andersonville a story of rebel military prisons fifteen months a guest of the so-called southern confederacy a private soldiers experience in richmond, andersonville, savannah, millen blackshear and florence by john mcelroy late of co. l. 16th ill cav. 1879 to the honorable noah h. swayne. justice of the supreme court of the united states, a jurist of distinguished talents and exalted character; one of the last of that admirable array of pure patriots and sagacious counselors, who, in the years of the nation's trial, faithfully surrounded the great president, and, with him, bore the burden of those momentous days; and whose wisdom and fairness have done so much since to conserve what was then won, this book is dedicated with respect and appreciation, by the author. introduction. the fifth part of a century almost has sped with the flight of time since the outbreak of the slaveholder's rebellion against the united states. the young men of to-day were then babes in their cradles, or, if more than that, too young to be appalled by the terror of the times. those now graduating from our schools of learning to be teachers of youth and leaders of public thought, if they are ever prepared to teach the history of the war for the union so as to render adequate honor to its martyrs and heroes, and at the same time impress the obvious moral to be drawn from it, must derive their knowledge from authors who can each one say of the thrilling story he is spared to tell: "all of which i saw, and part of which i was." the writer is honored with the privilege of introducing to the reader a volume written by an author who was an actor and a sufferer in the scenes he has so vividly and faithfully described, and sent forth to the public by a publisher whose literary contributions in support of the loyal cause entitle him to the highest appreciation. both author and publisher have had an honorable and efficient part in the great struggle, and are therefore worthy to hand down to the future a record of the perils encountered and the sufferings endured by patriotic soldiers in the prisons of the enemy. the publisher, at the beginning of the war, entered, with zeal and ardor upon the work of raising a company of men, intending to lead them to the field. prevented from carrying out this design, his energies were directed to a more effective service. his famous "nasby letters" exposed the absurd and sophistical argumentations of rebels and their sympathisers, in such broad, attractive and admirable burlesque, as to direct against them the "loud, long laughter of a world!" the unique and telling satire of these papers became a power and inspiration to our armies in the field and to their anxious friends at home, more than equal to the might of whole battalions poured in upon the enemy. an athlete in logic may lay an error writhing at his feet, and after all it may recover to do great mischief. but the sharp wit of the humorist drives it before the world's derision into shame and everlasting contempt. these letters were read and shouted over gleefully at every camp-fire in the union army, and eagerly devoured by crowds of listeners when mails were opened at country post-offices. other humorists were content when they simply amused the reader, but "nasby's" jests were arguments--they had a meaningthey were suggested by the necessities and emergencies of the nation's peril, and written to support, with all earnestness, a most sacred cause. the author, when very young, engaged in journalistic work, until the drum of the recruiting officer called him to join the ranks of his country's defenders. as the reader is told, he was made a prisoner. he took with him into the terrible prison enclosure not only a brave, vigorous, youthful spirit, but invaluable habits of mind and thought for storing up the incidents and experiences of his prison life. as a journalist he had acquired the habit of noticing and memorizing every striking or thrilling incident, and the experiences of his prison life were adapted to enstamp themselves indelibly on both feeling and memory. he speaks from personal experience and from the stand-paint of tender and complete sympathy with those of his comrades who suffered more than he did himself. of his qualifications, the writer of these introductory words need not speak. the sketches themselves testify to his ability with such force that no commendation is required. this work is needed. a generation is arising who do not know what the preservation of our free government cost in blood and suffering. even the men of the passing generation begin to be forgetful, if we may judge from the recklessness or carelessness of their political action. the soldier is not always remembered nor honored as he should be. but, what to the future of the great republic is more important, there is great danger of our people under-estimating the bitter animus and terrible malignity to the union and its defenders cherished by those who made war upon it. this is a point we can not afford to be mistaken about. and yet, right at this point this volume will meet its severest criticism, and at this point its testimony is most vital and necessary. many will be slow to believe all that is here told most truthfully of the tyranny and cruelty of the captors of our brave boys in blue. there are no parallels to the cruelties and malignities here described in northern society. the system of slavery, maintained for over two hundred years at the south, had performed a most perverting, morally desolating, and we might say, demonizing work on the dominant race, which people bred under our free civilization can not at once understand, nor scarcely believe when it is declared unto them. this reluctance to believe unwelcome truths has been the snare of our national life. we have not been willing to believe how hardened, despotic, and cruel the wielders of irresponsible power may become. when the anti-slavery reformers of thirty years ago set forth the cruelties of the slave system, they were met with a storm of indignant denial, villification and rebuke. when theodore d. weld issued his "testimony of a thousand witnesses," to the cruelty of slavery, he introduced it with a few words, pregnant with sound philosophy, which can be applied to the work now introduced, and may help the reader better to accept and appreciate its statements. mr. weld said: "suppose i should seize you, rob you of your liberty, drive you into the field, and make you work without pay as long as you lived. would that be justice? would it be kindness? or would it be monstrous injustice and cruelty? now, is the man who robs you every day too tender-hearted ever to cuff or kick you? he can empty your pockets without remorse, but if your stomach is empty, it cuts him to the quick. he can make you work a life-time without pay, but loves you too well to let you go hungry. he fleeces you of your rights with a relish, but is shocked if you work bare-headed in summer, or without warm stockings in winter. he can make you go without your liberty, but never without a shirt. he can crush in you all hope of bettering your condition by vowing that you shall die his slave, but though he can thus cruelly torture your feelings, he will never lacerate your back--he can break your heart, but is very tender of your skin. he can strip you of all protection of law, and all comfort in religion, and thus expose you to all outrages, but if you are exposed to the weather, half-clad and half-sheltered, how yearn his tender bowels! what! talk of a man treating you well while robbing you of all you get, and as fast as you get it? and robbing you of yourself, too, your hands and feet, your muscles, limbs and senses, your body and mind, your liberty and earnings, your free speech and rights of conscience, your right to acquire knowledge, property and reputation, and yet you are content to believe without question that men who do all this by their slaves have soft hearts oozing out so lovingly toward their human chattles that they always keep them well housed and well clad, never push them too hard in the field, never make their dear backs smart, nor let their dear stomachs get empty!" in like manner we may ask, are not the cruelties and oppressions described in the following pages what we should legitimately expect from men who, all their lives, have used whip and thumb-screw, shot-gun and bloodhound, to keep human beings subservient to their will? are we to expect nothing but chivalric tenderness and compassion from men who made war on a tolerant government to make more secure their barbaric system of oppression? these things are written because they are true. duty to the brave dead, to the heroic living, who have endured the pangs of a hundred deaths for their country's sake; duty to the government which depends on the wisdom and constancy of its good citizens for its support and perpetuity, calls for this "round, unvarnished tale" of suffering endured for freedom's sake. the publisher of this work urged his friend and associate in journalism to write and send forth these sketches because the times demanded just such an expose of the inner hell of the southern prisons. the tender mercies of oppressors are cruel. we must accept the truth and act in view of it. acting wisely on the warnings of the past, we shall be able to prevent treason, with all its fearful concomitants, from being again the scourge and terror of our beloved land. robert mccune. author's preface fifteen months ago--and one month before it was begun--i had no more idea of writing this book than i have now of taking up my residence in china. while i have always been deeply impressed with the idea that the public should know much more of the history of andersonville and other southern prisons than it does, it had never occurred to me that i was in any way charged with the duty of increasing that enlightenment. no affected deprecation of my own abilities had any part is this. i certainly knew enough of the matter, as did every other boy who had even a month's experience in those terrible places, but the very magnitude of that knowledge overpowered me, by showing me the vast requirements of the subject-requirements that seemed to make it presumption for any but the greatest pens in our literature to attempt the work. one day at andersonville or florence would be task enough for the genius of carlyle or hugo; lesser than they would fail preposterously to rise to the level of the theme. no writer ever described such a deluge of woes as swept over the unfortunates confined in rebel prisons in the last year-and-a-half of the confederacy's life. no man was ever called upon to describe the spectacle and the process of seventy thousand young, strong, able-bodied men, starving and rotting to death. such a gigantic tragedy as this stuns the mind and benumbs the imagination. i no more felt myself competent to the task than to accomplish one of michael angelo's grand creations in sculpture or painting. study of the subject since confirms me in this view, and my only claim for this book is that it is a contribution--a record of individual observation and experience--which will add something to the material which the historian of the future will find available for his work. the work was begun at the suggestion of mr. d. r. locke, (petroleum v. nasby), the eminent political satirist. at first it was only intended to write a few short serial sketches of prison life for the columns of the toledo blade. the exceeding favor with which the first of the series was received induced a great widening of their scope, until finally they took the range they now have. i know that what is contained herein will be bitterly denied. i am prepared for this. in my boyhood i witnessed the savagery of the slavery agitation--in my youth i felt the fierceness of the hatred directed against all those who stood by the nation. i know that hell hath no fury like the vindictiveness of those who are hurt by the truth being told of them. i apprehend being assailed by a sirocco of contradiction and calumny. but i solemnly affirm in advance the entire and absolute truth of every material fact, statement and description. i assert that, so far from there being any exaggeration in any particular, that in no instance has the half of the truth been told, nor could it be, save by an inspired pen. i am ready to demonstrate this by any test that the deniers of this may require, and i am fortified in my position by unsolicited letters from over 3,000 surviving prisoners, warmly indorsing the account as thoroughly accurate in every respect. it has been charged that hatred of the south is the animus of this work. nothing can be farther from the truth. no one has a deeper love for every part of our common country than i, and no one to-day will make more efforts and sacrifices to bring the south to the same plane of social and material development with the rest of the nation than i will. if i could see that the sufferings at andersonville and elsewhere contributed in any considerable degree to that end, and i should not regret that they had been. blood and tears mark every step in the progress of the race, and human misery seems unavoidable in securing human advancement. but i am naturally embittered by the fruitlessness, as well as the uselessness of the misery of andersonville. there was never the least military or other reason for inflicting all that wretchedness upon men, and, as far as mortal eye can discern, no earthly good resulted from the martyrdom of those tens of thousands. i wish i could see some hope that their wantonly shed blood has sown seeds that will one day blossom, and bear a rich fruitage of benefit to mankind, but it saddens me beyond expression that i can not. the years 1864-5 were a season of desperate battles, but in that time many more union soldiers were slain behind the rebel armies, by starvation and exposure, than were killed in front of them by cannon and rifle. the country has heard much of the heroism and sacrifices of those loyal youths who fell on the field of battle; but it has heard little of the still greater number who died in prison pen. it knows full well how grandly her sons met death in front of the serried ranks of treason, and but little of the sublime firmness with which they endured unto the death, all that the ingenious cruelty of their foes could inflict upon them while in captivity. it is to help supply this deficiency that this book is written. it is a mite contributed to the better remembrance by their countrymen of those who in this way endured and died that the nation might live. it is an offering of testimony to future generations of the measureless cost of the expiation of a national sin, and of the preservation of our national unity. this is all. i know i speak for all those still living comrades who went with me through the scenes that i have attempted to describe, when i say that we have no revenges to satisfy, no hatreds to appease. we do not ask that anyone shall be punished. we only desire that the nation shall recognize and remember the grand fidelity of our dead comrades, and take abundant care that they shall not have died in vain. for the great mass of southern people we have only the kindliest feeling. we but hate a vicious social system, the lingering shadow of a darker age, to which they yield, and which, by elevating bad men to power, has proved their own and their country's bane. the following story does not claim to be in any sense a history of southern prisons. it is simply a record of the experience of one individual--one boy--who staid all the time with his comrades inside the prison, and had no better opportunities for gaining information than any other of his 60,000 companions. the majority of the illustrations in this work are from the skilled pencil of captain o. j. hopkins, of toledo, who served through the war in the ranks of the forty-second ohio. his army experience has been of peculiar value to the work, as it has enabled him to furnish a series of illustrations whose life-like fidelity of action, pose and detail are admirable. some thirty of the pictures, including the frontispiece, and the allegorical illustrations of war and peace, are from the atelier of mr. o. reich, cincinnati, o. a word as to the spelling: having always been an ardent believer in the reformation of our present preposterous system--or rather, no system--of orthography, i am anxious to do whatever lies in my power to promote it. in the following pages the spelling is simplified to the last degree allowed by webster. i hope that the time is near when even that advanced spelling reformer will be left far in the rear by the progress of a people thoroughly weary of longer slavery to the orthographical absurdities handed down to us from a remote and grossly unlearned ancestry. toledo, o., dec. 10, 1879. john mcelroy. we wait beneath the furnace blast the pangs of transformation; not painlessly doth god recast and mold anew the nation. hot burns the fire where wrongs expire; nor spares the hand that from the land uproots the ancient evil. the hand-breadth cloud the sages feared its bloody rain is dropping; the poison plant the fathers spared all else is overtopping. east, west, south, north, it curses the earth; all justice dies, and fraud and lies live only in its shadow. then let the selfish lip be dumb and hushed the breath of sighing; before the joy of peace must come the pains of purifying. god give us grace each in his place to bear his lot, and, murmuring not, endure and wait and labor! whittier andersonville a story of rebel military prisons chapter i. a strange land--the heart of the appalachians--the gateway of an empire --a sequestered vale, and a primitive, arcadian, non-progressive people. a low, square, plainly-hewn stone, set near the summit of the eastern approach to the formidable natural fortress of cumberland gap, indicates the boundaries of--the three great states of virginia, kentucky and tennessee. it is such a place as, remembering the old greek and roman myths and superstitions, one would recognize as fitting to mark the confines of the territories of great masses of strong, aggressive, and frequently conflicting peoples. there the god terminus should have had one of his chief temples, where his shrine would be shadowed by barriers rising above the clouds, and his sacred solitude guarded from the rude invasion of armed hosts by range on range of battlemented rocks, crowning almost inaccessible mountains, interposed across every approach from the usual haunts of men. roundabout the land is full of strangeness and mystery. the throes of some great convulsion of nature are written on the face of the four thousand square miles of territory, of which cumberland gap is the central point. miles of granite mountains are thrust up like giant walls, hundreds of feet high, and as smooth and regular as the side of a monument. huge, fantastically-shaped rocks abound everywhere--sometimes rising into pinnacles on lofty summits--sometimes hanging over the verge of beetling cliffs, as if placed there in waiting for a time when they could be hurled down upon the path of an advancing army, and sweep it away. large streams of water burst out in the most unexpected planes, frequently far up mountain sides, and fall in silver veils upon stones beaten round by the ceaseless dash for ages. caves, rich in quaintly formed stalactites and stalagmites, and their recesses filled with metallic salts of the most powerful and diverse natures; break the mountain sides at frequent intervals. everywhere one is met by surprises and anomalies. even the rank vegetation is eccentric, and as prone to develop into bizarre forms as are the rocks and mountains. the dreaded panther ranges through the primeval, rarely trodden forests; every crevice in the rocks has for tenants rattlesnakes or stealthy copperheads, while long, wonderfully swift "blue racers" haunt the edges of the woods, and linger around the fields to chill his blood who catches a glimpse of their upreared heads, with their great, balefully bright eyes, and "white-collar" encircled throats. the human events happening here have been in harmony with the natural ones. it has always been a land of conflict. in 1540--339 years ago --de soto, in that energetic but fruitless search for gold which occupied his later years, penetrated to this region, and found it the fastness of the xualans, a bold, aggressive race, continually warring with its neighbors. when next the white man reached the country--a century and a half later--he found the xualans had been swept away by the conquering cherokees, and he witnessed there the most sanguinary contest between indians of which our annals give any account--a pitched battle two days in duration, between the invading shawnees, who lorded it over what is now kentucky, ohio and indiana--and the cherokees, who dominated the country the southeast of the cumberland range. again the cherokees were victorious, and the discomfited shawnees retired north of the gap. then the white man delivered battle for the possession the land, and bought it with the lives of many gallant adventurers. half a century later boone and his hardy companion followed, and forced their way into kentucky. another half century saw the gap the favorite haunt of the greatest of american bandits--the noted john a. murrell--and his gang. they infested the country for years, now waylaying the trader or drover threading his toilsome way over the lone mountains, now descending upon some little town, to plunder its stores and houses. at length murrell and his band were driven out, and sought a new field of operations on the lower mississippi. they left germs behind them, however, that developed into horse thieve counterfeiters, and later into guerrillas and bushwhackers. when the rebellion broke out the region at once became the theater of military operations. twice cumberland gap was seized by the rebels, and twice was it wrested away from them. in 1861 it was the point whence zollicoffer launched out with his legions to "liberate kentucky," and it was whither they fled, beaten and shattered, after the disasters of wild cat and mill springs. in 1862 kirby smith led his army through the gap on his way to overrun kentucky and invade the north. three months later his beaten forces sought refuge from their pursuers behind its impregnable fortifications. another year saw burnside burst through the gap with a conquering force and redeem loyal east tennessee from its rebel oppressors. had the south ever been able to separate from the north the boundary would have been established along this line. between the main ridge upon which cumberland gap is situated, and the next range on the southeast which runs parallel with it, is a narrow, long, very fruitful valley, walled in on either side for a hundred miles by tall mountains as a city street is by high buildings. it is called powell's valley. in it dwell a simple, primitive people, shut out from the world almost as much as if they lived in new zealand, and with the speech, manners and ideas that their fathers brought into the valley when they settled it a century ago. there has been but little change since then. the young men who have annually driven cattle to the distant markets in kentucky, tennessee and virginia, have brought back occasional stray bits of finery for the "women folks," and the latest improved fire-arms for themselves, but this is about all the innovations the progress of the world has been allowed to make. wheeled vehicles are almost unknown; men and women travel on horseback as they did a century ago, the clothing is the product of the farm and the busy looms of the women, and life is as rural and arcadian as any ever described in a pastoral. the people are rich in cattle, hogs, horses, sheep and the products of the field. the fat soil brings forth the substantials of life in opulent plenty. having this there seems to be little care for more. ambition nor avarice, nor yet craving after luxury, disturb their contented souls or drag them away from the non-progressive round of simple life bequeathed them by their fathers. chapter ii. scarcity of food for the army--raid for forage--encounter wit the rebels --sharp cavalry fight--defeat of the "johnnies"--powell's valley opened up. as the autumn of 1863 advanced towards winter the difficulty of supplying the forces concentrated around cumberland gap--as well as the rest of burnside's army in east tennessee--became greater and greater. the base of supplies was at camp nelson, near lexington, ky., one hundred and eighty miles from the gap, and all that the army used had to be hauled that distance by mule teams over roads that, in their best state were wretched, and which the copious rains and heavy traffic had rendered well-nigh impassable. all the country to our possession had been drained of its stock of whatever would contribute to the support of man or beast. that portion of powell's valley extending from the gap into virginia was still in the hands of the rebels; its stock of products was as yet almost exempt from military contributions. consequently a raid was projected to reduce the valley to our possession, and secure its much needed stores. it was guarded by the sixty-fourth virginia, a mounted regiment, made up of the young men of the locality, who had then been in the service about two years. maj. c. h. beer's third battalion, sixteenth illinois cavalry--four companies, each about 75 strong--was sent on the errand of driving out the rebels and opening up the valley for our foraging teams. the writer was invited to attend the excursion. as he held the honorable, but not very lucrative position of "high, private" in company l, of the battalion, and the invitation came from his captain, he did not feel at liberty to decline. he went, as private soldiers have been in the habit of doing ever since the days of the old centurion, who said with the characteristic boastfulness of one of the lower grades of commissioned officers when he happens to be a snob: for i am also a man set under authority, having under me soldiers, and i say unto one, go; and he goeth; and to another, come, and he cometh; and to my servant, do this, and he doeth it. rather "airy" talk that for a man who nowadays would take rank with captains of infantry. three hundred of us responded to the signal of "boots and saddles," buckled on three hundred more or less trusty sabers and revolvers, saddled three hundred more or less gallant steeds, came into line "as companies" with the automatic listlessness of the old soldiers, "counted off by fours" in that queer gamut-running style that makes a company of men "counting off"--each shouting a number in a different voice from his neighbor--sound like running the scales on some great organ badly out of tune; something like this: one. two. three. four. one. two. three. four. one. two. three. four. then, as the bugle sounded "right forward! fours right!" we moved off at a walk through the melancholy mist that soaked through the very fiber of man and horse, and reduced the minds of both to a condition of limp indifference as to things past, present and future. whither we were going we knew not, nor cared. such matters had long since ceased to excite any interest. a cavalryman soon recognizes as the least astonishing thing in his existence the signal to "fall in!" and start somewhere. he feels that he is the "poor joe" of the army--under perpetual orders to "move on." down we wound over the road that zig-tagged through the forts, batteries and rifle-pits covering the eastern ascent to the flap-past the wonderful murrell spring--so-called because the robber chief had killed, as he stooped to drink of its crystal waters, a rich drover, whom he was pretending to pilot through the mountains--down to where the "virginia road" turned off sharply to the left and entered powell's valley. the mist had become a chill, dreary rain, through, which we plodded silently, until night closed in around us some ten miles from the gap. as we halted to go into camp, an indignant virginian resented the invasion of the sacred soil by firing at one of the guards moving out to his place. the guard looked at the fellow contemptuously, as if he hated to waste powder on a man who had no better sense than to stay out in such a rain, when he could go in-doors, and the bushwhacker escaped, without even a return shot. fires were built, coffee made, horses rubbed, and we laid down with feet to the fire to get what sleep we could. before morning we were awakened by the bitter cold. it had cleared off during the night and turned so cold that everything was frozen stiff. this was better than the rain, at all events. a good fire and a hot cup of coffee would make the cold quite endurable. at daylight the bugle sounded "right forward! fours right!" again, and the 300 of us resumed our onward plod over the rocky, cedar-crowned hills. in the meantime, other things were taking place elsewhere. our esteemed friends of the sixty-fourth virginia, who were in camp at the little town of jonesville, about 40 miles from the gap, had learned of our starting up the valley to drive them out, and they showed that warm reciprocity characteristic of the southern soldier, by mounting and starting down the valley to drive us out. nothing could be more harmonious, it will be perceived. barring the trifling divergence of yews as to who was to drive and who be driven, there was perfect accord in our ideas. our numbers were about equal. if i were to say that they considerably outnumbered us, i would be following the universal precedent. no soldier-high or low-ever admitted engaging an equal or inferior force of the enemy. about 9 o'clock in the morning--sunday--they rode through the streets of jonesville on their way to give us battle. it was here that most of the members of the regiment lived. every man, woman and child in the town was related in some way to nearly every one of the soldiers. the women turned out to wave their fathers, husbands, brothers and lovers on to victory. the old men gathered to give parting counsel and encouragement to their sons and kindred. the sixty-fourth rode away to what hope told them would be a glorious victory. at noon we are still straggling along without much attempt at soldierly order, over the rough, frozen hill-sides. it is yet bitterly cold, and men and horses draw themselves together, as if to expose as little surface as possible to the unkind elements. not a word had been spoken by any one for hours. the head of the column has just reached the top of the hill, and the rest of us are strung along for a quarter of a mile or so back. suddenly a few shots ring out upon the frosty air from the carbines of the advance. the general apathy is instantly, replaced by keen attention, and the boys instinctively range themselves into fours--the cavalry unit of action. the major, who is riding about the middle of the first company--i--dashes to the front. a glance seems to satisfy him, for he turns in his saddle and his voice rings out: "company i! fours left into line!--march!!" the company swings around on the hill-top like a great, jointed toy snake. as the fours come into line on a trot, we see every man draw his saber and revolver. the company raises a mighty cheer and dashes forward. company k presses forward to the ground company i has just left, the fours sweep around into line, the sabers and revolvers come out spontaneously, the men cheer and the company flings itself forward. all this time we of company l can see nothing except what the companies ahead of us are doing. we are wrought up to the highest pitch. as company k clears its ground, we press forward eagerly. now we go into line just as we raise the hill, and as my four comes around, i catch a hurried glimpse through a rift in the smoke of a line of butternut and gray clad men a hundred yards or so away. their guns are at their faces, and i see the smoke and fire spurt from the muzzles. at the same instant our sabers and revolvers are drawn. we shout in a frenzy of excitement, and the horses spring forward as if shot from a bow. i see nothing more until i reach the place where the rebel line stood. then i find it is gone. looking beyond toward the bottom of the hill, i see the woods filled with rebels, flying in disorder and our men yelling in pursuit. this is the portion of the line which companies i and k struck. here and there are men in butternut clothing, prone on the frozen ground, wounded and dying. i have just time to notice closely one middle-aged man lying almost under my horse's feet. he has received a carbine bullet through his head and his blood colors a great space around him. one brave man, riding a roan horse, attempts to rally his companions. he halts on a little knoll, wheels his horse to face us, and waves his hat to draw his companions to him. a tall, lank fellow in the next four to me--who goes by the nickname of "'leven yards"--aims his carbine at him, and, without checking his horse's pace, fires. the heavy sharpe's bullet tears a gaping hole through the rebel's heart. he drops from his saddle, his life-blood runs down in little rills on either side of the knoll, and his riderless horse dashes away in a panic. at this instant comes an order for the company to break up into fours and press on through the forest in pursuit. my four trots off to the road at the right. a rebel bugler, who hag been cut off, leaps his horse into the road in front of us. we all fire at him on the impulse of the moment. he falls from his horse with a bullet through his back. company m, which has remained in column as a reserve, is now thundering up close behind at a gallop. its seventy-five powerful horses are spurning the solid earth with steel-clad hoofs. the man will be ground into a shapeless mass if left where he has fallen. we spring from our horses and drag him into a fence corner; then remount and join in the pursuit. this happened on the summit of chestnut ridge, fifteen miles from jonesville. late in the afternoon the anxious watchers at jonesville saw a single fugitive urging his well-nigh spent horse down the slope of the hill toward town. in an agony of anxiety they hurried forward to meet him and learn his news. the first messenger who rushed into job's presence to announce the beginning of the series of misfortunes which were to afflict the upright man of uz is a type of all the cowards who, before or since then, have been the first to speed away from the field of battle to spread the news of disaster. he said: "and the sabeans fell upon them, and took them away; yea, they have slain the servants with the edge of the sword; and i only am escaped alone to tell thee." so this fleeing virginian shouted to his expectant friends: "the boys are all cut to pieces; i'm the only one that got away." the terrible extent of his words was belied a little later, by the appearance on the distant summit of the hill of a considerable mob of fugitives, flying at the utmost speed of their nearly exhausted horses. as they came on down the hill as almost equally disorganized crowd of pursuers appeared on the summit, yelling in voices hoarse with continued shouting, and pouring an incessant fire of carbine and revolver bullets upon the hapless men of the sixty-fourth virginia. the two masses of men swept on through the town. beyond it, the road branched in several directions, the pursued scattered on each of these, and the worn-out pursuers gave up the chase. returning to jonesville, we took an account of stock, and found that we were "ahead" one hundred and fifteen prisoners, nearly that many horses, and a considerable quantity of small arms. how many of the enemy had been killed and wounded could not be told, as they were scattered over the whole fifteen miles between where the fight occurred and the pursuit ended. our loss was trifling. comparing notes around the camp-fires in the evening, we found that our success had been owing to the major's instinct, his grasp of the situation, and the soldierly way in which he took advantage of it. when he reached the summit of the hill he found the rebel line nearly formed and ready for action. a moment's hesitation might have been fatal to us. at his command company i went into line with the thought-like celerity of trained cavalry, and instantly dashed through the right of the rebel line. company k followed and plunged through the rebel center, and when we of company l arrived on the ground, and charged the left, the last vestige of resistance was swept away. the whole affair did not probably occupy more than fifteen minutes. this was the way powell's valley was opened to our foragers. chapter iii. living off the enemy--reveling in the fatness of the country--soldierly purveying and camp cookery--susceptible teamsters and their tendency to flightiness--making soldier's bed. for weeks we rode up and down--hither and thither--along the length of the narrow, granite-walled valley; between mountains so lofty that the sun labored slowly over them in the morning, occupying half the forenoon in getting to where his rays would reach the stream that ran through the valley's center. perpetual shadow reigned on the northern and western faces of these towering nights--not enough warmth and sunshine reaching them in the cold months to check the growth of the ever-lengthening icicles hanging from the jutting cliffs, or melt the arabesque frost-forms with which the many dashing cascades decorated the adjacent rocks and shrubbery. occasionally we would see where some little stream ran down over the face of the bare, black rocks for many hundred feet, and then its course would be a long band of sheeny white, like a great rich, spotless scarf of satin, festooning the war-grimed walls of some old castle. our duty now was to break up any nuclei of concentration that the rebels might attempt to form, and to guard our foragers--that is, the teamsters and employee of the quartermaster's department--who were loading grain into wagons and hauling it away. this last was an arduous task. there is no man in the world that needs as much protection as an army teamster. he is worse in this respect than a new england manufacturer, or an old maid on her travels. he is given to sudden fears and causeless panics. very innocent cedars have a fashion of assuming in his eyes the appearance of desperate rebels armed with murderous guns, and there is no telling what moment a rock may take such a form as to freeze his young blood, and make each particular hair stand on end like quills upon the fretful porcupine. one has to be particular about snapping caps in his neighborhood, and give to him careful warning before discharging a carbine to clean it. his first impulse, when anything occurs to jar upon his delicate nerves, is to cut his wheel-mule loose and retire with the precipitation of a man having an appointment to keep and being behind time. there is no man who can get as much speed out of a mule as a teamster falling back from the neighborhood of heavy firing. this nervous tremor was not peculiar to the engineers of our transportation department. it was noticeable in the gentry who carted the scanty provisions of the rebels. one of wheeler's cavalrymen told me that the brigade to which he belonged was one evening ordered to move at daybreak. the night was rainy, and it was thought best to discharge the guns and reload before starting. unfortunately, it was neglected to inform the teamsters of this, and at the first discharge they varnished from the scene with such energy that it was over a week before the brigade succeeded in getting them back again. why association with the mule should thus demoralize a man, has always been a puzzle to me, for while the mule, as col. ingersoll has remarked, is an animal without pride of ancestry or hope of posterity, he is still not a coward by any means. it is beyond dispute that a full-grown and active lioness once attacked a mule in the grounds of the cincinnati zoological garden, and was ignominiously beaten, receiving injuries from which she died shortly afterward. the apparition of a badly-scared teamster urging one of his wheel mules at break-neck speed over the rough ground, yelling for protection against "them johnnies," who had appeared on some hilltop in sight of where he was gathering corn, was an almost hourly occurrence. of course the squad dispatched to his assistance found nobody. still, there were plenty of rebels in the country, and they hung around our front, exchanging shots with us at long taw, and occasionally treating us to a volley at close range, from some favorable point. but we had the decided advantage of them at this game. our sharpe's carbines were much superior in every way to their enfields. they would shoot much farther, and a great deal more rapidly, so that the virginians were not long in discovering that they were losing more than they gained in this useless warfare. once they played a sharp practical joke upon us. copper river is a deep, exceedingly rapid mountain stream, with a very slippery rocky bottom. the rebels blockaded a ford in such a way that it was almost impossible for a horse to keep his feet. then they tolled us off in pursuit of a small party to this ford. when we came to it there was a light line of skirmishers on the opposite bank, who popped away at us industriously. our boys formed in line, gave the customary, cheer, and dashed in to carry the ford at a charge. as they did so at least one-half of the horses went down as if they were shot, and rolled over their riders in the swift running, ice-cold waters. the rebels yelled a triumphant laugh, as they galloped away, and the laugh was re-echoed by our fellows, who were as quick to see the joke as the other side. we tried to get even with them by a sharp chase, but we gave it up after a few miles, without having taken any prisoners. but, after all, there was much to make our sojourn in the valley endurable. though we did not wear fine linen, we fared sumptuously--for soldiers--every day. the cavalryman is always charged by the infantry and artillery with having a finer and surer scent for the good things in the country than any other man in the service. he is believed to have an instinct that will unfailingly lead him, in the dankest night, to the roosting place of the most desirable poultry, and after he has camped in a neighborhood for awhile it would require a close chemical analysis to find a trace of ham. we did our best to sustain the reputation of our arm of the service. we found the most delicious hams packed away in the ash-houses. they were small, and had that; exquisite nutty flavor, peculiar to mast-fed bacon. then there was an abundance of the delightful little apple known as "romanites." there were turnips, pumpkins, cabbages, potatoes, and the usual products of the field in plenty, even profusion. the corn in the fields furnished an ample supply of breadstuff. we carried it to and ground it in the quaintest, rudest little mills that can be imagined outside of the primitive affairs by which the women of arabia coarsely powder the grain for the family meal. sometimes the mill would consist only of four stout posts thrust into the ground at the edge of some stream. a line of boulders reaching diagonally across the stream answered for a dam, by diverting a portion of the volume of water to a channel at the side, where it moved a clumsily constructed wheel, that turned two small stones, not larger than good-sized grindstones. over this would be a shed made by resting poles in forked posts stuck into the ground, and covering these with clapboards held in place by large flat stones. they resembled the mills of the gods--in grinding slowly. it used to seem that a healthy man could eat the meal faster than they ground it. but what savory meals we used to concoct around the campfires, out of the rich materials collected during the day's ride! such stews, such soups, such broils, such wonderful commixtures of things diverse in nature and antagonistic in properties such daring culinary experiments in combining materials never before attempted to be combined. the french say of untasteful arrangement of hues in dress "that the colors swear at each other." i have often thought the same thing of the heterogeneities that go to make up a soldier's pot-a feu. but for all that they never failed to taste deliciously after a long day's ride. they were washed down by a tincupful of coffee strong enough to tan leather, then came a brier-wood pipeful of fragrant kinnikinnic, and a seat by the ruddy, sparkling fire of aromatic cedar logs, that diffused at once warmth, and spicy, pleasing incense. a chat over the events of the day, and the prospect of the morrow, the wonderful merits of each man's horse, and the disgusting irregularities of the mails from home, lasted until the silver-voiced bugle rang out the sweet, mournful tattoo of the regulations, to the flowing cadences of which the boys had arranged the absurdly incongruous words: "s-a-y--d-e-u-t-c-h-e-r-will-you fight-mit sigel! zwei-glass of lager-bier, ja! ja! ja!" words were fitted to all the calls, which generally bore some relativeness to the sigmal, but these were as, destitute of congruity as of sense. tattoo always produces an impression of extreme loneliness. as its weird, half-availing notes ring out and are answered back from the distant rocks shrouded in night, and perhaps concealing the lurking foe, the soldier remembers that he is far away from home and friends--deep in the enemy's country, encompassed on every hand by those in deadly hostility to him, who are perhaps even then maturing the preparations for his destruction. as the tattoo sounds, the boys arise from around the fire, visit the horse line, see that their horses are securely tied, rub off from the fetlocks and legs such specks of mud as may have escaped the cleaning in the early evening, and if possible, smuggle their faithful four-footed friends a few ears of corn, or another bunch of hay. if not too tired, and everything else is favorable, the cavalryman has prepared himself a comfortable couch for the night. he always sleeps with a chum. the two have gathered enough small tufts of pine or cedar to make a comfortable, springy, mattress-like foundation. on this is laid the poncho or rubber blanket. next comes one of their overcoats, and upon this they lie, covering themselves with the two blankets and the other overcoat, their feet towards the fire, their boots at the foot, and their belts, with revolver, saber and carbine, at the sides of the bed. it is surprising what an amount of comfort a man can get out of such a couch, and how, at an alarm, he springs from it, almost instantly dressed and armed. half an hour after tattoo the bugle rings out another sadly sweet strain, that hath a dying sound. chapter iv. a bitter cold morning and a warm awakening--trouble all along the line --fierce conflicts, assaults and defense--prolonged and desperate struggle ending with a surrender. the night had been the most intensely cold that the country had known for many years. peach and other tender trees had been killed by the frosty rigor, and sentinels had been frozen to death in our neighborhood. the deep snow on which we made our beds, the icy covering of the streams near us, the limbs of the trees above us, had been cracking with loud noises all night, from the bitter cold. we were camped around jonesville, each of the four companies lying on one of the roads leading from the town. company l lay about a mile from the court house. on a knoll at the end of the village toward us, and at a point where two roads separated,--one of which led to us,--stood a three-inch rodman rifle, belonging to the twenty-second ohio battery. it and its squad of eighteen men, under command of lieutenant alger and sergeant davis, had been sent up to us a few days before from the gap. the comfortless gray dawn was crawling sluggishly over the mountain-tops, as if numb as the animal and vegetable life which had been shrinking all the long hours under the fierce chill. the major's bugler had saluted the morn with the lively, ringing tarr-r-r-a-ta-ara of the regulation reveille, and the company buglers, as fast as they could thaw out their mouth-pieces, were answering him. i lay on my bed, dreading to get up, and yet not anxious to lie still. it was a question which would be the more uncomfortable. i turned over, to see if there was not another position in which it would be warmer, and began wishing for the thousandth time that the efforts for the amelioration of the horrors of warfare would progress to such a point as to put a stop to all winter soldiering, so that a fellow could go home as soon as cold weather began, sit around a comfortable stove in a country store; and tell camp stories until the spring was far enough advanced to let him go back to the front wearing a straw hat and a linen duster. then i began wondering how much longer i would dare lie there, before the orderly sergeant would draw me out by the heels, and accompany the operation with numerous unkind and sulphurous remarks. this cogitation, was abruptly terminated by hearing an excited shout from the captain: "turn out!--company l!! turnout ! ! !" almost at the same instant rose that shrill, piercing rebel yell, which one who has once heard it rarely forgets, and this was followed by a crashing volley from apparently a regiment of rifles. i arose-promptly. there was evidently something of more interest on hand than the weather. cap, overcoat, boots and revolver belt went on, and eyes opened at about the same instant. as i snatched up my carbine, i looked out in front, and the whole woods appeared to be full of rebels, rushing toward us, all yelling and some firing. my captain and first lieutenant had taken up position on the right front of the tents, and part of the boys were running up to form a line alongside them. the second lieutenant had stationed himself on a knoll on the left front, and about a third of the company was rallying around him. my chum was a silent, sententious sort of a chap, and as we ran forward to the captain's line, he remarked earnestly: "well: this beats hell!" i thought he had a clear idea of the situation. all this occupied an inappreciably short space of time. the rebels had not stopped to reload, but were rushing impetuously toward us. we gave them a hot, rolling volley from our carbines. many fell, more stopped to load and reply, but the mass surged straight forward at us. then our fire grew so deadly that they showed a disposition to cover themselves behind the rocks and trees. again they were urged forward; and a body of them headed by their colonel, mounted on a white horse, pushed forward through the gap between us and the second lieutenant. the rebel colonel dashed up to the second lieutenant, and ordered him to surrender. the latter-a gallant old graybeard--cursed the rebel bitterly and snapped his now empty revolver in his face. the colonel fired and killed him, whereupon his squad, with two of its sergeants killed and half its numbers on the ground, surrendered. the rebels in our front and flank pressed us with equal closeness. it seemed as if it was absolutely impossible to check their rush for an instant, and as we saw the fate of our companions the captain gave the word for every man to look out for himself. we ran back a little distance, sprang over the fence into the fields, and rushed toward town, the rebels encouraging us to make good time by a sharp fire into our backs from the fence. while we were vainly attempting to stem the onset of the column dashed against us, better success was secured elsewhere. another column swept down the other road, upon which there was only an outlying picket. this had to come back on the run before the overwhelming numbers, and the rebels galloped straight for the three-inch rodman. company m was the first to get saddled and mounted, and now came up at a steady, swinging gallop, in two platoons, saber and revolver in hand, and led by two sergeants-key and mcwright,--printer boys from bloomington, illinois. they divined the object of the rebel dash, and strained every nerve to reach the gun first. the rebels were too near, and got the gun and turned it. before they could fire it, company m struck them headlong, but they took the terrible impact without flinching, and for a few minutes there was fierce hand-to-hand work, with sword and pistol. the rebel leader sank under a half-dozen simultaneous wounds, and fell dead almost under the gun. men dropped from their horses each instant, and the riderless steeds fled away. the scale of victory was turned by the major dashing against the rebel left flank at the head of company i, and a portion of the artillery squad. the rebels gave ground slowly, and were packed into a dense mass in the lane up which they had charged. after they had been crowded back, say fifty yards, word was passed through our men to open to the right and left on the sides of the road. the artillerymen had turned the gun and loaded it with a solid shot. instantly a wide lane opened through our ranks; the man with the lanyard drew the fatal cord, fire burst from the primer and the muzzle, the long gun sprang up and recoiled, and there seemed to be a demoniac yell in its ear-splitting crash, as the heavy ball left the mouth, and tore its bloody way through the bodies of the struggling mass of men and horses. this ended it. the rebels gave way in disorder, and our men fell back to give the gun an opportunity to throw shell and canister. the rebels now saw that we were not to be run over like a field of cornstalks, and they fell back to devise further tactics, giving us a breathing spell to get ourselves in shape for defense. the dullest could see that we were in a desperate situation. critical positions were no new experience to us, as they never are to a cavalry command after a few months in the field, but, though the pitcher goes often to the well, it is broken at last, and our time was evidently at hand. the narrow throat of the valley, through which lay the road back to the gap, was held by a force of rebels evidently much superior to our own, and strongly posted. the road was a slender, tortuous one, winding through rocks and gorges. nowhere was there room enough to move with even a platoon front against the enemy, and this precluded all chances of cutting out. the best we could do was a slow, difficult movement, in column of fours, and this would have been suicide. on the other side of the town the rebels were massed stronger, while to the right and left rose the steep mountain sides. we were caught-trapped as surely as a rat ever was in a wire trap. as we learned afterwards, a whole division of cavalry, under command of the noted rebel, major general sam jones, had been sent to effect our capture, to offset in a measure longstreet's repulse at knoxville. a gross overestimate of our numbers had caused the sending of so large a force on this errand, and the rough treatment we gave the two columns that attacked us first confirmed the rebel general's ideas of our strength, and led him to adopt cautious tactics, instead of crushing us out speedily, by a determined advance of all parts of his encircling lines. the lull in the fight did not last long. a portion of the rebel line on the east rushed forward to gain a more commanding position. we concentrated in that direction and drove it back, the rodman assisting with a couple of well-aimed shells.--this was followed by a similar but more successful attempt by another part of the rebel line, and so it went on all day--the rebels rushing up first on this side, and then on that, and we, hastily collecting at the exposed points, seeking to drive them back. we were frequently successful; we were on the inside, and had the advantage of the short interior lines, so that our few men and our breech-loaders told to a good purpose. there were frequent crises in the struggle, that at some times gave encouragement, but never hope. once a determined onset was made from the east, and was met by the equally determined resistance of nearly our whole force. our fire was so galling that a large number of our foes crowded into a house on a knoll, and making loopholes in its walls, began replying to us pretty sharply. we sent word to our faithful artillerists, who trained the gun upon the house. the first shell screamed over the roof, and burst harmlessly beyond. we suspended fire to watch the next. it crashed through the side; for an instant all was deathly still; we thought it had gone on through. then came a roar and a crash; the clapboards flew off the roof, and smoke poured out; panic-stricken rebels rushed from the doors and sprang from the windows --like bees from a disturbed hive; the shell had burst among the confined mass of men inside! we afterwards heard that twenty-five were killed there. at another time a considerable force of rebels gained the cover of a fence in easy range of our main force. companies l and k were ordered to charge forward on foot and dislodge them. away we went, under a fire that seemed to drop a man at every step. a hundred yards in front of the rebels was a little cover, and behind this our men lay down as if by one impulse. then came a close, desperate duel at short range. it was a question between northern pluck and southern courage, as to which could stand the most punishment. lying as flat as possible on the crusted snow, only raising the head or body enough to load and aim, the men on both sides, with their teeth set, their glaring eyes fastened on the foe, their nerves as tense as tightly-drawn steel wires, rained shot on each other as fast as excited hands could crowd cartridges into the guns and discharge them. not a word was said. the shallower enthusiasm that expresses itself in oaths and shouts had given way to the deep, voiceless rage of men in a death grapple. the rebel line was a rolling torrent of flame, their bullets shrieked angrily as they flew past, they struck the snow in front of us, and threw its cold flakes in faces that were white with the fires of consuming hate; they buried themselves with a dull thud in the quivering bodies of the enraged combatants. minutes passed; they seemed hours. would the villains, scoundrels, hell-hounds, sons of vipers never go? at length a few rebels sprang up and tried to fly. they were shot down instantly. then the whole line rose and ran! the relief was so great that we jumped to our feet and cheered wildly, forgetting in our excitement to make use of our victory by shooting down our flying enemies. nor was an element of fun lacking. a second lieutenant was ordered to take a party of skirmishers to the top of a hill and engage those of the rebels stationed on another hill-top across a ravine. he had but lately joined us from the regular army, where he was a drill sergeant. naturally, he was very methodical in his way, and scorned to do otherwise under fire than he would upon the parade ground. he moved his little command to the hill-top, in close order, and faced them to the front. the johnnies received them with a yell and a volley, whereat the boys winced a little, much to the lieutenant's disgust, who swore at them; then had them count off with great deliberation, and deployed them as coolly as if them was not an enemy within a hundred miles. after the line deployed, he "dressed" it, commanded "front!" and "begin, firing!" his attention was called another way for an instant, and when he looked back again, there was not a man of his nicely formed skirmish line visible. the logs and stones had evidently been put there for the use of skirmishers, the boys thought, and in an instant they availed themselves of their shelter. never was there an angrier man than that second lieutenant; he brandished his saber and swore; he seemed to feel that all his soldierly reputation was gone, but the boys stuck to their shelter for all that, informing him that when the rebels would stand out in the open field and take their fire, they would likewise. despite all our efforts, the rebel line crawled up closer an closer to us; we were driven back from knoll to knoll, and from one fence after another. we had maintained the unequal struggle for eight hours; over one-fourth of our number were stretched upon the snow, killed or badly wounded. our cartridges were nearly all gone; the cannon had fired its last shot long ago, and having a blank cartridge left, had shot the rammer at a gathering party of the enemy. just as the winter sun was going down upon a day of gloom the bugle called us all up on the hillside. then the rebels saw for the first time how few there were, and began an almost simultaneous charge all along the line. the major raised piece of a shelter tent upon a pole. the line halted. an officer rode out from it, followed by two privates. approaching the major, he said, "who is in command this force?" the major replied: "i am." "then, sir, i demand your sword." "what is your rank, sir!" "i am adjutant of the sixty-fourth virginia." the punctillious soul of the old "regular"--for such the major was swelled up instantly, and he answered: "by ---, sir, i will never surrender to my inferior in rank!" the adjutant reined his horse back. his two followers leveled their pieces at the major and waited orders to fire. they were covered by a dozen carbines in the hands of our men. the adjutant ordered his men to "recover arms," and rode away with them. he presently returned with a colonel, and to him the major handed his saber. as the men realized what was being done, the first thought of many of them was to snatch out the cylinder's of their revolvers, and the slides of their carbines, and throw them away, so as to make the arms useless. we were overcome with rage and humiliation at being compelled to yield to an enemy whom we had hated so bitterly. as we stood there on the bleak mountain-side, the biting wind soughing through the leafless branches, the shadows of a gloomy winter night closing around us, the groans and shrieks of our wounded mingling with the triumphant yells of the rebels plundering our tents, it seemed as if fate could press to man's lips no cup with bitterer dregs in it than this. chapter v. the reaction--depression--bitting cold--sharp hunger and sad reflexion. "of being taken by the insolent foe."--othello. the night that followed was inexpressibly dreary: the high-wrought nervous tension, which had been protracted through the long hours that the fight lasted, was succeeded by a proportionate mental depression, such as naturally follows any strain upon the mind. this was intensified in our cases by the sharp sting of defeat, the humiliation of having to yield ourselves, our horses and our arms into the possession of the enemy, the uncertainty as to the future, and the sorrow we felt at the loss of so many of our comrades. company l had suffered very severely, but our chief regret was for the gallant osgood, our second lieutenant. he, above all others, was our trusted leader. the captain and first lieutenant were brave men, and good enough soldiers, but osgood was the one "whose adoption tried, we grappled to our souls with hooks of steel." there was never any difficulty in getting all the volunteers he wanted for a scouting party. a quiet, pleasant spoken gentleman, past middle age, he looked much better fitted for the office of justice of the peace, to which his fellow-citizens of urbana, illinois, had elected and reelected him, than to command a troop of rough riders in a great civil war. but none more gallant than he ever vaulted into saddle to do battle for the right. he went into the army solely as a matter of principle, and did his duty with the unflagging zeal of an olden puritan fighting for liberty and his soul's salvation. he was a superb horseman--as all the older illinoisans are and, for all his two-score years and ten, he recognized few superiors for strength and activity in the battalion. a radical, uncompromising abolitionist, he had frequently asserted that he would rather die than yield to a rebel, and he kept his word in this as in everything else. as for him, it was probably the way he desired to die. no one believed more ardently than he that whether on the scaffold high, or in the battle's van; the fittest place for man to die, is where he dies for man. among the many who had lost chums and friends was ned johnson, of company k. ned was a young englishman, with much of the suggestiveness of the bull-dog common to the lower class of that nation. his fist was readier than his tongue. his chum, walter savage was of the same surly type. the two had come from england twelve years before, and had been together ever since. savage was killed in the struggle for the fence described in the preceding chapter. ned could not realize for a while that his friend was dead. it was only when the body rapidly stiffened on its icy bed, and the eyes which had been gleaming deadly hate when he was stricken down were glazed over with the dull film of death, that he believed he was gone from him forever. then his rage was terrible. for the rest of the day he was at the head of every assault upon the enemy. his voice could ever be heard above the firing, cursing the rebels bitterly, and urging the boys to "stand up to 'em! stand right up to 'em! don't give a inch! let them have the best you got in the shop! shoot low, and don't waste a cartridge!" when we surrendered, ned seemed to yield sullenly to the inevitable. he threw his belt and apparently his revolver with it upon the snow. a guard was formed around us, and we gathered about the fires that were started. ned sat apart, his arms folded, his head upon his breast, brooding bitterly upon walter's death. a horseman, evidently a colonel or general, clattered up to give some directions concerning us. at the sound of his voice ned raised his head and gave him a swift glance; the gold stars upon the rebel's collar led him to believe that he was the commander of the enemy. ned sprang to his feet, made a long stride forward, snatched from the breast of his overcoat the revolver he had been hiding there, cocked it and leveled it at the rebel's breast. before he could pull the trigger orderly sergeant charles bentley, of his company, who was watching him, leaped forward, caught his wrist and threw the revolver up. others joined in, took the weapon away, and handed it over to the officer, who then ordered us all to be searched for arms, and rode away. all our dejection could not make us forget that we were intensely hungry. we had eaten nothing all day. the fight began before we had time to get any breakfast, and of course there was no interval for refreshments during the engagement. the rebels were no better off than we, having been marched rapidly all night in order to come upon us by daylight. late in the evening a few sacks of meal were given us, and we took the first lesson in an art that long and painful practice afterward was to make very familiar to us. we had nothing to mix the meal in, and it looked as if we would have to eat it dry, until a happy thought struck some one that our caps would do for kneading troughs. at once every cap was devoted to this. getting water from an adjacent spring, each man made a little wad of dough--unsalted--and spreading it upon a flat stone or a chip, set it up in front of the fire to bake. as soon as it was browned on one side, it was pulled off the stone, and the other side turned to the fire. it was a very primitive way of cooking and i became thoroughly disgusted with it. it was fortunate for me that i little dreamed that this was the way i should have to get my meals for the next fifteen months. after somewhat of the edge had been taken off our hunger by this food, we crouched around the fires, talked over the events of the day, speculated as to what was to be done with us, and snatched such sleep as the biting cold would permit. chapter vi. "on to richmond!"--marching on foot over the mountains--my horse has a new rider--unsophisticated mountain girls--discussing the issues of the war--parting with "hiatoga." at dawn we were gathered together, more meal issued to us, which we cooked in the same way, and then were started under heavy guard to march on foot over the mountains to bristol, a station at the point where the virginia and tennessee railroad crosses the line between virginia and tennessee. as we were preparing to set out a sergeant of the first virginia cavalry came galloping up to us on my horse! the sight of my faithful "hiatoga" bestrid by a rebel, wrung my heart. during the action i had forgotten him, but when it ceased i began to worry about his fate. as he and his rider came near i called out to him; he stopped and gave a whinny of recognition, which seemed also a plaintive appeal for an explanation of the changed condition of affairs. the sergeant was a pleasant, gentlemanly boy of about my own age. he rode up to me and inquired if it was my horse, to which i replied in the affirmative, and asked permission to take from the saddle pockets some letters, pictures and other trinkets. he granted this, and we became friends from thence on until we separated. he rode by my side as we plodded over the steep, slippery hills, and we beguiled the way by chatting of the thousand things that soldiers find to talk about, and exchanged reminiscences of the service on both sides. but the subject he was fondest of was that which i relished least: my--now his--horse. into the open ulcer of my heart he poured the acid of all manner of questions concerning my lost steed's qualities and capabilities: would he swim? how was he in fording? did he jump well! how did he stand fire? i smothered my irritation, and answered as pleasantly as i could. in the afternoon of the third day after the capture, we came up to where a party of rustic belles were collected at "quilting." the "yankees" were instantly objects of greater interest than the parade of a menagerie would have been. the sergeant told the girls we were going to camp for the night a mile or so ahead, and if they would be at a certain house, he would have a yankee for them for close inspection. after halting, the sergeant obtained leave to take me out with a guard, and i was presently ushered into a room in which the damsels were massed in force, --a carnation-checked, staring, open-mouthed, linsey-clad crowd, as ignorant of corsets and gloves as of hebrew, and with a propensity to giggle that was chronic and irrepressible. when we entered the room there was a general giggle, and then a shower of comments upon my appearance,--each sentence punctuated with the chorus of feminine cachination. a remark was made about my hair and eyes, and their risibles gave way; judgment was passed on my nose, and then came a ripple of laughter. i got very red in the face, and uncomfortable generally. attention was called to the size of my feet and hands, and the usual chorus followed. those useful members of my body seemed to swell up as they do to a young man at his first party. then i saw that in the minds of these bucolic maidens i was scarcely, if at all, human; they did not understand that i belonged to the race; i was a "yankee"--a something of the non-human class, as the gorilla or the chimpanzee. they felt as free to discuss my points before my face as they would to talk of a horse or a wild animal in a show. my equanimity was partially restored by this reflection, but i was still too young to escape embarrassment and irritation at being thus dissected and giggled at by a party of girls, even if they were ignorant virginia mountaineers. i turned around to speak to the sergeant, and in so doing showed my back to the ladies. the hum of comment deepened into surprise, that half stopped and then intensified the giggle. i was puzzled for a minute, and then the direction of their glances, and their remarks explained it all. at the rear of the lower part of the cavalry jacket, about where the upper ornamental buttons are on the tail of a frock coat, are two funny tabs, about the size of small pin-cushions. they are fastened by the edge, and stick out straight behind. their use is to support the heavy belt in the rear, as the buttons do in front. when the belt is off it would puzzle the seven wise men to guess what they are for. the unsophisticated young ladies, with that swift intuition which is one of lovely woman's salient mental traits, immediately jumped at the conclusion that the projections covered some peculiar conformation of the yankee anatomy--some incipient, dromedary-like humps, or perchance the horns of which they had heard so much. this anatomical phenomena was discussed intently for a few minutes, during which i heard one of the girls inquire whether "it would hurt him to cut 'em off?" and another hazarded the opinion that "it would probably bleed him to death." then a new idea seized them, and they said to the sergeant "make him sing! make him sing!" this was too much for the sergeant, who had been intensely amused at the girls' wonderment. he turned to me, very red in the face, with: "sergeant: the girls want to hear you sing." i replied that i could not sing a note. said he: "oh, come now. i know better than that; i never seed or heerd of a yankee that couldn't sing." i nevertheless assured him that there really were some yankees that did not have any musical accomplishments, and that i was one of that unfortunate number. i asked him to get the ladies to sing for me, and to this they acceded quite readily. one girl, with a fair soprano, who seemed to be the leader of the crowd, sang "the homespun dress," a song very popular in the south, and having the same tune as the "bonnie blue flag." it began, i envy not the northern girl their silks and jewels fine, and proceeded to compare the homespun habiliments of the southern women to the finery and frippery of the ladies on the other side of mason and dixon's line in a manner very disadvantageous to the latter. the rest of the girls made a fine exhibition of the lung-power acquired in climbing their precipitous mountains, when they came in on the chorus hurra! hurra! for southern rights hurra! hurra for the homespun dress, the southern ladies wear. this ended the entertainment. on our journey to bristol we met many rebel soldiers, of all ranks, and a small number of citizens. as the conscription had then been enforced pretty sharply for over a year the only able-bodied men seen in civil life were those who had some trade which exempted them from being forced into active service. it greatly astonished us at first to find that nearly all the mechanics were included among the exempts, or could be if they chose; but a very little reflection showed us the wisdom of such a policy. the south is as nearly a purely agricultural country as is russia or south america. the people have, little inclination or capacity for anything else than pastoral pursuits. consequently mechanics are very scarce, and manufactories much scarcer. the limited quantity of products of mechanical skill needed by the people was mostly imported from the north or europe. both these sources of supply were cutoff by the war, and the country was thrown upon its own slender manufacturing resources. to force its mechanics into the army would therefore be suicidal. the army would gain a few thousand men, but its operations would be embarrassed, if not stopped altogether, by a want of supplies. this condition of affairs reminded one of the singular paucity of mechanical skill among the bedouins of the desert, which renders the life of a blacksmith sacred. no matter how bitter the feud between tribes, no one will kill the other's workers of iron, and instances are told of warriors saving their lives at critical periods by falling on their knees and making with their garments an imitation of the action of a smith's bellows. all whom we met were eager to discuss with us the causes, phases and progress of the war, and whenever opportunity offered or could be made, those of us who were inclined to talk were speedily involved in an argument with crowds of soldiers and citizens. but, owing to the polemic poverty of our opponents, the argument was more in name than in fact. like all people of slender or untrained intellectual powers they labored under the hallucination that asserting was reasoning, and the emphatic reiteration of bald statements, logic. the narrow round which all from highest to lowest--traveled was sometimes comical, and sometimes irritating, according to one's mood! the dispute invariably began by their asking: "well, what are you 'uns down here a-fightin' we 'uns for?" as this was replied to the newt one followed: "why are you'uns takin' our niggers away from we 'uns for?" then came: "what do you 'uns put our niggers to fightin' we'uns for?" the windup always was: "well, let me tell you, sir, you can never whip people that are fighting for liberty, sir." even general giltner, who had achieved considerable military reputation as commander of a division of kentucky cavalry, seemed to be as slenderly furnished with logical ammunition as the balance, for as he halted by us he opened the conversation with the well-worn formula: "well: what are you 'uns down here a-fighting we'uns for?" the question had become raspingly monotonous to me, whom he addressed, and i replied with marked acerbity: "because we are the northern mudsills whom you affect to despise, and we came down here to lick you into respecting us." the answer seemed to tickle him, a pleasanter light came into his sinister gray eyes, he laughed lightly, and bade us a kindly good day. four days after our capture we arrived in bristol. the guards who had brought us over the mountains were relieved by others, the sergeant bade me good by, struck his spurs into "hiatoga's" sides, and he and my faithful horse were soon lost to view in the darkness. a new and keener sense of desolation came over me at the final separation from my tried and true four-footed friend, who had been my constant companion through so many perils and hardships. we had endured together the winter's cold, the dispiriting drench of the rain, the fatigue of the long march, the discomforts of the muddy camp, the gripings of hunger, the weariness of the drill and review, the perils of the vidette post, the courier service, the scout and the fight. we had shared in common the whips and scorns of time, the oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, the insolence of office, and the spurns which a patient private and his horse of the unworthy take; we had had our frequently recurring rows with other fellows and their horses, over questions of precedence at watering places, and grass-plots, had had lively tilts with guards of forage piles in surreptitious attempts to get additional rations, sometimes coming off victorious and sometimes being driven off ingloriously. i had often gone hungry that he might have the only ear of corn obtainable. i am not skilled enough in horse lore to speak of his points or pedigree. i only know that his strong limbs never failed me, and that he was always ready for duty and ever willing. now at last our paths diverged. i was retired from actual service to a prison, and he bore his new master off to battle against his old friends. ........................... packed closely in old, dilapidated stock and box cars, as if cattle in shipment to market, we pounded along slowly, and apparently interminably, toward the rebel capital. the railroads of the south were already in very bad condition. they were never more than passably good, even in their best estate, but now, with a large part of the skilled men engaged upon them escaped back to the north, with all renewal, improvement, or any but the most necessary repairs stopped for three years, and with a marked absence of even ordinary skill and care in their management, they were as nearly ruined as they could well be and still run. one of the severe embarrassments under which the roads labored was a lack of oil. there is very little fatty matter of any kind in the south. the climate and the food plants do not favor the accumulation of adipose tissue by animals, and there is no other source of supply. lard oil and tallow were very scarce and held at exorbitant prices. attempts were made to obtain lubricants from the peanut and the cotton seed. the first yielded a fine bland oil, resembling the ordinary grade of olive oil, but it was entirely too expensive for use in the arts. the cotton seed oil could be produced much cheaper, but it had in it such a quantity of gummy matter as to render it worse than useless for employment on machinery. this scarcity of oleaginous matter produced a corresponding scarcity of soap and similar detergents, but this was a deprivation which caused the rebels, as a whole, as little inconvenience as any that they suffered from. i have seen many thousands of them who were obviously greatly in need of soap, but if they were rent with any suffering on that account they concealed it with marvelous self-control. there seemed to be a scanty supply of oil provided for the locomotives, but the cars had to run with unlubricated axles, and the screaking and groaning of the grinding journals in the dry boxes was sometimes almost deafening, especially when we were going around a curve. our engine went off the wretched track several times, but as she was not running much faster than a man could walk, the worst consequence to us was a severe jolting. she was small, and was easily pried back upon the track, and sent again upon her wheezy, straining way. the depression which had weighed us down for a night and a day after our capture had now been succeeded by a more cheerful feeling. we began to look upon our condition as the fortune of war. we were proud of our resistance to overwhelming numbers. we knew we had sold ourselves at a price which, if the rebels had it to do over again, they would not pay for us. we believed that we had killed and seriously wounded as many of them as they had killed, wounded and captured of us. we had nothing to blame ourselves for. moreover, we began to be buoyed up with the expectation that we would be exchanged immediately upon our arrival at richmond, and the rebel officers confidently assured us that this would be so. there was then a temporary hitch in the exchange, but it would all be straightened out in a few days, and it might not be a month until we were again marching out of cumberland gap, on an avenging foray against some of the force which had assisted in our capture. fortunately for this delusive hopefulness there was no weird and boding cassandra to pierce the veil of the future for us, and reveal the length and the ghastly horror of the valley of the shadow of death, through which we must pass for hundreds of sad days, stretching out into long months of suffering and death. happily there was no one to tell us that of every five in that party four would never stand under the stars and stripes again, but succumbing to chronic starvation, long-continued exposure, the bullet of the brutal guard, the loathsome scurvy, the hideous gangrene, and the heartsickness of hope deferred, would find respite from pain low in the barren sands of that hungry southern soil. were every doom foretokened by appropriate omens, the ravens along our route would have croaked themselves hoarse. but, far from being oppressed by any presentiment of coming evil, we began to appreciate and enjoy the picturesque grandeur of the scenery through which we were moving. the rugged sternness of the appalachian mountain range, in whose rock-ribbed heart we had fought our losing fight, was now softening into less strong, but more graceful outlines as we approached the pine-clad, sandy plains of the seaboard, upon which richmond is built. we were skirting along the eastern base of the great blue ridge, about whose distant and lofty summits hung a perpetual veil of deep, dark, but translucent blue, which refracted the slanting rays of the morning and evening sun into masses of color more gorgeous than a dreamer's vision of an enchanted land. at lynchburg we saw the famed peaks of otter--twenty miles away--lifting their proud heads far into the clouds, like giant watch-towers sentineling the gateway that the mighty waters of the james had forced through the barriers of solid adamant lying across their path to the far-off sea. what we had seen many miles back start from the mountain sides as slender rivulets, brawling over the worn boulders, were now great, rushing, full-tide streams, enough of them in any fifty miles of our journey to furnish water power for all the factories of new england. their amazing opulence of mechanical energy has lain unutilized, almost unnoticed; in the two and one-half centuries that the white man has dwelt near them, while in massachusetts and her near neighbors every rill that can turn a wheel has been put into harness and forced to do its share of labor for the benefit of the men who have made themselves its masters. here is one of the differences between the two sections: in the north man was set free, and the elements made to do his work. in the south man was the degraded slave, and the elements wantoned on in undisturbed freedom. as we went on, the valleys of the james and the appomattox, down which our way lay, broadened into an expanse of arable acres, and the faces of those streams were frequently flecked by gem-like little islands. chapter vii. entering richmond--disappointment at its appearance--everybody in uniform--curled darlings of the capital--the rebel flag--libby prison --dick turner--searching the new comers. early on the tenth morning after our capture we were told that we were about to enter richmond. instantly all were keenly observant of every detail in the surroundings of a city that was then the object of the hopes and fears of thirty-five millions of people--a city assailing which seventy-five thousand brave men had already laid down their lives, defending which an equal number had died, and which, before it fell, was to cost the life blood of another one hundred and fifty thousand valiant assailants and defenders. so much had been said and written about richmond that our boyish minds had wrought up the most extravagant expectations of it and its defenses. we anticipated seeing a city differing widely from anything ever seen before; some anomaly of nature displayed in its site, itself guarded by imposing and impregnable fortifications, with powerful forts and heavy guns, perhaps even walls, castles, postern gates, moats and ditches, and all the other panoply of defensive warfare, with which romantic history had made us familiar. we were disappointed--badly disappointed--in seeing nothing of this as we slowly rolled along. the spires and the tall chimneys of the factories rose in the distance very much as they had in other cities we had visited. we passed a single line of breastworks of bare yellow sand, but the scrubby pines in front were not cut away, and there were no signs that there had ever been any immediate expectation of use for the works. a redoubt or two--without guns--could be made out, and this was all. grim-visaged war had few wrinkles on his front in that neighborhood. they were then seaming his brow on the rappahannock, seventy miles away, where the army of northern virginia and the army of the potomac lay confronting each other. at one of the stopping places i had been separated from my companions by entering a car in which were a number of east tennesseeans, captured in the operations around knoxville, and whom the rebels, in accordance with their usual custom, were treating with studied contumely. i had always had a very warm side for these simple rustics of the mountains and valleys. i knew much of their unwavering fidelity to the union, of the firm steadfastness with which they endured persecution for their country's sake, and made sacrifices even unto death; and, as in those days i estimated all men simply by their devotion to the great cause of national integrity, (a habit that still clings to me) i rated these men very highly. i had gone into their car to do my little to encourage them, and when i attempted to return to my own i was prevented by the guard. crossing the long bridge, our train came to a halt on the other side of the river with the usual clamor of bell and whistle, the usual seemingly purposeless and vacillating, almost dizzying, running backward and forward on a network of sidetracks and switches, that seemed unavoidably necessary, a dozen years ago, in getting a train into a city. still unable to regain my comrades and share their fortunes, i was marched off with the tennesseeans through the city to the office of some one who had charge of the prisoners of war. the streets we passed through were lined with retail stores, in which business was being carried on very much as in peaceful times. many people were on the streets, but the greater part of the men wore some sort of a uniform. though numbers of these were in active service, yet the wearing of a military garb did not necessarily imply this. nearly every able-bodied man in richmond was; enrolled in some sort of an organization, and armed, and drilled regularly. even the members of the confederate congress were uniformed and attached, in theory at least, to the home guards. it was obvious even to the casual glimpse of a passing prisoner of war, that the city did not lack its full share of the class which formed so large an element of the society of washington and other northern cities during the war--the dainty carpet soldiers, heros of the promenade and the boudoir, who strutted in uniforms when the enemy was far off, and wore citizen's clothes when he was close at hand. there were many curled darlings displaying their fine forms in the nattiest of uniforms, whose gloss had never suffered from so much as a heavy dew, let alone a rainy day on the march. the confederate gray could be made into a very dressy garb. with the sleeves lavishly embroidered with gold lace, and the collar decorated with stars indicating the wearer's rank--silver for the field officers, and gold for the higher grade,--the feet compressed into high-heeled, high-instepped boots, (no virginian is himself without a fine pair of skin-tight boots) and the head covered with a fine, soft, broad-brimmed hat, trimmed with a gold cord, from which a bullion tassel dangled several inches down the wearer's back, you had a military swell, caparisoned for conquest--among the fair sex. on our way we passed the noted capitol of virginia--a handsome marble building,--of the column-fronted grecian temple style. it stands in the center of the city. upon the grounds is crawford's famous equestrian statue of washington, surrounded by smaller statues of other revolutionary patriots. the confederate congress was then in session in the capitol, and also the legislature of virginia, a fact indicated by the state flag of virginia floating from the southern end of the building, and the new flag of the confederacy from the northern end. this was the first time i had seen the latter, which had been recently adopted, and i examined it with some interest. the design was exceedingly plain. simply a white banner, with a red field in the corner where the blue field with stars is in ours. the two blue stripes were drawn diagonally across this field in the shape of a letter x, and in these were thirteen white stars, corresponding to the number of states claimed to be in the confederacy. the battle-flag was simply the red field. my examination of all this was necessarily very brief. the guards felt that i was in richmond for other purposes than to study architecture, statuary and heraldry, and besides they were in a hurry to be relieved of us and get their breakfast, so my art-education was abbreviated sharply. we did not excite much attention on the streets. prisoners had by that time become too common in richmond to create any interest. occasionally passers by would fling opprobrious epithets at "the east tennessee traitors," but that was all. the commandant of the prisons directed the tennesseeans to be taken to castle lightning--a prison used to confine the rebel deserters, among whom they also classed the east tennesseeans, and sometimes the west virginians, kentuckians, marylanders and missourians found fighting against them. such of our men as deserted to them were also lodged there, as the rebels, very properly, did not place a high estimate upon this class of recruits to their army, and, as we shall see farther along, violated all obligations of good faith with them, by putting them among the regular prisoners of war, so as to exchange them for their own men. back we were all marched to a street which ran parallel to the river and canal, and but one square away from them. it was lined on both sides by plain brick warehouses and tobacco factories, four and five stories high, which were now used by the rebel government as prisons and military storehouses. the first we passed was castle thunder, of bloody repute. this occupied the same place in confederate history, that, the dungeons beneath the level of the water did in the annals of the venetian council of ten. it was believed that if the bricks in its somber, dirt-grimed walls could speak, each could tell a separate story of a life deemed dangerous to the state that had gone down in night, at the behest of the ruthless confederate authorities. it was confidently asserted that among the commoner occurrences within its confines was the stationing of a doomed prisoner against a certain bit of blood-stained, bullet-chipped wall, and relieving the confederacy of all farther fear of him by the rifles of a firing party. how well this dark reputation was deserved, no one but those inside the inner circle of the davis government can say. it is safe to believe that more tragedies were enacted there than the archives of the rebel civil or military judicature give any account of. the prison was employed for the detention of spies, and those charged with the convenient allegation of "treason against the confederate states of america." it is probable that many of these were sent out of the world with as little respect for the formalities of law as was exhibited with regard to the 'suspects' during the french revolution. next we came to castle lightning, and here i bade adieu to my tennessee companions. a few squares more and we arrived at a warehouse larger than any of the others. over the door was a sign thomas libby & son, ship chandlers and grocers. this was the notorious "libby prison," whose name was painfully familiar to every union man in the land. under the sign was a broad entrance way, large enough to admit a dray or a small wagon. on one side of this was the prison office, in which were a number of dapper, feeble-faced clerks at work on the prison records. as i entered this space a squad of newly arrived prisoners were being searched for valuables, and having their names, rank and regiment recorded in the books. presently a clerk addressed as "majah tunnah," the man who was superintending these operations, and i scanned him with increased interest, as i knew then that he was the ill-famed dick turner, hated all over the north for his brutality to our prisoners. he looked as if he deserved his reputation. seen upon the street he would be taken for a second or third class gambler, one in whom a certain amount of cunning is pieced out by a readiness to use brute force. his face, clean-shaved, except a "bowery-b'hoy" goatee, was white, fat, and selfishly sensual. small, pig-like eyes, set close together, glanced around continually. his legs were short, his body long, and made to appear longer, by his wearing no vest--a custom common them with southerners. his faculties were at that moment absorbed in seeing that no person concealed any money from him. his subordinates did not search closely enough to suit him, and he would run his fat, heavily-ringed fingers through the prisoner's hair, feel under their arms and elsewhere where he thought a stray five dollar greenback might be concealed. but with all his greedy care he was no match for yankee cunning. the prisoners told me afterward that, suspecting they would be searched, they had taken off the caps of the large, hollow brass buttons of their coats, carefully folded a bill into each cavity, and replaced the cap. in this way they brought in several hundred dollars safely. there was one dirty old englishman in the party, who, turner was convinced, had money concealed about his person. he compelled him to strip off everything, and stand shivering in the sharp cold, while he took up one filthy rag after another, felt over each carefully, and scrutinized each seam and fold. i was delighted to see that after all his nauseating work he did not find so much as a five cent piece. it came my turn. i had no desire, in that frigid atmosphere, to strip down to what artemus ward called "the skanderlous costoom of the greek slave;" so i pulled out of my pocket my little store of wealth--ten dollars in greenbacks, sixty dollars in confederate graybacks--and displayed it as turner came up with, "there's all i have, sir." turner pocketed it without a word, and did not search me. in after months, when i was nearly famished, my estimation of "majah tunnah" was hardly enhanced by the reflection that what would have purchased me many good meals was probably lost by him in betting on a pair of queens, when his opponent held a "king full." i ventured to step into the office to inquire after my comrades. one of the whey-faced clerks said with the supercilious asperity characteristic of gnat-brained headquarters attaches: "get out of here!" as if i had been a stray cur wandering in in search of a bone lunch. i wanted to feed the fellow to a pile-driver. the utmost i could hope for in the way of revenge was that the delicate creature might some day make a mistake in parting his hair, and catch his death of cold. the guard conducted us across the street, and into the third story of a building standing on the next corner below. here i found about four hundred men, mostly belonging to the army of the potomac, who crowded around me with the usual questions to new prisoners: what was my regiment, where and when captured, and: what were the prospects of exchange? it makes me shudder now to recall how often, during the dreadful months that followed, this momentous question was eagerly propounded to every new comer: put with bated breath by men to whom exchange meant all that they asked of this world, and possibly of the next; meant life, home, wife or sweet-heart, friends, restoration to manhood, and self-respect --everything, everything that makes existence in this world worth having. i answered as simply and discouragingly as did the tens of thousands that came after me: "i did not hear anything about exchange." a soldier in the field had many other things of more immediate interest to think about than the exchange of prisoners. the question only became a living issue when he or some of his intimate friends fell into the enemy's hands. thus began my first day in prison. chapter viii. introduction to prison life--the pemberton building and its occupants --neat sailors--roll call--rations and clothing--chivalric "confiscation." i began acquainting myself with my new situation and surroundings. the building into which i had been conducted was an old tobacco factory, called the "pemberton building," possibly from an owner of that name, and standing on the corner of what i was told were fifteenth and carey streets. in front it was four stories high; behind but three, owing to the rapid rise of the hill, against which it was built. it fronted towards the james river and kanawha canal, and the james river--both lying side by side, and only one hundred yards distant, with no intervening buildings. the front windows afforded a fine view. to the right front was libby, with its guards pacing around it on the sidewalk, watching the fifteen hundred officers confined within its walls. at intervals during each day squads of fresh prisoners could be seen entering its dark mouth, to be registered, and searched, and then marched off to the prison assigned them. we could see up the james river for a mile or so, to where the long bridges crossing it bounded the view. directly in front, across the river, was a flat, sandy plain, said to be general winfield scott's farm, and now used as a proving ground for the guns cast at the tredegar iron works. the view down the river was very fine. it extended about twelve miles, to where a gap in the woods seemed to indicate a fort, which we imagined to be fort darling, at that time the principal fortification defending the passage of the james. between that point and where we were lay the river, in a long, broad mirror-like expanse, like a pretty little inland lake. occasionally a busy little tug would bustle up or down, a gunboat move along with noiseless dignity, suggestive of a reserved power, or a schooner beat lazily from one side to the other. but these were so few as to make even more pronounced the customary idleness that hung over the scene. the tug's activity seemed spasmodic and forced--a sort of protest against the gradually increasing lethargy that reigned upon the bosom of the waters --the gunboat floated along as if performing a perfunctory duty, and the schooners sailed about as if tired of remaining in one place. that little stretch of water was all that was left for a cruising ground. beyond fort darling the union gunboats lay, and the only vessel that passed the barrier was the occasional flag-of-truce steamer. the basement of the building was occupied as a store-house for the taxes-in-kind which the confederate government collected. on the first floor were about five hundred men. on the second floor--where i was --were about four hundred men. these were principally from the first division, first corps distinguished by a round red patch on their caps; first division, second corps, marked by a red clover leaf; and the first division, third corps, who wore a red diamond. they were mainly captured at gettysburg and mine run. besides these there was a considerable number from the eighth corps, captured at winchester, and a large infusion of cavalry-first, second and third west virginia--taken in averill's desperate raid up the virginia valley, with the wytheville salt works as an objective. on the third floor were about two hundred sailors and marines, taken in the gallant but luckless assault upon the ruins of fort sumter, in the september previous. they retained the discipline of the ship in their quarters, kept themselves trim and clean, and their floor as white as a ship's deck. they did not court the society of the "sojers" below, whose camp ideas of neatness differed from theirs. a few old barnacle-backs always sat on guard around the head of the steps leading from the lower rooms. they chewed tobacco enormously, and kept their mouths filled with the extracted juice. any luckless "sojer" who attempted to ascend the stairs usually returned in haste, to avoid the deluge of the filthy liquid. for convenience in issuing rations we were divided into messes of twenty, each mess electing a sergeant as its head, and each floor electing a sergeant-of-the-floor, who drew rations and enforced what little discipline was observed. though we were not so neat as the sailors above us, we tried to keep our quarters reasonably clean, and we washed the floor every morning; getting down on our knees and rubbing it clean and dry with rags. each mess detailed a man each day to wash up the part of the floor it occupied, and he had to do this properly or no ration would be given him. while the washing up was going on each man stripped himself and made close examination of his garments for the body-lice, which otherwise would have increased beyond control. blankets were also carefully hunted over for these "small deer." about eight o'clock a spruce little lisping rebel named ross would appear with a book, and a body-guard, consisting of a big irishman, who had the air of a policeman, and carried a musket barrel made into a cane. behind him were two or three armed guards. the sergeant-of-the-floor commanded: "fall in in four ranks for roll-call." we formed along one side of the room; the guards halted at the head of the stairs; ross walked down in front and counted the files, closely followed by his irish aid, with his gun-barrel cane raised ready for use upon any one who should arouse his ruffianly ire. breaking ranks we returned to our places, and sat around in moody silence for three hours. we had eaten nothing since the previous noon. rising hungry, our hunger seemed to increase in arithmetical ratio with every quarter of an hour. these times afforded an illustration of the thorough subjection of man to the tyrant stomach. a more irritable lot of individuals could scarcely be found outside of a menagerie than these men during the hours waiting for rations. "crosser than, two sticks" utterly failed as a comparison. they were crosser than the lines of a check apron. many could have given odds to the traditional bear with a sore head, and run out of the game fifty points ahead of him. it was astonishingly easy to get up a fight at these times. there was no need of going a step out of the way to search for it, as one could have a full fledged article of overwhelming size on his hands at any instant, by a trifling indiscretion of speech or manner. all the old irritating flings between the cavalry, the artillery and the infantry, the older "first-call" men, and the later or "three-hundred-dollar-men," as they were derisively dubbed, between the different corps of the army of the potomac, between men of different states, and lastly between the adherents and opponents of mcclellan, came to the lips and were answered by a blow with the fist, when a ring would be formed around the combatants by a crowd, which would encourage them with yells to do their best. in a few minutes one of the parties to the fistic debate, who found the point raised by him not well taken, would retire to the sink to wash the blood from his battered face, and the rest would resume their seats and glower at space until some fresh excitement roused them. for the last hour or so of these long waits hardly a word would be spoken. we were too ill-natured to talk for amusement, and there was nothing else to talk for. this spell was broken about eleven o'clock by the appearance at the head of the stairway of the irishman with the gun-barrel cane, and his singing out: "sargint uv the flure: fourtane min and a bread-box!" instantly every man sprang to his feet, and pressed forward to be one of the favored fourteen. one did not get any more gyrations or obtain them any sooner by this, but it was a relief, and a change to walk the half square outside the prison to the cookhouse, and help carry the rations back. for a little while after our arrival in richmond, the rations were tolerably good. there had been so much said about the privations of the prisoners that our government had, after much quibbling and negotiation, succeeded in getting the privilege of sending food and clothing through the lines to us. of course but a small part of that sent ever reached its destination. there were too many greedy rebels along its line of passage to let much of it be received by those for whom it was intended. we could see from our windows rebels strutting about in overcoats, in which the box wrinkles were still plainly visible, wearing new "u. s." blankets as cloaks, and walking in government shoes, worth fabulous prices in confederate money. fortunately for our government the rebels decided to out themselves off from this profitable source of supply. we read one day in the richmond papers that "president davis and his cabinet had come to the conclusion that it was incompatible with the dignity of a sovereign power to permit another power with which it was at war, to feed and clothe prisoners in its hands." i will not stop to argue this point of honor, and show its absurdity by pointing out that it is not an unusual practice with nations at war. it is a sufficient commentary upon this assumption of punctiliousness that the paper went on to say that some five tons of clothing and fifteen tons of food, which had been sent under a flag of truce to city point, would neither be returned nor delivered to us, but "converted to the use of the confederate government." "and surely they are all honorable men!" heaven save the mark. chapter ix. brans or peas--insufficiency of darky testimony--a guard kills a prisoner--prisoners teaze the guards--desperate outbreak. but, to return to the rations--a topic which, with escape or exchange, were to be the absorbing ones for us for the next fifteen months. there was now issued to every two men a loaf of coarse bread--made of a mixture of flour and meal--and about the size and shape of an ordinary brick. this half loaf was accompanied, while our government was allowed to furnish rations, with a small piece of corned beef. occasionally we got a sweet potato, or a half-pint or such a matter of soup made from a coarse, but nutritious, bean or pea, called variously "nigger-pea," "stock-pea," or "cow-pea." this, by the way, became a fruitful bone of contention during our stay in the south. one strong party among us maintained that it was a bean, because it was shaped like one, and brown, which they claimed no pea ever was. the other party held that it was a pea because its various names all agreed in describing it as a pea, and because it was so full of bugs--none being entirely free from insects, and some having as many as twelve by actual count--within its shell. this, they declared, was a distinctive characteristic of the pea family. the contention began with our first instalment of the leguminous ration, and was still raging between the survivors who passed into our lines in 1865. it waxed hot occasionally, and each side continually sought evidence to support its view of the case. once an old darky, sent into the prison on some errand, was summoned to decide a hot dispute that was raging in the crowd to which i belonged. the champion of the pea side said, producing one of the objects of dispute: "now, boys, keep still, till i put the question fairly. now, uncle, what do they call that there?" the colored gentleman scrutinized the vegetable closely, and replied, "well, dey mos' generally calls 'em stock-peas, round hyar aways." "there," said the pea-champion triumphantly. "but," broke in the leader of the bean party, "uncle, don't they also call them beans?" "well, yes, chile, i spec dat lots of 'em does." and this was about the way the matter usually ended. i will not attempt to bias the reader's judgment by saying which side i believed to be right. as the historic british showman said, in reply to the question as to whether an animal in his collection was a rhinoceros or an elephant, "you pays your money and you takes your choice." the rations issued to us, as will be seen above, though they appear scanty, were still sufficient to support life and health, and months afterward, in andersonville, we used to look back to them as sumptuous. we usually had them divided and eaten by noon, and, with the gnawings of hunger appeased, we spent the afternoon and evening comfortably. we told stories, paced up and down, the floor for exercise, played cards, sung, read what few books were available, stood at the windows and studied the landscape, and watched the rebels trying their guns and shells, and so on as long as it was daylight. occasionally it was dangerous to be about the windows. this depended wholly on the temper of the guards. one day a member of a virginia regiment, on guard on the pavement in front, deliberately left his beat, walked out into the center of the street, aimed his gun at a member of the ninth west virginia, who was standing at a window near, and firing, shot him through the heart, the bullet passing through his body, and through the floor above. the act was purely malicious, and was done, doubtless, in revenge for some injury which our men had done the assassin or his family. we were not altogether blameless, by any means. there were few opportunities to say bitterly offensive things to the guards, let pass unimproved. the prisoners in the third floor of the smith building, adjoining us, had their own way of teasing them. late at night, when everybody would be lying down, and out of the way of shots, a window in the third story would open, a broomstick, with a piece nailed across to represent arms, and clothed with a cap and blouse, would be protruded, and a voice coming from a man carefully protected by the wall, would inquire: "s-a-y, g-uarr-d, what time is it?" if the guard was of the long suffering kind he would answer: "take yo' head back in, up dah; you kno hits agin all odahs to do dat?" then the voice would say, aggravatingly, "oh, well, go to ---you ---rebel ----, if you can't answer a civil question." before the speech was ended the guard's rifle would be at his shoulder and he would fire. back would come the blouse and hat in haste, only to go out again the next instant, with a derisive laugh, and, "thought you were going to hurt somebody, didn't you, you ----------------. but, lord, you can't shoot for sour apples; if i couldn't shoot no better than you, mr. johnny reb, i would ----" by this time the guard, having his gun loaded again, would cut short the remarks with another shot, which, followed up with similar remarks, would provoke still another, when an alarm sounding, the guards at libby and all the other buildings around us would turn out. an officer of the guard would go up with a squad into the third floor, only to find everybody up there snoring away as if they were the seven sleepers. after relieving his mind of a quantity of vigorous profanity, and threats to "buck and gag" and cut off the rations of the whole room, the officer would return to his quarters in the guard house, but before he was fairly ensconced there the cap and blouse would go out again, and the maddened guard be regaled with a spirited and vividly profane lecture on the depravity of rebels in general, and his own unworthiness in particular. one night in january things took a more serious turn. the boys on the lower floor of our building had long considered a plan of escape. there were then about fifteen thousand prisoners in richmond--ten thousand on belle isle and five thousand in the buildings. of these one thousand five hundred were officers in libby. besides there were the prisoners in castles thunder and lightning. the essential features of the plan were that at a preconcerted signal we at the second and third floors should appear at the windows with bricks and irons from the tobacco presses, which a should shower down on the guards and drive them away, while the men of the first floor would pour out, chase the guards into the board house in the basement, seize their arms, drive those away from around libby and the other prisons, release the officers, organize into regiments and brigades, seize the armory, set fire to the public buildings and retreat from the city, by the south side of the james, where there was but a scanty force of rebels, and more could be prevented from coming over by burning the bridges behind us. it was a magnificent scheme, and might have been carried out, but there was no one in the building who was generally believed to have the qualities of a leader. but while it was being debated a few of the hot heads on the lower floor undertook to precipitate the crisis. they seized what they thought was a favorable opportunity, overpowered the guard who stood at the foot of the stairs, and poured into the street. the other guards fell back and opened fire on them; other troops hastened up, and soon drove them back into the building, after killing ten or fifteen. we of the second and third floors did not anticipate the break at that time, and were taken as much by surprise as were the rebels. nearly all were lying down and many were asleep. some hastened to the windows, and dropped missiles out, but before any concerted action could be taken it was seen that the case was hopeless, and we remained quiet. among those who led in the assault was a drummer-boy of some new york regiment, a recklessly brave little rascal. he had somehow smuggled a small four-shooter in with him, and when they rushed out he fired it off at the guards. after the prisoners were driven back, the rebel officers came in and vapored around considerably, but confined themselves to big words. they were particularly anxious to find the revolver, and ordered a general and rigorous search for it. the prisoners were all ranged on one side of the room and carefully examined by one party, while another hunted through the blankets and bundles. it was all in vain; no pistol could be found. the boy had a loaf of wheat bread, bought from a baker during the day. it was a round loaf, set together in two pieces like a biscuit. he pulled these apart, laid the fourshooter between them, pressed the two halves together, and went on calmly nibbling away at the loaf while the search was progressing. two gunboats were brought up the next morning, and anchored in the canal near us, with their heavy guns trained upon the building. it was thought that this would intimidate as from a repetition of the attack, but our sailors conceived that, as they laid against the shore next to us, they could be easily captured, and their artillery made to assist us. a scheme to accomplish this was being wrought out, when we received notice to move, and it came to naught. chapter x. the exchange and the cause of its interruption--brief resume of the different cartels, and the difficulties that led to their suspension. few questions intimately connected with the actual operations of the rebellion have been enveloped with such a mass of conflicting statement as the responsibility for the interruption of the exchange. southern writers and politicians, naturally anxious to diminish as much as possible the great odium resting upon their section for the treatment of prisoners of war during the last year and a half of the confederacy's existence, have vehemently charged that the government of the united states deliberately and pitilessly resigned to their fate such of its soldiers as fell into the hands of the enemy, and repelled all advances from the rebel government looking toward a resumption of exchange. it is alleged on our side, on the other hand, that our government did all that was possible, consistent with national dignity and military prudence, to secure a release of its unfortunate men in the power of the rebels. over this vexed question there has been waged an acrimonious war of words, which has apparently led to no decision, nor any convictions--the disputants, one and all, remaining on the sides of the controversy occupied by them when the debate began. i may not be in possession of all the facts bearing upon the case, and may be warped in judgment by prejudices in favor of my own government's wisdom and humanity, but, however this may be, the following is my firm belief as to the controlling facts in this lamentable affair: 1. for some time after the beginning of hostilities our government refused to exchange prisoners with the rebels, on the ground that this might be held by the european powers who were seeking a pretext for acknowledging the confederacy, to be admission by us that the war was no longer an insurrection but a revolution, which had resulted in the 'de facto' establishment of a new nation. this difficulty was finally gotten over by recognizing the rebels as belligerents, which, while it placed them on a somewhat different plane from mere insurgents, did not elevate them to the position of soldiers of a foreign power. 2. then the following cartel was agreed upon by generals dig on our side and hill on that of the rebels: haxall's landing, on james river, july 22, 1882. the undersigned, having been commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent to make arrangements for a general exchange of prisoners of war, have agreed to the following articles: article i.--it is hereby agreed and stipulated, that all prisoners of war, held by either party, including those taken on private armed vessels, known as privateers, shall be exchanged upon the conditions and terms following: prisoners to be exchanged man for man and officer for officer. privateers to be placed upon the footing of officers and men of the navy. men and officers of lower grades may be exchanged for officers of a higher grade, and men and officers of different services may be exchanged according to the following scale of equivalents: a general-commanding-in-chief, or an admiral, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for sixty privates or common seamen. a commodore, carrying a broad pennant, or a brigadier general, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or twenty privates or common seamen. a captain in the navy, or a colonel, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for fifteen privates or common seamen. a lieutenant colonel, or commander in the navy, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for ten privates or common seamen. a lieutenant, or a master in the navy, or a captain in the army or marines shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or six privates or common seamen. master's-mates in the navy, or lieutenants or ensigns in the army, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or four privates or common seamen. midshipmen, warrant officers in the navy, masters of merchant vessels and commanders of privateers, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or three privates or common seamen; second captains, lieutenants or mates of merchant vessels or privateers, and all petty officers in the navy, and all noncommissioned officers in the army or marines, shall be severally exchanged for persons of equal rank, or for two privates or common seamen; and private soldiers or common seamen shall be exchanged for each other man for man. article ii.--local, state, civil and militia rank held by persons not in actual military service will not be recognized; the basis of exchange being the grade actually held in the naval and military service of the respective parties. article iii.--if citizens held by either party on charges of disloyalty, or any alleged civil offense, are exchanged, it shall only be for citizens. captured sutlers, teamsters, and all civilians in the actual service of either party, to be exchanged for persons in similar positions. article iv.--all prisoners of war to be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture; and the prisoners now held, and those hereafter taken, to be transported to the points mutually agreed upon, at the expense of the capturing party. the surplus prisoners not exchanged shall not be permitted to take up arms again, nor to serve as military police or constabulary force in any fort, garrison or field-work, held by either of the respective parties, nor as guards of prisoners, deposits or stores, nor to discharge any duty usually performed by soldiers, until exchanged under the provisions of this cartel. the exchange is not to be considered complete until the officer or soldier exchanged for has been actually restored to the lines to which he belongs. article v.--each party upon the discharge of prisoners of the other party is authorized to discharge an equal number of their own officers or men from parole, furnishing, at the same time, to the other party a list of their prisoners discharged, and of their own officers and men relieved from parole; thus enabling each party to relieve from parole such of their officers and men as the party may choose. the lists thus mutually furnished, will keep both parties advised of the true condition of the exchange of prisoners. article vi.--the stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of binding obligation during the continuance of the war, it matters not which party may have the surplus of prisoners; the great principles involved being, first, an equitable exchange of prisoners, man for man, or officer for officer, or officers of higher grade exchanged for officers of lower grade, or for privates, according to scale of equivalents. second, that privates and officers and men of different services may be exchanged according to the same scale of equivalents. third, that all prisoners, of whatever arm of service, are to be exchanged or paroled in ten days from the time of their capture, if it be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time; if not, so soon thereafter as practicable. fourth, that no officer, or soldier, employed in the service of either party, is to be considered as exchanged and absolved from his parole until his equivalent has actually reached the lines of his friends. fifth, that parole forbids the performance of field, garrison, police, or guard or constabulary duty. john a. dix, major general. d. h. hill, major general, c. s. a. supplementary articles. article vii.--all prisoners of war now held on either side, and all prisoners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable dispatch to a. m. aiken's, below dutch gap, on the james river, in virginia, or to vicksburg, on the mississippi river, in the state of mississippi, and there exchanged of paroled until such exchange can be effected, notice being previously given by each party of the number of prisoners it will send, and the time when they will be delivered at those points respectively; and in case the vicissitudes of war shall change the military relations of the places designated in this article to the contending parties, so as to render the same inconvenient for the delivery and exchange of prisoners, other places bearing as nearly as may be the present local relations of said places to the lines of said parties, shall be, by mutual agreement, substituted. but nothing in this article contained shall prevent the commanders of the two opposing armies from exchanging prisoners or releasing them on parole, at other points mutually agreed on by said commanders. article viii.--for the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing articles of agreement, each party will appoint two agents for the exchange of prisoners of war, whose duty it shall be to communicate with each other by correspondence and otherwise; to prepare the lists of prisoners; to attend to the delivery of the prisoners at the places agreed on, and to carry out promptly, effectually, and in good faith, all the details and provisions of the said articles of agreement. article ix.--and, in case any misunderstanding shall arise in regard to any clause or stipulation in the foregoing articles, it is mutually agreed that such misunderstanding shall not affect the release of prisoners on parole, as herein provided, but shall be made the subject of friendly explanation, in order that the object of this agreement may neither be defeated nor postponed. john a. dix, major general. d. h. hill, major general. c. s. a. this plan did not work well. men on both sides, who wanted a little rest from soldiering, could obtain it by so straggling in the vicinity of the enemy. their parole--following close upon their capture, frequently upon the spot--allowed them to visit home, and sojourn awhile where were pleasanter pastures than at the front. then the rebels grew into the habit of paroling everybody that they could constrain into being a prisoner of war. peaceable, unwarlike and decrepit citizens of kentucky, east tennessee, west virginia, missouri and maryland were "captured" and paroled, and setoff against regular rebel soldiers taken by us. 3. after some months of trial of this scheme, a modification of the cartel was agreed upon, the main feature of which was that all prisoners must be reduced to possession, and delivered to the exchange officers either at city point, va., or vicksburg, miss. this worked very well for some months, until our government began organizing negro troops. the rebels then issued an order that neither these troops nor their officers should be held as amenable to the laws of war, but that, when captured, the men should be returned to slavery, and the officers turned over to the governors of the states in which they were taken, to be dealt with according to the stringent law punishing the incitement of servile insurrection. our government could not permit this for a day. it was bound by every consideration of national honor to protect those who wore its uniform and bore its flag. the rebel government was promptly informed that rebel officers and men would be held as hostages for the proper treatment of such members of colored regiments as might be taken. 4. this discussion did not put a stop to the exchange, but while it was going on vicksburg was captured, and the battle of gettysburg was fought. the first placed one of the exchange points in our hands. at the opening of the fight at gettysburg lee captured some six thousand pennsylvania militia. he sent to meade to have these exchanged on the field of battle. meade declined to do so for two reasons: first, because it was against the cartel, which prescribed that prisoners must be reduced to possession; and second, because he was anxious to have lee hampered with such a body of prisoners, since it was very doubtful if he could get his beaten army back across the potomac, let alone his prisoners. lee then sent a communication to general couch, commanding the pennsylvania militia, asking him to receive prisoners on parole, and couch, not knowing what meade had done, acceded to the request. our government disavowed couch's action instantly, and ordered the paroles to be treated as of no force, whereupon the rebel government ordered back into the field twelve thousand of the prisoners captured by grant's army at vicksburg. 5. the paroling now stopped abruptly, leaving in the hands of both sides the prisoners captured at gettysburg, except the militia above mentioned. the rebels added considerably to those in their hands by their captures at chickamauga, while we gained a great many at mission ridge, cumberland gap and elsewhere, so that at the time we arrived in richmond the rebels had about fifteen thousand prisoners in their hands and our government had about twenty-five thousand. 6. the rebels now began demanding that the prisoners on both sides be exchanged--man for man--as far as they went, and the remainder paroled. our government offered to exchange man for man, but declined--on account of the previous bad faith of the rebels--to release the balance on parole. the rebels also refused to make any concessions in regard to the treatment of officers and men of colored regiments. 7. at this juncture general b. f. butler was appointed to the command of the department of the blackwater, which made him an ex-officio commissioner of exchange. the rebels instantly refused to treat with him, on the ground that he was outlawed by the proclamation of jefferson davis. general butler very pertinently replied that this only placed him nearer their level, as jefferson davis and all associated with him in the rebel government had been outlawed by the proclamation of president lincoln. the rebels scorned to notice this home thrust by the union general. 