upwards of five years at brienne, from april 1779 till the latter end of 1784. in 1783 the chevalier keralio, sub-inspector of the military schools, selected him to pass the year following to the military school at paris, to which three of the best scholars were annually sent from each of the twelve provincial military schools of france. it is curious as well as satisfactory to know the opinion at this time entertained of him by those who were the best qualified to judge. his old master, le guille, professor of history at paris, boasted that, in a list of the different scholars, he had predicted his pupil's subsequent career. in fact, to the name of bonaparte the following note is added: "a corsican by birth and character--he will do something great, if circumstances favour him." menge was his instructor in geometry, who also entertained a high opinion of him. m. bauer, his german master, was the only one who saw nothing in him, and was surprised at being told he was undergoing his examination for the artillery.- hazlitt.]-i knew bonaparte well; and i think m. de keralio's report of him was exceedingly just, except, perhaps, that he might have said he was very well as to his progress in history and geography, and very backward in latin; but certainly nothing indicated the probability of his being an excellent seaman. he himself had no thought of the navy. --[bourrienne is certainly wrong as to bonaparte having no thought of the navy. in a letter of 1784 to the minister of war his father says of napoleon that, "following the advice of the comte de marbeuf, he has turned his studies towards the navy; and so well has he succeeded that he was intended by m. de keralio for the school of paris, and afterwards for the department of toulon. the retirement of the former professor (keralio) has changed the fate of my son." it was only on the failure of his intention to get into the navy that his father, on 15th july 1784 applied for permission for him to enter the artillery; napoleon having a horror of the infantry, where he said they did nothing. it was on the success of this application that he was allowed to enter the school of paris (jung, tome i. pp. 91-103). oddly enough, in later years, on 30th august 1792, having just succeeded in getting himself reinstated as captain after his absence, overstaying leave, he applied to pass into the artillerie de la marine. "the application was judged to be simply absurd, and was filed with this note, 's. r.' ('sans reponse')" (jung, tome ii. p. 201)]-in consequence of m. de keralio's report, bonaparte was transferred to the military college of paris, along with mm. montarby de dampierre, de castres, de comminges, and de laugier de bellecourt, who were all, like him, educated at the public expense, and all, at least, as favorably reported. what could have induced sir walter scott to say that bonaparte was the pride of the college, that our mathematical master was exceedingly fond of him, and that the other professors in the different sciences had equal reason to be satisfied with him? what i have above stated, together with the report of m. de keralio, bear evidence of his backwardness in almost every branch of education except mathematics. neither was it, as sir walter affirms, his precocious progress in mathematics that occasioned him to be removed to paris. he had attained the proper age, and the report of him was favourable, therefore he was very naturally included among the number of the five who were chosen in 1784. in a biographical account of bonaparte i have read the following anecdote:--when he was fourteen years of age he happened to be at a party where some one pronounced a high eulogium on turenne; and a lady in the company observed that he certainly was a great man, but that she should like him better if he had not burned the palatinate. "what signifies that," replied bonaparte, "if it was necessary to the object he had in view?" this is either an anachronism or a mere fabrication. bonaparte was fourteen in the year 1783. he was then at brienne, where certainly he did not go into company, and least of all the company of ladies. chapter ii. 1784-1794. bonaparte enters the military college of paris--he urges me to embrace the military profession--his report on the state of the military school of paris--he obtains a commission--i set off for vienna--return to paris, where i again meet bonaparte--his singular plans for raising money--louis xvi, with the red cap on his head- the 10th of august--my departure for stuttgart--bonaparte goes to corsica--my name inscribed on the list of emigrants--bonaparte at the siege of toulon--le souper de beaucaire--napoleon's mission to genoa--his arrest--his autographical justification --duroc's first connection with bonaparte. bonaparte was fifteen years and two months old when he went to the military college of paris. --[madame junot relates some interesting particulars connected with napoleon's first residence in paris: "my mother's first care," says she, "on arriving in paris was to inquire after napoleon bonaparte. he was at that time in the military school at paris, having quitted brienne in the september of the preceding year. "my uncle demetrius had met him just after he alighted from the coach which brought him to town; 'and truly.' said my uncle, 'he had the appearance of a fresh importation. i met him in the palais royal, where he was gaping and staring with wonder at everything he saw. he would have been an excellent subject for sharpers, if, indeed, he had had anything worth taking!' my uncle invited him to dine at his house; for though my uncle was a bachelor, he did not choose to dine at a 'traiteur' (the name 'restaurateur' was not then introduced). he told my mother that napoleon was very morose. 'i fear,' added he, 'that that young man has more self-conceit than is suitable to his condition. when he dined with me he began to declaim violently against the luxury of the young men of the military school. after a little he turned the conversation on mania, and the present education of the young maniotes, drawing a comparison between it and the ancient spartan system of education. his observations on this head he told me he intended to embody in a memorial to be presented to the minister of war. all this, depend upon it, will bring him under the displeasure of his comrades; and it will be lucky if he escape being run through.' a few days afterwards my mother saw napoleon, and then his irritability was at its height. he would scarcely bear any observations, even if made in his favour, and i am convinced that it is to this uncontrollable irritability that he owed the reputation of having been ill-tempered in his boyhood, and splenetic in his youth. my father, who was acquainted with almost all the heads of the military school, obtained leave for him sometimes to come out for recreation. on account of an accident (a sprain, if i recollect rightly) napoleon once spent a whole week at our house. to this day, whenever i pass the quai conti, i cannot help looking up at a 'mansarde' at the left angle of the house on the third floor. that was napoleon's chamber when he paid us a visit, and a neat little room it was. my brother used to occupy the one next to it. the two young men were nearly of the same age: my brother perhaps had the advantage of a year or fifteen months. my mother had recommended him to cultivate the friendship of young bonaparte; but my brother complained how unpleasant it was to find only cold politeness where he expected affection. this repulsiveness on the part of napoleon was almost offensive, and must have been sensibly felt by my brother, who was not only remarkable for the mildness of his temper and the amenity and grace of his manner, but whose society was courted in the most distinguished circles of paris on account of his accomplishments. he perceived in bonaparte a kind of acerbity and bitter irony, of which he long endeavoured to discover the cause. 'i believe,' said albert one day to my mother, 'that the poor young man feels keenly his dependent situation.'" ('memoirs of the duchesse d'abrantes, vol. i. p. 18, edit. 1883).]-i accompanied him in a carriole as far as nogent sur seine, whence the coach was to start. we parted with regret, and we did not meet again till the year 1792. during these eight years we maintained an active correspondence; but so little did i anticipate the high destiny which, after his elevation, it was affirmed the wonderful qualities of his boyhood plainly denoted, that i did not preserve one of the letters he wrote to me at that period, but tore them up as soon as they were answered. --[i remember, however, that in a letter which i received from him about a year after his arrival in paris he urged me to keep my promise of entering the army with him. like him, i had passed through the studies necessary for the artillery service; and in 1787 i went for three months to metz, in order to unite practice with theory. a strange ordinance, which i believe was issued in 1778 by m. de segur, required that a man should possess four quarterings of nobility before he could be qualified to serve his king and country as a military officer. my mother went to paris, taking with her the letters patent of her husband, who died six weeks after my birth. she proved that in the year 1640 louis xiii. had, by letters patent, restored the titles of one fauvelet de villemont, who in 1586 had kept several provinces of burgundy subject to the king's authority at the peril of his life and the loss of his property; and that his family had occupied the first places in the magistracy since the fourteenth century. all was correct, but it was observed that the letters of nobility had not been registered by the parliament, and to repair this little omission, the sum of twelve thousand francs was demanded. this my mother refused to pay, and there the matter rested.]-on his arrival at the military school of paris, bonaparte found the establishment on so brilliant and expensive a footing that he immediately addressed a memorial on the subject to the vice-principal berton of brienne. --[a second memoir prepared by him to the same effect was intended for the minister of war, but father berton wisely advised silence to the young cadet (jung, tome i. p. 122). although believing in the necessity of show and of magnificence in public life, napoleon remained true to these principles. while lavishing wealth on his ministers and marshals, "in your private life," said be, "be economical and even parsimonious; in public be magnificent" (meneval, tome i. p. 146).]-he showed that the plan of education was really pernicious, and far from being calculated to fulfil the object which every wise government must have in view. the result of the system, he said, was to inspire the pupils, who were all the sons of poor gentlemen, with a love of ostentation, or rather, with sentiments of vanity and self-sufficiency; so that, instead of returning happy to the bosom of their families, they were likely to be ashamed of their parents, and to despise their humble homes. instead of the numerous attendants by whom they were surrounded, their dinners of two courses, and their horses and grooms, he suggested that they should perform little necessary services for themselves, such as brushing their clothes, and cleaning their boots and shoes; that they should eat the coarse bread made for soldiers, etc. temperance and activity, he added, would render them robust, enable them to bear the severity of different seasons and climates, to brave the fatigues of war, and to inspire the respect and obedience of the soldiers under their command. thus reasoned napoleon at the age of sixteen, and time showed that he never deviated from these principles. the establishment of the military school at fontainebleau is a decided proof of this. as napoleon was an active observer of everything passing around him, and pronounced his opinion openly and decidedly, he did not remain long at the military school of paris. his superiors, who were anxious to get rid of him, accelerated the period of his examination, and he obtained the first vacant sub-lieutenancy in a regiment of artillery. i left brienne in 1787; and as i could not enter the artillery, i proceeded in the following year to vienna, with a letter of recommendation to m. de montmorin, soliciting employment in the french embassy at the court of austria. i remained two months at vienna, where i had the honour of twice seeing the emperor joseph. the impression made upon me by his kind reception, his dignified and elegant manners, and graceful conversation, will never be obliterated from my recollection. after m. de noailles had initiated me in the first steps of diplomacy, he advised me to go to one of the german universities to study the law of nations and foreign languages. i accordingly repaired to leipsic, about the time when the french revolution broke out. i spent some time at leipsic, where i applied myself to the study of the law of nations, and the german and english languages. i afterwards travelled through prussia and poland, and passed a part of the winter of 1791 and 1792 at warsaw, where i was most graciously received by princess tyszicwiez, niece of stanislaus augustus, the last king of poland, and the sister of prince poniatowski. the princess was very well informed, and was a great admirer of french literature. at her invitation i passed several evenings in company with the king in a circle small enough to approach to something like intimacy. i remember that his majesty frequently asked me to read the moniteur; the speeches to which he listened with the greatest pleasure were those of the girondists. the princess tyszicwiez wished to print at warsaw, at her own expense, a translation i had executed of kotzebue's 'menschenhass und reue, to which i gave the title of 'l'inconnu'. --[a play known on the english stage as the stranger.]-i arrived at vienna on the 26th of march 1792, when i was informed of the serious illness of the emperor, leopold ii, who died on the following day. in private companies, and at public places, i heard vague suspicions expressed of his having been poisoned; but the public, who were admitted to the palace to see the body lie in state, were soon convinced of the falsehood of these reports. i went twice to see the mournful spectacle, and i never heard a word which was calculated to confirm the odious suspicion, though the spacious hall in which the remains of the emperor were exposed was constantly thronged with people. in the month of april 1792 i returned to paris, where i again met bonaparte, --[bonaparte is said, on very doubtful authority, to have spent five or six weeks in london in 1791 or 1792, and to have "lodged in a house in george street, strand. his chief occupation appeared to be taking pedestrian exercise in the streets of london--hence his marvellous knowledge of the great metropolis which used to astonish any englishmen of distinction who were not aware of this visit. he occasionally took his cup of chocolate at the 'northumberland,' occupying himself in reading, and preserving a provoking taciturnity to the gentlemen in the room; though his manner was stern, his deportment was that of a gentleman." the story of his visit is probably as apocryphal as that of his offering his services to the english government when the english forces were blockading the coast of corsica,]-and our college intimacy was fully renewed. i was not very well off, and adversity was hanging heavily on him; his resources frequently failed him. we passed our time like two young fellows of twenty-three who have little money and less occupation. bonaparte was always poorer than i. every day we conceived some new project or other. we were on the lookout for some profitable speculation. at one time he wanted me to join him in renting several houses, then building in the rue montholon, to underlet them afterwards. we found the demands of the landlords extravagant--everything failed. at the same time he was soliciting employment at the war office, and i at the office of foreign affairs. i was for the moment the luckier of the two. while we were spending our time in a somewhat vagabond way, --[it was before the 20th of june that in our frequent excursions around paris we went to st. cyr to see his sister marianne (elisa). we returned to dine alone at trianon.--bourrienne.]-the 20th of june arrived. we met by appointment at a restaurateur's in the rue st. honore, near the palais royal, to take one of our daily rambles. on going out we saw approaching, in the direction of the market, a mob, which bonaparte calculated at five or six thousand men. they were all in rags, ludicrously armed with weapons of every description, and were proceeding hastily towards the tuilleries, vociferating all kinds of gross abuse. it was a collection of all that was most vile and abject in the purlieus of paris. "let us follow the mob," said bonaparte. we got the start of them, and took up our station on the terrace of the banks of the river. it was there that he witnessed the scandalous scenes which took place; and it would be difficult to describe the surprise and indignation which they excited in him. when the king showed himself at the windows overlooking the garden, with the red cap, which one of the mob had put on his head, he could no longer repress his indignation. "che coglione!" he loudly exclaimed. "why have they let in all that rabble! they should sweep off four or five hundred of them with the cannon; the rest would then set off fast enough." when we sat down to dinner, which i paid for, as i generally did, for i was the richer of the two, he spoke of nothing but the scene we had witnessed. he discussed with great good sense the causes and consequences of this unrepressed insurrection. he foresaw and developed with sagacity all that would ensue. he was not mistaken. the 10th of august soon arrived. i was then at stuttgart, where i was appointed secretary of legation. at st. helena bonaparte said, "on the news of the attack of the tuilleries, on the 10th of august, i hurried to fauvelet, bourrienne's brother, who then kept a furniture warehouse at the carrousel." this is partly correct. my brother was connected with what was termed an 'enterprise d'encan national', where persons intending to quit france received an advance of money, on depositing any effects which they wished to dispose of, and which were sold for them immediately. bonaparte had some time previously pledged his watch in this way. after the fatal 10th of august bonaparte went to corsica, and did not return till 1793. sir walter scott says that after that time he never saw corsica again. this is a mistake, as will be shown when i speak of his return from egypt. --[sir walter appears to have collected his information for the life of napoleon only from those libels and vulgar stories which gratified the calumnious spirit and national hatred. his work is written with excessive negligence, which, added to its numerous errors, shows how much respect he must have entertained for his readers. it would appear that his object was to make it the inverse of his novels, where everything is borrowed from history. i have been assured that marshal macdonald having offered to introduce scott to some generals who could have furnished him with the most accurate information respecting military events, the glory of which they had shared, sir walter replied, "i thank you, but i shall collect my information from unprofessional reports."--bourrienne.]-having been appointed secretary of legation to stuttgart, i set off for that place on the 2d of august, and i did not again see my ardent young friend until 1795. he told me that my departure accelerated his for corsica. we separated, as may be supposed, with but faint hopes of ever meeting again. by a decree of the 28th of march of 1793, all french agents abroad were ordered to return to france, within three months, under pain of being regarded as emigrants. what i had witnessed before my departure for stuttgart, the excitement in which i had left the public mind, and the well-known consequences of events of this kind, made me fear that i should be compelled to be either an accomplice or a victim in the disastrous scenes which were passing at home. my disobedience of the law placed my name on the list of emigrants. it has been said of me, in a biographical publication, that "it was as remarkable as it was fortunate for bourrienne that, on his return, he got his name erased from the list of emigrants of the department of the yonne, on which it had been inscribed during his first journey to germany. this circumstance has been interpreted in several different ways, which are not all equally favourable to m. de bourrienne." i do not understand what favourable interpretations can be put upon a statement entirely false. general bonaparte repeatedly applied for the erasure of my name, from the month of april 1797, when i rejoined him at leoben, to the period of the signature of the treaty of campo-formio; but without success. he desired his brother louis, berthier, bernadotte, and others, when he sent them to the directory, to urge my erasure; but in vain. he complained of this inattention to his wishes to bottot, when he came to passeriano, after the 18th fructidor. bottot, who was secretary to barras, was astonished that i was not erased, and he made fine promises of what he would do. on his return to france he wrote to bonaparte: "bourrienne is erased." but this was untrue. i was not erased until november 1797, upon the reiterated solicitations of general bonaparte. it was during my absence from france that bonaparte, in the rank of 'chef de bataillon', performed his first campaign, and contributed so materially to the recapture of toulon. of this period of his life i have no personal knowledge, and therefore i shall not speak of it as an eyewitness. i shall merely relate some facts which fill up the interval between 1793 and 1795, and which i have collected from papers which he himself delivered to me. among these papers is a little production, entitled 'le souper de beaucaire', the copies of which he bought up at considerable expense, and destroyed upon his attaining the consulate. this little pamphlet contains principles very opposite to those he wished to see established in 1800, a period when extravagant ideas of liberty were no longer the fashion, and when bonaparte entered upon a system totally the reverse of those republican principles professed in 'le souper de beaucaire. --[this is not, as sir walter says, a dialogue between marat and a federalist, but a conversation between a military officer, a native of nismes, a native of marseilles, and a manufacturer from montpellier. the latter, though he takes a share in the conversation, does not say much. 'le souper de beaucaire' is given at full length in the french edition of these memoirs, tome i. pp. 319-347; and by jung, tome ii. p. 354, with the following remarks: "the first edition of 'le souper de beaucaire' was issued at the cost of the public treasury, in august 1793. sabin tournal, its editor, also then edited the 'courrier d'avignon'. the second edition only appeared twenty-eight years afterwards, in 1821, preceded by an introduction by frederick royou (paris: brasseur aine, printer, terrey, publisher, in octavo). this pamphlet did not make any sensation at the time it appeared. it was only when napoleon became commandant of the army of italy that m. loubet, secretary and corrector of the press for m. tournal, attached some value to the manuscript, and showed it to several persons. louis bonaparte, later, ordered several copies from m. aurel. the pamphlet, dated 29th july 1793, is in the form of a dialogue between an officer of the army, a citizen of nismes, a manufacturer of montpellier, and a citizen of marseilles. marseilles was then in a state of insurrection against the convention. its forces had seized avignon, but had been driven out by the army of carteaux, which was about to attack marseilles itself." in the dialogue the officer gives most excellent military advice to the representative of marseilles on the impossibility of their resisting the old soldiers of carteaux. the marseilles citizen argues but feebly, and is alarmed at the officer's representations; while his threat to call in the spaniards turns the other speakers against him. even colonel jung says, tome ii. p. 372, "in these concise judgments is felt the decision of the master and of the man of war..... these marvellous qualities consequently struck the members of the convention, who made much of bonaparte, authorised him to have it published at the public expense, and made him many promises." lanfrey, vol. i. pp. 201, says of this pamphlets "common enough ideas, expressed in a style only remarkable for its 'italianisms,' but becoming singularly firm and precise every time the author expresses his military views. under an apparent roughness, we find in it a rare circumspection, leaving no hold on the writer, even if events change."]-it may be remarked, that in all that has come to us from st. helena, not a word is said of this youthful production. its character sufficiently explains this silence. in all bonaparte's writings posterity will probably trace the profound politician rather than the enthusiastic revolutionist. some documents relative to bonaparte's suspension and arrest, by order of the representatives albitte and salicetti, serve to place in their true light circumstances which have hitherto been misrepresented. i shall enter into some details of this event, because i have seen it stated that this circumstance of bonaparte's life has been perverted and misrepresented by every person who has hitherto written about him; and the writer who makes this remark, himself describes the affair incorrectly and vaguely. others have attributed bonaparte's misfortune to a military discussion on war, and his connection with robespierre the younger. --[it will presently be seen that all this is erroneous, and that sir walter commits another mistake when he says that bonaparte's connection with robespierre was attended with fatal consequences to him, and that his justification consisted in acknowledging that his friends were very different from what he had supposed them to be.- bourrienne.]-it has, moreover, been said that albitte and salicetti explained to the committee of public safety the impossibility of their resuming the military operations unaided by the talents of general bonaparte. this is mere flattery. the facts are these: on the 13th of july 1794 (25th messidor, year ii), the representatives of the people with the army of italy ordered that general bonaparte should proceed to genoa, there, conjointly with the french 'chargé d'affaires', to confer on certain subjects with the genoese government. this mission, together with a list of secret instructions, directing him to examine the fortresses of genoa and the neighbouring country, show the confidence which bonaparte, who was then only twenty-five, inspired in men who were deeply interested in making a prudent choice of their agents. bonaparte set off for genoa, and fulfilled his mission. the 9th thermidor arrived, and the deputies, called terrorists, were superseded by albitte and salicetti. in the disorder which then prevailed they were either ignorant of the orders given to general bonaparte, or persons envious of the rising glory of the young general of artillery inspired albitte and salicetti with suspicions prejudicial to him. be this as it may, the two representatives drew up a resolution, ordering that general bonaparte should be arrested, suspended from his rank, and arraigned before the committee of public safety; and, extraordinary as it may appear, this resolution was founded in that very journey to genoa which bonaparte executed by the direction of the representatives of the people. --[madame junot throws some light on this persecution of bonaparte by salicetti. "one motive (i do not mean to say the only one)," remarks this lady, "of the animosity shown by salicetti to bonaparte, in the affair of loano, was that they were at one time suitors to the same lady. i am not sure whether it was in corsica or in paris, but i know for a fact that bonaparte, in spite of his youth, or perhaps i should rather say on account of his youth, was the favoured lover. it was the opinion of my brother, who was secretary to salicetti, that bonaparte owed his life to a circumstance which is not very well known. the fact is, that salicetti received a letter from bonaparte, the contents of which appeared to make a deep impression on him. bonaparte's papers had been delivered into salicetti's hands, who, after an attentive perusal of them, laid them aside with evident dissatisfaction. he then took them up again, and read them a second time. salicetti declined my brother's assistance in the examination of the papers, and after a second examination, which was probably as unsatisfactory as the first, he seated himself with a very abstracted air. it would appear that he had seen among the papers some document which concerned himself. another curious fact is, that the man who had the care of the papers after they were sealed up was an inferior clerk entirely under the control of salicetti; and my brother, whose business it was to have charge of the papers, was directed not to touch them. he has often spoken to me of this circumstance, and i mention it here as one of importance to the history of the time. nothing that relates to a man like napoleon can be considered useless or trivial. "what, after all, was the result of this strange business which might have cost bonaparte his head?--for, had he been taken to paris and tried by the committee of public safety, there is little doubt that the friend of robespierre the younger would have been condemned by billaud-varennes and collot d'herbois. the result was the acquittal of the accused. this result is the more extraordinary, since it would appear that at that time salicetti stood in fear of the young general. a compliment is even paid to bonaparte in the decree, by which he was provisionally restored to liberty. that liberation was said to be granted on the consideration that general bonaparte might he useful to the republic. this was foresight; but subsequently when measures were taken which rendered bonaparte no longer an object of fear, his name was erased from the list of general officers, and it is a curious fact that cambaceres, who was destined to be his colleague in the consulate, was one of the persons who signed the act of erasure" (memoirs of the duchesse d'abrantes, vol. i, p. 69, edit. 1843).]-bonaparte said at st. helena that he was a short time imprisoned by order of the representative laporte; but the order for his arrest was signed by albitte, salicetti, and laporte. --[albitte and laporte were the representatives sent from the convention to the army of the alps, and salicetti to the army of italy.]-laporte was not probably the most influential of the three, for bonaparte did not address his remonstrance to him. he was a fortnight under arrest. had the circumstance occurred three weeks earlier, and had bonaparte been arraigned before the committee of public safety previous to the 9th thermidor, there is every probability that his career would have been at an end; and we should have seen perish on the scaffold, at the age of twenty-five, the man who, during the twenty-five succeeding years, was destined to astonish the world by his vast conceptions, his gigantic projects, his great military genius, his extraordinary good fortune, his faults, reverses, and final misfortunes. it is worth while to remark that in the post-thermidorian resolution just alluded to no mention is made of bonaparte's association with robespierre the younger. the severity with which he was treated is the more astonishing, since his mission to genoa was the alleged cause of it. was there any other charge against him, or had calumny triumphed over the services he had rendered to his country? i have frequently conversed with him on the subject of this adventure, and he invariably assured me that he had nothing to reproach himself with, and that his defence, which i shall subjoin, contained the pure expression of his sentiments, and the exact truth. in the following note, which he addressed to albitte and salicetti, he makes no mention of laporte. the copy which i possess is in the handwriting of junot, with corrections in the general's hand. it exhibits all the characteristics of napoleon's writing: his short sentences, his abrupt rather than concise style, sometimes his elevated ideas, and always his plain good sense. to the representatives albitte and salicetti. you have suspended me from my duties, put me under arrest, and declared me to be suspected. thus i am disgraced before being judged, or indeed judged before being heard. in a revolutionary state there are two classes, the suspected and the patriots. when the first are aroused, general measures are adopted towards them for the sake of security. the oppression of the second class is a blow to public liberty. the magistrate cannot condemn until after the fullest evidence and a succession of facts. this leaves nothing to arbitrary decision. to declare a patriot suspected is to deprive him of all that he most highly values--confidence and esteem. in what class am i placed? since the commencement of the revolution, have i not always been attached to its principles? have i not always been contending either with domestic enemies or foreign foes? i sacrificed my home, abandoned my property, and lost everything for the republic? i have since served with some distinction at toulon, and earned a part of the laurels of the army of italy at the taking of saorgio, oneille, and tanaro. on the discovery of robespierre's conspiracy, my conduct was that of a man accustomed to look only to principles. my claim to the title of patriot, therefore cannot be disputed. why, then, am i declared suspected without being heard, and arrested eight days after i heard the news of the tyrant's death? i am declared suspected, and my papers are placed under seal. the reverse of this course ought to have been adopted. my papers should first have been sealed; then i should have been called on for my explanation; and, lastly, declared suspected, if there was reason for coming to such a decision. it is wished that i should go to paris with an order which declares me suspected. it will naturally be presumed that the representatives did not draw up this decree without accurate information, and i shall be judged with the bias which a man of that class merits. though a patriot and an innocent and calumniated man, yet whatever measures may be adopted by the committee i cannot complain. if three men declare that i have committed a crime, i cannot complain of the jury who condemns me. salicetti, you know me; and i ask whether you have observed anything in my conduct for the last five years which can afford ground of suspicion? albitte, you do not know me; but you have received proof of no fact against me; you have not heard me, and you know how artfully the tongue of calumny sometimes works. must i then be confounded with the enemies of my country and ought the patriots inconsiderately to sacrifice a general who has not been useless to the republic? ought the representatives to reduce the government to the necessity of being unjust and impolitic? hear me; destroy the oppression that overwhelms me, and restore me to the esteem of the patriots. an hour after, if my enemies wish for my life, let them take it. i have often given proofs how little i value it. nothing but the thought that i may yet be useful to my country makes me bear the burden of existence with courage. it appears that this defence, which is remarkable for its energetic simplicity, produced an effect on albitte and salicetti. inquiries more accurate, and probably more favourable to the general, were instituted; and on the 3d fructidor (20th august 1794) the representatives of the people drew up a decree stating that, after a careful examination of general bonaparte's papers, and of the orders he had received relative to his mission to genoa, they saw nothing to justify any suspicion of his conduct; and that, moreover, taking into consideration the advantage that might accrue to the republic from the military talents of the said general bonaparte, it was resolved that he should be provisionally set at liberty. --[with reference to the arrest of bonaparte (which lasted thirteen days) see 'bourrienne et ses erreurs', tome i. pp. 16-28, and jung, tome ii. pp. 443-457. both, in opposition to bourrienne, attribute the arrest to his connection with the younger robespierre. apparently albitte and salicetti were not acquainted with the secret plan of campaign prepared by the younger robespierre and by bonaparte, or with the real instructions given for the mission to genoa. jealousy between the representatives in the staff of the army of the alps and those with the army of italy, with which napoleon was, also played a part in the affair. jung looks on salicetti as acting as the protector of the bonapartes; but napoleon does not seem to have regarded him in that light; see the letter given in junot, vol. i. p. l06, where in 1795 he takes credit for not returning the ill done to him; see also the same volume, p. 89. salicetti eventually became minister of police to joseph, when king of naples, in 1806; but when he applied to return to france, napoleon said to mathieu dumas, "let him know that i am not powerful enough to protect the wretches who voted for the death of louis xvi. from the contempt and indignation of the public" (dumas, tome iii. p. 318). at the same time napoleon described salicetti as worse than the lazzaroni.]-salicetti afterwards became the friend and confidant of young bonaparte; but their intimacy did not continue after his elevation. what is to be thought of the motives for bonaparte's arrest and provisional liberation, when his innocence and the error that had been committed were acknowledged? the importance of the general's military talents, though no mention is made about the impossibility of dispensing with them, is a pretence for restoring him to that liberty of which he had been unjustly deprived. it was not at toulon, as has been stated, that bonaparte took duroc into the artillery, and made him his 'aide de camp'. --[michel duroc (1773-1813) at first only aide de camp to napoleon, was several times entrusted with special diplomatic missions (for example, to berlin, etc.) on the formation of the empire he became grand marechal du palais, and duc de frioul. he always remained in close connection with napoleon until he was killed in 1813. as he is often mentioned in contemporary memoirs under his abbreviated title of 'marshal', he has sometimes been erroneously included in the number of the marshals of the empire--a military rank he never attained to.]-the acquaintance was formed at a subsequent period, in italy. duroc's cold character and unexcursive mind suited napoleon, whose confidence he enjoyed until his death, and who entrusted him with missions perhaps above his abilities. at st. helena bonaparte often declared that he was much attached to duroc. i believe this to be true; but i know that the attachment was not returned. the ingratitude of princes is proverbial. may it not happen that courtiers are also sometimes ungrateful?--[it is only just to duroc to add that this charge does not seem borne out by the impressions of those more capable than bourrienne of judging in the matter.] chapter iii. 1794-1795. proposal to send bonaparte to la vendee--he is struck off the list of general officers--salicetti--joseph's marriage with mademoiselle clary--bonaparte's wish to go to turkey--note explaining the plan of his proposed expedition--madame bourrienne's character of bonaparte, and account of her husband's arrest--constitution of the year iii- the 13th vendemiaire--bonaparte appointed second in command of the army of the interior--eulogium of bonaparte by barras, and its consequences--st. helena manuscript. general bonaparte returned to paris, where i also arrived from germany shortly after him. our intimacy was resumed, and he gave me an account of all that had passed in the campaign of the south. he frequently alluded to the persecutions he had suffered, and he delivered to me the packet of papers noticed in the last chapter, desiring me to communicate their contents to my friends. he was very anxious, he said, to do away with the supposition that he was capable of betraying his country, and, under the pretence of a mission to genoa, becoming a spy on the interests of france. he loved to talk over his military achievements at toulon and in italy. he spoke of his first successes with that feeling of pleasure and gratification which they were naturally calculated to excite in him. the government wished to send him to la vendee, with the rank of brigadier-general of infantry. bonaparte rejected this proposition on two grounds. he thought the scene of action unworthy of his talents, and he regarded his projected removal from the artillery to the infantry as a sort of insult. this last was his most powerful objection, and was the only one he urged officially. in consequence of his refusal to accept the appointment offered him, the committee of public safety decreed that he should be struck off the list of general officers. --[this statement as to the proposed transfer of bonaparte to the infantry, his disobedience to the order, and his consequent dismissal, is fiercely attacked in the 'erreurs', tome i. chap. iv. it is, however, correct in some points; but the real truths about bonaparte's life at this time seem so little known that it may be well to explain the whole matter. on the 27th of march 1795 bonaparte, already removed from his employment in the south, was ordered to proceed to the army of the west to command its artillery as brigadier-general. he went as far as paris, and then lingered there, partly on medical certificate. while in paris he applied, as bourrienne says, to go to turkey to organise its artillery. his application, instead of being neglected, as bourrienne says, was favourably received, two members of the 'comité de saint public' putting on its margin most favorable reports of him; one, jean debry, even saying that he was too distinguished an officer to be sent to a distance at such a time. far from being looked on as the half-crazy fellow bourrienne considered him at that time, bonaparte was appointed, on the 21st of august 1795, one of four generals attached as military advisers to the committee for the preparation of warlike operations, his own department being a most important one. he himself at the time tells joseph that he is attached to the topographical bureau of the comité de saint public, for the direction of the armies in the place of carnot. it is apparently this significant appointment to which madame junot, wrongly dating it, alludes as "no great thing" (junot, vol. i, p. 143). another officer was therefore substituted for him as commander of hoches artillery, a fact made use of in the erreurs (p. 31) to deny his having been dismissed--but a general re-classification of the generals was being made. the artillery generals were in excess of their establishment, and bonaparte, as junior in age, was ordered on 13th june to join hoche's army at brest to command a brigade of infantry. all his efforts to get the order cancelled failed, and as he did not obey it he was struck off the list of employed general officers on the 15th of september 1795, the order of the 'comité de salut public' being signed by cambaceres, berber, merlin, and boissy. his application to go to turkey still, however, remained; and it is a curious thing that, on the very day he was struck off the list, the commission which had replaced the minister of war recommended to the 'comité de saint public' that he and his two aides de camp, junot and livrat, with other officers, under him, should be sent to constantinople. so late as the 29th of september, twelve days later, this matter was being considered, the only question being as to any departmental objections to the other officers selected by him, a point which was just being settled. but on the 13th vendemiaire (5th october 1795), or rather on the night before, only nineteen days after his removal, he was appointed second in command to barras, a career in france was opened to him, and turkey was no longer thought of. thiers (vol. iv, p. 326) and most writers, contemporary and otherwise, say that aubry gave the order for his removal from the list. aubry, himself a brigadier-general of artillery, did not belong to the 'comité de salut public' at the time bonaparte was removed from the south; and he had left the comité early is august, that is, before the order striking bonaparte off was given. aubry was, however, on the comité in june 1795, and signed the order, which probably may have originated from him, for the transfer of bonaparte to the infantry. it will be seen that, in the ordinary military sense of the term, napoleon was only in paris without employment from the 15th of september to the 4th or 6th of october 1795; all the rest of the time in paris he had a command which he did not choose to take up. the distress under which napoleon is said to have laboured in pecuniary matters was probably shared by most officers at that time; see 'erreurs', tome i. p. 32. this period is fully described in jung, tome ii. p. 476, and tome iii. pp. 1-93.]-deeply mortified at this unexpected stroke, bonaparte retired into private life, and found himself doomed to an inactivity very uncongenial with his ardent character. he lodged in the rue du mail, in an hotel near the place des victoires, and we recommenced the sort of life we had led in 1792, before his departure for corsica. it was not without a struggle that he determined to await patiently the removal of the prejudices which were cherished against him by men in power; and he hoped that, in the perpetual changes which were taking place, those men might be superseded by others more favourable to him. he frequently dined and spent the evening with me and my elder brother; and his pleasant conversation and manners made the hours pass away very agreeably. i called on him almost every morning, and i met at his lodgings several persons who were distinguished at the time; among others salicetti, with whom he used to maintain very animated conversations, and who would often solicit a private interview with him. on one occasion salicetti paid him three thousand francs, in assignats, as the price of his carriage, which his straitened circumstances obliged him to dispose of. --[of napoleon's poverty at this time madame junot says, "on bonaparte's return to paris, after the misfortunes of which he accused salicetti of being the cause, he was in very destitute circumstances. his family, who were banished from corsica, found an asylum at marseilles; and they could not now do for him what they would have done had they been in the country whence they derived their pecuniary resources. from time to time he received remittances of money, and i suspect they came from his excellent brother joseph, who had then recently married mademoiselle clary; but with all his economy these supplies were insufficient. bonaparte was therefore in absolute distress. junot often used to speak of the six months they passed together in paris at this time. when they took an evening stroll on the boulevard, which used to be the resort of young men, mounted on fine horses, and displaying all the luxury which they were permitted to show at that time, bonaparte would declaim against fate, and express his contempt for the dandies with their whiskers and their 'orielles de chiene', who, as they rode past, were eulogising in ecstasy the manner in which madame scio sang. and it is on such beings as these,' he would say, 'that fortune confers her favours. grand dieu! how contemptible is human nature!'" (memoirs of the duchesse d'abrantes, vol. i. p. 80, edit. 1883.)]-i could easily perceive that our young friend either was or wished to be initiated in some political intrigue; and i moreover suspected that salicetti had bound him by an oath not to disclose the plans that were hatching. he became pensive, melancholy, and anxious; and he always looked with impatience for salicetti's daily visit. --[salicetti was implicated in the insurrection of the 20th may 1795, 1st prairial, year iii., and was obliged to fly to venice.]-sometimes, withdrawing his mind from political affairs, he would envy the happiness of his brother joseph, who had just then married mademoiselle clary, the daughter of a rich and respectable merchant of marseilles. he would often say, "that joseph is a lucky rogue." meanwhile time passed away, and none of his projects succeeded--none of his applications were listened to. he was vexed by the injustice with which he was treated, and tormented by the desire of entering upon some active pursuit. he could not endure the thought of remaining buried in the crowd. he determined to quit france; and the favourite idea, which he never afterwards relinquished, that the east is a fine field for glory, inspired him with the wish to proceed to constantinople, and to enter the service of the grand seignior. what romantic plans, what stupendous projects he conceived! he asked me whether i would go with him? i replied in the negative. i looked upon him as a half-crazy young fellow, who was driven to extravagant enterprises and desperate resolutions by his restless activity of mind, joined to the irritating treatment he had experienced, and, perhaps, it may be added, his want of money. he did not blame me for my refusal to accompany him; and he told me that junot, marmont, and some other young officers whom he had known at toulon, would be willing to follow his fortunes. he drew up a note which commenced with the words 'note for . . .' it was addressed to no one, and was merely a plan. some days after he wrote out another, which, however, did not differ very materially from the first, and which he addressed to aubert and coni. i made him a fair copy of it, and it was regularly forwarded. it was as follows:- note. at a moment when the empress of russia has strengthened her union with the emperor of germany (austria), it is the interest of france to do everything in her power to increase the military power of turkey. that power possesses a numerous and brave militia but is very backward in the scientific part of the art of war. the organization and the service of the artillery, which, in our modern tactics, so powerfully facilitate the gaining of battles, and on which, almost exclusively, depend the attack and defence of fortresses, are especially the points in which france excels, and in which the turks are most deficient. they have several times applied to us for artillery officers, and we have sent them some; but the officers thus sent have not been sufficiently powerful, either in numbers or talent, to produce any important result. general bonaparte, who, from his youth, has served in the artillery, of which he was entrusted with the command at the siege of toulon, and in the two campaigns of italy, offers his services to proceed to turkey, with a mission from the (french) government. he proposes to take along with him six or seven officers, of different kinds, and who may be, altogether, perfect masters of the military art. he will have the satisfaction of being useful to his country in this new career, if he succeed in rendering the turkish power more formidable, by completing the defence of their principal fortresses, and constructing new ones. this note shows the error of the often-repeated assertion, that he proposed entering the service of the turks against austria. he makes no mention of such a thing; and the two countries were not at war. --[the scottish biographer makes bonaparte say that it would be strange if a little corsican should become king of jerusalem. i never heard anything drop from him which supports the probability of such a remark, and certainly there is nothing in his note to warrant the inference of his having made it.--bourrienne.]-no answer was returned to this note. turkey remained unaided, and bonaparte unoccupied. i must confess that for the failure of this project, at least i was not sorry. i should have regretted to see a young man of great promise, and one for whom i cherished a sincere friendship, devote himself to so uncertain a fate. napoleon has less than any man provoked the events which have favoured him; no one has more yielded to circumstances from which he was so skilful to derive advantages. if, however, a clerk of the war office had but written on the note, "granted," that little word would probably have changed the fate of europe. bonaparte remained in paris, forming schemes for the gratification of his ambition, and his desire of making a figure in the world; but obstacles opposed all he attempted. women are better judges of character than men. madame de bourrienne, knowing the intimacy which subsisted between us, preserved some notes which she made upon bonaparte, and the circumstances which struck her as most remarkable, during her early connection with him. my wife did not entertain so favourable an opinion of him as i did; the warm friendship i cherished for him probably blinded me to his faults. i subjoin madame de bourrienne's notes, word for word: on the day after our second return from germany, which was in may 1795, we met bonaparte in the palais royal, near a shop kept by a man named girardin. bonaparte embraced bourrienne as a friend whom he loved and was glad to see. we went that evening to the theatre francais. the performance consisted of a tragedy; and 'le sourd, ou l'auberge pleine'. during the latter piece the audience was convulsed with laughter. the part of dasnieres was represented by batiste the younger, and it was never played better. the bursts of laughter were so loud and frequent that the actor was several times obliged to stop in the midst of his part. bonaparte alone (and it struck me as being very extraordinary) was silent, and coldly insensible to the humour which was so irresistibly diverting to everyone else. i remarked at this period that his character was reserved, and frequently gloomy. his smile was hypocritical, and often misplaced; and i recollect that a few days after our return he gave us one of these specimens of savage hilarity which i greatly disliked, and which prepossessed me against him. he was telling us that, being before toulon, where he commanded the artillery, one of his officers was visited by his wife, to whom he had been but a short time married, and whom he tenderly loved. a few days after, orders were given for another attack upon the town, in which this officer was to be engaged. his wife came to general bonaparte, and with tears entreated him to dispense with her husband's services that day. the general was inexorable, as he himself told us, with a sort of savage exaltation. the moment for the attack arrived, and the officer, though a very brave man, as bonaparte himself assured us, felt a presentiment of his approaching death. he turned pale and trembled. he was stationed beside the general, and during an interval when the firing from the town was very heavy, bonaparte called out to him, "take care, there is a shell coming!" the officer, instead of moving to one side, stooped down, and was literally severed in two. bonaparte laughed loudly while he described the event with horrible minuteness. at this time we saw him almost every day. he frequently came to dine with us. as there was a scarcity of bread, and sometimes only two ounces per head daily were distributed in the section, it was customary to request one's guests to bring their own bread, as it could not be procured for money. bonaparte and his brother louis (a mild, agreeable young man, who was the general's aide de camp) used to bring with them their ration bread, which was black, and mixed with bran. i was sorry to observe that all this bad bread fell to the share of the poor aide de camp, for we provided the general with a finer kind, which was made clandestinely by a pastrycook, from flour which we contrived to smuggle from sens, where my husband had some farms. had we been denounced, the affair might have cost us our heads. we spent six weeks in paris, and we went frequently with bonaparte to the theatres, and to the fine concerts given by garat in the rue st. marc. these were the first brilliant entertainments that took place after the death of robespierre. there was always something original in bonaparte's behaviour, for he often slipped away from us without saying a word; and when we were supposing he had left the theatre, we would suddenly discover him in the second or third tier, sitting alone in a box, and looking rather sulky. before our departure for sens, where my husband's family reside, and which was fixed upon for the place of my first accouchement, we looked out for more agreeable apartments than we had in the rue grenier st. lazare, which we only had temporarily. bonaparte used to assist us in our researches. at last we took the first floor of a handsome new house, no. 19 rue des marais. bonaparte, who wished to stop in paris, went to look at a house opposite to ours. he had thoughts of taking it for himself, his uncle fesch (afterwards cardinal fesch), and a gentleman named patrauld, formerly one of his masters at the military school. one day he said, "with that house over there, my friends in it, and a cabriolet, i shall be the happiest fellow in the world." we soon after left town for sens. the house was not taken by him, for other and great affairs were preparing. during the interval between our departure and the fatal day of vendemiaire several letters passed between him and his school companion. these letters were of the most amiable and affectionate description. they have been stolen. on our return, in november of the same year, everything was changed. the college friend was now a great personage. he had got the command of paris in return for his share in the events of vendemiaire. instead of a small house in the rue des marais, he occupied a splendid hotel in the rue des capucines; the modest cabriolet was converted into a superb equipage, and the man himself was no longer the same. but the friends of his youth were still received when they made their morning calls. they were invited to grand dejeuners, which were sometimes attended by ladies; and, among others, by the beautiful madame tallien and her friend the amiable madame de beauharnais, to whom bonaparte had begun to pay attention. he cared little for his friends, and ceased to address them in the style of familiar equality. after the 13th of vendemiaire m. de bourrienne saw bonaparte only at distant periods. in the month of february 1796 my husband was arrested, at seven in the morning, by a party of men, armed with muskets, on the charge of being a returned emigrant. he was torn from his wife and his child, only six months old, being barely allowed time to dress himself. i followed him. they conveyed him to the guard-house of the section, and thence i know not whither; and, finally, in the evening, they placed him in the lockup-house of the prefecture of police, which, i believe, is now called the central bureau. there he passed two nights and a day, among men of the lowest description, some of whom were even malefactors. i and his friends ran about everywhere, trying to find somebody to rescue him, and, among the rest, bonaparte was applied to. it was with great difficulty he could be seen. accompanied by one of my husband's friends, i waited for the commandant of paris until midnight, but he did not come home. next morning i returned at an early hour, and found him. i stated what had happened to my husband, whose life was then at stake. he appeared to feel very little for the situation of his friend, but, however, determined to write to merlin, the minister of justice. i carried the letter according to its address, and met the minister as he was coming downstairs, on his way to the directory. being in grand costume, he wore a henri iv. hat, surmounted with a multitude of plumes, a dress which formed a singular contrast with his person. he opened the letter; and whether it was that he cared as little for the general as for the cause of m. de bourrienne's arrest, he replied that the matter was no longer in his hands, and that it was now under the cognisance of the public administrators of the laws. the minister then stepped into his carriage, and the writer was conducted to several offices in his hotel. she passed through them with a broken heart, for she met with none but harsh men, who told her that the prisoner deserved death. from them she learned that on the following day he would be brought before the judge of the peace for his section, who would decide whether there was ground for putting him on his trial. in fact, this proceeding took place next day. he was conveyed to the house of the judge of the peace for the section of bondy, rue grange-sue-belles, whose name was lemaire. his countenance was mild; and though his manner was cold, he had none of the harshness and ferocity common to the government agents of that time. his examination of the charge was long, and he several times shook his head. the moment of decision had arrived, and everything seemed to indicate that the termination would be to place the prisoner under accusation. at seven o'clock he desired me to be called. i hastened to him, and beheld a most heart rending scene. bourrienne was suffering under a hemorrhage, which had continued since two o'clock, and had interrupted the examination. the judge of the peace, who looked sad, sat with his head resting on his hand. i threw myself at his feet and implored his clemency. the wife and the two daughters of the judge visited this scene of sorrow, and assisted me in softening him. he was a worthy and feeling man, a good husband and parent, and it was evident that he struggled between compassion and duty. he kept referring to the laws on the subject, and, after long researches said to me, "to-morrow is decadi, and no proceedings can take place on that day. find, madame, two responsible persons, who will answer for the appearance of your husband, and i will permit him to go home with you, accompanied by the two guardians." next day two friends were found, one of whom was m. desmaisons, counsellor of the court, who became bail for m. de bourrienne. he continued under these guardians six months, until a law compelled the persons who were inscribed on the fatal list to remove to the distance of ten leagues from paris. one of the guardians was a man of straw; the other was a knight of st. louis. the former was left in the antechamber; the latter made, every evening, one of our party at cards. the family of m. de bourrienne have always felt the warmest gratitude to the judge of the peace and his family. that worthy man saved the life of m. de bourrienne, who, when he returned from egypt, and had it in his power to do him some service, hastened to his house; but the good judge was no more! the letters mentioned in the narrative were at this time stolen from me by the police officers. everyone was now eager to pay court to a man who had risen from the crowd in consequence of the part he had acted at an extraordinary crisis, and who was spoken of as the future general of the army of italy. it was expected that he would be gratified, as he really was, by the restoration of some letters which contained the expression of his former very modest wishes, called to recollection his unpleasant situation, his limited ambition, his pretended aversion for public employment, and finally exhibited his intimate relations with those who were, without hesitation, characterised as emigrants, to be afterwards made the victims of confiscation and death. the 13th of vendemiaire (5th october 1795) was approaching. the national convention had been painfully delivered of a new constitution, called, from the epoch of its birth, "the constitution of year iii." it was adopted on the 22d of august 1795. the provident legislators did not forget themselves. they stipulated that two-thirds of their body should form part of the new legislature. the party opposed to the convention hoped, on the contrary, that, by a general election, a majority would be obtained for its opinion. that opinion was against the continuation of power in the hands of men who had already so greatly abused it. the same opinion was also entertained by a great part of the most influential sections of paris, both as to the possession of property and talent. these sections declared that, in accepting the new constitution, they rejected the decree of the 30th of august, which required the reelection of two-thirds. the convention, therefore, found itself menaced in what it held most dear--its power;--and accordingly resorted to measures of defence. a declaration was put forth, stating that the convention, if attacked, would remove to chalons-sur-marne; and the commanders of the armed force were called upon to defend that body. the 5th of october, the day on which the sections of paris attacked the convention, is certainly one which ought to be marked in the wonderful destiny of bonaparte. with the events of that day were linked, as cause and effect, many great political convulsions of europe. the blood which flowed ripened the seeds of the youthful general's ambition. it must be admitted that the history of past ages presents few periods full of such extraordinary events as the years included between 1795 and 1815. the man whose name serves, in some measure, as a recapitulation of all these great events was entitled to believe himself immortal. living retired at sens since the month of july, i only learned what had occasioned the insurrection of the sections from public report and the journals. i cannot, therefore, say what part bonaparte may have taken in the intrigues which preceded that day. he was officially characterised only as secondary actor in the scene. the account of the affair which was published announces that barras was, on that very day, commander-inchief of the army of the interior, and bonaparte second in command. bonaparte drew up that account. the whole of the manuscript was in his handwriting, and it exhibits all the peculiarity of his style and orthography. he sent me a copy. those who read the bulletin of the 13th vendemiaire, cannot fail to observe the care which bonaparte took to cast the reproach of shedding the first blood on the men he calls rebels. he made a great point of representing his adversaries as the aggressors. it is certain he long regretted that day. he often told me that he would give years of his life to blot it out from the page of his history. he was convinced that the people of paris were dreadfully irritated against him, and he would have been glad if barras had never made that speech in the convention, with the part of which, complimentary to himself, he was at the time so well pleased. barras said, "it is to his able and prompt dispositions that we are indebted for the defence of this assembly, around which he had posted the troops with so much skill." this is perfectly true, but it is not always agreeable that every truth should be told. being out of paris, and a total stranger to this affair, i know not how far he was indebted for his success to chance, or to his own exertions, in the part assigned to him by the miserable government which then oppressed france. he represented himself only as secondary actor in this sanguinary scene in which barras made him his associate. he sent to me, as already mentioned, an account of the transaction, written entirely in his own hand, and distinguished by all the peculiarities of his style and orthography. --[joseph bonaparte, in a note on this passage, insinuates that the account of the 13th vendemiaire was never sent to sens, but was abstracted by bourrienne, with other documents, from napoleon's cabinet (erreurs, tome i. p. 239).]-"on the 13th," says bonaparte, "at five o'clock in the morning, the representative of the people, barras, was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the interior, and general bonaparte was nominated second in command. "the artillery for service on the frontier was still at the camp of sablons, guarded solely by 150 men; the remainder was at marly with 200 men. the depot of meudon was left unprotected. there were at the feuillans only a few four-pounders without artillerymen, and but 80,000 cartridges. the victualling depots were dispersed throughout paris. in many sections the drums beat to arms; the section of the theatre francais had advanced posts even as far as the pont neuf, which it had barricaded. "general barras ordered the artillery to move immediately from the camp of sablons to the tuilleries, and selected the artillerymen from the battalions of the 89th regiment, and from the gendarmerie, and placed them at the palace; sent to meudon 200 men of the police legion whom he brought from versailles, 50 cavalry, and two companies of veterans; he ordered the property which was at marly to be conveyed to meudon; caused cartridges to be brought there, and established a workshop at that place for the manufacture of more. he secured means for the subsistence of the army and of the convention for many days, independently of the depots which were in the sections. "general verdier, who commanded at the palais national, exhibited great coolness; he was required not to suffer a shot to be fired till the last extremity. in the meantime reports reached him from all quarters acquainting him that the sections were assembled in arms, and had formed their columns. he accordingly arrayed his troops so as to defend the convention, and his artillery was in readiness to repulse the rebels. his cannon was planted at the feuillans to fire down the rue honore. eight-pounders were pointed at every opening, and in the event of any mishap, general verdier had cannon in reserve to fire in flank upon the column which should have forced a passage. he left in the carrousel three howitzers (eight-pounders) to batter down the houses from which the convention might be fired upon. at four o'clock the rebel columns marched out from every street to unite their forces. it was necessary to take advantage of this critical moment to attack the insurgents, even had they been regular troops. but the blood about to flow was french; it was therefore for these misguided people, already guilty of rebellion, to embrue their hands in the blood of their countrymen by striking the first blow. "at a quarter before five o'clock the insurgents had formed. the attack was commenced by them on all sides. they were everywhere routed. french blood was spilled: the crime, as well as the disgrace, fell this day upon the sections. "among the dead were everywhere to be recognized emigrants, landowners, and nobles; the prisoners consisted for the most part of the 'chouans' of charette. "nevertheless the sections did not consider themselves beaten: they took refuge in the church of st. roch, in the theatre of the republic, and in the palais egalite; and everywhere they were heard furiously exciting the inhabitants to arms. to spare the blood which would have been shed the next day it was necessary that no time should be given them to rally, but to follow them with vigour, though without incurring fresh hazards. the general ordered montchoisy, who commanded a reserve at the place de la resolution, to form a column with two twelve-pounders, to march by the boulevard in order to turn the place vendôme, to form a junction with the picket stationed at headquarters, and to return in the same order of column. "general brune, with two howitzers, deployed in the streets of st. nicaise and st. honore. general cartaux sent two hundred men and a fourpounder of his division by the rue st. thomas-du-louvre to debouch in the square of the palais egalite. general bonaparte, who had his horse killed under him, repaired to the feuillans. "the columns began to move, st. roch and the theatre of the republic were taken, by assault, when the rebels abandoned them, and retreated to the upper part of the rue de la loi, and barricaded themselves on all sides. patrols were sent thither, and several cannon-shots were fired during the night, in order to prevent them from throwing up defences, which object was effectually accomplished. "at daybreak, the general having learned that some students from the st. genevieve side of the river were marching with two pieces of cannon to succour the rebels, sent a detachment of dragoons in pursuit of them, who seized the cannon and conducted them to the tuilleries. the enfeebled sections, however, still showed a front. they had barricaded the section of grenelle, and placed their cannon in the principal streets. at nine o'clock general beruyer hastened to form his division in battle array in the place vendôme, marched with two eight-pounders to the rue des vieuxaugustins, and pointed them in the direction of the section le pelletier. general vachet, with a corps of 'tirailleurs', marched on his right, ready to advance to the place victoire. general brune marched to the perron, and planted two howitzers at the upper end of the rue vivienne. general duvigier, with his column of six hundred men, and two twelvepounders, advanced to the streets of st. roch and montmartre. the sections lost courage with the apprehension of seeing their retreat cut off, and evacuated the post at the sight of our soldiers, forgetting the honour of the french name which they had to support. the section of brutus still caused some uneasiness. the wife of a representative had been arrested there. general duvigier was ordered to proceed along the boulevard as far as the rue poissonniere. general beruyer took up a position at the place victoire, and general bonaparte occupied the pontau-change. "the section of brutus was surrounded, and the troops advanced upon the place de greve, where the crowd poured in from the isle st. louis, from the theatre francais, and from the palace. everywhere the patriots had regained their courage, while the poniards of the emigrants, armed against us, had disappeared. the people universally admitted their error. "the next day the two sections of le pelletier and the theatre francais were disarmed." the result of this petty civil war brought bonaparte forward; but the party he defeated at that period never pardoned him for the past, and that which he supported dreaded him in the future. five years after he will be found reviving the principles which he combated on the 5th of october 1795. on being appointed, on the motion of barras, lieutenantgeneral of the army of the interior, he established his headquarters in the rue neuve des capucines. the statement in the 'manuscrit de sainte helene, that after the 13th brumaire he remained unemployed at paris, is therefore obviously erroneous. so far from this, he was incessantly occupied with the policy of the nation, and with his own fortunes. bonaparte was in constant, almost daily, communication with every one then in power, and knew how to profit by all he saw or heard. to avoid returning to this 'manuscrit de sainte helene', which at the period of its appearance attracted more attention than it deserved, and which was very generally attributed to bonaparte, i shall here say a few words respecting it. i shall briefly repeat what i said in a note when my opinion was asked, under high authority, by a minister of louis xviii. no reader intimately acquainted with public affairs can be deceived by the pretended authenticity of this pamphlet. what does it contain? facts perverted and heaped together without method, and related in an obscure, affected, and ridiculously sententious style. besides what appears in it, but which is badly placed there, it is impossible not to remark the omission of what should necessarily be there, were napoleon the author. it is full of absurd and of insignificant gossip, of thoughts napoleon never had, expressions unknown to him, and affectations far removed from his character. with some elevated ideas, more than one style and an equivocal spirit can be seen in it. professed coincidences are put close to unpardonable anachronisms, and to the most absurd revelations. it contains neither his thoughts, his style, his actions, nor his life. some truths are mixed up with an inconceivable mass of falsehoods. some forms of expression used by bonaparte are occasionally met with, but they are awkwardly introduced, and often with bad taste. it has been reported that the pamphlet was written by m. bertrand, formerly an officer of the army of the vistula, and a relation of the comte de simeon, peer of france. --['manuscrit de sainte helene d'une maniere inconnue', london. murray; bruxelles, de mat, 20 avril 1817. this work merits a note. metternich (vol, i. pp. 312-13) says, "at the time when it appeared the manuscript of st. helena made a great impression upon europe. this pamphlet was generally regarded as a precursor of the memoirs which napoleon was thought to be writing in his place of exile. the report soon spread that the work was conceived and executed by madame de stael. madame de stael, for her part, attributed it to benjamin constant, from whom she was at this time separated by some disagreement. afterwards it came to be known that the author was the marquis lullin de chateauvieux, a man in society, whom no one had suspected of being able to hold a pen: jomini (tome i. p. 8 note) says. "it will be remarked that in the course of this work [his life of napoleon] the author has used some fifty pages of the pretended 'manuscrit de sainte helene'. far from wishing to commit a plagiarism, he considers he ought to render this homage to a clever and original work, several false points of view in which, however, he has combated. it would have been easy for him to rewrite these pages in other terms, but they appeared to him to be so well suited to the character of napoleon that he has preferred to preserve them." in the will of napoleon occurs (see end of this work): "i disavow the 'manuscrit de sainte helene', and the other works under the title of maxims, sentences, etc., which they have been pleased to publish during the last six years. such rules are not those which have guided my life: this manuscript must not be confused with the 'memorial of saint helena'.]-chapter iv. 1795-1797 on my return to paris i meet bonaparte--his interview with josephine --bonaparte's marriage, and departure from paris ten days after- portrait and character of josephine--bonaparte's dislike of national property--letter to josephine--letter of general colli, and bonaparte's reply--bonaparte refuses to serve with kellerman- marmont's letters--bonaparte's order to me to join the army--my departure from sens for italy--insurrection of the venetian states. after the 13th vendemiaire i returned to paris from sens. during the short time i stopped there i saw bonaparte less frequently than formerly. i had, however, no reason to attribute this to anything but the pressure of public business with which he was now occupied. when i did meet him it was most commonly at breakfast or dinner. one day he called my attention to a young lady who sat opposite to him, and asked what i thought of her. the way in which i answered his question appeared to give him much pleasure. he then talked a great deal to me about her, her family, and her amiable qualities; he told me that he should probably marry her, as he was convinced that the union would make him happy. i also gathered from his conversation that his marriage with the young widow would probably assist him in gaining the objects of his ambition. his constantly-increasing influence with her had already brought him into contact with the most influential persons of that epoch. he remained in paris only ten days after his marriage, which took place on the 9th of march 1796. it was a union in which great harmony prevailed, notwithstanding occasional slight disagreements. bonaparte never, to my knowledge, caused annoyance to his wife. madame bonaparte possessed personal graces and many good qualities. --["eugene was not more than fourteen years of age when he ventured to introduce himself to general bonaparte, for the purpose of soliciting his father's sword, of which he understood the general had become possessed. the countenance, air, and frank manner of eugene pleased bonaparte, and he immediately granted him the boon he sought. as soon as the sword was placed in the boy's hands he burst into tears, and kissed it. this feeling of affection for his father's memory, and the natural manner in which it was evinced, increased the interest of bonaparte in his young visitor. madame de beauharnais, on learning the kind reception which the general had given her son, thought it her duty to call and thank him. bonaparte was much pleased with josephine on this first interview, and he returned her visit. the acquaintance thus commenced speedily led to their marriage."--constant]- --[bonaparte himself, at st. helena, says that he first met josephine at barras' (see jung's bonaparte, tome iii. p. 116).]- --["neither of his wives had ever anything to complain of from napoleon's personal manners" (metternich, vol. 1 p. 279).]- --[madame de remusat, who, to paraphrase thiers' saying on bourrienne himself, is a trustworthy witness, for if she received benefits from napoleon they did not weigh on her, says, "however, napoleon had some affection for his first wife; and, in fact, if he has at any time been touched, no doubt it has been only for her and by her" (tome i. p. 113). "bonaparte was young when he first knew madame de beauharnais. in the circle where he met her she had a great superiority by the name she bore and by the extreme elegance of her manners . . . . in marrying madame de beauharnais, bonaparte believed he was allying himself to a very grand lady; thus this was one more conquest" (p. 114). but in speaking of josephine's complaints to napoleon of his love affairs, madame de remusat says, "her husband sometimes answered by violences, the excesses of which i do not dare to detail, until the moment when, his new fancy having suddenly passed, he felt his tenderness for his wife again renewed. then he was touched by her sufferings, replaced his insults by caresses which were hardly more measured than his violences and, as she was gentle and untenacious, she fell back into her feeling of security" (p. 206).]- --[miot de melito, who was a follower of joseph bonaparte, says, "no woman has united so much kindness to so much natural grace, or has done more good with more pleasure than she did. she honoured me with her friendship, and the remembrance of the benevolence she has shown me, to the last moment of her too short existence, will never be effaced from my heart" (tome i. pp.101-2).]- --[meneval, the successor of bourrienne is his place of secretary to napoleon, and who remained attached to the emperor until the end, says of josephine (tome i. p. 227), "josephine was irresistibly attractive. her beauty was not regular, but she had 'la grace, plus belle encore que la beaute', according to the good la fontaine. she had the soft abandonment, the supple and elegant movements, and the graceful carelessness of the creoles.--(the reader must remember that the term "creole" does not imply any taint of black blood, but only that the person, of european family, has been born in the west indies.)--her temper was always the same. she was gentle and kind."]-i am convinced that all who were acquainted with her must have felt bound to speak well of her; to few, indeed, did she ever give cause for complaint. in the time of her power she did not lose any of her friends, because she forgot none of them. benevolence was natural to her, but she was not always prudent in its exercise. hence her protection was often extended to persons who did not deserve it. her taste for splendour and expense was excessive. this proneness to luxury became a habit which seemed constantly indulged without any motive. what scenes have i not witnessed when the moment for paying the tradesmen's bills arrived! she always kept back one-half of their claims, and the discovery of this exposed her to new reproaches. how many tears did she shed which might have been easily spared! when fortune placed a crown on her head she told me that the event, extraordinary as it was, had been predicted: it is certain that she put faith in fortune-tellers. i often expressed to her my astonishment that she should cherish such a belief, and she readily laughed at her own credulity; but notwithstanding never abandoned it: the event had given importance to the prophecy; but the foresight of the prophetess, said to be an old negress, was not the less a matter of doubt. not long before the 13th of vendemiaire, that day which opened for bonaparte his immense career, he addressed a letter to me at sens, in which, after some of his usually friendly expressions, he said, "look out a small piece of land in your beautiful valley of the yonne. i will purchase it as soon as i can scrape together the money. i wish to retire there; but recollect that i will have nothing to do with national property." bonaparte left paris on the 21st of march 1796, while i was still with my guardians. he no sooner joined the french army than general colli, then in command of the piedmontese army, transmitted to him the following letter, which, with its answer, i think sufficiently interesting to deserve preservation: general--i suppose that you are ignorant of the arrest of one of my officers, named moulin, the bearer of a flag of truce, who has been detained for some days past at murseco, contrary to the laws of war, and notwithstanding an immediate demand for his liberation being made by general count vital. his being a french emigrant cannot take from him the rights of a flag of truce, and i again claim him in that character. the courtesy and generosity which i have always experienced from the generals of your nation induces me to hope that i shall not make this application in vain; and it is with regret that i mention that your chief of brigade, barthelemy, who ordered the unjust arrest of my flag of truce, having yesterday by the chance of war fallen into my hands, that officer will be dealt with according to the treatment which m. moulin may receive. i most sincerely wish that nothing may occur to change the noble and humane conduct which the two nations have hitherto been accustomed to observe towards each other. i have the honour, etc., (signed) colli. ceva. 17th april 1796. bonaparte replied as follows: general--an emigrant is a parricide whom no character can render sacred. the feelings of honour, and the respect due to the french people, were forgotten when m. moulin was sent with a flag of truce. you know the laws of war, and i therefore do not give credit to the reprisals with which you threaten the chief of brigade, barthelemy. if, contrary to the laws of war, you authorise such an act of barbarism, all the prisoners taken from you shall be immediately made responsible for it with the most deplorable vengeance, for i entertain for the officers of your nation that esteem which is due to brave soldiers. the executive directory, to whom these letters were transmitted, approved of the arrest of m. moulin; but ordered that he should be securely guarded, and not brought to trial, in consequence of the character with which he had been invested. about the middle of the year 1796 the directory proposed to appoint general kellerman, who commanded the army of the alps, second in command of the army of italy. on the 24th of may 1796 bonaparte wrote to carnot respecting, this plan, which was far from being agreeable to him. he said, "whether i shall be employed here or anywhere else is indifferent to me: to serve the country, and to merit from posterity a page in our history, is all my ambition. if you join kellerman and me in command in italy you will undo everything. general kellerman has more experience than i, and knows how to make war better than i do; but both together, we shall make it badly. i will not willingly serve with a man who considers himself the first general in europe." numbers of letters from bonaparte to his wife have been published. i cannot deny their authenticity, nor is it my wish to do so. i will, however, subjoin one which appears to me to differ a little from the rest. it is less remarkable for exaggerated expressions of love, and a singularly ambitious and affected style, than most of the correspondence here alluded to. bonaparte is announcing the victory of arcola to josephine. verona, the 29th, noon. at length, my adored josephine, i live again. death is no longer before me, and glory and honour are still in my breast. the enemy is beaten at arcola. to-morrow we will repair the blunder of vaubois, who abandoned rivoli. in eight days mantua will be ours, and then thy husband will fold thee in his arms, and give thee a thousand proofs of his ardent affection. i shall proceed to milan as soon as i can: i am a little fatigued. i have received letters from eugene and hortense. i am delighted with the children. i will send you their letters as soon as i am joined by my household, which is now somewhat dispersed. we have made five thousand prisoners, and killed at least six thousand of the enemy. adieu, my adorable josephine. think of me often. when you cease to love your achilles, when your heart grows cool towards him, you wilt be very cruel, very unjust. but i am sure you will always continue my faithful mistress, as i shall ever remain your fond lover ('tendre amie'). death alone can break the union which sympathy, love, and sentiment have formed. let me have news of your health. a thousand and a thousand kisses. it is impossible for me to avoid occasionally placing myself in the foreground in the course of these memoirs. i owe it to myself to answer, though indirectly, to certain charges which, on various occasions, have been made against me. some of the documents which i am about to insert belong, perhaps, less to the history of the general-in-chief of the army of italy than to that of his secretary; but i must confess i wish to show that i was not an intruder, nor yet pursuing, as an obscure intriguer, the path of fortune. i was influenced much more by friendship than by ambition when i took a part on the scene where the rising glory of the future emperor already shed a lustre on all who were attached to his destiny. it will be seen by the following letters with what confidence i was then honoured; but these letters, dictated by friendship, and not written for history, speak also of our military achievements; and whatever brings to recollection the events of that heroic period must still be interesting to many. headquarters at milan, 20th prairial, year iv. (8th june 1796). the general-in-chief has ordered me, my dear bourrienne, to make known to you the pleasure he experienced on hearing of you, and his ardent desire that you should join us. take your departure, then, my dear bourrienne, and arrive quickly. you may be certain of obtaining the testimonies of affection which are your due from all who know you; and we much regret that you were not with us to have a share in our success. the campaign which we have just concluded will be celebrated in the records of history. with less than 30,000 men, in a state of almost complete destitution, it is a fine thing to have, in the course of less than two months, beaten, eight different times, an army of from 65 to 70,000 men, obliged the king of sardinia to make a humiliating peace, and driven the austrians from italy. the last victory, of which you have doubtless had an account, the passage of the mincio, has closed our labours. there now remain for us the siege of mantua and the castle of milan; but these obstacles will not detain us long. adieu, my dear bourrienne: i repeat general bonaparte's request that you should repair hither, and the testimony of his desire to see you. receive, etc., (signed) marmont. chief of brigade (artillery) and aide de camp to the general-in-chief. i was obliged to remain at sens, soliciting my erasure from the emigrant list, which i did not obtain, however, till 1797, and to put an end to a charge made against me of having fabricated a certificate of residence. meanwhile i applied myself to study, and preferred repose to the agitation of camps. for these reasons i did not then accept his friendly invitation, notwithstanding that i was very desirous of seeing my young college friend in the midst of his astonishing triumphs. ten months after, i received another letter from marmont, in the following terms:- headquarters gorizia 2d germinal, year v. (22d march 1797). the general-in-chief, my dear bourrienne, has ordered me to express to you his wish for your prompt arrival here. we have all along anxiously desired to see you, and look forward with great pleasure to the moment when we shall meet. i join with the general, my dear bourrienne, in urging you to join the army without loss of time. you will increase a united family, happy to receive you into its bosom. i enclose an order written by the general, which will serve you as a passport. take the post route and arrive as soon as you can. we are on the point of penetrating into germany. the language is changing already, and in four days we shall hear no more italian. prince charles has been well beaten, and we are pursuing him. if this campaign be fortunate, we may sign a peace, which is so necessary for europe, in vienna. adieu, my dear bourrienne: reckon for something the zeal of one who is much attached to you. (signed) marmont. bonaparte, general-in-chief of the army of italy. headquarters, gorizia, 2d germinal, year v. the citizen bourrienne is to come to me on receipt of the present order. (signed) bonaparte. the odious manner in which i was then harassed, i know not why, on the part of the government respecting my certificate of residence, rendered my stay in france not very agreeable. i was even threatened with being put on my trial for having produced a certificate of residence which was alleged to be signed by nine false witnesses. this time, therefore, i resolved without hesitation to set out for the army. general bonaparte's order, which i registered at the municipality of sens, answered for a passport, which otherwise would probably have been refused me. i have always felt a strong sense of gratitude for his conduct towards me on this occasion. notwithstanding the haste i made to leave sens, the necessary formalities and precautions detained me some days, and at the moment i was about to depart i received the following letter: headquarters, judenbourg, 19th germinal, year v. (8th april 1797). the general-in-chief again orders me, my dear bourrienne, to urge you to come to him quickly. we are in the midst of success and triumphs. the german campaign begins even more brilliantly than did the italian. you may judge, therefore, what a promise it holds out to us. come, my dear bourrienne, immediately--yield to our solicitations--share our pains and pleasures, and you will add to our enjoyments. i have directed the courier to pass through sens, that he may deliver this letter to you, and bring me back your answer. (signed) marmont. to the above letter this order was subjoined: the citizen fauvelet de bourrienne is ordered to leave sens, and repair immediately by post to the headquarters of the army of italy. (signed) bonaparte. i arrived at the venetian territory at the moment when the insurrection against the french was on the point of breaking out. thousands of peasants were instigated to rise under the pretext of appeasing the troubles of bergamo and brescia. i passed through verona on the 16th of april, the eve of the signature of the preliminaries of leoben and of the revolt of verona. easter sunday was the day which the ministers of jesus christ selected for preaching "that it was lawful, and even meritorious, to kill jacobins." death to frenchmen!