8. on february 12, 1864, general butler addressed a letter to the rebel commissioner ould, in which be asked, for the sake of humanity, that the questions interrupting the exchange be left temporarily in abeyance while an informal exchange was put in operation. he would send five hundred prisoners to city point; let them be met by a similar number of union prisoners. this could go on from day to day until all in each other's hands should be transferred to their respective flags. the five hundred sent with the general's letter were received, and five hundred union prisoners returned for them. another five hundred, sent the next day, were refused, and so this reasonable and humane proposition ended in nothing. this was the condition of affairs in february, 1864, when the rebel authorities concluded to send us to andersonville. if the reader will fix these facts in his minds i will explain other phases as they develop. chapter xi. putting in the time--rations--cooking utensils--"fiat" soup--"spooning" --african newspaper venders--trading greenbacks for confederate money --visit from john morgan. the winter days passed on, one by one, after the manner described in a former chapter,--the mornings in ill-nature hunger; the afternoons and evenings in tolerable comfort. the rations kept growing lighter and lighter; the quantity of bread remained the same, but the meat diminished, and occasional days would pass without any being issued. then we receive a pint or less of soup made from the beans or peas before mentioned, but this, too, suffered continued change, in the gradually increasing proportion of james river water, and decreasing of that of the beans. the water of the james river is doubtless excellent: it looks well--at a distance--and is said to serve the purposes of ablution and navigation admirably. there seems to be a limit however, to the extent of its advantageous combination with the bean (or pea) for nutritive purposes. this, though, was or view of the case, merely, and not shared in to any appreciably extent by the gentlemen who were managing our boarding house. we seemed to view the matter through allopathic spectacles, they through homoeopathic lenses. we thought that the atomic weight of peas (or beans) and the james river fluid were about equal, which would indicate that the proper combining proportions would be, say a bucket of beans (or peas) to a bucket of water. they held that the nutritive potency was increased by the dilution, and the best results were obtainable when the symptoms of hunger were combated by the trituration of a bucketful of the peas-beans with a barrel of 'aqua jamesiana.' my first experience with this "flat" soup was very instructive, if not agreeable. i had come into prison, as did most other prisoners, absolutely destitute of dishes, or cooking utensils. the well-used, half-canteen frying-pan, the blackened quart cup, and the spoon, which formed the usual kitchen outfit of the cavalryman in the field, were in the haversack on my saddle, and were lost to me when i separated from my horse. now, when we were told that we were to draw soup, i was in great danger of losing my ration from having no vessel in which to receive it. there were but few tin cups in the prison, and these were, of course, wanted by their owners. by great good fortune i found an empty fruit can, holding about a quart. i was also lucky enough to find a piece from which to make a bail. i next manufactured a spoon and knife combined from a bit of hoop-iron. these two humble utensils at once placed myself and my immediate chums on another plane, as far as worldly goods were concerned. we were better off than the mass, and as well off as the most fortunate. it was a curious illustration of that law of political economy which teaches that so-called intrinsic value is largely adventitious. their possession gave us infinitely more consideration among our fellows than would the possession of a brown-stone front in an eligible location, furnished with hot and cold water throughout, and all the modern improvements. it was a place where cooking utensils were in demand, and title-deeds to brown-stone fronts were not. we were in possession of something which every one needed every day, and, therefore, were persons of consequence and consideration to those around us who were present or prospective borrowers. on our side we obeyed another law of political economy: we clung to our property with unrelaxing tenacity, made the best use of it in our intercourse with our fellows, and only gave it up after our release and entry into a land where the plenitude of cooking utensils of superior construction made ours valueless. then we flung them into the sea, with little gratitude for the great benefit they had been to us. we were more anxious to get rid of the many hateful recollections clustering around them. but, to return to the alleged soup: as i started to drink my first ration it seemed to me that there was a superfluity of bugs upon its surface. much as i wanted animal food, i did not care for fresh meat in that form. i skimmed them off carefully, so as to lose as little soup as possible. but the top layer seemed to be underlaid with another equally dense. this was also skimmed off as deftly as possible. but beneath this appeared another layer, which, when removed, showed still another; and so on, until i had scraped to the bottom of the can, and the last of the bugs went with the last of my soup. i have before spoken of the remarkable bug fecundity of the beans (or peas). this was a demonstration of it. every scouped out pea (or bean) which found its way into the soup bore inside of its shell from ten to twenty of these hard-crusted little weevil. afterward i drank my soup without skimming. it was not that i hated the weevil less, but that i loved the soup more. it was only another step toward a closer conformity to that grand rule which i have made the guiding maxim of my life: 'when i must, i had better.' i recommend this to other young men starting on their career. the room in which we were was barely large enough for all of us to lie down at once. even then it required pretty close "spooning" together --so close in fact that all sleeping along one side would have to turn at once. it was funny to watch this operation. all, for instance, would be lying on their right sides. they would begin to get tired, and one of the wearied ones would sing out to the sergeant who was in command of the row-"sergeant: let's spoon the other way." that individual would reply: "all right. attention! left spoon!!" and the whole line would at once flop over on their left sides. the feet of the row that slept along the east wall on the floor below us were in a line with the edge of the outer door, and a chalk line drawn from the crack between the door and the frame to the opposite wall would touch, say 150 pairs of feet. they were a noisy crowd down there, and one night their noise so provoked the guard in front of the door that he called out to them to keep quiet or he would fire in upon them. they greeted this threat with a chorus profanely uncomplimentary to the purity of the guard's ancestry; they did not imply his descent a la darwin, from the remote monkey, but more immediate generation by a common domestic animal. the incensed rebel opened the door wide enough to thrust his gun in, and he fired directly down the line of toes. his piece was apparently loaded with buckshot, and the little balls must have struck the legs, nipped off the toes, pierced the feet, and otherwise slightly wounded the lower extremities of fifty men. the simultaneous shriek that went up was deafening. it was soon found out that nobody had been hurt seriously, and there was not a little fun over the occurrence. one of the prisoners in libby was brigadier general neal dow, of maine, who had then a national reputation as a temperance advocate, and the author of the famous maine liquor law. we, whose places were near the front window, used to see him frequently on the street, accompanied by a guard. he was allowed, we understood, to visit our sick in the hospital. his long, snowy beard and hair gave him a venerable and commanding appearance. newsboys seemed to be a thing unknown in richmond. the papers were sold on the streets by negro men. the one who frequented our section with the morning journals had a mellow; rich baritone for which we would be glad to exchange the shrill cries of our street arabs. we long remembered him as one of the peculiar features of richmond. he had one unvarying formula for proclaiming his wares. it ran in this wise: "great nooze in de papahs! "great nooze from orange coaht house, virginny! "great nooze from alexandry, virginny! "great nooze from washington city! "great nooze from chattanoogy, tennessee! "great nooze from chahlston, sou' cahlina! "great nooze in depapahs!" it did not matter to him that the rebels had not been at some of these places for months. he would not change for such mere trifles as the entire evaporation of all possible interest connected with chattanooga and alexandria. he was a true bourbon southerner--he learned nothing and forgot nothing. there was a considerable trade driven between the prisoners and the guard at the door. this was a very lucrative position for the latter, and men of a commercial turn of mind generally managed to get stationed there. the blockade had cut off the confederacy's supplies from the outer world, and the many trinkets about a man's person were in good demand at high prices. the men of the army of the potomac, who were paid regularly, and were always near their supplies, had their pockets filled with combs, silk handkerchiefs, knives, neckties, gold pens, pencils, silver watches, playing cards, dice, etc. such of these as escaped appropriation by their captors and dick turner, were eagerly bought by the guards, who paid fair prices in confederate money, or traded wheat bread, tobacco, daily papers, etc., for them. there was also considerable brokerage in money, and the manner of doing this was an admirable exemplification of the folly of the "fiat" money idea. the rebels exhausted their ingenuity in framing laws to sustain the purchasing power of their paper money. it was made legal tender for all debts public and private; it was decreed that the man who refused to take it was a public enemy; all the considerations of patriotism were rallied to its support, and the law provided that any citizens found trafficking in the money of the enemy--i.e., greenbacks, should suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary, and any soldier so offending should suffer death. notwithstanding all this, in richmond, the head and heart of the confederacy, in january, 1864--long before the rebel cause began to look at all desperate--it took a dollar to buy such a loaf of bread as now sells for ten cents; a newspaper was a half dollar, and everything else in proportion. and still worse: there was not a day during our stay in richmond but what one could go to the hole in the door before which the guard was pacing and call out in a loud whisper: "say, guard: do you want to buy some greenbacks?" and be sure that the reply would be, after a furtive glance around to see that no officer was watching: "yes; how much do you want for them?" the reply was then: "ten for one." "all right; how much have you got?" the yankee would reply; the rebel would walk to the farther end of his beat, count out the necessary amount, and, returning, put up one hand with it, while with the other he caught hold of one end of the yankee's greenback. at the word, both would release their holds simultaneously, the exchange was complete, and the rebel would pace industriously up and down his beat with the air of the school boy who "ain't been a-doin' nothing." there was never any risk in approaching any guard with a proposition of this kind. i never heard of one refusing to trade for greenbacks, and if the men on guard could not be restrained by these stringent laws, what hope could there be of restraining anybody else? one day we were favored with a visit from the redoubtable general john h. morgan, next to j. e. b. stuart the greatest of rebel cavalry leaders. he had lately escaped from the ohio penitentiary. he was invited to richmond to be made a major general, and was given a grand ovation by the citizens and civic government. he came into our building to visit a number of the first kentucky cavalry (loyal)--captured at new philadelphia, east tennessee--whom he was anxious to have exchanged for men of his own regiment--the first kentucky cavalry (rebel)--who were captured at the same time he was. i happened to get very close to him while he was standing there talking to his old acquaintances, and i made a mental photograph of him, which still retains all its original distinctness. he was a tall, heavy man, with a full, coarse, and somewhat dull face, and lazy, sluggish gray eyes. his long black hair was carefully oiled, and turned under at the ends, as was the custom with the rural beaux some years ago. his face was clean shaved, except a large, sandy goatee. he wore a high silk hat, a black broadcloth coat, kentucky jeans pantaloons, neatly fitting boots, and no vest. there was nothing remotely suggestive of unusual ability or force of character, and i thought as i studied him that the sting of george d. prentice's bon mot about him was in its acrid truth. said mr. prentice: "why don't somebody put a pistol to basil duke's head, and blow john morgan's brains out!" [basil duke was john morgan's right hand man.] chapter xii. remarks as to nomenclature--vaccination and its effects--"n'yaarker's" --their characteristics and their methods of operating. before going any further in this narrative it may be well to state that the nomenclature employed is not used in any odious or disparaging sense. it is simply the adoption of the usual terms employed by the soldiers of both sides in speaking to or of each other. we habitually spoke of them and to them, as "rebels," and "johnnies ;" they of and to us, as "yanks," and "yankees." to have said "confederates," "southerners," "secessionists," or "federalists," "unionists," "northerners" or "nationalists," would have seemed useless euphemism. the plainer terms suited better, and it was a day when things were more important than names. for some inscrutable reason the rebels decided to vaccinate us all. why they did this has been one of the unsolved problems of my life. it is true that there was small pox in the city, and among the prisoners at danville; but that any consideration for our safety should have led them to order general inoculation is not among the reasonable inferences. but, be that as it may, vaccination was ordered, and performed. by great good luck i was absent from the building with the squad drawing rations, when our room was inoculated, so i escaped what was an infliction to all, and fatal to many. the direst consequences followed the operation. foul ulcers appeared on various parts of the bodies of the vaccinated. in many instances the arms literally rotted off; and death followed from a corruption of the blood. frequently the faces, and other parts of those who recovered, were disfigured by the ghastly cicatrices of healed ulcers. a special friend of mine, sergeant frank beverstock--then a member of the third virginia cavalry, (loyal), and after the war a banker in bowling green, o.,--bore upon his temple to his dying day, (which occurred a year ago), a fearful scar, where the flesh had sloughed off from the effects of the virus that had tainted his blood. this i do not pretend to account for. we thought at the time that the rebels had deliberately poisoned the vaccine matter with syphilitic virus, and it was so charged upon them. i do not now believe that this was so; i can hardly think that members of the humane profession of medicine would be guilty of such subtle diabolism--worse even than poisoning the wells from which an enemy must drink. the explanation with which i have satisfied myself is that some careless or stupid practitioner took the vaccinating lymph from diseased human bodies, and thus infected all with the blood venom, without any conception of what he was doing. the low standard of medical education in the south makes this theory quite plausible. we now formed the acquaintance of a species of human vermin that united with the rebels, cold, hunger, lice and the oppression of distraint, to leave nothing undone that could add to the miseries of our prison life. these were the fledglings of the slums and dives of new york--graduates of that metropolitan sink of iniquity where the rogues and criminals of the whole world meet for mutual instruction in vice. they were men who, as a rule, had never known, a day of honesty and cleanliness in their misspent lives; whose fathers, brothers and constant companions were roughs, malefactors and, felons; whose mothers, wives and sisters were prostitutes, procuresses and thieves; men who had from infancy lived in an atmosphere of sin, until it saturated every fiber of their being as a dweller in a jungle imbibes malaria by every one of his, millions of pores, until his very marrow is surcharged with it. they included representatives from all nationalities, and their descendants, but the english and irish elements predominated. they had an argot peculiar to themselves. it was partly made up of the "flash" language of the london thieves, amplified and enriched by the cant vocabulary and the jargon of crime of every european tongue. they spoke it with a peculiar accent and intonation that made them instantly recognizable from the roughs of all other cities. they called themselves "n'yaarkers;" we came to know them as "raiders." if everything in the animal world has its counterpart among men, then these were the wolves, jackals and hyenas of the race at once cowardly and fierce--audaciously bold when the power of numbers was on their side, and cowardly when confronted with resolution by anything like an equality of strength. like all other roughs and rascals of whatever degree, they were utterly worthless as soldiers. there may have been in the army some habitual corner loafer, some fistic champion of the bar-room and brothel, some terror of plug uglyville, who was worth the salt in the hard tack he consumed, but if there were, i did not form his acquaintance, and i never heard of any one else who did. it was the rule that the man who was the readiest in the use of fist and slungshot at home had the greatest diffidence about forming a close acquaintance with cold lead in the neighborhood of the front. thousands of the so-called "dangerous classes" were recruited, from whom the government did not receive so much service as would pay for the buttons on their uniforms. people expected that they would make themselves as troublesome to the rebels as they were to good citizens and the police, but they were only pugnacious to the provost guard, and terrible to the people in the rear of the army who had anything that could be stolen. the highest type of soldier which the world has yet produced is the intelligent, self-respecting american boy, with home, and father and mother and friends behind him, and duty in front beckoning him on. in the sixty centuries that war has been a profession no man has entered its ranks so calmly resolute in confronting danger, so shrewd and energetic in his aggressiveness, so tenacious of the defense and the assault, so certain to rise swiftly to the level of every emergency, as the boy who, in the good old phrase, had been "well-raised" in a godfearing home, and went to the field in obedience to a conviction of duty. his unfailing courage and good sense won fights that the incompetency or cankering jealousy of commanders had lost. high officers were occasionally disloyal, or willing to sacrifice their country to personal pique; still more frequently they were ignorant and inefficient; but the enlisted man had more than enough innate soldiership to make amends for these deficiencies, and his superb conduct often brought honors and promotions to those only who deserved shame and disaster. our "n'yaarkers," swift to see any opportunity for dishonest gain, had taken to bounty-jumping, or, as they termed it, "leppin' the bounty," for a livelihood. those who were thrust in upon us had followed this until it had become dangerous, and then deserted to the rebels. the latter kept them at castle lightning for awhile, and then, rightly estimating their character, and considering that it was best to trade them off for a genuine rebel soldier, sent them in among us, to be exchanged regularly with us. there was not so much good faith as good policy shown by this. it was a matter of indifference to the rebels how soon our government shot these deserters after getting them in its hands again. they were only anxious to use them to get their own men back. the moment they came into contact with us our troubles began. they stole whenever opportunities offered, and they were indefatigable in making these offer; they robbed by actual force, whenever force would avail; and more obsequious lick-spittles to power never existed--they were perpetually on the look-out for a chance to curry favor by betraying some plan or scheme to those who guarded us. i saw one day a queer illustration of the audacious side of these fellows' characters, and it shows at the same time how brazen effrontery will sometimes get the better of courage. in a room in an adjacent building were a number of these fellows, and a still greater number of east tennesseeans. these latter were simple, ignorant folks, but reasonably courageous. about fifty of them were sitting in a group in one corner of the room, and near them a couple or three "n'yaarkers." suddenly one of the latter said with an oath: "i was robbed last night; i lost two silver watches, a couple of rings, and about fifty dollars in greenbacks. i believe some of you fellers went through me." this was all pure invention; he no more had the things mentioned than he had purity of heart and a christian spirit, but the unsophisticated tennesseeans did not dream of disputing his statement, and answered in chorus: "oh, no, mister; we didn't take your things; we ain't that kind." this was like the reply of the lamb to the wolf, in the fable, and the n'yaarker retorted with a simulated storm of passion, and a torrent of oaths: "------i know ye did; i know some uv yez has got them; stand up agin the wall there till i search yez!" and that whole fifty men, any one of whom was physically equal to the n'yaarker, and his superior in point of real courage, actually stood against the wall, and submitted to being searched and having taken from them the few confederate bills they had, and such trinkets as the searcher took a fancy to. i was thoroughly disgusted. chapter xiii. belle isle--terrible suffering from cold and hunger--fate of lieutenant boisseux's dog--our company mystery--termination of all hopes of its solution. in february my chum--b. b. andrews, now a physician in astoria, illinois --was brought into our building, greatly to my delight and astonishment, and from him i obtained the much desired news as to the fate of my comrades. he told me they had been sent to belle isle, whither he had gone, but succumbing to the rigors of that dreadful place, he had been taken to the hospital, and, upon his convalesence, placed in our prison. our men were suffering terribly on the island. it was low, damp, and swept by the bleak, piercing winds that howled up and down the surface of the james. the first prisoners placed on the island had been given tents that afforded them some shelter, but these were all occupied when our battalion came in, so that they were compelled to lie on the snow and frozen ground, without shelter, covering of any kind, or fire. during this time the cold had been so intense that the james had frozen over three times. the rations had been much worse than ours. the so-called soup had been diluted to a ridiculous thinness, and meat had wholly disappeared. so intense became the craving for animal food, that one day when lieutenant boisseux--the commandant--strolled into the camp with his beloved white bull-terrier, which was as fat as a cheshire pig, the latter was decoyed into a tent, a blanket thrown over him, his throat cut within a rod of where his master was standing, and he was then skinned, cut up, cooked, and furnished a savory meal to many hungry men. when boisseux learned of the fate of his four-footed friend he was, of course, intensely enraged, but that was all the good it did him. the only revenge possible was to sentence more prisoners to ride the cruel wooden horse which he used as a means of punishment. four of our company were already dead. jacob lowry and john beach were standing near the gate one day when some one snatched the guard's blanket from the post where he had hung it, and ran. the enraged sentry leveled his gun and fired into the crowd. the balls passed through lowry's and beach's breasts. then charley osgood, son of our lieutenant, a quiet, fair-haired, pleasant-spoken boy, but as brave and earnest as his gallant father, sank under the combination of hunger and cold. one stinging morning he was found stiff and stark, on the hard ground, his bright, frank blue eyes glazed over in death. one of the mysteries of our company was a tall, slender, elderly scotchman, who appeared on the rolls as william bradford. what his past life had been, where he had lived, what his profession, whether married or single, no one ever knew. he came to us while in camp of instruction near springfield, illinois, and seemed to have left all his past behind him as he crossed the line of sentries around the camp. he never received any letters, and never wrote any; never asked for a furlough or pass, and never expressed a wish to be elsewhere than in camp. he was courteous and pleasant, but very reserved. he interfered with no one, obeyed orders promptly and without remark, and was always present for duty. scrupulously neat in dress, always as clean-shaved as an old-fashioned gentleman of the world, with manners and conversation that showed him to have belonged to a refined and polished circle, he was evidently out of place as a private soldier in a company of reckless and none-too-refined young illinois troopers, but he never availed himself of any of the numerous opportunities offered to change his associations. his elegant penmanship would have secured him an easy berth and better society at headquarters, but he declined to accept a detail. he became an exciting mystery to a knot of us imaginative young cubs, who sorted up out of the reminiscential rag-bag of high colors and strong contrasts with which the sensational literature that we most affected had plentifully stored our minds, a half-dozen intensely emotional careers for him. we spent much time in mentally trying these on, and discussing which fitted him best. we were always expecting a denouement that would come like a lightning flash and reveal his whole mysterious past, showing him to have been the disinherited scion of some noble house, a man of high station, who was expiating some fearful crime; an accomplished villain eluding his pursuers--in short, a somebody who would be a fitting hero for miss braddon's or wilkie collins's literary purposes. we never got but two clues of his past, and they were faint ones. one day, he left lying near me a small copy of "paradise lost," that he always carried with him. turning over its leaves i found all of milton's bitter invectives against women heavily underscored. another time, while on guard with him, he spent much of his time in writing some latin verses in very elegant chirography upon the white painted boards of a fence along which his beat ran. we pressed in all the available knowledge of latin about camp, and found that the tenor of the verses was very uncomplimentary to that charming sex which does us the honor of being our mothers and sweethearts. these evidences we accepted as sufficient demonstration that there was a woman at the bottom of the mystery, and made us more impatient for further developments. these were never to come. bradford pined away an belle isle, and grew weaker, but no less reserved, each day. at length, one bitter cold night ended it all. he was found in the morning stone dead, with his iron-gray hair frozen fast to the ground, upon which he lay. our mystery had to remain unsolved. there was nothing about his person to give any hint as to his past. chapter xiv. hoping for exchange--an exposition of the doctrine of chances --off for andersonville--uncertainty as to our destination--arrival at andersonville. as each lagging day closed, we confidently expected that the next would bring some news of the eagerly-desired exchange. we hopefully assured each other that the thing could not be delayed much longer; that the spring was near, the campaign would soon open, and each government would make an effort to get all its men into the field, and this would bring about a transfer of prisoners. a sergeant of the seventh indiana infantry stated his theory to me this way: "you know i'm just old lightnin' on chuck-a-luck. now the way i bet is this: i lay down, say on the ace, an' it don't come up; i just double my bet on the ace, an' keep on doublin' every time it loses, until at last it comes up an' then i win a bushel o' money, and mebbe bust the bank. you see the thing's got to come up some time; an' every time it don't come up makes it more likely to come up the next time. it's just the same way with this 'ere exchange. the thing's got to happen some day, an' every day that it don't happen increases the chances that it will happen the next day." some months later i folded the sanguine sergeant's stiffening hands together across his fleshless ribs, and helped carry his body out to the dead-house at andersonville, in order to get a piece of wood to cook my ration of meal with. on the evening of the 17th of february, 1864, we were ordered to get ready to move at daybreak the next morning. we were certain this could mean nothing else than exchange, and our exaltation was such that we did little sleeping that night. the morning was very cold, but we sang and joked as we marched over the creaking bridge, on our way to the cars. we were packed so tightly in these that it was impossible to even sit down, and we rolled slow ly away after a wheezing engine to petersburg, whence we expected to march to the exchange post. we reached petersburg before noon, and the cars halted there along time, we momentarily expecting an order to get out. then the train started up and moved out of the city toward the southeast. this was inexplicable, but after we had proceeded this way for several hours some one conceived the idea that the rebels, to avoid treating with butler, were taking us into the department of some other commander to exchange us. this explanation satisfied us, and our spirits rose again. night found us at gaston, n. c., where we received a few crackers for rations, and changed cars. it was dark, and we resorted to a little strategy to secure more room. about thirty of us got into a tight box car, and immediately announced that it was too full to admit any more. when an officer came along with another squad to stow away, we would yell out to him to take some of the men out, as we were crowded unbearably. in the mean time everybody in the car would pack closely around the door, so as to give the impression that the car was densely crowded. the rebel would look convinced, and demand: "why, how many men have you got in de cah?" then one of us would order the imaginary host in the invisible recesses to-"stand still there, and be counted," while he would gravely count up to one hundred or one hundred and twenty, which was the utmost limit of the car, and the rebel would hurry off to put his prisoners somewhere else. we managed to play this successfully during the whole journey, and not only obtained room to lie down in the car, but also drew three or four times as many rations as were intended for us, so that while we at no time had enough, we were farther from starvation than our less strategic companions. the second afternoon we arrived at raleigh, the capitol of north carolina, and were camped in a piece of timber, and shortly after dark orders were issued to us all to lie flat on the ground and not rise up till daylight. about the middle of the night a man belonging to a new jersey regiment, who had apparently forgotten the order, stood up, and was immediately shot dead by the guard. for four or five days more the decrepit little locomotive strained along, dragging after it the rattling' old cars. the scenery was intensely monotonous. it was a flat, almost unending, stretch of pine barrens and the land so poor that a disgusted illinoisan, used to the fertility of the great american bottom, said rather strongly, that, "by george, they'd have to manure this ground before they could even make brick out of it." it was a surprise to all of us who had heard so much of the wealth of virginia, north carolina, south carolina and georgia, to find the soil a sterile sand bank, interspersed with swamps. we had still no idea of where we were going. we only knew that our general course was southward, and that we had passed through the carolinas, and were in georgia. we furbished up our school knowledge of geography and endeavored to recall something of the location of raleigh, charlotte, columbia and augusta, through which we passed, but the attempt was not a success. late on the afternoon of the 25th of february the seventh indiana sergeant approached me with the inquiry: "do you know where macon is?" the place had not then become as well known as it was afterward. it seemed to me that i had read something of macon in revolutionary history, and that it was a fort on the sea coast. he said that the guard had told him that we were to be taken to a point near that place, and we agreed that it was probably a new place of exchange. a little later we passed through the town of macon, ga, and turned upon a road that led almost due south. about midnight the train stopped, and we were ordered off. we were in the midst of a forest of tall trees that loaded the air with the heavy balsamic odor peculiar to pine trees. a few small rude houses were scattered around near. stretching out into the darkness was a double row of great heaps of burning pitch pine, that smoked and flamed fiercely, and lit up a little space around in the somber forest with a ruddy glare. between these two rows lay a road, which we were ordered to take. the scene was weird and uncanny. i had recently read the "iliad," and the long lines of huge fires reminded me of that scene in the first book, where the greeks burn on the sea shore the bodies of those smitten by apollo's pestilential-arrows for nine long nights, through all the dusky air, the pyres, thick flaming shot a dismal glare. five hundred weary men moved along slowly through double lines of guards. five hundred men marched silently towards the gates that were to shut out life and hope from most of them forever. a quarter of a mile from the railroad we came to a massive palisade of great squared logs standing upright in the ground. the fires blazed up and showed us a section of these, and two massive wooden gates, with heavy iron hinges and bolts. they swung open as we stood there and we passed through into the space beyond. we were in andersonville. chapter xv. georgia--a lean and hungry land--difference between upper and lower georgia--the pillage of andersonville. as the next nine months of the existence of those of us who survived were spent in intimate connection with the soil of georgia, and, as it exercised a potential influence upon our comfort and well-being, or rather lack of these--a mention of some of its peculiar characteristics may help the reader to a fuller comprehension of the conditions surrounding us--our environment, as darwin would say. georgia, which, next to texas, is the largest state in the south, and has nearly twenty-five per cent. more area than the great state of new york, is divided into two distinct and widely differing sections, by a geological line extending directly across the state from augusta, on the savannah river, through macon, on the ocmulgee, to columbus, on the chattahoochie. that part lying to the north and west of this line is usually spoken of as "upper georgia;" while that lying to the south and east, extending to the atlantic ocean and the florida line, is called "lower georgia." in this part of the state--though far removed from each other--were the prisons of andersonville, savannah, millen and blackshear, in which we were incarcerated one after the other. upper georgia--the capital of which is atlanta--is a fruitful, productive, metalliferous region, that will in time become quite wealthy. lower georgia, which has an extent about equal to that of indiana, is not only poorer now than a worn-out province of asia minor, but in all probability will ever remain so. it is a starved, sterile land, impressing one as a desert in the first stages of reclamation into productive soil, or a productive soil in the last steps of deterioration into a desert. it is a vast expanse of arid, yellow sand, broken at intervals by foul swamps, with a jungle-life growth of unwholesome vegetation, and teeming with venomous snakes, and all manner of hideous crawling thing. the original forest still stands almost unbroken on this wide stretch of thirty thousand square miles, but it does not cover it as we say of forests in more favored lands. the tall, solemn pines, upright and symmetrical as huge masts, and wholly destitute of limbs, except the little, umbrella-like crest at the very top, stand far apart from each other in an unfriendly isolation. there is no fraternal interlacing of branches to form a kindly, umbrageous shadow. between them is no genial undergrowth of vines, shrubs, and demi-trees, generous in fruits, berries and nuts, such as make one of the charms of northern forests. on the ground is no rich, springing sod of emerald green, fragrant with the elusive sweetness of white clover, and dainty flowers, but a sparse, wiry, famished grass, scattered thinly over the surface in tufts and patches, like the hair on a mangy cur. the giant pines seem to have sucked up into their immense boles all the nutriment in the earth, and starved out every minor growth. so wide and clean is the space between them, that one can look through the forest in any direction for miles, with almost as little interference with the view as on a prairie. in the swampier parts the trees are lower, and their limbs are hung with heavy festoons of the gloomy spanish moss, or "death moss," as it is more frequently called, because where it grows rankest the malaria is the deadliest. everywhere nature seems sad, subdued and somber. i have long entertained a peculiar theory to account for the decadence and ruin of countries. my reading of the world's history seems to teach me that when a strong people take possession of a fertile land, they reduce it to cultivation, thrive upon its bountifulness, multiply into millions the mouths to be fed from it, tax it to the last limit of production of the necessities of life, take from it continually, and give nothing back, starve and overwork it as cruel, grasping men do a servant or a beast, and when at last it breaks down under the strain, it revenges itself by starving many of them with great famines, while the others go off in search of new countries to put through the same process of exhaustion. we have seen one country after another undergo this process as the seat of empire took its westward way, from the cradle of the race on the banks of the oxus to the fertile plains in the valley of the euphrates. impoverishing these, men next sought the valley of the nile, then the grecian peninsula; next syracuse and the italian peninsula, then the iberian peninsula, and the african shores of the mediterranean. exhausting all these, they were deserted for the french, german and english portions of europe. the turn of the latter is now come; famines are becoming terribly frequent, and mankind is pouring into the virgin fields of america. lower georgia, the carolinas and eastern virginia have all the characteristics of these starved and worn-out lands. it would seem as if, away back in the distance of ages, some numerous and civilized race had drained from the soil the last atom of food-producing constituents, and that it is now slowly gathering back, as the centuries pass, the elements that have been wrung from the land. lower georgia is very thinly settled. much of the land is still in the hands of the government. the three or four railroads which pass through it have little reference to local traffic. there are no towns along them as a rule; stations are made every ten miles, and not named, but numbered, as "station no. 4"--"no. 10", etc. the roads were built as through lines, to bring to the seaboard the rich products of the interior. andersonville is one of the few stations dignified with a same, probably because it contained some half dozen of shabby houses, whereas at the others there was usually nothing more than a mere open shed, to shelter goods and travelers. it is on a rudely constructed, rickety railroad, that runs from macon to albany, the head of navigation on the flint river, which is, one hundred and six miles from macon, and two hundred and fifty from the gulf of mexico. andersonville is about sixty miles from macon, and, consequently, about three hundred miles from the gulf. the camp was merely a hole cut in the wilderness. it was as remote a point from, our armies, as they then lay, as the southern confederacy could give. the nearest was sherman, at chattanooga, four hundred miles away, and on the other side of a range of mountains hundreds of miles wide. to us it seemed beyond the last forlorn limits of civilization. we felt that we were more completely at the mercy of our foes than ever. while in richmond we were in the heart of the confederacy; we were in the midst of the rebel military and, civil force, and were surrounded on every hand by visible evidences of the great magnitude of that power, but this, while it enforced our ready submission, did not overawe us depressingly, we knew that though the rebels were all about us in great force, our own men were also near, and in still greater force--that while they were very strong our army was still stronger, and there was no telling what day this superiority of strength, might be demonstrated in such a way as to decisively benefit us. but here we felt as did the ancient mariner: alone on a wide, wide sea, so lonely 'twas that god himself scarce seemed there to be. chapter xvi. waking up in andersonville--some description of the place--our first mail--building shelter--gen. winder--himself and lineage. we roused up promptly with the dawn to take a survey of our new abiding place. we found ourselves in an immense pen, about one thousand feet long by eight hundred wide, as a young surveyor--a member of the thirty-fourth ohio--informed us after he had paced it off. he estimated that it contained about sixteen acres. the walls were formed by pine logs twenty-five feet long, from two to three feet in diameter, hewn square, set into the ground to a depth of five feet, and placed so close together as to leave no crack through which the country outside could be seen. there being five feet of the logs in the ground, the wall was, of course, twenty feet high. this manner of enclosure was in some respects superior to a wall of masonry. it was equally unscalable, and much more difficult to undermine or batter down. the pen was longest due north and south. it was divided in the center by a creek about a yard wide and ten inches deep, running from west to east. on each side of this was a quaking bog of slimy ooze one hundred and fifty feet wide, and so yielding that one attempting to walk upon it would sink to the waist. from this swamp the sand-hills sloped north and south to the stockade. all the trees inside the stockade, save two, had been cut down and used in its construction. all the rank vegetation of the swamp had also been cut off. there were two entrances to the stockade, one on each side of the creek, midway between it and the ends, and called respectively the "north gate" and the "south gate." these were constructed double, by building smaller stockades around them on the outside, with another set of gates. when prisoners or wagons with rations were brought in, they were first brought inside the outer gates, which were carefully secured, before the inner gates were opened. this was done to prevent the gates being carried by a rush by those confined inside. at regular intervals along the palisades were little perches, upon which stood guards, who overlooked the whole inside of the prison. the only view we had of the outside was that obtained by looking from the highest points of the north or south sides across the depression where the stockade crossed the swamp. in this way we could see about forty acres at a time of the adjoining woodland, or say one hundred and sixty acres altogether, and this meager landscape had to content us for the next half year. before our inspection was finished, a wagon drove in with rations, and a quart of meal, a sweet potato and a few ounces of salt beef were issued to each one of us. in a few minutes we were all hard at work preparing our first meal in andersonville. the debris of the forest left a temporary abundance of fuel, and we had already a cheerful fire blazing for every little squad. there were a number of tobacco presses in the rooms we occupied in richmond, and to each of these was a quantity of sheets of tin, evidently used to put between the layers of tobacco. the deft hands of the mechanics among us bent these up into square pans, which were real handy cooking utensils, holding about--a quart. water was carried in them from the creek; the meal mixed in them to a dough, or else boiled as mush in the same vessels; the potatoes were boiled; and their final service was to hold a little meal to be carefully browned, and then water boiled upon it, so as to form a feeble imitation of coffee. i found my education at jonesville in the art of baking a hoe-cake now came in good play, both for myself and companions. taking one of the pieces of tin which had not yet been made into a pan, we spread upon it a layer of dough about a half-inch thick. propping this up nearly upright before the fire, it was soon nicely browned over. this process made it sweat itself loose from the tin, when it was turned over and the bottom browned also. save that it was destitute of salt, it was quite a toothsome bit of nutriment for a hungry man, and i recommend my readers to try making a "pone" of this kind once, just to see what it was like. the supreme indifference with which the rebels always treated the matter of cooking utensils for us, excited my wonder. it never seemed to occur to them that we could have any more need of vessels for our food than cattle or swine. never, during my whole prison life, did i see so much as a tin cup or a bucket issued to a prisoner. starving men were driven to all sorts of shifts for want of these. pantaloons or coats were pulled off and their sleeves or legs used to draw a mess's meal in. boots were common vessels for carrying water, and when the feet of these gave way the legs were ingeniously closed up with pine pegs, so as to form rude leathern buckets. men whose pocket knives had escaped the search at the gates made very ingenious little tubs and buckets, and these devices enabled us to get along after a fashion. after our meal was disposed of, we held a council on the situation. though we had been sadly disappointed in not being exchanged, it seemed that on the whole our condition had been bettered. this first ration was a decided improvement on those of the pemberton building; we had left the snow and ice behind at richmond--or rather at some place between raleigh, n. c., and columbia, s. c.--and the air here, though chill, was not nipping, but bracing. it looked as if we would have a plenty of wood for shelter and fuel, it was certainly better to have sixteen acres to roam over than the stiffing confines of a building; and, still better, it seemed as if there would be plenty of opportunities to get beyond the stockade, and attempt a journey through the woods to that blissful land --"our lines." we settled down to make the best of things. a rebel sergeant came in presently and arranged us in hundreds. we subdivided these into messes of twenty-five, and began devising means for shelter. nothing showed the inborn capacity of the northern soldier to take care of himself better than the way in which we accomplished this with the rude materials at our command. no ax, spade nor mattock was allowed us by the rebels, who treated us in regard to these the same as in respect to culinary vessels. the only tools were a few pocket-knives, and perhaps half-a-dozen hatchets which some infantrymen-principally members of the third michigan--were allowed to retain. yet, despite all these drawbacks, we had quite a village of huts erected in a few days,--nearly enough, in fact, to afford tolerable shelter for the whole five hundred of us first-comers. the wither and poles that grew in the swamp were bent into the shape of the semi-circular bows that support the canvas covers of army wagons, and both ends thrust in the ground. these formed the timbers of our dwellings. they were held in place by weaving in, basket-wise, a network of briers and vines. tufts of the long leaves which are the distinguishing characteristic of the georgia pine (popularly known as the "long-leaved pine") were wrought into this network until a thatch was formed, that was a fair protection against the rain--it was like the irishman's unglazed window-sash, which "kep' out the coarsest uv the cold." the results accomplished were as astonishing to us as to the rebels, who would have lain unsheltered upon the sand until bleached out like field-rotted flax, before thinking to protect themselves in this way. as our village was approaching completion, the rebel sergeant who called the roll entered. he was very odd-looking. the cervical muscles were distorted in such a way as to suggest to us the name of "wry-necked smith," by which we always designated him. pete bates, of the third michigan, who was the wag of our squad, accounted for smith's condition by saying that while on dress parade once the colonel of smith's regiment had commanded "eyes right," and then forgot to give the order "front." smith, being a good soldier, had kept his eyes in the position of gazing at the buttons of the third man to the right, waiting for the order to restore them to their natural direction, until they had become permanently fixed in their obliquity and he was compelled to go through life taking a biased view of all things. smith walked in, made a diagonal survey of the encampment, which, if he had ever seen "mitchell's geography," probably reminded him of the picture of a kaffir village, in that instructive but awfully dull book, and then expressed the opinion that usually welled up to every rebel's lips: "well, i'll be durned, if you yanks don't just beat the devil." of course, we replied with the well-worn prison joke, that we supposed we did, as we beat the rebels, who were worse than the devil. there rode in among us, a few days after our arrival, an old man whose collar bore the wreathed stars of a major general. heavy white locks fell from beneath his slouched hat, nearly to his shoulders. sunken gray eyes, too dull and cold to light up, marked a hard, stony face, the salient feature of which was a thin-upped, compressed mouth, with corners drawn down deeply--the mouth which seems the world over to be the index of selfish, cruel, sulky malignance. it is such a mouth as has the school-boy--the coward of the play ground, who delights in pulling off the wings of flies. it is such a mouth as we can imagine some remorseless inquisitor to have had--that is, not an inquisitor filled with holy zeal for what he mistakenly thought the cause of christ demanded, but a spleeny, envious, rancorous shaveling, who tortured men from hatred of their superiority to him, and sheer love of inflicting pain. the rider was john h. winder, commissary general of prisoners, baltimorean renegade and the malign genius to whose account should be charged the deaths of more gallant men than all the inquisitors of the world ever slew by the less dreadful rack and wheel. it was he who in august could point to the three thousand and eighty-one new made graves for that month, and exultingly tell his hearer that he was "doing more for the confederacy than twenty regiments." his lineage was in accordance with his character. his father was that general william h. winder, whose poltroonery at bladensburg, in 1814, nullified the resistance of the gallant commodore barney, and gave washington to the british. the father was a coward and an incompetent; the son, always cautiously distant from the scene of hostilities, was the tormentor of those whom the fortunes of war, and the arms of brave men threw into his hands. winder gazed at us stonily for a few minutes without speaking, and, turning, rode out again. our troubles, from that hour, rapidly increased. chapter xvii. the plantation negros--not stupid to be loyal--their dithyrambic music --copperhead opinion of longfellow. the stockade was not quite finished at the time of our arrival--a gap of several hundred feet appearing at the southwest corner. a gang of about two hundred negros were at work felling trees, hewing legs, and placing them upright in the trenches. we had an opportunity--soon to disappear forever--of studying the workings of the "peculiar institution" in its very home. the negros were of the lowest field-hand class, strong, dull, ox-like, but each having in our eyes an admixture of cunning and secretiveness that their masters pretended was not in them. their demeanor toward us illustrated this. we were the objects of the most supreme interest to them, but when near us and in the presence of a white rebel, this interest took the shape of stupid, open-eyed, open-mouthed wonder, something akin to the look on the face of the rustic lout, gazing for the first time upon a locomotive or a steam threshing machine. but if chance threw one of them near us when he thought himself unobserved by the rebels, the blank, vacant face lighted up with an entirely different expression. he was no longer the credulous yokel who believed the yankees were only slightly modified devils, ready at any instant to return to their original horn-and-tail condition and snatch him away to the bluest kind of perdition; he knew, apparently quite as well as his master, that they were in some way his friends and allies, and he lost no opportunity in communicating his appreciation of that fact, and of offering his services in any possible way. and these offers were sincere. it is the testimony of every union prisoner in the south that he was never betrayed by or disappointed in a field-negro, but could always approach any one of them with perfect confidence in his extending all the aid in his power, whether as a guide to escape, as sentinel to signal danger, or a purveyor of food. these services were frequently attended with the greatest personal risk, but they were none the less readily undertaken. this applies only to the field-hands; the house servants were treacherous and wholly unreliable. very many of our men who managed to get away from the prisons were recaptured through their betrayal by house servants, but none were retaken where a field hand could prevent it. we were much interested in watching the negro work. they wove in a great deal of their peculiar, wild, mournful music, whenever the character of the labor permitted. they seemed to sing the music for the music's sake alone, and were as heedless of the fitness of the accompanying words, as the composer of a modern opera is of his libretto. one middle aged man, with a powerful, mellow baritone, like the round, full notes of a french horn, played by a virtuoso, was the musical leader of the party. he never seemed to bother himself about air, notes or words, but improvised all as he went along, and he sang as the spirit moved him. he would suddenly break out with- "oh, he's gone up dah, nevah to come back agin," at this every darkey within hearing would roll out, in admirable consonance with the pitch, air and time started by the leader- "o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o!" then would ring out from the leader as from the throbbing lips of a silver trumpet, "lord bress him soul; i done hope he is happy now!" and the antiphonal two hundred would chant back "o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o!" and so on for hours. they never seemed to weary of singing, and we certainly did not of listening to them. the absolute independence of the conventionalities of tune and sentiment, gave them freedom to wander through a kaleideoscopic variety of harmonic effects, as spontaneous and changeful as the song of a bird. i sat one evening, long after the shadows of night had fallen upon the hillside, with one of my chums--a frank berkstresser, of the ninth maryland infantry, who before enlisting was a mathematical tutor in college at hancock, maryland. as we listened to the unwearying flow of melody from the camp of the laborers, i thought of and repeated to him longfellow's fine lines: the slave singing at midnight. and the voice of his devotion filled my soul with strong emotion; for its tones by turns were glad sweetly solemn, wildly sad. paul and silas, in their prison, sang of christ, the lord arisen, and an earthquake's arm of might broke their dungeon gates at night. but, alas, what holy angel brings the slave this glad evangel and what earthquake's arm of might. breaks his prison gags at night. said i: "now, isn't that fine, berkstresser?" he was a democrat, of fearfully pro-slavery ideas, and he replied, sententiously: "o, the poetry's tolerable, but the sentiment's damnable." chapter xviii. schemes and plans to escape--scaling the stockade--establishing the dead line--the first man killed. the official designation of our prison was "camp sumpter," but this was scarcely known outside of the rebel documents, reports and orders. it was the same way with the prison five miles from millen, to which we were afterward transferred. the rebels styled it officially "camp lawton," but we called it always "millen." having our huts finished, the next solicitude was about escape, and this was the burden of our thoughts, day and night. we held conferences, at which every man was required to contribute all the geographical knowledge of that section of georgia that he might have left over from his schoolboy days, and also that gained by persistent questioning of such guards and other rebels as he had come in contact with. when first landed in the prison we were as ignorant of our whereabouts as if we had been dropped into the center of africa. but one of the prisoners was found to have a fragment of a school atlas, in which was an outline map of georgia, that had macon, atlanta, milledgeville, and savannah laid down upon it. as we knew we had come southward from macon, we felt pretty certain we were in the southwestern corner of the state. conversations with guards and others gave us the information that the chattahooche flowed some two score of miles to the westward, and that the flint lay a little nearer on the east. our map showed that these two united and flowed together into appalachicola bay, where, some of us remembered, a newspaper item had said that we had gunboats stationed. the creek that ran through the stockade flowed to the east, and we reasoned that if we followed its course we would be led to the flint, down which we could float on a log or raft to the appalachicola. this was the favorite scheme of the party with which i sided. another party believed the most feasible plan was to go northward, and endeavor to gain the mountains, and thence get into east tennessee. but the main thing was to get away from the stockade; this, as the french say of all first steps, was what would cost. our first attempt was made about a week after our arrival. we found two logs on the east side that were a couple of feet shorter than the rest, and it seemed as if they could be successfully scaled. about fifty of us resolved to make the attempt. we made a rope twenty-five or thirty feet long, and strong enough to bear a man, out of strings and strips of cloth. a stout stick was fastened to the end, so that it would catch on the logs on either side of the gap. on a night dark enough to favor our scheme, we gathered together, drew cuts to determine each boy's place in the line, fell in single rank, according to this arrangement, and marched to the place. the line was thrown skillfully, the stick caught fairly in the notch, and the boy who had drawn number one climbed up amid a suspense so keen that i could hear my heart beating. it seemed ages before he reached the top, and that the noise he made must certainly attract the attention of the guard. it did not. we saw our comrade's. figure outlined against the sky as he slid, over the top, and then heard the dull thump as he sprang to the ground on the other side. "number two," was whispered by our leader, and he performed the feat as successfully as his predecessor. "number, three," and he followed noiselessly and quickly. thus it went on, until, just as we heard number fifteen drop, we also heard a rebel voice say in a vicious undertone: "halt! halt, there, d--n you!" this was enough. the game was up; we were discovered, and the remaining thirty-five of us left that locality with all the speed in our heels, getting away just in time to escape a volley which a squad of guards, posted in the lookouts, poured upon the spot where we had been standing. the next morning the fifteen who had got over the stockade were brought in, each chained to a sixty-four pound ball. their story was that one of the n'yaarkers, who had become cognizant of our scheme, had sought to obtain favor in the rebel eyes by betraying us. the rebels stationed a squad at the crossing place, and as each man dropped down from the stockade he was caught by the shoulder, the muzzle of a revolver thrust into his face, and an order to surrender whispered into his ear. it was expected that the guards in the sentry-boxes would do such execution among those of us still inside as would prove a warning to other would-be escapes. they were defeated in this benevolent intention by the readiness with which we divined the meaning of that incautiously loud halt, and our alacrity in leaving the unhealthy locality. the traitorous n'yaarker was rewarded with a detail into the commissary department, where he fed and fattened like a rat that had secured undisturbed homestead rights in the center of a cheese. when the miserable remnant of us were leaving andersonville months afterward, i saw him, sleek, rotund, and well-clothed, lounging leisurely in the door of a tent. he regarded us a moment contemptuously, and then went on conversing with a fellow n'yaarker, in the foul slang that none but such as he were low enough to use. i have always imagined that the fellow returned home, at the close of the war, and became a prominent member of tweed's gang. we protested against the barbarity of compelling men to wear irons for exercising their natural right of attempting to escape, but no attention was paid to our protest. another result of this abortive effort was the establishment of the notorious "dead line." a few days later a gang of negros came in and drove a line of stakes down at a distance of twenty feet from the stockade. they nailed upon this a strip of stuff four inches wide, and then an order was issued that if this was crossed, or even touched, the guards would fire upon the offender without warning. our surveyor figured up this new contraction of our space, and came to the conclusion that the dead line and the swamp took up about three acres, and we were left now only thirteen acres. this was not of much consequence then, however, as we still had plenty of room. the first man was killed the morning after the dead-line was put up. the victim was a german, wearing the white crescent of the second division of the eleventh corps, whom we had nicknamed "sigel." hardship and exposure had crazed him, and brought on a severe attack of st. vitus's dance. as he went hobbling around with a vacuous grin upon his face, he spied an old piece of cloth lying on the ground inside the dead line. he stooped down and reached under for it. at that instant the guard fired. the charge of ball-and-buck entered the poor old fellow's shoulder and tore through his body. he fell dead, still clutching the dirty rag that had cost him his life. chapter xix. capt. henri wirz--some description of a small-minded personage, who gained great notoriety--first experience with his disciplinary method. the emptying of the prisons at danville and richmond into andersonville went on slowly during the month of march. they came in by train loads of from five hundred to eight hundred, at intervals of two or three days. by the end of the month there were about five thousand in the stockade. there was a fair amount of space for this number, and as yet we suffered no inconvenience from our crowding, though most persons would fancy that thirteen acres of ground was a rather limited area for five thousand men to live, move and have their being a upon. yet a few weeks later we were to see seven times that many packed into that space. one morning a new rebel officer came in to superintend calling the roll. he was an undersized, fidgety man, with an insignificant face, and a mouth that protruded like a rabbit's. his bright little eyes, like those of a squirrel or a rat, assisted in giving his countenance a look of kinship to the family of rodent animals--a genus which lives by stealth and cunning, subsisting on that which it can steal away from stronger and braver creatures. he was dressed in a pair of gray trousers, with the other part of his body covered with a calico garment, like that which small boys used to wear, called "waists." this was fastened to the pantaloons by buttons, precisely as was the custom with the garments of boys struggling with the orthography of words in two syllables. upon his head was perched a little gray cap. sticking in his belt, and fastened to his wrist by a strap two or three feet long, was one of those formidable looking, but harmless english revolvers, that have ten barrels around the edge of the cylinder, and fire a musket-bullet from the center. the wearer of this composite costume, and bearer of this amateur arsenal, stepped nervously about and sputtered volubly in very broken english. he said to wry-necked smith: "py gott, you don't vatch dem dam yankees glose enough! dey are schlippin' rount, and peatin' you efery dimes." this was captain henri wirz, the new commandant of the interior of the prison. there has been a great deal of misapprehension of the character of wirz. he is usually regarded as a villain of large mental caliber, and with a genius for cruelty. he was nothing of the kind. he was simply contemptible, from whatever point of view he was studied. gnat-brained, cowardly, and feeble natured, he had not a quality that commanded respect from any one who knew him. his cruelty did not seem designed so much as the ebullitions of a peevish, snarling little temper, united to a mind incapable of conceiving the results of his acts, or understanding the pain he was inflicting. i never heard anything of his profession or vocation before entering the army. i always believed, however, that he had been a cheap clerk in a small dry-goods store, a third or fourth rate book-keeper, or something similar. imagine, if you please, one such, who never had brains or self-command sufficient to control himself, placed in command of thirty-five thousand men. being a fool he could not help being an infliction to them, even with the best of intentions, and wirz was not troubled with good intentions. i mention the probability of his having been a dry-goods clerk or book-keeper, not with any disrespect to two honorable vocations, but because wirz had had some training as an accountant, and this was what gave him the place over us. rebels, as a rule, are astonishingly ignorant of arithmetic and accounting, generally. they are good shots, fine horsemen, ready speakers and ardent politicians, but, like all noncommercial people, they flounder hopelessly in what people of this section would consider simple mathematical processes. one of our constant amusements was in befogging and "beating" those charged with calling rolls and issuing rations. it was not at all difficult at times to make a hundred men count as a hundred and ten, and so on. wirz could count beyond one hundred, and this determined his selection for the place. his first move was a stupid change. we had been grouped in the natural way into hundreds and thousands. he re-arranged the men in "squads" of ninety, and three of these--two hundred and seventy men --into a "detachment." the detachments were numbered in order from the north gate, and the squads were numbered "one, two, three." on the rolls this was stated after the man's name. for instance, a chum of mine, and in the same squad with me, was charles l. soule, of the third michigan infantry. his name appeared on the rolls: "chas. l. soule, priv. co. e, 8d mich. inf., 1-2." that is, he belonged to the second squad of the first detachment. where wirz got his, preposterous idea of organization from has always been a mystery to me. it was awkward in every way--in drawing rations, counting, dividing into messes, etc. wirz was not long in giving us a taste of his quality. the next morning after his first appearance he came in when roll-call was sounded, and ordered all the squads and detachments to form, and remain standing in ranks until all were counted. any soldier will say that there is no duty more annoying and difficult than standing still in ranks for any considerable length of time, especially when there is nothing to do or to engage the attention. it took wirz between two and three hours to count the whole camp, and by that time we of the first detachments were almost all out of ranks. thereupon wirz announced that no rations would be issued to the camp that day. the orders to stand in ranks were repeated the next morning, with a warning that a failure to obey would be punished as that of the previous day had been. though we were so hungry, that, to use the words of a thirty-fifth pennsylvanian standing next to me--his "big intestines were eating his little ones up," it was impossible to keep the rank formation during the long hours. one man after another straggled away, and again we lost our rations. that afternoon we became desperate. plots were considered for a daring assault to force the gates or scale the stockade. the men were crazy enough to attempt anything rather than sit down and patiently starve. many offered themselves as leaders in any attempt that it might be thought best to make. the hopelessness of any such venture was apparent, even to famished men, and the propositions went no farther than inflammatory talk. the third morning the orders were again repeated. this time we succeeded in remaining in ranks in such a manner as to satisfy wirz, and we were given our rations for that day, but those of the other days were permanently withheld. that afternoon wirz ventured into camp alone. he was assailed with a storm of curses and execrations, and a shower of clubs. he pulled out his revolver, as if to fire upon his assailants. a yell was raised to take his pistol away from him and a crowd rushed forward to do this. without waiting to fire a shot, he turned and ran to the gate for dear life. he did not come in again for a long while, and never afterward without a retinue of guards. chapter xx. prize-fight among the n'yaarkers--a great many formalities, and little blood spilt--a futile attempt to recover a watch--defeat of the law and order party. one of the train-loads from richmond was almost wholly made up of our old acquaintances--the n'yaarkers. the number of these had swelled to four hundred or five hundred--all leagued together in the fellowship of crime. we did not manifest any keen desire for intimate social relations with them, and they did not seem to hunger for our society, so they moved across the creek to the unoccupied south side, and established their camp there, at a considerable distance from us. one afternoon a number of us went across to their camp, to witness a fight according to the rules of the prize ring, which was to come off between two professional pugilists. these were a couple of bounty-jumpers who had some little reputation in new york sporting circles, under the names of the "staleybridge chicken" and the "haarlem infant." on the way from richmond a cast-iron skillet, or spider, had been stolen by the crowd from the rebels. it was a small affair, holding a half gallon, and worth to-day about fifty cents. in andersonville its worth was literally above rubies. two men belonging to different messes each claimed the ownership of the utensil, on the ground of being most active in securing it. their claims were strenuously supported by their respective messes, at the heads of which were the aforesaid infant and chicken. a great deal of strong talk, and several indecisive knock-downs resulted in an agreement to settle the matter by wager of battle between the infant and chicken. when we arrived a twenty-four foot ring had been prepared by drawing a deep mark in the sand. in diagonally opposite corners of these the seconds were kneeling on one knee and supporting their principals on the other by their sides they had little vessels of water, and bundles of rags to answer for sponges. another corner was occupied by the umpire, a foul-mouthed, loud-tongued tombs shyster, named pete bradley. a long-bodied, short-legged hoodlum, nick-named "heenan," armed with a club, acted as ring keeper, and "belted" back, remorselessly, any of the spectators who crowded over the line. did he see a foot obtruding itself so much as an inch over the mark in the sand--and the pressure from the crowd behind was so great that it was difficult for the front fellows to keep off the line--his heavy club and a blasting curse would fall upon the offender simultaneously. every effort was made to have all things conform as nearly as possible to the recognized practices of the "london prize ring." at bradley's call of "time!" the principals would rise from their seconds' knees, advance briskly to the scratch across the center of the ring, and spar away sharply for a little time, until one got in a blow that sent the other to the ground, where he would lie until his second picked him up, carried him back, washed his face off, and gave him a drink. he then rested until the next call of time. this sort of performance went on for an hour or more, with the knockdowns and other casualities pretty evenly divided between the two. then it became apparent that the infant was getting more than he had storage room for. his interest in the skillet was evidently abating, the leering grin he wore upon his face during the early part of the engagement had disappeared long ago, as the successive "hot ones" which the chicken had succeeded in planting upon his mouth, put it out of his power to "smile and smile," "e'en though he might still be a villain." he began coming up to the scratch as sluggishly as a hired man starting out for his day's work, and finally he did not come up at all. a bunch of blood soaked rags was tossed into the air from his corner, and bradley declared the chicken to be the victor, amid enthusiastic cheers from the crowd. we voted the thing rather tame. in the whole hour and a-half there was not so much savage fighting, not so much damage done, as a couple of earnest, but unscientific men, who have no time to waste, will frequently crowd into an impromptu affair not exceeding five minutes in duration. our next visit to the n'yaarkers was on a different errand. the moment they arrived in camp we began to be annoyed by their depredations. blankets--the sole protection of men--would be snatched off as they slept at night. articles of clothing and cooking utensils would go the same way, and occasionally a man would be robbed in open daylight. all these, it was believed, with good reason, were the work of the n'yaarkers, and the stolen things were conveyed to their camp. occasionally depredators would be caught and beaten, but they would give a signal which would bring to their assistance the whole body of n'yaarkers, and turn the tables on their assailants. we had in our squad a little watchmaker named dan martin, of the eighth new york infantry. other boys let him take their watches to tinker up, so as to make a show of running, and be available for trading to the guards. one day martin was at the creek, when a n'yaarker asked him to let him look at a watch. martin incautiously did so, when the n'yaarker snatched it and sped away to the camp of his crowd. martin ran back to us and told his story. this was the last feather which was to break the camel's back of our patience. peter bates, of the third michigan, the sergeant of our squad, had considerable confidence in his muscular ability. he flamed up into mighty wrath, and swore a sulphurous oath that we would get that watch back, whereupon about two hundred of us avowed our willingness to help reclaim it. each of us providing ourselves with a club, we started on our errand. the rest of the camp--about four thousand--gathered on the hillside to watch us. we thought they might have sent us some assistance, as it was about as much their fight as ours, but they did not, and we were too proud to ask it. the crossing of the swamp was quite difficult. only one could go over at a time, and he very slowly. the n'yaarkers understood that trouble was pending, and they began mustering to receive us. from the way they turned out it was evident that we should have come over with three hundred instead of two hundred, but it was too late then to alter the program. as we came up a stalwart irishman stepped out and asked us what we wanted. bates replied: "we have come over to get a watch that one of your fellows took from one of ours, and by --we're going to have it." the irishman's reply was equally explicit though not strictly logical in construction. said he: "we havn't got your watch, and be ye can't have it." this joined the issue just as fairly as if it had been done by all the documentary formula that passed between turkey and russia prior to the late war. bates and the irishman then exchanged very derogatory opinions of each other, and began striking with their clubs. the rest of us took this as our cue, and each, selecting as small a n'yaarker as we could readily find, sailed in. there is a very expressive bit of slang coming into general use in the west, which speaks of a man "biting off more than he can chew." that is what we had done. we had taken a contract that we should have divided, and sub-let the bigger half. two minutes after the engagement became general there was no doubt that we would have been much better off if we had staid on our own side of the creek. the watch was a very poor one, anyhow. we thought we would just say good day to our n'yaark friends, and return home hastily. but they declined to be left so precipitately. they wanted to stay with us awhile. it was lots of fun for them, and for the, four thousand yelling spectators on the opposite hill, who were greatly enjoying our discomfiture. there was hardly enough of the amusement to go clear around, however, and it all fell short just before it reached us. we earnestly wished that some of the boys would come over and help us let go of the n'yaarkers, but they were enjoying the thing too much to interfere. we were driven down the hill, pell-mell, with the n'yaarkers pursuing hotly with yell and blow. at the swamp we tried to make a stand to secure our passage across, but it was only partially successful. very few got back without some severe hurts, and many received blows that greatly hastened their deaths. after this the n'yaarkers became bolder in their robberies, and more arrogant in their demeanor than ever, and we had the poor revenge upon those who would not assist us, of seeing a reign of terror inaugurated over the whole camp. chapter xxi. diminishing rations--a deadly cold rain--hovering over pitch pine fires --increase on mortality--a theory of health. the rations diminished perceptibly day by day. when we first entered we each received something over a quart of tolerably good meal, a sweet potato, a piece of meat about the size of one's two fingers, and occasionally a spoonful of salt. first the salt disappeared. then the sweet potato took unto itself wings and flew away, never to return. an attempt was ostensibly made to issue us cow-peas instead, and the first issue was only a quart to a detachment of two hundred and seventy men. this has two-thirds of a pint to each squad of ninety, and made but a few spoonfuls for each of the four messes in the squad. when it came to dividing among the men, the beans had to be counted. nobody received enough to pay for cooking, and we were at a loss what to do until somebody suggested that we play poker for them. this met general acceptance, and after that, as long as beans were drawn, a large portion of the day was spent in absorbing games of "bluff" and "draw," at a bean "ante," and no "limit." after a number of hours' diligent playing, some lucky or skillful player would be in possession of all the beans in a mess, a squad, and sometimes a detachment, and have enough for a good meal. next the meal began to diminish in quantity and deteriorate in quality. it became so exceedingly coarse that the common remark was that the next step would be to bring us the corn in the shock, and feed it to us like stock. then meat followed suit with the rest. the rations decreased in size, and the number of days that we did not get any, kept constantly increasing in proportion to the days that we did, until eventually the meat bade us a final adieu, and joined the sweet potato in that undiscovered country from whose bourne no ration ever returned. the fuel and building material in the stockade were speedily exhausted. the later comers had nothing whatever to build shelter with. but, after the spring rains had fairly set in, it seemed that we had not tasted misery until then. about the middle of march the windows of heaven opened, and it began a rain like that of the time of noah. it was tropical in quantity and persistency, and arctic in temperature. for dreary hours that lengthened into weary days and nights, and these again into never-ending weeks, the driving, drenching flood poured down upon the sodden earth, searching the very marrow of the five thousand hapless men against whose chilled frames it beat with pitiless monotony, and soaked the sand bank upon which we lay until it was like a sponge filled with ice-water. it seems to me now that it must have been two or three weeks that the sun was wholly hidden behind the dripping clouds, not shining out once in all that time. the intervals when it did not rain were rare and short. an hour's respite would be followed by a day of steady, regular pelting of the great rain drops. i find that the report of the smithsonian institute gives the average annual rainfall in the section around andersonville, at fifty-six inches --nearly five feet--while that of foggy england is only thirty-two. our experience would lead me to think that we got the five feet all at once. we first comers, who had huts, were measurably better off than the later arrivals. it was much drier in our leaf-thatched tents, and we were spared much of the annoyance that comes from the steady dash of rain against the body for hours. the condition of those who had no tents was truly pitiable. they sat or lay on the hill-side the live-long day and night, and took the washing flow with such gloomy composure as they could muster. all soldiers will agree with me that there is no campaigning hardship comparable to a cold rain. one can brace up against the extremes of heat and cold, and mitigate their inclemency in various ways. but there is no escaping a long-continued, chilling rain. it seems to penetrate to the heart, and leach away the very vital force. the only relief attainable was found in huddling over little fires kept alive by small groups with their slender stocks of wood. as this wood was all pitch-pine, that burned with a very sooty flame, the effect upon the appearance of the hoverers was, startling. face, neck and hands became covered with mixture of lampblack and turpentine, forming a coating as thick as heavy brown paper, and absolutely irremovable by water alone. the hair also became of midnight blackness, and gummed up into elflocks of fantastic shape and effect. any one of us could have gone on the negro minstrel stage, without changing a hair, and put to blush the most elaborate make-up of the grotesque burnt-cork artists. no wood was issued to us. the only way of getting it was to stand around the gate for hours until a guard off duty could be coaxed or hired to accompany a small party to the woods, to bring back a load of such knots and limbs as could be picked up. our chief persuaders to the guards to do us this favor were rings, pencils, knives, combs, and such trifles as we might have in our pockets, and, more especially, the brass buttons on our uniforms. rebel soldiers, like indians, negros and other imperfectly civilized people, were passionately fond of bright and gaudy things. a handful of brass buttons would catch every one of them as swiftly and as surely as a piece of red flannel will a gudgeon. our regular fee for an escort for three of us to the woods was six over-coat or dress-coat buttons, or ten or twelve jacket buttons. all in the mess contributed to this fund, and the fuel obtained was carefully guarded and husbanded. this manner of conducting the wood business is a fair sample of the management, or rather the lack of it, of every other detail of prison administration. all the hardships we suffered from lack of fuel and shelter could have been prevented without the slightest expense or trouble to the confederacy. two hundred men allowed to go out on parole, and supplied with ages, would have brought in from the adjacent woods, in a week's time, enough material to make everybody comfortable tents, and to supply all the fuel needed. the mortality caused by the storm was, of course, very great. the official report says the total number in the prison in march was four thousand six hundred and three, of whom two hundred and eighty-three died. among the first to die was the one whom we expected to live longest. he was by much the largest man in prison, and was called, because of this, "big joe." he was a sergeant in the fifth pennsylvania cavalry, and seemed the picture of health. one morning the news ran through the prison that "big joe is dead," and a visit to his squad showed his stiff, lifeless form, occupying as much ground as goliath's, after his encounter with david. his early demise was an example of a general law, the workings of which few in the army failed to notice. it was always the large and strong who first succumbed to hardship. the stalwart, huge-limbed, toil-inured men sank down earliest on the march, yielded soonest to malarial influences, and fell first under the combined effects of home-sickness, exposure and the privations of army life. the slender, withy boys, as supple and weak as cats, had apparently the nine lives of those animals. there were few exceptions to this rule in the army--there were none in andersonville. i can recall few or no instances where a large, strong, "hearty" man lived through a few months of imprisonment. the survivors were invariably youths, at the verge of manhood,--slender, quick, active, medium-statured fellows, of a cheerful temperament, in whom one would have expected comparatively little powers of endurance. the theory which i constructed for my own private use in accounting for this phenomenon i offer with proper diffidence to others who may be in search of a hypothesis to explain facts that they have observed. it is this: a. the circulation of the blood maintains health, and consequently life by carrying away from the various parts of the body the particles of worn-out and poisonous tissue, and replacing them with fresh, structure-building material. b. the man is healthiest in whom this process goes on most freely and continuously. c. men of considerable muscular power are disposed to be sluggish; the exertion of great strength does not favor circulation. it rather retards it, and disturbs its equilibrium by congesting the blood in quantities in the sets of muscles called into action. d. in light, active men, on the other hand, the circulation goes on perfectly and evenly, because all the parts are put in motion, and kept so in such a manner as to promote the movement of the blood to every extremity. they do not strain one set of muscles by long continued effort, as a strong man does, but call one into play after another. there is no compulsion on the reader to accept this speculation at any valuation whatever. there is not even any charge for it. i will lay down this simple axiom: no strong man, is a healthy man from the athlete in the circus who lifts pieces of artillery and catches cannon balls, to the exhibition swell in a country gymnasium. if my theory is not a sufficient explanation of this, there is nothing to prevent the reader from building up one to suit him better. chapter xxii. difference between alabamians and georgians--death of "poll parrott" --a good joke upon the guard--a brutal rascal. there were two regiments guarding us--the twenty-sixth alabama and the fifty-fifth georgia. never were two regiments of the same army more different. the alabamians were the superiors of the georgians in every way that one set of men could be superior to another. they were manly, soldierly, and honorable, where the georgians were treacherous and brutal. we had nothing to complain of at the hands of the alabamians; we suffered from the georgians everything that mean-spirited cruelty could devise. the georgians were always on the look-out for something that they could torture into such apparent violation of orders, as would justify them in shooting men down; the alabamians never fired until they were satisfied that a deliberate offense was intended. i can recall of my own seeing at least a dozen instances where men of the fifty-fifth georgia killed prisoners under the pretense that they were across the dead line, when the victims were a yard or more from the dead line, and had not the remotest idea of going any nearer. the only man i ever knew to be killed by one of the twenty-sixth alabama was named hubbard, from chicago, ills., and a member of the thirty-eighth illinois. he had lost one leg, and went hobbling about the camp on crutches, chattering continually in a loud, discordant voice, saying all manner of hateful and annoying things, wherever he saw an opportunity. this and his beak-like nose gained for him the name of "poll parrot." his misfortune caused him to be tolerated where another man would have been suppressed. by-and-by he gave still greater cause for offense by his obsequious attempts to curry favor with captain wirz, who took him outside several times for purposes that were not well explained. finally, some hours after one of poll parrot's visits outside, a rebel officer came in with a guard, and, proceeding with suspicious directness to a tent which was the mouth of a large tunnel that a hundred men or more had been quietly pushing forward, broke the tunnel in, and took the occupants of the tent outside for punishment. the question that demanded immediate solution then was: "who is the traitor who has informed the rebels?" suspicion pointed very strongly to "poll parrot." by the next morning the evidence collected seemed to amount to a certainty, and a crowd caught the parrot with the intention of lynching him. he succeeded in breaking away from them and ran under the dead line, near where i was sitting in, my tent. at first it looked as if he had done this to secure the protection of the guard. the latter--a twenty-sixth alabamian --ordered him out. poll parrot rose up on his one leg, put his back against the dead line, faced the guard, and said in his harsh, cackling voice: "no; i won't go out. if i've lost the confidence of my comrades i want to die." part of the crowd were taken back by this move, and felt disposed to accept it as a demonstration of the parrot's innocence. the rest thought it was a piece of bravado, because of his belief that the rebels would not injure, him after he had served them. they renewed their yells, the guard again ordered the parrot out, but the latter, tearing open his blouse, cackled out: "no, i won't go; fire at me, guard. there's my heart shoot me right there." there was no help for it. the rebel leveled his gun and fired. the charge struck the parrot's lower jaw, and carried it completely away, leaving his tongue and the roof of his mouth exposed. as he was carried back to die, he wagged his tongue rigorously, in attempting to speak, but it was of no use. the guard set his gun down and buried his face in his hands. it was the only time that i saw a sentinel show anything but exultation at killing a yankee. a ludicrous contrast to this took place a few nights later. the rains had ceased, the weather had become warmer, and our spirits rising with this increase in the comfort of our surroundings, a number of us were sitting around "nosey"--a boy with a superb tenor voice--who was singing patriotic songs. we were coming in strong on the chorus, in a way that spoke vastly more for our enthusiasm for the union than our musical knowledge. "nosey" sang the "star spangled banner," "the battle cry of freedom," "brave boys are they," etc., capitally, and we threw our whole lungs into the chorus. it was quite dark, and while our noise was going on the guards changed, new men coming on duty. suddenly, bang! went the gun of the guard in the box about fifty feet away from us. we knew it was a fifty-fifth georgian, and supposed that, irritated at our singing, he was trying to kill some of us for spite. at the sound of the gun we jumped up and scattered. as no one gave the usual agonized yell of a prisoner when shot, we supposed the ball had not taken effect. we could hear the sentinel ramming down another cartridge, hear him "return rammer," and cock his rifle. again the gun cracked, and again there was no sound of anybody being hit. again we could hear the sentry churning down another cartridge. the drums began beating the long roll in the camps, and officers could be heard turning the men out. the thing was becoming exciting, and one of us sang out to the guard: "s-a-y! what the are you shooting at, any how?" "i'm a shootin' at that ------yank thar by the dead line, and by --if you'uns don't take him in i'll blow the whole head offn him." "what yank? where's any yank?" "why, thar--right thar--a-standin' agin the ded line." "why, you rebel fool, that's a chunk of wood. you can't get any furlough for shooting that!" at this there was a general roar from the rest of the camp, which the other guards took up, and as the reserves came double-quicking up, and learned the occasion of the alarm, they gave the rascal who had been so anxious to kill somebody a torrent of abuse for having disturbed them. a part of our crowd had been out after wood during the day, and secured a piece of a log as large as two of them could carry, and bringing it in, stood it up near the dead line. when the guard mounted to his post he was sure he saw a temerarious yankee in front of him, and hastened to slay him. it was an unusual good fortune that nobody was struck. it was very rare that the guards fired into the prison without hitting at least one person. the georgia reserves, who formed our guards later in the season, were armed with an old gun called a queen anne musket, altered to percussion. it carried a bullet as big as a large marble, and three or four buckshot. when fired into a group of men it was sure to bring several down. i was standing one day in the line at the gate, waiting for a chance to go out after wood. a fifty-fifth georgian was the gate guard, and he drew a line in the sand with his bayonet which we should not cross. the crowd behind pushed one man till he put his foot a few inches over the line, to save himself from falling; the guard sank a bayonet through the foot as quick as a flash. andersonville a story of rebel military prisons fifteen months a guest of the so-called southern confederacy a private soldiers experience in richmond, andersonville, savannah, millen blackshear and florence by john mcelroy late of co. l. 16th ill cav. 1879 volume 3. chapter xliii. difficulty of exercising--embarrassments of a morning walk--the rialto of the prison--cursing the southern confederacy--the story of the battle of spottsylvania courthouse. certainly, in no other great community, that ever existed upon the face of the globe was there so little daily ebb and flow as in this. dull as an ordinary town or city may be; however monotonous, eventless, even stupid the lives of its citizens, there is yet, nevertheless, a flow every day of its life-blood--its population towards its heart, and an ebb of the same, every evening towards its extremities. these recurring tides mingle all classes together and promote the general healthfulness, as the constant motion hither and yon of the ocean's waters purify and sweeten them. the lack of these helped vastly to make the living mass inside the stockade a human dead sea--or rather a dying sea--a putrefying, stinking lake, resolving itself into phosphorescent corruption, like those rotting southern seas, whose seething filth burns in hideous reds, and ghastly greens and yellows. being little call for motion of any kind, and no room to exercise whatever wish there might be in that direction, very many succumbed unresistingly to the apathy which was so strongly favored by despondency and the weakness induced by continual hunger, and lying supinely on the hot sand, day in and day out, speedily brought themselves into such a condition as invited the attacks of disease. it required both determination and effort to take a little walking exercise. the ground was so densely crowded with holes and other devices for shelter that it took one at least ten minutes to pick his way through the narrow and tortuous labyrinth which served as paths for communication between different parts of the camp. still further, there was nothing to see anywhere or to form sufficient inducement for any one to make so laborious a journey. one simply encountered at every new step the same unwelcome sights that he had just left; there was a monotony in the misery as in everything else, and consequently the temptation to sit or lie still in one's own quarters became very great. i used to make it a point to go to some of the remoter parts of the stockade once every day, simply for exercise. one can gain some idea of the crowd, and the difficulty of making one's way through it, when i say that no point in the prison could be more than fifteen hundred feet from where i staid, and, had the way been clear, i could have walked thither and back in at most a half an hour, yet it usually took me from two to three hours to make one of these journeys. this daily trip, a few visits to the creek to wash all over, a few games of chess, attendance upon roll call, drawing rations, cooking and eating the same, "lousing" my fragments of clothes, and doing some little duties for my sick and helpless comrades, constituted the daily routine for myself, as for most of the active youths in the prison. the creek was the great meeting point for all inside the stockade. all able to walk were certain to be there at least once during the day, and we made it a rendezvous, a place to exchange gossip, discuss the latest news, canvass the prospects of exchange, and, most of all, to curse the rebels. indeed no conversation ever progressed very far without both speaker and listener taking frequent rests to say bitter things as to the rebels generally, and wirz, winder and davis in particular. a conversation between two boys--strangers to each other who came to the creek to wash themselves or their clothes, or for some other purpose, would progress thus: first boy--"i belong to the second corps,--hancock's, [the army of the potomac boys always mentioned what corps they belonged to, where the western boys stated their regiment.] they got me at spottsylvania, when they were butting their heads against our breast-works, trying to get even with us for gobbling up johnson in the morning,"--he stops suddenly and changes tone to say: "i hope to god, that when our folks get richmond, they will put old ben butler in command of it, with orders to limb, skin and jayhawk it worse than he did new orleans." second boy, (fervently :) "i wish to god he would, and that he'd catch old jeff., and that grayheaded devil, winder, and the old dutch captain, strip 'em just as we were, put 'em in this pen, with just the rations they are givin' us, and set a guard of plantation niggers over 'em, with orders to blow their whole infernal heads off, if they dared so much as to look at the dead line." first boy--(returning to the story of his capture.) "old hancock caught the johnnies that morning the neatest you ever saw anything in your life. after the two armies had murdered each other for four or five days in the wilderness, by fighting so close together that much of the time you could almost shake hands with the graybacks, both hauled off a little, and lay and glowered at each other. each side had lost about twenty thousand men in learning that if it attacked the other it would get mashed fine. so each built a line of works and lay behind them, and tried to nag the other into coming out and attacking. at spottsylvania our lines and those of the johnnies weren't twelve hundred yards apart. the ground was clear and clean between them, and any force that attempted to cross it to attack would be cut to pieces, as sure as anything. we laid there three or four days watching each other--just like boys at school, who shake fists and dare each other. at one place the rebel line ran out towards us like the top of a great letter 'a.' the night of the 11th of may it rained very hard, and then came a fog so thick that you couldn't see the length of a company. hancock thought he'd take advantage of this. we were all turned out very quietly about four o'clock in the morning. not a bit of noise was allowed. we even had to take off our canteens and tin cups, that they might not rattle against our bayonets. the ground was so wet that our footsteps couldn't be heard. it was one of those deathly, still movements, when you think your heart is making as much noise as a bass drum. "the johnnies didn't seem to have the faintest suspicion of what was coming, though they ought, because we would have expected such an attack from them if we hadn't made it ourselves. their pickets were out just a little ways from their works, and we were almost on to them before they discovered us. they fired and ran back. at this we raised a yell and dashed forward at a charge. as we poured over the works, the rebels came double-quicking up to defend them. we flanked johnson's division quicker'n you could say 'jack robinson,' and had four thousand of 'em in our grip just as nice as you please. we sent them to the rear under guard, and started for the next line of rebel works about a half a mile away. but we had now waked up the whole of lee's army, and they all came straight for us, like packs of mad wolves. ewell struck us in the center; longstreet let drive at our left flank, and hill tackled our right. we fell back to the works we had taken, warren and wright came up to help us, and we had it hot and heavy for the rest of the day and part of the night. the johnnies seemed so mad over what we'd done that they were half crazy. they charged us five times, coming up every time just as if they were going to lift us right out of the works with the bayonet. about midnight, after they'd lost over ten thousand men, they seemed to understand that we had pre-empted that piece of real estate, and didn't propose to allow anybody to jump our claim, so they fell back sullen like to their main works. when they came on the last charge, our brigadier walked behind each of our regiments and said: "boys, we'll send 'em back this time for keeps. give it to 'em by the acre, and when they begin to waver, we'll all jump over the works and go for them with the bayonet.' "we did it just that way. we poured such a fire on them that the bullets knocked up the ground in front just like you have seen the deep dust in a road in the middle of summer fly up when the first great big drops of a rain storm strike it. but they came on, yelling and swearing, officers in front waving swords, and shouting--all that business, you know. when they got to about one hundred yards from us, they did not seem to be coming so fast, and there was a good deal of confusion among them. the brigade bugle sounded: "stop firing." "we all ceased instantly. the rebels looked up in astonishment. our general sang out: "fix bayonets!' but we knew what was coming, and were already executing the order. you can imagine the crash that ran down the line, as every fellow snatched his bayonet out and slapped it on the muzzle of his gun. then the general's voice rang out like a bugle: "ready!--forward! charge!' "we cheered till everything seemed to split, and jumped over the works, almost every man at the same minute. the johnnies seemed to have been puzzled at the stoppage of our fire. when we all came sailing over the works, with guns brought right, down where they meant business, they were so astonished for a minute that they stood stock still, not knowing whether to come for us, or run. we did not allow them long to debate, but went right towards them on the double quick, with the bayonets looking awful savage and hungry. it was too much for mr. johnny reb's nerves. they all seemed to about face' at once, and they lit out of there as if they had been sent for in a hurry. we chased after 'em as fast as we could, and picked up just lots of 'em. finally it began to be real funny. a johnny's wind would begin to give out he'd fall behind his comrades; he'd hear us yell and think that we were right behind him, ready to sink a bayonet through him'; he'd turn around, throw up his hands, and sing out: "i surrender, mister! i surrender!' and find that we were a hundred feet off, and would have to have a bayonet as long as one of mcclellan's general orders to touch him. "well, my company was the left of our regiment, and our regiment was the left of the brigade, and we swung out ahead of all the rest of the boys. in our excitement of chasing the johnnies, we didn't see that we had passed an angle of their works. about thirty of us had become separated from the company and were chasing a squad of about seventy-five or one hundred. we had got up so close to them that we hollered: "'halt there, now, or we'll blow your heads off.' "they turned round with, 'halt yourselves; you ---yankee -------' "we looked around at this, and saw that we were not one hundred feet away from the angle of the works, which were filled with rebels waiting for our fellows to get to where they could have a good flank fire upon them. there was nothing to do but to throw down our guns and surrender, and we had hardly gone inside of the works, until the johnnies opened on our brigade and drove it back. this ended the battle at spottsylvania court house." second boy (irrelevantly.) "some day the underpinning will fly out from under the south, and let it sink right into the middle kittle o' hell." first boy (savagely.) "i only wish the whole southern confederacy was hanging over hell by a single string, and i had a knife." chapter xliv. rebel music--singular lack of the creative power among the southerners --contrast with similar people elsewhere--their favorite music, and where it was borrowed from--a fifer with one tune. i have before mentioned as among the things that grew upon one with increasing acquaintance with the rebels on their native heath, was astonishment at their lack of mechanical skill and at their inability to grapple with numbers and the simpler processes of arithmetic. another characteristic of the same nature was their wonderful lack of musical ability, or of any kind of tuneful creativeness. elsewhere, all over the world, people living under similar conditions to the southerners are exceedingly musical, and we owe the great majority of the sweetest compositions which delight the ear and subdue the senses to unlettered song-makers of the swiss mountains, the tyrolese valleys, the bavarian highlands, and the minstrels of scotland, ireland and wales. the music of english-speaking people is very largely made up of these contributions from the folk-songs of dwellers in the wilder and more mountainous parts of the british isles. one rarely goes far out of the way in attributing to this source any air that he may hear that captivates him with its seductive opulence of harmony. exquisite melodies, limpid and unstrained as the carol of a bird in spring-time, and as plaintive as the cooing of a turtle-dove seems as natural products of the scottish highlands as the gorse which blazons on their hillsides in august. debarred from expressing their aspirations as people of broader culture do--in painting, in sculpture, in poetry and prose, these mountaineers make song the flexible and ready instrument for the communication of every emotion that sweeps across their souls. love, hatred, grief, revenge, anger, and especially war seems to tune their minds to harmony, and awake the voice of song in them hearts. the battles which the scotch and irish fought to replace the luckless stuarts upon the british throne--the bloody rebellions of 1715 and 1745, left a rich legacy of sweet song, the outpouring of loving, passionate loyalty to a wretched cause; songs which are today esteemed and sung wherever the english language is spoken, by people who have long since forgotten what burning feelings gave birth to their favorite melodies. for a century the bones of both the pretenders have moldered in alien soil; the names of james edward, and charles edward, which were once trumpet blasts to rouse armed men, mean as little to the multitude of today as those of the saxon ethelbert, and danish hardicanute, yet the world goes on singing--and will probably as long as the english language is spoken--"wha'll be king but charlie?" "when jamie come hame," "over the water to charlie," "charlie is my darling," "the bonny blue bonnets are over the border," "saddle your steeds and awa," and a myriad others whose infinite tenderness and melody no modern composer can equal. yet these same scotch and irish, the same jacobite english, transplanted on account of their chronic rebelliousness to the mountains of virginia, the carolinas, and georgia, seem to have lost their tunefulness, as some fine singing birds do when carried from their native shores. the descendants of those who drew swords for james and charles at preston pans and culloden dwell to-day in the dales and valleys of the alleganies, as their fathers did in the dales and valleys of the grampians, but their voices are mute. as a rule the southerners are fond of music. they are fond of singing and listening to old-fashioned ballads, most of which have never been printed, but handed down from one generation to the other, like the 'volklieder' of germany. they sing these with the wild, fervid impressiveness characteristic of the ballad singing of unlettered people. very many play tolerably on the violin and banjo, and occasionally one is found whose instrumentation may be called good. but above this hight they never soar. the only musician produced by the south of whom the rest of the country has ever heard, is blind tom, the negro idiot. no composer, no song writer of any kind has appeared within the borders of dixie. it was a disappointment to me that even the stress of the war, the passion and fierceness with which the rebels felt and fought, could not stimulate any adherent of the stars and bars into the production of a single lyric worthy in the remotest degree of the magnitude of the struggle, and the depth of the popular feeling. where two million scotch, fighting to restore the fallen fortunes of the worse than worthless stuarts, filled the world with immortal music, eleven million of southerners, fighting for what they claimed to be individual freedom and national life, did not produce any original verse, or a bar of music that the world could recognize as such. this is the fact; and an undeniable one. its explanation i must leave to abler analysts than i am. searching for peculiar causes we find but two that make the south differ from the ancestral home of these people. these two were climate and slavery. climatic effects will not account for the phenomenon, because we see that the peasantry of the mountains of spain and the south of france as ignorant as these people, and dwellers in a still more enervating atmosphere-are very fertile in musical composition, and their songs are to the romanic languages what the scotch and irish ballads are to the english. then it must be ascribed to the incubus of slavery upon the intellect, which has repressed this as it has all other healthy growths in the south. slavery seems to benumb all the faculties except the passions. the fact that the mountaineers had but few or no slaves, does not seem to be of importance in the case. they lived under the deadly shadow of the upas tree, and suffered the consequences of its stunting their development in all directions, as the ague-smitten inhabitant of the roman campana finds every sense and every muscle clogged by the filtering in of the insidious miasma. they did not compose songs and music, because they did not have the intellectual energy for that work. the negros displayed all the musical creativeness of that section. their wonderful prolificness in wild, rude songs, with strangely melodious airs that burned themselves into the memory, was one of the salient characteristics of that down-trodden race. like the russian serfs, and the bondmen of all ages and lands, the songs they made and sang all had an undertone of touching plaintiveness, born of ages of dumb suffering. the themes were exceedingly simple, and the range of subjects limited. the joys, and sorrows, hopes and despairs of love's gratification or disappointment, of struggles for freedom, contests with malign persons and influences, of rage, hatred, jealousy, revenge, such as form the motifs for the majority of the poetry of free and strong races, were wholly absent from their lyrics. religion, hunger and toil were their main inspiration. they sang of the pleasures of idling in the genial sunshine; the delights of abundance of food; the eternal happiness that awaited them in the heavenly future, where the slave-driver ceased from troubling and the weary were at rest; where time rolled around in endless cycles of days spent in basking, harp in hand, and silken clad, in golden streets, under the soft effulgence of cloudless skies, glowing with warmth and kindness emanating from the creator himself. had their masters condescended to borrow the music of the slaves, they would have found none whose sentiments were suitable for the ode of a people undergoing the pangs of what was hoped to be the birth of a new nation. the three songs most popular at the south, and generally regarded as distinctively southern, were "the bonnie blue flag," "maryland, my maryland," and "stonewall jackson crossing into maryland." the first of these was the greatest favorite by long odds. women sang, men whistled, and the so-called musicians played it wherever we went. while in the field before capture, it was the commonest of experiences to have rebel women sing it at us tauntingly from the house that we passed or near which we stopped. if ever near enough a rebel camp, we were sure to hear its wailing crescendo rising upon the air from the lips or instruments of some one more quartered there. at richmond it rang upon us constantly from some source or another, and the same was true wherever else we went in the so-called confederacy. all familiar with scotch songs will readily recognize the name and air as an old friend, and one of the fierce jacobite melodies that for a long time disturbed the tranquility of the brunswick family on the english throne. the new words supplied by the rebels are the merest doggerel, and fit the music as poorly as the unchanged name of the song fitted to its new use. the flag of the rebellion was not a bonnie blue one; but had quite as much red and white as azure. it did not have a single star, but thirteen. near in popularity was "maryland, my maryland." the versification of this was of a much higher order, being fairly respectable. the air is old, and a familiar one to all college students, and belongs to one of the most common of german household songs: o, tannenbaum! o, tannenbaum, wie tru sind deine blatter! da gruenst nicht nur zur sommerseit, nein, auch in winter, when es schneit, etc. which longfellow has finely translated, o, hemlock tree! o, hemlock tree! how faithful are thy branches! green not alone in summer time, but in the winter's float and rime. o, hemlock tree o, hemlock tree! how faithful are thy branches. etc. the rebel version ran: maryland. the despot's heel is on thy shore, maryland! his touch is at thy temple door, maryland! avenge the patriotic gore that flecked the streets of baltimore, and be the battle queen of yore, maryland! my maryland! hark to the wand'ring son's appeal, maryland! my mother state, to thee i kneel, maryland! for life and death, for woe and weal, thy peerless chivalry reveal, and gird thy beauteous limbs with steel, maryland! my maryland! thou wilt not cower in the duet, maryland! thy beaming sword shall never rust maryland! remember carroll's sacred trust, remember howard's warlike thrust-and all thy slumberers with the just, maryland! my maryland! come! 'tis the red dawn of the day, maryland! come! with thy panoplied array, maryland! with ringgold's spirit for the fray, with watson's blood at monterey, with fearless lowe and dashing may, maryland! my maryland! comet for thy shield is bright and strong, maryland! come! for thy dalliance does thee wrong, maryland! come! to thins own heroic throng, that stalks with liberty along, and give a new key to thy song, maryland! my maryland! dear mother! burst the tyrant's chain, maryland! virginia should not call in vain, maryland! she meets her sisters on the plain-'sic semper' 'tis the proud refrain, that baffles millions back amain, maryland! arise, in majesty again, maryland! my maryland! i see the blush upon thy cheek, maryland! but thou wast ever bravely meek, maryland! but lo! there surges forth a shriek from hill to hill, from creek to creek-potomac calls to chesapeake, maryland! my maryland! thou wilt not yield the vandal toll. maryland! thou wilt not crook to his control, maryland! better the fire upon thee roll, better the blade, the shot, the bowl, than crucifixion of the soul, maryland! my maryland! i hear the distant thunder hem, maryland! the old line's bugle, fife, and drum. maryland! she is not dead, nor deaf, nor dumb-hnzza! she spurns the northern scum! she breathes--she burns! she'll come! she'll come! maryland! my maryland! "stonewall jackson crossing into maryland," was another travesty, of about the same literary merit, or rather demerit, as "the bonnie blue flag." its air was that of the well-known and popular negro minstrel song, "billy patterson." for all that, it sounded very martial and stirring when played by a brass band. we heard these songs with tiresome iteration, daily and nightly, during our stay in the southern confederacy. some one of the guards seemed to be perpetually beguiling the weariness of his watch by singing in all keys, in every sort of a voice, and with the wildest latitude as to air and time. they became so terribly irritating to us, that to this day the remembrance of those soul-lacerating lyrics abides with me as one of the chief of the minor torments of our situation. they were, in fact, nearly as bad as the lice. we revenged ourselves as best we could by constructing fearfully wicked, obscene and insulting parodies on these, and by singing them with irritating effusiveness in the hearing of the guards who were inflicting these nuisances upon us. of the same nature was the garrison music. one fife, played by an asthmatic old fellow whose breathings were nearly as audible as his notes, and one rheumatic drummer, constituted the entire band for the post. the fifer actually knew but one tune "the bonnie blue flag" --and did not know that well. but it was all that he had, and he played it with wearisome monotony for every camp call--five or six times a day, and seven days in the week. he called us up in the morning with it for a reveille; he sounded the "roll call" and "drill call," breakfast, dinner and supper with it, and finally sent us to bed, with the same dreary wail that had rung in our ears all day. i never hated any piece of music as i came to hate that threnody of treason. it would have been such a relief if the old asthmatic who played it could have been induced to learn another tune to play on sundays, and give us one day of rest. he did not, but desecrated the lord's day by playing as vilely as on the rest of the week. the rebels were fully conscious of their musical deficiencies, and made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to induce the musicians among the prisoners to come outside and form a band. chapter xlv. august--needles stuck in pumpkin seeds--some phenomena of starvation --rioting in remembered luxuries. "illinoy," said tall, gaunt jack north, of the one hundred and fourteenth illinois, to me, one day, as we sat contemplating our naked, and sadly attenuated underpinning; "what do our legs and feet most look most like?" "give it up, jack," said i. "why--darning needles stuck in pumpkin seeds, of course." i never heard a better comparison for our wasted limbs. the effects of the great bodily emaciation were sometimes very startling. boys of a fleshy habit would change so in a few weeks as to lose all resemblance to their former selves, and comrades who came into prison later would utterly fail to recognize them. most fat men, as most large men, died in a little while after entering, though there were exceptions. one of these was a boy of my own company, named george hillicks. george had shot up within a few years to over six feet in hight, and then, as such boys occasionally do, had, after enlisting with us, taken on such a development of flesh that we nicknamed him the "giant," and he became a pretty good load for even the strongest horse. george held his flesh through belle isle, and the earlier weeks in andersonville, but june, july, and august "fetched him," as the boys said. he seemed to melt away like an icicle on a spring day, and he grew so thin that his hight seemed preternatural. we called him "flagstaff," and cracked all sorts of jokes about putting an insulator on his head, and setting him up for a telegraph pole, braiding his legs and using him for a whip lash, letting his hair grow a little longer, and trading him off to the rebels for a sponge and staff for the artillery, etc. we all expected him to die, and looked continually for the development of the fatal scurvy symptoms, which were to seal his doom. but he worried through, and came out at last in good shape, a happy result due as much as to anything else to his having in chester hayward, of prairie city, ill.,--one of the most devoted chums i ever knew. chester nursed and looked out for george with wife-like fidelity, and had his reward in bringing him safe through our lines. there were thousands of instances of this generous devotion to each other by chums in andersonville, and i know of nothing that reflects any more credit upon our boy soldiers. there was little chance for any one to accumulate flesh on the rations we were receiving. i say it in all soberness that i do not believe that a healthy hen could have grown fat upon them. i am sure that any good-sized "shanghai" eats more every day than the meager half loaf that we had to maintain life upon. scanty as this was, and hungry as all were, very many could not eat it. their stomachs revolted against the trash; it became so nauseous to them that they could not force it down, even when famishing, and they died of starvation with the chunks of the so-called bread under their head. i found myself rapidly approaching this condition. i had been blessed with a good digestion and a talent for sleeping under the most discouraging circumstances. these, i have no doubt, were of the greatest assistance to me in my struggle for existence. but now the rations became fearfully obnoxious to me, and it was only with the greatest effort--pulling the bread into little pieces and swallowing each, of these as one would a pill--that i succeeded in worrying the stuff down. i had not as yet fallen away very much, but as i had never, up, to that time, weighed so much as one hundred and twenty-five pounds, there was no great amount of adipose to lose. it was evident that unless some change occurred my time was near at hand. there was not only hunger for more food, but longing with an intensity beyond expression for alteration of some kind in the rations. the changeless monotony of the miserable saltless bread, or worse mush, for days, weeks and months, became unbearable. if those wretched mule teams had only once a month hauled in something different--if they had come in loaded with sweet potatos, green corn or wheat flour, there would be thousands of men still living who now slumber beneath those melancholy pines. it would have given something to look forward to, and remember when past. but to know each day that the gates would open to admit the same distasteful apologies for food took away the appetite and raised one's gorge, even while famishing for something to eat. we could for a while forget the stench, the lice, the heat, the maggots, the dead and dying around us, the insulting malignance of our jailors; but it was, very hard work to banish thoughts and longings for food from our minds. hundreds became actually insane from brooding over it. crazy men could be found in all parts of the camp. numbers of them wandered around entirely naked. their babblings and maunderings about something to eat were painful to hear. i have before mentioned the case of the plymouth pilgrim near me, whose insanity took the form of imagining that he was sitting at the table with his family, and who would go through the show of helping them to imaginary viands and delicacies. the cravings for green food of those afflicted with the scurvy were, agonizing. large numbers of watermelons were brought to the prison, and sold to those who had the money to pay for them at from one to five dollars, greenbacks, apiece. a boy who had means to buy a piece of these would be followed about while eating it by a crowd of perhaps twenty-five or thirty livid-gummed scorbutics, each imploring him for the rind when he was through with it. we thought of food all day, and were visited with torturing dreams of it at night. one of the pleasant recollections of my pre-military life was a banquet at the "planter's house," st. louis, at which i was a boyish guest. it was, doubtless, an ordinary affair, as banquets go, but to me then, with all the keen appreciation of youth and first experience, it was a feast worthy of lucullus. but now this delightful reminiscence became a torment. hundreds of times i dreamed i was again at the "planter's." i saw the wide corridors, with their mosaic pavement; i entered the grand dining-room, keeping timidly near the friend to whose kindness i owed this wonderful favor; i saw again the mirror-lined walls, the evergreen decked ceilings, the festoons and mottos, the tables gleaming with cutglass and silver, the buffets with wines and fruits, the brigade of sleek, black, white-aproned waiters, headed by one who had presence enough for a major general. again i reveled in all the dainties and dishes on the bill-of-fare; calling for everything that i dared to, just to see what each was like, and to be able to say afterwards that i had partaken of it; all these bewildering delights of the first realization of what a boy has read and wondered much over, and longed for, would dance their rout and reel through my somnolent brain. then i would awake to find myself a half-naked, half-starved, vermin-eaten wretch, crouching in a hole in the ground, waiting for my keepers to fling me a chunk of corn bread. naturally the boys--and especially the country boys and new prisoners --talked much of victuals--what they had had, and what they would have again, when they got out. take this as a sample of the conversation which might be heard in any group of boys, sitting together on the sand, killin lice and talking of exchange: tom--"well, bill, when we get back to god's country, you and jim and john must all come to my house and take dinner with me. i want to give you a square meal. i want to show you just what good livin' is. you know my mother is just the best cook in all that section. when she lays herself out to get up a meal all the other women in the neighborhood just stand back and admire!" bill--"o, that's all right; but i'll bet she can't hold a candle to my mother, when it comes to good cooking." jim--"no, nor to mine." john--(with patronizing contempt.) "o, shucks! none of you fellers were ever at our house, even when we had one of our common weekday dinners." tom--(unheedful of the counter claims.) i hev teen studyin' up the dinner i'd like, and the bill-of-fare i'd set out for you fellers when you come over to see me. first, of course, we'll lay the foundation like with a nice, juicy loin roast, and some mashed potatos. bill--(interrupting.) "now, do you like mashed potatos with beef? the way may mother does is to pare the potatos, and lay them in the pan along with the beef. then, you know, they come out just as nice and crisp, and brown; they have soaked up all the beef gravy, and they crinkle between your teeth--" jim--"now, i tell you, mashed neshannocks with butter on 'em is plenty good enough for me." john--"if you'd et some of the new kind of peachblows that we raised in the old pasture lot the year before i enlisted, you'd never say another word about your neshannocks." tom--(taking breath and starting in fresh.) "then we'll hev some fried spring chickens, of our dominick breed. them dominicks of ours have the nicest, tenderest meat, better'n quail, a darned sight, and the way my mother can fry spring chickens----" bill--(aside to jim.) "every durned woman in the country thinks she can 'spry ching frickens;' but my mother---" john--"you fellers all know that there's nobody knows half as much about chicken doin's as these 'tinerant methodis' preachers. they give 'em chicken wherever they go, and folks do say that out in the new settlements they can't get no preachin', no gospel, nor nothin', until the chickens become so plenty that a preacher is reasonably sure of havin' one for his dinner wherever he may go. now, there's old peter cartwright, who has traveled over illinoy and indianny since the year one, and preached more good sermons than any other man who ever set on saddle-bags, and has et more chickens than there are birds in a big pigeon roost. well, he took dinner at our house when he came up to dedicate the big, white church at simpkin's corners, and when he passed up his plate the third time for more chicken, he sez, sez he:--i've et at a great many hundred tables in the fifty years i have labored in the vineyard of the redeemer, but i must say, mrs. kiggins, that your way of frying chickens is a leetle the nicest that i ever knew. i only wish that the sisters generally would get your reseet.' yes, that's what he said,--'a leetle the nicest.'" tom--"an' then, we'll hev biscuits an' butter. i'll just bet five hundred dollars to a cent, and give back the cent if i win, that we have the best butter at our house that there is in central illinoy. you can't never hev good butter onless you have a spring house; there's no use of talkin'--all the patent churns that lazy men ever invented--all the fancy milk pans an' coolers, can't make up for a spring house. locations for a spring house are scarcer than hen's teeth in illinoy, but we hev one, and there ain't a better one in orange county, new york. then you'll see dome of the biscuits my mother makes." bill--"well, now, my mother's a boss biscuit-maker, too." jim--"you kin just gamble that mine is." john--"o, that's the way you fellers ought to think an' talk, but my mother----" tom--(coming in again with fresh vigor) "they're jest as light an' fluffy as a dandelion puff, and they melt in your month like a ripe bartlett pear. you just pull 'em open--now you know that i think there's nothin' that shows a person's raisin' so well as to see him eat biscuits an' butter. if he's been raised mostly on corn bread, an' common doins,' an' don't know much about good things to eat, he'll most likely cut his biscuit open with a case knife, an' make it fall as flat as one o' yesterday's pancakes. but if he is used to biscuits, has had 'em often at his house, he'll--just pull 'em open, slow an' easy like, then he'll lay a little slice of butter inside, and drop a few drops of clear honey on this, an' stick the two halves back, together again, an--" "oh, for god almighty's sake, stop talking that infernal nonsense," roar out a half dozen of the surrounding crowd, whose mouths have been watering over this unctuous recital of the good things of the table. "you blamed fools, do you want to drive yourselves and everybody else crazy with such stuff as that. dry up and try to think of something else." chapter xlvi. surly briton--the stolid courage that makes the english flag a banner of triumph--our company bugler, his characteristics and his death--urgent demand for mechanics--none want to go--treatment of a rebel shoemaker --enlargement of the stockade--it is broken by a storm --the wonderful spring. early in august, f. marriott, our company bugler, died. previous to coming to america he had been for many years an english soldier, and i accepted him as a type of that stolid, doggedly brave class, which forms the bulk of the english armies, and has for centuries carried the british flag with dauntless courage into every land under the sun. rough, surly and unsocial, he did his duty with the unemotional steadiness of a machine. he knew nothing but to obey orders, and obeyed them under all circumstances promptly, but with stony impassiveness. with the command to move forward into action, he moved forward without a word, and with face as blank as a side of sole leather. he went as far as ordered, halted at the word, and retired at command as phlegmatically as he advanced. if he cared a straw whether he advanced or retreated, if it mattered to the extent of a pinch of salt whether we whipped the rebels or they defeated us, he kept that feeling so deeply hidden in the recesses of his sturdy bosom that no one ever suspected it. in the excitement of action the rest of the boys shouted, and swore, and expressed their tense feelings in various ways, but marriott might as well have been a graven image, for all the expression that he suffered to escape. doubtless, if the captain had ordered him to shoot one of the company through the heart, he would have executed the command according to the manual of arms, brought his carbine to a "recover," and at the word marched back to his quarters without an inquiry as to the cause of the proceedings. he made no friends, and though his surliness repelled us, he made few enemies. indeed, he was rather a favorite, since he was a genuine character; his gruffness had no taint of selfish greed in it; he minded his own business strictly, and wanted others to do the same. when he first came into the company, it is true, he gained the enmity of nearly everybody in it, but an incident occurred which turned the tide in his favor. some annoying little depredations had been practiced on the boys, and it needed but a word of suspicion to inflame all their minds against the surly englishman as the unknown perpetrator. the feeling intensified, until about half of the company were in a mood to kill the bugler outright. as we were returning from stable duty one evening, some little occurrence fanned the smoldering anger into a fierce blaze; a couple of the smaller boys began an attack upon him; others hastened to their assistance, and soon half the company were engaged in the assault. he succeeded in disengaging himself from his assailants, and, squaring himself off, said, defiantly: "dom yer cowardly heyes; jest come hat me one hat a time, hand hi'll wollop the 'ole gang uv ye's." one of our sergeants styled himself proudly "a chicago rough," and was as vain of his pugilistic abilities as a small boy is of a father who plays in the band. we all hated him cordially--even more than we did marriott. he thought this was a good time to show off, and forcing his way through the crowd, he said, vauntingly: "just fall back and form a ring, boys, and see me polish off the---fool." the ring was formed, with the bugler and the sergeant in the center. though the latter was the younger and stronger the first round showed him that it would have profited him much more to have let marriott's challenge pass unheeded. as a rule, it is as well to ignore all invitations of this kind from englishmen, and especially from those who, like marriott, have served a term in the army, for they are likely to be so handy with their fists as to make the consequences of an acceptance more lively than desirable. so the sergeant found. "marriott," as one of the spectators expressed it, "went around him like a cooper around a barrel." he planted his blows just where he wished, to the intense delight of the boys, who yelled enthusiastically whenever he got in "a hot one," and their delight at seeing the sergeant drubbed so thoroughly and artistically, worked an entire revolution in his favor. thenceforward we viewed his eccentricities with lenient eyes, and became rather proud of his bull-dog stolidity and surliness. the whole battalion soon came to share this feeling, and everybody enjoyed hearing his deep-toned growl, which mischievous boys would incite by some petty annoyances deliberately designed for that purpose. i will mention incidentally, that after his encounter with the sergeant no one ever again volunteered to "polish" him off. andersonville did not improve either his temper or his communicativeness. he seemed to want to get as far away from the rest of us as possible, and took up his quarters in a remote corner of the stockade, among utter strangers. those of us who wandered up in his neighborhood occasionally, to see how he was getting along, were received with such scant courtesy, that we did not hasten to repeat the visit. at length, after none of us had seen him for weeks, we thought that comradeship demanded another visit. we found him in the last stages of scurvy and diarrhea. chunks of uneaten corn bread lay by his head. they were at least a week old. the rations since then had evidently been stolen from the helpless man by those around him. the place where he lay was indescribably filthy, and his body was swarming with vermin. some good samaritan had filled his little black oyster can with water, and placed it within his reach. for a week, at least, he had not been able to rise from the ground; he could barely reach for the water near him. he gave us such a glare of recognition as i remembered to have seen light up the fast-darkening eyes of a savage old mastiff, that i and my boyish companions once found dying in the woods of disease and hurts. had he been able he would have driven us away, or at least assailed us with biting english epithets. thus he had doubtless driven away all those who had attempted to help him. we did what little we could, and staid with him until the next afternoon, when he died. we prepared his body, in the customary way: folded the hands across his breast, tied the toes together, and carried it outside, not forgetting each of us, to bring back a load of wood. the scarcity of mechanics of all kinds in the confederacy, and the urgent needs of the people for many things which the war and the blockade prevented their obtaining, led to continual inducements being offered to the artizans among us to go outside and work at their trade. shoemakers seemed most in demand; next to these blacksmiths, machinists, molders and metal workers generally. not a week passed during my imprisonment that i did not see a rebel emissary of some kind about the prison seeking to engage skilled workmen for some purpose or another. while in richmond the managers of the tredegar iron works were brazen and persistent in their efforts to seduce what are termed "malleable iron workers," to enter their employ. a boy who was master of any one of the commoner trades had but to make his wishes known, and he would be allowed to go out on parole to work. i was a printer, and i think that at least a dozen times i was approached by rebel publishers with offers of a parole, and work at good prices. one from columbia, s. c., offered me two dollars and a half a "thousand" for composition. as the highest price for such work that i had received before enlisting was thirty cents a thousand, this seemed a chance to accumulate untold wealth. since a man working in day time can set from thirty-five to fifty "thousand" a week, this would make weekly wages run from eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents to one hundred and twenty-five dollars--but it was in confederate money, then worth from ten to twenty cents on the dollar. still better offers were made to iron workers of all kinds, to shoemakers, tanners, weavers, tailors, hatters, engineers, machinists, millers, railroad men, and similar tradesmen. any of these could have made a handsome thing by accepting the offers made them almost weekly. as nearly all in the prison had useful trades, it would have been of immense benefit to the confederacy if they could have been induced to work at them. there is no measuring the benefit it would have been to the southern cause if all the hundreds of tanners and shoemakers in the stockade could have, been persuaded to go outside and labor in providing leather and shoes for the almost shoeless people and soldiery. the machinists alone could have done more good to the southern confederacy than one of our brigades was doing harm, by consenting to go to the railroad shops at griswoldville and ply their handicraft. the lack of material resources in the south was one of the strongest allies our arms had. this lack of resources was primarily caused by a lack of skilled labor to develop those resources, and nowhere could there be found a finer collection of skilled laborers than in the thirty-three thousand prisoners incarcerated in andersonville. all solicitations to accept a parole and go outside to work at one's trade were treated with the scorn they deserved. if any mechanic yielded to them, the fact did not come under my notice. the usual reply to invitations of this kind was: "no, sir! by god, i'll stay in here till i rot, and the maggots carry me out through the cracks in the stockade, before i'll so much as raise my little finger to help the infernal confederacy, or rebels, in any shape or form." in august a macon shoemaker came in to get some of his trade to go back with him to work in the confederate shoe factory. he prosecuted his search for these until he reached the center of the camp on the north side, when some of the shoemakers who had gathered around him, apparently considering his propositions, seized him and threw him into a well. he was kept there a whole day, and only released when wirz cut off the rations of the prison for that day, and announced that no more would be issued until the man was returned safe and sound to the gate. the terrible crowding was somewhat ameliorated by the opening in july of an addition--six hundred feet long--to the north side of the stockade. this increased the room inside to twenty acres, giving about an acre to every one thousand seven hundred men,--a preposterously contracted area still. the new ground was not a hotbed of virulent poison like the olds however, and those who moved on to it had that much in their favor. the palisades between the new and the old portions of the pen were left standing when the new portion was opened. we were still suffering a great deal of inconvenience from lack of wood. that night the standing timbers were attacked by thousands of prisoners armed with every species of a tool to cut wood, from a case-knife to an ax. they worked the live-long night with such energy that by morning not only every inch of the logs above ground had disappeared, but that below had been dug up, and there was not enough left of the eight hundred foot wall of twenty-five-foot logs to make a box of matches. one afternoon--early in august--one of the violent rain storms common to that section sprung up, and in a little while the water was falling in torrents. the little creek running through the camp swelled up immensely, and swept out large gaps in the stockade, both in the west and east sides. the rebels noticed the breaches as soon as the prisoners. two guns were fired from the star tort, and all the guards rushed out, and formed so as to prevent any egress, if one was attempted. taken by surprise, we were not in a condition to profit by the opportunity until it was too late. the storm did one good thing: it swept away a great deal of filth, and left the camp much more wholesome. the foul stench rising from the camp made an excellent electrical conductor, and the lightning struck several times within one hundred feet of the prison. toward the end of august there happened what the religously inclined termed a providential dispensation. the water in the creek was indescribably bad. no amount of familiarity with it, no increase of intimacy with our offensive surroundings, could lessen the disgust at the polluted water. as i have said previously, before the stream entered the stockade, it was rendered too filthy for any use by the contaminations from the camps of the guards, situated about a half-mile above. immediately on entering the stockade the contamination became terrible. the oozy seep at the bottom of the hillsides drained directly into it all the mass of filth from a population of thirty-three thousand. imagine the condition of an open sewer, passing through the heart of a city of that many people, and receiving all the offensive product of so dense a gathering into a shallow, sluggish stream, a yard wide and five inches deep, and heated by the burning rays of the sun in the thirty-second degree of latitude. imagine, if one can, without becoming sick at the stomach, all of these people having to wash in and drink of this foul flow. there is not a scintilla of exaggeration in this statement. that it is within the exact truth is demonstrable by the testimony of any man--rebel or union--who ever saw the inside of the stockade at andersonville. i am quite content to have its truth--as well as that of any other statement made in this book--be determined by the evidence of any one, no matter how bitter his hatred of the union, who had any personal knowledge of the condition of affairs at andersonville. no one can successfully deny that there were at least thirty-three thousand prisoners in the stockade, and that the one shallow, narrow creek, which passed through the prison, was at once their main sewer and their source of supply of water for bathing, drinking and washing. with these main facts admitted, the reader's common sense of natural consequences will furnish the rest of the details. it is true that some of the more fortunate of us had wells; thanks to our own energy in overcoming extraordinary obstacles; no thanks to our gaolers for making the slightest effort to provide these necessities of life. we dug the wells with case and pocket knives, and half canteens to a depth of from twenty to thirty feet, pulling up the dirt in pantaloons legs, and running continual risk of being smothered to death by the caving in of the unwalled sides. not only did the rebels refuse to give us boards with which to wall the wells, and buckets for drawing the water, but they did all in their power to prevent us from digging the wells, and made continual forays to capture the digging tools, because the wells were frequently used as the starting places for tunnels. professor jones lays special stress on this tunnel feature in his testimony, which i have introduced in a previous chapter. the great majority of the prisoners who went to the creek for water, went as near as possible to the dead line on the west side, where the creek entered the stockade, that they might get water with as little filth in it as possible. in the crowds struggling there for their turn to take a dip, some one nearly every day got so close to the dead line as to arouse a suspicion in the guard's mind that he was touching it. the suspicion was the unfortunate one's death warrant, and also its execution. as the sluggish brain of the guard conceived it he leveled his gun; the distance to his victim was not over one hundred feet; he never failed his aim; the first warning the wretched prisoner got that he was suspected of transgressing a prison-rule was the charge of "ball-and-buck" that tore through his body. it was lucky if he was, the only one of the group killed. more wicked and unjustifiable murders never were committed than these almost daily assassinations at the creek. one morning the camp was astonished beyond measure to discover that during the night a large, bold spring had burst out on the north side, about midway between the swamp and the summit of the hill. it poured out its grateful flood of pure, sweet water in an apparently exhaustless quantity. to the many who looked in wonder upon it, it seemed as truly a heaven-wrought miracle as when moses's enchanted rod smote the parched rock in sinai's desert waste, and the living waters gushed forth. the police took charge of the spring, and every one was compelled to take his regular turn in filling his vessel. this was kept up during our whole stay in andersonville, and every morning, shortly after daybreak, a thousand men could be seen standing in line, waiting their turns to fill their cans and cups with the precious liquid. i am told by comrades who have revisited the stockade of recent years, that the spring is yet running as when we left, and is held in most pious veneration by the negros of that vicinity, who still preserve the tradition of its miraculous origin, and ascribe to its water wonderful grace giving and healing properties, similar to those which pious catholics believe exist in the holy water of the fountain at lourdes. i must confess that i do not think they are so very far from right. if i could believe that any water was sacred and thaumaturgic, it would be of that fountain which appeared so opportunely for the benefit of the perishing thousands of andersonville. and when i hear of people bringing water for baptismal purposes from the jordan, i say in my heart, "how much more would i value for myself and friends the administration of the chrismal sacrament with the diviner flow from that low sand-hill in western georgia." chapter xlvii. "sick call," and the scenes that accompanied it--mustering the lame, halt and diseased at the south gate--an unusually bad case--going out to the hospital--accommodation and treatment of the patients there--the horrible suffering in the gangrene ward--bungling amputations by blundering practitioners--affection between a sailor and his ward --death of my comrade. every morning after roll-call, thousands of sick gathered at the south gate, where the doctors made some pretense of affording medical relief. the scene there reminded me of the illustrations in my sunday-school lessons of that time when "great multitudes came unto him," by the shores of the sea of galilee, "having with them those that were lame, blind, dumb, maimed, and many others." had the crowds worn the flouting robes of the east, the picture would have lacked nothing but the presence of the son of man to make it complete. here were the burning sands and parching sun; hither came scores of groups of three or four comrades, laboriously staggering under the weight of a blanket in which they had carried a disabled and dying friend from some distant part of the stockade. beside them hobbled the scorbutics with swollen and distorted limbs, each more loathsome and nearer death than the lepers whom christ's divine touch made whole. dozens, unable to walk, and having no comrades to carry them, crawled painfully along, with frequent stops, on their hands and knees. every form of intense physical suffering that it is possible for disease to induce in the human frame was visible at these daily parades of the sick of the prison. as over three thousand (three thousand and seventy-six) died in august, there were probably twelve thousand dangerously sick at any given time daring the month; and a large part of these collected at the south gate every morning. measurably-calloused as we had become by the daily sights of horror around us, we encountered spectacles in these gatherings which no amount of visible misery could accustom us to. i remember one especially that burned itself deeply into my memory. it was of a young man not over twenty-five, who a few weeks ago--his clothes looked comparatively new --had evidently been the picture of manly beauty and youthful vigor. he had had a well-knit, lithe form; dark curling hair fell over a forehead which had once been fair, and his eyes still showed that they had gleamed with a bold, adventurous spirit. the red clover leaf on his cap showed that he belonged to the first division of the second corps, the three chevrons on his arm that he was a sergeant, and the stripe at his cuff that he was a veteran. some kind-hearted boys had found him in a miserable condition on the north side, and carried him over in a blanket to where the doctors could see him. he had but little clothing on, save his blouse and cap. ulcers of some kind had formed in his abdomen, and these were now masses of squirming worms. it was so much worse than the usual forms of suffering, that quite a little crowd of compassionate spectators gathered around and expressed their pity. the sufferer turned to one who lay beside him with: "comrade: if we were only under the old stars and stripes, we wouldn't care a g-d d--n for a few worms, would we?" this was not profane. it was an utterance from the depths of a brave man's heart, couched in the strongest language at his command. it seemed terrible that so gallant a soul should depart from earth in this miserable fashion. some of us, much moved by the sight, went to the doctors and put the case as strongly as possible, begging them to do something to alleviate his suffering. they declined to see the case, but got rid of us by giving us a bottle of turpentine, with directions to pour it upon the ulcers to kill the maggots. we did so. it must have been cruel torture, and as absurd remedially as cruel, but our hero set his teeth and endured, without a groan. he was then carried out to the hospital to die. i said the doctors made a pretense of affording medical relief. it was hardly that, since about all the prescription for those inside the stockade consisted in giving a handful of sumach berries to each of those complaining of scurvy. the berries might have done some good, had there been enough of them, and had their action been assisted by proper food. as it was, they were probably nearly, if not wholly, useless. nothing was given to arrest the ravages of dysentery. a limited number of the worst cases were admitted to the hospital each day. as this only had capacity for about one-quarter of the sick in the stockade, new patients could only be admitted as others died. it seemed, anyway, like signing a man's death warrant to send him to the hospital, as three out of every four who went out there died. the following from the official report of the hospital shows this: total number admitted .........................................12,900 died ................................................. 8,663 exchanged ............................................ 828 took the oath of allegiance .......................... 25 sent elsewhere ....................................... 2,889 total ................................................12,400 average deaths, 76 per cent. early in august i made a successful effort to get out to the hospital. i had several reasons for this: first, one of my chums, w. w. watts, of my own company, had been sent out a little whale before very sick with scurvy and pneumonia, and i wanted to see if i could do anything for him, if he still lived: i have mentioned before that for awhile after our entrance into andersonville five of us slept on one overcoat and covered ourselves with one blanket. two of these had already died, leaving as possessors of-the blanket and overcoat, w. w. watts, b. b. andrews, and myself. next, i wanted to go out to see if there was any prospect of escape. i had long since given up hopes of escaping from the stockade. all our attempts at tunneling had resulted in dead failures, and now, to make us wholly despair of success in that direction, another stockade was built clear around the prison, at a distance of one hundred and twenty feet from the first palisades. it was manifest that though we might succeed in tunneling past one stockade, we could not go beyond the second one. i had the scurvy rather badly, and being naturally slight in frame, i presented a very sick appearance to the physicians, and was passed out to the hospital. while this was a wretched affair, it was still a vast improvement on the stockade. about five acres of ground, a little southeast of the stockade, and bordering on a creek, were enclosed by a board fence, around which the guard walked, trees shaded the ground tolerably well. there were tents and flies to shelter part of the sick, and in these were beds made of pine leaves. there were regular streets and alleys running through the grounds, and as the management was in the hands of our own men, the place was kept reasonably clean and orderly for andersonville. there was also some improvement in the food. rice in some degree replaced the nauseous and innutritious corn bread, and if served in sufficient quantities, would doubtless have promoted the recovery of many men dying from dysenteric diseases. we also received small quantities of "okra," a plant peculiar to the south, whose pods contained a mucilaginous matter that made a soup very grateful to those suffering from scurvy. but all these ameliorations of condition were too slight to even arrest the progress of the disease of the thousands of dying men brought out from the stockade. these still wore the same lice-infested garments as in prison; no baths or even ordinary applications of soap and water cleaned their dirt-grimed skins, to give their pores an opportunity to assist in restoring them to health; even their long, lank and matted hair, swarming with vermin, was not trimmed. the most ordinary and obvious measures for their comfort and care were neglected. if a man recovered he did it almost in spite of fate. the medicines given were scanty and crude. the principal remedial agent--as far as my observation extended--was a rank, fetid species of unrectified spirits, which, i was told, was made from sorgum seed. it had a light-green tinge, and was about as inviting to the taste as spirits of turpentine. it was given to the sick in small quantities mixed with water. i had had some experience with kentucky "apple-jack," which, it was popularly believed among the boys, would dissolve a piece of the fattest pork thrown into it, but that seemed balmy and oily alongside of this. after tasting some, i ceased to wonder at the atrocities of wirz and his associates. nothing would seem too bad to a man who made that his habitual tipple. [for a more particular description of the hospital i must refer my reader to the testimony of professor jones, in a previous chapter.] certainly this continent has never seen--and i fervently trust it will never again see--such a gigantic concentration of misery as that hospital displayed daily. the official statistics tell the story of this with terrible brevity: there were three thousand seven hundred and nine in the hospital in august; one thousand four hundred and eighty-nine--nearly every other man died. the rate afterwards became much higher than this. the most conspicuous suffering was in the gangrene wards. horrible sores spreading almost visibly from hour to hour, devoured men's limbs and bodies. i remember one ward in which the alterations appeared to be altogether in the back, where they ate out the tissue between the skin and the ribs. the attendants seemed trying to arrest the progress of the sloughing by drenching the sores with a solution of blue vitriol. this was exquisitely painful, and in the morning, when the drenching was going on, the whole hospital rang with the most agonizing screams. but the gangrene mostly attacked the legs and arms, and the led more than the arms. sometimes it killed men inside of a week; sometimes they lingered on indefinitely. i remember one man in the stockade who cut his hand with the sharp corner of a card of corn bread he was lifting from the ration wagon; gangrene set in immediately, and he died four days after. one form that was quit prevalent was a cancer of the lower one corner of the mouth, and it finally ate the whole side of the face out. of course the sufferer had the greatest trouble in eating and drinking. for the latter it was customary to whittle out a little wooden tube, and fasten it in a tin cup, through which he could suck up the water. as this mouth cancer seemed contagious, none of us would allow any one afflicted with it to use any of our cooking utensils. the rebel doctors at the hospital resorted to wholesale amputations to check the progress of the gangrene. they had a two hours session of limb-lopping every morning, each of which resulted in quite a pile of severed members. i presume more bungling operations are rarely seen outside of russian or turkish hospitals. their unskilfulness was apparent even to non-scientific observers like myself. the standard of medical education in the south--as indeed of every other form of education--was quite low. the chief surgeon of the prison, dr. isaiah white, and perhaps two or three others, seemed to be gentlemen of fair abilities and attainments. the remainder were of that class of illiterate and unlearning quacks who physic and blister the poor whites and negros in the country districts of the south; who believe they can stop bleeding of the nose by repeating a verse from the bible; who think that if in gathering their favorite remedy of boneset they cut the stem upwards it will purge their patients, and if downward it will vomit them, and who hold that there is nothing so good for "fits" as a black cat, killed in the dark of the moon, cut open, and bound while yet warm, upon the naked chest of the victim of the convulsions. they had a case of instruments captured from some of our field hospitals, which were dull and fearfully out of order. with poor instruments and unskilled hands the operations became mangling. in the hospital i saw an admirable illustration of the affection which a sailor will lavish on a ship's boy, whom he takes a fancy to, and makes his "chicken," as the phrase is. the united states sloop "water witch" had recently been captured in ossabaw sound, and her crew brought into prison. one of her boys--a bright, handsome little fellow of about fifteen--had lost one of his arms in the fight. he was brought into the hospital, and the old fellow whose "chicken" he was, was allowed to accompany and nurse him. this "old barnacle-back" was as surly a growler as ever went aloft, but to his "chicken" he was as tender and thoughtful as a woman. they found a shady nook in one corner, and any moment one looked in that direction he could see the old tar hard at work at something for the comfort and pleasure of his pet. now he was dressing the wound as deftly and gently as a mother caring for a new-born babe; now he was trying to concoct some relish out of the slender materials he could beg or steal from the quartermaster; now trying to arrange the shade of the bed of pine leaves in a more comfortable manner; now repairing or washing his clothes, and so on. all the sailors were particularly favored by being allowed to bring their bags in untouched by the guards. this "chicken" had a wonderful supply of clothes, the handiwork of his protector who, like most good sailors, was very skillful with the needle. he had suits of fine white duck, embroidered with blue in a way that would ravish the heart of a fine lady, and blue suits similarly embroidered with white. no belle ever kept her clothes in better order than these were. when the duck came up from the old sailor's patient washing it was as spotless as new-fallen snow. i found my chum in a very bad condition. his appetite was entirely gone, but he had an inordinate craving for tobacco--for strong, black plug --which he smoked in a pipe. he had already traded off all his brass buttons to the guards for this. i had accumulated a few buttons to bribe the guard to take me out for wood, and i gave these also for tobacco for him. when i awoke one morning the man who laid next to me on the right was dead, having died sometime during the night. i searched his pockets and took what was in them. these were a silk pocket handkerchief, a gutta percha finger-ring, a comb, a pencil, and a leather pocket-book, making in all quite a nice little "find." i hied over to the guard, and succeeded in trading the personal estate which i had inherited from the intestate deceased, for a handful of peaches, a handful of hardly ripe figs, and a long plug of tobacco. i hastened back to watts, expecting that the figs and peaches would do him a world of good. at first i did not show him the tobacco, as i was strongly opposed to his using it, thinking that it was making him much worse. but he looked at the tempting peaches and figs with lack-luster eyes; he was too far gone to care for them. he pushed them back to me, saying faintly: "no, you take 'em, mc; i don't want 'em; i can't eat 'em!" i then produced the tobacco, and his face lighted up. concluding that this was all the comfort that he could have, and that i might as well gratify him, i cut up some of the weed, filled his pipe and lighted it. he smoked calmly and almost happily all the afternoon, hardly speaking a word to me. as it grew dark he asked me to bring him a drink. i did so, and as i raised him up he said: "mc, this thing's ended. tell my father that i stood it as long as i could, and----" the death rattle sounded in his throat, and when i laid him back it was all over. straightening out his limbs, folding his hands across his breast, and composing his features as best i could, i lay, down beside the body and slept till morning, when i did what little else i could toward preparing for the grave all that was left of my long-suffering little friend. chapter xlviii. determination to escape--different plans and their merits--i prefer the appalachicola route--preparations for departure--a hot day--the fence passed successfully pursued by the hounds--caught --returned to the stockade. after watt's death, i set earnestly about seeing what could be done in the way of escape. frank harvey, of the first west virginia cavalry, a boy of about my own age and disposition, joined with me in the scheme. i was still possessed with my original plan of making my way down the creeks to the flint river, down the flint river to where it emptied into the appalachicola river, and down that stream to its debauchure into the bay that connected with the gulf of mexico. i was sure of finding my way by this route, because, if nothing else offered, i could get astride of a log and float down the current. the way to sherman, in the other direction, was long, torturous and difficult, with a fearful gauntlet of blood-hounds, patrols and the scouts of hood's army to be run. i had but little difficulty in persuading harvey into an acceptance of my views, and we began arranging for a solution of the first great problem--how to get outside of the hospital guards. as i have explained before, the hospital was surrounded by a board fence, with guards walking their beats on the ground outside. a small creek flowed through the southern end of the grounds, and at its lower end was used as a sink. the boards of the fence came down to the surface of the water, where the creek passed out, but we found, by careful prodding with a stick, that the hole between the boards and the bottom of the creek was sufficiently large to allow the passage of our bodies, and there had been no stakes driven or other precautions used to prevent egress by this channel. a guard was posted there, and probably ordered to stand at the edge of the stream, but it smelled so vilely in those scorching days that he had consulted his feelings and probably his health, by retiring to the top of the bank, a rod or more distant. we watched night after night, and at last were gratified to find that none went nearer the creak than the top of this bank. then we waited for the moon to come right, so that the first part of the night should be dark. this took several days, but at last we knew that the next night she would not rise until between 9 and 10 o'clock, which would give us nearly two hours of the dense darkness of a moonless summer night in the south. we had first thought of saving up some rations for the trip, but then reflected that these would be ruined by the filthy water into which we must sink to go under the fence. it was not difficult to abandon the food idea, since it was very hard to force ourselves to lay by even the smallest portion of our scanty rations. as the next day wore on, our minds were wrought up into exalted tension by the rapid approach of the supreme moment, with all its chances and consequences. the experience of the past few months was not such as to mentally fit us for such a hazard. it prepared us for sullen, uncomplaining endurance, for calmly contemplating the worst that could come; but it did not strengthen that fiber of mind that leads to venturesome activity and daring exploits. doubtless the weakness of our bodies reacted upon our spirits. we contemplated all the perils that confronted us; perils that, now looming up with impending nearness, took a clearer and more threatening shape than they had ever done before. we considered the desperate chances of passing the guard unseen; or, if noticed, of escaping his fire without death or severe wounds. but supposing him fortunately evaded, then came the gauntlet of the hounds and the patrols hunting deserters. after this, a long, weary journey, with bare feet and almost naked bodies, through an unknown country abounding with enemies; the dangers of assassination by the embittered populace; the risks of dying with hunger and fatigue in the gloomy depths of a swamp; the scanty hopes that, if we reached the seashore, we could get to our vessels. not one of all these contingencies failed to expand itself to all its alarming proportions, and unite with its fellows to form a dreadful vista, like the valleys filled with demons and genii, dragons and malign enchantments, which confront the heros of the "arabian nights," when they set out to perform their exploits. but behind us lay more miseries and horrors than a riotous imagination could conceive; before us could certainly be nothing worse. we would put life and freedom to the hazard of a touch, and win or lose it all. the day had been intolerably hot. the sun's rays seemed to sear the earth, like heated irons, and the air that lay on the burning sand was broken by wavy lines, such as one sees indicate the radiation from a hot stove. except the wretched chain-gang plodding torturously back and forward on the hillside, not a soul nor an animal could be seen in motion outside the stockade. the hounds were panting in their kennel; the rebel officers, half or wholly drunken with villainous sorgum whisky, were stretched at full length in the shade at headquarters; the half-caked gunners crouched under the shadow of the embankments of the forts, the guards hung limply over the stockade in front of their little perches; the thirty thousand boys inside the stockade, prone or supine upon the glowing sand, gasped for breath--for one draft of sweet, cool, wholesome air that did not bear on its wings the subtle seeds of rank corruption and death. everywhere was the prostration of discomfort--the inertia of sluggishness. only the sick moved; only the pain-racked cried out; only the dying struggled; only the agonies of dissolution could make life assert itself against the exhaustion of the heat. harvey and i, lying in the scanty shade of the trunk of a tall pine, and with hearts filled with solicitude as to the outcome of what the evening would bring us, looked out over the scene as we had done daily for long months, and remained silent for hours, until the sun, as if weary with torturing and slaying, began going down in the blazing west. the groans of the thousands of sick around us, the shrieks of the rotting ones in the gangrene wards rang incessantly in our ears. as the sun disappeared, and the heat abated, the suspended activity was restored. the master of the hounds came out with his yelping pack, and started on his rounds; the rebel officers aroused themselves from their siesta and went lazily about their duties; the fifer produced his cracked fife and piped forth his unvarying "bonnie blue flag," as a signal for dress parade, and drums beaten by unskilled hands in the camps of the different regiments, repeated the signal. in time stockade the mass of humanity became full of motion as an ant hill, and resembled it very much from our point of view, with the boys threading their way among the burrows, tents and holes. it was becoming dark quite rapidly. the moments seemed galloping onward toward the time when we must make the decisive step. we drew from the dirty rag in which it was wrapped the little piece of corn bread that we had saved for our supper, carefully divided it into two equal parts, and each took one and ate it in silence. this done, we held a final consultation as to our plans, and went over each detail carefully, that we might fully understand each other under all possible circumstances, and act in concert. one point we laboriously impressed upon each other, and that was; that under no circumstances were we to allow ourselves to be tempted to leave the creek until we reached its junction with the flint river. i then picked up two pine leaves, broke them off to unequal lengths, rolled them in my hands behind my back for a second, and presenting them to harney with their ends sticking out of my closed hand, said: "the one that gets the longest one goes first." harvey reached forth and drew the longer one. we made a tour of reconnaissance. everything seemed as usual, and wonderfully calm compared with the tumult in our minds. the hospital guards were pacing their beats lazily; those on the stockade were drawling listlessly the first "call around" of the evening: "post numbah foah! half-past seven o'clock! and a-l-l's we-l-ll!" inside the stockade was a babel of sounds, above all of which rose the melody of religious and patriotic songs, sung in various parts of the camp. from the headquarters came the shouts and laughter of the rebel officers having a little "frolic" in the cool of the evening. the groans of the sick around us were gradually hushing, as the abatement of the terrible heat let all but the worst cases sink into a brief slumber, from which they awoke before midnight to renew their outcries. but those in the gangrene wards seemed to be denied even this scanty blessing. apparently they never slept, for their shrieks never ceased. a multitude of whip-poor-wills in the woods around us began their usual dismal cry, which had never seemed so unearthly and full of dreadful presages as now. it was, now quite dark, and we stole noiselessly down to the creek and reconnoitered. we listened. the guard was not pacing his beat, as we could not hear his footsteps. a large, ill-shapen lump against the trunk of one of the trees on the bank showed that he was leaning there resting himself. we watched him for several minutes, but he did not move, and the thought shot into our minds that he might be asleep; but it seemed impossible: it was too early in the evening. now, if ever, was the opportunity. harney squeezed my hand, stepped noiselessly into the creek, laid himself gently down into the filthy water, and while my heart was beating so that i was certain it could be heard some distance from me, began making toward the fence. he passed under easily, and i raised my eyes toward the guard, while on my strained ear fell the soft plashing made by harvey as he pulled himself cautiously forward. it seemed as if the sentinel must hear this; he could not help it, and every second i expected to see the black lump address itself to motion, and the musket flash out fiendishly. but he did not; the lump remained motionless; the musket silent. when i thought that harvey had gained a sufficient distance i followed. it seemed as if the disgusting water would smother me as i laid myself down into it, and such was my agitation that it appeared almost impossible that i should escape making such a noise as would attract the guard's notice. catching hold of the roots and limbs at the side of the stream, i pulled myself slowly along, and as noiselessly as possible. i passed under the fence without difficulty, and was outside, and within fifteen feet of the guard. i had lain down into the creek upon my right side, that my face might be toward the guard, and i could watch him closely all the time. as i came under the fence he was still leaning motionless against the tree, but to my heated imagination he appeared to have turned and be watching me. i hardly breathed; the filthy water rippling past me seemed to roar to attract the guard's attention; i reached my hand out cautiously to grasp a root to pull myself along by, and caught instead a dry branch, which broke with a loud crack. my heart absolutely stood still. the guard evidently heard the noise. the black lump separated itself from the tree, and a straight line which i knew to be his musket separated itself from the lump. in a brief instant i lived a year of mortal apprehension. so certain was i that he had discovered me, and was leveling his piece to fire, that i could scarcely restrain myself from springing up and dashing away to avoid the shot. then i heard him take a step, and to my unutterable surprise and relief, he walked off farther from the creek, evidently to speak to the man whose beat joined his. i pulled away more swiftly, but still with the greatest caution, until after half-an-hour's painful effort i had gotten fully one hundred and fifty yards away from the hospital fence, and found harney crouched on a cypress knee, close to the water's edge, watching for me. we waited there a few minutes, until i could rest, and calm my perturbed nerves down to something nearer their normal equilibrium, and then started on. we hoped that if we were as lucky in our next step as in the first one we would reach the flint river by daylight, and have a good long start before the morning roll-call revealed our absence. we could hear the hounds still baying in the distance, but this sound was too customary to give us any uneasiness. but our progress was terribly slow. every step hurt fearfully. the creek bed was full of roots and snags, and briers, and vines trailed across it. these caught and tore our bare feet and legs, rendered abnormally tender by the scurvy. it seemed as if every step was marked with blood. the vines tripped us, and we frequently fell headlong. we struggled on determinedly for nearly an hour, and were perhaps a mile from the hospital. the moon came up, and its light showed that the creek continued its course through a dense jungle like that we had been traversing, while on the high ground to our left were the open pine woods i have previously described. we stopped and debated for a few minutes. we recalled our promise to keep in the creek, the experience of other boys who had tried to escape and been caught by the hounds. if we staid in the creek we were sure the hounds would not find our trail, but it was equally certain that at this rate we would be exhausted and starved before we got out of sight of the prison. it seemed that we had gone far enough to be out of reach of the packs patrolling immediately around the stockade, and there could be but little risk in trying a short walk on the dry ground. we concluded to take the chances, and, ascending the bank, we walked and ran as fast as we could for about two miles further. all at once it struck me that with all our progress the hounds sounded as near as when we started. i shivered at the thought, and though nearly ready to drop with fatigue, urged myself and harney on. an instant later their baying rang out on the still night air right behind us, and with fearful distinctness. there was no mistake now; they had found our trail, and were running us down. the change from fearful apprehension to the crushing reality stopped us stock-still in our tracks. at the next breath the hounds came bursting through the woods in plain sight, and in full cry. we obeyed our first impulse; rushed back into the swamp, forced our way for a few yards through the flesh-tearing impediments, until we gained a large cypress, upon whose great knees we climbed--thoroughly exhausted--just as the yelping pack reached the edge of the water, and stopped there and bayed at us. it was a physical impossibility for us to go another step. in a moment the low-browed villain who had charge of the hounds came galloping up on his mule, tooting signals to his dogs as he came, on the cow-horn slung from his shoulders. he immediately discovered us, covered us with his revolver, and yelled out: "come ashore, there, quick: you-------------s!" there was no help for it. we climbed down off the knees and started towards the land. as we neared it, the hounds became almost frantic, and it seemed as if we would be torn to pieces the moment they could reach us. but the master dismounted and drove them back. he was surly --even savage--to us, but seemed in too much hurry to get back to waste any time annoying us with the dogs. he ordered us to get around in front of the mule, and start back to camp. we moved as rapidly as our fatigue and our lacerated feet would allow us, and before midnight were again in the hospital, fatigued, filthy, torn, bruised and wretched beyond description or conception. the next morning we were turned back into the stockade as punishment. chapter xlix. august--good luck in not meeting captain wirz--that worthy's treatment of recaptured prisoners--secret societies in prison--singular meeting and its result--discovery and removal of the officers among the enlisted men. harney and i were specially fortunate in being turned back into the stockade without being brought before captain wirz. we subsequently learned that we owed this good luck to wirz's absence on sick leave--his place being supplied by lieutenant davis, a moderate brained baltimorean, and one of that horde of marylanders in the rebel army, whose principal service to the confederacy consisted in working themselves into "bomb-proof" places, and forcing those whom they displaced into the field. winder was the illustrious head of this crowd of bomb-proof rebels from "maryland, my maryland!" whose enthusiasm for the southern cause and consistency in serving it only in such places as were out of range of the yankee artillery, was the subject of many bitter jibes by the rebels--especially by those whose secure berths they possessed themselves of. lieutenant davis went into the war with great brashness. he was one of the mob which attacked the sixth massachusetts in its passage through baltimore, but, like all of that class of roughs, he got his stomach full of war as soon as the real business of fighting began, and he retired to where the chances of attaining a ripe old age were better than in front of the army of the potomac's muskets. we shall hear of davis again. encountering captain wirz was one of the terrors of an abortive attempt to escape. when recaptured prisoners were brought before him he would frequently give way to paroxysms of screaming rage, so violent as to closely verge on insanity. brandishing the fearful and wonderful revolver--of which i have spoken in such a manner as to threaten the luckless captives with instant death, he would shriek out imprecations, curses; and foul epithets in french, german and english, until he fairly frothed at the mouth. there were plenty of stories current in camp of his having several times given away to his rage so far as to actually shoot men down in these interviews, and still more of his knocking boys down and jumping upon them, until he inflicted injuries that soon resulted in death. how true these rumors were i am unable to say of my own personal knowledge, since i never saw him kill any one, nor have i talked with any one who did. there were a number of cases of this kind testified to upon his trial, but they all happened among "paroles" outside the stockade, or among the prisoners inside after we left, so i knew nothing of them. one of the old switzer's favorite ways of ending these seances was to inform the boys that he would have them shot in an hour or so, and bid them prepare for death. after keeping them in fearful suspense for hours he would order them to be punished with the stocks, the ball-and-chain, the chain-gang, or--if his fierce mood had burned itself entirely out --as was quite likely with a man of his shallop' brain and vacillating temper--to be simply returned to the stockade. nothing, i am sure, since the days of the inquisition--or still later, since the terrible punishments visited upon the insurgents of 1848 by the austrian aristocrats--has been so diabolical as the stocks and chain-gangs, as used by wirz. at one time seven men, sitting in the stocks near the star fort--in plain view of the camp--became objects of interest to everybody inside. they were never relieved from their painful position, but were kept there until all of them died. i think it was nearly two weeks before the last one succumbed. what they endured in that time even imagination cannot conceive--i do not think that an indian tribe ever devised keener torture for its captives. the chain-gang consisted of a number of men--varying from twelve to twenty-five, all chained to one sixty-four pound ball. they were also stationed near the star fort, standing out in the hot sun, without a particle of shade over them. when one moved they all had to move. they were scourged with the dysentery, and the necessities of some one of their number kept them constantly in motion. i can see them distinctly yet, tramping laboriously and painfully back and forward over that burning hillside, every moment of the long, weary summer days. a comrade writes to remind me of the beneficent work of the masonic order. i mention it most gladly, as it was the sole recognition on the part of any of our foes of our claims to human kinship. the churches of all denominations--except the solitary catholic priest, father hamilton, --ignored us as wholly as if we were dumb beasts. lay humanitarians were equally indifferent, and the only interest manifested by any rebel in the welfare of any prisoner was by the masonic brotherhood. the rebel masons interested themselves in securing details outside the stockade in the cookhouse, the commissary, and elsewhere, for the brethren among the prisoners who would accept such favors. such as did not feel inclined to go outside on parole received frequent presents in the way of food, and especially of vegetables, which were literally beyond price. materials were sent inside to build tents for the masons, and i think such as made themselves known before death, received burial according to the rites of the order. doctor white, and perhaps other surgeons, belonged to the fraternity, and the wearing of a masonic emblem by a new prisoner was pretty sure to catch their eyes, and be the means of securing for the wearer the tender of their good offices, such as a detail into the hospital as nurse, ward-master, etc. i was not fortunate enough to be one of the mystic brethren, and so missed all share in any of these benefits, as well as in any others, and i take special pride in one thing: that during my whole imprisonment i was not beholden to a rebel for a single favor of any kind. the rebel does not live who can say that he ever gave me so much as a handful of meal, a spoonful of salt, an inch of thread, or a stick of wood. from first to last i received nothing but my rations, except occasional trifles that i succeeded in stealing from the stupid officers charged with issuing rations. i owe no man in the southern confederacy gratitude for anything--not even for a kind word. speaking of secret society pins recalls a noteworthy story which has been told me since the war, of boys whom i knew. at the breaking out of hostilities there existed in toledo a festive little secret society, such as lurking boys frequently organize, with no other object than fun and the usual adolescent love of mystery. there were a dozen or so members in it who called themselves "the royal reubens," and were headed by a bookbinder named ned hopkins. some one started a branch of the order in napoleon, o., and among the members was charles e. reynolds, of that town. the badge of the society was a peculiarly shaped gold pin. reynolds and hopkins never met, and had no acquaintance with each other. when the war broke out, hopkins enlisted in battery h, first ohio artillery, and was sent to the army of the potomac, where he was captured, in the fall of 1863, while scouting, in the neighborhood of richmond. reynolds entered the sixty-eighth ohio volunteer infantry, and was taken in the neighborhood of jackson, miss.,--two thousand miles from the place of hopkins's capture. at andersonville hopkins became one of the officers in charge of the hospital. one day a rebel sergeant, who called the roll in the stockade, after studying hopkins's pin a minute, said: "i seed a yank in the stockade to-day a-wearing a pin egzackly like that ere." this aroused hopkins's interest, and he went inside in search of the other "feller." having his squad and detachment there was little difficulty in finding him. he recognized the pin, spoke to its wearer, gave him the "grand hailing sign" of the "royal reubens," and it was duly responded to. the upshot of the matter was that he took reynolds out with him as clerk, and saved his life, as the latter was going down hill very rapidly. reynolds, in turn, secured the detail of a comrade of the sixty-eighth who was failing fast, and succeeded in saving his life--all of which happy results were directly attributable to that insignificant boyish society, and its equally unimportant badge of membership. along in the last of august the rebels learned that there were between two and three hundred captains and lieutenants in the stockade, passing themselves off as enlisted men. the motive of these officers was two-fold: first, a chivalrous wish to share the fortunes and fate of their boys, and second, disinclination to gratify the rebels by the knowledge of the rank of their captives. the secret was so well kept that none of us suspected it until the fact was announced by the rebels themselves. they were taken out immediately, and sent to macon, where the commissioned officers' prison was. it would not do to trust such possible leaders with us another day. chapter l. food--the meagerness, inferior quality, and terrible sameness --rebel testimony on the subject--futility of successful explanation. i have in other places dwelt upon the insufficiency and the nauseousness of the food. no words that i can use, no insistence upon this theme, can give the reader any idea of its mortal importance to us. let the reader consider for a moment the quantity, quality, and variety of food that he now holds to be necessary for the maintenance of life and health. i trust that every one who peruses this book--that every one in fact over whom the stars and stripes wave--has his cup of coffee, his biscuits and his beefsteak for breakfast--a substantial dinner of roast or boiled--and a lighter, but still sufficient meal in the evening. in all, certainly not less than fifty different articles are set before him during the day, for his choice as elements of nourishment. let him scan this extended bill-of-fare, which long custom has made so common-place as to be uninteresting--perhaps even wearisome to think about --and see what he could omit from it, if necessity compelled him. after a reluctant farewell to fish, butter, eggs, milk, sugar, green and preserved fruits, etc., he thinks that perhaps under extraordinary circumstances he might be able to merely sustain life for a limited period on a diet of bread and meat three times a day, washed down with creamless, unsweetened coffee, and varied occasionally with additions of potatos, onions, beans, etc. it would astonish the innocent to have one of our veterans inform him that this was not even the first stage of destitution; that a soldier who had these was expected to be on the summit level of contentment. any of the boys who followed grant to appomattox court house, sherman to the sea, or "pap" thomas till his glorious career culminated with the annihilation of hood, will tell him of many weeks when a slice of fat pork on a piece of "hard tack" had to do duty for the breakfast of beefsteak and biscuits; when another slice of fat pork and another cracker served for the dinner of roast beef and vegetables, and a third cracker and slice of pork was a substitute for the supper of toast and chops. i say to these veterans in turn that they did not arrive at the first stages of destitution compared with the depths to which we were dragged. the restriction for a few weeks to a diet of crackers and fat pork was certainly a hardship, but the crackers alone, chemists tell us, contain all the elements necessary to support life, and in our army they were always well made and very palatable. i believe i risk nothing in saying that one of the ordinary square crackers of our commissary department contained much more real nutriment than the whole of our average ration. i have before compared the size, shape and appearance of the daily half loaf of corn bread issued to us to a half-brick, and i do not yet know of a more fitting comparison. at first we got a small piece of rusty bacon along with this; but the size of this diminished steadily until at last it faded away entirely, and during the last six months of our imprisonment i do not believe that we received rations of meat above a half-dozen times. to this smallness was added ineffable badness. the meal was ground very coarsely, by dull, weakly propelled stones, that imperfectly crushed the grains, and left the tough, hard coating of the kernels in large, sharp, mica-like scales, which cut and inflamed the stomach and intestines, like handfuls of pounded glass. the alimentary canals of all compelled to eat it were kept in a continual state of irritation that usually terminated in incurable dysentery. that i have not over-stated this evil can be seen by reference to the testimony of so competent a scientific observer as professor jones, and i add to that unimpeachable testimony the following extract from the statement made in an attempted defense of andersonville by doctor r. randolph stevenson, who styles himself, formerly surgeon in the army of the confederate states of america, chief surgeon of the confederate states military prison hospitals, andersonville, ga.: v. from the sameness of the food, and from the action of the poisonous gases in the densely crowded and filthy stockade and hospital, the blood was altered in its constitution, even, before the manifestation of actual disease. in both the well and the sick, the red corpuscles were diminished; and in all diseases uncomplicated with inflammation, the fibrinous element was deficient. in cases of ulceration of the mucous membrane of the intestinal canal, the fibrinous element of the blood appeared to be increased; while in simple diarrhea, uncomplicated with ulceration, and dependent upon the character of the food and the existence of scurvy, it was either diminished or remained stationary. heart-clots were very common, if not universally present, in the cases of ulceration of the intestinal mucous membrane; while in the uncomplicated cases of diarrhea and scurvy, the blood was fluid and did not coagulate readily, and the heart-clots and fibrinous concretions were almost universally absent. from the watery condition of the blood there resulted various serous effusions into the pericardium, into the ventricles of the brain, and into the abdominal cavity. in almost all cases which i examined after death, even in the most emaciated, there was more or less serous effusion into the abdominal cavity. in cases of hospital gangrene of the extremities, and in cases of gangrene of the intestines, heart-clots and firm coagula were universally present. the presence of these clots in the cases of hospital gangrene, whilst they were absent in the cases in which there were no inflammatory symptoms, appears to sustain the conclusion that hospital gangrene is a species of inflammation (imperfect and irregular though it may be in its progress), in which the fibrinous element and coagulability of the blood are increased, even in those who are suffering from such a condition of the blood and from such diseases as are naturally accompanied with a decrease in the fibrinous constituent. vi. the impoverished condition of the blood, which led to serous effusions within the ventricles of the brain, and around the brain and spinal cord, and into the pericardial and abdominal cavities, was gradually induced by the action of several causes, but chiefly by the character of the food. the federal prisoners, as a general rule, had been reared upon wheat bread and irish potatos; and the indian corn so extensively used at the south, was almost unknown to them as an article of diet previous to their capture. owing to the impossibility of obtaining the necessary sieves in the confederacy for the separation of the husk from the corn-meal, the rations of the confederate soldiers, as well as of the federal prisoners, consisted of unbolted corn-flour, and meal and grist; this circumstance rendered the corn-bread still more disagreeable and distasteful to the federal prisoners. while indian meal, even when prepared with the husk, is one of the most wholesome and nutritious forms of food, as has been already shown by the health and rapid increase of the southern population, and especially of the negros, previous to the present war, and by the strength, endurance and activity of the confederate soldiers, who were throughout the war confined to a great extent to unbolted corn-meal; it is nevertheless true that those who have not been reared upon corn-meal, or who have not accustomed themselves to its use gradually, become excessively tired of this kind of diet when suddenly confined to it without a due proportion of wheat bread. large numbers of the federal prisoners appeared to be utterly disgusted with indian corn, and immense piles of corn-bread could be seen in the stockade and hospital inclosures. those who were so disgusted with this form of food that they had no appetite to partake of it, except in quantities insufficient to supply the waste of the tissues, were, of course, in the condition of men slowly starving, notwithstanding that the only farinaceous form of food which the confederate states produced in sufficient abundance for the maintenance of armies was not withheld from them. in such cases, an urgent feeling of hunger was not a prominent symptom; and even when it existed at first, it soon disappeared, and was succeeded by an actual loathing of food. in this state the muscular strength was rapidly diminished, the tissues wasted, and the thin, skeleton-like forms moved about with the appearance of utter exhaustion and dejection. the mental condition connected with long confinement, with the most miserable surroundings, and with no hope for the future, also depressed all the nervous and vital actions, and was especially active in destroying the appetite. the effects of mental depression, and of defective nutrition, were manifested not only in the slow, feeble motions of the wasted, skeleton-like forms, but also in such lethargy, listlessness, and torpor of the mental faculties as rendered these unfortunate men oblivious and indifferent to their afflicted condition. in many cases, even of the greatest apparent suffering and distress, instead of showing any anxiety to communicate the causes of their distress, or to relate their privations, and their longings for their homes and their friends and relatives, they lay in a listless, lethargic, uncomplaining state, taking no notice either of their own distressed condition, or of the gigantic mass of human misery by which they were surrounded. nothing appalled and depressed me so much as this silent, uncomplaining misery. it is a fact of great interest, that notwithstanding this defective nutrition in men subjected to crowding and filth, contagious fevers were rare; and typhus fever, which is supposed to be generated in just such a state of things as existed at andersonville, was unknown. these facts, established by my investigations, stand in striking contrast with such a statement as the following by a recent english writer: "a deficiency of food, especially of the nitrogenous part, quickly leads to the breaking up of the animal frame. plague, pestilence and famine are associated with each other in the public mind, and the records of every country show how closely they are related. the medical history of ireland is remarkable for the illustrations of how much mischief may be occasioned by a general deficiency of food. always the habitat of fever, it every now and then becomes the very hot-bed of its propagation and development. let there be but a small failure in the usual imperfect supply of food, and the lurking seeds of pestilence are ready to burst into frightful activity. the famine of the present century is but too forcible and illustrative of this. it fostered epidemics which have not been witnessed in this generation, and gave rise to scenes of devastation and misery which are not surpassed by the most appalling epidemics of the middle ages. the principal form of the scourge was known as the contagious famine fever (typhus), and it spread, not merely from end to end of the country in which it had originated, but, breaking through all boundaries, it crossed the broad ocean, and made itself painfully manifest in localities where it was previously unknown. thousands fell under the virulence of its action, for wherever it came it struck down a seventh of the people, and of those whom it attacked, one out of nine perished. even those who escaped the fatal influence of it, were left the miserable victims of scurvy and low fever." while we readily admit that famine induces that state of the system which is the most susceptible to the action of fever poisons, and thus induces the state of the entire population which is most favorable for the rapid and destructive spread of all contagious fevers, at the same time we are forced by the facts established by the present war, as well as by a host of others, both old and new, to admit that we are still ignorant of the causes necessary for the origin of typhus fever. added to the imperfect nature of the rations issued to the federal prisoners, the difficulties of their situation were at times greatly increased by the sudden and desolating federal raids in virginia, georgia, and other states, which necessitated the sudden transportation from richmond and other points threatened of large bodies of prisoners, without the possibility of much previous preparation; and not only did these men suffer in transition upon the dilapidated and overburdened line of railroad communication, but after arriving at andersonville, the rations were frequently insufficient to supply the sudden addition of several thousand men. and as the confederacy became more and more pressed, and when powerful hostile armies were plunging through her bosom, the federal prisoners of andersonville suffered incredibly during the hasty removal to millen, savannah, charleston, and other points, supposed at the time to be secure from the enemy. each one of these causes must be weighed when an attempt is made to estimate the unusual mortality among these prisoners of war. vii. scurvy, arising from sameness of food and imperfect nutrition, caused, either directly or indirectly, nine-tenths of the deaths among the federal prisoners at andersonville. not only were the deaths referred to unknown causes, to apoplexy, to anasarca, and to debility, traceable to scurvy and its effects; and not only was the mortality in small-pox, pneumonia, and typhoid fever, and in all acute diseases, more than doubled by the scorbutic taint, but even those all but universal and deadly bowel affections arose from the same causes, and derived their fatal character from the same conditions which produced the scurvy. in truth, these men at andersonville were in the condition of a crew at sea, confined in a foul ship upon salt meat and unvarying food, and without fresh vegetables. not only so, but these unfortunate prisoners were men forcibly confined and crowded upon a ship tossed about on a stormy ocean, without a rudder, without a compass, without a guiding-star, and without any apparent boundary or to their voyage; and they reflected in their steadily increasing miseries the distressed condition and waning fortunes of devastated and bleeding country, which was compelled, in justice to her own unfortunate sons, to hold these men in the most distressing captivity. i saw nothing in the scurvy which prevailed so universally at andersonville, at all different from this disease as described by various standard writers. the mortality was no greater than that which has afflicted a hundred ships upon long voyages, and it did not exceed the mortality which has, upon me than one occasion, and in a much shorter period of time, annihilated large armies and desolated beleaguered cities. the general results of my investigations upon the chronic diarrhea and dysentery of the federal prisoners of andersonville were similar to those of the english surgeons during the war against russia. ix. drugs exercised but little influence over the progress and fatal termination of chronic diarrhea and dysentery in the military prison and hospital at andersonville, chiefly because the proper form of nourishment (milk, rice, vegetables, anti-scorbutics, and nourishing animal and vegetable soups) was not issued, and could not be procured in sufficient quantities for the sick prisoners. opium allayed pain and checked the bowels temporarily, but the frail dam was soon swept away, and the patient appears to be but little better, if not the worse, for this merely palliative treatment. the root of the difficulty could not be reached by drugs; nothing short of the wanting elements of nutrition would have tended in any manner to restore the tone of the digestive system, and of all the wasted and degenerated organs and tissues. my opinion to this effect was expressed most decidedly to the medical officers in charge of these unfortunate men. the correctness of this view was sustained by the healthy and robust condition of the paroled prisoners, who received an extra ration, and who were able to make considerable sums by trading, and who supplied themselves with a liberal and varied diet. x. the fact that hospital gangrene appeared in the stockade first, and originated spontaneously, without any previous contagion, and occurred sporadically all over the stockade and prison hospital, was proof positive that this disease will arise whenever the conditions of crowding, filth, foul air, and bad diet are present. the exhalations from the hospital and stockade appeared to exert their effects to a considerable distance outside of these localities. the origin of gangrene among these prisoners appeared clearly to depend in great measure upon the state of the general system, induced by diet, exposure, neglect of personal cleanliness; and by various external noxious influences. the rapidity of the appearance and action of the gangrene depended upon the powers and state of the constitution, as well as upon the intensity of the poison in the atmosphere, or upon the direct application of poisonous matter to the wounded surface. this was further illustrated by the important fact, that hospital gangrene, or a disease resembling this form of gangrene, attacked the intestinal canal of patients laboring under ulceration of the bowels, although there were no local manifestations of gangrene upon the surface of the body. this mode of termination in cases of dysentery was quite common in the foul atmosphere of the confederate states military prison hospital; and in the depressed, depraved condition of the system of these federal prisoners, death ensued very rapidly after the gangrenous state of the intestines was established. xi. a scorbutic condition of the system appeared to favor the origin of foul ulcers, which frequently took on true hospital gangrene. scurvy and gangrene frequently existed in the same individual. in such cases, vegetable diet with vegetable acids would remove the scorbutic condition without curing the hospital gangrene. . . scurvy consists not only in an alteration in the constitution of the blood, which leads to passive hemorrhages from the bowels, and the effusion into the various tissues of a deeply-colored fibrinous exudation; but, as we have conclusively shown by postmortem examination, this state is attended with consistence of the muscles of the heart, and the mucous membrane of the alimentary canal, and of solid parts generally. we have, according to the extent of the deficiency of certain articles of food, every degree of scorbutic derangement, from the most fearful depravation of the blood and the perversion of every function subserved by the blood to those slight derangements which are scarcely distinguishable from a state of health. we are as yet ignorant of the true nature of the changes of the blood and tissues in scurvy, and wide field for investigation is open for the determination the characteristic changes--physical, chemical, and physiological--of the blood and tissues, and of the secretions and excretions of scurvy. such inquiries would be of great value in their bearing upon the origin of hospital gangrene. up to the present war, the results of chemical investigations upon the pathology of the blood in scurvy were not only contradictory, but meager, and wanting in that careful detail of the cases from which the blood was abstracted which would enable us to explain the cause of the apparent discrepancies in different analyses. thus it is not yet settled whether the fibrin is increased or diminished in this disease; and the differences which exist in the statements of different writers appear to be referable to the neglect of a critical examination and record of all the symptoms of the cases from which the blood was abstracted. the true nature of the changes of the blood in scurvy can be established only by numerous analyses during different stages of the disease, and followed up by carefully performed and recorded postmortem examinations. with such data we could settle such important questions as whether the increase of fibrin in scurvy was invariably dependent upon some local inflammation. xii. gangrenous spots, followed by rapid destruction of tissue, appeared in some cases in which there had been no previous or existing wound or abrasion; and without such well established facts, it might be assumed that the disease was propagated from one patient to another in every case, either by exhalations from the gangrenous surface or by direct contact. in such a filthy and crowded hospital as that of the confederate, states military prison of camp sumter, andersonville, it was impossible to isolate the wounded from the sources of actual contact of the gangrenous matter. the flies swarming over the wounds and over filth of every description; the filthy, imperfectly washed, and scanty rags; the limited number of sponges and wash-bowls (the same wash-bowl and sponge serving for a score or more of patients), were one and all sources of such constant circulation of the gangrenous matter, that the disease might rapidly be propagated from a single gangrenous wound. while the fact already considered, that a form of moist gangrene, resembling hospital gangrene, was quite common in this foul atmosphere in cases of dysentery, both with and without the existence of hospital gangrene upon the surface, demonstrates the dependence of the disease upon the state of the constitution, and proves in a clear manner that neither the contact of the poisonous matter of gangrene, nor the direct action of the poisoned atmosphere upon the ulcerated surface, is necessary to the development of the disease; on the other hand, it is equally well-established that the disease may be communicated by the various ways just mentioned. it is impossible to determine the length of time which rags and clothing saturated with gangrenous matter will retain the power of reproducing the disease when applied to healthy wounds. professor brugmans, as quoted by guthrie in his commentaries on the surgery of the war in portugal, spain, france, and the netherlands, says that in 1797, in holland, 'charpie,' composed of linen threads cut of different lengths, which, on inquiry, it was found had been already used in the great hospitals in france, and had been subsequently washed and bleached, caused every ulcer to which it was applied to be affected by hospital gangrene. guthrie affirms in the same work, that the fact that this disease was readily communicated by the application of instruments, lint, or bandages which had been in contact with infected parts, was too firmly established by the experience of every one in portugal and spain to be a matter of doubt. there are facts to show that flies may be the means of communicating malignant pustules. dr. wagner, who has related several cases of malignant pustule produced in man and beasts, both by contact and by eating the flesh of diseased animals, which happened in the village of striessa in saxony, in 1834, gives two very remarkable cases which occurred eight days after any beast had been affected with the disease. both were women, one of twenty-six and the other of fifty years, and in them the pustules were well marked, and the general symptoms similar to the other cases. the latter patient said she had been bitten by a fly upon the back d the neck, at which part the carbuncle appeared; and the former, that she had also been bitten upon the right upper arm by a gnat. upon inquiry, wagner found that the skin of one of the infected beasts had been hung on a neighboring wall, and thought it very possible that the insects might have been attracted to them by the smell, and had thence conveyed the poison. [end of dr. stevenson's statement] .......................... the old adage says that "hunger is the best sauce for poor food," but hunger failed to render this detestable stuff palatable, and it became so loathsome that very many actually starved to death because unable to force their organs of deglutition to receive the nauseous dose and pass it to the stomach. i was always much healthier than the average of the boys, and my appetite consequently much better, yet for the last month that i was in andersonville, it required all my determination to crowd the bread down my throat, and, as i have stated before, i could only do this by breaking off small bits at a time, and forcing each down as i would a pill. a large part of this repulsiveness was due to the coarseness and foulness of the meal, the wretched cooking, and the lack of salt, but there was a still more potent reason than all these. nature does not intend that man shall live by bread alone, nor by any one kind of food. she indicates this by the varying tastes and longings that she gives him. if his body needs one kind of constituents, his tastes lead him to desire the food that is richest in those constituents. when he has taken as much as his system requires, the sense of satiety supervenes, and he "becomes tired" of that particular food. if tastes are not perverted, but allowed a free but temperate exercise, they are the surest indicators of the way to preserve health and strength by a judicious selection of alimentation. in this case nature was protesting by a rebellion of the tastes against any further use of that species of food. she was saying, as plainly as she ever spoke, that death could only be averted by a change of diet, which would supply our bodies with the constituents they so sadly needed, and which could not be supplied by corn meal. how needless was this confinement of our rations to corn meal, and especially to such wretchedly prepared meal, is conclusively shown by the rebel testimony heretofore given. it would have been very little extra trouble to the rebels to have had our meal sifted; we would gladly have done it ourselves if allowed the utensils and opportunity. it would have been as little trouble to have varied our rations with green corn and sweet potatos, of which the country was then full. a few wagon loads of roasting ears and sweet potatos would have banished every trace of scurvy from the camp, healed up the wasting dysentery, and saved thousands of lives. any day that the rebels had chosen they could have gotten a thousand volunteers who would have given their solemn parole not to escape, and gone any distance into the country, to gather the potatos and corn, and such other vegetables as were readily obtainable, and bring, them into the camp. whatever else may be said in defense of the southern management of military prisons, the permitting seven thousand men to die of the scurvy in the summer time, in the midst of an agricultural region, filled with all manner of green vegetation, must forever remain impossible of explanation. chapter li. solicitude as to the fate of atlanta and sherman's army--paucity of news --how we heard that atlanta had fallen--announcement of a general exchange--we leave andersonville. we again began to be exceedingly solicitous over the fate of atlanta and sherman's army: we had heard but little directly from that front for several weeks. few prisoners had come in since those captured in the bloody engagements of the 20th, 22d, and 28th of july. in spite of their confident tones, and our own sanguine hopes, the outlook admitted of very grave doubts. the battles of the last week of july had been looked at it in the best light possible--indecisive. our men had held their own, it is true, but an invading army can not afford to simply hold its own. anything short of an absolute success is to it disguised defeat. then we knew that the cavalry column sent out under stoneman had been so badly handled by that inefficient commander that it had failed ridiculously in its object, being beaten in detail, and suffering the loss of its commander and a considerable portion of its numbers. this had been followed by a defeat of our infantry at etowah creek, and then came a long interval in which we received no news save what the rebel papers contained, and they pretended no doubt that sherman's failure was already demonstrated. next came well-authenticated news that sherman had raised the siege and fallen back to the chattahoochee, and we felt something of the bitterness of despair. for days thereafter we heard nothing, though the hot, close summer air seemed surcharged with the premonitions of a war storm about to burst, even as nature heralds in the same way a concentration of the mighty force of the elements for the grand crash of the thunderstorm. we waited in tense expectancy for the decision of the fates whether final victory or defeat should end the long and arduous campaign. at night the guards in the perches around the stockade called out every half hour, so as to show the officers that they were awake and attending to their duty. the formula for this ran thus: "post numbah 1; half-past eight o'clock, and a-l-l 's w-e-l-l!" post no. 2 repeated this cry, and so it went around. one evening when our anxiety as to atlanta was wrought to the highest pitch, one of the guards sang out: "post numbah foah--half past eight o'clock--and atlanta's--gone--t-o --hell." the heart of every man within hearing leaped to his mouth. we looked toward each other, almost speechless with glad surprise, and then gasped out: "did 'you hear that?" the next instant such a ringing cheer burst out as wells spontaneously from the throats and hearts of men, in the first ecstatic moments of victory--a cheer to which our saddened hearts and enfeebled lungs had long been strangers. it was the genuine, honest, manly northern cheer, as different from the shrill rebel yell as the honest mastiff's deep-voiced welcome is from the howl of the prowling wolf. the shout was taken up all over the prison. even those who had not heard the guard understood that it meant that "atlanta was ours and fairly won," and they took up the acclamation with as much enthusiasm as we had begun it. all thoughts of sleep were put to flight: we would have a season of rejoicing. little knots gathered together, debated the news, and indulged in the most sanguine hopes as to the effect upon the rebels. in some parts of the stockade stump speeches were made. i believe that boston corbett and his party organized a prayer and praise meeting. in our corner we stirred up our tuneful friend "nosey," who sang again the grand old patriotic hymns that set our thin blood to bounding, and made us remember that we were still union soldiers, with higher hopes than that of starving and dying in andersonville. he sang the ever-glorious star spangled banner, as he used to sing it around the camp fire in happier days, when we were in the field. he sang the rousing "rally round the flag," with its wealth of patriotic fire and martial vigor, and we, with throats hoarse from shouting; joined in the chorus until the welkin rang again. the rebels became excited, lest our exaltation of spirits would lead to an assault upon the stockade. they got under arms, and remained so until the enthusiasm became less demonstrative. a few days later--on the evening of the 6th of september--the rebel sergeants who called the roll entered the stockade, and each assembling his squads, addressed them as follows: "prisoners: i am instructed by general winder to inform you that a general exchange has been agreed upon. twenty thousand men will be exchanged immediately at savannah, where your vessels are now waiting for you. detachments from one to ten will prepare to leave early to-morrow morning." the excitement that this news produced was simply indescribable. i have seen men in every possible exigency that can confront men, and a large proportion viewed that which impended over them with at least outward composure. the boys around me had endured all that we suffered with stoical firmness. groans from pain-racked bodies could not be repressed, and bitter curses and maledictions against the rebels leaped unbidden to the lips at the slightest occasion, but there was no murmuring or whining. there was not a day--hardly an hour--in which one did not see such exhibitions of manly fortitude as made him proud of belonging to a race of which every individual was a hero. but the emotion which pain and suffering and danger could not develop, joy could, and boys sang, and shouted and cried, and danced as if in a delirium. "god's country," fairer than the sweet promised land of canaan appeared to the rapt vision of the hebrew poet prophet, spread out in glad vista before the mind's eye of every one. it had come--at last it had come that which we had so longed for, wished for, prayed for, dreamed of; schemed, planned, toiled for, and for which went up the last earnest, dying wish of the thousands of our comrades who would now know no exchange save into that eternal "god's country" where sickness and sorrow, pain and death are felt and feared no more. our "preparations," for leaving were few and simple. when the morning came, and shortly after the order to move, andrews and i picked our well-worn blanket, our tattered overcoat, our rude chessmen, and no less rude board, our little black can, and the spoon made of hoop-iron, and bade farewell to the hole-in-the-ground that had been our home for nearly seven long months. my feet were still in miserable condition from the lacerations received in the attempt to escape, but i took one of our tent poles as a staff and hobbled away. we re-passed the gates which we had entered on that february night, ages since, it seemed, and crawled slowly over to the depot. i had come to regard the rebels around us as such measureless liars that my first impulse was to believe the reverse of anything they said to us; and even now, while i hoped for the best, my old habit of mind was so strongly upon me that i had some doubts of our going to be exchanged, simply because it was a rebel who had said so. but in the crowd of rebels who stood close to the road upon which we were walking was a young second lieutenant, who said to a colonel as i passed: "weil, those fellows can sing 'homeward bound,' can't they?" this set my last misgiving at rest. now i was certain that we were going to be exchanged, and my spirits soared to the skies. entering the cars we thumped and pounded toilsomely along, after the manner of southern railroads, at the rate of six or eight miles an hour. savannah was two hundred and forty miles away, and to our impatient minds it seemed as if we would never get there. the route lay the whole distance through the cheerless pine barrens which cover the greater part of georgia. the only considerable town on the way was macon, which had then a population of five thousand or thereabouts. for scores of miles there would not be a sign of a human habitation, and in the one hundred and eighty miles between macon and savannah there were only three insignificant villages. there was a station every ten miles, at which the only building was an open shed, to shelter from sun and rain a casual passenger, or a bit of goods. the occasional specimens of the poor white "cracker" population that we saw, seemed indigenous products of the starved soil. they suited their poverty-stricken surroundings as well as the gnarled and scrubby vegetation suited the sterile sand. thin-chested, round-shouldered, scraggy-bearded, dull-eyed and open-mouthed, they all looked alike--all looked as ignorant, as stupid, and as lazy as they were poor and weak. they were "low-downers" in every respect, and made our rough and simple. minded east tennesseans look like models of elegant and cultured gentlemen in contrast. we looked on the poverty-stricken land with good-natured contempt, for we thought we were leaving it forever, and would soon be in one which, compared to it, was as the fatness at egypt to the leanness of the desert of sinai. the second day after leaving andersonville our train struggled across the swamps into savannah, and rolled slowly down the live oak shaded streets into the center of the city. it seemed like another deserted village, so vacant and noiseless the streets, and the buildings everywhere so overgrown with luxuriant vegetation: the limbs of the shade trees crashed along and broke, upon the tops of our cars, as if no train had passed that way for years. through the interstices between the trees and clumps of foliage could be seen the gleaming white marble of the monuments erected to greene and pulaski, looking like giant tombstones in a city of the dead. the unbroken stillness--so different from what we expected on entering the metropolis of georgia, and a city that was an important port in revolutionary days--became absolutely oppressive. we could not understand it, but our thoughts were more intent upon the coming transfer to our flag than upon any speculation as to the cause of the remarkable somnolence of savannah. finally some little boys straggled out to where our car was standing, and we opened up a conversation with them: "say, boys, are our vessels down in the harbor yet?" the reply came in that piercing treble shriek in which a boy of ten or twelve makes even his most confidential communications: "i don't know." "well," (with our confidence in exchange somewhat dashed,) "they intend to exchange us here, don't they?" another falsetto scream, "i don't know." "well," (with something of a quaver in the questioner's voice,) "what are they going to do, with us, any way?" "o," (the treble shriek became almost demoniac) "they are fixing up a place over by the old jail for you." what a sinking of hearts was there then! andrews and i would not give up hope so speedily as some others did, and resolved to believe, for awhile at least, that we were going to be exchanged. ordered out of the cars, we were marched along the street. a crowd of small boys, full of the curiosity of the animal, gathered around us as we marched. suddenly a door in a rather nice house opened; an angry-faced woman appeared on the steps and shouted out: "boys! boys! what are you doin' there! come up on the steps immejitely! come away from them n-a-s-t-y things!" i will admit that we were not prepossessing in appearance; nor were we as cleanly as young gentlemen should habitually be; in fact, i may as well confess that i would not now, if i could help it, allow a tramp, as dilapidated in raiment, as unwashed, unshorn, uncombed, and populous with insects as we were, to come within several rods of me. nevertheless, it was not pleasant to hear so accurate a description of our personal appearance sent forth on the wings of the wind by a shrill-voiced rebel female. a short march brought us to the place "they were fixing for us by the old jail." it was another pen, with high walls of thick pine plank, which told us only too plainly how vain were our expectations of exchange. when we were turned inside, and i realized that the gates of another prison had closed upon me, hope forsook me. i flung our odious little possessions-our can, chess-board, overcoat, and blanket-upon the ground, and, sitting down beside them, gave way to the bitterest despair. i wanted to die, o, so badly. never in all my life had i desired anything in the world so much as i did now to get out of it. had i had pistol, knife, rope, or poison, i would have ended my prison life then and there, and departed with the unceremoniousness of a french leave. i remembered that i could get a quietus from a guard with very little trouble, but i would not give one of the bitterly hated rebels the triumph of shooting me. i longed to be another samson, with the whole southern confederacy gathered in another temple of dagon, that i might pull down the supporting pillars, and die happy in slaying thousands of my enemies. while i was thus sinking deeper and deeper in the slough of despond, the firing of a musket, and the shriek of the man who was struck, attracted my attention. looking towards the opposite end of the pen i saw a guard bringing his still smoking musket to a "recover arms," and, not fifteen feet from him, a prisoner lying on the ground in the agonies of death. the latter had a pipe in his mouth when he was shot, and his teeth still clenched its stem. his legs and arms were drawn up convulsively, and he was rocking backward and forward on his back. the charge had struck him just above the hip-bone. the rebel officer in command of the guard was sitting on his horse inside the pen at the time, and rode forward to see what the matter was. lieutenant davis, who had come with us from andersonville, was also sitting on a horse inside the prison, and he called out in his usual harsh, disagreeable voice: "that's all right, cunnel; the man's done just as i awdahed him to." i found that lying around inside were a number of bits of plank--each about five feet long, which had been sawed off by the carpenters engaged in building the prison. the ground being a bare common, was destitute of all shelter, and the pieces looked as if they would be quite useful in building a tent. there may have been an order issued forbidding the prisoners to touch them, but if so, i had not heard it, and i imagine the first intimation to the prisoner just killed that the boards were not to be taken was the bullet which penetrated his vitals. twenty-five cents would be a liberal appraisement of the value of the lumber for which the boy lost his life. half an hour afterward we thought we saw all the guards march out of the front gate. there was still another pile of these same kind of pieces of board lying at the further side of the prison. the crowd around me noticed it, and we all made a rush for it. in spite of my lame feet i outstripped the rest, and was just in the act of stooping down to pick the boards up when a loud yell from those behind startled me. glancing to my left i saw a guard cocking his gun and bringing it up to shoot me. with one frightened spring, as quick as a flash, and before he could cover me, i landed fully a rod back in the crowd, and mixed with it. the fellow tried hard to draw a bead on me, but i was too quick for him, and he finally lowered his gun with an oath expressive of disappointment in not being able to kill a yankee. walking back to my place the full ludicrousness of the thing dawned upon me so forcibly that i forgot all about my excitement and scare, and laughed aloud. here, not an hour age i was murmuring because i could find no way to die; i sighed for death as a bridegroom for the coming of his bride, an yet, when a rebel had pointed his gun at me, it had nearly scared me out of a year's growth, and made me jump farther than i could possibly do when my feet were well, and i was in good condition otherwise. chapter lii. savannah--devices to obtain materials for a tent--their ultimate success --resumption of tunneling--escaping by wholesale and being recaptured en masse--the obstacles that lay between us and our lines. andrews and i did not let the fate of the boy who was killed, nor my own narrow escape from losing the top of my head, deter us from farther efforts to secure possession of those coveted boards. my readers remember the story of the boy who, digging vigorously at a hole, replied to the remark of a passing traveler that there was probably no ground-hog there, and, even if there was, "ground-hog was mighty poor eatin', any way," with: "mister, there's got to be a ground-hog there; our family's out o' meat!" that was what actuated us: we were out of material for a tent. our solitary blanket had rotted and worn full of holes by its long double duty, as bed-clothes and tent at andersonville, and there was an imperative call for a substitute. andrews and i flattered ourselves that when we matched our collective or individual wits against those of a johnny his defeat was pretty certain, and with this cheerful estimate of our own powers to animate us, we set to work to steal the boards from under the guard's nose. the johnny had malice in his heart and buck-and-ball in his musket, but his eyes were not sufficiently numerous to adequately discharge all the duties laid upon him. he had too many different things to watch at the same time. i would approach a gap in the fence not yet closed as if i intended making a dash through it for liberty, and when the johnny had concentrated all his attention on letting me have the contents of his gun just as soon as he could have a reasonable excuse for doing so, andrews would pick u a couple of boards and slip away with them. then i would fall back in pretended (and some real) alarm, and--andrew would come up and draw his attention by a similar feint, while i made off with a couple more pieces. after a few hours c this strategy, we found ourselves the possessors of some dozen planks, with which we made a lean-to, that formed a tolerable shelter for our heads and the upper portion of our bodies. as the boards were not over five feet long, and the slope reduce the sheltered space to about four-and-one-half feet, it left the lower part of our naked feet and legs to project out-of-doors. andrews used to lament very touchingly the sunburning his toe-nails were receiving. he knew that his complexion was being ruined for life, and all the balm of a thousand flowers in the world would not restore his comely ankles to that condition of pristine loveliness which would admit of their introduction into good society again. another defect was that, like the fun in a practical joke, it was all on one side; there was not enough of it to go clear round. it was very unpleasant, when a storm came up in a direction different from that we had calculated upon, to be compelled to get out in the midst of it, and build our house over to face the other way. still we had a tent, and were that much better off than three-fourths of our comrades who had no shelter at all. we were owners of a brown stone front on fifth avenue compared to the other fellows. our tent erected, we began a general survey of our new abiding place. the ground was a sandy common in the outskirts of savannah. the sand was covered with a light sod. the rebels, who knew nothing of our burrowing propensities, had neglected to make the plank forming the walls of the prison project any distance below the surface of the ground, and had put up no dead line around the inside; so that it looked as if everything was arranged expressly to invite us to tunnel out. we were not the boys to neglect such an invitation. by night about three thousand had been received from andersonville, and placed inside. when morning came it looked as if a colony of gigantic rats had been at work. there was a tunnel every ten or fifteen feet, and at least twelve hundred of us had gone out through them during the night. i never understood why all in the pen did not follow our example, and leave the guards watching a forsaken prison. there was nothing to prevent it. an hour's industrious work with a half-canteen would take any one outside, or if a boy was too lazy to dig his own tunnel, he could have the use of one of the hundred others that had been dug. but escaping was only begun when the stockade was passed. the site of savannah is virtually an island. on the north is the savannah river; to the east, southeast and south, are the two ogeechee rivers, and a chain of sounds and lagoons connecting with the atlantic ocean. to the west is a canal connecting the savannah and big ogeechee rivers. we found ourselves headed off by water whichever way we went. all the bridges were guarded, and all the boats destroyed. early in the morning the rebels discovered our absence, and the whole garrison of savannah was sent out on patrol after us. they picked up the boys in squads of from ten to thirty, lurking around the shores of the streams waiting for night to come, to get across, or engaged in building rafts for transportation. by evening the whole mob of us were back in the pen again. as nobody was punished for running away, we treated the whole affair as a lark, and those brought back first stood around the gate and yelled derisively as the others came in. that night big fires were built all around the stockade, and a line of guards placed on the ground inside of these. in spite of this precaution, quite a number escaped. the next day a dead line was put up inside of the prison, twenty feet from the stockade. this only increased the labor of burrowing, by making us go farther. instead of being able to tunnel out in an hour, it now took three or four hours. that night several hundred of us, rested from our previous performance, and hopeful of better luck, brought our faithful half canteens--now scoured very bright by constant use-into requisition again, and before the morning. dawned we had gained the high reeds of the swamps, where we lay concealed until night. in this way we managed to evade the recapture that came to most of those who went out, but it was a fearful experience. having been raised in a country where venomous snakes abounded, i had that fear and horror of them that inhabitants of those districts feel, and of which people living in sections free from such a scourge know little. i fancied that the southern swamps were filled with all forms of loathsome and poisonous reptiles, and it required all my courage to venture into them barefooted. besides, the snags and roots hurt our feet fearfully. our hope was to find a boat somewhere, in which we could float out to sea, and trust to being picked up by some of the blockading fleet. but no boat could we find, with all our painful and diligent search. we learned afterward that the rebels made a practice of breaking up all the boats along the shore to prevent negros and their own deserters from escaping to the blockading fleet. we thought of making a raft of logs, but had we had the strength to do this, we would doubtless have thought it too risky, since we dreaded missing the vessels, and being carried out to sea to perish of hunger. during the night we came to the railroad bridge across the ogeechee. we had some slender hope that, if we could reach this we might perhaps get across the river, and find better opportunities for escape. but these last expectations were blasted by the discovery that it was guarded. there was a post and a fire on the shore next us, and a single guard with a lantern was stationed on one of the middle spans. almost famished with hunger, and so weary and footsore that we could scarcely move another step, we went back to a cleared place on the high ground, and laid down to sleep, entirely reckless as to what became of us. late in the morning we were awakened by the rebel patrol and taken back to the prison. lieutenant davis, disgusted with the perpetual attempts to escape, moved the dead line out forty feet from the stockade; but this restricted our room greatly, since the number of prisoners in the pen had now risen to about six thousand, and, besides, it offered little additional protection against tunneling. it was not much more difficult to dig fifty feet than it had been to dig thirty feet. davis soon realized this, and put the dead line back to twenty feet. his next device was a much more sensible one. a crowd of one hundred and fifty negros dug a trench twenty feet wide and five feet deep around the whole prison on the outside, and this ditch was filled with water from the city water works. no one could cross this without attracting the attention of the guards. still we were not discouraged, and andrews and i joined a crowd that was constructing a large tunnel from near our quarters on the east side of the pen. we finished the burrow to within a few inches of the edge of the ditch, and then ceased operations, to await some stormy night, when we could hope to get across the ditch unnoticed. orders were issued to guards to fire without warning on men who were observed to be digging or carrying out dirt after nightfall. they occasionally did so, but the risk did not keep anyone from tunneling. our tunnel ran directly under a sentry box. when carrying dirt away the bearer of the bucket had to turn his back on the guard and walk directly down the street in front of him, two hundred or three hundred feet, to the center of the camp, where he scattered the sand around--so as to give no indication of where it came from. though we always waited till the moon went down, it seemed as if, unless the guard were a fool, both by nature and training, he could not help taking notice of what was going on under his eyes. i do not recall any more nervous promenades in my life, than those when, taking my turn, i received my bucket of sand at the mouth of the tunnel, and walked slowly away with it. the most disagreeable part was in turning my back to the guard. could i have faced him, i had sufficient confidence in my quickness of perception, and talents as a dodger, to imagine that i could make it difficult for him to hit me. but in walling with my back to him i was wholly at his mercy. fortune, however, favored us, and we were allowed to go on with our work--night after night--without a shot. in the meanwhile another happy thought slowly gestated in davis's alleged intellect. how he came to give birth to two ideas with no more than a week between them, puzzled all who knew him, and still more that he survived this extraordinary strain upon the gray matter of the cerebrum. his new idea was to have driven a heavily-laden mule cart around the inside of the dead line at least once a day. the wheels or the mule's feet broke through the thin sod covering the tunnels and exposed them. our tunnel went with the rest, and those of our crowd who wore shoes had humiliation added to sorrow by being compelled to go in and spade the hole full of dirt. this put an end to subterranean engineering. one day one of the boys watched his opportunity, got under the ration wagon, and clinging close to the coupling pole with hands and feet, was carried outside. he was detected, however, as he came from under the wagon, and brought back. chapter liii. frank reverstock's attempt at escape--passing off as rebel boy he reaches griswoldville by rail, and then strikes across the country for sherman, but is caught within twenty miles of our lines. one of the shrewdest and nearest successful attempts to escape that came under my notice was that of my friend sergeant frank reverstock, of the third west virginia cavalry, of whom i have before spoken. frank, who was quite small, with a smooth boyish face, had converted to his own use a citizen's coat, belonging to a young boy, a sutler's assistant, who had died in andersonville. he had made himself a pair of bag pantaloons and a shirt from pieces of meal sacks which he had appropriated from day to day. he had also the sutler's assistant's shoes, and, to crown all, he wore on his head one of those hideous looking hats of quilted calico which the rebels had taken to wearing in the lack of felt hats, which they could neither make nor buy. altogether frank looked enough like a rebel to be dangerous to trust near a country store or a stable full of horses. when we first arrived in the prison quite a crowd of the savannahians rushed in to inspect us. the guards had some difficulty in keeping them and us separate. while perplexed with this annoyance, one of them saw frank standing in our crowd, and, touching him with his bayonet, said, with some sharpness: "see heah; you must stand back; you musn't crowd on them prisoners so." frank stood back. he did it promptly but calmly, and then, as if his curiosity as to yankees was fully satisfied, he walked slowly away up the street, deliberating as he went on a plan for getting out of the city. he hit upon an excellent one. going to the engineer of a freight train making ready to start back to macon, he told him that his father was working in the confederate machine shops at griswoldville, near macon; that he himself was also one of the machinists employed there, and desired to go thither but lacked the necessary means to pay his passage. if the engineer would let him ride up on the engine he would do work enough to pay the fare. frank told the story ingeniously, the engineer and firemen were won over, and gave their consent. no more zealous assistant ever climbed upon a tender than frank proved to be. he loaded wood with a nervous industry, that stood him in place of great strength. he kept the tender in perfect order, and anticipated, as far as possible, every want of the engineer and his assistant. they were delighted with him, and treated him with the greatest kindness, dividing their food with him, and insisting that he should share their bed when they "laid by" for the night. frank would have gladly declined this latter kindness with thanks, as he was conscious that the quantity of "graybacks" his clothing contained did not make him a very desirable sleeping companion for any one, but his friends were so pressing that he was compelled to accede. his greatest trouble was a fear of recognition by some one of the prisoners that were continually passing by the train load, on their way from andersonville to other prisons. he was one of the best known of the prisoners in andersonville; bright, active, always cheerful, and forever in motion during waking hours,--every one in the prison speedily became familiar with him, and all addressed him as "sergeant frankie." if any one on the passing trains had caught a glimpse of him, that glimpse would have been followed almost inevitably with a shout of: "hello, sergeant frankie! what are you doing there?" then the whole game would have been up. frank escaped this by persistent watchfulness, and by busying himself on the opposite side of the engine, with his back turned to the other trains. at last when nearing griswoldville, frank, pointing to a large white house at some distance across the fields, said: "now, right over there is where my uncle lives, and i believe i'll just run over and see him, and then walk into griswoldville." he thanked his friends fervently for their kindness, promised to call and see them frequently, bade them good by, and jumped off the train. he walked towards the white house as long as he thought he could be seen, and then entered a large corn field and concealed himself in a thicket in the center of it until dark, when he made his way to the neighboring woods, and began journeying northward as fast as his legs could carry him. when morning broke he had made good progress, but was terribly tired. it was not prudent to travel by daylight, so he gathered himself some ears of corn and some berries, of which he made his breakfast, and finding a suitable thicket he crawled into it, fell asleep, and did not wake up until late in the afternoon. after another meal of raw corn and berries he resumed his journey, and that night made still better progress. he repeated this for several days and nights--lying in the woods in the day time, traveling by night through woods, fields, and by-paths avoiding all the fords, bridges and main roads, and living on what he could glean from the fields, that he might not take even so much risk as was involved in going to the negro cabins for food. but there are always flaws in every man's armor of caution--even in so perfect a one as frank's. his complete success so far had the natural effect of inducing a growing carelessness, which wrought his ruin. one evening he started off briskly, after a refreshing rest and sleep. he knew that he must be very near sherman's lines, and hope cheered him up with the belief that his freedom would soon be won. descending from the hill, in whose dense brushwood he had made his bed all day, he entered a large field full of standing corn, and made his way between the rows until he reached, on the other side, the fence that separated it from the main road, across which was another corn-field, that frank intended entering. but he neglected his usual precautions on approaching a road, and instead of coming up cautiously and carefully reconnoitering in all directions before he left cover, he sprang boldly over the fence and strode out for the other side. as he reached the middle of the road, his ears were assailed with the sharp click of a musket being cocked, and the harsh command: "halt! halt, dah, i say!" turning with a start to his left he saw not ten feet from him, a mounted patrol, the sound of whose approach had been masked by the deep dust of the road, into which his horse's hoofs sank noiselessly. frank, of course, yielded without a word, and when sent to the officer in command he told the old story about his being an employee of the griswoldville shops, off on a leave of absence to make a visit to sick relatives. but, unfortunately, his captors belonged to that section themselves, and speedily caught him in a maze of cross-questioning from which he could not extricate himself. it also became apparent from his language that he was a yankee, and it was not far from this to the conclusion that he was a spy--a conclusion to which the proximity of sherman's lines, then less than twenty miles distant-greatly assisted. by the next morning this belief had become so firmly fixed in the minds of the rebels that frank saw a halter dangling alarmingly near, and he concluded the wisest plan was to confess who he really was. it was not the smallest of his griefs to realize by how slight a chance he had failed. had he looked down the road before he climbed the fence, or had he been ten minutes earlier or later, the patrol would not have been there, he could have gained the next field unperceived, and two more nights of successful progress would have taken him into sherman's lines at sand mountain. the patrol which caught him was on the look-out for deserters and shirking conscripts, who had become unusually numerous since the fall of atlanta. he was sent back to us at savannah. as he came into the prison gate lieutenant davis was standing near. he looked sternly at frank and his rebel garments, and muttering, "by god, i'll stop this!" caught the coat by the tails, tore it to the collar, and took it and his hat away from frank. there was a strange sequel to this episode. a few weeks afterward a special exchange for ten thousand was made, and frank succeeded in being included in this. he was given the usual furlough from the paroled camp at annapolis, and went to his home in a little town near mansfield, o. one day while on the cars going--i think to newark, o., he saw lieutenant davis on the train, in citizens' clothes. he had been sent by the rebel government to canada with dispatches relating to some of the raids then harassing our northern borders. davis was the last man in the world to successfully disguise himself. he had a large, coarse mouth, that made him remembered by all who had ever seen him. frank recognized him instantly and said: "you are lieutenant davis?" davis replied: "you are totally mistaken, sah, i am -----." frank insisted that he was right. davis fumed and blustered, but though frank was small, he was as game as a bantam rooster, and he gave davis to understand that there had been a vast change in their relative positions; that the one, while still the same insolent swaggerer, had not regiments of infantry or batteries of artillery to emphasize his insolence, and the other was no longer embarrassed in the discussion by the immense odds in favor of his jailor opponent. after a stormy scene frank called in the assistance of some other soldiers in the car, arrested davis, and took him to camp chase--near columbus, o.,--where he was fully identified by a number of paroled prisoners. he was searched, and documents showing the nature of his mission beyond a doubt, were found upon his person. a court martial was immediately convened for his trial. this found him guilty, and sentenced him to be hanged as a spy. at the conclusion of the trial frank stepped up to the prisoner and said: "mr. davis, i believe we're even on that coat, now." davis was sent to johnson's island for execution, but influences were immediately set at work to secure executive clemency. what they were i know not, but i am informed by the rev. robert mccune, who was then chaplain of the one hundred and twenty-eighth ohio infantry and the post of johnson's island and who was the spiritual adviser appointed to prepare davis for execution, that the sentence was hardly pronounced before davis was visited by an emissary, who told him to dismiss his fears, that he should not suffer the punishment. it is likely that leading baltimore unionists were enlisted in his behalf through family connections, and as the border state unionists were then potent at washington, they readily secured a commutation of his sentence to imprisonment during the war. it seems that the justice of this world is very unevenly dispensed when so much solicitude is shown for the life of such a man, and none at all for the much better men whom he assisted to destroy. the official notice of the commutation of the sentence was not published until the day set for the execution, but the certain knowledge that it would be forthcoming enabled davis to display a great deal of bravado on approaching what was supposed to be his end. as the reader can readily imagine, from what i have heretofore said of him, davis was the man to improve to the utmost every opportunity to strut his little hour, and he did it in this instance. he posed, attitudinized and vapored, so that the camp and the country were filled with stories of the wonderful coolness with which he contemplated his approaching fate. among other things he said to his guard, as he washed himself elaborately the night before the day announced for the execution: "well, you can be sure of one thing; to-morrow night there will certainly be one clean corpse on this island." unfortunately for his braggadocio, he let it leak out in some way that he had been well aware all the time that he would not be executed. he was taken to fort delaware for confinement, and died there some time after. frank beverstock went back to his regiment, and served with it until the close of the war. he then returned home, and, after awhile became a banker at bowling green, o. he was a fine business man and became very prosperous. but though naturally healthy and vigorous, his system carried in it the seeds of death, sown there by the hardships of captivity. he had been one of the victims of the rebels' vaccination; the virus injected into his blood had caused a large part of his right temple to slough off, and when it healed it left a ghastly cicatrix. two years ago he was taken suddenly ill, and died before his friends had any idea that his condition was serious. chapter liv. savannah proves to be a change for the better--escape from the brats of guards--comparison between wirz and davis--a brief interval of good rations--winder, the man with the evil eye --the disloyal work of a shyster. after all savannah was a wonderful improvement on andersonville. we got away from the pestilential swamp and that poisonous ground. every mouthful of air was not laden with disease germs, nor every cup of water polluted with the seeds of death. the earth did not breed gangrene, nor the atmosphere promote fever. as only the more vigorous had come away, we were freed from the depressing spectacle of every third man dying. the keen disappointment prostrated very many who had been of average health, and i imagine, several hundred died, but there were hospital arrangements of some kind, and the sick were taken away from among us. those of us who tunneled out had an opportunity of stretching our legs, which we had not had for months in the overcrowded stockade we had left. the attempts to escape did all engaged in them good, even though they failed, since they aroused new ideas and hopes, set the blood into more rapid circulation, and toned up the mind and system both. i had come away from andersonville with considerable scurvy manifesting itself in my gums and feet. soon these signs almost wholly disappeared. we also got away from those murderous little brats of reserves, who guarded us at andersonville, and shot men down as they would stone apples out of a tree. our guards now were mostly, sailors, from the rebel fleet in the harbor--irishmen, englishmen and scandinavians, as free hearted and kindly as sailors always are. i do not think they ever fired a shot at one of us. the only trouble we had was with that portion of the guard drawn from the infantry of the garrison. they had the same rattlesnake venom of the home guard crowd wherever we met it, and shot us down at the least provocation. fortunately they only formed a small part of the sentinels. best of all, we escaped for a while from the upas-like shadow of winder and wirz, in whose presence strong men sickened and died, as when near some malign genii of an eastern story. the peasantry of italy believed firmly in the evil eye. did they ever know any such men as winder and his satellite, i could comprehend how much foundation they could have for such a belief. lieutenant davis had many faults, but there was no comparison between him and the andersonville commandant. he was a typical young southern man; ignorant and bumptious as to the most common matters of school-boy knowledge, inordinately vain of himself and his family, coarse in tastes and thoughts, violent in his prejudices, but after all with some streaks of honor and generosity that made the widest possible difference between him and wirz, who never had any. as one of my chums said to me: "wirz is the most even-tempered man i ever knew; he's always foaming mad." this was nearly the truth. i never saw wirz when he was not angry; if not violently abusive, he was cynical and sardonic. never, in my little experience with him did i detect a glint of kindly, generous humanity; if he ever was moved by any sight of suffering its exhibition in his face escaped my eye. if he ever had even a wish to mitigate the pain or hardship of any man the expression of such wish never fell on my ear. how a man could move daily through such misery as he encountered, and never be moved by it except to scorn and mocking is beyond my limited understanding. davis vapored a great deal, swearing big round oaths in the broadest of southern patois; he was perpetually threatening to: "open on ye wid de ahtillery," but the only death that i knew him to directly cause or sanction was that i have described in the previous chapter. he would not put himself out of the way to annoy and oppress prisoners, as wirz would, but frequently showed even a disposition to humor them in some little thing, when it could be done without danger or trouble to himself. by-and-by, however, he got an idea that there was some money to be made out of the prisoners, and he set his wits to work in this direction. one day, standing at the gate, he gave one of his peculiar yells that he used to attract the attention of the camp with: "wh-ah-ye!!" we all came to "attention," and he announced: "yesterday, while i wuz in the camps (a rebel always says camps,) some of you prisoners picked my pockets of seventy-five dollars in greenbacks. now, i give you notice that i'll not send in any moah rations till the money's returned to me." this was a very stupid method of extortion, since no one believed that he had lost the money, and at all events he had no business to have the greenbacks, as the rebel laws imposed severe penalties upon any citizen, and still more upon any soldier dealing with, or having in his possession any of "the money of the enemy." we did without rations until night, when they were sent in. there was a story that some of the boys in the prison had contributed to make up part of the sum, and davis took it and was satisfied. i do not know how true the story was. at another time some of the boys stole the bridle and halter off an old horse that was driven in with a cart. the things were worth, at a liberal estimate, one dollar. davis cut off the rations of the whole six thousand of us for one day for this. we always imagined that the proceeds went into his pocket. a special exchange was arranged between our navy department and that of the rebels, by which all seamen and marines among us were exchanged. lists of these were sent to the different prisons and the men called for. about three-fourths of them were dead, but many soldiers divining, the situation of affairs, answered to the dead men's names, went away with the squad and were exchanged. much of this was through the connivance of the rebel officers, who favored those who had ingratiated themselves with them. in many instances money was paid to secure this privilege, and i have been informed on good authority that jack huckleby, of the eighth tennessee, and ira beverly, of the one hundredth ohio, who kept the big sutler shop on the north side at andersonville, paid davis five hundred dollars each to be allowed to go with the sailors. as for andrews and me, we had no friends among the rebels, nor money to bribe with, so we stood no show. the rations issued to us for some time after our arrival seemed riotous luxury to what we had been getting at andersonville. each of us received daily a half-dozen rude and coarse imitations of our fondly-remembered hard tack, and with these a small piece of meat or a few spoonfuls of molasses, and a quart or so of vinegar, and several plugs of tobacco for each "hundred." how exquisite was the taste of the crackers and molasses! it was the first wheat bread i had eaten since my entry into richmond --nine months before--and molasses had been a stranger to me for years. after the corn bread we had so long lived upon, this was manna. it seems that the commissary at savannah labored under the delusion that he must issue to us the same rations as were served out to the rebel soldiers and sailors. it was some little time before the fearful mistake came to the knowledge of winder. i fancy that the news almost threw him into an apoplectic fit. nothing, save his being ordered to the front, could have caused him such poignant sorrow as the information that so much good food had been worse than wasted in undoing his work by building up the bodies of his hated enemies. without being told, we knew that he had been heard from when the tobacco, vinegar and molasses failed to come in, and the crackers gave way to corn meal. still this was a vast improvement on andersonville, as the meal was fine and sweet, and we each had a spoonful of salt issued to us regularly. i am quite sure that i cannot make the reader who has not had an experience similar to ours comprehend the wonderful importance to us of that spoonful of salt. whether or not the appetite for salt be, as some scientists claim, a purely artificial want, one thing is certain, and that is, that either the habit of countless generations or some other cause, has so deeply ingrained it into our common nature, that it has come to be nearly as essential as food itself, and no amount of deprivation can accustom us to its absence. rather, it seemed that the longer we did without it the more overpowering became our craving. i could get along to-day and to-morrow, perhaps the whole week, without salt in my food, since the lack would be supplied from the excess i had already swallowed, but at the end of that time nature would begin to demand that i renew the supply of saline constituent of my tissues, and she would become more clamorous with every day that i neglected her bidding, and finally summon nausea to aid longing. the light artillery of the garrison of savannah--four batteries, twenty-four pieces--was stationed around three sides of the prison, the guns unlimbered, planted at convenient distance, and trained upon us, ready for instant use. we could see all the grinning mouths through the cracks in the fence. there were enough of them to send us as high as the traditional kite flown by gilderoy. the having at his beck this array of frowning metal lent lieutenant davis such an importance in his own eyes that his demeanor swelled to the grandiose. it became very amusing to see him puff up and vaunt over it, as he did on every possible occasion. for instance, finding a crowd of several hundred lounging around the gate, he would throw open the wicket, stalk in with the air of a jove threatening a rebellious world with the dread thunders of heaven, and shout: "w-h-a-a y-e-e! prisoners, i give you jist two minutes to cleah away from this gate, aw i'll open on ye wid de ahtillery!" one of the buglers of the artillery was a superb musician--evidently some old "regular" whom the confederacy had seduced into its service, and his instrument was so sweet toned that we imagined that it was made of silver. the calls he played were nearly the same as we used in the cavalry, and for the first few days we became bitterly homesick every time he sent ringing out the old familiar signals, that to us were so closely associated with what now seemed the bright and happy days when we were in the field with our battalion. if we were only back in the valleys of tennessee with what alacrity we would respond to that "assembly;" no orderly's patience would be worn out in getting laggards and lazy ones to "fall in for roll-call;" how eagerly we would attend to "stable duty;" how gladly mount our faithful horses and ride away to "water," and what bareback races ride, going and coming. we would be even glad to hear "guard" and "drill" sounded; and there would be music in the disconsolate "surgeon's call:" "come-get-your-q-n-i-n-i-n-e; come, get your quinine; it'll make you sad: it'll make you sick. come, come." o, if we were only back, what admirable soldiers we would be! one morning, about three or four o'clock, we were awakened by the ground shaking and a series of heavy, dull thumps sounding oft seaward. our silver-voiced bugler seemed to be awakened, too. he set the echoes ringing with a vigorously played "reveille;" a minute later came an equally earnest "assembly," and when "boots and saddles" followed, we knew that all was not well in denmark; the thumping and shaking now had a significance. it meant heavy yankee guns somewhere near. we heard the gunners hitching up; the bugle signal "forward," the wheels roll off, and for a half hour afterwards we caught the receding sound of the bugle commanding "right turn," "left turn," etc., as the batteries marched away. of course, we became considerably wrought up over the matter, as we fancied that, knowing we were in savannah, our vessels were trying to pass up to the city and take it. the thumping and shaking continued until late in the afternoon. we subsequently learned that some of our blockaders, finding time banging heavy upon their hands, had essayed a little diversion by knocking forts jackson and bledsoe--two small forts defending the passage of the savannah--about their defenders' ears. after capturing the forts our folks desisted and came no farther. quite a number of the old raider crowd had come with us from andersonville. among these was the shyster, peter bradley. they kept up their old tactics of hanging around the gates, and currying favor with the rebels in every possible way, in hopes to get paroles outside or other favors. the great mass of the prisoners were so bitter against the rebels as to feel that they would rather die than ask or accept a favor from their hands, and they had little else than contempt for these trucklers. the raider crowd's favorite theme of conversation with the rebels was the strong discontent of the boys with the manner of their treatment by our government. the assertion that there was any such widespread feeling was utterly false. we all had confidence--as we continue to have to this day--that our government would do everything for us possible, consistent with its honor, and the success of military operations, and outside of the little squad of which i speak, not an admission could be extracted from anybody that blame could be attached to any one, except the rebels. it was regarded as unmanly and unsoldier-like to the last degree, as well as senseless, to revile our government for the crimes committed by its foes. but the rebels were led to believe that we were ripe for revolt against our flag, and to side with them. imagine, if possible, the stupidity that would mistake our bitter hatred of those who were our deadly enemies, for any feeling that would lead us to join hands with those enemies. one day we were surprised to see the carpenters erect a rude stand in the center of the camp. when it was finished, bradley appeared upon it, in company with some rebel officers and guards. we gathered around in curiosity, and bradley began making a speech. he said that it had now become apparent to all of us that our government had abandoned us; that it cared little or nothing for us, since it could hire as many more quite readily, by offering a bounty equal to the pay which would be due us now; that it cost only a few hundred dollars to bring over a shipload of irish, "dutch," and french, who were only too glad to agree to fight or do anything else to get to this country. [the peculiar impudence of this consisted in bradley himself being a foreigner, and one who had only come out under one of the later calls, and the influence of a big bounty.] continuing in this strain he repeated and dwelt upon the old lie, always in the mouths of his crowd, that secretary stanton and general halleck had positively refused to enter upon negotiations for exchange, because those in prison were "only a miserable lot of 'coffee-boilers' and 'blackberry pickers,' whom the army was better off without." the terms "coffee-boiler," and "blackberry-pickers" were considered the worst terms of opprobrium we had in prison. they were applied to that class of stragglers and skulkers, who were only too ready to give themselves up to the enemy, and who, on coming in, told some gauzy story about "just having stopped to boil a cup of coffee," or to do something else which they should not have done, when they were gobbled up. it is not risking much to affirm the probability of bradley and most of his crowd having belonged to this dishonorable class. the assertion that either the great chief-of-staff or the still greater war-secretary were even capable of applying such epithets to the mass of prisoners is too preposterous to need refutation, or even denial. no person outside the raider crowd ever gave the silly lie a moment's toleration. bradley concluded his speech in some such language as this: "and now, fellow prisoners, i propose to you this: that we unite in informing our government that unless we are exchanged in thirty days, we will be forced by self-preservation to join the confederate army." for an instant his hearers seemed stunned at the fellow's audacity, and then there went up such a roar of denunciation and execration that the air trembled. the rebels thought that the whole camp was going to rush on bradley and tear him to pieces, and they drew revolvers and leveled muskets to defend him. the uproar only ceased when bradley was hurried out of the prisons but for hours everybody was savage and sullen, and full of threatenings against him, when opportunity served. we never saw him afterward. angry as i was, i could not help being amused at the tempestuous rage of a tall, fine-looking and well educated irish sergeant of an illinois regiment. he poured forth denunciations of the traitor and the rebels, with the vivid fluency of his hibernian nature, vowed he'd "give a year of me life, be j---s, to have the handling of the dirty spalpeen for ten minutes; be g-d," and finally in his rage, tore off his own shirt and threw it on the ground and trampled on it. imagine my astonishment, some time after getting out of prison, to find the southern papers publishing as a defense against the charges in regard to andersonville, the following document, which they claimed to have been adopted by "a mass meeting of the prisoners:" "at a mass meeting held september 28th, 1864, by the federal prisoners confined at savannah, ga., it was unanimously agreed that the following resolutions be sent to the president of the united states, in the hope that he might thereby take such steps as in his wisdom he may think necessary for our speedy exchange or parole: "resolved, that while we would declare our unbounded love for the union, for the home of our fathers, and for the graves of those we venerate, we would beg most respectfully that our situation as prisoners be diligently inquired into, and every obstacle consistent with the honor and dignity of the government at once removed. "resolved, that while allowing the confederate authorities all due praise for the attention paid to prisoners, numbers of our men are daily consigned to early graves, in the prime of manhood, far from home and kindred, and this is not caused intentionally by the confederate government, but by force of circumstances; the prisoners are forced to go without shelter, and, in a great portion of cases, without medicine. "resolved, that, whereas, ten thousand of our brave comrades have descended into an untimely grave within the last six months, and as we believe their death was caused by the difference of climate, the peculiar kind and insufficiency of food, and lack of proper medical treatment; and, whereas, those difficulties still remain, we would declare as our firm belief, that unless we are speedily exchanged, we have no alternative but to share the lamentable fate of our comrades. must this thing still go on! is there no hope? "resolved, that, whereas, the cold and inclement season of the year is fast approaching, we hold it to be our duty as soldiers and citizens of the united states, to inform our government that the majority of our prisoners ate without proper clothing, in some cases being almost naked, and are without blankets to protect us from the scorching sun by day or the heavy dews by night, and we would most respectfully request the government to make some arrangement whereby we can be supplied with these, to us, necessary articles. "resolved, that, whereas, the term of service of many of our comrades having expired, they, having served truly and faithfully for the term of their several enlistments, would most respectfully ask their government, are they to be forgotten? are past services to be ignored? not having seen their wives and little ones for over three years, they would most respectfully, but firmly, request the government to make some arrangements whereby they can be exchanged or paroled. "resolved, that, whereas, in the fortune of war, it was our lot to become prisoners, we have suffered patiently, and are still willing to suffer, if by so doing we can benefit the country; but we must most respectfully beg to say, that we are not willing to suffer to further the ends of any party or clique to the detriment of our honor, our families, and our country, and we beg that this affair be explained to us, that we may continue to hold the government in that respect which is necessary to make a good citizen and soldier. "p. bradley, "chairman of committee in behalf of prisoners." in regard to the above i will simply say this, that while i cannot pretend to know or even much that went on around me, i do not think it was possible for a mass meeting of prisoners to have been held without my knowing it, and its essential features. still less was it possible for a mass meeting to have been held which would have adopted any such a document as the above, or anything else that a rebel would have found the least pleasure in republishing. the whole thing is a brazen falsehood. chapter lv. why we were hurried out of andersonville--the of the fall of atlanta --our longing to hear the news--arrival of some fresh fish--how we knew they were western boys--difference in the appearance of the soldiers of the two armies. the reason of our being hurried out of andersonville under the false pretext of exchange dawned on us before we had been in savannah long. if the reader will consult the map of georgia he will understand this, too. let him remember that several of the railroads which now appear were not built then. the road upon which andersonville is situated was about one hundred and twenty miles long, reaching from macon to americus, andersonville being about midway between these two. it had no connections anywhere except at macon, and it was hundreds of miles across the country from andersonville to any other road. when atlanta fell it brought our folks to within sixty miles of macon, and any day they were liable to make a forward movement, which would capture that place, and have us where we could be retaken with ease. there was nothing left undone to rouse the apprehensions of the rebels in that direction. the humiliating surrender of general stoneman at macon in july, showed them what our, folks were thinking of and awakened their minds to the disastrous consequences of such a movement when executed by a bolder and abler commander. two days of one of kilpatrick's swift, silent marches would carry his hard-riding troopers around hood's right flank, and into the streets of macon, where a half hour's work with the torch on the bridges across the ocmulgee and the creeks that enter it at that point, would have cut all of the confederate army of the tennessee's communications. another day and night of easy marching would bring his guidons fluttering through the woods about the stockade at andersonville, and give him a reinforcement of twelve or fifteen thousand able-bodied soldiers, with whom he could have held the whole valley of the chattahoochie, and become the nether millstone, against which sherman could have ground hood's army to powder. such a thing was not only possible, but very probable, and doubtless would have occurred had we remained in andersonville another week. hence the haste to get us away, and hence the lie about exchange, for, had it not been for this, one-quarter at least of those taken on the cars would have succeeded in getting off and attempted to have reached sherman's lines. the removal went on with such rapidity that by the end of september only eight thousand two hundred and eighteen remained at andersonville, and these were mostly too sick to be moved; two thousand seven hundred died in september, fifteen hundred and sixty in october, and four hundred and eighty-five in november, so that at the beginning of december there were only thirteen hundred and fifty-nine remaining. the larger part of those taken out were sent on to charleston, and subsequently to florence and salisbury. about six or seven thousand of us, as near as i remember, were brought to savannah. ....................... we were all exceedingly anxious to know how the atlanta campaign had ended. so far our information only comprised the facts that a sharp battle had been fought, and the result was the complete possession of our great objective point. the manner of accomplishing this glorious end, the magnitude of the engagement, the regiments, brigades and corps participating, the loss on both sides, the completeness of the victories, etc., were all matters that we knew nothing of, and thirsted to learn. the rebel papers said as little as possible about the capture, and the facts in that little were so largely diluted with fiction as to convey no real information. but few new, prisoners were coming in, and none of these were from sherman. however, toward the last of september, a handful of "fresh fish" were turned inside, whom our experienced eyes instantly told us were western boys. there was never any difficulty in telling, as far as he could be seen, whether a boy belonged to the east or the west. first, no one from the army of the potomac was ever without his corps badge worn conspicuously; it was rare to see such a thing on one of sherman's men. then there was a dressy air about the army of the potomac that was wholly wanting in the soldiers serving west of the alleghanies. the army, of the potomac was always near to its base of supplies, always had its stores accessible, and the care of the clothing and equipments of the men was an essential part of its discipline. a ragged or shabbily dressed man was a rarity. dress coats, paper collars, fresh woolen shirts, neat-fitting pantaloons, good comfortable shoes, and trim caps or hats, with all the blazing brass of company letters an inch long, regimental number, bugle and eagle, according to the regulations, were as common to eastern boys as they were rare among the westerners. the latter usually wore blouses, instead of dress coats, and as a rule their clothing had not been renewed since the opening, of the campaign --and it showed this. those who wore good boots or shoes generally had to submit to forcible exchanges by their captors, and the same was true of head gear. the rebels were badly off in regard to hats. they did not have skill and ingenuity enough to make these out of felt or straw, and the make-shifts they contrived of quilted calico and long-leaved pine, were ugly enough to frighten horned cattle. i never blamed them much for wanting to get rid of these, even if they did have to commit a sort of highway robbery upon defenseless prisoners to do so. to be a traitor in arms was bad certainly, but one never appreciated the entire magnitude of the crime until he saw a rebel wearing a calico or a pine-leaf hat. then one felt as if it would be a great mistake to ever show such a man mercy. the army of northern virginia seemed to have supplied themselves with head-gear of yankee manufacture of previous years, and they then quit taking the hats of their prisoners. johnston's army did not have such good luck, and had to keep plundering to the end of the war. another thing about the army of the potomac was the variety of the uniforms. there were members of zouave regiments, wearing baggy breeches of various hues, gaiters, crimson fezes, and profusely braided jackets. i have before mentioned the queer garb of the "lost ducks." (les enfants perdu, forty-eighth new york.) one of the most striking uniforms was that of the "fourteenth brooklyn." they wore scarlet pantaloons, a blue jacket handsomely braided, and a red fez, with a white cloth wrapped around the head, turban-fashion. as a large number of them were captured, they formed quite a picturesque feature of every crowd. they were generally good fellows and gallant soldiers. another uniform that attracted much, though not so favorable, attention was that of the third new jersey cavalry, or first new jersey hussars, as they preferred to call themselves. the designer of the uniform must have had an interest in a curcuma plantation, or else he was a fanatical orangeman. each uniform would furnish occasion enough for a dozen new york riots on the 12th of july. never was such an eruption of the yellows seen outside of the jaundiced livery of some eastern potentate. down each leg of the pantaloons ran a stripe of yellow braid one and one-half inches wide. the jacket had enormous gilt buttons, and was embellished with yellow braid until it was difficult to tell whether it was blue cloth trimmed with yellow, or yellow adorned with blue. from the shoulders swung a little, false hussar jacket, lined with the same flaring yellow. the vizor-less cap was similarly warmed up with the hue of the perfected sunflower. their saffron magnificence was like the gorgeous gold of the lilies of the field, and solomon in all his glory could not have beau arrayed like one of them. i hope he was not. i want to retain my respect for him. we dubbed these daffodil cavaliers "butterflies," and the name stuck to them like a poor relation. still another distinction that was always noticeable between the two armies was in the bodily bearing of the men. the army of the potomac was drilled more rigidly than the western men, and had comparatively few long marches. its members had something of the stiffness and precision of english and german soldiery, while the western boys had the long, "reachy" stride, and easy swing that made forty miles a day a rather commonplace march for an infantry regiment. this was why we knew the new prisoners to be sherman's boys as soon as they came inside, and we started for them to hear the news. inviting them over to our lean-to, we told them our anxiety for the story of the decisive blow that gave us the central gate of the confederacy, and asked them to give it to us. chapter lvi. what caused the fall of atlanta--a dissertation upon an important psychological problem--the battle of jonesboro--why it was fought --how sherman deceived hood--a desperate bayonet charge, and the only successful one in the atlanta campaign--a gallant colonel and how he died--the heroism of some enlisted men--going calmly into certain death. an intelligent, quick-eyed, sunburned boy, without an ounce of surplus flesh on face or limbs, which had been reduced to gray-hound condition by the labors and anxieties of the months of battling between chattanooga and atlanta, seemed to be the accepted talker of the crowd, since all the rest looked at him, as if expecting him to answer for them. he did so: "you want to know about how we got atlanta at last, do you? well, if you don't know, i should think you would want to. if i didn't, i'd want somebody to tell me all about it just as soon as he could get to me, for it was one of the neatest little bits of work that 'old billy' and his boys ever did, and it got away with hood so bad that he hardly knew what hurt him. "well, first, i'll tell you that we belong to the old fourteenth ohio volunteers, which, if you know anything about the army of the cumberland, you'll remember has just about as good a record as any that trains around old pap thomas--and he don't 'low no slouches of any kind near him, either--you can bet $500 to a cent on that, and offer to give back the cent if you win. ours is jim steedman's old regiment--you've all heard of old chickamauga jim, who slashed his division of 7,000 fresh men into the rebel flank on the second day at chickamauga, in a way that made longstreet wish he'd staid on the rappahannock, and never tried to get up any little sociable with the westerners. if i do say it myself, i believe we've got as good a crowd of square, stand-up, trust'em-everyminute-in-your-life boys, as ever thawed hard-tack and sowbelly. we got all the grunters and weak sisters fanned out the first year, and since then we've been on a business basis, all the time. we're in a mighty good brigade, too. most of the regiments have been with us since we formed the first brigade pap thomas ever commanded, and waded with him through the mud of kentucky, from wild cat to mill springs, where he gave zollicoffer just a little the awfulest thrashing that a rebel general ever got. that, you know, was in january, 1862, and was the first victory gained by the western army, and our people felt so rejoiced over it that--" "yes, yes; we've read all about that," we broke in, "and we'd like to hear it again, some other time; but tell us now about atlanta." "all right. let's see: where was i? o, yes, talking about our brigade. it is the third brigade, of the third division, of the fourteenth corps, and is made up of the fourteenth ohio, thirty-eighth ohio, tenth kentucky, and seventy-fourth indiana. our old colonel--george p. este --commands it. we never liked him very well in camp, but i tell you he's a whole team in a fight, and he'd do so well there that all would take to him again, and he'd be real popular for a while." "now, isn't that strange," broke in andrews, who was given to fits of speculation of psychological phenomena: "none of us yearn to die, but the surest way to gain the affection of the boys is to show zeal in leading them into scrapes where the chances of getting shot are the best. courage in action, like charity, covers a multitude of sins. i have known it to make the most unpopular man in the battalion, the most popular inside of half an hour. now, m.(addressing himself to me,) you remember lieutenant h., of our battalion. you know he was a very fancy young fellow; wore as snipish' clothes as the tailor could make, had gold lace on his jacket wherever the regulations would allow it, decorated his shoulders with the stunningest pair of shoulder knots i ever saw, and so on. well, he did not stay with us long after we went to the front. he went back on a detail for a court martial, and staid a good while. when he rejoined us, he was not in good odor, at all, and the boys weren't at all careful in saying unpleasant things when he could hear them, a little while after he came back we made that reconnaissance up on the virginia road. we stirred up the johnnies with our skirmish line, and while the firing was going on in front we sat on our horses in line, waiting for the order to move forward and engage. you know how solemn such moments are. i looked down the line and saw lieutenant h. at the right of company --, in command of it. i had not seen him since he came back, and i sung out: "'hello, lieutenant, how do you feel?' "the reply came back, promptly, and with boyish cheerfulness: "'bully, by ----; i'm going to lead seventy men of company into action today!' "how his boys did cheer him. when the bugle sounded--'forward, trot,' his company sailed in as if they meant it, and swept the johnnies off in short meter. you never heard anybody say anything against lieutenant after that." "you know how it was with captain g., of our regiment," said one of the fourteenth to another. "he was promoted from orderly sergeant to a second lieutenant, and assigned to company d. all the members of company d went to headquarters in a body, and protested against his being put in their company, and he was not. well, he behaved so well at chickamauga that the boys saw that they had done him a great injustice, and all those that still lived went again to headquarters, and asked to take all back that they had said, and to have him put into the company." "well, that was doing the manly thing, sure; but go on about atlanta." "i was telling about our brigade," resumed the narrator. "of course, we think our regiment's the best by long odds in the army--every fellow thinks that of his regiment--but next to it come the other regiments of our brigade. there's not a cent of discount on any of them. "sherman had stretched out his right away to the south and west of atlanta. about the middle of august our corps, commanded by jefferson c. davis, was lying in works at utoy creek, a couple of miles from atlanta. we could see the tall steeples and the high buildings of the city quite plainly. things had gone on dull and quiet like for about ten days. this was longer by a good deal than we had been at rest since we left resaca in the spring. we knew that something was brewing, and that it must come to a head soon. "i belong to company c. our little mess--now reduced to three by the loss of two of our best soldiers and cooks, disbrow and sulier, killed behind head-logs in front of atlanta, by sharpshooters--had one fellow that we called 'observer,' because he had such a faculty of picking up news in his prowling around headquarters. he brought us in so much of this, and it was generally so reliable that we frequently made up his absence from duty by taking his place. he was never away from a fight, though. on the night of the 25th of august, 'observer' came in with the news that something was in the wind. sherman was getting awful restless, and we had found out that this always meant lots of trouble to our friends on the other side. "sure enough, orders came to get ready to move, and the next night we all moved to the right and rear, out of sight of the johnnies. our well built works were left in charge of garrard's cavalry, who concealed their horses in the rear, and came up and took our places. the whole army except the twentieth corps moved quietly off, and did it so nicely that we were gone some time before the enemy suspected it. then the twentieth corps pulled out towards the north, and fell back to the chattahoochie, making quite a shove of retreat. the rebels snapped up the bait greedily. they thought the siege was being raised, and they poured over their works to hurry the twentieth boys off. the twentieth fellows let them know that there was lots of sting in them yet, and the johnnies were not long in discovering that it would have been money in their pockets if they had let that 'moon-and-star' (that's the twentieth's badge, you know) crowd alone. "but the rebs thought the rest of us were gone for good and that atlanta was saved. naturally they felt mighty happy over it; and resolved to have a big celebration--a ball, a meeting of jubilee, etc. extra trains were run in, with girls and women from the surrounding country, and they just had a high old time. "in the meantime we were going through so many different kinds of tactics that it looked as if sherman was really crazy this time, sure. finally we made a grand left wheel, and then went forward a long way in line of battle. it puzzled us a good deal, but we knew that sherman couldn't get us into any scrape that pap thomas couldn't get us out of, and so it was all right. "along on the evening of the 31st our right wing seemed to have run against a hornet's nest, and we could hear the musketry and cannon speak out real spiteful, but nothing came down our way. we had struck the railroad leading south from atlanta to macon, and began tearing it up. the jollity at atlanta was stopped right in the middle by the appalling news that the yankees hadn't retreated worth a cent, but had broken out in a new and much worse spot than ever. then there was no end of trouble all around, and hood started part of his army back after us. "part of hardee's and pat cleburne's command went into position in front of us. we left them alone till stanley could come up on our left, and swing around, so as to cut off their retreat, when we would bag every one of them. but stanley was as slow as he always was, and did not come up until it was too late, and the game was gone. "the sun was just going down on the evening of the 1st of september, when we began to see we were in for it, sure. the fourteenth corps wheeled into position near the railroad, and the sound of musketry and artillery became very loud and clear on our front and left. we turned a little and marched straight toward the racket, becoming more excited every minute. we saw the carlin's brigade of regulars, who were some distance ahead of us, pile knapsacks, form in line, fix bayonets, and dash off with arousing cheer. "the rebel fire beat upon them like a summer rain-storm, the ground shook with the noise, and just as we reached the edge of the cotton field, we saw the remnant of the brigade come flying back out of the awful, blasting shower of bullets. the whole slope was covered with dead and wounded." "yes," interrupts one of the fourteenth; "and they made that charge right gamely, too, i can tell you. they were good soldiers, and well led. when we went over the works, i remember seeing the body of a little major of one of the regiments lying right on the top. if he hadn't been killed he'd been inside in a half-a-dozen steps more. there's no mistake about it; those regulars will fight." "when we saw this," resumed the narrator, "it set our fellows fairly wild; they became just crying mad; i never saw them so before. the order came to strip for the charge, and our knapsacks were piled in half a minute. a lieutenant of our company, who was then on the staff of gen. baird, our division commander, rode slowly down the line and gave us our instructions to load our guns, fix bayonets, and hold fire until we were on top of the rebel works. then colonel este sang out clear and steady as a bugle signal: "'brigade, forward! guide center! march!!' "and we started. heavens, how they did let into us, as we came up into range. they had ten pieces of artillery, and more men behind the breastworks than we had in line, and the fire they poured on us was simply withering. we walked across the hundreds of dead and dying of the regular brigade, and at every step our own men fell down among them. general baud's horse was shot down, and the general thrown far over his head, but he jumped up and ran alongside of us. major wilson, our regimental commander, fell mortally wounded; lieutenant kirk was killed, and also captain stopfard, adjutant general of the brigade. lieutenants cobb and mitchell dropped with wounds that proved fatal in a few days. captain ugan lost an arm, one-third of the enlisted men fell, but we went straight ahead, the grape and the musketry becoming worse every step, until we gained the edge of the hill, where we were checked a minute by the brush, which the rebels had fixed up in the shape of abattis. just then a terrible fire from a new direction, our left, swept down the whole length of our line. the colonel of the seventeenth new york--as gallant a man as ever lived saw the new trouble, took his regiment in on the run, and relieved us of this, but he was himself mortally wounded. if our boys were half-crazy before, they were frantic now, and as we got out of the entanglement of the brush, we raised a fearful yell and ran at the works. we climbed the sides, fired right down into the defenders, and then began with the bayonet and sword. for a few minutes it was simply awful. on both sides men acted like infuriated devils. they dashed each other's brains out with clubbed muskets; bayonets were driven into men's bodies up to the muzzle of the gun; officers ran their swords through their opponents, and revolvers, after being emptied into the faces of the rebels, were thrown with desperate force into the ranks. in our regiment was a stout german butcher named frank fleck. he became so excited that he threw down his sword, and rushed among the rebels with his bare fists, knocking down a swath of them. he yelled to the first rebel he met: "py gott, i've no patience mit you,' and knocked him sprawling. he caught hold of the commander of the rebel brigade, and snatched him back over the works by main strength. wonderful to say, he escaped unhurt, but the boys will probably not soon let him hear the last of, "py gott, i've no patience mit you.' "the tenth kentucky, by the queerest luck in the world, was matched against the rebel ninth kentucky. the commanders of the two regiments were brothers-in-law, and the men relatives, friends, acquaintances and schoolmates. they hated each other accordingly, and the fight between them was more bitter, if possible, than anywhere else on the line. the thirty-eighth ohio and seventy-fourth indiana put in some work that was just magnificent. we hadn't time to look at it then, but the dead and wounded piled up after the fight told the story. "we gradually forced our way over the works, but the rebels were game to the last, and we had to make them surrender almost one at a time. the artillerymen tried to fire on us when we were so close we could lay our hands on the guns. "finally nearly all in the works surrendered, and were disarmed and marched back. just then an aid came dashing up with the information that we must turn the works, and get ready to receive hardee, who was advancing to retake the position. we snatched up some shovels lying near, and began work. we had no time to remove the dead and dying rebels on the works, and the dirt we threw covered them up. it proved a false alarm. hardee had as much as he could do to save his own hide, and the affair ended about dark. "when we came to count up what we had gained, we found that we had actually taken more prisoners from behind breastworks than there were in our brigade when we started the charge. we had made the only really successful bayonet charge of the campaign. every other time since we left chattanooga the party standing on the defensive had been successful. here we had taken strong double lines, with ten guns, seven battle flags, and over two thousand prisoners. we had lost terribly--not less than one-third of the brigade, and many of our best men. our regiment went into the battle with fifteen officers; nine of these were killed or wounded, and seven of the nine lost either their limbs or lives. the thirty-eighth ohio, and the other regiments of the brigade lost equally heavy. we thought chickamauga awful, but jonesboro discounted it." "do you know," said another of the fourteenth, "i heard our surgeon telling about how that colonel grower, of the seventeenth new york, who came in so splendidly on our left, died? they say he was a wall street broker, before the war. he was hit shortly after he led his regiment in, and after the fight, was carried back to the hospital. while our surgeon was going the rounds colonel grower called him, and said quietly, 'when you get through with the men, come and see me, please.' "the doctor would have attended to him then, but grower wouldn't let him. after he got through he went back to grower, examined his wound, and told him that he could only live a few hours. grower received the news tranquilly, had the doctor write a letter to his wife, and gave him his things to send her, and then grasping the doctor's hand, he said: "doctor, i've just one more favor to ask; will you grant it?' "the doctor said, 'certainly; what is it?' "you say i can't live but a few hours?' "yes; that is true.' "and that i will likely be in great pain!' "i am sorry to say so.' "well, then, do give me morphia enough to put me to sleep, so that i will wake up only in another world.' "the doctor did so; colonel grower thanked him; wrung his hand, bade him good-by, and went to sleep to wake no more." "do you believe in presentiments and superstitions?" said another of the fourteenth. there was fisher pray, orderly sergeant of company i. he came from waterville, o., where his folks are now living. the day before we started out he had a presentiment that we were going into a fight, and that he would be killed. he couldn't shake it off. he told the lieutenant, and some of the boys about it, and they tried to ridicule him out of it, but it was no good. when the sharp firing broke out in front some of the boys said, 'fisher, i do believe you are right,' and he nodded his head mournfully. when we were piling knapsacks for the charge, the lieutenant, who was a great friend of fisher's, said: "fisher, you stay here and guard the knapsacks.' "fisher's face blazed in an instant. "no, sir,' said he; i never shirked a fight yet, and i won't begin now.' "so he went into the fight, and was killed, as he knew he would be. now, that's what i call nerve." "the same thing was true of sergeant arthur tarbox, of company a," said the narrator; "he had a presentiment, too; he knew he was going to be killed, if he went in, and he was offered an honorable chance to stay out, but he would not take it, and went in and was killed." "well, we staid there the next day, buried our dead, took care of our wounded, and gathered up the plunder we had taken from the johnnies. the rest of the army went off, 'hot blocks,' after hardee and the rest of hood's army, which it was hoped would be caught outside of entrenchments. but hood had too much the start, and got into the works at lovejoy, ahead of our fellows. the night before we heard several very loud explosions up to the north. we guessed what that meant, and so did the twentieth corps, who were lying back at the chattahoochee, and the next morning the general commanding--slocum--sent out a reconnaissance. it was met by the mayor of atlanta, who said that the rebels had blown up their stores and retreated. the twentieth corps then came in and took 'possession of the city, and the next day--the 3d--sherman came in, and issued an order declaring the campaign at an end, and that we would rest awhile and refit. "we laid around atlanta a good while, and things quieted down so that it seemed almost like peace, after the four months of continual fighting we had gone through. we had been under a strain so long that now we boys went in the other direction, and became too careless, and that's how we got picked up. we went out about five miles one night after a lot of nice smoked hams that a nigger told us were stored in an old cotton press, and which we knew would be enough sight better eating for company c, than the commissary pork we had lived on so long. we found the cotton press, and the hams, just as the nigger told us, and we hitched up a team to take them into camp. as we hadn't seen any johnny signs anywhere, we set our guns down to help load the meat, and just as we all came stringing out to the wagon with as much meat as we could carry, a company of ferguson's cavalry popped out of the woods about one hundred yards in front of us and were on top of us before we could say i scat. you see they'd heard of the meat, too." chapter lvii. a fair sacrifice--the story of one boy who willingly gave his young life for his country. charley barbour was one of the truest-hearted and best-liked of my school-boy chums and friends. for several terms we sat together on the same uncompromisingly uncomfortable bench, worried over the same boy-maddening problems in "ray's arithmetic-part iii.," learned the same jargon of meaningless rules from "greene's grammar," pondered over "mitchell's geography and atlas," and tried in vain to understand why providence made the surface of one state obtrusively pink and another ultramarine blue; trod slowly and painfully over the rugged road "bullion" points out for beginners in latin, and began to believe we should hate ourselves and everybody else, if we were gotten up after the manner shown by "cutter's physiology." we were caught together in the same long series of school-boy scrapes--and were usually ferruled together by the same strong-armed teacher. we shared nearly everything --our fun and work; enjoyment and annoyance--all were generally meted out to us together. we read from the same books the story of the wonderful world we were going to see in that bright future "when we were men;" we spent our saturdays and vacations in the miniature explorations of the rocky hills and caves, and dark cedar woods around our homes, to gather ocular helps to a better comprehension of that magical land which we were convinced began just beyond our horizon, and had in it, visible to the eye of him who traveled through its enchanted breadth, all that "gulliver's fables," the "arabian nights," and a hundred books of travel and adventure told of. we imagined that the only dull and commonplace spot on earth was that where we lived. everywhere else life was a grand spectacular drama, full of thrilling effects. brave and handsome young men were rescuing distressed damsels, beautiful as they were wealthy; bloody pirates and swarthy murderers were being foiled by quaint spoken backwoodsmen, who carried unerring rifles; gallant but blundering irishmen, speaking the most delightful brogue, and making the funniest mistakes, were daily thwarting cool and determined villains; bold tars were encountering fearful sea perils; lionhearted adventurers were cowing and quelling whole tribes of barbarians; magicians were casting spells, misers hoarding gold, scientists making astonishing discoveries, poor and unknown boys achieving wealth and fame at a single bound, hidden mysteries coming to light, and so the world was going on, making reams of history with each diurnal revolution, and furnishing boundless material for the most delightful books. at the age of thirteen a perusal of the lives of benjamin franklin and horace greeley precipitated my determination to no longer hesitate in launching my small bark upon the great ocean. i ran away from home in a truly romantic way, and placed my foot on what i expected to be the first round of the ladder of fame, by becoming "devil boy" in a printing office in a distant large city. charley's attachment to his mother and his home was too strong to permit him to take this step, and we parted in sorrow, mitigated on my side by roseate dreams of the future. six years passed. one hot august morning i met an old acquaintance at the creek, in andersonville. he told me to come there the next morning, after roll-call, and he would take me to see some person who was very anxious to meet me. i was prompt at the rendezvous, and was soon joined by the other party. he threaded his way slowly for over half an hour through the closely-jumbled mass of tents and burrows, and at length stopped in front of a blanket-tent in the northwestern corner. the occupant rose and took my hand. for an instant i was puzzled; then the clear, blue eyes, and well-remembered smile recalled to me my old-time comrade, charley barbour. his story was soon told. he was a sergeant in a western virginia cavalry regiment--the fourth, i think. at the time hunter was making his retreat from the valley of virginia, it was decided to mislead the enemy by sending out a courier with false dispatches to be captured. there was a call for a volunteer for this service. charley was the first to offer, with that spirit of generous self-sacrifice that was one of his pleasantest traits when a boy. he knew what he had to expect. capture meant imprisonment at andersonville; our men had now a pretty clear understanding of what this was. charley took the dispatches and rode into the enemy's lines. he was taken, and the false information produced the desired effect. on his way to andersonville he was stripped of all his clothing but his shirt and pantaloons, and turned into the stockade in this condition. when i saw him he had been in a week or more. he told his story quietly--almost diffidently--not seeming aware that he had done more than his simple duty. i left him with the promise and expectation of returning the next day, but when i attempted to find him again, i was lost in the maze of tents and burrows. i had forgotten to ask the number of his detachment, and after spending several days in hunting for him, i was forced to give the search up. he knew as little of my whereabouts, and though we were all the time within seventeen hundred feet of each other, neither we nor our common acquaintance could ever manage to meet again. this will give the reader an idea of the throng compressed within the narrow limits of the stockade. after leaving andersonville, however, i met this man once more, and learned from him that charley had sickened and died within a month after his entrance to prison. so ended his day-dream of a career in the busy world. chapter lviii. we leave savannah--more hopes of exchange--scenes at departure --"flankers"--on the back track toward andersonville--alarm thereat --at the parting of two ways--we finally bring up at camp lawton. on the evening of the 11th of october there came an order for one thousand prisoners to fall in and march out, for transfer to some other point. of course, andrews and i "flanked" into this crowd. that was our usual way of doing. holding that the chances were strongly in favor of every movement of prisoners being to our lines, we never failed to be numbered in the first squad of prisoners that were sent out. the seductive mirage of "exchange" was always luring us on. it must come some time, certainly, and it would be most likely to come to those who were most earnestly searching for it. at all events, we should leave no means untried to avail ourselves of whatever seeming chances there might be. there could be no other motive for this move, we argued, than exchange. the confederacy was not likely to be at the trouble and expense of hauling us about the country without some good reason--something better than a wish to make us acquainted with southern scenery and topography. it would hardly take us away from savannah so soon after bringing us there for any other purpose than delivery to our people. the rebels encouraged this belief with direct assertions of its truth. they framed a plausible lie about there having arisen some difficulty concerning the admission of our vessels past the harbor defenses of savannah, which made it necessary to take us elsewhere--probably to charleston--for delivery to our men. wishes are always the most powerful allies of belief. there is little difficulty in convincing a man of that of which he wants to be convinced. we forgot the lie told us when we were taken from andersonville, and believed the one which was told us now. andrews and i hastily snatched our worldly possessions--our overcoat, blanket, can, spoon, chessboard and men, yelled to some of our neighbors that they could have our hitherto much-treasured house, and running down to the gate, forced ourselves well up to the front of the crowd that was being assembled to go out. the usual scenes accompanying the departure of first squads were being acted tumultuously. every one in the camp wanted to be one of the supposed-to-be-favored few, and if not selected at first, tried to "flank in"--that is, slip into the place of some one else who had had better luck. this one naturally resisted displacement, 'vi et armis,' and the fights would become so general as to cause a resemblance to the famed fair of donnybrook. the cry would go up: "look out for flankers!" the lines of the selected would dress up compactly, and outsiders trying to force themselves in would get mercilessly pounded. we finally got out of the pen, and into the cars, which soon rolled away to the westward. we were packed in too densely to be able to lie down. we could hardly sit down. andrews and i took up our position in one corner, piled our little treasures under us, and trying to lean against each other in such a way as to afford mutual support and rest, dozed fitfully through a long, weary night. when morning came we found ourselves running northwest through a poor, pine-barren country that strongly resembled that we had traversed in coming to savannah. the more we looked at it the more familiar it became, and soon there was no doubt we were going back to andersonville. by noon we had reached millen--eighty miles from savannah, and fifty-three from augusta. it was the junction of the road leading to macon and that running to augusta. we halted a little while at the "y," and to us the minutes were full of anxiety. if we turned off to the left we were going back to andersonville. if we took the right hand road we were on the way to charleston or richmond, with the chances in favor of exchange. at length we started, and, to our joy, our engine took the right hand track. we stopped again, after a run of five miles, in the midst of one of the open, scattering forests of long leaved pine that i have before described. we were ordered out of the cars, and marching a few rods, came in sight of another of those hateful stockades, which seemed to be as natural products of the sterile sand of that dreary land as its desolate woods and its breed of boy murderers and gray-headed assassins. again our hearts sank, and death seemed more welcome than incarceration in those gloomy wooden walls. we marched despondently up to the gates of the prison, and halted while a party of rebel clerks made a list of our names, rank, companies, and regiments. as they were rebels it was slow work. reading and writing never came by nature, as dogberry would say, to any man fighting for secession. as a rule, he took to them as reluctantly as if, he thought them cunning inventions of the northern abolitionist to perplex and demoralize him. what a half-dozen boys taken out of our own ranks would have done with ease in an hour or so, these rebels worried over all of the afternoon, and then their register of us was so imperfect, badly written and misspelled, that the yankee clerks afterwards detailed for the purpose, never could succeed in reducing it to intelligibility. we learned that the place at which we had arrived was camp lawton, but we almost always spoke of it as "millen," the same as camp sumter is universally known as andersonville. shortly after dark we were turned inside the stockade. being the first that had entered, there was quite a quantity of wood--the offal from the timber used in constructing the stockade--lying on the ground. the night was chilly one we soon had a number of fires blazing. green pitch pine, when burned, gives off a peculiar, pungent odor, which is never forgotten by one who has once smelled it. i first became acquainted with it on entering andersonville, and to this day it is the most powerful remembrance i can have of the opening of that dreadful iliad of woes. on my journey to washington of late years the locomotives are invariably fed with pitch pine as we near the capital, and as the well-remembered smell reaches me, i grow sick at heart with the flood of saddening recollections