--death to jacobins! as they called all the french, were their rallying cries. at the time i had not the slightest idea of this state of things, for i had left sens only on the 11th of april. after stopping two hours at verona, i proceeded on my journey without being aware of the massacre which threatened that city. when about a league from the town i was, however, stopped by a party of insurgents on their way thither, consisting, as i estimated, of about two thousand men. they only desired me to cry 'el viva santo marco', an order with which i speedily complied, and passed on. what would have become of me had i been in verona on the monday? on that day the bells were rung, while the french were butchered in the hospitals. every one met in the streets was put to death. the priests headed the assassins, and more than four hundred frenchmen were thus sacrificed. the forts held out against the venetians, though they attacked them with fury; but repossession of the town was not obtained until after ten days. on the very day of the insurrection of verona some frenchmen were assassinated between that city and vicenza, through which i passed on the day before without danger; and scarcely had i passed through padua, when i learned that others had been massacred there. thus the assassinations travelled as rapidly as the post. i shall say a few words respecting the revolt of the venetian states, which, in consequence of the difference of political opinions, has been viewed in very contradictory lights. the last days of venice were approaching, and a storm had been brewing for more than a year. about the beginning of april 1797 the threatening symptoms of a general insurrection appeared. the quarrel commenced when the austrians entered peschiera, and some pretext was also afforded by the reception given to monsieur, afterwards louis xviii. it was certain that venice had made military preparations during the siege of mantua in 1796. the interests of the aristocracy outweighed the political considerations in our favour. on, the 7th of june 1796 general bonaparte wrote thus to the executive directory: the senate of venice lately sent two judges of their council here to ascertain definitively how things stand. i repeated my complaints. i spoke to them about the reception given to monsieur. should it be your plan to extract five or six millions from venice, i have expressly prepared this sort of rupture for you. if your intentions be more decided, i think this ground of quarrel ought to be kept up. let me know what you mean to do, and wait till the favourable moment, which i shall seize according to circumstances; for we must not have to do with all the world at once. the directory answered that the moment was not favourable; that it was first necessary to take mantua, and give wurmser a sound beating. however, towards the end of the year 1796 the directory began to give more credit to the sincerity of the professions of neutrality made on the part of venice. it was resolved, therefore, to be content with obtaining money and supplies for the army, and to refrain from violating the neutrality. the directory had not then in reserve, like bonaparte, the idea of making the dismemberment of venice serve as a compensation for such of the austrian possessions as the french republic might retain. in 1797 the expected favourable moment had arrived. the knell of venice was rung; and bonaparte thus wrote to the directory on the 30th of april: "i am convinced that the only course to be now taken is to destroy this ferocious and sanguinary government." on the 3d of may, writing from palma nuova, he says: "i see nothing that can be done but to obliterate the venetian name from the face of the globe." towards the end of march 1797 the government of venice was in a desperate state. ottolini, the podesta of bergamo, an instrument of tyranny in the hands of the state inquisitors, then harassed the people of bergamo and brescia, who, after the reduction of mantua, wished to be separated from venice. he drew up, to be sent to the senate, a long report respecting the plans of separation, founded on information given him by a roman advocate, named marcelin serpini; who pretended to have gleaned the facts he communicated in conversation with officers of the french army. the plan of the patriotic party was, to unite the venetian territories on the mainland with lombardy, and to form of the whole one republic. the conduct of ottolini exasperated the party inimical to venice, and augmented the prevailing discontent. having disguised his valet as a peasant, he sent him off to venice with the report he had drawn up on serpini's communications, and other information; but this report never reached the inquisitors. the valet was arrested, his despatches taken, and ottolini fled from bergamo. this gave a beginning to the general rising of the venetian states. in fact, the force of circumstances alone brought on the insurrection of those territories against their old insular government. general la hoz, who commanded the lombard legion, was the active protector of the revolution, which certainly had its origin more in the progress of the prevailing principles of liberty than in the crooked policy of the senate of venice. bonaparte, indeed, in his despatches to the directory, stated that the senate had instigated the insurrection; but that was not quite correct, and he could not wholly believe his own assertion. pending the vacillation of the venetian senate, vienna was exciting the population of its states on the mainland to rise against the french. the venetian government had always exhibited an extreme aversion to the french revolution, which had been violently condemned at venice. hatred of the french had been constantly excited and encouraged, and religious fanaticism had inflamed many persons of consequence in the country. from the end of 1796 the venetian senate secretly continued its armaments, and the whole conduct of that government announced intentions which have been called perfidious, but the only object of which was to defeat intentions still more perfidious. the senate was the irreconcilable enemy of the french republic. excitement was carried to such a point that in many places the people complained that they were not permitted to arm against the french. the austrian generals industriously circulated the most sinister reports respecting the armies of the sambre-et-meuse and the rhine, and the position of the french troops in the tyrol. these impostures, printed in bulletins, were well calculated to instigate the italians, and especially the venetians, to rise in mass to exterminate the french, when the victorious army should penetrate into the hereditary states. the pursuit of the archduke charles into the heart of austria encouraged the hopes which the venetian senate had conceived, that it would be easy to annihilate the feeble remnant of the french army, as the troops were scattered through the states of venice on the mainland. wherever the senate had the ascendency, insurrection was secretly fomented; wherever the influence of the patriots prevailed, ardent efforts were made to unite the venetian terra firma to the lombard republic. bonaparte skillfully took advantage of the disturbances, and the massacres consequent on them, to adopt towards the senate the tone of an offended conqueror. he published a declaration that the venetian government was the most treacherous imaginable. the weakness and cruel hypocrisy of the senate facilitated the plan he had conceived of making a peace for france at the expense of the venetian republic. on returning from leoben, a conqueror and pacificator, he, without ceremony, took possession of venice, changed the established government, and, master of all the venetian territory, found himself, in the negotiations of campo formio, able to dispose of it as he pleased, as a compensation for the cessions which had been exacted from austria. after the 19th of may he wrote to the directory that one of the objects of his treaty with venice was to avoid bringing upon us the odium of violating the preliminaries relative to the venetian territory, and, at the same time, to afford pretexts and to facilitate their execution. at campo formio the fate of this republic was decided. it disappeared from the number of states without effort or noise. the silence of its fall astonished imaginations warmed by historical recollections from the brilliant pages of its maritime glory. its power, however, which had been silently undermined, existed no longer except in the prestige of those recollections. what resistance could it have opposed to the man destined to change the face of all europe? memoirs of napoleon bonaparte, volume 2. by louis antoine fauvelet de bourrienne his private secretary edited by r. w. phipps colonel, late royal artillery 1891 contents: chapter v. to chapter xiv. 1798 chapter v 1797. signature of the preliminaries of peace--fall of venice--my arrival and reception at leoben--bonaparte wishes to pursue his success- the directory opposes him--he wishes to advance on vienna--movement of the army of the sambre-et-meuse--bonaparte's dissatisfaction- arrival at milan--we take up our residence at montebello--napoleon's judgment respecting dandolo and melzi. i joined bonaparte at leoben on the 19th of april, the day after the signature of the preliminaries of peace. these preliminaries resembled in no respect the definitive treaty of campo formio. the still incomplete fall of the state of venice did not at that time present an available prey for partition. all was arranged afterwards. woe to the small states that come in immediate contact with two colossal empires waging war! here terminated my connection with bonaparte as a comrade and equal, and those relations with him commenced in which i saw him suddenly great, powerful, and surrounded with homage and glory. i no longer addressed him as i had been accustomed to do. i appreciated too well his personal importance. his position placed too great a social distance between him and me not to make me feel the necessity of fashioning my demeanour accordingly. i made with pleasure, and without regret, the easy sacrifice of the style of familiar companionship and other little privileges. he said, in a loud voice, when i entered the salon where he was surrounded by the officers who formed his brilliant staff, "i am glad to see you, at last"--"te voila donc, enfin;", but as soon as we were alone he made me understand that he was pleased with my reserve, and thanked me for it. i was immediately placed at the head of his cabinet. i spoke to him the same evening respecting the insurrection of the venetian territories, of the dangers which menaced the french, and of those which i had escaped, etc. "care thou[*] nothing about it," said he; [*]--[he used to 'tutoyer' me in this familiar manner until his return to milan.]-"those rascals shall pay for it. their republic has had its day, and is done." this republic was, however, still existing, wealthy and powerful. these words brought to my recollection what i had read in a work by one gabriel naude, who wrote during the reign of louis xiii. for cardinal de bagin: "do you see constantinople, which flatters itself with being the seat of a double empire; and venice, which glories in her stability of a thousand years? their day will come." in the first conversation which bonaparte had with me, i thought i could perceive that he was not very well satisfied with the preliminaries. he would have liked to advance with his army to vienna. he did not conceal this from me. before he offered peace to prince charles, he wrote to the directory that he intended to pursue his success, but that for this purpose he reckoned on the co-operation of the armies of the sambre-etmeuse and the rhine. the directory replied that he must not reckon on a diversion in germany, and that the armies of the sambre-et-meuse and the rhine were not to pass that river. a resolution so unexpected-a declaration so contrary to what he had constantly solicited, compelled him to terminate his triumphs, and renounce his favourite project of planting the standard of the republic on the ramparts of vienna, or at least of levying contributions on the suburbs of that capital. a law of the 23d of august 1794 forbade the use of any other names than those in the register of births. i wished to conform to this law, which very foolishly interfered with old habits. my eldest brother was living, and i therefore designated myself fauvelet the younger. this annoyed general bonaparte. "such change of name is absolute nonsense," said he. "i have known you for twenty years by the name of bourrienne. sign as you still are named, and see what the advocates with their laws will do." on the 20th of april, as bonaparte was returning to italy, he was obliged to stop on an island of the tagliamento, while a torrent passed by, which had been occasioned by a violent storm. a courier appeared on the right bank of the river. he reached the island. bonaparte read in the despatches of the directory that the armies of the sambre-et-meuse and the rhine were in motion; that they were preparing to cross the rhine, and had commenced hostilities on the very day of the signing of the preliminaries. this information arrived seven days after the directory had written that "he must not reckon on the co-operation of the armies of germany." it is impossible to describe the general's vexation on reading these despatches. he had signed the preliminaries only because the government had represented the co-operation of the armies of the rhine as impracticable at that moment, and shortly afterwards he was informed that the co-operation was about to take place! the agitation of his mind was so great that he for a moment conceived the idea of crossing to the left bank of the tagliamento, and breaking off the negotiations under some pretext or other. he persisted for some time in this resolution, which, however, berthier and some other generals successfully opposed. he exclaimed, "what a difference would there have been in the preliminaries, if, indeed, there had been any!" his chagrin, i might almost say his despair, increased when, some days after his entry into the venetian states, he received a letter from moreau, dated the 23d of april, in which that general informed him that, having passed the rhine on the 20th with brilliant success, and taken four thousand prisoners, it would not be long before he joined him. who, in fact, can say what would have happened but for the vacillating and distrustful policy of the directory, which always encouraged low intrigues, and participated in the jealousy excited by the renown of the young conqueror? because the directory dreaded his ambition they sacrificed the glory of our arms and the honour of the nation; for it cannot be doubted that, had the passage of the rhine, so urgently demanded by bonaparte, taken place some days sooner, he would have been able, without incurring any risk, to dictate imperiously the conditions of peace on the spot; or, if austria were obstinate, to have gone on to vienna and signed it there. still occupied with this idea, he wrote to the directory on the 8th of may: "since i have received intelligence of the passage of the rhine by hoche and moreau, i much regret that it did not take place fifteen days sooner; or, at least, that moreau did not say that he was in a situation to effect it." (he had been informed to the contrary.) what, after this, becomes of the unjust reproach against bonaparte of having, through jealousy of moreau, deprived france of the advantages which a prolonged campaign would have procured her? bonaparte was too devoted to the glory of france to sacrifice it to jealousy of the glory of any individual. in traversing the venetian states to return to milan, he often spoke to me of venice. he always assured me that he was originally entirely unconnected with the insurrections which had agitated that country; that common sense would show, as his project was to advance into the basin of the danube, he had no interest in having his rear disturbed by revolts, and his communications interrupted or cut off: "such an idea," said he, "would be absurd, and could never enter into the mind of a man to whom even his enemies cannot deny a certain degree of tact." he acknowledged that he was not vexed that matters had turned out as they had done, because he had already taken advantage of these circumstances in the preliminaries and hoped to profit still more from them in the definitive peace. "when i arrive at milan," said he, "i will occupy myself with venice." it is therefore quite evident to me that in reality the general-in-chief had nothing to do with the venetian insurrections; that subsequently he was not displeased with them; and that, later still, he derived great advantage from them. we arrived at milan on the 5th of may, by way of laybach, triest, palmanova, padua, verona, and mantua. bonaparte soon took up his residence at montebello, a very fine chateau, three leagues from milan, with a view over the rich and magnificent plains of lombard. at montebello commenced the negotiations for the definitive peace which were terminated at passeriano. the marquis de gallo, the austrian plenipotentiary, resided half a league from montebello. during his residence at montebello the general-in-chief made an excursion to the lake of como and to the lago maggiore. he visited the borromean islands in succession, and occupied himself on his return with the organization of the towns of venice, genoa, and milan. he sought for men and found none. "good god," said he, "how rare men are! there are eighteen millions in italy, and i have with difficulty found two, dandolo and melzi." he appreciated them properly. dandolo was one of the men who, in those revolutionary times, reflected the greatest honour upon italy. after being a member of the great council of the cisalpine republic, he exercised the functions of proveditore-general in dalmatia. it is only necessary to mention the name of dandolo to the dalmatians to learn from the grateful inhabitants how just and vigorous his administration was. the services of melzi are known. he was chancellor and keeper of the seals of the italian monarchy, and was created duke of lodi. --[francesco, comte de melzi d'eryl (1753-1816), vice president of the italian republic, 1802; chancellor of the kingdom of italy, 1805; duc de lodi, 1807.]-in those who have seen the world the truth of napoleon's reproach excites little astonishment. in a country which, according to biographies and newspapers, abounds with extraordinary men, a woman of much talent --(madame roland.)--said, "what has most surprised me, since the elevation of my husband has afforded me the opportunity of knowing many persons, and particularly those employed in important affairs, is the universal mediocrity which exists. it surpasses all that the imagination can conceive, and it is observable in all ranks, from the clerk to the minister. without this experience i never could have believed my species to be so contemptible." who does not remember oxenstiern's remark to his son, who trembled at going so young to the congress of munster: "go, my son. you will see by what sort of men the world is governed." chapter vi. 1797. napoleon's correspondence--release of french prisoners at olmutz- negotiations with austria--bonaparte's dissatisfaction--letter of complaint from bonaparte to the executive directory--note respecting the affairs of venice and the club of clichy, written by bonaparte and circulated in the army--intercepted letter of the emperor francis. during the time when the preliminaries of leoben suspended military operations, napoleon was not anxious to reply immediately to all letters. he took a fancy to do, not exactly as cardinal dubois did, when he threw into the fire the letters he had received, saying, "there! my correspondents are answered," but something of the same kind. to satisfy himself that people wrote too much, and lost, in trifling and useless answers, valuable time, he told me to open only the letters which came by extraordinary couriers, and to leave all the rest for three weeks in the basket. at the end of that time it was unnecessary to reply to fourfifths of these communications. some were themselves answers; some were acknowledgments of letters received; others contained requests for favours already granted, but of which intelligence had not been received. many were filled with complaints respecting provisions, pay, or clothing, and orders had been issued upon all these points before the letters were written. some generals demanded reinforcements, money, promotion, etc. by not opening their letters bonaparte was spared the unpleasing office of refusing. when the general-in-chief compared the very small number of letters which it was necessary to answer with the large number which time alone had answered, he laughed heartily at his whimsical idea. would not this mode of proceeding be preferable to that of causing letters to be opened by any one who may be employed, and replying to them by a circular to which it is only necessary to attach a date? during the negotiations which followed the treaty of leoben, the directory ordered general bonaparte to demand the liberty of mm. de la fayette, latour-marbourg, and bureau de puzy, detained at olmutz since 1792 as prisoners of state. the general-in-chief executed this commission with as much pleasure as zeal, but he often met with difficulties which appeared to be insurmountable. it has been very incorrectly stated that these prisoners obtained their liberty by one of the articles of the preliminaries of leoben. i wrote a great deal on this subject to the dictation of general bonaparte, and i joined him only on the day after the signature of these preliminaries. it was not till the end of may of the year 1797 that the liberation of these captives was demanded, and they did not obtain their freedom till the end of august. there was no article in the treaty, public or secret, which had reference to them. neither was it at his own suggestion that bonaparte demanded the enlargement of the prisoners, but by order of the directory. to explain why they did not go to france immediately after their liberation from olmutz, it is necessary to recollect that the events of the 18th fructidor occurred between the period when the first steps were taken to procure their liberty and the date of their deliverance. it required all bonaparte's ascendency and vigour of character to enable him to succeed in his object at the end of three months. we had arrived at the month of july, and the negotiations were tediously protracted. it was impossible to attribute the embarrassment which was constantly occurring to anything but the artful policy of austria: other affairs occupied bonaparte. the news from paris engrossed all his attention. he saw with extreme displeasure the manner in which the influential orators of the councils, and pamphlets written in the same spirit as they spoke, criticised him, his army, his victories, the affairs of venice, and the national glory. he was quite indignant at the suspicions which it was sought to create respecting his conduct and ulterior views. the following excerpts, attributed to the pens of dumouriez or rivarol, are specimens of some of the comments of the time: extracts of letters in "le spectatuer du nord" of 1797. general bonaparte is, without contradiction, the most brilliant warrior who has appeared at the head of the armies of the french republic. his glory is incompatible with democratic equality, and the services he has rendered are too great to be recompensed except by hatred and ingratitude. he is very young, and consequently has to pursue a long career of accusations and of persecutions. ........whatever may be the crowning event of his military career, bonaparte is still a great man. all his glory is due to himself alone; because he alone has developed a character and a genius of which no one else has furnished an example. extract of letter or 18th april 1797 in "the spectateur du nord." regard, for instance, this wretched war. uncertain in champagne, it becomes daring under dumouriez, unbridled under the brigands who fought the vendeeans, methodic under pichegru, vulgar under jourdan, skilled under moreau, rash under bonaparte. each general has put the seal of his genius on his career, and has given life or death to his army. from the commencement of his career bonaparte has developed an ardent character which is irritated by obstacles, and a quickness which forestalls every determination of the enemy. it is with heavier and heavier blows that he strikes. he throws his army on the enemy like an unloosed torrent. he is all action, and he is so in everything. see him fight, negotiate, decree, punish, all is the matter of a moment. he compromises with turin as with rome. he invades modena as he burns binasco. he never hesitates; to cut the gordian knot is always his method. bonaparte could not endure to have his conduct predicated; and enraged at seeing his campaigns depreciated, his glory and that of his army disparaged, --[the extraordinary folly of the opposition to the directory in throwing bonaparte on to the side of the directory, will be seen by reading the speech of dumolard, so often referred to by bourrienne (thiers, vol. v. pp. 110-111), and by the attempts of mathieu dumas to remove the impression that the opposition slighted the fortunate general. (see dumas, tome iii. p. 80; see also lanfrey, tome i. pp. 257-299).]-and intrigues formed against him in the club of clichy, he wrote the following letter to the directory:- to the president of the executive directory. i have just received, citizens-directors, a copy of the motion of dumolard (23d june 1797). this motion, printed by order of the assembly, it is evident, is directed against me. i was entitled, after, having five times concluded peace, and given a death-blow to the coalition, if not to civic triumphs, at least to live tranquilly under the protection of the first magistrates of the republic. at present i find myself ill-treated, persecuted, and disparaged, by every shameful means, which their policy brings to the aid of persecution. i would have been indifferent to all except that species of opprobrium with which the first magistrates of the republic endeavour to overwhelm me. after having deserved well of my country by my last act, i am not bound to hear myself accused in a manner as absurd as atrocious. i have not expected that a manifesto, signed by emigrants, paid by england, should obtain more credit with the council of five hundred than the evidence of eighty thousand men--than mine! what! we were assassinated by traitors--upwards of four hundred men perished; and the first magistrates of the republic make it a crime to have believed the statement for a moment. upwards of four hundred frenchmen were dragged through the streets. they were assassinated before the eyes of the governor of the fort. they were pierced with a thousand blows of stilettos, such as i sent you and the representatives of the french people cause it to be printed, that if they believed this fact for an instant, they were excusable. i know well there are societies where it is said, "is this blood, then, so pure?" if only base men, who are dead to the feeling of patriotism and national glory, had spoken of me thus, i would not have complained. i would have disregarded it; but i have a right to complain of the degradation to which the first magistrates of the republic reduce those who have aggrandised, and carried the french name to so high a pitch of glory. citizens-directors, i reiterate the demand i made for my dismissal; i wish to live in tranquillity, if the poniards of clichy will allow me to live. you have employed me in negotiations. i am not very fit to conduct them. about the same time he drew up the following note respecting the affairs of venice, which was printed without the author's name, and circulated through the whole army:- note. bonaparte, pausing before the gates of turin, parma, rome, and vienna, offering peace when he was sure of obtaining nothing but fresh triumphs--bonaparte, whose every operation exhibits respect for religion, morality, and old age; who, instead of heaping, as he might have done, dishonour upon the venetians, and humbling their republic to the earth, loaded her with acts of kindness, and took such great interest in her glory--is this the same bonaparte who is accused of destroying the ancient government of venice, and democratising genoa, and even of interfering in the affairs of the prudent and worthy people of the swiss cantons? bonaparte had passed the tagliamento, and entered germany, when insurrections broke out in the venetian states; these insurrections were, therefore, opposed to bonaparte's project; surely, then, he could not favour them. when he was in the heart of germany the venetians massacred more than four hundred french troops, drove their quarters out of verona, assassinated the unfortunate laugier, and presented the spectacle of a fanatical party in arms. he returned to italy; and on his arrival, as the winds cease their agitation at the presence of neptune, the whole of italy, which was in commotion, which was in arms, was restored to order. however, the deputies from bonaparte drew up different articles conformable to the situation of the country, and in order to prevent, not a revolution in the government, for the government was defunct, and had died a natural death, but a crisis, and to save the city from convulsion, anarchy, and pillage. bonaparte spared a division of his army to save venice from pillage and massacre. all the battalions were in the streets of venice, the disturbers were put down, and the pillage discontinued. property and trade were preserved, when general baragney d'hilliers entered venice with his division. bonaparte, as usual, spared blood, and was the protector of venice. whilst the french troops remained they conducted themselves peaceably, and only interfered to support the provisional government. bonaparte could not say to the deputies of venice, who came to ask his protection and assistance against the populace, who wished to plunder them, "i cannot meddle with your affairs." he could not say this, for venice, and all its territories, had really formed the theatre of war; and, being in the rear of the army of italy, the republic of venice was really under the jurisdiction of that army. the rights of war confer upon a general the powers of supreme police over the countries which are the seat of war. as the great frederick said, "there are no neutrals where there is war." ignorant advocates and babblers have asked, in the club of clichy, why we occupy the territory of venice. these declaimers should learn war, and they would know that the adige, the brenta, and the tagliamento, where we have been fighting for two years, are within the venetian states. but, gentlemen of clichy, we are at no loss to perceive your meaning. you reproach the army of italy for having surmounted all difficulties--for subduing all italy for having twice passed the alps--for having marched on vienna, and obliged austria to acknowledge the republic that, you, men of clichy, would destroy. you accuse bonaparte, i see clearly, for having brought about peace. but i know you, and i speak in the name of eighty thousand soldiers. the time is gone when base advocates and wretched declaimers could induce soldiers to revolt. if, however, you compel them, the soldiers of the army of italy will soon appear at the barrier of clichy, with their general. but woe unto you if they do! bonaparte having arrived at palma-nova, issued a manifesto on the 2d of may 1797. arrived at mestre, where he posted his troops, the government sent three deputies to him, with a decree of the great council, without bonaparte having solicited it and without his having thought of making any change in the government of that country: the governor of venice was an old man, ninety-nine years of age, confined by illness to his apartment. everyone felt the necessity of renovating this government of twelve hundred years' existence, and to simplify its machinery, in order to preserve its independence, honour, and glory. it was necessary to deliberate, first, on the manner of renovating the government; secondly, on the means of atoning for the massacre of the french, the iniquity of which every one was sensible.. bonaparte, after having received the deputation at mestre, told them that in order to obtain satisfaction, for the assassination of his brethren in arms, he wished the great council to arrest the inquisitors. he afterwards granted them an armistice, and appointed milan as the place of conference. the deputies arrived at milan on the . . . a negotiation commenced to re-establish harmony between the governments. however, anarchy, with all its horrors, afflicted the city of venice. ten thousand sclavonians threatened to pillage the shops. bonaparte acquiesced in the proposition submitted by the deputies, who promised to verify the loss which had been sustained by pillage. bonaparte also addressed a manifesto to the doge, which appeared in all the public papers. it contained fifteen articles of complaint, and was followed by a decree ordering the french minister to leave venice, the venetian agents to leave lombard, and the lion of st. mark to be pulled down in all the continental territories of venice. the general-in-chief now openly manifested his resolution of marching on paris; and this disposition, which was well known in the army, was soon communicated to vienna. at this period a letter from the emperor francis ii. to his brother, the grand duke of tuscany, was intercepted by bonaparte. i translated the letter, which proved to him that francis ii. was acquainted with his project. he likewise saw with pleasure the assurances which the emperor gave his brother of his love of peace, as well as the wavering of the imperial resolves, and the incertitude respecting the fate of the italian princes, which the emperor easily perceived to depend on bonaparte. the emperor's letter was as follows:- my dear brother--i punctually received your third letter, containing a description of your unhappy and delicate situation. you may be assured that i perceive it as clearly as you do yourself; and i pity you the more because, in truth, i do not know what advice to give you. you are, like me, the victim of the former inactivity of the princes of italy, who ought, at once, to have acted with all their united forces, while i still possessed mantua. if bonaparte's project be, as i learn, to establish republics in italy, this is likely to end in spreading republicanism over the whole country. i have already commenced negotiations for peace, and the preliminaries are ratified. if the french observe them as strictly as i do, and will do, then your situation will be improved; but already the french are beginning to disregard them. the principal problem which remains to be solved is, whether the french directory approve of bonaparte's proceedings, and whether the latter, as appears by some papers distributed through his army, is not disposed to revolt against his country, which also seems to be probable, from his severe conduct towards switzerland, notwithstanding the assurances of the directory, that he had been ordered to leave the country untouched. if this should be the case, new and innumerable difficulties may arise. under these circumstances i can, at present, advise nothing; for, as to myself, it is only time and the circumstances of the moment which can point out how i am to act. there is nothing new here. we are all well; but the heat is extraordinary. always retain your friendship and love for me. make my compliments to your wife, and believe me ever your best friend and brother, francis. hetzendorf, july 20, 1797. chapter vii. 1797. unfounded reports--carnot--capitulation of mantua--general clarke- the directory yields to bonaparte--berthier--arrival of eugene beauharnais at milan--comte delaunay d'entraigues--his interview with bonaparte--seizure of his papers--copy of one describing a conversation between him and comte de montgaillard--the emperor francis--the prince de conde and general pichegru. while bonaparte was expressing his opinion on his campaigns and the injustice with which they had been criticised, it was generally believed that carnot dictated to him from a closet in the luxembourg all the plans of his operations, and that berthier was at his right hand, without whom, notwithstanding carnot's plans, which were often mere romances, he would have been greatly embarrassed. this twofold misrepresentation was very current for some time; and, notwithstanding it was contrary to the evidence of facts, it met with much credence, particularly abroad. there was, however, no foundation for the opinion: let us render to caesar that which is caesar's due. bonaparte was a creator in the art of war, and no imitator. that no man was superior to him in that art is incontestable. at the commencement of the glorious campaign in italy the directory certainly sent out instructions to him; but he always followed his own plans, and continually, wrote back that all would be lost if movements conceived at a distance from the scene of action were to be blindly executed. he also offered to resign. at length the directory perceived the impossibility of prescribing operations of war according to the view of persons in paris; and when i became the secretary of the general-inchief i saw a despatch of the directory, dated may, 1796, committing the whole plan of the campaign to his judgment; and assuredly there was not a single operation or movement which did not originate with him. carnot was obliged to yield to his firmness. when the directory, towards the end of 1796, felt disposed to treat for peace, general clarke, appointed to conclude the armistice, was authorised, in case mantua should not be taken before the negotiation was brought to a close, to propose leaving the blockade in statu quo. had such a condition been adopted it would doubtless have been stipulated that the emperor of austria should be allowed to provision the garrison and inhabitants of the city day by day. bonaparte, convinced that an armistice without mantua would by no means conduce to peace, earnestly opposed such a condition. he carried his point; mantua capitulated, and the result is well known. yet he was not blind to the hazards of war; while preparing, during the blockade, an assault on mantua, he wrote thus to the directory: "a bold stroke of this nature depends absolutely for success on a dog or a goose." this was about a question of surprise. bonaparte was exceedingly sensitive to the rumours which reached him respecting carnot and berthier. he one day said to me: "what gross stupidity, is this? it is very well to say to a general, 'depart for italy, gain battles, and sign a peace at vienna;' but the execution that is not so easy. i never attached any value to the plans which the directory sent me. too many circumstances occur on the spot to modify them. the movement of a single corps of the enemy's army may confound a whole plan arranged by the fireside. only fools can believe such stuff! as for berthier, since you have been with me, you see what he is--he is a blockhead. yet it is he who does it all; it is he who gathers a great part of the glory of the army of italy." i told him that this erroneous opinion could not last long; that each person would be allowed his merit, and that at least posterity would judge rightly. this observation seemed to please him. berthier was a man full of honour, courage, and probity, and exceedingly regular in the performance of his duties. bonaparte's attachment to him arose more from habit than liking. berthier did not concede with affability, and refused with harshness. his abrupt, egotistic, and careless manners did not, however, create him many enemies, but, at the same time, did not make him many friends. in consequence of our frequent intercourse he had contracted the friendly practice of speaking to me in the second person singular; but he never wrote to me in that style. he was perfectly acquainted with the disposition of all the corps, and could name their commanders and their respective forces. day or night he was always at hand and made out with clearness all the secondary orders which resulted from the dispositions of the general-in-chief. in fact, he was an excellent head of the staff of an army; but that is all the praise that can be given, and indeed he wished for no greater. he had such entire confidence in bonaparte, and looked up to him with so much admiration, that he never would have presumed to oppose his plans or give any advise. berthier's talent was very limited, and of a special nature; his character was one of extreme weakness. bonaparte's friendship for him and the frequency of his name in the bulletins and official despatches have unduly elevated his reputation. bonaparte, giving his opinion to the directory respecting the generals employed in his army, said, "berthier has talents, activity, courage, character--all in his favour." this was in 1796. he then made an eagle of him; at st. helena he called him a goose. he should neither have raised him so high nor sunk him so low. berthier neither merited the one nor the other. bonaparte was a man of habit; he was much attached to all the people about him, and did not like new faces. berthier loved him. he carried out his orders well, and that enabled him to pass off with his small portion of talent. it was about this time that young beauharnais came to milan. he was seventeen years old. he had lived in paris with his mother since the departure of bonaparte. on his arrival he immediately entered the service as 'aide de camp' to the general-in-chief, who felt for him an affection which was justified by his good qualities. comte delaunay d'entraigues, well known in the french revolution, held a diplomatic post at venice when that city was threatened by the french. aware of his being considered the agent of all the machinations then existing against france, and especially against the army of italy, he endeavoured to escape; but the city being, surrounded, he was seized, together with all his papers. the apparently frank manners of the count pleased bonaparte, who treated him with indulgence. his papers were restored, with the exception of three relating to political subjects. he afterwards fled to switzerland, and ungratefully represented himself as having been oppressed by bonaparte. his false statements have induced many writers to make of him an heroic victim. he was assassinated by his own servant in 1802. i kept a copy of one of his most interesting papers. it has been much spoken of, and fauche-borel has, i believe, denied its authenticity and the truth of its contents. the manner in which it fell into the hands of the general-in-chief, the importance attached to it by d'entraigues, the differences i have observed between the manuscript i copied and versions which i have since read, and the knowledge of its, authenticity, having myself transcribed it from the handwriting of the count, who in my presence vouched for the truth of the facts it details--all these circumstances induce me to insert it here, and compel me to doubt that it was, as fauche-borel asserted, a fabrication. this manuscript is entitled, 'my conversation with comte de montgaillard, on the 4th of december 1796, from six in the afternoon till midnight, in the presence of the abbe dumontel.' [on my copy are written the words, "extracts from this conversation, made by me, from the original." i omitted what i thought unimportant, and transcribed only the most interesting passages. montgaillard spoke of his escape, of his flight to england, of his return to france, of his second departure, and finally of his arrival at bale in august 1795.] the prince de conde soon afterwards, he said, called me to mulheim, and knowing the connections i had had in france, proposed that i should sound general pichegru, whose headquarters were at altkirch, where he then was, surrounded by four representatives of the convention. i immediately went to neufchatel, taking with me four or five hundred louis. i cast my eyes on fauche-borel, the king's printer at neufchatel, and also yours and mine, as the instrument by which to make the first overture, and i selected as his colleague m. courant, a native of neufchatel. i persuaded them to undertake the business: i supplied them with instructions and passports. they were foreigners: so i furnished them with all the necessary documents to enable them to travel in france as foreign merchants and purchasers of national property. i went to bale to wait for news from them. on the 13th of august fauche and courant set out for the headquarters at altkirch. they remained there eight days without finding an opportunity to speak to pichegru, who was surrounded by representatives and generals. pichegru observed them, and seeing them continually wheresoever he went, he conjectured that they had something to say to him, and he called out in a loud voice, while passing them, "i am going to huningen." fauche contrived to throw himself in his way at the end of a corridor. pichegru observed him, and fixed his eyes upon him, and although it rained in torrents, he said aloud, "i am going to dine at the chateau of madame salomon." this chateau was three leagues from huningen, and madame salomon was pichegru's mistress. fauche set off directly to the chateau, and begged to speak with general pichegru. he told the general that, being in the possession of some of j. j. rousseau's manuscripts, he wished to publish them and dedicate them to him. "very good," said pichegru; "but i should like to read them first; for rousseau professed principles of liberty in which i do not concur, and with which i should not like to have my name connected."--"but," said fauche, "i have something else to speak to you about."--"what is it, and on whose behalf?"- "on behalf of the prince de conde."--"be silent, then, and follow me." he conducted fauche alone into a retired cabinet, and said to him, "explain yourself; what does monseigneur le prince de conde wish to communicate to me?" fauche was embarrassed, and stammered out something unintelligible. "compose yourself," said pichegru; "my sentiments are the same as the prince de conde's. what does he desire of me?" fauche, encouraged by these words, replied, "the prince wishes to join you. he counts on you, and wishes to connect himself with you." "these are vague and unmeaning words," observed pichegru. "all this amounts to nothing. go back, and ask for written instructions, and return in three days to my headquarters at altkirch. you will find me alone precisely at six o'clock in the evening." fauche immediately departed, arrived at bale, and informed me of all that had passed. i spent the night in writing a letter to general pichegru. (the prince de conde, who was invested with all the powers of louis xviii, except that of granting the 'cordon-bleu', had, by a note in his own handwriting, deputed to me all his powers, to enable me to maintain a negotiation with general pichegru). i therefore wrote to the general, stating, in the outset, everything that was calculated to awaken in him that noble sentiment of pride which is the instinct of great minds; and after pointing out to him the vast good it was in his power to effect, i spoke of the gratitude of the king, and the benefit he would confer on his country by restoring royalty. i told him that his majesty would make him a marshal of france, and governor of alsace, as no one could better govern the province than he who had so valiantly defended it. i added that he would have the 'cordon-rouge', the chateau de chambord, with its park, and twelve pieces of cannon taken from the austrians, a million of ready money, 200,000 livres per annum, and an hotel in paris; that the town of arbors, pichegru's native place, should bear his name, and be exempt from all taxation for twenty-five years; that a pension of 200,000 livres would be granted to him, with half reversion to his wife, and 50,000 livres to his heirs for ever, until the extinction of his family. such were the offers, made in the name of the king, to general pichegru. (then followed the boons to be granted to the officers and soldiers, an amnesty to the people, etc). i added that the prince de conde desired that he would proclaim the king in the camps, surrender the city of huningen to him, and join him for the purpose of marching on paris. pichegru, having read my letter with great attention, said to fauche, "this is all very well; but who is this m. de montgaillard who talks of being thus authorised? i neither know him nor his signature. is he the author?"--"yes," replied fauche. "but," said pichegru, "i must, before making any negotiation on my part, be assured that the prince de conde, with whose handwriting i am well acquainted, approves of all that has been written in his name by m. de montgaillard. return directly to m. de montgaillard, and tell him to communicate my answer to the prince." fauche immediately departed, leaving m. courant with pichegru. he arrived at bale at nine o'clock in the evening. i set off directly for malheim, the prince de conde's headquarters, and arrived there at half-past twelve. the prince was in bed, but i awoke him. he made me sit down by his bedside, and our conference then commenced. after having informed the prince of the state of affairs, all that remained was to prevail on him to write to general pichegru to confirm the truth of what had been stated in his name. this matter, which appeared so simple, and so little liable to objection, occupied the whole night. the prince, as brave a man as can possibly be, inherited nothing from the great conde but his undaunted courage. in other respects he is the most insignificant of men; without resources of mind, or decision of character; surrounded by men of mediocrity, and even baseness; and though he knows them well, he suffers himself to be governed by them. it required nine hours of hard exertion on my part to get him to write to general pichegru a letter of eight lines. 1st. he did not wish it to be in his handwriting. 2d. he objected to dating it 3d. he was unwilling to call him general, lest he should recognise the republic by giving that title. 4th. he did not like to address it, or affix his seal to it. at length he consented to all, and wrote to pichegru that he might place full confidence in the letters of the comte de montgaillard. when all this was settled, after great difficulty, the prince next hesitated about sending the letter; but at length he yielded. i set off for bale, and despatched fauche to altkirch, to general pichegru. the general, after reading the letter of eight lines, and recognising the handwriting and signature, immediately returned it to fauche, saying, "i have seen the signature: that is enough for me. the word of the prince is a pledge with which every frenchman ought to be satisfied. take back his letter." he then inquired what was the prince's wish. fauche explained that he wished--1st. that pichegru should proclaim the king to his troops, and hoist the white flag. 2d. that he should deliver up huningen to the prince. pichegru objected to this. "i will never take part in such a plot," said he; "i have no wish to make the third volume of la fayette and dumouriez. i know my resources; they are as certain as they are vast. their roots are not only in my army, but in paris, in the convention, in the departments, and in the armies of those generals, my colleagues, who think as i do. i wish to do nothing by halves. there must be a complete end of the present state of things. france cannot continue a republic. she must have a king, and that king must be louis xviii. but we must not commence the counter revolution until we are certain of effecting it. 'surely and rightly' is my motto. the prince's plan leads to nothing. he would be driven from huningen in four days, and in fifteen i should be lost. my army is composed both of good men and bad. we must distinguish between them, and, by a bold stroke, assure the former of the impossibility of drawing back, and that their only safety lies in success. for this purpose i propose to pass the rhine, at any place and any time that may be thought necessary. in the advance i will place those officers on whom i can depend, and who are of my way of thinking. i will separate the bad, and place them in situations where they can do no harm, and their position shall be such as to prevent them from uniting. that done, as soon as i shall be on the other side of the rhine, i will proclaim the king, and hoist the white flag. conde's corps and the emperor's army will then join us. i will immediately repass the rhine, and re-enter france. the fortresses will be surrendered, and will be held in the king's name by the imperial troops. having joined conde's army, i immediately advance. all my means now develop themselves on every side. we march upon paris, and in a fortnight will be there. but it is necessary that you should know that you must give the french soldier wine and a crown in his hand if you would have him cry 'vive le roi! nothing must be wanting at the first moment. my army must be well paid as far as the fourth or fifth march in the french territory. there go and tell all this to the prince, show my handwriting, and bring me back his answer." during these conferences pichegru was surrounded by four representatives of the people, at the head of whom was merlin de thionville, the most insolent and the most ferocious of inquisitors. these men, having the orders of the committee, pressed pichegru to pass the rhine and go and besiege manheim, where merlin had an understanding with the inhabitants. thus, if on the one hand the committee by its orders made pichegru wish to hasten the execution of his plan, on the other he had not a moment to lose; for to delay obeying the orders of the four representatives was to render himself suspected. every consideration, therefore, called upon the prince to decide, and decide promptly. good sense required him also to do another thing, namely, to examine without prejudice what sort of man pichegru was, to consider the nature of the sacrifice he made, and what were his propositions. europe acknowledged his talents, and he had placed the prince in a condition to judge of his good faith. besides, his conduct and his plan afforded fresh proofs of his sincerity. by passing the rhine and placing himself between the armies of conde and wurmser, he rendered desertion impossible; and, if success did not attend his attempt, his own acts forced him to become an emigrant. he left in the power of his fierce enemies his wife, his father, his children. everything bore testimony to his honesty; the talents he had shown were a pledge for his genius, his genius for his resources; and the sacrifices he would have to make in case of failure proved that he was confident of success. what stupid conceit was it for any one to suppose himself better able to command pichegru's army than pichegru himself!--to pretend to be better acquainted with the frontier provinces than pichegru, who commanded them, and had placed his friends in them as commanders of the towns! this self-conceit, however, ruined the monarchy at this time, as well as at so many others. the prince de conde, after reading the plan, rejected it in toto. to render it successful it was necessary to make the austrians parties to it. this pichegru exacted, but the prince of conde would not hear a word of it, wishing to have confined to himself the glory of effecting the counter-revolution. he replied to pichegru by a few observations, and concluded his answer by returning to his first plan--that pichegru should proclaim the king without passing the rhine, and should give up huningen; that then the army of conde by itself, and without the aid of the austrians, would join him. in that case he could promise 100,000 crowns in louis, which he had at bale, and 1,400,000 livres, which he had in good bills payable at sight. no argument or entreaty had any effect on the prince de conde. the idea of communicating his plan to wurmser and sharing his glory with him rendered him blind and deaf to every consideration. however, it was necessary to report to pichegru the observations of the prince de conde, and courant was commissioned to do so. this document appeared so interesting to me that while bonaparte was sleeping i was employed in copying it. notwithstanding posterior and reiterated denials of its truth, i believe it to be perfectly correct. napoleon had ordered plans of his most famous battles to be engraved, and had paid in advance for them. the work was not done quickly enough for him. he got angry, and one day said to his geographer, bacler d'albe, whom he liked well enough, "ah! do hurry yourself, and think all this is only the business of a moment. if you make further delay you will sell nothing; everything is soon forgotten!" we were now in july, and the negotiations were carried on with a tardiness which showed that something was kept in reserve on both sides. bonaparte at this time was anything but disposed to sign a peace, which he always hoped to be able to make at vienna, after a campaign in germany, seconded by the armies of the rhine and the sambre-et-meuse. the minority of the directory recommended peace on the basis of the preliminaries, but the majority wished for more honourable and advantageous terms; while austria, relying on troubles breaking out in france, was in no haste to conclude a treaty. in these circumstances bonaparte drew up a letter to be sent to the emperor of austria, in which he set forth the moderation of france; but stated that, in consequence of the many delays, nearly all hope of peace had vanished. he advised the emperor not to rely on difficulties arising in france, and doubted, if war should continue and the emperor be successful in the next campaign, that he would obtain a more advantageous peace than was now at his option. this letter was never sent to the emperor, but was communicated as the draft of a proposed despatch to the directory. the emperor francis, however, wrote an autograph letter to the general-in-chief of the army of italy, which will be noticed when i come to the period of its reception. it is certain that bonaparte at this time wished for war. he was aware that the cabinet of vienna was playing with him, and that the austrian ministers expected some political convulsion in paris, which they hoped would be favourable to the bourbons. he therefore asked for reinforcements. his army consisted of 35,900 men, and he desired it to be raised to 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry ready for the field. general desaix, profiting by the preliminaries of leoben, came in the end of july to visit the scene of the army of italy's triumphs. his conversations with bonaparte respecting the army of the rhine were far from giving him confidence in his military situation in italy, or assurance of support from that army in the event of hostilities commencing beyond the mountains. it was at this period that their intimacy began. bonaparte conceived for desaix the greatest esteem and the sincerest friendship. --[desaix discontented with the conduct of affairs in germany, seceded from the army of the rhine, to which he belonged, to join that of napoleon. he was sent to italy to organise the part of the egyptian expedition starting from civita vecchia. he took with him his two aides de camp, rapp and savary (later duc de rovigo), both of whom, on his death, were given the same post with bonaparte.]-when desaix was named temporary commander of the force called the army of england, during the absence of general bonaparte, the latter wrote to the directory that they could not have chosen a more distinguished officer than desaix; these sentiments he never belied. the early death of desaix alone could break their union, which, i doubt not, would eventually have had great influence on the political and military career of general bonaparte. all the world knows the part which the general-in-chief of the army of italy took at the famous crisis of the 18th fructidor; his proclamation, his addresses to the army, and his celebrated order of the day. bonaparte went much into detail on this subject at st. helena; and i shall now proceed to state what i knew at the time respecting that memorable event, which was in preparation in the month of june. chapter viii. 1797. the royalists of the interior--bonaparte's intention of marching on paris with 25,000 men--his animosity against the emigrants and the clichy club--his choice between the two parties of the directory- augereau's order of the day against the word 'monsieur'--bonaparte wishes to be made one of the five directors--he supports the majority of the directory--la vallette, augereau, and bernadotte sent to paris--interesting correspondence relative to the 18th fructidor. bonaparte had long observed the struggle which was going on between the partisans of royalty and the republic. he was told that royalism was everywhere on the increase. all the generals who returned from paris to the army complained of the spirit of reaction they had noticed. bonaparte was constantly urged by his private correspondents to take one side or the other, or to act for himself. he was irritated by the audacity of the enemies of the republic, and he saw plainly that the majority of the councils had an evident ill-will towards him. the orators of the club of clichy missed no opportunity of wounding his selflove in speeches and pamphlets. they spared no insults, disparaged his success, and bitterly censured his conduct in italy, particularly with respect to venice. thus his services were recompensed by hatred or ingratitude. about this time he received a pamphlet, which referred to the judgments pronounced upon him by the german journals, and more particularly by the spectator of the north, which he always made me translate. bonaparte was touched to the quick by the comparison made between him and moreau, and by the wish to represent him as foolhardy ("savants sous moreau, fougueuse sous buonaparte"). in the term of "brigands," applied to the generals who fought in la vendee, he thought he recognized the hand of the party he was about to attack and overthrow. he was tired of the way in which moreau's system of war was called "savants." but what grieved him still more was to see sitting in the councils of the nation frenchmen who were detractors and enemies of the national glory. he urged the directory to arrest the emigrants, to destroy the influence of foreigners, to recall the armies, to suppress the journals sold to england, such as the 'quotidienne', the 'memorial', and the 'the', which he accused of being more sanguinary than marat ever was. in case of there being no means of putting a stop to assassinations and the influence of louis xviii., he offered to resign. his resolution of passing the alps with 25,000 men and marching by lyons and paris was known in the capital, and discussions arose respecting the consequences of this passage of another rubicon. on the 17th of august 1797 carnot wrote to him: "people attribute to you a thousand absurd projects. they cannot believe that a man who has performed so many great exploits can be content to live as a private citizen." this observation applied to bonaparte's reiterated request to be permitted to retire from the service on account of the state of his health, which, he said, disabled him from mounting his horse, and to the need which he constantly urged of having two years' rest. the general-in-chief was justly of opinion that the tardiness of the negotiations and the difficulties which incessantly arose were founded on the expectation of an event which would change the government of france, and render the chances of peace more favourable to austria. he still urgently recommended the arrest of the emigrants, the stopping of the presses of the royalist journals, which he said were sold to england and austria, the suppression of the clichy club. this club was held at the residence of gerard desodieres, in the rue de clichy. aubry was one of its warmest partisans, and he was the avowed enemy of the revolutionary cause which bonaparte advocated at this period. aubry's conduct at this time, together with the part he had taken in provoking bonaparte's dismissal in 1795, inspired the general with an implacable hatred of him. bonaparte despised the directory, which he accused of weakness, indecision, pusillanimity, wasteful expenditure, of many errors, and perseverance in a system degrading to the national glory. --[the directory merited those accusations. the following sketches of two of their official sittings present a singular contrast: "at the time that the directory were first installed in the luxembourg (27th october 1795)." says m. baileul, "there was hardly a single article of furniture in it. in a small room, round a little broken table, one of the legs of which had given way from age, on which table they had deposited a quire of letter-paper, and a writing desk 'a calamet', which luckily they had had the precaution to bring with them from the committee of public safety, seated on four rush-bottomed chairs, in front of some logs of wood ill-lighted, the whole borrowed from the porter dupont; who would believe that it was in this deplorable condition that the members of the new government, after having examined all the difficulties, nay, let me add, all the horrors of their situation, resolved to confront all obstacles, and that they would either deliver france from the abyss in which she was plunged or perish in the attempt? they drew up on a sheet of letter-paper the act by which they declared themselves constituted, and immediately forwarded it to the legislative bodies." and the comte de la vallette, writing to m. cuvillier fleury, says: "i saw our five kings, dressed in the robes of francis i., his hat, his pantaloons, and his lace: the face of la reveilliere looked like a cork upon two pins, with the black and greasy hair of clodion. m. de talleyrand, in pantaloons of the colour of wine dregs, sat in a folding chair at the feet of the director barras, in the court of the petit luxembourg, and gravely presented to his sovereigns as ambassador from the grand duke of tuscany, while the french were eating his master's dinner, from the soup to the cheese. at the right hand there were fifty musicians and singers of the opera, laine, lays, regnault, and the actresses, not all dead of old age, roaring a patriotic cantata to the music of mehul. facing them, on another elevation, there were two hundred young and beautiful women, with their arms and bosoms bare, all in ecstasy at the majesty of our pentarchy and the happiness of the republic. they also wore tight flesh-coloured pantaloons, with rings on their toes. that was a sight that never will be seen again. a fortnight after this magnificent fete, thousands of families wept over their banished fathers, forty-eight departments were deprived of their representatives, and forty editors of newspapers were forced to go and drink the waters of the elbe, the synamary or the ohio! it would be a curious disquisition to seek to discover what really were at that time the republic and liberty."] he knew that the clichy party demanded his dismissal and arrest. he was given to understand that dumolard was one of the most decided against him, and that, finally, the royalist party was on the point of triumphing. before deciding for one party or the other bonaparte first thought of himself. he did not imagine that he had yet achieved enough to venture on possessing himself of that power which certainly he might easily have obtained. he therefore contented himself with joining the party which was, for the moment, supported by public opinion. i know he was determined to march upon paris with 25,000 men had affairs taken a turn unfavourable to the republic, which he preferred to royalty. he cautiously formed his plan. to defend the directory was, he conceived, to defend his own future fortune; that is to say, it was protecting a power which appeared to have no other object than to keep a place for him until his return. the parties which rose up in paris produced a reaction in the army. the employment of the word 'monsieur' had occasioned quarrels, and even bloodshed. general augereau, in whose division these contests had taken place, published an order of the day, setting forth that every individual in his division who should use the word 'monsieur', either verbally or in writing, under any pretence whatever, should be deprived of his rank, and declared incapable of serving in the republican armies. this order was read at the head of each company. bonaparte viewed the establishment of peace as the close of his military career. repose and inactivity were to him unbearable. he sought to take part in the civil affairs of the republic, and was desirous of becoming one of the five directors, convinced that, if he obtained that object, he would speedily stand single and alone. the fulfilment of this wish would have prevented the egyptian expedition, and placed the imperial crown much sooner upon his head. intrigues were carried on in paris in his name, with the view of securing to him a legal dispensation on the score of age. he hoped, though he was but eight-and-twenty, to supersede one of the two directors who were to go out of office. --[the directors had to be forty years of age before they could be appointed.]-his brothers and their friends made great exertions for the success of the project, which, however, was not officially proposed, because it was too adverse to the prevailing notions of the day, and seemed too early a violation of the constitution of the year iii., which, nevertheless, was violated in another way a few months after. the members of the directory were by no means anxious to have bonaparte for their colleague. they dissembled, and so did he. both parties were lavish of their mutual assurances of friendship, while they cordially hated each other. the directory, however, appealed for the support of bonaparte, which he granted; but his subsequent conduct clearly proves that the maintenance of the constitution of the year iii. was a mere pretext. he indeed defended it meanwhile, because, by aiding the triumph of the opposite party, he could not hope to preserve the influence which he exercised over the directory. i know well that, in case of the clichy party gaining the ascendency, he was determined to cross the alps with his army, and to assemble all the friends of the republic at lyons, thence to march upon paris. in the memorial of st. helena it is stated, in reference to the 18th fructidor, "that the triumph of the majority of the councils was his desire and hope, we are inclined to believe from the following fact, viz., that at the crisis of the contest between the two factions a secret resolution was drawn up by three of the members of the directory, asking him for three millions to support the attack on the councils, and that napoleon, under various pretences, did not send the money, though he might easily have done so." this is not very comprehensible. there was no secret resolution of the members who applied for the three millions. it was bonaparte who offered the money, which, however, he did not send; it was he who despatched augereau; and he who wished for the triumph of the directorial majority. his memory served him badly at st. helena, as will be seen from some correspondence which i shall presently submit to the reader. it is very certain that he did offer the money to the directory; that is to say, to three of its members. --[barras, la revelliere-lepaux, and rewbell, the three directors who carried out the 'coup d'etat' of the 18th fructidor against their colleagues carnot and bartholemy. (see thiers' french revolution", vol. v. pp. 114,139, and 163.)]-bonaparte had so decidedly formed his resolution that on the 17th of july, wishing to make augereau his confidant, he sent to vicenza for him by an extraordinary courier. bonaparte adds that when bottot, the confidential agent of barras, came to passeriano, after the 18th fructidor, he declared to him that as soon as la vallette should make him acquainted with the real state of things the money should be transmitted. the inaccuracy of these statements will be seen in the correspondence relative to the event. in thus distorting the truth napoleon's only object could have been to proclaim his inclination for the principles he adopted and energetically supported from the year 1800, but which, previously to that period, he had with no less energy opposed. he decidedly resolved to support the majority of the directory, and to oppose the royalist faction; the latter, which was beginning to be important, would have been listened to had it offered power to him. about the end of july he sent his 'aide de camp' la vallette to paris. la vallette was a man of good sense and education, pleasing manners, pliant temper, and moderate opinions. he was decidedly devoted to bonaparte. with his instructions he received a private cipher to enable him to correspond with the general-in-chief. augereau went after la vallette, on the 27th of july. bonaparte officially wrote to the directory that augereau "had solicited leave to go to paris on his own private business." but the truth is, augereau was sent expressly to second the revolution which was preparing against the clichy party and the minority of the directory. bonaparte made choice of augereau because he knew his staunch republican principles, his boldness, and his deficiency in political talent. he thought him well calculated to aid a commotion, which his own presence with the army of italy prevented him from directing in person; and besides, augereau was not an ambitious rival who might turn events to his own advantage. napoleon said, at st. helena, that he sent the addresses of the army of italy by augereau because he was a decided supporter of the opinions of the day. that was the true reason for choosing him. bernadotte was subsequently despatched on the same errand. bonaparte's pretence for sending him was, that he wished to transmit to the directory four flags, which, out of the twenty-one taken at the battle of rivoli, had been left, by mistake, at peschiera. bernadotte, however, did not take any great part in the affair. he was always prudent. the crisis of the 18th fructidor, which retarded for three years the extinction of the pentarchy, presents one of the most remarkable events of its short existence. it will be seen how the directors extricated themselves from this difficulty. i subjoin the correspondence relating to this remarkable episode of our revolution, cancelling only such portions of it as are irrelevant to the subject. it exhibits several variations from the accounts given by napoleon at st. helena to his noble companions in misfortune. augereau thus expressed himself on the 18th fructidor (4th september 1797):- at length, general, my mission is accomplished, and the promises of the army of italy are fulfilled. the fear of being anticipated has caused measures to be hurried. at midnight i despatched orders to all the troops to march towards the points specified. before day all the bridges and principal places were planted with cannon. at daybreak the halls of the councils were surrounded, the guards of the councils were amicably mingled with our troops, and the members, of whom i send you a list, were arrested and conveyed to the temple. the greater number have escaped, and are being pursued. carnot has disappeared.' --[in 1824 louis xviii. sent letters of nobility to those members of the two councils who were, as it was termed, 'fructidorized'. --bourrienne]- paris is tranquil, and every one is astounded at an event which promised to be awful, but which has passed over like a fete. the stout patriots of the faubourgs proclaim the safety of the republic, and the black collars are put down. it now remains for the wise energy of the directory and the patriots of the two councils to do the rest. the place of sitting is changed, and the first operations promise well. this event is a great step towards peace; which it is your task finally to secure to us. on the 24th fructidor (10th september 1797) augereau writes: my 'aide de camp', de verine, will acquaint you with the events of the 18th. he is also to deliver to you some despatches from the directory, where much uneasiness is felt at not hearing from you. no less uneasiness is experienced on seeing in paris one of your 'aides de camp',--(la vallette)--whose conduct excites the dissatisfaction and distrust of the patriots, towards whom he has behaved very ill. the news of general clarke's recall will have reached you by this time, and i suspect has surprised you. amongst the thousand and one motives which have determined the government to take this step may be reckoned his correspondence with carnot, which has been communicated to me, and in which he treated the generals of the army of italy as brigands. moreau has sent the directory a letter which throws a new light on pichegru's treason. such baseness is hardly to be conceived. the government perseveres in maintaining the salutary measures which it has adopted. i hope it will be in vain for the remnant of the factions to renew their plots. the patriots will continue united. fresh troops having been summoned to paris, and my presence at their head being considered indispensable by the government, i shall not have the satisfaction of seeing you so soon as i hoped. this has determined me to send for my horses and carriages, which i left at milan. bernadotte wrote to bonaparte on the 24th fructidor as follows:- the arrested deputies are removed to rochefort, where they will be embarked for the island of madagascar. paris is tranquil. the people at first heard of the arrest of the deputies with indifference. a feeling of curiosity soon drew them into the streets; enthusiasm followed, and cries of 'vive la republique', which had not been heard for a long time, now resounded in every street. the neighbouring departments have expressed their discontent. that of allier has, it is said, protested; but it will cut a fine figure. eight thousand men are marching to the environs of paris. part is already within the precincts; under the orders of general lemoine. the government has it at present in its power to elevate public spirit; but everybody feels that it is necessary the directory should be surrounded by tried and energetic republicans. unfortunately a host of men, without talent and resources, already suppose that what has taken place has been done only in order to advance their interests. time is necessary to set all to rights. the armies have regained consistency. the soldiers of the interior are esteemed, or at least feared. the emigrants fly, and the non juring priests conceal themselves. nothing could have happened more fortunately to consolidate the republic. bonaparte wrote as follows, to the directory on the 26th fructidor: herewith you will receive a proclamation to the army, relative to the events of the 18th. i have despatched the 45th demi-brigade, commanded by general bon, to lyons, together with fifty cavalry; also general lannes, with the 20th light infantry and the 9th regiment of the line, to marseilles. i have issued the enclosed proclamation in the southern departments. i am about to prepare a proclamation for the inhabitants of lyons, as soon as i obtain some information of what may have passed there. if i find there is the least disturbance, i will march there with the utmost rapidity. believe that there are here a hundred thousand men, who are alone sufficient to make the measures you have taken to place liberty on a solid basis be respected. what avails it that we gain victories if we are not respected in our country. in speaking of paris, one may parody what cassius said of rome: "of what use to call her queen on the banks of the seine, when she is the slave of pitt's gold?" after the 18th fructidor augereau wished to have his reward for his share in the victory, and for the service which he had rendered. he wished to be a director. he got, however, only the length of being a candidate; honour enough for one who had merely been an instrument on that day. chapter ix. 1797. bonaparte's joy at the result of the 18th fructidor.--his letter to augereau--his correspondence with the directory and proposed resignation--explanation of the directory--bottot--general clarke- letter from madame bacciocchi to bonaparte--autograph letter of the emperor francis to bonaparte--arrival of count cobentzel--autograph note of bonaparte on the conditions of peace. bonaparte was delighted when he heard of the happy issue of the 18th fructidor. its result was the dissolution of the legislative body and the fall of the clichyan party, which for some months had disturbed his tranquillity. the clichyans had objected to joseph bonaparte's right to sit as deputy for liamone in the council of five hundred. --[he was ambassador to rome, and not a deputy at this time. when he became a member of the council, after his return from rome, he experienced no opposition (bourrienne et ses erreurs, tome i. p. 240).]-his brother's victory removed the difficulty; but the general-in-chief soon perceived that the ascendant party abused its power, and again compromised the safety of the republic, by recommencing the revolutionary government. the directors were alarmed at his discontent and offended by his censure. they conceived the singular idea of opposing to bonaparte, augereau, of whose blind zeal they had received many proofs. the directory appointed augereau commander of the army of germany. augereau, whose extreme vanity was notorious, believed himself in a situation to compete with bonaparte. what he built his arrogance on was, that, with a numerous troop, he had arrested some unarmed representatives, and torn the epaulettes from the shoulders of the commandant of the guard of the councils. the directory and he filled the headquarters at passeriano with spies and intriguers. bonaparte, who was informed of everything that was going on, laughed at the directory, and tendered his resignation, in order that he might be supplicated to continue in command. the following post-thermidorian letters will prove that the general's judgment on this point was correct. on the 2d vendemiaire, year vi. (23d september 1797), he wrote to augereau, after having announced the arrival of his 'aide de camp' as follows: the whole army applauds the wisdom and vigour which you have displayed upon this important occasion, and participates in the success of the country with the enthusiasm and energy which characterise our soldiers. it is only to be hoped, however, that the government will not be playing at see saw, and thus throw itself into the opposite party. wisdom and moderate views alone can establish the happiness of the country on a sure foundation. as for myself, this is the most ardent wish of my heart. i beg that you will sometimes let me know what you are doing in paris. on the 4th vendemiaire bonaparte wrote a letter to the directory in the following terms: the day before yesterday an officer arrived at the army from paris. he reported that he left paris on the 25th, when anxiety prevailed there as to the feelings with which i viewed the events of the 18th he was the bearer of a sort of circular from general augereau to all the generals of division; and he brought a letter of credit from the minister of war to the commissary-general, authorising him to draw as much money as he might require for his journey. it is evident from these circumstances that the government is acting towards me in somewhat the same way in which pichegru was dealt with after vendemiaire (year iv.). i beg of you to receive my resignation, and appoint another to my place. no power on earth shall make me continue in the service after this shocking mark of ingratitude on the part of the government, which i was very far from expecting. my health, which is considerably impaired, imperiously demands repose and tranquillity. the state of my mind, likewise, requires me to mingle again in the mass of citizens. great power has for a long time been confided to my hands. i have employed it on all occasions for the advantage of my country; so much the worse for those who put no faith in virtue, and may have suspected mine. my recompense is in my own conscience, and in the opinion of posterity. now that the country is tranquil and free from the dangers which have menaced it, i can, without inconvenience, quit the post in which i have been placed. be sure that if there were a moment of danger, i would be found in the foremost rank of the defenders of liberty and of the constitution of the year iii. the directory, judging from the account which bottot gave of his mission that he had not succeeded in entirely removing the suspicions of bonaparte, wrote the following letter on the 30th vendemiaire: the directory has itself been troubled about the impression made on you by the letter to the paymaster-general, of which an 'aide de camp' was the bearer. the composition of this letter has very much astonished the government, which never appointed nor recognised such an agent: it is at least an error of office. but it should not alter the opinion you ought otherwise to entertain of the manner in which the directory thinks of and esteems you. it appears that the 18th fructidor was misrepresented in the letters which were sent to the army of italy. you did well to intercept them, and it may be right to transmit the most remarkable to the minister of police. --(what an ignoble task to propose to the conqueror of italy.) in your observations on the too strong tendency of opinion towards military government, the directory recognises an equally enlightened and ardent friend of the republic. nothing is wiser than the maxim, 'cedant arma togae', for the maintenance of republics. to show so much anxiety on so important a point is not one of the least glorious features in the life of a general placed at the head of a triumphant army. the directory had sent general clarke --[h. j. g. clarke, afterwards minister of war under napoleon, 1807-1814, and under the bourbons in 1816, when he was made a marshal of france. he was created duc de feltre in 1819.]-to treat for peace, as second plenipotentiary. bonaparte has often told me he had no doubt from the time of his arrival that general clarke was charged with a secret mission to act as a spy upon him, and even to arrest him if an opportunity offered for so doing without danger. that he had a suspicion of this kind is certain; but i must own that i was never by any means able to discover its grounds; for in all my intercourse since with clarke he never put a single question to me, nor did i ever hear a word drop from his mouth, which savoured of such a character. if the fact be that he was a spy, he certainly played his part well. in all the parts of his correspondence which were intercepted there never was found the least confirmation of this suspicion. be this as it may, bonaparte could not endure him; he did not make him acquainted with what was going on, and his influence rendered this mission a mere nullity. the general-in-chief concentrated all the business of the negotiation in his own closet; and, as to what was going on, clarke continued a mere cipher until the 18th fructidor, when he was recalled. bonaparte made but little count of clarke's talents. it is but justice, however, to say that he bore him no grudge for the conduct of which he suspected he was guilty in italy. "i pardon him because i alone have the right to be offended." he even had the generosity to make interest for an official situation for him. these amiable traits were not uncommon with bonaparte. bonaparte had to encounter so many disagreeable contrarieties, both in the negotiators for peace and the events at paris, that he often displayed a good deal of irritation and disgust. this state of mind was increased by the recollection of the vexation his sister's marriage had caused him, and which was unfortunately revived by a letter he received from her at this juncture. his excitement was such that he threw it down with an expression of anger. it has been erroneously reported in several publications that "bacciocchi espoused marie-anne-eliza bonaparte on the 5th of may 1797. the brother of the bride was at the time negotiating the preliminaries of peace with austria." in fact, the preliminaries were signed in the month of april, and it was for the definitive peace we were negotiating in may. but the reader will find by the subjoined letter that christine applied to her brother to stand godfather to her third child. three children in three months would be rather quick work. ajaccio, 14th, thermidor, year v. (1st august 1797). general--suffer me to write to you and call you by the name of brother. my first child was born at a time when you were much incensed against us. i trust she may soon caress you, and so make you forget the pain my marriage has occasioned you. my second child was still-born. obliged to quit paris by your order, --[napoleon had written in august 1796 to carnot, to request that lucien might be ordered to quit paris; see iung, tome iii. p. 223.]- i miscarried in germany. in a month's time i hope to present you with a nephew. a favourable time, and other circumstances, incline me to hope my next will be a boy, and i promise you i will make a soldier of him; but i wish him to bear your name, and that you should be his godfather. i trust you will not refuse your sister's request. will you send, for this purpose, your power of attorney to bacciocchi, or to whomsoever you think fit? i shall expect with impatience your assent. because we are poor let not that cause you to despise us; for, after all, you are our brother, mine are the only children that call you uncle, and we all love you more than we do the favours of fortune. perhaps i may one day succeed in convincing you of the love i bear you.--your affectionate sister, christine bonaparte. --[madame bacciocchi went by the name of marianne at st. cyr, of christine while on her travels, and of eliza under the consulate.- bourrienne.]- p.s.--do not fail to remember me to your wife, whom i strongly desire to be acquainted with. they told me at paris i was very like her. if you recollect my features you can judge. c. b. this letter is in the handwriting of lucien bonaparte.' --[joseph bonaparte in his notes says, "it is false that madame bonaparte ever called herself christine; it is false that she ever wrote the letter of which m. de bourrienne here gives a copy." it will be observed that bourrienne says it was written by her brother lucien. this is an error. the letter is obviously from christine boyer, the wife of lucien bonaparte, whose marriage had given such displeasure to napoleon. (see erreurs, tome i. p. 240, and iung's lucien, tome i p. 161).]-general bonaparte had been near a month at passeriano when he received the following autograph letter from the emperor of austria: to monsieur le general bonaparte, general-in-chief of the army of italy. monsieur le general bonaparte--when i thought i had given my plenipotentiaries full powers to terminate the important negotiation with which they were charged, i learn, with as much pain as surprise, that in consequence of swerving continually from the stipulations of the preliminaries, the restoration of tranquillity, with the tidings of which i desire to gladden the hearts of my subjects, and which the half of europe devoutly prays for, becomes day after day more uncertain. faithful to the performance of my engagements, i am ready to execute what was agreed to at leoben, and require from you but the reciprocal performance of so sacred a duty. this is what has already been declared in my name, and what i do not now hesitate myself to declare. if, perhaps, the execution of some of the preliminary articles be now impossible, in consequence of the events which have since occurred, and in which i had no part, it may be necessary to substitute others in their stead equally adapted to the interests and equally conformable to the dignity of the two nations. to such alone will i put my hand. a frank and sincere explanation, dictated by the same feelings which govern me, is the only way to lead to so salutary a result. in order to accelerate this result as far as in me lies, and to put an end at once to the state of uncertainty we remain in, and which has already lasted too long, i have determined to despatch to the place of the present negotiations comte de cobentzel, a man who possesses my most unlimited confidence, and who is instructed as to my intentions and furnished with my most ample powers. i have authorised him to receive and accept every proposition tending to the reconciliation of the two parties which may be in conformity with the principles of equity and reciprocal fitness, and to conclude accordingly. after this fresh assurance of the spirit of conciliation which animates me, i doubt not you will perceive that peace lies in your own hands, and that on your determination will depend the happiness or misery of many thousand men. if i mistake as to the means i think best adapted to terminate the calamities which for along time have desolated europe, i shall at least have the consolation of reflecting that i have done all that depended on me. with the consequences which may result i can never be reproached. i have been particularly determined to the course i now take by the opinion i entertain of your upright character, and by the personal esteem i have conceived towards you, of which i am very happy, m. le general bonaparte, to give you here an assurance. (signed) francis. in fact, it was only on the arrival of the comte de cobentzel that the negotiations were seriously set on foot. bonaparte had all along clearly perceived that gallo and meerweldt were not furnished with adequate powers. he saw also clearly enough that if the month of september were to be trifled away in unsatisfactory negotiations, as the month which preceded it had been, it would be difficult in october to strike a blow at the house of austria on the side of carinthia. the austrian cabinet perceived with satisfaction the approach of the bad weather, and insisted more strongly on its ultimatum, which was the adige, with venice. before the 18th fructidor the emperor of austria hoped that the movement which was preparing in paris would operate badly for france and favourably to the european cause. the austrian plenipotentiaries, in consequence, raised their pretensions, and sent notes and an ultimatum which gave the proceedings more an air of trifling than of serious negotiation. bonaparte's original ideas, which i have under his hand, were as follows: 1. the emperor to have italy as far as the adda. 2. the king of sardinia as far as the adda. 3. the genoese republic to have the boundary of tortona as far as the po (tortona to be demolished), as also the imperial fiefs. (coni to be ceded to france, or to be demolished.) 4. the grand duke of tuscany to be restored. 5. the duke of parma to be restored. chapter x. 1797. influence of the 18th fructidor on the negotiations--bonaparte's suspicion of bottot--his complaints respecting the non-erasure of bourrienne--bourrienne's conversation with the marquis of gallo- bottot writes from paris to bonaparte on the part of the directory agents of the directory employed to watch bonaparte--influence of the weather on the conclusion of peace--remarkable observation of bonaparte--conclusion of the treaty--the directory dissatisfied with the terms of the peace--bonaparte's predilection for representative government--opinion on bonaparte. after the 18th fructidor bonaparte was more powerful, austria less haughty and confident. venice was the only point of real difficulty. austria wanted the line of the adige, with venice, in exchange for mayence, and the boundary of the rhine until that river enters holland. the directory wished to have the latter boundary, and to add mantua to the italian republic, without giving up all the line of the adige and venice. the difficulties were felt to be so irreconcilable that within about a month of the conclusion of peace the directory wrote to general bonaparte that a resumption of hostilities was preferable to the state of uncertainty which was agitating and ruining france. the directory, therefore, declared that both the armies of the rhine should take the field. it appears from the fructidorian correspondence, which has been already given, that the majority of the directory then looked upon a peace such as bonaparte afterwards made as infamous. but bonaparte, from the moment the venetian insurrection broke out, perceived that venice might be used for the pacification. bonaparte, who was convinced that, in order to bring matters to an issue, venice and the territory beyond the adige must fall beneath the hapsburg sceptre, wrote to the directory that he could not commence operations, advantageously, before the end of march, 1798; but that if the objections to giving venice to the emperor of austria were persisted in, hostilities would certainly be resumed in the month of october, for the emperor would not renounce venice. in that case it would be necessary to be ready on the rhine for an advance in germany, as the army of italy, if it could make head against the archduke charles, was not sufficiently strong for any operations on a grand scale. at this period the conclusion of peace was certainly very doubtful; it was even seriously considered in what form the rupture should be notified. towards the end of september bottot, barras' secretary, arrived at passeriano. he was despatched by the directory. bonaparte immediately suspected he was a new spy, come on a secret mission, to watch him. he was therefore received and treated with coolness; but bonaparte never had, as sir walter scott asserts, the idea of ordering him to be shot. that writer is also in error when he says that bottot was sent to passeriano to reproach bonaparte for failing to fulfil his promise of sending money to the directory. bonaparte soon gave bottot an opportunity of judging of the kind of spirit which prevailed at headquarters. he suddenly tendered his resignation, which he had already several times called upon the directory to accept. he accused the government, at table, in bottot's presence, of horrible ingratitude. he recounted all his subjects of complaint, in loud and impassioned language, without any restraint, and before twenty or thirty persons. indignant at finding that his reiterated demands for the erasure of my name from the list of emigrants had been slighted, and that, in spite of his representations, conveyed to paris by general bernadotte, louis bonaparte, and others, i was still included in that fatal list, he apostrophised m. bottot at dinner one day, before forty individuals, among whom were the diplomatists gallo, cobentzel, and meerweldt. the conversation turned upon the directory. "yes, truly," cried bonaparte, in a loud voice, "i have good reason to complain; and, to pass from great to little things, look, i pray you, at bourrienne's case. he possesses my most unbounded confidence. he alone is entrusted, under my orders, with all the details of the negotiation. this you well know; and yet your directory will not strike him off the list. in a word it is not only an inconceivable, but an extremely stupid piece of business; for he has all my secrets; he knows my ultimatum, and could by a single word realize a handsome fortune, and laugh at your obstinacy. ask m. de gallo if this be not true." bottot wished to offer some excuse; but the general murmur which followed this singular outburst reduced him to silence. the marquis de gallo had conversed with me but three days before, in the park of passeriano, on the subject of my position with regard to france, of the determination expressed by the directory not to erase my name, and of the risk i thereby ran. "we have no desire," continued he, "to renew the war; we wish sincerely for peace; but it must be an honourable one. the republic of venice presents a large territory for partition, which would be sufficient for both parties. the cessions at present proposed are not, however, satisfactory. we want to know bonaparte's ultimatum; and i am authorised to offer an estate in bohemia, with a title and residence, and an annual revenue of 90,000 florins." i quickly interrupted m. de gallo, and assured him that both my conscience and my duty obliged me to reject his proposal; and so put at once an end to the conversation. i took care to let the general-in-chief know this story, and he was not surprised at my reply. his conviction, however, was strong, from all that m. de gallo had said, and more particularly from the offer he had made, that austria was resolved to avoid war, and was anxious for peace. after i had retired to rest m. bottot came to my bedroom and asked me, with a feigned surprise, if it was true that my name was still on the list of emigrants. on my replying in the affirmative, he requested me to draw up a note on the subject. this i declined doing, telling him that twenty notes of the kind he required already existed; that i would take no further steps; and that i would henceforth await the decision in a state of perfect inaction. general bonaparte thought it quite inexplicable that the directory should express dissatisfaction at the view he took of the events of the 18th fructidor, as, without his aid, they would doubtless have been overcome. he wrote a despatch, in which he repeated that his health and his spirits were affected--that he had need of some years' repose-that he could no longer endure the fatigue of riding; but that the prosperity and liberty of his country would always command his warmest interests. in all this there was not a single word of truth. the directory thought as much, and declined to accept his resignation in the most flattering terms. bottot proposed to him, on the part of the directory, to revolutionise italy. the general inquired whether the whole of italy would be included in the plan. the revolutionary commission had, however, been entrusted to bottot in so indefinite a way that he could only hesitate, and give a vague reply. bonaparte wished for more precise orders. in the interval peace was concluded, and the idea of that perilous and extravagant undertaking was no longer agitated. bottot, soon after his return to paris, wrote a letter to general bonaparte, in which he complained that the last moments he had passed at passeriano had deeply afflicted his heart. he said that cruel suspicions had followed him even to the gates of the directory. these cruel suspicions had, however, been dissipated by the sentiments of admiration and affection which he had found the directory entertained for the person of bonaparte. these assurances, which were precisely what bonaparte had expected, did not avail to lessen the contempt he entertained for the heads of the government, nor to change his conviction of their envy and mistrust of himself. to their alleged affection he made no return. bottot assured the hero of italy of "the republican docility" of the directory, and touched upon the reproaches bonaparte had thrown out against them, and upon his demands which had not been granted. he said: "the three armies, of the north, of the rhine, and of the sambre-etmeuse, are to form only one, the army of germany.--augereau? but you yourself sent him. the fault committed by the directory is owing to yourself! bernadotte?--he is gone to join you. cacault?--he is recalled. twelve thousand men for your army?--they are on their march. the treaty with sardinia?--it is ratified. bourrienne?--he is erased. the revolution of italy?--it is adjourned. advise the directory, then: i repeat it, they have need of information, and it is to you they look for it." the assertion regarding me was false. for six months bonaparte demanded my erasure without being able to obtain it. i was not struck off the list until the 11th of november 1797. just before the close of the negotiation bonaparte, disgusted at the opposition and difficulties with which he was surrounded, reiterated again and again the offer of his resignation, and his wish to have a successor appointed. what augmented his uneasiness was an idea he entertained that the directory had penetrated his secret, and attributed his powerful concurrence on the 18th fructidor to the true cause--his personal views of ambition. in spite of the hypocritical assurances of gratitude made to him in writing, and though the directory knew that his services were indispensable, spies were employed to watch his movements, and to endeavour by means of the persons about him to discover his views. some of the general's friends wrote to him from paris, and for my part i never ceased repeating to him that the peace, the power of making which he had in his own hands, would render him far more popular than the renewal of hostilities undertaken with all the chances of success and reverse. the signing of the peace, according to his own ideas, and in opposition to those of the directory, the way in which he just halted at rastadt, and avoided returning to the congress, and, finally, his resolution to expatriate himself with an army in order to attempt new enterprises, sprung more than is generally believed from the ruling idea that he was distrusted, and that his ruin was meditated. he often recalled to mind what la vallette had written to him about his conversation with lacuã©e; and all he saw and heard confirmed the impression he had received on this subject. the early appearance of bad weather precipitated his determination. on the 13th of october, at daybreak, on opening my window, i perceived the mountains covered with snow. the previous night had been superb, and the autumn till then promised to be fine and late. i proceeded, as i always did, at seven o'clock in the morning, to the general's chamber. i woke him, and told him what i had seen. he feigned at first to disbelieve me, then leaped from his bed, ran to the window, and, convinced of the sudden change, he calmly said, "what! before the middle of october! what a country is this! well, we must make peace!" while he hastily put on his clothes i read the journals to him, as was my daily custom. he paid but little attention to them. shutting himself up with me in his closet, he reviewed with the greatest care all the returns from the different corps of his army. "here are," said he, "nearly 80,000 effective men. i feed, i pay them: but i can bring but 60,000 into the field on the day of battle. i shall gain it, but afterwards my force will be reduced 20,000 men--by killed, wounded, and prisoners. then how oppose all the austrian forces that will march to the protection of vienna? it would be a month before the armies of the rhine could support me, if they should be able; and in a fortnight all the roads and passages will be covered deep with snow. it is settled--i will make peace. venice shall pay for the expense of the war and the boundary of the rhine: let the directory and the lawyers say what they like." he wrote to the directory in the following words: "the summits of the hills are covered with snow; i cannot, on account of the stipulations agreed to for the recommencement of hostilities, begin before five-andtwenty days, and by that time we shall be overwhelmed with snow." fourteen years after, another early winter, in a more severe climate, was destined to have a fatal influence on his fortunes. had he but then exercised equal foresight! it is well known that, by the treaty of campo-formio, the two belligerent powers made peace at the expense of the republic of venice, which had nothing to do with the quarrel in the first instance, and which only interfered at a late period, probably against her own inclination, and impelled by the force of inevitable circumstances. but what has been the result of this great political spoliation? a portion of the venetian territory was adjudged to the cisalpine republic; it is now in the possession of austria. another considerable portion, and the capital itself, fell to the lot of austria in compensation for the belgic provinces and lombard, which she ceded to france. austria has now retaken lombard, and the additions then made to it, and belgium is in the possession of the house of orange. france obtained corfu and some of the ionian isles; these now belong to england. --[afterwards to be ceded by her to greece. belgium is free.]-romulus never thought he was founding rome for goths and priests. alexander did not foresee that his egyptian city would belong to the turks; nor did constantine strip rome for the benefit of mahomet ii. why then fight for a few paltry villages? thus have we been gloriously conquering for austria and england. an ancient state is overturned without noise, and its provinces, after being divided among different bordering states, are now all under the dominion of austria. we do not possess a foot of ground in all the fine countries we conquered, and which served as compensations for the immense acquisitions of the house of hapsburgh in italy. thus that house was aggrandised by a war which was to itself most disastrous. but austria has often found other means of extending her dominion than military triumphs, as is recorded in the celebrated distich of mathias corvinus: "bella gerunt alli, to felix austria nube; nam quae mars allis, dat tibi regna venus." ["glad austria wins by hymen's silken chain what other states by doubtful battle gain, and while fierce mars enriches meaner lands, receives possession from fair venus' hands."] the directory was far from being satisfied with the treaty of campoformio, and with difficulty resisted the temptation of not ratifying it. a fortnight before the signature the directors wrote to general bonaparte that they would not consent to give to the emperor venice, frioul, padua, and the 'terra firma' with the boundary of the adige. "that," said they, "would not be to make peace, but to adjourn the war. we shall be regarded as the beaten party, independently of the disgrace of abandoning venice, which bonaparte himself thought so worthy of freedom. france ought not, and never will wish, to see italy delivered up to austria. the directory would prefer the chances of a war to changing a single word of its ultimatum, which is already too favourable to austria." all this was said in vain. bonaparte made no scruple of disregarding his instructions. it has been said that the emperor of austria made an offer of a very considerable sum of money, and even of a principality, to obtain favourable terms. i was never able to find the slightest ground for this report, which refers to a time when the smallest circumstance could not escape my notice. the character of bonaparte stood too high for him to sacrifice his glory as a conqueror and peacemaker for even the greatest private advantage. this was so thoroughly known, and he was so profoundly esteemed by the austrian plenipotentiaries, that i will venture to say none of them would have been capable of making the slightest overture to him of so debasing a proposition. besides, it would have induced him to put an end to all intercourse with the plenipotentiaries. perhaps what i have just stated of m. de gallo will throw some light upon this odious accusation. but let us dismiss this story with the rest, and among them that of the porcelain tray, which was said to have been smashed and thrown at the head of m. de cobentzel. i certainly know nothing of any such scene; our manners at passeriano were not quite so bad! the presents customary on such occasions were given, and the emperor of austria also took that opportunity to present to general bonaparte six magnificent white horses. bonaparte returned to milan by way of gratz, laybach, triest, mestre, verona, and mantua. at this period napoleon was still swayed by the impulse of the age. he thought of nothing but representative governments. often has he said to me, "i should like the era of representative governments to be dated from my time." his conduct in italy and his proclamations ought to give, and in fact do give, weight to this account of his opinion. but there is no doubt that this idea was more connected with lofty views of ambition than a sincere desire for the benefit of the human race; for, at a later period, he adopted this phrase: "i should like to be the head of the most ancient of the dynasties of europe." what a difference between bonaparte, the author of the 'souper de beaucaire', the subduer of royalism at toulon; the author of the remonstrance to albitte and salicetti, the fortunate conqueror of the 13th vendemiaire, the instigator and supporter of the revolution of fructidor, and the founder of the republics of italy, the fruits of his immortal victories,--and bonaparte, first consul in 1800, consul for life in 1802, and, above all, napoleon, emperor of the french in 1804, and king of italy in 1805! chapter xi. 1797 effect of the 18th fructidor on the peace--the standard of the army of italy--honours rendered to the memory of general hoche and of virgil at mantua--remarkable letter--in passing through switzerland bonaparte visits the field of morat--arrival at rastadt--letter from the directory calling bonaparte to paris--intrigues against josephine--grand ceremony on the reception of bonaparte by the directory--the theatres--modesty of bonaparte--an assassination- bonaparte's opinion of the parisians--his election to the national institute--letter to camus--projects--reflections. the day of the 18th fructidor had, without any doubt, mainly contributed to the conclusion of peace at campo formio. on the one hand, the directory, hitherto not very pacifically inclined, after having effected a 'coup d'etat', at length saw the necessity of appeasing the discontented by giving peace to france. on the other hand, the cabinet of vienna, observing the complete failure of all the royalist plots in the interior, thought it high time to conclude with the french republic a treaty which, notwithstanding all the defeats austria had sustained, still left her a preponderating influence over italy. besides, the campaign of italy, so fertile in glorious achievements of arms, had not been productive of glory alone. something of greater importance followed these conquests. public affairs had assumed a somewhat unusual aspect, and a grand moral influence, the effect of victories and of peace, had begun to extend all over france. republicanism was no longer so sanguinary and fierce as it had been some years before. bonaparte, negotiating with princes and their ministers on a footing of equality, but still with all that superiority to which victory and his genius entitled him, gradually taught foreign courts to be familiar with republican france, and the republic to cease regarding all states governed by kings as of necessity enemies. in these circumstances the general-in-chief's departure and his expected visit to paris excited general attention. the feeble directory was prepared to submit to the presence of the conqueror of italy in the capital. it was for the purpose of acting as head of the french legation at the congress of rastadt that bonaparte quitted milan on the 17th of november. but before his departure he sent to the directory one of those monuments, the inscriptions on which may generally be considered as fabulous, but which, in this case, were nothing but the truth. this monument was the "flag of the army of italy," and to general joubert was assigned the honourable duty of presenting it to the members of the executive government. on one side of the flag were the words "to the army of italy, the grateful country." the other contained an enumeration of the battles fought and places taken, and presented, in the following inscriptions, a simple but striking abridgment of the history of the italian campaign. 150,000 prisoners; 170 standards; 550 pieces of siege artillery; 600 pieces of field artillery; five pontoon equipages; nine 64-gun ships; twelve 32-gun frigates; 12 corvettes; 18 galleys; armistice with the king of sardinia; convention with genoa; armistice with the duke of parma; armistice with the king of naples; armistice with the pope; preliminaries of leoben; convention of montebello with the republic of genoa; treaty of peace with the emperor of germany at campo-formio. liberty given to the people of bologna, ferrara, modena, massa carrara, la romagna, lombard, brescia, bergamo, mantua, cremona. part of the veronese, chiavena, bormio, the valteline, the genoese, the imperial fiefs, the people of the departments of corcyra, of the aegean sea, and of ithaca. sent to paris all the masterpieces of michael angelo, of guercino, of titian, of paul veronese, of correggio, of albana, of the carracci, of raphael, and of leonardo da vinci. thus were recapitulated on a flag, destined to decorate the hall of the public sittings of the directory, the military deeds of the campaign in italy, its political results, and the conquest of the monuments of art. most of the italian cities looked upon their conqueror as a liberator-such was the magic of the word liberty, which resounded from the alps to the apennines. on his way to mantua the general took up his residence in the palace of the ancient dukes. bonaparte promised the authorities of mantua that their department should be one of the most extensive; impressed on them the necessity of promptly organising a local militia, and of putting in execution the plans of mari, the mathematician, for the navigation of the mincio from mantua to peschiera. he stopped two days at mantua, and the morrow of his arrival was devoted to the celebration of a military funeral solemnity, in honour of general hoche, who had just died. his next object was to hasten the execution of the monument which was erecting to the memory of virgil. thus, in one day, he paid honour to france and italy, to modern and to ancient glory, to the laurels of war and to the laurels of poetry. a person who saw bonaparte on this occasion for the first time thus described him in a letter he wrote to paris:--"with lively interest and extreme attention i have observed this extraordinary man, who has performed such great deeds, and about whom there is something which seems to indicate that his career is not yet terminated. i found him very like his portraits--little, thin, pale, with an air of fatigue, but not of ill-health, as has been reported of him. he appears to me to listen with more abstraction than interest, and that he was more occupied with what he was thinking of than with what was said to him. there is great intelligence in his countenance, along with which may be marked an air of habitual meditation, which reveals nothing of what is passing within. in that thinking head, in that bold mind, it is impossible not to believe that some daring designs are engendering which will have their influence on the destinies of europe." from the last phrase, in particular, of this letter, one might suspect that it was written after bonaparte had made his name feared throughout europe; but it really appeared in a journal in the month of december 1797, a little before his arrival in paris. there exists a sort of analogy between celebrated men and celebrated places; it was not, therefore, an uninteresting spectacle to see bonaparte surveying the field of morat, where, in 1476, charles the bold, duke of burgundy, daring like himself, fell with his powerful army under the effects of helvetian valour. bonaparte slept during the night at maudon, where, as in every place through which he passed, the greatest honours were paid him. in the morning, his carriage having broken down, we continued our journey on foot, accompanied only by some officers and an escort of dragoons of the country. bonaparte stopped near the ossuary, and desired to be shown the spot where the battle of morat was fought. a plain in front of the chapel was pointed out to him. an officer who had served in france was present, and explained to him how the swiss, descending from the neighbouring mountains, were enabled, under cover of a wood, to turn the burgundian army and put it to the rout. "what was the force of that army?" asked bonaparte.--"sixty thousand men."--"sixty thousand men!" he exclaimed: "they ought to have completely covered these mountains!"--"the french fight better now," said lannes, who was one of the officers of his suite. "at that time," observed bonaparte, interrupting him, "the burgundians were not frenchmen." bonaparte's journey through switzerland was not without utility; and his presence served to calm more than one inquietude. he proceeded on his journey to rastadt by aix in savoy, berne, and bale. on arriving at berne during night we passed through a double file of well-lighted equipages, filled with beautiful women, all of whom raised the cry of "long live, bonaparte!--long live the pacificator!" "to have a proper idea of this genuine enthusiasm it is necessary to have seen it. the position in society to which his services had raised him rendered it unfit to address him in the second person singular and the familiar manner sometimes used by his old schoolfellows of brienne. i thought this very natural. m. de cominges, one of those who went with him to the military school at paris, and who had emigrated, was at bale. having learned our arrival, he presented himself without ceremony, with great indecorum, and with a complete disregard of the respect due to a man who had rendered himself so illustrious. general bonaparte, offended at this behaviour, refused to receive him again, and expressed himself to me with much warmth on the occasion of this visit. all my efforts to remove his displeasure were unavailing; this impression always continued, and he never did for m. de cominges what his means and the old ties of boyhood might well have warranted. on arriving at rastadt --[the conference for the formal peace with the empire of germany was held there. the peace of leoben was only one made with austria.]-bonaparte found a letter from the directory summoning him to paris. he eagerly obeyed this invitation, which drew him from a place where he could act only an insignificant part, and which he had determined to leave soon, never again to return. some time after his arrival in paris, on the ground that his presence was necessary for the execution of different orders, and the general despatch of business, he required that authority should be given to a part of his household, which he had left at rastadt, to return. how could it ever be said that the directory "kept general bonaparte away from the great interests which were under discussion at rastadt"? quite the contrary! the directory would have been delighted to see him return there, as they would then have been relieved from his presence in paris; but nothing was so disagreeable to bonaparte as long and seemingly interminable negotiations. such tedious work did not suit his character, and he had been sufficiently disgusted with similar proceedings at campoformio. on our arrival at rastadt i soon found that general bonaparte was determined to stay there only a short time. i therefore expressed to him my decided desire to remain in germany. i was then ignorant that my erasure from the emigrant list had been ordered on the 11th of november, as the decree did not reach the commissary of the executive directory at auxerre until the 17th of november, the day of our departure from milan. the silly pretext of difficulties by which my erasure, notwithstanding the reiterated solicitations of the victorious general, was so long delayed made me apprehensive of a renewal, under a weak and jealous pentarchy, of the horrible scenes of 1796. bonaparte said to me, in a tone of indignation, "come, pass the rhine; they will not dare to seize you while near me. i answer for your safety." on reaching paris i found that my erasure had taken place. it was at this period only that general bonaparte's applications in my favour were tardily crowned with success. sotin, the minister of general police, notified the fact to bonaparte; but his letter gave a reason for my erasure very different from that stated in the decree. the minister said that the government did not wish to leave among the names of traitors to their country the name of a citizen who was attached to the person of the conqueror of italy; while the decree itself stated as the motive for removing my name from the list that i never had emigrated. at st. helena it seems bonaparte said that he did not return from italy with more than 300,000 francs; but i assert that he had at that time in his possession something more than 3,000,000. --[joseph says that napoleon, when he exiled for egypt, left with him all his fortune, and that it was much nearer 300,000 francs than 3,000,000. (see erreurs, tome i. pp. 243, 259)]-how could he with 300,000 francs have been able to provide for the extensive repairs, the embellishment, and the furnishing of his house in the rue chantereine? how could he have supported the establishment he did with only 15,000 francs of income and the emoluments of his rank? the excursion which he made along the coast, of which i have yet to speak, of itself cost near 12,000 francs in gold, which he transferred to me to defray the expense of the journey; and i do not think that this sum was ever repaid him. besides, what did it signify, for any object he might have in disguising his fortune, whether he brought 3,000,000 or 300,000 francs with him from italy? no one will accuse him of peculation. he was an inflexible administrator. he was always irritated at the discovery of fraud, and pursued those guilty of it with all the vigour of his character. he wished to be independent, which he well knew that no one could be without fortune. he has often said to me, "i am no capuchin, not i." but after having been allowed only 300,000 francs on his arrival from the rich italy, where fortune never abandoned him, it has been printed that he had 20,000,000 (some have even doubled the amount) on his return from egypt, which is a very poor country, where money is scarce, and where reverses followed close upon his victories. all these reports are false. what he brought from italy has just been stated, and it will be seen when we come to egypt what treasure he carried away from the country of the pharaohs. bonaparte's brothers, desirous of obtaining complete dominion over his mind, strenuously endeavoured to lessen the influence which josephine possessed from the love of her husband. they tried to excite his jealousy, and took advantage of her stay at milan after our departure, which had been authorised by bonaparte himself. my intimacy with both the husband and the wife fortunately afforded me an opportunity of averting or lessening a good deal of mischief. if josephine still lived she would allow me this merit. i never took part against her but once, and that unwillingly. it was on the subject of the marriage of her daughter hortense. josephine had never as yet spoken to me on the subject. bonaparte wished to give his stepdaughter to duroc, and his brothers were eager to promote the marriage, because they wished to separate josephine from hortense, for whom bonaparte felt the tenderest affection. josephine, on the other hand, wished hortense to marry louis bonaparte. her motives, as may easily be divined, were to gain support in a family where she experienced nothing but enmity, and she carried her point. --[previous to her marriage with louis, hortense cherished an attachment for duroc, who was at that time a handsome man about thirty, and a great favourite of bonaparte. however, the indifference with which duroc regarded the marriage of louis bonaparte sufficiently proves that the regard with which he had inspired hortense was not very ardently returned. it is certain that duroc might have become the husband of mademoiselle de beauharnais had he been willing to accede to the conditions on which the first consul offered him his step-daughter's hand. but duroc looked forward to something better, and his ordinary prudence forsook him at a moment when he might easily have beheld a perspective calculated to gratify even a more towering ambition than his. he declined the proposed marriage; and the union of hortense and louis, which madame bonaparte, to conciliate the favour of her brothers-in-law, had endeavoured to bring about, was immediately determined on (memoires de constant). in allusion to the alleged unfriendly feeling of napoleon's brothers towards josephine, the following observation occurs in joseph bonaparte's notes on bourrienne: "none of napoleon's brothers," he says, "were near him from the time of his departure for italy except louis who cannot be suspected of having intrigued against josephine, whose daughter he married. these calumnies are without foundation" (erreurs, tome i. p. 244)]-on his arrival from rastadt the most magnificent preparations were made at the luxembourg for the reception of bonaparte. the grand court of the palace was elegantly ornamented; and at its farther end, close to the palace, a large amphitheatre was erected for the accommodation of official persons. curiosity, as on all like occasions, attracted multitudes, and the court was filled. opposite to the principal vestibule stood the altar of the country, surrounded by the statues of liberty, equality, and peace. when bonaparte entered every head was uncovered. the windows were full of young and beautiful females. but notwithstanding this great preparation an icy coldness characterized the ceremony. every one seemed to be present only for the purpose of beholding a sight, and curiosity was the prevailing expression rather than joy or gratitude. it is but right to say, however, that an unfortunate event contributed to the general indifference. the right wing of the palace was not occupied, but great preparations had been making there, and an officer had been directed to prevent anyone from ascending. one of the clerks of the directory, however, contrived to get upon the scaffolding, but had scarcely placed his foot on the first plank when it tilted up, and the imprudent man fell the whole height into the court. this accident created a general stupor. ladies fainted, and the windows were nearly deserted. however, the directory displayed all the republican splendour of which they were so prodigal on similar occasions. speeches were far from being scarce. talleyrand, who was then minister for foreign affairs, on introducing bonaparte to the directory, made a long oration, in the course of which he hinted that the personal greatness of the general ought not to excite uneasiness, even in a rising republic. "far from apprehending anything from his ambition, i believe that we shall one day be obliged to solicit him to tear himself from the pleasures of studious retirement. all france will be free, but perhaps he never will; such is his destiny." talleyrand was listened to with impatience, so anxious was every one to hear bonaparte. the conqueror of italy then rose, and pronounced with a modest air, but in a firm voice, a short address of congratulation on the improved position of the nation. barras, at that time president of the directory, replied to bonaparte with so much prolixity as to weary everyone; and as soon as he had finished speaking he threw himself into the arms of the general, who was not much pleased with such affected displays, and gave him what was then called the fraternal embrace. the other members of the directory, following the example of the president, surrounded bonaparte and pressed him in their arms; each acted, to the best of his ability, his part in the sentimental comedy. chenier composed for this occasion a hymn, which mehul set to music. a few days after an opera was produced, bearing the title of the 'fall of carthage', which was meant as an allusion to the anticipated exploits of the conqueror of italy, recently appointed to the command of the "army of england." the poets were all employed in praising him; and lebrun, with but little of the pindaric fire in his soul, composed the following distich, which certainly is not worth much: "heros, cher a la paix, aux arts, a la victoire- il conquit en deux ans mille siecles de gloire." the two councils were not disposed to be behind the directory in the manifestation of joy. a few days after they gave a banquet to the general in the gallery of the louvre, which had recently been enriched by the masterpieces of painting conquered in italy. at this time bonaparte displayed great modesty in all his transactions in paris. the administrators of the department of the seine having sent a deputation to him to inquire what hour and day he would allow them to wait on him, he carried himself his answer to the department, accompanied by general berthier. it was also remarked that the judge of the peace of the arrondissement where the general lived having called on him on the 6th of december, the evening of his arrival, he returned the visit next morning. these attentions, trifling as they may appear, were not without their effect on the minds of the parisians. in consequence of general bonaparte's victories, the peace he had effected, and the brilliant reception of which he had been the object, the business of vendemiaire was in some measure forgotten. every one was eager to get a sight of the young hero whose career had commenced with so much 'eclat'. he lived very retiredly, yet went often to the theatre. he desired me, one day, to go and request the representation of two of the best pieces of the time, in which elleviou, mesdames st. aubin, phillis, and other distinguished performers played. his message was, that he only wished these two pieces on the same night, if that were possible. the manager told me that nothing that the conqueror of italy wished for was impossible, for he had long ago erased that word from the dictionary. bonaparte laughed heartily at the manager's answer. when we went to the theatre he seated himself, as usual, in the back of the box, behind madame bonaparte, making me sit by her side. the pit and boxes, however, soon found out that he was in the house, and loudly called for him. several times an earnest desire to see him was manifested, but all in vain, for he never showed himself. some days after, being at the theatre des arts, at the second representation of 'horatius cocles', although he was sitting at the back of a box in the second tier, the audience discovered that he was in the house. immediately acclamations arose from all quarters; but he kept himself concealed as much as possible, and said to a person in the next box, "had i known that the boxes were so exposed, i should not have come." during bonaparte's stay at paris a woman sent a messenger to warn him that his life would be attempted, and that poison was to be employed for that purpose. bonaparte had the bearer of this information arrested, who went, accompanied by the judge of the peace, to the woman's house, where she was found extended on the floor, and bathed in her blood. the men whose plot she had overheard, having discovered that she had revealed their secret, murdered her. the poor woman was dreadfully mangled: her throat was cut; and, not satisfied with that, the assassins had also hacked her body with sharp instruments. on the night of the 10th of nivose the rue chantereine, in which bonaparte had a small house (no. 6), received, in pursuance of a decree of the department, the name of rue de la victoire. the cries of "vive bonaparte!" and the incense prodigally offered up to him, did not however seduce him from his retired habits. lately the conqueror and ruler of italy, and now under men for whom he had no respect, and who saw in him a formidable rival, he said to me one day, "the people of paris do not remember anything. were i to remain here long, doing nothing, i should be lost. in this great babylon one reputation displaces another. let me be seen but three times at the theatre and i shall no longer excite attention; so i shall go there but seldom." when he went he occupied a box shaded with curtains. the manager of the opera wished to get up a special performance in his honour; but he declined the offer. when i observed that it must be agreeable to him to see his fellow-citizens so eagerly running after him, he replied, "bah! the people would crowd as fast to see me if i were going to the scaffold." --[a similar remark made to william iii. on his lending at brixham elicited the comment, "like the jews, who cried one day 'hosanna!' and the next 'crucify him! crucify him!'"]-on the 28th of december bonaparte was named a member of the institute, in the class of the sciences and arts. --[napoleon seems to have really considered this nomination as a great honour. he was fond of using the title in his proclamations; and to the last the allowance attached to the appointment figured in the imperial accounts. he replaced carnot, the exiled director.]-he showed a deep sense of this honour, and wrote the following letter to camus; the president of the class: citizen president--the suffrage of the distinguished men who compose the institute confers a high honour on me. i feel well assured that, before i can be their equal, i must long be their scholar. if there were any way more expressive than another of making known my esteem for you, i should be glad to employ it. true conquests--the only ones which leave no regret behind them--are those which are made over ignorance. the most honourable, as well as the most useful, occupation for nations is the contributing to the extension of human knowledge. the true power of the french republic should henceforth be made to consist in not allowing a single new idea to exist without making it part of its property. bonaparte. the general now renewed, though unsuccessfully, the attempt he had made before the 18th fructidor to obtain a dispensation of the age necessary for becoming a director. perceiving that the time was not yet favourable for such a purpose, he said to me, on the 29th of january 1798, "bourrienne, i do not wish to remain here; there is nothing to do. they are unwilling to listen to anything. i see that if i linger here, i shall soon lose myself. everything wears out here; my glory has already disappeared. this little europe does not supply enough of it for me. i must seek it in the east, the fountain of glory. however, i wish first to make a tour along the coast, to ascertain by my own observation what may be attempted. i will take you, lannes, and sulkowsky, with me. if the success of a descent on england appear doubtful, as i suspect it will, the army of england shall become the army of the east, and i will go to egypt." this and other conversations give a correct insight into his character. he always considered war and conquest as the most noble and inexhaustible source of that glory which was the constant object of his desire. he revolted at the idea of languishing in idleness at paris, while fresh laurels were growing for him in distant climes. his imagination inscribed, in anticipation, his name on those gigantic monuments which alone, perhaps, of all the creations of man, have the character of eternity. already proclaimed the most illustrious of living generals, he sought to efface the rival names of antiquity by his own. if caesar fought fifty battles, he longed to fight a hundred--if alexander left macedon to penetrate to the temple of ammon, he wished to leave paris to travel to the cataracts of the nile. while he was thus to run a race with fame, events would, in his opinion, so proceed in france as to render his return necessary and opportune. his place would be ready for him, and he should not come to claim it a forgotten or unknown man. chapter xii. 1798. bonaparte's departure from paris--his return--the egyptian expedition projected--m. de talleyrand--general desaix--expedition against malta--money taken at berne--bonaparte's ideas respecting the east--monge--non-influence of the directory--marriages of marmont and la valette--bonaparte's plan of colonising egypt--his camp library--orthographical blunders--stock of wines--bonaparte's arrival at toulon--madame bonaparte's fall from a balcony--execution of an old man--simon. bonaparte left paris for the north on the 10th of february 1798--but he received no order, though i have seen it everywhere so stated, to go there--"for the purpose of preparing the operations connected with the intended invasion of england." he occupied himself with no such business, for which a few days certainly would not have been sufficient. his journey to the coast was nothing but a rapid excursion, and its sole object was to enable him to form an opinion on the main point of the question. neither did he remain absent several weeks, for the journey occupied only one. there were four of us in his carriage--himself, lannes, sulkowsky, and i. moustache was our courier. bonaparte was not a little surprised on reading, in the 'moniteur' of the 10th february, an article giving greater importance to his little excursion than it deserved. "general bonaparte," said the 'moniteur', "has departed for dunkirk with some naval and engineer officers. they have gone to visit the coasts and prepare the preliminary operations for the descent [upon england]. it may be stated that he will not return to rastadt, and that the close of the session of the congress there is approaching." now for the facts. bonaparte visited etaples, ambleteuse, boulogne, calais, dunkirk, furnes, niewport, ostend, and the isle of walcheren. he collected at the different ports all the necessary information with that intelligence and tact for which he was so eminently distinguished. he questioned the sailors, smugglers, and fishermen, and listened attentively to the answers he received. we returned to paris by antwerp, brussels, lille, and st. quentin. the object of our journey was accomplished when we reached the first of these towns. "well, general," said i, "what think you of our journey? are you satisfied? for my part, i confess i entertain no great hopes from anything i have seen and heard." bonaparte immediately answered, "it is too great a chance. i will not hazard it. i would not thus sport with the fate of my beloved france." on hearing this i already fancied myself in cairo! on his return to paris bonaparte lost no time in setting on foot the military and scientific preparations for the projected expedition to the banks of the nile, respecting which such incorrect statements have appeared. it had long occupied his thoughts, as the following facts will prove. in the month of august 1797 he wrote "that the time was not far distant when we should see that, to destroy the power of england effectually, it would be necessary to attack egypt." in the same month he wrote to talleyrand, who had just succeeded charles de lacroix as minister of foreign affairs, "that it would be necessary to attack egypt, which did not belong to the grand signior." talleyrand replied, "that his ideas respecting egypt were certainly grand, and that their utility could not fail to be fully appreciated." he concluded by saying he would write to him at length on the subject. history will speak as favourably of m. de talleyrand as his contemporaries have spoken ill of him. when a statesman, throughout a great, long, and difficult career, makes and preserves a number of faithful friends, and provokes but few enemies, it must be acknowledged that his character is honourable and his talent profound, and that his political conduct has been wise and moderate. it is impossible to know m. de talleyrand without admiring him. all who have that advantage, no doubt, judge him as i do. in the month of november of the same year bonaparte sent poussielgue, under the pretence of inspecting the ports of the levant, to give the finishing stroke to the meditated expedition against malta. general desaix, whom bonaparte had made the confidant of all his plans at their interview in italy after the preliminaries of leoben, wrote to him from affenbourg, on his return to germany, that he regarded the fleet of corfu with great interest. "if ever," said he, "it should be engaged in the grand enterprises of which i have heard you speak, do not, i beseech you, forget me." bonaparte was far from forgetting him. the directory at first disapproved of the expedition against malta, which bonaparte had proposed long before the treaty of campo-formio was signed. the expedition was decided to be impossible, for malta had observed strict neutrality, and had on several occasions even assisted our ships and seamen. thus we had no pretext for going to war with her. it was said, too, that the legislative body would certainly not look with a favourable eye on such a measure. this opinion, which, however, did not last long, vexed bonaparte. it was one of the disappointments which made him give a rough welcome to bottot, barras' agent, at the commencement of october 1797. in the course of an animated conversation he said to bottot, shrugging his shoulders, "mon dieu! malta is for sale!" sometime after he himself was told that "great importance was attached to the acquisition of malta, and that he must not suffer it to escape." at the latter end of september 1797 talleyrand, then minister of foreign affairs, wrote to him that the directory authorized him to give the necessary orders to admiral brueys for taking malta. he sent bonaparte some letters for the island, because bonaparte had said it was necessary to prepare the public mind for the event. bonaparte exerted himself night and day in the execution of his projects. i never saw him so active. he made himself acquainted with the abilities of the respective generals, and the force of all the army corps. orders and instructions succeeded each other with extraordinary rapidity. if he wanted an order of the directory he ran to the luxembourg to get it signed by one of the directors. merlin de douai was generally the person who did him this service, for he was the most constant at his post. lagarde, the secretary-general, did not countersign any document relative to this expedition, bonaparte not wishing him to be informed of the business. he transmitted to toulon the money taken at berne, which the directory had placed at his disposal. it amounted to something above 3,000,000 francs. in those times of disorder and negligence the finances were very badly managed. the revenues were anticipated and squandered away, so that the treasury never possessed so large a sum as that just mentioned. it was determined that bonaparte should undertake an expedition of an unusual character to the east. i must confess that two things cheered me in this very painful interval; my friendship and admiration for the talents of the conqueror of italy, and the pleasing hope of traversing those ancient regions, the historical and religious accounts of which had engaged the attention of my youth. it was at passeriano that, seeing the approaching termination of his labours in europe, he first began to turn serious attention to the east. during his long strolls in the evening in the magnificent park there he delighted to converse about the celebrated events of that part of the world, and the many famous empires it once possessed. he used to say, "europe is a mole-hill. there have never been great empires and revolutions except in the east, where there are 600,000,000 men." he considered that part of the world as the cradle of all religious, of all metaphysical extravagances. this subject was no less interesting than inexhaustible, and he daily introduced it when conversing with the generals with whom he was intimate, with monge, and with me. monge entirely concurred in the general-in-chief's opinions on this point; and his scientific ardour was increased by bonaparte's enthusiasm. in short, all were unanimously of one opinion. the directory had no share in renewing the project of this memorable expedition, the result of which did not correspond with the grand views in which it had been conceived. neither had the directory any positive control over bonaparte's departure or return. it was merely the passive instrument of the general's wishes, which it converted into decrees, as the law required. he was no more ordered to undertake the conquest of egypt than he was instructed as to the plan of its execution. bonaparte organised the army of the east, raised money, and collected ships; and it was he who conceived the happy idea of joining to the expedition men distinguished in science and art, and whose labours have made known, in its present and past state, a country, the very name of which is never pronounced without exciting grand recollections. bonaparte's orders flew like lightning from toulon to civita vecchia. with admirable precision he appointed some forces to assemble before malta, and others before alexandria. he dictated all these orders to me in his cabinet. in the position in which france stood with respect to europe, after the treaty of campo-formio, the directory, far from pressing or even facilitating this expedition, ought to have opposed it. a victory on the adige would have been far better for france than one on the nile. from all i saw, i am of opinion that the wish to get rid of an ambitious and rising man, whose popularity excited envy, triumphed over the evident danger of removing, for an indefinite period, an excellent army, and the possible loss of the french fleet. as to bonaparte, he was well assured that nothing remained for him but to choose between that hazardous enterprise and his certain ruin. egypt was, he thought, the right place to maintain his reputation, and to add fresh glory to his name. on the 12th of april 1798 he was appointed general-in-chief of the army of the east. it was about this time that marmont was married to mademoiselle perregaux; and bonaparte's aide de camp, la vallette, to mademoiselle beauharnais. --[sir walter scott informs us that josephine, when she became empress, brought about the marriage between her niece and la vallette. this is another fictitious incident of his historical romance.--bourrienne.]-shortly before our departure i asked bonaparte how long he intended to remain in egypt. he replied, "a few months, or six years: all depends on circumstances. i will colonise the country. i will bring them artists and artisans of every description; women, actors, etc. we are but nineand-twenty now, and we shall then be five-and-thirty. that is not an old age. those six years will enable me, if all goes well, to get to india. give out that you are going to brest. say so even to your family." i obeyed, to prove my discretion and real attachment to him. bonaparte wished to form a camp library of cabinet editions, and he gave me a list of the books which i was to purchase. this list is in his own writing, and is as follows: camp library. 1. arts and science.--fontenelle's worlds, 1 vol. letters to a german princess, 2 vols. courses of the normal school, 6 vols. the artillery assistant, 1 vol. treatise on fortifications, 3 vols. treatise on fireworks, 1 vol. 2. geography and travels.--barclay's geography, 12 vols. cook's voyages, 3 vols. la harpe's travels, 24 vols. 3. history.--plutarch, 12 vols. turenne, 2 vols. conde, 4 vols. villars, 4 vols. luxembourg, 2 vols. duguesclin, 2 vols. saxe, 3 vols. memoirs of the marshals of france, 20 vols. president hainault, 4 vols. chronology, 2 vols. marlborough, 4 vols. prince eugene, 6 vols. philosophical history of india, 12 vols. germany, 2 vols. charles xii., 1 vol. essay on the manners of nations, 6 vols. peter the great, 1 vol. polybius, 6 vols. justin, 2 vols. arrian, 3 vols. tacitus, 2 vols. titus livy, thucydides, 2 vols. vertot, 4 vols. denina, 8 vols. frederick ii, 8 vols. 4. poetry.--ossaian, 1 vol. tasso, 6 vols. ariosto, 6 vols. homer, 6 vols. virgil, 4 vols. the henriade, 1 vol. telemachus, 2 vols. les jardin, 1 vol. the chefs-d'oeuvre of the french theatre, 20 vols. select light poetry, 10 vols. la fontaine. 5. romance.--voltaire, 4 vols. heloise, 4 vols. werther, 1 vol. marmontel, 4 vols. english novels, 40 vols. le sage, 10 vols. prevost, 10 vols. 6. politics and morals.--the old testament. the new testament. the koran. the vedan. mythology. montesquieu. the esprit des lois. it will be observed that he classed the books of the religious creeds of nations under the head of "politics." the autograph copy of the above list contains some of those orthographical blunders which bonaparte so frequently committed. whether these blunders are attributable to the limited course of instruction he received at brienne, to his hasty writing, the rapid flow of his ideas, or the little importance he attached to that indispensable condition of polite education, i know not. knowing so well as he did the authors and generals whose names appear in the above list, it is curious that he should have written ducecling for duguesclin, and ocean for ossian. the latter mistake would have puzzled me not a little had i not known his predilection for the caledonian bard. before his departure bonaparte laid in a considerable stock of burgundy. it was supplied by a man named james, of dijon. i may observe that on this occasion we had an opportunity of ascertaining that good burgundy, well racked off, and in casks hermetically sealed, does not lose its quality on a sea voyage. several cases of this burgundy twice crossed the desert of the isthmus of suez on camels' backs. we brought some of it back with us to frejus, and it was as good as when we departed. james went with us to egypt. during the remainder of our stay in paris nothing occurred worthy of mention, with the exception of a conversation between bonaparte and me some days before our departure for toulon. he went with me to the luxembourg to get signatures to the official papers connected with his expedition. he was very silent. as we passed through the rue sainte anne i asked him, with no other object than merely to break a long pause, whether he was still determined to quit france. he replied, "yes: i have tried everything. they do not want me (probably alluding to the office of director). i ought to overthrow them, and make myself king; but it will not do yet. the nobles will never consent to it. i have tried my ground. the time is not yet come. i should be alone. but i will dazzle them again." i replied, "well, we will go to egypt;" and changed the conversation. --[lucien and the bonapartists of course deny that napoleon wished to become director, or to seize on power at this time; see lucien, tome 1. p. 154. thiers (vol. v. p. 257) takes the same view. lanfrey (tome i. p. 363) believes napoleon was at last compelled by the directory to start and he credits the story told by desaix to mathieu dumas, or rather to the wife of that officer, that there was a plot to upset the directory, but that when all was ready napoleon judged that the time was not ripe. lanfrey, however, rather enlarges what dumas says; see dumas, tome iii. p. 167. see also the very remarkable conversation of napoleon with miot de melito just before leaving italy for rastadt: "i cannot obey any longer. i have tasted the pleasures of command, and i cannot renounce it. my decision is taken. if i cannot be master, i shall quit france (miot, tome i. p. 184).]-the squabble with bernadotte at vienna delayed our departure for a fortnight, and might have had the most disastrous influence on the fate of the squadron, as nelson would most assuredly have waited between malta and sicily if he had arrived there before us.' --[sir walter scott, without any authority, states that, at the moment of his departure, bonaparte seemed disposed to abandon the command of an expedition so doubtful and hazardous, and that for this purpose he endeavoured to take advantage of what had occurred at vienna. this must be ranked in the class of inventions, together with barras' mysterious visit to communicate the change of destination, and also the ostracism and honourable exile which the directory wished to impose on bonaparte.--bourrienne.]-it is untrue that he ever entertained the idea of abandoning the expedition in consequence of bernadotte's affair. the following letter to brueys, dated the 28th of april 1798, proves the contrary: some disturbances which have arisen at vienna render my presence in paris necessary for a few days. this will not change any of the arrangements for the expedition. i have sent orders by this courier for the troops at marseilles to embark and proceed to toulon. on the evening of the 30th i will send you a courier with orders for you to embark and proceed with the squadron and convoy to genoa, where i will join you. the delay which this fresh event has occasioned will, i imagine, have enabled you to complete every preparation. we left paris on the 3d of may 1798. ten days before bonaparte's departure for egypt a prisoner (sir sidney smith) escaped from the temple who was destined to contribute materially to his reverses. an escape so unimportant in itself afterwards caused the failure of the most gigantic projects and daring conceptions. this escape was pregnant with future events; a false order of the minister of police prevented the revolution of the east! we were at toulon on the 8th. bonaparte knew by the movements of the english that not a moment was to be lost; but adverse winds detained us ten days, which he occupied in attending to the most minute details connected with the fleet. bonaparte, whose attention was constantly occupied with his army, made a speech to the soldiers, which i wrote to his dictation, and which appeared in the public papers at the time. this address was followed by cries of "the immortal republic for ever!" and the singing of national hymns. those who knew madame bonaparte are aware that few women were more amiable and fascinating. bonaparte was passionately fond of her, and to enjoy the pleasure of her society as long as possible he brought her with him to toulon. nothing could be more affecting than their parting. on leaving toulon josephine went to the waters of plombieres. i recollect that during her stay at plombieres she incurred great danger from a serious accident. whilst she was one day sitting at the balcony of the hotel, with her suite, the balcony suddenly gave way, and all the persons in it fell into the street. madame bonaparte was much hurt, but no serious consequences ensued. bonaparte had scarcely arrived at toulon when he heard that the law for the death of emigrants was enforced with frightful rigour; and that but recently an old man, upwards of eighty, had been shot. indignant at this barbarity, he dictated to me, in a tone of anger, the following letter: headquarters toulon, 27th floreal, year vi. (16th may 1798). bonaparte, member of the national institute, to the military commissioners of the ninth division, established by the law of the 19th fructidor. i have learned, citizens, with deep regret, that an old man, between seventy and eighty years of age, and some unfortunate women, in a state of pregnancy, or surrounded with children of tender age, have been shot on the charge of emigration. have the soldiers of liberty become executioners? can the mercy which they have exercised even in the fury of battle be extinct in their hearts? the law of the 19th fructidor was a measure of public safety. its object was to reach conspirators, not women and aged men. i therefore exhort you, citizens, whenever the law brings to your tribunals women or old men, to declare that in the field of battle you have respected the women and old men of your enemies. the officer who signs a sentence against a person incapable of bearing arms is a coward. (signed) bonaparte. this letter saved the life of an unfortunate man who came under the description of persons to whom bonaparte referred. the tone of this note shows what an idea he already entertained of his power. he took upon him, doubtless from the noblest motives, to step out of his way to interpret and interdict the execution of a law, atrocious, it is true, but which even in those times of weakness, disorder, and anarchy was still a law. in this instance, at least, the power of his name was nobly employed. the letter gave great satisfaction to the army destined for the expedition. a man named simon, who had followed his master in emigration, and dreaded the application of the law, heard that i wanted a servant. he came to me and acknowledged his situation. he suited me, and i hired him. he then told me he feared he should be arrested whilst going to the port to embark. bonaparte, to whom i mentioned the circumstance, and who had just given a striking proof of his aversion to these acts of barbarity, said to me in a tone of kindness, "give him my portfolio to carry, and let him remain with you." the words "bonaparte, general-in-chief of the army of the east," were inscribed in large gold letters on the green morocco. whether it was the portfolio or his connection with us that prevented simon from being arrested i know not; but he passed on without interruption. i reprimanded him for having smiled derisively at the ill humour of the persons appointed to arrest him. he served me faithfully, and was even sometimes useful to bonaparte. chapter xiii. 1798. departure of the squadron--arrival at malta--dolomieu--general barguay d'hilliers--attack on the western part of the island- caffarelli's remark--deliverance of the turkish prisoners--nelson's pursuit of the french fleet--conversations on board--how bonaparte passed his time--questions to the captains--propositions discussed --morning music--proclamation--admiral brueys--the english fleet avoided--dangerous landing--bonaparte and his fortune--alexandria taken--kleber wounded--bonaparte's entrance into alexandria. the squadron sailed on the 19th of may. the orient, which, owing to her heavy lading, drew too much water, touched the ground; but she was got off without much difficulty. we arrived off malta on the 10th of june. we had lost two days in waiting for some convoys which joined us at malta. the intrigues throughout europe had not succeeded in causing the ports of that island to be opened to us immediately on our arrival. bonaparte expressed much displeasure against the persons sent from europe to arrange measures for that purpose. one of them, however, m. dolomieu, had cause to repent his mission, which occasioned him to be badly treated by the sicilians. m. poussielgue had done all he could in the way of seduction, but he had not completely succeeded. there was some misunderstanding, and, in consequence, some shots were interchanged. bonaparte was very much pleased with general baraguay d'hilliers' services in italy. he could not but praise his military and political conduct at venice when, scarcely a year before, he had taken possession of that city by his orders. general baraguay d'hilliers joined us with his division,--which had embarked in the convoy that sailed from genoa. the general-in-chief ordered him to land and attack the western part of the island. he executed this order with equal prudence and ability, and highly to the satisfaction of the general-in-chief. as every person in the secret knew that all this was a mere form, these hostile demonstrations produced no unpleasant consequences. we wished to save the honour of the knights--that was all; for no one who has seen malta can imagine that an island surrounded with such formidable and perfect fortifications would have surrendered in two days to a fleet which was pursued by an enemy. the impregnable fortress of malta is so secure against a 'coup de main' that general caffarelli, after examining its fortifications, said to the general-in-chief, in my presence, "upon my word, general, it is luck: there is some one in the town to open the gates for us." by comparing the observation of general caffarelli with what has been previously stated respecting the project of the expedition to egypt and malta, an idea may be formed of the value of bonaparte's assertion at st. helena: "the capture of malta was not owing to private intrigues, but to the sagacity of the commander-in-chief. i took malta when i was in mantua!" it is not the less true, however, that i wrote, by his dictation, a mass of instructions for private intrigues. napoleon also said to another noble companion of his exile at st helena, "malta certainly possessed vast physical means of resistance; but no moral means. the knights did nothing dishonourable; nobody is obliged to do impossibilities. no; but they were sold; the capture of malta was assured before we left toulon." the general-in-chief proceeded to that part of the port where the turks made prisoners by the knights were kept. the disgusting galleys were emptied of their occupants. the same principles which, a few days after, formed the basis of bonaparte's proclamation to the egyptians, guided him in this act of reason and humanity. he walked several times in the gardens of the grandmaster. they were in beautiful order, and filled with magnificent orange-trees. we regaled ourselves with their fruit, which the great heat rendered most delicious. on the 19th of june, after having settled the government and defence of the island, the general left malta, which he little dreamed he had taken for the english, who have very badly requited the obligation. many of the knights followed bonaparte and took civil and military appointments. during the night of the 22d of june the english squadron was almost close upon us. it passed at about six leagues from the french fleet. nelson, who learned the capture of malta at messina on the day we left the island, sailed direct for alexandria, without proceeding into the north. he considered that city to be the place of our destination. by taking the shortest course, with every sail set, and unembarrassed by any convoy, he arrived before alexandria on the 28th of june, three days before the french fleet, which, nevertheless, had sailed before him from the shores of malta. the french squadron took the direction of candia, which we perceived on the 25th of june, and afterwards stood to the south, favoured by the etesian winds, which regularly prevail at that season. the french fleet did not reach alexandria till the 30th of june. when on board the 'orient' he took pleasure in conversing frequently with monge and berthollet. the subjects on which they usually talked were chemistry, mathematics, and religion. general caffarelli, whose conversation, supplied by knowledge, was at once energetic, witty, and lively, was one of those with whom he most willingly discoursed. whatever friendship he might entertain for berthollet, it was easy to perceive that he preferred monge, and that he was led to that preference because monge, endowed with an ardent imagination, without exactly possessing religious principles, had a kind of predisposition for religious ideas which harmonised with the notions of bonaparte. on this subject berthollet sometimes rallied his inseparable friend monge. besides, berthollet was, with his cold imagination, constantly devoted to analysis and abstractions, inclined towards materialism, an opinion with which the general was always much dissatisfied. bonaparte sometimes conversed with admiral brueys. his object was always to gain information respecting the different manoeuvres, and nothing astonished the admiral more than the sagacity of his questions. i recollect that one day, bonaparte having asked brueys in what manner the hammocks were disposed of when clearing for action, he declared, after he had received an answer, that if the case should occur he would order every one to throw his baggage overboard. he passed a great part of his time in his cabin, lying on a bed, which, swinging on a kind of castors, alleviated the severity of the seasickness from which he frequently suffered much when the ship rolled. i was almost always with him in his cabin, where i read to him some of the favourite works which he had selected for his camp library. he also frequently conversed, for hours together, with the captains of the vessels which he hailed. he never failed to ask whence they came? what was their destination? what ships they had met? what course they had sailed? his curiosity being thus satisfied, he allowed them to continue their voyage, after making them promise to say nothing of having seen the french squadron. whilst we were at sea he seldom rose before ten o'clock in the morning. the 'orient' had the appearance of a populous town, from which women had been excluded; and this floating city was inhabited by 2000 individuals, amongst whom were a great number of distinguished men. bonaparte every day invited several persons to dine with him, besides brueys, berthier, the colonels, and his ordinary household, who were always present at the table of the general-in-chief. when the weather was fine he went up to the quarter-deck, which, from its extent, formed a grand promenade. i recollect once that when walking the quarter-deck with him whilst we were in sicilian waters i thought i could see the summits of the alps beautifully lighted by the rays of the setting sun. bonaparte laughed much, and joked me about it. he called admiral brueys, who took his telescope and soon confirmed my conjecture. the alps! at the mention of that word by the admiral i think i can see bonaparte still. he stood for a long time motionless; then, suddenly bursting from his trance, exclaimed, "no! i cannot behold the land of italy without emotion! there is the east: and there i go; a perilous enterprise invites me. those mountains command the plains where i so often had the good fortune to lead the french to victory. with them we will conquer again." one of bonaparte's greatest pleasures during the voyage was, after dinner, to fix upon three or four persons to support a proposition and as many to oppose it. he had an object in view by this. these discussions afforded him an opportunity of studying the minds of those whom he had an interest in knowing well, in order that he might afterwards confide to each the functions for which he possessed the greatest aptitude. it will not appear singular to those who have been intimate with bonaparte, that in these intellectual contests he gave the preference to those who had supported an absurd proposition with ability over those who had maintained the cause of reason; and it was not superiority of mind which determined his judgment, for he really preferred the man who argued well in favour of an absurdity to the man who argued equally well in support of a reasonable proposition. he always gave out the subjects which were to be discussed; and they most frequently turned upon questions of religion, the different kinds of government, and the art of war. one day he asked whether the planets were inhabited; on another, what was the age of the world; then he proposed to consider the probability of the destruction of our globe, either by water or fire; at another time, the truth or fallacy of presentiments, and the interpretation of dreams. i remember the circumstance which gave rise to the last proposition was an allusion to joseph, of whom he happened to speak, as he did of almost everything connected with the country to which we were bound, and which that able administrator had governed. no country came under bonaparte's observation without recalling historical recollections to his mind. on passing the island of candia his imagination was excited, and he spoke with enthusiasm of ancient crete and the colossus, whose fabulous renown has surpassed all human glories. he spoke much of the fall of the empire of the east, which bore so little resemblance to what history has preserved of those fine countries, so often moistened with the blood of man. the ingenious fables of mythology likewise occurred to his mind, and imparted to his language something of a poetical, and, i may say, of an inspired character. the sight of the kingdom of minos led him to reason on the laws best calculated for the government of nations; and the birthplace of jupiter suggested to him the necessity of a religion for the mass of mankind. this animated conversation lasted until the favourable north winds, which drove the clouds into the valley of the nile, caused us to lose sight of the island of candia. the musicians on board the orient sometimes played serenades; but only between decks, for bonaparte was not yet sufficiently fond of music to wish to hear it in his cabin. it may be said that his taste for this art increased in the direct ratio of his power; and so it was with his taste for hunting, of which he gave no indication until after his elevation to the empire; as though he had wished to prove that he possessed within himself not only the genius of sovereignty for commanding men, but also the instinct for those aristocratical pleasures, the enjoyment of which is considered by mankind to be amongst the attributes of kings. it is scarcely possible that some accidents should not occur during a long voyage in a crowded vessel--that some persons should not fall overboard. accidents of this kind frequently happened on board the 'orient'. on those occasions nothing was more remarkable than the great humanity of the man who has since been so prodigal of the blood of his fellow-creatures on the field of battle, and who was about to shed rivers of it even in egypt, whither we were bound. when a man fell into the sea the general-in-chief was in a state of agitation till he was saved. he instantly had the ship hove-to, and exhibited the greatest uneasiness until the unfortunate individual was recovered. he ordered me to reward those who ventured their lives in this service. amongst these was a sailor who had incurred punishment for some fault. he not only exempted him from the punishment, but also gave him some money. i recollect that one dark night we heard a noise like that occasioned by a man falling into the sea. bonaparte instantly caused the ship to be hove-to until the supposed victim was rescued from certain death. the men hastened from all sides, and at length they picked up-what?--the quarter of a bullock, which had fallen from the hook to which it was hung. what was bonaparte's conduct? he ordered me to reward the sailors who had exerted themselves in this occasion even more generously than usual, saying, "it might have been a sailor, and these brave fellows have shown as much activity and courage as if it had." after the lapse of thirty years all these things are as fresh in my recollection as if they were passing at the present moment. in this manner bonaparte employed his time on board the orient during the voyage, and it was also at this time that he dictated to me the following proclamation: headquarters on board the "orient," the 4th messidor, year vi. bonaparte, member of the national institute, general-in-chief. soldiers--you are about to undertake a conquest the effects of which on civilisation and commerce are incalculable. the blow you are about to give to england will be the best aimed, and the most sensibly felt, she can receive until the time arrive when you can give her her death-blow. we must make some fatiguing marches; we must fight several battles; we shall succeed in all we undertake. the destinies are with us. the mameluke beys who favour exclusively english commerce, whose extortions oppress our merchants, and who tyrannise over the unfortunate inhabitants of the nile, a few days after our arrival will no longer exist. the people amongst whom we are going to live are mahometans. the first article of their faith is this: "there is no god but god, and mahomet is his prophet." do not contradict them. behave to them as you have behaved to the jews--to the italians. pay respect to their muftis, and their imaums, as you did to the rabbis and the bishops. extend to the ceremonies prescribed by the koran and to the mosques the same toleration which you showed to the synagogues, to the religion of moses and of jesus christ. the roman legions protected all religions. you will find here customs different from those of europe. you must accommodate yourselves to them. the people amongst whom we are to mix differ from us in the treatment of women; but in all countries he who violates is a monster. pillage enriches only a small number of men; it dishonours us; it destroys our resources; it converts into enemies the people whom it is our interest to have for friends. the first town we shall come to was built by alexander. at every step we shall meet with grand recollections, worthy of exciting the emulation of frenchmen. bonaparte. during the voyage, and particularly between malta and alexandria, i often conversed with the brave and unfortunate admiral brueys. the intelligence we heard from time to time augmented his uneasiness. i had the good fortune to obtain the confidence of this worthy man. he complained bitterly of the imperfect manner in which the fleet had been prepared for sea; of the encumbered state of the ships of the line and frigates, and especially of the 'orient'; of the great number of transports; of the bad outfit of all the ships and the weakness of their crews. he assured me that it required no little courage to undertake the command of a fleet so badly equipped; and he often declared, that in the event of our falling in with the enemy, he could not answer for the consequences. the encumbered state of the vessels, the immense quantity of civic and military baggage which each person had brought, and would wish to save, would render proper manoeuvres impracticable. in case of an attack, added brueys, even by an inferior squadron, the confusion and disorder amongst so great a number of persons would produce an inevitable catastrophe. finally, if the english had appeared with ten vessels only, the admiral could not have guaranteed a fortunate result. he considered victory to be a thing that was impossible, and even with a victory, what would have become of the expedition? "god send," he said, with a sigh, "that we may pass the english without meeting them!" he appeared to foresee what did afterwards happen to him, not in the open sea, but in a situation which he considered much more favourable to his defence. on the morning of the 1st of july the expedition arrived off the coast of africa, and the column of septimus-severus pointed out to us the city of alexandria. our situation and frame of mind hardly permitted us to reflect that in the distant point we beheld the city of the ptolemies and caesars, with its double port, its pharos, and the gigantic monuments of its ancient grandeur. our imaginations did not rise to this pitch. admiral brueys had sent on before the frigate juno to fetch m. magallon, the french consul. it was near four o'clock when he arrived, and the sea was very rough. he informed the general-in-chief that nelson had been off alexandria on the 28th--that he immediately dispatched a brig to obtain intelligence from the english agent. on the return of the brig nelson instantly stood away with his squadron towards the north-east. but for a delay which our convoy from civita vecchia occasioned, we should have been on this coast at the same time as nelson. it appeared that nelson supposed us to be already at alexandria when he arrived there. he had reason to suppose so, seeing that we left malta on the 19th of june, whilst he did not sail from messina till the 21st. not finding us where he expected, and being persuaded we ought to have arrived there had alexandria been the place of our destination; he sailed for alexandretta in syria, whither he imagined we had gone to effect a landing. this error saved the expedition a second time. bonaparte, on hearing the details which the french consul communicated, resolved to disembark immediately. admiral brueys represented the difficulties and dangers of a disembarkation--the violence of the surge, the distance from the coast,--a coast, too, lined with reefs of rocks, the approaching night, and our perfect ignorance of the points suitable for landing. the admiral, therefore, urged the necessity of waiting till next morning; that is to say, to delay the landing twelve hours. he observed that nelson could not return from syria for several days. bonaparte listened to these representations with impatience and illhumour. he replied peremptorily, "admiral, we have no time to lose. fortune gives me but three days; if i do not profit by them we are lost." he relied much on fortune; this chimerical idea constantly influenced his resolutions. bonaparte having the command of the naval as well as the military force, the admiral was obliged to yield to his wishes. i attest these facts, which passed in my presence, and no part of which could escape my observation. it is quite false that it was owing to the appearance of a sail which, it is pretended, was descried, but of which, for my part, i saw nothing, that bonaparte exclaimed, "fortune, have you abandoned me? i ask only five days!" no such thing occurred. it was one o'clock in the morning of the 2d of july when we landed on the soil of egypt, at marabou, three leagues to the west of alexandria. we had to regret the loss of some lives; but we had every reason to expect that our losses would have been greater. at three o'clock the same morning the general-in-chief marched on alexandria with the divisions of kleber, bon, and menou. the bedouin arabs, who kept hovering about our right flank and our rear, picked up the stragglers. having arrived within gunshot of alexandria, we scaled the ramparts, and french valour soon triumphed over all obstacles. the first blood i saw shed in war was general kleber's. he was struck in the head by a ball, not in storming the walls, but whilst heading the attack. he came to pompey's pillar, where many members of the staff were assembled, and where the general-in-chief was watching the attack. i then spoke to kleber for the first time, and from that day our friendship commenced. i had the good fortune to contribute somewhat towards the assistance of which he stood in need, and which, as we were situated, could not be procured very easily. it has been endeavoured to represent the capture of alexandria, which surrendered after a few hours, as a brilliant exploit. the general-inchief himself wrote that the city had been taken after a few discharges of cannon; the walls, badly fortified, were soon scaled. alexandria was not delivered up to pillage, as has been asserted, and often repeated. this would have been a most impolitic mode of commencing the conquest of egypt, which had no strong places requiring to be intimidated by a great example. bonaparte, with some others, entered the city by a narrow street which scarcely allowed two persons to walk abreast; i was with him. we were stopped by some musket-shots fired from a low window by a man and a woman. they repeated their fire several times. the guides who preceded their general kept up a heavy fire on the window. the man and woman fell dead, and we passed on in safety, for the place had surrendered. bonaparte employed the six days during which he remained in alexandria in establishing order in the city and province, with that activity and superior talent which i could never sufficiently admire, and in directing the march of the army across the province of bohahire'h. he sent desaix with 4500 infantry and 60 cavalry to beda, on the road to damanhour. this general was the first to experience the privations and sufferings which the whole army had soon to endure. his great mind, his attachment to bonaparte, seemed for a moment about to yield to the obstacles which presented themselves. on the 15th of july he wrote from bohahire'h as follows: "i beseech you do not let us stop longer in this position. my men are discouraged and murmur. make us advance or fall back without delay. the villages consist merely of huts, absolutely without resources." in these immense plains, scorched by the vertical rays of a burning sun, water, everywhere else so common, becomes an object of contest. the wells and springs, those secret treasures of the desert, are carefully concealed from the travellers; and frequently, after our most oppressive marches, nothing could be found to allay the urgent cravings of thirst but a little brackish water of the most disgusting description. --[some idea of the misery endured by the french troops on this occasion may be gathered from the following description is napoleon's memoirs, dictated at st. helena: "as the hebrews wandering in the wilderness complained, and angrily asked moses for the onions and flesh-pots of egypt, the french soldiers constantly regretted the luxuries of italy. in vain were they assured that the country was the most fertile in the world, that it was even superior to lombard; how were they to be persuaded of this when they could get neither bread nor wine? we encamped on immense quantities of wheat, but there was neither mill nor oven in the country. the biscuit brought from alexandria had long been exhausted; the soldiers were even reduced to bruise the wheat between two stones and to make cake which they baked under the ashes. many parched the wheat in a pan, after which they boiled it. this was the best way to use the grain; but, after all, it was not bread. the apprehensions of the soldiers increased daily, and rose to such a pitch that a great number of them said there was no great city of cairo; and that the place bearing that name was, like damanhour, a vast assemblage of mere huts, destitute of everything that could render life comfortable or agreeable. to such a melancholy state of mind had they brought themselves that two dragoons threw themselves, completely clothed, into the nile, where they were drowned. it is nevertheless true that, though there was neither bread nor wine, the resources which were procured with wheat, lentils, meat, and sometimes pigeons, furnished the army with food of some kind. but the evil was, in the ferment of the mind. the officers complained more loudly than the soldiers, because the comparison was proportionately more disadvantageous to them. in egypt they found neither the quarters, the good table, nor the luxury of italy. the general-in-chief, wishing to set an example, tried to bivouac in the midst of the army, and in the least commodious spots. no one had either tent or provisions; the dinner of napoleon and his staff consisted of a dish of lentils. the soldiers passed the evenings in political conversations, arguments, and complaints. 'for what purpose are we come here?' said some of them, 'the directory has transported us.' 'caffarelli,' said others, 'is the agent that has been made use of to deceive the general-in chief.' many of them, having observed that wherever there were vestiges of antiquity they were carefully searched, vented their spite in invective against the savants, or scientific men, who, they said, had started the idea of the expedition to order to make these searches. jests were showered upon them, even in their presence. the men called an ass a savant; and said of caffarelli dufalga, alluding to his wooden leg, 'he laughs at all these troubles; he has one foot to france.'" chapter xiv. 1798. the mirage--skirmishes with the arabs--mistake of general desaix's division--wretchedness of a rich sheik--combat beneath the general's window--the flotilla on the nile--its distress and danger--the battle of chebreisse--defeat of the mamelukes--bonaparte's reception of me--letter to louis bonaparte--success of the french army- triumphal entrance into cairo--civil and military organisation of cairo--bonaparte's letter to his brother joseph--plan of colonisation. on the 7th of july general bonaparte left alexandria for damanhour. in the vast plains of bohahire'h the mirage every moment presented to the eye wide sheets of water, while, as we advanced, we found nothing but barren ground full of deep cracks. villages, which at a distance appear to be surrounded with water, are, on a nearer approach, discovered to be situated on heights, mostly artificial, by which they are raised above the inundations of the nile. this illusion continually recurs; and it is the more treacherous, inasmuch as it presents to the eye the perfect representation of water, at the time when the want of that article is most felt. this mirage is so considerable in the plain of pelusium that shortly after sunrise no object is recognisable. the same phenomenon has been observed in other countries. quintus curtius says that in the deserts of sogdiana, a fog rising from the earth obscures the light, and the surrounding country seems like a vast sea. the cause of this singular illusion is now fully explained; and, from the observations of the learned monge, it appears that the mirage will be found in almost every country situated between the tropics where the local circumstances are similar. the arabs harassed the army without intermission. the few wells met with in the desert were either filled up or the water was rendered unfit for use. the intolerable thirst with which the troops were tormented, even on this first march, was but ill allayed by brackish and unwholesome water. the army crossed the desert with the rapidity of lightning, scarcely tasting a drop of water. the sufferings of the troops were frequently expressed by discouraging murmurs. on the first night a mistake occurred which might have proved fatal. we were advancing in the dark, under feeble escort, almost sleeping on our horses, when suddenly we were assailed by two successive discharges of musketry. we aroused ourselves and reconnoitred, and to our great satisfaction discovered that the only mischief was a slight wound received by one of our guides. our assailants were the division of general desaix, who, forming the advanced guard of the army, mistook us for a party of the enemy, and fired upon us. it was speedily ascertained that the little advanced guard of the headquarters had not heard the "qui vive?" of desaix's advanced posts. on reaching damanhour our headquarters were established at the residence of a sheik. the house had been new whitened, and looked well enough outside, but the interior was inconceivably wretched. every domestic utensil was broken, and the only seats were a few dirty tattered mats. bonaparte knew that the sheik was rich, and having somewhat won his confidence, he asked him, through the medium of the interpreter, why, being in easy circumstances, he thus deprived himself of all comfort. "some years ago," replied the sheik, "i repaired and furnished my house. when this became known at cairo a demand was made upon me for money, because it was said my expenses proved me to be rich. i refused to pay the money, and in consequence i was ill-treated, and at length forced to pay it. from that time i have allowed myself only the bare necessaries of life, and i shall buy no furniture for my house." the old man was lame in consequence of the treatment he had suffered. woe to him who in this country is suspected of having a competency--a hundred spies are always ready to denounce him. the appearance of poverty is the only security against the rapine of power and the cupidity of barbarism. a little troop of arabs on horseback assailed our headquarters. bonaparte, who was at the window of the sheik's house, indignant at this insolence, turned to one of his aides de camp, who happened to be on duty, and said, "croisier, take a few guides and drive those fellows away!" in an instant croisier was in the plain with fifteen guides. a little skirmish ensued, and we looked on from the window. in the movement and in the attack of croisier and his party there was a sort of hesitation which the general-in-chief could not comprehend. "forward, i say! charge!" he exclaimed from the window, as if he could have been heard. our horsemen seemed to fall back as the arabs returned to the attack; and after a little contest, maintained with tolerable spirit, the arabs retired without loss, and without being molested in their retreat. bonaparte could no longer repress his rage; and when croisier returned he experienced such a harsh reception that the poor fellow withdrew deeply mortified and distressed. bonaparte desired me to follow him and say something to console him: but all was in vain. "i cannot survive this," he said. "i will sacrifice my life on the first occasion that offers itself. i will not live dishonoured." the word coward had escaped the general's lips. poor croisier died at saint jean d'acre. on the 10th of july our headquarters were established at rahmahanie'h, where they remained during the 11th and 12th. at this place commences the canal which was cut by alexander to convey water to his new city; and to facilitate commercial intercourse between europe and the east. the flotilla, commanded by the brave chief of division perree, had just arrived from rosette. perree was on board the xebec 'cerf'. --[bonaparte had great confidence in him. he had commanded, under the general's orders, the naval forces in the adriatic in 1797.