indissolubly associated with it. as our fires blazed up the clinging, penetrating fumes diffused themselves everywhere. the night was as cool as the one when we arrived at andersonville, the earth, meagerly sodded with sparse, hard, wiry grass, was the same; the same piney breezes blew in from the surrounding trees, the same dismal owls hooted at us; the same mournful whip-poor-will lamented, god knows what, in the gathering twilight. what we both felt in the gloomy recesses of downcast hearts andrews expressed as he turned to me with: "my god, mc, this looks like andersonville all over again." a cupful of corn meal was issued to each of us. i hunted up some water. andrews made a stiff dough, and spread it about half an inch thick on the back of our chessboard. he propped this up before the fire, and when the surface was neatly browned over, slipped it off the board and turned it over to brown the other side similarly. this done, we divided it carefully between us, swallowed it in silence, spread our old overcoat on the ground, tucked chess-board, can, and spoon under far enough to be out of the reach of thieves, adjusted the thin blanket so as to get the most possible warmth out of it, crawled in close together, and went to sleep. this, thank heaven, we could do; we could still sleep, and nature had some opportunity to repair the waste of the day. we slept, and forgot where we were. chapter lix. our new quarters at camp lawton--building a hut--an exceptional commandant--he is a good man, but will take bribes--rations. in the morning we took a survey of our new quarters, and found that we were in a stockade resembling very much in construction and dimensions that at andersonville. the principal difference was that the upright logs were in their rough state, whereas they were hewed at andersonville, and the brook running through the camp was not bordered by a swamp, but had clean, firm banks. our next move was to make the best of the situation. we were divided into hundreds, each commanded by a sergeant. ten hundreds constituted a division, the head of which was also a sergeant. i was elected by my comrades to the sergeantcy of the second hundred of the first division. as soon as we were assigned to our ground, we began constructing shelter. for the first and only time in my prison experience, we found a full supply of material for this purpose, and the use we made of it showed how infinitely better we would have fared if in each prison the rebels had done even so slight a thing as to bring in a few logs from the surrounding woods and distribute them to us. a hundred or so of these would probably have saved thousands of lives at andersonville and florence. a large tree lay on the ground assigned to our hundred. andrews and i took possession of one side of the ten feet nearest the butt. other boys occupied the rest in a similar manner. one of our boys had succeeded in smuggling an ax in with him, and we kept it in constant use day and night, each group borrowing it for an hour or so at a time. it was as dull as a hoe, and we were very weak, so that it was slow work "niggering off"--(as the boys termed it) a cut of the log. it seemed as if beavers could have gnawed it off easier and more quickly. we only cut an inch or so at a time, and then passed the ax to the next users. making little wedges with a dull knife, we drove them into the log with clubs, and split off long, thin strips, like the weatherboards of a house, and by the time we had split off our share of the log in this slow and laborious way, we had a fine lot of these strips. we were lucky enough to find four forked sticks, of which we made the corners of our dwelling, and roofed it carefully with our strips, held in place by sods torn up from the edge of the creek bank. the sides and ends were enclosed; we gathered enough pine tops to cover the ground to a depth of several inches; we banked up the outside, and ditched around it, and then had the most comfortable abode we had during our prison career. it was truly a house builded with our own hands, for we had no tools whatever save the occasional use of the aforementioned dull axe and equally dull knife. the rude little hut represented as much actual hard, manual labor as would be required to build a comfortable little cottage in the north, but we gladly performed it, as we would have done any other work to better our condition. for a while wood was quite plentiful, and we had the luxury daily of warm fires, which the increasing coolness of the weather made important accessories to our comfort. other prisoners kept coming in. those we left behind at savannah followed us, and the prison there was broken up. quite a number also came in from--andersonville, so that in a little while we had between six and seven thousand in the stockade. the last comers found all the material for tents and all the fuel used up, and consequently did not fare so well as the earlier arrivals. the commandant of the prison--one captain bowes--was the best of his class it was my fortune to meet. compared with the senseless brutality of wirz, the reckless deviltry of davis, or the stupid malignance of barrett, at florence, his administration was mildness and wisdom itself. he enforced discipline better than any of those named, but has what they all lacked--executive ability--and he secured results that they could not possibly attain, and without anything, like the friction that attended their efforts. i do not remember that any one was shot during our six weeks' stay at millen--a circumstance simply remarkable, since i do not recall a single week passed anywhere else without at least one murder by the guards. one instance will illustrate the difference of his administration from that of other prison commandants. he came upon the grounds of our division one morning, accompanied by a pleasant-faced, intelligent-appearing lad of about fifteen or sixteen. he said to us: "gentlemen: (the only instance during our imprisonment when we received so polite a designation.) this is my son, who will hereafter call your roll. he will treat you as gentlemen, and i know you will do the same to him." this understanding was observed to the letter on both sides. young bowes invariably spoke civilly to us, and we obeyed his orders with a prompt cheerfulness that left him nothing to complain of. the only charge i have to make against bowes is made more in detail in another chapter, and that is, that he took money from well prisoners for giving them the first chance to go through on the sick exchange. how culpable this was i must leave each reader to decide for himself. i thought it very wrong at the time, but possibly my views might have been colored highly by my not having any money wherewith to procure my own inclusion in the happy lot of the exchanged. of one thing i am certain: that his acceptance of money to bias his official action was not singular on his part. i am convinced that every commandant we had over us--except wirz--was habitually in the receipt of bribes from prisoners. i never heard that any one succeeded in bribing wirz, and this is the sole good thing i can say of that fellow. against this it may be said, however, that he plundered the boys so effectually on entering the prison as to leave them little of the wherewithal to bribe anybody. davis was probably the most unscrupulous bribe-taker of the lot. he actually received money for permitting prisoners to escape to our lines, and got down to as low a figure as one hundred dollars for this sort of service. i never heard that any of the other commandants went this far. the rations issued to us were somewhat better than those of andersonville, as the meal was finer and better, though it was absurdedly insufficient in quantity, and we received no salt. on several occasions fresh beef was dealt out to us, and each time the excitement created among those who had not tasted fresh meat for weeks and months was wonderful. on the first occasion the meat was simply the heads of the cattle killed for the use of the guards. several wagon loads of these were brought in and distributed. we broke them up so that every man got a piece of the bone, which was boiled and reboiled, as long as a single bubble of grease would rise to the surface of the water; every vestige of meat was gnawed and scraped from the surface and then the bone was charred until it crumbled, when it was eaten. no one who has not experienced it can imagine the inordinate hunger for animal food of those who had eaten little else than corn bread for so long. our exhausted bodies were perishing for lack of proper sustenance. nature indicated fresh beef as the best medium to repair the great damage already done, and our longing for it became beyond description. chapter lx. the raiders reappear on the scene--the attempt to assassinate those who were concerned in the execution--a couple of lively fights, in which the raiders are defeated--holding an election. our old antagonists--the raiders--were present in strong force in millen. like ourselves, they had imagined the departure from andersonville was for exchange, and their relations to the rebels were such that they were all given a chance to go with the first squads. a number had been allowed to go with the sailors on the special naval exchange from savannah, in the place of sailors and marines who had died. on the way to charleston a fight had taken place between them and the real sailors, during which one of their number--a curly-headed irishman named dailey, who was in such high favor with the rebels that he was given the place of driving the ration wagon that came in the north side at andersonville --was killed, and thrown under the wheels of the moving train, which passed over him. after things began to settle into shape at millen, they seemed to believe that they were in such ascendancy as to numbers and organization that they could put into execution their schemes of vengeance against those of us who had been active participants in the execution of their confederates at andersonville. after some little preliminaries they settled upon corporal "wat" payne, of my company, as their first victim. the reader will remember payne as one of the two corporals who pulled the trigger to the scaffold at the time of the execution. payne was a very good man physically, and was yet in fair condition. the raiders came up one day with their best man--pete donnelly--and provoked a fight, intending, in the course of it, to kill payne. we, who knew payee, felt reasonably confident of his ability to handle even so redoubtable a pugilist as donnelly, and we gathered together a little squad of our friends to see fair play. the fight began after the usual amount of bad talk on both sides, and we were pleased to see our man slowly get the better of the new york plug-ugly. after several sharp rounds they closed, and still payne was ahead, but in an evil moment he spied a pine knot at his feet, which he thought he could reach, and end the fight by cracking donnelly's head with it. donnelly took instant advantage of the movement to get it, threw payne heavily, and fell upon him. his crowd rushed in to finish our man by clubbing him over the head. we sailed in to prevent this, and after a rattling exchange of blows all around, succeeded in getting payne away. the issue of the fight seemed rather against us, however, and the raiders were much emboldened. payne kept close to his crowd after that, and as we had shown such an entire willingness to stand by him, the raiders --with their accustomed prudence when real fighting was involved--did not attempt to molest him farther, though they talked very savagely. a few days after this sergeant goody and corporal ned carrigan, both of our battalion, came in. i must ask the reader to again recall the fact that sergeant goody was one of the six hangmen who put the meal-sacks over the heads, and the ropes around the necks of the condemned. corporal carrigan was the gigantic prize fighter, who was universally acknowledged to be the best man physically among the whole thirty-four thousand in andersonville. the raiders knew that goody had come in before we of his own battalion did. they resolved to kill him then and there, and in broad daylight. he had secured in some way a shelter tent, and was inside of it fixing it up. the raider crowd, headed by pete donnelly, and dick allen, went up to his tent and one of them called to him: "sergeant, come out; i want to see you." goody, supposing it was one of us, came crawling out on his hands and knees. as he did so their heavy clubs crashed down upon his head. he was neither killed nor stunned, as they had reason to expect. he succeeded in rising to his feet, and breaking through the crowd of assassins. he dashed down the side of the hill, hotly pursued by them. coming to the creek, he leaped it in his excitement, but his pursuers could not, and were checked. one of our battalion boys, who saw and comprehended the whole affair, ran over to us, shouting: "turn out! turn out, for god's sake! the raiders are killing goody!" we snatched up our clubs and started after the raiders, but before we could reach them, ned carrigan, who also comprehended what the trouble was, had run to the side of goody, armed with a terrible looking club. the sight of ned, and the demonstration that he was thoroughly aroused, was enough for the raider crew, and they abandoned the field hastily. we did not feel ourselves strong enough to follow them on to their own dung hill, and try conclusions with them, but we determined to report the matter to the rebel commandant, from whom we had reason to believe we could expect assistance. we were right. he sent in a squad of guards, arrested dick allen, pete donnelly, and several other ringleaders, took them out and put them in the stocks in such a manner that they were compelled to lie upon their stomachs. a shallow tin vessel containing water was placed under their faces to furnish them drink. they staid there a day and night, and when released, joined the rebel army, entering the artillery company that manned the guns in the fort covering the prison. i used to imagine with what zeal they would send us over; a round of shell or grape if they could get anything like an excuse. this gave us good riddance--of our dangerous enemies, and we had little further trouble with any of them. the depression in the temperature made me very sensible of the deficiencies in my wardrobe. unshod feet, a shirt like a fishing net, and pantaloons as well ventilated as a paling fence might do very well for the broiling sun at andersonville and savannah, but now, with the thermometer nightly dipping a little nearer the frost line, it became unpleasantly evident that as garments their office was purely perfunctory; one might say ornamental simply, if he wanted to be very sarcastic. they were worn solely to afford convenient quarters for multitudes of lice, and in deference to the prejudice which has existed since the fall of man against our mingling with our fellow creatures in the attire provided us by nature. had i read darwin then i should have expected that my long exposure to the weather would start a fine suit of fur, in the effort of nature to adapt me to my environment. but no more indications of this appeared than if i had been a hairless dog of mexico, suddenly transplanted to more northern latitudes. providence did not seem to be in the tempering-the-wind-to-the-shorn-lamb business, as far as i was concerned. i still retained an almost unconquerable prejudice against stripping the dead to secure clothes, and so unless exchange or death came speedily, i was in a bad fix. one morning about day break, andrews, who had started to go to another part of the camp, came slipping back in a state of gleeful excitement. at first i thought he either had found a tunnel or had heard some good news about exchange. it was neither. he opened his jacket and handed me an infantry man's blouse, which he had found in the main street, where it had dropped out of some fellow's bundle. we did not make any extra exertion to find the owner. andrews was in sore need of clothes himself, but my necessities were so much greater that the generous fellow thought of my wants first. we examined the garment with as much interest as ever a belle bestowed on a new dress from worth's. it was in fair preservation, but the owner had cut the buttons off to trade to the guard, doubtless for a few sticks of wood, or a spoonful of salt. we supplied the place of these with little wooden pins, and i donned the garment as a shirt and coat and vest, too, for that matter. the best suit i ever put on never gave me a hundredth part the satisfaction that this did. shortly after, i managed to subdue my aversion so far as to take a good shoe which a one-legged dead man had no farther use for, and a little later a comrade gave me for the other foot a boot bottom from which he had cut the top to make a bucket. ........................... the day of the presidential election of 1864 approached. the rebels were naturally very much interested in the result, as they believed that the election of mcclellan meant compromise and cessation of hostilities, while the re-election of lincoln meant prosecution of the war to the bitter end. the toadying raiders, who were perpetually hanging around the gate to get a chance to insinuate themselves into the favor of the rebel officers, persuaded them that we were all so bitterly hostile to our government for not exchanging us that if we were allowed to vote we would cast an overwhelming majority in favor of mcclellan. the rebels thought that this might perhaps be used to advantage as political capital for their friends in the north. they gave orders that we might, if we chose, hold an election on the same day of the presidential election. they sent in some ballot boxes, and we elected judges of the election. about noon of that day captain bowes, and a crowd of tightbooted, broad-hatted rebel officers, strutted in with the peculiar "ef-yer-don'tb'lieve--i'm-a-butcher-jest-smell-o'-mebutes" swagger characteristic of the class. they had come in to see us all voting for mcclellan. instead, they found the polls surrounded with ticket pedlers shouting: "walk right up here now, and get your unconditional-union-abraham-lincoln -tickets!" "here's your straight-haired prosecution-of-the-war ticket." "vote the lincoln ticket; vote to whip the rebels, and make peace with them when they've laid down their arms." "don't vote a mcclellan ticket and gratify rebels, everywhere," etc. the rebel officers did not find the scene what their fancy painted it, and turning around they strutted out. when the votes came to be counted out there were over seven thousand for lincoln, and not half that many hundred for mcclellan. the latter got very few votes outside the raider crowd. the same day a similar election was held in florence, with like result. of course this did not indicate that there was any such a preponderance of republicans among us. it meant simply that the democratic boys, little as they might have liked lincoln, would have voted for him a hundred times rather than do anything to please the rebels. i never heard that the rebels sent the result north. chapter lxi. the rebels formally propose to us to desert to them--contumelious treatment of the proposition--their rage--an exciting time--an outbreak threatened--difficulties attending desertion to the rebels. one day in november, some little time after the occurrences narrated in the last chapter, orders came in to make out rolls of all those who were born outside of the united states, and whose terms of service had expired. we held a little council among ourselves as to the meaning of this, and concluded that some partial exchange had been agreed on, and the rebels were going to send back the class of boys whom they thought would be of least value to the government. acting on this conclusion the great majority of us enrolled ourselves as foreigners, and as having served out our terms. i made out the roll of my hundred, and managed to give every man a foreign nativity. those whose names would bear it were assigned to england, ireland, scotland france and germany, and the balance were distributed through canada and the west indies. after finishing the roll and sending it out, i did not wonder that the rebels believed the battles for the union were fought by foreign mercenaries. the other rolls were made out in the same way, and i do not suppose that they showed five hundred native americans in the stockade. the next day after sending out the rolls, there came an order that all those whose names appeared thereon should fall in. we did so, promptly, and as nearly every man in camp was included, we fell in as for other purposes, by hundreds and thousands. we were then marched outside, and massed around a stump on which stood a rebel officer, evidently waiting to make us a speech. we awaited his remarks with the greatest impatience, but he did not begin until the last division had marched out and came to a parade rest close to the stump. it was the same old story: "prisoners, you can no longer have any doubt that your government has cruelly abandoned you; it makes no efforts to release you, and refuses all our offers of exchange. we are anxious to get our men back, and have made every effort to do so, but it refuses to meet us on any reasonable grounds. your secretary of war has said that the government can get along very well without you, and general halleck has said that you were nothing but a set of blackberry pickers and coffee boilers anyhow. "you've already endured much more than it could expect of you; you served it faithfully during the term you enlisted for, and now, when it is through with you, it throws you aside to starve and die. you also can have no doubt that the southern confederacy is certain to succeed in securing its independence. it will do this in a few months. it now offers you an opportunity to join its service, and if you serve it faithfully to the end, you will receive the same rewards as the rest of its soldiers. you will be taken out of here, be well clothed and fed, given a good bounty, and, at the conclusion of the war receive a land warrant for a nice farm. if you"-but we had heard enough. the sergeant of our division--a man with a stentorian voice sprang out and shouted: "attention, first division!" we sergeants of hundreds repeated the command down the line. shouted he: "first division, about--" said we: "first hundred, about--" "second hundred, about--" "third hundred, about--" "fourth hundred, about--" etc., etc. said he:-"face!!" ten sergeants repeated "face!" one after the other, and each man in the hundreds turned on his heel. then our leader commanded-"first division, forward! march!" and we strode back into the stockade, followed immediately by all the other divisions, leaving the orator still standing on the stump. the rebels were furious at this curt way of replying. we had scarcely reached our quarters when they came in with several companies, with loaded guns and fixed bayonets. they drove us out of our tents and huts, into one corner, under the pretense of hunting axes and spades, but in reality to steal our blankets, and whatever else they could find that they wanted, and to break down and injure our huts, many of which, costing us days of patient labor, they destroyed in pure wantonness. we were burning with the bitterest indignation. a tall, slender man named lloyd, a member of the sixty-first ohio--a rough, uneducated fellow, but brim full of patriotism and manly common sense, jumped up on a stump and poured out his soul in rude but fiery eloquence: "comrades," he said, "do not let the blowing of these rebel whelps discourage you; pay no attention to the lies they have told you to-day; you know well that our government is too honorable and just to desert any one who serves it; it has not deserted us; their hell-born confederacy is not going to succeed. i tell you that as sure as there is a god who reigns and judges in israel, before the spring breezes stir the tops of these blasted old pines their confederacy and all the lousy graybacks who support it will be so deep in hell that nothing but a search warrant from the throne of god almighty can ever find it again. and the glorious old stars and stripes--" here we began cheering tremendously. a rebel captain came running up, said to the guard, who was leaning on his gun, gazing curiously at lloyd: "what in ---are you standing gaping there for? why don't you shoot the ------yankee son---------?" and snatching the gun away from him, cocked and leveled it at lloyd, but the boys near jerked the speaker down from the stump and saved his life. we became fearfully, wrought up. some of the more excitable shouted out to charge on the line of guards, snatch they guns away from them, and force our way through the gate the shouts were taken up by others, and, as if in obedience to the suggestion, we instinctively formed in line-of-battle facing the guards. a glance down the line showed me an array of desperate, tensely drawn faces, such as one sees who looks a men when they are summoning up all their resolution for some deed of great peril. the rebel officers hastily retreated behind the line of guards, whose faces blanched, but they leveled the muskets and prepared to receive us. captain bowes, who was overlooking the prison from an elevation outside, had, however, divined the trouble at the outset, an was preparing to meet it. the gunners, who had shotted the pieces and trained them upon us when we came out to listen t the speech, had again covered us with them, and were ready to sweep the prison with grape and canister at the instant of command. the long roll was summoning the infantry regiments back into line, and some of the cooler-headed among us pointed these facts out and succeeded in getting the line to dissolve again into groups of muttering, sullen-faced men. when this was done, the guards marched out, by a cautious indirect maneuver, so as not to turn their backs to us. it was believed that we had some among us who would like to avail themselves of the offer of the rebels, and that they would try to inform the rebels of their desires by going to the gate during the night and speaking to the officer-of-the-guard. a squad armed themselves with clubs and laid in wait for these. they succeeded in catching several --snatching some of then back even after they had told the guard their wishes in a tone so loud that all near could hear distinctly. the officer-of-the-guard rushed in two or three times in a vain attempt to save the would be deserter from the cruel hands that clutched him and bore him away to where he had a lesson in loyalty impressed upon the fleshiest part of his person by a long, flexible strip of pine wielded by very willing hands. after this was kept up for several nights different ideas began i to prevail. it was felt that if a man wanted to join the rebels, the best way was to let him go and get rid of him. he was of no benefit to the government, and would be of none to the rebels. after this no restriction was put upon any one who desired to go outside and take the oath. but very few did so, however, and these were wholly confined to the raider crowd. produced from images generously made available by the library of congress.) doctor quintard, chaplain c.s.a. and second bishop of tennessee doctor quintard chaplain c.s.a. and second bishop of tennessee being his story of the war (1861-1865) edited and extended by the rev. arthur howard noll _historiographer of the diocese of tennessee, author of "history of the church in the diocese of tennessee," etc._ the university press of sewanee tennessee 1905 to the friends and comrades of doctor quintard in the army of the confederacy and in the church militant these memoirs of his life in war times- extended to include an account of his work for the upbuilding of the church in tennessee and for the advancement of christian education in the south--are most affectionately dedicated [illustration: charles quintard.] preface the chapters of this volume containing the memoirs of the war were written by bishop quintard about the year 1896 and are to be read with that date in mind. the work of the editor thereon has been devoted to bringing them into conformity with a plan agreed upon in personal interviews with bishop quintard about that time. in the first and in the last two chapters of the book the editor has drawn freely, even to the extent of transcribing entire sentences and paragraphs, upon the bishop's own addresses in the diocesan journals of tennessee; upon memorial addresses by his successor, the rt. rev. dr. gailor; upon material used in some of the chapters of the editor's "history of the church in the diocese of tennessee;" and upon documents preserved in the archives of the university of the south. thanks are due to the rev. bartow b. ramage, the rev. rowland hale and mr. george e. purvis, among others, for valuable assistance in the original preparation of the memoirs. a. h. n. _sewanee, tennessee,_ _may, 1905._ contents i. introduction 1 ii. personal narrative--the beginning of the war and valley mountain 10 iii. personal narrative--big sewell mountain, winchester and romney 31 iv. personal narrative--norfolk 43 v. personal narrative--perryville 50 vi. personal narrative--murfreesboro 64 vii. personal narrative--shelbyville 69 viii. personal narrative--a dramatic episode 83 ix. personal narrative--chickamauga 87 x. personal narrative--atlanta 95 xi. personal narrative--columbus (georgia) and the journey into tennessee 102 xii. personal narrative--franklin 112 xiii. personal narrative--the crumbling of the confederacy 125 xiv. personal narrative--the close of the war 143 xv. a long episcopate 149 xvi. bishop quintard and sewanee 164 chapter i introduction writers upon the late civil war have never done full justice to the high religious character of the majority of those who composed the confederate government and its army, and the high religious principles which inspired them. not only was the conviction of conscience clear in the southern soldiers, that they were right in waging war against the federal government, but the people of the south looked upon their cause as a holy one, and their conduct of affairs, civil and military, was wholly in accord with such a view. the confederacy, as it came into existence, committed its civil affairs, by deliberate choice, to men, not only of approved morality, but of approved religious character as well. it was not merely by accident, that, in the organization of its army, choice was made of such men as robert e. lee and thomas j. jackson,--not to mention a large number of other christian soldiers,--as leaders. and it seemed in no way incongruous in the conduct of a war of such a character, that commissions were offered to and accepted by the rev. william nelson pendleton, rector of grace church, lexington, virginia, and the rt. rev. leonidas polk, d. d., bishop of louisiana. a religious tone pervades the state papers pertaining to the confederacy,--its proclamations, and its legislation. the same religious tone is conspicuous in a majority of the military leaders. it is found upon investigation to have impressed itself upon the officers of regiments and companies and upon the private soldiers in the ranks throughout the whole army. so that there is more than an ordinary basis for the statement, surprising as such a statement may appear at first, that the armies of the confederate states had in them a larger proportion than any other in history since those of cromwell's nicknamed "roundheads," of true and active christian men. the provision made for the spiritual needs of the men in the field was quite remarkable. in the great haste with which the army of the confederacy was organized, equipped and sent to the field, there might have been found abundant apology for the omission of chaplains from the official staffs. yet there was no need for seeking such an apology, for the chaplains were not overlooked. even imputing a love of excitement and adventure to the young men who composed in such large measure the fighting forces of the confederacy at the first, they did not neglect to secure the services of a chaplain for each regiment which went to the seat of war. it was naturally thought that work might be found for chaplains in the hospitals, but it was early discovered that a chaplain had opportunities for efficient work at all times,--in the midst of active campaigns and when the army was in winter quarters. nor was their work in vain. few religious services in times of peace equalled in attendance, in fervor or results, those held at, or in the immediate vicinity of, encampments of the confederate army. the camps of regiments which had been sent forth with prayer and benediction, were often the seats of earnest religious life. it is estimated that 15,000 men in the army of virginia alone, made some open and public profession of their allegiance to christ during the war, and were affected in their subsequent lives by religious experiences gained in the war. and the number is especially remarkable of men in the southern army who after the close of the war entered the sacred ministry and won distinction in their holy calling. a study of what might be called "the religious phases" of this war history should be approached through a consideration of the chaplains of the confederacy. they were a regimental institution, and their number might be determined by the number of regiments engaged in the war. they were, for the most part, men of brains, of a keen sense of humor, and of fidelity to what they regarded as their duty; sticking to their posts; maintaining the most friendly and intimate relations with "the boys;" ever on the look-out for opportunities to do good in any way; ready to give up their horses to some poor fellows with bare and blistered feet and to march in the column as it hurried forward; going on picket duty with their men and bivouacking with them in the pelting storm; sharing with them at all times their hardships and their dangers, gaining a remarkably wide experience during four years of army life, and probably with it all acquiring the pleasing art of the _raconteur_. if an individual were desired for a more particular illustration of the religious phases of confederate war history, he might be found in the rev. charles todd quintard, m. d., of the first tennessee regiment, and after the war, second bishop of tennessee. he not only fully conformed to the type above indicated but in some respects he surpassed it, for his knowledge of the healing art and his surgical skill were ever at the demands of his fellow soldiers. he was one of the earliest to enter the service of the confederate army, and was probably the most widely known and the best beloved of all the chaplains. dr. quintard was born in stamford, connecticut, on the 22nd of december, 1824. his ancestors were huguenots who left france after the revocation of the edict of nantes and settled the country north of manhattan island, between long island sound and the hudson river. those who knew dr. quintard at any period of his life had no difficulty in detecting his french ancestry in his personal appearance, as well as in his manner,--his vivacity and demonstrativeness. though not a few who failed to get well acquainted with him fell into the error of supposing that some of his mannerisms were an affectation acquired in some of his visits to england subsequent to the war. his father was isaac quintard, a man of wealth and education, a prominent citizen of stamford, having been born in the same house in which he gave his son a birthplace, and in which he died in 1883 in the ninetieth year of his age. the doctor was a pupil at trinity school, new york city, and took his master's degree at columbia college. he studied medicine with dr. james r. wood and dr. valentine mott, and was graduated, with the degree of doctor of medicine, at the university of the city of new york, in 1847. after a year at bellevue hospital, he removed to georgia, and began the practice of medicine at athens in that state, where he was a parishioner of the rev. william bacon stevens, afterwards bishop of pennsylvania. in 1851 he accepted the chair of physiology and pathological anatomy in the medical college of memphis, tennessee, and became in that city co-editor with dr. ayres p. merrill, of the "memphis medical recorder." there also he formed a close friendship with bishop otey, and in january, 1854, he was admitted a candidate for holy orders. that year he appeared in the twenty-sixth annual convention of the church in the diocese of tennessee, held in st. john's church, knoxville, as the lay representative of st. paul's church, randolph. st paul's church has since passed out of existence, and the town of randolph no longer appears upon the map of the state of tennessee. studying theology under the direction of his bishop, he was ordered deacon in calvary church, memphis, in january, 1855, and a year later was advanced to the priesthood. his diaconate was spent in missionary work in tipton county,--one of the mississippi river counties of tennessee. upon his advancement to the priesthood he became rector of calvary church, memphis. in the latter part of 1856, he resigned the rectorship of his memphis parish, and at the urgent request of bishop otey, accepted the rectorship of the church of the advent, nashville. he had charge also of the church of the holy trinity in that city, and extended his work to edgefield, (now east nashville), and to the parish of st ann. he served the diocese as a member of the standing committee, and as a clerical deputy to the general convention meeting in richmond, virginia, in the fall of 1859. he was a man of varied and deep learning--a preacher of power and attractiveness, and ranked among the clergymen of greatest prominence and popularity in nashville. he was of ardent temperament, affectionate disposition, and possessed personal magnetism to a remarkable degree, especially with young men, who looked up to him with an affection which is now rarely if ever shown by young men to the ministry. this, and the influence he had over young men, are illustrated by the organization in 1859 of the rock city guard, a militia company composed largely of the young men of nashville. dr. quintard was at once elected chaplain of that organization, and its first public parade was for the purpose of attending services in a body at the church of the advent at which he officiated. his was a churchmanship of a type in those days considerably in advance of the average in the ante-bellum period in the south. he was clearly under the spell of the "oxford movement," and of the english "tractarians," and occupied a position to which churchmen generally in this country did not approach until ten or twenty years later. he was a "sacerdotalist,"--a pronounced "sacramentarian" at times when the highest "high" churchmen of the country would have hesitated long before applying those terms to themselves. to him baptism was, not "a theory and a notion," but "a gift and a power." and baptized children were to be educated, "not with a view to their becoming christians, but because they were already christians." consequently he regarded confirmation, not as "joining the church," or as merely a ratifying and renewing of the vows and promises of holy baptism, and hence as something which man does for god;--but as something which god does for man,--the bestowal of the gifts of the holy spirit. to the preparation of candidates for confirmation he therefore gave his most earnest attention, even to the extent of preparing "a plain tract on confirmation," and (in 1861), "a preparation for confirmation," a manual of eighty-nine pages. his veneration for the church's liturgical inheritance was great, and the books of devotion he compiled and had printed for the use of soldiers during the war were drawn from the ancient sources. he attached the utmost importance to the holy communion as a means of spiritual life, and throughout the war he availed himself of every opportunity of administering it to the soldiers in camp, in the way-side churches as he passed them, and in towns where he temporarily rested with the army. with a host of friends in nashville and vicinity, who looked up to him with love and reverence, it is not strange that doctor quintard should have been the choice for chaplain of those who enlisted from that city for the defence of their homes and firesides in 1861. many of the young men of his parish enlisted in the first tennessee regiment, of which he was elected chaplain, and feeling as he did that these young men would need his spiritual care far more than those of his parishioners who were left behind, he felt it his duty to accept the office and go with his regiment to the seat of war. both he and his parishioners supposed that his absence would not exceed six months. he did not return to nashville until after the collapse of the confederacy and the surrender of lee's army in 1865. during those four years he gathered up a rich fund of experiences, both grave and gay. always an accomplished _raconteur_ and brilliant conversationalist, it is but natural that a wide circle of friends in different parts of the world should have begged him to commit to writing the story of the war as he saw it and as none but he could tell it, and permit its publication. about the year 1896 he consented to do this and entered with considerable enthusiasm upon the literary task thus set for him. it was quite characteristic of him, however, that the work as he projected it was likely to have been a laudation of the men with whom he was brought into contact during the civil strife, at the expense of the personal experiences of which his friends were more anxious to read. for doctor quintard was an enthusiast and an optimist. no man was ever more loyal to his friends than he. his estimate of human character was always based upon whatever good he could find in a man. nothing was a greater delight to him in recalling the scenes of the war than to describe some deed of heroism, some noble trait of character, or some mark of friendship that was shown him by a soldier; to acknowledge some kindness shown him, or to correct some error of judgment that had been passed upon some actor in the drama of the civil war. some of the men whom he paused to eulogize were those to whom fame had otherwise done but scant justice, and his estimate of them is in more than one instance an addition of worth to the history of the people of the southern states. the death of doctor quintard on the 15th of february, 1898, prevented the completion of the work he had begun more than two years previously; but left it in such form that it has not been entirely impossible to gratify the wishes of his friends in regard thereto, and to make a valuable contribution to the pictures of life in the southern states during the troubled days of the civil war. chapter ii personal narrative--the beginning of the war and valley mountain while rector of the church of the advent, nashville, i was elected chaplain of a military company of somewhat more than local fame, known as the "rock city guard." this election was only a compliment shown me by the men who composed the guard. i was not a military man nor had i any fondness for military life. so i regarded myself as chaplain only by courtesy. but on thanksgiving day, 1860, the rock city guard and other military organizations of nashville requested me to officiate at the thanksgiving services to be held under their auspices. the services were held in the hall of representatives in the state capitol, and there was an immense congregation present. it was a time of great anxiety and the occasion was a memorable one. rumors of approaching war were abundant, and the newspapers were filled with discussions as to the course the south would pursue in case mr. lincoln, then recently elected, should take his seat as president of the united states. the subject of my discourse was: "obedience to rulers,"--my text being: "righteousness exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any people." (proverbs, xiv, 34.) my sermon was what might be called "a strong plea for the union." in december, south carolina seceded, and on the 18th of the following april,--after a bombardment of thirty-four hours,--fort sumter surrendered and the civil war was fairly begun. president lincoln at once called for seventy-five thousand volunteers to serve for ninety days and put down the insurrection in south carolina. tennessee being called upon for her quota, responded through her governor, isham g. harris:--"tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the defence of her rights or those of her southern brethren." this undoubtedly expressed the sentiments of the vast majority of tennesseeans, who did not favor secession and deplored war, but who were nevertheless determined to stand with the people of the south. in the spring of 1861, the states of virginia, north carolina and arkansas, which had hitherto refused to secede, joined their fortunes to those of the already seceded states; and in june, tennessee decided to unite with the southern confederacy. she was slow to draw the sword. in april, the rock city guard, now enlarged into a battalion, was mustered into the service of the state. subsequently a regiment was formed, consisting of the rock city guard and the following companies;--the williamson greys, of williamson county; the tennessee riflemen, and the railroad boys of nashville; the brown guards, of maury county; the rutherford rifles, of rutherford county; and the martin guards, of giles county. this was known as the first tennessee regiment. the field officers elected were: colonel george maney (afterwards made a brigadier-general); lieutenant-colonel, t. f. sevier; major, a. m. looney. lieutenant r. b. snowden, of company c., was appointed adjutant; dr. william nichol, surgeon, and dr. j. r. buist, assistant surgeon. on the 10th of july, 1861, orders were received by the regiment to repair to virginia. being very urgently pressed by members of the rock city guard and their friends in nashville to accompany the regiment as chaplain, i resolved to do so. this, of course, made it necessary for me to break up my household. i removed my family to georgia, left my parish in the hands of the rev. george c. harris, and prepared to join my regiment in virginia. my friend, general washington barrow, who had formerly been minister to portugal, thinking that i would have need of a weapon for my defence, sent me his old courtsword, which had enjoyed a long and quiet rest,--so long, indeed, that it had become rusted in its scabbard. i remember well my first attempt to unsheath the sword. i seized the handle and pulled with might and main, but to no effect. a friend came to my assistance. i took the sword handle,--he the scabbard. we pulled and we pulled, but the sword refused to come forth. i am not aware that i ever succeeded in drawing that sword "in defence of my country." on my departure for virginia i left it at home. the first battle of bull run was fought july 21, 1861. my cousin, captain thomas edward king, of georgia, having been severely wounded, i went to richmond to look after him, leaving nashville on the 1st of august. after he had sufficiently recovered to return to his home, i joined my regiment at valley mountain on the 23rd of august. some of the entries made in my pocket diary while on this trip are not devoid of interest as illustrating the condition of the southern army and of the southern country at this early stage of the war. my route was through knoxville and bristol. at the latter place, which is on the boundary line between tennessee and virginia, i missed the train for lynchburg by an hour, found all the hotels crowded, and the railroad pressed to its utmost in conveying troops. while waiting i visited two sick men from nashville of whom i had heard, and then strolled out to camp, a mile from the town. there i witnessed the execution of the sentence of a court-martial upon two private soldiers convicted of selling whiskey to other soldiers. the culprits were drummed around the camp, riding on rails, each with three empty bottles tied to his feet, and a label, "ten cents a glass," pinned to his back. at lynchburg i missed connections for richmond saturday night and so spent a very pleasant sunday in the former place. i found lynchburg a very quaint old town, built on steep hills, from the foot of which the james river finds its way sluggishly to the sea. i preached at st. paul's church on "the love of god." arriving at richmond, i found the place so crowded that i began to think i would not be able to get even a lodging. the spottswood and exchange hotels were crowded to overflowing, and i could not get the sign of a room, though i did succeed in getting some dinner at the latter house. but calling on the rev. mr. peterkin, i was asked to stay with him, and had for a co-guest the rev. a. toomer porter, chaplain of the hampton legion,--after the war a prominent educator and founder of a famous school in charleston, s. c. at the rev. mr. peterkin's i had the pleasure of meeting the rev. william nelson pendleton, then a colonel in the confederate army, afterwards a major-general in command of lee's artillery. he had been in command of the artillery that did such execution at the battle of manassas, and gave me a most interesting account of that fight. there was not a masked battery on the ground. his guns were within two hundred yards of the nearest of those of the enemy and within four hundred yards of those that were at the greatest distance. yet he did not lose a man. i learned from mr. peterkin where to find my wounded cousin, and with him found two other wounded soldiers. i made daily visits to the wounded during my stay in richmond; met bishop atkinson; called, with the rev. mr. porter, upon mrs. wade hampton, who was a daughter of the honorable george duffie; and visited mr. john stewart in his princely establishment four miles out from richmond, where i attended services at the church built by mr. stewart and his brother at a cost of fourteen thousand dollars. it was at this time that i received and accepted my appointment as chaplain in the confederate army. on the sunday i spent in the city that was shortly afterwards to become the capital of the confederate states, i preached at st. james' church in the morning, at the monumental church in the evening, and again at st. james' at night. another interesting incident of this visit to richmond was in regard to the rev. john flavel mines, a chaplain in the federal army, who had been captured, released on parole, and had been for two days at the rev. mr. peterkin's house, where i met him. by order of general winder he was rearrested, and the poor fellow was quite crushed by the idea of having to go to prison. he was especially fearful of contracting consumption, of which some of his family had died. he wrote two piteous letters to me begging me to intercede on his behalf. after two efforts i succeeded in visiting him in the afterwards famous "libby" prison, where i found him in company with the hon. alfred ely, a member of congress from rochester, n. y., who had been captured at manassas. i did all i could to cheer the prisoners up. mr. mines subsequently renounced the ministry and accepted a colonel's commission in the federal army. after the war he entered upon a literary career, and wrote some charming books under the _nom de plume_ of "felix oldboy." on my way to my regiment i found in staunton, virginia, that the deaf and dumb asylum was used as a hospital, and i wrote to the editor of the nashville "banner" asking contributions from the citizens of tennessee for the sick and wounded and advising the establishing of a depository at staunton under the supervision of the rev. james a. latanã©. the citizens of staunton made up two boxes of stores and comforts for the sick of my regiment. i preached in staunton sunday morning and night and left for milboro. i went thence to huntersville, which i reached on the 21st of august after a bit of just the toughest travel i had ever made. i found jackson's river so swollen by rains that it was impossible to ford with the stage. the passengers mounted the horses,--two on each horse,--and forded the stream. my travelling companion the night of this occurrence and the following day was colonel wheeler, ex-minister to nicaragua, vestryman in dr. pinckney's church in washington, d. c., one of the most agreeable men to take a trip with i had ever met. his wife was a daughter of sully the artist. we were again delayed at back creek, and while waiting for a chance to cross, i read "master humphrey's clock," a volume found in a knapsack on jackson's mountain. the owner's name on the fly-leaf was "b. b. ewing, comp. i, 12th miss. reg't." the book was wet and mouldy. i finally mounted one of the stage horses and swam the creek and so reached gatewoods,--a delightful place,--a valley shut in on all sides by most picturesque mountains. it was twelve miles from huntersville. i finally reached colonel fulton's camp, over the worst road i ever travelled, and thence found huntersville,--a most wretched and filthy town in those days, where there were many sick soldiers in a meeting-house, in public and private buildings and in tents. huntersville was twenty-seven miles from valley mountain where our troops were stationed. i was very anxious to get on for there was a battle daily expected. resuming the journey in an ambulance, i had to leave it within a mile in consequence of the wretched state of the roads, and walked all day over the most horrible roads, the rain at times coming down in torrents. i felt occasionally that i must give out, but finally reached big springs and received a warm welcome from general anderson, general donelson, colonel fulton, major duval and other officers. my clothes were so wet that the water could be wrung out of them and my first care was to dry them. that done, i set out for the camp at valley mountain three miles distant, and reached it on the morning of friday the 23rd of august, which happened to be the first clear day i had seen for more than a week. the following sunday i began my duties as chaplain, and had services in camp which were well attended. that week our scouts had a running fire with the enemy's pickets, and one of our lieutenants captured a federal soldier. as it was the first achievement of the kind by any of our regiment, our camp was greatly enlivened by it. about this time i was appointed assistant surgeon, but i did not wish to accept the office as i felt that it might separate me from my regiment. i do not remember, however, any time throughout the war, when there was any opportunity offered for me to assist the work of the surgeons that i did not do it. one afternoon a courier arrived at colonel maney's headquarters with orders for the regiment to report to general loring. while colonel maney was reading the order, a sudden volley of small arms resounded through the mountain, and some one, thinking the federal forces had attacked general lee's position, ordered the long roll beaten. this startled the camp, every man seized his gun and cartridge box, and the regiment was at once in line. for at that time the boys were all spoiling for a fight. i well remember how good mrs. sullivan, the wife of an irish private and a kind of "daughter of the regiment," drew off her shoes and gave them to a soldier who was barefoot. the boys started off for general lee's headquarters without rations, without blankets, and many of them without coats or shoes. in this plight they reported for duty. it was altogether a false alarm. a regiment had been on picket duty and was firing off guns in order to clean them. nevertheless it happened that the action of our boys was in conformity to an order received regularly enough about five minutes later, requiring our regiment to take position within a very short distance of the enemy's entrenchments, and the regiment remained out in consequence from friday morning until sunday, in full view of the enemy. a few days after this general lee determined on a movement on the enemy holding a fortified position on cheat pass. the camp became a scene of great animation in anticipation of an important impending battle. to me it was a memorable week beginning on monday september 8th--a week of such experiences as i had never dreamed would fall to my lot, and of such fatigues as i never imagined myself capable of enduring. general lee's plans were undoubtedly well and skilfully laid, but "the wisest schemes of mice and men gang aft aglee." the plan, to my mind, was somewhat complicated inasmuch as it demanded concerted action on the part of too many commanders far removed from each other. thus general henry r. jackson of georgia, with rust of arkansas, was to attack the enemy at cheat pass where he was strongly entrenched. general loring with donelson was to engage the enemy at crouch's and huttonville and force his way up to cheat pass, while anderson with his brigade was to pass over cheat mountain and engage the enemy in the rear. the rock city guard, with the regiment, left camp at valley mountain on monday, and moved to a new camp three or four miles in advance. i remained behind for a day to care for the sick and then followed the regiment. at nine o'clock on tuesday morning general s. r. anderson's brigade, consisting of colonel maney's regiment and two others, started on. the route was not by a road but through fields and over mountains the most precipitous, in going up which we had to wind single file along the sides and reach the top by very circuitous paths. the paths were exceedingly steep, rocky and rough, and our horses had to be taken to the rear. at one time i reached the top of the mountain and sat down for a little rest under a great boulder that projected out into the pathway. an officer in front called out to me, "tell them that the order is to 'double quick!'" i passed the command to another officer, who turned to those behind him who were struggling up the mountain pass and called out to them, "the order is to 'double quick' back there!" whereupon the rear of the regiment turned and rushed down the mountain. in the flight the major was upset, and flat on his back and with heels in the air he poured forth benedictions of an unusual kind for a presbyterian elder. our first night out, after i had travelled twelve miles on foot, (i had lent to a less fortunate officer the horse that had been presented to me but a few days previously), we halted at 10 o'clock. soon after it began to rain heavily. i had been carrying the blankets of lieutenant joe van leer, who had been exceedingly kind to me throughout the march, and when i came up to him he said, "i have a capital place where we may sleep. i'll put my blankets on the ground and we'll cover with yours, as they are heavier." so he cleaned out a hollow on the side of the mountain, and there we lay down for the night. we had my blanket and his rubber coat for a covering. shortly after midnight a little river began running down my neck. the rain was pouring in torrents, and the basin van leer had scooped out was soon filled; so i spent the night as did the georgia soldier who said that he had slept in the bed of a river with a thin sheet of water over him. this was not altogether a unique experience for me as we shall soon see. the next morning, after breaking our fast on cold meat and "gutta percha" bread, we took up our line of march and had gone but a mile or so when we heard the fire of musketry at our left. we supposed this was by the scouts sent out by general donelson. this day, (wednesday), was the severest of all upon our men. we made slow progress and the march was very toilsome. we kept perfect silence, expecting every moment to come up with scouting parties of the enemy. at about three o'clock the order was passed along the line, just as one half the regiment had reached the top of the mountain, to "double-quick forward!" the drums of the enemy were distinctly heard, and we moved as rapidly as possible, and were about an hour in descending. all the horses were left behind, as the mountain was found so steep and rocky that it was impossible for them to go any further. we clambered down the rocks, clinging to the bushes and jumping from rock to rock, and at nine o'clock we halted for the night. not a word was spoken above a whisper, nor a fire lighted, although it was very cold. van leer arranged our blankets as on the previous night, and with much the same result. for soon after we lay down the rain came as though the windows of heaven were opened, and about eleven o'clock we were thoroughly saturated. a rivulet ran down my back and joe and i actually lay in a pool of water all night. i thought it impossible for me to stand it, but as there was no alternative, i kept quiet and thought over all i had ever read of the benefits of hydropathy. i consoled myself with the reflection that the water-cure might relieve me of an intense pain i had suffered for some hours in my left knee,--and so it did. at the same time i would hesitate long before recommending the same treatment for every other pain in the left knee. in the morning i was well soaked, my finger ends were corrugated and my whole body chilled through. i was very hungry also, but all i could get to eat was one tough biscuit that almost defied my most vigorous assaults. we were ordered to be on the parkersburg pike that day, (thursday), at daybreak. to show how little we understood the art of war at that time, soon after we started, a well mounted horseman passed halfway down the line of the regiment without detection. he proved to be a federal courier. lieutenant-colonel sevier finally halted him and said in surprise: "why, you're a yankee!" to which the courier coolly replied: "i'm so thankful you found me out; i was so afraid of being shot." the colonel took from him a fine pair of pistols, sword, carbine and his horse, which he gave to major looney who was thoroughly knocked up. half a mile further on brought us to the parkersburg pike, three miles and a half from cheat mountain pass. the brigade was, as rapidly as possible, put in position. the first tennessee was at the head of a column towards cheat pass. in about ten minutes a body of the enemy, about one hundred strong, in ambush on the opposite side of the road and only about twenty-five yards from our troops, began firing into our left, composed of the companies from pulaski, columbia and murfreesboro. the enemy were completely concealed but our men stood the fire nobly. not a man flinched. after two or three volleys had been fired, captain field ordered a charge and the enemy fled. we lost two killed, two missing and sixteen wounded. we captured lieutenant merrill of the engineer corps, u. s. a., attached to general rosecrans' command. i fell into conversation with him, and found him not only a most intelligent gentleman but also a most genial and pleasant companion,--as most west pointers are. we also captured seven privates, and left on the roadside two wounded men of the enemy who were so disabled that they could not be moved, though we dressed their wounds and made them as comfortable as possible. the enemy lost some eight or ten killed,--how many wounded i do not know. my first experience in actual battle was very different from what i had anticipated. i had expected an open field and a fair fight, but this bushwhacking was entirely out of my line. the balls whistled in a way that can never be appreciated by one who has not heard them. we held our position until four o'clock in the afternoon, anxiously listening for general h. r. jackson's fire, upon which the whole movement depended; but not a gun was heard in that direction. general donelson, however, met a party of the enemy and engaged them, killing seventeen and taking sixty-eight prisoners. he then waited for us,--of course waited in vain, and like us withdrew. when we left the turnpike, we took with us our wounded, all but five of whom were carried on horses, the others on litters. about two miles from the highway we came to the house of a mr. white, where we deposited seven of our wounded men and left them. the brigade halted in a meadow. after attending to the wounded, i lay down by a wheat-stack with joe van leer, who made a very comfortable bed for us. at daylight i returned to the house to assist the surgeons in dressing the wounds of our men. this occupied us until nine o'clock. the brigade in the meantime had moved forward and left us. we supposed that they had stationed a guard for our protection, but it had been neglected, and when we left, a man suggested to us that we better remove the white badges from our caps, for we might come across some scouting party of the enemy. we took his advice and in addition i took the precaution to tie a white handkerchief to a stick, and so i led the way. after winding about over the hills for a mile or so, we came upon a body of men behind a fallen tree with their guns pointed at us ready to fire. we heard the click of the locks and i instantly threw up the white flag, and this possibly saved our party from being shot down _by our own men_. it was a detachment that had been sent back for us, and as they saw us winding along without our badges, they supposed us a party of the enemy on the trail of our forces. one man was very much overcome when he found out who we were. about a mile further on we came up with the main body of our troops, which had been halted for us by colonel hatton, who, on discovering that we were in the rear, ran the whole length of the column to inform general anderson of the fact. it felt mighty good to get with the brigade again. in less than half an hour after we left mr. white's house, a party of the enemy was in possession there. at half past twelve word was passed along the line that the enemy were following us. immediately a line of battle was formed, but very shortly we moved on to get a more advantageous position. we rolled down one precipice and climbed up another and again the line of battle was formed. then it was discovered that a small part of the enemy's forces was on its way by a route that crossed ours to reinforce crouch's, so there was no fighting. friday night we camped about one mile from the place we occupied our first night out. i had no provisions, but various persons gave me what made up a tolerably good supper, to wit,--a roasting ear, a slice of bacon and a biscuit; and in the morning i found on a log a good-sized piece of fresh meat, not strikingly clean, but i sliced off a piece of it and cooked it on a long stick. the fire, i reckon, removed all impurities; and joe van leer brought me half a cup of coffee and another biscuit. we rested here until seven o'clock at night, when we took up our march for brady's gate. at about eleven o'clock we rested for the night and had the pleasure of meeting two men from nashville who had brought out a couple of ambulances loaded with nick-nacks for the rock city guard. out of their supplies we had a comfortable breakfast, and again started for brady's gate and reached it at 1 p. m. at this point the enemy had been in great numbers,--some three or four thousand. everywhere in the woods they had erected comfortable booths and rustic benches. our brigade took position expecting an attack, and waited until half-past six, and then once more started on our march. about eight o'clock the rain poured down in torrents and once more we were thoroughly drenched. the brigade remained all night in an open meadow, but colonel sevier insisted upon my taking his horse, and so i rode forward with major looney and some other officers to a house half a mile further on, and dr. buist, van leer, myself and five others took up quarters for the night in a smoke-house. unfortunately the shingles were off just over my head and the rain came through pretty freely. the next morning we started for our old camp at valley mountain, which we reached at eleven o'clock. it really seemed like getting home. the tents looked more than familiar,--inviting even. i rested well and ate well and felt well generally. the march left many of our men bare-footed. some of them made the last of the tramp in their stocking feet, and when we reached our quarters they had not even a thread to cover them. one of captain jack butler's men made the remark that if the enemy took the captain prisoner they would not believe him if he told them his rank; and when i looked at the dear fellow, ragged and barefooted, with feet cut and swollen, i thought so too. but then when i looked down at my own feet and saw my own toes peeping,--nay, rather boldly showing themselves,--as plain as the nose on my face;--and found that almost a majority of our regiment were bootless and shoeless by the hardness of the march, i realized what we had gone through. the path by which we ascended to the top of cheat mountain was one which the foot of man probably never trod before. the guide said that he knew that he could cross it but did not think that the brigade could. i would not have undertaken the march, i presume, could i have foretold what it would be. i made the whole trip, with the exception of a few miles, on foot; for the morning we started out, lieutenant john house, of franklin, a noble fellow, was very weak from an attack of fever from which he had not entirely convalesced. i insisted upon his taking my horse and so i did not ride at all until sunday the 15th. my horse proved a most valuable one. on our return one of the wounded men rode her down the steepest hills and she did not once miss a foot. being raised in that region she had the faculty of adapting herself to the provender, while other tennessee horses grew thin and became useless. as a result of the expedition, our forces had driven in all the outposts of the enemy, made a thorough survey of all their works, had killed, wounded and captured about two hundred of their men, and all with a loss of less than thirty on our side. but the campaign in that section was abandoned and all our forces were transferred to another section. i was very glad to believe that my labors among the soldiers as their chaplain were not all thrown away. it was very delightful to see how well our regular daily evening service in camp was attended. and i was greatly pleased to find so many of the young men anxious to receive the holy communion when i celebrated on the fifteenth sunday after trinity, the day before we started on the expedition. the whole regiment seemed devoted to me. one of the captains told the major that he believed every man in his company would lay down his life for me. certainly i met nothing but kindness from officers and men. and so i was led to hope that some good would yet grow out of the seed sown in those wild mountains. on friday the 13th of september, general loring was anxious to have a reconnaissance made, and assigned the duty to major fitzhugh lee, son of general robert e. lee. colonel j. a. washington, a brother-in-law of general lee and one of his personal aides, asked permission to accompany the party, which was granted. they had advanced a considerable distance when major lee told the colonel that it was unsafe for them to proceed further. but the colonel was anxious to make a thorough exploration. major lee, however, decided not to endanger the lives of his men by taking them along, and so halted them and rode on with colonel washington, accompanied by two privates. they had not gone far when they were fired upon by a large picket guard lying in ambush by the roadside. colonel washington was instantly killed, being pierced by three balls through the breast. major lee's horse was shot under him and one of the privates also lost his horse. major lee escaped on colonel washington's horse. a flag was sent to the federal camp the next day by general lee, and colonel washington's body was given up. the enemy offered to send it the whole distance in an ambulance, but this offer colonel stark, the bearer of the flag, declined. this sad occurrence was the occasion of my first acquaintance with general lee, the most conspicuous character in the struggle between the states. i saw him at cheat mountain when he had just learned of the death of colonel washington. he was standing with his right arm thrown over the neck of his horse,--(a blooded animal, thoroughly groomed),--and i was impressed first of all by the man's splendid physique, and then by the look of extreme sadness that pervaded his countenance. he felt the death of his relative very keenly and seemed greatly dispirited. it was my high privilege later on to be brought in contact with this great and good man and to learn most thoroughly to appreciate his exalted character and to understand why his life is to-day an enduring inheritance of his country and of the church of christ. personally he was a man of rare gifts, physical and mental. to these were added the advantages of finished culture. he was a very bayard in manner and bearing. the habits of temperance, frugality and self-control, formed by him in youth, adhered to him through life. chapter iii personal narrative--big sewell mountain, winchester and romney from valley mountain i was sent with the sick of our brigade to a place named edrai where a number of our troops were encamped. i think it was about sixteen miles distant, but on account of the condition of the roads, i was fully three days in making the trip. i had given up my horse to lieutenant van leer and i was busy each day of the march administering to the wants of the sick, several of whom died on the way. a cup of strong coffee was made for me by the sergeant in command of our escort, (we had coffee in those days, later our ingenuity was taxed to discover substitutes for it), which was the only thing that refreshed me on the march. instead of a coffee mill, a hatchet handle was used to beat up the grains which were then boiled in a tin cup. i was a long time drinking that cup of coffee. the last day of the journey i felt myself breaking down and determined to reach edrai as soon as possible. accordingly i took the middle of the road, not avoiding the holes which were abundant, and walked through slush and mud, reaching edrai just in the gloaming. there was one brick house in the place, to which i made my way. to my delight i found there major looney of my regiment, who received me with great cordiality. i was so exhausted that i was obliged to support myself in my chair, and the major, seeing how greatly prostrated i was, gave me a large drink of brandy. it produced not the slightest effect on me, and so in fifteen minutes more he repeated the dose, and "richard was himself again." i went out at once, borrowed a horse of a friend who was a lieutenant in a virginia regiment, and rode back to meet my sick train. the next day i officiated at the burial of those who had died en route. shortly after this, general lee ordered us to reinforce general john b. floyd, who was strongly intrenched at big sewell mountain, facing the federal army under general rosecrans and only a mile distant. i passed through the hot springs on the way to big sewell mountain; and from there, making our way was very gradual, for rains had been destructive of the roads. in some places every trace of the road had been so completely washed away that no one would dream that any had ever been where were then gullies eight or ten feet or even fifteen feet deep. fences, bridges and even houses had been washed away, farms ruined, and at white sulphur springs the guests had to be taken from the lower story of the hotel. major looney, captain foster and myself were detained at this point for several days, and i went back and forth to hold services and to visit the sick. at big sewell mountain i was brought into very pleasant relations with general lee. at white sulphur springs, mrs. lee had entrusted me with a parcel to deliver to the general at my first opportunity. upon my arrival i at once called upon him and spent several hours with him in most delightful intercourse. from his headquarters we could see the whole federal encampment. with the audacity of ignorance, i said to him: "why, general, there are the federals! why don't we attack them?" in his gentle voice, he replied; "ah, it is sometimes better to wait until you are attacked." from the camp at big sewell mountain i was sent, in the latter part of october to accompany a detachment of our sick men to the hospitals at white sulphur and hot springs, virginia. when i reached the latter place, being only fifteen miles from a railroad, i determined to run down to staunton to get, if possible, some clean clothing. my visit was timely, for a few hours after my arrival in staunton i received by train two boxes,--one from rome, georgia, and one from nashville. in the latter box were two pairs of heavy winter boots, a pair of winter pants, flannel under-clothing and a great variety of useful articles, and my wardrobe was now so generally well supplied that i could help along some who were in worse condition than i was in. my visit to staunton was otherwise a rich treat. somehow or other everybody seemed to have heard of me or to know me, and all extended to me the most overflowing cordiality and hospitality. i was first the guest of the rev. mr. latanã© and afterwards of dr. stribling, the superintendent of the insane asylum. mrs. stribling and her daughter sent by me two trunks filled with things for our regiment, and a lady met me on the street and handed me ten dollars for the use of the sick. about the middle of november i received orders from general loring to proceed from huntersville to the lewisburg line and to transport all the sick and convalescent belonging to his division to the hospitals at warm, hot and bath alum springs. i accordingly left general loring's headquarters one friday at noon, and crossing the greenbrier bridge, six miles above huntersville, took the road to hillsboro, a little hamlet ten miles distant, where i spent the night very pleasantly, without charge, at the home of mr. baird. thence i rode to the residence of mr. renick, sixteen miles, and found three of our regiment who had been sick for some weeks but were then greatly improved and glad to get away under my protection. on sunday morning i rode five miles to the town of frankford and my name (and fame) having preceded me, i was urged to have services in the presbyterian church. of course i was very glad to do so and had a good and very attentive congregation. at frankford there lived a dr. renick who had been extremely kind to all of our tennessee soldiers. he turned his home into a hospital and he and his wife devoted themselves most assiduously to the welfare of the sick, refusing any remuneration. i stopped at his house and at his request baptized his youngest child, a little girl about eighteen months old, born on easter sunday. the parents were quite unacquainted with the ecclesiastical calendar, yet the father said: "i'm going to give her a good episcopal name, doctor," and so he had me give her in baptism the name of "margaret easter sunday." i was glad she was not born on quinquagesima sunday for i might in that case have had to give her that name. the following day i went to lewisburg and thence to white sulphur springs, hoping to be in part relieved by one of the surgeons, whom i ordered to join his regiment with the sick men belonging to it. there were more than one thousand patients at white sulphur springs and there had been forty deaths within the past thirteen days. i shall never forget the dinner we had in camp one sunday about the last of november. it was the best of the season. beef, venison, preserved peaches, raspberries and plums, rice, fine old madeira, currant wine and many other things,--most of which had been sent by dr. stribling,--made a real feast quite in contrast with our usual camp fare. at that time the boys were going into winter quarters and were building very snug, roofed cabins. one sunday early in december, after having service in the camp near huntersville, with a pass from general loring to go to richmond and return at the public charge, i started first for staunton to look after the interests of a young man from maury county, tennessee, who while in a state of intoxication, killed another man by the accidental discharge of his pistol. that i arrived safely in staunton i felt to be a matter of special congratulation on account of the roads i had to travel. the mud was from two to three feet deep. the young prisoner was a noble fellow to whom i had become very much attached, and was clear of any intentional wrong, i was sure. after calling upon him in staunton and consulting with his lawyer, we concluded to engage the services of the hon. alexander h. stuart, formerly secretary of the interior under president fillmore, and i went to richmond to see that eminent man. on my return to staunton i had the trial put off until the january term of court. when it was finally held, i was called upon to testify to the good character of the accused and i am glad to say that the verdict of the jury was in the end: "not guilty." our regiment's stay at big sewell was not long. there was a good deal of marching to and fro, and rosecrans finally escaped lee and jackson. from big sewell, general loring, to whose division we were attached, was invited to join general thomas j. jackson at winchester. there for the first time i met that distinguished general and i was very cordially received by the rev. mr. meredith, the rector of the parish, and was made to feel quite at home in the rectory. this was the beginning of a severe and disastrous campaign. the weather was bitterly cold and during the second night of our encampment a severe snow-storm arose. i can never forget the appearance of the troops as they arose the next morning from their snowy couches. it suggested thoughts of the resurrection morn. in spite of it all, the troops were very cheerful, and as they shook the snow from their uniforms, began singing a song, the chorus of which was: "so let the wide world wag as it will, we'll be gay and happy still!" after some delay we began our march against bath on new year's day 1862. it was one of the coldest winters known to the oldest inhabitant. snow, sleet and rain came down upon us in all their wrath. we had a skirmish on the march. general jackson wished to drive the enemy's forces from the gap in capon mountain opposite bath where they were posted. i begged him to allow me to bring up the first tennessee regiment. they were some distance in the rear, but i brought them forward in short time. as they passed by in double-quick, the general said to me: "what a splendid regiment!" in his report of the engagement, general jackson said: "the order to drive the enemy from the hill was undertaken with a patriotic enthusiasm which entitles the first tennessee and its commander to special praise." it was here that captain bullock issued his unique command: "here, you boys, just separate three or four yards, and pie-root!" (pirouette). they did pirouette and made the enemy dance as well. as the federal troops retreated through the gap in the mountain, they came face to face with a brigade of the virginia militia. each fired a volley and fled as fast as legs could carry them, in opposite directions. to the boys looking down upon the scene from the mountain, it was a comical sight. as the infantry put the federals to flight on capon mountain, captain turner ashby drove the federal cavalry along the highway in the valley like leaves before the wind. we reached romney without further obstruction. on sunday i officiated in a church which was crowded to its utmost capacity. i shall never forget the grave attention which "stonewall" jackson paid to my discourse. the text from which i preached was: "be sure your sin will find you out." the march from winchester to romney was one of great hardship and was utterly fruitless of military results. the situation in our camp in the latter part of january 1862, was rather disturbed. the two generals, stonewall jackson and loring, did not work well together. their commands were separate. jackson commanded the army of the valley district; loring the army of the north west. the former had written begging the secretary of war to send loring and all his forces to co-operate with him (jackson), in that section and expressing the opinion that the two could drive the enemy from the whole region. the secretary of war enclosed jackson's letter to loring, leaving the movement to his (loring's) discretion, but at the same time expressing his opinion and that of the president, as decidedly in favor of it. accordingly loring went expecting some prompt and decided work. but no sooner had he arrived in winchester, than general jackson began to work to merge the two armies into one and to take general loring's command under his control. jackson had but one brigade, while loring had three under his control. the troops of the latter, from the highest officer to the lowest private, were perfectly devoted to their general. of course a vast amount of ill feeling was stirred up, and the affair reached a climax when an order was issued for our troops to build winter quarters in romney, while jackson's brigade marched back to ease and comfort at winchester. i cannot begin to tell all that our troops suffered through the stupidity and want of forethought, (as i then thought it), of major-general jackson. it is enough to say that we were subjected to the severest trials that human nature could endure. we left winchester with 2,700 men in general anderson's brigade of tennesseeans. that number was reduced to 1,100. when we reached the position opposite the town of hancock, maryland, the first regiment numbered 680. in romney, it mustered only 230 men fit for duty. i felt that general loring ought to demand that he might be allowed to withdraw his forces from the command of major-general jackson. so far as the personal staff of general loring (including myself) was concerned, it was comfortably situated in a very pleasant new house. but no one could possibly imagine the horrible condition of affairs at romney among the troops; and when stonewall jackson took his command back to winchester, the men of loring's command shouted to them: "there go your f. f. v.'s!" the "pet lambs" of the stonewall brigade were comfortably housed at winchester while the troops of loring's command were left behind in romney to endure the bitter, biting weather. this movement on the part of jackson was the subject of much bitter comment. a report thereof was taken to richmond and laid before the secretary of war. he was greatly surprised that jackson should have withdrawn his forces to winchester, leaving the reinforcing column behind,--or as it was expressed at the time, "leaving the guests,--the invited guests,--out in the cold." as a result of the controversy that ensued, general jackson was required by the secretary of war to direct general loring to return with his command to winchester. this we did on the 1st of february, and while in winchester i was called to officiate at the funerals of a number of our men who had died from sickness and exposure. and it was while there that we received the news of the fall of fort donelson. although jackson complied with the order of the secretary of war, he regarded it as a case of interference with his command and took umbrage. it was by the exercise of great tact on the part of general joseph e. johnston, commander-in-chief of the department, and of governor john letcher, of virginia, that jackson was prevailed upon to withhold his resignation, and his valuable services were preserved to the army of the confederacy. on the 10th of february, 1862, the first and third regiments, tennessee volunteers, with a georgia regiment, were by the command of the secretary of war, ordered to proceed to knoxville, tennessee, and to report for duty to general albert sidney johnston. a different disposition was made of the seventh and fourteenth tennessee volunteers and of an arkansas regiment, and all the remainder of the command of brigadier-general loring was to proceed to manassas, virginia, to report for duty to general joseph e. johnston. it was with a sad heart that "the boys" of the first tennessee bade farewell, on the 7th of february, to the seventh and fourteenth regiments and to their warm-hearted and hospitable virginia friends. during the march against romney, general loring had me commissioned by the secretary of war as his aide-de-camp. i was very strongly opposed to holding such a commission, and declined to accept, but i could not leave general loring in the troubles and anxieties that distressed him, and so as a member of his staff, i travelled around considerably at that time, going from camp to camp, attending the trial of my friend at staunton, and going to richmond on military business. to get from romney to staunton on one occasion i had to take a horse-back ride of forty-three miles to winchester, then to go by stage eighteen miles to strasburg, and thence by rail via manassas and gordonsville. this was a roundabout way but was preferable at the time to a much shorter route down the valley from winchester. on the 21st of february, i went with general loring to norfolk, to which point he had been ordered, instead, as i had hoped, to georgia, where i would have been nearer my family. at this time he was promoted to major-general. we went, of course, by way of richmond where i called with him on president jefferson davis and was very agreeably disappointed in his personal appearance and bearing. i might have witnessed the ceremonies of his inauguration, but as the day set for that function proved very inclement, i was glad that i chose to spend it on the cars between richmond and norfolk. on that day general loring had a very severe chill followed by congestion of the right lung, which was the precursor of an attack of pneumonia affecting both lungs. i watched by his bedside in norfolk through all his illness, which prolonged my visit in that city for several weeks. chapter iv personal narrative--norfolk at norfolk i had the pleasure of intercourse with such friends as john tattnall, son of commander tattnall; benjamin loyall and lieutenant walter butt of the ironclad "virginia," with the clergy of the city and with many charming families. how can i ever forget the old-time virginia hospitality that was meted out to me--the enthusiastic reception i had from all kinds and conditions of men? how well i remember mr. tazewell taylor! he was well up in genealogy, and not only knew all of the old families of virginia, but the principal families of the whole south. it was quite delightful to hear him, "in the midst of war's alarums," talk over "old times" and old folks. those days before the war were all so different from what we have known since. no one born since the war can write intelligently of the blessed old days in the south. but if any one would read a true account of the trials and woes of a southern household during the dreadful war-time, let him read "the diary of a southern refugee during the war," written by mrs. judith w. mcguire for the members of her family, "who were too young to remember those days." mrs. mcguire's book is a wonderful record of hope, joys, sorrows and trials, and of the way in which, amid it all, the faithful women of the south cheered the hearts of the heroes in the field. one sunday in march i preached a sermon at st. paul's church, (old st. paul's, built in 1739,) exhorting the people to the work before them, reminding them that in the conflict in which we were engaged, not only the rights of our people and the glory of our nation, but the church of god was imperilled. it was my "old war sermon," rearranged for virginia. at the solicitation of clergy and people formally presented, i repeated it several times in norfolk. on ash wednesday i preached again in st. paul's to a fine congregation and was requested to repeat my sermon, which was on the good samaritan, the following sunday in the same church and subsequently in christ church. i met many persons of distinction in the city. general huger, who was in command in norfolk, called upon me. general howell cobb was there as commissioner on the part of the confederate government to arrange with general wood on the part of the united states, about the exchange of prisoners. in the latter part of february, i became interested in the transformation by which the "merrimac" became the "virginia" of the confederate navy. one day i slipped off from my patient, general loring, while he was sleeping, and went to portsmouth to visit the wonderful craft. the part that appeared above water suggested to me a book opened at an angle of forty-five degrees and the fore edges of its cover placed on a table. at the bow was a sharp projection by which it was expected to pierce the side of any ship it might run against. all the machinery was below water. the roof was about thirty-eight inches in thickness, of timber very heavily plated with iron. the fore and aft guns were the heaviest, carrying shot and shell eighty-five and ninety pounds in weight. the others were very heavy also and magnificent of their kind. she carried ten guns in all. her new steel-pointed and wrought iron shot were destined to do some terrific work. she was likely to escape injury unless struck below the water-line, and there was not much danger of that occurring as she was in a measure protected below that line also. she drew rather too much water, as lieutenant spotswood told me at the time of my visit. while i was at norfolk, the great battle between the "virginia" and the "monitor" and ships of war "congress" and "cumberland" took place. i witnessed the destruction of the "congress" and the "cumberland." the first days fight was on the 8th of march. by special invitation, the rev. j. h. d. wingfield, (who afterwards became bishop of northern california), celebrated the blessed sacrament in his church, (trinity church, portsmouth), for the officers of the "virginia" before they went into battle. when the "virginia" cast off her moorings at norfolk navy yard and steamed down the river, the "congress" and the "cumberland" (frigates) had been lying for some time off newport news. officers and men on the "virginia" were taking things quietly as if they were really on an ordinary trial trip. as they drew near the "congress," captain buchanan, the commander of the "virginia," made a brief and stirring appeal to his crew, which was answered by cheers. he then took his place by the side of the pilot near the wheel. my friend lieutenant j. r. eggleston commanded the nine-inch broadside guns next abaft the engine-room hatch, and he was ordered to serve one of them with hot shot. suddenly he saw a great ship near at hand bearing down upon the "virginia." in a moment twenty-five solid shot and shell struck the sloping side of the "virginia" and glanced high into the air, many of the shells exploding in their upward flight. in reply to this broadside from the "congress" one red hot shot and three nine-inch shells were hurled into her and the "virginia" steamed on without pausing. suddenly there was a jar as if the vessel had run aground. there was a cheering forward and lieutenant eggleston passed aft, waving his hat and crying: "we have sunk the 'cumberland.'" she had been struck about amidship by the prow of the "virginia," and in sinking tore the prow from the bow of her assailant and carried it down with her. the "virginia" then moved some distance up the river in order to turn about in the narrow channel. as soon as the "congress" saw her terrible foe coming down upon her, she tried to escape under sail, but ran aground in the effort. the "virginia" took position under her stern and a few raking shots brought down her flag. captain porcher, in command of the confederate ship "beaufort," made an effort to take the officers and wounded men of the "congress" prisoners. two officers came on board the "beaufort" and surrendered the "congress." captain porcher asked them to get the officers and wounded men aboard his vessel as quickly as possible as he had been ordered to burn the "congress." he was begged not to do so as there were sixty wounded men on board the "congress," but his orders were peremptory. while he was making every effort to move the wounded, a tremendous fire was opened on the "beaufort" from the shore. the federal officers begged him to hoist a white flag lest all the wounded men should be killed. the fact that the federals were firing on a white flag flying from the mainmast of the "congress" was brought to the attention of the federal officers, who claimed, however, that they were powerless to stop the fire as it proceeded from a lot of volunteers who were not under the control of the officers on board the "beaufort." the fire continuing, captain porcher returned it, but with little effect. he estimated the loss in the federal fleet, in killed, drowned, wounded and missing, of nearly four hundred men. the total loss of the confederates did not exceed sixty. captain buchanan and his flag-lieutenant were wounded and taken to the naval hospital at norfolk. catesby jones succeeded to the command of the "virginia." about an hour before midnight the fire reached the magazine of the "congress" and she blew up. the next day the "virginia" steamed out towards the "minnesota," when the "monitor" made her appearance. the latter came gallantly forward, and then began the first battle ever fought between ironclads. it continued several hours, neither vessel, so far as could be ascertained at the time, inflicting by her fire any very serious damage on the other. the "virginia" then got ready to try what ramming would do for the "monitor." what it did was to silence the latter forever in the presence of the "virginia." unfortunately, just before the "virginia" struck the "monitor," the former stopped her engine under the belief that the momentum of the ship would prove sufficient for the work. had the "virginia" kept on at full speed, she would undoubtedly have run the "monitor" under. as it was, the latter got such a shaking up that she sought safety in shoal water whither she knew the "virginia" could not follow her. it should be remembered that the "virginia" drew twenty-two feet of water and was very hard to manage, whereas the "monitor" was readily managed and drew but ten feet of water. the following day the rev. mr. wingfield was called upon to offer up prayers and thanksgiving for the victory, on board the gallant ship. it was a solemn, most impressive and affecting scene, as those valiant men of war fell upon their knees on the deck and bowed their heads in reverence and godly fear. the weather-beaten faces of many of the brave seamen were observed to be bathed in tears and trembling with emotion under the influence of that memorable service. after this commodore tattnall was placed in command of the "virginia," and on the morning of the 11th of april the "virginia" went down hampton roads with the design of engaging the enemy to the fullest extent. i received a concise cypher telegram, ("splinters," was all it said), from my dear friend john tattnall, son of the commodore, and i at once set out to see what was going on. with general loring, (who was by that time fully recovered from his illness), and quite a party of friends and officers, i went down the bay in a cockle-shell of a steamer, to witness the engagement. in order to provoke the enemy, commodore tattnall ordered two of his gunboats to run into the transport anchorage and cut out such of the vessels as were lying nearest the "virginia." this was successfully done within sight of and almost within gun-shot of the "monitor," but she could not be drawn into an engagement. although the enemy refused to fight, the "monitor" threw a number of shells, several of which passed over our little steamer. we deemed it, therefore, good military, (and naval) tactics to withdraw and let the contestants attend to their own business. chapter v personal narrative--perryville hearing about this time of the extreme illness of my bishop, the right reverend james hervey otey, in jackson, mississippi, i left norfolk, with considerable regret, for the society of that city i had found most charming, and my stay there had been very pleasant. i went by way of mobile, having for my travelling companion from montgomery, alabama, to that city, captain j. f. lay, a brother of the then bishop of arkansas. the captain was a member of beauregard's staff. general forney was in command at mobile and i had a very pleasant chat with him. his left arm was still almost useless from a severe wound received in the dranesville fight. i met also the rev. mr. pierce, who afterwards became bishop of arkansas; and madame le vert, one of the most distinguished of southern writers. i had a drive down the bay over one of the finest shell roads in the world. and on the sunday that i spent in mobile, i preached my "war sermon,"--adapted, of course, to the people of mobile. i found my beloved bishop at the residence of mrs. george yerger, in jackson, and remained in attendance on him for several weeks. he was then removed from jackson to the residence of mrs. johnstone at annandale. there he enjoyed all that kindness and wealth could give. he was able to drive out after a time, and i remember how thoroughly he enjoyed the music of the spring birds. there was one bird that he called the "wood-robin," whose notes were especially enjoyed, and the carriage was frequently stopped that he might listen to the warbling of this bird. from annandale i went to visit my family in rome, georgia, and spent some time in attendance upon the hospitals there. then i returned to general loring's headquarters for a brief visit to the general to whom i was warmly attached, and to make farewell visits to sundry officers and bid my old military companions a final adieu. for my intention it then was to leave the army. general loring's headquarters were at new river, virginia, at a place called the narrows, because the river gashed through peter's mountain, which rises abruptly from the banks on either side. the general and all the staff gave me a most cordial greeting, but the former told me that i had no business to resign and that he had kept the place open for me. if i would not be his aide he had a place for me as chaplain. but my resignation had already been accepted on the 14th of june by the secretary of war. as soon as i had determined to resign, i forwarded to the secretary of war a copy of my resignation to general loring and the former had accepted it. the general, colonel myer, colonel fitzhugh and myself, with a cavalry escort, went for a little outing to the salt sulphur springs, dining on our way at the gray sulphur springs. the former place was really one of the pleasantest of all the watering places i visited in virginia. the grounds were rolling, well laid out and very well shaded. the houses were principally of stone and capable of accommodating about four hundred guests. there were two springs of great value there, the salt sulphur and the iodine. the first possessed all the sensible properties of sulphur water in general; its odor, for instance, was very like that of a "tolerable egg," and might be perceived at some distance from the spring; and in taste it was cousin-german to a strong solution of epsom salts and magnesia. like most of the sulphurous, this water was transparent and deposited a whitish sediment composed of its various saline ingredients mingled with sulphur. the iodine spring was altogether remarkable and was the only one possessing similar properties in all the country round. it was peculiarly adapted to cutaneous eruptions and glandular diseases. the salt sulphur spring was hemmed in on every side by mountains. general william wing loring, of whom i was then taking my leave, was not only a very charming companion but he was altogether a remarkable man. a braver man never lived. he was a north carolinian by birth, and only a few years older than myself. yet he was already the hero of three wars--the seminole war, the war with mexico and that in which we were then engaged. and in 1849 he had marched across the continent to oregon with some united states troops as an escort for a party of gold-seekers. he had also engaged in indian warfare and had taken part in the utah expedition in 1858. his frontier services in the united states army were equalled only by those of that grand soldier, albert sidney johnston. the following year, he had leave of absence from the army and visited europe, egypt and the holy land. he was in command of the department of new mexico in may 1861 and resigned to accept a commission as brigadier-general in the confederate army. as major-general he served to the end of the war, leading a division and frequently commanding a corps--always with credit to himself and to the service in which he was engaged. it was at vicksburg, in 1863, that he received the familiar nickname of "old blizzard." after the war he took service with the khedive of egypt as general of brigade and was decorated in 1875 with the "imperial order of osmariah," and was promoted to be general of a division. four years later he was mustered out of the egyptian service. in 1883 he published "a confederate soldier in egypt,"--a most readable book. he died in new york city three years later at the age of sixty-eight. i officiated at his funeral in st. augustine, florida, on the 19th of march, 1886. the commanding general of the army post at st. augustine acted as one of the pall-bearers, and at the cemetery the body was borne from the gun-carriage to the grave by three federal and three ex-confederate soldiers. a salute was fired at the grave by a battery of united states artillery. i had looked toward the diocese of alabama for some parochial work, but the bishop of alabama, the rt. rev. dr. wilmer, not only could offer me no work in his jurisdiction, but strongly advised me to go back to the army as chaplain and surgeon, assuring me that there was work for me in that capacity. in june, i had a petition from my old regiment to rejoin it. i had no difficulty in getting a chaplain's commission. general loring wrote me a strong letter, and that, with the aid of a telegram from general (and bishop) polk, secured it. so i returned to the army of tennessee at chattanooga, and was enthusiastically received by the officers and members of my regiment; and especially by general polk and his staff, upon which i found my dear friends colonel harry yeatman, colonel william b. richmond and colonel william d. gale. in august 1862 we advanced into kentucky, crossing over walden's ridge and the cumberland mountains by way of pikeville and sparta, tennessee. my first intention was to leave chattanooga with general polk and his staff, but on finding that dr. buist was going alone, i concluded to accompany him. so we two started off at 10 a.m. on the 28th of august, and following the route of our immense wagon train, which stretched out for miles along the road, we supposed we were all right and knew nothing to the contrary until we reached the top of walden's ridge where we found general bragg, general buckner and governor harris. the governor put us right as to our way and we had a long ride back to get into the road taken by our brigade, which was quite different from that taken by the wagon train. we rode until after four o'clock in the afternoon, and then stopped at a house that was crowded with soldiers and refugees. we had a bed made on the floor for us and, with many others, slept well until 1 a.m., when we started on, and after a couple of hours learned that the army had halted. we rode into camp, about thirty miles from chattanooga, at dinner time with ravenous appetites. we were having pretty good living just then, for the country was admirably watered. a great many country women visited our camp to hear our band play. we continued our march to mumfordville, kentucky, where the louisville and nashville railroad crosses green river. there on the 16th of september, with a loss of fifty killed and wounded, we captured some four thousand prisoners with as many guns and much ammunition, besides killing and wounding seven hundred of the enemy. the federal forces were commanded by general wilder, since the war a most prominent citizen of chattanooga, for whom i entertain the heartiest and most cordial regard. general chalmers, one of general bragg's brigadiers, was conspicuous in this fight for the gallantry and skill with which he handled his troops. when the federal forces surrendered on the 17th, i stood beside the road and saw them lay down their arms. though there were but four thousand, i thought as they passed by me that the whole federal army had surrendered to general bragg. the night following this battle i found a sleeping place in a graveyard. on the 23rd of september we reached bardstown, kentucky, and took possession. in the meantime general buell, leaving a strong guard at nashville, marched to louisville where his army was increased to fully one hundred thousand men. it was not until october and after he had reorganized his army and was in danger of being superseded in the command thereof that he began his campaign against general bragg's forces. the latter had collected an immense train, mostly of federal army wagons loaded with supplies. and it being clear that the two great objects of our invasion of kentucky--the evacuation of nashville and the inducement of kentucky to join the confederacy--would fail, bragg decided only to gain time to effect a retreat with his spoils. he harrassed the advance of buell on bardstown and springfield, retired to danville and thence marched to harrodsburg to effect a juncture with general kirby-smith. on the 7th of october he moved to perryville, where on wednesday, the 8th, a battle was fought between a portion of bragg's army and buell's advance, commanded by general mccook. at this battle of perryville our regiment captured from the federals four twelve-pounder napoleon brass guns, which were afterwards, by special order, presented to the battery of maney's brigade. the night before the battle i shared blankets in a barnyard with general leonidas polk, bishop of louisiana. the battle began at break of day by an artillery duel, the federal battery being commanded by colonel charles carroll parsons and the confederates by captain william w. carnes. colonel parsons was a graduate of west point and captain carnes was a graduate of the naval academy at annapolis. i took position upon an eminence at no great distance, commanding a fine view of the engagement, and there i watched the progress of the battle until duty called me elsewhere. captain carnes managed his battery with the greatest skill, killing and wounding nearly all the officers, men and horses connected with parsons' battery. parsons fought with great bravery and coolness and continued fighting a single gun until the confederate infantry advanced. the officer in command ordered colonel parsons to be shot down. as the muskets were leveled at him, he drew his sword and stood at "parade rest," ready to receive the fire. the confederate colonel was so impressed with this display of calm courage that he ordered the guns lowered, saying: "no! you shall not shoot down such a brave man!" and colonel parsons was allowed to walk off the field. subsequently i captured colonel parsons for the ministry of the church in the diocese of tennessee. he was brevetted for his bravery at perryville and he performed other feats of bravery in the war. at murfreesboro he repelled six charges, much of the time under musketry fire. he was often mentioned in official reports of battles. after the war he was on frontier duty until 1868 when he returned to west point as a professor. shortly after my consecration as bishop of tennessee, i preached in the church of the holy trinity, brooklyn, new york, on "repentance and the divine life." this sermon made a deep impression upon colonel parsons, as he told me when i subsequently met him at a reception at the residence of the hon. hamilton fish. i visited him twice at west point by his invitation, and a correspondence sprang up between us. in 1870 he resigned his commission in the army to enter the ministry. he studied theology with me at memphis, and it was my privilege to ordain him to the diaconate and advance him to the priesthood. his first work was at memphis. then for a while he was at cold spring, new york. he returned, however, to memphis and became rector of a parish of which mr. jefferson davis was a member and a vestryman. he remained heroically at his post of duty during the great epidemic of yellow fever in 1878. he was stricken with the fever and died at my episcopal residence on the 6th of september. captain carnes was the first man i confirmed after my consecration to the episcopate of tennessee. with the advance of cheatham's division the battle of perryville began in good earnest. general cheatham was supported by general cleburne and general bushrod johnson, but it was not long before the whole confederate line from right to left was advancing steadily, driving back the enemy. it was a fierce struggle. until nightfall the battle raged with unexampled fury,--a perfect hurricane of shell tore up the earth and scattered death on all sides, while the storm of musketry mowed down the opposing ranks. maney's brigade did the most brilliant fighting of the day. it was in the charge by which the federal battery was captured that major-general jackson of the federal army was killed. it was shortly after noon that the battle began with a sudden crash followed by a prolonged roar. i was resting at the time in the woods, discussing questions of theology with the rev. dr. joseph cross, a wesleyan chaplain whom i had first met on the march into kentucky. i sprang to my horse at once and said to him: "let us go! there will be work enough for us presently!" he mounted his horse and followed me up a hill where we paused in full view of the enemy's line. i dismounted and sat down in the shelter of a large tree, saying as i did so: "you better get off your horse! the enemy is training a battery this way and there will be a shell here in a short time!" scarcely were the warning words uttered than a shell struck the tree twenty feet above my head and a shower of wooden splinters fell about me. i jumped into my saddle again and rode at full speed down the hill, followed by my friend, who shouted with laughter at what he called my resemblance to an enormous bird in flight, with my long coat-skirts like wings lying horizontal on the air. when he overtook me at the creek, i said to him: "this is the place. you will remain with me and i shall give you something more serious to do than laughing at a flying buzzard." dr. cross assisted me that fearful day. we met many times subsequently during the war and afterwards, i ordained him deacon and priest, and he was for a time on my staff of clergy in the diocese of tennessee. when the wounded were brought to the rear, at three o'clock in the afternoon, i took my place as a surgeon on chaplain's creek, and throughout the rest of the day and until half past five the next morning, without food of any sort, i was incessantly occupied with the wounded. it was a horrible night i spent,--god save me from such another. i suppose excitement kept me up. about half past five in the morning of the 9th, i dropped,--i could do no more. i went out by myself and leaning against a fence, i wept like a child. and all that day i was so unnerved that if any one asked me about the regiment, i could make no reply without tears. having taken off my shirt to tear into strips to make bandages, i took a severe cold. the total loss of the confederates, (whose force numbered of all arms only 16,000), was 510 killed, 2,635 wounded and 251 captured or missing, and of this loss a great part was sustained by our regiment. how well i remember the wounded men! one of the rock city guard, brought to me mortally wounded, cried out: "oh, doctor, i have been praying ever since i was shot that i might be brought to you." one of the captains was wounded mortally, it was thought at first, but it was afterwards learned that the ball which struck him in the side, instead of passing through his body, had passed around under the integuments. lieutenant woolridge had both eyes shot out and still lives. a stripling of fifteen years fell in the battle apparently dead, shot through the neck and collar-bone, but is still living. lieutenant-colonel patterson was killed at his side. the latter was wounded in the arm early in the action. he bound his handkerchief around his arm and in the most gallant and dashing style urged his men forward until a grape shot struck him in the face killing him instantly. two days after the battle i went to the enemy's line with a flag of truce. and the following day general polk, (who had won the hearts of the whole army), asked me to go with him to the church in harrodsburg. i obtained the key and as we entered the holy house, i think that we both felt that we were in the presence of god. general polk threw his arms about my neck and said: "oh, for the blessed days when we walked in the house of god as friends! let us have prayer!" i vested myself with surplice and stole and entered the sanctuary. the general knelt at the altar railing. i said the litany, used proper prayers and supplications, and then turned to the dear bishop and general and pronounced the benediction from the office for the visitation of the sick. "unto god's gracious mercy and protection i commit thee. the lord bless thee and keep thee. the lord make his face to shine upon thee and be gracious unto thee. the lord lift up the light of his countenance upon thee and give thee peace, both now and evermore. amen." the bishop bowed his head upon the railing and wept like a child on its mother's breast. shortly after this service, general kirby-smith begged me that he might go to the church with me, so i returned, and he too was refreshed at god's altar. general kirby-smith was a most remarkable character. a few years later it was my pleasure to have him as one of my neighbors at sewanee, tennessee, where he did much towards making the university of the south what it is. he was kindly, big-hearted, and no man was a better friend. he was a very devoted communicant of the church, and during the war, whenever opportunity offered, he held services and officiated as lay-reader. in an epidemic of cholera at nashville, some years after the war, he was called upon to say the burial office over his own rector who had died of the dread disease. he entered upon his duties in the university of the south in 1875, as professor of mathematics and gave a great deal of attention to botany and natural science. his end on the 28th of march, 1893, was very peaceful. he died as he had lived--bright, strong in his christian faith and hope. one of his last connected utterances was the fourth verse from the twenty-third psalm. on good friday, the 31st of march, 1893, it was my high privilege to commit his body to the earth in the cemetery at sewanee. chapter vi personal narrative--murfreesboro after the battle of perryville, both bragg and kirby-smith were compelled to retreat by way of cumberland gap to chattanooga. during this retreat i was in charge of the regiment as surgeon, dr. buist having been left behind to care for our sick and wounded. every morning i filled my canteen with whiskey and strapped it to the pommel of my saddle to help the wearied and broken down to keep up in the march. i was riding a splendid bay which had been brought from maury county and presented to me by the members of the regiment. he was the best saddle horse i ever rode. one day the colonel commanding the regiment rode up to me on his old gray nag and said: "doctor, this horse of mine is very rough. would you mind exchanging with me for a little while?" i was off my horse before he had finished speaking. with a smiling countenance and a look of great gratitude he mounted my bay and rode off some hundred yards or more to the front, accompanied by the lieutenant-colonel, the major and one or two other officers--when they wheeled and saluted me, the colonel holding aloft my canteen of whiskey and waving it with great glee, each one taking a drink. when that canteen was returned to me every drop of the whiskey had disappeared. i was an "innocent abroad." from chattanooga i went to rome, georgia, to visit my family and to obtain some fresh clothing of which i was sorely in need. there were many hospitals established there and among them was one named for me, "quintard hospital." i spent much of my time in the hospitals, and also went to columbus, georgia, to secure clothing for my regiment. mr. rhodes brown, president of one of the principal woolen mills in columbus, gave me abundant supplies of the very best material. besides this generous donation, he gave me a thousand dollars to use as i saw fit. after some weeks i rejoined the army which had moved on to murfreesboro. on my way up, i met at stevenson, alabama, captain jack butler of my regiment, who informed me that a telegraphic dispatch from general polk had just passed over the line ordering me to murfreesboro. i asked how he knew it, and he told me that he had caught it as it clicked over the wire, which seemed very wonderful to me then. immediately on reaching murfreesboro i reported to general polk and said: "general, i am here in response to your telegram." he was greatly astonished and asked how it was possible for me to have made the journey from rome, georgia, in so brief a time. general bragg, who was in command at murfreesboro, was attacked by rosecrans on the last day of the year 1862. a great battle resulted and the fighting continued until the 2d day of january, 1863. i was on the field dressing the wounded, as usual, when an order came for me to repair to the hospitals. while crossing the fields on my way to the hospitals in town, a tremendous shell came flying towards me, and i felt sure it would strike me in the epigastric region. i leaned down over the pommel of my saddle and the shell passed far above my head. as i rose to an upright position, i found that my watchguard had been broken and that a gold cross which had been suspended from it, was lost. i never expected to see it again. the next day, a colonel, moving with his command at "double quick" in line of battle, picked up the cross and returned it to me the day following. it is still in my possession--a valued relic of the battle of murfreesboro. as dr. buist was still in perryville, kentucky, i was practically surgeon of the regiment. as the wounded of the first tennessee were brought in, they always called for me, and it was my high privilege to attend nearly, if not quite all, the wounded of my regiment. some of them were desperately wounded; among these was bryant house, nicknamed among the boys, who were artists in bestowing nicknames, "shanty." he had been shot through the body. the surgeon into whose hands he had first fallen told him that it was impossible to extract the ball and that there was no hope for him. "well, send for my chaplain," he said, doubtless thinking that i would offer up a prayer in his behalf. instead of that, however, i went in search of the ball with my surgical instruments, and was successful. "shanty" died in september, 1895. he was for years after the war a conductor on the nashville, chattanooga and st. louis railway, and took great delight in telling this story. i continued at work in the hospital located in soule college until the army was about to fall back to shelbyville, when i was sent for by general polk, who asked if i would go to chattanooga in charge of willie huger, whose leg had been amputated at the thigh. he was placed in a box car with a number of other wounded men and i held the stump of his thigh in my hands most of the journey. when we reached chattanooga i was more exhausted than my patient. i remained with him for some time. the dear fellow finally recovered, married a daughter of general polk, and now resides in new orleans. general james e. rains, a member of my parish in nashville, fell while gallantly leading his men at the battle of murfreesboro. general hanson of kentucky, likewise gave up his life. his last words were: "i am willing to die with such a wound in so glorious a cause!" here it was that colonel marks, afterwards governor of tennessee, was severely wounded and lamed for life. after the first day's fight, general bragg sent a telegram to richmond in the following words: "god has indeed granted us a happy new year." but subsequently hearing that rosecrans was being heavily reinforced from nashville, he retired to shelbyville, carrying with him his prisoners and the spoils of battle, for the confederates captured and carried off 30 cannon, 6,000 small arms, and over 6,000 prisoners, including those captured by cavalry in the rear of the union army. wheeler's cavalry also captured and burned 800 wagons. chapter vii personal narrative--shelbyville having placed willie huger in comfortable quarters in chattanooga and watched over him as long as i was able to, i returned to the army. at shelbyville, i found general polk's headquarters occupying the grounds of william gosling, esquire. the gosling family were old friends of mine and insisted upon my making their house my home. general polk had his office in the house. mrs. gosling was an ideal housekeeper and made me feel in every respect at home. we remained nearly six months in shelbyville, most of the army being camped about tullahoma. soon after the battle of murfreesboro, general bragg was removed from the command of the army of the tennessee and general johnston was sent to shelbyville. on the 7th of february, 1863, we had a grand review by general johnston, who rode my horse--to me the most interesting item of the review. for i had seen so much of marching and countermarching that i was tired of it all--thoroughly disgusted indeed. it was a brilliant pageant, nevertheless. the troops looked and marched well, and general johnston expressed the greatest satisfaction with what he witnessed. he said he had never seen men he would rather trust. i found general johnston a charming man. i was constantly with him at general polk's headquarters and enjoyed his visit to the army very much. he was of perfectly simple manners, of easy and graceful carriage and a good conversationalist. he had used his utmost endeavor to keep general bragg in command of the army of the tennessee; though when he was ordered, in may, to take command of the forces of mississippi, general bragg remarked to me, "doctor, he was kept here too long to watch me!" afterwards in command of the army of the tennessee, no man enjoyed a greater popularity than he did. soldiers and citizens alike recognized that general johnston possessed a solid judgment, invincible firmness, imperturbable self-reliance and a perseverance which no difficulties could subdue. it was my privilege to be frequently with the general after the war and more and more he entered into the religious life, illustrating in his daily walk and conversation the highest type of the christian gentleman. he was one of the pall-bearers at the funeral of general sherman at a time when his health was far from strong. he caught cold and died of heart failure in march, 1891. the weather was at times very inclement while we were in shelbyville and i suffered much illness. i kept at my work as well as i could, however, and often i preached before distinguished congregations; as, for example, when generals johnston, polk, cheatham and nearly all the general officers and staffs were present. the congregations were usually large. i recall reading with a great deal of zest, one day when the weather was very inclement and i was by illness kept in the house, a publication entitled "robinson crusoe." perhaps my readers may have heard of such a book. and one night in february, general polk and i remained up until two o'clock, and the bishop-general gave me a detailed account of the manner in which his mind was turned to serious things while he was at west point--practically the same story that may be found in dr. william m. polk's recently published life of his father. on another occasion the general and i were riding out together and he mentioned the following odd incident to me: his eldest son when at college in the north purchased a gold-headed walking-stick as a present to the bishop. wishing his name and seal engraved upon it, the son took it to an engraver in new york, giving him a picture of the bishop's seal as published in a church almanac. the seal was a simple shield having for its device a cross in the center, with a crosier and key laid across it. by some hocus pocus the artist engraved a crosier and a _sword_ instead of the key. the bishop had the cane still when he told me this, and i think it was his intention to adopt that device as his seal thenceforth. but, of course, as we all know, the bishop's death before the close of the war prevented his adopting a seal for his future work in the episcopate. it must not be supposed, however, that my time was idly spent in shelbyville or in reading such books as "robinson crusoe" and listening to the charming conversation of general polk and others. on the 2nd of march, at the request of my fellow-chaplains, general bragg issued an order to the effect that i was assigned to duty at the general hospitals of polk's corps, and was to proceed to a central point and there establish my office. with the approval of medical officers, i was to visit the different hospitals, rendering such services and affording such relief and consolation to the sick and wounded as a minister only could give. on my copy of this order was endorsed "transportation furnished in kind from wartrace to atlanta, mch. 3, '63." so i went off and was gone several weeks, visiting my family in rome, georgia, before my return. i made also a trip to columbia, tennessee, on business relating to my new appointment--a distance of forty miles from shelbyville, over roads none of the best at that time. while i was in rome i received a very characteristic letter from my friend, colonel yeatman, on polk's staff, which gave me an amusing account of the services held in shelbyville on the day appointed by the president of the confederate states to be observed as a day of fasting and prayer. the chaplain of an alabama regiment preached a very good sermon, the letter says, and then "your brother ---wound up with a prayer--eminently a _war prayer_--in which he prayed that their (the yankees') moral sensibilities might be awakened by the 'roar of our cannon and the gleam of our bayonets and that the _stars and bars_ might soon wave in triumph through these beleagured states!' and then after prescribing a course which he desired might be followed by the lord, he quit." it is such a good example of the manner in which some persons attempt to preach to the people while they pray to god, that it is quite worth quoting here. the visit of bishop elliott, of georgia, to shelbyville was a great event. he arrived on the 23rd of may and was most affectionately welcomed by his friend general polk, and remained with us at mr. gosling's house two weeks. services were held every day and the bishop preached. everywhere he was received most enthusiastically. the presbyterian church in shelbyville, was by far the largest church building in the town, and as it was without a pastor at the time, i had been invited to occupy it and had accepted the very kind invitation. we accordingly held services there on sunday, the 24th of may. in the morning i said the service and the bishop celebrated the holy communion and preached. in the afternoon the bishop preached one of his most eloquent sermons, and i presented a class of ten persons for confirmation. it included colonel yeatman; colonel porter (of the sixth tennessee); major hoxton, chief of artillery on hardee's staff; lieutenant smith, on general cheatham's staff; surgeon green, (fourth tennessee); four privates of my own regiment; one private of the fifty-first alabama cavalry; and a lady. it was a very novel sight to see a large church crowded in every part with officers and soldiers. scarcely a dozen of the gentler sex were to be seen. the attention of this large body of soldiers was earnest and like that of men who were thoughtful about their souls. being anxious for the bishop to officiate for my regiment, i made an appointment with him for the following day, to preach to the brigade under general george maney, at their camp. the service was held at the headquarters of colonel porter of the sixth regiment. the attendance was very large and the bishop said he had never had a more orderly or attentive congregation in a church. i conducted the service and the bishop preached. on tuesday i was very unwell but felt it my duty to drive six miles to the front and visit, with the bishop, the brigade of general manigault, of south carolina. he was on outpost duty and was only a few miles from the pickets of general rosecrans' army. the service was at five o'clock. the whole brigade was in attendance, having been marched to the grove arranged for the service, under arms. i assisted in the service and undertook to baptize a captain of the twenty-eighth alabama, but was taken ill, and being unable to proceed, the bishop took my place. it was a very solemn service indeed. the captain knelt in the presence of his brother soldiers and enlisted under the banner of christ crucified. after which the bishop preached to the assembled officers and soldiers seated on the ground in concentric circles. it was an admirable extempore discourse which fell with great effect upon the hearts of all who heard it. on returning to shelbyville, i betook myself to bed, and using proper remedies, i had a comfortable night. the following day, i fasted and lounged about headquarters. mr. vallandigham, who had been sent to us by the federal authorities because of what were regarded as disloyal utterances made in political speeches in ohio, dined with us, and my great desire to see him gave me strength to endure a long sitting at table, though i ate nothing. mr. vallandigham was altogether a different man from what i had expected. he was about my own age and height, had remarkably fine features, a frank, open countenance, beautiful teeth and a color indicating very high health. he wore no side-whiskers nor moustache but a beard slightly tinged with gray, on his chin. in manner he was extremely easy and polite; in conversation very fluent and entertaining. he was greatly pleased with the kind reception he had met from the officers of the army and the citizens of shelbyville, but was very desirous of avoiding all public demonstration. on thursday morning, feeling much better, i accompanied bishop elliott to wartrace, the headquarters of general hardee. general polk and colonel richmond accompanied us. later colonel yeatman brought mr. vallandigham over in general polk's ambulance and we had a "goodlie companie." at eleven o'clock we held a service in the presbyterian church, the use of which was kindly tendered me. there was a large congregation, consisting of officers, soldiers and ladies. the bishop read part of the morning service and i preached an extempore sermon. i had not expected to say anything, but the bishop having declined to preach, i was determined not to disappoint the congregation altogether. and i had great reason to be thankful that i did preach, for it gave me the opportunity to have a long and very delightful conversation with general hardee about confirmation. in the afternoon, services were to have been held for the brigades of general wood and general lucius polk, but rain coming on, and the services having been arranged for the open air, it was thought best to postpone them to a future occasion. the train that evening brought a very agreeable addition to our party in the person of lieutenant-colonel freemantle of the coldstream guard of the british army. the guard was the oldest regiment in the british service. colonel freemantle was only about eight and twenty, and was on furlough,--just taking a hasty tour through the confederacy to look at our army and become acquainted with our officers. he was very intelligent and very companionable. his grandfather and his father were adjutants of the coldstream guard, and he had held the same office. his family was an ancient and honorable one, and he seemed worthy to wear his ancestral honors. he accompanied general polk and myself to shelbyville the next day, and was for a while the general's guest. he had left england three months before and had come into the confederacy by way of texas. the following sunday i held services again in the presbyterian church at shelbyville, preached to a crowded congregation, and presented another class to the bishop for confirmation. in the afternoon we drove to wartrace where i said evening prayer at the headquarters of general wood, and the bishop preached to an immense concourse. between four and five thousand persons were present and the services were most impressive and solemn. on monday morning, (june 1st), we attended a review of general liddell's brigade. after the review, general hardee had the brigade formed in a hollow square and the bishop addressed it briefly upon the religious aspects of the struggle in which we were engaged. a memorable incident of bishop elliott's visit to our army was general bragg's baptism and confirmation. as soon as i found that the bishop was able to give us a visit, i made very earnest appeals to the officers and soldiers of our army to confess christ before men. but there was one man in the army whom i felt i could never get at. he was the commander-in-chief, general braxton bragg. he had the reputation of being so stern and so sharp in his sarcasm, that many men were afraid to go near him. yet i had often thought of him in connection with my work. he never came to the holy communion, and i never heard of his being a member of any religious denomination. immediately after i received notice of bishop elliott's proposed visit, i determined to have a talk with general bragg. it was late one afternoon when i started for his headquarters. i found two tents and a sentry at the outer one, and when i asked for general bragg the sentry said: "you cannot see him. he is very busy, and has given positive orders not to be disturbed, except for a matter of life and death." that cooled my enthusiasm and i returned to my own quarters; but all the night long i blamed myself for my timidity. the next day i started out again, found the same sentry and received the same reply. this time, however, i was resolved to see the general, no matter what happened, so i said: "it _is_ a matter of life and death." the sentry withdrew and in a few minutes returned and said: "you can see the general, but i advise you to be brief. he is not in a good humour." this chilled me, but i went in. i found the general dictating to two secretaries. he met me with: "well, dr. quintard, what can i do for you? i am quite busy, as you see." i stammered out that i wanted to see him alone. he replied that it was impossible, but i persisted. finally he dismissed the secretaries, saying to me rather sternly: "your business must be of grave importance, sir." i was very much frightened, but i asked the general to be seated, and then, fixing my eyes upon a knot-hole in the pine board floor of the tent, talked about our blessed lord, and about the responsibilities of a man in the general's position. when i looked up after a while i saw tears in the general's eyes and took courage to ask him to be confirmed. at last he came to me, took both my hands in his and said: "i have been waiting for twenty years to have some one say this to me, and i thank you from my heart. certainly, i shall be confirmed if you will give me the necessary instruction." i had frequent interviews with him subsequently on the subject and he was baptized and confirmed. the latter service took place in shelbyville, on the afternoon of our return from wartrace. wishing to make the usual record, i asked the general to give me the names of his parents and the date of his birth. in reply he sent me the following note: my dear doctor: i was born in the town of warrenton, warren county, north carolina, on the 21st of june, 1817, son of thomas bragg and margaret crossland, his wife. though too late in seeking, [but not,] i hope, in obtaining the pardon offered to all who penitently confess, i trust time will yet be allowed me to prove the sincerity with which i have at last undertaken the task. for the kindness and consideration of yourself and the good and venerable bishop, for whom my admiration has ever been very great, i shall never cease to be grateful. my mind has never been so much at ease, and i feel renewed strength for the task before me. faithfully yours, braxton bragg. toward the end of our stay in shelbyville, it was my privilege to assist in getting two ladies through the enemy's lines. the rev. mr. clark, rector of st. paul's church, augusta, georgia, had been appointed by the bishop of georgia, a missionary to the army,--that is, a sort of chaplain under diocesan control and for whose support the confederate government was in no way responsible. the plan was intended to continue the work which the bishop had begun by his visit to our army. mr. clark desired to send his mother and sister to nashville, and communicating with me in advance, i made all necessary arrangements for their transit through the lines before they arrived in our camp at shelbyville. i obtained a pass from general bragg and his permission for mr. edmund cooper, of shelbyville, to write such letters to federal officers as he saw fit. mr. cooper was in a position to be of great service to us, for although a union man and afterwards private secretary to president johnson and assistant secretary of the united states treasury, his brothers were in the confederate army. he accordingly gave us letters to general rosecrans and governor andrew johnson. general wheeler wrote to colonel webb, in command of our outposts, requesting him to do all in his power for the welfare of the party. in the morning the two ladies, accompanied by the rev. mr. clark, my old class-mate dr. frank stanford, then general wheeler's medical director, and myself, left shelbyville in a fine four-horse ambulance. on our way "to the front," nine miles out, we reached general martin's headquarters, where our passports were examined and approved. three miles further on, we reached colonel webb, who gave us a note to lieutenant spence of the outer picket, still three miles further in advance. lieutenant spence conducted us to a house where we were kindly received and made to feel quite at home. he sent one of his scouts forward to the residence of colonel lytle, two miles further on in the "neutral ground," to inform him of our arrival and to take letters to him from mr. cooper and myself asking his assistance in conveying the ladies through the enemy's lines. about two o'clock colonel and mrs. lytle arrived in their carriage. the latter kindly offered to accompany the ladies through the federal lines to the house of a friend where they could remain until they could communicate with general rosecrans. at this point we made our adieus and on returning to camp stopped for dinner at colonel, (afterward general) strahl's headquarters. the day was a pleasant one and the whole party was greatly pleased with the trip. the rev. mr. clark remained with me over the following sunday and held services for one of our regiments. chapter viii personal narrative--a dramatic episode a short time before we left shelbyville i was a participant in one of the most solemn, and at the same time one of the most dramatic, scenes of my whole life. i was requested one day by general polk to visit two men who were sentenced to be shot within a few days for desertion. one of them belonged to the nineteenth tennessee regiment and the other to the eighth tennessee. the former was a man forty-seven years of age, the latter not more than twenty-three. i cannot describe the feelings which oppressed me on my first visit in compliance with the general's request. i urged upon both men, with all the powers of my persuasion, an attention to the interests of their souls. the younger man was, i believe, really in earnest in endeavouring to prepare for death, but the other seemed to have no realizing sense of his condition. i found that the younger man had a cumberland presbyterian minister for a chaplain for whom i sent and who would minister to him. i called upon governor harris and begged him to see the judges of the court and find if there was any possibility of having the men pardoned. i never begged so hard for anything in my life as for the lives of these men. i had a special sympathy for the older man, for he had deserted to visit his wife and children. however, the day came for their execution. the cumberland presbyterian chaplain baptized the man belonging to his regiment. i remained in town the night preceding the day appointed for the execution, and from eight o'clock to nine, the cumberland presbyterian chaplain and myself engaged in prayer privately in behalf of the condemned men. at seven in the morning i gave them the most comfortable sacrament of christ's body and blood. both prisoners seemed deeply and profoundly penitent and to be very much in earnest in preparing for death. the room in which they were confined was a very mean and uncleanly one. half the window was boarded up, and the light struggled through the dirt that begrimed the other half. but the sacrament itself and the thought that the prisoners would so soon be in eternity, made it all very solemn. the prisoners made an effort to give themselves up to god, and seemed to feel that this was the occasion for bidding farewell to earth and earthly things. i pronounced the benediction, placing my hand upon the head of each, and commending them to the mercy of god. at eight o'clock, the older man, to whom i was to minister in his last moments, was taken from his cell, ironed hand and feet. he was placed in an ambulance, surrounded by a guard, and we started for the brigade of colonel strahl, seven miles out of town. on reaching strahl's headquarters, the prisoner was placed in a room and closely guarded until the hour fixed for his execution,--one o'clock,--should arrive. a squad of twenty-four men was marched into the yard, and stacking arms, was marched off in order that the guns might be loaded by an officer,--one half with blank cartridges. leaving headquarter preceded by a wagon bearing the prisoner's coffin and followed by the squad which was to do the execution, we arrived on the ground precisely at one o'clock. the brigade was drawn up on three sides of a square. colonel strahl and his staff; captain stanford; major jack, general polk's adjutant; and captain spence of general polk's staff, rode forward with me. a grave had been dug. the coffin was placed beside the grave, the prisoner was seated on it and i took my place by his side. captain johnston, colonel strahl's adjutant, advanced and read the sentence of the court and the approval of the general. the prisoner was then informed that if he wished to make any remarks, he had now an opportunity. he requested me to cut off a lock of his hair and preserve it for his wife. he then stood up and said: "i am about to die. i hope i am going to a better world. i trust that one and all of my companions will take warning by my fate." he seated himself on his coffin again and i began the psalm: "out of the deep have i called unto thee, o lord," and after that the "comfortable words." we then knelt down together, and i said the confession from the communion office. then i turned to the office for the visitation of prisoners, and used the prayer beginning, "o father of mercies and god of all comfort," and so on down to the benediction, "unto god's gracious mercy and protection i commit you." i then shook hands with him and said: "be a man! it will soon be over!" the firing squad was in position, the guns were cocked, the order had been given to "take aim," when major jack rode forward and read "special order, no. 132," the purport of which was that since the sentence of the court-martial and order for the execution of the prisoner, facts and circumstances with regard to the history and character of the man had come to the knowledge of the lieutenant-general commanding which in his judgment palliated the offence of desertion of which the man had been condemned and warranted a suspension of his execution. the sentence of death was therefore annulled, and the man was pardoned and ordered to report to his regiment for duty. the poor fellow did not understand it at first, but when the truth burst upon him, he exclaimed: "thank god! thank god!" and the tears streamed down his face. the whole scene was most impressive, and was calculated to have a good effect upon all who were present. the other prisoner was executed at high noon in another locality. chapter ix personal narrative--chickamauga on the last day of june, 1863, rosecrans began to advance on bragg. that was the signal for our leaving shelbyville. on the 3rd of july the union army entered tullahoma. on the morning of the 2nd, as i left the headquarters of general bragg, i met my friend governor isham g. harris. he looked very bright and cheerful and said to me: "to-morrow morning you will be roused up by the thunder of our artillery." but instead of being thus aroused i found myself in full retreat toward winchester. thence i rode to cowan, where i found general bragg and his staff, and general polk with his staff. i rode up to them and said to general bragg: "my dear general, i am afraid you are thoroughly outdone." "yes," he said, "i am utterly broken down." and then leaning over his saddle he spoke of the loss of middle tennessee and whispered: "this is a great disaster." i said to him: "general, don't be disheartened, our turn will come next." i found colonel walters, his adjutant-general, lying in the corner of a rail fence, with his hands under his head, looking the very picture of despair. i said to him; "my dear colonel, what is the matter with you?" his reply was: "how can you ask such a question, when you know as well as i do what has happened?" our troops were at this time moving rapidly across the sewanee mountain, over country which subsequently became very familiar to me in times of peace. i said to him; "my dear colonel, i am afraid you've not read the psalms for