- bourrienne]-bonaparte placed on board the cerf and the other vessels of the flotilla those individuals who, not being military, could not be serviceable in engagements, and whose horses served to mount a few of the troops. on the night of the 14th of july the general-in-chief directed his march towards the south, along the left bank of the nile. the flotilla sailed up the river parallel with the left wing of the army. but the force of the wind, which at this season blows regularly from the mediterranean into the valley of the nile, carried the flotilla far in advance of the army, and frustrated the plan of their mutually defending and supporting each other. the flotilla thus unprotected fell in with seven turkish gunboats coming from cairo, and was exposed simultaneously to their fire and to that of the mamelukes, fellahs, and arabs who lined both banks of the river. they had small guns mounted on camels. perree cast anchor, and an engagement commenced at nine o'clock on the 14th of july, and continued till half past twelve. at the same time the general-in-chief met and attacked a corps of about 4000 mamelukes. his object, as he afterwards said, was to turn the corps by the left of the village of chebreisse, and to drive it upon the nile. about eleven in the morning perree told me that the turks were doing us more harm than we were doing them; that our ammunition would soon be exhausted; that the army was far inland, and that if it did not make a move to the left there would be no hope for us. several vessels had already been boarded and taken by the turks, who massacred the crews before our eyes, and with barbarous ferocity showed us the heads of the slaughtered men. perree, at considerable risk, despatched several persons to inform the general-in-chief of the desperate situation of the flotilla. the cannonade which bonaparte had heard since the morning, and the explosion of a turkish gunboat, which was blown up by the artillery of the xebec, led him to fear that our situation was really perilous. he therefore made a movement to the left, in the direction of the nile and chebreisse, beat the mamelukes, and forced them to retire on cairo. at sight of the french troops the commander of the turkish flotilla weighed anchor and sailed up the nile. the two banks of the river were evacuated, and the flotilla escaped the destruction which a short time before had appeared inevitable. some writers have alleged that the turkish flotilla was destroyed in this engagement. the truth is, the turks did us considerable injury, while on their part they suffered but little. we had twenty men killed and several wounded. upwards of 1500 cannon-shots were fired during the action. general berthier, in his narrative of the egyptian expedition, enumerates the individuals who, though not in the military service, assisted perree in this unequal and dangerous engagement. he mentions monge, berthollet, andreossy, the paymaster, junot, and bourrienne, secretary to the general-in-chief. it has also been stated that sucy, the commissarygeneral, was seriously wounded while bravely defending a gunboat laden with provisions; but this is incorrect. we had no communication with the army until the 23d of july. on the 22d we came in sight of the pyramids, and were informed that we were only about ten leagues from gizeh, where they are situated. the cannonade which we heard, and which augmented in proportion as the north wind diminished, announced a serious engagement; and that same day we saw the banks of the nile strewed with heaps of bodies, which the waves were every moment washing into the sea. this horrible spectacle, the silence of the surrounding villages, which had hitherto been armed against us, and the cessation of the firing from the banks of the river, led us to infer, with tolerable certainty, that a battle fatal to the mamelukes had been fought. the misery we suffered on our passage from rahmahanie'h to gizeh is indescribable. we lived for eleven days on melons and water, besides being momentarily exposed to the musketry of the arabs and the fellahs. we luckily escaped with but a few killed and wounded. the rising of the nile was only beginning. the shallowness of the river near cairo obliged us to leave the xebec and get on board a djerm. we reached gizeh at three in the afternoon of the 23d of july. when i saluted the general, whom i had not seen for twelve days, he thus addressed me: "so you are here, are you? do you know that you have all of you been the cause of my not following up the battle of chebreisse? it was to save you, monge, berthollet, and the others on board the flotilla that i hurried the movement of my left upon the nile before my right had turned chebreisse. but for that, not a single mameluke would have escaped." "i thank you for my own part," replied i; "but in conscience could you have abandoned us, after taking away our horses, and making us go on board the xebec, whether we would or not?" he laughed, and then told me how sorry he was for the wound of sucy, and the death of many useful men, whose places could not possibly be filled up. he made me write a letter to his brother louis, informing him that he had gained a complete victory over the mamelukes at embabeh, opposite boulac, and that the enemy's loss was 2000 men killed and wounded, 40 guns, and a great number of horses. the occupation of cairo was the immediate consequence of the victory of embabeh. bonaparte established his headquarters in the home of elfy bey, in the great square of ezbekye'h. the march of the french army to cairo was attended by an uninterrupted succession of combats and victories. we had won the battles of rahmahanie'h, chebreisse, and the pyramids. the mamelukes were defeated, and their chief, mourad bey, was obliged to fly into upper egypt. bonaparte found no obstacle to oppose his entrance into the capital of egypt, after a campaign of only twenty days. no conqueror, perhaps, ever enjoyed a victory so much as bonaparte, and yet no one was ever less inclined to abuse his triumphs. we entered cairo on the 24th of july, and the general-in-chief immediately directed his attention to the civil and military organization of the country. only those who saw him in the vigour of his youth can form an idea of his extraordinary intelligence and activity. nothing escaped his observation. egypt had long been the object of his study; and in a few weeks he was as well acquainted with the country as if he had lived in it ten years. he issued orders for observing the strictest discipline, and these orders were punctually obeyed. the mosques, the civil and religious institutions, the harems, the women, the customs of the country-all were scrupulously respected. a few days after they entered cairo the french were freely admitted into the shops, and were seen sociably smoking their pipes with the inhabitants, assisting them in their occupations, and playing with their children. the day after his arrival in cairo bonaparte addressed to his brother joseph the following letter, which was intercepted and printed. its authenticity has been doubted, but i saw napoleon write it, and he read it to me before he sent it off. cairo, 7th. thermidor (25th july 1798) you will see in the public papers the bulletins of the battles and conquest of egypt, which were sufficiently contested to add another wreath to the laurels of this army. egypt is richer than any country in the world in coin, rice, vegetables, and cattle. but the people are in a state of utter barbarism. we cannot procure money, even to pay the troops. i maybe in france in two months. engage a country-house, to be ready for me on my arrival, either near paris or in burgundy, where i mean to pass the winter. --[bonaparte's autograph note, after enumerating the troops and warlike stores he wished to be sent, concluded with the following list: 1st, a company of actors; 2d, a company of dancers; 3d, some dealers in marionettes, at least three or four; 4th, a hundred french women; 5th, the wives of all the men employed in the corps; 6th, twenty surgeons, thirty apothecaries, and ten physicians; 7th, some founders; 8th, some distillers and dealers in liquor; 9th fifty gardeners with their families, and the seeds of every kind of vegetable; 10th, each party to bring with them: 200,000 pints of brandy; 11th, 30,000 ells of blue and scarlet cloth; 12th, a supply of soap and oil.--bourrienne.]- (signed) bonaparte this announcement of his departure to his brother is corroborated by a note which he despatched some days after, enumerating the supplies and individuals which he wished to have sent to egypt. his note proves, more convincingly than any arguments, that bonaparte earnestly wished to preserve his conquest, and to make it a french colony. it must be borne in mind that the note here alluded to, as well as the letter above quoted, was written long before the destruction of the fleet. memoirs of napoleon bonaparte, volume 4. by louis antoine fauvelet de bourrienne his private secretary edited by r. w. phipps colonel, late royal artillery 1891 contents: chapter xxvii. to chapter xxxv. chapter xxvii. 1799-1800. difficulties of a new government--state of europe--bonaparte's wish for peace--m. de talleyrand minister for foreign affairs- negotiations with england and austria--their failure--bonaparte's views on the east--his sacrifices to policy--general bonaparte denounced to the first consul--kléber's letter to the directory- accounts of the egyptian expedition published in the moniteur- proclamation to the army of the east--favour and disgrace of certain individuals accounted for. when a new government rises on the ruins of one that has been overthrown, its best chance of conciliating the favour of the nation, if that nation be at war, is to hold out the prospect of peace; for peace is always dear to a people. bonaparte was well aware of this; and if in his heart he wished otherwise, he knew how important it was to seem to desire peace. accordingly, immediately after his installation at the luxembourg he notified to all the foreign powers his accession to the consulate, and, for the same purpose, addressed letters to all the diplomatic agents of the french government abroad. the day after he got rid of his first two colleagues, sieyès and roger ducos, he prepared to open negotiations with the cabinet of london. at that time we were at war with almost the whole of europe. we had also lost italy. the emperor of germany was ruled by his ministers, who in their turn were governed by england. it was no easy matter to manage equally the organization of the consular government and the no less important affairs abroad; and it was very important to the interests of the first consul to intimate to foreign powers, while at the same time he assured himself against the return of the bourbons, that the system which he proposed to adopt was a system of order and regeneration, unlike either the demagogic violence of the convention or the imbecile artifice of the directory. in fulfilment of this object bonaparte directed m. de talleyrand, the new minister for foreign affairs, to make the first friendly overtures to the english cabinet: a correspondence ensued, which was published at the time, and which showed at once the conciliatory policy of bonaparte and the arrogant policy of england. the exchange of notes which took place was attended by no immediate result. however, the first consul had partly attained his object: if the british government would not enter into negotiations for peace, there was at least reason to presume that subsequent overtures of the consular government might be listened to. the correspondence had at all events afforded bonaparte the opportunity of declaring his principles, and above all, it had enabled him to ascertain that the return of the bourbons to france (mentioned in the official reply of lord grenville) would not be a sine qua non condition for the restoration of peace between the two powers. since m. de talleyrand had been minister for foreign affairs the business of that department had proceeded with great activity. it was an important advantage to bonaparte to find a nobleman of the old regime among the republicans. the choice of m. de talleyrand was in some sort an act of courtesy to the foreign courts. it was a delicate attention to the diplomacy of europe to introduce to its members, for the purpose of treating with them, a man whose rank was at least equal to their own, and who was universally distinguished for a polished elegance of manner combined with solid good qualities and real talents. it was not only with england that bonaparte and his minister endeavoured to open negotiations; the consular cabinet also offered peace to the house of austria; but not at the same time. the object of this offer was to sow discord between the two powers. speaking to me one day of his earnest wish to obtain peace bonaparte said, "you see, bourrienne, i have two great enemies to cope with. i will conclude peace with the one i find most easy to deal with. that will enable me immediately to assail the other. i frankly confess that i should like best to be at peace with england. nothing would then be more easy than to crush austria. she has no money except what she gets through england." for a long time all negotiations proved abortive. none of the european powers would acknowledge the new government, of which bonaparte was the head; and the battle of marengo was required before the peace of amiens could be obtained. though the affairs of the new government afforded abundant occupation to bonaparte, he yet found leisure to direct attention to the east--to that land of despotism whence, judging from his subsequent conduct, it might be presumed he derived his first principles of government. on becoming the head of the state he wished to turn egypt, which he had conquered as a general, to the advantage of his policy as consul. if bonaparte triumphed over a feeling of dislike in consigning the command of the army to kléber, it was because he knew kléber to be more capable than any other of executing the plans he had formed; and bonaparte was not the man to sacrifice the interests of policy to personal resentment. it is certainly true that he then put into practice that charming phrase of molière's--"i pardon you, but you shall pay me for this!" with respect to all whom he had left in egypt bonaparte stood in a very singular situation. on becoming chief of the government he was not only the depositary of all communications made to the directory; but letters sent to one address were delivered to another, and the first consul received the complaints made against the general who had so abruptly quitted egypt. in almost all the letters that were delivered to us he was the object of serious accusation. according to some he had not avowed his departure until the very day of his embarkation; and he had deceived everybody by means of false and dissembling proclamations. others canvassed his conduct while in egypt: the army which had triumphed under his command he had abandoned when reduced to two-thirds of its original force and a prey to all the horrors of sickness and want. it must be confessed that these complaints and accusations were but too well founded, and one can never cease wondering at the chain of fortunate circumstances which so rapidly raised bonaparte to the consular seat. in the natural order of things, and in fulfilment of the design which he himself had formed, he should have disembarked at toulon, where the quarantine laws would no doubt have been observed; instead of which, the fear of the english and the uncertainty of the pilots caused him to go to fréjus, where the quarantine laws were violated by the very persons most interested in respecting them. let us suppose that bonaparte had been forced to perform quarantine at toulon. what would have ensued? the charges against him would have fallen into the hands of the directory, and he would probably have been suspended, and put upon his trial. among the letters which fell into bonaparte's hands, by reason of the abrupt change of government, was an official despatch (of the 4th vendemiaire, year viii.) from general kléber at cairo to the executive directory, in which that general spoke in very stringent terms of the sudden departure of bonaparte and of the state in which the army in egypt had been left. general kléber further accused him of having evaded, by his flight, the difficulties which he thus transferred to his successor's shoulders, and also of leaving the army "without a sou in the chest," with pay in arrear, and very little supply of munitions or clothing. the other letters from egypt were not less accusatory than kléber's; and it cannot be doubted that charges of so precise a nature, brought by the general who had now become commander-in-chief against his predecessor, would have had great weight, especially backed as they were by similar complaints from other quarters. a trial would have been inevitable; and then, no 18th brumaire, no consulate, no empire, no conquest of europebut also, it may be added, no st. helena. none of these events would have ensued had not the english squadron, when it appeared off corsica, obliged the muiron to scud about at hazard, and to touch at the first land she could reach. the egyptian expedition filled too important a place in the life of bonaparte for him to neglect frequently reviving in the public mind the recollection of his conquests in the east. it was not to be forgotten that the head of the republic was the first of her generals. while moreau received the command of the armies of the rhine, while massena, as a reward for the victory of zurich, was made commander-in-chief in italy, and while brune was at the head of the army of batavia, bonaparte, whose soul was in the camps, consoled himself for his temporary inactivity by a retrospective glance on his past triumphs. he was unwilling that fame should for a moment cease to blazon his name. accordingly, as soon as he was established at the head of the government, he caused accounts of his egyptian expedition to be from time to time published in the moniteur. he frequently expressed his satisfaction that the accusatory correspondence, and, above all, kléber's letter, had fallen into his own hands. such was bonaparte's perfect self-command that immediately after perusing that letter he dictated to me the following proclamation, addressed to the army of the east: soldiers!--the consuls of the french republic frequently direct their attention to the army of the east. france acknowledges all the influence of your conquests on the restoration of her trade and the civilisation of the world. the eyes of all europe are upon you, and in thought i am often with you. in whatever situation the chances of war may place you, prove yourselves still the soldiers of rivoli and aboukir--you will be invincible. place in kléber the boundless confidence which you reposed in me. he deserves it. soldiers, think of the day when you will return victorious to the sacred territory of france. that will be a glorious day for the whole nation. nothing can more forcibly show the character of bonaparte than the above allusion to kléber, after he had seen the way in which kléber spoke of him to the directory. could it ever have been imagined that the correspondence of the army, to whom he addressed this proclamation, teemed with accusations against him? though the majority of these accusations were strictly just, yet it is but fair to state that the letters from egypt contained some calumnies. in answer to the wellfounded portion of the charges bonaparte said little; but he seemed to feel deeply the falsehoods that were stated against him, one of which was, that he had carried away millions from egypt. i cannot conceive what could have given rise to this false and impudent assertion. so far from having touched the army chest, bonaparte had not even received all his own pay. before he constituted himself the government the government was his debtor. though he knew well all that was to be expected from the egyptian expedition, yet those who lauded that affair were regarded with a favourable eye by bonaparte. the correspondence which had fallen into his hands was to him of the highest importance in enabling him to ascertain the opinions which particular individuals entertained of him. it was the source of favours and disgraces which those who were not in the secret could not account for. it serves to explain why many men of mediocrity were elevated to the highest dignities and honours, while other men of real merit fell into disgrace or were utterly neglected. chapter xxviii. 1800. great and common men--portrait of bonaparte--the varied expression of his countenance--his convulsive shrug--presentiment of his corpulency--partiality for bathing--his temperance--his alleged capability of dispensing with sleep--good and bad news--shaving, and reading the journals--morning business--breakfast--coffee and snuff --bonaparte's idea of his own situation--his ill opinion of mankind --his dislike of a 'tête-à-tête'--his hatred of the revolutionists --ladies in white--anecdotes--bonaparte's tokens of kindness, and his droll compliments--his fits of ill humour--sound of bells- gardens of malmaison--his opinion of medicine--his memory- his poetic insensibility--his want of gallantry--cards and conversation--the dress-coat and black cravat--bonaparte's payments --his religious ideas--his obstinacy. in perusing the history of the distinguished characters of past ages, how often do we regret that the historian should have portrayed the hero rather than the man! we wish to know even the most trivial habits of those whom great talents and vast reputation have elevated above their fellow-creatures. is this the effect of mere curiosity, or rather is it not an involuntary feeling of vanity which prompts us to console ourselves for the superiority of great men by reflecting on their faults, their weaknesses, their absurdities; in short, all the points of resemblance between them and common men? for the satisfaction of those who are curious in details of this sort, i will here endeavour to paint bonaparte, as i saw him, in person and in mind, to describe what were his tastes and habits, and even his whims and caprices. bonaparte was now in the prime of life, and about thirty. the person of bonaparte has served as a model for the most skilful painters and sculptors; many able french artists have successfully delineated his features, and yet it may be said that no perfectly faithful portrait of him exists. his finely-shaped head, his superb forehead, his pale countenance, and his usual meditative look, have been transferred to the canvas; but the versatility of his expression was beyond the reach of imitation. all the various workings of his mind were instantaneously depicted in his countenance; and his glance changed from mild to severe, and from angry to good-humoured, almost with the rapidity of lightning. it may truly be said that he had a particular look for every thought that arose in his mind. bonaparte had beautiful hands, and he was very proud of them; while conversing he would often look at them with an air of self-complacency. he also fancied he had fine teeth, but his pretension to that advantage was not so well founded as his vanity on the score of his hands. when walking, either alone or in company with any one, in his apartments or in his gardens, he had the habit of stooping a little, and crossing his hands behind his back. he frequently gave an involuntary shrug of his right shoulder, which was accompanied by a movement of his mouth from left to right. this habit was always most remarkable when his mind was absorbed in the consideration of any profound subject. it was often while walking that he dictated to me his most important notes. he could endure great fatigue, not only on horseback but on foot; he would sometimes walk for five or six hours in succession without being aware of it. when walking with any person whom he treated with familiarity he would link his arm into that of his companion, and lean on it. he used often to say to me, "you see, bourrienne, how temperate, and how thin i am; but, in spite of that, i cannot help thinking that at forty i shall become a great eater, and get very fat. i foresee that my constitution will undergo a change. i take a great deal of exercise; but yet i feel assured that my presentiment will be fulfilled." this idea gave him great uneasiness, and as i observed nothing which seemed to warrant his apprehensions, i omitted no opportunity of assuring him that they were groundless. but he would not listen to me, and all the time i was about him, he was haunted by this presentiment, which, in the end, was but too well verified. his partiality for the bath he mistook for a necessity. he would usually remain in the bath two hours, during which time i used to read to him extracts from the journals and pamphlets of the day, for he was anxious to hear and know all that was going on. while in the bath he was continually turning on the warm water to raise the temperature, so that i was sometimes enveloped in such a dense vapour that i could not see to read, and was obliged to open the door. bonaparte was exceedingly temperate, and averse to all excess. he knew the absurd stories that were circulated about him, and he was sometimes vexed at them. it has been repeated, over and over again, that he was subject to attacks of epilepsy; but during the eleven years that i was almost constantly with him i never observed any symptom which in the least degree denoted that malady. his health was good and his constitution sound. if his enemies, by way of reproach, have attributed to him a serious periodical disease, his flatterers, probably under the idea that sleep is incompatible with greatness, have evinced an equal disregard of truth in speaking of his night-watching. bonaparte made others watch, but he himself slept, and slept well. his orders were that i should call him every morning at seven. i was therefore the first to enter his chamber; but very frequently when i awoke him he would turn himself, and say, "ah, bourrienne! let me lie a little longer." when there was no very pressing business i did not disturb him again till eight o'clock. he in general slept seven hours out of the twenty-four, besides taking a short nap in the afternoon. among the private instructions which bonaparte gave me, one was very curious. "during the night," said he, "enter my chamber as seldom as possible. do not awake me when you have any good news to communicate: with that there is no hurry. but when you bring bad news, rouse me instantly; for then there is not a moment to be lost." this was a wise regulation, and bonaparte found his advantage in it. as soon as he rose his 'valet de chambre' shaved him and dressed his hair. while he was being shaved i read to him the newspapers, beginning always with the 'moniteur.' he paid little attention to any but the german and english papers. "pass over all that," he would say, while i was perusing the french papers; "i know it already. they say only what they think will please me." i was often surprised that his valet did not cut him while i was reading; for whenever he heard anything interesting he turned quickly round towards me. when bonaparte had finished his toilet, which he did with great attention, for he was scrupulously neat in his person, we went down to his cabinet. there he signed the orders on important petitions which had been analysed by me on the preceding evening. on reception and parade days he was particularly exact in signing these orders, because i used to remind him that he would be likely to see most of the petitioners, and that they would ask him for answers. to spare him this annoyance i used often to acquaint them beforehand of what had been granted or refused, and what had been the decision of the first consul. he next perused the letters which i had opened and laid on his table, ranging them according to their importance. he directed me to answer them in his name; he occasionally wrote the answers himself, but not often. at ten o'clock the 'maître d'hôtel' entered, and announced breakfast, saying, "the general is served." we went to breakfast, and the repast was exceedingly simple. he ate almost every morning some chicken, dressed with oil and onions. this dish was then, i believe, called 'poulet à la provençale'; but our restaurateurs have since conferred upon it the more ambitious name of 'poulet à la marengo.' bonaparte drank little wine, always either claret or burgundy, and the latter by preference. after breakfast, as well as after dinner, he took a cup of strong coffee. --[m. brillat de savarin, whose memory is dear to all gourmands, had established, as a gastronomic principle, that "he who does not take coffee after each meal is assuredly not a man of taste."- bourrienne.]-i never saw him take any between his meals, and i cannot imagine what could have given rise to the assertion of his being particularly fond of coffee. when he worked late at night he never ordered coffee, but chocolate, of which he made me take a cup with him. but this only happened when our business was prolonged till two or three in the morning. all that has been said about bonaparte's immoderate use of snuff has no more foundation in truth than his pretended partiality for coffee. it is true that at an early period of his life he began to take snuff, but it was very sparingly, and always out of a box; and if he bore any resemblance to frederick the great, it was not by filling his waistcoatpockets with snuff, for i must again observe he carried his notions of personal neatness to a fastidious degree. bonaparte had two ruling passions, glory and war. he was never more gay than in the camp, and never more morose than in the inactivity of peace. plans for the construction of public monuments also pleased his imagination, and filled up the void caused by the want of active occupation. he was aware that monuments form part of the history of nations, of whose civilisation they bear evidence for ages after those who created them have disappeared from the earth, and that they likewise often bear false-witness to remote posterity of the reality of merely fabulous conquests. bonaparte was, however, mistaken as to the mode of accomplishing the object he had in view. his ciphers, his trophies, and subsequently his eagles, splendidly adorned the monuments of his reign. but why did he wish to stamp false initials on things with which neither he nor his reign had any connection; as, for example the old louvre? did he imagine that the letter, "n" which everywhere obtruded itself on the eye, had in it a charm to controvert the records of history, or alter the course of time? --[when louis xviii. returned to the tuileries in 1814 he found that bonaparte had been an excellent tenant, and that he had left everything in very good condition.]-be this as it may, bonaparte well knew that the fine arts entail lasting glory on great actions, and consecrate the memory of princes who protect and encourage them. he oftener than once said to me, "a great reputation is a great noise; the more there is made, the farther off it is heard. laws, institutions, monuments, nations, all fall; but the noise continues and resounds in after ages." this was one of his favourite ideas. "my power," he would say at other times, "depends on my glory, and my glory on my victories. my power would fall were i not to support it by new glory and new victories. conquest has made me what i am, and conquest alone can maintain me." this was then, and probably always continued to be, his predominant idea, and that which prompted him continually to scatter the seeds of war through europe. he thought that if he remained stationary he would fall, and he was tormented with the desire of continually advancing. not to do something great and decided was, in his opinion, to do nothing. "a newly-born government," said he to me, "must dazzle and astonish. when it ceases to do that it falls." it was vain to look for rest from a man who was restlessness itself. his sentiments towards france now differed widely from what i had known them to be in his youth. he long indignantly cherished the recollection of the conquest of corsica, which he was once content to regard as his country. but that recollection was effaced, and it might be said that he now ardently loved france. his imagination was fired by the very thought of seeing her great, happy, and powerful, and, as the first nation in the world, dictating laws to the rest. he fancied his name inseparably connected with france, and resounding in the ears of posterity. in all his actions he lost sight of the present moment, and thought only of futurity; so, in all places where he led the way to glory, the opinion of france was ever present in his thoughts. as alexander at arbela pleased himself less in having conquered darius than in having gained the suffrage of the athenians, so bonaparte at marengo was haunted by the idea of what would be said in france. before he fought a battle bonaparte thought little about what he should do in case of success, but a great deal about what he should do in case of a reverse of fortune. i mention this as a fact of which i have often been a witness, and leave to his brothers in arms to decide whether his calculations were always correct. he had it in his power to do much, for he risked everything and spared nothing. his inordinate ambition goaded him on to the attainment of power; and power when possessed served only to augment his ambition. bonaparte was thoroughly convinced of the truth that trifles often decide the greatest events; therefore he watched rather than provoked opportunity, and when the right moment approached, he suddenly took advantage of it. it is curious that, amidst all the anxieties of war and government, the fear of the bourbons incessantly pursued him, and the faubourg st. germain was to him always a threatening phantom. he did not esteem mankind, whom, indeed, he despised more and more in proportion as he became acquainted with them. in him this unfavourable opinion of human nature was justified by many glaring examples of baseness, and he used frequently to repeat, "there are two levers for moving men,--interest and fear." what respect, indeed, could bonaparte entertain for the applicants to the treasury of the opera? into this treasury the gaming-houses paid a considerable sum, part of which went to cover the expenses of that magnificent theatre. the rest was distributed in secret gratuities, which were paid on orders signed by duroc. individuals of very different characters were often seen catching the little door in the rue rameau. the lady who was for a while the favourite of the general-in-chief in egypt, and whose husband was maliciously sent back by the english, was a frequent visitor to the treasury. on an occasion would be seen assembled there a distinguished scholar and an actor, a celebrated orator and a musician; on another, the treasurer would have payments to make to a priest, a courtesan, and a cardinal. one of bonaparte's greatest misfortunes was, that he neither believed in friendship not felt the necessity of loving. how often have i heard him say, "friendship is but a name; i love nobody. i do not even love my brothers. perhaps joseph, a little, from habit and because he is my elder; and duroc, i love him too. but why? because his character pleases me. he is stern and resolute; and i really believe the fellow never shed a tear. for my part, i know very well that i have no true friends. as long as i continue what i am, i may have as many pretended friends as i please. leave sensibility to women; it is their business. but men should be firm in heart and in purpose, or they should have nothing to do with war or government." in his social relations bonaparte's temper was bad; but his fits of illhumour passed away like a cloud, and spent themselves in words. his violent language and bitter imprecations were frequently premeditated. when he was going to reprimand any one he liked to have a witness present. he would then say the harshest things, and level blows against which few could bear up. but he never gave way to those violent ebullitions of rage until be acquired undoubted proofs of the misconduct of those against whom they were directed. in scenes of this sort i have frequently observed that the presence of a third person seemed to give him confidence. consequently, in a 'tête-à-tête' interview, any one who knew his character, and who could maintain sufficient coolness and firmness, was sure to get the better of him. he told his friends at st. helena that he admitted a third person on such occasions only that the blow might resound the farther. that was not his real motive, or the better way would have been to perform the scene in public. he had other reasons. i observed that he did not like a 'tête-à-tête'; and when he expected any one, he would say to me beforehand, "bourrienne, you may remain;" and when any one was announced whom he did not expect, as a minister or a general, if i rose to retire he would say in a halfwhisper, "stay where you are." certainly this was not done with the design of getting what he said reported abroad; for it belonged neither to my character nor my duty to gossip about what i had heard. besides, it may be presumed, that the few who were admitted as witnesses to the conferences of napoleon were aware of the consequences attending indiscreet disclosures under a government which was made acquainted with all that was said and done. bonaparte entertained a profound dislike of the sanguinary men of the revolution, and especially of the regicides. he felt, as a painful burden, the obligation of dissembling towards them. he spoke to me in terms of horror of those whole he called the assassins of louis xvi, and he was annoyed at the necessity of employing them and treating them with apparent respect. how many times has he not said to cambacérès, pinching him by the ear, to soften, by that habitual familiarity, the bitterness of the remark, "my dear fellow, your case is clear; if ever the bourbons come back you will be hanged!" a forced smile would then relax the livid countenance of cambacérès, and was usually the only reply of the second consul, who, however, on one occasion said in my hearing, "come, come, have done with this joking." one thing which gave bonaparte great pleasure when in the country was to see a tall, slender woman, dressed in white, walking beneath an alley of shaded trees. he detested coloured dresses, and especially dark ones. to fat women he had an invincible antipathy, and he could not endure the sight of a pregnant woman; it therefore rarely happened that a female in that situation was invited to his parties. he possessed every requisite for being what is called in society an agreeable man, except the will to be so. his manner was imposing rather than pleasing, and those who did not know him well experienced in his presence an involuntary feeling of awe. in the drawing-room, where josephine did the honours with so much grace and affability, all was gaiety and ease, and no one felt the presence of a superior; but on bonaparte's entrance all was changed, and every eye was directed towards him, to read his humour in his countenance, whether he intended to be silent or talkative, dull or cheerful. he often talked a great deal, and sometimes a little too much; but no one could tell a story in a more agreeable and interesting way. his conversation rarely turned on gay or humorous subjects, and never on trivial matters. he was so fond of argument that in the warmth of discussion it was easy to draw from him secrets which he was most anxious to conceal. sometimes, in a small circle, he would amuse himself by relating stories of presentiments and apparitions. for this he always chose the twilight of evening, and he would prepare his hearers for what was coming by some solemn remark. on one occasion of this kind he said, in a very grave tone of voice, "when death strikes a person whom we love, and who is distant from us, a foreboding almost always denotes the event, and the dying person appears to us at the moment of his dissolution." he then immediately related the following anecdote: "a gentleman of the court of louis xiv. was in the gallery of versailles at the time that the king was reading to his courtiers the bulletin of the battle of friedlingen gained by villars. suddenly the gentleman saw, at the farther end of the gallery, the ghost of his son, who served under villars. he exclaimed, 'my son is no more!' and next moment the king named him among the dead." when travelling bonaparte was particularly talkative. in the warmth of his conversation, which was always characterised by original and interesting ideas, he sometimes dropped hints of his future views, or, at least, he said things which were calculated to disclose what he wished to conceal. i took the liberty of mentioning to him this indiscretion, and far from being offended, he acknowledged his mistake, adding that he was not aware he had gone so far. he frankly avowed this want of caution when at st. helena. when in good humour his usual tokens of kindness consisted in a little rap on the head or a slight pinch of the ear. in his most friendly conversations with those whom he admitted into his intimacy he would say, "you are a fool"--"a simpleton"--"a ninny"--"a blockhead." these, and a few other words of like import, enabled him to vary his catalogue of compliments; but he never employed them angrily, and the tone in which they were uttered sufficiently indicated that they were meant in kindness. bonaparte had many singular habits and tastes. whenever he experienced any vexation, or when any unpleasant thought occupied his mind, he would hum something which was far from resembling a tune, for his voice was very unmusical. he would, at the same time, seat himself before the writing-table, and swing back in his chair so far that i have often been fearful of his falling. he would then vent his ill-humour on the right arm of his chair, mutilating it with his penknife, which he seemed to keep for no other purpose. i always took care to keep good pens ready for him; for, as it was my business to decipher his writing, i had a strong interest in doing what i could to make it legible. the sound of bells always produced in bonaparte pleasurable sensations, which i could never account for. when we were at malmaison, and walking in the alley leading to the plain of ruel, how many times has the bell of the village church interrupted our most serious conversations! he would stop, lest the noise of our footsteps should drown any portion of the delightful sound. he was almost angry with me because i did not experience the impressions he did. so powerful was the effect produced upon him by the sound of these bells that his voice would falter as he said, "ah! that reminds me of the first years i spent at brienne! i was then happy!" when the bells ceased he would resume the course of his speculations, carry himself into futurity, place a crown on his head, and dethrone kings. nowhere, except on the field of battle, did i ever see bonaparte more happy than in the gardens of malmaison. at the commencement of the consulate we used to go there every saturday evening, and stay the whole of sunday, and sometimes monday. bonaparte used to spend a considerable part of his time in walking and superintending the improvements which he had ordered. at first he used to make excursions about the neighbourhood, but the reports of the police disturbed his natural confidence, and gave him reason to fear the attempts of concealed royalist partisans. during the first four or five days that bonaparte spent at malmaison he amused himself after breakfast with calculating the revenue of that domain. according to his estimates it amounted to 8000 francs. "that is not bad!" said he; "but to live here would require an income of 30,000 livres!" i could not help smiling to see him seriously engaged in such a calculation. bonaparte had no faith in medicine. he spoke of it as an art entirely conjectural, and his opinion on this subject was fired and incontrovertible. his vigorous mind rejected all but demonstrative proofs. he had little memory for proper names, words, or dates, but he had a wonderful recollection of facts and places. i recollect that, on going from paris to toulon, he pointed out to me ten places calculated for great battles, and he never forgot them. they were memoranda of his first youthful journeys. bonaparte was insensible to the charms of poetic harmony. he had not even sufficient ear to feel the rhythm of poetry, and he never could recite a verse without violating the metre; yet the grand ideas of poetry charmed him. he absolutely worshipped corneille; and, one day, after having witnessed a performance of 'cinna', he said to me, "if a man like corneille were living in my time i would make him my prime minister. it is not his poetry that i most admire; it is his powerful understanding, his vast knowledge of the human heart, and his profound policy!" at st. helena he said that he would have made corneille a prince; but at the time he spoke to me of corneille he had no thought of making either princes or kings. gallantry to women was by no means a trait in bonaparte's character. he seldom said anything agreeable to females, and he frequently addressed to them the rudest and most extraordinary remarks. to one he would say, "heavens, how red your elbows are!" to another, "what an ugly headdress you have got!" at another time he would say, "your dress is none of the cleanest..... do you ever change your gown? i have seen you in that twenty times!" he showed no mercy to any who displeased him on these points. he often gave josephine directions about her toilet, and the exquisite taste for which she was distinguished might have helped to make him fastidious about the costume of other ladies. at first he looked to elegance above all things: at a later period he admired luxury and splendour, but he always required modesty. he frequently expressed his disapproval of the low-necked dresses which were so much in fashion at the beginning of the consulate. bonaparte did not love cards, and this was very fortunate for those who were invited to his parties; for when he was seated at a card-table, as he sometimes thought himself obliged to be, nothing could exceed the dulness of the drawing-room either at the luxembourg or the tuileries. when, on the contrary, he walked about among the company, all were pleased, for he usually spoke to everybody, though he preferred the conversation of men of science, especially those who had been with him in in egypt; as for example, monge and berthollet. he also liked to talk with chaptal and lacépède, and with lemercier, the author of 'agamemnon'. bonaparte was seen to less advantage in a drawing-room than at the head of his troops. his military uniform became him much better than the handsomest dress of any other kind. his first trials of dress-coats were unfortunate. i have been informed that the first time he wore one he kept on his black cravat. this incongruity was remarked to him, and he replied, "so much the better; it leaves me something of a military air, and there is no harm in that." for my own part, i neither saw the black cravat nor heard this reply. the first consul paid his own private bills very punctually; but he was always tardy in settling the accounts of the contractors who bargained with ministers for supplies for the public service. he put off these payments by all sorts of excuses and shufflings. hence arose immense arrears in the expenditure, and the necessity of appointing a committee of liquidation. in his opinion the terms contractor and rogue were synonymous. all that he avoided paying them he regarded as a just restitution to himself; and all the sums which were struck off from their accounts he regarded as so much deducted from a theft. the less a minister paid out of his budget the more bonaparte was pleased with him; and this ruinous system of economy can alone explain the credit which decrès so long enjoyed at the expense of the french navy. on the subject of religion bonaparte's ideas were very vague. "my reason," said he, "makes me incredulous respecting many things; but the impressions of my childhood and early youth throw me into uncertainty." he was very fond of talking of religion. in italy, in egypt, and on board the 'orient' and the 'muiron', i have known him to take part in very animated conversations on this subject. he readily yielded up all that was proved against religion as the work of men and time: but he would not hear of materialism. i recollect that one fine night, when he was on deck with some persons who were arguing in favour of materialism, bonaparte raised his hand to heaven and, pointing to the stars, said, "you may talk as long as you please, gentlemen, but who made all that?" the perpetuity of a name in the memory of man was to him the immortality of the soul. he was perfectly tolerant towards every variety of religious faith. among bonaparte's singular habits was that of seating himself on any table which happened to be of a suitable height for him. he would often sit on mine, resting his left arm on my right shoulder, and swinging his left leg, which did not reach the ground; and while he dictated to me he would jolt the table so that i could scarcely write. bonaparte had a great dislike to reconsider any decision, even when it was acknowledged to be unjust. in little as well as in great things he evinced his repugnance to retrograde. an instance of this occurred in the affair of general latour-foissac. the first consul felt how much he had wronged that general; but he wished some time to elapse before he repaired his error. his heart and his conduct were at variance; but his feelings were overcome by what he conceived to be political necessity. bonaparte was never known to say, "i have done wrong:" his usual observation was, "i begin to think there is something wrong." in spite of this sort of feeling, which was more worthy of an illhumoured philosopher than the head of a government, bonaparte was neither malignant nor vindictive. i cannot certainly defend him against all the reproaches which he incurred through the imperious law of war and cruel necessity; but i may say that he has often been unjustly accused. none but those who are blinded by fury will call him a nero or a caligula. i think i have avowed his faults with sufficient candour to entitle me to credit when i speak in his commendation; and i declare that, out of the field of battle, bonaparte had a kind and feeling heart. he was very fond of children, a trait which seldom distinguishes a bad man. in the relations of private life to call him amiable would not be using too strong a word, and he was very indulgent to the weakness of human nature. the contrary opinion is too firmly fixed in some minds for me to hope to root it out. i shall, i fear, have contradictors, but i address myself to those who look for truth. to judge impartially we must take into account the influence which time and circumstances exercise on men; and distinguish between the different characters of the collegian, the general, the consul, and the emperor. chapter xxix. 1800. bonaparte's laws--suppression of the festival of the 21st of january--officials visits--the temple--louis xvi. and sir sidney smith--peculation during the directory--loan raised--modest budget --the consul and the member of the institute--the figure of the republic--duroc's missions--the king of prussia--the emperor alexander--general latour-foissac--arbitrary decree--company of players for egypt--singular ideas respecting literary property- the preparatory consulate--the journals--sabres and muskets of honour--the first consul and his comrade--the bust of brutus- statues in the gallery of the tuileries--sections of the council of state--costumes of public functionaries--masquerades--the opera balls--recall of the exiles. it is not my purpose to say much about the laws, decrees, and 'senatusconsultes', which the first consul either passed, or caused to be passed, after his accession to power, what were they all, with the exception of the civil code? the legislative reveries of the different men who have from time to time ruled france form an immense labyrinth, in which chicanery bewilders reason and common sense; and they would long since have been buried in oblivion had they not occasionally served to authorise injustice. i cannot, however, pass over unnoticed the happy effect produced in paris, and throughout the whole of france, by some of the first decisions of the consuls. perhaps none but those who witnessed the state of society during the reign of terror can fully appreciate the satisfaction which the first steps towards the restoration of social order produced in the breasts of all honest men. the directory, more base and not less perverse than the convention, had retained the horrible 21st of january among the festivals of the republic. one of bonaparte's first ideas on attaining the possession of power was to abolish this; but such was the ascendency of the abettors of the fearful event that he could not venture on a straightforward course. he and his two colleagues, who were sieyès and roger ducos, signed, on the 5th nivôse, a decree, setting forth that in future the only festivals to be celebrated by the republic were the 1st vendemiaire and the 14th of july, intending by this means to consecrate provisionally the recollection of the foundation of the republic and of liberty. all was calculation with bonaparte. to produce effect was his highest gratification. thus he let slip no opportunity of saying or doing things which were calculated to dazzle the multitude. while at the luxembourg, he went sometimes accompanied by his 'aides de camp' and sometimes by a minister, to pay certain official visits. i did not accompany him on these occasions; but almost always either on his return, after dinner, or in the evening, he related to me what he had done and said. he congratulated himself on having paid a visit to daubenton, at the jardin des plantes, and talked with great self-complacency of the distinguished way in which he had treated the contemporary of buffon. on the 24th brumaire he visited the prisons. he liked to make these visits unexpectedly, and to take the governors of the different public establishments by surprise; so that, having no time to make their preparations, he might see things as they really were. i was in his cabinet when he returned, for i had a great deal of business to go through in his absence. as he entered he exclaimed, "what brutes these directors are! to what a state they have brought our public establishments! but, stay a little! i will put all in order. the prisons are in a shockingly unwholesome state, and the prisoners miserably fed. i questioned them, and i questioned the jailers, for nothing is to be learned from the superiors. they, of course, always speak well of their own work! when i was in the temple i could not help thinking of the unfortunate louis xvi. he was an excellent man, but too amiable, too gentle for the times. he knew not how to deal with mankind! and sir sidney smith! i made them show me his apartment. if the fools had not let him escape i should have taken st. jean d'acre! there are too many painful recollections connected with that prison! i will certainly have it pulled down some day or other! what do you think i did at the temple? i ordered the jailers' books to be brought to me, and finding that some hostages were still in confinement i liberated them. 'an unjust law,' said i, 'has deprived you of liberty; my first duty is to restore it to you.' was not this well done, bourrienne? "as i was, no less than bonaparte himself, an enemy to the revolutionary laws, i congratulated him sincerely; and he was very sensible to my approbation, for i was not accustomed to greet him with "good; very good," on all occasions. it is true, knowing his character as i did, i avoided saying anything that was calculated to offend him; but when i said nothing, he knew very well how to construe my silence. had i flattered him i should have continued longer in favour. bonaparte always spoke angrily of the directors he had turned off. their incapacity disgusted and astonished him. "what simpletons! what a government!" he would frequently exclaim when he looked into the measures of the directory. "bourrienne," said he, "can you imagine anything more pitiable than their system of finance? can it for a moment be doubted that the principal agents of authority daily committed the most fraudulent peculations? what venality! what disorder! what wastefulness! everything put up for sale: places, provisions, clothing, and military, all were disposed of. have they not actually consumed 75,000,000 in advance? and then, think of all the scandalous fortunes accumulated, all the malversations! but are there no means of making them refund? we shall see." in these first moments of poverty it was found necessary to raise a loan, for the funds of m. collot did not last long, and 12,000,000 were advanced by the different bankers of paris, who, i believe, were paid by bills of the receivers-general, the discount of which then amounted to about 33 per cent. the salaries of the first offices were not very considerable, and did not amount to anything like the exorbitant stipends of the empire. bonaparte's salary was fixed at 500,000 francs. what a contrast to the 300,000,000 in gold which were reported to have been concealed in 1811 in the cellars of the tuileries! in mentioning bonaparte's nomination to the institute, and his affectation in putting at the head of his proclamation his title of member of that learned body before that of general-in-chief, i omitted to state what value he really attached to that title. the truth is that, when young and ambitious, he was pleased with the proffered title, which he thought would raise him in public estimation. how often have we laughed together when he weighed the value of his scientific titles! bonaparte, to be sure, knew something of mathematics, a good deal of history, and, i need not add, possessed extraordinary military talent; but he was nevertheless a useless member of the institute. on his return from egypt he began to grow weary of a title which gave him so many colleagues. "do you not think," said he one day to me, "that there is something mean and humiliating in the words, 'i have the honour to be, my dear colleague'! i am tired of it!" generally speaking, all phrases which indicated equality displeased him. it will be recollected how gratified he was that i did not address him in the second person singular on our meeting at leoben, and also what befell m. de cominges at bâle because he did not observe the same precaution. the figure of the republic seated and holding a spear in her hand, which at the commencement of the consulate was stamped on official letters, was speedily abolished. happy would it have been if liberty herself had not suffered the same treatment as her emblem! the title of first consul made him despise that of member of the institute. he no longer entertained the least predilection for that learned body, and subsequently he regarded it with much suspicion. it was a body, an authorised assembly; these were reasons sufficient for him to take umbrage at it, and he never concealed his dislike of all bodies possessing the privilege of meeting and deliberating. while we were at the luxembourg bonaparte despatched duroc on a special mission to the king of prussia. this happened, i think, at the very beginning of the year 1800. he selected duroc because he was a man of good education and agreeable manners, and one who could express himself with elegance and reserve, qualities not often met with at that period. duroc had been with us in italy, in egypt, and on board the 'muiron', and the consul easily guessed that the king of prussia would be delighted to hear from an eye-witness the events of bonaparte's campaigns, especially the siege of st. jean d'acre, and the scenes which took place during the months of march and may at jaffa. besides, the first consul considered it indispensable that such circumstantial details should be given in a way to leave no doubt of their correctness. his intentions were fully realised; for duroc told me, on his return, that nearly the whole of the conversation he had with the king turned upon st. jean d'acre and jaffa. he stayed nearly two whole hours with his majesty, who, the day after, gave him an invitation to dinner. when this intelligence arrived at the luxembourg i could perceive that the chief of the republic was flattered that one of his aides de camp should have sat at table with a king, who some years after was doomed to wait for him in his antechamber at tilsit. duroc never spoke on politics to the king of prussia, which was very fortunate, for, considering his age and the exclusively military life he had led, he could scarcely have been expected to avoid blunders. some time later, after the death of paul i., he was sent to congratulate alexander on his accession to the throne. bonaparte's design in thus making choice of duroc was to introduce to the courts of europe, by confidential missions, a young man to whom he was much attached, and also to bring him forward in france. duroc went on his third mission to berlin after the war broke out with austria. he often wrote to me, and his letters convinced me how much he had improved himself within a short time. another circumstance which happened at the commencement of the consulate affords an example of bonaparte's inflexibility when he had once formed a determination. in the spring of 1799, when we were in egypt, the directory gave to general latour-foissac, a highly distinguished officer, the command of mantua, the taking of which had so powerfully contributed to the glory of the conqueror of italy. shortly after latour's appointment to this important post the austrians besieged mantua. it was well known that the garrison was supplied with provisions and ammunition for a long resistance; yet, in the month of july it surrendered to the austrians. the act of capitulation contained a curious article, viz. "general latour-foissac and his staff shall be conducted as prisoners to austria; the garrison shall be allowed to return to france." this distinction between the general and the troops entrusted to his command, and at the same time the prompt surrender of mantua, were circumstances which, it must be confessed, were calculated to excite suspicions of latour-foissac. the consequence was, when bernadotte was made war minister he ordered an inquiry into the general's conduct by a courtmartial. latour-foissac had no sooner returned to france than he published a justificatory memorial, in which he showed the impossibility of his having made a longer defence when he was in want of many objects of the first necessity. such was the state of the affair on bonaparte's elevation to the consular power. the loss of mantua, the possession of which had cost him so many sacrifices, roused his indignation to so high a pitch that whenever the subject was mentioned he could find no words to express his rage. he stopped the investigation of the court-martial, and issued a violent decree against latour-foissac even before his culpability had been proved. this proceeding occasioned much discussion, and was very dissatisfactory to many general officers, who, by this arbitrary decision, found themselves in danger of forfeiting the privilege of being tried by their natural judges whenever they happened to displease the first consul. for my own part, i must say that this decree against latour-foissac was one which i saw issued with considerable regret. i was alarmed for the consequences. after the lapse of a few days i ventured to point out to him the undue severity of the step he had taken; i reminded him of all that had been said in latour-foissac's favour, and tried to convince him how much more just it would be to allow the trial to come to a conclusion. "in a country," said i, "like france, where the point of honour stands above every thing, it is impossible foissac can escape condemnation if he be culpable."--"perhaps you are right, bourrienne," rejoined he; "but the blow is struck; the decree is issued. i have given the same explanation to every one; but i cannot so suddenly retrace my steps. to retro-grade is to be lost. i cannot acknowledge myself in the wrong. by and by we shall see what can be done. time will bring lenity and pardon. at present it would be premature." such, word for word, was bonaparte's reply. if with this be compared what he said on the subject at st. helena it will be found that his ideas continued nearly unchanged; the only difference is that, instead of the impetuosity of 1800, he expressed himself with the calmness which time and adversity naturally produce. --["it was," says the 'memorial of st. helena', "an illegal and tyrannical act, but still it was a necessary evil. it was the fault of the law. he was a hundred, nay, a thousand fold guilty, and yet it was doubtful whether he would be condemned. we therefore assailed him with the shafts of honour and public opinion. yet i repeat it was a tyrannical act, and one of those violent measures which are at times necessary in great nations and in extraordinary circumstances."]-bonaparte, as i have before observed, loved contrasts; and i remember at the very time he was acting so violently against latour-foissac he condescended to busy himself about a company of players which he wished to send to egypt, or rather that he pretended to wish to send there, because the announcement of such a project conveyed an impression of the prosperous condition of our oriental colony. the consuls gravely appointed the minister of the interior to execute this business, and the minister in his turn delegated his powers to florence, the actor. in their instructions to the minister the consuls observed that it would be advisable to include some female dancers in the company; a suggestion which corresponds with bonaparte's note, in which were specified all that he considered necessary for the egyptian expedition. the first consul entertained singular notions respecting literary property. on his hearing that a piece, entitled 'misanthropie et repentir', had been brought out at the odeon, he said to me, "bourrienne, you have been robbed."--"i, general? how?"--"you have been robbed, i tell you, and they are now acting your piece." i have already mentioned that during my stay at warsaw i amused myself with translating a celebrated play of kotzebue. while we were in italy i lent bonaparte my translation to read, and he expressed himself much pleased with it. he greatly admired the piece, and often went to see it acted at the odeon. on his return he invariably gave me fresh reasons for my claiming what he was pleased to call my property. i represented to him that the translation of a foreign work belonged to any one who chose to execute it. he would not, however, give up his point, and i was obliged to assure him that my occupations in his service left me no time to engage in a literary lawsuit. he then exacted a promise from me to translate goethe's 'werther'. i told him it was already done, though indifferently, and that i could not possibly devote to the subject the time it merited. i read over to him one of the letters i had translated into french, and which he seemed to approve. that interval of the consular government during which bonaparte remained at the luxembourg may be called the preparatory consulate. then were sown the seeds of the great events which he meditated, and of those institutions with which he wished to mark his possession of power. he was then, if i may use the expression, two individuals in one: the republican general, who was obliged to appear the advocate of liberty and the principles of the revolution; and the votary of ambition, secretly plotting the downfall of that liberty and those principles. i often wondered at the consummate address with which he contrived to deceive those who were likely to see through his designs. this hypocrisy, which some, perhaps, may call profound policy, was indispensable to the accomplishment of his projects; and sometimes, as if to keep himself in practice, he would do it in matters of secondary importance. for example, his opinion of the insatiable avarice of sieyès is well known; yet when he proposed, in his message to the council of ancients, to give his colleague, under the title of national recompense, the price of his obedient secession, it was, in the words of the message, a recompense worthily bestowed on his disinterested virtues. while at the luxembourg bonaparte showed, by a consular act, his hatred of the liberty of the press above all liberties, for he loved none. on the 27th nivôse the consuls, or rather the first consul, published a decree, the real object of which was evidently contrary to its implied object. this decree stated that: the consuls of the republic, considering that some of the journals printed at paris are instruments in the hands of the enemies of the republic, over the safety of which the government is specially entrusted by the people of france to watch, decree-that the minister of police shall, during the continuation of the war, allow only the following journals to be printed and published, viz. (list of 20 publications) .....and those papers which are exclusively devoted to science, art, literature, commerce, and advertisements. surely this decree may well be considered as preparatory; and the fragment i have quoted may serve as a standard for measuring the greater part of those acts by which bonaparte sought to gain, for the consolidation of his power, what he seemed to be seeking solely for the interest of the friends of the republic. the limitation to the period of the continuance of the war had also a certain provisional air which afforded hope for the future. but everything provisional is, in its nature, very elastic; and bonaparte knew how to draw it out ad infinitum. the decree, moreover, enacted that if any of the uncondemned journals should insert articles against the sovereignty of the people they would be immediately suppressed. in truth, great indulgence was shown on this point, even after the emperor's coronation. the presentation of swords and muskets of honour also originated at the luxembourg; and this practice was, without doubt, a preparatory step to the foundation of the legion of honour. --["armes d'honneur," decreed 25th december 1799. muskets for infantry, carbines for cavalry, grenades for artillery, swords for the officers. gouvion st. cyr received the first sword (thiers, tome i. p. 126).]-a grenadier sergeant, named léon aune, who had been included in the first distribution, easily obtained permission to write to the first consul to thank him. bonaparte, wishing to answer him in his own name, dictated to me the following letter for aune:- i have received your letter, my brave comrade. you needed not to have told me of your exploits, for you are the bravest grenadier in the whole army since the death of benezete. you received one of the hundred sabres i distributed to the army, and all agreed you most deserved it. i wish very much again to see you. the war minister sends you an order to come to paris. this wheedling wonderfully favoured bonaparte's designs. his letter to aune could not fail to be circulated through the army. a sergeant called my brave comrade by the first consul--the first general of france! who but a thorough republican, the stanch friend of equality, would have done this? this was enough to wind up the enthusiasm of the army. at the same time it must be confessed that bonaparte began to find the luxembourg too little for him, and preparations were set on foot at the tuileries. still this great step towards the re-establishment of the monarchy was to be cautiously prepared. it was important to do away with the idea that none but a king could occupy the palace of our ancient kings. what was to be done? a very fine bust of brutus had been brought from italy. brutus was the destroyer of tyrants! this was the very thing; and david was commissioned to place it in a gallery of the tuileries. could there be a greater proof of the consul's horror of tyranny? to sleep at the tuileries, in the bedchamber of the kings of france, was all that bonaparte wanted; the rest would follow in due course. he was willing to be satisfied with establishing a principle the consequences of which were to be afterwards deduced. hence the affectation of never inserting in official acts the name of the tuileries, but designating that place as the palace of the government. the first preparations were modest, for it did not become a good republican to be fond of pomp. accordingly lecomte, who was at that time architect of the tuileries, merely received orders to clean the palace, an expression which might bear more than one meaning, after the meetings which had been there. for this purpose the sum of 500,000 francs was sufficient. bonaparte's drift was to conceal, as far as possible, the importance he attached to the change of his consular domicile. but little expense was requisite for fitting up apartments for the first consul. simple ornaments, such as marbles and statues, were to decorate the palace of the government. nothing escaped bonaparte's consideration. thus it was not merely at hazard that he selected the statues of great men to adorn the gallery of the tuileries. among the greeks he made choice of demosthenes and alexander, thus rendering homage at once to the genius of eloquence and the genius of victory. the statue of hannibal was intended to recall the memory of rome's most formidable enemy; and rome herself was represented in the consular palace by the statues of scipio, cicero, cato, brutus and caesar--the victor and the immolator being placed side by side. among the great men of modern times he gave the first place to gustavus adolphus, and the next to turenne and the great condé, to turenne in honour of his military talent, and to condé to prove that there was nothing fearful in the recollection of a bourbon. the remembrance of the glorious days of the french navy was revived by the statue of duguai trouin. marlborough and prince eugène had also their places in the gallery, as if to attest the disasters which marked the close of the great reign; and marshal sage, to show that louis xv.'s reign was not without its glory. the statues of frederick and washington were emblematic of false philosophy on a throne and true wisdom founding a free state. finally, the names of dugommier, dampierre, and joubert were intended to bear evidence of the high esteem which bonaparte cherished for his old comrades,--those illustrious victims to a cause which had now ceased to be his. the reader has already been informed of the attempts made by bonaparte to induce england and austria to negotiate with the consular government, which the king of prussia was the first of the sovereigns of europe to recognise. these attempts having proved unavailing, it became necessary to carry on the war with renewed vigour, and also to explain why the peace, which had been promised at the beginning of the consulate, was still nothing but a promise. in fulfilment of these two objects bonaparte addressed an energetic proclamation to the armies, which was remarkable for not being followed by the usual sacred words, "vive la république!" at the same time bonaparte completed the formation of the council of state, and divided it into five sections:--(1) the interior; (2) finance; (3) marine; (4) the war department; (5) legislation. he fixed the salaries of the councillors of the state at 25,000 francs, and that of the precedents of sections at 30,000. he settled the costume of the consuls, the ministers, and the different bodies of the state. this led to the re-introduction of velvet, which had been banished with the old regime, and the encouragement of the manufactures of lyons was the reason alleged for employing this un-republican article in the different dresses, such as those of the consuls and ministers. it was bonaparte's constant aim to efface the republic, even in the utmost trifles, and to prepare matters so well that the customs and habits of monarchy being restored, there should only then remain a word to be changed. i never remember to have seen bonaparte in the consular dress, which he detested, and which he wore only because duty required him to do so at public ceremonies. the only dress he was fond of, and in which he felt at ease, was that in which he subjugated the ancient eridanus and the nile, namely, the uniform of the guides, to which corps bonaparte was always sincerely attached. the masquerade of official dresses was not the only one which bonaparte summoned to the aid of his policy. at that period of the year viii. which corresponded with the carnival of 1800, masques began to be resumed at paris. disguises were all the fashion, and bonaparte favoured the revival of old amusements; first, because they were old, and next, because they were the means of diverting the attention of the people: for, as he had established the principle that on the field of battle it is necessary to divide the enemy in order to beat him, he conceived it no less advisable to divert the people in order to enslave them. bonaparte did not say 'panem et circenses', for i believe his knowledge of latin did not extend even to that well-known phrase of juvenal, but he put the maxim in practice. he accordingly authorised the revival of balls at the opera, which they who lived during that period of the consulate know was an important event in paris. some gladly viewed it as a little conquest in favour of the old regime; and others, who for that very reason disapproved it, were too shallow to understand the influence of little over great things. the women and the young men did not bestow a thought on the subject, but yielded willingly to the attractions of pleasure. bonaparte, who was delighted at having provided a diversion for the gossiping of the parisian salons, said to me one day, "while they are chatting about all this, they do not babble upon politics, and that is what i want. let them dance and amuse themselves as long as they do not thrust their noses into the councils of the government; besides, bourrienne," added he, "i have other reasons for encouraging this, i see other advantages in it. trade is languishing; fouché tells me that there are great complaints. this will set a little money in circulation; besides, i am on my guard about the jacobins. everything is not bad, because it is not new. i prefer the opera-balls to the saturnalia of the goddess of reason. i was never so enthusiastically applauded as at the last parade." a consular decision of a different and more important nature had, shortly before, namely, at the commencement of nivôse, brought happiness to many families. bonaparte, as every one knows, had prepared the events of the 18th fructidor that he might have some plausible reasons for overthrowing the directors. the directory being overthrown, he was now anxious, at least in part, to undo what he had done on the 18th fructidor. he therefore ordered a report on the persons exiled to be presented to him by the minister of police. in consequence of this report he authorised forty of them to return to france, placing them under the observation of the police minister, and assigning them their place of residence. however, they did not long remain under these restrictions, and many of them were soon called to fill high places in the government. it was indeed natural that bonaparte, still wishing, at least in appearance, to found his government on those principles of moderate republicanism which had caused their exile, should invite them to second his views. barrère wrote a justificatory letter to the first consul, who, however, took no notice of it, for he could not get so far as to favour barrère. thus did bonaparte receive into the councils of the consulate the men who had been exiled by the directory, just as he afterwards appointed the emigrants and those exiles of the revolution to high offices under the empire. the time and the men alone differed; the intention in both cases was the same. chapter xxx 1800. bonaparte and paul i.--lord whitworth--baron sprengporten's arrival at paris--paul's admiration of bonaparte--their close connection and correspondence--the royal challenge--general mack--the road to malmaison--attempts at assassination--death of washington--national mourning--ambitious calculation--m. de fontanel, the skilful orator --fete at the temple of mars--murat's marriage with caroline bonaparte--madame bonaparte's pearls. the first communications between bonaparte and paul i. commenced a short time after his accession to the consulate. affairs then began to look a little less unfavourable for france; already vague reports from switzerland and the banks of the rhine indicated a coldness existing between the russians and the austrians; and at the same time, symptoms of a misunderstanding between the courts of london and st. petersburg began to be perceptible. the first consul, having in the meantime discovered the chivalrous and somewhat eccentric character of paul i., thought the moment a propitious one to attempt breaking the bonds which united russia and england. he was not the man to allow so fine an opportunity to pass, and he took advantage of it with his usual sagacity. the english had some time before refused to include in a cartel for the exchange of prisoners 7000 russians taken in holland. bonaparte ordered them all to be armed, and clothed in new uniforms appropriate to the corps to which they had belonged, and sent them back to russia, without ransom, without exchange, or any condition whatever. this judicious munificence was not thrown away. paul i. showed himself deeply sensible of it, and closely allied as he had lately been with england, he now, all at once, declared himself her enemy. this triumph of policy delighted the first consul. thenceforth the consul and the czar became the best friends possible. they strove to outdo each other in professions of friendship; and it may be believed that bonaparte did not fail to turn this contest of politeness to his own advantage. he so well worked upon the mind of paul that he succeeded in obtaining a direct influence over the cabinet of st. petersburg. lord whitworth, at that time the english ambassador in russia, was ordered to quit the capital without delay, and to retire to riga, which then became the focus of the intrigues of the north which ended in the death of paul. the english ships were seized in all the ports, and, at the pressing instance of the czar, a prussian army menaced hanover. bonaparte lost no time, and, profiting by the friendship manifested towards him by the inheritor of catherine's power, determined to make that friendship subservient to the execution of the vast plan which he had long conceived: he meant to undertake an expedition by land against the english colonies in the east indies. the arrival of baron sprengporten at paris caused great satisfaction among the partisans of the consular government, that is to say, almost every one in paris. m. sprengporten was a native of swedish finland. he had been appointed by catherine chamberlain and lieutenant-general of her forces, and he was not less in favour with paul, who treated him in the most distinguished manner. he came on an extraordinary mission, being ostensibly clothed with the title of plenipotentiary, and at the same time appointed confidential minister to the consul. bonaparte was extremely satisfied with the ambassador whom paul had selected, and with the manner in which he described the emperor's gratitude for the generous conduct of the first consul. m. sprengporten did not conceal the extent of paul's dissatisfaction with his allies. the bad issue, he said, of the war with france had already disposed the czar to connect himself with that power, when the return of his troops at once determined him. we could easily perceive that paul placed great confidence in m. sprengporten. as he had satisfactorily discharged the mission with which he had been entrusted, paul expressed pleasure at his conduct in several friendly and flattering letters, which sprengporten always allowed us to read. no one could be fonder of france than he was, and he ardently desired that his first negotiations might lead to a long alliance between the russian and french governments. the autograph and very frequent correspondence between bonaparte and paul passed through his hands. i read all paul's letters, which were remarkable for the frankness with which his affection for bonaparte was expressed. his admiration of the first consul was so great that no courtier could have written in a more flattering manner. this admiration was not feigned on the part of the emperor of russia: it was no less sincere than ardent, and of this he soon gave proofs. the violent hatred he had conceived towards the english government induced him to defy to single combat every monarch who would not declare war against england and shut his ports against english ships. he inserted a challenge to the king of denmark in the st. petersburg court gazette; but not choosing to apply officially to the senate of hamburg to order its insertion in the 'correspondant', conducted by m. stoves, he sent the article, through count pahlen, to m. schramm, a hamburg merchant. the count told m. schramm that the emperor would be much pleased to see the article of the st. petersburg court gazette copied into the correspondant; and that if it should be inserted, he wished to have a dozen copies of the paper printed on vellum, and sent to him by an extraordinary courier. it was paul's intention to send a copy to every sovereign in europe; but this piece of folly, after the manner of charles xii., led to no further results. bonaparte never felt greater satisfaction in the whole course of his life than he experienced from paul's enthusiasm for him. the friendship of a sovereign seemed to him a step by which he was to become a sovereign himself. at the same time the affairs of la vendée began to assume a better aspect, and he hoped soon to effect that pacification in the interior which he so ardently desired. it was during the first consul's residence at the luxembourg that the first report on the civil code was made to the legislative body. it was then, also, that the regulations for the management of the bank of france were adopted, and that establishment so necessary to france was founded. there was at this time in paris a man who has acquired an unfortunate celebrity, the most unlucky of modern generals--in a word, general mack. i should not notice that person here were it not for the prophetic judgment which bonaparte then pronounced on him. mack had been obliged to surrender himself at championnet some time before our landing at fréjus. he was received as a prisoner of war, and the town of dijon had been appointed his place of residence, and there he remained until after the 18th brumaire. bonaparte, now consul, permitted him to come to paris, and to reside there on his parole. he applied for leave to go to vienna, pledging himself to return again a prisoner to france if the emperor francis would not consent to exchange him for generals pérignon and grouchy, then prisoners in austria. his request was not granted, but his proposition was forwarded to vienna. the court of vienna refused to accede to it, not placing perhaps so much importance on the deliverance of mack as he had flattered himself it would. bonaparte speaking to me of him one day said, "mack is a man of the lowest mediocrity i ever saw in my life; he is full of self-sufficiency and conceit, and believes himself equal to anything. he has no talent. i should like to see him opposed some day to one of our good generals; we should then see fine work. he is a boaster, and that is all. he is really one of the most silly men existing; and, besides all that, he is unlucky." was not this opinion of bonaparte, formed on the past, fully verified by the future? it was at malmaison that bonaparte thus spoke of general mack. that place was then far from resembling what it afterwards became, and the road to it was neither pleasant nor sure. there was not a house on the road; and in the evening, during the season when we were there, it was not frequented all the way from st. germain. those numerous vehicles, which the demands of luxury and an increasing population have created, did not then, as now, pass along the roads in the environs of paris. everywhere the road was solitary and dangerous; and i learned with certainty that many schemes were laid for carrying off the first consul during one of his evening journeys. they were unsuccessful, and orders were given to enclose the quarries, which were too near to the road. on saturday evening bonaparte left the luxembourg, and afterwards the tuileries, to go to malmaison, and i cannot better express the joy he then appeared to experience than by comparing it to the delight of a school-boy on getting a holiday. before removing from the luxembourg to the tuileries bonaparte determined to dazzle the eyes of the parisians by a splendid ceremony. he had appointed it to take place on the 'decadi', pluviôse 20 (9th february 1800), that is to say, ten days before his final departure from the old directorial palace. these kinds of fetes did not resemble what they afterwards became; their attraction consisted in the splendour of military dress: and bonaparte was always sure that whenever he mounted his horse, surrounded by a brilliant staff from which he was to be distinguished by the simplicity of his costume, his path would be crowded and himself greeted with acclamations by the people of paris. the object of this fete was at first only to present to the 'hôtel des invalides', then called the temple of mars, seventy-two flags taken from the turks in the battle of aboukir and brought from egypt to paris; but intelligence of washington's death, who expired on the 14th of december 1799, having reached bonaparte, he eagerly took advantage of that event to produce more effect, and mixed the mourning cypress with the laurels he had collected in egypt. bonaparte did not feel much concerned at the death of washington, that noble founder of rational freedom in the new world; but it afforded him an opportunity to mask his ambitious projects under the appearance of a love of liberty. in thus rendering honour to the memory of washington everybody would suppose that bonaparte intended to imitate his example, and that their two names would pass in conjunction from mouth to mouth. a clever orator might be employed, who, while pronouncing a eulogium on the dead, would contrive to bestow some praise on the living; and when the people were applauding his love of liberty he would find himself one step nearer the throne, on which his eyes were constantly fixed. when the proper time arrived, he would not fail to seize the crown; and would still cry, if necessary, "vive la liberté!" while placing it on his imperial head. the skilful orator was found. m. de fontanes --[l. de fontanes (1767-1821) became president of the corps legislatif, senator, and grand master of the university. he was the centre of the literary group of the empire,]-was commissioned to pronounce the funeral eulogium on washington, and the flowers of eloquence which he scattered about did not all fall on the hero of america. lannes was entrusted by bonaparte with the presentation of the flags; and on the 20th pluviôse he proceeded, accompanied by strong detachments of the cavalry then in paris, to the council-hall of the invalides, where he was met by the minister of war, who received the colours. all the ministers, the councillors of state, and generals were summoned to the presentation. lannes pronounced a discourse, to which berthier replied, and m. de fontanes added his well-managed eloquence to the plain military oratory of the two generals. in the interior of this military temple a statue of mars sleeping had been placed, and from the pillars and roof were suspended the trophies of denain, fontenoy, and the campaign of italy, which would still have decorated that edifice had not the demon of conquest possessed bonaparte. two invalides, each said to be a hundred years old, stood beside the minister of war; and the bust of the emancipator of america was placed under the trophy composed of the flags of aboukir. in a word, recourse was had to every sort of charlatanism usual on such occasions. in the evening there was a numerous assembly at the luxembourg, and bonaparte took much credit to himself for the effect produced on this remarkable day. he had only to wait ten days for his removal to the tuileries, and precisely on that day the national mourning for washington was to cease, for which a general mourning for freedom might well have been substituted. i have said very little about murat in the course of these memoirs except mentioning the brilliant part he performed in several battles. having now arrived at the period of his marriage with one of napoleon's sisters i take the opportunity of returning to the interesting events which preceded that alliance. his fine and well-proportioned form, his great physical strength and somewhat refined elegance of manner,--the fire of his eye, and his fierce courage in battle, gave to murat rather the character of one of those 'preux chevaliers' so well described by ariosto and taro, than that a republican soldier. the nobleness of his look soon made the lowness of his birth be forgotten. he was affable, polished, gallant; and in the field of battle twenty men headed by murat were worth a whole regiment. once only he showed himself under the influence of fear, and the reader shall see in what circumstance it was that he ceased to be himself. --[marshal lannes, so brave and brilliant in war and so well able to appreciate courage, one day sharply rebuked a colonel for having punished a young officer just arrived from school at fontainebleau because he gave evidence of fear in his first engagement. "know, colonel," said he, "none but a poltroon (the term was even more strong) will boast that he never was afraid."--bourrienne.]-when bonaparte in his first italian campaign had forced wurmser to retreat into mantua with 28,000 men, he directed miollis, with only 4000 men, to oppose any sortie that might be attempted by the austrian general. in one of these sorties murat, who was at the head of a very weak detachment, was ordered to charge wurmser. he was afraid, neglected to execute the order, and in a moment of confusion said that he was wounded. murat immediately fell into disgrace with the general-in-chief, whose 'aide de camp' he was. murat had been previously sent to paris to present to the directory the first colours taken by the french army of italy in the actions of dego and mondovi, and it was on this occasion that he got acquainted with madame tallien and the wife of his general. but he already knew the beautiful caroline bonaparte, whom he had seen at rome in the residence of her brother joseph, who was then discharging the functions of ambassador of the republic. it appears that caroline was not even indifferent to him, and that he was the successful rival of the princess santa croce's son, who eagerly sought the honour of her hand. madame tallien and madame bonaparte received with great kindness the first 'aide de camp', and as they possessed much influence with the directory, they solicited, and easily obtained for him, the rank of brigadier-general. it was somewhat remarkable at that time murat, notwithstanding his newlyacquired rank, to remain bonaparte's 'aide de camp', the regulations not allowing a general-in-chief an 'aide de camp' of higher rank than chief of brigade, which was equal to that of colonel. this insignificant act was, therefore, rather a hasty anticipation of the prerogatives everywhere reserved to princes and kings. it was after having discharged this commission that murat, on his return to italy, fell into disfavour with the general-in chief. he indeed looked upon him with a sort of hostile feeling, and placed him in reille's division, and afterwards baraguey d'hilliers'; consequently, when we went to paris, after the treaty of campo-formio, murat was not of the party. but as the ladies, with whom he was a great favourite, were not devoid of influence with the minister of war, murat was, by their interest, attached to the engineer corps in the expedition to egypt. on board the orient he remained in the most complete disgrace. bonaparte did not address a word to him during the passage; and in egypt the general-in-chief always treated him with coldness, and often sent him from the headquarters on disagreeable services. however, the general-inchief having opposed him to mourad bey, murat performed such prodigies of valour in every perilous encounter that he effaced the transitory stain which a momentary hesitation under the walls of mantua had left on his character. finally, murat so powerfully contributed to the success of the day at aboukir that bonaparte, glad to be able to carry another laurel plucked in egypt to france, forgot the fault which had made so unfavourable an impression, and was inclined to efface from his memory other things that he had heard to the disadvantage of murat; for i have good reasons for believing, though bonaparte never told me so, that murat's name, as well as that of charles, escaped from the lips of junot when he made his indiscreet communication to bonaparte at the walls of messoudiah. the charge of grenadiers, commanded by murat on the 19th brumaire in the hall of the five hundred, dissipated all the remaining traces of dislike; and in those moments when bonaparte's political views subdued every other sentiment of his mind, the rival of the prince santa croce received the command of the consular guard. --[joachim murat (1771-1616), the son of an innkeeper, aide de camp to napoleon in italy, etc.; marshal, 1804; prince in 1806; grand admiral; grand duc de berg et de clesves, 1808; king of naples, 1808. shot by bourbons 13th october 1815. married caroline bonaparte (third sister of napoleon) 20th january 1800.]-it may reasonably be supposed that madame bonaparte, in endeavouring to win the friendship of murat by aiding his promotion, had in view to gain one partisan more to oppose to the family and brothers of bonaparte; and of this kind of support she had much need. their jealous hatred was displayed on every occasion; and the amiable josephine, whose only fault was being too much of the woman, was continually tormented by sad presentiments. carried away by the easiness of her character, she did not perceive that the coquetry which enlisted for her so many defenders also supplied her implacable enemies with weapons to use against her. in this state of things josephine, who was well convinced that she had attached murat to herself by the bonds of friendship and gratitude, and ardently desired to see him united to bonaparte by a family connection, favoured with all her influence his marriage with caroline. she was not ignorant that a close intimacy had already sprung up at milan between caroline and murat, and she was the first to propose a marriage. murat hesitated, and went to consult m. collot, who was a good adviser in all things, and whose intimacy with bonaparte had initiated him into all the secrets of the family. m. collot advised murat to lose no time, but to go to the first consul and formally demand the hand of his sister. murat followed his advice. did he do well? it was to this step that he owed the throne of naples. if he had abstained he would not have been shot at pizzo. 'sed ipsi dei fata rumpere non possunt!' however that might be, bonaparte received, more in the manner of a sovereign than of a brother in arms, the proposal of murat. he heard him with unmoved gravity, said that he would consider the matter, but gave no positive answer. this affair was, as may be supposed, the subject of conversation in the evening in the salon of the luxembourg. madame bonaparte employed all her powers of persuasion to obtain the first consul's consent, and her efforts were seconded by hortense, eugène, and myself, "murat," said he, among other things, "murat is an innkeeper's son. in the elevated rank where glory and fortune have placed me, i never can mix his blood with mine! besides, there is no hurry: i shall see by and by." we forcibly described to him the reciprocal affection of the two young people, and did not fail to bring to his observation murat's devoted attachment to his person, his splendid courage and noble conduct in egypt. "yes," said he, with warmth, "i agree with you; murat was superb at aboukir." we did not allow so favourable a moment to pass by. we redoubled our entreaties, and at last he consented. when we were together in his cabinet in the evening, "well, bourrienne," said he to me, "you ought to be satisfied, and so am i, too, everything considered. murat is suited to my sister, and then no one can say that i am proud, or seek grand alliances. if i had given my sister to a noble, all your jacobins would have raised a cry of counter-revolution. besides, i am very glad that my wife is interested in this marriage, and you may easily suppose the cause. since it is determined on, i will hasten it forward; we have no time to lose. if i go to italy i will take murat with me. i must strike a decisive blow there. adieu." when i entered the first consul's chamber at seven o'clock the next day he appeared even more satisfied than on the preceding evening with the resolution he had taken. i easily perceived that in spite of all his cunning, he had failed to discover the real motive which had induced josephine to take so lively an interest respecting murat's marriage with caroline. still bonaparte's satisfaction plainly showed that his wife's eagerness for the marriage had removed all doubt in his mind of the falsity of the calumnious reports which had prevailed respecting her intimacy with murat. the marriage of murat and caroline was celebrated at the luxembourg, but with great modesty. the first consul did not yet think that his family affairs were affairs of state. but previously to the celebration a little comedy was enacted in which i was obliged to take a part, and i will relate how. at the time of the marriage of murat bonaparte had not much money, and therefore only gave his sister a dowry of 30,000 francs. still, thinking it necessary to make her a marriage present, and not possessing the means to purchase a suitable one, he took a diamond necklace which belonged to his wife and gave it to the bride. josephine was not at all pleased with this robbery, and taxed her wits to discover some means of replacing her necklace. josephine was aware that the celebrated jeweler foncier possessed a magnificent collection of fine pearls which had belonged, as he said, to the late queen, marie antoinette. having ordered them to be brought to her to examine them, she thought there were sufficient to make a very fine necklace. but to make the purchase 250,000 francs were required, and how to get them was the difficulty. madame bonaparte had recourse to berthier, who was then minister of war. berthier, after biting his nails according to his usual habit, set about the liquidation of the debts due for the hospital service in italy with as much speed as possible; and as in those days the contractors whose claims were admitted overflowed with gratitude towards their patrons, through whom they obtained payment, the pearls soon passed from foncier's shop to the casket of madame bonaparte. the pearls being thus obtained, there was still another difficulty, which madame bonaparte did not at first think of. how was she to wear a necklace purchased without her husband's knowledge? indeed it was the more difficult for her to do so as the first consul knew very well that his wife had no money, and being, if i may be allowed the expression, something of the busybody, he knew, or believed he knew, all josephine's jewels. the pearls were therefore condemned to remain more than a fortnight in madame bonaparte's casket without her daring to use them. what a punishment for a woman! at length her vanity overcame her prudence, and being unable to conceal the jewels any longer, she one day said to me, "bourrienne, there is to be a large party here to-morrow, and i absolutely must wear my pearls. but you know he will grumble if he notices them. i beg, bourrienne, that you will keep near me. if he asks me where i got my pearls i must tell him, without hesitation, that i have had them a long time." everything happened as josephine feared and hoped. bonaparte, on seeing the pearls, did not fail to say to madame, "what is it you have got there? how fine you are to-day! where did you get these pearls? i think i never saw them before."--"oh! 'mon dieu'! you have seen them a dozen times! it is the necklace which the cisalpine republic gave me, and which i now wear in my hair."--"but i think--"--"stay: ask bourrienne, he will tell you."--"well, bourrienne, what do you say to it? do you recollect the necklace?"--"yes, general, i recollect very well seeing it before." this was not untrue, for madame bonaparte had previously shown me the pearls. besides, she had received a pearl necklace from the cisalpine republic, but of incomparably less value than that purchased from foncier. josephine performed her part with charming dexterity, and i did not act amiss the character of accomplice assigned me in this little comedy. bonaparte had no suspicions. when i saw the easy confidence with which madame bonaparte got through this scene, i could not help recollecting suzanne's reflection on the readiness with which well-bred ladies can tell falsehoods without seeming to do so. chapter xxxi. 1800. police on police--false information--dexterity of fouché--police agents deceived--money ill applied--inutility of political police- bonaparte's opinion--general considerations--my appointment to the prefecture of police. before taking up his quarters in the tuileries the first consul organised his secret police, which was intended, at the same time, to be the rival or check upon fouché's police. duroc and moncey were at first the director of this police; afterwards davoust and junot. madame bonaparte called this business a vile system of espionage. my remarks on the inutility of the measure were made in vain. bonaparte had the weakness at once to fear fouché and to think him necessary. fouché, whose talents at this trade are too well known to need my approbation, soon discovered this secret institution, and the names of all the subaltern agents employed by the chief agents. it is difficult to form an idea of the nonsense, absurdity, and falsehood contained in the bulletins drawn up by the noble and ignoble agents of the police. i do not mean to enter into details on this nauseating subject; and i shall only trespass on the reader's patience by relating, though it be in anticipation, one fact which concerns myself, and which will prove that spies and their wretched reports cannot be too much distrusted. during the second year of the consulate we were established at malmaison. junot had a very large sum at his disposal for the secret police of the capital. he gave 3000 francs of it to a wretched manufacturer of bulletins; the remainder was expended on the police of his stable and his table. in reading one of these daily bulletins i saw the following lines: "m. de bourrienne went last night to paris. he entered an hotel of the faubourg st. germain, rue de varenne, and there, in the course of a very animated discussion, he gave it to be understood that the first consul wished to make himself king." as it happens, i never had opened my mouth, either respecting what bonaparte had said to me before we went to egypt or respecting his other frequent conversations with me of the same nature, during this period of his consulship. i may here observe, too, that i never quitted, nor ever could quit malmaison for a moment. at any time, by night or day, i was subject to be called for by the first consul, and, as very often was the case, it so happened that on the night in question he had dictated to me notes and instructions until three o'clock in the morning. junot came every day to malmaison at eleven o'clock in the morning. i called him that day into my cabinet, when i happened to be alone. "have you not read your bulletin?" said i, "yes, i have."--"nay, that is impossible."--"why?"--"because, if you had, you would have suppressed an absurd story which relates to me."--"ah!" he replied, "i am sorry on your account, but i can depend on my agent, and i will not alter a word of his report." i then told him all that had taken place on that night; but he was obstinate, and went away unconvinced. every morning i placed all the papers which the first consul had to read on his table, and among the first was junot's report. the first consul entered and read it; on coming to the passage concerning me he began to smile. "have you read this bulletin?"--"yes, general."--"what an ass that junot is! it is a long time since i have known that."--" how he allows himself to be entrapped! is he still here?"--"i believe so. i have just seen him, and made observations to him, all in good part, but he would hear nothing."--"tell him to come here." when junot appeared bonaparte began --"imbecile that you are! how could you send me such reports as these? do you not read them? how shall i be sure that you will not compromise other persons equally unjustly? i want positive facts, not inventions. it is some time since your agent displeased me; dismiss him directly." junot wanted to justify himself, but bonaparte cut him short--"enough!-it is settled!" i related what had passed to fouché, who told me that, wishing to amuse himself at junot's expense, whose police agents only picked up what they heard related in coffeehouses, gaming-houses, and the bourse, he had given currency to this absurd story, which junot had credited and reported, as he did many other foolish tales. fouché often caught the police of the palace in the snares he laid for them, and thus increased his own credit. this circumstance, and others of the same nature, induced the first consul to attach less importance than at first he had to his secret police, which seldom reported anything but false and silly stories. that wretched police! during the time i was with him it embittered his life, and often exasperated him against his wife, his relations, and friends. --[bourrienne, it must be remembered, was a sufferer from the vigilance of this police.]-rapp, who was as frank as he was brave, tells us in his memoirs (p. 233) that when napoleon, during his retreat from moscow, while before smolenski, heard of the attempt of mallet, he could not get over the adventure of the police minister, savary, and the prefect of police, pasquier. "napoleon," says rapp, "was not surprised that these wretches (he means the agents of the police) who crowd the salons and the taverns, who insinuate themselves everywhere and obstruct everything, should not have found out the plot, but he could not understand the weakness of the duc de rovigo. the very police which professed to divine everything had let themselves be taken by surprise." the police possessed no foresight or faculty of prevention. every silly thing that transpired was reported either from malice or stupidity. what was heard was misunderstood or distorted in the recital, so that the only result of the plan was mischief and confusion. the police as a political engine is a dangerous thing. it foments and encourages more false conspiracies than it discovers or defeats real ones. napoleon has related "that m. de la rochefoucauld formed at paris a conspiracy in favour of the king, then at mittau, the first act of which was to be the death of the chief of the government. the plot being discovered, a trusty person belonging to the police was ordered to join it and become one of the most active agents. he brought letters of recommendation from an old gentleman in lorraine who had held a distinguished rank in the army of condé." after this, what more can be wanted? a hundred examples could not better show the vileness of such a system. napoleon, when fallen, himself thus disclosed the scandalous means employed by his government. napoleon on one occasion, in the isle of elba, said to an officer who was conversing with him about france, "you believe, then, that the police agents foresee everything and know everything? they invent more than they discover. mine, i believe, was better than that they have got now, and yet it was often only by mere chance, the imprudence of the parties implicated, or the treachery of some of them, that something was discovered after a week or fortnight's exertion." napoleon, in directing this officer to transmit letters to him under the cover of a commercial correspondence, to quiet his apprehensions that the correspondence might be discovered, said, "do you think, then, that all letters are opened at the post office? they would never be able to do so. i have often endeavoured to discover what the correspondence was that passed under mercantile forms, but i never succeeded. the post office, like the police, catches only fools." since i am on the subject of political police, that leprosy of modern society, perhaps i may be allowed to overstep the order of time, and advert to its state even in the present day. the minister of police, to give his prince a favourable idea of his activity, contrives great conspiracies, which he is pretty sure to discover in time, because he is their originator. the inferior agents, to find favour in the eyes of the minister, contrive small plots. it would be difficult to mention a conspiracy which has been discovered, except when the police agents took part in it, or were its promoters. it is difficult to conceive how those agents can feed a little intrigue, the result at first, perhaps, of some petty ill-humour and discontent which, thanks to their skill, soon becomes a great affair. how many conspiracies have escaped the boasted activity and vigilance of the police when none of its agents were parties. i may instance babeuf's conspiracy, the attempt at the camp at grenelle, the 18th brumaire, the infernal machine, mallet, the 20th of march, the affair of grenoble, and many others. the political police, the result of the troubles of the revolution, has survived them. the civil police for the security of property, health, and order, is only made a secondary object, and has been, therefore, neglected. there are times in which it is thought of more consequence to discover whether a citizen goes to mass or confession than to defeat the designs of a band of robbers. such a state of things is unfortunate for a country; and the money expended on a system of superintendence over persons alleged to be suspected, in domestic inquisitions, in the corruption of the friends, relations, and servants of the man marked out for destruction might be much better employed. the espionage of opinion, created, as i have said, by the revolutionary troubles, is suspicious, restless, officious, inquisitorial, vexatious, and tyrannical. indifferent to crimes and real offences, it is totally absorbed in the inquisition of thoughts. who has not heard it said in company, to some one speaking warmly, "be moderate, m-----is supposed to belong to the police." this police enthralled bonaparte himself in its snares, and held him a long time under the influence of its power. i have taken the liberty thus to speak of a scourge of society of which i have been a victim. what i here state may be relied on. i shall not speak of the week during which i had to discharge the functions of prefect of police, namely, from the 13th to the 20th of march, 1815. it may well be supposed that though i had not held in abhorrence the infamous system which i have described, the important nature of the circumstances and the short period of my administration must have prevented me from making complete use of the means placed at my disposal. the dictates of discretion, which i consider myself bound to obey, forbid me giving proofs of what i advance. what it was necessary to do i accomplished without employing violent or vexatious means; and i can take on myself to assert that no one has cause to complain of me. were i to publish the list of the persons i had orders to arrest, those of them who are yet living would be astonished that the only knowledge they had of my being the prefect of police was from the moniteur. i obtained by mild measures, by persuasion, and reasoning what i could never have got by violence. i am not divulging any secrets of office, but i believe i am rendering a service to the public in pointing out what i have often observed while an unwilling confidant in the shameful manoeuvres of that political institution. the word ideologue was often in bonaparte's mouth; and in using it he endeavoured to throw ridicule on those men whom he fancied to have a tendency towards the doctrine of indefinite perfectibility. he esteemed them for their morality, yet he looked on them as dreamers seeking for the type of a universal constitution, and considering the character of man in the abstract only. the ideologues, according to him, looked for power in institutions; and that he called metaphysics. he had no idea of power except in direct force. all benevolent men who speculate on the amelioration of human society were regarded by bonaparte as dangerous, because their maxims and principles were diametrically opposed to the harsh and arbitrary system he had adopted. he said that their hearts were better than their heads, and, far from wandering with them in abstractions, he always said that men were only to be governed by fear and interest. the free expression of opinion through the press has been always regarded by those who are not led away by interest or power as useful to society. but bonaparte held the liberty of the press in the greatest horror; and so violent was his passion when anything was urged in its favour that he seemed to labour under a nervous attack. great man as he was, he was sorely afraid of little paragraphs. --[joseph bonaparte fairly enough remarks on this that such writings had done great harm in those extraordinary times (erreurs, tome i, p. 259). metternich, writing in 1827 with distrust of the proceedings of louis xviii., quotes, with approval, napoleon's sentiments on this point. "napoleon, who could not have been wanting in the feeling of power, said to me, 'you see me master of france; well, i would not undertake to govern her for three months with liberty of the press. louis xviii., apparently thinking himself stronger than napoleon, is not content with allowing the press its freedom, but has embodied its liberty in the charter" (metternich, tome iv, p. 391.)]-chapter xxxii. 1800. successful management of parties--precautions--removal from the luxembourg to the tuileries--hackney-coaches and the consul's white horses--royal custom and an inscription--the review--bonaparte's homage to the standards--talleyrand in bonaparte's cabinet- bonaparte's aversion to the cap of liberty even in painting--the state bed--our cabinet. of the three brothers to whom the 18th brumaire gave birth bonaparte speedily declared himself the eldest, and hastened to assume all the rights of primogeniture. he soon arrogated to himself the whole power. the project he had formed, when he favoured the revolution of the 18th fructidor, was now about to be realized. it was then an indispensable part of his plan that the directory should violate the constitution in order to justify a subsequent subversion of the directory. the expressions which escaped him from time to time plainly showed that his ambition was not yet satisfied, and that the consulship was only a state of probation preliminary to the complete establishment of monarchy. the luxembourg was then discovered to be too small for the chief of the government, and it was resolved that bonaparte should inhabit the tuileries. still great prudence was necessary to avoid the quicksands which surrounded him! he therefore employed great precaution in dealing with the susceptibilities of the republicans, taking care to inure them gradually to the temperature of absolute power. but this mode of treatment was not sufficient; for such was bonaparte's situation between the jacobins and the royalists that he could not strike a blow at one party without strengthening the other. he, however, contrived to solve this difficult problem, and weakened both parties by alternately frightening each. "you see, royalists," he seemed to say, "if you do not attach yourselves to my government the jacobins will again rise and bring back the reign of terror and its scaffold." to the men of the revolution he, on the other hand, said, "see, the counter-revolution appears, threatening reprisals and vengeance. it is ready to overwhelm you; my buckler can alone protect you from its attacks." thus both parties were induced, from their mutual fear of each other, to attach themselves to bonaparte; and while they fancied they were only placing themselves under the protection of the chief of the government, they were making themselves dependent on an ambitious man, who, gradually bending them to his will, guided them as he chose in his political career. he advanced with a firm step; but he never neglected any artifice to conceal, as long as possible, his designs. i saw bonaparte put in motion all his concealed springs; and i could not help admiring his wonderful address. but what most astonished me was the control he possessed over himself, in repressing any premature manifestation of his intentions which might prejudice his projects. thus, for instance, he never spoke of the tuileries but under the name of "the palace of the government," and he determined not to inhabit, at first, the ancient palace of the kings of france alone. he contented himself with selecting the royal apartments, and proposed that the third consul should also reside in the tuileries, and in consequence he occupied the pavilion of flora. this skilful arrangement was perfectly in accordance with the designation of "palace of the government" given to the tuileries, and was calculated to deceive, for a time, the most clear-sighted. the moment for leaving the luxembourg having arrived, bonaparte still used many deceptive precautions. the day filed for the translation of the seat of government was the 30th pluviôse, the previous day having been selected for publishing the account of the votes taken for the acceptance of the new constitution. he had, besides, caused the insertion in the 'moniteur' of the eulogy on washington, pronounced, by m. de fontanes, the decadi preceding, to be delayed for ten days. he thought that the day when he was about to take so large a step towards monarchy would be well chosen for entertaining the people of paris with grand ideas of liberty, and for coupling his own name with that of the founder of the free government of the united states. at seven o'clock on the morning of the 30th pluviôse i entered, as usual, the chamber of the first consul. he was in a profound sleep, and this was one of the days on which i had been desired to allow him to sleep a little longer than usual. i have often observed that general bonaparte appeared much less moved when on the point of executing any great design than during the time of projecting it, so accustomed was he to think that what he had resolved on in his mind, was already done. when i returned to bonaparte he said to me, with a marked air of satisfaction, "well, bourrienne, to-night, at last, we shall sleep in the tuileries. you are better off than i: you are not obliged to make a spectacle of yourself, but may go your own road there. i must, however, go in procession: that disgusts me; but it is necessary to speak to the eyes. that has a good effect on the people. the directory was too simple, and therefore never enjoyed any consideration. in the army simplicity is in its proper place; but in a great city, in a palace, the chief of the government must attract attention in every possible way, yet still with prudence. josephine is going to look out from lebrun's apartments; go with her, if you like; but go to the cabinet as soon as you see me alight from my horse." i did not go to the review, but proceeded to the tuileries, to arrange in our new cabinet the papers which it was my duty to take care of, and to prepare everything for the first consul's arrival. it was not until the evening that i learned, from the conversation in the salon, where there was a numerous party, what had taken place in the course of the day. at one o'clock precisely bonaparte left the luxembourg. the procession was, doubtless, far from approaching the magnificent parade of the empire: but as much pomp was introduced as the state of things in france permitted. the only real splendour of that period consisted in fine troops. three thousand picked men, among whom was the superb regiment of the guides, had been ordered out for the occasion: all marched in the greatest order; with music at the head of each corps. the generals and their staffs were on horseback, the ministers in carriages, which were somewhat remarkable, as they were almost the only private carriages then in paris, for hackney-coaches had been hired to convey the council of state, and no trouble had been taken to alter them, except by pasting over the number a piece of paper of the same colour as the body of the vehicle. the consul's carriage was drawn by six white horses. with the sight of those horses was associated the recollection of days of glory and of peace, for they had been presented to the general-in-chief of the army of italy by the emperor of germany after the treaty of campo-formio. bonaparte also wore the magnificent sabre given him by the emperor francis. with cambacérès on his left, and lebrun in the front of the carriage, the first consul traversed a part of paris, taking the rue de thionville, and the quai voltaire to the pont royal. everywhere he was greeted by acclamations of joy, which at that time were voluntary, and needed not to be commanded by the police. from the wicket of the carrousel to the gate of the tuileries the troops of the consular guard were formed in two lines, through which the procession passed--a royal custom, which made a singular contrast with an inscription in front of which bonaparte passed on entering the courtyard. two guard-houses had been built, one on the right and another on the left of the centre gate. on the one to the right were written these words: "the tenth of august 1792.--royalty in france is abolished; and shall never be re-established!" it was already re-established! in the meantime the troops had been drawn up in line in the courtyard. as soon as the consul's carriage stopped bonaparte immediately alighted, and mounted, or, to speak more properly, leaped on his horse, and reviewed his troops, while the other two consuls proceeded to the state apartments of the tuileries, where the council of state and the ministers awaited them. a great many ladies, elegantly dressed in greek costume, which was then the fashion, were seated with madame bonaparte at the windows of the third consul's apartments in the pavilion of flora. it is impossible to give an idea of the immense crowds which flowed in from all quarters. the windows looking to the carrousel were let for very large sums; and everywhere arose, as if from one voice, shouts of "long live the first consul!" who could help being intoxicated by so much enthusiasm? bonaparte prolonged the review for some time, passed down all the ranks, and addressed the commanders of corps in terms of approbation and praise. he then took his station at the gate of the tuileries, with murat on his right, and lannes on his left, and behind him a numerous staff of young warriors, whose complexions had been browned by the sun of egypt and italy, and who had been engaged in more battles than they numbered years. when the colours of the 96th, 43d, and 34th demi-brigades, or rather their flagstaffs surmounted by some shreds, riddled by balls and blackened by powder, passed before him, he raised his hat and inclined his head in token of respect. every homage thus paid by a great captain to standards which had been mutilated on the field of battle was saluted by a thousand acclamations. when the troops had finished defiling before him, the first consul, with a firm step, ascended the stairs of the tuileries. the general's part being finished for the day, that of the chief of the state began; and indeed it might already be said that the first consul was the whole consulate. at the risk of interrupting my narrative of what occurred on our arrival at the tuileries, by a digression, which may be thought out of place, i will relate a fact which had no little weight in hastening bonaparte's determination to assume a superiority over his colleagues. it may be remembered that when roger ducos and sieyès bore the title of consuls the three members of the consular commission were equal, if not in fact at least in right. but when cambacérès and lebrun took their places, talleyrand, who had at the same time been appointed to succeed m. reinhart as minister of foreign affairs, obtained a private audience of the first consul in his cabinet, to which i was admitted. the observations of talleyrand on this occasion were highly agreeable to bonaparte, and they made too deep an impression on my mind to allow me to forget them. "citizen consul," said he to him, "you have confided to me the office of minister for foreign affairs, and i will justify your confidence; but i must declare to you that from this moment, i will not transact business with any but yourself. this determination does not proceed from any vain pride on my part, but is induced by a desire to serve france. in order that france may be well governed, in order that there may be a unity of action in the government, you must be first consul, and the first consul must have the control over all that relates directly to politics; that is to say, over the ministry of the interior, and the ministry of police, for internal affairs, and over my department, for foreign affairs; and, lastly, over the two great means of execution, the military and naval forces. it will therefore be most convenient that the ministers of those five departments should transact business with you. the administration of justice and the ordering of the finances are objects certainly connected with state politics by numerous links, which, however, are not of so intimate a nature as those of the other departments. if you will allow me, general, i should advise that the control over the administration of justice be given to the second consul, who is well versed in jurisprudence; and to the third consul, who is equally well acquainted with finance, the control over that department. that will occupy and amuse them, and you, general, having at your disposal all the vital parts of the government, will be able to reach the end you aim at, the regeneration of france." bonaparte did not hear these remarkable words with indifference. they were too much in accordance with his own secret wishes to be listened to without pleasure; and he said to me as soon as talleyrand had taken leave, "do you know, bourrienne, i think talleyrand gives good advice. he is a man of great understanding."--"such is the opinion," i replied, "of all who know him."--"he is perfectly right." afterwards he added, smiling, "tallyrand is evidently a shrewd man. he has penetrated my designs. what he advises you know i am anxious to do. but again i say, he is right; one gets on quicker by oneself. lebrun is a worthy man, but he has no policy in his head; he is a book-maker. cambacérès carries with him too many traditions of the revolution. my government must be an entirely new one." talleyrand's advice had been so punctually followed that even on the occasion of the installation of the consular government, while bonaparte was receiving all the great civil and military officers of the state in the hall of presentation, cambacérès and lebrun stood by more like spectators of the scene than two colleagues of the first consul. the minister of the interior presented the civil authorities of paris; the minister of war, the staff of the 17th military division; the minister of marine, several naval officers; and the staff of the consular guard was presented by murat. as our consular republicans were not exactly spartans, the ceremony of the presentations was followed by grand dinnerparties. the first consul entertained at his table, the two other consuls, the ministers, and the presidents of the great bodies of the state. murat treated the heads of the army; and the members of the council of state, being again seated in their hackney-coaches with covered numbers, drove off to dine with lucien. before taking possession of the tuileries we had frequently gone there to see that the repairs, or rather the whitewashing, which bonaparte had directed to be done, was executed. on our first visit, seeing a number of red caps of liberty painted on the walls, he said to m. lecomte, at that time the architect in charge, "get rid of all these things; i do not like to see such rubbish." the first consul gave directions himself for what little alterations he wanted in his own apartments. a state bed--not that of louis xvi.--was placed in the chamber next his cabinet, on the south side, towards the grand staircase of the pavilion of flora. i may as well mention here that he very seldom occupied that bed, for bonaparte was very simple in his manner of living in private, and was not fond of state, except as a means of imposing on mankind. at the luxembourg, at malmaison, and during the first period that he occupied the tuileries, bonaparte, if i may speak in the language of common life, always slept with his wife. he went every evening down to josephine by a small staircase leading from a wardrobe attached to his cabinet, and which had formerly been the chapel of maria de medici. i never went to bonaparte's bedchamber but by this staircase; and when he came to our cabinet it was always by the wardrobe which i have mentioned. the door opened opposite the only window of our room, and it commanded a view of the garden. as for our cabinet, where so many great, and also small events were prepared, and where i passed so many hours of my life, i can, even now, give the most minute description of it to those who like such details. there were two tables. the best, which was the first consul's, stood in the middle of the room, and his armchair was turned with its back to the fireplace, having the window on the right. to the right of this again was a little closet where duroc sat, through which we could communicate with the clerk of the office and the grand apartments of the court. when the first consul was seated at his table in his chair (the arms of which he so frequently mutilated with his penknife) he had a large bookcase opposite to him. a little to the right, on one side of the bookcase, was another door, opening into the cabinet which led directly to the state bedchamber which i have mentioned. thence we passed into the grand presentation saloon, on the ceiling of which lebrun had painted a likeness of louis xiv. a tri-coloured cockade placed on the forehead of the great king still bore witness of the imbecile turpitude of the convention. lastly came the hall of the guards, in front of the grand staircase of the pavilion of flora. my writing-table, which was extremely plain, stood near the window, and in summer i had a view of the thick foliage of the chestnut-trees; but in order to see the promenaders in the garden i was obliged to raise myself from my seat. my back was turned to the general's side, so that it required only a slight movement of the head to speak to each other. duroc was seldom in his little cabinet, and that was the place where i gave some audiences. the consular cabinet, which afterwards became the imperial, has left many impressions on my mind; and i hope the reader, in going through these volumes, will not think that they have been of too slight a description. chapter xxxiii. 1800. the tuileries--royalty in perspective--remarkable observation- presentations--assumption of the prerogative of mercy--m. defeu- m. de frotte--georges cadoudal's audience of bonaparte--rapp's precaution and bonaparte's confidence--the dignity of france- napper tandy and blackwell delivered up by the senate of hamburg- contribution in the egyptian style--valueless bill--fifteen thousand francs in the drawer of a secretaire--josephine's debts--evening walks with bonaparte. the morning after that ardently wished-for day on which we took possession of the palace of the kings of france i observed to bonaparte on entering his chamber, "well, general, you have got here without much difficulty, and with the applause of the people! do you remember what you said to me in the rue st. anne nearly two years ago?"--"ay, true enough, i recollect. you see what it is to have the mind set on a thing. only two years have gone by! don't you think we have not worked badly since that time? upon the whole i am very well content. yesterday passed off well. do you imagine that all those who came to flatter me were sincere? no, certainly not: but the joy of the people was real. they know what is right. besides, consult the grand thermometer of opinion, the price of the funds: on the 17th brumaire at 11 francs, on the 20th at 16 and to-day at 21. in such a state of things i may let the jacobins prate as they like. but let them not talk too loudly either!" as soon as he was dressed we went to look through the gallery of diana and examine the statues which had been placed there by his orders. we ended our morning's work by taking complete possession of our new residence. i recollect bonaparte saying to me, among other things, "to be at the tuileries, bourrienne, is not all. we must stay here. who, in heaven's name, has not already inhabited this palace? ruffians, conventionalists! but hold! there is your brother's house! was it not from those windows i saw the tuileries besieged, and the good louis xvi. carried off? but be assured they will not come here again!" the ambassadors and other foreign ministers then in paris were presented to the first consul at a solemn audience. on this occasion all the ancient ceremonials belonging to the french court were raked up, and in place of chamberlains and a grand master of ceremonies a counsellor of state, m. benezech, who was once minister for foreign affairs, officiated. when the ambassadors had all arrived m. benezech conducted them into the cabinet, in which were the three consuls, the ministers, and the council of state. the ambassadors presented their credentials to the first consul, who handed them to the minister for foreign affairs. these presentations were followed by others; for example, the tribunal of cassation, over which the old advocate, target, who refused to defend louis xvi., then presided. all this passed in view of the three consuls; but the circumstance which distinguished the first consul from his colleagues was, that the official personages, on leaving the audiencechamber, were conducted to madame bonaparte's apartments, in imitation of the old practice of waiting on the queen after presentation to the king. thus old customs of royalty crept by degrees into the former abodes of royalty. amongst the rights attached to the crown, and which the constitution of the year viii. did not give to the first consul, was one which he much desired to possess, and which, by the most happy of all usurpations, he arrogated to himself. this was the right of granting pardon. bonaparte felt a real pleasure in saving men under the sentence of the law; and whenever the imperious necessity of his policy, to which, in truth, he sacrificed everything, permitted it, he rejoiced in the exercise of mercy. it would seem as if he were thankful to the persons to whom he rendered such service merely because he had given them occasion to be thankful to him. such was the first consul: i do not speak of the emperor. bonaparte, the first consul, was accessible to the solicitations of friendship in favour of persons placed under proscription. the following circumstance, which interested me much, affords an incontestable proof of what i state:-whilst we were still at the luxembourg, m. defeu, a french emigrant, was taken in the tyrol with arms in his hand by the troops of the republic. he was carried to grenoble, and thrown into the military prison of that town. in the course of january general ferino, then commanding at grenoble, received orders to put the young emigrant on his trial. the laws against emigrants taken in arms were terrible, and the judges dared not be indulgent. to be tried in the morning, condemned in the course of the day, and shot in the evening, was the usual course of those implacable proceedings. one of my cousins, the daughter of m. poitrincourt, came from sens to paris to inform me of the dreadful situation of m. defeu. she told me that he was related to the most respectable families of the town of sens, and that everybody felt the greatest interest in his fate. i had escaped for a few moments to keep the appointment i made with mademoiselle poitrincourt. on my return i perceived the first consul surprised at finding himself alone in the cabinet, which i was not in the habit of quitting without his knowledge. "where have you been?" said he. "i have been to see one of my relations, who solicits a favour of you."-"what is it?" i then informed him of the unfortunate situation of m. defeu. his first answer was dreadful. "no pity! no pity for emigrants! whoever fights against his country is a child who tries to kill his mother!" this first burst of anger being over, i returned to the charge. i urged the youth of m. defeu, and the good effect which clemency would produce. "well," said he, "write- "the first consul orders the judgment on m. defeu to be suspended." he signed this laconic order, which i instantly despatched to general ferino. i acquainted my cousin with what had passed, and remained at ease as to the result of the affair. scarcely had i entered the chamber of the first consul the next morning when he said to me, "well, bourrienne, you say nothing about your m. defeu. are you satisfied?"--"general, i cannot find terms to express my gratitude."--"ah, bah! but i do not like to do things by halves. write to ferino that i wish m. defeu to be instantly set at liberty. perhaps i am serving one who will prove ungrateful. well, so much the worse for him. as to these matters, bourrienne, always ask them from me. when i refuse, it is because i cannot help it." i despatched at my own expense an extraordinary courier, who arrived in time to save m. defeu's life. his mother, whose only son he was, and m. blanchet, his uncle, came purposely from sens to paris to express their gratitude to me. i saw tears of joy fall from the eyes of a mother who had appeared to be destined to shed bitter drops, and i said to her as i felt, "that i was amply recompensed by the success which had attended my efforts." emboldened by this success, and by the benevolent language of the first consul, i ventured to request the pardon of m. de frotte, who was strongly recommended to me by most honourable persons. comte louis de frotte had at first opposed all negotiation for the pacification of la vendée. at length, by a series of unfortunate combats, he was, towards the end of january, reduced to the necessity of making himself the advances which he had rejected when made by others. at this period he addressed a letter to general guidal, in which he offered pacificatory proposals. a protection to enable him to repair to alençon was transmitted to him. unfortunately for m. de frotte, he did not confine himself to writing to general guidal, for whilst the safe-conduct which he had asked was on the way to him, he wrote to his lieutenants, advising them not to submit or consent to be disarmed. this letter was intercepted. it gave all the appearance of a fraudulent stratagem to his proposal to treat for peace. besides, this opinion appeared to be confirmed by a manifesto of m. de frotte, anterior, it is true, to the offers of pacification, but in which he announced to all his partisans the approaching end of bonaparte's "criminal enterprise." i had more trouble than in m. defeu's case to induce the first consul to exercise his clemency. however, i pressed him so much, i laboured so hard to convince him of the happy effect of such indulgence, that at length i obtained an order to suspend the judgment. what a lesson i then experienced of the evil which may result from the loss of time! not supposing that matters were so far advanced as they were, i did not immediately send off the courier with the order for the suspension of the judgment. besides, the minister-of-police had marked his victim, and he never lost time when evil was to be done. having, therefore, i know not for what motive, resolved on the destruction of m. de frotte, he sent an order to hasten his trial. comte louis de frotte was brought to trial on the 28th pluviôse, condemned the same day, and executed the next morning, the day before we entered the tuileries. the cruel precipitation of the minister rendered the result of my solicitations abortive. i had reason to think that after the day on which the first consul granted me the order for delay he had received some new accusation against m. de frotte, for when he heard of his death he appeared to me very indifferent about the tardy arrival of the order for suspending judgment. he merely said to me, with unusual insensibility, "you should take your measures better. you see it is not my fault." though bonaparte put no faith in the virtue of men, he had confidence in their honour. i had proof of this in a matter which deserves to be recorded in history. when, during the first period of our abode at the tuileries, he had summoned the principal chiefs of la vendée to endeavour to bring about the pacification of that unhappy country, he received georges cadoudal in a private audience. the disposition in which i beheld him the evening before the day appointed for this audience inspired me with the most flattering hopes. rapp introduced georges into the grand salon looking into the garden. rapp left him alone with the first consul, but on returning to the cabinet where i was he did not close either of the two doors of the state bedchamber which separated the cabinet from the salon. we saw the first consul and georges walk from the window to the bottom of the salon--then return--then go back again. this lasted for a long time. the conversation appeared very animated, and we heard several things, but without any connection. there was occasionally a good deal of ill-humour displayed in their tone and gestures. the interview ended in nothing. the first consul, perceiving that georges entertained some apprehensions for his personal safety, gave him assurances of security in the most noble manner, saying, "you take a wrong view of things, and are wrong in not coming to some understanding; but if you persist in wishing to return to your country you shall depart as freely as you came to paris." when bonaparte returned to his cabinet he said to rapp, "tell me, rapp, why you left these doors open, and stopped with bourrienne?" rapp replied, "if you had closed the doors i would have opened them again. do you think i would have left you alone with a man like that? there would have been danger in it."--"no, rapp," said bonaparte, "you cannot think so." when we were alone the first consul appeared pleased with rapp's attachment, but very vexed at georges' refusal. he said, "he does not take a correct view of things; but the extravagance of his principles has its source in noble sentiments, which must give him great influence over his countrymen. it is necessary, however, to bring this business soon to an end." of all the actions of louis xiv. that which bonaparte most admired was his having made the doge of genoa send ambassadors to paris to apologise to him. the slightest insult offered in a foreign country to the rights and dignity of france put napoleon beside himself. this anxiety to have the french government respected exhibited itself in an affair which made much noise at the period, but which was amicably arranged by the soothing influence of gold. two irishmen, napper tandy and blackwell, who had been educated in france, and whose names and rank as officers appeared in the french army list, had retired to hamburg. the british government claimed them as traitors to their country, and they were given up; but, as the french government held them to be subjects of france, the transaction gave rise to bitter complaints against the senate of hamburg. blackwell had been one of the leaders of the united irishmen. he had procured his naturalisation in france, and had attained the rank of chef d'escadron. being sent on a secret mission to norway, the ship in which he was embarked was wrecked on the coast of that kingdom. he then repaired to hamburg, where the senate placed him under arrest on the demand of mr. crawford, the english minister. after being detained in prison a whole year he was conveyed to england to be tried. the french government interfered, and preserved, if not his liberty, at least his life. napper tandy was also an irishman. to escape the search made after him, on account of the sentiments of independence which had induced him to engage in the contest for the liberty of his country, he got on board a french brig, intending to land at hamburg and pass into sweden. being exempted from the amnesty by the irish parliament, he was claimed by the british government, and the senators of hamburg forgot honour and humanity in their alarm at the danger which at that moment menaced their little republic both from england and france. the senate delivered up napper tandy; he was carried to ireland, and condemned to death, but owed the suspension of his execution to the interference of france. he remained two years in prison, when m. otto, who negotiated with lord hawkesbury the preliminaries of peace, obtained the release of napper tandy, who was sent back to france. the first consul spoke at first of signal vengeance; but the senate of hamburg sent him a memorial, justificatory of its conduct, and backed the apology with a sum of four millions and a half, which mollified him considerably. this was in some sort a recollection of egypt--one of those little contributions with which the general had familiarised the pashas; with this difference, that on the present occasion not a single sous went into the national treasury. the sum was paid to the first consul through the hands of m. chapeau rouge. --[a solemn deputation from the senate arrived at the tuileries to make public apologies to napoleon. he again testified his indignation: and when the envoys urged their weakness he said to them. "well and had you not the resource of weak states? was it not in your power to let them escape?" (napoleon's memoirs).]-i kept the four millions and a half in dutch bonds in a secretaire for a week. bonaparte then determined to distribute them; after paying josephine's debts, and the whole of the great expenses incurred at malmaison, he dictated to me a list of persons to whom he wished to make presents. my name did not escape his lips, and consequently i had not the trouble to transcribe it; but some time after he said to me, with the most engaging kindness, "bourrienne, i have given you none of the money which came from hamburg, but i will make you amends for it." he took from his drawer a large and broad sheet of printed paper, with blanks filled up in his own handwriting, and said to me, "here is a bill for 300,000 italian livres on the cisalpine republic, for the price of cannon furnished. it is endorsed halter and collot--i give it you." to make this understood, i ought to state that cannon had been sold to the cisalpine republic, for the value of which the administrator-general of the italian finances drew on the republic, and the bills were paid over to m. collot, a provision contractor, and other persons. m. collot had given one of these bills for 300,000 livres to bonaparte in quittance of a debt, but the latter had allowed the bill to run out without troubling himself about it. the cisalpine republic kept the cannons and the money, and the first consul kept his bill. when i had examined it i said, "general, it has been due for a long time; why have you not got it paid? the endorsers are no longer liable."--"france is bound to discharge debts of this kind;" said he; "send the paper to de fermont: he will discount it for three per cent. you will not have in ready money more than about 9000 francs of rentes, because the italian livre is not equal to the franc." i thanked him, and sent the bill to m. de fermont. he replied that the claim was bad, and that the bill would not be liquidated because it did not come within the classifications made by the laws passed in the months the names of which terminated in 'aire, ose, al, and or'. i showed m. de fermont's answer to the first consul, who said, "ah, bah! he understands nothing about it--he is wrong: write." he then dictated a letter, which promised very favourably for the discounting of the bill; but the answer was a fresh refusal. i said, "general, m. de fermont does not attend to you any more than to myself." bonaparte took the letter, read it, and said, in the tone of a man who knew beforehand what he was about to be informed of, "well, what the devil would you have me do, since the laws are opposed to it? persevere; follow the usual modes of liquidation, and something will come of it!" what finally happened was, that by a regular decree this bill was cancelled, torn, and deposited in the archives. these 300,000 livres formed part of the money which bonaparte brought from italy. if the bill was useless to me it was also useless to him. this scrap of paper merely proves that he brought more than 25,000 francs from italy. i never had, from the general-in-chief of the army of italy, nor from the general in-chief of the army of egypt, nor from the first consul, for ten years, nor from the consul for life, any fixed salary: i took from his drawer what was necessary for my expenses as well as his own. he never asked me for any account. after the transaction of the bill on the insolvent cisalpine republic he said to me, at the beginning of the winter of 1800, "bourrienne, the weather is becoming very bad; i will go but seldom to malmaison. whilst i am at council get my papers and little articles from malmaison; here is the key of my secretaire, take out everything that is there." i got into the carriage at two o'clock and returned at six. when he had dined i placed upon the table of his cabinet the various articles which i had found in his secretaire including 15,000 francs (somewhere about l 600 of english money) in banknotes which were in the corner of a little drawer. when he looked at them he said, "here is money--what is the meaning of this?" i replied, "i know nothing about it, except that it was in your secretaire."-"oh yes; i had forgotten it. it was for my trifling expenses. here, take it." i remembered well that one summer morning he had given me his key to bring him two notes of 1000 francs for some incidental expense, but i had no idea that he had not drawn further on his little treasure. i have stated the appropriation of the four millions and a half, the result of the extortion inflicted on the senate of hamburg, in the affair of napper tandy and blackwell. the whole, however, was not disposed of in presents. a considerable portion was reserved for paying josephine's debts, and this business appears to me to deserve some remarks. the estate of malmaison had cost 160,000 francs. josephine had purchased it of m. lecouteulx while we were in egypt. many embellishments, and some new buildings, had been made there; and a park had been added, which had now become beautiful. all this could not be done for nothing, and besides, it was very necessary that what was due for the original purchase should be entirely discharged; and this considerable item was not the only debt of josephine. the creditors murmured, which had a bad effect in paris; and i confess i was so well convinced that the first consul would be extremely displeased that i constantly delayed the moment of speaking to him on the subject. it was therefore with extreme satisfaction i learned that m. de talleyrand had anticipated me. no person was more capable than himself of gilding the pill, as one may say, to bonaparte. endowed with as much independence of character as of mind, he did him the service, at the risk of offending him, to tell him that a great number of creditors expressed their discontent in bitter complaints respecting the debts contracted by madame bonaparte during his expedition to the east. bonaparte felt that his situation required him promptly to remove the cause of such complaints. it was one night about half-past eleven o'clock that m. talleyrand introduced this delicate subject. as soon he was gone i entered the little cabinet; bonaparte said to me, "bourrienne, talleyrand has been speaking to me about the debts of my wife. i have the money from hamburg--ask her the exact amount of her debts: let her confess all. i wish to finish, and not begin again. but do not pay without showing me the bills of those rascals: they are a gang of robbers." hitherto the apprehension of an unpleasant scene, the very idea of which made josephine tremble, had always prevented me from broaching this subject to the first consul; but, well pleased that talleyrand had first touched upon it, i resolved to do all in my power to put an end to the disagreeable affair. the next morning i saw josephine. she was at first delighted with her husband's intentions; but this feeling did not last long. when i asked her for an exact account of what she owed she entreated me not to press it, but content myself with what she should confess. i said to her, "madame, i cannot deceive you respecting the disposition of the first consul. he believes that you owe a considerable sum, and is willing to discharge it. you will, i doubt not, have to endure some bitter reproaches, and a violent scene; but the scene will be just the same for the whole as for a part. if you conceal a large proportion of your debts at the end of some time murmurs will recommence, they will reach the ears of the first consul, and his anger will display itself still more strikingly. trust to me--state all; the result will be the same; you will hear but once the disagreeable things he will say to you; by reservations you will renew them incessantly." josephine said, "i can never tell all; it is impossible. do me the service to keep secret what i say to you. i owe, i believe, about 1,200,000 francs, but i wish to confess only 600,000; i will contract no more debts, and will pay the rest little by little out of my savings."--"here, madame, my first observations recur. as i do not believe he estimates your debts at so high a sum as 600,000 francs, i can warrant that you will not experience more displeasure for acknowledging to 1,200,000 than to 600,000; and by going so far you will get rid of them for ever."--"i can never do it, bourrienne; i know him; i can never support his violence." after a quarter of an hour's further discussion on the subject i was obliged to yield to her earnest solicitation, and promise to mention only the 600,000 francs to the first consul. the anger and ill-humour of bonaparte may be imagined. he strongly suspected that his wife was dissembling in some respect; but he said, "well, take 600,000 francs, but liquidate the debts for that sum, and let me hear nothing more on the subject. i authorise you to threaten these tradesmen with paying nothing if they do not reduce their enormous charges. they ought to be taught not to be so ready in giving credit." madame bonaparte gave me all her bills. the extent to which the articles had been overcharged, owing to the fear of not being paid for a long period, and of deductions being made from the amount, was inconceivable. it appeared to me, also, that there must be some exaggeration in the number of articles supplied. i observed in the milliner's bill thirtyeight new hats, of great price, in one month. there was likewise a charge of 1800 francs for heron plumes, and 800 francs for perfumes. i asked josephine whether she wore out two hats in one day? she objected to this charge for the hats, which she merely called a mistake. the impositions which the saddler attempted, both in the extravagance of his prices and in charging for articles which he had not furnished, were astonishing. i need say nothing of the other tradesmen, it was the same system of plunder throughout. i availed myself fully of the first consul's permission, and spared neither reproaches nor menaces. i am ashamed to say that the greater part of the tradesmen were contented with the half of what they demanded. one of them received 35,000 francs for a bill of 80,000; and he had the impudence to tell me that he made a good profit nevertheless. finally, i was fortunate enough, after the most vehement disputes, to settle everything for 600,000 francs. madame bonaparte, however, soon fell again into the same excesses, but fortunately money became more plentiful. this inconceivable mania of spending money was almost the sole cause of her unhappiness. her thoughtless profusion occasioned permanent disorder in her household until the period of bonaparte's second marriage, when, i am informed, she became regular in her expenditure. i could not say so of her when she was empress in 1804. --[notwithstanding her husband's wish, she could never bring her establishment into any order or rule. he wished that no tradesmen should ever reach her, but he was forced to yield on this point. the small inner rooms were filled with them, as with artists of all sorts. she had a mania for having herself painted, and gave her portraits to whoever wished for one, relations, 'femmes de chambre', even to tradesmen. they never ceased bringing her diamonds, jewels, shawls, materials for dresses, and trinkets of all kinds; she bought everything without ever asking the price; and generally forgot what she had purchased. . . all the morning she had on a shawl which she draped on her shoulders with a grace i have seen in no one else. bonaparte, who thought her shawls covered her too much, tore them off, and sometimes threw them into the fire; then she sent for another (rémusat, tome ii. pp. 343-345). after the divorce her income, large as it was, was insufficient, but the emperor was more compassionate then, and when sending the comte mollien to settle her affairs gave him strict orders "not to make her weep" (meneval, tome iii. p.237]-the amiable josephine had not less ambition in little things than her husband had in great. she felt pleasure in acquiring and not in possessing. who would suppose it? she grew tired of the beauty of the park of malmaison, and was always asking me to take her out on the high road, either in the direction of nanterre, or on that of marly, in the midst of the dust occasioned by the passing of carriages. the noise of the high road appeared to her preferable to the calm silence of the beautiful avenues of the park, and in this respect hortense had the same taste as her mother. this whimsical fancy astonished bonaparte, and he was sometimes vexed at it. my intercourse with josephine was delightful; for i never saw a woman who so constantly entered society with such an equable disposition, or with so much of the spirit of kindness, which is the first principle of amiability. she was so obligingly attentive as to cause a pretty suite of apartments to be prepared at malmaison for me and my family. she pressed me earnestly, and with all her known grace, to accept it; but almost as much a captive at paris as a prisoner of state, i wished to have to myself in the country the moments of liberty i was permitted to enjoy. yet what was this liberty? i had bought a little house at ruel, which i kept during two years and a half. when i saw my friends there, it had to be at midnight, or at five o'clock in the morning; and the first consul would often send for me in the night when couriers arrived. it was for this sort of liberty i refused josephine's kind offer. bonaparte came once to see me in my retreat at ruel, but josephine and hortense came often. it was a favourite walk with these ladies. at paris i was less frequently absent from bonaparte than at malmaison. we sometimes in the evening walked together in the garden of the tuileries after the gates were closed. in these evening walks he always wore a gray greatcoat, and a round hat. i was directed to answer, "the first consul," to the sentinel's challenge of, "who goes there?" these promenades, which were of much benefit to bonaparte, and me also, as a relaxation from our labours, resembled those which we had at malmaison. as to our promenades in the city, they were often very amusing. at the period of our first inhabiting the tuileries, when i saw bonaparte enter the cabinet at eight o'clock in the evening in his gray coat, i knew he would say, "bourrienne, come and take a turn." sometimes, then, instead of going out by the garden arcade, we would take the little gate which leads from the court to the apartments of the duc d'angoulême. he would take my arm, and we would go to buy articles of trifling value in the shops of the rue st. honoré; but we did not extend our excursions farther than rue de l'arbre sec. whilst i made the shopkeeper exhibit before us the articles which i appeared anxious to buy he played his part in asking questions. nothing was more amusing than to see him endeavouring to imitate the careless and jocular tone of the young men of fashion. how awkward was he in the attempt to put on dandy airs when pulling up the corners of his cravat he would say, "well, madame, is there anything new to-day? citizen, what say they of bonaparte? your shop appears to be well supplied. you surely have a great deal of custom. what do people say of that buffoon, bonaparte?" he was made quite happy one day when we were obliged to retire hastily from a shop to avoid the attacks drawn upon us by the irreverent tone in which bonaparte spoke of the first consul. chapter xxxiv. 1800. war and monuments--influence of the recollections of egypt- first improvements in paris--malmaison too little--st. cloud taken --the pont des arts--business prescribed for me by bonaparte- pecuniary remuneration--the first consul's visit to the pritanée- his examination of the pupils--consular pensions--tragical death of miackzinski--introduction of vaccination--recall of the members of the constituent assembly--the "canary" volunteers--tronchet and target--liberation of the austrian prisoners--longchamps and sacred music. the destruction of men and the construction of monuments were two things perfectly in unison in the mind of bonaparte. it may be said that his passion for monuments almost equalled his passion for war; --[take pleasure, if you can, in reading your returns. the good condition of my armies is owing to my devoting to them one or two hours in every day. when the monthly returns of my armies and of my fleets, which form twenty thick volumes, are sent to me, i give up every other occupation in order to read them in detail and to observe the difference between one monthly return and another. no young girl enjoys her novel so much as i do these returns! (napoleon to joseph, 20th august 1806--du casse, tome iii. p. 145).]-but as in all things he disliked what was little and mean, so he liked vast constructions and great battles. the sight of the colossal ruins of the monuments of egypt had not a little contributed to augment his natural taste for great structures. it was not so much the monuments themselves that he admired, but the historical recollections they perpetuate, the great names they consecrate, the important events they attest. what should he have cared for the column which we beheld on our arrival in alexandria had it not been pompey's pillar? it is for artists to admire or censure its proportions and ornaments, for men of learning to explain its inscriptions; but the name of pompey renders it an object of interest to all. when endeavouring to sketch the character of bonaparte, i ought to have noticed his taste for monuments, for without this characteristic trait something essential is wanting to the completion of the portrait. this taste, or, as it may more properly be called, this passion for monuments, exercised no small influence on his thoughts and projects of glory; yet it did not deter him from directing attention to public improvements of a less ostentatious kind. he wished for great monuments to perpetuate the recollection of his glory; but at the same time he knew how to appreciate all that was truly useful. he could very rarely be reproached for rejecting any plan without examination; and this examination was a speedy affair, for his natural tact enabled him immediately to see things in their proper light. though most of the monuments and embellishments of paris are executed from the plans of men of talent, yet some owe their origin to circumstances merely accidental. of this i can mention an example. i was standing at the window of bonaparte's' cabinet, which looked into the garden of the tuileries. he had gone out, and i took advantage of his absence to arise from my chair, for i was tired of sitting. he had scarcely been gone a minute when he unexpectedly returned to ask me for a paper. "what are you doing there, bourrienne? i'll wager anything you are admiring the ladies walking on the terrace."--"why, i must confess i do sometimes amuse myself in that way," replied i; "but i assure you, general, i was now thinking of something else. i was looking at that villainous left bank of the seine, which always annoys me with the gaps in its dirty quay, and the floodings which almost every winter prevent communication with the faubourg st. germain; and i was thinking i would speak to you on the subject." he approached the window, and, looking out, said, "you are right, it is very ugly; and very offensive to see dirty linen washed before our windows. here, write immediately: 'the quay of the école de natation is to be finished during next campaign.' send that order to the minister of the interior." the quay was finished the year following. an instance of the enormous difference which frequently appears between the original estimates of architects and their subsequent accounts i may mention what occurred in relation to the palace of st. cloud. but i must first say a word about the manner in which bonaparte originally refused and afterwards took possession of the queen's pleasure-house. malmaison was a suitable country residence for bonaparte as long as he remained content with his town apartments in the little luxembourg; but that consular 'bagatelle' was too confined in comparison with the spacious apartments in the tuileries. the inhabitants of st. cloud, well-advised, addressed a petition to the legislative body, praying that their deserted chateau might be made the summer residence of the first consul. the petition was referred to the government; but bonaparte, who was not yet consul for life, proudly declared that so long as he was at the head of affairs, and, indeed, for a year afterwards, he would accept no national recompense. sometime after we went to visit the palace of the 18th brumaire. bonaparte liked it exceedingly, but all was in a state of complete dilapidation. it bore evident marks of the revolution. the first consul did not wish, as yet, to burden the budget of the state with his personal expenses, and he was alarmed at the enormous sum required to render st. cloud habitable. flattery had not yet arrived at the degree of proficiency which it subsequently attained; but even then his flatterers boldly assured him he might take possession of st. cloud for 25,000 francs. i told the first consul that considering the ruinous state of the place, i could to say that the expense would amount to more than 1,200,000 francs. bonaparte determined to have a regular estimate of the expense, and it amounted to nearly 3,000,000. he thought it a great sum; but as he had resolved to make st. cloud his residence he gave orders for commencing the repairs, the expense of which, independently of the furniture, amounted to 6,000,000. so much for the 3,000,000 of the architect and the 25,000 francs of the flatterers. when the first consul contemplated the building of the pont des arts we had a long conversation on the subject. i observed that it would be much better to build the bridge of stone. "the first object of monuments of this kind," said i, "is public utility. they require solidity of appearance, and their principal merit is duration. i cannot conceive, general, why, in a country where there is abundance of fine stone of every quality, the use of iron should be preferred."--"write," said bonaparte, "to fontaine and percier, the architects, and ask what they think of it." i wrote and they stated in their answer that "bridges were intended for public utility and the embellishment of cities. the projected bridge between the louvre and the quatre-nations would unquestionably fulfil the first of these objects, as was proved by the great number of persons who daily crossed the seine at that point in boats; that the site fixed upon between the pont neuf and the tuileries appeared to be the best that could be chosen for the purpose; and that on the score of ornament paris would gain little by the construction of an iron bridge, which would be very narrow, and which, from its light form, would not correspond with the grandeur of the two bridges between which it would be placed." when we had received the answer of mm. percier and fontaine, we again had a conversation on the subject of the bridge. i told the first consul that i perfectly concurred in the opinion of mm. fontaine and percier; however, he would have his own way, and thus was authorised the construction of the toy which formed a communication between the louvre and the institute. but no sooner was the pont des arts finished than bonaparte pronounced it to be mean and out of keeping with the other bridges above and below it. one day when visiting the louvre he stopped at one of the windows looking towards the pont des arts and said, "there is no solidity, no grandeur about that bridge. in england, where stone is scarce, it is very natural that iron should be used for arches of large dimensions. but the case is different in france, where the requisite material is abundant." the infernal machine of the 3d nivôse, of which i shall presently speak more at length, was the signal for vast changes in the quarter of the tuileries. that horrible attempt was at least so far attended by happy results that it contributed to the embellishment of paris. it was thought more advisable for the government to buy and pull down the houses which had been injured by the machine than to let them be put under repair. as an example of bonaparte's grand schemes in building i may mention that, being one day at the louvre, he pointed towards st. germain l'auxerrois and said to me, "that is where i will build an imperial street. it shall run from here to the barrière du trône. it shall be a hundred feet broad, and have arcades and plantations. this street shall be the finest in the world." the palace of the king of rome, which was to face the pont de jena and the champ de mars, would have been in some measure isolated from paris, with which, however, it was to be connected by a line of palaces. these were to extend along the quay, and were destined as splendid residences for the ambassadors of foreign sovereigns, at least as long as there should be any sovereigns in europe except napoleon. the temple of glory, too, which was to occupy the site of the church of la madeleine, was never finished. if the plan of this monument proved the necessity. which bonaparte felt of constantly holding out stimulants to his soldiers, its relinquishment was at least a proof of his wisdom. he who had reestablished religious worship in france, and had restored to its destination the church of the invalides, which was for a time metamorphosed into the temple of mars, foresaw that a temple of glory would give birth to a sort of paganism incompatible with the ideas of the age. the recollection of the magnificent necropolis of cairo frequently recurred to bonaparte's mind. he had admired that city of the dead, which he had partly contributed to people; and his design was to make, at the four cardinal points of paris, four vast cemeteries on the plan of that at cairo. bonaparte determined that all the new streets of paris should be 40 feet wide, and be provided with foot-pavements; in short, he thought nothing too grand for the embellishment of the capital of a country which he wished to make the first in the world. next to war, he regarded the embellishment of paris as the source of his glory; and he never considered a victory fully achieved until he had raised a monument to transmit its memory to posterity. he, wanted glory, uninterrupted glory, for france as well as for himself. how often, when talking over his schemes, has he not said, "bourrienne, it is for france i am doing all this! all i wish, all i desire, the end of all my labours is, that my name should be indissolubly connected with that of france!" paris is not the only city, nor is france the only kingdom, which bears traces of napoleon's passion for great and useful monuments. in belgium, in holland, in piedmont, in all italy, he executed great improvements. at turin a splendid bridge was built over the po, in lieu of an old bridge which was falling in ruins. how many things were undertaken and executed in napoleon's short and eventful reign! to obviate the difficulty of communication between metz and mayence a magnificent road was made, as if by magic, across impracticable marshes and vast forests. mountains were cut through and ravines filled up. he would not allow nature more than man to resist him. one day when he was proceeding to belgium by the way of givet, he was detained for a short time at little givet, on the right bank of the meuse, in consequence of an accident which happened to the ferry-boat. he was within a gunshot of the fortress of charlemont, on the left bank, and in the vexation which the delay occasioned he dictated the following decree: "a bridge shall be built over the meuse to join little givet to great givet. it shall be terminated during the ensuing campaign." it was completed within the prescribed time. in the great work of bridges and highways bonaparte's chief object was to remove the obstacles and barriers which nature had raised up as the limits of old france so as to form a junction with the provinces which he successively annexed to the empire. thus in savoy a road, smooth as a garden-walk, superseded the dangerous ascents and descents of the wood of bramant; thus was the passage of mont cenis a pleasant promenade at almost every season of the year; thus did the simplon bow his head, and bonaparte might have said, "there are now my alps," with more reason than louis xiv. said, "there are now no pyrenees." --[metternich (tome iv. p. 187) says on this subject, 'if you look closely at the course of human affairs you will make strange discoveries. for instance, that the simplon pass has contributed as surely to napoleon's immortality as the numerous works done in the reign of the emperor francis will fail to add to his.]-such was the implicit confidence which bonaparte reposed in me that i was often alarmed at the responsibility it obliged me to incur. --[of this confidence the following instructions for me, which he dictated to duroc, afford sufficient proof:- "1st. citizen bourrienne shall open all the letters addressed to the first consul, vol, and present them to him three times a day, or oftener in case of urgent business. the letters shall be deposited in the cabinet when they are opened. bourrienne is to analyse all those which are of secondary interest, and write the first consul's decision on each letter. the hours for presenting the letters shall be, first, when the consul rises; second, a quarter of an hour before dinner; and third, at eleven at night. "2d. he is to have the superintendence of the topographical office, and of an office of translation, in which there shall be a german and an english clerk. every day he shall present to the first consul, at the hours above mentioned the german and english journals, together with a translation. with respect to the italian journals, it will only be necessary to mark what the first consul is to read. "3d. he shall keep a register of appointments to offices under government; a second, for appointments to judicial posts; a third for appointments to places abroad; and a fourth, for the situations of receivers and great financial posts, where he is to inscribe the names of all the individuals whom the first consul may refer to him. these registers must be written by his own hand, and must be kept entirely private. "4th. secret correspondence, and the different reports of surveillance, are to be addressed directly to bourrienne, and transmitted by him to the hand of the first consul, by whom they will be returned without the intervention of any third party. "6th. there shall be a register for all that relates to secret extraordinary expenditure. bourrienne shall write the whole with his own hand, in order that the business may be kept from the knowledge of any one. "7th. he shall despatch all the business which may be referred to him, either from citizen duroc, or from the cabinet of the first consul, taking care to arrange everything so as to secure secrecy. "(signed) "bonaparte, first council. "paris, 13th germinal, year viii. "(3d. april 1800.)"]-official business was not the only labour that devolved upon me. i had to write to the dictation of the first consul during a great part of the day, or to decipher his writing, which was always the most laborious part of my duty. i was so closely employed that i scarcely ever went out; and when by chance i dined in town, i could not arrive until the very moment of dinner, and i was obliged to run away immediately after it. once a month, at most, i went without bonaparte to the comédie française, but i was obliged to return at nine o'clock, that being the hour at which we resumed business. corvisart, with whom i was intimately acquainted, constantly expressed his apprehensions about my health; but my zeal carried me through every difficulty, and during our stay at the tuileries i cannot express how happy i was in enjoying the unreserved confidence of the man on whom the eyes of all europe were filed. so perfect was this confidence that bonaparte, neither as general, consul, nor emperor, ever gave me any fixed salary. in money matters we were still comrades: i took from his funds what was necessary to defray my expenses, and of this bonaparte never once asked me for any account. he often mentioned his wish to regenerate public education, which he thought was ill managed. the central schools did not please him; but he could not withhold his admiration from the polytechnic school, the finest establishment of education that was ever founded, but which he afterwards spoiled by giving it a military organisation. in only one college of paris the old system of study was preserved: this was the louis-le-grand, which had received the name of pritanée. the first consul directed the minister of the interior to draw up a report on that establishment; and he himself went to pay an unexpected visit to the pritanée, accompanied by m. lebrun and duroc. he remained there upwards of an hour, and in the evening he spoke to me with much interest on the subject of his visit. "do you know, bourrienne," said he, "that i have been performing the duties of professor?"--"you, general!"--"yes! and i did not acquit myself badly. i examined the pupils in the mathematical class; and i recollected enough of my bezout to make some demonstrations before them. i went everywhere, into the bedrooms and the dining-room. i tasted the soup, which is better than we used to have at brienne. i must devote serious attention to public education and the management of the colleges. the pupils must have a uniform. i observed some well and others ill dressed. that will not do. at college, above all places, there should be equality. but i was much pleased with the pupils of the pritanée. i wish to know the names of those i examined, and i have desired duroc to report them to me. i will give them rewards; that stimulates young people. i will provide for some of them." on this subject bonaparte did not confine himself to an empty scheme. after consulting with the headmaster of the pritanée, he granted pensions of 200 francs to seven or eight of the most distinguished pupils of the establishment, and he placed three of them in the department of foreign affairs, under the title of diplomatic pupils. --[this institution of diplomatic pupils was originally suggested by m. de talleyrand.]-what i have just said respecting the first consul's visit to the pritanée reminds me of a very extraordinary circumstance which arose out of it. among the pupils at the pritanée there was a son of general miackzinski, who died fighting under the banners of the republic. young miackzinski was then sixteen or seventeen years of age. he soon quitted the college, entered the army as a volunteer, and was one of a corps reviewed by bonaparte, in the plain of sablons. he was pointed out to the first consul, who said to him, "i knew your father. follow his example, and in six months you shall be an officer." six months elapsed, and miackzinski wrote to the first consul, reminding him of his promise. no answer was returned, and the young man then wrote a second letter as follows: you desired me to prove myself worthy of my father; i have done so. you promised that i should be an officer in six months; seven have elapsed since that promise was made. when you receive this letter i shall be no more. i cannot live under a government the head of which breaks his word. poor miackzinski kept his word but too faithfully. after writing the above letter to the first consul he retired to his chamber and blew out his brains with a pistol. a few days after this tragical event miackzinski's commission was transmitted to his corps, for bonaparte had not forgotten him. a delay in the war office had caused the death of this promising young man. bonaparte was much affected at the circumstance, and he said to me, "these poles have such refined notions of honour.... poor sulkowski, i am sure, would have done the same." at the commencement of the consulate it was gratifying to see how actively bonaparte was seconded in the execution of plans for the social regeneration of france; all seemed animated with new life, and every one strove to do good as if it were a matter of competition. every circumstance concurred to favour the good intentions of the first consul. vaccination, which, perhaps, has saved as many lives as war has sacrificed, was introduced into france by m. d liancourt; and bonaparte, immediately appreciating the value of such a discovery, gave it his decided approbation. at the same time a council of prizes was established, and the old members of the constituent assembly were invited to return to france. it was for their sake and that of the royalists that the first consul recalled them, but it was to please the jacobins, whom he was endeavouring to conciliate, that their return was subject to restrictions. at first the invitation to return to france extended only to those who could prove that they had voted in favour of the abolition of nobility. the lists of emigrants were closed, and committees were appointed to investigate their claims to the privilege of returning. from the commencement of the month of germinal the reorganisation of the army of italy had proceeded with renewed activity. the presence in paris of the fine corps of the consular guard, added to the desire of showing themselves off in gay uniforms, had stimulated the military ardour of many respectable young men of the capital. taking advantage of this circumstance the first consul created a corps of volunteers destined for the army of reserve, which was to remain at dijon. he saw the advantage of connecting a great number of families with his cause, and imbuing them with the spirit of the army. this volunteer corps wore a yellow uniform which, in some of the salons of paris where it was still the custom to ridicule everything, obtained for them the nickname of "canaries." bonaparte, who did not always relish a joke, took this in very ill part, and often expressed to me his vexation at it. however, he was gratified to observe in the composition of this corps a first specimen of privileged soldiers; an idea which he acted upon when he created the orderly gendarmes in the campaign of jena, and when he organised the guards of honour after the disasters of moscow. in every action of his life bonaparte had some particular object in view. i recollect his saying to me one day, "bourrienne, i cannot yet venture to do anything against the regicides; but i will let them see what i think of them. to-morrow i shall have some business with abrial respecting the organisation of the court of cassation. target, who is the president of that court, would not defend louis xvi. well, whom do you think i mean to appoint in his place? . . . tronchet, who did defend the king. they may say what they please; i care not." --[on this, as on many other occasions, the cynicism of bonaparte's language does not admit of a literal translation.]