the day." "no," he answered. "what do they say?" i replied in the words of the first verse of the eleventh psalm: "in the lord put i my trust; how say ye then to my soul, that she should flee as a bird unto the hill?" i gave my horse to one of "the boys," and at the request of general bragg, i accompanied him by rail to chattanooga. on the 21st of august, a day appointed by the president of the confederate states for fasting, humiliation and prayer, while i was preaching in a church, the union army appeared opposite chattanooga and began shelling the town. i think my sermon on that occasion was not long. early in september, general mccook and general thomas moved in such a way as to completely flank the confederate position. general bragg immediately began his retreat southward, and having been joined by general longstreet and his forces, attacked general thomas at lee and gordon's mills, twelve miles south of chattanooga, on the 19th of september. it was a bitter fight, but the day closed without any decisive results to either side. after this the great battle of chickamauga was fought. undoubtedly general thomas saved the union army from utter ruin, but longstreet, by his prompt action in seizing an opportunity, won the victory for the confederate army. the troops led by brigadier-general archibald gracie fired the last gun and stormed the last strong position held by the enemy at the battle of chickamauga, and so memorable was his conduct on that day, that the people in that vicinity have given the hill the name of gracie hill. it was a great privilege to know general gracie as i did. he was a character that old froissart would have delighted to paint. chivalrous as a bayard, he had all the tenderness of a woman. a warrior by nature as well as a soldier by education, (he graduated at west point in 1852,) and profession, he had a horror of shedding blood and would almost shed tears in the hour of victory over the thin ranks of his brigade. a few months before his death he became a communicant of the church. one great personal loss i sustained in the battle of chickamauga was that of my dear friend, colonel w. b. richmond, a member of general polk's staff. he was a true friend, a thoroughly well rounded character and a most gallant soldier. he was the treasurer of the diocese of tennessee, before the war. brigadier-general helm of kentucky was killed at chickamauga, as was also brigadier-general preston smith. among the dead was my cousin, captain thomas e. king, of roswell, georgia, who had sufficiently recovered from his fearful wounds at the first battle of manassas, to act as honorary aide-de-camp to general smith. here also general hood lost a leg. the day after the battle i was sent to the field with one hundred and fifty ambulances to gather up the wounded. it was a sad duty. i saw many distressing sights. i was directed to convey the federal wounded to the field hospitals fitted up by the federal surgeons that had been captured to the number of not less than fifty, i think. i labored all the day and at nightfall i came upon a wretched hut into which a half dozen wounded men had dragged themselves. i found there among them, a young fellow about seventeen years of age. he had a severe wound in his leg and a small bone had been torn away. i chatted with him pleasantly for a while and promised to take him to the hospital early the next morning. early the next day when i went to fulfill my promise, i saw a surgeon's amputating knife on the head of a barrel by the door of the hut, and found that my young friend had been weeping bitterly. when i asked him what was the matter, he replied: "the surgeon has been examining my wound and says that my leg must be amputated. i would not care for myself, but my poor mother--" and then he burst into an agony of tears. "nonsense!" i said to him. "they shall not take off your leg." and lifting him up bodily, i placed him in an ambulance and took him to the hospital, where the next day i found him bright and cheerful. i learned subsequently that the "surgeon" who was about to amputate his leg unnecessarily, was a doctor who had come up from georgia to get a little practice in that line. the boy subsequently became a railway conductor and used to say many years later, "you know i belong to bishop quintard. he saved my leg and perhaps my life at chickamauga. the leg young saw-bones was going to amputate is now as good as the other." another warm friend of mine, john marsh, was horribly wounded at the battle of chickamauga; so sorely wounded that he could not be removed from the field. a tent was erected over him and i nursed him until he was in a condition to be taken to the hospital. on the 1st of october, i obtained leave of absence from my duties as chaplain of polk's corps, volunteered my services as an assistant surgeon, was assigned to duty as such at marietta, georgia, and reported as promptly as possible to surgeon d. d. saunders, who was in charge of the hospitals at that post. i took marsh with me and there he slowly recovered his health. i prepared him for baptism and it was my great pleasure to baptize him and present him to bishop elliott for confirmation. when he was to be baptized, knowing that it would be painful for him to kneel because of his recent and scarcely healed wounds, i told him that he might sit in his chair. "no," he said. "let me kneel; let me kneel." and so he knelt, as i placed upon his brow the sign of the cross. our victory was complete at chickamauga and rosecrans' army threw down their arms and retreated pell-mell in the direction of chattanooga. the confederates followed on the 21st of september and took possession of missionary ridge and lookout mountain. for two months the two armies confronted each other at chattanooga. matters remained quiet in both armies until november, when the confederate lines extended around chattanooga from the mouth of chattanooga creek above, to moccasin point below the town. to my great regret, general polk was relieved of his command on the 29th of september, in consequence of a misunderstanding with general bragg, the commanding general. his application for a court of inquiry was dismissed and a month later he was assigned to a new field of duty, alike important and difficult--the best evidence that president davis could offer of his appreciation of the bishop-general's past services and of his expectations of his future career. it was while we were in chattanooga, before the battle of chickamauga, that the "order of the southern cross" was organized. there came to general polk's headquarters, (on whose staff i was serving,) several officers, who stated that they had been considering the propriety if not the necessity of instituting an organization within the army, both social and charitable in its character, whose aim would be as a military brotherhood, to foster patriotic sentiment, to strengthen the ties of army fellowship and at the same time to provide a fund, not only for the mutual benefit of its members, but for the relief of disabled soldiers and the widows and orphans of such as might perish in the confederate service. they requested bishop polk to attend a meeting that evening to consider the subject further, and he finding it inconvenient to attend, asked me to go as his representative. so i went. some six or eight of us met at tyne's station, about nine miles northwest of chattanooga. after sufficient discussion and explanation to bring us to a common understanding of the purposes of the proposed order, general pat cleburne, general john c. brown, general liddell and myself were appointed a committee to draft a constitution and plan of organization. we met every day, i think, for a week or ten days, and the outcome of our labors was a little pamphlet, in appearance similar to the catechisms of our sunday school days. it was in fact three by five inches in size, contained twenty-five pages and was from the press of burke, boykin & co., macon, georgia. it was entitled "constitution of the comrades of the southern cross, adopted august 28, 1863." several "companies" were at once organized and but for the unfavorable course of events, i do not doubt that the order would have rapidly extended throughout the armies of the confederacy. but active military operations were very soon afterward begun, and the army was kept constantly on the move until the "bottom dropped out," and the "order of the southern cross"--like the southern confederacy--went to pieces. the confederate veterans' organization subsequently embodied some of the features which it was intended that the comrades of the southern cross should possess. chapter x personal narrative--atlanta general bragg was defeated by general grant at chattanooga in november 1863, and early in the following month he was, at his own request, relieved of the command of the confederate army. he was called to richmond to act for a while as military adviser to president davis. his life subsequent to the war was quiet. he was a god-fearing man in peace and in war. he died in 1876. he was succeeded in the command by general joseph e. johnston, whose army was encamped in and around atlanta. soon afterward i secured the use of a methodist church building on the corner of garnet and forsyth streets, assembled a congregation, held services and instituted a work which resulted in the establishment of st. luke's parish. a suitable lot was soon obtained and with the help of men detailed from the army, a building was speedily erected. it was a most attractive building, handsomely furnished, and although somewhat "confederate" in style, would have compared favorably with most churches built in the days of peace and prosperity. within its portals devout worshippers,--many distinguished confederate officers among them,--were delighted to turn aside from the bloody strife of war and bow themselves before the throne of grace. on the 8th of may, 1864, while i was in atlanta in charge of st. luke's church and in attendance upon the hospitals, the following telegram came to me from major henry hampton: "can't you come up tomorrow? general hood wishes to be baptized." it was impossible for me to go, but it was a great pleasure for me to learn afterwards that general polk arrived with his staff that day and that night he baptized his brother general. it was the eve of an expected battle. it was a touching sight, we may be sure,--the one-legged veteran, leaning upon his crutches to receive the waters of baptism and the sign of the cross. a few nights later, general polk baptized general johnston and lieutenant-general hardee, general hood being witness. these were two of the four ecclesiastical acts performed by bishop polk after receiving his commission in the army. i was then chaplain-at-large under the appointment of the general commanding. being anxious for the bishop of georgia to consecrate the new church, i arranged for him to visit that portion of the army then at dalton. at dalton i baptized brigadier-general strahl in his camp in the presence of his assembled brigade, and at night we held services in the methodist church at dalton. the church was so densely packed that it was impossible for bishop elliott and myself to enter by the front door. fortunately there was a small door in the rear of the church, opening into what i should call the chancel. we were obliged to vest ourselves in the open air. i crawled through the little doorway first, and then taking the bishop by his right hand, did all i could to help him through. i read evening prayer and the bishop preached; after which i presented a class for confirmation in which were general hardee, general strahl, two other generals, a number of officers of the line and many privates. the next day i accompanied the bishop to marietta where he held an ordination service at which i preached the sermon. and the day following he consecrated to the service of almighty god, st. luke's church, atlanta. in the afternoon of that day i presented a class of five persons to the bishop for confirmation,--the first-fruits of my labors in st. luke's parish. it was about this time that i prepared some little books adapted to the use of the soldiers as a convenient substitute for the book of common prayer. i also prepared a booklet, entitled, "balm for the weary and wounded." it was through the great kindness and generosity of mr. jacob k. sass, the treasurer of the general council of the church in the confederate states, that i was enabled to publish these two little volumes. the first four copies of the latter booklet that came from the press were forwarded to general polk and he wrote upon three of them the names of general j. e. johnston, lieutenant-general hardee and lieutenant-general hood, respectively, and "with the compliments of lieutenant-general leonidas polk, june 12, 1864." they were taken from the breastpocket of his coat, stained with his blood, after his death, and forwarded to the officers for whom he had intended them. on the 14th of june, i telegraphed to general polk from atlanta that i would visit him at his headquarters and give him the blessed sacrament. two telegrams came to me that day. one was from major mason and read as follows: "lieutenant-general polk's remains leave here on the 12 o'clock train and will go directly through to augusta." the other was as follows: "to the rev. dr. quintard, atlanta, georgia. lieutenant-general polk was killed to-day by a cannon ball. his body goes down to atlanta to-day. be at the depot to meet it and watch the trains. douglass west, a. a. g." i was never more shocked and overwhelmed. on reaching atlanta the body of the dead bishop and general was escorted to st. luke's church, and placed in front of the altar. he was dressed in his gray uniform. on his breast rested a cross of white roses and beside his casket lay his sword. throughout the following morning, thousands of soldiers and citizens came to pay their last tribute of affection. at noon, assisted by the rev. john w. beckwith, of demopolis, (afterwards bishop of georgia), i held funeral services and made an address. the body was then escorted to the railway station by the dead general's personal staff, together with general g. w. smith, general wright, general ruggles, general reynolds, colonel ewell and many officers of the army, soldiers and citizens, and a committee representing the city of atlanta. at augusta the body remained two days at st. paul's church and lay in state at the city hall until st. peter's day, june 29th, when the final rites were held in st. paul's church. the bishops of georgia, mississippi and arkansas officiated. the sermon was by the bishop of georgia. the burial was in the chancel of the church. bishop polk's was the first funeral to take place in st. luke's church, atlanta. there was but one other, that of a child named after and baptized by bishop elliott, for whom bishop polk had stood as sponsor but a short time before. in august, 1864, i was in macon, georgia, not knowing precisely what to do or where to go. the times were very distressing. i took charge of the church and parish in macon for the rector who had been sick but was slowly recovering. this was in accordance with a letter from the bishop of georgia, who had written me about the middle of the previous month, that i had been sadly tossed about and needed rest and that i might go to macon for that purpose. but a few days later i was with bishop lay of arkansas, in atlanta, and with the army again, though compelled to go on sundays to macon to officiate for the sick rector at that place. i remained at general hood's headquarters in atlanta, expecting to move with the general into tennessee. the city was being shelled by the federals, and some of the shells fell very thickly about the general's headquarters. i thought the locality seemed very unhealthy, but as the general and his staff did not seem in the least disturbed, bishop lay and i concluded that everything was going on all right according to the art of war and we stood it with the best of them. on one particular day when more shells were thrown than in all the other days put together, there were, strange to say, no casualties. on the 10th of august, at headquarters, i presented a class to bishop lay for confirmation. it included general hood and some officers of his staff. in speaking to me the night before his confirmation, the general said: "doctor, i have two objects in life that engage my supreme regard. one is to do all i can for my country. the other is to be ready and prepared for death whenever god shall call me." learning that st. luke's church had been injured in the bombardment of the city, bishop lay and i made a visit to it. we looked in wonder at the sight that met our eyes upon our entering the sacred edifice. one of the largest shells had torn through the side of the building and struck the prayer desk on which the large bible happened to be lying. the prayer desk was broken and the bible fell under it and upon the shell so as apparently to smother it and prevent its exploding. i lifted up the bible and removed the shell and gathered up all the prayer books i could find for the soldiers in the camps. before leaving the church i sat in one of the seats for a few moments and thought of the dear friends who had assisted in the building of the church, and who had offered up the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving in that place; of the bishop who had but a short time before consecrated it; of the bishop-general over whom i had said the burial service there; of the now scattered flock and the utter desolation of god's house. as i rose to go, i picked up a handkerchief that had been dropped there at the child's funeral, which was the last service held there. i wrote a little story subsequently about "nellie peters' pocket handkerchief, and what it saw," and it was published in the columns of the "church intelligencer." this was the last time i visited st. luke's church of which i have such tender memories. it was destroyed in the "burning of atlanta." on the 6th of september, 1864, a general pass was issued to me by order of general hood and signed by general f. a. shoup, his chief of staff. this pass is an interesting relic of my early associations with one who subsequent to the war came under my jurisdiction as a priest of the church when i was bishop of tennessee. he married a daughter of bishop elliott, took orders in the church, so distinguished himself in the ministry as to receive the degree of doctor of divinity, and was for a long time my neighbor at sewanee, where he was a professor in the university of the south. chapter xi personal narrative--columbus (georgia) and the journey into tennessee when the fall of atlanta seemed imminent, general johnston advised me to remove my family from the city and i decided to go to columbus, georgia. the rector of trinity church in that town was ill, and the bishop of georgia appointed me a missionary to the army, at a stipend of $3,000 per year, to be paid as long as the churches in georgia remained open, and to be continued to me while i was in columbus and while the rev. mr. hawks, rector of trinity church, was ill. my appointment was subsequently made that of permanent missionary to the army. so in october, 1864, i rented a very comfortable house two miles from town, for which i paid rent in advance for nine months--twenty-five hundred dollars, confederate money. but everything seemed to be on the same generous scale, for when on the sunday after my arrival, i preached in trinity church, the offerings for the poor amounted to one thousand dollars. we met with great cordiality from all the people of the town, especially from mr. j. rhodes brown, who placed me under great obligations by his kindness. we met in columbus the musical prodigy, "blind tom," who belonged to one of our neighbors, general bethune. i had heard him in a public performance two years previously in richmond. i was calling on the bethunes one day, and on hearing my voice, tom came into the parlor and in the most uncouth way paid his respects to the ladies and myself. he was not as much as usual in the humor for playing, having already spent four hours at the piano that day for the amusement of some cavalrymen who had visited him. nevertheless he cheerfully sat down to the piano and gave us some delightful music, and sang us some french songs, in which his powers of mimicry were wonderfully displayed. his playing was most marvellous. it seemed as though inspired. he was then a lad of fifteen. his musical talents were exhibited in his earliest childhood. during all the month of october i was in constant attendance upon the sick and wounded in the hospitals of columbus and holding daily religious services in my capacity of missionary to the army. my brother-in-law, dr. h. m. anderson, having been ordered to selma with the polk hospital to which he was attached, spent a week with me and did much to assist me in my medical services. greatly to my satisfaction he afterwards received orders to report for duty to the hospitals in columbus. one day, at the carnes hospital, in the presence of a large number of surgeons and convalescents, i baptized an infant. that day was made ever memorable by the generous donation of my friend, mr. j. rhodes brown, who handed me a thousand dollars to be appropriated to the purchase of reading matter for the army. he also presented me with a pair of blankets for my own use, and subsequently with three hundred yards of excellent cloth to clothe my regiment. to this he thoughtfully added buttons, thread and lining and three hundred pairs of socks. the cloth at that time was valued at forty-five dollars a yard. "the liberal soul shall be made fat." about the middle of october, general g. p. t. beauregard assumed command of the military division east of the mississippi river, including the department of tennessee and georgia commanded by general hood, who, however, was to retain command of his department. on assuming command, general beauregard published an address to his army in excellent tone and taste, promising a forward movement. it caused great enthusiasm. the general was very popular with his troops and his name was a tower of strength. on the 8th of november, captain wickham informed me that he would leave for the army on the morrow and i immediately made my arrangements to accompany him. leaving columbus on a freight train, after a long and wearying journey we reached montgomery, alabama, and found accommodations, or what passed for such, in the topmost story of the principal hotel. while in montgomery i dined at dr. scott's in company with a number of tennessee friends, among whom were colonel battle, late in command of the twentieth tennessee, and then state treasurer; colonel ray, secretary of state; general dunlap, comptroller; henry watterson, and albert roberts who then edited the _montgomery mail_. colonel battle followed me after i left the house, and handed me a roll of bills, which he begged me to accept from colonel ray, general dunlap and himself, to assist me in defraying my expenses. the money came very opportunely and i thanked him very heartily, for i had not five dollars in my pocket at the time. i took a steamer for selma. the vessel was crowded to excess--in the cabin, on the deck and all about the guards. still i had a much pleasanter night than i anticipated--on the floor of the cabin. at selma, i met the rev. mr. ticknor, who handed me a letter from my dear friend, the bishop of alabama, containing a check for five hundred dollars, which he begged me to accept for my own comfort. i left for demopolis at eight the following morning, in company with captain wickham and my friend major thomas peters, formerly of general polk's staff. at demopolis i had the pleasure of seeing the rev. john w. beckwith, who had officiated with me at the funeral of general polk and who was afterwards to become the bishop of georgia. continuing on our journey we sailed down the tombigbee river to the terminus of the railway, where we took cars and started for meridian, mississippi. it was a most tedious trip on the river, taking up about ten hours to make fifty miles. and when we reached the cars we found them crowded to excess. i stopped at macon, mississippi, to visit captain yates who had lost his leg at atlanta and to whom i had ministered there. i met the heartiest of welcomes, and found the captain greatly improved and getting about a little on crutches. his nephew, who had lost a leg at murfreesboro, was visiting him. i started off from macon with abundant supplies furnished by mrs. yates, among which were two roast turkeys, a ham and "all the et ceteras." when the train came along i found major winter, of the engineers, in the car with his baggage and implements. he kindly invited me to a seat and i had a comfortable ride to okalona, mississippi. it having been decided not to go forward until general cheatham could be heard from, captain wickham, captain bradford and i went on to columbus, mississippi, where i was very cordially received by bishop green of mississippi. wednesday, the 16th of november, having been set apart by the president of the confederate states as a day of supplication and prayer for god's blessing on our cause, i officiated in st. paul's church, columbus, and preached from the text: "think not that i am come to send peace on earth: i came not to send peace, but a sword." general cheatham telegraphed me to go forward. so i left west point, mississippi, on the 19th of november, in a car loaded with corn. the party on our car included brigadier-general quarles, sterling cockrill, of nashville, captains shute, wickham, bradford, jones, mayrant and colonel young of the forty-ninth tennessee regiment, besides some ladies and young people. the day wore away pleasantly enough in such company and about 8 o'clock at night we reached corinth, mississippi, where the rev. mr. markham, an excellent presbyterian minister from new orleans, shared my blankets with me. here we had information that general sherman was making his way to the seaboard and was within thirty miles of macon, georgia. captain wickham and myself passed on with others, and at half-past four in the evening of thursday, the 22nd of november, we crossed the line into tennessee. in consequence of the wretched condition of the roads and the rough weather, we had had a hard time of it. i made my way with all possible speed, through mount pleasant to ashwood and to the house of my dear friend, general lucius polk. such greetings as i received! how i thanked god for the friends he had given me! general chalmers and his staff were guests at general polk's, and the next day we had many happy meetings. all day long there was a constant stream of visitors to hamilton place, the residence of general polk. general hood and governor harris came early in the day as did also general cheatham. then came general john c. brown, general gibson, general bate, handsome frank armstrong, and general walthall, who with his staff, spent the night with us. i offered a special prayer of thanksgiving to god for our return to tennessee, and the following day was one of supreme enjoyment. i did not move out of the house but just rested and tried to realize that i was once more in tennessee. on the 27th, advent sunday, i had morning prayer at the residence of general lucius polk, and baptized two children, making a record of the same in the parish register. on the following day our forces entered columbia. i accompanied them and found the good people of the town in a state of the wildest enthusiasm. almost the first person i met was my dear friend, the rev. dr. pise who went with me to call on several families. these were days of great hopefulness. general beauregard telegraphed to general hood that sherman was making his way rapidly to the atlantic coast and urged hood to advance to relieve general lee. general hood proposed to press forward with all possible speed, and said to me confidentially that he would either beat the enemy to nashville or make the latter go there double quick. so the race began to see who would get to nashville first. that night the enemy was still on the opposite side of duck river, but it was thought he would withdraw next morning. at all events our forces were to cross at daylight. general hood urged me to go with the ambulance. when he told me "good-bye," i prayed god's blessing, guidance and direction upon him. "thank you, doctor," he replied, "that is my hope and trust." and as he turned away he remarked: "the enemy must give me fight or i will be in nashville before to-morrow night." general cheatham and general stewart crossed duck river at sunrise; general lee shortly afterwards. there was considerable shelling of the town, and colonel beckham was wounded, but no lives were lost. by wednesday the enemy had all withdrawn, our forces had crossed over and the wagons were crossing. i crossed the river at two o'clock with major john green, of south carolina, and dr. phillips, of hoxton's artillery. we met on the road several hundred prisoners going to the rear. at spring hill we heard that the federal commanders were in a sad way. general stanley had been heard to say, "i can do nothing more; i must retreat." three trains of cars were burned by the federals at this place. very much has been said about the confederates' "lost opportunity," as it is called, at spring hill, and general cheatham has been faulted for not doing something very brilliant there that would have changed the whole complexion of affairs. it is said that he failed to give battle when the "enemy was marching along the road almost under the camp fires of the main body of our army." during the war and after its close i was brought into such intimate association with general b. f. cheatham, that i learned to appreciate his high character. he was a man of admirable presence. in manner he was free, without frivolity,--cheerful, kind-hearted and ever easy of access. he was a gentleman without pretensions and a politician without deceit; a faithful friend and a generous foe; strong in his attachments and rational in his resentments. he was clear in judgment, firm in purpose and courageous as a lion. he was fruitful in expedients, prompt in action and always ready for a fight. he won victory on many a well-contested field; but, best of all, he ruled his own spirit. he participated in the greater number of battles in the war with mexico; and in the civil war he won distinction and promotion at belmont, shiloh, perryville, murfreesboro, chickamauga, and on many fields besides, he exhibited the most perfect self-possession,--the utmost disregard of peril. he possessed in an eminent degree the indispensable quality of a soldier which enabled him to go wherever duty or necessity demanded his presence. he understood thoroughly that it was better that a leader should lose his life than his honor. i have every confidence in the statement he once made: "during my services as a soldier under the flag of my country in mexico, and as an officer of the confederate armies, i cannot recall an instance where i failed to obey an order literally, promptly and faithfully." major saunders, of french's division, has said: "the assumption that schofield's army would have been destroyed at spring hill, and one of the most brilliant victories of the war achieved, had it not been for the misconduct of cheatham, is one of the delusions that has survived the war.... no circumstance or incident that his strategy developed can be found that justifies [the] attacks [made] on the military reputation of general cheatham." my own opinion has always been that general cheatham was in no way at fault in his conduct at spring hill. and this opinion has been strengthened by the letter from governor harris to governor james d. porter, dated may 20, 1877, and the brief letter from general hood to cheatham, dated december 13, 1864, both recently published in "southern historical papers," vol. 9, p. 532. i baptized general cheatham, confirmed him, officiated at his marriage, and it was my sad privilege to say the burial service over him. he died in nashville, tennessee, september 4th. 1886. his last words were: "bring me my horse! i am going to the front!" just before moving toward franklin, general strahl came to me and said: "i want to make you a present," and presented me with a splendid horse, named "the lady polk." i used the horse through the remainder of the war and at its close sold her, and with the money erected in st. james' church, bolivar, tennessee, a memorial window to general strahl and his adjutant, lieutenant john marsh, both of them killed in the fearful battle of franklin. both of these men i had baptized but a few months previously, and both were confirmed by bishop elliott. chapter xii personal narrative--franklin the battle of franklin was fought on the 30th of november, 1864, and was one of the bloodiest of the war. on that dismal november day, our line of battle was formed at 4 o'clock in the afternoon and marched directly down through an open field toward the outer breastworks of the enemy. a sheet of fire was pouring into the very faces of our men. the command was: "forward! forward men!" never on earth did men fight against greater odds, but they advanced towards the breastworks,--on and on,--and met death without flinching. the roar of battle was kept up until after midnight and then gradually died away, as the enemy abandoned their interior line of defences and rapidly retreated to nashville. we had about 23,000 men engaged. they fought with great gallantry, drove the enemy from their outer line of temporary works into their interior line, captured several stands of colors and about one thousand prisoners. but our losses were about 4,500 brave men, and among them major-general pat cleburne, brigadier-general john adams, brigadier-general o. f. strahl, brigadier-general gist, brigadier-general granberry and brigadier-general john c. carter was mortally wounded. among the wounded were major-general john c. brown, brigadier-generals manigault, quarles, cockrill, scott and george gordon. general john adams, on reaching the vicinity of franklin, had immediately formed his line of battle near the residence of colonel john mcgavock and led his troops into the fight. a more gallant set of officers and men never faced a foe. general adams was calm, cool and self-possessed and vigilantly watched and directed the movements of his men and led them on for victory or for death. he was severely wounded early in the action and was urged to leave the field. he calmly replied: "no, i will not! i will see my men through!" and at the same time gave an order to captain thomas gibson, his aide-de-camp and brigade inspector. when he fell he was in the act of leaping his horse, "old charlie," over the outer works. both horse and his rider were instantly killed,--the general falling within our lines, while old charlie lay astride the works. the general received two wounds in the right leg, four balls entered his body, one ball passed through his breast and one entered his right shoulder-blade. these wounds were all received simultaneously and his death was instantaneous. major-general cleburne's mare was dead on the works and the general himself was pierced with no less than forty-nine bullets. the bodies of these two brave generals were brought from the battlefield in an ambulance and taken to the residence of colonel mcgavock, whose house and grounds were literally filled with the confederate dead and wounded. mrs. mcgavock rendered every assistance possible and her name deserves to be handed down to future generations as that of a woman of lofty principle, exalted character and untiring devotion. captain gibson, general adams' aide and brigade inspector, although badly wounded, accompanied by captain blackwell, conveyed the body of his commander to the residence of the general's brother, major nathan adams, in pulaski. i officiated at the funeral and his mortal remains were placed in the cemetery by the side of those of his father and mother. as a soldier, general adams was active, calm and self-possessed, brave without rashness, quick to perceive and ever ready to seize the favorable moment. he enjoyed the confidence of his superiors and the love and respect of his soldiers and officers. in camp and on the march he looked closely to the comfort of his soldiers, and often shared his horse on long marches with his sick and broken-down men. he was a member of the episcopal church and a sincere and humble christian. for a year or more before his death he engaged, morning, noon and night in devotional exercises. he invariably fasted on friday and other days of abstinence appointed by the book of common prayer. he was guided in all his actions by a thoughtful and strict regard for truth, right and duty. in all the relations of life he was upright, just and pure. there is no shadow on his memory and he left to his children the heritage of an unblemished name and to coming generations the sublime heroism of a southern soldier. after the battle general strahl's horse lay by the road-side and the general by his side,--both dead. all his staff were killed. general strahl was a native of ohio, but he had come to tennessee in his youth, and was as thoroughly identified with the latter state as any of her sons. he gave to the fourth tennessee regiment its drill and discipline and made it a noted regiment before he succeeded general a. p. stewart in command of a brigade. he was just recovering from a dangerous wound received at atlanta the previous july when he entered upon the tennessee campaign, which ended for him fatally. general gist, of south carolina, was lying dead with his sword still grasped in his hand and reaching across the fatal breastworks. general granberry of texas, and his horse were seen on the top of the breastworks,--horse and rider,--dead! i went back to columbia, hired a negro to make some plain coffins, helped him to put them into a wagon, drove with him about sixteen miles, and buried these brave men,--strahl, gist, and granberry,--under the shadow of the ivy-mantled tower of st. john's church, ashwood,--with the services of the church. then i returned to the field. major-general john c. brown, general george gordon, and general carter were seriously wounded,--the last named, mortally. after ministering to these and many another, i returned to columbia to the hospital in the columbia institute. here i found captain william flournoy and adjutant mckinney of the first tennessee regiment, both severely wounded. there were hundreds of wounded in the institute. i buried major-general cleburne from the residence of mrs. william polk. a military escort was furnished by captain long and every token of respect was shown to the memory of the glorious dead. after the funeral, i rode out to hamilton place with general lucius polk. there i found general manigault wounded in the head and major prince, of mobile, wounded in the foot. returning to columbia, i met captain stepleton and through him paid the burial expenses of my dear friend, john marsh,--three hundred dollars. the dear fellow had given me a farewell kiss as he entered the battle. i also gave the rev. dr. pise one hundred dollars and left myself without funds. while in columbia i sent wagons down to the webster settlement to procure supplies for our wounded at franklin. having visited the sick and wounded in the hospitals at columbia, i went with captain stepleton towards franklin. i reached the house of mr. harrison, about three miles from franklin, at dark, and stopped to see my friends, general carter, general quarles, captain tom henry, and captain matt pilcher. captain pilcher was shot in the side. captain henry was wounded slightly in the head. both were doing well. general quarles had his left arm shattered. general carter was shot through the body and his wound was mortal. i knelt by the side of the wounded and commended them to god. i had prayers with the family before retiring. all that night we could hear the guns around nashville very distinctly, but all i could learn in the morning was that our lines were within a mile and a half of the city. the following day was the second sunday in advent, december 4th. i rode to franklin to see dr. buist, the post surgeon. all along the way were abundant marks of the terrific battle,--dead horses and burnt wagons,--but at the line of the breastworks near mr. carter's house, where the heaviest fighting was done, there was a great number of horses piled almost one upon another. mr. carter's son was shot within a few yards of his home. returning to mr. harrison's house with dr. buist, who went down to attend to the wounded, i visited them all and had prayers with them. the doctor and myself returned to franklin in the evening and william clouston called and took me to his house for the night. there i found general cockrill of missouri, wounded in the legs and in the right arm but full of life and very cheerful. lieutenant anderson, one of his staff, who had lost a part of one foot at vicksburg, was now wounded in the other. captain john m. hickey, in command of a company in a missouri regiment, while charging the main lines of the works just in front of the cotton gin, was desperately wounded, his leg being shattered. he fell into the mud and while in this deplorable condition, his left arm was badly broken by a minnie ball and soon afterwards he was shot in the shoulder. with thousands of dead and wounded lying about him, he lay upon the field of battle for fifteen hours, without food, water or shelter, in the freezing cold, and half of that time exposed to the plunging shot and shell of both friend and foe. i devoted my time while in franklin, to visiting the hospitals. in one room of brown's division hospital, in the court house, i dressed a goodly number of wounds, after which i went to visit general cockrill and thence to army headquarters at the residence of john overton. i met with a most cordial welcome, not only from general hood, but also from mr. overton's family and several ladies from nashville. on wednesday, i rode with governor harris to franklin and thence to mr. harrison's, to be with general john c. carter who was nearing his end. i found general quarles and captain pilcher both doing well. major dunlap was also improving. lieutenant-colonel jones of the twenty-fourth south carolina, however, was not doing so well, having had a profuse hemorrhage. on visiting general carter, i read a short passage of holy scripture and had prayers with him for which he thanked me in the most earnest manner. in his lucid moments my conversation with him was exceedingly interesting. but his paroxysms of pain were frequent and intense and he craved for chloroform and it was freely administered to him. he could not be convinced that he was going to die. "but," i said, "general, if you should die, what do you wish me to say to your wife?" "tell her," he replied, "that i have always loved her devotedly and regret leaving her more than i can express." i had prayers with all the wounded and with the family of mr. harrison, and sat up with general carter until half past twelve o'clock. lieutenant-colonel jones died some time in the night. general carter died the following saturday. i wrote to the rev. dr. pise at columbia to attend his funeral as his body was to be taken there for temporary burial. it was bitterly cold and the roads were very slippery. general carter was a native of georgia but a citizen of tennessee. he had been advanced for merit from a lieutenant at the beginning of the war to the command of a brigade. he had a wonderful gentleness of manner coupled with dauntless courage. every field officer of his brigade but one, was killed, wounded or captured on the enemy's works at the dreadful battle of franklin. the following sunday, (third sunday in advent,) i celebrated the holy communion at army headquarters. that night general forrest shared my bed with me. one of the men remarked: "it was the lion and the lamb lying down together." the following day, in the methodist church at brentwood, i united in the holy bonds of matrimony, major william clare and miss mary hadley, of nashville. the major's attendants were dr. foard, medical director, and major moore, chief commissary. a large number of officers were present. after the marriage, the party returned to the residence of mr. overton where a sumptuous dinner was provided. my empty purse was replenished by a fee of two hundred dollars, besides which a friend sent me, the following morning, fifty dollars in greenbacks. i left headquarters the following day in dr. foard's ambulance for franklin and on the way picked up a couple of wounded men and carried them to the hospital. we met governor harris and colonel ray, secretary of state. i spent the evening at mrs. carter's with my friends, colonel rice and captain tom henry. the next day i made efforts to purchase shoes for my family. the merchants had hidden their goods and were unwilling to dispose of them for confederate money. but by offering to pay in greenbacks, i not only secured shoes but all sorts of goods. meeting captain kelly, of the rock city guard, then off duty in consequence of wounds received in the recent battle, i proposed to him to go to georgia for clothing for the soldiers. to this he agreed and we left for columbia. while there i attended a meeting of the ladies, the object of which was to organize a relief association. distressing reports began to come in of a reverse to our arms at nashville. at first i did not credit them, but later i met colonel harvie, the inspector general, who not only confirmed the very worst of the reports, but expressed both indignation and disgust at the conduct of our troops. general lucius polk sent a buggy for me and i drove out to hamilton place and spent the night. the next day, (fourth sunday in advent,) i celebrated the holy communion in the parlor at hamilton place, and after administering to the company assembled there, carried the consecrated elements to the rooms of general manigault and major prince, that they might also receive the comfortable sacrament. in the afternoon i drove back to columbia and assisted the rev. dr. pise at the marriage of miss hages to major william e. moore, chief commissary of the army. after this i rode to the residence of mr. vaught, where i found general hood and his staff. i was glad to find the general bearing up well under the disaster to our arms. it was now a very serious question whether general hood should hold the line of duck river, (even if it were possible for him to do so,) or fall back across the tennessee. one officer remarked to the general in my presence, that while god was on our side so manifestly that no man could question it, it was still very apparent that our people had not yet passed through all their sufferings. the general replied that the remark was a just one. he had been impressed with the fact at spring hill, where the enemy was completely within our grasp, and notwithstanding all his efforts to strike a decisive blow, he had failed. and now again at nashville, after the day's fighting was well nigh over, when all had gone successfully until the evening, our troops had broken in confusion and fled. early the following morning, general forrest reached headquarters and advised strongly that general hood withdraw without delay south of the tennessee. "if we are unable to hold the state, we should at once evacuate it," were the words of general forrest. at nine o'clock in the morning, cannonading began at rutherford hill. after a couple of hours, word came from general cheatham that he had repulsed the enemy, and the firing ceased. general hood finally decided to fall back south of the tennessee; and governor harris, in whose judgment i had great confidence, thought it the best we could do. still it was a dark day to me, and the thought of leaving the state of tennessee once more, greatly depressed me. tuesday, the 20th of december, was a day of gloominess. i felt in bidding farewell to columbia, that i was parting with my dearest and most cherished hopes. i recalled the days of our march into tennessee, so full of delightful intercourse with strahl, and marsh and other friends. after saying "good-bye," i rode on to pulaski, thirty miles, where i was cordially received at the home of mrs. ballentine. the next day i baptized six persons there, and later at the headquarters of general hood, in the residence of the honorable thomas jones, four of mr. jones' children. after this baptism mr. jones joined us at prayers in general hood's room. the general said, "i am afraid that i have been more wicked since i began this retreat than for a long time past. i had so set my heart upon success,--had prayed so earnestly for it,--had such a firm trust that i should succeed, that my heart has been very rebellious. but," he added, "let us go out of tennessee, singing hymns of praise." the weather was exceeding inclement. so many of our poor boys were barefooted that there was very great suffering. the citizens of pulaski did all they could to provide shoes. i dined on wednesday with governor harris, at major nathan adams' and spent the night with colonel rice. the general informed me the next day that the enemy effected a crossing of duck river at columbia at noon, and began shelling the town. but forrest told them by flag, that if the shelling were not stopped, he would put their wounded directly under the fire. the firing consequently ceased. our forces all moved on towards bainbridge. general hood left the following morning. i joined governor harris as he was not to be detained en route. we rode thirty miles to a little town called lexington, where colonel rice, captain ballentine and myself obtained rough accommodations for the night. the next day, we started for lamb's ferry, thinking to find a boat there, but learned that general roddy had ordered it to elk river to cross his command. i therefore had another journey of eighteen miles to make. just at the close of the day i found my friend, major-general clayton, camped by the road-side, and not knowing general hood's location, i decided to accept general clayton's very cordial invitation to spend the night with him. it was christmas eve. after supper the general called up all his staff and couriers and we had prayers. the next day, christmas day and sunday, was very sad and gloomy. i had prayers at general clayton's headquarters, after which i rode down to the river and watched the work of putting down the pontoons. some one brought me a christmas gift of two five dollar gold pieces from mrs. thomas jones of pulaski. the following day i crossed the river at nine o'clock. on crossing the river on our forward march, i had sung "jubilate." now i was chanting "de profundis." i joined general hood at tuscumbia on the 27th and found the general feeling the disaster more since he reached tuscumbia than at any time since the retreat began. and after various adventures, i reached aberdeen on saturday, the last day of 1864. though an entire stranger in aberdeen, i received a most cordial welcome at the home of mr. needham whitfield, whose family were church people. and thus ended the year 1864. chapter xiii personal narrative--the crumbling of the confederacy new year's day fell on a sunday in 1865. there being no resident priest in aberdeen, the vestry of st. john's church requested me to officiate for them, which i did both morning and evening, having large congregations. and on the following tuesday, i began holding daily services in the church, which were exceedingly well attended. at the first of these services, i preached on "earnestness in the christian life." i remained in aberdeen until the 14th of january, holding daily services, visiting the members of the parish and performing such priestly offices as were desired. then i left for columbus, mississippi, where i had a cordial welcome at the house of mr. john c. ramsey, a vestryman of st. paul's church. the bishop of the diocese, bishop green, was making columbus his home, but was absent at the time and expected to return on the following monday. i met the rev. mr. schwrar, of tennessee, at the bishop's residence, and on the following sunday i preached at st. paul's church, both morning and night, the services being taken by the rev. mr. schwrar and the rev. mr. bakewell of new orleans. i held services daily, morning and evening, during that week, at most of which i preached. at this time the minds of the people of the south were becoming impressed with the idea that the victory and independence of the confederate states were no longer certain. on the 19th of january, general hood was relieved of his command and lieutenant-general taylor took temporary command. both officers and privates were holding meetings in the army asking for the return of general johnston. general hood deserved well of his country for his bravery, for his devotion, for his energy and enterprise. but the troops longed for general joseph e. johnston, the country was crying out for him, and congress of the confederate states was demanding that the president restore him to the command of the army of the tennessee. and i am satisfied that no other man, had he the genius of a cã¦sar or a napoleon, could have commanded that army so well as general johnston. on sunday the 22nd of january, the rev. john m. schwrar, deacon, was advanced to the priesthood in st. paul's church, columbus, by bishop green. i presented him for ordination and preached the sermon, from the text: "what shall one then answer the messengers of the nation? that the lord hath founded zion and the poor of his people shall trust in it." isaiah xiv, 32. it saddened me to think that, because of the death of bishop otey of tennessee, mr. schwrar had need to be ordained outside of the diocese to which he belonged canonically. but after the close of the war and i had become bishop otey's successor, mr. schwrar was one of my most faithful and beloved clergymen, was for several years secretary of the diocese of tennessee and missionary in charge of several important places near memphis. in the epidemic of yellow fever in 1878, he remained bravely at his post and died of the fever. a few days after the ordination, i met at general elzy's, colonel baskerville, captain hudson, james d. b. de bow and others and we discussed the policy of putting the negroes into the army as our soldiers, and we all agreed to the wisdom of so doing. we also discussed the rumors then current of the readiness of the foreign powers to recognize us on the basis of gradual emancipation. and mr. de bow, who was the editor of the "southern quarterly review," stated that governor aiken of south carolina, the owner of over a thousand slaves, had spoken to him more than two years previously in favor of emancipation to secure recognition, and had urged him to employ his pen to bring the subject before the people of the confederate states. it was at this time reported that commissioners had gone from the confederacy to washington on a peace mission. i spent wednesday, the 1st of february, with colonel baskerville and with mr. de bow, who was of the opinion that we should have peace on the 1st of may. the thought of peace almost made me hold my breath, but i feared that the time was not yet. at the same time the president of the confederate states appointed a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer. lieutenant-colonel llewellyn hoxton, whom i had presented to bishop elliott for confirmation at shelbyville in 1863, spent a night with me. he belonged to an old virginia family from alexandria where he was carefully nurtured in the church and had instilled into his mind and heart the principles of virtue and religion by the quiet and steady influences of a christian home. he graduated at west point, in 1861, just at the time of the breaking out of the war. after reaching washington, he resigned his commission in the united states army in order that he might go with his state. his resignation was not accepted, but his name was stricken from the roll. he crossed over to virginia and was ordered by the secretary of war of the confederacy, to report to general polk. he was a most faithful soldier and on many a battlefield displayed conspicuous gallantry. i was unable to get transportation from columbus before the 7th of february, and before leaving, bishop green handed me an envelope containing two hundred dollars, an offering from a member of st. paul's parish. after many annoyances, owing to the crowded state of the trains, i arrived in meridian. here i found captain frierson of tennessee. dr. foster the post surgeon, met me at the railway station and i accepted an invitation to be his guest during his detention at that place. at his quarters, i found a number of nashville friends--general maney, captain alexander porter, captain rice, major vaulx, captain kelly and others. i visited colonel hurt who was commanding maney's brigade. the brigade was smaller than my old regiment at the beginning of the war. of all the thousand and more who came out in the first tennessee regiment in may, 1861, i found but fifty men remaining. many had been killed in battle, others had sickened and died, some were "in the house of bondage," and, worst of all, some had deserted their colors. i left meridian on thursday, the 9th of february, for demopolis, alabama, where i arrived at three o'clock in the evening. my visit to demopolis was a pleasant one. while there the report of the peace commission was made public. the failure of the commission was used to rally the spirits of the people, who were told that every avenue to peace was closed, excepting that which might be carved out with the sword. but this attempt to raise the drooping spirits of the south failed. the feeble flare of excitement produced by the fiasco of the peace commission was soon totally extinguished. leaving demopolis, i accompanied the rev. mr. beckwith to greensboro, alabama, to see bishop wilmer. during this visit the bishop held a confirmation service at which i preached and the offerings, amounting to $530, were given to me for army missions. after the service a gentleman took me to one side and stated that several gentlemen of the congregation desired to present me with a slight token of their regard and presented me with $700. it took me greatly by surprise. accompanied by frank dunnington, i went to selma. we put up for the night at a hotel. in the morning i paid for lodging and breakfast $13. i declined the breakfast. the following day i had the great pleasure of meeting my friend colonel harry yeatman. that morning i visited the naval works, and spent some time with captain ap catesby jones. we had much pleasant chat about our virginia friends. it seemed strange to find a naval establishment in an inland town or upon the banks of a small river. but the truth is, the confederate government had learned the wisdom of selecting such places for the manufacture of gunboats and naval ordnance in order that they might be the better protected from the raids of the federals. captain catesby jones had accomplished a vast amount of work at this place. he had some four hundred workmen employed, only ninety of whom were white. he had up to the time i visited him, turned out one hundred and ninety guns, besides doing a vast amount of other work for the government. he went through the works with me and showed me the different steps, from the melting of the ore to the drilling of the guns. he was casting the brooks gun almost exclusively and said that it combined more good points than any other. while in the office at the naval works, mr. phillips, of north carolina, came in to take a look at the works. he was just from richmond having travelled with vice-president alexander h. stephens as far as atlanta. he told a story which illustrated mr. lincoln's wit, and as we all thought at that time, lack of dignity and perhaps also lack of sympathy with those who were interested in the war on the southern side. mr. hunter, one of the commissioners from the south, suggested, during a four hours' interview with mr. lincoln and mr. seward, many instances in history in which governments had treated with insurgents, and mentioned one in the time of charles i of england. mr. lincoln replied: "seward may know all about the history of that time. all i know is, that charles i lost his head." i reached montgomery by steamer too late saturday night for the train to columbus, georgia. i was therefore obliged to spend sunday in montgomery. my expenses on the steamer, exclusive of fare, were twenty-five dollars, to wit: three cups of coffee furnished by one of the servants, fifteen dollars; and "tip" to the boy for waiting on me and caring for my traps, ten dollars. with the rev. mr. mitchell, i went that night to a meeting of the citizens of montgomery, called to consider the condition of affairs then existing. the theater in which the meeting was held, was crowded to excess. when we arrived, governor watts was addressing the assembled multitude. we could scarcely get standing room. the governor spoke for more than an hour, made many good points, defended president davis, and altogether his speech was an able one, practical and thoroughly patriotic. he referred to the different spirit displayed by the people at home from that of the soldiers in the field. he was followed by other speakers and a series of patriotic resolutions was adopted by the people present. i spent sunday in montgomery, preached morning and evening and baptized the son of lieutenant-general albert j. smith. leaving montgomery the next morning, i arrived at columbus, georgia, at five o'clock in the evening, after an absence of more than three months. i was glad to find my family well. i took up my work of assisting the rev. mr. hawks as before my departure for tennessee. the 1st of march was ash wednesday and it rained incessantly. i said morning prayer and preached for the rector of the parish, who though able to attend the service, was looking very badly. his active labors were evidently at an end. three weeks later, my former classmate, dr. frank stanford, put him under the influence of chloroform, and operated upon him with a knife, removing a cancer. he bore the operation well, and was present to give his blessing, when on the 5th of april, at the rectory, i united in the bonds of matrimony, captain john s. smith, aide-de-camp to general hood, and sallie c. hawks, the reverend gentleman's daughter. and his health continued reasonably good so long as i remained in columbus. during the season of lent i officiated every sunday for mr. hawks and delivered a course of lectures on "confirmation." on the 10th of march, friday and the day appointed by president davis as a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer, i preached to a crowded congregation from isaiah iv, 12. i attended to funerals, baptisms and other parochial duties for mr. hawks. among the baptisms, was that of general warner, chief engineer of the naval works at columbus. another was that of captain rodolph morerod, of the thirty-third tennessee, strahl's brigade. he was of swiss parentage, a native of indiana and a practicing physician before the war. major-general john c. brown spent an evening with me just before he left to join his command, having recovered sufficiently from the wound received at the battle of franklin. he made a full statement to me of his movements at spring hill, which satisfied me that his skirts were clear of even a shadow of blame for the neglect of a great opportunity, as is sometimes said. i had always believed it, for he was at once one of the noblest of men and most accomplished of soldiers. i had united him in the bonds of matrimony with miss bettie childress, a little more than a year previously, at griffin, georgia, under somewhat romantic circumstances. invitations had been issued for the wedding to take place at nine o'clock, in the evening of the 23rd of february, (1864). the groom, accompanied by nine officers of his staff, arrived in griffin on the 22nd. but the following morning he received a telegram from general joseph e. johnston, ordering him to report at once at rome, georgia. the officers who were with him were likewise recalled. general brown at once sought miss childress and laid the case before her. "you will have to return to your command," she said. "but not before you are my wife," he replied. i was in attendance at the hospitals in griffin at the time and was sent for and married them at one o'clock in the afternoon in the presence of a few friends. the groom said "good by" to his bride and went to the seat of war. two weeks later he had a leave of absence and with his bride took a wedding journey. i baptized the children of this marriage, confirmed all but one, performed the ceremony at the marriage of the eldest daughter and officiated at her funeral a year later. i was with the heart-broken father at the death-bed of a second daughter and stood with him at her grave. thus i knew general brown in peace and war, in joy and sorrow, in sunshine and beneath the clouds, and i always knew him as a true man--faithful in all the relations of life, broad-minded and generous, an enterprising citizen, a lawyer, a statesman,--a man always to be depended upon. he had the good judgment, the force and decision of character, the methodical habit and the fidelity and integrity of purpose which compelled confidence and made success easy. after i became bishop of tennessee and especially during his term as governor of tennessee, we were warm friends. his death on the 17th of august, 1889, was sudden and unexpected. i was apprised thereof by telegram and hastened to the funeral at pulaski, tennessee, where i laid him to rest with the solemn and impressive services of the church. at another time we had as our guests lieutenant-colonel dawson of the 154th tennessee, and brigadier-general felix h. robertson, both nearly recovered from their wounds. but i received the most distressing news of the death of mr. jacob k. sass, president of the bank of charleston and treasurer of the council of the church in the confederate states of america. he had just escaped from columbia, south carolina, before its fall, and died at unionville. he was one of the noblest laymen of the church, of large heart and mind, full of love for christ and the church,--abundant in labors, earnest-minded and pure-hearted. mr. rhodes brown one day handed me a brief and pointed note, to the following effect: "to the rev. dr. quintard, for his private use, from a few friends." the note contained $2500 and was no doubt given to enable me to purchase theological books and i think mr. brown was the sole donor. on palm sunday, (april 9th) i brought before the church people at the services, the importance of establishing an orphanage and church home in columbus, and gave notice that the offerings on the following sunday (easter) would be for that purpose. on good friday it was with great delight that i received into the church by baptism, my old friend general washington barrow, of nashville. he was one of my earliest friends in that city and always commanded my highest and warmest regard. he had received a classical education, studied law and was admitted to the bar. he was american charge-d'affaires in portugal from 1841 to 1844, served in congress as a whig from tennessee, was state senator in 1860 and 1861, and a member of the commission that negotiated a military league between the southern states on the 4th of may, 1861. he was arrested in march, 1862, by governor johnson, of tennessee, on charge of disloyalty and was imprisoned in the penitentiary at nashville, but was released the following week by order of president lincoln. he died in st. louis, in october, 1866. before easter came, charleston,--the city by the sea,--after as gallant a defence as the records of history, ancient or modern, furnish,--had fallen. columbia had suffered severely from a visit of the federal forces. selma, alabama, had been taken and the larger part of it burned. finally the rumors that had reached us from time to time, that richmond had fallen, were confirmed. general howell cobb wrote to the mayor of columbus, urging him to do all in his power to arouse the citizens to a sense of their duty, to oppose the arming of the negroes, and to promise from the military authorities all the assistance that could be rendered. but from the address of president davis upon the occasion of the fall of richmond, and from the proclamation of the governor of alabama to the people of his state when it was threatened with an invasion of federal troops, it was evident that hope was dying out in the hearts of the people and that the end of the confederacy was not far off. easter eve the enemy was in montgomery and that city was surrendered by the mayor without an effort at defence. everything in columbus was in commotion. the tranquility of the place was not in the least served by the distressing news that was received of the assassination of president lincoln. absurd preparations were made for the defence of the city, but it was an insignificant force that could be gathered there. thus easter dawned. the first service of the day was at half-past five in the morning when i celebrated the holy communion. there was a very large attendance at this service. many men were present. it was most solemn and impressive. all hearts were filled with forebodings of what was to come. the enemy was close at hand. at the second service at half-past ten, i said the litany and celebrated the holy communion. i did not preach, feeling that it was a time for prayer and supplication only. the offerings as previously announced, were for the church home and orphanage. they amounted to $33,000. i stood at the altar for a considerable time administering the sacrament to officers and soldiers who came to receive before going to the field. among these i recognized general finley, of florida, and lieutenant green, son of the bishop of mississippi. i was deeply touched by seeing an officer who was very devout, kneel at the chancel rail, and then hasten away, equipped for battle, clasping his wife by the hand as he tore himself from her. at noon the federal artillery began firing upon the city. the fight for the defence of columbus was quite a brisk affair. major-general howell cobb was chief in command, his second being colonel leon von zinken, commander of the post. our whole force was less than 4,000, while that of the federals amounted to some 12,000 or 15,000, under major-general james h. wilson. the enemy not only greatly outnumbered our force but was splendidly equipped. the enemy was twice repulsed, but of course our troops had, before very long, to give way before such superiority of numbers and equipment. about ten and a half o'clock on monday morning, our troops fell back across the river into the city and beat a hasty retreat on the road to macon, numbers of them passing by my house. i had made but little preparation for the coming of the enemy. i had in my possession the money collected at the offertory at the sunday morning service. this i wrapped up in a piece of rubber cloth and a friend put it in the top of a tall pine tree for me. it may be there yet for aught i know. i had at my house a considerable amount of silver ware. this was rapidly gathered up, put in a sack and lowered into a well. some battle-field trophies were thrown into another well. about mid-night we retired to rest thinking we might be disturbed at any moment. but it was not until eight o'clock on tuesday morning that any of the federal soldiers put in an appearance. the first man who rode into my front yard was a sergeant of the tenth missouri cavalry. he asked if i had seen any confederates about there, to which i replied: "not since last night." "which way were they going?" he next inquired. "towards macon." "can we get something to eat?" "yes, breakfast will soon be ready. will you walk in?" he rode off and called a lieutenant, who rode up, hitched his horse in the front yard, taking the precaution to throw the front gates wide open. as he went up the steps of the porch, i asked him his name. he then gave it as jones, but after breakfast he told me his name was freese, which it evidently was. i had with me as a guest, mr. samuel noble, a very dear friend who had arrived from selma on sunday morning. he was a pennsylvanian, who had been sent south by the federal government to secure cotton and prevent its being destroyed by the confederates. at selma he had fallen under the suspicion of the federals and after being released by them, was taken up as a spy by our soldiers. he was asked with whom he was acquainted and gave me as his reference. he was accordingly sent on to columbus in charge of a lieutenant, who instantly released him upon my recognizing him. he was of great service to me in the emergencies which now arose. lieutenant freese seemed a gentlemanly fellow enough and gave me the following paper for my protection: i have paid a visit to the house of the rev. c. t. quintard, (where samuel noble of pennsylvania is a guest,) for the protection of his person and property. all soldiers will leave everything unmolested until general wilson can send out a guard as applied for. this property must remain unmolested. henry h. freese, 1st lieut co. d. 10th mo. cavalry, volunteer u. s. a. armed with this document, mr. noble determined to keep out all intruders. several friends took shelter at my house. infamous outrages were committed in the presence of ladies at my nearest neighbor's; and in his effort to protect us, mr. noble was twice put in imminent danger, pistols being placed at his head with threats that he would be shot. so i went to headquarters to secure a guard. a neighbor went with me and a soldier agreed to protect my premises until my return. i called first on general winslow, with a note from mr. noble addressed to both general winslow and captain hodge, his acting adjutant-general. captain hodge not only treated me with great courtesy, but accompanied me to the office of the provost marshal. not finding the latter as i desired, i determined to call upon general wilson. i wrote out a statement of what had transpired at my neighbor's house and sent it in to the general with my card. the general himself came to the door, shook hands with me very cordially and invited me into his room where he introduced me to general mccook. i asked general mccook to read the statement i had written and he did so. then rising from his seat and pacing the floor, he said with great warmth: "doctor, if you could identify these men who have committed this outrage, i would hang them in a minute if i could put my hands on them." he immediately gave orders to his adjutant who in turn gave the necessary orders to the provost marshal. by this means i secured a guard for my own house and for three of my neighbors. it was to the great relief of my family that i finally returned home, for they feared from my long absence that some mishap had befallen me. we had a quiet night and i had the good fortune the next morning to save both of my horses. on leaving the breakfast table, i walked out on the front porch, and saw two federal soldiers putting their saddles on my horses. i called to the lieutenant in command of the guard, to know if i must give them both up. he came out immediately, buckled on his sword, went to the men, gave them a sound thumping with his sword and ordered them to unsaddle and give up the horses. they at once obeyed and i put the horses in the basement of my house. when an hour later four other soldiers came dashing up expecting to secure my horses, they failed to find them, and mr. noble went out and put the intruders off the premises. a few days later the guards were all called in, the troops having been ordered forward on the road to macon. a number of stragglers came to the house from time to time and made efforts to enter it, but without success. one night the torch was applied to the government property, factories, etc., in columbus. the heavens were brilliantly lighted up and at intervals there were tremendous explosions. the loudest was at one o'clock, when the magazine was fired. it shattered the glass in houses two miles away. all along the river, the enemy left a scene of desolation and ruin. all the bridges were destroyed. the factories, naval works, nitre works, and cotton houses, were all burned. the shops in the town were all pillaged chiefly by the poor of the town. the destruction is said to have involved about fifteen millions of dollars. chapter xiv personal narrative--the close of the war from columbus i made my way as best i could with my family, to atlanta, where i was the guest of my friend mr. richard peters. the affairs of the confederacy, its armies, its political organization, had all come to naught. general thomas and his army had effected a junction with general grant. cavalry, infantry and artillery completely surrounded the confederate forces, whose supply of ammunition was nearly exhausted. overwhelming circumstances compelled the capitulation of general lee at appomattox court house, on sunday april 9th, 1865. a few days later occurred the assassination of president lincoln and that event was followed by the proclamation offering a reward for the apprehension of jefferson davis and certain other persons,--not as the chief actors in the recent war,--but as _particeps criminis_ in that atrocious crime. in my stay at atlanta i was brought somewhat in touch with the march of events. on the 20th of may the honorable ben hill was brought to atlanta. he had been an intimate friend of president davis and was a man of fine intellect. he bore himself nobly in the then depressing state of affairs. i had a long and most interesting conversation with him. mr. mallory, who had been secretary of the confederate navy, seemed to take a pessimistic view of the situation, and told me that his greatest regret was that he had spent four years of his life in working for a people unfit for independence. major-general howell cobb, although a paroled prisoner of war, was brought into atlanta under guard, probably to accompany mr. hill and mr. mallory to washington. i had half an hour's conversation with him. he told me that he had no regrets for the past so far as his own conduct was concerned; that he was willing to let his record stand without the dotting of an _i_ or the crossing of a _t_; that he felt that the future had nothing in store for him; that he was willing to submit to the united states laws; and that he had no desire to escape from the united states officers. "indeed," said he, "were there now two paths before me, one leading to the woods and the other to the gallows, i would rather take the latter than compromise my self-respect by attempting to escape." on sunday, the 21st of may, i officiated in the central presbyterian church, atlanta. there was an immense congregation present. it was made up of about an equal number of federals and confederates. before beginning the service, i made a brief address in which i expressed my views as to the duties of all true men in the then present condition of the country. i said that every man should do his utmost to heal the wounds and to hide the seams and scars of the fratricidal war that had just closed. i told the congregation that i would not use the prayer for the president of the united states at that service, simply because it had not yet been authorized by the bishop of the diocese whose ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the matter i recognized. i then proceeded with the service. a few evenings later, major e. b. beaumont, adjutant-general on major-general wilson's staff, took tea with us. he was from wilkes-barre, pennsylvania, and an intimate friend of mr. peters' relatives in that state. as soon as he reached macon, he wrote to mr. peters requesting him to call on him for any assistance he might be able to render. he was then on his way home on thirty days' leave. he was a graduate of west point, and,--like all from that institution with whom i was ever brought in contact,--a gentleman. from him i heard the federal side of the story of the columbus fight. i appreciated more than ever how utterly absurd was the attempt on the part of the confederates to defend the place! we had but a handful of untrained militia and a squad of veterans from the hospitals, against 13,000 of the best disciplined and best equipped troops of the federal army! from atlanta i started for nashville, accompanied by my family and my friend mr. peters, who was most anxious to get to philadelphia. the railroad between atlanta and chattanooga had been destroyed but had been re-built as far south as kingston, georgia. i found an old friend, the engineer in charge of the work of construction, who gladly received us into his coach and provided us with abounding hospitality. as there was considerable difficulty in getting through chattanooga, i called upon the federal commander at kingston, and asked him if he would kindly facilitate my movements. i handed him my passport upon which he endorsed his name and asked me to hand it to an officer in an adjoining room. the latter, to my surprise, provided me with free passes to nashville. arrived at nashville, i was very cordially received at the residence of my friend, colonel harry yeatman. this was on a friday. the next day, the rev. w. d. harlow, then in charge of christ church, called upon me. i said to him in the course of our conversation: "i shall be glad to take part with you in the services tomorrow." for the hall, used by my congregation previous to the war, had been taken by the military, in 1862, and converted into barracks, and my congregation was scattered. "perhaps you had better not," he said. "and pray, why not?" i asked. "the authorities might not like it," he replied. "very well," i rejoined, "if they do not like it, let them come and arrest me. i shall not object in the least." i learned subsequently that he had called upon general parkhurst of michigan, then provost marshal of nashville, informed him of my arrival and asked him if i would be permitted to officiate. "ah," replied the general, "has the doctor returned? where does he officiate? i shall be glad to attend his services." later i was called upon to visit the general's wife in sickness and i found myself very busily engaged in visiting the sick and wounded of the federal forces at nashville and in burying their dead. for weeks i was in constant attendance in the hospitals and in camp. gradually i began to realize that i had been unconsciously converted from a confederate to a federal chaplain. when i decided to take my family to new york, i was waited upon by a committee of federal officers, the chairman of which made a touching address and asked me to accept a purse of gold in token of the high appreciation in which my services had been held by the federal officers in nashville. i need hardly say that i was both surprised and gratified. in those days the railways were in charge of military conductors, the coaches were greatly crowded and it was difficult to obtain seats. but general parkhurst came to my assistance, sent his adjutant to the railway station to secure seats for me and my family, and placed a guard over them. thus my family made a very comfortable journey. on reaching new york, i was most cordially received by my friend the rev. dr. morgan, rector of st. thomas' church, and was invited to preach for him the following sunday. his was therefore the first church in the north in which i preached or held service of any kind after the war. i returned to tennessee on the 1st of september, 1865, and on the 6th of that month, a special convention of the diocese met in pursuance of the call of the standing committee, to elect a bishop to succeed bishop otey, who had died in april, 1863. the convention met in christ church, nashville. on the second day, the convention proceeded to the election. and in the afternoon of that day, the president of the convention, the rev. dr. pise, announced that the clergy, by an almost unanimous vote, had nominated me for that high office. the laity retired to consider the nomination and soon returned and reported that they had ratified the same. the president thereupon announced that i had been duly elected bishop of the diocese of tennessee. with my consecration in st. luke's church, philadelphia, in the presence of the general convention of the protestant episcopal church in the united states of america, on wednesday, the 11th of october, 1865, i felt that the war between the states was indeed over. chapter xv a long episcopate the consecration of dr. quintard to the episcopate of tennessee was of peculiar significance in the history of the church in the united states. the consecration took place at the first meeting of the general convention after the close of the war. at that convention all doubts as to the mutual relations of the northern and southern dioceses were dispelled. the latter had never been dropped from the roll of the general convention, notwithstanding the fact that pending the war they had been forced by the exigencies of the case, to withdraw from the northern dioceses and organize the "protestant episcopal church in the confederate states of america." they were still regarded as constituent members of the american national church. each day of the convention meeting in 1862, the southern dioceses had been called in their proper turn, beginning with alabama; and though absent, their right to be present was never questioned. still the question must have arisen in the minds of many of the southern churchmen as to how far this feeling might extend among the church people of the north. with the general convention meeting in philadelphia in october came the opportunity for the church and the church people of the north to express clearly their feelings towards their southern brethren; and this they did, first, by the cordial welcome extended to the two southern bishops present, and to the clerical and lay deputies in attendance from three southern dioceses; secondly, by the ratification of the consecration of the rt. rev. dr. wilmer to the episcopate of alabama, which had taken place in 1862, at the hands of southern bishops acting wholly independently of the church in the north; and thirdly, by the almost unanimous vote upon the report made to the house of deputies on the consecration of the bishop-elect of tennessee, wholly ignoring the especially conspicuous official position he had held in the confederate army and the prominent part he had taken in the affairs of the church in the confederate states. his consecration, therefore, furnished a very significant act by which to crown the work of reunion of the northern and southern dioceses. the service of consecration was, in dignity of ritual, quite in advance of the times. dr. quintard prepared himself therefor, by a vigil held in the church of st. james-the-less. the consecrator was the rt. rev. dr. hopkins, bishop of vermont and presiding bishop of the church in the united states. five other bishops of northern dioceses united in the act of consecration, as did also the rt. rev. francis fulford, d.d., bishop of montreal and metropolitan of canada, whose presence "contributed to a growing sense of the unity of the church throughout the whole american continent." in the history of the diocese of tennessee, the consecration of a second bishop marked, of course, a distinct and important epoch. that diocese had met with other losses than that of her ante-bellum bishop. the war had swept away, to a large extent, the results of his work and that of his clergy. all the horrors of war had been visited upon the state and diocese. churches had been mutilated and destroyed and congregations had been scattered. the effects of the war were very deeply impressed upon the mind of the new and young bishop in the first series of visitations made by him in his diocese,--a sad and laborious journey beginning in november, 1865. the evidences of devastation were fresh and visible on every side. in some places, where before there were promising parishes and missions, there was no fit building left standing in which services could be held. only three churches in the whole diocese were uninjured and very few were fit for occupation. many were in ruins. the returns from two of the parishes showed similarly severe inroads upon congregations. in one of these there remained 65 out of 147 communicants reported before the war. in the other, ten only remained out of 65 previously reported. the bishop never faltered as he confronted conditions which foretold the anxious care, the exhausting labors, the weary journeys, the disappointments, the fears and the griefs the coming years were to bring. it was with the utmost cheerfulness that he took up the burdens of the episcopate, and in gathering up the _disjecta membra_ of the church in tennessee and in strengthening the things that remained, bishop quintard was a marvel. in labors, in journeyings and in "the care of all the churches," he was truly an apostle,--not a step behind any of the heroes of the american missionary episcopate. his jurisdiction, though nominally a diocese, was virtually a missionary district in all respects save that it never received its due proportion of the church's funds devoted to missionary enterprises. with far-sighted statesmanship, dr. quintard perceived in 1865, that the church's effectiveness could be enhanced by the division of the diocese of tennessee and the establishment of the see episcopate in the three chief cities,--memphis, nashville and knoxville. and from that time on, a division of the diocese that would increase the efficiency of the work of the church therein, was kept constantly before the minds of the people. but strange to say, the very arguments used in support of the plea for the relief needed, were made the excuse for not granting it. "it is impossible for the church to grow in such a large territory under the supervision of a single bishop, let him work never so hard nor so wisely," constantly pleaded the diocese of tennessee. "the church is not growing fast enough in the diocese of tennessee to warrant a division of that diocese and an increase of episcopal supervision therein," was the invariable reply. and so it was not until five years before the bishop's death,--not until after he had worn himself out by his efforts to perform single-handed the work of three bishops in his diocese,--not until after repeated illness had warned him that he must have relief,--that a coadjutor was elected and consecrated for him. the wide-spread popularity of dr. quintard, his personal magnetism and the large-hearted charity he had manifested in time of war, were not without their effect for a time upon the work he had undertaken. wherever he appeared there flocked to meet him his old friends of the camp and battle-field. they felt that the religion he preached, having stood the test of adversity in war-time, was a good religion for times of peace,--a good religion to rule the every-day business of life. they readily yielded in large numbers to his persistent appeals to them to confess christ before men. in his record of official acts published in the diocesan journal from year to year, he noted such gratifying incidents as the baptism and confirmation at his hands of some of the officers and men with whom his acquaintance had begun on the battle-field or in camp. in the few months that elapsed between his consecration and the meeting of his first diocesan convention, 314 persons were confirmed by him in tennessee, and that number was a good yearly average of his confirmations for nearly thirty-three years; and his 470 confirmations, 152 sermons and 112 addresses, reported to the convention in 1867, for the first full year of his episcopate, were a sample of the pace he set for himself at the beginning of his episcopate. but as before the war, bishop otey in an episcopate of little less than twenty-nine years, discovered that there was a remarkable tendency among churchmen to move away from tennessee, so it was after the war, as bishop quintard was to find. bishop otey confirmed more than 6,000 persons in tennessee, yet the diocese never numbered more than 3,500 communicants before the war arrested its development. many of those whom the ante-bellum bishop confirmed took their way, like the star of empire, westward, and began to colonize the dioceses of missouri, texas and california. bishop quintard, by actual count, confirmed more than 12,000 persons, and yet his diocese was never, to the day of his death, able to count 6,000 communicants. despite the difficulties of the field in which it was given him to labor for the upbuilding of the church, the bishop was in the forefront of every movement which went on in the church in the latter part of the nineteenth century. he was a pioneer in the adoption of the cathedral system in the american church. he was among the first to utilize the work of the sisterhoods in the administration of diocesan charitable institutions. with his refined and cultivated tastes, it was natural that he should give attention to the improvement of ecclesiastical architecture in his diocese. and he was a leader in the work of the church for the negro. in 1883, a conference of bishops, presbyters and laymen was held in sewanee, to consider the relations of the church to the colored people of the south. a canon was proposed for the organization of work among colored people, which, when it came before the general convention, was known as "the sewanee canon." it was never adopted by the general convention but the work among the negroes in tennessee was organized in accordance with its suggestions. in the list of the american episcopate, bishop quintard's name is the seventy-fifth. it is an unusual name, especially conspicuous by beginning with an unusual letter. these may seem trivial circumstances to receive mention here, but the fact is that they seem significant of the striking position which the bishop held among his brethren, of the peculiarities of his personality, and of the attention he attracted to himself throughout the country. he was, as has been seen, a link between the ante-bellum and the post-bellum bishop. he was likewise a link between the clergymen of the old school and those of the new. it is curious to those who knew him later than 1870, to see him represented in the portraits taken soon after his elevation to the episcopate, wearing the "bands,"--the surviving fragment of the broad collars worn in milton's time. he probably gave them up about the time of his first visit to england in 1867. he must have been among the first in america to wear his college hood when officiating. for it is related that after he had officiated on one occasion in a church in connecticut, a lady was heard to exclaim in great indignation, "the idea of that southern bishop coming to this church and wearing a rebel flag on his back!" in sympathy with the oxford movement in the church of england, he was a leader in that movement as it affected the church in america, and so was called a "high churchman," at a time when that term was of somewhat different application from what it is now. and he was then called a "ritualist," and was regarded as an extremist though at the present day he would be considered a very moderate ritualist. he was always a welcome visitor in all parts of the country and people not only delighted to hear him preach but especially enjoyed social intercourse with him. his conversation was extremely entertaining, partly because of the breadth of his experiences in times of war and in times of peace;--as a traveller in england and as the hard-working bishop of a southern diocese, but also because his talk scintillated with wit and quick repartee. when some one in new york asked him why he had named a church at sewanee, "st. paul's-on-the-mountain," he answered: "sewanee is cherokee indian for 'mother mountain,' and you know st. paul preached on _mars_ hill." on another occasion a man was attempting to argue with him in regard to what he chose to call "the use of forms" in the church. "well," said the bishop, "you know that when the earth was without form, it was void; and that is the way with many christians." the bishop enjoyed a reputation as a pulpit orator that became wider than national. his voice was "as musical as the lute and resonant as a bugle." the southern newspapers between 1868 and 1875 praised his eloquence and noted the fact that, in spite of his belonging to a school of thought not altogether popular in the south at that time, people of all shades of opinion thronged the churches to hear him preach. he was a ready extemporaneous speaker, yet his sermons were for the most part carefully prepared and written out and delivered from the manuscript. some of them became widely known through many repetitions, and not a few became famous. one of these had a history the bishop was as fond of telling as he was of repeating the sermon. it was known as the "bishop's samson sermon," and was from the text, "i will go out as at other times and shake myself." (judges xvi, 20.) when first delivered in one of the parishes of tennessee, the bishop was informed by a disgusted hearer that it was "positively indecent," and not fit to be preached before any congregation. consequently the sermon was "retired" until it was almost forgotten. some time afterward, however, it was by accident included among sermons provided for use on one of the bishop's series of visitations; and when discovered with his homiletic ammunition, the bishop read it over carefully but without finding anything in it that could be characterized as indecent. so he determined to "try it again." it made a deep and wholesome impression upon the minds of those who then heard it. he preached it one sunday night in christ church, st. louis, and after the service a gentleman said to him, "bishop, if you will preach that sermon here tomorrow night, i will have this church full of men to hear you." the sermon was accordingly preached the following night and the gentleman kept his promise. the sermon was preached at trinity college, port hope, canada; at west point, before a congregation of cadets; at sewanee, tennessee, before successive classes of students of the university of the south;--it was preached everywhere the bishop went,--usually at some one's request who had heard it before and who wanted the impression made on his mind at the first hearing, renewed. numberless were the letters received by the bishop telling him of hearing that sermon and of good resulting from it. in his repeated visits to england, bishop quintard enjoyed a distinction never before, and rarely since, accorded to any member of the american episcopate. the first of these visits was made in 1867 in order that he might be present at, and participate in, the meeting of the first pan-anglican or lambeth conference. he attended subsequent conferences up to 1897, a few months before his death. at each of these visits he was the recipient of an unusual amount of attention from english bishops and from the english people of every rank and he revolutionized the opinions of the englishmen of that day as to america and americans. the english newspapers were captivated by his powers in the pulpit. one of the liverpool daily papers said that "the bishop of tennessee speaks english better than an englishman and preaches with the fire and clearness of lacordaire." one of the leading london papers devoted two editorial columns to a description of him and said; "the bishop of tennessee is the first american we ever heard whose speech did not bewray him." "his exterior is impressive." "his voice strong and searching and his enunciation deliberate." "his well-turned sentences are like solid carved mahogany." "he is a type of the highest average of the american public man." "his sermon was in every sense sufficient, strong, well-knit and balanced, and adequately emotional, while never falling short of the full dignity of the preacher's office and evident character. if the church in america has many such bishops it is indeed a living, efflorescent, healing branch of the great tree, which, according to dr. quintard, has never withered a day in england since the epoch of the apostles." he was a guest of the bishop of london at fulham palace; was present at his ordination examinations and took part with him in the ordination of twenty-five priests and nineteen deacons in the famous chapel royal, whitehall; at the invitation of the bishop of london, he preached the first sermon at the special evening services in st. paul's cathedral; he officiated at the service at the laying of the corner stone of the church of st. paul, old brentford,--the stone being laid by h. r. h. mary adelaide, princess of teck; he laid the foundation stone of st. chad's church, haggeston, london; he was present with bishops from the far-away south sea islands, from canada, and elsewhere, at the laying of the foundation stone of keble memorial college, oxford; he reopened the restored parish church of garstag; he assisted the archbishop of york and preached the sermon at the consecration of the church of st. michael, sheffield; he assisted the archbishop of york at the parish church, sheffield, where a class, numbering six hundred, was confirmed; he administered the apostolic rite for the bishops of london and winchester; and on the invitation of the bishops of oxford and ely, took part in their lenten missions in 1868. a second visit was made in 1875-6. his reception by the most rev. the archbishops, the rt. rev. the bishops, the clergy and the laity of the english church was all that could be asked. on two occasions he administered the apostolic rite of confirmation for the lord bishop of london and on two occasions held confirmations at the request of the archbishop of canterbury. he assisted the archbishop of york also at the confirmation of more than 500 candidates presented in one class. by the invitation of the archbishop of canterbury, he participated in the opening services of the convocation of canterbury and was the first bishop of the church, not a member of the convocation, to be admitted to that service. the service was held in the chapel of henry vii in westminster abbey. he assisted at the opening service of keble college, oxford, the laying of the foundation stone of which he had witnessed eight years before. he united, with bishops of the anglican communion from england and africa, in the consecration, in st paul's cathedral, of a bishop for asia,--the rt. rev., dr. mylne, bishop of bombay. he visited the continent also and scotland; attended the church congress at stoke-upon-trent; and assisted at the consecration of the cathedral of cumbrae, in the diocese of argyle and the isles. returning to england he was again present at the opening of the convocation of canterbury. the degree of doctor of laws was conferred upon him by the university of cambridge on the occasion of this visit. he was again in england in 1881 and attended, by invitation, the funeral of dean stanley, (july 25th). on the invitation of the queen's domestic chaplain, the hon. and rev. dr. wellesley, he preached in the chapel royal, windsor, on sunday, august 14th. no american had ever previously been invited to preach in this chapel. he took for his text on that occasion: "if thou hast run with the footmen and they have wearied thee, then how canst thou contend with horses? and if in the land of peace, wherein thou trustedst they wearied thee, then how wilt thou do in the swelling of jordan?" (jeremiah xii: 5.) in these three visits, therefore, the bishop performed every service appertaining to the episcopal office. such experiences were absolutely unique for an american bishop at that time. it had often been asserted that the bishops and clergy of the church in america were not permitted to officiate in the church of england. these visits of the bishop not only gave him an extended acquaintance among the bishops and clergy and prominent laity of the english church, but changed the relations between them and the american church, so that the latter has since been held in higher regard by the church of england. how much this was influential in leading up to the present amicable relations existing between england and america, it is not necessary for us to inquire, though doubtless such an influence might be taken into account in tracing up the history of the present anglo-american alliance. in 1887 the bishop was in england and was present by invitation of the dean of westminster, in the abbey at the queen's jubilee. he assisted at an anniversary service of the order of st. john of jerusalem, in the chapel royal, savoy. as a chaplain of the order, he attended a meeting in the chapter house, clerkenwell gate. the following year, as chaplain of the order, he assisted at the installation of h. r. h. the prince of wales, (now edward vii), as grand prior of the order of st. john, in succession to the duke of manchester, who for twenty-five years had held the office. he was also in attendance, in 1888, at the lambeth conference, was the guest of the archbishop at lambeth palace, and assisted at the consecration of two bishops. with the lord bishop of peterborough, he was presenter of one of them,--the rev. dr. thicknesse, consecrated bishop suffragan of leicester, in the diocese of peterborough. chapter xvi bishop quintard and sewanee the enthusiasm with which bishop quintard, immediately after his consecration, took up and pushed forward whatever promised to be of spiritual benefit to the people of the south, was characteristic of the man. especially attractive to him was the scheme set forth in the address by bishop polk to the bishops of the southern dioceses, published in 1856, emphasizing the importance of building up an educational institution upon broad foundations, for the promotion of social order, civil justice, and christian truth; to be centrally located within the southern states. the scheme had been formulated and developed by its projector and originator, bishop polk; and "the university of the south" was duly organized in 1857. a liberal charter was secured from the state of tennessee; title was acquired to a domain of nearly ten thousand acres of land upon the top of sewanee mountain; the corner-stone of a main college building was laid; and pledges of an endowment amounting to half a million of dollars were obtained before the war broke out. in the fall of 1865, before his election to the episcopate, dr. quintard met upon a train between nashville and columbia, the rev. david pise, a prominent presbyter of the diocese of tennessee, and secretary of the board of trustees of the university of the south as it was organized before the war. on the same train was major george r. fairbanks, of florida, a lay trustee on said board. the conversation of these three gentlemen was upon the proposed university. the magnificent domain secured for that institution, it was asserted, would revert to its donors unless the proposed university were in operation within ten years of the date of the donation, that is, in 1868. dr. quintard pledged himself not only to save the domain, but to revive the scheme for the university and to establish such an institution of learning as bishop polk, bishop otey, and others had in view when the university of the south was organized in 1857. the day that he took his seat for the first time in the house of bishops, dr. quintard entered into correspondence with the rev. john austin merrick, d.d., a "man of godly and sound learning," and offered to meet him in winchester, tennessee, on a specified day; to go with him to sewanee and see what might be done toward carrying out the educational enterprise which was intended to mean so much to the southern people, and which meant all the more to them in the condition in which the war had left them. the way for such a movement had been prepared at the special convention of the diocese of tennessee at which dr. quintard had been elected bishop. reviving a measure that had evidently been adopted in 1861, at the last convention over which bishop otey had presided, (the journal of this convention was lost in the printing office to which it was committed for publication,) the special convention of 1865 appointed a committee to take measures for establishing, (with the concurrence of the executive committee of the board of trustees of the university,) a diocesan training and theological school upon the university domain. dr. quintard, as bishop-elect, had made sure that the war had not impaired the charter, nor up to that time, the title to the domain; even though it had swept away the endowment, and though soldiers of both armies, marching over the mountain and encamping about the spot, had amused themselves by blowing up the corner-stone laid in 1860, and making out of the fragments trinkets for their sweet-hearts. in the course of his first series of visitations throughout his immense diocese, in march 1866, bishop quintard arrived in winchester, and there met the rev. dr. merrick, the rev. thomas a. morris, rector of the church in winchester, and major george r. fairbanks. accompanied by these gentlemen he ascended the mountain, visited "university place," (sewanee,) and found shelter and a most cordial hospitality in a log cabin occupied by mr. william tomlinson. he selected locations for buildings for the diocesan training school and a site for a chapel. in the evening he erected a rustic cross about twelve feet in height, upon the latter site, which is the exact spot whereon now stands the oratory of st. luke's hall. gathered around the cross with the bishop and his companions, were members of mr. tomlinson's household, a few mountaineers and some negro workmen. the nicene creed was recited and the bishop knelt down and prayed god to give to those who were then engaging in a great enterprise, "grace both to perceive and know what things they ought to do, and strength faithfully to fulfill the same." the woods rang with the strains of "gloria in excelsis." it was a scene worthy of association with those of the sixteenth century, where discoverers and conquistadores preempted new lands by planting a cross and claiming the territory for their king and for the church. thus was the domain at sewanee reclaimed for the king of kings and for the cause of christian education. the site selected for the university in ante-bellum times was ideal for the purpose to which it was consecrated. sewanee is on a spur of the cumberland mountains,--a plateau some two thousand feet above the level of the sea and about one thousand feet above the surrounding valleys. the scenery is of unparalleled grandeur with many points of picturesque beauty,--primeval forests, cliffs, ravines and caves,--immediately at hand. the climate is of such a character as to exempt the residents from malarial or pulmonary troubles. it is especially adapted to the requirements of a school whose terms were to be held in the summer months and with mid-winter vacations, to suit the convenience of a southern population whose home life was more or less likely to be broken up in the summer. the conception of a grand landed domain as an important feature in the planning and planting of an institution of learning, was at that time quite unusual in america. colleges and universities had previously looked to populous centers and environment to build them up and sustain them. the university of the south deliberately chose to go out into the wilderness and create therein its own environment. the site had been carefully studied by bishop hopkins, who was an accomplished architect and landscape gardener, and who had it mapped, and had a tentative scheme of buildings designed for it upon the models of the english universities. in furtherance of the enterprise, bishop quintard accepted the tender of a lease, for educational purposes, of a school property in winchester, twelve miles from sewanee, at the foot of the mountains; and there established "sewanee college," with major fairbanks as president of the board of trustees, and with rev. f. l. knight, d. d., and a competent faculty in charge. although this collegiate institute was formally opened and remained in operation for a time, the bishop found it too expensive for him to maintain; and so, as the university developed, he gave up the lease of the winchester property and concentrated his efforts upon the work at sewanee. he made immediate efforts to collect funds to advance the work of building up the diocesan training school. he recorded with deep gratitude the gift of $1000 and of a handsome communion service from mrs. barnum of baltimore. the following may, out of funds thus early collected, a building was erected and called "otey hall." that summer the bishop and major fairbanks erected residences near otey hall and removed their families to sewanee. the episcopal residence at sewanee was at first a log dwelling-house. this was improved and added to until it assumed the character of what the bishop was wont to call "the cucumber-vine style of architecture," and acquired the name of fulford hall, in commemoration of the canadian metropolitan who had participated in the bishop's consecration. memphis had been made the residence of bishop otey in the latter part of his episcopate, and as the work at sewanee increased and that place became widely known and its importance recognized, the memphians regarded it with some jealousy and sought to secure the person of the bishop by providing a residence for him in that city on the western borders of the diocese. the bishop accordingly adopted memphis as his winter residence. but his work at sewanee was too dear to his heart to permit his abandoning his home there,--as much as a bishop could be said to have a home anywhere. and so while memphis became officially the ecclesiastical capital of his diocese, he strove earnestly to make sewanee the scholastic, and, to some extent, the ecclesiastical capital of all the southern dioceses, and in great measure he succeeded. it would be impossible to estimate the value of the bishop's thus fixing his residence at sewanee, not only to the work of building up the university, but in its influence upon the cause of christian education. for the university of the south "has been built up upon men, not upon things." the faith, the enthusiasm and the personal magnetism of bishop quintard drew around him at sewanee a band of high-minded and consecrated clergymen and laymen of fine scholarship and noble aims. thus was realized the idea of bishop polk, who, when on one occasion he was asked in reference to the apparently isolated location of the university, "where will you get your society?" replied, "we will make it; and not only so, but we will surround our university with such a society as is nowhere else possible in this land." the tone, the temper, the social and religious atmosphere of sewanee came from bishop quintard more than from anyone else. for the first twenty years of the university's existence at least, it could almost be said that bishop quintard was sewanee and that sewanee was bishop quintard; and throughout that period fulford hall was the visible center of sewanee life. into it the bishop gathered the spolia of his travels, rich art treasures, rare and valuable books and autographs, and made it a most interesting place to visit. when the building was destroyed by fire in june, 1889, most of its interior attractions were saved from the flames through the energetic efforts of the students of the university, and the elegant building which replaced it, retains the name of fulford hall. therein the bishop passed the last years of his life. it is still the residence of the vice-chancellor of the university. bishop elliott of georgia, the senior bishop of the southern dioceses, was likewise deeply interested in the university and was ex-officio chancellor. at the suggestion of bishop quintard, he called a meeting of the board of trustees to be held at "university place" in october, 1866. it was attended by the bishops of georgia, mississippi, arkansas and tennessee, respectively, together with several clerical and lay members of the board who unanimously resolved that the work of establishing the university be prosecuted. bishop quintard was appointed a commissioner to solicit funds for the erection of plain but substantial buildings, in order that the university might begin its work at the earliest possible date. he accordingly made a trip to new orleans where he held services in all the churches and made an earnest appeal at every service to the church people of that city to carry on the work in which the first bishop of louisiana had been so deeply interested. he was able to report the results of his visit to new orleans, at a meeting of the board of trustees held at a private residence in montgomery, alabama, in february, 1867. bishop elliott had died in december, 1866, and bishop green, of mississippi, had succeeded him in the chancellorship of the university. bishop quintard's report to the board was of such a character that the board proceeded to the reorganization of the university forthwith. the bishop offered otey hall, at sewanee, which was capable of accommodating a goodly number of students, as part of the property of the university, on condition that the board adopt the diocesan training school (for which the building had been intended,) as the theological department of the university, and the offer was accepted. the actual establishment of the theological department was delayed, however, for nearly ten years and until more favorable opportunities offered. the deliberations of the board upon the question of the most feasible plan for beginning work, resulted in the recommendation that a vice-chancellor be elected, and that this officer be charged with the duty of soliciting subscriptions and otherwise advancing the interests of the university. bishop quintard was thereupon elected vice-chancellor and major fairbanks was appointed commissioner of lands and buildings to act as general agent and business manager; to be associated with the bishop in the work of soliciting subscriptions; to reside at the university site; and, under the direction of the executive committee, to have charge of all business affairs of the university. no more efficient officers could have been selected, and with this action of the board, the university scheme might be said to have been fairly launched. of the trials and antagonisms the bishop was to meet with in his work, there is no need to speak now. it was no easy matter to solicit funds for this project at that time. not only had the south been impoverished by the war, but the southern people had not become fully acquainted with the changed condition of their affairs, and did not fully appreciate the value of a plan to educate their sons and make the best citizens of them. in june, 1867, at the request of the trustees, the bishop made an attempt to raise funds for the erection of additional buildings, confining his efforts to the state and diocese of georgia. early in august the corner-stone of st. augustine's chapel was laid by bishop green, in the presence of a concourse of clergy and laity. the occasion was signalized by a dignity of ceremonial befitting the prospective magnitude of the undertaking. the function began with a celebration of the holy communion in the portion of otey hall then used as a chapel. the bishops and clergy moved in solemn procession to the spot selected. the doctors wore hoods expressive of their degrees. a scholastic as well as an ecclesiastical tone was thereby given to the function, and from that time forward the university of the south conformed in the details of its regulations to the models set by the english universities. in 1871, the university, then in full working order, adopted the cap and gown for the distinctive uniform of its advanced students, divided the academic department into juniors and gownsmen, and provided rich robes for the chancellor and vice-chancellor. in these respects it was quite in advance of other institutions of learning in america, though its customs have since grown in favor with other and older universities. still it was possible for some one who attended the commencement in 1891, to write:--"probably nowhere else in america is there any such formal and stately collegiate ceremony as at sewanee." in 1867, the bishop being in england, he consented at the earnest solicitation of his friends, to spend the winter there, and to do what he could to promote the cause of the university. the influential friends he made in england took up with enthusiasm a movement which resulted in such liberal offerings that the university was enabled to start afresh with most encouraging prospects of final and complete success. the rev. frederick w. tremlett, of st peter's church, belsize park, london, inaugurated the movement and a committee was appointed which issued a circular inviting subscriptions. the committee consisted of the archbishop of york, the earl of carnarvon, viscount cranbourne, (afterwards lord salisbury,) the lord bishop of oxford, earl nelson, lord john manners, the rt. hon. w. e. gladstone and others. the archbishop of canterbury, the most rev. campbell tait, in a letter, expressed his deepest interest in the project and subscribed twenty-five pounds toward it. the archbishop of york, and bishops of the anglican communion from all parts of her majesty's realms, expressed a like sympathy. among the subscribers were names of great distinction both in state and church. considerably more than ten thousand dollars was thereby raised, and with this sum the bishop returned to america. much needed buildings were erected in sewanee, and on the 18th of september, 1868, as vice-chancellor, the bishop formally opened the junior department of the university of the south. thus after twelve years of labor and anxiety, of disappointment and sorrow,--after the death of bishops polk, otey, elliott, rutledge and cobbs,--all of them actively interested in the project for building a church university of the first class in the south that would in some degree do for our country what the universities of oxford and cambridge have so well done for england and the civilized world,--the university of the south began its work for god and our land. that day has since been annually observed at sewanee as "foundation day." among the men who were early attracted to the work at sewanee, were brigadier-general josiah gorgas, (who had been head of the confederate ordnance department, and became at first head-master of the junior academic department of the university, and was afterward made vice-chancellor;) brigadier-general f. a. shoup, (who was now the rev. professor shoup, acting-chaplain and professor of mathematics;) general e. kirby-smith; and colonel f. t. sevier, the bishop's old friend of the first tennessee regiment, who became commandant of cadets and head-master of the grammar school. for it was but natural that the military feature of the school should commend itself to men who had just passed through war and had seen the benefit of military discipline upon life and character. these men felt that a higher duty awaited them at the close of the war, than trying to make money,--that the training of the youths of the land as christian citizens was of paramount importance,--and they gave themselves up to that educational work. the splendid sacrifice of these and others set high the standard of the university and invested it with a poetic beauty and a sacredness that dwells there still. "nowhere in the south," said charles dudley warner, in 1889, "and i might say, nowhere in the republic, have i found anything so hopeful as the university of the south." "of the wisdom of founding this university," said a visitor who spent the summer of 1878 at sewanee, "no one would question after a single visit here. its highest development is yet to be obtained. its present standard is equal to the best, but its aims are to reach the highest and best culture obtainable. it is slowly and surely reaching forward and satisfactorily filling the measure of its allotted work.... it is difficult to explain to one who has had no opportunity for a personal observation, how many excellent formative influences are here combined.... everything here promotes a feeling of reverence and respect for sacred things. the presence and influence of men of high standard in church and state, whose example is potent for good.... the book of nature is always open here to the investigations of the geologist, the botanist, and the student of natural history.... the physical education goes on with that of the intellect; an invigorating atmosphere strengthens the capacity.... the various gymnastic and military exercises give a clear complexion, an elastic step and a noble carriage; and then mind and body, acting in healthy unison, fill out the measure of a well rounded man." bishop quintard's ideals regarding the university to the upbuilding of which he was giving the most valuable years of his life, were shadowed forth in his words to the convention of his diocese in 1874, in referring to the meeting of the board of trustees which he had attended the previous year. "it is the aim and purpose of any true system of education to draw out, to strengthen and to exhibit in active working, certain powers which exist in man,--planted, indeed, by god, but latent in man until they shall have been so drawn out. education is not the filling of a mind with so much knowledge, though, of course, it includes the imparting of knowledge. as education is the drawing out of the dormant powers of the whole man, it must in its highest sense be commensurate with the whole man. the body must be trained by healthful exercise, the mind or thinking power, must be drawn out and strengthened, and finally a heart must be sanctified and a will subdued. it is the aim and object of the university of the south to give to its students every advantage,--physical, mental and moral; to develop a harmonious and symmetrical character; to fit and prepare men for every vocation in the life that now is, where we are strangers and sojourners; and to teach all those things which a christian ought to know and believe to his soul's health. the momentous and concerning truth that intellectual power unrestrained and unregulated by sound moral and religious principle tends only to mischief and misery in our race, has been in the educational systems of the age, almost overlooked." the heroic struggle the university was making, began to attract admiring attention. gifts began to flow into it,--small as compared with those that have been given to the cause of education in these later days, but large when the impoverished condition of the south from which many of them came, is taken into consideration. and not only was the continued existence of the university guaranteed, but its ultimate success was assured. the responsibility and work devolving upon the vice-chancellor of a university, even in its nascent stages, were too great a burden when added to the cares of a large and exacting diocese, and bishop quintard resigned the office of vice-chancellor in 1868 in order that some one else might be elected to fill that position. an effort to secure the valuable services of general robert e. lee, for the university, resulted in the following letter:- washington college, lexington, va., 23 sept., 1868. rt. rev'd. and dear sir,--absence from lexington has prevented me until to-day from replying to your kind interesting letter of the 20th of august last. i have followed with deep interest the progress of the university of the south from its origin, and my wishes for its success have been as earnest as my veneration for its founders and respect for its object have been sincere. its prosperity will always be to me a source of pleasure, and i trust that in the providence of god its career may be one of eminent benefit to our country. that it has survived the adverse circumstances with which it has been surrounded and has surmounted the difficulties with which it has had to contend, is cause of great rejoicing to me, and i am glad to learn that it has so fair a prospect of advancement and usefulness. i need not, then, assure you that i feel highly honored that its board of trustees has thought of me for the office of vice-chancellor, and i beg that you will present to them my fervent thanks for their favorable consideration. they have, however, been misinformed as to my feelings concerning my present position, and even were they as represented, i could not now resign it with propriety unless i saw it would be for the benefit of the college. i must therefore respectfully decline your proposition, and ask you to accept my grateful thanks for the frank and courteous manner in which it has been tendered, as well as for the considerate measures you proposed to promote my convenience and comfort. i am, with great respect and highest regard, your friend and obt. servt., r. e. lee. rt. rev'd. wm. m. green, d.d., chancellor of university of the south. commodore matthew fontaine maury was then elected by the board, and when commodore maury declined, the bishop withdrew his resignation and continued his work. in various parts of the south, in the north and in england, he represented the needs of the university. a trip made to new orleans and galveston in 1870 was in some respects characteristic of the bishop's appeals and of the breadth of scope of the university as presented by him. in galveston, the first person who responded to his appeal was a hebrew; one of the most active helpers was a presbyterian, and these two with a churchman composed a committee to work for the university of the south. in 1871 the academic department was formally organized by the election of five professors. in 1872, the bishop again resigned the vice-chancellorship and general gorgas was elected to succeed him. general gorgas was in time succeeded by the rev. dr. telfair hodgson, and he in turn by the rev. dr. thomas f. gailor. in 1893 the last named was succeeded by bishop quintard's son-in-law, dr. b. lawton wiggins, an alumnus of the university of the south, and the preserver of what his father-in-law had founded. but the bishop's interest in the university was not relaxed. wherever he went he represented the needs of the university as well as those of his diocese. in 1876, he attended a "matinee" at the london residence of lord shrewsbury. cards of invitation had been issued by the earl and countess of shrewsbury and about three hundred guests assembled. the lord bishop of winchester presided at this meeting, which was organized in the interests of the university of the south--not so much to collect money for the university as to make known in england the work the university was doing. the church in scotland was represented by the primus and by the bishop of edinburgh; the irish church by the bishop of derry and raphoe and by the bishop of moray and ross. a large number of prominent clergymen were present. addresses were made by the bishops, by lord shrewsbury, a. j. beresford-hope, m.p., and others. in 1887 bishop green died and was succeeded in the chancellorship by bishop gregg of texas. when the latter died in 1893, his logical successor was bishop quintard, who, however, felt unfitted for the office by reason of his infirmity of deafness which had come to him in his later years. he accordingly stood aside and favored the election of the rt. rev. dr. dudley, bishop of kentucky. bishop quintard had seen buildings of permanent character grow up upon the university domain,--built of sewanee sand-stone, unsurpassed either in quality or appearance as a building material. he had seen the theological department opened in 1878, the medical department opened in 1892, and the law department in 1893. he had acted as consecrator at the elevation of an alumnus of the university to the episcopate of louisiana[a]. he had consecrated as his own coadjutor one whose life had been closely connected with sewanee and the university. he had ordained to the priesthood many alumni. he had seen degrees conferred upon many men who were to go out into the world and carry the influence of the noble work the bishop himself had done so much toward establishing. and in many ways he had seen in the church university, whose broad foundations had been wisely laid by godly men who inaugurated the enterprise, a visible advance made toward the ideals set for it by its founders and re-founder. footnote a: five other alumni have been elevated to the episcopate since the bishop's death. the last convention at which the bishop presided, was held in sewanee in 1897. the bishop, shortly afterward, went to england to be present at the lambeth conference held that year. he returned to sewanee somewhat refreshed in body and resumed the work of his diocese. but further rest became necessary and he went to darien, georgia, in search thereof. there the end came on the 15th of february, 1898. his body was brought back to sewanee, lay for a time in the otey memorial church, watched by the clergy and the sisters of st. mary, and was thence taken to st. augustine's chapel, where the service was said over it by the bishops in attendance. the university was not in session at the time, but the university town was filled with sorrowing friends, representing the army of the late confederate states, the clergy and laity of the diocese, the house of bishops, and the alumni of the university. the coadjutor bishop of tennessee, now bishop quintard's successor, committed his body to the ground in the sewanee cemetery. a movement was begun soon after the bishop's death to endow a professorship in the theological department of the university as a memorial of him. very fittingly, the new grammar school dormitory, erected on the university domain in 1901, was named the "quintard memorial." but the greatest monument and the most lasting one, to the second bishop of tennessee, is and will be the university which he re-founded and did much to build up. the end appendix the following is a copy of the petition, with signatures attached, of the rock city guard, which induced dr. quintard to suspend his parochial work in nashville, and enter the military service of the confederacy. we the undersigned members of the "battalion of rock city guard" do hereby respectfully invite the rev. c. t. quintard to accompany us throughout the campaign as our friend and spiritual adviser, and we hereby pledge ourselves to sustain him and attend regularly whatever service he may institute, being willing to be guided by him. f. j. reamer, c. h. stockell, john gee haily, w. wills, e. c. leonhard, john b. johnson, robt. gordon, b. m. franklin, nat hampton, jr., jno. m. pearl, robert swan, john w. mcwhirter, john w. branch, d. w. sumner, m. n. brown, joseph freeman, j. c. march, r. j. howse, jas. mcmanus, r. s. bugg, e. w. fariss, douglas lee, sam robinson, f. i. loiseau, v. l. benton, wm. t. hefferman, james p. shockly, wm. morrow, berry morgan, rowe foote, r. r. hightower, h. b. finn, joseph a. carney, d. j. roberts, j. h. hough, a. w. harris, i. m. cockrill, r. a. withers, r. w. gillespie, j. h. bankston, harry ross, r. darrington, t. j. gattright, john k. sloan, b. j. mccarty, l. h. mclemore, a. j. phillips, w. a. mayo, r. h. fiser, james t. gunn, wm. a. ellis, t. h. atkeison, r. b. rozell, r. cheatham, w. n. johns, j. p. shane, j. l. cooke, geo. a. diggons, t. o. harris, victor vallette, d. g. carter, j. w. thomas, j. clarke, f. m. geary, w. b. ross, wm. baxter, j. t. henderson, john w. barnes, james p. kirkman, h. n. stothart, d. k. sanford, r. w. burke, james carrigan, t. h. griffin, w. p. prichard, j. h. allen, p. bartola, g. t. hampton, f. h. morgan, wm. r. elliston, jr., wm. h. everett, t. b. lanier, i. l. smith, t. c. lucas, w. p. wadlington, jas. w. nichol, wm. b. maney, john a. murkin, jr., j. walker coleman, jo h. sewell, g. e. valette, geo. m. mace, mason vannoy. index aberdeen, miss., 124 adams, gen. john, 112-114 adams, maj. nathan, 114, 123 aiken, gov. of s. c., 127 anderson, dr. h. m., 103 anderson, gen. s. r., 17, 19, 20, 39 anderson, lieut., 117 annandale, miss., 50, 51 appomattox court house, 143 armstrong, frank, 107 ashby, capt. turner, 38 ashwood, tenn., 107, 115 athens, ga., 5 atkinson, bishop, 14 atlanta, 72, 95-102, 115, 142-145 augusta, ga., 80, 99 back creek, va., 16 bainbridge, ga., 123 baird, mr., 34 bakewell, rev. mr., 125 ballentine, capt., 123 ballentine, mrs., 122 bardstown, ky., 56 barnum, mrs., 161 barrow, gen. washington, 12, 136 baskerville, col., 127 bate, gen., 107 bath, 37 bath alum springs, 34 battle, col., 104, 105 "beaufort," 47 beaumont, maj. e. b., 145 beauregard, gen. g. p. t., 104, 108 beckwith, bishop john w., 98, 105, 129 beresford-hope, hon. a. j., 181 bethune, gen., 102 big sewell mountain, 32, 33, 36 blackwell, capt., 114 "blind tom," 102 bolivar, tenn., 111 bombay, bishop of, 161 bradford, capt., 106, 107 brady's gate, 26 bragg, gen. braxton, 55, 56, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 77-80, 87, 88, 92, 95 brentwood, 120 bristol, 13 brown, gen. john c., 93, 107, 112, 115, 133-135 brown, j. rhodes, 65, 102, 103, 135 buchanan, capt., 46, 47 buckner, gen., 55 buell, gen., 56 buist, dr. j. r., 12, 27, 54, 64, 66, 117 bullock, capt., 37 burke, boykin & co., 93 butler, capt. jack, 27, 65 butt, lieut. walter, 43 cambridge university, 175 canterbury, archbishop of, 174 capon mountain, 37, 38 carnes, capt. w. w., 57, 58 carnes hospital, 103 carter, gen. john c, 112, 115-119 chalmers, gen., 55, 107 chaplain's creek, 60 charleston, s. c., 14, 136 chattanooga, 54, 55, 64, 67, 69, 88, 92, 95, 145, 146 cheatham, gen. b. f., 59, 70, 106, 107, 109, 122 cheat mountain, 19, 23, 28, 30 cheat pass, 19, 23 chickamauga, 87-94, 110 childress, miss bettie, 133, 134 clare, maj. william, 120 clark, rev. mr., 80-82 clayton, gen., 124 cleburne, gen. pat., 59, 93, 112, 113, 116 clouston, william, 117 cobb, gen. howell, 44, 136, 138, 144 cobbs, bishop, 175 cockrill, gen., 112, 117, 118 cockrill, sterling, 106 columbia, s. c., 135 columbia, tenn., 23, 72, 108, 115-123, 164 columbia institute, 116 columbus, ga., 65, 102, 104, 131-145 columbus, miss., 106, 125-128 "congress," 45-48 cooper, hon. edmund, 80, 81 corinth, miss., 107 cowan, tenn., 87 cross, rev. dr. joseph, 59, 60 crouch's, 19, 26 "cumberland," 45, 46 cumberland gap, 64 cumbrae, 161 dalton, ga., 96 danville, ky., 56 darien, ga., 182 davis, jefferson, 42, 58, 92, 95, 132, 133, 137, 143 dawson, col., 135 debow, james d. b., 127 demopolis, ala., 98, 105, 129 derry and raphoe, bishop of, 180 donelson, gen., 17, 19, 24 duck river, 108, 121, 123 dudley, bishop, 181 duffie, hon. george, 14 dunlap, gen., 104, 105, 118 dunnington, frank, 130 duval, maj., 17 edinburgh, bishop of, 180 edgefield, tenn., 6 edrai, 31 edward vii, 162 eggleston, lieut. j. r., 46 elk river, 124 elliott, bishop, 73-80, 91, 96-99, 101-105, 111, 128, 171, 175 ely, hon. alfred, 15 elzy, gen., 127 ewell, col., 99 fairbanks, maj. george r., 165, 166, 169, 172 "felix old boy," 16 field, capt., 23 finley, gen., 138 fitzhugh, col., 51 flournoy, capt. william, 116 floyd, gen. j. b., 32 foard, dr., 120 forney, gen., 50 forrest, gen., 119, 122, 123 fort donelson, 40 foster, capt., 32 foster, dr., 128 foundation day, 175 franklin, tenn., 28, 111, 112-124 freemantle, lt.-col., 76, 77 freese, lieut. h. h., 139, 140 frierson, capt., 128 fulford, bishop, 150 fulford hall, 169, 170 fulton, col., 17 gailor, bishop, 180-182 gale, col. w. d., 54 galveston, 179 gatewoods, 17 gibson, capt. thomas, 113, 114 gibson, gen., 117 gist, gen., 112, 115 gordon, gen. george, 112, 115 gordonsville, 42 gorgas, gen. josiah, 175, 180 gosling, william, 69, 73 gracie, gen. archibald, 89 granberry, gen., 112, 115 grant, gen., 95, 142 gray sulphur springs, 52 green, bishop, 99, 106, 125-128, 138, 171, 173, 179, 181 green, lieut., 138 green, maj. john, 109 green, surgeon, 73 greenbrier bridge, 34 green river, 55 greensboro, ala., 129 gregg, bishop, 181 griffin, ga., 133, 134 hadley, miss mary, 120 hages, miss, 121 hamilton place, 107, 116, 121 hampton, maj. henry, 96 hampton, mrs. wade, 14 hampton roads, 49 hancock, md., 39 hanson, gen., 67 hardee, gen., 76, 77, 96, 97 harlow, rev. w. d., 146 harris, gov., 11, 55, 83, 87, 107, 111, 118, 120, 122, 123 harris, rev. george c., 12 harrodsburg, 56, 61 harvie, col., 121 hatton, col., 25 hawks, rev. mr., 102, 132, 133 hawks, miss sallie c., 132 helm, gen., 89 henry, capt. tom, 116, 120 hickey, capt. john m., 117 hill, hon. ben, 143, 144 hillsboro, va., 34 hodge, capt., 141 hodgson, rev. dr. telfair, 180 hood, gen., 90, 96-100, 104, 107, 108, 111, 118, 121-126, 132 hopkins, bishop, 150 hot springs, va., 32-34 house, bryant, 66 house, lieut. john, 28 hoxton, maj., 73, 109, 128 hudson, capt., 127 huger, gen., 44 huger, willie, 67, 69 hunter, mr., 131 huntersville, va., 16, 17, 34, 35 huttonville, 19 hurt, col., 129 iodine springs, 52 jack, maj., 85, 86 jackson, miss., 50 jackson, gen. h. r., 19, 24 jackson, gen. t. j., (stonewall) 1, 36-40, 59 johnson, gen. bushrod, 59 johnson, gov., (president) 81, 136 johnston, gen. albert sidney, 41, 53 johnston, capt., 85 johnston, gen. joseph e., 40, 41, 69, 70, 95-97, 102, 126, 134 johnstone, mrs., 50 jones, capt. ap catesby, 48, 130 jones, capt., 107 jones, lt.-col., 118, 119 jones, hon. thomas, 123 jones, mrs. thomas, 124 keble college, oxford, 161 kelly, capt., 120, 129 king, capt. thomas edward, 12, 89, 90 kingston, ga., 145, 146 kirby-smith, gen., 56, 62-64, 175 knight, rev. dr. f. l., 168 knoxville, tenn., 5, 13, 41, 152 lamb's ferry, 123 lambeth conference, 182 lambeth palace, 163 latanã©, rev. james a., 16, 33 lay, bishop, 99, 100 lay, capt. j. f., 50 lee and gordon's mills, 88 lee, fitzhugh, 29 lee, gen. robert e., 1, 18, 19, 29-33, 108, 109, 143, 178, 179 leicester, bishop of, 103 letcher, gov. john, 40 le vert, madame, 50 lewisburg, 35 liddell, gen., 77, 93 lincoln, president, 10, 11, 131, 136, 137, 143 london, 160 long, capt., 116 longstreet, 88, 89 lookout mountain, 92 looney, maj., 12, 23, 27, 31, 32 loring, gen. w. w., 18, 19, 29, 34-44, 49-54 louisville, 56 loyall, benj., 43 lynchburg, va., 13 lytle, col., 81 macon, ga., 93, 99, 107, 138, 139, 142, 145 macon, miss., 106 mallory, hon. mr., 143, 144 manassas, 41, 42, 90 manchester, duke of, 162 maney, gen. george, 11, 18, 20, 57, 59, 74, 128 manigault, gen., 74, 112, 116, 121 manners, lord john, 174 marietta, ga., 91, 97 markham, rev. mr., 107 marks, col., 67 marsh, lieut. john, 91, 92, 111, 116, 122 martin, gen., 81 mary adelaide, 160 mason, maj., 98 maury, com. m. f., 179 mayrant, capt., 107 mccook, gen., 56, 88, 141 mcgavock, col. john, 113 mcguire, mrs. judith w., 43 mckinney, adjt., 116 memphis, tenn., 5, 6, 58,127, 152, 169 meredith, rev. mr., 36 meridian, miss., 105, 128, 129 merrick, rev. dr. john a., 165, 166 merrill, dr. ayres p., 5 merrill, lieut., 23 "merrimac," 44-48 mines, john flavel, 15 "minnesota," 48 missionary ridge, 92 mitchell, rev. mr., 131 mobile, 50, 116 "monitor," 45-49 montgomery, ala., 50, 104, 131, 132, 137, 171 moray and ross, bishop of, 181 morerod, capt. ralph, 133 morgan, rev. dr., 147 moore, maj. william e., 120, 121 morris, rev. thomas a., 166 mott, dr. valentine, 5 mount pleasant, tenn., 107 mumfordville, ky., 55 murfreesboro, tenn., 23, 58, 64-69, 110 myer, col., 51 mylne, bishop, 161 narrows, 51 nashville, tenn., 6, 8, 10, 11, 26, 33, 56, 63, 67, 68, 80, 108, 109, 111, 120-122, 136, 145, 146-148, 152, 164 "nellie peters' pocket handkerchief," 101 nelson, earl, 174 new orleans, la., 171, 179 newport news, 45 new river, va., 51 new york, 5, 147 nichol, dr. william, 12 noble, samuel, 140-142 norfolk, va., 42-50 okalona, miss., 106 "old blizzard," 53 order of southern cross, 92, 94 otey, bishop, 50, 126, 148, 154, 165, 169, 175 otey hall, 169, 171 overton, john, 118, 120 oxford, 160, 175 oxford, bishop of, 174 parkersburg pike, 22, 23 parkhurst, gen., 146, 147 parsons, col. c. c., 57, 58 patterson, lt.