-tronchet was appointed. nearly about the same time the first consul, being informed of the escape of general mack, said to me, "mack may go where he pleases; i am not afraid of him. but i will tell you what i have been thinking. there are some other austrian officers who were prisoners with mack; among the number is a count dietrichstein, who belongs to a great family in vienna. i will liberate them all. at the moment of opening a campaign this will have a good effect. they will see that i fear nothing; and who knows but this may procure me some admirers in austria." the order for liberating the austrian prisoners was immediately despatched. thus bonaparte's acts of generosity, as well as his acts of severity and his choice of individuals, were all the result of deep calculation. this unvarying attention to the affairs of the government was manifest in all he did. i have already mentioned the almost simultaneous suppression of the horrible commemoration of the month of january, and the permission for the revival of the opera balls. a measure something similar to this was the authorisation of the festivals of longchamps, which had been forgotten since the revolution. he at the same time gave permission for sacred music to be performed at the opera. thus, while in public acts he maintained the observance of the republican calendar, he was gradually reviving the old calendar by seasons of festivity. shrove-tuesday was marked by a ball, and passion-week by promenades and concerts. chapter xxxv 1800. the memorial of st. helena--louis xviii.'s first letter to bonaparte --josephine, hortense, and the faubourg st. germain- madame bonaparte and the fortune-teller--louis xviii's second letter --bonaparte's answer--conversation respecting the recall of louis xviii.--peace and war--a battle fought with pins--genoa and melas- realisation of bonaparte's military plans--ironical letter to berthier--departure from paris--instructions to lucien and cambacérès--joseph bonaparte appointed councillor of state- travelling conversation--alexander and caesar judged by bonaparte. it sometimes happens that an event which passes away unnoticed at the time of its occurrence acquires importance from events which subsequently ensue. this reflection naturally occurs to my mind now that i am about to notice the correspondence which passed between louis xviii. and the first consul. this is certainly not one of the least interesting passages in the life of bonaparte. but i must first beg leave to make an observation on the 'memorial of st. helena.' that publication relates what bonaparte said respecting the negotiations between louis xviii. and himself; and i find it necessary to quote a few lines on the subject, in order to show how far the statements contained in the memorial differ from the autograph letters in my possession. at st. helena napoleon said that he never thought of the princes of the house of bourbon. this is true to a certain point. he did not think of the princes of the house of bourbon with the view of restoring them to their throne; but it has been shown, in several parts of these memoirs, that he thought of them very often, and on more than one occasion their very names alarmed him. --[the memorial states that "a letter was delivered to the first consul by lebrun who received it from the abbé de montesquieu, the secret agent of the bourbons in paris." this letter which was very cautiously written, said:- "you are long delaying the restoration of my throne. it is to be feared you are suffering favourable moments to escape. you cannot secure the happiness of france without me, and i can do nothing for france without you. hasten, then, to name the offices which you would choose for your friends." the answer, napoleon said, was as follows:- "i have received your royal highness' letter. i have always taken a lively interest in your misfortunes, and those of your family. you must not think of appearing in france; you could only return here by trampling over a hundred thousand dead bodies. i shall always be happy to do anything that can alleviate your fate and help to banish the recollection of your misfortunes."--bourrienne.]-the substance of the two letters given in the 'memorial of st. helena' is correct. the ideas are nearly the same as those of the original letters. but it is not surprising that, after the lapse of so long an interval, napoleon's memory should somewhat have failed him. however, it will not, i presume, be deemed unimportant if i present to the reader literal copies of this correspondence; together with the explanation of some curious circumstances connected with it. the following is louis xviii's letter:- february 20,1800. sir--whatever may be their apparent conduct, men like you never inspire alarm. you have accepted an eminent station, and i thank you for having done so. you know better than any one how much strength and power are requisite to secure the happiness of a great nation. save france from her own violence, and you will fulfil the first wish of my heart. restore her king to her, and future generations will bless your memory. you will always be too necessary to the state for me ever to be able to discharge, by important appointments, the debt of my family and myself. (signed) louis. the first consul was much agitated on the reception of this letter. though he every day declared his determination to have nothing to do with the princes, yet he hesitated whether or no he should reply to this overture. the numerous affairs which then occupied his mind favoured this hesitation. josephine and hortense conjured him to hold out hope to the king, as by so doing he would in no way pledge himself, and would gain time to ascertain whether he could not ultimately play a far greater part than that of monk. their entreaties became so urgent that he said to me, "these devils of women are mad! the faubourg st. germain has turned their heads! they make the faubourg the guardian angel of the royalists; but i care not; i will have nothing to do with them." madame bonaparte said she was anxious he should adopt the step she proposed in order to banish from his mind all thought of making himself king. this idea always gave rise to a painful foreboding which she could never overcome. in the first consul's numerous conversations with me he discussed with admirable sagacity louis xviii.'s proposition and its consequences. "the partisans of the bourbons," said he, "are deceived if they suppose i am the man to play monk's part." here the matter rested, and the king's letter remained on the table. in the interim louis xviii. wrote a second letter, without any date. it was as follows: you must have long since been convinced, general, that you possess my esteem. if you doubt my gratitude, fix your reward and mark out the fortune of your friends. as to my principles, i am a frenchman, merciful by character, and also by the dictates of reason. no, the victor of lodi, castiglione, and arcola, the conqueror of italy and egypt, cannot prefer vain celebrity to real glory. but you are losing precious time. we may ensure the glory of france. i say we, because i require the aid of bonaparte, and he can do nothing without me. general, europe observes you. glory awaits you, and i am impatient to restore peace to my people. (signed) louis. this dignified letter the first consul suffered to remain unanswered for several weeks; at length he proposed to dictate an answer to me. i observed, that as the king's letters were autographs, it would be more proper that he should write himself. he then wrote with his own hand the following: sir--i have received your letter, and i thank you for the compliments you address to me. you must not seek to return to france. to do so you must trample over a hundred thousand dead bodies. sacrifice your interest to the repose and happiness of france, and history will render you justice. i am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family. i shall learn with pleasure, and shall willingly contribute to ensure, the tranquillity of your retirement. (signed) bonaparte. he showed me this letter, saying, "what do you think of it? is it not good? "he was never offended when i pointed out to him an error of grammar or style, and i therefore replied, "as to the substance, if such be your resolution, i have nothing to say against it; but," added i, "i must make one observation on the style. you cannot say that you shall learn with pleasure to ensure, etc." on reading the passage over again he thought he had pledged himself too far in saying that he would willingly contribute, etc. he therefore scored out the last sentence, and interlined, "i shall contribute with pleasure to the happiness and tranquillity of your retirement." the answer thus scored and interlined could not be sent off, and it lay on the table with bonaparte's signature affixed to it. some time after he wrote another answer, the three first paragraphs of which were exactly alike that first quoted; but far the last paragraph he substituted the following "i am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family; and i shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with all that can contribute to the tranquillity of your retirement." by this means he did not pledge himself in any way, not even in words, for he himself made no offer of contributing to the tranquillity of the retirement. every day which augmented his power and consolidated his position diminished, he thought, the chances of the bourbons; and seven months were suffered to intervene between the date of the king's first letter and the answer of the first consul, which was written on the 2d vendemiaire, year ix. (24th september 1800) just when the congress of luneville was on the point of opening. some days after the receipt of louis xviii.'s letter we were walking in the gardens of malmaison; he was in good humour, for everything was going on to his mind. "has my wife been saying anything more to you about the bourbons?" said he.--"no, general."--"but when you converse with her you concur a little in her opinions. tell me why you wish the bourbons back? you have no interest in their return, nothing to expect from them. your family rank is not high enough to enable you to obtain any great post. you would be nothing under them. through the patronage of m. de chambonas you got the appointment of secretary of legation at stuttgart; but had it not been for the change you would have remained all your life in that or some inferior post. did you ever know men rise by their own merit under kings? everything depends on birth, connection, fortune, and intrigue. judge things more accurately; reflect more maturely on the future."--"general," replied i, "i am quite of your opinion on one point. i never received gift, place, or favour from the bourbons; and i have not the vanity to believe that i should ever have attained any important appointment. but you must not forget that my nomination as secretary of legation at stuttgart preceded the overthrow of the throne only by a few days; and i cannot infer, from what took place under circumstances unfortunately too certain, what might have happened in the reverse case. besides, i am not actuated by personal feelings; i consider not my own interests, but those of france. i wish you to hold the reins of government as long as you live; but you have no children, and it is tolerably certain that you will have none by josephine. what will become of us when you are gone? you talk of the future; but what will be the future fate of france? i have often heard you say that your brothers are not--"--"you are right," said he, abruptly interrupting me. "if i do not live thirty years to complete my work you will have a long series of civil wars after my death. my brothers will not suit france; you know what they are. a violent conflict will therefore arise among the most distinguished generals, each of whom will think himself entitled to succeed me."--"well, general, why not take means to obviate the mischief you foresee?"--"do you imagine i do not think of it? but look at the difficulties that stand in my way. how are so many acquired rights and material results to be secured against the efforts of a family restored to power, and returning with 80,000 emigrants and the influence of fanaticism? what would become of those who voted for the death of the king--the men who acted a conspicuous part in the revolution--the national domains, and a multitude of things that have been done during twelve years? can you see how far reaction would extend?"--"general, need i remind you that louis, in his letter, guarantees the contrary of all you apprehend? i know what will be your answer; but are you not able to impose whatever conditions you may think fit? grant what is asked of you only at that price. take three or four years; in that time you may ensure the happiness of france by institutions conformable to her wants. custom and habit would give them a power which it would not be easy to destroy; and even supposing such a design were entertained, it could not be accomplished. i have heard you say it is wished you should act the part of monk; but you well know the difference between a general opposing the usurper of a crown, and one whom victory and peace have raised above the ruins of a subverted throne, and who restores it voluntarily to those who have long occupied it. you are well aware what you call ideology will not again be revived; and--"--"i know what you are going to say; but it all amounts to nothing. depend upon it, the bourbons will think they have reconquered their inheritance, and will dispose of it as they please. the most sacred pledges, the most positive promises, will be violated. none but fools will trust them. my resolution is formed; therefore let us say no more on the subject. but i know how these women torment you. let them mind their knitting, and leave me to do what i think right." every one knows the adage, 'si vis pacem para bellum'. had bonaparte been a latin scholar he would probably have reversed it and said, 'si vis bellum para pacem'. while seeking to establish pacific relations with the powers of europe the first consul was preparing to strike a great blow in italy. as long as genoa held out, and massena continued there, bonaparte did not despair of meeting the austrians in those fields which not four years before had been the scenes of his success. he resolved to assemble an army of reserve at dijon. where there was previously nothing he created everything. at that period of his life the fertility of his imagination and the vigour of his genius must have commanded the admiration of even his bitterest enemies. i was astonished at the details into which he entered. while every moment was engrossed by the most important occupations he sent 24,000 francs to the hospital of mont st. bernard. when he saw that his army of reserve was forming, and everything was going on to his liking, he said to me, "i hope to fall on the rear of melas before he is aware i am in italy . . . that is to say, provided genoa holds out. but massena is defending it." on the 17th of march, in a moment of gaiety and good humour, he desired me to unroll chauchard's great map of italy. he lay down upon it, and desired me to do likewise. he then stuck into it pins, the heads of which were tipped with wax, some red and some black. i silently observed him; and awaited with no little curiosity the result of this plan of campaign. when he had stationed the enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins with red heads on the points where he hoped to bring his own troops, he said to me, "where do you think i shall beat melas?"--"how the devil should i know?"--"why, look here, you fool! melas is at alessandria with his headquarters. there he will remain until genoa surrenders. he has in alessandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, and his reserves. crossing the alps here (pointing to the great mont st. bernard) i shall fall upon melas, cut off his communications with austria, and meet him here in the plains of scrivia" (placing a red, pin at san giuliano). finding that i looked on this manoeuvre of pins as mere pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual compliments, such as fool, ninny, etc., and then proceeded to demonstrate his plans more clearly on the map. at the expiration of a quarter of an hour we rose; i folded up the map, and thought no more of the matter. four months after this, when i was at san giuliano with bonaparte's portfolio and despatches, which i had saved from the rout which had taken place during the day, and when that very evening i was writing at torre di galifolo the bulletin of the battle to napoleon's dictation, i frankly avowed my admiration of his military plans. he himself smiled at the accuracy of his own foresight. the first consul was not satisfied with general berthier as war minister, and he superseded him by carnot, --[there were special reasons for the appointment of carnot, berthier was required with his master in italy, while carnot, who had so long ruled the armies of the republic, was better fitted to influence moreau, at this time advancing into germany. carnot probably fulfilled the main object of his appointment when he was sent to moreau, and succeeded in getting that general, with natural reluctance, to damage his own campaign by detaching a large body of troops into italy. berthier was reappointed to the ministry on the 8th of october 1800,--a very speedy return if he had really been disgraced.]-who had given great proofs of firmness and integrity, but who, nevertheless, was no favourite of bonaparte, on account of his decided republican principles. berthier was too slow in carrying out the measures ordered, [duplicated line removed here d.w.] and too lenient in the payment of past charges and in new contracts. carnot's appointment took place on the 2d of april 1800; and to console berthier, who, he knew, was more at home in the camp than in the office, he dictated to me the following letter for him:- paris, 2d april 1800. citizen-general,--the military talents of which you have given so many proofs, and the confidence of the government, call you to the command of an army. during the winter you have reorganised the war department, and you have provided, as far as circumstances would permit, for the wants of our armies. during the spring and summer it must be your task to lead our troops to victory, which is the effectual means of obtaining peace and consolidating the republic. bonaparte laughed heartily while he dictated this epistle, especially when he uttered the word which i have marked in italics [caps]. berthier set out for dijon, where he commenced the formation of the army of reserve. the consular constitution did not empower the first consul to command an army out of the territory of france. bonaparte therefore wished to keep secret his long-projected plan of placing himself at the head of the army of italy, which he then for the first time called the grand army. i observed that by his choice of berthier nobody could be deceived, because it must be evident that he would have made another selection had he not intended to command in person. he laughed at my observation. our departure from paris was fixed for the 6th of may, or, according to the republican calendar, the 16th floréal. bonaparte had made all his arrangements and issued all his orders; but still he did not wish it to be known that he was going to take the command of the army. on the eve of our departure, being in conference with the two other consuls and the ministers, he said to lucien, "prepare, to-morrow morning, a circular to the prefects, and you, fouché, will publish it in the journals. say i am gone to dijon to inspect the army of reserve. you may add that i shall perhaps go as far as geneva; but you must affirm positively that i shall not be absent longer than a fortnight. you, cambacérès, will preside tomorrow at the council of state. in my absence you are the head of the government. state that my absence will be but of short duration, but specify nothing. express my approbation of the council of state; it has already rendered great services, and i shall be happy to see it continue in the course it has hitherto pursued. oh! i had nearly forgotten--you will at the same time announce that i have appointed joseph a councillor of state. should anything happen i shall be back again like a thunderbolt. i recommend to you all the great interests of france, and i trust that i shall shortly be talked of in vienna and in london." we set out at two in the morning, taking the burgundy road, which we had already so often travelled under very different circumstances. on the journey bonaparte conversed about the warriors of antiquity, especially alexander, caesar, scipio, and hannibal. i asked him which he preferred, alexander or caesar. "i place alexander in the first rank," said he, "yet i admire caesar's fine campaign in africa. but the ground of my preference for the king of macedonia is the plan, and above all the execution, of his campaign in asia. only those who are utterly ignorant of war can blame alexander for having spent seven months at the siege of tyre. for my part, i would have stayed there seven years had it been necessary. this is a great subject of dispute; but i look upon the siege of tyre, the conquest of egypt, and the journey to the oasis of ammon as a decided proof of the genius of that great captain. his object was to give the king of persia (of whose force he had only beaten a feeble advance-guard at the granicus and issus) time to reassemble his troops, so that he might overthrow at a blow the colossus which he had as yet only shaken. by pursuing darius into his states alexander would have separated himself from his reinforcements, and would have met only scattered parties of troops who would have drawn him into deserts where his army would have been sacrificed. by persevering in the taking of tyre he secured his communications with greece, the country he loved as dearly as i love france, and in whose glory he placed his own. by taking possession of the rich province of egypt he forced darius to come to defend or deliver it, and in so doing to march half-way to meet him. by representing himself as the son of jupiter he worked upon the ardent feelings of the orientals in a way that powerfully seconded his designs. though he died at thirty-three what a name he has left behind him!" though an utter stranger to the noble profession of arms, yet i could admire bonaparte's clever military plans and his shrewd remarks on the great captains of ancient and modern times. i could not refrain from saying, "general, you often reproach me for being no flatterer, but now i tell you plainly i admire you." and certainly, i really spoke the true sentiments of my mind. memoirs of napoleon bonaparte, volume 3. by louis antoine fauvelet de bourrienne his private secretary edited by r. w. phipps colonel, late royal artillery 1891 contents: chapter xv. to chapter xxvi. 1799 chapter xv. 1798. establishment of a divan in each egyptian province--desaix in upper egypt--ibrahim bey beaten by bonaparte at salehye'h--sulkowsky wounded--disaster at aboukir--dissatisfaction and murmurs of the army--dejection of the general-in-chief--his plan respecting egypt --meditated descent upon england--bonaparte's censure of the directory--intercepted correspondence. from the details i have already given respecting bonaparte's plans for colonising egypt, it will be seen that his energy of mind urged him to adopt anticipatory measures for the accomplishment of objects which were never realised. during the short interval in which he sheathed his sword he planned provisional governments for the towns and provinces occupied by the french troops, and he adroitly contrived to serve the interests of his army without appearing to violate those of the country. after he had been four days at cairo, during which time he employed himself in examining everything, and consulting every individual from whom he could obtain useful information, he published the following order: headquarters, cairo, 9th thermidor, year vi. bonaparte, member of the national institute, and general-in-chief, orders: art. 1. there shall be in each province of egypt a divan, composed of seven individuals, whose duty will be to superintend the interests of the province; to communicate to me any complaints that may be made; to prevent warfare among the different villages; to apprehend and punish criminals (for which purpose they may demand assistance from the french commandant); and to take every opportunity of enlightening the people. art. 2. there shall be in each province an aga of the janizaries, maintaining constant communication with the french commandant. he shall have with him a company of sixty armed natives, whom he may take wherever he pleases, for the maintenance of good order, subordination, and tranquillity. art. 3. there shall be in each province an intendant, whose business will be to levy the miri, the feddam, and the other contributions which formerly belonged to the mamelukes, but which now belong to the french republic. the intendants shall have as many agents as may be necessary. art. 4. the said intendant shall have a french agent to correspond with the finance department, and to execute all the orders he may receive. (signed) bonaparte. while bonaparte was thus actively taking measures for the organization of the country[1], general desaix had marched into upper egypt in pursuit of mourad bey. we learned that ibrahim, who, next to mourad, was the most influential of the beys, had proceeded towards syria, by the way of belbeis and salehye'h. the general-in-chief immediately determined to march in person against that formidable enemy, and he left cairo about fifteen days after he had entered it. it is unnecessary to describe the well-known engagement in which bonaparte drove ibrahim back upon el-arish; besides, i do not enter minutely into the details of battles, my chief object being to record events which i personally witnessed. [1]--[far more thoroughly and actively than those taken by the english government in 1882-3-4]-at the battle of salehye'h bonaparte thought he had lost one of his 'aides de camp', sulkowsky, to whom he was much attached, and who had been with us during the whole of the campaign of italy. on the field of battle one object of regret cannot long engross the mind; yet, on his return to cairo, bonaparte frequently spoke to me of sulkowsky in terms of unfeigned sorrow. "i cannot," said he one day, "sufficiently admire the noble spirit and determined courage of poor sulkowsky." he often said that sulkowsky would have been a valuable aid to whoever might undertake the resuscitation of poland. fortunately that brave officer was not killed on that occasion, though seriously wounded. he was, however, killed shortly after. the destruction of the french squadron in the roads of aboukir occurred during the absence of the general-in-chief. this event happened on the 1st of august. the details are generally known; but there is one circumstance to which i cannot refrain from alluding, and which excited deep interest at the time. this was the heroic courage of the son of casablanca, the captain of the 'orient'. casablanca was among the wounded, and when the vessel was blown up his son, a lad of ten years of age, preferred perishing with him rather than saving himself, when one of the seamen had secured him the means of escape. i told the 'aide de camp', sent by general kléber, who had the command of alexandria, that the general-in-chief was near salehye'h. he proceeded thither immediately, and bonaparte hastened back to cairo, a distance of about thirty-three leagues. in spite of any assertions that may have been made to the contrary, the fact is, that as soon as the french troops set foot in egypt, they were filled with dissatisfaction, and ardently longed to return home[2]. the illusion of the expedition had disappeared, and only its reality remained. what bitter murmuring have i not heard from murat, lannes, berthier, bessières, and others! their complaints were, indeed, often so unmeasured as almost to amount to sedition. this greatly vexed bonaparte, and drew from him severe reproaches and violent language[3]. when the news arrived of the loss of the fleet, discontent increased. all who had acquired fortunes under napoleon now began to fear that they would never enjoy them. all turned their thoughts to paris, and its amusements, and were utterly disheartened at the idea of being separated from their homes and their friends for a period, the termination of which it was impossible to foresee. [2]--['erreurs' objects to this description of the complaints of the army, but savary (tome i. pp. 66, 67, and tome i. p. 89) fully confirms it, giving the reason that the army was not a homogeneous body, but a mixed force taken from rome, florence, milan, venice, genoa, and marseilles; see also thiers, tome v. p. 283. but the fact is not singular. for a striking instance, in the days of the empire, of the soldiers in 1809, in spain, actually threatening napoleon in his own hearing, see de gonneville (tome i. pp. 190-193): "the soldiers of lapisse's division gave loud expression to the most sinister designs against the emperor's person, stirring up each other to fire a shot at him, and bandying accusations of cowardice for not doing it." he heard it all as plainly as we did, and seemed as if he did not care a bit for it, but "sent the division into good quarters, when the men were as enthusiastic as they were formerly mutinous." in 1796 d'entraigues, the bourbon spy, reports, "as a general rule, the french soldier grumbles and is discontented. he accuses bonaparte of being a thief and a rascal. but to-morrow the very same soldier will obey him blindly" (iung's bonaparte, tome iii. p. 152).]- [3]--[napoleon related at st. helena that in a fit of irritation he rushed among a group of dissatisfied generals, and said to one of them, who was remarkable for his stature, "you have held seditious language; but take care i do not perform my duty. though you are five feet ten inches high, that shall not save you from being shot."--bourrienne.]-the catastrophe of aboukir came like a thunderbolt upon the general-in-chief. in spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was deeply distressed by the disasters which now assailed him. to the painful feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his companions in arms was now added the irreparable misfortune of the burning of our fleet. he measured the fatal consequences of this event at a single glance. we were now cut off from all communication with france, and all hope of returning thither, except by a degrading capitulation with an implacable and hated enemy. bonaparte had lost all chance of preserving his conquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter reflection. and at what a time did this disaster befall him? at the very moment when he was about to apply for the aid of the mother-country. from what general bonaparte communicated to me previously to the 1st of august, his object was, having once secured the possession of egypt; to return to toulon with the fleet; then to send troops and provisions of every kind to egypt; and next to combine with the fleet all the forces that could be supplied, not only by france, but by her allies, for the purpose of attacking england. it is certain that previously to his departure for egypt he had laid before the directory a note relative to his plans. he always regarded a descent upon england as possible, though in its result fatal, so long as we should be inferior in naval strength; but he hoped by various manoeuvres to secure a superiority on one point. his intention was to return to france. availing himself of the departure of the english fleet for the mediterranean, the alarm excited by his egyptian expedition, the panic that would be inspired by his sudden appearance at boulogne, and his preparations against england, he hoped to oblige that power to withdraw her naval force from the mediterranean, and to prevent her sending out troops to egypt. this project was often in his head. he would have thought it sublime to date an order of the day from the ruins of memphis, and three months later, one from london. the loss of the fleet converted all these bold conceptions into mere romantic visions. when alone with me he gave free vent to his emotion. i observed to him that the disaster was doubtless great, but that it would have been infinitely more irreparable had nelson fallen in with us at malta, or had he waited for us four-and-twenty hours before alexandria, or in the open sea. "any one of these events," said i, "which were not only possible but probable, would have deprived us of every resource. we are blockaded here, but we have provisions and money. let us then wait patiently to see what the directory will do for us."--"the directory!" exclaimed he angrily, "the directory is composed of a set of scoundrels! they envy and hate me, and would gladly let me perish here. besides, you see how dissatisfied the whole army is: not a man is willing to stay." the pleasing illusions which were cherished at the outset of the expedition vanished long before our arrival in cairo. egypt was no longer the empire of the ptolemies, covered with populous and wealthy cities; it now presented one unvaried scene of devastation and misery. instead of being aided by the inhabitants, whom we had ruined, for the sake of delivering them from the yoke of the beys, we found all against us: mamelukes, arabs, and fellahs. no frenchman was secure of his life who happened to stray half a mile from any inhabited place, or the corps to which he belonged. the hostility which prevailed against us and the discontent of the army were clearly developed in the numerous letters which were written to france at the time, and intercepted. the gloomy reflections which at first assailed bonaparte, were speedily banished; and he soon recovered the fortitude and presence of mind which had been for a moment shaken by the overwhelming news from aboukir. he, however, sometimes repeated, in a tone which it would be difficult to describe, "unfortunate brueys, what have you done!" i have remarked that in some chance observations which escaped napoleon at st. helena he endeavoured to throw all the blame of the affair on admiral brueys. persons who are determined to make bonaparte an exception to human nature have unjustly reproached the admiral for the loss of the fleet. chapter xvi. 1798. the egyptian institute--festival of the birth of mahomet--bonaparte's prudent respect for the mahometan religion--his turkish dress- djezzar, the pasha of acre--thoughts of a campaign in germany--want of news from france--bonaparte and madame fourés--the egyptian fortune-teller, m. berthollet, and the sheik el bekri--the air "marlbrook"--insurrection in cairo--death of general dupuis--death of sulkowsky--the insurrection quelled--nocturnal executions- destruction of a tribe of arabs--convoy of sick and wounded- massacre of the french in sicily--projected expedition to syria- letter to tippoo saib. the loss of the fleet convinced general bonaparte of the necessity of speedily and effectively organising egypt, where everything denoted that we should stay for a considerable time, excepting the event of a forced evacuation, which the general was far from foreseeing or fearing. the distance of ibrahim bey and mourad bey now left him a little at rest. war, fortifications, taxation, government, the organization of the divans, trade, art, and science, all occupied his attention. orders and instructions were immediately despatched, if not to repair the defeat, at least to avert the first danger that might ensue from it. on the 21st of august bonaparte established at cairo an institute of the arts and sciences, of which he subsequently appointed me a member in the room of m. de sucy, who was obliged to return to france, in consequence of the wound he received on board the flotilla in the nile[4]. [4]--[the institute of egypt was composed of members of the french institute, and of the men of science and artists of the commission who did not belong to that body. they assembled and added to their number several officers of the artillery and staff, and others who had cultivated the sciences and literature. the institute was established in one of the palaces of the bey's. a great number of machines, and physical, chemical, and astronomical instruments had been brought from france. they were distributed in the different rooms, which were also successively filled with all the curiosities of the country, whether of the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom. the garden of the palace became a botanical garden. a chemical laboratory was formed at headquarters; berthollet performed experiments there several times every week, which napoleon and a great number of officers attended ('memoirs of napoleon')]-in founding this institute, bonaparte wished to afford an example of his ideas of civilisation. the minutes of the sittings of that learned body, which have been printed, bear evidence of its utility, and of napoleon's extended views. the objects of the institute were the advancement and propagation of information in egypt, and the study and publication of all facts relating to the natural history, trade, and antiquities of that ancient country. on the 18th bonaparte was present at the ceremony of opening the dyke of the canal of cairo, which receives the water of the nile when it reaches the height fired by the mequyas. two days after came the anniversary festival of the birth of mahomet. at this napoleon was also present, in company with the sheik el bekri[5], who at his request gave him two young mamelukes, ibrahim, and roustan[6]. [5]--[the general-in-chief went to celebrate the feast of the prophet at the house of the sheik el bekri. the ceremony was begun by the recital of a kind of litany, containing the life of mahomet from his birth to his death. about a hundred sheiks, sitting in a circle, on carpets, with their legs crossed, recited all the verses, swinging their bodies violently backwards and forwards, and altogether. a grand dinner was afterwards served up, at which the guests sat on carpets, with their legs across. there were twenty tables, and five or six people at each table. that of the general-in-chief and the sheik el bekri was in the middle; a little slab of a precious kind of wood ornamented with mosaic work was placed eighteen inches above the floor and covered with a great number of dishes in succession. they were pillaws of rice, a particular kind of roast, entrees, and pastry, all very highly spiced. the sheiks picked everything with their fingers. accordingly water was brought to wash the hands three times during dinner. gooseberry-water, lemonade, and other sorts of sherbets were served to drink, and abundance of preserves and confectionery with the dessert. on the whole, the dinner was not disagreeable; it was only the manner of eating it that seemed strange to us. in the evening the whole city was illuminated. after dinner the party went into the square of el bekri, the illumination of which, in coloured lamps, was very beautiful. an immense concourse of people attended. they were all placed in order, in ranks of from twenty to a hundred persons, who, standing close together, recited the prayers and litanies of the prophet with movements which kept increasing, until at length they seemed to be convulsive, and some of the most zealous fainted away ('memoirs of napoleon').]- [6]--[roustan or rustan, a mameluke, was always with napoleon from the time of the return from egypt till 1814, when he abandoned his master. he slept at or near the door of napoleon. see rémusat, tome i, p. 209, for an amusing description of the alarm of josephine, and the precipitate flight of madame de rémusat, at the idea of being met and killed by this man in one of josephine's nocturnal attacks on the privacy of her husband when closeted with his mistress.]-it has been alleged that bonaparte, when in egypt, took part in the religious ceremonies and worship of the mussulmans; but it cannot be said that he celebrated the festivals of the overflowing of the nile and the anniversary of the prophet. the turks invited him to these merely as a spectator; and the presence of their new master was gratifying to the people. but he never committed the folly of ordering any solemnity. he neither learned nor repeated any prayer of the koran, as many persons have asserted; neither did he advocate fatalism, polygamy, or any other doctrine of the koran. bonaparte employed himself better than in discussing with the imaums the theology of the children of ismael. the ceremonies, at which policy induced him to be present, were to him, and to all who accompanied him, mere matters of curiosity. he never set foot in a mosque; and only on one occasion, which i shall hereafter mention, dressed himself in the mahometan costume. he attended the festivals to which the green turbans invited him[7]. his religious tolerance was the natural consequence of his philosophic spirit. [7]--[from this sir walter scott infers that he did not scruple to join the musselmans in the external ceremonies of their religion. he embellishes his romance with the ridiculous farce of the sepulchral chamber of the grand pyramid, and the speeches which were addressed to the general as well as to the muftis and imaums; and he adds that bonaparte was on the point of embracing islamism. all that sir walter says on this subject is the height of absurdity, and does not even deserve to be seriously refuted. bonaparte never entered a mosque except from motives of curiosity,(see contradiction in previous paragraph. d.w.) and he never for one moment afforded any ground for supposing that he believed to the mission of mahomet.- bourrienne.]-doubtless bonaparte did, as he was bound to do, show respect for the religion of the country; and he found it necessary to act more like a mussulman than a catholic. a wise conqueror supports his triumphs by protecting and even elevating the religion of the conquered people. bonaparte's principle was, as he himself has often told me, to look upon religions as the work of men, but to respect them everywhere as a powerful engine of government. however, i will not go so far as to say that he would not have changed his religion had the conquest of the east been the price of that change. all that he said about mahomet, islamism, and the koran to the great men of the country he laughed at himself. he enjoyed the gratification of having all his fine sayings on the subject of religion translated into arabic poetry, and repeated from mouth to mouth. this of course tended to conciliate the people. i confess that bonaparte frequently conversed with the chiefs of the mussulman religion on the subject of his conversion; but only for the sake of amusement. the priests of the koran, who would probably have been delighted to convert us, offered us the most ample concessions. but these conversations were merely started by way of entertainment, and never could have warranted a supposition of their leading to any serious result. if bonaparte spoke as a mussulman, it was merely in his character of a military and political chief in a mussulman country. to do so was essential to his success, to the safety of his army, and, consequently, to his glory. in every country he would have drawn up proclamations and delivered addresses on the same principle. in india he would have been for ali, at thibet for the dalai-lama, and in china for confucius[8]. [8]--[on the subject of his alleged conversion to mahometanism bonaparte expressed himself at st. helena as follows: "i never followed any of the tenets of that religion. i never prayed in the mosques. i never abstained from wine, or was circumcised, neither did i ever profess it. i said merely that we were the friends of the mussulmans, and that i respected mahomet their prophet, which was true; i respect him now. i wanted to make the imaums cause prayers to be offered up in the mosques for me, in order to make the people respect me still more than they actually did, and obey me more readily. the imaums replied that there was a great obstacle, because their prophet in the koran had inculcated to them that they were not to obey, respect, or hold faith with infidels, and that i came under that denomination. i then desired them to hold a consultation, and see what was necessary to be done in order to become a mussulman, as some of their tenets could not be practised by us. that, as to circumcision, god had made us unfit for that. that, with respect to drinking wine, we were poor cold people, inhabitants of the north, who could not exist without it. they consulted together accordingly, and in about three weeks issued a fetham, declaring that circumcision might be omitted, because it was merely a profession; that as to drinking wine, it might be drunk by mussulmans, but that those who drank it would not go to paradise, but to hell. i replied that this would not do; that we had no occasion to make ourselves mussulmans in order to go to hell, that there were many ways of getting there without coming to egypt, and desired them to hold another consultation. after deliberating and battling together for i believe three months, they finally decided that a man might become a mussulman, and neither circumcise nor abstain from wine; but that, in proportion to the wine drunk, some good works must be done. i then told them that we were all mussulmans and friends of the prophet, which they really believed, as the french soldiers never went to church, and had no priests with them. for you must know that during the revolution there was no religion whatever in the french army. menou," continued napoleon, "really turned mahometan, which was the reason i left him behind." --(voices from st. helena.)]-the general-in-chief had a turkish dress made, which he once put on, merely in joke. one day he desired me to go to breakfast without waiting for him, and that he would follow me. in about a quarter of an hour he made his appearance in his new costume. as soon as he was recognised he was received with a loud burst of laughter. he sat down very coolly; but he found himself so encumbered and ill at ease in his turban and oriental robe that he speedily threw them off, and was never tempted to a second performance of the masquerade. about the end of august bonaparte wished to open negotiations with the pasha of acre, nicknamed the butcher. he offered djezzar his friendship, sought his in return, and gave him the most consolatory assurances of the safety of his dominions. he promised to support him against the grand seignior, at the very moment when he was assuring the egyptians that he would support the grand seignior against the beys. but djezzar, confiding in his own strength and in the protection of the english, who had anticipated bonaparte, was deaf to every overture, and would not even receive beauvoisin, who was sent to him on the 22d of august. a second envoy was beheaded at acre. the occupations of bonaparte and the necessity of obtaining a more solid footing in egypt retarded for the moment the invasion of that pashalic, which provoked vengeance by its barbarities, besides being a dangerous neighbour. from the time he received the accounts of the disaster of aboukir until the revolt of cairo on the 22d of october, bonaparte sometimes found the time hang heavily on his hands. though he devoted attention to everything, yet there was not sufficient occupation for his singularly active mind. when the heat was not too great he rode on horseback; and on his return, if he found no despatches to read (which often happened), no orders to send off; or no letters to answer, he was immediately absorbed in reverie, and would sometimes converse very strangely. one day, after a long pause, he said to me: "do you know what i am thinking of?"--"upon my word, that would be very difficult; you think of such extraordinary things."--"i don't know," continued he, "that i shall ever see france again; but if i do, my only ambition is to make a glorious campaign in germany--in the plains of bavaria; there to gain a great battle, and to avenge france for the defeat of hochstadt. after that i would retire into the country, and live quietly." he then entered upon a long dissertation on the preference he would give to germany as the theatre of war[9]; the fine character of the people, and the prosperity and wealth of the country, and its power of supporting an army. his conversations were sometimes very long; but always replete with interest. [9]--[so early as 1794 napoleon had suggested that austria should always be attacked in germany, not in italy. "it is germany that should be overwhelmed; that done, italy and spain fall of themselves. germany should be attacked, not spain or italy. if we obtain great success, advantage should never be taken of it to penetrate into italy while germany, unweakened, offers a formidable front" (iung's bonaparte, tome ii. p. 936), he was always opposed to the wild plans which had ruined so many french armies in italy, and which the directory tried to force on him, of marching on rome and naples after every success in the north.]-in these intervals of leisure bonaparte was accustomed to retire to bed early. i used to read to him every evening. when i read poetry he would fall asleep; but when he asked for the life of cromwell i counted on sitting up pretty late. in the course of the day he used to read and make notes. he often expressed regret at not receiving news from france; for correspondence was rendered impracticable by the numerous english and turkish cruisers. many letters were intercepted and scandalously published. not even family secrets and communications of the most confidential nature were respected. about the middle of september in this year (1798), bonaparte ordered to be brought to the house of elfy bey half a dozen asiatic women whose beauty he had heard highly extolled. but their ungraceful obesity displeased him, and they were immediately dismissed. a few days after he fell violently in love with madame fourés, the wife of a lieutenant of infantry. she was very pretty, and her charms were enhanced by the rarity of seeing a woman in egypt who was calculated to please the eye of a european. bonaparte engaged for her a house adjoining the palace of elfy bey, which we occupied. he frequently ordered dinner to be prepared there, and i used to go there with him at seven o'clock, and leave him at nine. this connection soon became the general subject of gossip at head-quarters. through a feeling of delicacy to m. fourés, the general-in-chief gave him a mission to the directory. he embarked at alexandria, and the ship was captured by the english, who, being informed of the cause of his mission, were malicious enough to send him back to egypt, instead of keeping him prisoner. bonaparte wished to have a child by madame fourés, but this wish was not realised. a celebrated soothsayer was recommended to bonaparte by the inhabitants of cairo, who confidentially vouched for the accuracy with which he could foretell future events. he was sent for, and when he arrived, i, venture, and a sheik were with the general. the prophet wished first to exercise his skill upon bonaparte, who, however, proposed that i should have my fortune told first, to which i acceded without hesitation. to afford an idea of his prophetic skill i must mention that since my arrival in cairo i had been in a very weak state. the passage of the nile and the bad food we had had for twelve days had greatly reduced me, so that i was miserably pale and thin. after examining my hands, feeling my pulse, my forehead, and the nape of my neck, the fortune-teller shrugged his shoulders, and, in a melancholy tone, told venture that he did not think it right to inform me of my fate. i gave him to understand that he might say what he pleased, as it was a matter of indifference to me. after considerable hesitation on his part and pressing on mine, he announced to me that the earth of egypt would receive me in two months. i thanked him, and he was dismissed. when we were alone the general said to me, "well, what do you think of that?" i observed that the fortune-teller did not run any great risk in foretelling my death, which was a very probable circumstance in the state in which i was; "but," added i, "if i procure the wines which i have ordered from france, you will soon see me get round again." the art of imposing on mankind has at all times been an important part of the art of governing; and it was not that portion of the science of government which bonaparte was the least acquainted with. he neglected no opportunity of showing off to the egyptians the superiority of france in arts and sciences; but it happened, oftener than once, that the simple instinct of the egyptians thwarted his endeavours in this way. some days after the visit of the pretended fortune-teller he wished, if i may so express myself, to oppose conjurer to conjurer. for this purpose he invited the principal sheiks to be present at some chemical experiments performed by m. berthollet. the general expected to be much amused at their astonishment; but the miracles of the transformation of liquids, electrical commotions and galvanism, did not elicit from them any symptom of surprise. they witnessed the operations of our able chemist with the most imperturbable indifference. when they were ended, the sheik el bekri desired the interpreter to tell m. berthollet that it was all very fine; "but," said he, "ask him whether he can make me be in morocco and here at one and the same moment?" m. berthollet replied in the negative, with a shrug of his shoulders. "oh! then," said the sheik, "he is not half a sorcerer." our music produced no greater effect upon them. they listened with insensibility to all the airs that were played to them, with the exception of "marlbrook." when that was played they became animated, and were all in motion, as if ready to dance. an order which had been issued on our arrival in cairo for watching the criers of the mosques had for some weeks been neglected. at certain hours of the night these criers address prayers to the prophet. as it was merely a repetition of the same ceremony over and over again, in a short time no notice was taken of it. the turks, perceiving this negligence, substituted for their prayers and hymns cries of revolt, and by this sort of verbal telegraph, insurrectionary excitement was transmitted to the northern and southern extremities of egypt. by this means, and by the aid of secret emissaries, who eluded our feeble police, and circulated real or forged firmans of the sultan disavowing the concord between france and the porte, and provoking war, the plan of a revolution was organised throughout the country. the signal for the execution of this plan was given from the minarets on the night of the 20th of october, and on the morning of the 21st it was announced at headquarters that the city of cairo was in open insurrection. the general-in-chief was not, as has been stated, in the isle of raeuddah: he did not hear the firing of the alarm-guns. he rose when the news arrived; it was then five o'clock. he was informed that all the shops were closed, and that the french were attacked. a moment after he heard of the death of general dupuis, commandant of the garrison, who was killed by a lance in the street. bonaparte immediately mounted his horse, and, accompanied by only thirty guides, visited all the threatened points, restored confidence, and, with great presence of mind, adopted measures of defence. he left me at headquarters with only one sentinel; but he had been accurately informed of the situation of the insurgents; and such was my confidence in his activity and foresight that i had no apprehension, and awaited his return with perfect composure. this composure was not disturbed even when i saw a party of insurgents attack the house of m. estève, our paymaster-general, which was situated on the opposite side of ezbekye'h place. m. estève was, fortunately, able to resist the attack until troops from boulac came up to his assistance. after visiting all the posts, and adopting every precautionary measure, bonaparte returned to headquarters. finding me still alone with the sentinel, he asked me, smiling, "whether i had not been frightened?"-"not at all, general, i assure you," replied i. --it was about half-past eight in the morning when bonaparte returned to headquarters, and while at breakfast he was informed that some bedouin arabs, on horseback, were trying to force their entrance into cairo. he ordered his aide de camp, sulkowsky, to mount his horse, to take with him fifteen guides, and proceed to the point where the assailants were most numerous. this was the bab-el-nasser, or the gate of victory. croisier observed to the general-in-chief that sulkowsky had scarcely recovered from the wounds at salehye'h, and he offered to take his place. he had his motives for this. bonaparte consented; but sulkowsky had already set out. within an hour after, one of the fifteen guides returned, covered with blood, to announce that sulkowsky and the remainder of his party had been cut to pieces. this was speedy work, for we were still at table when the sad news arrived. mortars were planted on mount mokatam, which commands cairo. the populace, expelled from all the principal streets by the troops, assembled in the square of the great mosque, and in the little streets running into it, which they barricaded. the firing of the artillery on the heights was kept up with vigour for two days. about twelve of the principal chiefs of cairo were arrested and confined in an apartment at headquarters. they awaited with the calmest resignation the death they knew they merited; but bonaparte merely detained them as hostages. the aga in the service of bonaparte was astonished that sentence of death was not pronounced upon them; and he said, shrugging his shoulders, and with a gesture apparently intended to provoke severity, "you see they expect it." on the third the insurrection was at an end, and tranquillity restored. numerous prisoners were conducted to the citadel. in obedience to an order which i wrote every evening, twelve were put to death nightly. the bodies were then put into sacks and thrown into the nile. there were many women included in these nocturnal executions. i am not aware that the number of victims amounted to thirty per day, as bonaparte assured general reynier in a letter which he wrote to him six days after the restoration of tranquillity. "every night," said he, "we cut off thirty heads. this, i hope, will be an effectual example." i am of opinion that in this instance he exaggerated the extent of his just revenge. some time after the revolt of cairo the necessity of ensuring our own safety forced the commission of a terrible act of cruelty. a tribe of arabs in the neighbourhood of cairo had surprised and massacred a party of french. the general-in-chief ordered his aide de camp croisier to proceed to the spot, surround the tribe, destroy the huts, kill all the men, and conduct the rest of the population to cairo. the order was to decapitate the victims, and bring their heads in sacks to cairo to be exhibited to the people. eugène beauharnais accompanied croisier, who joyfully set out on this horrible expedition, in hope of obliterating all recollection of the affair of damanhour. on the following day the party returned. many of the poor arab women had been delivered on the road, and the children had perished of hunger, heat, and fatigue. about four o'clock a troop of asses arrived in ezbekye'h place, laden with sacks. the sacks were opened and the heads rolled out before the assembled populace. i cannot describe the horror i experienced; but i must nevertheless acknowledge that this butchery ensured for a considerable time the tranquillity and even the existence of the little caravans which were obliged to travel in all directions for the service of the army. shortly before the loss of the fleet the general-in chief had formed the design of visiting suez, to examine the traces of the ancient canal which united the nile to the gulf of arabia, and also to cross the latter. the revolt at cairo caused this project to be adjourned until the month of december. before his departure for suez, bonaparte granted the commissary sucy leave to return to france. he had received a wound in the right hand, when on board the xebec 'cerf'. i was conversing with him on deck when he received this wound. at first it had no appearance of being serious; but some time after he could not use his hand. general bonaparte despatched a vessel with sick and wounded, who were supposed to be incurable, to the number of about eighty. all envied their fate, and were anxious to depart with them, but the privilege was conceded to very few. however, those who were disappointed had no cause for regret. we never know what we wish for. captain marengo, who landed at augusta in sicily, supposing it to be a friendly land, was required to observe quarantine for twenty-two days, and information was given of the arrival of the vessel to the court, which was at palermo. on the 25th of january 1799 all on board the french vessel were massacred, with the exception of twenty-one who were saved by a neapolitan frigate, and conducted to messing, where they were detained. before he conceived the resolution of attacking the turkish advanced guard in the valleys of syria, bonaparte had formed a plan of invading british india from persia. he had ascertained, through the medium of agents, that the shah of persia would, for a sum of money paid in advance, consent to the establishment of military magazines on certain points of his territory. bonaparte frequently told me that if, after the subjugation of egypt, he could have left 15,000 men in that country, and have had 30,000 disposable troops, he would have marched on the euphrates. he was frequently speaking about the deserts which were to be crossed to reach persia. how many times have i seen him extended on the ground, examining the beautiful maps which he had brought with him, and he would sometimes make me lie down in the same position to trace to me his projected march. this reminded him of the triumphs of his favourite hero, alexander, with whom he so much desired to associate his name; but, at the same time, he felt that these projects were incompatible with our resources, the weakness of the government; and the dissatisfaction which the army already evinced. privation and misery are inseparable from all these remote operations. this favourite idea still occupied his mind a fortnight before his departure for syria was determined on, and on the 25th of january 1799 he wrote to tippoo saib as follows:- you are of course already informed of my arrival on the banks of the red sea, with a numerous and invincible army. eager to deliver you from the iron yoke of england, i hasten to request that you will send me, by the way of mascate or mocha, an account of the political situation in which you are. i also wish that you could send to suez, or grand cairo, some able man, in your confidence, with whom i may confer[10]. [10]--[it is not true, as has often been stated, that tippoo saib wrote to general bonaparte. he could not reply to a letter written on the 23th of january, owing to the great difficulty of communication, the considerable distance, and the short interval which elapsed between the 25th of january and the fall of the empire of mysore, which happened on the 20th of april following. the letter to tippo saib commenced "citizen-sultan!"--bourrienne]-chapter xvii. 1798-1799. bonaparte's departure for suez--crossing the desert--passage of the red sea--the fountain of moses--the cenobites of mount sinai--danger in recrossing the red sea--napoleon's return to cairo--money borrowed at genoa--new designs upon syria--dissatisfaction of the ottoman porte--plan for invading asia--gigantic schemes--general berthier's permission to return to france--his romantic love and the adored portrait--he gives up his permission to return home--louis bonaparte leaves egypt--the first cashmere shawl in france- intercepted correspondence--departure for syria--fountains of messoudish--bonaparte jealous--discontent of the troops--el-arish taken--aspect of syria--ramleh--jerusalem. on the 24th of december we set out for suez, where we arrived on the 26th. on the 25th we encamped in the desert some leagues before ad-geroth. the heat had been very great during the day; but about eleven at night the cold became so severe as to be precisely in an inverse ratio to the temperature of the day. this desert, which is the route of the caravans from suez, from tor and the countries situated on the north of arabia, is strewed with the bones of the men and animals who, for ages past, have perished in crossing it. as there was no wood to be got, we collected a quantity of these bones for fuel. monge himself was induced to sacrifice some of the curious skulls of animals which he had picked up on the way and deposited in the berlin of the general-in-chief. but no sooner had we kindled our fires than an intolerable effluvium obliged us to raise our camp and advance farther on, for we could procure no water to extinguish the fires. on the 27th bonaparte employed himself in inspecting the town and port of suez, and in giving orders for some naval and military works. he feared--what indeed really occurred after his departure from egypt--the arrival of some english troops from the east indies, which he had intended to invade. these regiments contributed to the loss of his conquest[11]. [11]--[sir david baird, with a force of about 7000 men sent from india, landed at cosseir in july 1801.]-on the morning of the 28th we crossed the red sea dry-shod, to go to the wells of moses, which are nearly a myriametre from the eastern coast, and a little southeast of suez. the gulf of arabia terminates at about 5,000 metres north of that city. near the port the red sea is not above 1,500 metres wide, and is always fordable at low water. the caravans from tor and mount sinai[12] always pass at that part, either in going to or returning from egypt. this shortens their journey nearly a myriametre. at high tide the water rises five or six feet at suez, and when the wind blows fresh it often rises to nine or ten feet. [12]--[i shall say nothing of the cenobites of mount sinai, as i had not the honour of seeing them. neither did i see the register containing the names of ali, salah-eddin, ibrahim or abraham, on which bonaparte is said to have inscribed his name. i perceived at a distance some high hills which were said to be mount sinai. i conversed, through the medium of an interpreter, with some arabian chiefs of tor and its neighbourhood. they had been informed of our excursion to the wells, and that they might there thank the french general for the protection granted to their caravans and their trade with egypt. on the 19th of december, before his departure from suez, bonaparte signed a sort of safeguard, or exemption from duties, for the convent of mount sinai. this had been granted out of respect to moses and the jewish nation, and also because the convent of mount sinai is a seat of learning and civilisation amidst the barbarism of the deserts.--bourrienne.]-we spent a few hours seated by the largest of the springs called the wells of moses, situated on the eastern shore of the gulf of arabia. we made coffee with the water from these springs, which, however, gave it such a brackish taste that it was scarcely drinkable. though the water of the eight little springs which form the wells of moses is not so salt as that of many wells dug in other parts of the deserts, it is, nevertheless, exceedingly brackish, and does not allay thirst so well as fresh water. bonaparte returned to suez that same night. it was very dark when we reached the sea-shore. the tide was coming up, and the water was pretty high. we deviated a little from the way we had taken in the morning; we crossed a little too low down; we were thrown into disorder, but we did not lose ourselves in the marshes as has been stated. there were none. i have read somewhere, though i did not see the fact, nor did i hear it mentioned at the time, that the tide, which was coming up, would have been the grave of the general-in-chief had not one of the guides saved him by carrying him on his shoulders. if any such danger had existed, all who had not a similar means of escape must have perished. this is a fabrication. general caffarelli was the only person who was really in danger, for his wooden leg prevented his sitting firmly on his horse in the water; but some persons came to his assistance and supported him[13]. [13]--[bonaparte extricated himself as the others did from the real danger he and his escort had run. at st. helena he said, "profiting by the low tide, i crossed the red sea dry-shod. on my return i was overtaken by the night and went astray in the middle of the rising tide. i ran the greatest danger. i nearly perished in the same manner as pharaoh did. this would certainly have furnished all the christian preachers with a magnificent test against me." --bourrienne.]-on his return to cairo the general-in-chief wished to discover the site of the canal which in ancient times formed a junction between the red sea and the nile by belbeis. m. lepère, who was a member of the egyptian institute, and is now inspector-general of bridges and highways, executed on the spot a beautiful plan, which may confidently be consulted by those who wish to form an accurate idea of that ancient communication, and the level of the two seas[14]. [14]--[since accurately ascertained during the progress of the works for the suez canal.]-on his arrival at the capital bonaparte again devoted all his thoughts to the affairs of the army, which he had not attended to during his short absence. the revenues of egypt were far from being sufficient to meet the military expenditure. to defray his own expenses bonaparte raised several considerable loans in genoa through the medium of m. james. the connection of james with the bonaparte family takes its date from this period[15]. [15]--[joseph bonaparte says that the fathers of napoleon and of m. james had long known one another, and that napoleon had met james at autun. ('erreurs', tome i, p. 296).]-since the month of august the attention of general bonaparte had been constantly fixed on syria. the period of the possible landing of an enemy in egypt had now passed away, and could not return until the month of july in the following year. bonaparte was fully convinced that that landing would take place, and he was not deceived. the ottoman porte had, indeed, been persuaded that the conquest of egypt was not in her interest. she preferred enduring a rebel whom she hoped one day to subdue to supporting a power which, under the specious pretext of reducing her insurgent beys to obedience, deprived her of one of her finest provinces, and threatened the rest of the empire. on his return to cairo the general-in-chief had no longer any doubt as to the course which the porte intended to adopt. the numerous class of persons who believed that the ottoman porte had consented to our occupation of egypt were suddenly undeceived. it was then asked how we could, without that consent, have attempted such an enterprise? nothing, it was said, could justify the temerity of such an expedition, if it should produce a rupture between france, the ottoman empire, and its allies. however, for the remainder of the year bonaparte dreaded nothing except an expedition from gaza and el-arish, of which the troops of djezzar had already taken possession. this occupation was justly regarded as a decided act of hostility; war was thus practically declared. "we must adopt anticipatory measures," thought napoleon; "we must destroy this advanced guard of the ottoman empire, overthrow the ramparts of jaffa and acre, ravage the country, destroy all her resources, so as to render the passage of an army across the desert impracticable." thus was planned the expedition against syria. general berthier, after repeated entreaties, had obtained permission to return to france. the 'courageuse' frigate, which was to convey him home, was fitting out at alexandria; he had received his instructions, and was to leave cairo on the 29th of january, ten days before bonaparte's departure for syria. bonaparte was sorry to part with him; but he could not endure to see an old friend, and one who had served him well in all his campaigns, dying before his eyes, the victim of nostalgia and romantic love. besides, berthier had been for some time past, anything but active in the discharge of his duties. his passion, which amounted almost to madness, impaired the feeble faculties with which nature had endowed him. some writers have ranked him in the class of sentimental lovers: be this as it may, the homage which berthier rendered to the portrait of the object of his adoration more frequently excited our merriment than our sensibility. one day i went with an order from bonaparte to the chief of his staff, whom i found on his knees before the portrait of madame visconti, which was hanging opposite the door. i touched him, to let him know i was there. he grumbled a little, but did not get angry. the moment was approaching when the two friends were to part, perhaps forever. bonaparte was sincerely distressed at this separation, and the chief of his staff was informed of the fact. at a moment when it was supposed berthier was on his way to alexandria, he presented himself to the general-in-chief. "you are, then, decidedly going to asia?" said he.--"you know," replied the general, "that all is ready, and i shall set out in a few days."--"well, i will not leave you. i voluntarily renounce all idea of returning to france. i could not endure to forsake you at a moment when you are going to encounter new dangers. here are my instructions and my passport." bonaparte, highly pleased with this resolution, embraced berthier; and the coolness which had been excited by his request to return home was succeeded by a sincere reconciliation. louis bonaparte, who was suffering from the effects of the voyage, was still at alexandria. the general-in-chief, yielding to the pacific views of his younger brother, who was also beginning to evince some symptoms of nostalgia, consented to his return home. he could not, however, depart until the 11th of march 1799. i felt the absence of louis very much. on his return to france louis passed through sens, where he dined with madame de bourrienne, to whom he presented a beautiful shawl, which general berthier had given me. this, i believe, was the first cashmere that had ever been seen in france. louis was much surprised when madame de bourrienne showed him the egyptian correspondence, which had been seized by the english and printed in london. he found in the collection some letters addressed to himself, and there were others, he said, which were likely to disturb the peace of more than one family on the return of the army. on the 11th of february 1799 we began our march for syria, with about 12,000 men. it has been erroneously stated that the army amounted to only 6000: nearly that number was lost in the course of the campaign. however, at the very moment we were on our way to syria, with 12,000 men, scarcely as many being left in egypt, the directory published that, "according to the information which had been received," we had 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry; that the army had doubled its numbers by battles; and that since our arrival in egypt, we had lost only 300 men. is history to be written from such documents? we arrived, about four o'clock in the afternoon, at messoudiah, or, "the fortunate spot." here we witnessed a kind of phenomenon, which was not a little agreeable to us. messoudiah is a place situated on the coast of the mediterranean, surrounded with little dunes of very fine sand, which the copious rains of winter readily penetrate. the rain remains in the sand, so that on making with the fingers holes of four or five inches in depth at the bottom of these little hills, the water immediately flows out. this water was, indeed, rather thick, but its flavour was agreeable; and it would have become clear if we could have spared time to allow it to rest and deposit the particles of sand it contained. it was a curious spectacle to behold us all lying prostrate, digging wells in miniature; and displaying a laughable selfishness in our endeavours to obtain the most abundant source. this was a very important discovery to us. we found these sand-wells at the extremity of the desert, and it contributed, in no small degree, to revive the courage of our soldiers; besides, when men are, as was the case with us, subject to privations of every kind, the least benefit which accrues inspires the hope of a new advantage. we were approaching the confines of syria, and we enjoyed by anticipation, the pleasure we were about to experience, on treading a soil which, by its variety of verdure and vegetation, would remind us of our native land. at messoudiah we likewise possessed the advantage of bathing in the sea, which was not more than fifty paces from our unexpected water-supply. whilst near the wells of messoudiah, on the way to el-arish, i one day saw bonaparte walking alone with junot, as he was often in the habit of doing. i stood at a little distance, and my eyes, i know not why, were fixed on him during their conversation. the general's countenance, which was always pale, had, without my being able to divine the cause, become paler than usual. there was something convulsive in his features--a wildness in his look, and he several times struck his head with his hand. after conversing with junot about a quarter of an hour he quitted him and came towards me. i never saw him exhibit such an air of dissatisfaction, or appear so much under the influence of some prepossession. i advanced towards him, and as soon as we met, he exclaimed in an abrupt and angry tone, "so! i find i cannot depend upon you.--these women!--josephine! --if you had loved me, you would before now have told me all i have heard from junot--he is a real friend--josephine!--and i 600 leagues from her-you ought to have told me.--that she should thus have deceived me!--'woe to them!--i will exterminate the whole race of fops and puppies!--as to her--divorce!--yes, divorce! a public and open divorce!--i must write! --i know all!--it is your fault--you ought to have told me!" these energetic and broken exclamations, his disturbed countenance and altered voice informed me but too well of the subject of his conversation with junot. i saw that junot had been drawn into a culpable indiscretion; and that, if josephine had committed any faults, he had cruelly exaggerated them. my situation was one of extreme delicacy. however, i had the good fortune to retain my self-possession, and as soon as some degree of calmness succeeded to this first burst, i replied that i knew nothing of the reports which junot might have communicated to him; that even if such reports, often the offspring of calumny, had reached my ear, and if i had considered it my duty to inform him of them, i certainly would not have selected for that purpose the moment when he was 600 leagues from france. i also did not conceal how blamable junot's conduct appeared to me, and how ungenerous i considered it thus rashly to accuse a woman who was not present to justify or defend herself; that it was no great proof of attachment to add domestic uneasiness to the anxiety, already sufficiently great, which the situation of his brothers in arms, at the commencement of a hazardous enterprise, occasioned him. notwithstanding these observations, which, however, he listened to with some calmness, the word "divorce" still escaped his lips; and it is necessary to be aware of the degree of irritation to which he was liable when anything seriously vexed him, to be able to form an idea of what bonaparte was during this painful scene. however, i kept my ground. i repeated what i had said. i begged of him to consider with what facility tales were fabricated and circulated, and that gossip such as that which had been repeated to him was only the amusement of idle persons; and deserved the contempt of strong minds. i spoke of his glory. "my glory!" cried he. "i know not what i would not give if that which junot has told me should be untrue; so much do i love josephine! if she be really guilty a divorce must separate us for ever. i will not submit to be a laughing-stock for all the imbeciles in paris. i will write to joseph; he will get the divorce declared." although his agitation continued long, intervals occurred in which he was less excited. i seized one of these moments of comparative calm to combat this idea of divorce which seemed to possess his mind. i represented to him especially that it would be imprudent to write to his brother with reference to a communication which was probably false. "the letter might be intercepted; it would betray the feelings of irritation which dictated it. as to a divorce, it would be time to think of that hereafter, but advisedly." these last words produced an effect on him which i could not have ventured to hope for so speedily. he became tranquil, listened to me as if he had suddenly felt the justice of my observations, dropped the subject, and never returned to it; except that about a fortnight after, when we were before st. jean d'acre, he expressed himself greatly dissatisfied with junot, and complained of the injury he had done him by his indiscreet disclosures, which he began to regard as the inventions of malignity. i perceived afterwards that he never pardoned junot for this indiscretion; and i can state, almost with certainty, that this was one of the reasons why junot was not created a marshal of france, like many of his comrades whom bonaparte had loved less. it may be supposed that josephine, who was afterwards informed by bonaparte of junot's conversation, did not feel particularly interested in his favour[16]. he died insane on the 27th of july 1813. [16]--[however indiscreet junot might on this occasion have shown himself in interfering in so delicate a matter, it is pretty certain that his suspicions were breathed to no other ear than that of bonaparte himself. madame junot, in speaking of the ill-suppressed enmity between her husband and madame bonaparte, says that he never uttered a word even to her of the subject of his conversation with the general-in-chief to egypt. that junot's testimony, however, notwithstanding the countenance it obtained from bonaparte's relations, ought to be cautiously received, the following passage from the memoirs of the duchesse d'abrantès, vol. i. p. 250, demonstrative of the feelings of irritation between the parties, will show: "junot escorted madame bonaparte when she went to join the general-in-chief in italy. i am surprised that m. de bourrienne has omitted mentioning this circumstance in his memoirs. he must have known it, since he was well acquainted with everything relating to josephine, and knew many facts of high interest in her life at this period and subsequently. how happens it too that he makes no mention of mademoiselle louise, who might be called her 'demoiselle de compagnie' rather than her 'femme de chambre'? at the outset of the journey to italy she was such a favourite with josephine that she dressed like her mistress, ate at table with her, and was in all respects her friend and confidante. "the journey was long, much too long for junot, though he was very much in love with mademoiselle louise. but he was anxious to join the army, for to him his general was always the dearest of mistresses. junot has often spoken to me, and to me alone, of the vexations he experienced on this journey. he might have added to his circumstantial details relative to josephine the conversation he is reported to have had with bonaparte to egypt; but he never breathed a word on the subject, for his character was always noble and generous. the journey to italy did not produce the effect which usually arises from such incidents in common life; namely, a closer friendship and intimacy between the parties. on the contrary, madame bonaparte from that moment evinced some degree of ill-humour towards junot, and complained with singular warmth of the want of respect which he had shown her, in making love to her 'femme de chambre' before her face." according to 'erreurs (tome i. pp. 4, 50) junot was not then in syria. on 10th february napoleon was at messoudiah. junot only arrived from egypt at gaza on the 25th february. madame d'abrantès (ii. 32) treats this conversation as apocryphal. "this (an anecdote of her own) is not an imaginary episode like that, for example, of making a person speak at messoudiah who never was there."]-our little army continued its march on el-arish, where we arrived on the 17th of february. the fatigues experienced in the desert and the scarcity of water excited violent murmurs amongst the soldiers during their march across the isthmus. when any person on horseback passed them they studiously expressed their discontent. the advantage possessed by the horsemen provoked their sarcasms. i never heard the verses which they are said to have repeated, but they indulged in the most violent language against the republic, the men of science, and those whom they regarded as the authors of the expedition. nevertheless these brave fellows, from whom it was not astonishing that such great privations should extort complaints, often compensated by their pleasantries for the bitterness of their reproaches. many times during the crossing of the isthmus i have seen soldiers, parched with thirst, and unable to wait till the hour for distribution of water, pierce the leathern bottles which contained it; and this conduct, so injurious to all, occasioned numerous quarrels. el-arish surrendered on the 17th of february. it has been erroneously stated that the garrison of this insignificant place, which was set at liberty on condition of not again serving against us, was afterwards found amongst the besieged at jaffa. it has also been stated that it was because the men composing the el-arish garrison did not proceed to bagdad, according to the capitulation, that we shot them at jaffa. we shall presently see the falsehood of these assertions. on the 28th of february we obtained the first glimpse of the green and fertile plains of syria, which, in many respects, reminded us of the climate and soil of europe. we now had rain, and sometimes rather too much. the feelings which the sight of the valleys and mountains called forth made us, in some degree, forget the hardships and vexations of an expedition of which few persons could foresee the object or end. there are situations in life when the slightest agreeable sensation alleviates all our ills. on the 1st of march we slept at ramleh[17], in a small convent occupied by two monks, who paid us the greatest attention. they gave us the church for a hospital. these good fathers did not fail to tell us that it was through this place the family of jesus christ passed into egypt, and showed us the wells at which they quenched their thirst. the pure and cool water of these wells delighted us. [17]--[ramleh, the ancient arimathea, is situated at the base of a chain of mountains, the eastern extremity of which is washed by the persian gulf, and the western by the mediterranean.--bourrienne.]-we were not more than about six leagues from jerusalem. i asked the general whether he did not intend to direct his march by the way of that city, so celebrated in many respects. he replied, "oh no! jerusalem is not in my line of operations. i do not wish to be annoyed by mountaineers in difficult roads. and, besides, on the other side of the mountain i should be assailed by swarms of cavalry. i am not ambitious of the fate of cassius." we therefore did not enter jerusalem, which was not disturbed by the war. all we did was to send a written declaration to the persons in power at jerusalem, assuring them that we had no design against that country, and only wished them to remain at peace. to this communication no answer was returned, and nothing more passed on the subject[18]. [18]--[sir walter scott says, speaking of bonaparte, that he believes that little officer of artillery dreamed of being king of jerusalem. what i have just stated proves that he never thought of such a thing. the "little officer of artillery" had a far more splendid dream in his head.--bourrienne.]-we found at ramleh between two and three hundred christians in a pitiable state of servitude, misery, and dejection. on conversing with them i could not help admiring how much the hope of future rewards may console men under present ills. but i learned from many of them that they did not live in harmony together. the feelings of hatred and jealousy are not less common amongst these people than amongst the better-instructed inhabitants of rich and populous cities. chapter xviii 1799. arrival at jaffa--the siege--beauharnais and croisier--four thousand prisoners--scarcity of provisions--councils of war--dreadful necessity--the massacre--the plague--lannes and the mountaineers- barbarity of djezzar--arrival at st jean d'acre, and abortive attacks--sir sidney smith--death of caffarelli--duroc wounded- rash bathing--insurrections in egypt. on arriving before jaffa, where there were already some troops, the first person i met was adjutant-general gresieux, with whom i was well acquainted. i wished him good-day, and offered him my hand. "good god! what are you about?" said he, repulsing me with a very abrupt gesture; "you may have the plague. people do not touch each other here!" i mentioned the circumstance to bonaparte, who said, "if he be afraid of the plague, he will die of it." shortly after, at st. jean d'acre, he was attacked by that malady, and soon sank under it. on the 4th of march we commenced the siege of jaffa. that paltry place, which, to round a sentence, was pompously styled the ancient joppa, held out only to the 6th of march, when it was taken by storm, and given up to pillage. the massacre was horrible. general bonaparte sent his aides de camp beauharnais and croisier to appease the fury of the soldiers as much as possible, and to report to him what was passing. they learned that a considerable part of the garrison had retired into some vast buildings, a sort of caravanserai, which formed a large enclosed court. beauharnais and croisier, who were distinguished by wearing the 'aide de camp' scarf on their arms, proceeded to that place. the arnauts and albanians, of whom these refugees were almost entirely composed, cried from the windows that they were willing to surrender upon an assurance that they would be exempted from the massacre to which the town was doomed; if not, they threatened to fire on the 'aides de camp', and to defend themselves to the last extremity. the two officers thought that they ought to accede to the proposition, notwithstanding the decree of death which had been pronounced against the whole garrison, in consequence of the town being taken by storm. they brought them to our camp in two divisions, one consisting of about 2500 men, the other of about 1600. i was walking with general bonaparte, in front of his tent, when he beheld this mass of men approaching, and before he even saw his 'aides de camp' he said to me, in a tone of profound sorrow, "what do they wish me to do with these men? have i food for them?--ships to convey them to egypt or france? why, in the devil's name, have they served me thus?" after their arrival, and the explanations which the general-in-chief demanded and listened to with anger, eugène and croisier received the most severe reprimand for their conduct. but the deed was done. four thousand men were there. it was necessary to decide upon their fate. the two aides de camp observed that they had found themselves alone in the midst of numerous enemies, and that he had directed them to restrain the carnage. "yes, doubtless," replied the general-in-chief, with great warmth, "as to women, children, and old men--all the peaceable inhabitants; but not with respect to armed soldiers. it was your duty to die rather than bring these unfortunate creatures to me. what do you want me to do with them?" these words were pronounced in the most angry tone. the prisoners were then ordered to sit down, and were placed, without any order, in front of the tents, their hands tied behind their backs. a sombre determination was depicted on their countenances. we gave them a little biscuit and bread, squeezed out of the already scanty supply for the army. on the first day of their arrival a council of war was held in the tent of the general-in-chief, to determine what course should be pursued with respect to them. the council deliberated a long time without coming to any decision. on the evening of the following day the daily reports of the generals of division came in. they spoke of nothing but the insufficiency of the rations, the complaints of the soldiers--of their murmurs and discontent at seeing their bread given to enemies who had been withdrawn from their vengeance, inasmuch as a decree of death, in conformity with the laws of war, had been passed on jaffa. all these reports were alarming, and especially that of general bon, in which no reserve was made. he spoke of nothing less than the fear of a revolt, which would be justified by the serious nature of the case. the council assembled again. all the generals of division were summoned to attend, and for several hours together they discussed, under separate questions, what measures might be adopted, with the most sincere desire to discover and execute one which would save the lives of these unfortunate prisoners. (1.) should they be sent into egypt? could it be done? to do so, it would be necessary to send with them a numerous escort, which would too much weaken our little army in the enemy's country. how, besides, could they and the escort be supported till they reached cairo, having no provisions to give them on setting out, and their route being through a hostile territory, which we had exhausted, which presented no fresh resources, and through which we, perhaps, might have to return, (2.) should they be embarked? where were the ships?