-col., 61 pendleton, rev. william nelson, 1, 14 perryville, 50-63, 64, 66, 110 peterborough, bishop of, 163 peterkin, rev. mr., 14, 15 peters, maj. thomas, 105 peters, richard, 143, 145 peter's mountain, 51 philadelphia, 145, 148, 149 phillips, dr., 107 phillips, mr., 131 pierce, bishop, 50 pikeville, tenn., 54 pilcher, capt. matt., 116, 118 pinckney, rev. dr., 16 pise, rev. dr., 108, 116, 119, 121, 148, 164 polk, bishop and gen., 1, 54, 57, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69-73, 76, 77, 83, 87, 92, 93, 96-98, 101, 105, 128, 164, 165, 170, 175 polk, dr. william m., 71 polk, gen. lucius, 76, 101, 108, 116, 121 polk hospital, 103 polk, mrs. william, 116 porcher, capt., 47 porter, capt. alexander, 129 porter, col., 73, 74 porter, gov. james d., 111 porter, rev. a. toomer, 14 port hope, canada, 158 portsmouth, va., 45 prince of wales, 162 prince, maj., 116, 121 pulaski, tenn., 23, 114, 122, 135 quarles, gen., 106, 112, 116-118 quintard hospital, 65 quintard, isaac, 4 quintard memorial, 183 rains, gen. james e., 61 ramsey, john c, 125 randolph, tenn., 5 ray, col., 104, 105, 120 renick, dr., 34 rennick, mr., 34 reynolds, gen., 99 rice, col., 120, 123, 129 richmond, col. w. b., 54, 89 richmond, va., 13, 14, 35, 41, 67, 95, 102, 136, 137 roberts, albert, 105 robertson, gen. felix h., 135 rock city guard, 6, 10-12, 19, 26, 61, 120 roddy, gen., 124 rome, ga., 33, 51, 65, 72 romney, 38-41 rosecrans, gen., 23, 32, 36, 65, 67, 74, 81, 82, 87, 92 ruggles, gen., 99 rust, gen., 19 rutherford hill, 122 rutledge, bishop, 175 salt sulphur springs, 51, 52 sass, jacob k., 97, 135 saunders, maj., 110 saunders, surgeon d. d., 91 schwrar, rev. john m., 125-127 scott, dr., 104 scott, gen., 112 selma, ala., 103, 105, 130, 136, 140 sevier, col. f. t., 12, 23, 27, 175 sewanee, 62, 63, 87, 101, 154-158, 164-183 seward, w. h., 131 shelbyville, tenn., 67-87 sherman, gen. w. t., 70, 107, 108 shoup, gen. f. a., 101, 175 shrewsbury, earl and countess of, 180 shute, capt., 106 smith, capt. john s., 132 smith, gen. a. j., 132 smith, gen. g. w., 98 smith, gen. preston, 89, 90 smith, lieut., 73 snowden, r. b., 12 sparta, tenn., 54 spence, capt., 81, 85 spotswood, lieut., 45 springfield, 56 spring hill, 109-111, 121 stamford, conn., 4 stanford, dr. frank, 81, 132 stanford, capt., 85 stanley, dean, 161 stanley, gen., 109 staunton, va., 16, 33, 35, 36, 41 st. augustine, fla., 53 st. louis, mo., 136, 158 st. luke's, atlanta, 95-101 stephens, alexander h., 131 stepleton, capt., 116 stevens, bishop, 5 stevenson, ala., 65 stewart, gen. a. p., 109, 115 stewart, john, 14, 15 stoke-upon-trent, 161 strahl, gen. o. f., 82, 84, 85, 96, 97, 111, 112, 115, 122 strasburg, 42 stribling, dr. and mrs., 33, 35 stuart, hon. a. h. 36 sullivan, mrs., 18 tait, archbishop, 174 tattnall, commodore, 43, 49 tattnall, john, 43, 49 taylor, gen., 126 taylor, tazewell, 43 thicknesse, bishop, 163 thomas, gen., 88, 89, 143 ticknor, rev. mr., 105 tomlinson, william, 166 tremlett, rev. f. w., 174 tullahoma, 69, 87 tuscumbia, ala., 124 unionville, s. c., 135 university of the south, 62, 63, 101, 158, 164-183 university place, 166 vallandigham, c. l., 75, 76 valley mountain, 13, 17, 19, 27, 31 van leer, joe, 20-26, 31 vaught, mr., 121 vaulx, maj., 129 "virginia," 44-49 von zinken, leon, 138 walden's ridge, 54, 55 walters, col., 87 walthall, gen., 107 warm springs, 34 warner, charles dudley, 176 warner, gen., 133 wartrace, 72, 76, 77, 79 washington, col. j. a., 29, 30 watterson, henry, 104 watts, gov. of ala., 131 webb, col., 81 wellesley, rev. dr., 161 west, douglas, 98 westminster abbey, 161, 162 west point, miss., 106 west point, n. y., 57, 58, 71, 89, 128, 145 wheeler, col., 16 wheeler, gen. joseph, 68, 81 white sulphur springs, 32, 33, 35 whitfield, needham, 124 wickham, capt., 104-107 wiggins, dr. b. l., 180 wilder, gen., 55 wilmer, bishop, 54, 105, 129, 150 wilson, gen. james h., 138, 140, 141, 145 winchester, bishop of, 180 winchester, tenn., 165, 168 winchester, va., 36, 38-42, 87 winder, gen., 15 windsor, eng., 161 wingfield, bishop, 45, 48 winslow, gen., 141 winter, maj., 106 wood, dr. james r., 5 wood, gen., 44, 76, 77 woolridge, lieut., 61 wright, gen., 98 yates, capt., 106 yeatman, col. harry, 54, 72, 73, 76, 130, 146 yerger, mrs. george, 50 york, archbishop of, 174 young, col., 107 -----------------------------------------------------------------------transcriber's notes: missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. typographical errors were silently corrected. spelling and hyphenation were made consistent when a predominant form was found in this book; otherwise it was not changed. text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_). andersonville a story of rebel military prisons fifteen months a guest of the so-called southern confederacy a private soldiers experience in richmond, andersonville, savannah, millen blackshear and florence by john mcelroy late of co. l. 16th ill cav. 1879 volume 2. chapter xxiii. a new lot of prisoners--the battle of oolustee--men sacrificed to a general's incompetency--a hoodlum reinforcement--a queer crowd --mistreatment of an officer of a colored regiment--killing the sergeant of a negro squad. so far only old prisoners--those taken at gettysburg, chicamauga and mine run--had been brought in. the armies had been very quiet during the winter, preparing for the death grapple in the spring. there had been nothing done, save a few cavalry raids, such as our own, and averill's attempt to gain and break up the rebel salt works at wytheville, and saltville. consequently none but a few cavalry prisoners were added to the number already in the hands of the rebels. the first lot of new ones came in about the middle of march. there were about seven hundred of them, who had been captured at the battle of oolustee, fla., on the 20th of february. about five hundred of them were white, and belonged to the seventh connecticut, the seventh new hampshire, forty seventh, forty-eighth and one hundred and fifteenth new york, and sherman's regular battery. the rest were colored, and belonged to the eighth united states, and fifty-fourth massachusetts. the story they told of the battle was one which had many shameful reiterations during the war. it was the story told whenever banks, sturgis, butler, or one of a host of similar smaller failures were trusted with commands. it was a senseless waste of the lives of private soldiers, and the property of the united states by pretentious blunderers, who, in some inscrutable manner, had attained to responsible commands. in this instance, a bungling brigadier named seymore had marched his forces across the state of florida, to do he hardly knew what, and in the neighborhood of an enemy of whose numbers, disposition, location, and intentions he was profoundly ignorant. the rebels, under general finnegan, waited till he had strung his command along through swamps and cane brakes, scores of miles from his supports, and then fell unexpectedly upon his advance. the regiment was overpowered, and another regiment that hurried up to its support, suffered the same fate. the balance of the regiments were sent in in the same manner--each arriving on the field just after its predecessor had been thoroughly whipped by the concentrated force of the rebels. the men fought gallantly, but the stupidity of a commanding general is a thing that the gods themselves strive against in vain. we suffered a humiliating defeat, with a loss of two thousand men and a fine rifled battery, which was brought to andersonville and placed in position to command the prison. the majority of the seventh new hampshire were an unwelcome addition to our numbers. they were n'yaarkers--old time colleagues of those already in with us--veteran bounty jumpers, that had been drawn to new hampshire by the size of the bounty offered there, and had been assigned to fill up the wasted ranks of the veteran seventh regiment. they had tried to desert as soon as they received their bounty, but the government clung to them literally with hooks of steel, sending many of them to the regiment in irons. thus foiled, they deserted to the rebels during the retreat from the battlefield. they were quite an accession to the force of our n'yaarkers, and helped much to establish the hoodlum reign which was shortly inaugurated over the whole prison. the forty-eighth new yorkers who came in were a set of chaps so odd in every way as to be a source of never-failing interest. the name of their regiment was 'l'enfants perdu' (the lost children), which we anglicized into "the lost ducks." it was believed that every nation in europe was represented in their ranks, and it used to be said jocularly, that no two of them spoke the same language. as near as i could find out they were all or nearly all south europeans, italians, spaniards; portuguese, levantines, with a predominance of the french element. they wore a little cap with an upturned brim, and a strap resting on the chin, a coat with funny little tales about two inches long, and a brass chain across the breast; and for pantaloons they had a sort of a petticoat reaching to the knees, and sewed together down the middle. they were just as singular otherwise as in their looks, speech and uniform. on one occasion the whole mob of us went over in a mass to their squad to see them cook and eat a large water snake, which two of them had succeeded in capturing in the swamps, and carried off to their mess, jabbering in high glee over their treasure trove. any of us were ready to eat a piece of dog, cat, horse or mule, if we could get it, but, it was generally agreed, as dawson, of my company expressed it, that "nobody but one of them darned queer lost ducks would eat a varmint like a water snake." major albert bogle, of the eighth united states, (colored) had fallen into the hands of the rebels by reason of a severe wound in the leg, which left him helpless upon the field at oolustee. the rebels treated him with studied indignity. they utterly refused to recognize him as an officer, or even as a man. instead of being sent to macon or columbia, where the other officers were, he was sent to andersonville, the same as an enlisted man. no care was given his wound, no surgeon would examine it or dress it. he was thrown into a stock car, without a bed or blanket, and hauled over the rough, jolting road to andersonville. once a rebel officer rode up and fired several shots at him, as he lay helpless on the car floor. fortunately the rebel's marksmanship was as bad as his intentions, and none of the shots took effect. he was placed in a squad near me, and compelled to get up and hobble into line when the rest were mustered for roll-call. no opportunity to insult, "the nigger officer," was neglected, and the n'yaarkers vied with the rebels in heaping abuse upon him. he was a fine, intelligent young man, and bore it all with dignified self-possession, until after a lapse of some weeks the rebels changed their policy and took him from the prison to send to where the other officers were. the negro soldiers were also treated as badly as possible. the wounded were turned into the stockade without having their hurts attended to. one stalwart, soldierly sergeant had received a bullet which had forced its way under the scalp for some distance, and partially imbedded itself in the skull, where it still remained. he suffered intense agony, and would pass the whole night walking up and down the street in front of our tent, moaning distressingly. the bullet could be felt plainly with the fingers, and we were sure that it would not be a minute's work, with a sharp knife, to remove it and give the man relief. but we could not prevail upon the rebel surgeons even to see the man. finally inflammation set in and he died. the negros were made into a squad by themselves, and taken out every day to work around the prison. a white sergeant was placed over them, who was the object of the contumely of the guards and other rebels. one day as he was standing near the gate, waiting his orders to come out, the gate guard, without any provocation whatever, dropped his gun until the muzzle rested against the sergeant's stomach, and fired, killing him instantly. the sergeantcy was then offered to me, but as i had no accident policy, i was constrained to decline the honor. chapter xxiv. april--longing to get out--the death rate--the plague of lice --the so-called hospital. april brought sunny skies and balmy weather. existence became much more tolerable. with freedom it would have been enjoyable, even had we been no better fed, clothed and sheltered. but imprisonment had never seemed so hard to bear--even in the first few weeks--as now. it was easier to submit to confinement to a limited area, when cold and rain were aiding hunger to benumb the faculties and chill the energies than it was now, when nature was rousing her slumbering forces to activity, and earth, and air and sky were filled with stimulus to man to imitate her example. the yearning to be up and doing something-to turn these golden hours to good account for self and country--pressed into heart and brain as the vivifying sap pressed into tree-duct and plant cell, awaking all vegetation to energetic life. to be compelled, at such a time, to lie around in vacuous idleness --to spend days that should be crowded full of action in a monotonous, objectless routine of hunting lice, gathering at roll-call, and drawing and cooking our scanty rations, was torturing. but to many of our number the aspirations for freedom were not, as with us, the desire for a wider, manlier field of action, so much as an intense longing to get where care and comforts would arrest their swift progress to the shadowy hereafter. the cruel rains had sapped away their stamina, and they could not recover it with the meager and innutritious diet of coarse meal, and an occasional scrap of salt meat. quick consumption, bronchitis, pneumonia, low fever and diarrhea seized upon these ready victims for their ravages, and bore them off at the rate of nearly a score a day. it now became a part of, the day's regular routine to take a walk past the gates in the morning, inspect and count the dead, and see if any friends were among them. clothes having by this time become a very important consideration with the prisoners, it was the custom of the mess in which a man died to remove from his person all garments that were of any account, and so many bodies were carried out nearly naked. the hands were crossed upon the breast, the big toes tied together with a bit of string, and a slip of paper containing the man's name, rank, company and regiment was pinned on the breast of his shirt. the appearance of the dead was indescribably ghastly. the unclosed eyes shone with a stony glitter- an orphan's curse would drag to hell a spirit from on high: but, o, more terrible than that, is the curse in a dead man's eye. the lips and nostrils were distorted with pain and hunger, the sallow, dirt-grimed skin drawn tensely over the facial bones, and the whole framed with the long, lank, matted hair and beard. millions of lice swarmed over the wasted limbs and ridged ribs. these verminous pests had become so numerous--owing to our lack of changes of clothing, and of facilities for boiling what we had--that the most a healthy man could do was to keep the number feeding upon his person down to a reasonable limit--say a few tablespoonfuls. when a man became so sick as to be unable to help himself, the parasites speedily increased into millions, or, to speak more comprehensively, into pints and quarts. it did not even seem exaggeration when some one declared that he had seen a dead man with more than a gallon of lice on him. there is no doubt that the irritation from the biting of these myriads materially the days of those who died. where a sick man had friends or comrades, of course part of their duty, in taking care of him, was to "louse" his clothing. one of the most effectual ways of doing this was to turn the garments wrong side out and hold the seams as close to the fire as possible, without burning the cloth. in a short time the lice would swell up and burst open, like pop-corn. this method was a favorite one for another reason than its efficacy: it gave one a keener sense of revenge upon his rascally little tormentors than he could get in any other way. as the weather grew warmer and the number in the prison increased, the lice became more unendurable. they even filled the hot sand under our feet, and voracious troops would climb up on one like streams of ants swarming up a tree. we began to have a full comprehension of the third plague with which the lord visited the egyptians: and the lord said unto moses, say unto aaron, stretch out thy rod, and smite the dust of the land, that it may become lice through all the land of egypt. and they did so; for aaron stretched out his hand with his rod, and smote the dust of the earth, and it became lice in man and in beast; all the dust of the land became lice throughout all the land of egypt. the total number of deaths in april, according to the official report, was five hundred and seventy-six, or an average of over nineteen a day. there was an average of five thousand prisoner's in the pen during all but the last few days of the month, when the number was increased by the arrival of the captured garrison of plymouth. this would make the loss over eleven per cent., and so worse than decimation. at that rate we should all have died in about eight months. we could have gone through a sharp campaign lasting those thirty days and not lost so great a proportion of our forces. the british had about as many men as were in the stockade at the battle of new orleans, yet their loss in killed fell much short of the deaths in the pen in april. a makeshift of a hospital was established in the northeastern corner of the stockade. a portion of the ground was divided from the rest of the prison by a railing, a few tent flies were stretched, and in these the long leaves of the pine were made into apologies for beds of about the goodness of the straw on which a northern farmer beds his stock. the sick taken there were no better off than if they had staid with their comrades. what they needed to bring about their recovery was clean clothing, nutritious food, shelter and freedom from the tortures of the lice. they obtained none of these. save a few decoctions of roots, there were no medicines; the sick were fed the same coarse corn meal that brought about the malignant dysentery from which they all suffered; they wore and slept in the same vermin-infested clothes, and there could be but one result: the official records show that seventy-six per cent. of those taken to the hospitals died there. the establishment of the hospital was specially unfortunate for my little squad. the ground required for it compelled a general reduction of the space we all occupied. we had to tear down our huts and move. by this time the materials had become so dry that we could not rebuild with them, as the pine tufts fell to pieces. this reduced the tent and bedding material of our party--now numbering five--to a cavalry overcoat and a blanket. we scooped a hole a foot deep in the sand and stuck our tent-poles around it. by day we spread our blanket over the poles for a tent. at night we lay down upon the overcoat and covered ourselves with the blanket. it required considerable stretching to make it go over five; the two out side fellows used to get very chilly, and squeeze the three inside ones until they felt no thicker than a wafer. but it had to do, and we took turns sleeping on the outside. in the course of a few weeks three of my chums died and left myself and b. b. andrews (now dr. andrews, of astoria, ill.) sole heirs to and occupants of, the overcoat and blanket. chapter xxv. the "plymouth pilgrims"--sad transition from comfortable barracks to andersonville--a crazed pennsylvanian--development of the butler business. we awoke one morning, in the last part of april, to find about two thousand freshly arrived prisoners lying asleep in the main streets running from the gates. they were attired in stylish new uniforms, with fancy hats and shoes; the sergeants and corporals wore patent leather or silk chevrons, and each man had a large, well-filled knapsack, of the kind new recruits usually carried on coming first to the front, and which the older soldiers spoke of humorously as "bureaus." they were the snuggest, nattiest lot of soldiers we had ever seen, outside of the "paper collar" fellows forming the headquarter guard of some general in a large city. as one of my companions surveyed them, he said: "hulloa! i'm blanked if the johnnies haven't caught a regiment of brigadier generals, somewhere." by-and-by the "fresh fish," as all new arrivals were termed, began to wake up, and then we learned that they belonged to a brigade consisting of the eighty-fifth new york, one hundred and first and one hundred and third pennsylvania, sixteenth connecticut, twenty-fourth new york battery, two companies of massachusetts heavy artillery, and a company of the twelfth new york cavalry. they had been garrisoning plymouth, n. c., an important seaport on the roanoke river. three small gunboats assisted them in their duty. the rebels constructed a powerful iron clad called the "albemarle," at a point further up the roanoke, and on the afternoon of the 17th, with her and three brigades of infantry, made an attack upon the post. the "albemarle" ran past the forts unharmed, sank one of the gunboats, and drove the others away. she then turned her attention to the garrison, which she took in the rear, while the infantry attacked in front. our men held out until the 20th, when they capitulated. they were allowed to retain their personal effects, of all kinds, and, as is the case with all men in garrison, these were considerable. the one hundred and first and one hundred and third pennsylvania and eighty-fifth new york had just "veteranized," and received their first instalment of veteran bounty. had they not been attacked they would have sailed for home in a day or two, on their veteran furlough, and this accounted for their fine raiment. they were made up of boys from good new york and pennsylvania families, and were, as a rule, intelligent and fairly educated. their horror at the appearance of their place of incarceration was beyond expression. at one moment they could not comprehend that we dirty and haggard tatterdemalions had once been clean, self-respecting, well-fed soldiers like themselves; at the next they would affirm that they knew they could not stand it a month, in here we had then endured it from four to nine months. they took it, in every way, the hardest of any prisoners that came in, except some of the 'hundred-days' men, who were brought in in august, from the valley of virginia. they had served nearly all their time in various garrisons along the seacoast--from fortress monroe to beaufort--where they had had comparatively little of the actual hardships of soldiering in the field. they had nearly always had comfortable quarters, an abundance of food, few hard marches or other severe service. consequently they were not so well hardened for andersonville as the majority who came in. in other respects they were better prepared, as they had an abundance of clothing, blankets and cooking utensils, and each man had some of his veteran bounty still in possession. it was painful to see how rapidly many of them sank under the miseries of the situation. they gave up the moment the gates were closed upon them, and began pining away. we older prisoners buoyed ourselves up continually with hopes of escape or exchange. we dug tunnels with the persistence of beavers, and we watched every possible opportunity to get outside the accursed walls of the pen. but we could not enlist the interest of these discouraged ones in any of our schemes, or talk. they resigned themselves to death, and waited despondingly till he came. a middle-aged one hundred and first pennsylvanian, who had taken up his quarters near me, was an object of peculiar interest. reasonably intelligent and fairly read, i presume that he was a respectable mechanic before entering the army. he was evidently a very domestic man, whose whole happiness centered in his family. when he first came in he was thoroughly dazed by the greatness of his misfortune. he would sit for hours with his face in his hands and his elbows on his knees, gazing out upon the mass of men and huts, with vacant, lack-luster eyes. we could not interest him in anything. we tried to show him how to fix his blanket up to give him some shelter, but he went at the work in a disheartened way, and finally smiled feebly and stopped. he had some letters from his family and a melaineotype of a plain-faced woman--his wife--and her children, and spent much time in looking at them. at first he ate his rations when he drew them, but finally began to reject, them. in a few days he was delirious with hunger and homesick ness. he would sit on the sand for hours imagining that he was at his family table, dispensing his frugal hospitalities to his wife and children. making a motion, as if presenting a dish, he would say: "janie, have another biscuit, do!" or, "eddie, son, won't you have another piece of this nice steak?" or, "maggie, have some more potatos," and so on, through a whole family of six, or more. it was a relief to us when he died in about a month after he came in. as stated above, the plymouth men brought in a large amount of money --variously estimated at from ten thousand to one hundred thousand dollars. the presence of this quantity of circulating medium immediately started a lively commerce. all sorts of devices were resorted to by the other prisoners to get a little of this wealth. rude chuck-a-luck boards were constructed out of such material as was attainable, and put in operation. dice and cards were brought out by those skilled in such matters. as those of us already in the stockade occupied all the ground, there was no disposition on the part of many to surrender a portion of their space without exacting a pecuniary compensation. messes having ground in a good location would frequently demand and get ten dollars for permission for two or three to quarter with them. then there was a great demand for poles to stretch blankets over to make tents; the rebels, with their usual stupid cruelty, would not supply these, nor allow the prisoners to go out and get them themselves. many of the older prisoners had poles to spare which they were saying up for fuel. they sold these to the plymouth folks at the rate of ten dollars for three--enough to put up a blanket. the most considerable trading was done through the gates. the rebel guards were found quite as keen to barter as they had been in richmond. though the laws against their dealing in the money of the enemy were still as stringent as ever, their thirst for greenbacks was not abated one whit, and they were ready to sell anything they had for the coveted currency. the rate of exchange was seven or eight dollars in confederate money for one dollar in greenbacks. wood, tobacco, meat, flour, beans, molasses, onions and a villainous kind of whisky made from sorghum, were the staple articles of trade. a whole race of little traffickers in these articles sprang up, and finally selden, the rebel quartermaster, established a sutler shop in the center of the north side, which he put in charge of ira beverly, of the one hundredth ohio, and charlie huckleby, of the eighth tennessee. it was a fine illustration of the development of the commercial instinct in some men. no more unlikely place for making money could be imagined, yet starting in without a cent, they contrived to turn and twist and trade, until they had transferred to their pockets a portion of the funds which were in some one else's. the rebels, of course, got nine out of every ten dollars there was in the prison, but these middle men contrived to have a little of it stick to their fingers. it was only the very few who were able to do this. nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand were, like myself, either wholly destitute of money and unable to get it from anybody else, or they paid out what money they had to the middlemen, in exorbitant prices for articles of food. the n'yaarkers had still another method for getting food, money, blankets and clothing. they formed little bands called "raiders," under the leadership of a chief villain. one of these bands would select as their victim a man who had good blankets, clothes, a watch, or greenbacks. frequently he would be one of the little traders, with a sack of beans, a piece of meat, or something of that kind. pouncing upon him at night they would snatch away his possessions, knock down his friends who came to his assistance, and scurry away into the darkness. chapter xxvi. longings for god's country--considerations of the methods of getting there--exchange and escape--digging tunnels, and the difficulties connected therewith--punishment of a traitor. to our minds the world now contained but two grand divisions, as widely different from each other as happiness and misery. the first--that portion over which our flag floated was usually spoken of as "god's country;" the other--that under the baneful shadow of the banner of rebellion--was designated by the most opprobrious epithets at the speaker's command. to get from the latter to the former was to attain, at one bound, the highest good. better to be a doorkeeper in the house of the lord, under the stars and stripes, than to dwell in the tents of wickedness, under the hateful southern cross. to take even the humblest and hardest of service in the field now would be a delightsome change. we did not ask to go home--we would be content with anything, so long as it was in that blest place "within our lines." only let us get back once, and there would be no more grumbling at rations or guard duty--we would willingly endure all the hardships and privations that soldier flesh is heir to. there were two ways of getting back--escape and exchange. exchange was like the ever receding mirage of the desert, that lures the thirsty traveler on over the parched sands, with illusions of refreshing springs, only to leave his bones at last to whiten by the side of those of his unremembered predecessors. every day there came something to build up the hopes that exchange was near at hand--every day brought something to extinguish the hopes of the preceding one. we took these varying phases according to our several temperaments. the sanguine built themselves up on the encouraging reports; the desponding sank down and died under the discouraging ones. escape was a perpetual allurement. to the actively inclined among us it seemed always possible, and daring, busy brains were indefatigable in concocting schemes for it. the only bit of rebel brain work that i ever saw for which i did not feel contempt was the perfect precautions taken to prevent our escape. this is shown by the fact that, although, from first to last, there were nearly fifty thousand prisoners in andersonville, and three out of every five of these were ever on the alert to take french leave of their captors, only three hundred and twenty-eight succeeded in getting so far away from andersonville as to leave it to be presumed that they had reached our lines. the first, and almost superhuman difficulty was to get outside the stockade. it was simply impossible to scale it. the guards were too close together to allow an instant's hope to the most sanguine, that he could even pass the dead line without being shot by some one of them. this same closeness prevented any hope of bribing them. to be successful half those on post would have to be bribed, as every part of the stockade was clearly visible from every other part, and there was no night so dark as not to allow a plain view to a number of guards of the dark figure outlined against the light colored logs of any yankee who should essay to clamber towards the top of the palisades. the gates were so carefully guarded every time they were opened as to preclude hope of slipping out through theme. they were only unclosed twice or thrice a day--once to admit, the men to call the roll, once to let them out again, once to let the wagons come in with rations, and once, perhaps, to admit, new prisoners. at all these times every precaution was taken to prevent any one getting out surreptitiously. this narrowed down the possibilities of passing the limits of the pen alive, to tunneling. this was also surrounded by almost insuperable difficulties. first, it required not less than fifty feet of subterranean excavation to get out, which was an enormous work with our limited means. then the logs forming the stockade were set in the ground to a depth of five feet, and the tunnel had to go down beneath them. they had an unpleasant habit of dropping down into the burrow under them. it added much to the discouragements of tunneling to think of one of these massive timbers dropping upon a fellow as he worked his mole-like way under it, and either crushing him to death outright, or pinning him there to die of suffocation or hunger. in one instance, in a tunnel near me, but in which i was not interested, the log slipped down after the digger had got out beyond it. he immediately began digging for the surface, for life, and was fortunately able to break through before he suffocated. he got his head above the ground, and then fainted. the guard outside saw him, pulled him out of the hole, and when he recovered sensibility hurried him back into the stockade. in another tunnel, also near us, a broad-shouldered german, of the second minnesota, went in to take his turn at digging. he was so much larger than any of his predecessors that he stuck fast in a narrow part, and despite all the efforts of himself and comrades, it was found impossible to move him one way or the other. the comrades were at last reduced to the humiliation of informing the officer of the guard of their tunnel and the condition of their friend, and of asking assistance to release him, which was given. the great tunneling tool was the indispensable half-canteen. the inventive genius of our people, stimulated by the war, produced nothing for the comfort and effectiveness of the soldier equal in usefulness to this humble and unrecognized utensil. it will be remembered that a canteen was composed of two pieces of tin struck up into the shape of saucers, and soldered together at the edges. after a soldier had been in the field a little while, and thrown away or lost the curious and complicated kitchen furniture he started out with, he found that by melting the halves of his canteen apart, he had a vessel much handier in every way than any he had parted with. it could be used for anything --to make soup or coffee in, bake bread, brown coffee, stew vegetables, etc., etc. a sufficient handle was made with a split stick. when the cooking was done, the handle was thrown away, and the half canteen slipped out of the road into the haversack. there seemed to be no end of the uses to which this ever-ready disk of blackened sheet iron could be turned. several instances are on record where infantry regiments, with no other tools than this, covered themselves on the field with quite respectable rifle pits. the starting point of a tunnel was always some tent close to the dead line, and sufficiently well closed to screen the operations from the sight of the guards near by. the party engaged in the work organized by giving every man a number to secure the proper apportionment of the labor. number one began digging with his half canteen. after he had worked until tired, he came out, and number two took his place, and so on. the tunnel was simply a round, rat-like burrow, a little larger than a man's body. the digger lay on his stomach, dug ahead of him, threw the dirt under him, and worked it back with his feet till the man behind him, also lying on his stomach, could catch it and work it back to the next. as the tunnel lengthened the number of men behind each other in this way had to be increased, so that in a tunnel seventy-five feet long there would be from eight to ten men lying one behind the other. when the dirt was pushed back to the mouth of the tunnel it was taken up in improvised bags, made by tying up the bottoms of pantaloon legs, carried to the swamp, and emptied. the work in the tunnel was very exhausting, and the digger had to be relieved every half-hour. the greatest trouble was to carry the tunnel forward in a straight line. as nearly everybody dug most of the time with the right hand, there was an almost irresistible tendency to make the course veer to the left. the first tunnel i was connected with was a ludicrous illustration of this. about twenty of us had devoted our nights for over a week to the prolongation of a burrow. we had not yet reached the stockade, which astonished us, as measurement with a string showed that we had gone nearly twice the distance necessary for the purpose. the thing was inexplicable, and we ceased operations to consider the matter. the next day a man walking by a tent some little distance from the one in which the hole began, was badly startled by the ground giving way under his feet, and his sinking nearly to his waist in a hole. it was very singular, but after wondering over the matter for some hours, there came a glimmer of suspicion that it might be, in some way, connected with the missing end of our tunnel. one of us started through on an exploring expedition, and confirmed the suspicions by coming out where the man had broken through. our tunnel was shaped like a horse shoe, and the beginning and end were not fifteen feet apart. after that we practised digging with our left hand, and made certain compensations for the tendency to the sinister side. another trouble connected with tunneling was the number of traitors and spies among us. there were many--principally among the n'yaarker crowd who were always zealous to betray a tunnel, in order to curry favor with the rebel officers. then, again, the rebels had numbers of their own men in the pen at night, as spies. it was hardly even necessary to dress these in our uniform, because a great many of our own men came into the prison in rebel clothes, having been compelled to trade garments with their captors. one day in may, quite an excitement was raised by the detection of one of these "tunnel traitors" in such a way as left no doubt of his guilt. at first everybody was in favor of killing him, and they actually started to beat him to death. this was arrested by a proposition to "have captain jack tattoo him," and the suggestion was immediately acted upon. "captain jack" was a sailor who had been with us in the pemberton building at richmond. he was a very skilful tattoo artist, but, i am sure, could make the process nastier than any other that i ever saw attempt it. he chewed tobacco enormously. after pricking away for a few minutes at the design on the arm or some portion of the body, he would deluge it with a flood of tobacco spit, which, he claimed, acted as a kind of mordant. piping this off with a filthy rag, he would study the effect for an instant, and then go ahead with another series of prickings and tobacco juice drenchings. the tunnel-traitor was taken to captain jack. that worthy decided to brand him with a great "t," the top part to extend across his forehead and the stem to run down his nose. captain jack got his tattooing kit ready, and the fellow was thrown upon the ground and held there. the captain took his head between his legs, and began operations. after an instant's work with the needles, he opened his mouth, and filled the wretch's face and eyes full of the disgusting saliva. the crowd round about yelled with delight at this new process. for an hour, that was doubtless an eternity to the rascal undergoing branding, captain jack continued his alternate pickings and drenchings. at the end of that time the traitor's face was disfigured with a hideous mark that he would bear to his grave. we learned afterwards that he was not one of our men, but a rebel spy. this added much to our satisfaction with the manner of his treatment. he disappeared shortly after the operation was finished, being, i suppose, taken outside. i hardly think captain jack would be pleased to meet him again. chapter xxvii. the hounds, and the difficulties they put in the way of escape --the whole south patrolled by them. those who succeeded, one way or another, in passing the stockade limits, found still more difficulties lying between them and freedom than would discourage ordinarily resolute men. the first was to get away from the immediate vicinity of the prison. all around were rebel patrols, pickets and guards, watching every avenue of egress. several packs of hounds formed efficient coadjutors of these, and were more dreaded by possible "escapes," than any other means at the command of our jailors. guards and patrols could be evaded, or circumvented, but the hounds could not. nearly every man brought back from a futile attempt at escape told the same story: he had been able to escape the human rebels, but not their canine colleagues. three of our detachment--members of the twentieth indiana--had an experience of this kind that will serve to illustrate hundreds of others. they had been taken outside to do some work upon the cook-house that was being built. a guard was sent with the three a little distance into the woods to get a piece of timber. the boys sauntered, along carelessly with the guard, and managed to get pretty near him. as soon as they were fairly out of sight of the rest, the strongest of them--tom williams--snatched the rebel's gun away from him, and the other two springing upon him as swift as wild cats, throttled him, so that he could not give the alarm. still keeping a hand on his throat, they led him off some distance, and tied him to a sapling with strings made by tearing up one of their blouses. he was also securely gagged, and the boys, bidding him a hasty, but not specially tender, farewell, struck out, as they fondly hoped, for freedom. it was not long until they were missed, and the parties sent in search found and released the guard, who gave all the information he possessed as to what had become of his charges. all the packs of hounds, the squads of cavalry, and the foot patrols were sent out to scour the adjacent country. the yankees kept in the swamps and creeks, and no trace of them was found that afternoon or evening. by this time they were ten or fifteen miles away, and thought that they could safely leave the creeks for better walking on the solid ground. they had gone but a few miles, when the pack of hounds captain wirz was with took their trail, and came after them in full cry. the boys tried to ran, but, exhausted as they were, they could make no headway. two of them were soon caught, but tom williams, who was so desperate that he preferred death to recapture, jumped into a mill-pond near by. when he came up, it was in a lot of saw logs and drift wood that hid him from being seen from the shore. the dogs stopped at the shore, and bayed after the disappearing prey. the rebels with them, who had seen tom spring in, came up and made a pretty thorough search for him. as they did not think to probe around the drift wood this was unsuccessful, and they came to the conclusion that tom had been drowned. wirz marched the other two back and, for a wonder, did not punish them, probably because he was so rejoiced at his success in capturing them. he was beaming with delight when he returned them to our squad, and said, with a chuckle: "brisoners, i pring you pack two of dem tam yankees wat got away yesterday, unt i run de oder raskal into a mill-pont and trowntet him." what was our astonishment, about three weeks later, to see tom, fat and healthy, and dressed in a full suit of butternut, come stalking into the pen. he had nearly reached the mountains, when a pack of hounds, patrolling for deserters or negros, took his trail, where he had crossed the road from one field to another, and speedily ran him down. he had been put in a little country jail, and well fed till an opportunity occurred to send him back. this patrolling for negros and deserters was another of the great obstacles to a successful passage through the country. the rebels had put, every able-bodied white man in the ranks, and were bending every energy to keep him there. the whole country was carefully policed by provost marshals to bring out those who were shirking military duty, or had deserted their colors, and to check any movement by the negros. one could not go anywhere without a pass, as every road was continually watched by men and hounds. it was the policy of our men, when escaping, to avoid roads as much as possible by traveling through the woods and fields. from what i saw of the hounds, and what i could learn from others, i believe that each pack was made up of two bloodhounds and from twenty-five to fifty other dogs. the bloodhounds were debased descendants of the strong and fierce hounds imported from cuba--many of them by the united states government--for hunting indians, during the seminole war. the other dogs were the mongrels that are found in such plentifulness about every southern house--increasing, as a rule, in numbers as the inhabitant of the house is lower down and poorer. they are like wolves, sneaking and cowardly when alone, fierce and bold when in packs. each pack was managed by a well-armed man, who rode a mule; and carried, slung over his shoulders by a cord, a cow horn, scraped very thin, with which he controlled the band by signals. what always puzzled me much was why the hounds took only yankee trails, in the vicinity of the prison. there was about the stockade from six thousand to ten thousand rebels and negros, including guards, officers, servants, workmen, etc. these were, of course, continually in motion and must have daily made trails leading in every direction. it was the custom of the rebels to send a pack of hounds around the prison every morning, to examine if any yankees had escaped during the night. it was believed that they rarely failed to find a prisoner's tracks, and still more rarely ran off upon a rebel's. if those outside the stockade had been confined to certain path and roads we could have understood this, but, as i understand, they were not. it was part of the interest of the day, for us, to watch the packs go yelping around the pen searching for tracks. we got information in this way whether any tunnel had been successfully opened during the night. the use of hounds furnished us a crushing reply to the ever recurring rebel question: "why are you-uns puttin' niggers in the field to fight we-uns for?" the questioner was always silenced by the return interrogatory: "is that as bad as running white men down with blood hounds?" chapter xxviii. may--influx of new prisoners--disparity in numbers between the eastern and western armies--terrible crowding--slaughter of men at the creek. in may the long gathering storm of war burst with angry violence all along the line held by the contending armies. the campaign began which was to terminate eleven months later in the obliteration of the southern confederacy. may 1, sigel moved up the shenandoah valley with thirty thousand men; may 3, butler began his blundering movement against petersburg; may 3, the army of the potomac left culpeper, and on the 5th began its deadly grapple with lee, in the wilderness; may 6, sherman moved from chattanooga, and engaged joe johnston at rocky face ridge and tunnel hill. each of these columns lost heavily in prisoners. it could not be otherwise; it was a consequence of the aggressive movements. an army acting offensively usually suffers more from capture than one on the defensive. our armies were penetrating the enemy's country in close proximity to a determined and vigilant foe. every scout, every skirmish line, every picket, every foraging party ran the risk of falling into a rebel trap. this was in addition to the risk of capture in action. the bulk of the prisoners were taken from the army of the potomac. for this there were two reasons: first, that there were many more men in that army than in any other; and second, that the entanglement in the dense thickets and shrubbery of the wilderness enabled both sides to capture great numbers of the other's men. grant lost in prisoners from may 5 to may 31, seven thousand four hundred and fifty; he probably captured two-thirds of that number from the johnnies. wirz's headquarters were established in a large log house which had been built in the fort a little distant from the southeast corner of the prison. every day--and sometimes twice or thrice a day--we would see great squads of prisoners marched up to these headquarters, where they would be searched, their names entered upon the prison records, by clerks (detailed prisoners; few rebels had the requisite clerical skill) and then be marched into the prison. as they entered, the rebel guards would stand to arms. the infantry would be in line of battle, the cavalry mounted, and the artillerymen standing by their guns, ready to open at the instant with grape and canister. the disparity between the number coming in from the army of the potomac and western armies was so great, that we westerners began to take some advantage of it. if we saw a squad of one hundred and fifty or thereabouts at the headquarters, we felt pretty certain they were from sherman, and gathered to meet them, and learn the news from our friends. if there were from five hundred to two thousand we knew they were from the army of the potomac, and there were none of our comrades among them. there were three exceptions to this rule while we were in andersonville. the first was in june, when the drunken and incompetent sturgis (now colonel of the seventh united states cavalry) shamefully sacrificed a superb division at guntown, miss. the next was after hood made his desperate attack on sherman, on the 22d of july, and the third was when stoneman was captured at macon. at each of these times about two thousand prisoners were brought in. by the end of may there were eighteen thousand four hundred and fifty-four prisoners in the stockade. before the reader dismisses this statement from his mind let him reflect how great a number this is. it is more active, able-bodied young men than there are in any of our leading cities, save new york and philadelphia. it is more than the average population of an ohio county. it is four times as many troops as taylor won the victory of buena vista with, and about twice as many as scott went into battle with at any time in his march to the city of mexico. these eighteen thousand four hundred and fifty-four men were cooped up on less than thirteen acres of ground, making about fifteen hundred to the acre. no room could be given up for streets, or for the usual arrangements of a camp, and most kinds of exercise were wholly precluded. the men crowded together like pigs nesting in the woods on cold nights. the ground, despite all our efforts, became indescribably filthy, and this condition grew rapidly worse as the season advanced and the sun's rays gained fervency. as it is impossible to describe this adequately, i must again ask the reader to assist with a few comparisons. he has an idea of how much filth is produced, on an ordinary city lot, in a week, by its occupation by a family say of six persons. now let him imagine what would be the result if that lot, instead of having upon it six persons, with every appliance for keeping themselves clean, and for removing and concealing filth, was the home of one hundred and eight men, with none of these appliances. that he may figure out these proportions for himself, i will repeat some of the elements of the problem: we will say that an average city lot is thirty feet front by one hundred deep. this is more front than most of them have, but we will be liberal. this gives us a surface of three thousand square feet. an acre contains forty-three thousand five hundred and sixty square feet. upon thirteen of these acres, we had eighteen thousand four hundred and fifty-four men. after he has found the number of square feet that each man had for sleeping apartment, dining room, kitchen, exercise grounds and outhouses, and decided that nobody could live for any length of time in such contracted space, i will tell him that a few weeks later double that many men were crowded upon that space that over thirty-five thousand were packed upon those twelve and a-half or thirteen acres. but i will not anticipate. with the warm weather the condition of the swamp in the center of the prison became simply horrible. we hear so much now-a-days of blood poisoning from the effluvia of sinks and sewers, that reading it, i wonder how a man inside the stockade, and into whose nostrils came a breath of that noisomeness, escaped being carried off by a malignant typhus. in the slimy ooze were billions of white maggots. they would crawl out by thousands on the warm sand, and, lying there a few minutes, sprout a wing or a pair of them. with these they would essay a clumsy flight, ending by dropping down upon some exposed portion of a man's body, and stinging him like a gad-fly. still worse, they would drop into what he was cooking, and the utmost care could not prevent a mess of food from being contaminated with them. all the water that we had to use was that in the creek which flowed through this seething mass of corruption, and received its sewerage. how pure the water was when it came into the stockade was a question. we always believed that it received the drainage from the camps of the guards, a half-a-mile away. a road was made across the swamp, along the dead line at the west side, where the creek entered the pen. those getting water would go to this spot, and reach as far up the stream as possible, to get the water that was least filthy. as they could reach nearly to the dead line this furnished an excuse to such of the guards as were murderously inclined to fire upon them. i think i hazard nothing in saying that for weeks at least one man a day was killed at this place. the murders became monotonous; there was a dreadful sameness to them. a gun would crack; looking up we would see, still smoking, the muzzle of the musket of one of the guards on either side of the creek. at the same instant would rise a piercing shriek from the man struck, now floundering in the creek in his death agony. then thousands of throats would yell out curses and denunciations, and-"o, give the rebel ------------a furlough!" it was our belief that every guard who killed a yankee was rewarded with a thirty-day furlough. mr. frederick holliger, now of toledo, formerly a member of the seventy-second ohio, and captured at guntown, tells me, as his introduction to andersonville life, that a few hours after his entry he went to the brook to get a drink, reached out too far, and was fired upon by the guard, who missed him, but killed another man and wounded a second. the other prisoners standing near then attacked him, and beat him nearly to death, for having drawn the fire of the guard. nothing could be more inexcusable than these murders. whatever defense there might be for firing on men who touched the dead line in other parts of the prison, there could be none here. the men had no intention of escaping; they had no designs upon the stockade; they were not leading any party to assail it. they were in every instance killed in the act of reaching out with their cups to dip up a little water. chapter xxix. some distinction between soldierly duty and murder--a plot to escape --it is revealed and frustrated. let the reader understand that in any strictures i make i do not complain of the necessary hardships of war. i understood fully and accepted the conditions of a soldier's career. my going into the field uniformed and armed implied an intention, at least, of killing, wounding, or capturing, some of the enemy. there was consequently no ground of complaint if i was, myself killed, wounded, or captured. if i did not want to take these chances i ought to stay at home. in the same way, i recognized the right of our captors or guards to take proper precautions to prevent our escape. i never questioned for an instant the right of a guard to fire upon those attempting to escape, and to kill them. had i been posted over prisoners i should have had no compunction about shooting at those trying to get away, and consequently i could not blame the rebels for doing the same thing. it was a matter of soldierly duty. but not one of the men assassinated by the guards at andersonville were trying to escape, nor could they have got away if not arrested by a bullet. in a majority of instances there was not even a transgression of a prison rule, and when there was such a transgression it was a mere harmless inadvertence. the slaying of every man there was a foul crime. the most of this was done by very young boys; some of it by old men. the twenty-sixth alabama and fifty-fifth georgia, had guarded us since the opening of the prison, but now they were ordered to the field, and their places filled by the georgia "reserves," an organization of boys under, and men over the military age. as general grant aptly-phrased it, "they had robbed the cradle and the grave," in forming these regiments. the boys, who had grown up from children since the war began, could not comprehend that a yankee was a human being, or that it was any more wrongful to shoot one than to kill a mad dog. their young imaginations had been inflamed with stories of the total depravity of the unionists until they believed it was a meritorious thing to seize every opportunity to exterminate them. early one morning i overheard a conversation between two of these youthful guards: "say, bill, i heerd that you shot a yank last night?" "now, you just bet i did. god! you jest ought to've heerd him holler." evidently the juvenile murderer had no more conception that he had committed crime than if he had killed a rattlesnake. among those who came in about the last of the month were two thousand men from butler's command, lost in the disastrous action of may 15, by which butler was "bottled up" at bermuda hundreds. at that time the rebel hatred for butler verged on insanity, and they vented this upon these men who were so luckless--in every sense--as to be in his command. every pains was taken to mistreat them. stripped of every article of clothing, equipment, and cooking utensils--everything, except a shirt and a pair of pantaloons, they were turned bareheaded and barefooted into the prison, and the worst possible place in the pen hunted out to locate them upon. this was under the bank, at the edge of the swamp and at the eastern side of the prison, where the sinks were, and all filth from the upper part of the camp flowed down to them. the sand upon which they lay was dry and burning as that of a tropical desert; they were without the slightest shelter of any kind, the maggot flies swarmed over them, and the stench was frightful. if one of them survived the germ theory of disease is a hallucination. the increasing number of prisoners made it necessary for the rebels to improve their means of guarding and holding us in check. they threw up a line of rifle pits around the stockade for the infantry guards. at intervals along this were piles of hand grenades, which could be used with fearful effect in case of an outbreak. a strong star fort was thrown up at a little distance from the southwest corner. eleven field pieces were mounted in this in such a way as to rake the stockade diagonally. a smaller fort, mounting five guns, was built at the northwest corner, and at the northeast and southeast corners were small lunettes, with a couple of howitzers each. packed as we were we had reason to dread a single round from any of these works, which could not fail to produce fearful havoc. still a plot was concocted for a break, and it seemed to the sanguine portions of us that it must prove successful. first a secret society was organized, bound by the most stringent oaths that could be devised. the members of this were divided into companies of fifty men each; under officers regularly elected. the secrecy was assumed in order to shut out rebel spies and the traitors from a knowledge of the contemplated outbreak. a man named baker--belonging, i think, to some new york regiment--was the grand organizer of the scheme. we were careful in each of our companies to admit none to membership except such as long acquaintance gave us entire confidence in. the plan was to dig large tunnels to the stockade at various places, and then hollow out the ground at the foot of the timbers, so that a half dozen or so could be pushed over with a little effort, and make a gap ten or twelve feet wide. all these were to be thrown down at a preconcerted signal, the companies were to rush out and seize the eleven guns of the headquarters fort. the plymouth brigade was then to man these and turn them on the camp of the reserves who, it was imagined, would drop their arms and take to their heels after receiving a round or so of shell. we would gather what arms we could, and place them in the hands of the most active and determined. this would give us frown eight to ten thousand fairly armed, resolute men, with which we thought we could march to appalachicola bay, or to sherman. we worked energetically at our tunnels, which soon began to assume such shape as to give assurance that they would answer our expectations in opening the prison walls. then came the usual blight to all such enterprises: a spy or a traitor revealed everything to wirz. one day a guard came in, seized baker and took him out. what was done with him i know not; we never heard of him after he passed the inner gate. immediately afterward all the sergeants of detachments were summoned outside. there they met wirz, who made a speech informing them that he knew all the details of the plot, and had made sufficient preparations to defeat it. the guard had been strongly reinforced, and disposed in such a manner as to protect the guns from capture. the stockade had been secured to prevent its falling, even if undermined. he said, in addition, that sherman had been badly defeated by johnston, and driven back across the river, so that any hopes of co-operation by him would be ill-founded. when the sergeants returned, he caused the following notice to be posted on the gates: notice. not wishing to shed the blood of hundreds, not connected with those who concocted a mad plan to force the stockade, and make in this way their escape, i hereby warn the leaders and those who formed themselves into a band to carry out this, that i am in possession of all the facts, and have made my dispositions accordingly, so as to frustrate it. no choice would be left me but to open with grape and canister on the stockade, and what effect this would have, in this densely crowded place, need not be told. may 25,1864. h. wirz. the next day a line of tall poles, bearing white flags, were put up at some little distance from the dead line, and a notice was read to us at roll call that if, except at roll call, any gathering exceeding one hundred was observed, closer the stockade than these poles, the guns would open with grape and canister without warning. the number of deaths in the stockade in may was seven hundred and eight, about as many as had been killed in sherman's army during the same time. chapter xxx. june--possibilities of a murderous cannonade--what was proposed to be done in that event--a false alarm--deterioration of the rations --fearful increase of mortality. after wirz's threat of grape and canister upon the slightest provocation, we lived in daily apprehension of some pretext being found for opening the guns upon us for a general massacre. bitter experience had long since taught us that the rebels rarely threatened in vain. wirz, especially, was much more likely to kill without warning, than to warn without killing. this was because of the essential weakness of his nature. he knew no art of government, no method of discipline save "kill them!" his petty little mind's scope reached no further. he could conceive of no other way of managing men than the punishment of every offense, or seeming offense, with death. men who have any talent for governing find little occasion for the death penalty. the stronger they are in themselves--the more fitted for controlling others--the less their need of enforcing their authority by harsh measures. there was a general expression of determination among the prisoners to answer any cannonade with a desperate attempt to force the stockade. it was agreed that anything was better than dying like rats in a pit or wild animals in a battue. it was believed that if anything would occur which would rouse half those in the pen to make a headlong effort in concert, the palisade could be scaled, and the gates carried, and, though it would be at a fearful loss of life, the majority of those making the attempt would get out. if the rebels would discharge grape and canister, or throw a shell into the prison, it would lash everybody to such a pitch that they would see that the sole forlorn hope of safety lay in wresting the arms away from our tormentors. the great element in our favor was the shortness of the distance between us and the cannon. we could hope to traverse this before the guns could be reloaded more than once. whether it would have been possible to succeed i am unable to say. it would have depended wholly upon the spirit and unanimity with which the effort was made. had ten thousand rushed forward at once, each with a determination to do or die, i think it would have been successful without a loss of a tenth of the number. but the insuperable trouble--in our disorganized state--was want of concert of action. i am quite sure, however, that the attempt would have been made had the guns opened. one day, while the agitation of this matter was feverish, i was cooking my dinner--that is, boiling my pitiful little ration of unsalted meal, in my fruit can, with the aid of a handful of splinters that i had been able to pick up by a half day's diligent search. suddenly the long rifle in the headquarters fort rang out angrily. a fuse shell shrieked across the prison--close to the tops of the logs, and burst in the woods beyond. it was answered with a yell of defiance from ten thousand throats. i sprang up-my heart in my mouth. the long dreaded time had arrived; the rebels had opened the massacre in which they must exterminate us, or we them. i looked across to the opposite bank, on which were standing twelve thousand men--erect, excited, defiant. i was sure that at the next shot they would surge straight against the stockade like a mighty human billow, and then a carnage would begin the like of which modern times had never seen. the excitement and suspense were terrible. we waited for what seemed ages for the next gun. it was not fired. old winder was merely showing the prisoners how he could rally the guards to oppose an outbreak. though the gun had a shell in it, it was merely a signal, and the guards came double-quicking up by regiments, going into position in the rifle pits and the hand-grenade piles. as we realized what the whole affair meant, we relieved our surcharged feelings with a few general yells of execration upon rebels generally, and upon those around us particularly, and resumed our occupation of cooking rations, killing lice, and discussing the prospects of exchange and escape. the rations, like everything else about us, had steadily grown worse. a bakery was built outside of the stockade in may and our meal was baked there into loaves about the size of brick. each of us got a half of one of these for a day's ration. this, and occasionally a small slice of salt pork, was call that i received. i wish the reader would prepare himself an object lesson as to how little life can be supported on for any length of time, by procuring a piece of corn bread the size of an ordinary brickbat, and a thin slice of pork, and then imagine how he would fare, with that as his sole daily ration, for long hungry weeks and months. dio lewis satisfied himself that he could sustain life on sixty cents, a week. i am sure that the food furnished us by the rebels would not, at present prices cost one-third that. they pretended to give us one-third of pound of bacon and one and one-fourth pounds of corn meal. a week's rations then would be two and one-third pounds of bacon--worth ten cents, and eight and three-fourths pounds of meal, worth, say, ten cents more. as a matter of fact, i do not presume that at any time we got this full ration. it would surprise me to learn that we averaged two-thirds of it. the meal was ground very coarse and produced great irrition in the bowels. we used to have the most frightful cramps that men ever suffered from. those who were predisposed intestinal affections were speedily carried off by incurable diarrhea and dysentery. of the twelve thousand and twelve men who died, four thousand died of chronic diarrhea; eight hundred and seventeen died of acute diarrhea, and one thousand three hundred and eighty-four died of dysenteria, making total of six thousand two hundred and one victims to enteric disorders. let the reader reflect a moment upon this number, till comprehends fully how many six thousand two hundred and men are, and how much force, energy, training, and rich possibilities for the good of the community and country died with those six thousand two hundred and one young, active men. it may help his perception of the magnitude of this number to remember that the total loss of the british, during the crimean war, by death in all shapes, was four thousand five hundred and ninety-five, or one thousand seven hundred and six less than the deaths in andersonville from dysenteric diseases alone. the loathsome maggot flies swarmed about the bakery, and dropped into the trough where the dough was being mixed, so that it was rare to get a ration of bread not contaminated with a few of them. it was not long until the bakery became inadequate to supply bread for all the prisoners. then great iron kettles were set, and mush was issued to a number of detachments, instead of bread. there was not so much cleanliness and care in preparing this as a farmer shows in cooking food for stock. a deep wagon-bed would be shoveled full of the smoking paste, which was then hailed inside and issued out to the detachments, the latter receiving it on blankets, pieces of shelter tents, or, lacking even these, upon the bare sand. as still more prisoners came in, neither bread nor mush could be furnished them, and a part of the detachments received their rations in meal. earnest solicitation at length resulted in having occasional scanty issues of wood to cook this with. my detachment was allowed to choose which it would take--bread, mush or meal. it took the latter. cooking the meal was the topic of daily interest. there were three ways of doing it: bread, mush and "dumplings." in the latter the meal was dampened until it would hold together, and was rolled into little balls, the size of marbles, which were then boiled. the bread was the most satisfactory and nourishing; the mush the bulkiest--it made a bigger show, but did not stay with one so long. the dumplings held an intermediate position--the water in which they were boiled becoming a sort of a broth that helped to stay the stomach. we received no salt, as a rule. no one knows the intense longing for this, when one goes without it for a while. when, after a privation of weeks we would get a teaspoonful of salt apiece, it seemed as if every muscle in our bodies was invigorated. we traded buttons to the guards for red peppers, and made our mush, or bread, or dumplings, hot with the fiery-pods, in hopes that this would make up for the lack of salt, but it was a failure. one pinch of salt was worth all the pepper pods in the southern confederacy. my little squad--now diminished by death from five to three--cooked our rations together to economize wood and waste of meal, and quarreled among ourselves daily as to whether the joint stock should be converted into bread, mush or dumplings. the decision depended upon the state of the stomach. if very hungry, we made mush; if less famished, dumplings; if disposed to weigh matters, bread. this may seem a trifling matter, but it was far from it. we all remember the man who was very fond of white beans, but after having fifty or sixty meals of them in succession, began to find a suspicion of monotony in the provender. we had now six months of unvarying diet of corn meal and water, and even so slight a change as a variation in the way of combining the two was an agreeable novelty. at the end of june there were twenty-six thousand three hundred and sixty-seven prisoners in the stockade, and one thousand two hundred--just forty per day--had died during the month. chapter xxxi. dying by inches--seitz, the slow, and his death--stiggall and emerson --ravages on the scurvy. may and june made sad havoc in the already thin ranks of our battalion. nearly a score died in my company--l--and the other companies suffered proportionately. among the first to die of my company comrades, was a genial little corporal, "billy" phillips--who was a favorite with us all. everything was done for him that kindness could suggest, but it was of little avail. then "bruno" weeks--a young boy, the son of a preacher, who had run away from his home in fulton county, ohio, to join us, succumbed to hardship and privation. the next to go was good-natured, harmless victor seitz, a detroit cigar maker, a german, and one of the slowest of created mortals. how he ever came to go into the cavalry was beyond the wildest surmises of his comrades. why his supernatural slowness and clumsiness did not result in his being killed at least once a day, while in the service, was even still farther beyond the power of conjecture. no accident ever happened in the company that seitz did not have some share in. did a horse fall on a slippery road, it was almost sure to be seitz's, and that imported son of the fatherland was equally sure to be caught under him. did somebody tumble over a bank of a dark night, it was seitz that we soon heard making his way back, swearing in deep german gutterals, with frequent allusion to 'tausend teuflin.' did a shanty blow down, we ran over and pulled seitz out of the debris, when he would exclaim: "zo! dot vos pretty vunny now, ain't it?" and as he surveyed the scene of his trouble with true german phlegm, he would fish a brier-wood pipe from the recesses of his pockets, fill it with tobacco, and go plodding off in a cloud of smoke in search of some fresh way to narrowly escape destruction. he did not know enough about horses to put a snaffle-bit in one's mouth, and yet he would draw the friskiest, most mettlesome animal in the corral, upon whose back he was scarcely more at home than he would be upon a slack rope. it was no uncommon thing to see a horse break out of ranks, and go past the battalion like the wind, with poor seitz clinging to his mane like the traditional grim death to a deceased african. we then knew that seitz had thoughtlessly sunk the keen spurs he would persist in wearing; deep into the flanks of his high-mettled animal. these accidents became so much a matter-of-course that when anything unusual occurred in the company our first impulse was to go and help seitz out. when the bugle sounded "boots and saddles," the rest of us would pack up, mount, "count off by fours from the right," and be ready to move out before the last notes of the call had fairly died away. just then we would notice an unsaddled horse still tied to the hitching place. it was seitz's, and that worthy would be seen approaching, pipe in mouth, and bridle in hand, with calm, equable steps, as if any time before the expiration of his enlistment would be soon enough to accomplish the saddling of his steed. a chorus of impatient and derisive remarks would go up from his impatient comrades: "for heaven's sake, seitz, hurry up!" "seitz! you are like a cow's tail--always behind!" "seitz, you are slower than the second coming of the savior!" "christmas is a railroad train alongside of you, seitz!" "if you ain't on that horse in half a second, seitz, we'll go off and leave you, and the johnnies will skin you alive!" etc., etc. not a ripple of emotion would roll over seitz's placid features under the sharpest of these objurgations. at last, losing all patience, two or three boys would dismount, run to seitz's horse, pack, saddle and bridle him, as if he were struck with a whirlwind. then seitz would mount, and we would move 'off. for all this, we liked him. his good nature was boundless, and his disposition to oblige equal to the severest test. he did not lack a grain of his full share of the calm, steadfast courage of his race, and would stay where he was put, though erebus yawned and bade him fly. he was very useful, despite his unfitness for many of the duties of a cavalryman. he was a good guard, and always ready to take charge of prisoners, or be sentry around wagons or a forage pile-duties that most of the boys cordially hated. but he came into the last trouble at andersonville. he stood up pretty well under the hardships of belle isle, but lost his cheerfulness--his unrepining calmness--after a few weeks in the stockade. one day we remembered that none of us had seen him for several days, and we started in search of him. we found him in a distant part of the camp, lying near the dead line. his long fair hair was matted together, his blue eyes had the flush of fever. every part of his clothing was gray with the lice that were hastening his death with their torments. he uttered the first complaint i ever heard him make, as i came up to him: "my gott, m ----, dis is worse dun a dog's det!" in a few days we gave him all the funeral in our power; tied his big toes together, folded his hands across his breast, pinned to his shirt a slip of paper, upon which was written: victor e. seitz, co. l, sixteenth illinois cavalry. and laid his body at the south gate, beside some scores of others that were awaiting the arrival of the six-mule wagon that hauled them to the potter's field, which was to be their last resting-place. john emerson and john stiggall, of my company, were two norwegian boys, and fine specimens of their race--intelligent, faithful, and always ready for duty. they had an affection for each other that reminded one of the stories told of the sworn attachment and the unfailing devotion that were common between two gothic warrior youths. coming into andersonville some little time after the rest of us, they found all the desirable ground taken up, and they established their quarters at the base of the hill, near the swamp. there they dug a little hole to lie in, and put in a layer of pine leaves. between them they had an overcoat and a blanket. at night they lay upon the coat and covered themselves with the blanket. by day the blanket served as a tent. the hardships and annoyances that we endured made everybody else cross and irritable. at times it seemed impossible to say or listen to pleasant words, and nobody was ever allowed to go any length of time spoiling for a fight. he could usually be accommodated upon the spot to any extent he desired, by simply making his wishes known. even the best of chums would have sharp quarrels and brisk fights, and this disposition increased as disease made greater inroads upon them. i saw in one instance two brothers-both of whom died the next day of scurvy--and who were so helpless as to be unable to rise, pull themselves up on their knees by clenching the poles of their tents --in order to strike each other with clubs, and they kept striking until the bystanders interfered and took their weapons away from them. but stiggall and emerson never quarreled with each other. their tenderness and affection were remarkable to witness. they began to go the way that so many were going; diarrhea and scurvy set in; they wasted away till their muscles and tissues almost disappeared, leaving the skin lying fiat upon the bones; but their principal solicitude was for each other, and each seemed actually jealous of any person else doing anything for the other. i met emerson one day, with one leg drawn clear out of shape, and rendered almost useless by the scurvy. he was very weak, but was hobbling down towards the creek with a bucket made from a boot leg. i said: "johnny, just give me your bucket. i'll fill it for you, and bring it up to your tent." "no; much obliged, m ----" he wheezed out; "my pardner wants a cool drink, and i guess i'd better get it for him." stiggall died in june. he was one of the first victims of scurvy, which, in the succeeding few weeks, carried off so many. all of us who had read sea-stories had read much of this disease and its horrors, but we had little conception of the dreadful reality. it usually manifested itself first in the mouth. the breath became unbearably fetid; the gums swelled until they protruded, livid and disgusting, beyond the lips. the teeth became so loose that they frequently fell out, and the sufferer would pick them up and set them back in their sockets. in attempting to bite the hard corn bread furnished by the bakery the teeth often stuck fast and were pulled out. the gums had a fashion of breaking away, in large chunks, which would be swallowed or spit out. all the time one was eating his mouth would be filled with blood, fragments of gums and loosened teeth. frightful, malignant ulcers appeared in other parts of the body; the ever-present maggot flies laid eggs in these, and soon worms swarmed therein. the sufferer looked and felt as if, though he yet lived and moved, his body was anticipating the rotting it would undergo a little later in the grave. the last change was ushered in by the lower parts of the legs swelling. when this appeared, we considered the man doomed. we all had scurvy, more or less, but as long as it kept out of our legs we were hopeful. first, the ankle joints swelled, then the foot became useless. the swelling increased until the knees became stiff, and the skin from these down was distended until it looked pale, colorless and transparent as a tightly blown bladder. the leg was so much larger at the bottom than at the thigh, that the sufferers used to make grim jokes about being modeled like a churn, "with the biggest end down." the man then became utterly helpless and usually died in a short time. the official report puts down the number of deaths from scurvy at three thousand five hundred and seventy-four, but dr. jones, the rebel surgeon, reported to the rebel government his belief that nine-tenths of the great mortality of the prison was due, either directly or indirectly, to this cause. the only effort made by the rebel doctors to check its ravages was occasionally to give a handful of sumach berries to some particularly bad case. when stiggall died we thought emerson would certainly follow him in a day or two, but, to our surprise, he lingered along until august before dying. chapter xxxii. "ole boo," and "ole sol, the haymaker"--a fetid, burning desert--noisome water, and the effects of drinking it--stealing soft soap. the gradually lengthening summer days were insufferably long and wearisome. each was hotter, longer and more tedious than its predecessors. in my company was a none-too-bright fellow, named dawson. during the chilly rains or the nipping, winds of our first days in prison, dawson would, as he rose in, the morning, survey the forbidding skies with lack-luster eyes and remark, oracularly: "well, ole boo gits us agin, to-day." he was so unvarying in this salutation to the morn that his designation of disagreeable weather as "ole boo" became generally adopted by us. when the hot weather came on, dawson's remark, upon rising and seeing excellent prospects for a scorcher, changed to: "well, ole sol, the haymaker, is going to git in his work on us agin to-day." as long as he lived and was able to talk, this was dawson's invariable observation at the break of day. he was quite right. the ole haymaker would do some famous work before he descended in the west, sending his level rays through the wide interstices between the somber pines. by nine o'clock in the morning his beams would begin to fairly singe everything in the crowded pen. the hot sand would glow as one sees it in the center of the unshaded highway some scorching noon in august. the high walls of the prison prevented the circulation inside of any breeze that might be in motion, while the foul stench rising from the putrid swamp and the rotting ground seemed to reach the skies. one can readily comprehend the horrors of death on the burning sands of a desert. but the desert sand is at least clean; there is nothing worse about it than heat and intense dryness. it is not, as that was at andersonville, poisoned with the excretions of thousands of sick and dying men, filled with disgusting vermin, and loading the air with the germs of death. the difference is as that between a brick-kiln and a sewer. should the fates ever decide that i shall be flung out upon sands to perish, i beg that the hottest place in the sahara may be selected, rather than such a spot as the interior of the andersonville stockade. it may be said that we had an abundance of water, which made a decided improvement on a desert. doubtless--had that water been pure. but every mouthful of it was a blood poison, and helped promote disease and death. even before reaching the stockade it was so polluted by the drainage of the rebel camps as to be utterly unfit for human use. in our part of the prison we sank several wells--some as deep as forty feet--to procure water. we had no other tools for this than our ever-faithful half canteens, and nothing wherewith to wall the wells. but a firm clay was reached a few feet below the surface, which afforded tolerable strong sides for the lower part, ana furnished material to make adobe bricks for curbs to keep out the sand of the upper part. the sides were continually giving away, however, and fellows were perpetually falling down the holes, to the great damage of their legs and arms. the water, which was drawn up in little cans, or boot leg buckets, by strings made of strips of cloth, was much better than that of the creek, but was still far from pure, as it contained the seepage from the filthy ground. the intense heat led men to drink great quantities of water, and this superinduced malignant dropsical complaints, which, next to diarrhea, scurvy and gangrene, were the ailments most active in carrying men off. those affected in this way swelled up frightfully from day to day. their clothes speedily became too small for them, and were ripped off, leaving them entirely naked, and they suffered intensely until death at last came to their relief. among those of my squad who died in this way, was a young man named baxter, of the fifth indiana cavalry, taken at chicamauga. he was very fine looking--tall, slender, with regular features and intensely black hair and eyes; he sang nicely, and was generally liked. a more pitiable object than he, when last i saw him, just before his death, can not be imagined. his body had swollen until it seemed marvelous that the human skin could bear so much distention without disruption, all the old look of bright intelligence had been. driven from his face by the distortion of his features. his swarthy hair and beard, grown long and ragged, had that peculiar repulsive look which the black hair of the sick is prone to assume. i attributed much of my freedom from the diseases to which others succumbed to abstention from water drinking. long before i entered the army, i had constructed a theory--on premises that were doubtless as insufficient as those that boyish theories are usually based upon--that drinking water was a habit, and a pernicious one, which sapped away the energy. i took some trouble to curb my appetite for water, and soon found that i got along very comfortably without drinking anything beyond that which was contained in my food. i followed this up after entering the army, drinking nothing at any time but a little coffee, and finding no need, even on the dustiest marches, for anything more. i do not presume that in a year i drank a quart of cold water. experience seemed to confirm my views, for i noticed that the first to sink under a fatigue, or to yield to sickness, were those who were always on the lookout for drinking water, springing from their horses and struggling around every well or spring on the line of march for an opportunity to fill their canteens. i made liberal use of the creek for bathing purposes, however, visiting it four or five times a day during the hot days, to wash myself all over. this did not cool one off much, for the shallow stream was nearly as hot as the sand, but it seemed to do some good, and it helped pass away the tedious hours. the stream was nearly all the time filled as full of bathers as they could stand, and the water could do little towards cleansing so many. the occasional rain storms that swept across the prison were welcomed, not only because they cooled the air temporarily, but because they gave us a shower-bath. as they came up, nearly every one stripped naked and got out where he could enjoy the full benefit of the falling water. fancy, if possible, the spectacle of twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand men without a stitch of clothing upon them. the like has not been seen, i imagine, since the naked followers of boadicea gathered in force to do battle to the roman invaders. it was impossible to get really clean. our bodies seemed covered with a varnish-like, gummy matter that defied removal by water alone. i imagined that it came from the rosin or turpentine, arising from the little pitch pine fires over which we hovered when cooking our rations. it would yield to nothing except strong soap-and soap, as i have before stated--was nearly as scarce in the southern confederacy as salt. we in prison saw even less of it, or rather, none at all. the scarcity of it, and our desire for it, recalls a bit of personal experience. i had steadfastly refused all offers of positions outside the prison on parole, as, like the great majority of the prisoners, my hatred of the rebels grew more bitter, day by day; i felt as if i would rather die than accept the smallest favor at their hands, and i shared the common contempt for those who did. but, when the movement for a grand attack on the stockade--mentioned in a previous chapter--was apparently rapidly coming to a head, i was offered a temporary detail outside to, assist in making up some rolls. i resolved to accept; first because i thought i might get some information that would be of use in our enterprise; and, next, because i foresaw that the rush through the gaps in the stockade would be bloody business, and by going out in advance i would avoid that much of the danger, and still be able to give effective assistance. i was taken up to wirz's office. he was writing at a desk at one end of a large room when the sergeant brought me in. he turned around, told the sergeant to leave me, and ordered me to sit down upon a box at the other end of the room. turning his back and resuming his writing, in a few minutes he had forgotten me. i sat quietly, taking in the details for a half-hour, and then, having exhausted everything else in the room, i began wondering what was in the box i was sitting upon. the lid was loose; i hitched it forward a little without attracting wirz's attention, and slipped my left hand down of a voyage of discovery. it seemed very likely that there was something there that a loyal yankee deserved better than a rebel. i found that it was a fine article of soft soap. a handful was scooped up and speedily shoved into my left pantaloon pocket. expecting every instant that wirz would turn around and order me to come to the desk to show my handwriting, hastily and furtively wiped my hand on the back of my shirt and watched wirz with as innocent an expression as a school boy assumes when he has just flipped a chewed paper wad across the room. wirz was still engrossed in his writing, and did not look around. i was emboldened to reach down for another handful. this was also successfully transferred, the hand wiped off on the back of the shirt, and the face wore its expression of infantile ingenuousness. still wirz did not look up. i kept dipping up handful after handful, until i had gotten about a quart in the left hand pocket. after each handful i rubbed my hand off on the back of my shirt and waited an instant for a summons to the desk. then the process was repeated with the other hand, and a quart of the saponaceous mush was packed in the right hand pocket. shortly after wirz rose and ordered a guard to take me away and keep me, until he decided what to do with me. the day was intensely hot, and soon the soap in my pockets and on the back of my shirt began burning like double strength spanish fly blisters. there was nothing to do but grin and bear it. i set my teeth, squatted down under the shade of the parapet of the fort, and stood it silently and sullenly. for the first time in my life i thoroughly appreciated the story of the spartan boy, who stole the fox and suffered the animal to tear his bowels out rather than give a sign which would lead to the exposure of his theft. between four and five o'clock-after i had endured the thing for five or six hours, a guard came with orders from wirz that i should be returned to the stockade. upon hastily removing my clothes, after coming inside, i found i had a blister on each thigh, and one down my back, that would have delighted an old practitioner of the heroic school. but i also had a half gallon of excellent soft soap. my chums and i took a magnificent wash, and gave our clothes the same, and we still had soap enough left to barter for some onions that we had long coveted, and which tasted as sweet to us as manna to the israelites. chapter xxxiii. "pour passer le temps"--a set of chessmen procured under difficulties --religious services--the devoted priest--war song. the time moved with leaden feet. do the best we could, there were very many tiresome hours for which no occupation whatever could be found. all that was necessary to be done during the day--attending roll call, drawing and cooking rations, killing lice and washing--could be disposed of in an hour's time, and we were left with fifteen or sixteen waking hours, for which there was absolutely no employment. very many tried to escape both the heat and ennui by sleeping as much as possible through the day, but i noticed that those who did this soon died, and consequently i did not do it. card playing had sufficed to pass away the hours at first, but our cards soon wore out, and deprived us of this resource. my chum, andrews, and i constructed a set of chessmen with an infinite deal of trouble. we found a soft, white root in the swamp which answered our purpose. a boy near us had a tolerably sharp pocket-knife, for the use of which a couple of hours each day, we gave a few spoonfuls of meal. the knife was the only one among a large number of prisoners, as the rebel guards had an affection for that style of cutlery, which led them to search incoming prisoners, very closely. the fortunate owner of this derived quite a little income of meal by shrewdly loaning it to his knifeless comrades. the shapes that we made for pieces and pawns were necessarily very rude, but they were sufficiently distinct for identification. we blackened one set with pitch pine soot, found a piece of plank that would answer for a board and purchased it from its possessor for part of a ration of meal, and so were fitted out with what served until our release to distract our attention from much of the surrounding misery. every one else procured such amusement as they could. newcomers, who still had money and cards, gambled as long as their means lasted. those who had books read them until the leaves fell apart. those who had paper and pen and ink tried to write descriptions and keep journals, but this was usually given up after being in prison a few weeks. i was fortunate enough to know a boy who had brought a copy of "gray's anatomy" into prison with him. i was not specially interested in the subject, but it was hobson's choice; i could read anatomy or nothing, and so i tackled it with such good will that before my friend became sick and was taken outside, and his book with him, i had obtained a very fair knowledge of the rudiments of physiology. there was a little band of devoted christian workers, among whom were orderly sergeant thomas j. sheppard, ninety-seventh o. y. l, now a leading baptist minister in eastern ohio; boston corbett, who afterward slew john wilkes booth, and frank smith, now at the head of the railroad bethel work at toledo. they were indefatigable in trying to evangelize the prison. a few of them would take their station in some part of the stockade (a different one every time), and begin singing some old familiar hymn like: "come, thou fount of every blessing," and in a few minutes they would have an attentive audience of as many thousand as could get within hearing. the singing would be followed by regular services, during which sheppard, smith, corbett, and some others would make short, spirited, practical addresses, which no doubt did much good to all who heard them, though the grains of leaven were entirely too small to leaven such an immense measure of meal. they conducted several funerals, as nearly like the way it was done at home as possible. their ministrations were not confined to mere lip service, but they labored assiduously in caring for the sick, and made many a poor fellow's way to the grave much smoother for him. this was about all the religious services that we were favored with. the rebel preachers did not make that effort to save our misguided souls which one would have imagined they would having us where we could not choose but hear they might have taken advantage of our situation to rake us fore and aft with their theological artillery. they only attempted it in one instance. while in richmond a preacher came into our room and announced in an authoritative way that he would address us on religious subjects. we uncovered respectfully, and gathered around him. he was a loud-tongued, brawling boanerges, who addressed the lord as if drilling a brigade. he spoke but a few moments before making apparent his belief that the worst of crimes was that of being a yankee, and that a man must not only be saved through christ's blood, but also serve in the rebel army before he could attain to heaven. of course we raised such a yell of derision that the sermon was brought to an abrupt conclusion. the only minister who came into the stockade was a catholic priest, middle-aged, tall, slender, and unmistakably devout. he was unwearied in his attention to the sick, and the whole day could be seen moving around through the prison, attending to those who needed spiritual consolation. it was interesting to see him administer the extreme unction to a dying man. placing a long purple scarf about his own neck and a small brazen crucifix in the hands of the dying one, he would kneel by the latter's side and anoint him upon the eyes, ears, nostrils; lips, hands, feet and breast, with sacred oil; from a little brass vessel, repeating the while, in an impressive voice, the solemn offices of the church. his unwearying devotion gained the admiration of all, no matter how little inclined one might be to view priestliness generally with favor. he was evidently of such stuff as christian heros have ever been made of, and would have faced stake and fagot, at the call of duty, with unquailing eye. his name was father hamilton, and he was stationed at macon. the world should know more of a man whose services were so creditable to humanity and his church: the good father had the wisdom of the serpent, with the harmlessness of the dove. though full of commiseration for the unhappy lot of the prisoners, nothing could betray him into the slightest expression of opinion regarding the war or those who were the authors of all this misery. in our impatience at our treatment, and hunger for news, we forgot his sacerdotal character, and importuned him for tidings of the exchange. his invariable reply was that he lived apart from these things and kept himself ignorant of them. "but, father," said i one day, with an impatience that i could not wholly repress, "you must certainly hear or read something of this, while you are outside among the rebel officers." like many other people, i supposed that the whole world was excited over that in which i felt a deep interest. "no, my son," replied he, in his usual calm, measured tones. "i go not among them, nor do i hear anything from them. when i leave the prison in the evening, full of sorrow at what i have seen here, i find that the best use i can make of my time is in studying the word of god, and especially the psalms of david." we were not any longer good company for each other. we had heard over and over again all each other's stories and jokes, and each knew as much about the other's previous history as we chose to communicate. the story of every individual's past life, relations, friends, regiment, and soldier experience had been told again and again, until the repetition was wearisome. the cool nights following the hot days were favorable to little gossiping seances like the yarn-spinning watches of sailors on pleasant nights. our squad, though its stock of stories was worn threadbare, was fortunate enough to have a sweet singer in israel "nosey" payne--of whose tunefulness we never tired. he had a large repertoire of patriotic songs, which he sang with feeling and correctness, and which helped much to make the calm summer nights pass agreeably. among the best of these was "brave boys are they," which i always thought was the finest ballad, both in poetry and music, produced by the war. chapter xxxiv. maggots, lice and raiders--practices of these human vermin--plundering the sick and dying--night attacks, and battles by day--hard times for the small traders. with each long, hot summer hour the lice, the maggot-flies and the n'yaarkers increased in numbers and venomous activity. they were ever-present annoyances and troubles; no time was free from them. the lice worried us by day and tormented us by night; the maggot-flies fouled our food, and laid in sores and wounds larvae that speedily became masses of wriggling worms. the n'yaarkers were human vermin that preyed upon and harried us unceasingly. they formed themselves into bands numbering from five to twenty-five, each led by a bold, unscrupulous, energetic scoundrel. we now called them "raiders," and the most prominent and best known of the bands were called by the names of their ruffian leaders, as "mosby's raiders," "curtis's raiders," "delaney's raiders," "sarsfield's raiders," "collins's raiders," etc. as long as we old prisoners formed the bulk of those inside the stockade, the raiders had slender picking. they would occasionally snatch a blanket from the tent poles, or knock a boy down at the creek and take his silver watch from him; but this was all. abundant opportunities for securing richer swag came to them with the advent of the plymouth pilgrims. as had been before stated, these boys brought in with them a large portion of their first instalment of veteran bounty--aggregating in amount, according to varying estimates, between twenty-five thousand and one hundred thousand dollars. the pilgrims were likewise well clothed, had an abundance of blankets and camp equipage, and a plentiful supply of personal trinkets, that could be readily traded off to the rebels. an average one of them--even if his money were all gone--was a bonanza to any band which could succeed in plundering him. his watch and chain, shoes, knife, ring, handkerchief, combs and similar trifles, would net several hundred dollars in confederate money. the blockade, which cut off the rebel communication with the outer world, made these in great demand. many of the prisoners that came in from the army of the potomac repaid robbing equally well. as a rule those from that army were not searched so closely as those from the west, and not unfrequently they came in with all their belongings untouched, where sherman's men, arriving the same day, would be stripped nearly to the buff. the methods of the raiders were various, ranging all the way from sneak thievery to highway robbery. all the arts learned in the prisons and purlieus of new york were put into exercise. decoys, "bunko-steerers" at home, would be on the look-out for promising subjects as each crowd of fresh prisoners entered the gate, and by kindly offers to find them a sleeping place, lure them to where they could be easily despoiled during the night. if the victim resisted there was always sufficient force at hand to conquer him, and not seldom his life paid the penalty of his contumacy. i have known as many as three of these to be killed in a night, and their bodies--with throats cut, or skulls crushed in--be found in the morning among the dead at the gates. all men having money or valuables were under continual espionage, and when found in places convenient for attack, a rush was made for them. they were knocked down and their persons rifled with such swift dexterity that it was done before they realized what had happened. at first these depredations were only perpetrated at night. the quarry was selected during the day, and arrangements made for a descent. after the victim was asleep the band dashed down upon him, and sheared him of his goods with incredible swiftness. those near would raise the cry of "raiders!" and attack the robbers. if the latter had secured their booty they retreated with all possible speed, and were soon lost in the crowd. if not, they would offer battle, and signal for assistance from the other bands. severe engagements of this kind were of continual occurrence, in which men were so badly beaten as to die from the effects. the weapons used were fists, clubs, axes, tent-poles, etc. the raiders were plentifully provided with the usual weapons of their class--slung-shots and brass-knuckles. several of them had succeeded in smuggling bowie-knives into prison. they had the great advantage in these rows of being well acquainted with each other, while, except the plymouth pilgrims, the rest of the prisoners were made up of small squads of men from each regiment in the service, and total strangers to all outside of their own little band. the raiders could concentrate, if necessary, four hundred or five hundred men upon any point of attack, and each member of the gangs had become so familiarized with all the rest by long association in new york, and elsewhere, that he never dealt a blow amiss, while their opponents were nearly as likely to attack friends as enemies. by the middle of june the continual success of the raiders emboldened them so that they no longer confined their depredations to the night, but made their forays in broad daylight, and there was hardly an hour in the twenty-four that the cry of "raiders! raiders!" did, not go up from some part of the pen, and on looking in the direction of the cry, one would see a surging commotion, men struggling, and clubs being plied vigorously. this was even more common than the guards shooting men at the creek crossing. one day i saw "dick allen's raiders," eleven in number, attack a man wearing the uniform of ellett's marine brigade. he was a recent comer, and alone, but he was brave. he had come into possession of a spade, by some means or another, and he used this with delightful vigor and effect. two or three times he struck one of his assailants so fairly on the head and with such good will that i congratulated myself that he had killed him. finally, dick allen managed to slip around behind him unnoticed, and striking him on the head with a slung-shot, knocked him down, when the whole crowd pounced upon him to kill him, but were driven off by others rallying to his assistance. the proceeds of these forays enabled the raiders to wax fat and lusty, while others were dying from starvation. they all had good tents, constructed of stolen blankets, and their headquarters was a large, roomy tent, with a circular top, situated on the street leading to the south gate, and capable of accommodating from seventy-five to one hundred men. all the material for this had been wrested away from others. while hundreds were dying of scurvy and diarrhea, from the miserable, insufficient food, and lack of vegetables, these fellows had flour, fresh meat, onions, potatoes, green beans, and other things, the very looks of which were a torture to hungry, scorbutic, dysenteric men. they were on the best possible terms with the rebels, whom they fawned upon and groveled before, and were in return allowed many favors, in the way of trading, going out upon detail, and making purchases. among their special objects of attack were the small traders in the prison. we had quite a number of these whose genius for barter was so strong that it took root and flourished even in that unpropitious soil, and during the time when new prisoners were constantly coming in with money, they managed to accumulate small sums--from ten dollars upward, by trading between the guards and the prisoners. in the period immediately following a prisoner's entrance he was likely to spend all his money and trade off all his possessions for food, trusting to fortune to get him out of there when these were gone. then was when he was profitable to these go-betweens, who managed to make him pay handsomely for what he got. the raiders kept watch of these traders, and plundered them whenever occasion served. it reminded one of the habits of the fishing eagle, which hovers around until some other bird catches a fish, and then takes it away. chapter xxxv. a community without government--formation of the regulators--raiders attack key but are bluffed off--assault of the regulators on the raiders --desperate battle--overthrow of the raiders. to fully appreciate the condition of affairs let it be remembered that we were a community of twenty-five thousand boys and young men--none too regardful of control at best--and now wholly destitute of government. the rebels never made the slightest attempt to maintain order in the prison. their whole energies were concentrated in preventing our escape. so long as we staid inside the stockade, they cared as little what we did there as for the performances of savages in the interior of africa. i doubt if they would have interfered had one-half of us killed and eaten the other half. they rather took a delight in such atrocities as came to their notice. it was an ocular demonstration of the total depravity of the yankees. among ourselves there was no one in position to lay down law and enforce it. being all enlisted men we were on a dead level as far as rank was concerned--the highest being only sergeants, whose stripes carried no weight of authority. the time of our stay was--it was hoped--too transient to make it worth while bothering about organizing any form of government. the great bulk of the boys were recent comers, who hoped that in another week or so they would be out again. there were no fat salaries to tempt any one to take upon himself the duty of ruling the masses, and all were left to their own devices, to do good or evil, according to their several bents, and as fear of consequences swayed them. each little squad of men was a law unto themselves, and made and enforced their own regulations on their own territory. the administration of justice was reduced to its simplest terms. if a fellow did wrong he was pounded--if there was anybody capable of doing it. if not he went free. the almost unvarying success of the raiders in--their forays gave the general impression that they were invincible--that is, that not enough men could be concentrated against them to whip them. our ill-success in the attack we made on them in april helped us to the same belief. if we could not beat them then, we could not now, after we had been enfeebled by months of starvation and disease. it seemed to us that the plymouth pilgrims, whose organization was yet very strong, should undertake the task; but, as is usually the case in this world, where we think somebody else ought to undertake the performance of a disagreeable public duty, they did not see it in the light that we wished them to. they established guards around their squads, and helped beat off the raiders when their own territory was invaded, but this was all they would do. the rest of us formed similar guards. in the southwest corner of the stockade--where i was--we formed ourselves into a company of fifty active boys--mostly belonging to my own battalion and to other illinois regiments--of which i was elected captain. my first lieutenant was a tall, taciturn, long-armed member of the one hundred and eleventh illinois, whom we called "egypt," as he came from that section of the state. he was wonderfully handy with his fists. i think he could knock a fellow down so that he would fall-harder, and lie longer than any person i ever saw. we made a tacit division of duties: i did the talking, and "egypt" went through the manual labor of knocking our opponents down. in the numerous little encounters in which our company was engaged, "egypt" would stand by my side, silent, grim and patient, while i pursued the dialogue with the leader of the other crowd. as soon as he thought the conversation had reached the proper point, his long left arm stretched out like a flash, and the other fellow dropped as if he had suddenly come in range of a mule that was feeling well. that unexpected left-hander never failed. it would have made charles reade's heart leap for joy to see it. in spite of our company and our watchfulness, the raiders beat us badly on one occasion. marion friend, of company i of our battalion, was one of the small traders, and had accumulated forty dollars by his bartering. one evening at dusk delaney's raiders, about twenty-five strong, took advantage of the absence of most of us drawing rations, to make a rush for marion. they knocked him down, cut him across the wrist and neck with a razor, and robbed him of his forty dollars. by the time we could rally delaney and his attendant scoundrels were safe from pursuit in the midst of their friends. this state of things had become unendurable. sergeant leroy l. key, of company m, our battalion, resolved to make an effort to crush the raiders. he was a printer, from bloomington, illinois, tall, dark, intelligent and strong-willed, and one of the bravest men i ever knew. he was ably seconded by "limber jim," of the sixty-seventh illinois, whose lithe, sinewy form, and striking features reminded one of a young sioux brave. he had all of key's desperate courage, but not his brains or his talent for leadership. though fearfully reduced in numbers, our battalion had still about one hundred well men in it, and these formed the nucleus for key's band of "regulators," as they were styled. among them were several who had no equals in physical strength and courage in any of the raider chiefs. our best man was ned carrigan, corporal of company i, from chicago--who was so confessedly the best man in the whole prison that he was never called upon to demonstrate it. he was a big-hearted, genial irish boy, who was never known to get into trouble on his own account, but only used his fists when some of his comrades were imposed upon. he had fought in the ring, and on one occasion had killed a man with a single blow of his fist, in a prize fight near st. louis. we were all very proud of him, and it was as good as an entertainment to us to see the noisiest roughs subside into deferential silence as ned would come among them, like some grand mastiff in the midst of a pack of yelping curs. ned entered into the regulating scheme heartily. other stalwart specimens of physical manhood in our battalion were sergeant goody, ned johnson, tom larkin, and others, who, while not approaching carrigan's perfect manhood, were still more than a match for the best of the raiders. key proceeded with the greatest secrecy in the organization of his forces. he accepted none but western men, and preferred illinoisans, iowans, kansans, indianians and ohioans. the boys from those states seemed to naturally go together, and be moved by the same motives. he informed wirz what he proposed doing, so that any unusual commotion within the prison might not be mistaken for an attempt upon the stockade, and made the excuse for opening with the artillery. wirz, who happened to be in a complaisant humor, approved of the design, and allowed him the use of the enclosure of the north gate to confine his prisoners in. in spite of key's efforts at secrecy, information as to his scheme reached the raiders. it was debated at their headquarters, and decided there that key must be killed. three men were selected to do this work. they called on key, a dusk, on the evening of the 2d of july. in response to their inquiries, he came out of the blanket-covered hole on the hillside that he called his tent. they told him what they had heard, and asked if it was true. he said it was. one of them then drew a knife, and the other two, "billies" to attack him. but, anticipating trouble, key had procured a revolver which one of the pilgrims had brought in in his knapsack and drawing this he drove them off, but without firing a shot. the occurrence caused the greatest excitement. to us of the regulators it showed that the raiders had penetrated our designs, and were prepared for them. to the great majority of the prisoners it was the first intimation that such a thing was contemplated; the news spread from squad to squad with the greatest rapidity, and soon everybody was discussing the chances of the movement. for awhile men ceased their interminable discussion of escape and exchange--let those over worked words and themes have a rare spell of repose--and debated whether the raiders would whip the regulators, or the regulators conquer the raiders. the reasons which i have previously enumerated, induced a general disbelief in the probability of our success. the raiders were in good health well fed, used to operating together, and had the confidence begotten by a long series of successes. the regulators lacked in all these respects. whether key had originally fixed on the next day for making the attack, or whether this affair precipitated the crisis, i know not, but later in the evening he sent us all order: to be on our guard all night, and ready for action the next morning. there was very little sleep anywhere that night. the rebels learned through their spies that something unusual was going on inside, and as their only interpretation of anything unusual there was a design upon the stockade, they strengthened the guards, took additional precautions in every way, and spent the hours in anxious anticipation. we, fearing that the raiders might attempt to frustrate the scheme by an attack in overpowering force on key's squad, which would be accompanied by the assassination of him and limber jim, held ourselves in readiness to offer any assistance that might be needed. the raiders, though confident of success, were no less exercised. they threw out pickets to all the approaches to their headquarters, and provided otherwise against surprise. they had smuggled in some canteens of a cheap, vile whisky made from sorghum--and they grew quite hilarious in their big tent over their potations. two songs had long ago been accepted by us as peculiarly the raiders' own--as some one in their crowd sang them nearly every evening, and we never heard them anywhere else. the first began: in athol lived a man named jerry lanagan; he battered away till he hadn't a pound. his father he died, and he made him a man agin; left him a farm of ten acres of ground. the other related the exploits of an irish highwayman named brennan, whose chief virtue was that what he rob-bed from the rich he gave unto the poor. and this was the villainous chorus in which they all joined, and sang in such a way as suggested highway robbery, murder, mayhem and arson: brennan on the moor! brennan on the moor! proud and undaunted stood john brennan on the moor. they howled these two yearly the live-long night. they became eventually quite monotonous to us, who were waiting and watching. it would have been quite a relief if they had thrown in a new one every hour or so, by way of variety. morning at last came. our companies mustered on their grounds, and then marched to the space on the south side where the rations were issued. each man was armed with a small club, secured to his wrist by a string. the rebels--with their chronic fear of an outbreak animating them--had all the infantry in line of battle with loaded guns. the cannon in the works were shotted, the fuses thrust into the touch-holes and the men stood with lanyards in hand ready to mow down everybody, at any instant. the sun rose rapidly through the clear sky, which soon glowed down on us like a brazen oven. the whole camp gathered where it could best view the encounter. this was upon the north side. as i have before explained the two sides sloped toward each other like those of a great trough. the raiders' headquarters stood upon the center of the southern slope, and consequently those standing on the northern slope saw everything as if upon the stage of a theater. while standing in ranks waiting the orders to move, one of my comrades touched me on the arm, and said: "my god! just look over there!" i turned from watching the rebel artillerists, whose intentions gave me more uneasiness than anything else, and looked in the direction indicated by the speaker. the sight was the strangest one my eyes ever encountered. there were at least fifteen thousand perhaps twenty thousand--men packed together on the bank, and every eye was turned on us. the slope was such that each man's face showed over the shoulders of the one in front of him, making acres on acres of faces. it was as if the whole broad hillside was paved or thatched with human countenances. when all was ready we moved down upon the big tent, in as good order as we could preserve while passing through the narrow tortuous paths between the tents. key, limber jim, ned carigan, goody, tom larkin, and ned johnson led the advance with their companies. the prison was as silent as a graveyard. as we approached, the raiders massed themselves in a strong, heavy line, with the center, against which our advance was moving, held by the most redoubtable of their leaders. how many there were of them could not be told, as it was impossible to say where their line ended and the mass of spectators began. they could not themselves tell, as the attitude of a large portion of the spectators would be determined by which way the battle went. not a blow was struck until the lines came close together. then the raider center launched itself forward against ours, and grappled savagely with the leading regulators. for an instant--it seemed an hour--the struggle was desperate. strong, fierce men clenched and strove to throttle each other; great muscles strained almost to bursting, and blows with fist and club-dealt with all the energy of mortal hate--fell like hail. one-perhaps two-endless minutes the lines surged--throbbed--backward and forward a step or two, and then, as if by a concentration of mighty effort, our men flung the raider line back from it--broken--shattered. the next instant our leaders were striding through the mass like raging lions. carrigan, limber jim, larkin, johnson and goody each smote down a swath of men before them, as they moved resistlessly forward. we light weights had been sent around on the flanks to separate the spectators from the combatants, strike the raiders 'en revers,' and, as far as possible, keep the crowd from reinforcing them. in five minutes after the first blow--was struck the overthrow of the raiders was complete. resistance ceased, and they sought safety in flight. as the result became apparent to the--watchers on the opposite hillside, they vented their pent-up excitement in a yell that made the very ground tremble, and we answered them with a shout that expressed not only our exultation over our victory, but our great relief from the intense strain we had long borne. we picked up a few prisoners on the battle field, and retired without making any special effort to get any more then, as we knew, that they could not escape us. we were very tired, and very hungry. the time for drawing rations had arrived. wagons containing bread and mush had driven to the gates, but wirz would not allow these to be opened, lest in the excited condition of the men an attempt might be made to carry them. key ordered operations to cease, that wirz might be re-assured and let the rations enter. it was in vain. wirz was thoroughly scared. the wagons stood out in the hot sun until the mush fermented and soured, and had to be thrown away, while we event rationless to bed, and rose the next day with more than usually empty stomachs to goad us on to our work. chapter xxxvi. why the regulators were not assisted by the entire camp--peculiarities of boys from different sections--hunting the raiders down--exploits of my left-handed lieutenant--running the gauntlet. i may not have made it wholly clear to the reader why we did not have the active assistance of the whole prison in the struggle with the raiders. there were many reasons for this. first, the great bulk of the prisoners were new comers, having been, at the farthest, but three or four weeks in the stockade. they did not comprehend the situation of affairs as we older prisoners did. they did not understand that all the outrages--or very nearly all--were the work of--a relatively small crowd of graduates from the metropolitan school of vice. the activity and audacity of the raiders gave them the impression that at least half the able-bodied men in the stockade were engaged in these depredations. this is always the case. a half dozen burglars or other active criminals in a town will produce the impression that a large portion of the population are law breakers. we never estimated that the raiding n'yaarkers, with their spies and other accomplices, exceeded five hundred, but it would have been difficult to convince a new prisoner that there were not thousands of them. secondly, the prisoners were made up of small squads from every regiment at the front along the whole line from the mississippi to the atlantic. these were strangers to and distrustful of all out side their own little circles. the eastern men were especially so. the pennsylvanians and new yorkers each formed groups, and did not fraternize readily with those outside their state lines. the new jerseyans held aloof from all the rest, while the massachusetts soldiers had very little in common with anybody--even their fellow new englanders. the michigan men were modified new englanders. they had the same tricks of speech; they said "i be" for "i am," and "haag" for "hog;" "let me look at your knife half a second," or "give me just a sup of that water," where we said simply "lend me your knife," or "hand me a drink." they were less reserved than the true yankees, more disposed to be social, and, with all their eccentricities, were as manly, honorable a set of fellows as it was my fortune to meet with in the army. i could ask no better comrades than the boys of the third michigan infantry, who belonged to the same "ninety" with me. the boys from minnesota and wisconsin were very much like those from michigan. those from ohio, indiana, illinois, iowa and kansas all seemed cut off the same piece. to all intents and purposes they might have come from the same county. they spoke the same dialect, read the same newspapers, had studied mcguffey's readers, mitchell's geography, and ray's arithmetics at school, admired the same great men, and held generally the same opinions on any given subject. it was never difficult to get them to act in unison--they did it spontaneously; while it required an effort to bring about harmony of action with those from other sections. had the western boys in prison been thoroughly advised of the nature of our enterprise, we could, doubtless, have commanded their cordial assistance, but they were not, and there was no way in which it could be done readily, until after the decisive blow was struck. the work of arresting the leading raiders went on actively all day on the fourth of july. they made occasional shows of fierce resistance, but the events of the day before had destroyed their prestige, broken their confidence, and driven away from their support very many who followed their lead when they were considered all-powerful. they scattered from their former haunts, and mingled with the crowds in other parts of the prison, but were recognized, and reported to key, who sent parties to arrest them. several times they managed to collect enough adherents to drive off the squads sent after them, but this only gave them a short respite, for the squad would return reinforced, and make short work of them. besides, the prisoners generally were beginning to understand and approve of the regulators' movement, and were disposed to give all the assistance needed. myself and "egypt," my taciturn lieutenant of the sinewy left arm, were sent with our company to arrest pete donnelly, a notorious character, and leader of, a bad crowd. he was more "knocker" than raider, however. he was an old pemberton building acquaintance, and as we marched up to where he was standing at the head of his gathering clan, he recognized me and said: "hello, illinoy," (the name by which i was generally known in prison) "what do you want here?" i replied, "pete, key has sent me for you. i want you to go to headquarters." "what the ---does key want with me?" "i don't know, i'm sure; he only said to bring you." "but i haven't had anything to do with them other snoozers you have been a-having trouble with." "i don't know anything about that; you can talk to key as to that. i only know that we are sent for you." "well, you don't think you can take me unless i choose to go? you haint got anybody in that crowd big enough to make it worth while for him to waste his time trying it." i replied diffidently that one never knew what--he could do till he tried; that while none of us were very big, we were as willing a lot of little fellows as he ever saw, and if it were all the same to him, we would undertake to waste a little time getting him to headquarters. the conversation seemed unnecessarily long to "egypt," who stood by my side; about a half step in advance. pete was becoming angrier and more defiant every minute. his followers were crowding up to us, club in hand. finally pete thrust his fist in my face, and roared out: "by ---, i ain't a going with ye, and ye can't take me, you ---------" this was "egypt's" cue. his long left arm uncoupled like the loosening of the weight of a pile-driver. it caught mr. donnelly under the chin, fairly lifted him from his feet, and dropped him on his back among his followers. it seemed to me that the predominating expression in his face as he went, over was that of profound wonder as to where that blow could have come from, and why he did not see it in time to dodge or ward it off. as pete dropped, the rest of us stepped forward with our clubs, to engage his followers, while "egypt" and one or two others tied his hands and otherwise secured him. but his henchmen made no effort to rescue him, and we carried him over to headquarters without molestation. the work of arresting increased in interest and excitement until it developed into the furore of a hunt, with thousands eagerly engaged in it. the raiders' tents were torn down and pillaged. blankets, tent poles, and cooking utensils were carried off as spoils, and the ground was dug over for secreted property. a large quantity of watches, chains, knives, rings, gold pens, etc., etc.--the booty of many a raid--was found, and helped to give impetus to the hunt. even the rebel quartermaster, with the characteristic keen scent of the rebels for spoils, smelled from the outside the opportunity for gaining plunder, and came in with a squad of rebels equipped with spades, to dig for buried treasures. how successful he was i know not, as i took no part in any of the operations of that nature. it was claimed that several skeletons of victims of the raiders were found buried beneath the tent. i cannot speak with any certainty as to this, though my impression is that at least one was found. by evening key had perhaps one hundred and twenty-five of the most noted raiders in his hands. wirz had allowed him the use of the small stockade forming the entrance to the north gate to confine them in. the next thing was the judgment and punishment of the arrested ones. for this purpose key organized a court martial composed of thirteen sergeants, chosen from the latest arrivals of prisoners, that they might have no prejudice against the raiders. i believe that a man named dick mccullough, belonging to the third missouri cavalry, was the president of the court. the trial was carefully conducted, with all the formality of a legal procedure that the court and those managing the matter could remember as applicable to the crimes with which the accused were charged. each of these confronted by the witnesses who testified against him, and allowed to cross-examine them to any extent he desired. the defense was managed by one of their crowd, the foul-tongued tombs shyster, pete bradley, of whom i have before spoken. such was the fear of the vengeance of the raiders and their friends that many who had been badly abused dared not testify against them, dreading midnight assassination if they did. others would not go before the court except at night. but for all this there was no lack of evidence; there were thousands who had been robbed and maltreated, or who had seen these outrages committed on others, and the boldness of the leaders in their bight of power rendered their identification a matter of no difficulty whatever. the trial lasted several days, and concluded with sentencing quite a large number to run the gauntlet, a smaller number to wear balls and chains, and the following six to be hanged: john sarsfield, one hundred and forty-fourth new york. william collins, alias "mosby," company d, eighty-eighth pennsylvania, charles curtis, company a, fifth rhode island artillery. patrick delaney, company e, eighty-third pennsylvania. a. muir, united states navy. terence sullivan, seventy-second new york. these names and regiments are of little consequence, however, as i believe all the rascals were professional bounty-jumpers, and did not belong to any regiment longer than they could find an opportunity to desert and join another. those sentenced to ball-and-chain were brought in immediately, and had the irons fitted to them that had been worn by some of our men as a punishment for trying to escape. it was not yet determined how punishment should be meted out to the remainder, but circumstances themselves decided the matter. wirz became tired of guarding so large a number as key had arrested, and he informed key that he should turn them back into the stockade immediately. key begged for little farther time to consider the disposition of the cases, but wirz refused it, and ordered the officer of the guard to return all arrested, save those sentenced to death, to the stockade. in the meantime the news had spread through the prison that the raiders were to be sent in again unpunished, and an angry mob, numbering some thousands, and mostly composed of men who had suffered injuries at the hands of the marauders, gathered at the south gate, clubs in hand, to get such satisfaction as they could out of the rascals. they formed in two long, parallel lines, facing inward, and grimly awaited the incoming of the objects of their vengeance. the officer of the guard opened the wicket in the gate, and began forcing the raiders through it--one at a time--at the point of the bayonet, and each as he entered was told what he already realized well--that he must run for his life. they did this with all the energy that they possessed, and as they ran blows rained on their heads, arms and backs. if they could succeed in breaking through the line at any place they were generally let go without any further punishment. three of the number were beaten to death. i saw one of these killed. i had no liking for the gauntlet performance, and refused to have anything to do with it, as did most, if not all, of my crowd. while the gauntlet was in operation, i was standing by my tent at the head of a little street, about two hundred feet from the line, watching what was being done. a sailor was let in. he had a large bowie knife concealed about his person somewhere, which he drew, and struck savagely with at his tormentors on either side. they fell back from before him, but closed in behind and pounded him terribly. he broke through the line, and ran up the street towards me. about midway of the distance stood a boy who had helped carry a dead man out during the day, and while out had secured a large pine rail which he had brought in with him. he was holding this straight up in the air, as if at a "present arms." he seemed to have known from the first that the raider would run that way. just as he came squarely under it, the boy dropped the rail like the bar of a toll gate. it struck the raider across the head, felled him as if by a shot, and his pursuers then beat him to death. chapter xxxvii. the execution--building the scaffold--doubts of the camp-captain wirz thinks it is probably a ruse to force the stockade--his preparations against such an attempt--entrance of the doomed ones--they realize their fate--one makes a desperate attempt to escape--his recapture--intense excitement--wirz orders the guns to open--fortunately they do not-the six are hanged--one breaks his rope--scene when the raiders are cut down. it began to be pretty generally understood through the prison that six men had been sentenced to be hanged, though no authoritative announcement of the fact had been made. there was much canvassing as to where they should be executed, and whether an attempt to hang them inside of the stockade would not rouse their friends to make a desperate effort to rescue them, which would precipitate a general engagement of even larger proportions than that of the 3d. despite the result of the affairs of that and the succeeding days, the camp was not yet convinced that the raiders were really conquered, and the regulators themselves were not thoroughly at ease on that score. some five thousand or six thousand new prisoners had come in since the first of the month, and it was claimed that the raiders had received large reinforcements from those,--a claim rendered probable by most of the new-comers being from the army of the potomac. key and those immediately about him kept their own counsel in the matter, and suffered no secret of their intentions to leak out, until on the morning of the 11th, when it became generally known that the sentences were too be carried into effect that day, and inside the prison. my first direct information as to this was by a messenger from key with an order to assemble my company and stand guard over the carpenters who were to erect the scaffold. he informed me that all the regulators would be held in readiness to come to our relief if we were attacked in force. i had hoped that if the men were to be hanged i would be spared the unpleasant duty of assisting, for, though i believed they richly deserved that punishment, i had much rather some one else administered it upon them. there was no way out of it, however, that i could see, and so "egypt" and i got the boys together, and marched down to the designated place, which was an open space near the end of the street running from the south gate, and kept vacant for the purpose of issuing rations. it was quite near the spot where the raiders' big tent had stood, and afforded as good a view to the rest of the camp as could be found. key had secured the loan of a few beams and rough planks, sufficient to build a rude scaffold with. our first duty was to care for these as they came in, for such was the need of wood, and plank for tent purposes, that they would scarcely have fallen to the ground before they were spirited away, had we not stood over them all the time with clubs. the carpenters sent by key came over and set to work. the n'yaarkers gathered around in considerable numbers, sullen and abusive. they cursed us with all their rich vocabulary of foul epithets, vowed that we should never carry out the execution, and swore that they had marked each one for vengeance. we returned the compliments in kind, and occasionally it seemed as if a general collision was imminent; but we succeeded in avoiding this, and by noon the scaffold was finished. it was a very simple affair. a stout beam was fastened on the top of two posts, about fifteen feet high. at about the height of a man's head a couple of boards stretched across the space between the posts, and met in the center. the ends at the posts laid on cleats; the ends in the center rested upon a couple of boards, standing upright, and each having a piece of rope fastened through a hole in it in such a manner, that a man could snatch it from under the planks serving as the floor of the scaffold, and let the whole thing drop. a rude ladder to ascend by completed the preparations. as the arrangements neared completion the excitement in and around the prison grew intense. key came over with the balance of the regulators, and we formed a hollow square around the scaffold, our company marking the line on the east side. there were now thirty thousand in the prison. of these about one-third packed themselves as tightly about our square as they could stand. the remaining twenty thousand were wedged together in a solid mass on the north side. again i contemplated the wonderful, startling, spectacle of a mosaic pavement of human faces covering the whole broad hillside. outside, the rebel, infantry was standing in the rifle pits, the artillerymen were in place about their loaded and trained pieces, the no. 4 of each gun holding the lanyard cord in his hand, ready to fire the piece at the instant of command. the small squad of cavalry was drawn up on the hill near the star fort, and near it were the masters of the hounds, with their yelping packs. all the hangers-on of the rebel camp--clerks, teamsters, employer, negros, hundreds of white and colored women, in all forming a motley crowd of between one and two thousand, were gathered together in a group between the end of the rifle pits and the star fort. they had a good view from there, but a still better one could be had, a little farther to the right, and in front of the guns. they kept edging up in that direction, as crowds will, though they knew the danger they would incur if the artillery opened. the day was broiling hot. the sun shot his perpendicular rays down with blistering fierceness, and the densely packed, motionless crowds made the heat almost insupportable. key took up his position inside the square to direct matters. with him were limber jim, dick mccullough, and one or two others. also, ned johnson, tom larkin, sergeant goody, and three others who were to act as hangmen. each of these six was provided with a white sack, such as the rebels brought in meal in. two corporals of my company--"stag" harris and wat payne--were appointed to pull the stays from under the platform at the signal. a little after noon the south gate opened, and wirz rode in, dressed in a suit of white duck, and mounted on his white horse--a conjunction which had gained for him the appellation of "death on a pale horse." behind him walked the faithful old priest, wearing his church's purple insignia of the deepest sorrow, and reading the service for the condemned. the six doomed men followed, walking between double ranks of rebel guards. all came inside the hollow square and halted. wirz then said: "brizners, i return to you dose men so boot as i got dem. you haf tried dem yourselves, and found dem guilty--i haf had notting to do wit it. i vash my hands of eferyting connected wit dem. do wit dem as you like, and may gott haf mercy on you and on dem. garts, about face! voryvarts, march!" with this he marched out and left us. for a moment the condemned looked stunned. they seemed to comprehend for the first time that it was really the determination of the regulators to hang them. before that they had evidently thought that the talk of hanging was merely bluff. one of them gasped out: "my god, men, you don't really mean to hang us up there!" key answered grimly and laconically: "that seems to be about the size of it." at this they burst out in a passionate storm of intercessions and imprecations, which lasted for a minute or so, when it was stopped by one of them saying imperatively: "all of you stop now, and let the priest talk for us." at this the priest closed the book upon which he had kept his eyes bent since his entrance, and facing the multitude on the north side began a plea for mercy. the condemned faced in the same direction to read their fate in the countenances of those whom he was addressing. this movement brought curtis--a low-statured, massively built man--on the right of their line, and about ten or fifteen steps from my company. the whole camp had been as still as death since wirz's exit. the silence seemed to become even more profound as the priest began his appeal. for a minute every ear was strained to catch what he said. then, as the nearest of the thousands comprehended what he was saying they raised a shout of "no! no!! no!!" "hang them! hang them!" "don't let them go! never!" "hang the rascals! hang the villains!" "hang,'em! hang 'em! hang 'em!" this was taken up all over the prison, and tens of thousands throats yelled it in a fearful chorus. curtis turned from the crowd with desperation convulsing his features. tearing off the broad-brimmed hat which he wore, he flung it on the ground with the exclamation! "by god, i'll die this way first!" and, drawing his head down and folding his arms about it, he dashed forward for the center of my company, like a great stone hurled from a catapult. "egypt" and i saw where he was going to strike, and ran down the line to help stop him. as he came up we rained blows on his head with our clubs, but so many of us struck at him at once that we broke each other's clubs to pieces, and only knocked him on his knees. he rose with an almost superhuman effort, and plunged into the mass beyond. the excitement almost became delirium. for an instant i feared that everything was gone to ruin. "egypt" and i strained every energy to restore our lines, before the break could be taken advantage of by the others. our boys behaved splendidly, standing firm, and in a few seconds the line was restored. as curtis broke through, delaney, a brawny irishman standing next to him, started to follow. he took one step. at the same instant limber jim's long legs took three great strides, and placed him directly in front of delaney. jim's right hand held an enormous bowie-knife, and as he raised it above delaney he hissed out: "if you dare move another step, i'll open you ----------, i'll open you from one end to the other. delaney stopped. this checked the others till our lines reformed. when wirz saw the commotion he was panic-stricken with fear that the long-dreaded assault on the stockade had begun. he ran down from the headquarter steps to the captain of the battery, shrieking: "fire! fire! fire!" the captain, not being a fool, could see that the rush was not towards the stockade, but away from it, and he refrained from giving the order. but the spectators who had gotten before the guns, heard wirz's excited yell, and remembering the consequences to themselves should the artillery be discharged, became frenzied with fear, and screamed, and fell down over and trampled upon each other in endeavoring to get away. the guards on that side of the stockade ran down in a panic, and the ten thousand prisoners immediately around us, expecting no less than that the next instant we would be swept with grape and canister, stampeded tumultuously. there were quite a number of wells right around us, and all of these were filled full of men that fell into them as the crowd rushed away. many had legs and arms broken, and i have no doubt that several were killed. it was the stormiest five minutes that i ever saw. while this was going on two of my company, belonging to the fifth iowa cavalry, were in hot pursuit of curtis. i had seen them start and shouted to them to come back, as i feared they would be set upon by the raiders and murdered. but the din was so overpowering that they could not hear me, and doubtless would not have come back if they had heard. curtis ran diagonally down the hill, jumping over the tents and knocking down the men who happened in his way. arriving at the swamp he plunged in, sinking nearly to his hips in the fetid, filthy ooze. he forged his way through with terrible effort. his pursuers followed his example, and caught up to him just as he emerged on the other side. they struck him on the back of the head with their clubs, and knocked him down. by this time order had been restored about us. the guns remained silent, and the crowd massed around us again. from where we were we could see the successful end of the chase after curtis, and could see his captors start back with him. their success was announced with a roar of applause from the north side. both captors and captured were greatly exhausted, and they were coming back very slowly. key ordered the balance up on to the scaffold. they obeyed promptly. the priest resumed his reading of the service for the condemned. the excitement seemed to make the doomed ones exceedingly thirsty. i never saw men drink such inordinate quantities of water. they called for it continually, gulped down a quart or more at a time, and kept two men going nearly all the time carrying it to them. when curtis finally arrived, he sat on the ground for a minute or so, to rest, and then, reeking with filth, slowly and painfully climbed the steps. delaney seemed to think he was suffering as much from fright as anything else, and said to him: "come on up, now, show yourself a man, and die game." again the priest resumed his reading, but it had no interest to delaney, who kept calling out directions to pete donelly, who was standing in the crowd, as to dispositions to be made of certain bits of stolen property: to give a watch to this one, a ring to another, and so on. once the priest stopped and said: "my son, let the things of this earth go, and turn your attention toward those of heaven." delaney paid no attention to this admonition. the whole six then began delivering farewell messages to those in the crowd. key pulled a watch from his pocket and said: "two minutes more to talk." delaney said cheerfully: "well, good by, b'ys; if i've hurted any of y ez, i hope ye'll forgive me. shpake up, now, any of yez that i've hurted, and say yell forgive me." we called upon marion friend, whose throat delaney had tried to cut three weeks before while robbing him of forty dollars, to come forward, but friend was not in a forgiving mood, and refused with an oath. key said: "time's up!" put the watch back in his pocket and raised his hand like an officer commanding a gun. harris and payne laid hold of the ropes to the supports of the planks. each of the six hangmen tied a condemned man's hands, pulled a meal sack down over his head, placed the noose around his neck, drew it up tolerably close, and sprang to the ground. the priest began praying aloud. key dropped his hand. payne and harris snatched the supports out with a single jerk. the planks fell with a clatter. five of the bodies swung around dizzily in the air. the sixth that of "mosby," a large, powerful, raw-boned man, one of the worst in the lot, and who, among other crimes, had killed limber jim's brother-broke the rope, and fell with a thud to the ground. some of the men ran forward, examined the body, and decided that he still lived. the rope was cut off his neck, the meal sack removed, and water thrown in his face until consciousness returned. at the first instant he thought he was in eternity. he gasped out: "where am i? am i in the other world?" limber jim muttered that they would soon show him where he was, and went on grimly fixing up the scaffold anew. "mosby" soon realized what had happened, and the unrelenting purpose of the regulator chiefs. then he began to beg piteously for his life, saying: "o for god's sake, do not put me up there again! god has spared my life once. he meant that you should be merciful to me." limber jim deigned him no reply. when the scaffold was rearranged, and a stout rope had replaced the broken one, he pulled the meal sack once more over "mosby's" head, who never ceased his pleadings. then picking up the large man as if he were a baby, he carried him to the scaffold and handed him up to tom larkin, who fitted the noose around his neck and sprang down. the supports had not been set with the same delicacy as at first, and limber jim had to set his heel and wrench desperately at them before he could force them out. then "mosby" passed away without a struggle. after hanging till life was extinct, the bodies were cut down, the meal-sacks pulled off their faces, and the regulators formal two parallel lines, through which all the prisoners passed and took a look at the bodies. pete donnelly and dick allen knelt down and wiped the froth off delaney's lips, and swore vengeance against those who had done him to death. chapter xxxviii. after the execution--formation of a police force--its first chief --"spanking" an offender. after the executions key, knowing that he, and all those prominently connected with the hanging, would be in hourly danger of assassination if they remained inside, secured details as nurses and ward-masters in the hospital, and went outside. in this crowd were key, ned carrigan, limber jim, dick mccullough, the six hangmen, the two corporals who pulled the props from under the scaffold, and perhaps some others whom i do not now remember. in the meanwhile provision had been made for the future maintenance of order in the prison by the organization of a regular police force, which in time came to number twelve hundred men. these were divided into companies, under appropriate officers. guards were detailed for certain locations, patrols passed through the camp in all directions continually, and signals with whistles could summon sufficient assistance to suppress any disturbance, or carry out any orders from the chief. the chieftainship was first held by key, but when he went outside he appointed sergeant a. r. hill, of the one hundredth o. v. i.--now a resident of wauseon, ohio,--his successor. hill was one of the notabilities of that immense throng. a great, broad-shouldered, giant, in the prime of his manhood--the beginning of his thirtieth year--he was as good-natured as big, and as mild-mannered as brave. he spoke slowly, softly, and with a slightly rustic twang, that was very tempting to a certain class of sharps to take him up for a "luberly greeny." the man who did so usually repented his error in sack-cloth and ashes. hill first came into prominence as the victor in the most stubbornly contested fight in the prison history of belle isle. when the squad of the one hundredth ohio--captured at limestone station, east tennessee, in september,1863--arrived on belle isle, a certain jack oliver, of the nineteenth indiana, was the undisputed fistic monarch of the island. he did not bear his blushing honors modestly; few of a right arm that indefinite locality known as "the middle of next week," is something that the possessor can as little resist showing as can a girl her first solitaire ring. to know that one can certainly strike a disagreeable fellow out of time is pretty sure to breed a desire to do that thing whenever occasion serves. jack oliver was one who did not let his biceps rust in inaction, but thrashed everybody on the island whom he thought needed it, and his ideas as to those who should be included in this class widened daily, until it began to appear that he would soon feel it his duty to let no unwhipped man escape, but pound everybody on the island. one day his evil genius led him to abuse a rather elderly man belonging to hill's mess. as he fired off his tirade of contumely, hill said with more than his usual "soft" rusticity: "mister--i--don't--think--it--just--right--for--a--young--man--to--call --an--old--one--such--bad names." jack oliver turned on him savagely. "well! may be you want to take it up?" the grin on hill's face looked still more verdant, as he answered with gentle deliberation: "well--mister--i--don't--go--around--a--hunting--things--but--i --ginerally--take--care--of--all--that's--sent--me!" jack foamed, but his fiercest bluster could not drive that infantile smile from hill's face, nor provoke a change in the calm slowness of his speech. it was evident that nothing would do but a battle-royal, and jack had sense enough to see that the imperturbable rustic was likely to give him a job of some difficulty. he went off and came back with his clan, while hill's comrades of the one hundredth gathered around to insure him fair play. jack pulled off his coat and vest, rolled up his sleeves, and made other elaborate preparations for the affray. hill, without removing a garment, said, as he surveyed him with a mocking smile: "mister--you--seem--to--be--one--of--them--partick-e-ler--fellers." jack roared out, "by ---, i'll make you partickeler before i get through with you. now, how shall we settle this? regular stand-up-and knock-down, or rough and tumble?" if anything hill's face was more vacantly serene, and his tones blander than ever, as he answered: "strike--any--gait--that--suits--you,--mister;--i guess--i--will--be --able--to--keep--up--with--you." they closed. hill feinted with his left, and as jack uncovered to guard, he caught him fairly on the lower left ribs, by a blow from his mighty right fist, that sounded--as one of the by-standers expressed it--"like striking a hollow log with a maul." the color in jack's face paled. he did not seem to understand how he had laid himself open to such a pass, and made the same mistake, receiving again a sounding blow in the short ribs. this taught him nothing, either, for again he opened his guard in response to a feint, and again caught a blow on his luckless left, ribs, that drove the blood from his face and the breath from his body. he reeled back among his supporters for an instant to breathe. recovering his wind, be dashed at hill feinted strongly with his right, but delivered a terrible kick against the lower part of the latter's abdomen. both closed and fought savagely at half-arm's length for an instant; during which hill struck jack so fairly in the mouth as to break out three front teeth, which the latter swallowed. then they clenched and struggled to throw each other. hill's superior strength and skill crushed his opponent to the ground, and he fell upon him. as they grappled there, one of jack's followers sought to aid his leader by catching hill by the hair, intending to kick him in the face. in an instant he was knocked down by a stalwart member of the one hundredth, and then literally lifted out of the ring by kicks. jack was soon so badly beaten as to be unable to cry "enough!" one of his friends did that service for him, the fight ceased, and thenceforth mr. oliver resigned his pugilistic crown, and retired to the shades of private life. he died of scurvy and diarrhea, some months afterward, in andersonville. the almost hourly scenes of violence and crime that marked the days and nights before the regulators began operations were now succeeded by the greatest order. the prison was freer from crime than the best governed city. there were frequent squabbles and fights, of course, and many petty larcenies. rations of bread and of wood, articles of clothing, and the wretched little cans and half canteens that formed our cooking utensils, were still stolen, but all these were in a sneak-thief way. there was an entire absence of the audacious open-day robbery and murder --the "raiding" of the previous few weeks. the summary punishment inflicted on the condemned was sufficient to cow even bolder men than the raiders, and they were frightened into at least quiescence. sergeant hill's administration was vigorous, and secured the best results. he became a judge of all infractions of morals and law, and sat at the door of his tent to dispense justice to all comers, like the cadi of a mahometan village. his judicial methods and punishments also reminded one strongly of the primitive judicature of oriental lands. the wronged one came before him and told his tale: he had his blouse, or his quart cup, or his shoes, or his watch, or his money stolen during the night. the suspected one was also summoned, confronted with his accuser, and sharply interrogated. hill would revolve the stories in his mind, decide the innocence or guilt of the accused, and if he thought the accusation sustained, order the culprit to punishment. he did not imitate his mussulman prototypes to the extent of bowstringing or decapitating the condemned, nor did he cut any thief's hands off, nor yet nail his ears to a doorpost, but he introduced a modification of the bastinado that made those who were punished by it even wish they were dead. the instrument used was what is called in the south a "shake" --a split shingle, a yard or more long, and with one end whittled down to form a handle. the culprit was made to bend down until he could catch around his ankles with his hands. the part of the body thus brought into most prominence was denuded of clothing and "spanked" from one to twenty times, as hill ordered, by the "shake" in same strong and willing hand. it was very amusing--to the bystanders. the "spankee" never seemed to enter very heartily into the mirth of the occasion. as a rule he slept on his face for a week or so after, and took his meals standing. the fear of the spanking, and hill's skill in detecting the guilty ones, had a very salutary effect upon the smaller criminals. the raiders who had been put into irons were very restive under the infliction, and begged hill daily to release them. they professed the greatest penitence, and promised the most exemplary behavior for the future. hill refused to release them, declaring that they should wear the irons until delivered up to our government. one of the raiders--named heffron--had, shortly after his arrest, turned state's evidence, and given testimony that assisted materially in the conviction of his companions. one morning, a week or so after the hanging, his body was found lying among the other dead at the south gate. the impression made by the fingers of the hand that had strangled him, were still plainly visible about the throat. there was no doubt as to why he had been killed, or that the raiders were his murderers, but the actual perpetrators were never discovered. chapter xxxix. july--the prison becomes more crowded, the weather hotter, nations poorer, and mortality greater--some of the phenomena of suffering and death. all during july the prisoners came streaming in by hundreds and thousands from every portion of the long line of battle, stretching from the eastern bank of the mississippi to the shores of the atlantic. over one thousand squandered by sturgis at guntown came in; two thousand of those captured in the desperate blow dealt by hood against the army of the tennessee on the 22d of the month before atlanta; hundreds from hunter's luckless column in the shenandoah valley, thousands from grant's lines in front of petersburg. in all, seven thousand one hundred and twenty-eight were, during the month, turned into that seething mass of corrupting humanity to be polluted and tainted by it, and to assist in turn to make it fouler and deadlier. over seventy hecatombs of chosen victims --of fair youths in the first flush of hopeful manhood, at the threshold of a life of honor to themselves and of usefulness to the community; beardless boys, rich in the priceless affections of homes, fathers, mothers, sisters and sweethearts, with minds thrilling with high aspirations for the bright future, were sent in as the monthly sacrifice to this minotaur of the rebellion, who, couched in his foul lair, slew them, not with the merciful delivery of speedy death, as his cretan prototype did the annual tribute of athenian youths and maidens, but, gloating over his prey, doomed them to lingering destruction. he rotted their flesh with the scurvy, racked their minds with intolerable suspense, burned their bodies with the slow fire of famine, and delighted in each separate pang, until they sank beneath the fearful accumulation. theseus [sherman. d.w.]--the deliverer--was coming. his terrible sword could be seen gleaming as it rose and fell on the banks of the james, and in the mountains beyond atlanta, where he was hewing his way towards them and the heart of the southern confederacy. but he came too late to save them. strike as swiftly and as heavily as he would, he could not strike so hard nor so sure at his foes with saber blow and musket shot, as they could at the hapless youths with the dreadful armament of starvation and disease. though the deaths were one thousand eight hundred and seventeen more than were killed at the battle of shiloh--this left the number in the prison at the end of the month thirty-one thousand six hundred and seventy-eight. let me assist the reader's comprehension of the magnitude of this number by giving the population of a few important cities, according to the census of 1870: cambridge, mass 89,639 charleston, s. c. 48,958 columbus, o. 31,274 dayton, o. 30,473 fall river, mass 26,766 kansas city, mo 32,260 the number of prisoners exceeded the whole number of men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five in several of the states and territories in the union. here, for instance, are the returns for 1870, of men of military age in some portions of the country: arizona 5,157 colorado 15,166 dakota 5,301 idaho 9,431 montana 12,418 nebraska 35,677 nevada 24,762 new hampshire 60,684 oregon 23,959 rhode island 44,377 vermont 62,450 west virginia 6,832 it was more soldiers than could be raised to-day, under strong pressure, in either alabama, arizona, arkansas, california, colorado, connecticut, dakota, delaware, district of columbia, florida, idaho, louisiana, maine, minnesota, montana, nebraska, nevada, new hampshire, new medico, oregon, rhode island, south carolina, utah, vermont or west virginia. these thirty-one thousand six hundred and seventy-eight active young men, who were likely to find the confines of a state too narrow for them, were cooped up on thirteen acres of ground--less than a farmer gives for play-ground for a half dozen colts or a small flock of sheep. there was hardly room for all to lie down at night, and to walk a few hundred feet in any direction would require an hour's patient threading of the mass of men and tents. the weather became hotter and hotter; at midday the sand would burn the hand. the thin skins of fair and auburn-haired men blistered under the sun's rays, and swelled up in great watery puffs, which soon became the breeding grounds of the hideous maggots, or the still more deadly gangrene. the loathsome swamp grew in rank offensiveness with every burning hour. the pestilence literally stalked at noon-day, and struck his victims down on every hand. one could not look a rod in any direction without seeing at least a dozen men in the last frightful stages of rotting death. let me describe the scene immediately around my own tent during the last two weeks of july, as a sample of the condition of the whole prison: i will take a space not larger than a good sized parlor or sitting room. on this were at least fifty of us. directly in front of me lay two brothers--named sherwood--belonging to company i, of my battalion, who came originally from missouri. they were now in the last stages of scurvy and diarrhea. every particle of muscle and fat about their limbs and bodies had apparently wasted away, leaving the skin clinging close to the bone of the face, arms, hands, ribs and thighs--everywhere except the feet and legs, where it was swollen tense and transparent, distended with gallons of purulent matter. their livid gums, from which most of their teeth had already fallen, protruded far beyond their lips. to their left lay a sergeant and two others of their company, all three slowly dying from diarrhea, and beyond was a fair-haired german, young and intelligent looking, whose life was ebbing tediously away. to my right was a handsome young sergeant of an illinois infantry regiment, captured at kenesaw. his left arm had been amputated between the shoulder and elbow, and he was turned into the stockade with the stump all undressed, save the ligating of the arteries. of course, he had not been inside an hour until the maggot flies had laid eggs in the open wound, and before the day was gone the worms were hatched out, and rioting amid the inflamed and super-sensitive nerves, where their every motion was agony. accustomed as we were to misery, we found a still lower depth in his misfortune, and i would be happier could i forget his pale, drawn face, as he wandered uncomplainingly to and fro, holding his maimed limb with his right hand, occasionally stopping to squeeze it, as one does a boil, and press from it a stream of maggots and pus. i do not think he ate or slept for a week before he died. next to him staid an irish sergeant of a new york regiment, a fine soldierly man, who, with pardonable pride, wore, conspicuously on his left breast, a medal gained by gallantry while a british soldier in the crimea. he was wasting away with diarrhea, and died before the month was out. this was what one could see on every square rod of the prison. where i was was not only no worse than the rest of the prison, but was probably much better and healthier, as it was the highest ground inside, farthest from the swamp, and having the dead line on two sides, had a ventilation that those nearer the center could not possibly have. yet, with all these conditions in our favor, the mortality was as i have described. near us an exasperating idiot, who played the flute, had established himself. like all poor players, he affected the low, mournful notes, as plaintive as the distant cooing of the dove in lowering, weather. he played or rather tooted away in his "blues"-inducing strain hour after hour, despite our energetic protests, and occasionally flinging a club at him. there was no more stop to him than to a man with a hand-organ, and to this day the low, sad notes of a flute are the swiftest reminder to me of those sorrowful, death-laden days. i had an illustration one morning of how far decomposition would progress in a man's body before he died. my chum and i found a treasure-trove in the streets, in the shape of the body of a man who died during the night. the value of this "find" was that if we took it to the gate, we would be allowed to carry it outside to the deadhouse, and on our way back have an opportunity to pick up a chunk of wood, to use in cooking. while discussing our good luck another party came up and claimed the body. a verbal dispute led to one of blows, in which we came off victorious, and i hastily caught hold of the arm near the elbow to help bear the body away. the skin gave way under my hand, and slipped with it down to the wrist, like a torn sleeve. it was sickening, but i clung to my prize, and secured a very good chunk of wood while outside with it. the wood was very much needed by my mess, as our squad had then had none for more than a week. chapter xl. the battle of the 22d of july--the arms of the tennessee assaulted front and rear--death of general mcpherson--assumption of command by general logan--result of the battle. naturally, we had a consuming hunger for news of what was being accomplished by our armies toward crushing the rebellion. now, more than ever, had we reason to ardently wish for the destruction of the rebel power. before capture we had love of country and a natural desire for the triumph of her flag to animate us. now we had a hatred of the rebels that passed expression, and a fierce longing to see those who daily tortured and insulted us trampled down in the dust of humiliation. the daily arrival of prisoners kept us tolerably well informed as to the general progress of the campaign, and we added to the information thus obtained by getting--almost daily--in some manner or another--a copy of a rebel paper. most frequently these were atlanta papers, or an issue of the "memphis-corinth-jackson-grenada-chattanooga-resacca-marietta-atlanta appeal," as they used to facetiously term a memphis paper that left that city when it was taken in 1862, and for two years fell back from place to place, as sherman's army advanced, until at last it gave up the struggle in september, 1864, in a little town south of atlanta, after about two thousand miles of weary retreat from an indefatigable pursuer. the papers were brought in by "fresh fish," purchased from the guards at from fifty cents to one dollar apiece, or occasionally thrown in to us when they had some specially disagreeable intelligence, like the defeat of banks, or sturgis, or bunter, to exult over. i was particularly fortunate in getting hold of these. becoming installed as general reader for a neighborhood of several thousand men, everything of this kind was immediately brought to me, to be read aloud for the benefit of everybody. all the older prisoners knew me by the nick-name of "illinoy" --a designation arising from my wearing on my cap, when i entered prison, a neat little white metal badge of "ills." when any reading matter was brought into our neighborhood, there would be a general cry of: "take it up to 'illinoy,'" and then hundreds would mass around my quarters to bear the news read. the rebel papers usually had very meager reports of the operations of the armies, and these were greatly distorted, but they were still very interesting, and as we always started in to read with the expectation that the whole statement was a mass of perversions and lies, where truth was an infrequent accident, we were not likely to be much impressed with it. there was a marled difference in the tone of the reports brought in from the different armies. sherman's men were always sanguine. they had no doubt that they were pushing the enemy straight to the wall, and that every day brought the southern confederacy much nearer its downfall. those from the army of the potomac were never so hopeful. they would admit that grant was pounding lee terribly, but the shadow of the frequent defeats of the army of the potomac seemed to hang depressingly over them. there came a day, however, when our sanguine hopes as to sherman were checked by a possibility that he had failed; that his long campaign towards atlanta had culminated in such a reverse under the very walls of the city as would compel an abandonment of the enterprise, and possibly a humiliating retreat. we knew that jeff. davis and his government were strongly dissatisfied with the fabian policy of joe johnston. the papers had told us of the rebel president's visit to atlanta, of his bitter comments on johnston's tactics; of his going so far as to sneer about the necessity of providing pontoons at key west, so that johnston might continue his retreat even to cuba. then came the news of johnston's supersession by hood, and the papers were full of the exulting predictions of what would now be accomplished "when that gallant young soldier is once fairly in the saddle." all this meant one supreme effort to arrest the onward course of sherman. it indicated a resolve to stake the fate of atlanta, and the fortunes of the confederacy in the west, upon the hazard of one desperate fight. we watched the summoning up of every rebel energy for the blow with apprehension. we dreaded another chickamauga. the blow fell on the 22d of july. it was well planned. the army of the tennessee, the left of sherman's forces, was the part struck. on the night of the 21st hood marched a heavy force around its left flank and gained its rear. on the 22d this force fell on the rear with the impetuous violence of a cyclone, while the rebels in the works immediately around atlanta attacked furiously in front. it was an ordeal that no other army ever passed through successfully. the steadiest troops in europe would think it foolhardiness to attempt to withstand an assault in force in front and rear at the same time. the finest legions that follow any flag to-day must almost inevitably succumb to such a mode of attack. but the seasoned veterans of the army of the tennessee encountered the shock with an obstinacy which showed that the finest material for soldiery this planet holds was that in which undaunted hearts beat beneath blue blouses. springing over the front of their breastworks, they drove back with a withering fire the force assailing them in the rear. this beaten off, they jumped back to their proper places, and repulsed the assault in front. this was the way the battle was waged until night compelled a cessation of operations. our boys were alternately behind the breastworks firing at rebels advancing upon the front, and in front of the works firing upon those coming up in the rear. sometimes part of our line would be on one side of the works, and part on the other. in the prison we were greatly excited over the result of the engagement, of which we were uncertain for many days. a host of new prisoners perhaps two thousand--was brought in from there, but as they were captured during the progress of the fight, they could not speak definitely as to its issue. the rebel papers exulted without stint over what they termed "a glorious victory." they were particularly jubilant over the death of mcpherson, who, they claimed, was the brain and guiding hand of sherman's army. one paper likened him to the pilot-fish, which guides the shark to his prey. now that he was gone, said the paper, sherman's army becomes a great lumbering hulk, with no one in it capable of directing it, and it must soon fall to utter ruin under the skilfully delivered strokes of the gallant hood. we also knew that great numbers of wounded had been brought to the prison hospital, and this seemed to confirm the rebel claim of a victory, as it showed they retained possession of the battle field. about the 1st of august a large squad of sherman's men, captured in one of the engagements subsequent to the 22d, came in. we gathered around them eagerly. among them i noticed a bright, curly-haired, blue-eyed infantryman--or boy, rather, as he was yet beardless. his cap was marked "68th o. y. y. l," his sleeves were garnished with re-enlistment stripes, and on the breast of his blouse was a silver arrow. to the eye of the soldier this said that he was a veteran member of the sixty-eighth regiment of ohio infantry (that is, having already served three years, he had re-enlisted for the war), and that he belonged to the third division of the seventeenth army corps. he was so young and fresh looking that one could hardly believe him to be a veteran, but if his stripes had not said this, the soldierly arrangement of clothing and accouterments, and the graceful, self-possessed pose of limbs and body would have told the observer that he was one of those "old reliables" with whom sherman and grant had already subdued a third of the confederacy. his blanket, which, for a wonder, the rebels had neglected to take from him, was tightly rolled, its ends tied together, and thrown over his shoulder scarf-fashion. his pantaloons were tucked inside his stocking tops, that were pulled up as far as possible, and tied tightly around his ankle with a string. a none-too-clean haversack, containing the inevitable sooty quart cup, and even blacker half-canteen, waft slung easily from the shoulder opposite to that on which the blanket rested. hand him his faithful springfield rifle, put three days' rations in his haversack, and forty rounds in his cartridge bog, and he would be ready, without an instant's demur or question, to march to the ends of the earth, and fight anything that crossed his path. he was a type of the honest, honorable, self respecting american boy, who, as a soldier, the world has not equaled in the sixty centuries that war has been a profession. i suggested to him that he was rather a youngster to be wearing veteran chevrons. "yes," said he, "i am not so old as some of the rest of the boys, but i have seen about as much service and been in the business about as long as any of them. they call me 'old dad,' i suppose because i was the youngest boy in the regiment, when we first entered the service, though our whole company, officers and all, were only a lot of boys, and the regiment to day, what's left of 'em, are about as young a lot of officers and men as there are in the service. why, our old colonel ain't only twenty-four years old now, and he has been in command ever since we went into vicksburg. i have heard it said by our boys that since we veteranized the whole regiment, officers, and men, average less than twenty-four years old. but they are gray-hounds to march and stayers in a fight, you bet. why, the rest of the troops over in west tennessee used to call our brigade 'leggett's cavalry,' for they always had us chasing old forrest, and we kept him skedaddling, too, pretty lively. but i tell you we did get into a red hot scrimmage on the 22d. it just laid over champion hills, or any of the big fights around vicksburg, and they were lively enough to amuse any one." "so you were in the affair on the 22d, were you! we are awful anxious to hear all about it. come over here to my quarters and tell us all you know. all we know is that there has been a big fight, with mcpherson killed, and a heavy loss of life besides, and the rebels claim a great victory." "o, they be -----. it was the sickest victory they ever got. about one more victory of that kind would make their infernal old confederacy ready for a coroner's inquest. well, i can tell you pretty much all about that fight, for i reckon if the truth was known, our regiment fired about the first and last shot that opened and closed the fighting on that day. well, you see the whole army got across the river, and were closing in around the city of atlanta. our corps, the seventeenth, was the extreme left of the army, and were moving up toward the city from the east. the fifteenth (logan's) corps joined us on the right, then the army of the cumberland further to the right. we run onto the rebs about sundown the 21st. they had some breastworks on a ridge in front of us, and we had a pretty sharp fight before we drove them off. we went right to work, and kept at it all night in changing and strengthening the old rebel barricades, fronting them towards atlanta, and by morning had some good solid works along our whole line. during the night we fancied we could hear wagons or artillery moving away in front of us, apparently going south, or towards our left. about three or four o'clock in the morning, while i was shoveling dirt like a beaver out on the works, the lieutenant came to me and said the colonel wanted to see me, pointing to a large tree in the rear, where i could find him. i reported and found him with general leggett, who commanded our division, talking mighty serious, and bob wheeler, of f company, standing there with his springfield at a parade rest. as soon as i came up, the colonel says: "boys, the general wants two level-headed chaps to go out beyond the pickets to the front and toward the left. i have selected you for the duty. go as quietly as possible and as fast as you can; keep your eyes and ears open; don't fire a shot if you can help it, and come back and tell us exactly what you have seen and heard, and not what you imagine or suspect. i have selected you for the duty.' "he gave us the countersign, and off we started over the breastworks and through the thick woods. we soon came to our skirmish or pickets, only a few rods in front of our works, and cautioned them not to fire on us in going or returning. we went out as much as half a mile or more, until we could plainly hear the sound of wagons and artillery. we then cautiously crept forward until we could see the main road leading south from the city filled with marching men, artillery and teams. we could hear the commands of the officers and see the flags and banners of regiment after regiment as they passed us. we got back quietly and quickly, passed through our picket line all right, and found the general and our colonel sitting on a log where we had left them, waiting for us. we reported what we had seen and heard, and gave it as our opinion that the johnnies were evacuating atlanta. the general shook his head, and the colonel says: 'you may re turn to your company.' bob says to me: "'the old general shakes his head as though he thought them d---d rebs ain't evacuating atlanta so mighty sudden, but are up to some devilment again. i ain't sure but he's right. they ain't going to keep falling back and falling back to all eternity, but are just agoin' to give us a rip-roaring great big fight one o' these days--when they get a good ready. you hear me!' "saying which we both went to our companies, and laid down to get a little sleep. it was about daylight then, and i must have snoozed away until near noon, when i heard the order 'fall in!' and found the regiment getting into line, and the boys all tallying about going right into atlanta; that the rebels had evacuated the city during the night, and that we were going to have a race with the fifteenth corps as to which would get into the city first. we could look away out across a large field in front of our works, and see the skirmish line advancing steadily towards the main works around the city. not a shot was being, fired on either side. "to our surprise, instead of marching to the front and toward the city, we filed off into a small road cut through the woods and marched rapidly to the rear. we could not understand what it meant. we marched at quick time, feeling pretty mad that we had to go to the rear, when the rest of our division were going into atlanta. "we passed the sixteenth corps lying on their arms, back in some open fields, and the wagon trains of our corps all comfortably corralled, and finally found ourselves out by the seventeenth corps headquarters. two or three companies were sent out to picket several roads that seemed to cross at that point, as it was reported 'rebel cavalry' had been seen on these roads but a short time before, and this accounted for our being rushed out in such a great hurry. "we had just stacked arms and were going to take a little rest after our rapid march, when several rebel prisoners were brought in by some of the boys who had straggled a little. they found the rebels on the road we had just marched out on. up to this time not a shot had been fired. all was quiet back at the main works we had just left, when suddenly we saw several staff officers come tearing up to the colonel, who ordered us to 'fall in!' 'take aims!' 'about, face!' the lieutenant colonel dashed down one of the roads where one of the companies had gone out on picket. the major and adjutant galloped down the others. we did not wait for them to come back, though, but moved right back on the road we had just come out, in line of battle, our colors in the road, and our flanks in open timber. we soon reached a fence enclosing a large field, and there could see a line of rebels moving by the flank, and forming, facing toward atlanta, but to the left and in the rear of the position occupied by our corps. as soon as we reached the fence we fired a round or two into the backs of these gray coats, who broke into confusion. "just then the other companies joined us, and we moved off on 'double quick by the right flank,' for you see we were completely cut off from the troops up at the front, and we had to get well over to the right to get around the flank of the rebels. just about the time we fired on the rebels the sixteenth corps opened up a hot fire of musketry and artillery on them, some of their shot coming over mighty close to where we were. we marched pretty fast, and finally turned in through some open fields to the left, and came out just in the rear of the sixteenth corps, who were fighting like devils along their whole line. "just as we came out into the open field we saw general r. k. scott, who used to be our colonel, and who commanded our brigade, come tearing toward us with one or two aids or orderlies. he was on his big clay-bank horse, 'old hatchie,' as we called him, as we captured him on the battlefield at the battle of 'matamora,' or 'hell on the hatchie,' as our boys always called it. he rode up to the colonel, said something hastily, when all at once we heard the all-firedest crash of musketry and artillery way up at the front where we had built the works the night before and left the rest of our brigade and division getting ready to prance into atlanta when we were sent off to the rear. scott put spurs to his old horse, who was one of the fastest runners in our division, and away he went back towards the position where his brigade and the troops immediately to their left were now hotly engaged. he rode right along in rear of the sixteenth corps, paying no attention apparently to the shot and shell and bullets that were tearing up the earth and exploding and striking all around him. his aids and orderlies vainly tried to keep up with him. we could plainly see the rebel lines as they came out of the woods into the open grounds to attack the sixteenth corps, which had hastily formed in the open field, without any signs of works, and were standing up like men, having a hand-to-hand fight. we were just far enough in the rear so that every blasted shot or shell that was fired too high to hit the ranks of the sixteenth corps came rattling over amongst us. all this time we were marching fast, following in the direction general scott had taken, who evidently had ordered the colonel to join his brigade up at the front. we were down under the crest of a little hill, following along the bank of a little creek, keeping under cover of the bank as much as possible to protect us from the shots of the enemy. we suddenly saw general logan and one or two of his staff upon the right bank of the ravine riding rapidly toward us. as he neared the head of the regiment he shouted: "'halt! what regiment is that, and where are you going?'" the colonel, in a loud voice, that all could hear, told him: "the sixty-eighth ohio; going to join our brigade of the third division--your old division, general, of the seventeenth corps." "logan says, 'you had better go right in here on the left of dodge. the third division have hardly ground enough left now to bury their dead. god knows they need you. but try it on, if you think you can get to them.' "just at this moment a staff officer came riding up on the opposite side of the ravine from where logan was and interrupted logan, who was about telling the colonel not to try to go to the position held by the third division by the road cut through the woods whence we had come out, but to keep off to the right towards the fifteenth corps, as the woods referred to were full of rebels. the officer saluted logan, and shouted across: "general sherman directs me to inform you of the death of general mcpherson, and orders you to take command of the army of the tennessee; have dodge close well up to the seventeenth corps, and sherman will reinforce you to the extent of the whole army.' "logan, standing in his stirrups, on his beautiful black horse, formed a picture against the blue sky as we looked up the ravine at him, his black eyes fairly blazing and his long black hair waving in the wind. he replied in a ringing, clear tone that we all could hear: "say to general sherman i have heard of mcpherson's death, and have assumed the command of the army of the tennessee, and have already anticipated his orders in regard to closing the gap between dodge and the seventeenth corps.' "this, of course, all happened in one quarter of the time i have been telling you. logan put spurs to his horse and rode in one direction, the staff officer of general sherman in another, and we started on a rapid step toward the front. this was the first we had heard of mcpherson's death, and it made us feel very bad. some of the officers and men cried as though they had lost a brother; others pressed their lips, gritted their teeth, and swore to avenge his death. he was a great favorite with all his army, particularly of our corps, which he commanded for a long while. our company, especially, knew him well, and loved him dearly, for we had been his headquarters guard for over a year. as we marched along, toward the front, we could see brigades, and regiments, and batteries of artillery; coming over from the right of the army, and taking position in new lines in rear of the sixteenth and seventeenth corps. major generals and their staffs, brigadier generals and their staffs, were mighty thick along the banks of the little ravine we were following; stragglers and wounded men by the hundred were pouring in to the safe shelter formed by the broken ground along which we were rapidly marching; stories were heard of divisions, brigades and regiments that these wounded or stragglers belonged, having been all cut to pieces; officers all killed; and the speaker, the only one of his command not killed, wounded or captured. but you boys have heard and seen the same cowardly sneaks, probably, in fights that you were in. the battle raged furiously all this time; part of the time the sixteenth corps seemed to be in the worst; then it would let up on them and the seventeenth corps would be hotly engaged along their whole front. "we had probably marched half an hour since leaving logan, and were getting pretty near back to our main line of works, when the colonel ordered a halt and knapsacks to be unslung and piled up. i tell you it was a relief to get them off, for it was a fearful hot day, and we had been marching almost double quick. we knew that this meant business though, and that we were stripping for the fight, which we would soon be in. just at this moment we saw an ambulance, with the horses on a dead run, followed by two or three mounted officers and men, coming right towards us out of the very woods logan had cautioned the colonel to avoid. when the ambulance got to where we were it halted. it was pretty well out of danger from the bullets and shell of the enemy. they stopped, and we recognized major strong, of mcpherson's staff, whom the all knew, as he was the chief inspector of our corps, and in the ambulance he had the body of general mcpherson. major strong, it appears, during a slight lull in the fighting at that part of the line, having taken an ambulance and driven into the very jaws of death to recover the remains of his loved commander. it seems he found the body right by the side of the little road that we had gone out on when we went to the rear. he was dead when he found him, having been shot off his horse, the bullet striking him in the back, just below his heart, probably killing him instantly. there was a young fellow with him who was wounded also, when strong found them. he belonged to our first division, and recognized general mcpherson, and stood by him until major strong came up. he was in the ambulance with the body of mcpherson when they stopped by us. "it seems that when the fight opened away back in the rear where we had been, and at the left of the sixteenth corps which was almost directly in the rear of the seventeenth corps, mcpherson sent his staff and orderlies with various orders to different parts of the line, and started himself to ride over from the seventeenth corps to the sixteenth corps, taking exactly the same course our regiment had, perhaps an hour before, but the rebels had discovered there was a gap between the sixteenth and seventeenth corps, and meeting no opposition to their advances in this strip of woods, where they were hidden from view, they had marched right along down in the rear, and with their line at right angles with the line of works occupied by the left of the seventeenth corps; they were thus parallel and close to the little road mcpherson had taken, and probably he rode right into them and was killed before he realized the true situation. "having piled our knapsacks, and left a couple of our older men, who were played out with the heat and most ready to drop with sunstroke, to guard them, we started on again. the ambulance with the corpse of gen. mcpherson moved off towards the right of the army, which was the last we ever saw of that brave and handsome soldier. "we bore off a little to the right of a large open field on top of a high hill where one of our batteries was pounding away at a tremendous rate. we came up to the main line of works just about at the left of the fifteenth corps. they seemed to be having an easy time of it just then --no fighting going on in their front, except occasional shots from some heavy guns on the main line of rebel works around the city. we crossed right over the fifteenth corps' works and filed to the left, keeping along on the outside of our works. we had not gone far before the rebel gunners in the main works around the city discovered us; and the way they did tear loose at us was a caution. their aim was rather bad, however, and most of their shots went over us. we saw one of them--i think it was a shell--strike an artillery caisson belonging to one of our-batteries. it exploded as it struck, and then the caisson, which was full of ammunition, exploded with an awful noise, throwing pieces of wood and iron and its own load of shot and shell high into the air, scattering death and destruction to the men and horses attached to it. we thought we saw arms and legs and parts of bodies of men flying in every direction; but we were glad to learn afterwards that it was the contents of the knapsacks of the battery boys, who had strapped them on the caissons for transportation. "just after passing the hill where our battery was making things so lively, they stopped firing to let us pass. we saw general leggett, our division commander, come riding toward us. he was outside of our line of works, too. you know how we build breastworks--sort of zigzag like, you know, so they cannot be enfiladed. well, that's just the way the works were along there, and you never saw such a curious shape as we formed our division in. why, part of them were on one side of the works, and go along a little further and here was a regiment, or part of a regiment on the other side, both sets firing in opposite directions. "no sir'ee, they were not demoralized or in confusion, they were cool and as steady as on parade. but the old division had, you know, never been driven from any position they had once taken, in all their long service, and they did not propose to leave that ridge until they got orders from some one beside the rebs. "there were times when a fellow did not know which side of the works was the safest, for the johnnies were in front of us and in rear of us. you see, our fourth division, which had been to the left of us, had been forced to quit their works, when the rebs got into the works in their rear, so that our division was now at the point where our line turned sharply to the left, and rear--in the direction of the sixteenth corps. "we got into business before we had been there over three minutes. a line of the rebs tried to charge across the open fields in front of us, but by the help of the old twenty-four pounders (which proved to be part of cooper's illinois battery, that we had been alongside of in many a hard fight before), we drove them back a-flying, only to have to jump over on the outside of our works the next minute to tackle a heavy force that came for our rear through that blasted strip of woods. we soon drove them off, and the firing on both sides seemed to have pretty much stopped. "'our brigade,' which we discovered, was now commanded by 'old whiskers' (colonel piles, of the seventy-eighth ohio. i'll bet he's got the longest whiskers of any man in the army.) you see general scott had not been seen or heard of since he had started to the rear after our regiment when the fighting first commenced. we all believed that he was either killed or captured, or he would have been with his command. he was a splendid soldier, and a bull-dog of a fighter. his absence was a great loss, but we had not much time to think of such things, for our brigade was then ordered to leave the works and to move to the right about twenty or thirty rods across a large ravine, where we were placed in position in an open corn-field, forming a new line at quite an angle from the line of works we had just left, extending to the left, and getting us back nearer onto a line with the sixteenth corps. the battery of howitzers, now reinforced by a part of the third ohio heavy guns, still occupied the old works on the highest part of the hill, just to the right of our new line. we took our position just on the brow of a hill, and were ordered to lie down, and the rear rank to go for rails, which we discovered a few rods behind us in the shape of a good ten-rail fence. every rear-rank chap came back with all the rails he could lug, and we barely had time to lay them down in front of us, forming a little barricade of six to eight or ten inches high, when we heard the most unearthly rebel yell directly in front of us. it grew louder and came nearer and nearer, until we could see a solid line of the gray coats coming out of the woods and down the opposite slope, their battle flags flying, officers in front with drawn swords, arms at right shoulder, and every one of them yelling like so many sioux indians. the line seemed to be massed six or eight ranks deep, followed closely by the second line, and that by the third, each, if possible, yelling louder and appearing more desperately reckless than the one ahead. at their first appearance we opened on them, and so did the bully old twenty-four-pounders, with canister. "on they came; the first line staggered and wavered back on to the second, which was coming on the double quick. such a raking as we did give them. oh, lordy, how we did wish that we had the breech loading spencers or winchesters. but we had the old reliable springfields, and we poured it in hot and heavy. by the time the charging column got down the opposite slope, and were struggling through the thicket of undergrowth in the ravine, they were one confused mass of officers and men, the three lines now forming one solid column, which made several desperate efforts to rush up to the top of the hill where we were punishing them so. one of their first surges came mighty near going right over the left of our regiment, as they were lying down behind their little rail piles. but the boys clubbed their guns and the officers used their revolvers and swords and drove them back down the hill. "the seventy-eighth and twentieth ohio, our right and left bowers, who had been brigaded with us ever since 'shiloh,' were into it as hot and heavy as we had been, and had lost numbers of their officers and men, but were hanging on to their little rail piles when the fight was over. at one time the rebs were right in on top of the seventy-eighth. one big reb grabbed their colors, and tried to pull them out of the hands of the color-bearer. but old captain orr, a little, short, dried-up fellow, about sixty years old, struck him with his sword across the back of the neck, and killed him deader than a mackerel, right in his tracks. "it was now getting dark, and the johnnies concluded they had taken a bigger contract in trying to drive us off that hill in one day than they had counted on, so they quit charging on us, but drew back under cover of the woods and along the old line of works that we had left, and kept up a pecking away and sharp-shooting at us all night long. they opened fire on us from a number of pieces of artillery from the front, from the left, and from some heavy guns away over to the right of us, in the main works around atlanta. "we did not fool away much time that night, either. we got our shovels and picks, and while part of us were sharpshooting and trying to keep the rebels from working up too close to us, the rest of the boys were putting up some good solid earthworks right where our rail piles had been, and by morning we were in splendid shape to have received our friends, no matter which way they had come at us, for they kept up such an all-fired shelling of us from so many different directions; that the boys had built traverses and bomb-proofs at all sorts of angles and in all directions. "there was one point off to our right, a few rods up along our old line of works where there was a crowd of rebel sharpshooters that annoyed us more than all the rest, by their constant firing at us through the night. they killed one of company h's boys, and wounded several others. finally captain williams, of d company, came along and said he wanted a couple of good shots out of our company to go with him, so i went for one. he took about ten of us, and we crawled down into the ravine in front of where we were building the works, and got behind a large fallen tree, and we laid there and could just fire right up into the rear of those fellows as they lay behind a traverse extending back from our old line of works. it was so dark we could only see where to fire by the flash of guns, but every time they would shoot, some of us would let them have one. they staid there until almost daylight, when they, concluded as things looked, since we were going to stay, they had better be going. "it was an awful night. down in the ravine below us lay hundreds of killed and wounded rebels, groaning and crying aloud for water and for help. we did do what we could for those right around us--but it was so dark, and so many shell bursting and bullets flying around that a fellow could not get about much. i tell you it was pretty tough next morning to go along to the different companies of our regiment and hear who were among the killed and wounded, and to see the long row of graves that were being dug to bury our comrades and our officers. there was the captain of company e, nelson skeeles, of fulton county, o., one of--the bravest and best officers in the regiment. by his side lay first sergeant lesnit, and next were the two great, powerful shepherds--cousins but more like brothers. one, it seems, was killed while supporting the head of the other, who had just received a death wound, thus dying in each other's arms. "but i can't begin to think or tell you the names of all the poor boys that we laid away to rest in their last, long sleep on that gloomy day. our major was severely wounded, and several other officers had been hit more or less badly. "it was a frightful sight, though, to go over the field in front of our works on that morning. the rebel dead and badly wounded laid where they had fallen. the bottom and opposite side of the ravine showed how destructive our fire and that of the canister from the howitzers had been. the underbrush was cut, slashed, and torn into shreds, and the larger trees were scarred, bruised and broken by the thousands of bullets and other missiles that had been poured into them from almost every conceivable direction during the day before. "a lot of us boys went way over to the left into fuller's division of the sixteenth corps, to see how some of our boys over there had got through the scrimmage, for they had about as nasty a fight as any part of the army, and if it had not been for their being just where they were, i am not sure but what the old seventeenth corps would have had a different story to tell now. we found our friends had been way out by decatur, where their brigade had got into a pretty lively fight on their own hook. "we got back to camp, and the first thing i knew i was detailed for picket duty, and we were posted over a few rods across the ravine in our front. we had not been out but a short time when we saw a flag of truce, borne by an officer, coming towards us. we halted him, and made him wait until a report was sent back to corps headquarters. the rebel officer was quite chatty and talkative with our picket officer, while waiting. he said he was on general cleburne's staff, and that the troops that charged us so fiercely the evening before was cleburne's whole division, and that after their last repulse, knowing the hill where we were posted was the most important position along our line, he felt that if they would keep close to us during the night, and keep up a show of fight, that we would pull out and abandon the hill before morning. he said that he, with about fifty of their best men, had volunteered to keep up the demonstration, and it was his party that had occupied the traverse in our old works the night before and had annoyed us and the battery men by their constant sharpshooting, which we fellows behind the old tree had finally tired out. he said they staid until almost daylight, and that he lost more than half his men before he left. he also told us that general scott was captured by their division, at about the time and almost the same spot as where general mcpherson was killed, and that he was not hurt or wounded, and was now a prisoner in their hands. "quite a lot of our staff officers soon came out, and as near as we could learn the rebels wanted a truce to bury their dead. our folks tried to get up an exchange of prisoners that had been taken by both sides the day before, but for some reason they could not bring it about. but the truce for burying the dead was agreed to. along about dusk some of the boys on my post got to telling about a lot of silver and brass instruments that belonged to one of the bands of the fourth division, which had been hung up in some small trees a little way over in front of where we were when the fight was going on the day before, and that when, a bullet would strike one of the horns they could hear it go 'pin-g' and in a few minutes 'pan-g' would go another bullet through one of them. "a new picket was just coming' on, and i had picked up my blanket and haversack, and was about ready to start back to camp, when, thinks i, 'i'll just go out there and see about them horns.' i told the boys what i was going to do. they all seemed to think it was safe enough, so out i started. i had not gone more than a hundred yards, i should think, when here i found the horns all hanging around on the trees just as the boys had described. some of them had lots of bullet holes in them. but i saw a beautiful, nice looking silver bugle hanging off to one side a little. 'i thinks,' says i, 'i'll just take that little toot horn in out of the wet, and take it back to camp.' i was just reaching up after it when i heard some one say, "'halt!' and i'll be dog-boned if there wasn't two of the meanest looking rebels, standing not ten feet from me, with their guns cocked and pointed at me, and, of course, i knew i was a goner; they walked me back about one hundred and fifty yards, where their picket line was. from there i was kept going for an hour or two until we got over to a place on the railroad called east point. there i got in with a big crowd of our prisoners, who were taken the day before, and we have been fooling along in a lot of old cattle cars getting down here ever since. "so this is 'andersonville,' is it! well, by ---!" chapter xli. clothing: its rapid deterioration, and devices to replenish it--desperate efforts to cover nakedness--"little red cap" and his letter. clothing had now become an object of real solicitude to us older prisoners. the veterans of our crowd--the surviving remnant of those captured at gettysburg--had been prisoners over a year. the next in seniority--the chickamauga boys--had been in ten months. the mine run fellows were eight months old, and my battalion had had seven months' incarceration. none of us were models of well-dressed gentlemen when captured. our garments told the whole story of the hard campaigning we had undergone. now, with months of the wear and tear of prison life, sleeping on the sand, working in tunnels, digging wells, etc., we were tattered and torn to an extent that a second-class tramp would have considered disgraceful. this is no reflection upon the quality of the clothes furnished by the government. we simply reached the limit of the wear of textile fabrics. i am particular to say this, because i want to contribute my little mite towards doing justice to a badly abused part of our army organization --the quartermaster's department. it is fashionable to speak of "shoddy," and utter some stereotyped sneers about "brown paper shoes," and "musketo-netting overcoats," when any discussion of the quartermaster service is the subject of conversation, but i have no hesitation in asking the indorsement of my comrades to the statement that we have never found anywhere else as durable garments as those furnished us by the government during our service in the army. the clothes were not as fine in texture, nor so stylish in cut as those we wore before or since, but when it came to wear they could be relied on to the last thread. it was always marvelous to me that they lasted so well, with the rough usage a soldier in the field must necessarily give them. but to return to my subject. i can best illustrate the way our clothes dropped off us, piece by piece, like the petals from the last rose of summer, by taking my own case as an example: when i entered prison i was clad in the ordinary garb of an enlisted man of the cavalry--stout, comfortable boots, woolen pocks, drawers, pantaloons, with a "reenforcement," or "ready-made patches," as the infantry called them; vest, warm, snug-fitting jacket, under and over shirts, heavy overcoat, and a forage-cap. first my boots fell into cureless ruin, but this was no special hardship, as the weather had become quite warm, and it was more pleasant than otherwise to go barefooted. then part of the underclothing retired from service. the jacket and vest followed, their end being hastened by having their best portions taken to patch up the pantaloons, which kept giving out at the most embarrassing places. then the cape of the overcoat was called upon to assist in repairing these continually-recurring breaches in the nether garments. the same insatiate demand finally consumed the whole coat, in a vain attempt to prevent an exposure of person greater than consistent with the usages of society. the pantaloons--or what, by courtesy, i called such, were a monument of careful and ingenious, but hopeless, patching, that should have called forth the admiration of a florentine artist in mosaic. i have been shown--in later years--many table tops, ornamented in marquetry, inlaid with thousands of little bits of wood, cunningly arranged, and patiently joined together. i always look at them with interest, for i know the work spent upon them: i remember my andersonville pantaloons. the clothing upon the upper part of my body had been reduced to the remains of a knit undershirt. it had fallen into so many holes that it looked like the coarse "riddles" through which ashes and gravel are sifted. wherever these holes were the sun had burned my back, breast and shoulders deeply black. the parts covered by the threads and fragments forming the boundaries of the holes, were still white. when i pulled my alleged shirt off, to wash or to free it from some of its teeming population, my skin showed a fine lace pattern in black and white, that was very interesting to my comrades, and the subject of countless jokes by them. they used to descant loudly on the chaste elegance of the design, the richness of the tracing, etc., and beg me to furnish them with a copy of it when i got home, for their sisters to work window curtains or tidies by. they were sure that so striking a novelty in patterns would be very acceptable. i would reply to their witticisms in the language of portia's prince of morocco: mislike me not for my complexion- the shadowed livery of the burning sun. one of the stories told me in my childhood by an old negro nurse, was of a poverty stricken little girl "who slept on the floor and was covered with the door," and she once asked-"mamma how do poor folks get along who haven't any door?" in the same spirit i used to wonder how poor fellows got along who hadn't any shirt. one common way of keeping up one's clothing was by stealing mealsacks. the meal furnished as rations was brought in in white cotton sacks. sergeants of detachments were required to return these when the rations were issued the next day. i have before alluded to the general incapacity of the rebels to deal accurately with even simple numbers. it was never very difficult for a shrewd sergeant to make nine sacks count as ten. after awhile the rebels began to see through this sleight of hand manipulation, and to check it. then the sergeants resorted to the device of tearing the sacks in two, and turning each half in as a whole one. the cotton cloth gained in this way was used for patching, or, if a boy could succeed in beating the rebels out of enough of it, he would fabricate himself a shirt or a pair of pantaloons. we obtained all our thread in the same way. a half of a sack, carefully raveled out, would furnish a couple of handfuls of thread. had it not been for this resource all our sewing and mending would have come to a standstill. most of our needles were manufactured by ourselves from bones. a piece of bone, split as near as possible to the required size, was carefully rubbed down upon a brick, and then had an eye laboriously worked through it with a bit of wire or something else available for the purpose. the needles were about the size of ordinary darning needles, and answered the purpose very well. these devices gave one some conception of the way savages provide for the wants of their lives. time was with them, as with us, of little importance. it was no loss of time to them, nor to us, to spend a large portion of the waking hours of a week in fabricating a needle out of a bone, where a civilized man could purchase a much better one with the product of three minutes' labor. i do not think any red indian of the plains exceeded us in the patience with which we worked away at these minutia of life's needs. of course the most common source of clothing was the dead, and no body was carried out with any clothing on it that could be of service to the survivors. the plymouth pilgrims, who were so well clothed on coming in, and were now dying off very rapidly, furnished many good suits to cover the nakedness of older, prisoners. most of the prisoners from the army of the potomac were well dressed, and as very many died within a month or six weeks after their entrance, they left their clothes in pretty good condition for those who constituted themselves their heirs, administrators and assigns. for my own part, i had the greatest aversion to wearing dead men's clothes, and could only bring myself to it after i had been a year in prison, and it became a question between doing that and freezing to death. every new batch of prisoners was besieged with anxious inquiries on the subject which lay closest to all our hearts: "what are they doing about exchange!" nothing in human experience--save the anxious expectancy of a sail by castaways on a desert island--could equal the intense eagerness with which this question was asked, and the answer awaited. to thousands now hanging on the verge of eternity it meant life or death. between the first day of july and the first of november over twelve thousand men died, who would doubtless have lived had they been able to reach our lines--"get to god's country," as we expressed it. the new comers brought little reliable news of contemplated exchange. there was none to bring in the first place, and in the next, soldiers in active service in the field had other things to busy themselves with than reading up the details of the negotiations between the commissioners of exchange. they had all heard rumors, however, and by the time they reached andersonville, they had crystallized these into actual statements of fact. a half hour after they entered the stockade, a report like this would spread like wildfire: "an army of the potomac man has just come in, who was captured in front of petersburg. he says that he read in the new york herald, the day before he was taken, that an exchange had been agreed upon, and that our ships had already started for savannah to take us home." then our hopes would soar up like balloons. we fed ourselves on such stuff from day to day, and doubtless many lives were greatly prolonged by the continual encouragement. there was hardly a day when i did not say to myself that i would much rather die than endure imprisonment another month, and had i believed that another month would see me still there, i am pretty certain that i should have ended the matter by crossing the dead line. i was firmly resolved not to die the disgusting, agonizing death that so many around me were dying. one of our best purveyors of information was a bright, blue-eyed, fair-haired little drummer boy, as handsome as a girl, well-bred as a lady, and evidently the darling of some refined loving mother. he belonged, i think, to some loyal virginia regiment, was captured in one of the actions in the shenandoa valley, and had been with us in richmond. we called him "red cap," from his wearing a jaunty, gold-laced, crimson cap. ordinarily, the smaller a drummer boy is the harder he is, but no amount of attrition with rough men could coarse the ingrained refinement of red cap's manners. he was between thirteen and fourteen, and it seemed utterly shameful that men, calling themselves soldier should make war on such a tender boy and drag him off to prison. but no six-footer had a more soldierly heart than little red cap, and none were more loyal to the cause. it was a pleasure to hear him tell the story of the fights and movements his regiment had been engaged in. he was a good observer and told his tale with boyish fervor. shortly after wirz assumed command he took red cap into his office as an orderly. his bright face and winning manner; fascinated the women visitors at headquarters, and numbers of them tried to adopt him, but with poor success. like the rest of us, he could see few charms in an existence under the rebel flag, and turned a deaf ear to their blandishments. he kept his ears open to the conversation of the rebel officers around him, and frequently secured permission to visit the interior of the stockade, when he would communicate to us all that he has heard. he received a flattering reception every time he cams in, and no orator ever secured a more attentive audience than would gather around him to listen to what he had to say. he was, beyond a doubt, the best known and most popular person in the prison, and i know all the survivors of his old admirer; share my great interest in him, and my curiosity as to whether he yet lives, and whether his subsequent career has justified the sanguine hopes we all had as to his future. i hope that if he sees this, or any one who knows anything about him, he will communicate with me. there are thousands who will be glad to hear from him. a most remarkable coincidence occurred in regard to this comrade. several days after the above had been written, and "set up," but before it had yet appeared in the paper, i received the following letter: eckhart mines, alleghany county, md., march 24. to the editor of the blade: last evening i saw a copy of your paper, in which was a chapter or two of a prison life of a soldier during the late war. i was forcibly struck with the correctness of what he wrote, and the names of several of my old comrades which he quoted: hill, limber jim, etc., etc. i was a drummer boy of company i, tenth west virginia infantry, and was fifteen years of age a day or two after arriving in andersonville, which was in the last of february, 1884. nineteen of my comrades were there with me, and, poor fellows, they are there yet. i have no doubt that i would have remained there, too, had i not been more fortunate. i do not know who your soldier correspondent is, but assume to say that from the following description he will remember having seen me in andersonville: i was the little boy that for three or four months officiated as orderly for captain wirz. i wore a red cap, and every day could be seen riding wirz's gray mare, either at headquarters, or about the stockade. i was acting in this capacity when the six raiders --"mosby," (proper name collins) delaney, curtis, and--i forget the other names--were executed. i believe that i was the first that conveyed the intelligence to them that confederate general winder had approved their sentence. as soon as wirz received the dispatch to that effect, i ran down to the stocks and told them. i visited hill, of wauseon, fulton county, o., since the war, and found him hale and hearty. i have not heard from him for a number of years until reading your correspondent's letter last evening. it is the only letter of the series that i have seen, but after reading that one, i feel called upon to certify that i have no doubts of the truthfulness of your correspondent's story. the world will never know or believe the horrors of andersonville and other prisons in the south. no living, human being, in my judgment, will ever be able to properly paint the horrors of those infernal dens. i formed the acquaintance of several ohio soldiers whilst in prison. among these were o. d. streeter, of cleveland, who went to andersonville about the same time that i did, and escaped, and was the only man that i ever knew that escaped and reached our lines. after an absence of several months he was retaken in one of sherman's battles before atlanta, and brought back. i also knew john l. richards, of fostoria, seneca county, o. or eaglesville, wood county. also, a man by the name of beverly, who was a partner of charley aucklebv, of tennessee. i would like to hear from all of these parties. they all know me. mr. editor, i will close by wishing all my comrades who shared in the sufferings and dangers of confederate prisons, a long and useful life. yours truly, ransom t. powell chapter xlii. some features of the mortality--percentage of deaths to those living --an average mean only stands the misery three months--description of the prison and the condition of the men therein, by a leading scientific man of the south. speaking of the manner in which the plymouth pilgrims were now dying, i am reminded of my theory that the ordinary man's endurance of this prison life did not average over three months. the plymouth boys arrived in may; the bulk of those who died passed away in july and august. the great increase of prisoners from all sources was in may, june and july. the greatest mortality among these was in august, september and october. many came in who had been in good health during their service in the field, but who seemed utterly overwhelmed by the appalling misery they saw on every hand, and giving way to despondency, died in a few days or weeks. i do not mean to include them in the above class, as their sickness was more mental than physical. my idea is that, taking one hundred ordinarily healthful young soldiers from a regiment in active service, and putting them into andersonville, by the end of the third month at least thirty-three of those weakest and most vulnerable to disease would have succumbed to the exposure, the pollution of ground and air, and the insufficiency of the ration of coarse corn meal. after this the mortality would be somewhat less, say at the end of six months fifty of them would be dead. the remainder would hang on still more tenaciously, and at the end of a year there would be fifteen or twenty still alive. there were sixty-three of my company taken; thirteen lived through. i believe this was about the usual proportion for those who were in as long as we. in all there were forty-five thousand six hundred and thirteen prisoners brought into andersonville. of these twelve thousand nine hundred and twelve died there, to say nothing of thousands that died in other prisons in georgia and the carolinas, immediately after their removal from andersonville. one of every three and a-half men upon whom the gates of the stockade closed never repassed them alive. twenty-nine per cent. of the boys who so much as set foot in andersonville died there. let it be kept in mind all the time, that the average stay of a prisoner there was not four months. the great majority came in after the 1st of may, and left before the middle of september. may 1, 1864, there were ten thousand four hundred and twenty-seven in the stockade. august 8 there were thirty-three thousand one hundred and fourteen; september 30 all these were dead or gone, except eight thousand two hundred and eighteen, of whom four thousand five hundred and ninety died inside of the next thirty days. the records of the world can shove no parallel to this astounding mortality. since the above matter was first published in the blade, a friend has sent me a transcript of the evidence at the wirz trial, of professor joseph jones, a surgeon of high rank in the rebel army, and who stood at the head of the medical profession in georgia. he visited andersonville at the instance of the surgeon-general of the confederate states' army, to make a study, for the benefit of science, of the phenomena of disease occurring there. his capacity and opportunities for observation, and for clearly estimating the value of the facts coming under his notice were, of course, vastly superior to mine, and as he states the case stronger than i dare to, for fear of being accused of exaggeration and downright untruth, i reproduce the major part of his testimony--embodying also his official report to medical headquarters at richmond--that my readers may know how the prison appeared to the eyes of one who, though a bitter rebel, was still a humane man and a conscientious observer, striving to learn the truth: medical testimony. [transcript from the printed testimony at the wirz trial, pages 618 to 639, inclusive.] october 7, 1885. dr. joseph jones, for the prosecution: by the judge advocate: question. where do you reside answer. in augusta, georgia. q. are you a graduate of any medical college? a. of the university of pennsylvania. q. how long have you been engaged in the practice of medicine? a. eight years. q. has your experience been as a practitioner, or rather as an investigator of medicine as a science? a. both. q. what position do you hold now? a. that of medical chemist in the medical college of georgia, at augusta. q. how long have you held your position in that college? a. since 1858. q. how were you employed during the rebellion? a. i served six months in the early part of it as a private in the ranks, and the rest of the time in the medical department. q. under the direction of whom? a. under the direction of dr. moore, surgeon general. q. did you, while acting under his direction, visit andersonville, professionally? a. yes, sir. q. for the purpose of making investigations there? a. for the purpose of prosecuting investigations ordered by the surgeon general. q. you went there in obedience to a letter of instructions? a. in obedience to orders which i received. q. did you reduce the results of your investigations to the shape of a report? a. i was engaged at that work when general johnston surrendered his army. (a document being handed to witness.) q. have you examined this extract from your report and compared it with the original? a. yes, sir; i have. q. is it accurate? a. so far as my examination extended, it is accurate.' the document just examined by witness was offered in evidence, and is as follows: observations upon the diseases of the federal prisoners, confined to camp sumter, andersonville, in sumter county, georgia, instituted with a view to illustrate chiefly the origin and causes of hospital gangrene, the relations of continued and malarial fevers, and the pathology of camp diarrhea and dysentery, by joseph jones; surgeon p. a. c. s., professor of medical chemistry in the medical college of georgia, at augusta, georgia. hearing of the unusual mortality among the federal prisoners confined at andersonville; georgia, in the month of august, 1864, during a visit to richmond, va., i expressed to the surgeon general, s. p. moore, confederate states of america, a desire to visit camp sumter, with the design of instituting a series of inquiries upon the nature and causes of the prevailing diseases. smallpox had appeared among the prisoners, and i believed that this would prove an admirable field for the establishment of its characteristic lesions. the condition of peyer's glands in this disease was considered as worthy of minute investigation. it was believed that a large body of men from the northern portion of the united states, suddenly transported to a warm southern climate, and confined upon a small portion of land, would furnish an excellent field for the investigation of the relations of typhus, typhoid, and malarial fevers. the surgeon general of the confederate states of america furnished me with the following letter of introduction to the surgeon in charge of the confederate states military prison at andersonville, ga.: confederate states of america, surgeon general's office, richmond, va., august 6, 1864. sir:--the field of pathological investigations afforded by the large collection of federal prisoners in georgia, is of great extant and importance, and it is believed that results of value to the profession may be obtained by careful investigation of the effects of disease upon the large body of men subjected to a decided change of climate and those circumstances peculiar to prison life. the surgeon in charge of the hospital for federal prisoners, together with his assistants, will afford every facility to surgeon joseph jones, in the prosecution of the labors ordered by the surgeon general. efficient assistance must be rendered surgeon jones by the medical officers, not only in his examinations into the causes and symptoms of the various diseases, but especially in the arduous labors of post mortem examinations. the medical officers will assist in the performance of such post-mortems as surgeon jones may indicate, in order that this great field for pathological investigation may be explored for the benefit of the medical department of the confederate army. s. p. moore, surgeon general. surgeon isaiah h. white, in charge of hospital for federal prisoners, andersonville, ga. in compliance with this letter of the surgeon general, isaiah h. white, chief surgeon of the post, and r. r. stevenson, surgeon in charge of the prison hospital, afforded the necessary facilities for the prosecution of my investigations among the sick outside of the stockade. after the completion of my labors in the military prison hospital, the following communication was addressed to brigadier general john h. winder, in consequence of the refusal on the part of the commandant of the interior of the confederate states military prison to admit me within the stockade upon the order of the surgeon general: camp sumter, andersonville ga., september 16, 1864. general:--i respectfully request the commandant of the post of andersonville to grant me permission and to furnish the necessary pass to visit the sick and medical officers within the stockade of the confederate states prison. i desire to institute certain inquiries ordered by the surgeon general. surgeon isaiah h. white, chief surgeon of the post, and surgeon r. r. stevenson, in charge of the prison hospital, have afforded me every facility for the prosecution of my labors among the sick outside of the stockade. very respectfully, your obedient servant, joseph jones, surgeon p. a. c. s. brigadier general john h. winder, commandant, post andersonville. in the absence of general winder from the post, captain winder furnished the following order: camp sumter, andersonville; september 17, 1864. captain:--you will permit surgeon joseph jones, who has orders from the surgeon general, to visit the sick within the stockade that are under medical treatment. surgeon jones is ordered to make certain investigations which may prove useful to his profession. by direction of general winder. very respectfully, w. s. winder, a. a. g. captain h. wirz, commanding prison. description of the confederate states military prison hospital at andersonville. number of prisoners, physical condition, food, clothing, habits, moral condition, diseases. the confederate military prison at andersonville, ga., consists of a strong stockade, twenty feet in height, enclosing twenty-seven acres. the stockade is formed of strong pine logs, firmly planted in the ground. the main stockade is surrounded by two other similar rows of pine logs, the middle stockade being sixteen feet high, and the outer twelve feet. these are intended for offense and defense. if the inner stockade should at any time be forced by the prisoners, the second forms another line of defense; while in case of an attempt to deliver the prisoners by a force operating upon the exterior, the outer line forms an admirable protection to the confederate troops, and a most formidable obstacle to cavalry or infantry. the four angles of the outer line are strengthened by earthworks upon commanding eminences, from which the cannon, in case of an outbreak among the prisoners, may sweep the entire enclosure; and it was designed to connect these works by a line of rifle pits, running zig-zag, around the outer stockade; those rifle pits have never been completed. the ground enclosed by the innermost stockade lies in the form of a parallelogram, the larger diameter running almost due north and south. this space includes the northern and southern opposing sides of two hills, between which a stream of water runs from west to east. the surface soil of these hills is composed chiefly of sand with varying admixtures of clay and oxide of iron. the clay is sufficiently tenacious to give a considerable degree of consistency to the soil. the internal structure of the hills, as revealed by the deep wells, is similar to that already described. the alternate layers of clay and sand, as well as the oxide of iron, which forms in its various combinations a cement to the sand, allow of extensive tunneling. the prisoners not only constructed numerous dirt huts with balls of clay and sand, taken from the wells which they have excavated all over those hills, but they have also, in some cases, tunneled extensively from these wells. the lower portions of these hills, bordering on the stream, are wet and boggy from the constant oozing of water. the stockade was built originally to accommodate only ten thousand prisoners, and included at first seventeen acres. near the close of the month of june the area was enlarged by the addition of ten acres. the ground added was situated on the northern slope of the largest hill. the average number of square feet of ground to each prisoner in august 1864: 35.7 within the circumscribed area of the stockade the federal prisoners were compelled to perform all the offices of life--cooking, washing, the calls of nature, exercise, and sleeping. during the month of march the prison was less crowded than at any subsequent time, and then the average space of ground to each prisoner was only 98.7 feet, or less than seven square yards. the federal prisoners were gathered from all parts of the confederate states east of the mississippi, and crowded into the confined space, until in the month of june the average number of square feet of ground to each prisoner was only 33.2 or less than four square yards. these figures represent the condition of the stockade in a better light even than it really was; for a considerable breadth of land along the stream, flowing from west to east between the hills, was low and boggy, and was covered with the excrement of the men, and thus rendered wholly uninhabitable, and in fact useless for every purpose except that of defecation. the pines and other small trees and shrubs, which originally were scattered sparsely over these hills, were in a short time cut down and consumed by the prisoners for firewood, and no shade tree was left in the entire enclosure of the stockade. with their characteristic industry and ingenuity, the federals constructed for themselves small huts and caves, and attempted to shield themselves from the rain and sun and night damps and dew. but few tents were distributed to the prisoners, and those were in most cases torn and rotten. in the location and arrangement of these tents and huts no order appears to have been followed; in fact, regular streets appear to be out of the question in so crowded an area; especially too, as large bodies of prisoners were from time to time added suddenly without any previous preparations. the irregular arrangement of the huts and imperfect shelters was very unfavorable for the maintenance of a proper system of police. the police and internal economy of the prison was left almost entirely in the hands of the prisoners themselves; the duties of the confederate soldiers acting as guards being limited to the occupation of the boxes or lookouts ranged around the stockade at regular intervals, and to the manning of the batteries at the angles of the prison. even judicial matters pertaining to themselves, as the detection and punishment of such crimes as theft and murder appear to have been in a great measure abandoned to the prisoners. a striking instance of this occurred in the month of july, when the federal prisoners within the stockade tried, condemned, and hanged six (6) of their own number, who had been convicted of stealing and of robbing and murdering their fellow-prisoners. they were all hung upon the same day, and thousands of the prisoners gathered around to witness the execution. the confederate authorities are said not to have interfered with these proceedings. in this collection of men from all parts of the world, every phase of human character was represented; the stronger preyed upon the weaker, and even the sick who were unable to defend themselves were robbed of their scanty supplies of food and clothing. dark stories were afloat, of men, both sick and well, who were murdered at night, strangled to death by their comrades for scant supplies of clothing or money. i heard a sick and wounded federal prisoner accuse his nurse, a fellow-prisoner of the united states army, of having stealthily, during his sleep inoculated his wounded arm with gangrene, that he might destroy his life and fall heir to his clothing. .................................... the large number of men confined within the stockade soon, under a defective system of police, and with imperfect arrangements, covered the surface of the low grounds with excrements. the sinks over the lower portions of the stream were imperfect in their plan and structure, and the excrements were in large measure deposited so near the borders of the stream as not to be washed away, or else accumulated upon the low boggy ground. the volume of water was not sufficient to wash away the feces, and they accumulated in such quantities in the lower portion of the stream as to form a mass of liquid excrement heavy rains caused the water of the stream to rise, and as the arrangements for the passage of the increased amounts of water out of the stockade were insufficient, the liquid feces overflowed the low grounds and covered them several inches, after the subsidence of the waters. the action of the sun upon this putrefying mass of excrements and fragments of bread and meat and bones excited most rapid fermentation and developed a horrible stench. improvements were projected for the removal of the filth and for the prevention of its accumulation, but they were only partially and imperfectly carried out. as the forces of the prisoners were reduced by confinement, want of exercise, improper diet, and by scurvy, diarrhea, and dysentery, they were unable to evacuate their bowels within the stream or along its banks, and the excrements were deposited at the very doors of their tents. the vast majority appeared to lose all repulsion to filth, and both sick and well disregarded all the laws of hygiene and personal cleanliness. the accommodations for the sick were imperfect and insufficient. from the organization of the prison, february 24, 1864, to may 22, the sick were treated within the stockade. in the crowded condition of the stockade, and with the tents and huts clustered thickly around the hospital, it was impossible to secure proper ventilation or to maintain the necessary police. the federal prisoners also made frequent forays upon the hospital stores and carried off the food and clothing of the sick. the hospital was, on the 22d of may, removed to its present site without the stockade, and five acres of ground covered with oaks and pines appropriated to the use of the sick. the supply of medical officers has been insufficient from the foundation of the prison. the nurses and attendants upon the sick have been most generally federal prisoners, who in too many cases appear to have been devoid of moral principle, and who not only neglected their duties, but were also engaged in extensive robbing of the sick. from the want of proper police and hygienic regulations alone it is not wonderful that from february 24 to september 21, 1864, nine thousand four hundred and seventy-nine deaths, nearly one-third the entire number of prisoners, should have been recorded. i found the stockade and hospital in the following condition during my pathological investigations, instituted in the month of september, 1864: stockade, confederate states military prison. at the time of my visit to andersonville a large number of federal prisoners had been removed to millen, savannah; charleston, and other parts of, the confederacy, in anticipation of an advance of general sherman's forces from atlanta, with the design of liberating their captive brethren; however, about fifteen thousand prisoners remained confined within the limits of the stockade and confederate states military prison hospital. in the stockade, with the exception of the damp lowlands bordering the small stream, the surface was covered with huts, and small ragged tents and parts of blankets and fragments of oil-cloth, coats, and blankets stretched upon stacks. the tents and huts were not arranged according to any order, and there was in most parts of the enclosure scarcely room for two men to walk abreast between the tents and huts. if one might judge from the large pieces of corn-bread scattered about in every direction on the ground the prisoners were either very lavishly supplied with this article of diet, or else this kind of food was not relished by them. each day the dead from the stockade were carried out by their fellow-prisoners and deposited upon the ground under a bush arbor, just outside of the southwestern gate. from thence they were carried in carts to the burying ground, one-quarter of a mile northwest, of the prison. the dead were buried without coffins, side by side, in trenches four feet deep. the low grounds bordering the stream were covered with human excrements and filth of all kinds, which in many places appeared to be alive with working maggots. an indescribable sickening stench arose from these fermenting masses of human filth. there were near five thousand seriously ill federals in the stockade and confederate states military prison hospital, and the deaths exceeded one hundred per day, and large numbers of the prisoners who were walking about, and who had not been entered upon the sick reports, were suffering from severe and incurable diarrhea, dysentery, and scurvy. the sick were attended almost entirely by their fellow-prisoners, appointed as nurses, and as they received but little attention, they were compelled to exert themselves at all times to attend to the calls of nature, and hence they retained the power of moving about to within a comparatively short period of the close of life. owing to the slow progress of the diseases most prevalent, diarrhea, and chronic dysentery, the corpses were as a general rule emaciated. i visited two thousand sick within the stockade, lying under some long sheds which had been built at the northern portion for themselves. at this time only one medical officer was in attendance, whereas at least twenty medical officers should have been employed. died in the stockade from its organization, february 24, 186l to september 2l ....................................................3,254 died in hospital during same time ...............................6,225 total deaths in hospital and stockade ...........................9,479 scurvy, diarrhea, dysentery, and hospital gangrene were the prevailing diseases. i was surprised to find but few cases of malarial fever, and no well-marked cases either of typhus or typhoid fever. the absence of the different forms of malarial fever may be accounted for in the supposition that the artificial atmosphere of the stockade, crowded densely with human beings and loaded with animal exhalations, was unfavorable to the existence and action of the malarial poison. the absence of typhoid and typhus fevers amongst all the causes which are supposed to generate these diseases, appeared to be due to the fact that the great majority of these prisoners had been in captivity in virginia, at belle island, and in other parts of the confederacy for months, and even as long as two years, and during this time they had been subjected to the same bad influences, and those who had not had these fevers before either had them during their confinement in confederate prisons or else their systems, from long exposure, were proof against their action. the effects of scurvy were manifested on every hand, and in all its various stages, from the muddy, pale complexion, pale gums, feeble, languid muscular motions, lowness of spirits, and fetid breath, to the dusky, dirty, leaden complexion, swollen features, spongy, purple, livid, fungoid, bleeding gums, loose teeth, oedematous limbs, covered with livid vibices, and petechiae spasmodically flexed, painful and hardened extremities, spontaneous hemorrhages from mucous canals, and large, ill-conditioned, spreading ulcers covered with a dark purplish fungus growth. i observed that in some of the cases of scurvy the parotid glands were greatly swollen, and in some instances to such an extent as to preclude entirely the power to articulate. in several cases of dropsy of the abdomen and lower extremities supervening upon scurvy, the patients affirmed that previously to the appearance of the dropsy they had suffered with profuse and obstinate diarrhea, and that when this was checked by a change of diet, from indian corn-bread baked with the husk, to boiled rice, the dropsy appeared. the severe pains and livid patches were frequently associated with swellings in various parts, and especially in the lower extremities, accompanied with stiffness and contractions of the knee joints and ankles, and often with a brawny feel of the parts, as if lymph had been effused between the integuments and apeneuroses, preventing the motion of the skin over the swollen parts. many of the prisoners believed that the scurvy was contagious, and i saw men guarding their wells and springs, fearing lest some man suffering with the scurvy might use the water and thus poison them. i observed also numerous cases of hospital gangrene, and of spreading scorbutic ulcers, which had supervened upon slight injuries. the scorbutic ulcers presented a dark, purple fungoid, elevated surface, with livid swollen edges, and exuded a thin; fetid, sanious fluid, instead of pus. many ulcers which originated from the scorbutic condition of the system appeared to become truly gangrenous, assuming all the characteristics of hospital gangrene. from the crowded condition, filthy habits, bad diet, and dejected, depressed condition of the prisoners, their systems had become so disordered that the smallest abrasion of the skin, from the rubbing of a shoe, or from the effects of the sun, or from the prick of a splinter, or from scratching, or a musketo bite, in some cases, took on rapid and frightful ulceration and gangrene. the long use of salt meat, ofttimes imperfectly cured, as well as the most total deprivation of vegetables and fruit, appeared to be the chief causes of the scurvy. i carefully examined the bakery and the bread furnished the prisoners, and found that they were supplied almost entirely with corn-bread from which the husk had not been separated. this husk acted as an irritant to the alimentary canal, without adding any nutriment to the bread. as far as my examination extended no fault could be found with the mode in which the bread was baked; the difficulty lay in the failure to separate the husk from the corn-meal. i strongly urged the preparation of large quantities of soup made from the cow and calves' heads with the brains and tongues, to which a liberal supply of sweet potatos and vegetables might have been advantageously added. the material existed in abundance for the preparation of such soup in large quantities with but little additional expense. such aliment would have been not only highly nutritious, but it would also have acted as an efficient remedial agent for the removal of the scorbutic condition. the sick within the stockade lay under several long sheds which were originally built for barracks. these sheds covered two floors which were open on all sides. the sick lay upon the bare boards, or upon such ragged blankets as they possessed, without, as far as i observed, any bedding or even straw. ............................ the haggard, distressed countenances of these miserable, complaining, dejected, living skeletons, crying for medical aid and food, and cursing their government for its refusal to exchange prisoners, and the ghastly corpses, with their glazed eye balls staring up into vacant space, with the flies swarming down their open and grinning mouths, and over their ragged clothes, infested with numerous lice, as they lay amongst the sick and dying, formed a picture of helpless, hopeless misery which it would be impossible to portray bywords or by the brush. a feeling of disappointment and even resentment on account of the united states government upon the subject of the exchange of prisoners, appeared to be widespread, and the apparent hopeless nature of the negotiations for some general exchange of prisoners appeared to be a cause of universal regret and deep and injurious despondency. i heard some of the prisoners go so far as to exonerate the confederate government from any charge of intentionally subjecting them to a protracted confinement, with its necessary and unavoidable sufferings, in a country cut off from all intercourse with foreign nations, and sorely pressed on all sides, whilst on the other hand they charged their prolonged captivity upon their own government, which was attempting to make the negro equal to the white man. some hundred or more of the prisoners had been released from confinement in the stockade on parole, and filled various offices as clerks, druggists, and carpenters, etc., in the various departments. these men were well clothed, and presented a stout and healthy appearance, and as a general rule they presented a much more robust and healthy appearance than the confederate troops guarding the prisoners. the entire grounds are surrounded by a frail board fence, and are strictly guarded by confederate soldiers, and no prisoner except the paroled attendants is allowed to leave the grounds except by a special permit from the commandant of the interior of the prison. the patients and attendants, near two thousand in number, are crowded into this confined space and are but poorly supplied with old and ragged tents. large numbers of them were without any bunks in the tents, and lay upon the ground, oft-times without even a blanket. no beds or straw appeared to have been furnished. the tents extend to within a few yards of the small stream, the eastern portion of which, as we have before said, is used as a privy and is loaded with excrements; and i observed a large pile of corn-bread, bones, and filth of all kinds, thirty feet in diameter and several feet in hight, swarming with myriads of flies, in a vacant space near the pots used for cooking. millions of flies swarmed over everything, and covered the faces of the sleeping patients, and crawled down their open mouths, and deposited their maggots in the gangrenous wounds of the living, and in the mouths of the dead. musketos in great numbers also infested the tents, and many of the patients were so stung by these pestiferous insects, that they resembled those suffering from a slight attack of the measles. the police and hygiene of the hospital were defective in the extreme; the attendants, who appeared in almost every instance to have been selected from the prisoners, seemed to have in many cases but little interest in the welfare of their fellow-captives. the accusation was made that the nurses in many cases robbed the sick of their clothing, money, and rations, and carried on a clandestine trade with the paroled prisoners and confederate guards without the hospital enclosure, in the clothing, effects of the sick, dying, and dead federals. they certainly appeared to neglect the comfort and cleanliness of the sick intrusted to their care in a most shameful manner, even after making due allowances for the difficulties of the situation. many of the sick were literally encrusted with dirt and filth and covered with vermin. when a gangrenous wound needed washing, the limb was thrust out a little from the blanket, or board, or rags upon which the patient was lying, and water poured over it, and all the putrescent matter allowed to soak into the ground floor of the tent. the supply of rags for dressing wounds was said to be very scant, and i saw the most filthy rags which had been applied several times, and imperfectly washed, used in dressing wounds. where hospital gangrene was prevailing, it was impossible for any wound to escape contagion under these circumstances. the results of the treatment of wounds in the hospital were of the most unsatisfactory character, from this neglect of cleanliness, in the dressings and wounds themselves, as well as from various other causes which will be more fully considered. i saw several gangrenous wounds filled with maggots. i have frequently seen neglected wounds amongst the confederate soldiers similarly affected; and as far as my experience extends, these worms destroy only the dead tissues and do not injure specially the well parts. i have even heard surgeons affirm that a gangrenous wound which had been thoroughly cleansed by maggots, healed more rapidly than if it had been left to itself. this want of cleanliness on the part of the nurses appeared to be the result of carelessness and inattention, rather than of malignant design, and the whole trouble can be traced to the want of the proper police and sanitary regulations, and to the absence of intelligent organization and division of labor. the abuses were in a large measure due to the almost total absence of system, government, and rigid, but wholesome sanitary regulations. in extenuation of these abuses it was alleged by the medical officers that the confederate troops were barely sufficient to guard the prisoners, and that it was impossible to obtain any number of experienced nurses from the confederate forces. in fact the guard appeared to be too small, even for the regulation of the internal hygiene and police of the hospital. the manner of disposing of the dead was also calculated to depress the already desponding spirits of these men, many of whom have been confined for months, and even for nearly two years in richmond and other places, and whose strength had been wasted by bad air, bad food, and neglect of personal cleanliness. the dead-house is merely a frame covered with old tent cloth and a few bushes, situated in the southwestern corner of the hospital grounds. when a patient dies, he is simply laid in the narrow street in front of his tent, until he is removed by federal negros detailed to carry off the dead; if a patient dies during the night, he lies there until the morning, and during the day even the dead were frequently allowed to remain for hours in these walks. in the dead-house the corpses lie upon the bare ground, and were in most cases covered with filth and vermin. ............................ the cooking arrangements are of the most defective character. five large iron pots similar to those used for boiling sugar cane, appeared to be the only cooking utensils furnished by the hospital for the cooking of nearly two thousand men; and the patients were dependent in great measure upon their own miserable utensils. they were allowed to cook in the tent doors and in the lanes, and this was another source of filth, and another favorable condition for the generation and multiplication of flies and other vermin. the air of the tents was foul and disagreeable in the extreme, and in fact the entire grounds emitted a most nauseous and disgusting smell. i entered nearly all the tents and carefully examined the cases of interest, and especially the cases of gangrene, upon numerous occasions, during the prosecution of my pathological inquiries at andersonville, and therefore enjoyed every opportunity to judge correctly of the hygiene and police of the hospital. there appeared to be almost absolute indifference and neglect on the part of the patients of personal cleanliness; their persons and clothing inmost instances, and especially of those suffering with gangrene and scorbutic ulcers, were filthy in the extreme and covered with vermin. it was too often the case that patients were received from the stockade in a most deplorable condition. i have seen men brought in from the stockade in a dying condition, begrimed from head to foot with their own excrements, and so black from smoke and filth that they, resembled negros rather than white men. that this description of the stockade and hospital has not been overdrawn, will appear from the reports of the surgeons in charge, appended to this report. ......................... we will examine first the consolidated report of the sick and wounded federal prisoners. during six months, from the 1st of march to the 31st of august, forty-two thousand six hundred and eighty-six cases of diseases and wounds were reported. no classified record of the sick in the stockade was kept after the establishment of the hospital without the prison. this fact, in conjunction with those already presented relating to the insufficiency of medical officers and the extreme illness and even death of many prisoners in the tents in the stockade, without any medical attention or record beyond the bare number of the dead, demonstrate that these figures, large as they, appear to be, are far below the truth. as the number of prisoners varied greatly at different periods, the relations between those reported sick and well, as far as those statistics extend, can best be determined by a comparison of the statistics of each month. during this period of six months no less than five hundred and sixty-five deaths are recorded under the head of 'morbi vanie.' in other words, those men died without having received sufficient medical attention for the determination of even the name of the disease causing death. during the month of august fifty-three cases and fifty-three deaths are recorded as due to marasmus. surely this large number of deaths must have been due to some other morbid state than slow wasting. if they were due to improper and insufficient food, they should have been classed accordingly, and if to diarrhea or dysentery or scurvy, the classification should in like manner have been explicit. we observe a progressive increase of the rate of mortality, from 3.11 per cent. in march to 9.09 per cent. of mean strength, sick and well, in august. the ratio of mortality continued to increase during september, for notwithstanding the removal of one-half of the entire number of prisoners during the early portion of the month, one thousand seven hundred and sixty-seven (1,767) deaths are registered from september 1 to 21, and the largest number of deaths upon any one day occurred during this month, on the 16th, viz. one hundred and nineteen. the entire number of federal prisoners confined at andersonville was about forty thousand six hundred and eleven; and during the period of near seven months, from february 24 to september 21, nine thousand four hundred and seventy-nine (9,479) deaths were recorded; that is, during this period near one-fourth, or more, exactly one in 4.2, or 13.3 per cent., terminated fatally. this increase of mortality was due in great measure to the accumulation of the sources of disease, as the increase of excrements and filth of all kinds, and the concentration of noxious effluvia, and also to the progressive effects of salt diet, crowding, and the hot climate. conclusions. 1st. the great mortality among the federal prisoners confined in the military prison at andersonville was not referable to climatic causes, or to the nature of the soil and waters. 2d. the chief causes of death were scurvy and its results and bowel affections-chronic and acute diarrhea and dysentery. the bowel affections appear to have been due to the diet, the habits of the patients, the depressed, dejected state of the nervous system and moral and intellectual powers, and to the effluvia arising from the decomposing animal and vegetable filth. the effects of salt meat, and an unvarying diet of cornmeal, with but few vegetables, and imperfect supplies of vinegar and syrup, were manifested in the great prevalence of scurvy. this disease, without doubt, was also influenced to an important extent in its origin and course by the foul animal emanations. 3d. from the sameness of the food and form, the action of the poisonous gases in the densely crowded and filthy stockade and hospital, the blood was altered in its constitution, even before the manifestation of actual disease. in both the well and the sick the red corpuscles were diminished; and in all diseases uncomplicated with inflammation, the fibrous element was deficient. in cases of ulceration of the mucous membrane of the intestinal canal, the fibrous element of the blood was increased; while in simple diarrhea, uncomplicated with ulceration, it was either diminished or else remained stationary. heart clots were very common, if not universally present, in cases of ulceration of the intestinal mucous membrane, while in the uncomplicated cases of diarrhea and scurvy, the blood was fluid and did not coagulate readily, and the heart clots and fibrous concretions were almost universally absent. from the watery condition of the blood, there resulted various serous effusions into the pericardium, ventricles of the brain, and into the abdomen. in almost all the cases which i examined after death, even the most emaciated, there was more or less serous effusion into the abdominal cavity. in cases of hospital gangrene of the extremities, and in cases of gangrene of the intestines, heart clots and fibrous coagula were universally present. the presence of those clots in the cases of hospital gangrene, while they were absent in the cases in which there was no inflammatory symptoms, sustains the conclusion that hospital gangrene is a species of inflammation, imperfect and irregular though it may be in its progress, in which the fibrous element and coagulation of the blood are increased, even in those who are suffering from such a condition of the blood, and from such diseases as are naturally accompanied with a decrease in the fibrous constituent. 4th. the fact that hospital gangrene appeared in the stockade first, and originated spontaneously without any previous contagion, and occurred sporadically all over the stockade and prison hospital, was proof positive that this disease will arise whenever the conditions of crowding, filth, foul air, and bad diet are present. the exhalations from the hospital and stockade appeared to exert their effects to a considerable distance outside of these localities. the origin of hospital gangrene among these prisoners appeared clearly to depend in great measure upon the state of the general system induced by diet, and various external noxious influences. the rapidity of the appearance and action of the gangrene depended upon the powers and state of the constitution, as well as upon the intensity of the poison in the atmosphere, or upon the direct application of poisonous matter to the wounded surface. this was further illustrated by the important fact that hospital gangrene, or a disease resembling it in all essential respects, attacked the intestinal canal of patients laboring under ulceration of the bowels, although there were no local manifestations of gangrene upon the surface of the body. this mode of termination in cases of dysentery was quite common in the foul atmosphere of the confederate states military hospital, in the depressed, depraved condition of the system of these federal prisoners. 5th. a scorbutic condition of the system appeared to favor the origin of foul ulcers, which frequently took on true hospital gangrene. scurvy and hospital gangrene frequently existed in the same individual. in such cases, vegetable diet, with vegetable acids, would remove the scorbutic condition without curing the hospital gangrene. from the results of the existing war for the establishment of the independence of the confederate states, as well as from the published observations of dr. trotter, sir gilbert blane, and others of the english navy and army, it is evident that the scorbutic condition of the system, especially in crowded ships and camps, is most favorable to the origin and spread of foul ulcers and hospital gangrene. as in the present case of andersonville, so also in past times when medical hygiene was almost entirely neglected, those two diseases were almost universally associated in crowded ships. in many cases it was very difficult to decide at first whether the ulcer was a simple result of scurvy or of the action of the prison or hospital gangrene, for there was great similarity in the appearance of the ulcers in the two diseases. so commonly have those two diseases been combined in their origin and action, that the description of scorbutic ulcers, by many authors, evidently includes also many of the prominent characteristics of hospital gangrene. this will be rendered evident by an examination of the observations of dr. lind and sir gilbert blane upon scorbutic ulcers. 6th. gangrenous spots followed by rapid destruction of tissue appeared in some cases where there had been no known wound. without such well-established facts, it might be assumed that the disease was propagated from one patient to another. in such a filthy and crowded hospital as that of the confederate states military prison at andersonville, it was impossible to isolate the wounded from the sources of actual contact of the gangrenous matter. the flies swarming over the wounds and over filth of every kind, the filthy, imperfectly washed and scanty supplies of rags, and the limited supply of washing utensils, the same wash-bowl serving for scores of patients, were sources of such constant circulation of the gangrenous matter that the disease might rapidly spread from a single gangrenous wound. the fact already stated, that a form of moist gangrene, resembling hospital gangrene, was quite common in this foul atmosphere, in cases of dysentery, both with and without the existence of the disease upon the entire surface, not only demonstrates the dependence of the disease upon the state of the constitution, but proves in the clearest manner that neither the contact of the poisonous matter of gangrene, nor the direct action of the poisonous atmosphere upon the ulcerated surfaces is necessary to the development of the disease. 7th. in this foul atmosphere amputation did not arrest hospital gangrene; the disease almost invariably returned. almost every amputation was followed finally by death, either from the effects of gangrene or from the prevailing diarrhea and dysentery. nitric acid and escharotics generally in this crowded atmosphere, loaded with noxious effluvia, exerted only temporary effects; after their application to the diseased surfaces, the gangrene would frequently return with redoubled energy; and even after the gangrene had been completely removed by local and constitutional treatment, it would frequently return and destroy the patient. as far as my observation extended, very few of the cases of amputation for gangrene recovered. the progress of these cases was frequently very deceptive. i have observed after death the most extensive disorganization of the structures of the stump, when during life there was but little swelling of the part, and the patient was apparently doing well. i endeavored to impress upon the medical officers the view that in this disease treatment was almost useless, without an abundant supply of pure, fresh air, nutritious food, and tonics and stimulants. such changes, however, as would allow of the isolation of the cases of hospital gangrene appeared to be out of the power of the medical officers. 8th. the gangrenous mass was without true pus, and consisted chiefly of broken-down, disorganized structures. the reaction of the gangrenous matter in certain stages was alkaline. 9th. the best, and in truth the only means of protecting large armies and navies, as well as prisoners, from the ravages of hospital gangrene, is to furnish liberal supplies of well-cured meat, together with fresh beef and vegetables, and to enforce a rigid system of hygiene. 10th. finally, this gigantic mass of human misery calls loudly for relief, not only for the sake of suffering humanity, but also on account of our own brave soldiers now captives in the hands of the federal government. strict justice to the gallant men of the confederate armies, who have been or who may be, so unfortunate as to be compelled to surrender in battle, demands that the confederate government should adopt that course which will best secure their health and comfort in captivity; or at least leave their enemies without a shadow of an excuse for any violation of the rules of civilized warfare in the treatment of prisoners. [end of the witness's testimony.] the variation--from month to month--of the proportion of deaths to the whole number living is singular and interesting. it supports the theory i have advanced above, as the following facts, taken from the official report, will show: in april one in every sixteen died. in may one in every twenty-six died. in june one in every twenty-two died. in july one in every eighteen died. in august one in every eleven died. in september one in every three died. in october one in every two died. in november one in every three died. does the reader fully understand that in september one-third of those in the pen died, that in october one-half of the remainder perished, and in november one-third of those who still survived, died? let him pause for a moment and read this over carefully again; because its startling magnitude will hardly dawn upon him at first reading. it is true that the fearfully disproportionate mortality of those months was largely due to the fact that it was mostly the sick that remained behind, but even this diminishes but little the frightfulness of the showing. did any one ever hear of an epidemic so fatal that one-third of those attacked by it in one month died; one-half of the remnant the next month, and one-third of the feeble remainder the next month? if he did, his reading has been much more extensive than mine. the greatest number of deaths in one day is reported to have occurred on the 23d of august, when one hundred and twenty-seven died, or one man every eleven minutes. the greatest number of prisoners in the stockade is stated to have been august 8, when there were thirty-three thousand one hundred and fourteen. i have always imagined both these statements to be short of the truth, because my remembrance is that one day in august i counted over two hundred dead lying in a row. as for the greatest number of prisoners, i remember quite distinctly standing by the ration wagon during the whole time of the delivery of rations, to see how many prisoners there really were inside. that day the one hundred and thirty-third detachment was called, and its sergeant came up and drew rations for a full detachment. all the other detachments were habitually kept full by replacing those who died with new comers. as each detachment consisted of two hundred and seventy men, one hundred and thirty-three detachments would make thirty-five thousand nine hundred and ten, exclusive of those in the hospital, and those detailed outside as cooks, clerks, hospital attendants and various other employments--say from one to two thousand more. andersonville a story of rebel military prisons fifteen months a guest of the so-called southern confederacy a private soldiers experience in richmond, andersonville, savannah, millen blackshear and florence by john mcelroy late of co. l. 16th ill cav. 1879 volume 4. chapter lxii. sergeant leroy l. key--his adventures subsequent to the executions --he goes outside at andersonville on parole--labors in the cook-house --attempts to escape--is recaptured and taken to macon--escapes from there, but is compelled to return--is finally exchanged at savannah. leroy l. key, the heroic sergeant of company m, sixteenth illinois cavalry, who organized and led the regulators at andersonville in their successful conflict with and defeat of the raiders, and who presided at the execution of the six condemned men on the 11th of july, furnishes, at the request of the author, the following story of his prison career subsequent to that event: on the 12th day of july, 1864, the day after the hanging of the six raiders, by the urgent request of my many friends (of whom you were one), i sought and obtained from wirz a parole for myself and the six brave men who assisted as executioners of those desperados. it seemed that you were all fearful that we might, after what had been done, be assassinated if we remained in the stockade; and that we might be overpowered, perhaps, by the friends of the raiders we had hanged, at a time possibly, when you would not be on hand to give us assistance, and thus lose our lives for rendering the help we did in getting rid of the worst pestilence we had to contend with. on obtaining my parole i was very careful to have it so arranged and mutually understood, between wirz and myself, that at any time that my squad (meaning the survivors of my comrades, with whom i was originally captured) was sent away from andersonville, either to be exchanged or to go to another prison, that i should be allowed to go with them. this was agreed to, and so written in my parole which i carried until it absolutely wore out. i took a position in the cook-house, and the other boys either went to work there, or at the hospital or grave-yard as occasion required. i worked here, and did the best i could for the many starving wretches inside, in the way of preparing their food, until the eighth day of september, at which time, if you remember, quite a train load of men were removed, as many of us thought, for the purpose of exchange; but, as we afterwards discovered, to be taken to another prison. among the crowd so removed was my squad, or, at least, a portion of them, being my intimate mess-mates while in the stockade. as soon as i found this to be the case i waited on wirz at his office, and asked permission to go with them, which he refused, stating that he was compelled to have men at the cookhouse to cook for those in the stockade until they were all gone or exchanged. i reminded him of the condition in my parole, but this only had the effect of making him mad, and he threatened me with the stocks if i did not go back and resume work. i then and there made up my mind to attempt my escape, considering that the parole had first been broken by the man that granted it. on inquiry after my return to the cook-house, i found four other boys who were also planning an escape, and who were only too glad to get me to join them and take charge of the affair. our plans were well laid and well executed, as the sequel will prove, and in this particular my own experience in the endeavor to escape from andersonville is not entirely dissimilar from yours, though it had different results. i very much regret that in the attempt i lost my penciled memorandum, in which it was my habit to chronicle what went on around me daily, and where i had the names of my brave comrades who made the effort to escape with me. unfortunately, i cannot now recall to memory the name of one of them or remember to what commands they belonged. i knew that our greatest risk was run in eluding the guards, and that in the morning we should be compelled to cheat the blood-hounds. the first we managed to do very well, not without many hairbreadth escapes, however; but we did succeed in getting through both lines of guards, and found ourselves in the densest pine forest i ever saw. we traveled, as nearly as we could judge, due north all night until daylight. from our fatigue and bruises, and the long hours that had elapsed since 8 o'clock, the time of our starting, we thought we had come not less than twelve or fifteen miles. imagine our surprise and mortification, then, when we could plainly hear the reveille, and almost the sergeant's voice calling the roll, while the answers of "here!" were perfectly distinct. we could not possibly have been more than a mile, or a mile-and-a-half at the farthest, from the stockade. our anxiety and mortification were doubled when at the usual hour--as we supposed--we heard the well-known and long-familiar sound of the hunter's horn, calling his hounds to their accustomed task of making the circuit of the stockade, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not any "yankee" had had the audacity to attempt an escape. the hounds, anticipating, no doubt, this usual daily work, gave forth glad barks of joy at being thus called forth to duty. we heard them start, as was usual, from about the railroad depot (as we imagined), but the sounds growing fainter and fainter gave us a little hope that our trail had been missed. only a short time, however, were we allowed this pleasant reflection, for ere long--it could not have been more than an hour--we could plainly see that they were drawing nearer and nearer. they finally appeared so close that i advised the boys to climb a tree or sapling in order to keep the dogs from biting them, and to be ready to surrender when the hunters came up, hoping thus to experience as little misery as possible, and not dreaming but that we were caught. on, on came the hounds, nearer and nearer still, till we imagined that we could see the undergrowth in the forest shaking by coming in contact with their bodies. plainer and plainer came the sound of the hunter's voice urging them forward. our hearts were in our throats, and in the terrible excitement we wondered if it could be possible for providence to so arrange it that the dogs would pass us. this last thought, by some strange fancy, had taken possession of me, and i here frankly acknowledge that i believed it would happen. why i believed it, god only knows. my excitement was so great, indeed, that i almost lost sight of our danger, and felt like shouting to the dogs myself, while i came near losing my hold on the tree in which i was hidden. by chance i happened to look around at my nearest neighbor in distress. his expression was sufficient to quell any enthusiasm i might have had, and i, too, became despondent. in a very few minutes our suspense was over. the dogs came within not less than three hundred yards of us, and we could even see one of them, god in heaven can only imagine what great joy was then, brought to our aching hearts, for almost instantly upon coming into sight, the hounds struck off on a different trail, and passed us. their voices became fainter and fainter, until finally we could hear them no longer. about noon, however, they were called back and taken to camp, but until that time not one of us left our position in the trees. when we were satisfied that we were safe for the present, we descended to the ground to get what rest we could, in order to be prepared for the night's march, having previously agreed to travel at night and sleep in the day time. "our father, who art in heaven," etc., were the first words that escaped my lips, and the first thoughts that came to my mind as i landed on terra firma. never before, or since, had i experienced such a profound reverence for almighty god, for i firmly believe that only through some mighty invisible power were we at that time delivered from untold tortures. had we been found, we might have been torn and mutilated by the dogs, or, taken back to andersonville, have suffered for days or perhaps weeks in the stocks or chain gang, as the humor of wirz might have dictated at the time--either of which would have been almost certain death. it was very fortunate for us that before our escape from andersonville we were detailed at the cook-house, for by this means we were enabled to bring away enough food to live for several days without the necessity of theft. each one of us had our haversacks full of such small delicacies as it was possible for us to get when we started, these consisting of corn bread and fat bacon--nothing less, nothing more. yet we managed to subsist comfortably until our fourth day out, when we happened to come upon a sweet potato patch, the potatos in which had not been dug. in a very short space of time we were all well supplied with this article, and lived on them raw during that day and the next night. just at evening, in going through a field, we suddenly came across three negro men, who at first sight of us showed signs of running, thinking, as they told us afterward, that we were the "patrols." after explaining to them who we were and our condition, they took us to a very quiet retreat in the woods, and two of them went off, stating that they would soon be back. in a very short time they returned laden with well cooked provisions, which not only gave us a good supper, but supplied us for the next day with all that we wanted. they then guided us on our way for several miles, and left us, after having refused compensation for what they had done. we continued to travel in this way for nine long weary nights, and on the morning of the tenth day, as we were going into the woods to hide as usual, a little before daylight, we came to a small pond at which there was a negro boy watering two mules before hitching them to a cane mill, it then being cane grinding time in georgia. he saw us at the same time we did him, and being frightened put whip to the animals and ran off. we tried every way to stop him, but it was no use. he had the start of us. we were very fearful of the consequences of this mishap, but had no remedy, and being very tired, could do nothing else but go into the woods, go to sleep and trust to luck. the next thing i remembered was being punched in the ribs by my comrade nearest to me, and aroused with the remark, "we are gone up." on opening my eyes, i saw four men, in citizens' dress, each of whom had a shot gun ready for use. we were ordered to get up. the first question asked us was: "who are you." this was spoken in so mild a tone as to lead me to believe that we might possibly be in the hands of gentlemen, if not indeed in those of friends. it was some time before any one answered. the boys, by their looks and the expression of their countenances, seemed to appeal to me for a reply to get them out of their present dilemma, if possible. before i had time to collect my thoughts, we were startled by these words, coming from the same man that had asked the original question: "you had better not hesitate, for we have an idea who you are, and should it prove that we are correct, it will be the worse for you." "'who do you think we are?' i inquired." "'horse thieves and moss-backs,' was the reply." i jumped at the conclusion instantly that in order to save our lives, we had better at once own the truth. in a very few words i told them who we were, where we were from, how long we had been on the road, etc. at this they withdrew a short distance from us for consultation, leaving us for the time in terrible suspense as to what our fate might be. soon, how ever, they returned and informed us that they would be compelled to take us to the county jail, to await further orders from the military commander of the district. while they were talking together, i took a hasty inventory of what valuables we had on hand. i found in the crowd four silver watches, about three hundred dollars in confederate money, and possibly, about one hundred dollars in greenbacks. before their return, i told the boys to be sure not to refuse any request i should make. said i: "'gentlemen, we have here four silver watches and several hundred dollars in confederate money and greenbacks, all of which we now offer you, if you will but allow us to proceed on our journey, we taking our own chances in the future.'" this proposition, to my great surprise, was refused. i thought then that possibly i had been a little indiscreet in exposing our valuables, but in this i was mistaken, for we had, indeed, fallen into the hands of gentlemen, whose zeal for the lost cause was greater than that for obtaining worldly wealth, and who not only refused the bribe, but took us to a well-furnished and well-supplied farm house close by, gave us an excellent breakfast, allowing us to sit at the table in a beautiful dining-room, with a lady at the head, filled our haversacks with good, wholesome food, and allowed us to keep our property, with an admonition to be careful how we showed it again. we were then put into a wagon and taken to hamilton, a small town, the county seat of hamilton county, georgia, and placed in jail, where we remained for two days and nights --fearing, always, that the jail would be burned over our heads, as we heard frequent threats of that nature, by the mob on the streets. but the same kind providence that had heretofore watched over us, seemed not to have deserted us in this trouble. one of the days we were confined at this place was sunday, and some kind-hearted lady or ladies (i only wish i knew their names, as well as those of the gentlemen who had us first in charge, so that i could chronicle them with honor here) taking compassion upon our forlorn condition, sent us a splendid dinner on a very large china platter. whether it was done intentionally or not, we never learned, but it was a fact, however, that there was not a knife, fork or spoon upon the dish, and no table to set it upon. it was placed on the floor, around which we soon gathered, and, with grateful hearts, we "got away" with it all, in an incredibly short space of time, while many men and boys looked on, enjoying our ludicrous attitudes and manners. from here we were taken to columbus, ga., and again placed in jail, and in the charge of confederate soldiers. we could easily see that we were gradually getting into hot water again, and that, ere many days, we would have to resume our old habits in prison. our only hope now was that we would not be returned to andersonville, knowing well that if we got back into the clutches of wirz our chances for life would be slim indeed. from columbus we were sent by rail to macon, where we were placed in a prison somewhat similar to andersonville, but of nothing like its pretensions to security. i soon learned that it was only used as a kind of reception place for the prisoners who were captured in small squads, and when they numbered two or three hundred, they would be shipped to andersonville, or some other place of greater dimensions and strength. what became of the other boys who were with me, after we got to macon, i do not know, for i lost sight of them there. the very next day after our arrival, there were shipped to andersonville from this prison between two and three hundred men. i was called on to go with the crowd, but having had a sufficient experience of the hospitality of that hotel, i concluded to play "old soldier," so i became too sick to travel. in this way i escaped being sent off four different times. meanwhile, quite a large number of commissioned officers had been sent up from charleston to be exchanged at rough and ready. with them were about forty more than the cartel called for, and they were left at macon for ten days or two weeks. among these officers were several of my acquaintance, one being lieut. huntly of our regiment (i am not quite sure that i am right in the name of this officer, but i think i am), through whose influence i was allowed to go outside with them on parole. it was while enjoying this parole that i got more familiarly acquainted with captain hurtell, or hurtrell, who was in command of the prison at macon, and to his honor, i here assert, that he was the only gentleman and the only officer that had the least humane feeling in his breast, who ever had charge of me while a prisoner of war after we were taken out of the hands of our original captors at jonesville, va. it now became very evident that the rebels were moving the prisoners from andersonville and elsewhere, so as to place them beyond the reach of sherman and stoneman. at my present place of confinement the fear of our recapture had also taken possession of the rebel authorities, so the prisoners were sent off in much smaller squads than formerly, frequently not more than ten or fifteen in a gang, whereas, before, they never thought of dispatching less than two or three hundred together. i acknowledge that i began to get very uneasy, fearful that the "old soldier" dodge would not be much longer successful, and i would be forced back to my old haunts. it so happened, however, that i managed to make it serve me, by getting detailed in the prison hospital as nurse, so that i was enabled to play another "dodge" upon the rebel officers. at first, when the sergeant would come around to find out who were able to walk, with assistance, to the depot, i was shaking with a chill, which, according to my representation, had not abated in the least for several hours. my teeth were actually chattering at the time, for i had learned how to make them do so. i was passed. the next day the orders for removal were more stringent than had yet been issued, stating that all who could stand it to be removed on stretchers must go. i concluded at once that i was gone, so as soon as i learned how matters were, i got out from under my dirty blanket, stood up and found i was able to walk, to my great astonishment, of course. an officer came early in the morning to muster us into ranks preparatory for removal. i fell in with the rest. we were marched out and around to the gate of the prison. now, it so happened that just as we neared the gate of the prison, the prisoners were being marched from the stockade. the officer in charge of us--we numbering possibly about ten--undertook to place us at the head of the column coming out, but the guard in charge of that squad refused to let him do so. we were then ordered to stand at one side with no guard over us but the officer who had brought us from the hospital. taking this in at a glance, i concluded that now was my chance to make my second attempt to escape. i stepped behind the gate office (a small frame building with only one room), which was not more than six feet from me, and as luck (or providence) would have it, the negro man whose duty it was, as i knew, to wait on and take care of this office, and who had taken quite a liking for me, was standing at the back door. i winked at him and threw him my blanket and the cup, at the same time telling him in a whisper to hide them away for me until he heard from me again. with a grin and a nod, he accepted the trust, and i started down along the walls of the stockade alone. in order to make this more plain, and to show what a risk i was running at the time, i will state that between the stockade and a brick wall, fully as high as the stockade fence that was parallel with it, throughout its entire length on that side, there was a space of not more than thirty feet. on the outside of this stockade was a platform, built for the guards to walk on, sufficiently clear the top to allow them to look inside with ease, and on this side, on the platform, were three guards. i had traveled about fifty feet only, from the gate office, when i heard the command to "halt!" i did so, of course. "where are you going, you d---d yank?" said the guard. "going after my clothes, that are over there in the wash," pointing to a small cabin just beyond the stockade, where i happened to know that the officers had their washing done. "oh, yes," said he; "you are one of the yank's that's been on, parole, are you?" "yes." "well, hurry up, or you will get left." the other guards heard this conversation and thinking it all right i was allowed to pass without further trouble. i went to the cabin in question--for i saw the last guard on the line watching me, and boldly entered. i made a clear statement to the woman in charge of it about how i had made my escape, and asked her to secrete me in the house until night. i was soon convinced, however, from what she told me, as well as from my own knowledge of how things were managed in the confederacy, that it would not be right for me to stay there, for if the house was searched and i found in it, it would be the worse for her. therefore, not wishing to entail misery upon another, i begged her to give me something to eat, and going to the swamp near by, succeeded in getting well without detection. i lay there all day, and during the time had a very severe chill and afterwards a burning fever, so that when night came, knowing i could not travel, i resolved to return to the cabin and spend the night, and give myself up the next morning. there was no trouble in returning. i learned that my fears of the morning had not been groundless, for the guards had actually searched the house for me. the woman told them that i had got my clothes and left the house shortly after my entrance (which was the truth except the part about the clothes), i thanked her very kindly and begged to be allowed to stay in the cabin till morning, when i would present myself at captain h.'s office and suffer the consequences. this she allowed me to do. i shall ever feel grateful to this woman for her protection. she was white and her given name was "sallie," but the other i have forgotten. about daylight i strolled over near the office and looked around there until i saw the captain take his seat at his desk. i stepped into the door as soon as i saw that he was not occupied and saluted him "a la militaire." "who are you?" he asked; "you look like a yank." "yes, sir," said i, "i am called by that name since i was captured in the federal army." "well, what are you doing here, and what is your name?" i told him. "why didn't you answer to your name when it was called at the gate yesterday, sir?" "i never heard anyone call my name." where were you?" "i ran away down into the swamp." "were you re-captured and brought back?" "no, sir, i came back of my own accord." "what do you mean by this evasion?" "i am not trying to evade, sir, or i might not have been here now. the truth is, captain, i have been in many prisons since my capture, and have been treated very badly in all of them, until i came here." "i then explained to him freely my escape from andersonville, and my subsequent re-capture, how it was that i had played 'old soldier' etc." "now," said i, "captain, as long as i am a prisoner of war, i wish to stay with you, or under your command. this is my reason for running away yesterday, when i felt confident that if i did not do so i would be returned under wirz's command, and, if i had been so returned, i would have killed myself rather than submit to the untold tortures which he would have put me to, for having the audacity to attempt an escape from him." the captain's attention was here called to some other matters in hand, and i was sent back into the stockade with a command very pleasantly given, that i should stay there until ordered out, which i very gratefully promised to do, and did. this was the last chance i ever had to talk to captain hurtrell, to my great sorrow, for i had really formed a liking for the man, notwithstanding the fact that he was a rebel, and a commander of prisoners. the next day we all had to leave macon. whether we were able or not, the order was imperative. great was my joy when i learned that we were on the way to savannah and not to andersonville. we traveled over the same road, so well described in one of your articles on andersonville, and arrived in savannah sometime in the afternoon of the 21st day of november, 1864. our squad was placed in some barracks and confined there until the next day. i was sick at the time, so sick in fact, that i could hardly hold my head up. soon after, we were taken to the florida depot, as they told us, to be shipped to some prison in those dismal swamps. i came near fainting when this was told to us, for i was confident that i could not survive another siege of prison life, if it was anything to compare to-what i had already suffered. when we arrived at the depot, it was raining. the officer in charge of us wanted to know what train to put us on, for there were two, if not three, trains waiting orders to start. he was told to march us on to a certain flat car, near by, but before giving the order he demanded a receipt for us, which the train officer refused. we were accordingly taken back to our quarters, which proved to be a most fortunate circumstance. on the 23d day of november, to our great relief, we were called upon to sign a parole preparatory to being sent down the river on the flat-boat to our exchange ships, then lying in the harbor. when i say we, i mean those of us that had recently come from macon, and a few others, who had also been fortunate in reaching savannah in small squads. the other poor fellows, who had already been loaded on the trains, were taken away to florida, and many of them never lived to return. on the 24th those of us who had been paroled were taken on board our ships, and were once more safely housed under that great, glorious and beautiful star spangled banner. long may she wave. chapter lxiii. dreary weather--the cold rains distress all and kill hundreds--exchange of ten thousand sick--captain bowes turns a pretty, but not very honest, penny. as november wore away long-continued, chill, searching rains desolated our days and nights. the great, cold drops pelted down slowly, dismally, and incessantly. each seemed to beat through our emaciated frames against the very marrow of our bones, and to be battering its way remorselessly into the citadel of life, like the cruel drops that fell from the basin of the inquisitors upon the firmly-fastened head of their victim, until his reason fled, and the death-agony cramped his heart to stillness. the lagging, leaden hours were inexpressibly dreary. compared with many others, we were quite comfortable, as our hut protected us from the actual beating of the rain upon our bodies; but we were much more miserable than under the sweltering heat of andersonville, as we lay almost naked upon our bed of pine leaves, shivering in the raw, rasping air, and looked out over acres of wretches lying dumbly on the sodden sand, receiving the benumbing drench of the sullen skies without a groan or a motion. it was enough to kill healthy, vigorous men, active and resolute, with bodies well-nourished and well clothed, and with minds vivacious and hopeful, to stand these day-and-night-long solid drenchings. no one can imagine how fatal it was to boys whose vitality was sapped by long months in andersonville, by coarse, meager, changeless food, by groveling on the bare earth, and by hopelessness as to any improvement of condition. fever, rheumatism, throat and lung diseases and despair now came to complete the work begun by scurvy, dysentery and gangrene, in andersonville. hundreds, weary of the long struggle, and of hoping against hope, laid themselves down and yielded to their fate. in the six weeks that we were at millen, one man in every ten died. the ghostly pines there sigh over the unnoted graves of seven hundred boys, for whom life's morning closed in the gloomiest shadows. as many as would form a splendid regiment--as many as constitute the first born of a populous city--more than three times as many as were slain outright on our side in the bloody battle of franklin, succumbed to this new hardship. the country for which they died does not even have a record of their names. they were simply blotted out of existence; they became as though they had never been. about the middle of the month the rebels yielded to the importunities of our government so far as to agree to exchange ten thousand sick. the rebel surgeons took praiseworthy care that our government should profit as little as possible by this, by sending every hopeless case, every man whose lease of life was not likely to extend much beyond his reaching the parole boat. if he once reached our receiving officers it was all that was necessary; he counted to them as much as if he had been a goliath. a very large portion of those sent through died on the way to our lines, or within a few hours after their transports at being once more under the old stars and stripes had moderated. the sending of the sick through gave our commandant--captain bowes--a fine opportunity to fill his pockets, by conniving at the passage of well men. there was still considerable money in the hands of a few prisoners. all this, and more, too, were they willing to give for their lives. in the first batch that went away were two of the leading sutlers at andersonville, who had accumulated perhaps one thousand dollars each by their shrewd and successful bartering. it was generally believed that they gave every cent to bowes for the privilege of leaving. i know nothing of the truth of this, but i am reasonably certain that they paid him very handsomely. soon we heard that one hundred and fifty dollars each had been sufficient to buy some men out; then one hundred, seventy-five, fifty, thirty, twenty, ten, and at last five dollars. whether the upright bowes drew the line at the latter figure, and refused to sell his honor for less than the ruling rates of a street-walker's virtue, i know not. it was the lowest quotation that came to my knowledge, but he may have gone cheaper. i have always observed that when men or women begin to traffic in themselves, their price falls as rapidly as that of a piece of tainted meat in hot weather. if one could buy them at the rate they wind up with, and sell them at their first price, there would be room for an enormous profit. the cheapest i ever knew a rebel officer to be bought was some weeks after this at florence. the sick exchange was still going on. i have before spoken of the rebel passion for bright gilt buttons. it used to be a proverbial comment upon the small treasons that were of daily occurrence on both sides, that you could buy the soul of a mean man in our crowd for a pint of corn meal, and the soul of a rebel guard for a half dozen brass buttons. a boy of the fifth-fourth ohio, whose home was at or near lima, o., wore a blue vest, with the gilt, bright-trimmed buttons of a staff officer. the rebel surgeon who was examining the sick