--where could they be found? all our telescopes, directed over the sea, could not descry a single friendly sail. bonaparte, i affirm, would have regarded such an event as a real favour of fortune. it was, and--i am glad to have to say it, this sole idea, this sole hope, which made him brave, for three days, the murmurs of his army. but in vain was help looked for seaward. it did not come. (3.) should the prisoners be set at liberty? they would then instantly proceed to st. jean d'acre to reinforce the pasha, or else, throwing themselves into the mountains of nablous, would greatly annoy our rear and right-flank, and deal out death to us, as a recompense for the life we had given them. there could be no doubt of this. what is a christian dog to a turk? it would even have been a religious and meritorious act in the eye of the prophet. (4.) could they be incorporated, disarmed, with our soldiers in the ranks? here again the question of food presented itself in all its force. next came to be considered the danger of having such comrades while marching through an enemy's country. what might happen in the event of a battle before st. jean d'acre? could we even tell what might occur during the march? and, finally, what must be done with them when under the ramparts of that town, if we should be able to take them there? the same embarrassments with respect to the questions of provisions and security would then recur with increased force. the third day arrived without its being possible, anxiously as it was desired, to come to any conclusion favourable to the preservation of these unfortunate men. the murmurs in the camp grew louder--the evil went on increasing--remedy appeared impossible--the danger was real and imminent. the order for shooting the prisoners was given and executed on the 10th of march. we did not, as has been stated, separate the egyptians from the other prisoners. there were no egyptians. many of the unfortunate creatures composing the smaller division, which was fired on close to the seacoast, at some distance from the other column, succeeded in swimming to some reefs of rocks out of the reach of musket-shot. the soldiers rested their muskets on the sand, and, to induce the prisoners to return, employed the egyptian signs of reconciliation in use in the country. they came back; but as they advanced they were killed, and disappeared among the waves. i confine myself to these details of this act of dreadful necessity, of which i was an eye-witness. others, who, like myself, saw it, have fortunately spared me the recital of the sanguinary result. this atrocious scene, when i think of it, still makes me shudder, as it did on the day i beheld it; and i would wish it were possible for me to forget it, rather than be compelled to describe it. all the horrors imagination can conceive, relative to that day of blood, would fall short of the reality. i have related the truth, the whole truth. i was present at all the discussions, all the conferences, all the deliberations. i had not, as may be supposed, a deliberative voice; but i am bound to declare that the situation of the army, the scarcity of food, our small numerical strength, in the midst of a country where every individual was an enemy, would have induced me to vote in the affirmative of the proposition which was carried into effect, if i had a vote to give. it was necessary to be on the spot in order to understand the horrible necessity which existed. war, unfortunately, presents too many occasions on which a law, immutable in all ages, and common to all nations, requires that private interests should be sacrificed to a great general interest, and that even humanity should be forgotten. it is for posterity to judge whether this terrible situation was that in which bonaparte was placed. for my own part, i have a perfect conviction that he could not do otherwise than yield to the dire necessity of the case. it was the advice of the council, whose opinion was unanimous in favour of the execution, that governed him. indeed i ought in truth to say, that he yielded only in the last extremity, and was one of those, perhaps, who beheld the massacre with the deepest pain. after the siege of jaffa the plague began to exhibit itself with a little more virulence. we lost between seven and eight hundred, men by the contagion during the campaign of syria[19]. [19]--[sir walter scott says, that heaven sent this pestilence amongst us to avenge the massacre of jaffa]-during our march on st. jean d'acre, which was commenced on the 14th of march, the army neither obtained the brilliant triumphs nor encountered the numerous obstacles spoken of in certain works. nothing of importance occurred but a rash skirmish of general lannes who, in spite of contrary orders from bonaparte, obstinately pursued a troop of mountaineers into the passes of nablous. on returning, he found the mountaineers placed in ambush in great numbers amongst rocks, the windings of which they were well acquainted with, whence they fired close upon our troops, whose situation rendered them unable to defend themselves. during the time of this foolish and useless enterprise, especially while the firing was brisk, bonaparte exhibited much impatience, and it must be confessed, his anger was but natural. the nablousians halted at the openings of the mountain defiles. bonaparte reproached lannes bitterly for having uselessly exposed himself, and "sacrificed, without any object, a number of brave men." lannes excused himself by saying that the mountaineers had defied him, and he wished to chastise the rabble. "we are not in a condition to play the swaggerer," replied napoleon. in four days we arrived before st. jean d'acre, where we learned that djezzar had cut off the head of our envoy, mailly-de-chateau-renaud, and thrown his body into the sea in a sack. this cruel pasha was guilty of a great number of similar executions. the waves frequently drove dead bodies towards the coast, and we came upon them whilst bathing. the details of the siege of acre are well known. although surrounded by a wall, flanked with strong towers, and having, besides, a broad and deep ditch defended by works this little fortress did not appear likely to hold out against french valour and the skill of our corps of engineers and artillery; but the ease and rapidity with which jaffa had been taken occasioned us to overlook in some degree the comparative strength of the two places, and the difference of their respective situations. at jaffa we had sufficient artillery: at st. jean d'acre we had not. at jaffa we had to deal only with a garrison left to itself: at st. jean d'acre we were opposed by a garrison strengthened by reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions, supported by the english fleet, and assisted by european science. sir sidney smith was, beyond doubt, the man who did us the greatest injury[20]. much has been said respecting his communications with the general-in-chief. the reproaches which the latter cast upon him for endeavouring to seduce the soldiers and officers of the army by tempting offers were the more singular, even if they were well founded, inasmuch as these means are frequently employed by leaders in war[21]. as to the embarking of french prisoners on board a vessel in which the plague existed, the improbability of the circumstance alone, but especially the notorious facts of the case, repell this odious accusation. i observed the conduct of sir sidney smith closely at the time, and i remarked in him a chivalric spirit, which sometimes hurried him into trifling eccentricities; but i affirm that his behaviour towards the french was that of a gallant enemy. i have seen many letters, in which the writers informed him that they "were very sensible of the good treatment which the french experienced when they fell into his hands." let any one examine sir sidney's conduct before the capitulation of el-arish, and after its rupture, and then they can judge of his character[22]. [20]--[sir sidney smith was the only englishman besides the duke of wellington who defeated napoleon in military operations. the third englishman opposed to him, sir john moore, was compelled to make a precipitate retreat through the weakness of his force]- [21]--[at one time the french general was so disturbed by them as to endeavour to put a stop to them; which object he effected by interdicting all communication with the english, and signifying, in an order of the day, that their commodore was a madman. this, being believed in the army, so enraged sir sidney smith, that in his wrath he sent a challenge to napoleon. the latter replied, that he had too many weighty affairs on his hands to trouble himself in so trifling a matter. had it, indeed, been the great marlborough, it might have been worthy his attention. still, if the english sailor was absolutely bent upon fighting, he would send him a bravo from the army, and show them a small portion of neutral ground, where the mad commodore might land, and satisfy his humour to the full.--(editor of 1836 edition.)]- [22]--[napoleon, when at st. helena, in speaking of the siege of acre, said,--sidney smith is a brave officer. he displayed considerable ability in the treaty for the evacuation of egypt by the french. he took advantage of the discontent which he found to prevail amongst the french troops at being so long away from france, and other circumstances. he manifested great honour in sending immediately to kléber the refusal of lord keith to ratify the treaty, which saved the french army; if he had kept it a secret seven or eight days longer, cairo would have been given up to the turks, and the french army necessarily obliged to surrender to the english. he also showed great humanity and honour in all his proceedings towards the french who felt into his hands. he landed at havre, for some 'sottise' of a bet he had made, according to some, to go to the theatre; others said it was for espionage; however that may be, he was arrested and confined in the temple as a spy; and at one time it was intended to try and execute him. shortly after i returned from italy he wrote to me from his prison, to request that i would intercede for him; but, under the circumstances in which he was taken, i could do nothing for him. he is active, intelligent, intriguing, and indefatigable; but i believe that he is 'mezzo pazo'. "the chief cause of the failure at acre was, that he took all my battering train, which was on board of several small vessels. had it not been for that, i would have taken acre in spite of him. he behaved very bravely, and was well seconded by phillipeaux, a frenchman of talent, who had studied with me as an engineer. there was a major douglas also, who behaved very gallantly. the acquisition of five or six hundred seamen as gunners was a great advantage to the turks, whose spirits they revived, and whom they showed how to defend the fortress. but he committed a great fault in making sorties, which cost the lives of two or three hundred brave fellows without the possibility of success. for it was impossible he could succeed against the number of the french who were before acre. i would lay a wage that he lost half of his crew in them. he dispersed proclamations amongst my troops, which certainly shook some of them, and i in consequence published an order, stating that he was mad, and forbidding all communication with him. some days after he sent, by means of a flag of truce, a lieutenant or a midshipman with a letter containing a challenge to me to meet him at some place he pointed out in order to fight a duel. i laughed at this, and sent him back an intimation that when he brought marlborough to fight me i would meet him. notwithstanding this, i like the character of the man." (voices from st. helena, vol. 4, p. 208).]-all our manoeuvres, our works, and attacks were made with that levity and carelessness which over-confidence inspires. kléber, whilst walking with me one day in the lines of our camp, frequently expressed his surprise and discontent. "the trenches," said, he, "do not come up to my knees." besieging artillery was, of necessity, required: we commenced with field artillery. this encouraged the besieged, who perceived the weakness of our resources. the besieging artillery, consisting only of three twenty-four pounders and six eighteen pounders, was not brought up until the end of april, and before that period three assaults had taken place with very serious loss. on the 4th of may our powder began to fail us. this cruel event obliged us to slacken our fire. we also wanted shot; and an order of the day fixed a price to be given for all balls, according to their calibre, which might be picked up after being fired from the fortress or the two ships of the line, the 'tiger' and 'theseus', which were stationed on each side of the harbour. these two vessels embarrassed the communication between the camp and the trenches; but though they made much noise, they did little harm. a ball from one of them killed an officer on the evening the siege was raised. the enemy had within the walls some excellent riflemen, chiefly albanians. they placed stones, one over the other, on the walls, put their firearms through the interstices, and thus, completely sheltered, fired with destructive precision. on the 9th of april general caffarelli, so well known for his courage and talents, was passing through the trench, his hand resting as he stooped on his hip, to preserve the equilibrium which his wooden leg impaired; his elbow only was raised above the trench. he was warned that the enemy's shot, fired close upon us, did not miss the smallest object. he paid no attention to any observation of this kind, and in a few instants his elbow joint was fractured. amputation of the arm was judged indispensable. the general survived the operation eighteen days. bonaparte went regularly twice a day to his tent. by his order, added to my friendship for caffarelli, i scarcely ever quitted him. shortly before he expired he said to me, "my dear bourrienne, be so good as to read to me voltaire's preface to 'esprit des lois'." when i returned to the tent of the general-in-chief he asked, "how is caffarelli?" i replied, "he is near his end; but he asked me to read him voltaire's preface to the 'esprit de lois', he has just fallen asleep." bonaparte said, "bah! to wish to hear that preface? how singular!" he went to see caffarelli, but he was still asleep. i returned to him that evening and received his last breath. he died with the utmost composure. his death. was equally regretted by the soldiers and the men of science, who accompanied us. it was a just regret due to that distinguished man, in whom very extensive information was united with great courage and amiable disposition. on the 10th of may, when an assault took place, bonaparte proceeded at an early hour to the trenches[23]. croisier, who was mentioned on our arrival at damanhour and on the capture of jaffa, had in vain courted death since the commencement of the siege. life had become insupportable to him since the unfortunate affair at jaffa. he as usual accompanied his general to the trenches. believing that the termination of the siege, which was supposed to be near, would postpone indefinitely the death which he sought, he mounted a battery. in this situation his tall figure uselessly provoked all the enemy's shots. "croisier, come down, i command you; you have no business there," cried bonaparte, in a loud and imperative tone. croisier remained without making any reply. a moment after a ball passed through his right leg. amputation was not considered indispensable. on the day of our departure he was placed on a litter, which was borne by sixteen men alternately, eight at a time. i received his farewell between gaza and el-arish, where he died of tetanus. his modest tomb will not be often visited. [23]--[sir sidney smith, in his official report of the assault of the 8th of may, says that napoleon was distinctly seen directing the operation.]-croisier, who was mentioned on our arrival at damanhour and on the capture of jaffa, had in vain courted death since the commencement of the siege. life had become insupportable to him since the unfortunate affair at jaffa. he as usual accompanied his general to the trenches. believing that the termination of the siege, which was supposed to be near, would postpone indefinitely the death which he sought, he mounted a battery. in this situation his tall figure uselessly provoked all the enemy's shots. "croisier, come down, i command you; you have no business there," cried bonaparte, in a loud and imperative tone. croisier remained without making any reply. a moment after a ball passed through his right leg. amputation was not considered indispensable. on the day of our departure he was placed on a litter, which was borne by sixteen men alternately, eight at a time. i received his farewell between gaza and el-arish, where he died of tetanus. his modest tomb will not be often visited. the siege of st. jean d'acre lasted sixty days. during that time eight assaults and twelve sorties took place. in the assault of the 8th of may more than 200 men penetrated into the town. victory was already shouted; but the breach having been taken in reverse by the turks, it was not approached without some degree of hesitation, and the men who had entered were not supported. the streets were barricaded. the cries, the howlings of the women, who ran through the streets throwing, according to the custom of the country, dust in the air, excited the male inhabitants to a desperate resistance, which rendered unavailing this short occupation of the town, by a handful of men, who, finding themselves left without assistance, retreated towards the breach. many who could not reach it perished in the town. during this assault duroc, who was in the trench, was wounded in the right thigh by the splinter from a shell fired against the fortifications. fortunately this accident only carried away the flesh from the bone, which remained untouched. he had a tent in common with several other 'aides de camp'; but for his better accommodation i gave him mine, and i scarcely ever quitted him. entering his tent one day about noon, i found him in a profound sleep. the excessive heat had compelled him to throw off all covering, and part of his wound was exposed. i perceived a scorpion which had crawled up the leg of the camp-bed and approached very near to the wound. i was just in time to hurl it to the ground. the sudden motion of my hand awoke duroc. we often bathed in the sea. sometimes the english, perhaps after taking a double allowance of grog, would fire at our heads, which appeared above water. i am not aware that any accident was occasioned by their cannonade; but as we were beyond reach of their guns, we paid scarcely any attention to the firing. it was seen a subject of amusement to us. had our attack on st. jean d'acre been less precipitate, and had the siege been undertaken according to the rules of war, the place would not have held out three days; one assault, like that of the 8th of may, would have been sufficient. if, in the situation in which we were on the day when we first came in sight of the ramparts of acre; we had made a less inconsiderate estimate of the strength of the place; if we had likewise taken into consideration the active co-operation of the english and the ottoman porte, our absolute want of artillery of sufficient calibre, our scarcity of gunpowder and the difficulty of procuring food, we certainly should not have undertaken the siege; and that would have been by far the wisest course. towards the end of the siege the general-in-chief received intelligence of some trifling insurrections in northern egypt. an angel had excited them, and the heavenly messenger, who had condescended to assume a name, was called the mahdi, or el mohdy. this religious extravagance, however, did not last long, and tranquillity was soon restored. all that the fanatic mahdi, who shrouded himself in mystery, succeeded in doing was to attack our rear by some vagabonds, whose illusions were dissipated by a few musket shots. chapter xix. 1799. the siege of acre raised--attention to names in bulletins--gigantic project--the druses--mount carmel--the wounded and infected- order to march on foot--loss of our cannon--a nablousian fires at bonaparte--return to jaffa--bonaparte visits the plague hospital- a potion given to the sick--bonaparte's statement at st. helena. the siege of st. jean d'acre was raised on the 20th of may. it cost us a loss of nearly 3000 men, in killed, deaths by the plague, or wounds. a great number were wounded mortally. in those veracious documents, the bulletins, the french loss was made 500 killed, and 1000 wounded, and the enemy's more than 15,000. our bulletins may form curious materials for history; but their value certainly will not depend on the credit due to their details. bonaparte attached the greatest importance to those documents; generally drawing them up himself, or correcting them, when written by another hand, if the composition did not please him. it must be confessed that at that time nothing so much flattered self-love as being mentioned in a bulletin. bonaparte was well aware of this; he knew that to insert a name in a bulletin was conferring a great honour, and that its exclusion was a severe disappointment. general berthier, to whom i had expressed a strong desire to examine the works of the siege, took me over them; but, notwithstanding his promise of secrecy, he mentioned the circumstance to the general-in-chief, who had desired me not to approach the works. "what did you go there for?" said bonaparte to me, with some severity; "that is not your place." i replied that berthier told me that no assault would take place that day; and he believed there would be no sortie, as the garrison had made one the preceding evening. "what matters that? there might have been another. those who have nothing to do in such places are always the first victims. let every man mind his own business. wounded or killed, i would not even have noticed you in the bulletin. you could have been laughed at, and that justly." bonaparte, not having at this time experienced reverses, having continually proceeded from triumph to triumph, confidently anticipated the taking of st. jean d'acre. in his letters to the generals in egypt he fixed the 25th of april for the accomplishment of that event. he reckoned that the grand assault against the tower could not be made before that day; it took place, however, twenty-four hours sooner. he wrote to desaix on the 19th of april, "i count on being master of acre in six days." on the 2d of may he told junot, "our 18 and 24 pounders have arrived. we hope to enter acre in a few days. the fire of their artillery is completely extinguished." letters have been printed, dated 30th floréal (19th. may), in which he announces to dugua and to poussielque that they can rely on his being in acre on 6th floréal (25th april). some mistake has evidently been made. "the slightest circumstances produce the greatest events," said napoleon, according to the memorial of st. helena; "had st. jean d'acre fallen, i should have changed the face of the world." and again, "the fate of the east lay in that small town." this idea is not one which he first began to entertain at st. helena; he often repeated the very same words at st. jean d'acre. on the shore of ptolemes gigantic projects agitated him, as, doubtless, regret for not having carried them into execution tormented him at st. helena. almost every evening bonaparte and myself used to walk together, at a little distance from the sea-shore. the day after the unfortunate assault of the 8th of may bonaparte, afflicted at seeing the blood of so many brave men uselessly shed, said to me, "bourrienne, i see that this wretched place has cost me a number of men, and wasted much time. but things are too far advanced not to attempt a last effort. if i succeed, as i expect, i shall find in the town the pasha's treasures, and arms for 300,000 men. i will stir up and arm the people of syria, who are disgusted at the ferocity of djezzar, and who, as you know, pray for his destruction at every assault. i shall then march upon damascus and aleppo. on advancing into the country, the discontented will flock round my standard, and swell my army. i will announce to the people the abolition of servitude and of the tyrannical governments of the pashas. i shall arrive at constantinople with large masses of soldiers. i shall overturn the turkish empire, and found in the east a new and grand empire, which will fix my place in the records of posterity. perhaps i shall return to paris by adrianople, or by vienna, after having annihilated the house of austria." after i had made some observations which these grand projects naturally suggested, he replied, "what! do you not see that the druses only wait for the fall of acre to rise in rebellion? have not the keys of damascus already been offered me? i only stay till these walls fall because until then i can derive no advantage from this large town. by the operation which i meditate i cut off all kind of succour from the beys, and secure the conquest of egypt. i will have desaix nominated commander-in-chief; but if i do not succeed in the last assault i am about to attempt, i set off directly. time presses,--i shall not be at cairo before the middle of june; the winds will then lie favourable for ships bound to egypt, from the north. constantinople will send troops to alexandria and rosetta. i must be there. as for the army, which will arrive afterwards by land, i do not fear it this year. i will cause everything to be destroyed, all the way to the entrance of the desert. i will render the passage of an army impossible for two years. troops cannot exist amoung ruins." as soon as i returned to my tent i committed to paper this conversation, which was then quite fresh in my memory, and, i may venture to say that every word i put down is correct. i may add, that during the siege our camp was constantly filled with the inhabitants, who invoked heaven to favour our arms, and prayed fervently at every assault for our success, many of them on their knees, with their faces to the city. the people of damascus, too, had offered the keys to bonaparte. thus everything contributed to make him confident in his favourite plan. the troops left st. jean d'acre on the 20th of may, taking advantage of the night to avoid a sortie from the besieged, and to conceal the retreat of the army, which had to march three leagues along the shore, exposed to the fire of the english vessels lying in the roads of mount carmel. the removal of the wounded and sick commenced on the 18th and 19th of may. bonaparte then made a proclamation, which from one end to the other offends against truth. it has been published in many works. the season of the year for hostile landing is there very dexterously placed in the foreground; all the rest is a deceitful exaggeration. it must be observed that the proclamations which bonaparte regarded as calculated to dazzle an ever too credulous public were amplifications often ridiculous and incomprehensible upon the spot, and which only excited the laughter of men of common sense. in all bonaparte's correspondence there is an endeavour to disguise his reverses, and impose on the public, and even on his own generals. for example, he wrote to general dugua, commandant of cairo, on the 15th of february, "i will bring you plenty of prisoners and flags!" one would almost be inclined to say that he had resolved, during his stay in the east, thus to pay a tribute to the country of fables[24]. [24]--[the prisoners and flags were sent. the turkish flags were entrusted by berthier to the adjutant-commandant boyer, who conducted a convoy of sick and wounded to egypt. sidney smith acknowledges the loss of some flags by the turks. the turkish prisoners were used as carriers of the litters for the wounded, and were, for the most part, brought into egypt. (erreurs, tome i. pp. 47 and 160)]-thus terminated this disastrous expedition. i have read somewhere that during this immortal campaign the two heroes murat and mourad had often been in face of one another. there is only a little difficulty; mourad bey never put his foot in syria. we proceeded along the coast, and passed mount carmel. some of the wounded were carried on litters, the remainder on horses, mules, and camels. at a short distance from mount carmel we were informed that three soldiers, ill of the plague, who were left in a convent (which served for a hospital), and abandoned too confidently to the generosity of the turks, had been barbarously put to death. a most intolerable thirst, the total want of water, an excessive heat, and a fatiguing march over burning sand-hills, quite disheartened the men, and made every generous sentiment give way to feelings of the grossest selfishness and most shocking indifference. i saw officers, with their limbs amputated, thrown off the litters, whose removal in that way had been ordered, and who had themselves given money to recompense the bearers. i saw the amputated, the wounded, the infected, or those only suspected of infection, deserted and left to themselves. the march was illumined by torches, lighted for the purpose of setting fire to the little towns, villages, and hamlets which lay in the route, and the rich crops with which the land was then covered. the whole country was in a blaze. those who were ordered to preside at this work of destruction seemed eager to spread desolation on every side, as if they could thereby avenge themselves for their reverses, and find in such dreadful havoc an alleviation of their sufferings. we were constantly surrounded by plunderers, incendiaries, and the dying, who, stretched on the sides of the road, implored assistance in a feeble voice, saying, "i am not infected--i am only wounded;" and to convince those whom they addressed, they reopened their old wounds, or inflicted on themselves fresh ones. still nobody attended to them. "it is all over with him," was the observation applied to the unfortunate beings in succession, while every one pressed onward. the sun, which shone in an unclouded sky in all its brightness, was often darkened by our conflagrations. on our right lay the sea; on our left, and behind us, the desert made by ourselves; before were the privations and sufferings which awaited us. such was our true situation. we reached tentoura on the 20th of may, when a most oppressive heat prevailed, and produced general dejection. we had nothing to sleep on but the parched and burning sand; on our right lay a hostile sea; our losses in wounded and sick were already considerable since leaving acre; and there was nothing consolatory in the future. the truly afflicting condition in which the remains of an army called triumphant were plunged, produced, as might well be expected, a corresponding impression on the mind of the general-in-chief. scarcely had he arrived at tentoura when he ordered his tent to be pitched. he then called me, and with a mind occupied by the calamities of our situation, dictated an order that every one should march on foot; and that all the horses, mules, and camels should be given up to the wounded, the sick, and infected who had been removed, and who still showed signs of life. "carry that to berthier," said he; and the order was instantly despatched. scarcely had i returned to the tent when the elder vigogne, the general-in-chief's groom, entered, and raising his hand to his cap, said, "general, what horse do you reserve for yourself?" in the state of excitement in which bonaparte was this question irritated him so violently that, raising his whip, he gave the man a severe blow on the head, saying in a terrible voice, "every-one must go on foot, you rascal--i the first--do you not know the order? be off!" every one in parting with his horse was now anxious to avoid giving it to any unfortunate individual supposed to be suffering from plague. much pains were taken to ascertain the nature of the diseases of the sick; and no difficulty was made in accommodating the wounded of amputated. for my part i had an excellent horse; a mule, and two camels, all which i gave up with the greatest pleasure; but i confess that i directed my servant to do all he could to prevent an infected person from getting my horse. it was returned to me in a very short time. the same thing happened to many others. the cause maybe easily conjectured. the remains of our heavy artillery were lost in the moving sands of tentoura, from the want of horses, the small number that remained being employed in more indispensable services. the soldiers seemed to forget their own sufferings, plunged in grief at the loss of their bronze guns, often the instruments of their triumphs, and which had made europe tremble. we halted at caesarea on the 22d of may, and we marched all the following night. towards daybreak a man, concealed in a bush upon the left of the road (the sea was two paces from us on the right), fired a musket almost close to the head of the general-in-chief, who was sleeping on his horse. i was beside him. the wood being searched, the nablousian was taken without difficulty, and ordered to be shot on the spot. four guides pushed him towards the sea by thrusting their carbines against his back; when close to the water's edge they drew the triggers, but all the four muskets hung fire: a circumstance which was accounted for by the great humidity of the night. the nablousian threw himself into the water, and, swimming with great agility and rapidity, gained a ridge of rocks so far off that not a shot from the whole troop, which fired as it passed, reached him. bonaparte, who continued his march, desired me to wait for kléber, whose division formed the rear-guard, and to tell him not to forget the nablousian. he was, i believe, shot at last. we returned to jaffa on the 24th of may, and stopped there during the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th. this town had lately been the scene of a horrible transaction, dictated by necessity, and it was again destined to witness the exercise of the same dire law. here i have a painful duty to perform--i will perform it. i will state what i know, what i saw. i have seen the following passage in a certain, work:--"bonaparte, having arrived at jaffa, ordered three removals of the infected: one by sea to damietta, and also by land; the second to gaza; and the third to el-arish!" so, many words, so many errors! some tents were pitched on an eminence near the gardens east of jaffa. orders were given directly to undermine the fortifications and blow them up; and on the 27th of may, upon the signaling given, the town was in a moment laid bare. an hour afterwards the general-in-chief left his tent and repaired to the town, accompanied by berthier, some physicians and surgeons, and his usual staff. i was also one of the party. a long and sad deliberation took place on the question which now arose relative to the men who were incurably ill of the plague, or who were at the point of death. after a discussion of the most serious and conscientious kind it was decided to accelerate a few moments, by a potion, a death which was inevitable, and which would otherwise be painful and cruel. bonaparte took a rapid view of the destroyed ramparts of the town and returned to the hospital, where there were men whose limbs had been amputated, many wounded, many afflicted with ophthalmia, whose lamentations were distressing, and some infected with the plague. the beds of the last description of patients were to the right on entering the first ward. i walked by the general's side, and i assert that i never saw him touch any one of the infected. and why should he have done so? they were in the last stage of the disease. not one of them spoke a word to him, and bonaparte well knew that he possessed no protection against the plague. is fortune to be again brought forward here? she had, in truth, little favoured him during the last few months, when he had trusted to her favours. i ask, why should he have exposed himself to certain death, and have left his army in the midst of a desert created by our ravages, in a desolate town, without succour, and without the hope of ever receiving any? would he have acted rightly in doing so--he who was evidently so necessary, so indispensable to his army; he on whom depended at that moment the lives of all who had survived the last disaster, and who had proved their attachment to him by their sufferings, their privations, and their unshaken courage, and who had done all that he could have required of men, and whose only trust was in him? bonaparte walked quickly through the rooms, tapping the yellow top of his boot with a whip he held in his hand. as he passed along with hasty steps he repeated these words: "the fortifications are destroyed. fortune was against me at st. jean d'acre. i must return to egypt to preserve it from the enemy, who will soon be there: in a few hours the turks will be here. let all those who have strength enough rise and come along with us. they shall be carried on litters and horses." there were scarcely sixty cases of plague in the hospital; and all accounts stating a greater number are exaggerated. the perfect silence, complete dejection, and general stupor of the patients announced their approaching end. to carry them away in the state in which they were would evidently have been doing nothing else than inoculating the rest of the army with the plague. i have, it is true, learned, since my return to europe, that some persons touched the infected with impunity; nay; that others went so far as to inoculate themselves with the plague in order to learn how to cure those whom it might attack. it certainly was a special protection from heaven to be preserved from it; but to cover in some degree the absurdity of such a story, it is added that they knew how to elude the danger, and that any one else who braved it without using precautions met with death for their temerity. this is, in fact, the whole point of the question. either those privileged persons took indispensable precautions; and in that case their boasted heroism is a mere juggler's trick; or they touched the infected without using precautions, and inoculated themselves with the plague, thus voluntarily encountering death, and then the story is really a good one. the infected were confided, it has been stated, to the head apothecary of the army, royer, who, dying in egypt three years after, carried the secret with him to the grave. but on a moment's reflection it will be evident that the leaving of royer alone in jaffa would have been to devote to certain death; and that a prompt and cruel one, a man who was extremely useful to the army, and who was at the time in perfect health. it must be remembered that no guard could be left with him, and that the turks were close at our heels. bonaparte truly said, while walking through the rooms of the hospital, that the turks would be at jaffa in a few hours. with this conviction, would he have left the head apothecary in that town? recourse has been had to suppositions to support the contrary belief to what i state. for example, it is said that the infected patients were embarked in ships of war. there were no such ships. where had they disembarked, who had received them; what had been done with them? no one speaks of them. others, not doubting that the infected men died at jaffa, say, that the rearguard under kléber, by order of bonaparte, delayed its departure for three days, and only began its march when death had put an end to the sufferings of these unfortunate beings, unshortened by any sacrifice. all this is incorrect. no rear-guard was left--it could not be done. pretence is made of forgetting that the ramparts were destroyed, that the town was as open and as defenceless as any village, so this small rear-guard would have been left for certain destruction. the dates themselves tell against these suppositions. it is certain, as can be seen by the official account, that we arrived at jaffa on 24th may, and stayed there the 25th, 26th, and 27th. we left it on the 28th. thus the rear-guard, which, according to these writers, left on the 29th, did not remain, even according to their own hypothesis, three days after the army to see the sick die. in reality it left on the 29th of may, the day after we did. here are the very words of the major-general (berthier) in his official account, written under the eye and under the dictation of the commander-in-chief:- the army arrived at jaffa, 5th prairial (24th may), and remained there the 6th, 7th, and 8th (25th-27th may). this time was employed in punishing the village, which had behaved badly. the fortifications of jaffa were blown up. all the iron guns of the place were thrown into the sea. the wounded were removed by sea and by land. there were only a few ships, and to give time to complete the evacuation by land, the departure of the army had to be deferred until the 9th (28th may). kléber's division formed the rear-guard, and only left jaffa on the 10th (29th may). the official report of what passed at jaffa was drawn up by berthier, under the eye of bonaparte. it has been published; but it may be remarked that not a word about the infected, not a word of the visit to the hospital, or the touching of the plague-patients with impunity, is there mentioned. in no official report is anything said about the matter. why this silence? bonaparte was not the man to conceal a fact which would have afforded him so excellent and so allowable a text for talking about his fortune. if the infected were removed, why not mention it? why be silent on so important an event? but it would have been necessary to confess that being obliged to have recourse to so painful a measure was the unavoidable consequence of this unfortunate expedition. very disagreeable details must have been entered into; and it was thought more advisable to be silent on the subject. but what did napoleon himself say on the subject at st. helena? his statement there was to the following effect:--"i ordered a consultation as to what was best to be done. the report which was made stated that there were seven or eight men (the question is not about the number) so dangerously ill that they could not live beyond twenty-four hours, and would besides infect the rest of the army with the plague. it was thought it would be an act of charity to anticipate their death a few hours." then comes the fable of the 500 men of the rear guard, who, it is pretended, saw them die! i make no doubt that the story of the poisoning was the invention of den----. he was a babbler, who understood a story badly, and repeated it worse. i do not think it would have been a crime to have given opium to the infected. on the contrary, it would have been obedience to the dictates of reason. where is the man who would not, in such a situation, have preferred a prompt death, to being exposed to the lingering tortures inflicted by barbarians? if my child, and i believe i love him as much as any father does his, had been in such a state, my advice would have been the same; if i had been among the infected myself, i should have demanded to be so treated. such was the reasoning at st. helena, and such was the view which he and every one else took of the case twenty years ago at jaffa. our little army arrived at cairo on the 14th of june, after a painful and harassing march of twenty-five days. the heats during the passage of the desert between el-arish and belbeis exceeded thirty-three degrees. on placing the bulb of the thermometer in the sand the mercury rose to forty-five degrees. the deceitful mirage was even more vexatious than in the plains of bohahire'h. in spite of our experience an excessive thirst, added to a perfect illusion, made us goad on our wearied horses towards lakes which vanished at our approach, and left behind nothing but salt and arid sand. in two days my cloak was completely covered with salt, left on it after the evaporation of the moisture which held it in solution. our horses, who ran eagerly to the brackish springs of the desert, perished in numbers, after travelling about a quarter of a league from the spot where they drank the deleterious fluid. bonaparte preceded his entry into the capital of egypt by one of those lying bulletins which only imposed on fools. "i will bring with me," said he, "many prisoners and flags. i have razed the palace of the djezzar and the ramparts of acre--not a stone remains upon another. all the inhabitants have left the city, by sea. djezzar is severely wounded." i confess that i experienced a painful sensation in writing, by his dictation, these official words, everyone of which was an imposition. excited by all i had just witnessed, it was difficult for me to refrain from making the observation; but his constant reply was, "my dear fellow, you are a simpleton: you do not understand this business." and he observed, when signing the bulletin, that he would yet fill the world with admiration, and inspire historians and poets. our return to cairo has been attributed to the insurrections which broke out during the unfortunate expedition into syria. nothing is more incorrect. the term insurrection cannot be properly applied to the foolish enterprises of the angel el-mahdi in the bohahire'h, or to the less important disturbances in the charkyeh. the reverses experienced before st. jean d'acre, the fear, or rather the prudent anticipation of a hostile landing, were sufficient motives, and the only ones, for our return to egypt. what more could we do in syria but lose men and time, neither of which the general had to spare? chapter xx. 1799. murat and moarad bey at the natron lakes--bonaparte's departure for the pyramids--sudden appearance of an arab messenger--news of the landing of the turks at aboukir--bonaparte marches against them--they are immediately attacked and destroyed in the battle of aboukir--interchange of communication with the english--sudden determination to return to europe--outfit of two frigates- bonaparte's dissimulation--his pretended journey to the delta- generous behaviour of lanusee--bonaparte's artifice--his bad treatment of general kléber. bonaparte had hardly set foot in cairo when he was informed that the brave and indefatigable mourad bey was descending by the fayoum, in order to form a junction with reinforcements which had been for some time past collected in the bohahire'h. in all probability this movement of mourad bey was the result of news he had received respecting plans formed at constantinople, and the landing which took place a short time after in the roads of aboukir. mourad had selected the natron lakes for his place of rendezvous. to these lakes murat was despatched. the bey no sooner got notice of murat's presence than he determined to retreat and to proceed by the desert to gizeh and the great pyramids. i certainly never heard, until i returned to france, that mourad had ascended to the summit of the great pyramid for the purpose of passing his time in contemplating cairo! napoleon said at st. helena that murat might have taken mourad bey had the latter remained four-and-twenty hours longer in the natron lakes. now the fact is, that as soon as the bey heard of murat's arrival he was off. the arabian spies were far more serviceable to our enemies than to us; we had not, indeed, a single friend in egypt. mourad bey, on being informed by the arabs, who acted as couriers for him, that general desaix was despatching a column from the south of egypt against him, that the general-in-chief was also about to follow his footsteps along the frontier of gizeh, and that the natron lakes and the bohahire'h were occupied by forces superior to his own, retired into fayoum. bonaparte attached great importance to the destruction of mourad, whom he looked upon as the bravest, the most active, and most dangerous of his enemies in egypt. as all accounts concurred in stating that mourad, supported by the arabs, was hovering about the skirts of the desert of the province of gizeh, bonaparte proceeded to the pyramids, there to direct different corps against that able and dangerous partisan. he, indeed, reckoned him so redoubtable that he wrote to murat, saying he wished fortune might reserve for him the honour of putting the seal on the conquest of egypt by the destruction of this opponent. on the 14th of july bonaparte left cairo for the pyramids. he intended spending three or four days in examining the ruins of the ancient necropolis of memphis; but he was suddenly obliged to alter his plan. this journey to the pyramids, occasioned by the course of war, has given an opportunity for the invention of a little piece of romance. some ingenious people have related that bonaparte gave audiences to the mufti and ulemas, and that on entering one of the great pyramids he cried out, "glory to allah! god only is god, and mahomet is his prophet!" now the fact is, that bonaparte never even entered the great pyramid. he never had any thought of entering it:--i certainly should have accompanied him had he done so for i never quitted his side a single moment in the desert. he caused some person to enter into one of the great pyramids while he remained outside, and received from them, on their return, an account of what they had seen. in other words, they informed him there was nothing to be seen! on the evening of the 15th of july, while we were taking a walk, we perceived, on the road leading from alexandria, an arab riding up to us in all haste. he brought to the general-in-chief a despatch from general marmont, who was entrusted with the command of alexandria, and who had conducted himself so well, especially during the dreadful ravages of the plague, that he had gained the unqualified approbation of bonaparte. the turks had landed on the 11th of july at aboukir, under the escort and protection of english ships of war. the news of the landing of from fifteen to sixteen thousand men did not surprise bonaparte, who had for some time expected it. it was not so, however, with the generals most in his favor, whose apprehensions, for reasons which may be conjectured, he had endeavoured to calm. he had even written to marmont, who, being in the most exposed situation, had the more reason to be vigilant, in these terms: the army which was to have appeared before alexandria, and which left constantinople on the 1st of the ramadhan, has been destroyed under the walls of acre. if, however, that mad englishman (smith) has embarked the remains of that army in order to convey them to aboukir, i do not believe there can be more than 2000 men. he wrote in the following strain to general dugua, who had the command of cairo: the english commander, who has summoned damietta, is a madman. the combined army they speak of has been destroyed before acre, where it arrived a fortnight before we left that place. as soon as he arrived at cairo, in a letter he despatched to desaix, he said: the time has now arrived when disembarkations have become practicable. i shall lose no time in getting ready. the probabilities, however, are, that none will take place this year. what other language could he hold, when he had proclaimed when after the raising of the siege of acre, that he had destroyed those 15,000 men who two months after landed at aboukir? no sooner had bonaparte perused the contents of marmont's letter than he retired into his tent and dictated to me, until three in the morning, his orders for the departure of the troops, and for the routes he wished to be pursued during his absence by the troops who should remain in the interior. at this moment i observed in him the development of that vigorous character of mind which was excited by obstacles until he overcame them--that celerity of thought which foresaw everything. he was all action, and never for a moment hesitated. on the 16th of july, at four in the morning, he was on horseback and the army in full march. i cannot help doing justice to the presence of mind, promptitude of decision, and rapidity of execution which at this period of his life never deserted him on great occasions. we reached ouardan, to the north of gizeh, on the evening of the 16th; on the 19th we arrived at rahmalianie'h, and on the 23d at alexandria, where every preparation was made for that memorable battle which, though it did not repair the immense losses and fatal consequences of the naval conflict of the same name, will always recall to the memory of frenchmen one of the most brilliant achievements of their arms[25]. [25]--[as m. de bourrienne gives no details of the battle, the following extract from the duc de rovigo's memoirs, tome i, p. 167, will supply the deficiency: "general bonaparte left cairo in the utmost haste to place himself at the head of the troops which he had ordered to quit their cantonments and march down to the coast. "whilst the general was making these arrangements and coming in person from cairo, the troops on board the turkish fleet had effected a landing and taken possession of the fort of aboukir, and of a redoubt placed behind the village of that name which ought to have been put into a state of defence six months before, but had been completely neglected. "the turks had nearly destroyed the weak garrisons that occupied those two military points when general marmont (who commanded at alexandria) came to their relief. this general, seeing the two posts in the power of the turks, returned to shut himself up in alexandria, where he would probably have been blockaded by the turkish army had it not been for the arrival of general bonaparte with his forces, who was very angry when he saw that the fort and redoubt had been taken; but he did not blame marmont for retreating to alexandria with the forces at his disposal. "general bonaparte arrived at midnight with his guides and the remaining part of his army, and ordered the turks to be attacked the next morning. in this battle, as in the preceding ones, the attack, the encounter, and the rout were occurrences of a moment, and the result of a single movement on the part of our troops. the whole turkish army plunged into the sea to regain its ships, leaving behind them everything they had brought on shore. "whilst this event was occurring on the seashore a pasha had left the field of battle with a corps of about 3000 men in order to throw himself into the fort of aboukir. they soon felt the extremities of thirst, which compelled them, after the lapse of a few days, to surrender unconditionally to general menou, who was left to close the operations connected with the recently defeated turkish army."] after the battle, which took place on the 25th of july, bonaparte sent a flag of truce on board the english admiral's ship. our intercourse was full of politeness, such as might be expected in the communications of the people of two civilised nations. the english admiral gave the flag of truce some presents in exchange for some we sent, and likewise a copy of the french gazette of frankfort, dated 10th of june 1799. for ten months we had received no news from france. bonaparte glanced over this journal with an eagerness which may easily be conceived[26]. [26]--[the french, on their return from st. jean d'acre were totally ignorant of all that had taken place in europe for several months. napoleon, eager to obtain intelligence, sent a flag of truce on board the turkish admiral's ship, under the pretence of treating for the ransom of the prisoners taken at aboukir, not doubting but the envoy would be stopped by sir sidney smith, who carefully prevented all direct communication between the french and the turks. accordingly the french flag of truce received directions from sir sidney to go on board his ship. he experienced the handsomest treatment; and the english commander having, among other things, ascertained that the disasters of italy were quite unknown to napoleon, indulged in the malicious pleasure of sending him a file of newspapers. napoleon spent the whole night in his tent perusing the papers; and he came to the determination of immediately proceeding to europe to repair the disasters of france; and if possible, to save her from destruction (memorial de sainte helene)]. "heavens!" said he to me, "my presentiment is verified: the fools have lost italy. all the fruits of our victories are gone! i must leave egypt!" he sent for berthier, to whom he communicated the news, adding that things were going on very badly in france--that he wished to return home --that he (berthier) should go along with him, and that, for the present, only he, gantheaume, and i were in the secret. he recommended berthier to be prudent, not to betray any symptoms of joy, nor to purchase or sell anything, and concluded by assuring him that he depended on him. "i can answer," said he, "for myself and for bourrienne." berthier promised to be secret, and he kept his word. he had had enough of egypt, and he so ardently longed to return to france, that there was little reason to fear he would disappoint himself by any indiscretion. gantheaume arrived, and bonaparte gave him orders to fit out the two frigates, the 'muiron' and the 'carrère', and the two small vessels, the 'revanche' and the 'fortune', with a two months' supply of provisions for from four to five hundred men. he enjoined his secrecy as to the object of these preparations, and desired him to act with such circumspection that the english cruisers might have no knowledge of what was going on. he afterwards arranged with gantheaume the course he wished to take. no details escaped his attention. bonaparte concealed his preparations with much care, but still some vague rumours crept abroad. general dugua, the commandant of cairo, whom he had just left for the purpose of embarking, wrote to him on the 18th of august to the following effect: i have this moment heard that it is reported at the institute you are about to return to france, taking with you monge, berthollet, berthier, lannes, and murat. this news has spread like lightning through the city, and i should not be at all surprised if it produce an unfavourable effect, which, however, i hope you will obviate. bonaparte embarked five days after the receipt of dugua's letter, and, as may be supposed, without replying to it. on the 18th of august he wrote to the divan of cairo as follows: i set out to-morrow for menouf, whence i intend to make various excursions in the delta, in order that i may myself witness the acts of oppression which are committed there, and acquire some knowledge of the people. he told the army but half the truth: the news from europe (said he) has determined me to proceed to france. i leave the command of the army to general kléber. the army shall hear from me forthwith. at present i can say no more. it costs me much pain to quit troops to whom i am so strongly attached. but my absence will be but temporary, and the general i leave in command has the confidence of the government as well as mine. i have now shown the true cause of general bonaparte's departure for europe. this circumstance, in itself perfectly natural, has been the subject of the most ridiculous conjectures to those who always wish to assign extraordinary causes for simple events. there is no truth whatever in the assertion of his having planned his departure before the battle of aboukir. such an idea never crossed his mind. he had no thought whatever of his departure for france when he made the journey to the pyramids, nor even when he received the news of the landing of the anglo-turkish force. at the end of december 1798 bonaparte thus wrote to the directory: "we are without any news from france. no courier has arrived since the month of june." some writers have stated that we received news by the way of tunis, algiers, or morocco; but there is no contradicting a positive fact. at that period i had been with bonaparte more than two years, and during that time not a single despatch on any occasion arrived of the contents of which i was ignorant. how then should the news alluded to have escaped me?[27] [27]--[details on the question of the correspondence of napoleon with france while he was to egypt will be found in colonel iung's work, lucien bonaparte (paris. charpentier, 1882), tome i. pp. 251-274. it seems most probable that napoleon was in occasional communication with his family and with some of the directors by way of tunis and tripoli. it would not be his interest to let his army or perhaps even bourrienne know of the disasters in italy till he found that they were sure to hear of them through the english. this would explain his affected ignorance till such a late date. on the 11th of april barras received a despatch by which napoleon stated his intention of returning to france if the news brought by hamelin was confirmed. on the 26th of may 1799 three of the directors, barras, rewbell, and la révellière-lepeaux, wrote to napoleon that admiral bruix had been ordered to attempt every means of bringing back his army. on the 15th of july napoleon seems to have received this and other letters. on the 20th of july he warns admiral gantheaume to be ready to start. on the 11th of september the directors formally approved the recall of the army from egypt. thus at the time napoleon landed in france (on the 8th october), his intended return had been long known to and approved by the majority of the directors, and had at last been formally ordered by the directory. at the most he anticipated the order. he cannot be said to have deserted his post. lantrey (tome i. p. 411) remarks that the existence and receipt of the letter from joseph denied by bourrienne is proved by miot (the commissary, the brother of miot de melito) and by joseph himself. talleyrand thanks the french consul at tripoli for sending news from egypt, and for letting bonaparte know what passed in europe. see also ragusa (marmont), tome i. p. 441, writing on 24th december 1798: "i have found an arab of whom i am sure, and who shall start to-morrow for derne . . . . this means can be used to send a letter to tripoli, for boats often go there."] almost all those who endeavour to avert from bonaparte the reproach of desertion quote a letter from the directory, dated the 26th of may 1799. this letter may certainly have been written, but it never reached its destination. why then should it be put upon record? the circumstance i have stated above determined the resolution of bonaparte, and made him look upon egypt as an exhausted field of glory, which it was high time he had quitted, to play another part in france. on his departure from europe bonaparte felt that his reputation was tottering. he wished to do something to raise up his glory, and to fix upon him the attention of the world. this object he had in great part accomplished; for, in spite of serious disasters, the french flag waved over the cataracts of the nile and the ruins of memphis, and the battles of the pyramids, and aboukir were calculated in no small degree to dazzle the imagination. cairo and alexandria too were ours. finding that the glory of his arms no longer supported the feeble power of the directory, he was anxious to see whether he could not share it, or appropriate it to himself. a great deal has been said about letters and secret communications from the directory, but bonaparte needed no such thing. he could do what he pleased: there was no power to check him; such had been the nature of his arrangements on leaving france. he followed only the dictates of his own will, and probably, had not the fleet been destroyed, he would have departed from egypt much sooner. to will and to do were with him one and the same thing. the latitude he enjoyed was the result of his verbal agreement with the directory, whose instructions and plans he did not wish should impede his operations. bonaparte left alexandria on the 5th of august, and on the 10th arrived at cairo. he at first circulated the report of a journey to upper egypt. this seemed so much the more reasonable, as he had really entertained that design before he went to the pyramids, and the fact was known to the army and the inhabitants of cairo. up to this time our secret had been studiously kept. however, general lanusse, the commandant at menouf, where we arrived on the 20th of august, suspected it. "you are going to france," said he to me. my negative reply confirmed his suspicion. this almost induced me to believe the general-in-chief had been the first to make the disclosure. general lanusse, though he envied our good fortune, made no complaints. he expressed his sincere wishes for our prosperous voyage, but never opened his mouth on the subject to any one. on the 21st of august we reached the wells of birkett. the arabs had rendered the water unfit for use, but the general-in-chief was resolved to quench his thirst, and for this purpose squeezed the juice of several lemons into a glass of the water; but he could not swallow it without holding his nose and exhibiting strong feelings of disgust. the next day we reached alexandria, where the general informed all those, who had accompanied him from cairo that france was their destination. at this announcement joy was pictured in every countenance. general kléber, to whose command bonaparte had resigned the army, was invited to come from damietta to rosetta to confer with the general-in-chief on affairs of extreme importance. bonaparte, in making an appointment which he never intended to keep, hoped to escape the unwelcome freedom of kléber's reproaches. he afterwards wrote to him all he had to say; and the cause he assigned for not keeping his appointment was, that his fear of being observed by the english cruisers had forced him to depart three days earlier than he intended. but when he wrote bonaparte well knew that he would be at sea before kléber could receive his letter. kkléber in his letter to the directory, complained bitterly of this deception. the singular fate that befell this letter will be seen by and by. chapter xxi 1799. our departure from egypt--nocturnal embarkation--m. parseval grandmaison--on course--adverse winds--fear of the english- favourable weather--vingt-et-un--chess--we land at ajaccio- bonaparte's pretended relations--family domains--want of money- battle of novi--death of joubert--visionary schemes--purchase of a boat--departure from corsica--the english squadron--our escape- the roads of fréjus--our landing in france--the plague or the austrians--joy of the people--the sanitary laws--bonaparte falsely accused. we were now to return to our country--again to cross the sea, to us so pregnant with danger--caesar and his fortune were once more to embark. but caesar was not now advancing to the east to add egypt to the conquests of the republic. he was revolving in his mind vast schemes, unawed by the idea of venturing everything to chance in his own favour the government for which he had fought. the hope of conquering the most celebrated country of the east no longer excited the imagination, as on our departure from france. our last visionary dream had vanished before the walls of st. jean d'acre, and we were leaving on the burning sands of egypt most of our companions in arms. an inconceivable destiny seemed to urge us on, and we were obliged to obey its decrees. on the 23d of august we embarked on board two frigates, the 'muiron'[28] and 'carrère'. our number was between four and five hundred. such was our squadron, and such the formidable army with which bonaparte had resolved, as he wrote to the divan of cairo, "to annihilate all his enemies." this boasting might impose on those who did not see the real state of things; but what were we to think of it? what bonaparte himself thought the day after. [28]--[named after bonaparte's aide de camp killed in the italian campaign]-the night was dark when we embarked in the frigates which lay at a considerable distance from the port of alexandria; but by the faint light of the stars we perceived a corvette, which appeared to be observing our silent nocturnal embarkation.[29] [29]--[the horses of the escort had been left to run loose on the beach, and all was perfect stillness in alexandria, when the advanced posts of the town were alarmed by the wild galloping of horses, which from a natural instinct, were returning to alexandria through the desert. the picket ran to arms on seeing horses ready saddled and bridled, which were soon discovered to belong to the regiment of guides. they at first thought that a misfortune had happened to some detachment in its pursuit of the arabs. with these horses came also those of the generals who had embarked with general bonaparte; so that alexandria was for a time in considerable alarm. the cavalry was ordered to proceed in all haste in the direction whence the horses came, and every one was giving himself up to the most gloomy conjectures, when the cavalry returned to the city with the turkish groom, who was bringing back general bonaparte's horse to alexandria (memoirs of the duc de rovigo, tome i. p. 182).]-next morning, just as we were on the point of setting sail, we saw. coming from the port of alexandria a boat, on board of which was m. parseval grandmaison. this excellent man, who was beloved by all of us, was not included among the persons whose return to france had been determined by the general-in-chief. in his anxiety to get off bonaparte would not hear of taking him on board. it will readily be conceived how urgent were the entreaties of parseval; but he would have sued in vain had not gantheaume, monge, berthollet, and i interceded for him. with some difficulty we overcame bonaparte's resistance, and our colleague of the egyptian institute got on board after the wind had filled our sails. it has been erroneously said that admiral gantheaume had full control of the frigates, as if any one could command when bonaparte was present. on the contrary, bonaparte declared to the admiral, in my hearing, that he would not take the ordinary course and get into the open sea. "keep close along the coast of the mediterranean," said he, "on the african side, until you get south of sardinia. i have here a handful of brave fellows and a few pieces of artillery; if the english should appear i will run ashore, and with my party, make my way by land to oran, tunis, or some other port, whence we may find an opportunity of getting home." this was his irrevocable determination. for twenty-one days adverse winds, blowing from west or north-west, drove us continually on the coast of syria, or in the direction of alexandria. at one time it was even proposed that we should again put into the port; but bonaparte declared he would rather brave every danger than do so. during the day we tacked to a certain distance northward, and in the evening we stood towards africa, until we came within sight of the coast. finally after no less than twenty-one days of impatience and disappointment, a favourable east wind carried us past that point of africa on which carthage formerly stood, and we soon doubled sardinia. we kept very near the western coast of that island, where bonaparte had determined to land in case of our falling in with the english squadron. from thence his plan was to reach corsica, and there to await a favourable opportunity of returning to france. everything had contributed to render our voyage dull and monotonous; and, besides, we were not entirely without uneasiness as to the steps which might be taken by the directory, for it was certain that the publication of the intercepted correspondence must have occasioned many unpleasant disclosures. bonaparte used often to walk on deck to superintend the execution of his orders. the smallest sail that appeared in view excited his alarm. the fear of falling into the hands of the english never forsook him. that was what he dreaded most of all, and yet, at a subsequent period, he trusted to the generosity of his enemies. however, in spite of our well-founded alarm, there were some moments in which we sought to amuse ourselves, or, to use a common expression, to kill time. cards afforded us a source of recreation, and even this frivolous amusement served to develop the character of bonaparte. in general he was not fond of cards; but if he did play, vingt-et-un was his favourite game, because it is more rapid than many others, and because, in short, it afforded him an opportunity of cheating. for example, he would ask for a card; if it proved a bad one he would say nothing, but lay it down on the table and wait till the dealer had drawn his. if the dealer produced a good card, then bonaparte would throw aside his hand, without showing it, and give up his stake. if, on the contrary, the dealer's card made him exceed twenty-one, bonaparte also threw his cards aside without showing them, and asked for the payment of his stake. he was much diverted by these little tricks, especially when they were played off undetected; and i confess that even then we were courtiers enough to humour him, and wink at his cheating. i must, however, mention that he never appropriated to himself the fruit of these little dishonesties, for at the end of the game he gave up all his winnings, and they were equally divided. gain, as may readily be supposed, was not his object; but he always expected that fortune would grant him an ace or a ten at the right moment with the same confidence with which he looked for fine weather on the day of battle. if he were disappointed he wished nobody to know it. bonaparte also played at chess, but very seldom, because he was only a third-rate player, and he did not like to be beaten at that game, which, i know not why, is said to bear a resemblance to the grand game of war. at this latter game bonaparte certainly feared no adversary. this reminds me that when we were leaving passeriano he announced his intention of passing through mantua. he was told that the commandant of that town, i believe general beauvoir, was a great chess-player, and he expressed a wish to play a game with him. general beauvoir asked him to point out any particular pawn with which he would be checkmated; adding, that if the pawn were taken, he, bonaparte, should be declared the winner. bonaparte pointed out the last pawn on the left of his adversary. a mark was put upon it, and it turned out that he actually was checkmated with that very pawn. bonaparte was not very well pleased at this. he liked to play with me because, though rather a better player than himself, i was not always able to beat him. as soon as a game was decided in his favour he declined playing any longer, preferring to rest on his laurels. the favourable wind which had constantly prevailed after the first twenty days of our voyage still continued while we kept along the coast of sardinia; but after we had passed that island the wind again blew violently from the west, and on the 1st of october we were forced to enter the gulf of ajaccio. we sailed again next day but we found it impossible to work our way out of the gulf. we were therefore obliged to put into the port and land at ajaccio. adverse winds obliged us to remain there until the 7th of october. it may readily be imagined how much this delay annoyed bonaparte. he sometimes expressed his impatience, as if he could enforce the obedience of the elements as well as of men. he was losing time, and time was everything to him. there was one circumstance which seemed to annoy him as much as any of his more serious vexations. "what will become of me," said he, "if the english, who are cruising hereabout, should learn that i have landed in corsica? i shall be forced to stay here. that i could never endure. i have a torrent of relations pouring upon me." his great reputation had certainly prodigiously augmented the number of his family. he was overwhelmed with visits, congratulations, and requests. the whole town was in a commotion. every one of its inhabitants wished to claim him as their cousin; and from the prodigious number of his pretended godsons and goddaughters, it might have been supposed that he had held one-fourth of the children of ajaccio at the baptismal font. bonaparte frequently walked with us in the neighbourhood of ajaccio; and when in all the plenitude of his power he did not count his crowns with greater pleasure than he evinced in pointing out to us the little domains of his ancestors. while we were at ajaccio m. fesch gave bonaparte french money in exchange for a number of turkish sequins, amounting in value to 17,000 francs. this sum was all that the general brought with him from egypt. i mention this fact because he was unjustly calumniated in letters written after his departure, and which were intercepted and published by the english. i ought also to add, that as he would never for his own private use resort to the money-chest of the army, the contents of which were, indeed, never half sufficient to defray the necessary expenses, he several times drew on genoa, through m. james, and on the funds he possessed in the house of clary, 16,000, 25,000, and up to 33,000 francs. i can bear witness that in egypt i never saw him touch any money beyond his pay; and that he left the country poorer than he had entered it is a fact that cannot be denied. in his notes on egypt it appears that in one year 12,600,000 francs were received. in this sum were included at least 2,000,000 of contributions, which were levied at the expense of many decapitations. bonaparte was fourteen months in egypt, and he is said to have brought away with him 20,000,000. calumny may be very gratifying to certain persons, but they should at least give it a colouring of probability. the fact is, that bonaparte had scarcely enough to maintain himself at ajaccio and to defray our posting expenses to paris. on our arrival at ajaccio we learnt the death of joubert, and the loss of the battle of novi, which was fought on the 15th of august. bonaparte was tormented by anxiety; he was in a state of utter uncertainty as to the future. from the time we left alexandria till our arrival in corsica he had frequently talked of what he should do during the quarantine, which he supposed he would be required to observe on reaching toulon, the port at which he had determined to land. even then he cherished some illusions respecting the state of affairs; and he often said to me, "but for that confounded quarantine, i would hasten ashore, and place myself at the head of the army of italy. all is not over; and i am sure that there is not a general who would refuse me the command. the news of a victory gained by me would reach paris as soon as the battle of aboukir; that, indeed, would be excellent." in corsica his language was very different. when he was informed of our reverses, and saw the full extent of the evil, he was for a moment overwhelmed. his grand projects then gave way to the consideration of matters of minor import, and he thought about his detention in the lazaretto of toulon. he spoke of the directory, of intrigues, and of what would be said of him. he accounted his enemies those who envied him, and those who could not be reconciled to his glory and the influence of his name. amidst all these anxieties bonaparte was outwardly calm, though he was moody and reflective. providing against every chance of danger, he had purchased at ajaccio a large launch which was intended to be towed by the 'muiron', and it was manned by twelve of the best sailors the island could furnish. his resolution was, in case of inevitable danger, to jump into this boat and get ashore. this precaution had well-nigh proved useful[30]. [30]--[sir walter scott, at the commencement of his life of napoleon, says that bonaparte did not see his native city after 1793. probably to avoid contradicting himself, the scottish historian observes that bonaparte was near ajaccio on his return from egypt. he spent eight days there.--bourrienne.]-after leaving the gulf of ajaccio the voyage was prosperous and undisturbed for one day; but on the second day, just at sunset, an english squadron of fourteen sail hove in sight. the english, having advantage of the lights which we had in our faces, saw us better than we could see them. they recognised our two frigates as venetian built; but luckily for us, night came on, for we were not far apart. we saw the signals of the english for a long time, and heard the report of the guns more and more to our left, and we thought it was the intention of the cruisers to intercept us on the south-east. under these circumstances bonaparte had reason to thank fortune; for it is very evident that had the english suspected our two frigates of coming from the east and going to france, they would have shut us out from land by running between us and it, which to them was very easy. probably they took us for a convoy of provisions going from toulon to genoa; and it was to this error and the darkness that we were indebted for escaping with no worse consequence than a fright[31]. [31]--[here bourrienne says in a note "where did sir walter scott learn that we were neither seen nor recognised? we were not recognised, but certainly seen," this is corroborated by the testimony of the duc de rovigo, who, in his memoirs, says, "i have met officers of the english navy who assured me that the two frigates had been seen but were considered by the admiral to belong to his squadron, as they steered their course towards him; and as he knew we had only one frigate in the mediterranean, and one in toulon harbour, he was far from supposing that the frigates which he had descried could have general bonaparte on board" (savary, tome i. p. 226).]-during the remainder of the night the utmost agitation prevailed on board the muiron. gantheaume especially was in a state of anxiety which it is impossible to describe, and which it was painful to witness: he was quite beside himself, for a disaster appeared inevitable. he proposed to return to corsica. "no, no!" replied bonaparte imperiously. "no! spread all sail! every man at his post! to the north-west! to the north-west!" this order saved us; and i am enabled to affirm that in the midst of almost general alarm bonaparte was solely occupied in giving orders. the rapidity of his judgment seemed to grow in the face of danger. the remembrance of that night will never be effaced from my mind. the hours lingered on; and none of us could guess upon what new dangers the morrow's sun would shine. however, bonaparte's resolution was taken: his orders were given, his arrangements made. during the evening he had resolved upon throwing himself into the long boat; he had already fixed on the persons who were to share his fate, and had already named to me the papers which he thought it most important to save. happily our terrors were vain and our arrangements useless. by the first rays of the sun we discovered the english fleet sailing to the north-east, and we stood for the wished-for coast of france. the 8th of october, at eight in the morning, we entered the roads of fréjus. the sailors not having recognised the coast during the night, we did not know where we were. there was, at first, some hesitation whether we should advance. we were by no means expected, and did not know how to answer the signals, which has been changed during our absence. some guns were even fired upon us by the batteries on the coast; but our bold entry into the roads, the crowd upon the decks of the two frigates, and our signs of joy, speedily banished all doubt of our being friends. we were in the port, and approaching the landing-place, when the rumour spread that bonaparte was on board one of the frigates. in an instant the sea was covered with boats. in vain we begged them to keep at a distance; we were carried ashore, and when we told the crowd, both of men and women who were pressing about us, the risk they ran, they all exclaimed, "we prefer the plague to the austrians!" what were our feelings when we again set foot on the soil of france i will not attempt to describe. our escape from the dangers that threatened us seemed almost miraculous. we had lost twenty days at the beginning of our voyage, and at its close we had been almost taken by an english squadron. under these circumstances, how rapturously we inhaled the balmy air of provence! such was our joy, that we were scarcely sensible of the disheartening news which arrived from all quarters. at the first moment of our arrival, by a spontaneous impulse, we all repeated, with tears in our eyes, the beautiful lines which voltaire has put into the mouth of the exile of sicily. bonaparte has been reproached with having violated the sanitary laws; but, after what i have already stated respecting his intentions, i presume there can remain no doubt of the falsehood of this accusation. all the blame must rest with the inhabitants of fréjus, who on this occasion found the law of necessity more imperious than the sanitary laws. yet when it is considered that four or five hundred persons, and a quantity of effects, were landed from alexandria, where the plague had been raging during the summer, it is almost a miracle that france, and indeed europe escaped the scourge. chapter xxii. 1799. effect produced by bonaparte's return--his justification- melancholy letter to my wife--bonaparte's intended dinner at sens- louis bonaparte and josephine--he changes his intended route- melancholy situation of the provinces--necessity of a change- bonaparte's ambitious views--influence of popular applause- arrival in paris--his reception of josephine--their reconciliation- bonaparte's visit to the directory--his contemptuous treatment of sieyès. the effect produced in france and throughout europe by the mere intelligence of bonaparte's return is well known. i shall not yet speak of the vast train of consequences which that event entailed. i must, however, notice some accusations which were brought against him from the time of our landing to the 9th of november. he was reproached for having left egypt, and it was alleged that his departure was the result of long premeditation. but i, who was constantly with him, am enabled positively to affirm that his return to france was merely the effect of a sudden resolution. of this the following fact is in itself sufficient evidence. while we were at cairo, a few days before we heard of the landing of the anglo-turkish fleet, and at the moment when we were on the point of setting off to encamp at the pyramids, bonaparte despatched a courier to france. i took advantage of this opportunity to write to my wife. i almost bade her an eternal adieu. my letter breathed expressions of grief such as i had not before evinced. i said, among other things, that we knew not when or how it would be possible for us to return to france. if bonaparte had then entertained any thought of a speedy return i must have known it, and in that case i should not certainly have distressed my family by a desponding letter, when i had not had an opportunity of writing for seven months before. two days after the receipt of my letter my wife was awoke very early in the morning to be informed of our arrival in france. the courier who brought this intelligence was the bearer of a second letter from me, which i had written on board ship, and dated from fréjus. in this letter i mentioned that bonaparte would pass through sens and dine with my mother. in fulfilment of my directions madame de bourrienne set off for paris at five in the morning. having passed the first post-house she met a berlin containing four travellers, among whom she recognised louis bonaparte going to meet the general on the lyons road. on seeing madame de bourrienne louis desired the postillion to stop, and asked her whether she had heard from me. she informed him that we should pass through sens, where the general wished to dine with my mother, who had made every preparation for receiving him. louis then continued his journey. about nine o'clock my wife met another berlin, in which were madame bonaparte and her daughter. as they were asleep, and both carriages were driving at a very rapid rate, madame de bourrienne did not stop them. josephine followed the route taken by louis. both missed the general, who changed his mind at lyons, and proceeded by way of bourbonnais. he arrived fifteen hours after my wife; and those who had taken the burgundy road proceeded to lyons uselessly. determined to repair in all haste to paris, bonaparte had left fréjus on the afternoon of the day of our landing. he himself had despatched the courier to sens to inform my mother of his intended visit to her; and it was not until he got to lyons that he determined to take the bourbonnais road. his reason for doing so will presently be seen. all along the road, at aix, at lyons, in every town and village, he was received, as at fréjus, with the most rapturous demonstrations of joy[32]. only those who witnessed his triumphal journey can form any notion of it; and it required no great discernment to foresee something like the 18th brumaire. [32]--[from fréjus to aix a crowd of men kindly escorted us, carrying torches alongside the carriage of the general, not so much to show their enthusiasm as to ensure our safety (bourrienne) these brigands became so bad in france that at one time soldiers were placed in the imperials of all the diligences, receiving from the wits the curiously anticipative name of "imperial armies".]-the provinces, a prey to anarchy and civil war, were continually threatened with foreign invasion. almost all the south presented the melancholy spectacle of one vast arena of conflicting factions. the nation groaned beneath the yoke of tyrannical laws; despotism was systematically established; the law of hostages struck a blow at personal liberty, and forced loans menaced every man's property. the generality of the citizens had declared themselves against a pentarchy devoid of power, justice, and morality, and which had become the sport of faction and intrigue. disorder was general; but in the provinces abuses were felt more sensibly than elsewhere. in great cities it was found more easy to elude the hand of despotism and oppression. a change so earnestly wished for could not fail to be realised, and to be received with transport. the majority of the french people longed to be relieved from the situation in which they then stood. there were two dangers bar to cope with--anarchy and the bourbons. every one felt the urgent and indispensable necessity of concentrating the power of the government in a single hand; at the same time maintaining the institutions which the spirit of the age demanded, and which france, after having so dearly purchased, was now about to lose. the country looked for a man who was capable of restoring her to tranquillity; but as yet no such man had appeared. a soldier of fortune presented himself, covered with glory; he had planted the standard of france on the capitol and on the pyramids. the whole world acknowledged his superior talent; his character, his courage, and his victories had raised him to the very highest rank. his great works, his gallant actions, his speeches, and his proclamations ever since he had risen to eminence left no doubt of his wish to secure happiness and freedom to france, his adopted country. at that critical moment the necessity of a temporary dictatorship, which sometimes secures the safety of a state, banished all reflections on the consequences of such a power, and nobody seemed to think glory incompatible with personal liberty. all eyes were therefore directed on the general, whose past conduct guaranteed his capability of defending the republic abroad, and liberty at home,--on the general whom his flatterers, and indeed some of his sincere friends, styled, "the hero of liberal ideas," the title to which he aspired. under every point of view, therefore, he was naturally chosen as the chief of a generous nation, confiding to him her destiny, in preference to a troop of mean and fanatical hypocrites, who, under the names of republicanism and liberty, had reduced france to the most abject slavery. among the schemes which bonaparte was incessantly revolving in his mind may undoubtedly be ranked the project of attaining the head of the french government; but it would be a mistake to suppose that on his return from egypt he had formed any fixed plan. there was something vague in his ambitious aspirations; and he was, if i may so express myself, fond of building those imaginary edifices called castles in the air. the current of events was in accordance with his wishes; and it may truly be said that the whole french nation smoothed for bonaparte the road which led to power. certainly the unanimous plaudits and universal joy which accompanied him along a journey of more than 200 leagues must have induced him to regard as a national mission that step which was at first prompted merely by his wish of meddling with the affairs of the republic. this spontaneous burst of popular feeling, unordered and unpaid for, loudly proclaimed the grievances of the people, and their hope that the man of victory would become their deliverer. the general enthusiasm excited by the return of the conqueror of egypt delighted him to a degree which i cannot express, and was, as he has often assured me, a powerful stimulus in urging him to the object to which the wishes of france seemed to direct him. among people of all classes and opinions an 18th brumaire was desired and expected. many royalists even believed that a change would prove favourable to the king. so ready are we to persuade ourselves of the reality of what we wish. as soon as it was suspected that bonaparte would accept the power offered him, an outcry was raised about a conspiracy against the republic, and measures were sought for preserving it. but necessity, and indeed, it must be confessed, the general feeling of the people, consigned the execution of those measures to him who was to subvert the republic. on his return to paris bonaparte spoke and acted like a man who felt his own power; he cared neither for flattery, dinners, nor balls,--his mind took a higher flight. we arrived in paris on the 24th vendémiaire (the 16th of october). as yet he knew nothing of what was going on; for he had seen neither his wife nor his brothers, who were looking for him on the burgundy road. the news of our landing at fréjus had reached paris by a telegraphic despatch. madame bonaparte, who was dining with m. gohier when that despatch was communicated to him, as president of the directory, immediately set off to meet her husband, well knowing how important it was that her first interview with him should not be anticipated by his brothers. the imprudent communications of junot at the fountains of messoudiah will be remembered, but, after the first ebullition of jealous rage, all traces of that feeling had apparently disappeared. bonaparte however, was still harassed by secret suspicion, and the painful impressions produced by junot were either not entirely effaced or were revived after our arrival in paris. we reached the capital before josephine returned. the recollection of the past, the ill-natured reports of his brothers[33], and the exaggeration of facts had irritated napoleon to the very highest pitch, and he received josephine with studied coldness, and with an air of the most cruel indifference. he had no communication with her for three days, during which time he frequently spoke to me of suspicions which his imagination converted into certainty; and threats of divorce escaped his lips with no less vehemence than when we were on the confines of syria. i took upon me the office of conciliator, which i had before discharged with success. i represented to him the dangers to be apprehended from the publicity and scandal of such an affair; and that the moment when his grand views might possibly be realized was not the fit time to entertain france and europe with the details of a charge of adultery. i spoke to him of hortense and eugène, to whom he was much attached. reflection, seconded by his ardent affection for josephine, brought about a complete reconciliation. after these three days of conjugal misunderstanding their happiness was never afterwards disturbed by a similar cause[34]. [33]--[joseph bonaparte remarks on this that napoleon met josephine at paris before his brothers arrived there, (compare d'abrantès, vol. 1, pp. 260-262 and rémusat, tome i. pp. 147-148.)]- [34]--[in speaking of the unexpected arrival of bonaparte and of the meeting between him and josephine, madame junot says: "on the 10th october josephine set off to meet her husband, but without knowing exactly what road he would take. she thought it likely he would come by way of burgundy, and therefore louis and she set off for lyons. "madame bonaparte was a prey to great and well-founded aspersions. whether she was guilty or only imprudent, she was strongly accused by the bonaparte family, who were desirous that napoleon should obtain a divorce. the elder m. de caulaincourt stated to us his apprehensions on this point; but whenever the subject was introduced my mother changed the conversation, because, knowing as she did the sentiments of the bonaparte family, she could not reply without either committing them or having recourse to falsehood. she knew, moreover, the truth of many circumstances which m. de caulaincourt seemed to doubt, and which her situation with respect to bonaparte prevented her from communicating to him. "madame bonaparte committed a great fault in neglecting at this juncture to conciliate her mother-in-law, who might have protected her against those who sought her ruin and effected it nine years later; for the divorce in 1809 was brought about by the joint efforts of all the members of the bonaparte family, aided by some of napoleon's most confidential servants, whom josephine, either as madame bonaparte or as empress, had done nothing to make her friends. "bonaparte, on his arrival in paris, found his house deserted: but his mother, sisters, and sisters-in-law, and, in short, every member of his family, except louis, who had attended madame bonaparte to lyons, came to him immediately. the impression made upon him by the solitude of his home and its desertion by its mistress was profound and terrible, and nine years afterwards, when the ties between him and josephine were severed for ever, he showed that it was not effaced. from not finding her with his family he inferred that she felt herself unworthy of their presence, and feared to meet the man she had wronged. he considered her journey to lyons as a mere pretence. "m. de bourrienne says that for some days after josephine's return bonaparte treated her with extreme coldness. as he was an eyewitness, why does he not state the whole truth, and say that on her return bonaparte refused to see her and did not see her? it was to the earnest entreaties of her children that she owed the recovery, not of her husband's love, for that had long ceased, but of that tenderness acquired by habit, and that intimate intercourse which made her still retain the rank of consort to the greatest man of his age. bonaparte was at this period much attached to eugène beauharnais, who, to do him justice, was a charming youth. he knew less of hortense; but her youth and sweetness of temper, and the protection of which, as his adopted daughter, she besought him not to deprive her, proved powerful advocates, and overcame his resistance. "in this delicate negotiation it was good policy not to bring any other person into play, whatever might be their influence with bonaparte, and madame bonaparte did not, therefore, have recourse either to barras, bourrienne, or berthier. it was expedient that they who interceded for her should be able to say something without the possibility of a reply. now bonaparte could not with any degree of propriety explain to such children as eugène or hortense the particulars of their mother's conduct. he was therefore constrained to silence, and had no argument to combat the tears of two innocent creatures at his feet exclaiming, 'do not abandon our mother; she will break her heart! and ought injustice to take from us, poor orphans, whose natural protector the scaffold has already deprived us of, the support of one whom providence has sent to replace him!' "the scene, as bonaparte has since stated, was long and painful, and the two children at length introduced their mother, and placed her in his arms. the unhappy woman had awaited his decision at the door of a small back staircase, extended at almost full length upon the stairs, suffering the acutest pangs of mental torture. "whatever might be his wife's errors, bonaparte appeared entirely to forget them, and the reconciliation was complete. of all the members of the family madame leclerc was most vexed at the pardon which napoleon had granted to his wife. bonaparte's mother was also very ill pleased; but she said nothing. madame joseph bonaparte, who was always very amiable, took no part in these family quarrels; therefore she could easily determine what part to take when fortune smiled on josephine. as to madame bacciocchi, she gave free vent to her ill-humour and disdain; the consequence was that her sister-in-law could never endure her. christine who was a beautiful creature, followed the example of madame joseph, and caroline was so young that her opinion could have no weight in such an affair. as to bonaparte's brothers, they were at open war with josephine."]-on the day after his arrival bonaparte visited the directors[35]. the interview was cold. on the 24th of october he said to me, "i dined yesterday at gohier's; sieyès was present, and i pretended not to see him. i observed how much he was enraged at this mark of disrespect."-"but are you sure he is against you?" inquired i. "i know nothing yet; but he is a scheming man, and i don't like him." even at that time bonaparte had thoughts of getting himself elected a member of the directory in the room of sieyès. [35]--[the directors at this time were barras, sieyès, moulins, gohier, and roger ducos.]-chapter xxiii 1799. moreau and bernadotte--bonaparte's opinion of bernadotte--false report--the crown of sweden and the constitution of the year iii.- intrigues of bonaparte's brothers--angry conversation between bonaparte and bernadotte--bonaparte's version--josephine's version- an unexpected visit--the manège club--salicetti and joseph bonaparte --bonaparte invites himself to breakfast with bernadotte--country excursion--bernadotte dines with bonaparte--the plot and conspiracy --conduct of lucien--dinner given to bonaparte by the council of the five hundred--bonaparte's wish to be chosen a member of the directory--his reconciliation with sieyès--offer made by the directory to bonaparte--he is falsely accused by barras. to throw a clear light on the course of the great events which will presently be developed it is necessary to state briefly what intrigues had been hatched and what ambitious hopes had risen up while we were in egypt. when in egypt bonaparte was entirely deprived of any means of knowing what was going on in france; and in our rapid journey from fréjus to paris we had no opportunity of collecting much information. yet it was very important that we should know the real state of affairs, and the sentiments of those whom bonaparte had counted among his rivals in glory, and whom he might now meet among his rivals in ambition. moreau's military reputation stood very high, and bernadotte's firmness appeared inflexible. generally speaking, bonaparte might have reckoned among his devoted partisans the companions of his glory in italy, and also those whom he subsequently denominated "his egyptians." but brave men had distinguished themselves in the army of the rhine; and if they did not withhold their admiration from the conqueror of italy, they felt at least more personally interested in the admiration which they lavished on him who had repaired the disaster of scherer. besides, it must be borne in mind that a republican spirit prevailed, almost without exception, in the army, and that the directory appeared to be a government invented expressly to afford patronage to intriguers. all this planted difficulties in our way, and rendered it indispensably necessary that we should know our ground. we had, it is true, been greeted by the fullest measure of popular enthusiasm on our arrival; but this was not enough. we wanted suffrages of a more solid kind. during the campaign of egypt, bernadotte, who was a zealous republican, had been war minister[36], but he had resigned the portfolio to dubois-crancé three weeks before bonaparte's return to france. some partisans of the old minister were endeavouring to get him recalled, and it was very important to bonaparte's interests that he should prevent the success of this design. i recollect that on the second day of our arrival bonaparte said to me, "i have learned many things; but we shall see what will happen. bernadotte is a singular man. when he was war minister augereau, salicetti, and some others informed him that the constitution was in danger, and that it was necessary to get rid of sieyès, barras, and fouché, who were at the head of a plot. what did bernadotte do? nothing. he asked for proofs. none could be produced. he asked for powers. who could grant them? nobody. he should have taken them; but he would not venture on that. he wavered. he said he could not enter into the schemes which were proposed to him. he only promised to be silent on condition that they were renounced. bernadotte is not a help; he is an obstacle. i have heard from good authority that a great number of influential persons wished to invest him with extensive power for the public good; but he was obstinate, and would listen to nothing." [36]--[bernadotte was minister of war from 2d july 1799 to 14th september 1799, when, as he himself wrote to the directory, they "accepted" the resignation he had not offered.]-after a brief interval of silence, during which bonaparte rubbed his forehead with his right hand, he then resumed: "i believe i shall have bernadotte and moreau against me. but i do not fear moreau. he is devoid of energy. i know he would prefer military to political power. the promise of the command of an army would gain him over. but bernadotte has moorish blood in his veins. he is bold and enterprising. he is allied to my brothers[37]. he does not like me, and i am almost certain that he will oppose me. if he should become ambitious he will venture anything. and yet, you recollect in what a lukewarm way he acted on the 18th fructidor, when i sent him to second augereau. this devil of a fellow is not to be seduced. he is disinterested and clever. but, after all, we have but just arrived, and know not what may happen." [37]--[joseph bonaparte and bernadotte had married sisters. marie-julie and eugénie bernardine-desirée clary. the feeling of bourrienne for bernadotte makes this passage doubtful. it is to be noticed that in the same conversation he makes napoleon describe bernadotte as not venturing to act without powers and as enterprising. the stern republican becoming prince de monte carlo and king of sweden, in a way compatible with his fidelity to the constitution of the year iii., is good. lanfrey attributes bernadotte's refusal to join more to rivalry than to principle (lanfrey, tome i. p. 440). but in any case napoleon did not dread bernadotte, and was soon threatening to shoot him; see lucien, tome ii. p. 107.]-bernadotte, it was reported, had advised that bonaparte should be brought to a court-martial, on the two-fold charge of having abandoned his army and violated the quarantine laws. this report came to the ear of bonaparte; but he refused to believe it and he was right. bernadotte thought himself bound to the constitution which he had sworn to defend. hence the opposition he manifested to the measures of the 18th brumaire. but he cherished no personal animosity against bonaparte as long as he was ignorant of his ambitious designs. the extraordinary and complicated nature of subsequent events rendered his possession of the crown of sweden in no way incompatible with his fidelity to the constitution of the year iii. on our first arrival in paris, though i was almost constantly with the general, yet, as our routine of occupation was not yet settled, i was enabled now and then to snatch an hour or two from business. this leisure time i spent in the society of my family and a few friends, and in collecting information as to what had happened during our absence, for which purpose i consulted old newspapers and pamphlets. i was not surprised to learn that bonaparte's brothers--that is to say, joseph and lucien--had been engaged in many intrigues. i was told that sieyès had for a moment thought of calling the duke of brunswick to the head of the government; that barras would not have been very averse to favouring the return of the bourbons; and that moulins, roger ducos, and gohier alone believed or affected to believe, in the possibility of preserving the existing form of government. from what i heard at the time i have good reasons for believing that joseph and lucien made all sorts of endeavours to inveigle bernadotte into their brother's party, and in the hope of accomplishing that object they had assisted in getting him appointed war minister. however, i cannot vouch for the truth of this. i was told that bernadotte had at first submitted to the influence of bonaparte's two brothers; but that their urgent interference in their client's behalf induced him to shake them off, to proceed freely in the exercise of his duties, and to open the eyes of the directory on what the republic might have to apprehend from the enterprising character of bonaparte. it is certain that what i have to relate respecting the conduct of bernadotte to bonaparte is calculated to give credit to these assertions. all the generals who were in paris, with the exception of bernadotte, had visited bonaparte during the first three days which succeeded his arrival. bernadotte's absence was the more remarkable because he had served under bonaparte in italy. it was not until a fortnight had elapsed, and then only on the reiterated entreaties of joseph and madame joseph bonaparte (his sister-in-law), that he determined to go and see his old general-in-chief. i was not present at their interview, being at that moment occupied in the little cabinet of the rue chantereine. but i soon discovered that their conversation had been long and warm; for as soon as it was ended bonaparte entered the cabinet exceedingly agitated, and said to me, "bourrienne, how do you think bernadotte has behaved? you have traversed france with me--you witnessed the enthusiasm which my return excited--you yourself told me that you saw in that enthusiasm the desire of the french people to be relieved from the disastrous position in which our reverses have placed them. well! would you believe it? bernadotte boasts, with ridiculous exaggeration, of the brilliant and victorious situation of france! he talks about the defeat of the russians, the occupation of genoa, the innumerable armies that are rising up everywhere. in short, i know not what nonsense he has got in his head."--"what can all this mean?" said i. "did he speak about egypt?"-"oh, yes! now you remind me. he actually reproached me for not having brought the army back with me! 'but,' observed i, 'have you not just told me that you are absolutely overrun with troops; that all your frontiers are secure, that immense levies are going on, and that you will have 200,000 infantry?--if this be true, what do you want with a few thousand men who may ensure the preservation of egypt?' he could make no answer to this. but he is quite elated by the honour of having been war minister, and he told me boldly that he looked upon the army of egypt as lost nay, more. he made insinuations. he spoke of enemies abroad and enemies at home; and as he uttered these last words he looked significantly at me. i too gave him a glance! but stay a little. the pear will soon be ripe! you know josephine's grace and address. she was present. the scrutinising glance of bernadotte did not escape her, and she adroitly turned the conversation. bernadotte saw from my countenance that i had had enough of it, and he took his leave. but don't let me interrupt you farther. i am going back to speak to josephine." i must confess that this strange story made me very impatient to find myself alone with madame bonaparte, for i wished to hear her account of the scene. an opportunity occurred that very evening. i repeated to her what i had heard from the general, and all that she told me tended to confirm its accuracy. she added that bernadotte seemed to take the utmost pains to exhibit to the general a flattering picture of the prosperity of france; and she reported to me, as follows, that part of the conversation which was peculiarly calculated to irritate bonaparte:-"'i do not despair of the safety of the republic, which i am certain can restrain her enemies both abroad and at home.' as bernadotte uttered these last words,'" continued josephine, "his glance made me shudder. one word more and bonaparte could have commanded himself no longer! it is true," added she, "that it was in some degree his own fault, for it was he who turned the conversation on politics; and bernadotte, in describing the flourishing condition of france, was only replying to the general, who had drawn a very opposite picture of the state of things. you know, my dear bourrienne, that bonaparte is not always very prudent. i fear he has said too much to bernadotte about the necessity of changes in the government." josephine had not yet recovered from the agitation into which this violent scene had thrown her. after i took leave of her i made notes of what she had told me. a few days after, when bonaparte, josephine, hortense, eugène, and i were together in the drawing-room, bernadotte unexpectedly entered. his appearance, after what had passed, was calculated to surprise us. he was accompanied by a person whom he requested permission to introduce to bonaparte. i have forgotten his name, but he was, i think, secretary-general while bernadotte was in office. bonaparte betrayed no appearance of astonishment. he received bernadotte with perfect ease, and they soon entered into conversation. bonaparte, who seemed to acquire confidence from the presence of those who were about him, said a great deal about the agitation which prevailed among the republicans, and expressed himself in very decided terms against the manège club.[38] i seconded him by observing that m. moreau de worms of my department, who was a member of that club, had himself complained to me of the violence that prevailed in it. "but, general," said bernadotte, "your brothers were its most active originators. yet," added he in a tone of firmness, "you accuse me of having favoured that club, and i repel the charge. it cannot be otherwise than false. when i came into office i found everything in the greatest disorder. i had no leisure to think about any club to which my duties did not call me. you know well that your friend salicetti, and that your brother, who is in your confidence, are both leading men in the manège club. to the instructions of i know not whom is to be attributed the violence of which you complain." at these words, and especially the tone in which bernadotte uttered 'i know not whom,' bonaparte could no longer restrain himself. "well, general," exclaimed he furiously, "i tell you plainly, i would rather live wild in the woods than in a state of society which affords no security." bernadotte then said, with great dignity of manner, "good god! general, what security would you have?" from the warmth evinced by bonaparte i saw plainly that the conversation would soon be converted into a dispute, and in a whisper i requested madame bonaparte to change the conversation, which she immediately did by addressing a question to some one present. bernadotte, observing madame bonaparte's design, checked his warmth. the subject of conversation was changed, and it became general. bernadotte soon took up his hat and departed. [38]--[the manège club, the last resort of the jacobins, formed in 1799, and closed seven or eight months afterwards. joseph bonaparte (erreurs, time i. p. 251) denies that he or lucien--for whom the allusion is meant--were members of this club, and he disputes this conversation ever having taken place. lucien (tome i. p. 219) treats this club as opposed to his party.]-one morning, when i entered bonaparte's chamber--it was, i believe, three or four days after the second visit of bernadotte--he said: "well, bourrienne, i wager you will not guess with whom i am going to breakfast this morning?"--"really, general, i ------"--"with bernadotte; and the best of the joke is, that i have invited myself. you would have seen how it was all brought about if you had been with us at the théâtre français, yesterday evening. you know we are going to visit joseph today at mortfontaine. well, as we were coming out of the theatre last night, finding myself side by side with bernadotte and not knowing what to talk about, i asked him whether he was to be of our party to-day? he replied in the affirmative; and as we were passing his house in the rue cisalpine[39], i told him, without any ceremony, that i should be happy to come and take a cup of coffee with him in the morning. he seemed pleased. what do you think of that, bourrienne?"--"why, general, i hope you may have reason on your part to be pleased with him."--" never fear, never fear. i know what i am about. this will compromise him with gohier. remember, you must always meet your enemies with a bold face, otherwise they think they are feared, and that gives them confidence." [39]--[joseph bonaparte lays great stress on the fact that napoleon would not have passed this house, which was far from the theatre (erreurs, tome i, p. 251).]-bonaparte stepped into the carriage with josephine, who was always ready when she had to go out with him, for he did not like to wait. they proceeded first to bernadotte's to breakfast, and from thence to mortfontaine. on his return bonaparte told me very little about what had passed during the day, and i could see that he was not in the best of humours. i afterwards learned that bonaparte had conversed a good deal with bernadotte, and that he had made every effort to render himself agreeable, which he very well knew how to do when he chose! but that, in spite of all his conversational talent; and supported as he was by the presence of his three brothers, and regnault de st. jean d'angély, he could not withstand the republican firmness of bernadotte. however, the number of his partisans daily augmented; for all had not the uncompromising spirit of bernadotte; and it will soon be seen that moreau himself undertook charge of the directors who were made prisoners on the 18th brumaire. bernadotte's shrewd penetration made him one of the first to see clearly into bonaparte's designs. he was well convinced of his determination to overthrow the constitution and possess himself of power. he saw the directory divided into two parties; the one duped by the promises and assurances of bonaparte, and the other conniving with him for the accomplishment of his plans. in these circumstances bernadotte offered his services to all persons connected with the government who, like himself, were averse to the change which he saw good reason to apprehend. but bonaparte was not the man to be outdone in cunning or activity; and every moment swelled the ranks of his adherents. on the 16th brumaire i dined in the rue de la victoire. bernadotte was present, and i believe general jourdan also. while the grand conspiracy was hastening to its accomplishment madame bonaparte and i had contrived a little plot of a more innocent kind. we let no one into our secret, and our 16th brumaire was crowned with complete success. we had agreed to be on the alert to prevent any fresh exchange of angry words. all succeeded to the utmost of our wishes. the conversation languished during dinner; but it was not dulness that we were afraid of. it turned on the subject of war, and in that vast field bonaparte's superiority over his interlocutors was undeniable. when we retired to the drawing-rooms a great number of evening visitors poured in, and the conversation then became animated, and even gay. bonaparte was in high spirits. he said to some one, smiling, and pointing to bernadotte, "you are not aware that the general yonder is a chouan."--"a chouan?" repeated bernadotte, also in a tone of pleasantry. "ah! general you contradict yourself. only the other day you taxed me with favouring the violence of the friends of the republic, and now you accuse me of protecting the chouans[40]. you should at least be consistent." a few moments after, availing himself of the confusion occasioned by the throng of visitors, bernadotte slipped off. [40]--[the "chouans," so called from their use of the cry of the screech-owl (chathouan) as a signal, were the revolted peasants of brittany and of maine.]-as a mark of respect to bonaparte the council of the five hundred appointed lucien its president. the event proved how important this nomination was to napoleon. up to the 19th brumaire, and especially on that day, lucien evinced a degree of activity, intelligence, courage, and presence of mind which are rarely found united in one individual. i have no hesitation in stating that to lucien's nomination and exertions must be attributed the success of the 19th brumaire. the general had laid down a plan of conduct from which he never deviated during the twenty-three days which intervened between his arrival in paris and the 18th brumaire. he refused almost all private invitations, in order to avoid indiscreet questions, unacceptable offers, and answers which might compromise him. it was not without some degree of hesitation that he yielded to a project started by lucien, who, by all sorts of manoeuvring, had succeeded in prevailing on a great number of his colleagues to be present at a grand subscription dinner to be given to bonaparte by the council of the ancients. the disorder which unavoidably prevailed in a party amounting to upwards of 250 persons, animated by a diversity of opinions and sentiments; the anxiety and distrust arising in the minds of those who were not in the grand plot, rendered this meeting one of the most disagreeable i ever witnessed. it was all restraint and dulness. bonaparte's countenance sufficiently betrayed his dissatisfaction; besides, the success of his schemes demanded his presence elsewhere. almost as soon as he had finished his dinner he rose, saying to berthier and me, "i am tired: let us be gone." he went round to the different tables, addressing to the company compliments and trifling remarks, and departed, leaving at table the persons by whom he had been invited. this short political crisis was marked by nothing more grand, dignified, or noble than the previous revolutionary commotions. all these plots were so contemptible, and were accompanied by so much trickery, falsehood, and treachery, that, for the honour of human nature, it is desirable to cover them with a veil. general bonaparte's thoughts were first occupied with the idea he had conceived even when in italy, namely, to be chosen a director. nobody dared yet to accuse him of being a deserter from the army of the east. the only difficulty was to obtain a dispensation on the score of age. and was this not to be obtained? no sooner was he installed in his humble abode in the rue de la victoire than he was assured that, on the retirement of rewbell, the majority of suffrages would have devolved on him had he been in france, and had not the fundamental law required the age of forty; but that not even his warmest partisans were disposed to violate the yet infant constitution of the year iii. bonaparte soon perceived that no efforts would succeed in overcoming this difficulty, and he easily resolved to possess himself wholly of an office of which he would nominally have had only a fifth part had he been a member of the directory. as soon as his intentions became manifest he found himself surrounded by all those who recognised in him the man they had long looked for. these persons, who were able and influential in their own circles, endeavoured to convert into friendship the animosity which existed between sieyès and bonaparte. this angry feeling had been increased by a remark made by sieyès, and reported to bonaparte. he had said, after the dinner at which bonaparte treated him so disrespectfully, "do you see how that little insolent fellow behaves to a member of a government which would do well to order him to be shot?" but all was changed when able mediators pointed out to bonaparte the advantage of uniting with sieyès for the purpose of overthrowing a constitution which he did not like. he was assured how vain it would be to think of superseding him, and that it would be better to flatter him with the hope of helping to subvert the constitution and raising up a new one. one day some one said to bonaparte in my hearing, "seek for support among the party who call the friends of the republic jacobins, and be assured that sieyès is at the head of that party." on the 25th vendémiaire (17th of october) the directory summoned general bonaparte to a private sitting. "they offered me the choice of any army i would command," said he to me the next morning. "i would not refuse, but i asked to be allowed a little time for the recovery of my health; and, to avoid any other embarrassing offers, i withdrew. i shall go to no more of their sittings." (he attended only one after this.) "i am determined to join sieyès' party. it includes a greater diversity of opinions than that of the profligate barras. he proclaims everywhere that he is the author of my fortune. he will never be content to play an inferior part, and i will never bend to such a man. he cherishes the mad ambition of being the support of the republic. what would he do with me? sieyès, on the contrary, has no political ambition." no sooner did sieyès begin to grow friendly with bonaparte than the latter learned from him that barras had said, "the 'little corporal' has made his fortune in italy and does not want to go back again." bonaparte repaired to the directory for the sole purpose of contradicting this allegation. he complained to the directors of its falsehood, boldly affirmed that the fortune he was supposed to possess had no existence, and that even if he had made his fortune it was not, at all events, at the expense of the republic "you know," said he to me, "that the mines of hydria have furnished the greater part of what i possess."--"is it possible," said i, "that barras could have said so, when you know so well of all the peculations of which he has been guilty since your return?" bonaparte had confided the secret of his plans to very few persons--to those only whose assistance he wanted. the rest mechanically followed their leaders and the impulse which was given to them; they passively awaited the realisation of the promises they had received, and on the faith of which they had pledged themselves. chapter xxiv. 1799. cambacérès and lebrun--gohier deceived--my nocturnal visit to barras --the command of the army given to bonaparte--the morning of the 18th brumaire--meeting of the generals at bonaparte's house- bernadotte's firmness--josephine's interest, for madame gohier- disappointment of the directors--review in the gardens of the tuileries--bonaparte's harangue--proclamation of the ancients- moreau, jailer of the luxembourg--my conversation with la vallette- bonaparte at st. cloud. the parts of the great drama which was shortly to be enacted were well distributed. during the three days preceding the 18th brumaire every one was at his post. lucien, with equal activity and intelligence, forwarded the conspiracy in the two councils; sieyès had the management of the directory; réal[41], under the instructions of fouché[42], negotiated with the departments, and dexterously managed, without compromising fouché, to ruin those from whom that minister had received his power. there was no time to lose; and fouché said to me on the 14th brumaire, "tell your general to be speedy; if he delays, he is lost." [41]--[pierre francois réal (1757-1834); public accuser before the revolutionary criminal tribunal; became, under napoleon, conseiller d'etat and comte, and was charged with the affairs of the "haute police."]- [42]--[joseph fouché (1754-1820); conventionalist; member of extreme jacobin party; minister of police under the directory, august 1799; retained by napoleon in that ministry till 1802, and again from 1804 to 1810; became duc d'otrante in 1809; disgraced in 1810, and sent in 1813 as governor of the illyrian provinces; minister of police during the 'cent jours'; president of the provisional government, 1815; and for a short time minister of police under second restoration.]-on the 17th, regnault de st. jean d'angély told bonaparte that the overtures made to cambacérès and lebrun had not been received in a very decided way. "i will have no tergiversation," replied bonaparte with warmth. "let them not flatter themselves that i stand in need of them. they must decide to-day; to-morrow will be too late. i feel myself strong enough now to stand alone." cambacérès[43] and lebrun[44] were almost utter strangers to the intrigues which preceded the 18th brumaire. bonaparte had cast his eyes on the minister of justice to be one of his colleagues when he should be at liberty to name them, because his previous conduct had pledged him as a partisan of the revolution. to him bonaparte added lebrun, to counterbalance the first choice. lebrun was distinguished for honourable conduct and moderate principles. by selecting these two men bonaparte hoped to please every one; besides, neither of them were able to contend against his fixed determination and ambitious views. [43]--[cambacérès (j. j. régis de) (1763-1824) conventionalist; minister of justice under directory, 1799; second consul, 25th december 1799; arch-chancellor of the empire, 1804; duc de parma, 1806; minister of justice during the 'cent jours': took great part in all the legal and administrative projects of the consulate and empire.]- [44]--[charles francois lebrun (1757-1824). deputy to the national assembly, and member of the council of the five hundred; third consul, 25th december 1799; arch-treasurer of the empire, 1804; duc de plaisance, 1806; governor-general of holland, 1806; lieutenant-governor of holland, 1810 to 1813; chiefly engaged in financial measures]-what petty intrigues marked the 17th brumaire! on that day i dined with bonaparte; and after dinner he said, "i have promised to dine to-morrow with gohier; but, as you may readily suppose, i do not intend going. however, i am very sorry for his obstinacy. by way of restoring his confidence josephine is going to invite him to breakfast with us to-morrow. it will be impossible for him to suspect anything. i saw barras this morning, and left him much disturbed. he asked me to return and visit him to-night. i promised to do so, but i shall not go. to-morrow all will be over. there is but little time; he expects me at eleven o'clock to-night. you shall therefore take my carriage, go there, send in my name, and then enter yourself. tell him that a severe headache confines me to my bed, but that i will be with him without fail tomorrow. bid him not be alarmed, for all will soon be right again. elude his questions as much as possible; do not stay long, and come to me on your return." at precisely eleven o'clock i reached the residence of barras, in general bonaparte's carriage. solitude and silence prevailed in all the apartments through which i passed to barras' cabinet. bonaparte was announced, and when barras saw me enter instead of him, he manifested the greatest astonishment and appeared much cast down. it was easy to perceive that he looked on himself as a lost man. i executed my commission, and stayed only a short time. i rose to take my leave, and he said, while showing me out, "i see that bonaparte is deceiving me: he will not come again. he has settled everything; yet to me he owes all." i repeated that he would certainly come tomorrow, but he shook his head in a way which plainly denoted that he did not believe me. when i gave bonaparte an account of my visit he appeared much pleased. he told me that joseph was going to call that evening on bernadotte, and to ask him to come tomorrow. i replied that, from all i knew, he would be of no use to him. "i believe so too," said he; "but he can no longer injure me, and that is enough. well, good-night; be here at seven in the morning." it was then one o'clock. i was with him a little before seven o'clock on the morning of the 18th brumaire, and on my arrival i found a great number of generals and officers assembled. i entered bonaparte's chamber, and found him already up--a thing rather unusual with him. at this moment he was as calm as on the approach of a battle. in a few moments joseph and bernadotte arrived. joseph had not found him at home on the preceding evening, and had called for him that morning. i was surprised to see bernadotte in plain clothes, and i stepped up to him and said in a low voice, "general, every one here, except you and i, is in uniform."--"why should i be in uniform?" said he. as he uttered these words bonaparte, struck with the same surprise as myself, stopped short while speaking to several persons around him, and turning quickly towards bernadotte said, "how is this? you are not in uniform!"--"i never am on a morning when i am not on duty," replied bernadotte.--"you will be on duty presently."--"i have not heard a word of it: i should have received my orders sooner." bonaparte then led bernadotte into an adjoining room. their conversation was not long, for there was no time to spare. on the other hand, by the influence of the principal conspirators the removal of the legislative body to st. cloud was determined on the morning of the 18th brumaire, and the command of the army was given to bonaparte. all this time barras was no doubt waiting for bonaparte, and madame bonaparte was expecting gohier to breakfast. at bonaparte's were assembled all the generals who were devoted to him. i never saw so great a number before in the rue de la victoire. they were all, except bernadotte, in full uniform; and there were, besides, half a dozen persons there initiated in the secrets of the day. the little hotel of the conqueror of italy was much too small for such an assemblage, and several persons were standing in the court-yard. bonaparte was acquainted with the decree of the council of the ancients, and only waited for its being brought to him before he should mount his horse. that decree was adopted in the council of the ancients by what may be called a false majority, for the members of the council were summoned at different hours, and it was so contrived that sixty or eighty of them, whom lucien and his friends had not been able to gain over, should not receive their notices in time. as soon as the message from the council of the ancients arrived bonaparte requested all the officers at his house to follow him. at that announcement a few who were in ignorance of what was going on did not follow--at least i saw two groups separately leave the hotel. bernadotte said to me, "i shall stay with you." i perceived there was a good deal of suspicion in his manner. bonaparte, before going down the stairs which led from the small round dining-room into the courtyard, returned quickly to bid bernadotte follow him. he would not, and bonaparte then said to me, while hurrying off, "gohier is not come--so much the worse for him," and leaped on his horse. scarcely was he off when bernadotte left me. josephine and i being now left alone, she acquainted me with her anxiety. i assured her that everything had been so well prepared that success was certain. she felt much interest about gohier on account of her friendship for his wife. she asked me whether i was well acquainted with gohier. "you know, madame," replied i, "that we have been only twenty days in paris, and that during that time i have only gone out to sleep in the rue martel. i have seen m. gohier several times, when he came to visit the general, and have talked to him about the situation of our affairs in switzerland, holland, france, and other political matters, but i never exchanged a word with him as to what is now going on. this is the whole extent of my acquaintance with him." "i am sorry for it," resumed josephine, "because i should have asked you to write to him, and beg him to make no stir, but imitate sieyès and roger, who will voluntarily retire, and not to join barras, who is probably at this very moment forced to do so. bonaparte has told me that if gohier voluntarily resigns, he will do everything for him." i believe josephine communicated directly with the president of the directory through a friend of madame gohier's. gohier and moulins, no longer depending on sieyès and roger ducos, waited for their colleague, barras, in the hall of the directory, to adopt some measure on the decree for removing the councils to st. cloud. but they were disappointed; for barras, whose eyes had been opened by my visit on the preceding night, did not join them. he had been invisible to his colleagues from the moment that bruix and m. de talleyrand had informed him of the reality of what he already suspected, and insisted on his retirement. on the 18th brumaire a great number of military, amounting to about 10,000 men, were assembled in the gardens of the tuileries, and were reviewed by bonaparte, accompanied by generals beurnonville, moreau, and macdonald. bonaparte read to them the decree just issued by the commission of inspectors of the council of the ancients, by which the legislative body was removed to st. cloud; and by which he himself was entrusted with the execution of that decree, and appointed to the command of all the military force in paris, and afterwards delivered an address to the troops. whilst bonaparte was haranguing the soldiers, the council of the ancients published an address to the french people, in which it was declared that the seat of the legislative body was changed, in order to put down the factions, whose object was to control the national representation. while all this was passing abroad i was at the general's house in the rue de la victoire; which i never left during the whole day. madame bonaparte and i were not without anxiety in bonaparte's absence. i learned from josephine that joseph's wife had received a visit from adjutant-general rapatel, who had been sent by bonaparte and moreau to bring her husband to the tuileries. joseph was from home at the time, and so the message was useless. this circumstance, however, awakened hopes which we had scarcely dared to entertain. moreau was then in accordance with bonaparte, for rapatel was sent in the name of both generals. this alliance, so long despaired of, appeared to augur favourably. it was one of bonaparte's happy strokes. moreau, who was a slave to military discipline, regarded his successful rival only as a chief nominated by the council of the ancients. he received his orders and obeyed them. bonaparte appointed him commander of the guard of the luxembourg, where the directors were under confinement. he accepted the command, and no circumstance could have contributed more effectually to the accomplishment of bonaparte's views and to the triumph of his ambition. at length bonaparte, whom we had impatiently expected, returned. almost everything had gone well with him, for he had had only to do with soldiers. in the evening he said to me, "i am sure that the committee of inspectors of the hall are at this very moment engaged in settling what is to be done at st. cloud to-morrow. it is better to let them decide the matter, for by that means their vanity is flattered. i will obey orders which i have myself concerted." what bonaparte was speaking of had been arranged nearly two or three days previously. the committee of inspectors was under the influence of the principal conspirators. in the evening of this anxious day, which was destined to be succeeded by a stormy morrow, bonaparte, pleased with having gained over moreau, spoke to me of bernadotte's visit in the morning.--"i saw," said he, "that you were as much astonished as i at bernadotte's behaviour. a general out of uniform! he might as well have come in slippers. do you know what passed when i took him aside? i told him all; i thought that the best way. i assured him that his directory was hated, and his constitution worn out; that it was necessary to turn them all off, and give another impulse to the government. 'go and put on your uniform said i: i cannot wait for you long. you will find me at the tuileries, with the rest of our comrades. do not depend on moreau, beurnonville, or the generals of your party. when you know them better you will find that they promise much but perform little. do not trust them.' bernadotte then said that he would not take part in what he called a rebellion. a rebellion! bourrienne, only think of that! a set of imbeciles, who from morning to night do nothing but debate in their kennels! but all was in vain. i could not move bernadotte. he is a bar of iron. i asked him to give me his word that he would do nothing against me; what do you think was his answer?"--"something unpleasant, no doubt."--"unpleasant! that is too mild a word. he said, 'i will remain quiet as a citizen; but if the directory order me to act, i will march against all disturbers.' but i can laugh at all that now. my measures are taken, and he will have no command. however, i set him at ease as to what would take place. i flattered him with a picture of private life, the pleasures of the country, and the charms of malmaison; and i left him with his head full of pastoral dreams. in a word, i am very well satisfied with my day's work. good-night, bourrienne; we shall see what will turn up to-morrow." on the 19th i went to st. cloud with my friend la vallette. as we passed the place louis xv., now louis xvi., he asked me what was doing, and what my opinion was as to the coming events? without entering into any detail i replied, "my friend, either we shall sleep tomorrow at the luxembourg, or there will be an end of us." who could tell which of the two things would happen! success legalised a bold enterprise, which the slightest accident might have changed into a crime. the sitting of the ancients, under the presidency of lemercier, commenced at one o'clock. a warm discussion took place upon the situation of affairs, the resignation of the members of the directory, and the immediate election of others. great heat and agitation prevailed during the debate. intelligence was every minute carried to bonaparte of what was going forward, and he determined to enter the hall and take part in the discussion. he entered in a hasty and angry way, which did not give me a favourable foreboding of what he was about to say. we passed through a narrow passage to the centre of the hall; our backs were turned to the door. bonaparte had the president to his right. he could not see him full in the face. i was close to the general on his right. berthier was at his left. all the speeches which have been subsequently passed off as having been delivered by bonaparte on this occasion differ from each other; as well they may, for he delivered none to the ancients, unless his confused conversation with the president, which was alike devoid of dignity and sense, is to be called a speech. he talked of his "brothers in arms" and the "frankness of a soldier." the questions of the president followed each other rapidly: they were clear; but it is impossible to conceive anything more confused or worse delivered than the ambiguous and perplexed replies of bonaparte. he talked without end of "volcanoes; secret agitations, victories, a violated constitution!" he blamed the proceedings of the 18th fructidor, of which he was the first promoter and the most powerful supporter. he pretended to be ignorant of everything until the council of ancients had called him to the aid of his country. then came "caesar--cromwell--tyrant!" and he several times repeated, "i have nothing more to say to you!" though, in fact, he had said nothing. he alleged that he had been called to assume the supreme authority, on his return from italy, by the desire of the nation, and afterwards by his comrades in arms. next followed the words "liberty-equality!" though it was evident he had not come to st. cloud for the sake of either. no sooner did he utter these words, than a member of the ancients, named, i think, linglet, interrupting him, exclaimed, "you forget the constitution!" his countenance immediately lighted up; yet nothing could be distinguished but, "the 18th fructidor--the 30th prairial--hypocrites--intriguers--i will disclose all!--i will resign my power, when the danger which threatens the republic shall have passed away!" bonaparte, believing all his assertions to be admitted as proved, assumed a little confidence, and accused the two directors barras and moulins of having proposed to put him at the head of a party whose object was to oppose all men professing liberal ideas. at these words, the falsehood of which was odious, a great tumult arose in the hall. a general committee was loudly called for to hear the disclosures. "no, no!" exclaimed others, "no general committee! conspirators have been denounced: it is right that france should know all!" bonaparte was then required to enter into the particulars of his accusation against barras and moulins, and of the proposals which had been made to him: "you must no longer conceal anything." embarrassed by these interruptions and interrogatories bonaparte believed that he was completely lost. instead of giving an explanation of what he had said, he began to make fresh accusations; and against whom? the council of the five hundred, who, he said, wished for "scaffolds, revolutionary committees, and a complete overthrow of everything." violent murmurs arose, and his language became more and more incoherent and inconsequent. he addressed himself at one moment to the representatives of the people, who were quite overcome by astonishment; at another to the military in the courtyard, who could not hear him. then, by an unaccountable transition, he spoke of "the thunderbolts of war!" and added, that he was "attended by the god of war and the god of fortune." the president, with great calmness, told him that he saw nothing, absolutely nothing, upon which the council could deliberate; that there was vagueness in all he had said. "explain yourself; reveal the plot which you say you were urged to join." bonaparte repeated again the same things. but only those who were present can form any idea of his manner. there was not the slightest connection in what he stammered out. bonaparte was then no orator. it may well be supposed that he was more accustomed to the din of war than to the discussions of the tribunes. he was more at home before a battery than before a president's chair. perceiving the bad effect which this unconnected babbling produced on the assembly, as well as the embarrassment of bonaparte, i said, in a low voice, pulling him gently by the skirt of his coat, "withdraw, general; you know not what you are saying." i made signs to berthier, who was on his left, to second me in persuading him to leave the hall; and all at once, after having stammered out a few more words, he turned round exclaiming, "let those who love me follow me!" the sentinels at the door offered no opposition to his passing. the person who went before him quietly drew aside the tapestry which concealed the door, and general bonaparte leaped upon his horse, which stood in the court-yard. it is hard to say what would have happened if, on seeing the general retire, the president had said, "grenadiers, let no one pass!" instead of sleeping next day at the luxembourg he would, i am convinced, have ended his career on the place de la revolution. chapter xxv. 1799. the two councils--barras' letter--bonaparte at the council of the five hundred--false reports--tumultuous sitting--lucien's speech- he resigns the presidency of the council of the five hundred--he is carried out by grenadiers--he harangues the troops--a dramatic scene --murat and his soldiers drive out the five hundred--council of thirty--consular commission--decree--return to paris--conversation with bonaparte and josephine respecting gohier and bernadotte--the directors gohier and moulins imprisoned. the scene which occurred at the sitting of the council of the ancients was very different from that which passed outside. bonaparte had scarcely reached the courtyard and mounted his horse when cries of "vive bonaparte!" resounded on all sides. but this was only a sunbeam between two storms. he had yet to brave the council of the five hundred, which was far more excited than the council of the ancients. everything tended to create a dreadful uncertainty; but it was too late to draw back. we had already staked too heavily. the game was desperate, and everything was to be ventured. in a few hours all would be determined. our apprehensions were not without foundation. in the council of the five hundred agitation was at its height. the most serious alarm marked its deliberations. it had been determined to announce to the directory the installation of the councils, and to inquire of the council of the ancients their reasons for resolving upon an extraordinary convocation. but the directory no longer existed. sieyès and roger ducos had joined bonaparte's party. gohier and moulins were prisoners in the luxembourg, and in the custody of general moreau; and at the very moment when the council of the five hundred had drawn up a message to the directory, the council of the ancients transmitted to them the following letter, received from barras. this letter, which was addressed to the council of the ancients, was immediately read by lucien bonaparte, who was president of the council of the five hundred. citizen president--having entered into public affairs solely from my love of liberty, i consented to share the first magistracy of the state only that i might be able to defend it in danger; to protect against their enemies the patriots compromised in its cause; and to ensure to the defenders of their country that attention to their interests which no one was more calculated to feel than a citizen, long the witness of their heroic virtues, and always sensible to their wants. the glory which accompanies the return of the illustrious warrior to whom i had the honour of opening the path of glory, the striking marks of confidence given him by the legislative body, and the decree of the national convention, convince me that, to whatever post he may henceforth be called, the dangers to liberty will be averted, and the interests of the army ensured. i cheerfully return to the rank of a private citizen: happy, after so many storms, to resign, unimpaired, and even more glorious than ever, the destiny of the republic, which has been, in part, committed to my care. (signed) barras. this letter occasioned a great sensation in the council of the five hundred. a second reading was called for, and a question was started, whether the retirement was legal, or was the result of collusion, and of the influence of bonaparte's agents; whether to believe barras, who declared the dangers of liberty averted, or the decree for the removal of the legislative corps, which was passed and executed under the pretext of the existence of imminent peril? at that moment bonaparte appeared, followed by a party of grenadiers, who remained at the entrance of the hall. i did not accompany him to the council of the five hundred. he had directed me to send off an express to ease the apprehensions of josephine, and to assure her that everything would go well. it was some time before i joined him again. however, without speaking as positively as if i had myself been an eye-witness of the scene, i do not hesitate to declare that all that has been said about assaults and poniards is pure invention. i rely on what was told me, on the very night, by persons well worthy of credit, and who were witnessess of all that passed. as to what passed at the sitting, the accounts, given both at the time and since, have varied according to opinions. some have alleged that unanimous cries of indignation were excited by the appearance of the military. from all parts of the hall resounded, "the sanctuary of the laws is violated. down with the tyrant!--down with cromwell!--down with the dictator!" bonaparte stammered out a few words, as he had done before the council of the ancients, but his voice was immediately drowned by cries of "vive la republique!" "vive la constitution!" "outlaw the dictator!" the grenadiers are then said to have rushed forward, exclaiming, "let us save our general!" at which indignation reached its height, and cries, even more violent than ever, were raised; that bonaparte, falling insensible into the arms of the grenadiers, said, "they mean to assassinate me!" all that regards the exclamations and threats i believe to be correct; but i rank with the story of the poniards the assertion of the members of the five hundred being provided with firearms, and the grenadiers rushing into the hall; because bonaparte never mentioned a word of anything of the sort to me, either on the way home, or when i was with him in his chamber. neither did he say anything on the subject to his wife, who had been extremely agitated by the different reports which reached her. after bonaparte left the council of the five hundred the deliberations were continued with great violence. the excitement caused by the appearance of bonaparte was nothing like subsided when propositions of the most furious nature were made. the president, lucien, did all in his power to restore tranquillity. as soon as he could make himself heard he said, "the scene which has just taken place in the council proves what are the sentiments of all; sentiments which i declare are also mine. it was, however, natural to believe that the general had no other object than to render an account of the situation of affairs, and of something interesting to the public. but i think none of you can suppose him capable of projects hostile to liberty." each sentence of lucien's address was interrupted by cries of "bonaparte has tarnished his glory! he is a disgrace to the republic!" lucien[45] made fresh efforts to be heard, and wished to be allowed to address the assembly as a member of the council, and for that purpose resigned the presidentship to chasal. he begged that the general might be introduced again and heard with calmness. but this proposition was furiously opposed. exclamations of "outlaw bonaparte! outlaw him!" rang through the assembly, and were the only reply given to the president. lucien, who had reassumed the president's chair, left it a second time, that he might not be constrained to put the question of outlawry demanded against his brother. braving the displeasure of the assembly, he mounted the tribune, resigned the presidentship, renounced his seat as a deputy, and threw aside his robes. [45]--[the next younger brother of napoleon, president of the council of the five hundred in 1799; minister of the interior, 1st december 1799 to 1841; ambassador in spain, 1801 to december 1801; left france in disgrace in 1804; retired to papal states; prisoner in malta and england, 1810 to 1814; created by pope in 1814 prince de canino and duc de musignano; married firstly, 1794, christine boyer, who died 1800; married secondly, 1802 or 1803, a madame jonberthon. of his part in the 18th brumaire napoleon said to him in 1807, "i well know that you were useful to me on the 18th brumaire, but it is not so clear to me that you saved me then" (iung's lucien, tome iii. p.89).]-just as lucien left the council i entered. bonaparte, who was well informed of all that was passing[46], had sent in soldiers to the assistance of his brother; they carried him off from the midst of the council, and bonaparte thought it a matter of no little importance to have with him the president of an assembly which he treated as rebellious. lucien was reinstalled in office; but he was now to discharge his duties, not in the president's chair, but on horseback, and at the head of a party of troops ready to undertake anything. roused by the danger to which both his brother and himself were exposed he delivered on horseback the following words, which can never be too often remembered, as showing what a man then dared to say, who never was anything except from the reflection of his brother's glory:- citizens! soldiers!--the president of the council of the five hundred declares to you that the majority of that council is at this moment held in terror by a few representatives of the people, who are armed with stilettoes, and who surround the tribune, threatening their colleagues with death, and maintaining most atrocious discussions. i declare to you that these brigands, who are doubtless in the pay of england, have risen in rebellion against the council of the ancients, and have dared to talk of outlawing the general, who is charged with the execution of its decree, as if the word "outlaw" was still to be regarded as the death-warrant of persons most beloved by their country. i declare to you that these madmen have outlawed themselves by their attempts upon the liberty of the council. in the name of that people, which for so many years have been the sport of terrorism, i consign to you the charge of rescuing the majority of their representatives; so that, delivered from stilettoes by bayonets, they may deliberate on the fate of the republic. general, and you, soldiers, and you, citizens, you will not acknowledge, as legislators of france, any but those who rally round me. as for those who remain in the orangery, let force expel them. they are not the representatives of the people, but the representatives of the poniard. let that be their title, and let it follow them everywhere; and whenever they dare show themselves to the people, let every finger point at them, and every tongue designate them by the well-merited title of representatives of the poniard! vive la republique! [46]--[lucien distinctly states that he himself, acting within his right as president, had demanded an escort of the grenadiers of the councils as soon as he saw his withdrawal might be opposed. then the first entry of the soldiers with napoleon would be illegal. the second, to withdraw lucien, was nominally legal (see iung's lucien, tome i, pp. 318-322)]-notwithstanding the cries of "vive bonaparte!" which followed this harangue, the troops still hesitated. it was evident that they were not fully prepared to turn their swords against the national representatives. lucien then drew his sword, exclaiming, "i swear that i will stab my own brother to the heart if he ever attempt anything against the liberty of frenchmen." this dramatic action was perfectly successful; hesitation vanished; and at a signal given by bonaparte, murat, at the head of his grenadiers, rushed into the hall, and drove out the representatives. everyone yielded to the reasoning of bayonets, and thus terminated the employment of the armed force on that memorable day. at ten o'clock at night the palace of st. cloud, where so many tumultuous scenes had occurred, was perfectly tranquil. all the deputies were still there, pacing the hall, the corridors, and the courts. most of them had an air of consternation; others affected to have foreseen the event, and to appear satisfied with it; but all wished to return to paris, which they could not do until a new order revoked the order for the removal of the councils to st. cloud. at eleven o'clock bonaparte, who had eaten nothing all day, but who was almost insensible to physical wants in moments of great agitation, said to me, "we must go and write, bourrienne; i intend this very night to address a proclamation to the inhabitants of paris. to-morrow morning i shall be all the conversation of the capital." he then dictated to me the following proclamation, which proves, no less than some of his reports from egypt, how much bonaparte excelled in the art of twisting the truth to own advantage: to the people. 19th brumaire, 11 o'clock, p.m. frenchmen!--on my return to france i found division reigning amongst all the authorities. they agreed only on this single point, that the constitution was half destroyed, and was unable to protect liberty! each party in turn came to me, confided to me their designs, imparted their secrets, and requested my support. i refused to be the man of a party. the council of the ancients appealed to me. i answered their appeal. a plan of general restoration had been concerted by men whom the nation has been accustomed to regard as the defenders of liberty, equality, and property. this plan required calm and free deliberation, exempt from all influence and all fear. the ancients, therefore, resolved upon the removal of the legislative bodies to st. cloud. they placed at my disposal the force necessary to secure their independence. i was bound, in duty to my fellow-citizens, to the soldiers perishing in our armies, and to the national glory, acquired at the cost of so much blood, to accept the command. the councils assembled at st. cloud. republican troops guaranteed their safety from without, but assassins created terror within. many members of the council of the five hundred, armed with stilettoes and pistols, spread menaces of death around them. the plans which ought to have been developed were withheld. the majority of the council was rendered inefficient; the boldest orators were disconcerted, and the inutility of submitting any salutary proposition was quite evident. i proceeded, filled with indignation and grief, to the council of the ancients. i besought them to carry their noble designs into execution. i directed their attention to the evils of the nation, which were their motives for conceiving those designs. they concurred in giving me new proofs of their uniform goodwill, i presented myself before the council of the five hundred, alone, unarmed, my head uncovered, just as the ancients had received and applauded me. my object was to restore to the majority the expression of its will, and to secure to it its power. the stilettoes which had menaced the deputies were instantly raised against their deliverer. twenty assassins rushed upon me and aimed at my breast. the grenadiers of the legislative body, whom i had left at the door of the hall, ran forward, and placed themselves between me and the assassins. one of these brave grenadiers (thomé[47]) had his clothes pierced by a stiletto. they bore me off. [47]--[thomé merely had a small part of his coat torn by a deputy, who took him by the collar. this constituted the whole of the attempted assassinations of the 19th brumaire.--bourrienne]- at the same moment cries of "outlaw him!" were raised against the defender of the law. it was the horrid cry of assassins against the power destined to repress them. they crowded round the president, uttering threats. with arms in their hands they commanded him to declare "the outlawry." i was informed of this. i ordered him to be rescued from their fury, and six grenadiers of the legislative body brought him out. immediately afterwards some grenadiers of the legislative body charged into the hall and cleared it. the factions, intimidated, dispersed and fled. the majority, freed from their assaults, returned freely and peaceably into the hall; listened to the propositions made for the public safety, deliberated, and drew up the salutary resolution which will become the new and provisional law of the republic. frenchmen, you doubtless recognise in this conduct the zeal of a soldier of liberty, of a citizen devoted to the republic. conservative, tutelary, and liberal ideas resumed their authority upon the dispersion of the factions, who domineered in the councils, and who, in rendering themselves the most odious of men, did not cease to be the most contemptible. (signed) bonaparte, general, etc. the day had been passed in destroying a government; it was necessary to devote the night to framing a new one. talleyrand, raederer, and sieyès were at st. cloud. the council of the ancients assembled, and lucien set himself about finding some members of the five hundred on whom he could reckon. he succeeded in getting together only thirty, who, with their president, represented the numerous assembly of which they formed part. this ghost of representation was essential, for bonaparte, notwithstanding his violation of all law on the preceding day, wished to make it appear that he was acting legally. the council of the ancients had, however, already decided that a provisional executive commission should be appointed, composed of three members, and was about to name the members of the commission--a measure which should have originated with the five hundred--when lucien came to acquaint bonaparte that his chamber 'introuvable' was assembled. this chamber, which called itself the council of the five hundred, though that council was now nothing but a council of thirty, hastily passed a decree, the first article of which was as follows: the directory exists no longer; and the individuals hereafter named are no longer members of the national representation, on account of the excesses and illegal acts which they have constantly committed, and more particularly the greatest part of them, in the sitting of this morning. then follow the names of sixty-one members expelled. by other articles of the same decree the council instituted a provisional commission, similar to that which the ancients had proposed to appoint, resolved that the said commission should consist of three members, who should assume the title of consuls; and nominated as consuls sieyès, roger ducos, and bonaparte. the other provisions of the nocturnal decree of st. cloud had for their object merely the carrying into effect those already described. this nocturnal sitting was very calm, and indeed it would have been strange had it been otherwise, for no opposition could be feared from the members of the five hundred, who were prepared to concur with lucien. all knew beforehand what they would have to do. everything was concluded by three o'clock in the morning; and the palace of st. cloud, which had been so agitated since the previous evening, resumed in the morning its wonted stillness, and presented the appearance of a vast solitude. all the hurrying about, the brief notes which i had to write to many friends, and the conversations in which i was compelled to take part, prevented me from dining before one o'clock in the morning. it was not till then that bonaparte, having gone to take the oath as consul before the five hundred, afforded me an opportunity of taking some refreshment with admiral bruix and some other officers. at three o'clock in the morning i accompanied bonaparte, in his carriage to paris. he was extremely fatigued after so many trials and fatigues. a new future was opened before him. he was completely absorbed in thought, and did not utter a single word during the journey. but when he arrived at his house in the rue de la victoire, he had no sooner entered his chamber and wished good morning to josephine, who was in bed, and in a state of the greatest anxiety on account of his absence, than he said before her, "bourrienne, i said many ridiculous things?"--"not so very bad, general"--"i like better to speak to soldiers than to lawyers. those fellows disconcerted me. i have not been used to public assemblies; but that will come in time." we then began, all three, to converse. madame bonaparte became calm, and bonaparte resumed his wonted confidence. the events of the day naturally formed the subject of our conversation. josephine, who was much attached to the gohier family, mentioned the name of that director in a tone of kindness. "what would you have, my dear?" said bonaparte to her. "it is not my fault. he is a respectable man, but a simpleton. he does not understand me!--i ought, perhaps, to have him transported. he wrote against me to the council of the ancients; but i have his letter, and they know nothing about it. poor man! he expected me to dinner yesterday. and this man thinks himself a statesman!--speak no more of him." during our discourse the name of bernadotte was also mentioned. "have you seen him, bourrienne?" said bonaparte to me.--"no, general"--"neither have i. i have not heard him spoken of. would you imagine it? i had intelligence to-day of many intrigues in which he is concerned. would you believe it? he wished nothing less than to be appointed my colleague in authority. he talked of mounting his horse and marching with the troops that might be placed under his command. he wished, he said, to maintain the constitution: nay, more; i am assured that he had the audacity to add that, if it were necessary to outlaw me, the government might come to him and he would find soldiers capable of carrying the decree into execution."--"all this, general, should give you an idea how inflexible his principles are."--"yes, i am well aware of it; there is something in that: he is honest. but for his obstinacy, my brothers would have brought him over. they are related to him. his wife, who is joseph's sister-in-law, has ascendency over him. as for me, have i not, i ask you, made sufficient advances to him? you have witnessed them. moreau, who has a higher military reputation than he, came over to me at once. however, i repent of having cajoled bernadotte. i am thinking of separating him from all his coteries without any one being able to find fault with the proceeding. i cannot revenge myself in any other manner. joseph likes him. i should have everybody against me. these family considerations are follies! goodnight, bourrienne.--by the way, we will sleep in the luxembourg to-morrow." i then left the general, whom, henceforth, i will call the first consul, after having remained with him constantly during nearly twenty-four hours, with the exception of the time when he was at the council of the five hundred. i retired to my lodging, in the rue martel, at five o'clock in the morning. it is certain that if gohier had come to breakfast on the morning of the 18th brumaire, according to madame bonaparte's invitation, he would have been one of the members of the government. but gohier acted the part of the stern republican. he placed himself, according to the common phrase of the time, astride of the constitution of the year iii.; and as his steed made a sad stumble, he fell with it. it was a singular circumstance which prevented the two directors gohier and moulins from defending their beloved constitution. it was from their respect for the constitution that they allowed it to perish, because they would have been obliged to violate the article which did not allow less than three directors to deliberate together. thus a king of castile was burned to death, because there did not happen to be in his apartment men of such rank as etiquette would permit to touch the person of the monarch. chapter xxvi. 1799. general approbation of the 18th brumaire--distress of the treasury- m. collot's generosity--bonaparte's ingratitude--gohier set at liberty--constitution of the year viii.--the senate, tribunate, and council of state--notes required on the character of candidates- bonaparte's love of integrity and talent--influence of habit over him--his hatred of the tribunate--provisional concessions--the first consular ministry--mediocrity of la place--proscription lists- cambacérès report--m. moreau de worms--character of sieyès- bonaparte at the luxembourg--distribution of the day and visits- lebrun's opposition--bonaparte's singing--his boyish tricks- assumption of the titles "madame" and "monseigneur"--the men of the revolution and the partisans of the bourbons--bonaparte's fears- confidential notes on candidates for office and the assemblies. it cannot be denied that france hailed, almost with unanimous voice, bonaparte's accession to the consulship as a blessing of providence. i do not speak now of the ulterior consequences of that event; i speak only of the fact itself, and its first results, such as the repeal of the law of hostages, and the compulsory loan of a hundred millions. doubtless the legality of the acts of the 18th brumaire may be disputed; but who will venture to say that the immediate result of that day ought not to be regarded as a great blessing to france? whoever denies this can have no idea of the wretched state of every branch of the administration at that deplorable epoch. a few persons blamed the 18th brumaire; but no one regretted the directory, with the exception, perhaps, of the five directors themselves. but we will say no more of the directorial government. what an administration! in what a state were the finances of france! would it be believed? on the second day of the consulate, when bonaparte wished to send a courier to general championet, commander-in-chief of the army of italy, the treasury had not 1200 francs disposable to give to the courier! it may be supposed that in the first moments of a new government money would be wanted. m. collot, who had served under bonaparte in italy, and whose conduct and administration deserved nothing but praise, was one of the first who came to the consul's assistance. in this instance m. collot was as zealous as disinterested. he gave the consul 500,000 francs in gold, for which service he was badly rewarded. bonaparte afterwards behaved to m. collot as though he was anxious to punish him for being rich. this sum, which at the time made so fine an appearance in the consular treasury, was not repaid for a long time after, and then without interest. this was not, indeed, the only instance in which m. collot had cause to complain of bonaparte, who was never inclined to acknowledge his important services, nor even to render justice to his conduct. on the morning of the 20th brumaire bonaparte sent his brother louis to inform the director gohier that he was free. this haste in relieving gohier was not without a reason, for bonaparte was anxious to install himself in the luxembourg, and we went there that same evening. everything was to be created. bonaparte had with him almost the whole of the army, and on the soldiers he could rely. but the military force was no longer sufficient for him. wishing to possess a great civil power established by legal forms, he immediately set about the composition of a senate and tribunate; a council of state and a new legislative body, and, finally, a new constitution[48]. [48]--[the constitution of the year viii. was presented on the 18th of december 1799 (22d frimaire, year viii.), and accepted by the people on the 7th of february 1800 (18th pluviose, year viii.). it established a consular government, composed of bonaparte, first consul, appointed for ten years; cambacérès, second consul, also for ten years; and lebrun, third consul appointed for five years. it established a conservative senate, a legislative body of 800 members, and a tribunate composed of 100 members. the establishment of the council of state took place on the 29th of december 1799. the installation of the new legislative body and the tribunate was fixed for the 1st of january 1800.--bourrienne. lanfrey (tome i. p. 329) sees this constitution foreshadowed in that proposed by napoleon in 1797 for the cisalpine republic.]-as bonaparte had not time to make himself acquainted with the persons by whom he was about to be surrounded, he requested from the most distinguished men of the period, well acquainted with france and the revolution, notes respecting the individuals worthy and capable of entering the senate, the tribunate, and the council of state. from the manner in which all these notes were drawn up it was evident that the writers of them studied to make their recommendation correspond with what they conceived to be bonaparte's views, and that they imagined he participated in the opinions which were at that time popular. accordingly they stated, as grounds for preferring particular candidates, their patriotism, their republicanism, and their having had seats in preceding assemblies. of all qualities, that which most influenced the choice of the first consul was inflexible integrity; and it is but just to say that in this particular he was rarely deceived. he sought earnestly for talent; and although he did not like the men of the revolution, he was convinced that he could not do without them. he had conceived an extreme aversion for mediocrity, and generally rejected a man of that character when recommended to him; but if he had known such a man long, he yielded to the influence of habit, dreading nothing so much as change, or, as he was accustomed to say himself, new faces[49]. [49]--[napoleon loved only men with strong passions and great weakness; he judged the most opposite qualities in men by these defects (metternich, tome iii. p.589)]-bonaparte then proceeded to organise a complaisant senate, a mute legislative body, and a tribunate which was to have the semblance of being independent, by the aid of some fine speeches and high-sounding phrases. he easily appointed the senators, but it was different with the tribunate. he hesitated long before he fixed upon the candidates for that body, which inspired him with an anticipatory fear. however, on arriving at power he dared not oppose himself to the exigencies of the moment, and he consented for a time to delude the ambitious dupes who kept up a buzz of fine sentiments of liberty around him. he saw that circumstances were not yet favourable for refusing a share in the constitution to this third portion of power, destined apparently to advocate the interests of the people before the legislative body. but in yielding to necessity, the mere idea of the tribunate filled him with the utmost uneasiness; and, in a word, bonaparte could not endure the public discussions on his projects[50]. [50]--[the tribunate under this constitution of the year viii. was the only body allowed to debate in public on proposed laws, the legislative body simply hearing in silence the orators sent by the council of state and by the tribunals to state reasons for or against propositions, and then voting in silence. its orators were constantly giving umbrage to napoleon. it was at first purified, early in 1802, by the senate naming the members to go out in rotation then reduced from 100 to 50 members later in 1802, and suppressed in 1807; its disappearance being regarded by napoleon as his last break with the revolution.]-bonaparte composed the first consular ministry as follows: berthier was minister of war; gaudin, formerly employed in the administration of the post office, was appointed minister of finance; cambacérès remained minister of justice; forfait was minister of marine; la place of the interior; fouché of police; and reinhard of foreign affairs. reinhard and la place were soon replaced, the former by the able m. talleyrand, the latter by lucien bonaparte[51]. it may be said that lucien merely passed through the ministry on his way to a lucrative embassy in spain. as to la place, bonaparte always entertained a high opinion of his talents. his appointment to the ministry of the interior was a compliment paid to science; but it was not long before the first consul repented of his choice. la place, so happily calculated for science, displayed the most inconceivable mediocrity in administration. he was incompetent to the most trifling matters; as if his mind, formed to embrace the system of the world, and to interpret the laws of newton and kepler, could not descend to the level of subjects of detail, or apply itself to the duties of the department with which he was entrusted for a short, but yet, with regard to him, too long a time. [51]--[when i quitted the service of the first consul talleyrand was still at the head of the foreign department. i have frequently been present at this great statesman's conferences with napoleon, and i can declare that i never saw him flatter his dreams of ambition; but, on the contrary, he always endeavoured to make him sensible of his true interests.--bourrienne.]-on the 26th brumaire (17th november 1799) the consuls issued a decree, in which they stated that, conformably with article iii. of the law of the 19th of the same month, which especially charged them with the reestablishment of public tranquillity, they decreed that thirty-eight individuals, who were named, should quit the continental territory of the republic, and for that purpose should proceed to rochefort, to be afterwards conducted to, and detained in, the department of french guiana. they likewise decreed that twenty-three other individuals, who were named, should proceed to the commune of rochelle, in the department of the lower charente, in order to be afterwards filed and detained in such part of that department as should be pointed out by the minister of general police. i was fortunate enough to keep my friend m. moreau de worms, deputy from the youne, out of the fiat of exiles. this produced a mischievous effect. it bore a character of wanton severity quite inconsistent with the assurances of mildness and moderation given at st. cloud on the 19th brumaire. cambacérès afterwards made a report, in which he represented that it was unnecessary for the maintenance of tranquillity to subject the proscribed to banishment, considering it sufficient to place them under the supervision of the superior police. upon receiving the report the consuls issued a decree, in which they directed all the individuals included in the proscription to retire respectively into the different communes which should be fixed upon by the minister of justice, and to remain there until further orders. at the period of the issuing of these decrees sieyès was still one of the consuls, conjointly with bonaparte and roger ducos; and although bonaparte had, from the first moment, possessed the whole power of the government, a sort of apparent equality was, nevertheless, observed amongst them. it was not until the 25th of december that bonaparte assumed the title of first consul, cambacérès and lebrun being then joined in the office with him. he had fixed his eyes on them previously to the 18th brumaire, and he had no cause to reproach them with giving him much embarrassment in his rapid progress towards the imperial throne. i have stated that i was so fortunate as to rescue m. moreau de worms from the list of proscription. some days after sieyès entered bonaparte's cabinet and said to him, "well, this m. moreau de worms, whom m. bourrienne induced you to save from banishment, is acting very finely! i told you how it would be! i have received from sens, his native place, a letter which informs me that moreau is in that town, where he has assembled the people in the market-place, and indulged in the most violent declamations against the 18th brumaire,"--"can you rely upon your agent" asked bonaparte.--"perfectly. i can answer for the truth of his communication." bonaparte showed me the bulletin of sieyès' agent, and reproached me bitterly. "what would you say, general," i observed, "if i should present this same m. moreau de worms, who is declaiming at sens against the 18th brumaire, to you within an hour?"--"i defy you to do it."--"i have made myself responsible for him, and i know what i am about. he is violent in his politics; but he is a man of honour, incapable of failing in his word."--"well, we shall see. go and find him." i was very sure of doing what i had promised, for within an hour before i had seen m. moreau de worms. he had been concealed since the 19th brumaire, and had not quitted paris. nothing was easier than to find him, and in three-quarters of an hour he was at the luxembourg. i presented him to bonaparte, who conversed with him a long time concerning the 18th brumaire. when m. moreau departed bonaparte said to me, "you are right. that fool sieyès is as inventive as a cassandra. this proves that one should not be too ready to believe the reports of the wretches whom we are obliged to employ in the police." afterwards he added, "bourrienne, moreau is a nice fellow: i am satisfied with him; i will do something for him." it was not long before m. moreau experienced the effect of the consul's good opinion. some days after, whilst framing the council of prizes, he, at my mere suggestion, appointed m. moreau one of the members, with a salary of 10,000 francs. on what extraordinary circumstances the fortunes of men frequently depend! as to sieyès, in the intercourse, not very frequent certainly, which i had with him, he appeared to be far beneath the reputation which he then enjoyed[52]. he reposed a blind confidence in a multitude of agents, whom he sent into all parts of france. when it happened, on other occasions, that i proved to him, by evidence as sufficient as that in the case of m. moreau, the falseness of the reports he had received, he replied, with a confidence truly ridiculous, "i can rely on my men." sieyès had written in his countenance, "give me money!" i recollect that i one day alluded to this expression in the anxious face of sieyès to the first consul. "you are right," observed he to me, smiling; "when money is in question, sieyès is quite a matter-of-fact man. he sends his ideology to the right about and thus becomes easily manageable. he readily abandons his constitutional dreams for a good round sum, and that is very convenient[53]." [52]--[m. de talleyrand, who is so capable of estimating men, and whose admirable sayings well deserve to occupy a place in history, had long entertained a similar opinion of sieyès. one day, when he was conversing with the second consul concerning sieyès, cambacérès said to him. "sieyès, however, is a very profound man."--"profound?" said talleyrand. "yes, he is, a cavity, a perfect cavity, as you would say."--bourrienne.]- [53]--[everybody knows, in fact, that sieyès refused to resign his consular dignities unless he received in exchange a beautiful farm situated in the park of versailles, and worth about 15,000 livres a year. the good abbé consoled himself for no longer forming a third of the republican sovereignty by making himself at home in the ancient domain of the kings of france.--bourrienne.]-bonaparte occupied, at the little luxembourg, the apartments on the ground floor which lie to the right on entering from the rue de vaugirard. his cabinet was close to a private staircase, which conducted me to the first floor, where josephine dwelt. my apartment was above. after breakfast, which was served at ten o'clock, bonaparte would converse for a few moments with his usual guests, that is to say, his 'aides de camp', the persons he invited, and myself, who never left him. he was also visited very often by deferment, regnault (of the town of st. jean d'angély), boulay (de la meurthe), monge, and berber, who were, with his brothers, joseph and lucien, those whom he most delighted to see; he conversed familiarly with them. cambacérès generally came at mid-day, and stayed some time with him, often a whole hour. lebrun visited but seldom. notwithstanding his elevation, his character remained unaltered; and bonaparte considered him too moderate, because he always opposed his ambitious views and his plans to usurp power. when bonaparte left the breakfast-table it was seldom that he did not add, after bidding josephine and her daughter hortense good-day, "come, bourrienne, come, let us to work." after the morning audiences i stayed with bonaparte all the day, either reading to him, or writing to his dictation. three or four times in the week he would go to the council. on his way to the hall of deliberation he was obliged to cross the courtyard of the little luxembourg and ascend the grand staircase. this always vexed him, and the more so as the weather was very bad at the time. this annoyance continued until the 25th of december, and it was with much satisfaction that he saw himself quit of it. after leaving the council he used to enter his cabinet singing, and god knows how wretchedly he sung! he examined whatever work he had ordered to be done, signed documents, stretched himself in his arm-chair, and read the letters of the preceding day and the publications of the morning. when there was no council he remained in his cabinet, conversed with me, always sang, and cut, according to custom, the arm of his chair, giving himself sometimes quite the air of a great boy. then, all at once starting up, he would describe a plan for the erection of a monument, or dictate some of those extraordinary productions which astonished and dismayed the world. he often became again the same man, who, under the walls of st. jean d'acre, had dreamed of an empire worthy his ambition. at five o'clock dinner was served up. when that was over the first consul went upstairs to josephine's apartments, where he commonly received the visits of the ministers. he was always pleased to see among the number the minister of foreign affairs, especially since the portfolio of that department had been entrusted to the hands of m. de talleyrand. at midnight, and often sooner, he gave the signal for retiring by saying in a hasty manner, "allons nous coucher." it was at the luxembourg, in the salons of which the adorable josephine so well performed the honours, that the word 'madame' came again into use. this first return towards the old french politeness was startling to some susceptible republicans; but things were soon carried farther at the tuileries by the introduction of 'votre altesse' on occasions of state ceremony, and monseigneur in the family circle. if, on the one hand, bonaparte did not like the men of the revolution, on the other he dreaded still more the partisans of the bourbons. on the mere mention of the name of those princes he experienced a kind of inward alarm; and he often spoke of the necessity of raising a wall of brass between france and them. to this feeling, no doubt, must be attributed certain nominations, and the spirit of some recommendations contained in the notes with which he was supplied on the characters of candidates, and which for ready reference were arranged alphabetically. some of the notes just mentioned were in the handwriting of regnault de st. jean d'angély, and some in lucien bonaparte's[54]. [54]--[among them was the following, under the title of "general observations": "in choosing among the men who were members of the constituent assembly it is necessary to be on guard against the orleans' party, which is not altogether a chimera, and may one day or other prove dangerous. "there is no doubt that the partisans of that family are intriguing secretly; and among many other proofs of this fact the following is a striking one: the journal called the 'aristargue', which undisguisedly supports royalism, is conducted by a man of the name of voidel, one of the hottest patriots of the revolution. he was for several months president of the committee of inquiry which caused the marquis de favras to be arrested and hanged, and gave so much uneasiness to the court. there was no one in the constituent assembly more hateful to the court than voidel, so much on account of his violence as for his connection with the duke of orleans, whose advocate and counsel he was. when the duke of orleans was arrested, voidel, braving the fury of the revolutionary tribunals, had the courage to defend him, and placarded all the walls of paris with an apology for the duke and his two sons. this man, writing now in favour of royalism, can have no other object than to advance a member of the orleans family to the throne."--bourrienne.]-at the commencement of the first consul's administration, though he always consulted the notes he had collected, he yet received with attention the recommendations of persons with whom he was well acquainted; but it was not safe for them to recommend a rogue or a fool. the men whom he most disliked were those whom he called babblers, who are continually prating of everything and on everything. he often said,-"i want more head and less tongue." what he thought of the regicides will be seen farther on, but at first the more a man had given a gage to the revolution, the more he considered him as offering a guarantee against the return of the former order of things. besides, bonaparte was not the man to attend to any consideration when once his policy was concerned. as i have said a few pages back, on taking the government into his own hands bonaparte knew so little of the revolution and of the men engaged in civil employments that it was indispensably necessary for him to collect information from every quarter respecting men and things. but when the conflicting passions of the moment became more calm and the spirit of party more prudent, and when order had been, by his severe investigations, introduced where hitherto unbridled confusion had reigned, he became gradually more scrupulous in granting places, whether arising from newly-created offices, or from those changes which the different departments often experienced. he then said to me, "bourrienne, i give up your department to you. name whom you please for the appointments; but remember you must be responsible to me." what a list would have been which should contain the names of all the prefects, sub-prefects, receivers-general, and other civil officers to whom i gave places! i have kept no memoranda of their names; and indeed, what advantage would there have been in doing so? it was impossible for me to have a personal knowledge of all the fortunate candidates; but i relied on recommendations in which i had confidence. i have little to complain of in those i obliged; though it is true that, since my separation from bonaparte, i have seen many of them take the opposite side of the street in which i was walking, and by that delicate attention save me the trouble of raising my hat. 