for exchange saw the buttons and admired them very much. the boy stepped back, borrowed a knife from a comrade, cut the buttons off, and handed them to the doctor. "all right, sir," said he as his itching palm closed over the coveted ornaments; "you can pass," and pass he did to home and friends. captain bowes's merchandizing in the matter of exchange was as open as the issuing of rations. his agent in conducting the bargaining was a raider--a new york gambler and stool-pigeon--whom we called "mattie." he dealt quite fairly, for several times when the exchange was interrupted, bowes sent the money back to those who had paid him, and received it again when the exchange was renewed. had it been possible to buy our way out for five cents each andrews and i would have had to stay back, since we had not had that much money for months, and all our friends were in an equally bad plight. like almost everybody else we had spent the few dollars we happened to have on entering prison, in a week or so, and since then we had been entirely penniless. there was no hope left for us but to try to pass the surgeons as desperately sick, and we expended our energies in simulating this condition. rheumatism was our forte, and i flatter myself we got up two cases that were apparently bad enough to serve as illustrations for a patent medicine advertisement. but it would not do. bad as we made our condition appear, there were so many more who were infinitely worse, that we stood no show in the competitive examination. i doubt if we would have been given an average of "50" in a report. we had to stand back, and see about one quarter of our number march out and away home. we could not complain at this--much as we wanted to go ourselves, since there could be no question that these poor fellows deserved the precedence. we did grumble savagely, however, at captain bowes's venality, in selling out chances to moneyed men, since these were invariably those who were best prepared to withstand the hardships of imprisonment, as they were mostly new men, and all had good clothes and blankets. we did not blame the men, however, since it was not in human nature to resist an opportunity to get away--at any cost-from that accursed place. "all that a man hath he will give for his life," and i think that if i had owned the city of new york in fee simple, i would have given it away willingly, rather than stand in prison another month. the sutlers, to whom i have alluded above, had accumulated sufficient to supply themselves with all the necessaries and some of the comforts of life, during any probable term of imprisonment, and still have a snug amount left, but they, would rather give it all up and return to service with their regiments in the field, than take the chances of any longer continuance in prison. i can only surmise how much bowes realized out of the prisoners by his venality, but i feel sure that it could not have been less than three thousand dollars, and i would not be astonished to learn that it was ten thousand dollars in green. chapter lxiv. another removal--sherman's advance scares the rebels into running us away from millen--we are taken to savannah, and thence down the atlantic & gulf road to blackshear one night, toward the last of november, there was a general alarm around the prison. a gun was fired from the fort, the long-roll was beaten in the various camps of the guards, and the regiments answered by getting under arms in haste, and forming near the prison gates. the reason for this, which we did not learn until weeks later, was that sherman, who had cut loose from atlanta and started on his famous march to the sea, had taken such a course as rendered it probable that millen was one of his objective points. it was, therefore, necessary that we should be hurried away with all possible speed. as we had had no news from sherman since the end of the atlanta campaign, and were ignorant of his having begun his great raid, we were at an utter loss to account for the commotion among our keepers. about 3 o'clock in the morning the rebel sergeants, who called the roll, came in and ordered us to turn out immediately and get ready to move. the morning was one of the most cheerless i ever knew. a cold rain poured relentlessly down upon us half-naked, shivering wretches, as we groped around in the darkness for our pitiful little belongings of rags and cooking utensils, and huddled together in groups, urged on continually by the curses and abuse of the rebel officers sent in to get us ready to move. though roused at 3 o'clock, the cars were not ready to receive us till nearly noon. in the meantime we stood in ranks--numb, trembling, and heart-sick. the guards around us crouched over fires, and shielded themselves as best they could with blankets and bits of tent cloth. we had nothing to build fires with, and were not allowed to approach those of the guards. around us everywhere was the dull, cold, gray, hopeless desolation of the approach of minter. the hard, wiry grass that thinly covered the once and sand, the occasional stunted weeds, and the sparse foliage of the gnarled and dwarfish undergrowth, all were parched brown and sere by the fiery heat of the long summer, and now rattled drearily under the pitiless, cold rain, streaming from lowering clouds that seemed to have floated down to us from the cheerless summit of some great iceberg; the tall, naked pines moaned and shivered; dead, sapless leaves fell wearily to the sodden earth, like withered hopes drifting down to deepen some slough of despond. scores of our crowd found this the culmination of their misery. they laid down upon the ground and yielded to death as s welcome relief, and we left them lying there unburied when we moved to the cars. as we passed through the rebel camp at dawn, on our way to the cars, andrews and i noticed a nest of four large, bright, new tin pans--a rare thing in the confederacy at that time. we managed to snatch them without the guard's attention being attracted, and in an instant had them wrapped up in our blanket. but the blanket was full of holes, and in spite of all our efforts, it would slip at the most inconvenient times, so as to show a broad glare of the bright metal, just when it seemed it could not help attracting the attention of the guards or their officers. a dozen times at least we were on the imminent brink of detection, but we finally got our treasures safely to the cars, and sat down upon them. the cars were open flats. the rain still beat down unrelentingly. andrews and i huddled ourselves together so as to make our bodies afford as much heat as possible, pulled our faithful old overcoat around us as far as it would go, and endured the inclemency as best we could. our train headed back to savannah, and again our hearts warmed up with hopes of exchange. it seemed as if there could be no other purpose of taking us out of a prison so recently established and at such cost as millen. as we approached the coast the rain ceased, but a piercing cold wind set in, that threatened to convert our soaked rags into icicles. very many died on the way. when we arrived at savannah almost, if not quite, every car had upon it one whom hunger no longer gnawed or disease wasted; whom cold had pinched for the last time, and for whom the golden portals of the beyond had opened for an exchange that neither davis nor his despicable tool, winder, could control. we did not sentimentalize over these. we could not mourn; the thousands that we had seen pass away made that emotion hackneyed and wearisome; with the death of some friend and comrade as regularly an event of each day as roll call and drawing rations, the sentiment of grief had become nearly obsolete. we were not hardened; we had simply come to look upon death as commonplace and ordinary. to have had no one dead or dying around us would have been regarded as singular. besides, why should we feel any regret at the passing away of those whose condition would probably be bettered thereby! it was difficult to see where we who still lived were any better off than they who were gone before and now "forever at peace, each in his windowless palace of rest." if imprisonment was to continue only another month, we would rather be with them. arriving at savannah, we were ordered off the cars. a squad from each car carried the dead to a designated spot, and land them in a row, composing their limbs as well as possible, but giving no other funeral rites, not even making a record of their names and regiments. negro laborers came along afterwards, with carts, took the bodies to some vacant ground, and sunk them out of sight in the sand. we were given a few crackers each--the same rude imitation of "hard tack" that had been served out to us when we arrived at savannah the first time, and then were marched over and put upon a train on the atlantic & gulf railroad, running from savannah along the sea coast towards florida. what this meant we had little conception, but hope, which sprang eternal in the prisoner's breast, whispered that perhaps it was exchange; that there was some difficulty about our vessels coming to savannah, and we were being taken to some other more convenient sea port; probably to florida, to deliver us to our folks there. we satisfied ourselves that we were running along the sea coast by tasting the water in the streams we crossed, whenever we could get an opportunity to dip up some. as long as the water tasted salty we knew we were near the sea, and hope burned brightly. the truth was--as we afterwards learned--the rebels were terribly puzzled what to do with us. we were brought to savannah, but that did not solve the problem; and we were sent down the atlantic & gulf road as a temporary expedient. the railroad was the worst of the many bad ones which it was my fortune to ride upon in my excursions while a guest of the southern confederacy. it had run down until it had nearly reached the worn-out condition of that western road, of which an employee of a rival route once said, "that all there was left of it now was two streaks of rust and the right of way." as it was one of the non-essential roads to the southern confederacy, it was stripped of the best of its rolling-stock and machinery to supply the other more important lines. i have before mentioned the scarcity of grease in the south, and the difficulty of supplying the railroads with lubricants. apparently there had been no oil on the atlantic & gulf since the beginning of the war, and the screeches of the dry axles revolving in the worn-out boxes were agonizing. some thing would break on the cars or blow out on the engine every few miles, necessitating a long stop for repairs. then there was no supply of fuel along the line. when the engine ran out of wood it would halt, and a couple of negros riding on the tender would assail a panel of fence or a fallen tree with their axes, and after an hour or such matter of hard chopping, would pile sufficient wood upon the tender to enable us to renew our journey. frequently the engine stopped as if from sheer fatigue or inanition. the rebel officers tried to get us to assist it up the grade by dismounting and pushing behind. we respectfully, but firmly, declined. we were gentlemen of leisure, we said, and decidedly averse to manual labor; we had been invited on this excursion by mr. jeff. davis and his friends, who set themselves up as our entertainers, and it would be a gross breach of hospitality to reflect upon our hosts by working our passage. if this was insisted upon, we should certainly not visit them again. besides, it made no difference to us whether the train got along or not. we were not losing anything by the delay; we were not anxious to go anywhere. one part of the southern confederacy was just as good as another to us. so not a finger could they persuade any of us to raise to help along the journey. the country we were traversing was sterile and poor--worse even than that in the neighborhood of andersonville. farms and farmhouses were scarce, and of towns there were none. not even a collection of houses big enough to justify a blacksmith shop or a store appeared along the whole route. but few fields of any kind were seen, and nowhere was there a farm which gave evidence of a determined effort on the part of its occupants to till the soil and to improve their condition. when the train stopped for wood, or for repairs, or from exhaustion, we were allowed to descend from the cars and stretch our numbed limbs. it did us good in other ways, too. it seemed almost happiness to be outside of those cursed stockades, to rest our eyes by looking away through the woods, and seeing birds and animals that were free. they must be happy, because to us to be free once more was the summit of earthly happiness. there was a chance, too, to pick up something green to eat, and we were famishing for this. the scurvy still lingered in our systems, and we were hungry for an antidote. a plant grew rather plentifully along the track that looked very much as i imagine a palm leaf fan does in its green state. the leaf was not so large as an ordinary palm leaf fan, and came directly out of the ground. the natives called it "bull-grass," but anything more unlike grass i never saw, so we rejected that nomenclature, and dubbed them "green fans." they were very hard to pull up, it being usually as much as the strongest of us could do to draw them out of the ground. when pulled up there was found the smallest bit of a stock--not as much as a joint of one's little finger--that was eatable. it had no particular taste, and probably little nutriment, still it was fresh and green, and we strained our weak muscles and enfeebled sinews at every opportunity, endeavoring to pull up a "green fan." at one place where we stopped there was a makeshift of a garden, one of those sorry "truck patches," which do poor duty about southern cabins for the kitchen gardens of the northern, farmers, and produce a few coarse cow peas, a scanty lot of collards (a coarse kind of cabbage, with a stalk about a yard long) and some onions to vary the usual side-meat and corn pone, diet of the georgia "cracker." scanning the patch's ruins of vine and stalk, andrews espied a handful of onions, which had; remained ungathered. they tempted him as the apple did eve. without stopping to communicate his intention to me, he sprang from the car, snatched the onions from their bed, pulled up, half a dozen collard stalks and was on his way back before the guard could make up his mind to fire upon him. the swiftness of his motions saved his life, for had he been more deliberate the guard would have concluded he was trying to, escape, and shot him down. as it was he was returning back before the guard could get his gun up. the onions he had, secured were to us more delicious than wine upon the lees. they seemed to find their way into every fiber of our bodies, and invigorate every organ. the collard stalks he had snatched up, in the expectation of finding in them something resembling the nutritious "heart" that we remembered as children, seeking and, finding in the stalks of cabbage. but we were disappointed. the stalks were as dry and rotten as the bones of southern, society. even hunger could find no meat in them. after some days of this leisurely journeying toward the south, we halted permanently about eighty-six miles from savannah. there was no reason why we should stop there more than any place else where we had been or were likely to go. it seemed as if the rebels had simply tired of hauling us, and dumped us, off. we had another lot of dead, accumulated since we left savannah, and the scenes at that place were repeated. the train returned for another load of prisoners. chapter lxv. blackshear and pierce country--we take up new quarters, but are called out for exchange--excitement over signing the parole--a happy journey to savannah--grievous disappointment we were informed that the place we were at was blackshear, and that it was the court house, i. e., the county seat of pierce county. where they kept the court house, or county seat, is beyond conjecture to me, since i could not see a half dozen houses in the whole clearing, and not one of them was a respectable dwelling, taking even so low a standard for respectable dwellings as that afforded by the majority of georgia houses. pierce county, as i have since learned by the census report, is one of the poorest counties of a poor section of a very poor state. a population of less than two thousand is thinly scattered over its five hundred square miles of territory, and gain a meager subsistence by a weak simulation of cultivating patches of its sandy dunes and plains in "nubbin" corn and dropsical sweet potatos. a few "razor-back" hogs --a species so gaunt and thin that i heard a man once declare that he had stopped a lot belonging to a neighbor from crawling through the cracks of a tight board fence by simply tying a knot in their tails--roam the woods, and supply all the meat used. andrews used to insist that some of the hogs which we saw were so thin that the connection between their fore and hindquarters was only a single thickness of skin, with hair on both sides--but then andrews sometimes seemed to me to have a tendency to exaggerate. the swine certainly did have proportions that strongly resembled those of the animals which children cut out of cardboard. they were like the geometrical definition of a superfice--all length and breadth, and no thickness. a ham from them would look like a palm-leaf fan. i never ceased to marvel at the delicate adjustment of the development of animal life to the soil in these lean sections of georgia. the poor land would not maintain anything but lank, lazy men, with few wants, and none but lank, lazy men, with few wants, sought a maintenance from it. i may have tangled up cause and effect, in this proposition, but if so, the reader can disentangle them at his leisure. i was not astonished to learn that it took five hundred square miles of pierce county land to maintain two thousand "crackers," even as poorly as they lived. i should want fully that much of it to support one fair-sized northern family as it should be. after leaving the cars we were marched off into the pine woods, by the side of a considerable stream, and told that this was to be our camp. a heavy guard was placed around us, and a number of pieces of artillery mounted where they would command the camp. we started in to make ourselves comfortable, as at millen, by building shanties. the prisoners we left behind followed us, and we soon had our old crowd of five or six thousand, who had been our companions at savannah and millers, again with us. the place looked very favorable for escape. we knew we were still near the sea coast--really not more than forty miles away--and we felt that if we could once get there we should be safe. andrews and i meditated plans of escape, and toiled away at our cabin. about a week after our arrival we were startled by an order for the one thousand of us who had first arrived to get ready to move out. in a few minutes we were taken outside the guard line, massed close together, and informed in a few words by a rebel officer that we were about to be taken back to savannah for exchange. the announcement took away our breath. for an instant the rush of emotion made us speechless, and when utterance returned, the first use we made of it was to join in one simultaneous outburst of acclamation. those inside the guard line, understanding what our cheer meant, answered us with a loud shout of congratulation--the first real, genuine, hearty cheering that had been done since receiving the announcement of the exchange at andersonville, three months before. as soon as the excitement had subsided somewhat, the rebel proceeded to explain that we would all be required to sign a parole. this set us to thinking. after our scornful rejection of the proposition to enlist in the rebel army, the rebels had felt around among us considerably as to how we were disposed toward taking what was called the "non-combatant's oath;" that is, the swearing not to take up arms against the southern confederacy again during the war. to the most of us this seemed only a little less dishonorable than joining the rebel army. we held that our oaths to our own government placed us at its disposal until it chose to discharge us, and we could not make any engagements with its enemies that might come in contravention of that duty. in short, it looked very much like desertion, and this we did not feel at liberty to consider. there were still many among us, who, feeling certain that they could not survive imprisonment much longer, were disposed to look favorably upon the non-combatant's oath, thinking that the circumstances of the case would justify their apparent dereliction from duty. whether it would or not i must leave to more skilled casuists than myself to decide. it was a matter i believed every man must settle with his own conscience. the opinion that i then held and expressed was, that if a boy, felt that he was hopelessly sick, and that he could not live if he remained in prison, he was justified in taking the oath. in the absence of our own surgeons he would have to decide for himself whether he was sick enough to be warranted in resorting to this means of saving his life. if he was in as good health as the majority of us were, with a reasonable prospect of surviving some weeks longer, there was no excuse for taking the oath, for in that few weeks we might be exchanged, be recaptured, or make our escape. i think this was the general opinion of the prisoners. while the rebel was talking about our signing the parole, there flashed upon all of us at the same moment, a suspicion that this was a trap to delude us into signing the non-combatant's oath. instantly there went up a general shout: "read the parole to us." the rebel was handed a blank parole by a companion, and he read over the printed condition at the top, which was that those signing agreed not to bear arms against the confederates in the field, or in garrison, not to man any works, assist in any expedition, do any sort of guard duty, serve in any military constabulary, or perform any kind of military service until properly exchanged. for a minute this was satisfactory; then their ingrained distrust of any thing a rebel said or did returned, and they shouted: "no, no; let some of us read it; let ilinoy' read it--" the rebel looked around in a puzzled manner. "who the h--l is 'illinoy!' where is he?" said he. i saluted and said: "that's a nickname they give me." "very well," said he, "get up on this stump and read this parole to these d---d fools that won't believe me." i mounted the stump, took the blank from his hand and read it over slowly, giving as much emphasis as possible to the all-important clause at the end--"until properly exchanged." i then said: "boys, this seems all right to me," and they answered, with almost one voice: "yes, that's all right. we'll sign that." i was never so proud of the american soldier-boy as at that moment. they all felt that signing that paper was to give them freedom and life. they knew too well from sad experience what the alternative was. many felt that unless released another week would see them in their graves. all knew that every day's stay in rebel hands greatly lessened their chances of life. yet in all that thousand there was not one voice in favor of yielding a tittle of honor to save life. they would secure their freedom honorably, or die faithfully. remember that this was a miscellaneous crowd of boys, gathered from all sections of the country, and from many of whom no exalted conceptions of duty and honor were expected. i wish some one would point out to me, on the brightest pages of knightly record, some deed of fealty and truth that equals the simple fidelity of these unknown heros. i do not think that one of them felt that he was doing anything especially meritorious. he only obeyed the natural promptings of his loyal heart. the business of signing the paroles was then begun in earnest. we were separated into squads according to the first letters of our names, all those whose name began with a being placed in one squad, those beginning with b, in another, and so on. blank paroles for each letter were spread out on boxes and planks at different places, and the signing went on under the superintendence of a rebel sergeant and one of the prisoners. the squad of m's selected me to superintend the signing for us, and i stood by to direct the boys, and sign for the very few who could not write. after this was done we fell into ranks again, called the roll of the signers, and carefully compared the number of men with the number of signatures so that nobody should pass unparoled. the oath was then administered to us, and two day's rations of corn meal and fresh beef were issued. this formality removed the last lingering doubt that we had of the exchange being a reality, and we gave way to the happiest emotions. we cheered ourselves hoarse, and the fellows still inside followed our example, as they expected that they would share our good fortune in a day or two. our next performance was to set to work, cook our two days' rations at once and eat them. this was not very difficult, as the whole supply for two days would hardly make one square meal. that done, many of the boys went to the guard line and threw their blankets, clothing, cooking utensils, etc., to their comrades who were still inside. no one thought they would have any further use for such things. "to-morrow, at this time, thank heaven," said a boy near me, as he tossed his blanket and overcoat back to some one inside, "we'll be in god's country, and then i wouldn't touch them d---d lousy old rags with a ten-foot pole." one of the boys in the m squad was a maine infantryman, who had been with me in the pemberton building, in richmond, and had fashioned himself a little square pan out of a tin plate of a tobacco press, such as i have described in an earlier chapter. he had carried it with him ever since, and it was his sole vessel for all purposes--for cooking, carrying water, drawing rations, etc. he had cherished it as if it were a farm or a good situation. but now, as he turned away from signing his name to the parole, he looked at his faithful servant for a minute in undisguised contempt; on the eve of restoration to happier, better things, it was a reminder of all the petty, inglorious contemptible trials and sorrows he had endured; he actually loathed it for its remembrances, and flinging it upon the ground he crushed it out of all shape and usefulness with his feet, trampling upon it as he would everything connected with his prison life. months afterward i had to lend this man my little can to cook his rations in. andrews and i flung the bright new tin pans we had stolen at millen inside the line, to be scrambled for. it was hard to tell who were the most surprised at their appearance--the rebels or our own boys--for few had any idea that there were such things in the whole confederacy, and certainly none looked for them in the possession of two such poverty-stricken specimens as we were. we thought it best to retain possession of our little can, spoon, chess-board, blanket, and overcoat. as we marched down and boarded the train, the rebels confirmed their previous action by taking all the guards from around us. only some eight or ten were sent to the train, and these quartered themselves in the caboose, and paid us no further attention. the train rolled away amid cheering by ourselves and those we left behind. one thousand happier boys than we never started on a journey. we were going home. that was enough to wreathe the skies with glory, and fill the world with sweetness and light. the wintry sun had something of geniality and warmth, the landscape lost some of its repulsiveness, the dreary palmettos had less of that hideousness which made us regard them as very fitting emblems of treason. we even began to feel a little good-humored contempt for our hateful little brats of guards, and to reflect how much vicious education and surroundings were to be held responsible for their misdeeds. we laughed and sang as we rolled along toward savannah--going back much faster than the came. we re-told old stories, and repeated old jokes, that had become wearisome months and months ago, but were now freshened up and given their olden pith by the joyousness of the occasion. we revived and talked over old schemes gotten up in the earlier days of prison life, of what "we would do when we got out," but almost forgotten since, in the general uncertainty of ever getting out. we exchanged addresses, and promised faithfully to write to each other and tell how we found everything at home. so the afternoon and night passed. we were too excited to sleep, and passed the hours watching the scenery, recalling the objects we had passed on the way to blackshear, and guessing how near we were to savannah. though we were running along within fifteen or twenty miles of the coast, with all our guards asleep in the caboose, no one thought of escape. we could step off the cars and walk over to the seashore as easily as a man steps out of his door and walks to a neighboring town, but why should we? were we not going directly to our vessels in the harbor of savannah, and was it not better to do this, than to take the chances of escaping, and encounter the difficulties of reaching our blockaders! we thought so, and we staid on the cars. a cold, gray winter morning was just breaking as we reached savannah. our train ran down in the city, and then whistled sharply and ran back a mile or so; it repeated this maneuver two or three times, the evident design being to keep us on the cars until the people were ready to receive us. finally our engine ran with all the speed she was capable of, and as the train dashed into the street we found ourselves between two heavy lines of guards with bayonets fixed. the whole sickening reality was made apparent by one glance at the guard line. our parole was a mockery, its only object being to get us to savannah as easily as possible, and to prevent benefit from our recapture to any of sherman's raiders, who might make a dash for the railroad while we were in transit. there had been no intention of exchanging us. there was no exchange going on at savannah. after all, i do not think we felt the disappointment as keenly as the first time we were brought to savannah. imprisonment had stupefied us; we were duller and more hopeless. ordered down out of the cars, we were formed in line in the street. said a rebel officer: "now, any of you fellahs that ah too sick to go to chahlston, step fohwahd one pace." we looked at each other an instant, and then the whole line stepped forward. we all felt too sick to go to charleston, or to do anything else in the world. chapter lxvi. specimen conversation with an average native georgian--we learn that sherman is heading for savannah--the reserves get a little settling down. as the train left the northern suburbs of savannah we came upon a scene of busy activity, strongly contrasting with the somnolent lethargy that seemed to be the normal condition of the city and its inhabitants. long lines of earthworks were being constructed, gangs of negros were felling trees, building forts and batteries, making abatis, and toiling with numbers of huge guns which were being moved out and placed in position. as we had had no new prisoners nor any papers for some weeks--the papers being doubtless designedly kept away from us--we were at a loss to know what this meant. we could not understand this erection of fortifications on that side, because, knowing as we did how well the flanks of the city were protected by the savannah and ogeeche rivers, we could not see how a force from the coast--whence we supposed an attack must come, could hope to reach the city's rear, especially as we had just come up on the right flank of the city, and saw no sign of our folks in that direction. our train stopped for a few minutes at the edge of this line of works, and an old citizen who had been surveying the scene with senile interest, tottered over to our car to take a look at us. he was a type of the old man of the south of the scanty middle class, the small farmer. long white hair and beard, spectacles with great round, staring glasses, a broad-brimmed hat of ante-revolutionary pattern, clothes that had apparently descended to him from some ancestor who had come over with oglethorpe, and a two-handed staff with a head of buckhorn, upon which he leaned as old peasants do in plays, formed such an image as recalled to me the picture of the old man in the illustrations in "the dairyman's daughter." he was as garrulous as a magpie, and as opinionated as a southern white always is. halting in front of our car, he steadied himself by planting his staff, clasping it with both lean and skinny hands, and leaning forward upon it, his jaws then addressed themselves to motion thus: "boys, who mout these be that ye got?" one of the guards:--"o, these is some yanks that we've bin hivin' down at camp sumter." "yes?" (with an upward inflection of the voice, followed by a close scrutiny of us through the goggle-eyed glasses,) "wall, they're a powerful ornary lookin' lot, i'll declah." it will be seen that the old, gentleman's perceptive powers were much more highly developed than his politeness. "well, they ain't what ye mout call purty, that's a fack," said the guard. "so yer yanks, air ye?" said the venerable goober-grabber, (the nick-name in the south for georgians), directing his conversation to me. "wall, i'm powerful glad to see ye, an' 'specially whar ye can't do no harm; i've wanted to see some yankees ever sence the beginnin' of the wah, but hev never had no chance. whah did ye cum from?" i seemed called upon to answer, and said: "i came from illinois; most of the boys in this car are from illinois, ohio, indiana, michigan and iowa." "'deed! all westerners, air ye? wall, do ye know i alluz liked the westerners a heap sight better than them blue-bellied new england yankees." no discussion with a rebel ever proceeded very far without his making an assertion like this. it was a favorite declaration of theirs, but its absurdity was comical, when one remembered that the majority of them could not for their lives tell the names of the new england states, and could no more distinguish a downeaster from an illinoisan than they could tell a saxon from a bavarian. one day, while i was holding a conversation similar to the above with an old man on guard, another guard, who had been stationed near a squad made up of germans, that talked altogether in the language of the fatherland, broke in with: "out there by post numbah foahteen, where i wuz yesterday, there's a lot of yanks who jest jabbered away all the hull time, and i hope i may never see the back of my neck ef i could understand ary word they said, are them the regular blue-belly kind?" the old gentleman entered upon the next stage of the invariable routine of discussion with a rebel: "wall, what air you'uns down heah, a-fightin' we'uns foh?" as i had answered this question several hundred times, i had found the most extinguishing reply to be to ask in return: "what are you'uns coming up into our country to fight we'uns for?" disdaining to notice this return in kind, the old man passed on to the next stage: "what are you'uns takin' ouah niggahs away from us foh?" now, if negros had been as cheap as oreoide watches, it is doubtful whether the speaker had ever had money enough in his possession at one time to buy one, and yet he talked of taking away "ouah niggahs," as if they were as plenty about his place as hills of corn. as a rule, the more abjectly poor a southerner was, the more readily he worked himself into a rage over the idea of "takin' away ouah niggahs." i replied in burlesque of his assumption of ownership: "what are you coming up north to burn my rolling mills and rob my comrade here's bank, and plunder my brother's store, and burn down my uncle's factories?" no reply, to this counter thrust. the old man passed to the third inevitable proposition: "what air you'uns puttin' ouah niggahs in the field to fight we'uns foh?" then the whole car-load shouted back at him at once: "what are you'uns putting blood-hounds on our trails to hunt us down, for?" old man--(savagely), "waal, ye don't think ye kin ever lick us; leastways sich fellers as ye air?" myself--"well, we warmed it to you pretty lively until you caught us. there were none of us but what were doing about as good work as any stock you fellows could turn out. no rebels in our neighborhood had much to brag on. we are not a drop in the bucket, either. there's millions more better men than we are where we came from, and they are all determined to stamp out your miserable confederacy. you've got to come to it, sooner or later; you must knock under, sure as white blossoms make little apples. you'd better make up your mind to it." old man--"no, sah, nevah. ye nevah kin conquer us! we're the bravest people and the best fighters on airth. ye nevah kin whip any people that's a fightin' fur their liberty an' their right; an' ye nevah can whip the south, sah, any way. we'll fight ye until all the men air killed, and then the wimmen'll fight ye, sah." myself--"well, you may think so, or you may not. from the way our boys are snatching the confederacy's real estate away, it begins to look as if you'd not have enough to fight anybody on pretty soon. what's the meaning of all this fortifying?" old man--"why, don't you know? our folks are fixin' up a place foh bill sherman to butt his brains out gain'." "bill sherman!" we all shouted in surprise: "why he ain't within two hundred miles of this place, is he?" old man--"yes, but he is, tho'. he thinks he's played a sharp yankee trick on hood. he found out he couldn't lick him in a squar' fight, nohow; he'd tried that on too often; so he just sneaked 'round behind him, and made a break for the center of the state, where he thought there was lots of good stealin' to be done. but we'll show him. we'll soon hev him just whar we want him, an' we'll learn him how to go traipesin' 'round the country, stealin' nigahs, burnin' cotton, an' runnin' off folkses' beef critters. he sees now the scrape he's got into, an' he's tryin' to get to the coast, whar the gun-boats'll help 'im out. but he'll nevah git thar, sah; no sah, nevah. he's mouty nigh the end of his rope, sah, and we'll purty' soon hev him jist whar you fellows air, sah." myself--"well, if you fellows intended stopping him, why didn't you do it up about atlanta? what did you let him come clear through the state, burning and stealing, as you say? it was money in your pockets to head him off as soon as possible." old man--"oh, we didn't set nothing afore him up thar except joe brown's pets, these sorry little reserves; they're powerful little account; no stand-up to'em at all; they'd break their necks runnin' away ef ye so much as bust a cap near to 'em." our guards, who belonged to these reserves, instantly felt that the conversation had progressed farther than was profitable and one of them spoke up roughly: "see heah, old man, you must go off; i can't hev ye talkin' to these prisoners; hits agin my awdahs. go 'way now!" the old fellow moved off, but as he did he flung this parthian arrow: "when sherman gits down deep, he'll find somethin' different from the little snots of reserves he ran over up about milledgeville; he'll find he's got to fight real soldiers." we could not help enjoying the rage of the guards, over the low estimate placed upon the fighting ability of themselves and comrades, and as they raved, around about what they would do if they were only given an opportunity to go into a line of battle against sherman, we added fuel to the flames of their anger by confiding to each other that we always "knew that little brats whose highest ambition was to murder a defenseless prisoner, could be nothing else than cowards end skulkers in the field." "yaas--sonnies," said charlie burroughs, of the third michigan, in that nasal yankee drawl, that he always assumed, when he wanted to say anything very cutting; "you--trundle--bed--soldiers--who've never--seen --a--real--wild--yankee--don't--know--how--different--they--are--from --the kind--that--are--starved--down--to tameness. they're--jest--as --different--as--a--lion in--a--menagerie--is--from--his--brother--in --the woods--who--has--a--nigger--every day--for-dinner. you--fellows --will--go--into--a--circus--tent--and--throw--tobacco--quids in--the --face--of--the--lion--in--the--cage--when--you--haven't--spunk enough --to--look--a woodchuck--in--the--eye--if--you--met--him--alone. it's --lots--o'--fun--to you--to--shoot--down--a--sick--and--starving-man --in--the--stockade, but--when--you--see--a--yank with--a--gun--in--his --hand--your--livers get--so--white--that--chalk--would--make--a--black --mark--on--'em." a little later, a paper, which some one had gotten hold of, in some mysterious manner, was secretly passed to me. i read it as i could find opportunity, and communicated its contents to the rest of the boys. the most important of these was a flaming proclamation by governor joe brown, setting forth that general sherman was now traversing the state, committing all sorts of depredations; that he had prepared the way for his own destruction, and the governor called upon all good citizens to rise en masse, and assist in crushing the audacious invader. bridges must be burned before and behind him, roads obstructed, and every inch of soil resolutely disputed. we enjoyed this. it showed that the rebels were terribly alarmed, and we began to feel some of that confidence that "sherman will come out all right," which so marvelously animated all under his command. chapter lxvii. off to charleston--passing through the rice swamps--two extremes of society--entry into charleston--leisurely warfare--shelling the city at regular intervals--we camp in a mass of ruins--departure for florence. the train started in a few minutes after the close of the conversation with the old georgian, and we soon came to and crossed the savannah river into south carolina. the river was wide and apparently deep; the tide was setting back in a swift, muddy current; the crazy old bridge creaked and shook, and the grinding axles shrieked in the dry journals, as we pulled across. it looked very much at times as if we were to all crash down into the turbid flood--and we did not care very much if we did, if we were not going to be exchanged. the road lay through the tide swamp region of south carolina, a peculiar and interesting country. though swamps and fens stretched in all directions as far as the eye could reach, the landscape was more grateful to the eye than the famine-stricken, pine-barrens of georgia, which had become wearisome to the sight. the soil where it appeared, was rich, vegetation was luxuriant; great clumps of laurel showed glossy richness in the greenness of its verdure, that reminded us of the fresh color of the vegetation of our northern homes, so different from the parched and impoverished look of georgian foliage. immense flocks of wild fowl fluttered around us; the georgian woods were almost destitute of living creatures; the evergreen live-oak, with its queer festoons of spanish moss, and the ugly and useless palmettos gave novelty and interest to the view. the rice swamps through which we were passing were the princely possessions of the few nabobs who before the war stood at the head of south carolina aristocracy--they were south carolina, in fact, as absolutely as louis xiv. was france. in their hands--but a few score in number--was concentrated about all there was of south carolina education, wealth, culture, and breeding. they represented a pinchbeck imitation of that regime in france which was happily swept out of existence by the revolution, and the destruction of which more than compensated for every drop of blood shed in those terrible days. like the provincial 'grandes seigneurs' of louis xvi's reign, they were gay, dissipated and turbulent; "accomplished" in the superficial acquirements that made the "gentleman" one hundred years ago, but are grotesquely out of place in this sensible, solid age, which demands that a man shall be of use, and not merely for show. they ran horses and fought cocks, dawdled through society when young, and intrigued in politics the rest of their lives, with frequent spice-work of duels. esteeming personal courage as a supreme human virtue, and never wearying of prating their devotion to the highest standard of intrepidity, they never produced a general who was even mediocre; nor did any one ever hear of a south carolina regiment gaining distinction. regarding politics and the art of government as, equally with arms, their natural vocations, they have never given the nation a statesman, and their greatest politicians achieved eminence by advocating ideas which only attracted attention by their balefulness. still further resembling the french 'grandes seigneurs' of the eighteenth century, they rolled in wealth wrung from the laborer by reducing the rewards of his toil to the last fraction that would support his life and strength. the rice culture was immensely profitable, because they had found the secret for raising it more cheaply than even the pauper laborer of the of world could. their lands had cost them nothing originally, the improvements of dikes and ditches were comparatively, inexpensive, the taxes were nominal, and their slaves were not so expensive to keep as good horses in the north. thousands of the acres along the road belonged to the rhetts, thousands to the heywards, thousands to the manigault the lowndes, the middletons, the hugers, the barnwells, and the elliots--all names too well known in the history of our country's sorrows. occasionally one of their stately mansions could be seen on some distant elevation, surrounded by noble old trees, and superb grounds. here they lived during the healthy part of the year, but fled thence to summer resort in the highlands as the miasmatic season approached. the people we saw at the stations along our route were melancholy illustrations of the evils of the rule of such an oligarchy. there was no middle class visible anywhere--nothing but the two extremes. a man was either a "gentleman," and wore white shirt and city-made clothes, or he was a loutish hind, clad in mere apologies for garments. we thought we had found in the georgia "cracker" the lowest substratum of human society, but he was bright intelligence compared to the south carolina "clay-eater" and "sand-hiller." the "cracker" always gave hopes to one that if he had the advantage of common schools, and could be made to understand that laziness was dishonorable, he might develop into something. there was little foundation for such hope in the average low south carolinian. his mind was a shaking quagmire, which did not admit of the erection of any superstructure of education upon it. the south carolina guards about us did not know the name of the next town, though they had been raised in that section. they did not know how far it was there, or to any place else, and they did not care to learn. they had no conception of what the war was being waged for, and did not want to find out; they did not know where their regiment was going, and did not remember where it had been; they could not tell how long they had been in service, nor the time they had enlisted for. they only remembered that sometimes they had had "sorter good times," and sometimes "they had been powerful bad," and they hoped there would be plenty to eat wherever they went, and not too much hard marching. then they wondered "whar a feller'd be likely to make a raise of a canteen of good whisky?" bad as the whites were, the rice plantation negros were even worse, if that were possible. brought to the country centuries ago, as brutal savages from africa, they had learned nothing of christian civilization, except that it meant endless toil, in malarious swamps, under the lash of the taskmaster. they wore, possibly, a little more clothing than their senegambian ancestors did; they ate corn meal, yams and rice, instead of bananas, yams and rice, as their forefathers did, and they had learned a bastard, almost unintelligible, english. these were the sole blessings acquired by a transfer from a life of freedom in the jungles of the gold coast, to one of slavery in the swamps of the combahee. i could not then, nor can i now, regret the downfall of a system of society which bore such fruits. towards night a distressingly cold breeze, laden with a penetrating mist, set in from the sea, and put an end to future observations by making us too uncomfortable to care for scenery or social conditions. we wanted most to devise a way to keep warm. andrews and i pulled our overcoat and blanket closely about us, snuggled together so as to make each one's meager body afford the other as much heat as possible--and endured. we became fearfully hungry. it will be recollected that we ate the whole of the two days' rations issued to us at blackshear at once, and we had received nothing since. we reached the sullen, fainting stage of great hunger, and for hours nothing was said by any one, except an occasional bitter execration on rebels and rebel practices. it was late at night when we reached charleston. the lights of the city, and the apparent warmth and comfort there cheered us up somewhat with the hopes that we might have some share in them. leaving the train, we were marched some distance through well-lighted streets, in which were plenty of people walking to and fro. there were many stores, apparently stocked with goods, and the citizens seemed to be going about their business very much as was the custom up north. at length our head of column made a "right turn," and we marched away from the lighted portion of the city, to a part which i could see through the shadows was filled with ruins. an almost insupportable odor of gas, escaping i suppose from the ruptured pipes, mingled with the cold, rasping air from the sea, to make every breath intensely disagreeable. as i saw the ruins, it flashed upon me that this was the burnt district of the city, and they were putting us under the fire of our own guns. at first i felt much alarmed. little relish as i had on general principles, for being shot i had much less for being killed by our own men. then i reflected that if they put me there--and kept me--a guard would have to be placed around us, who would necessarily be in as much clanger as we were, and i knew i could stand any fire that a rebel could. we were halted in a vacant lot, and sat down, only to jump up the next instant, as some one shouted: "there comes one of 'em!" it was a great shell from the swamp angel battery. starting from a point miles away, where, seemingly, the sky came down to the sea, was a narrow ribbon of fire, which slowly unrolled itself against the star-lit vault over our heads. on, on it came, and was apparently following the sky down to the horizon behind us. as it reached the zenith, there came to our ears a prolonged, but not sharp, "whish--ish-ish-ish-ish!" we watched it breathlessly, and it seemed to be long minutes in running its course; then a thump upon the ground, and a vibration, told that it had struck. for a moment there was a dead silence. then came a loud roar, and the crash of breaking timber and crushing walls. the shell had bursted. ten minutes later another shell followed, with like results. for awhile we forgot all about hunger in the excitement of watching the messengers from "god's country." what happiness to be where those shells came from. soon a rebel battery of heavy guns somewhere near and in front of us, waked up, and began answering with dull, slow thumps that made the ground shudder. this continued about an hour, when it quieted down again, but our shells kept coming over at regular intervals with the same slow deliberation, the same prolonged warning, and the same dreadful crash when they struck. they had already gone on this way for over a year, and were to keep it up months longer until the city was captured. the routine was the same from day to day, month in, and month out, from early in august, 1863, to the middle of april, 1865. every few minutes during the day our folks would hurl a great shell into the beleaguered city, and twice a day, for perhaps an hour each time, the rebel batteries would talk back. it must have been a lesson to the charlestonians of the persistent, methodical spirit of the north. they prided themselves on the length of the time they were holding out against the enemy, and the papers each day had a column headed: "390th day of the siege," or 391st, 393d, etc., as the number might be since our people opened fire upon the city. the part where we lay was a mass of ruins. many large buildings had been knocked down; very many more were riddled with shot holes and tottering to their fall. one night a shell passed through a large building about a quarter of a mile from us. it had already been struck several times, and was shaky. the shell went through with a deafening crash. all was still for an instant; then it exploded with a dull roar, followed by more crashing of timber and walls. the sound died away and was succeeded by a moment of silence. finally the great building fell, a shapeless heap of ruins, with a noise like that of a dozen field pieces. we wanted to cheer but restrained ourselves. this was the nearest to us that any shell came. there was only one section of the city in reach of our guns and this was nearly destroyed. fires had come to complete the work begun by the shells. outside of the boundaries of this region, the people felt themselves as safe as in one of our northern cities to-day. they had an abiding faith that they were clear out of reach of any artillery that we could mount. i learned afterwards from some of the prisoners, who went into charleston ahead of us, and were camped on the race course outside of the city, that one day our fellows threw a shell clear over the city to this race course. there was an immediate and terrible panic among the citizens. they thought we had mounted some new guns of increased range, and now the whole city must go. but the next shell fell inside the established limits, and those following were equally well behaved, so that the panic abated. i have never heard any explanation of the matter. it may have been some freak of the gun-squad, trying the effect of an extra charge of powder. had our people known of its signal effect, they could have depopulated the place in a few hours. the whole matter impressed me queerly. the only artillery i had ever seen in action were field pieces. they made an earsplitting crash when they were discharged, and there was likely to be oceans of trouble for everybody in that neighborhood about that time. i reasoned from this that bigger guns made a proportionally greater amount of noise, and bred an infinitely larger quantity of trouble. now i was hearing the giants of the world's ordnance, and they were not so impressive as a lively battery of three-inch rifles. their reports did not threaten to shatter everything, but had a dull resonance, something like that produced by striking an empty barrel with a wooden maul. their shells did not come at one in that wildly, ferocious way, with which a missile from a six-pounder convinces every fellow in a long line of battle that he is the identical one it is meant for, but they meandered over in a lazy, leisurely manner, as if time was no object and no person would feel put out at having to wait for them. then, the idea of firing every quarter of an hour for a year--fixing up a job for a lifetime, as andrews expressed it,--and of being fired back at for an hour at 9 o'clock every morning and evening; of fifty thousand people going on buying and selling, eating, drinking and sleeping, having dances, drives and balls, marrying and giving in marriage, all within a few hundred yards of where the shells were falling-struck me as a most singular method of conducting warfare. we received no rations until the day after our arrival, and then they were scanty, though fair in quality. we were by this time so hungry and faint that we could hardly move. we did nothing for hours but lie around on the ground and try to forget how famished we were. at the announcement of rations, many acted as if crazy, and it was all that the sergeants could do to restrain the impatient mob from tearing the food away and devouring it, when they were trying to divide it out. very many--perhaps thirty--died during the night and morning. no blame for this is attached to the charlestonians. they distinguished themselves from the citizens of every other place in the southern confederacy where we had been, by making efforts to relieve our condition. they sent quite a quantity of food to us, and the sisters of charity came among us, seeking and ministering to the sick. i believe our experience was the usual one. the prisoners who passed through charleston before us all spoke very highly of the kindness shown them by the citizens there. we remained in charleston but a few days. one night we were marched down to a rickety depot, and put aboard a still more rickety train. when morning came we found ourselves running northward through a pine barren country that resembled somewhat that in georgia, except that the pine was short-leaved, there was more oak and other hard woods, and the vegetation generally assumed a more northern look. we had been put into close box cars, with guards at the doors and on top. during the night quite a number of the boys, who had fabricated little saws out of case knives and fragments of hoop iron, cut holes through the bottoms of the cars, through which they dropped to the ground and escaped, but were mostly recaptured after several days. there was no hole cut in our car, and so andrews and i staid in. just at dusk we came to the insignificant village of florence, the junction of the road leading from charleston to cheraw with that running from wilmington to kingsville. it was about one hundred and twenty miles from charleston, and the same distance from wilmington. as our train ran through a cut near the junction a darky stood by the track gazing at us curiously. when the train had nearly passed him he started to run up the bank. in the imperfect light the guards mistook him for one of us who had jumped from the train. they all fired, and the unlucky negro fell, pierced by a score of bullets. that night we camped in the open field. when morning came we saw, a few hundred yards from us, a stockade of rough logs, with guards stationed around it. it was another prison pen. they were just bringing the dead out, and two men were tossing the bodies up into the four-horse wagon which hauled them away for burial. the men were going about their business as coolly as if loading slaughtered hogs. 'one of them would catch the body by the feet, and the other by the arms. they would give it a swing--"one, two, three," and up it would go into the wagon. this filled heaping full with corpses, a negro mounted the wheel horse, grasped the lines, and shouted to his animals: "now, walk off on your tails, boys." the horses strained, the wagon moved, and its load of what were once gallant, devoted soldiers, was carted off to nameless graves. this was a part of the daily morning routine. as we stood looking at the sickeningly familiar architecture of the prison pen, a seventh indianian near me said, in tones of wearisome disgust: "well, this southern confederacy is the d---dest country to stand logs on end on god almighty's footstool." chapter lxviii. first days at florence--introduction to lieutenant barrett, the red-headed keeper--a brief description of our new quarters--winders malign influence manifest. it did not require a very acute comprehension to understand that the stockade at which we were gazing was likely to be our abiding place for some indefinite period in the future. as usual, this discovery was the death-warrant of many whose lives had only been prolonged by the hoping against hope that the movement would terminate inside our lines. when the portentous palisades showed to a fatal certainty that the word of promise had been broken to their hearts, they gave up the struggle wearily, lay back on the frozen ground, and died. andrews and i were not in the humor for dying just then. the long imprisonment, the privations of hunger, the scourging by the elements, the death of four out of every five of our number had indeed dulled and stupefied us--bred an indifference to our own suffering and a seeming callosity to that of others, but there still burned in our hearts, and in the hearts of every one about us, a dull, sullen, smoldering fire of hate and defiance toward everything rebel, and a lust for revenge upon those who had showered woes upon our heads. there was little fear of death; even the king of terrors loses most of his awful character upon tolerably close acquaintance, and we had been on very intimate terms with him for a year now. he was a constant visitor, who dropped in upon us at all hours of the day and night, and would not be denied to any one. since my entry into prison fully fifteen thousand boys had died around me, and in no one of them had i seen the least, dread or reluctance to go. i believe this is generally true of death by disease, everywhere. our ever kindly mother, nature, only makes us dread death when she desires us to preserve life. when she summons us hence she tenderly provides that we shall willingly obey the call. more than for anything else, we wanted to live now to triumph over the rebels. to simply die would be of little importance, but to die unrevenged would be fearful. if we, the despised, the contemned, the insulted, the starved and maltreated; could live to come back to our oppressors as the armed ministers of retribution, terrible in the remembrance of the wrongs of ourselves and comrade's, irresistible as the agents of heavenly justice, and mete out to them that biblical return of seven-fold of what they had measured out to us, then we would be content to go to death afterwards. had the thrice-accursed confederacy and our malignant gaolers millions of lives, our great revenge would have stomach for them all. the december morning was gray and leaden; dull, somber, snow-laden clouds swept across the sky before the soughing wind. the ground, frozen hard and stiff, cut and hurt our bare feet at every step; an icy breeze drove in through the holes in our rags, and smote our bodies like blows from sticks. the trees and shrubbery around were as naked and forlorn as in the north in the days of early winter before the snow comes. over and around us hung like a cold miasma the sickening odor peculiar to southern forests in winter time. out of the naked, repelling, unlovely earth rose the stockade, in hideous ugliness. at the gate the two men continued at their monotonous labor of tossing the dead of the previous day into the wagon-heaving into that rude hearse the inanimate remains that had once tempted gallant, manly hearts, glowing with patriotism and devotion to country--piling up listlessly and wearily, in a mass of nameless, emaciated corpses, fluttering with rags, and swarming with vermin, the pride, the joy of a hundred fair northern homes, whose light had now gone out forever. around the prison walls shambled the guards, blanketed like indians, and with faces and hearts of wolves. other rebels--also clad in dingy butternut--slouched around lazily, crouched over diminutive fires, and talked idle gossip in the broadest of "nigger" dialect. officers swelled and strutted hither and thither, and negro servants loitered around, striving to spread the least amount of work over the greatest amount of time. while i stood gazing in gloomy silence at the depressing surroundings andrews, less speculative and more practical, saw a good-sized pine stump near by, which had so much of the earth washed away from it that it looked as if it could be readily pulled up. we had had bitter experience in other prisons as to the value of wood, and andrews reasoned that as we would be likely to have a repetition of this in the stockade we were about to enter, we should make an effort to secure the stump. we both attacked it, and after a great deal of hard work, succeeded in uprooting it. it was very lucky that we did, since it was the greatest help in preserving our lives through the three long months that we remained at florence. while we were arranging our stump so as to carry it to the best advantage, a vulgar-faced man, with fiery red hair, and wearing on his collar the yellow bars of a lieutenant, approached. this was lieutenant barrett, commandant of the interior of the prison, and a more inhuman wretch even than captain wirz, because he had a little more brains than the commandant at andersonville, and this extra intellect was wholly devoted to cruelty. as he came near he commanded, in loud, brutal tones: "attention, prisoners!" we all stood up and fell in in two ranks. said he: "by companies, right wheel, march!" this was simply preposterous. as every soldier knows, wheeling by companies is one of the most difficult of manuvers, and requires some preparation of a battalion before attempting to execute it. our thousand was made up of infantry, cavalry and artillery, representing, perhaps, one hundred different regiments. we had not been divided off into companies, and were encumbered with blankets, tents, cooking utensils, wood, etc., which prevented our moving with such freedom as to make a company wheel, even had we been divided up into companies and drilled for the maneuver. the attempt to obey the command was, of course, a ludicrous failure. the rebel officers standing near barrett laughed openly at his stupidity in giving such an order, but he was furious. he hurled at us a torrent of the vilest abuse the corrupt imagination of man can conceive, and swore until he was fairly black in the face. he fired his revolver off over our heads, and shrieked and shouted until he had to stop from sheer exhaustion. another officer took command then, and marched us into prison. we found this a small copy of andersonville. there was a stream running north and south, on either side of which was a swamp. a stockade of rough logs, with the bark still on, inclosed several acres. the front of the prison was toward the west. a piece of artillery stood before the gate, and a platform at each corner bore a gun, elevated high enough to rake the whole inside of the prison. a man stood behind each of these guns continually, so as to open with them at any moment. the earth was thrown up against the outside of the palisades in a high embankment, along the top of which the guards on duty walked, it being high enough to elevate their head, shoulders and breasts above the tops of the logs. inside the inevitable dead-line was traced by running a furrow around the prison-twenty feet from the stockade--with a plow. in one respect it was an improvement on andersonville: regular streets were laid off, so that motion about the camp was possible, and cleanliness was promoted. also, the crowd inside was not so dense as at camp sumter. the prisoners were divided into hundreds and thousands, with sergeants at the heads of the divisions. a very good police force-organized and officered by the prisoners--maintained order and prevented crime. thefts and other offenses were punished, as at andersonville, by the chief of police sentencing the offenders to be spanked or tied up. we found very many of our andersonville acquaintances inside, and for several days comparisons of experience were in order. they had left andersonville a few days after us, but were taken to charleston instead of savannah. the same story of exchange was dinned into their ears until they arrived at charleston, when the truth was told them, that no exchange was contemplated, and that they had been deceived for the purpose of getting them safely out of reach of sherman. still they were treated well in charleston--better than they had been anywhere else. intelligent physicians had visited the sick, prescribed for them, furnished them with proper medicines, and admitted the worst cases to the hospital, where they were given something of the care that one would expect in such an institution. wheat bread, molasses and rice were issued to them, and also a few spoonfuls of vinegar, daily, which were very grateful to them in their scorbutic condition. the citizens sent in clothing, food and vegetables. the sisters of charity were indefatigable in ministering to the sick and dying. altogether, their recollections of the place were quite pleasant. despite the disagreeable prominence which the city had in the secession movement, there was a very strong union element there, and many men found opportunity to do favors to the prisoners and reveal to them how much they abhorred secession. after they had been in charleston a fortnight or more, the yellow fever broke out in the city, and soon extended its ravages to the prisoners, quite a number dying from it. early in october they had been sent away from the city to their present location, which was then a piece of forest land. there was no stockade or other enclosure about them, and one night they forced the guard-line, about fifteen hundred escaping, under a pretty sharp fire from the guards. after getting out they scattered, each group taking a different route, some seeking beaufort, and other places along the seaboard, and the rest trying to gain the mountains. the whole state was thrown into the greatest perturbation by the occurrence. the papers magnified the proportion of the outbreak, and lauded fulsomely the gallantry of the guards in endeavoring to withstand the desperate assaults of the frenzied yankees. the people were wrought up into the highest alarm as to outrages and excesses that these flying desperados might be expected to commit. one would think that another grecian horse, introduced into the heart of the confederate troy, had let out its fatal band of armed men. all good citizens were enjoined to turn out and assist in arresting the runaways. the vigilance of all patrolling was redoubled, and such was the effectiveness of the measures taken that before a month nearly every one of the fugitives had been retaken and sent back to florence. few of these complained of any special ill-treatment by their captors, while many reported frequent acts of kindness, especially when their captors belonged to the middle and upper classes. the low-down class--the clay-eaters--on the other hand, almost always abused their prisoners, and sometimes, it is pretty certain, murdered them in cold blood. about this time winder came on from andersonville, and then everything changed immediately to the complexion of that place. he began the erection of the stockade, and made it very strong. the dead line was established, but instead of being a strip of plank upon the top of low posts, as at andersonville, it was simply a shallow trench, which was sometimes plainly visible, and sometimes not. the guards always resolved matters of doubt against the prisoners, and fired on them when they supposed them too near where the dead line ought to be. fifteen acres of ground were enclosed by the palisades, of which five were taken up by the creek and swamp, and three or four more by the dead line; main streets, etc., leaving about seven or eight for the actual use of the prisoners, whose number swelled to fifteen thousand by the arrivals from andersonville. this made the crowding together nearly as bad as at the latter place, and for awhile the same fatal results followed. the mortality, and the sending away of several thousand on the sick exchange, reduced the aggregate number at the time of our arrival to about eleven thousand, which gave more room to all, but was still not one-twentieth of the space which that number of men should have had. no shelter, nor material for constructing any, was furnished. the ground was rather thickly wooded, and covered with undergrowth, when the stockade was built, and certainly no bit of soil was ever so thoroughly cleared as this was. the trees and brush were cut down and worked up into hut building materials by the same slow and laborious process that i have described as employed in building our huts at millen. then the stumps were attacked for fuel, and with such persistent thoroughness that after some weeks there was certainly not enough woody material left in that whole fifteen acres of ground to kindle a small kitchen fire. the men would begin work on the stump of a good sized tree, and chip and split it off painfully and slowly until they had followed it to the extremity of the tap root ten or fifteen feet below the surface. the lateral roots would be followed with equal determination, and trenches thirty feet long, and two or three feet deep were dug with case-knives and half-canteens, to get a root as thick as one's wrist. the roots of shrubs and vines were followed up and gathered with similar industry. the cold weather and the scanty issues of wood forced men to do this. the huts constructed were as various as the materials and the tastes of the builders. those who were fortunate enough to get plenty of timber built such cabins as i have described at millen. those who had less eked out their materials in various ways. most frequently all that a squad of three or four could get would be a few slender poles and some brush. they would dig a hole in the ground two feet deep and large enough for them all to lie in. then putting up a stick at each end and laying a ridge pole across, they, would adjust the rest of their material so as to form sloping sides capable of supporting earth enough to make a water-tight roof. the great majority were not so well off as these, and had absolutely, nothing of which to build. they had recourse to the clay of the swamp, from which they fashioned rude sun-dried bricks, and made adobe houses, shaped like a bee hive, which lasted very well until a hard rain came, when they dissolved into red mire about the bodies of their miserable inmates. remember that all these makeshifts were practiced within a half-a-mile of an almost boundless forest, from which in a day's time the camp could have been supplied with material enough to give every man a comfortable hut. chapter lxix. barrett's insane cruelty--how he punished those alleged to be engaged in tunneling--the misery in the stockade--men's limbs rotting off with dry gangrene. winder had found in barrett even a better tool for his cruel purposes than wirz. the two resembled each other in many respects. both were absolutely destitute of any talent for commanding men, and could no more handle even one thousand men properly than a cabin boy could navigate a great ocean steamer. both were given to the same senseless fits of insane rage, coming and going without apparent cause, during which they fired revolvers and guns or threw clubs into crowds of prisoners, or knocked down such as were within reach of their fists. these exhibitions were such as an overgrown child might be expected to make. they did not secure any result except to increase the prisoners' wonder that such ill-tempered fools could be given any position of responsibility. a short time previous to our entry barrett thought he had reason to suspect a tunnel. he immediately announced that no more rations should be issued until its whereabouts was revealed and the ringleaders in the attempt to escape delivered up to him. the rations at that time were very scanty, so that the first day they were cut off the sufferings were fearful. the boys thought he would surely relent the next day, but they did not know their man. he was not suffering any, why should he relax his severity? he strolled leisurely out from his dinner table, picking his teeth with his penknife in the comfortable, self-satisfied way of a coarse man who has just filled his stomach to his entire content--an attitude and an air that was simply maddening to the famishing wretches, of whom he inquired tantalizingly: "air ye're hungry enough to give up them g-d d d s--s of b----s yet?" that night thirteen thousand men, crazy, fainting with hunger, walked hither and thither, until exhaustion forced them to become quiet, sat on the ground and pressed their bowels in by leaning against sticks of wood laid across their thighs; trooped to the creek and drank water until their gorges rose and they could swallow no more--did everything in fact that imagination could suggest--to assuage the pangs of the deadly gnawing that was consuming their vitals. all the cruelties of the terrible spanish inquisition, if heaped together, would not sum up a greater aggregate of anguish than was endured by them. the third day came, and still no signs of yielding by barrett. the sergeants counseled together. something must be done. the fellow would starve the whole camp to death with as little compunction as one drowns blind puppies. it was necessary to get up a tunnel to show barrett, and to get boys who would confess to being leaders in the work. a number of gallant fellows volunteered to brave his wrath, and save the rest of their comrades. it required high courage to do this, as there was no question but that the punishment meted out would be as fearful as the cruel mind of the fellow could conceive. the sergeants decided that four would be sufficient to answer the purpose; they selected these by lot, marched them to the gate and delivered them over to barrett, who thereupon ordered the rations to be sent in. he was considerate enough, too, to feed the men he was going to torture. the starving men in the stockade could not wait after the rations were issued to cook them, but in many instances mixed the meal up with water, and swallowed it raw. frequently their stomachs, irritated by the long fast, rejected the mess; any very many had reached the stage where they loathed food; a burning fever was consuming them, and seething their brains with delirium. hundreds died within a few days, and hundreds more were so debilitated by the terrible strain that they did not linger long afterward. the boys who had offered themselves as a sacrifice for the rest were put into a guard house, and kept over night that barrett might make a day of the amusement of torturing them. after he had laid in a hearty breakfast, and doubtless fortified himself with some of the villainous sorgum whisky, which the rebels were now reduced to drinking, he set about his entertainment. the devoted four were brought out--one by one--and their hands tied together behind their backs. then a noose of a slender, strong hemp rope was slipped over the first one's thumbs and drawn tight, after which the rope was thrown over a log projecting from the roof of the guard house, and two or three rebels hauled upon it until the miserable yankee was lifted from the ground, and hung suspended by the thumbs, while his weight seemed tearing his limbs from his shoulder blades. the other three were treated in the same manner. the agony was simply excruciating. the boys were brave, and had resolved to stand their punishment without a groan, but this was too much for human endurance. their will was strong, but nature could not be denied, and they shrieked aloud so pitifully that a young reserve standing near fainted. each one screamed: "for god's sake, kill me! kill me! shoot me if--you want to, but let me down from here!" the only effect of this upon barrett was to light up his brutal face with a leer of fiendish satisfaction. he said to the guards with a gleeful wink: "by god, i'll learn these yanks to be more afeard of me than of the old devil himself. they'll soon understand that i'm not the man to fool with. i'm old pizen, i am, when i git started. jest hear 'em squeal, won't yer?" then walking from one prisoner to another, he said: "d---n yer skins, ye'll dig tunnels, will ye? ye'll try to git out, and run through the country stealin' and carryin' off niggers, and makin' more trouble than yer d----d necks are worth. i'll learn ye all about that. if i ketch ye at this sort of work again, d----d ef i don't kill ye ez soon ez i ketch ye." and so on, ad infinitum. how long the boys were kept up there undergoing this torture can not be said. perhaps it was an hour or more. to the locker-on it seemed long hours, to the poor fellows themselves it was ages. when they were let down at last, all fainted, and were carried away to the hospital, where they were weeks in recovering from the effects. some of them were crippled for life. when we came into the prison there were about eleven thousand there. more uniformly wretched creatures i had never before seen. up to the time of our departure from andersonville the constant influx of new prisoners had prevented the misery and wasting away of life from becoming fully realized. though thousands were continually dying, thousands more of healthy, clean, well-clothed men were as continually coming in from the front, so that a large portion of those inside looked in fairly good condition. put now no new prisoners had come in for months; the money which made such a show about the sutler shops of andersonville had been spent; and there was in every face the same look of ghastly emaciation, the same shrunken muscles and feeble limbs, the same lack-luster eyes and hopeless countenances. one of the commonest of sights was to see men whose hands and feet were simply rotting off. the nights were frequently so cold that ice a quarter of an inch thick formed on the water. the naked frames of starving men were poorly calculated to withstand this frosty rigor, and thousands had their extremities so badly frozen as to destroy the life in those parts, and induce a rotting of the tissues by a dry gangrene. the rotted flesh frequently remained in its place for a long time --a loathsome but painless mass, that gradually sloughed off, leaving the sinews that passed through it to stand out like shining, white cords. while this was in some respects less terrible than the hospital gangrene at andersonville, it was more generally diffused, and dreadful to the last degree. the rebel surgeons at florence did not follow the habit of those at andersonville, and try to check the disease by wholesale amputation, but simply let it run its course, and thousands finally carried their putrefied limbs through our lines, when the confederacy broke up in the spring, to be treated by our surgeons. i had been in prison but a little while when a voice called out from a hole in the ground, as i was passing: "s-a-y, sergeant! won't you please take these shears and cut my toes off?" "what?" said i, in amazement, stopping in front of the dugout. "just take these shears, won't you, and cut my toes off?" answered the inmate, an indiana infantryman--holding up a pair of dull shears in his hand, and elevating a foot for me to look at. i examined the latter carefully. all the flesh of the toes, except little pads at the ends, had rotted off, leaving the bones as clean as if scraped. the little tendons still remained, and held the bones to their places, but this seemed to hurt the rest of the feet and annoy the man. "you'd better let one of the rebel doctors see this," i said, after finishing my survey, "before you conclude to have them off. may be they can be saved." "no; d----d if i'm going to have any of them rebel butchers fooling around me. i'd die first, and then i wouldn't," was the reply. "you can do it better than they can. it's just a little snip. just try it." "i don't like to," i replied. "i might lame you for life, and make you lots of trouble." "o, bother! what business is that of yours? they're my toes, and i want 'em off. they hurt me so i can't sleep. come, now, take the shears and cut 'em off." i yielded, and taking the shears, snipped one tendon after another, close to the feet, and in a few seconds had the whole ten toes lying in a heap at the bottom of the dug-out. i picked them up and handed them to their owner, who gazed at them, complacently, and remarked: "well, i'm darned glad they're off. i won't be bothered with corns any more, i flatter myself." chapter lxx. house and clothes--efforts to erect a suitable residence--difficulties attending this--varieties of florentine architecture--waiting for dead men's clothes--craving for tobacco. we were put into the old squads to fill the places of those who had recently died, being assigned to these vacancies according to the initials of our surnames, the same rolls being used that we had signed as paroles. this separated andrews and me, for the "a's" were taken to fill up the first hundreds of the first thousand, while the "m's," to which i belonged, went into the next thousand. i was put into the second hundred of the second thousand, and its sergeant dying shortly after, i was given his place, and commanded the hundred, drew its rations, made out its rolls, and looked out for its sick during the rest of our stay there. andrews and i got together again, and began fixing up what little we could to protect ourselves against the weather. cold as this was we decided that it was safer to endure it and risk frost-biting every night than to build one of the mud-walled and mud-covered holes that so many, lived in. these were much warmer than lying out on the frozen ground, but we believed that they were very unhealthy, and that no one lived long who inhabited them. so we set about repairing our faithful old blanket--now full of great holes. we watched the dead men to get pieces of cloth from their garments to make patches, which we sewed on with yarn raveled from other fragments of woolen cloth. some of our company, whom we found in the prison, donated us the three sticks necessary to make tent-poles --wonderful generosity when the preciousness of firewood is remembered. we hoisted our blanket upon these; built a wall of mud bricks at one end, and in it a little fireplace to economize our scanty fuel to the last degree, and were once more at home, and much better off than most of our neighbors. one of these, the proprietor of a hole in the ground covered with an arch of adobe bricks, had absolutely no bed-clothes except a couple of short pieces of board--and very little other clothing. he dug a trench in the bottom of what was by courtesy called his tent, sufficiently large to contain his body below his neck. at nightfall he would crawl into this, put his two bits of board so that they joined over his breast, and then say: "now, boys, cover me over;" whereupon his friends would cover him up with dry sand from the sides of his domicile, in which he would slumber quietly till morning, when he would rise, shake the sand from his garments, and declare that he felt as well refreshed as if he had slept on a spring mattress. there has been much talk of earth baths of late years in scientific and medical circles. i have been sorry that our florence comrade if he still lives--did not contribute the results of his experience. the pinching cold cured me of my repugnance to wearing dead men's clothes, or rather it made my nakedness so painful that i was glad to cover it as best i could, and i began foraging among the corpses for garments. for awhile my efforts to set myself up in the mortuary second-hand clothing business were not all successful. i found that dying men with good clothes were as carefully watched over by sets of fellows who constituted themselves their residuary legatees as if they were men of fortune dying in the midst of a circle of expectant nephews and nieces. before one was fairly cold his clothes would be appropriated and divided, and i have seen many sharp fights between contesting claimants. i soon perceived that my best chance was to get up very early in the morning, and do my hunting. the nights were so cold that many could not sleep, and they would walk up and down the streets, trying to keep warm by exercise. towards morning, becoming exhausted, they would lie down on the ground almost anywhere, and die. i have frequently seen so many as fifty of these. my first "find" of any importance was a young pennsylvania zouave, who was lying dead near the bridge that crossed the creek. his clothes were all badly worn, except his baggy, dark trousers, which were nearly new. i removed these, scraped out from each of the dozens of great folds in the legs about a half pint of lice, and drew the garments over my own half-frozen limbs, the first real covering those members had had for four or five months. the pantaloons only came down about half-way between my knees and feet, but still they were wonderfully comfortable to what i had been--or rather not been--wearing. i had picked up a pair of boot bottoms, which answered me for shoes, and now i began a hunt for socks. this took several morning expeditions, but on one of them i was rewarded with finding a corpse with a good brown one --army make--and a few days later i got another, a good, thick genuine one, knit at home, of blue yarn, by some patient, careful housewife. almost the next morning i had the good fortune to find a dead man with a warm, whole, infantry dress-coat, a most serviceable garment. as i still had for a shirt the blouse andrews had given me at millen, i now considered my wardrobe complete, and left the rest of the clothes to those who were more needy than i. those who used tobacco seemed to suffer more from a deprivation of the weed than from lack of food. there were no sacrifices they would not make to obtain it, and it was no uncommon thing for boys to trade off half their rations for a chew of "navy plug." as long as one had anything--especially buttons--to trade, tobacco could be procured from the guards, who were plentifully supplied with it. when means of barter were gone, chewers frequently became so desperate as to beg the guards to throw them a bit of the precious nicotine. shortly after our arrival at florence, a prisoner on the east side approached one of the reserves with the request: "say, guard, can't you give a fellow a chew of tobacco?" to which the guard replied: "yes; come right across the line there and i'll drop you down a bit." the unsuspecting prisoner stepped across the dead line, and the guard--a boy of sixteen--raised his gun and killed him. at the north side of the prison, the path down to the creek lay right along side of the dead line, which was a mere furrow in the ground. at night the guards, in their zeal to kill somebody, were very likely to imagine that any one going along the path for water was across the dead line, and fire upon him. it was as bad as going upon the skirmish line to go for water after nightfall. yet every night a group of boys would be found standing at the head of the path crying out: "fill your buckets for a chew of tobacco." that is, they were willing to take all the risk of running that gauntlet for this moderate compensation. chapter lxxi. december--rations of wood and food grow less daily--uncertainty as to the mortality at florence--even the government's statistics are very deficient--care fob the sick. the rations of wood grew smaller as the weather grew colder, until at last they settled down to a piece about the size of a kitchen rolling-pin per day for each man. this had to serve for all purposes--cooking, as well as warming. we split the rations up into slips about the size of a carpenter's lead pencil, and used them parsimoniously, never building a fire so big that it could not be covered with a half-peck measure. we hovered closely over this--covering it, in fact, with our hands and bodies, so that not a particle of heat was lost. remembering the indian's sage remark, "that the white man built a big fire and sat away off from it; the indian made a little fire and got up close to it," we let nothing in the way of caloric be wasted by distance. the pitch-pine produced great quantities of soot, which, in cold and rainy days, when we hung over the fires all the time, blackened our faces until we were beyond the recognition of intimate friends. there was the same economy of fuel in cooking. less than half as much as is contained in a penny bunch of kindling was made to suffice in preparing our daily meal. if we cooked mush we elevated our little can an inch from the ground upon a chunk of clay, and piled the little sticks around it so carefully that none should burn without yielding all its heat to the vessel, and not one more was burned than absolutely necessary. if we baked bread we spread the dough upon our chessboard, and propped it up before the little fire-place, and used every particle of heat evolved. we had to pinch and starve ourselves thus, while within five minutes' walk from the prison-gate stood enough timber to build a great city. the stump andrews and i had the foresight to save now did us excellent service. it was pitch pine, very fat with resin, and a little piece split off each day added much to our fires and our comfort. one morning, upon examining the pockets of an infantryman of my hundred who had just died, i had the wonderful luck to find a silver quarter. i hurried off to tell andrews of our unexpected good fortune. by an effort he succeeded in calming himself to the point of receiving the news with philosophic coolness, and we went into committee of the whole upon the state of our stomachs, to consider how the money could be spent to the best advantage. at the south side of the stockade on the outside of the timbers, was a sutler shop, kept by a rebel, and communicating with the prison by a hole two or three feet square, cut through the logs. the dead line was broken at this point, so as to permit prisoners to come up to the hole to trade. the articles for sale were corn meal and bread, flour and wheat bread, meat, beaus, molasses, honey, sweet potatos, etc. i went down to the place, carefully inspected the stock, priced everything there, and studied the relative food value of each. i came back, reported my observations and conclusions to andrews, and then staid at the tent while he went on a similar errand. the consideration of the matter was continued during the day and night, and the next morning we determined upon investing our twenty-five cents in sweet potatos, as we could get nearly a half-bushel of them, which was "more fillin' at the price," to use the words of dickens's fat boy, than anything else offered us. we bought the potatos, carried them home in our blanket, buried them in the bottom of our tent, to keep them from being stolen, and restricted ourselves to two per day until we had eaten them all. the rebels did something more towards properly caring for the sick than at andersonville. a hospital was established in the northwestern corner of the stockade, and separated from the rest of the camp by a line of police, composed of our own men. in this space several large sheds were erected, of that rude architecture common to the coarser sort of buildings in the south. there was not a nail or a bolt used in their entire construction. forked posts at the ends and sides supported poles upon which were laid the long "shakes," or split shingles, forming the roofs, and which were held in place by other poles laid upon them. the sides and ends were enclosed by similar "shakes," and altogether they formed quite a fair protection against the weather. beds of pine leaves were provided for the sick, and some coverlets, which our sanitary commission had been allowed to send through. but nothing was done to bathe or cleanse them, or to exchange their lice-infested garments for others less full of torture. the long tangled hair and whiskers were not cut, nor indeed were any of the commonest suggestions for the improvement of the condition of the sick put into execution. men who had laid in their mud hovels until they had become helpless and hopeless, were admitted to the hospital, usually only to die. the diseases were different in character from those which swept off the prisoners at andersonville. there they were mostly of the digestive organs; here of the respiratory. the filthy, putrid, speedily fatal gangrene of andersonville became here a dry, slow wasting away of the parts, which continued for weeks, even months, without being necessarily fatal. men's feet and legs, and less frequently their hands and arms, decayed and sloughed off. the parts became so dead that a knife could be run through them without causing a particle of pain. the dead flesh hung on to the bones and tendons long after the nerves and veins had ceased to perform their functions, and sometimes startled one by dropping off in a lump, without causing pain or hemorrhage. the appearance of these was, of course, frightful, or would have been, had we not become accustomed to them. the spectacle of men with their feet and legs a mass of dry ulceration, which had reduced the flesh to putrescent deadness, and left the tendons standing out like cords, was too common to excite remark or even attention. unless the victim was a comrade, no one specially heeded his condition. lung diseases and low fevers ravaged the camp, existing all the time in a more or less virulent condition, according to the changes of the weather, and occasionally ragging in destructive epidemics. i am unable to speak with any degree of definiteness as to the death rate, since i had ceased to interest myself about the number dying each day. i had now been a prisoner a year, and had become so torpid and stupefied, mentally and physically, that i cared comparatively little for anything save the rations of food and of fuel. the difference of a few spoonfuls of meal, or a large splinter of wood in the daily issues to me, were of more actual importance than the increase or decrease of the death rate by a half a score or more. at andersonville i frequently took the trouble to count the number of dead and living, but all curiosity of this kind had now died out. nor can i find that anybody else is in possession of much more than my own information on the subject. inquiry at the war department has elicited the following letters: i. the prison records of florence, s. c., have never come to light, and therefore the number of prisoners confined there could not be ascertained from the records on file in this office; nor do i think that any statement purporting to show that number has ever been made. in the report to congress of march 1, 1869, it was shown from records as follows: escaped, fifty-eight; paroled, one; died, two thousand seven hundred and ninety-three. total, two thousand eight hundred and fifty-two. since date of said report there have been added to the records as follows: died, two hundred and twelve; enlisted in rebel army, three hundred and twenty-six. total, five hundred and thirty-eight. making a total disposed of from there, as shown by records on file, of three thousand three hundred and ninety. this, no doubt, is a small proportion of the number actually confined there. the hospital register on file contains that part only of the alphabet subsequent to, and including part of the letter s, but from this register, it is shown that the prisoners were arranged in hundreds and thousands, and the hundred and thousand to which he belonged is recorded opposite each man's name on said register. thus: "john jones, 11th thousand, 10th hundred." eleven thousand being the highest number thus recorded, it is fair to presume that not less than that number were confined there on a certain date, and that more than that number were confined there during the time it was continued as a prison. ii statement showing the whole number of federals and confederates captured, (less the number paroled on the field), the number who died while prisoners, and the percentage of deaths, 1861-1865 federals captured .................................................. 187,818 died, (as shown by prison and hospital records on file).... 30,674 percentage of deaths ...................................... 16.375 confederates captured .................................................. 227,570 died ...................................................... 26,774 percentage of deaths ...................................... 11.768 in the detailed statement prepared for congress dated march 1, 1869, the whole number of deaths given as shown by prisoner of war records was twenty-six thousand three hundred and twenty-eight, but since that date evidence of three thousand six hundred and twenty-eight additional deaths has been obtained from the captured confederate records, making a total of twenty-nine thousand nine hundred and fifty-six as above shown. this is believed to be many thousands less than the actual number of federal prisoners who died in confederate prisons, as we have no records from those at montgomery ala., mobile, ala., millen, ga., marietta, ga., atlanta, ga., charleston, s. c., and others. the records of florence, s. c., and salisbury, n. c., are very incomplete. it also appears from confederate inspection reports of confederate prisons, that large percentage of the deaths occurred in prison quarter without the care or knowledge of the surgeon. for the month of december, 1864 alone, the confederate "burial report"; salisbury, n. c., show that out, of eleven hundred and fifty deaths, two hundred and twenty-three, or twenty per cent., died in prison quarters and are not accounted for in the report of the surgeon, and therefore not taken into consideration in the above report, as the only records of said prisons on file (with one exception) are the hospital records. calculating the percentage of deaths on this basis would give the number of deaths at thirty-seven thousand four hundred and forty-five and percentage of deaths at 20.023. [end of the letters from the war department.] if we assume that the government's records of florence as correct, it will be apparent that one man in every three die there, since, while there might have been as high as fifty thousand at one time in the prison, during the last three months of its existence i am quite sure that the number did not exceed seven thousand. this would make the mortality much greater than at andersonville, which it undoubtedly was, since the physical condition of the prisoners confined there had been greatly depressed by their long confinement, while the bulk c the prisoners at andersonville were those who had been brought thither directly from the field. i think also that all who experienced confinement in the two places are united in pronouncing florence to be, on the whole, much the worse place and more fatal to life. the medicines furnished the sick were quite simple in nature and mainly composed of indigenous substances. for diarrhea red pepper and decoctions of blackberry root and of pine leave were given. for coughs and lung diseases, a decoction of wild cherry bark was administered. chills and fever were treated with decoctions of dogwood bark, and fever patients who craved something sour, were given a weak acid drink, made by fermenting a small quantity of meal in a barrel of water. all these remedies were quite good in their way, and would have benefitted the patients had they been accompanied by proper shelter, food and clothing. but it was idle to attempt to arrest with blackberry root the diarrhea, or with wild cherry bark the consumption of a man lying in a cold, damp, mud hovel, devoured by vermin, and struggling to maintain life upon less than a pint of unsalted corn meal per diem. finding that the doctors issued red pepper for diarrhea, and an imitation of sweet oil made from peanuts, for the gangrenous sores above described, i reported to them an imaginary comrade in my tent, whose symptoms indicated those remedies, and succeeded in drawing a small quantity of each, two or three times a week. the red pepper i used to warm up our bread and mush, and give some different taste to the corn meal, which had now become so loathsome to us. the peanut oil served to give a hint of the animal food we hungered for. it was greasy, and as we did not have any meat for three months, even this flimsy substitute was inexpressibly grateful to palate and stomach. but one morning the hospital steward made a mistake, and gave me castor oil instead, and the consequences were unpleasant. a more agreeable remembrance is that of two small apples, about the size of walnuts, given me by a boy named henry clay montague porter, of the sixteenth connecticut. he had relatives living in north carolina, who sent him a small packs of eatables, out of which, in the fulness of his generous heart he gave me this share--enough to make me always remember him with kindness. speaking of eatables reminds me of an incident. joe darling, of the first maine, our chief of police, had a sister living at augusta, ga., who occasionally came to florence with basket of food and other necessaries for her brother. on one of these journeys, while sitting in colonel iverson's tent, waiting for her brother to be brought out of prison, she picked out of her basket a nicely browned doughnut and handed it to the guard pacing in front of the tent, with: "here, guard, wouldn't you like a genuine yankee doughnut?" the guard-a lank, loose-jointed georgia cracker--who in all his life seen very little more inviting food than the his hominy and molasses, upon which he had been raised, took the cake, turned it over and inspected it curiously for some time without apparently getting the least idea of what it was for, and then handed it back to the donor, saying: "really, mum, i don't believe i've got any use for it" chapter lxxii. dull winter days--too weak and too stupid to amuse ourselves--attempts of the rebels to recruit us into their army--the class of men they obtained --vengeance on "the galvanized"--a singular experience--rare glimpses of fun--inability of the rebels to count. the rebels continued their efforts to induce prisoners to enlist in their army, and with much better success than at any previous time. many men had become so desperate that they were reckless as to what they did. home, relatives, friends, happiness--all they had remembered or looked forward to, all that had nerved them up to endure the present and brave the future--now seemed separated from them forever by a yawning and impassable chasm. for many weeks no new prisoners had come in to rouse their drooping courage with news of the progress of our arms towards final victory, or refresh their remembrances of home, and the gladsomeness of "god's country." before them they saw nothing but weeks of slow and painful progress towards bitter death. the other alternative was enlistment in the rebel army. another class went out and joined, with no other intention than to escape at the first opportunity. they justified their bad faith to the rebels by recalling the numberless instances of the rebels' bad faith to us, and usually closed their arguments in defense of their course with: "no oath administered by a rebel can have any binding obligation. these men are outlaws who have not only broken their oaths to the government, but who have deserted from its service, and turned its arms against it. they are perjurers and traitors, and in addition, the oath they administer to us is under compulsion and for that reason is of no account." still another class, mostly made up from the old raider crowd, enlisted from natural depravity. they went out more than for anything else because their hearts were prone to evil and they did that which was wrong in preference to what was right. by far the largest portion of those the rebels obtained were of this class, and a more worthless crowd of soldiers has not been seen since falstaff mustered his famous recruits. after all, however, the number who deserted their flag was astonishingly small, considering all the circumstances. the official report says three hundred and twenty-six, but i imaging this is under the truth, since quite a number were turned back in after their utter uselessness had been demonstrated. i suppose that five hundred "galvanized," as we termed it, but this was very few when the hopelessness of exchange, the despair of life, and the wretchedness of the condition of the eleven or twelve thousand inside the stockade is remembered. the motives actuating men to desert were not closely analyzed by us, but we held all who did so as despicable scoundrels, too vile to be adequately described in words. it was not safe for a man to announce his intention of "galvanizing," for he incurred much danger of being beaten until he was physically unable to reach the gate. those who went over to the enemy had to use great discretion in letting the rebel officer, know so much of their wishes as would secure their being taker outside. men were frequently knocked down and dragged away while telling the officers they wanted to go out. on one occasion one hundred or more of the raider crowd who had galvanized, were stopped for a few hours in some little town, on their way to the front. they lost no time in stealing everything they could lay their hands upon, and the disgusted rebel commander ordered them to be returned to the stockade. they came in in the evening, all well rigged out in rebel uniforms, and carrying blankets. we chose to consider their good clothes and equipments an aggravation of their offense and an insult to ourselves. we had at that time quite a squad of negro soldiers inside with us. among them was a gigantic fellow with a fist like a wooden beetle. some of the white boys resolved to use these to wreak the camp's displeasure on the galvanized. the plan was carried out capitally. the big darky, followed by a crowd of smaller and nimbler "shades," would approach one of the leaders among them with: "is you a galvanized?" the surly reply would be, "yes, you ---black ----. what the business is that of yours?" at that instant the bony fist of the darky, descending like a pile-driver, would catch the recreant under the ear, and lift him about a rod. as he fell, the smaller darkies would pounce upon him, and in an instant despoil him of his blanket and perhaps the larger portion of his warm clothing. the operation was repeated with a dozen or more. the whole camp enjoyed it as rare fun, and it was the only time that i saw nearly every body at florence laugh. a few prisoners were brought in in december, who had been taken in foster's attempt to cut the charleston & savannah railroad at pocataligo. among them we were astonished to find charley hirsch, a member of company i's of our battalion. he had had a strange experience. he was originally a member of a texas regiment and was captured at arkansas post. he then took the oath of allegiance and enlisted with us. while we were at savannah he approached a guard one day to trade for tobacco. the moment he spoke to the man he recognized him as a former comrade in the texas regiment. the latter knew him also, and sang out, "i know you; you're charley hirsch, that used to be in my company." charley backed into the crowd as quickly as possible; to elude the fellow's eyes, but the latter called for the corporal of the guard, had himself relieved, and in a few minutes came in with an officer in search of the deserter. he found him with little difficulty, and took him out. the luckless charley was tried by court martial, found, guilty, sentenced to be shot, and while waiting execution was confined in the jail. before the sentence could be carried into effect sherman came so close to the city that it was thought best to remove the prisoners. in the confusion charley managed to make his escape, and at the moment the battle of pocataligo opened, was lying concealed between the two lines of battle, without knowing, of course, that he was in such a dangerous locality. after the firing opened, he thought it better to lie still than run the risk from the fire of both sides, especially as he momentarily expected our folks to advance and drive the rebels away. but the reverse happened; the johnnies drove our fellows, and, finding charley in his place of concealment, took him for one of foster's men, and sent him to florence, where he staid until we went through to our lines. our days went by as stupidly and eventless as can be conceived. we had grown too spiritless and lethargic to dig tunnels or plan escapes. we had nothing to read, nothing to make or destroy, nothing to work with, nothing to play with, and even no desire to contrive anything for amusement. all the cards in the prison were worn out long ago. some of the boys had made dominos from bones, and andrews and i still had our chessmen, but we were too listless to play. the mind, enfeebled by the long disuse of it except in a few limited channels, was unfitted for even so much effort as was involved in a game for pastime. nor were there any physical exercises, such as that crowd of young men would have delighted in under other circumstances. there was no running, boxing, jumping, wrestling, leaping, etc. all were too weak and hungry to make any exertion beyond that absolutely necessary. on cold days everybody seemed totally benumbed. the camp would be silent and still. little groups everywhere hovered for hours, moody and sullen, over diminutive, flickering fires, made with one poor handful of splinters. when the sun shone, more activity was visible. boys wandered around, hunted up their friends, and saw what gaps death--always busiest during the cold spells--had made in the ranks of their acquaintances. during the warmest part of the day everybody disrobed, and spent an hour or more killing the lice that had waxed and multiplied to grievous proportions during the few days of comparative immunity. besides the whipping of the galvanized by the darkies, i remember but two other bits of amusement we had while at florence. one of these was in hearing the colored soldiers sing patriotic songs, which they did with great gusto when the weather became mild. the other was the antics of a circus clown--a member, i believe, of a connecticut or a new york regiment, who, on the rare occasions when we were feeling not exactly well so much as simply better than we had been, would give us an hour or two of recitations of the drolleries with which he was wont to set the crowded canvas in a roar. one of his happiest efforts, i remember, was a stilted paraphrase of "old uncle ned" a song very popular a quarter of a century ago, and which ran something like this: there was an old darky, an' his name was uncle ned, but he died long ago, long ago he had no wool on de top of his head, de place whar de wool ought to grouw. chorus den lay down de shubel an' de hoe, den hang up de fiddle an' de bow; for dere's no more hard work for poor uncle ned he's gone whar de good niggahs go. his fingers war long, like de cane in de brake, and his eyes war too dim for to see; he had no teeth to eat de corn cake, so he had to let de corn cake be. chorus. his legs were so bowed dat he couldn't lie still. an' he had no nails on his toes; his neck was so crooked dot he couldn't take a pill, so he had to take a pill through his nose. chorus. one cold frosty morning old uncle ned died, an' de tears ran down massa's cheek like rain, for he knew when uncle ned was laid in de groun', he would never see poor uncle ned again, chorus. in the hands of this artist the song became-there was an aged and indigent african whose cognomen was uncle edward, but he is deceased since a remote period, a very remote period; he possessed no capillary substance on the summit of his cranium, the place designated by kind nature for the capillary substance to vegetate. chorus. then let the agricultural implements rest recumbent upon the ground; and suspend the musical instruments in peace neon the wall, for there's no more physical energy to be displayed by our indigent uncle edward he has departed to that place set apart by a beneficent providence for the reception of the better class of africans. and so on. these rare flashes of fun only served to throw the underlying misery out in greater relief. it was like lightning playing across the surface of a dreary morass. i have before alluded several times to the general inability of rebels to count accurately, even in low numbers. one continually met phases of this that seemed simply incomprehensible to us, who had taken in the multiplication table almost with our mother's milk, and knew the rule of three as well as a presbyterian boy does the shorter catechism. a cadet--an undergraduate of the south carolina military institute --called our roll at florence, and though an inborn young aristocrat, who believed himself made of finer clay than most mortals, he was not a bad fellow at all. he thought south carolina aristocracy the finest gentry, and the south carolina military institute the greatest institution of learning in the world; but that is common with all south carolinians. one day he came in so full of some matter of rare importance that we became somewhat excited as to its nature. dismissing our hundred after roll-call, he unburdened his mind: "now you fellers are all so d---d peart on mathematics, and such things, that you want to snap me up on every opportunity, but i guess i've got something this time that'll settle you. its something that a fellow gave out yesterday, and colonel iverson, and all the officers out there have been figuring on it ever since, and none have got the right answer, and i'm powerful sure that none of you, smart as you think you are, can do it." "heavens, and earth, let's hear this wonderful problem," said we all. "well," said he, "what is the length of a pole standing in a river, one-fifth of which is in the mud, two-thirds in the water, and one-eighth above the water, while one foot and three inches of the top is broken off?" in a minute a dozen answered, "one hundred and fifty feet." the cadet could only look his amazement at the possession of such an amount of learning by a crowd of mudsills, and one of our fellows said contemptuously: "why, if you south carolina institute fellows couldn't answer such questions as that they wouldn't allow you in the infant class up north." lieutenant barrett, our red-headed tormentor, could not, for the life of him, count those inside in hundreds and thousands in such a manner as to be reasonably certain of correctness. as it would have cankered his soul to feel that he was being beaten out of a half-dozen rations by the superior cunning of the yankees, he adopted a plan which he must have learned at some period of his life when he was a hog or sheep drover. every sunday morning all in the camp were driven across the creek to the east side, and then made to file slowly back--one at a time--between two guards stationed on the little bridge that spanned the creek. by this means, if he was able to count up to one hundred, he could get our number correctly. the first time this was done after our arrival he gave us a display of his wanton malevolence. we were nearly all assembled on the east side, and were standing in ranks, at the edge of the swamp, facing the west. barrett was walking along the opposite edge of the swamp, and, coming to a little gully jumped, it. he was very awkward, and came near falling into the mud. we all yelled derisively. he turned toward us in a fury, shook his fist, and shouted curses and imprecations. we yelled still louder. he snatched out his revolver, and began firing at our line. the distance was considerable--say four or five hundred feet--and the bullets struck in the mud in advance of the line. we still yelled. then he jerked a gun from a guard and fired, but his aim was still bad, and the bullet sang over our heads, striking in the bank above us. he posted of to get another gun, but his fit subsided before he obtained it. chapter lxxiii. christmas--and the way the was passed--the daily routine of ration drawing--some peculiarities of living and dying. christmas, with its swelling flood of happy memories,--memories now bitter because they marked the high tide whence our fortunes had receded to this despicable state--came, but brought no change to mark its coming. it is true that we had expected no change; we had not looked forward to the day, and hardly knew when it arrived, so indifferent were we to the lapse of time. when reminded that the day was one that in all christendom was sacred to good cheer and joyful meetings; that wherever the upraised cross proclaimed followers of him who preached "peace on earth and good will to men," parents and children, brothers and sisters, long-time friends, and all congenial spirits were gathering around hospitable boards to delight in each other's society, and strengthen the bonds of unity between them, we listened as to a tale told of some foreign land from which we had parted forever more. it seemed years since we had known anything of the kind. the experience we had had of it belonged to the dim and irrevocable past. it could not come to us again, nor we go to it. squalor, hunger, cold and wasting disease had become the ordinary conditions of existence, from which there was little hope that we would ever be exempt. perhaps it was well, to a certain degree, that we felt so. it softened the poignancy of our reflections over the difference in the condition of ourselves and our happier comrades who were elsewhere. the weather was in harmony with our feelings. the dull, gray, leaden sky was as sharp a contrast with the crisp, bracing sharpness of a northern christmas morning, as our beggarly little ration of saltless corn meal was to the sumptuous cheer that loaded the dinner-tables of our northern homes. we turned out languidly in the morning to roll-call, endured silently the raving abuse of the cowardly brute barrett, hung stupidly over the flickering little fires, until the gates opened to admit the rations. for an hour there was bustle and animation. all stood around and counted each sack of meal, to get an idea of the rations we were likely to receive. this was a daily custom. the number intended for the day's issue were all brought in and piled up in the street. then there was a division of the sacks to the thousands, the sergeant of each being called up in turn, and allowed to pick out and carry away one, until all were taken. when we entered the prison each thousand received, on an average, ten or eleven sacks a day. every week saw a reduction in the number, until by midwinter the daily issue to a thousand averaged four sacks. let us say that one of these sacks held two bushels, or the four, eight bushels. as there are thirty-two quarts in a bushel, one thousand men received two hundred and fifty-six quarts, or less than a half pint each. we thought we had sounded the depths of misery at andersonville, but florence showed us a much lower depth. bad as was parching under the burning sun whose fiery rays bred miasma and putrefaction, it was still not so bad as having one's life chilled out by exposure in nakedness upon the frozen ground to biting winds and freezing sleet. wretched as the rusty bacon and coarse, maggot-filled bread of andersonville was, it would still go much farther towards supporting life than the handful of saltless meal at florence. while i believe it possible for any young man, with the forces of life strong within him, and healthy in every way, to survive, by taking due precautions, such treatment as we received in andersonville, i cannot understand how anybody could live through a month of florence. that many did live is only an astonishing illustration of the tenacity of life in some individuals. let the reader imagine--anywhere he likes--a fifteen-acre field, with a stream running through the center. let him imagine this inclosed by a stockade eighteen feet high, made by standing logs on end. let him conceive of ten thousand feeble men, debilitated by months of imprisonment, turned inside this inclosure, without a yard of covering given them, and told to make their homes there. one quarter of them--two thousand five hundred--pick up brush, pieces of rail, splits from logs, etc., sufficient to make huts that will turn the rain tolerably. the huts are in no case as good shelter as an ordinarily careful farmer provides for his swine. half of the prisoners--five thousand--who cannot do so well, work the mud up into rude bricks, with which they build shelters that wash down at every hard rain. the remaining two thousand five hundred do not do even this, but lie around on the ground, on old blankets and overcoats, and in day-time prop these up on sticks, as shelter from the rain and wind. let them be given not to exceed a pint of corn meal a day, and a piece of wood about the size of an ordinary stick for a cooking stove to cook it with. then let such weather prevail as we ordinarily have in the north in november--freezing cold rains, with frequent days and nights when the ice forms as thick as a pane of glass. how long does he think men could live through that? he will probably say that a week, or at most a fortnight, would see the last and strongest of these ten thousand lying dead in the frozen mire where he wallowed. he will be astonished to learn that probably not more than four or five thousand of those who underwent this in florence died there. how many died after release--in washington, on the vessels coming to annapolis, in hospital and camp at annapolis, or after they reached home, none but the recording angel can tell. all that i know is we left a trail of dead behind us, wherever we moved, so long as i was with the doleful caravan. looking back, after these lapse of years, the most salient characteristic seems to be the ease with which men died. there, was little of the violence of dissolution so common at andersonville. the machinery of life in all of us, was running slowly and feebly; it would simply grow still slower and feebler in some, and then stop without a jar, without a sensation to manifest it. nightly one of two or three comrades sleeping together would die. the survivors would not know it until they tried to get him to "spoon" over, when they would find him rigid and motionless. as they could not spare even so little heat as was still contained in his body, they would not remove this, but lie up the closer to it until morning. such a thing as a boy making an outcry when he discovered his comrade dead, or manifesting any, desire to get away from the corpse, was unknown. i remember one who, as charles ii. said of himself, was --"an unconscionable long time in dying." his name was bickford; he belonged to the twenty-first ohio volunteer infantry, lived, i think, near findlay, o., and was in my hundred. his partner and he were both in a very bad condition, and i was not surprised, on making my rounds, one morning, to find them apparently quite dead. i called help, and took his partner away to the gate. when we picked up bickford we found he still lived, and had strength enough to gasp out: "you fellers had better let me alone." we laid him back to die, as we supposed, in an hour or so. when the rebel surgeon came in on his rounds, i showed him bickford, lying there with his eyes closed, and limbs motionless. the surgeon said: "o, that man's dead; why don't you have him taken out?" i replied: "no, he isn't. just see." stooping, i shook the boy sharply, and said: "bickford! bickford!! how do you feel?" the eyes did not unclose, but the lips opened slowly, and said with a painful effort: "f-i-r-s-t r-a-t-e!" this scene was repeated every morning for over a week. every day the rebel surgeon would insist that the man should betaken out, and every morning bickford would gasp out with troublesome exertion that he felt: "f-i-r-s-t r-a-t-e!" it ended one morning by his inability, to make his usual answer, and then he was carried out to join the two score others being loaded into the wagon. chapter lxxiv. new year's day--death of john h. winder--he dies on his way to a dinner --something as to character and career--one of the worst men that ever lived. on new year's day we were startled by the information that our old-time enemy--general john h. winder--was dead. it seemed that the rebel sutler of the post had prepared in his tent a grand new year's dinner to which all the officers were invited. just as winder bent his head to enter the tent he fell, and expired shortly after. the boys said it was a clear case of death by visitation of the devil, and it was always insisted that his last words were: "my faith is in christ; i expect to be saved. be sure and cut down the prisoners' rations." thus passed away the chief evil genius of the prisoners-of-war. american history has no other character approaching his in vileness. i doubt if the history of the world can show another man, so insignificant in abilities and position, at whose door can be laid such a terrible load of human misery. there have been many great conquerors and warriors who have waded through slaughter to a throne, and shut the gates of mercy on mankind, but they were great men, with great objects, with grand plans to carry out, whose benefits they thought would be more than an equivalent for the suffering they caused. the misery they inflicted was not the motive of their schemes, but an unpleasant incident, and usually the sufferers were men of other races and religions, for whom sympathy had been dulled by long antagonism. but winder was an obscure, dull old man--the commonplace descendant of a pseudo-aristocrat whose cowardly incompetence had once cost us the loss of our national capital. more prudent than his runaway father, he held himself aloof from the field; his father had lost reputation and almost his commission, by coming into contact with the enemy; he would take no such foolish risks, and he did not. when false expectations of the ultimate triumph of secession led him to cast his lot with the southern confederacy, he did not solicit a command in the field, but took up his quarters in richmond, to become a sort of informer-general, high-inquisitor and chief eavesdropper for his intimate friend, jefferson davis. he pried and spied around into every man's bedroom and family circle, to discover traces of union sentiment. the wildest tales malice and vindictiveness could concoct found welcome reception in his ears. he was only too willing to believe, that he might find excuse for harrying and persecuting. he arrested, insulted, imprisoned, banished, and shot people, until the patience even of the citizens of richmond gave way, and pressure was brought upon jefferson davis to secure the suppression of his satellite. for a long while davis resisted, but at last yielded, and transferred winder to the office of commissary general of prisoners. the delight of the richmond people was great. one of the papers expressed it in an article, the key note of which was: "thank god that richmond is at last rid of old winder. god have mercy upon those to whom he has been sent." remorseless and cruel as his conduct of the office of provost marshal general was, it gave little hint of the extent to which he would go in that of commissary general of prisoners. before, he was restrained somewhat by public opinion and the laws of the land. these no longer deterred him. from the time he assumed command of all the prisons east of the mississippi--some time in the fall of 1863--until death removed him, january 1, 1865--certainly not less than twenty-five thousand incarcerated men died in the most horrible manner that the mind can conceive. he cannot be accused of exaggeration, when, surveying the thousands of new graves at andersonville, he could say with a quiet chuckle that he was "doing more to kill off the yankees than twenty regiments at the front." no twenty regiments in the rebel army ever succeeded in slaying anything like thirteen thousand yankees in six months, or any other time. his cold blooded cruelty was such as to disgust even the rebel officers. colonel d. t. chandler, of the rebel war department, sent on a tour of inspection to andersonville, reported back, under date of august 5, 1864: "my duty requires me respectfully to recommend a change in the officer in command of the post, brigadier general john h. winder, and the substitution in his place of some one who unites both energy and good judgment with some feelings of humanity and consideration for the welfare and comfort, as far as is consistent with their safe keeping, of the vast number of unfortunates placed under his control; some one who, at least, will not advocate deliberately, and in cold blood, the propriety of leaving them in their present condition until their number is sufficiently reduced by death to make the present arrangements suffice for their accommodation, and who will not consider it a matter of self-laudation and boasting that he has never been inside of the stockade--a place the horrors of which it is difficult to describe, and which is a disgrace to civilization--the condition of which he might, by the exercise of a little energy and judgment, even with the limited means at his command, have considerably improved." in his examination touching this report, colonel chandler says: "i noticed that general winder seemed very indifferent to the welfare of the prisoners, indisposed to do anything, or to do as much as i thought he ought to do, to alleviate their sufferings. i remonstrated with him as well as i could, and he used that language which i reported to the department with reference to it--the language stated in the report. when i spoke of the great mortality existing among the prisoners, and pointed out to him that the sickly season was coming on, and that it must necessarily increase unless something was done for their relief--the swamp, for instance, drained, proper food furnished, and in better quantity, and other sanitary suggestions which i made to him--he replied to me that he thought it was better to see half of them die than to take care of the men." it was he who could issue such an order as this, when it was supposed that general stoneman was approaching andersonville: headquarters military prison, andersonville, ga., july 27, 1864. the officers on duty and in charge of the battery of florida artillery at the time will, upon receiving notice that the enemy has approached within seven miles of this post, open upon the stockade with grapeshot, without reference to the situation beyond these lines of defense. john h. winder, brigadier general commanding. this man was not only unpunished, but the government is to-day supporting his children in luxury by the rent it pays for the use of his property --the well-known winder building, which is occupied by one of the departments at washington. i confess that all my attempts to satisfactorily analyze winder's character and discover a sufficient motive for his monstrous conduct have been futile. even if we imagine him inspired by a hatred of the people of the north that rose to fiendishness, we can not understand him. it seems impossible for the mind of any man to cherish so deep and insatiable an enmity against his fellow-creatures that it could not be quenched and turned to pity by the sight of even one day's misery at andersonville or florence. no one man could possess such a grievous sense of private or national wrongs as to be proof against the daily spectacle of thousands of his own fellow citizens, inhabitants of the same country, associates in the same institutions, educated in the same principles, speaking the same language--thousands of his brethren in race, creed, and all that unite men into great communities, starving, rotting and freezing to death. there is many a man who has a hatred so intense that nothing but the death of the detested one will satisfy it. a still fewer number thirst for a more comprehensive retribution; they would slay perhaps a half-dozen persons; and there may be such gluttons of revenge as would not be satisfied with the sacrifice of less than a score or two, but such would be monsters of whom there have been very few, even in fiction. how must they all bow their diminished heads before a man who fed his animosity fat with tens of thousands of lives. but, what also militates greatly against the presumption that either revenge or an abnormal predisposition to cruelty could have animated winder, is that the possession of any two such mental traits so strongly marked would presuppose a corresponding activity of other intellectual faculties, which was not true of him, as from all i can learn of him his mind was in no respect extraordinary. it does not seem possible that he had either the brain to conceive, or the firmness of purpose to carry out so gigantic and long-enduring a career of cruelty, because that would imply superhuman qualities in a man who had previously held his own very poorly in the competition with other men. the probability is that neither winder nor his direct superiors--howell cobb and jefferson davis--conceived in all its proportions the gigantic engine of torture and death they were organizing; nor did they comprehend the enormity of the crime they were committing. but they were willing to do much wrong to gain their end; and the smaller crimes of to-day prepared them for greater ones to-morrow, and still greater ones the day following. killing ten men a day on belle isle in january, by starvation and hardship, led very easily to killing one hundred men a day in andersonville, in july, august and september. probably at the beginning of the war they would have felt uneasy at slaying one man per day by such means, but as retribution came not, and as their appetite for slaughter grew with feeding, and as their sympathy with human misery atrophied from long suppression, they ventured upon ever widening ranges of destructiveness. had the war lasted another year, and they lived, five hundred deaths a day would doubtless have been insufficient to disturb them. winder doubtless went about his part of the task of slaughter coolly, leisurely, almost perfunctorily. his training in the regular army was against the likelihood of his displaying zeal in anything. he instituted certain measures, and let things take their course. that course was a rapid transition from bad to worse, but it was still in the direction of his wishes, and, what little of his own energy was infused into it was in the direction of impetus,-not of controlling or improving the course. to have done things better would have involved soma personal discomfort. he was not likely to incur personal discomfort to mitigate evils that were only afflicting someone else. by an effort of one hour a day for two weeks he could have had every man in andersonville and florence given good shelter through his own exertions. he was not only too indifferent and too lazy to do this, but he was too malignant; and this neglect to allow--simply allow, remember--the prisoners to protect their lives by providing their own shelter, gives the key to his whole disposition, and would stamp his memory with infamy, even if there were no other charges against him. chapter lxxv. one instance of a successful escape--the adventures of sergeant walter hartsough, of company k, sixteenth illinois cavalry--he gets away from the rebels at thomasville, and after a toilsome and dangerous journey of several hundred miles, reaches our lines in florida. while i was at savannah i got hold of a primary geography in possession of one of the prisoners, and securing a fragment of a lead pencil from one comrade, and a sheet of note paper from another, i made a copy of the south carolina and georgia sea coast, for the use of andrews and myself in attempting to escape. the reader remembers the ill success of all our efforts in that direction. when we were at blackshear we still had the map, and intended to make another effort, "as soon as the sign got right." one day while we were waiting for this, walter hartsough, a sergeant of company g, of our battalion, came to me and said: "mc., i wish you'd lend me your map a little while. i want to make a copy." i handed it over to him, and never saw him more, as almost immediately after we were taken out "on parole" and sent to florence. i heard from other comrades of the battalion that he had succeeded in getting past the guard line and into the woods, which was the last they ever heard of him. whether starved to death in some swamp, whether torn to pieces by dogs, or killed by the rifles of his pursuers, they knew not. the reader can judge of my astonishment as well as pleasure, at receiving among the dozens of letters which came to me every day while this account was appearing in the blade, one signed "walter hartsough, late of co. k, sixteenth illinois cavalry." it was like one returned from the grave, and the next mail took a letter to him, inquiring eagerly of his adventures after we separated. i take pleasure in presenting the reader with his reply, which was only intended as a private communication to myself. the first part of the letter i omit, as it contains only gossip about our old comrades, which, however interesting to myself, would hardly be so to the general reader. genoa, wayne county, ia., may 27, 1879. dear comrade mc.: ..................... i have been living in this town for ten years, running a general store, under the firm name of hartsough & martin, and have been more successful than i anticipated. i made my escape from thomasville, ga., dec. 7, 1864, by running the guards, in company with frank hommat, of company m, and a man by the name of clipson, of the twenty-first illinois infantry. i had heard the officers in charge of us say that they intended to march us across to the other road, and take us back to andersonville. we concluded we would take a heavy risk on our lives rather than return there. by stinting ourselves we had got a little meal ahead, which we thought we would bake up for the journey, but our appetites got the better of us, and we ate it all up before starting. we were camped in the woods then, with no stockade--only a line of guards around us. we thought that by a little strategy and boldness we could pass these. we determined to try. clipson was to go to the right, hommat in the center, and myself to the left. we all slipped through, without a shot. our rendezvous was to be the center of a small swamp, through which flowed a small stream that supplied the prisoners with water. hommat and i got together soon after passing the guard lines, and we began signaling for clipson. we laid down by a large log that lay across the stream, and submerged our limbs and part of our bodies in the water, the better to screen ourselves from observation. pretty soon a johnny came along with a bunch of turnip tops, that he was taking up to the camp to trade to the prisoners. as he passed over the log i could have caught him by the leg, which i intended to do if he saw us, but he passed along, heedless of those concealed under his very feet, which saved him a ducking at least, for we were resolved to drown him if he discovered us. waiting here a little longer we left our lurking place and made a circuit of the edge of the swamp, still signaling for clipson. but we could find nothing of him, and at last had to give him up. we were now between thomasville and the camp, and as thomasville was the end of the railroad, the woods were full of rebels waiting transportation, and we approached the road carefully, supposing that it was guarded to keep their own men from going to town. we crawled up to the road, but seeing no one, started across it. at that moment a guard about thirty yards to our left, who evidently supposed that we were rebels, sang out: "whar ye gwine to thar boys?" i answered: "jest a-gwine out here a little ways." frank whispered me to run, but i said, "no; wait till he halts us, and then run." he walked up to where we had crossed his beat--looked after us a few minutes, and then, to our great relief, walked back to his post. after much trouble we succeeded in getting through all the troops, and started fairly on our way. we tried to shape our course toward florida. the country was very swampy, the night rainy and dark, no stars were out to guide us, and we made such poor progress that when daylight came we were only eight miles from our starting place, and close to a road leading from thomasville to monticello. finding a large turnip patch, we filled our pockets, and then hunted a place to lie concealed in during the day. we selected a thicket in the center of a large pasture. we crawled into this and laid down. some negros passed close to us, going to their work in an adjoining field. they had a bucket of victuals with them for dinner, which they hung on the fence in such a way that we could have easily stolen it without detection. the temptation to hungry men was very great, but we concluded that it was best and safest to let it alone. as the negros returned from work in the evening they separated, one old man passing on the opposite side of the thicket from the rest. we halted him and told him that we were rebs, who had taken a french leave of thomasville; that we were tired of guarding yanks, and were going home; and further, that we were hungry, and wanted something to eat. he told us that he was the boss on the plantation. his master lived in thomasville. he, himself, did not have much to eat, but he would show us where to stay, and when the folks went to bed he would bring us some food. passing up close to the negro quarters we got over the fence and lay down behind it, to wait for our supper. we had been there but a short time when a young negro came out, and passing close by us, went into a fence corner a few panels distant and, kneeling down, began praying aloud, and very, earnestly, and stranger still, the burden of his supplication was for the success of our armies. i thought it the best prayer i ever listened to. finishing his devotions he returned to the house, and shortly after the old man came with a good supper of corn bread, molasses and milk. he said that he had no meat, and that he had done the best he could for us. after we had eaten, he said that as the young people had gone to bed, we had better come into his cabin and rest awhile, which we did. hommat had a full suit of rebel clothes, and i had stolen sacks enough at andersonville, when they were issuing rations, to make me a shirt and pantaloons, which a sailor fabricated for me. i wore these over what was left of my blue clothes. the old negro lady treated us very coolly. in a few minutes a young negro came in, whom the old gentleman introduced as his son, and whom i immediately recognized as our friend of the prayerful proclivities. he said that he had been a body servant to his young master, who was an officer in the rebel army. "golly!" says he, "if you 'uns had stood a little longer at stone river, our men would have run." i turned to him sharply with the question of what he meant by calling us "you 'uns," and asked him if he believed we were yankees. he surveyed us carefully for a few seconds, and then said: "yes; i bleav you is yankees." he paused a second, and added: "yes, i know you is." i asked him how he knew it, and he said that we neither looked nor talked like their men. i then acknowledged that we were yankee prisoners, trying to make our escape to our lines. this announcement put new life into the old lady, and, after satisfying herself that we were really yankees, she got up from her seat, shook hands with us, and declared we must have a better supper than we had had. she set immediately about preparing it for us. taking up a plank in the floor, she pulled out a nice flitch of bacon, from which she cut as much as we could eat, and gave us some to carry with us. she got up a real substantial supper, to which we did full justice, in spite of the meal we had already eaten. they gave us a quantity of victuals to take with us, and instructed us as well as possible as to our road. they warned us to keep away from the young negros, but trust the old ones implicitly. thanking them over and over for their exceeding kindness, we bade them good-by, and started again on our journey. our supplies lasted two days, during which time we made good progress, keeping away from the roads, and flanking the towns, which were few and insignificant. we occasionally came across negros, of whom we cautiously inquired as to the route and towns, and by the assistance of our map and the stars, got along very well indeed, until we came to the suwanee river. we had intended to cross this at columbus or alligator. when within six miles of the river we stopped at some negro huts to get some food. the lady who owned the negros was a widow, who was born and raised in massachusetts. her husband had died before the war began. an old negro woman told her mistress that we were at the quarters, and she sent for us to come to the house. she was a very nice-looking lady, about thirty-five years of age, and treated us with great kindness. hommat being barefooted, she pulled off her own shoes and stockings and gave them to him, saying that she would go to town the next day and get herself another pair. she told us not to try to cross the river near columbus, as their troops had been deserting in great numbers, and the river was closely picketed to catch the runaways. she gave us directions how to go so as to cross the river about fifty miles below columbus. we struck the river again the next night, and i wanted to swim it, but hommat was afraid of alligators, and i could not induce him to venture into the water. we traveled down the river until we came to moseley's ferry, where we stole an old boat about a third full of water, and paddled across. there was quite a little town at that place, but we walked right down the main street without meeting any one. six miles from the river we saw an old negro woman roasting sweet potatos in the back yard of a house. we were very hungry, and thought we would risk something to get food. hommat went around near her, and asked her for something to eat. she told him to go and ask the white folks. this was the answer she made to every question. he wound up by asking her how far it was to mossley's ferry, saying that he wanted to go there, and get something to eat. she at last ran into the house, and we ran away as fast as we could. we had gone but a short distance when we heard a horn, and soon-the-cursed hounds began bellowing. we did our best running, but the hounds circled around the house a few times and then took our trail. for a little while it seemed all up with us, as the sound of the baying came closer and closer. but our inquiry about the distance to moseley's ferry seems to have saved us. they soon called the hounds in, and started them on the track we had come, instead of that upon which we were going. the baying shortly died away in the distance. we did not waste any time congratulating ourselves over our marvelous escape, but paced on as fast as we could for about eight miles farther. on the way we passed over the battle ground of oolustee, or ocean pond. coming near to lake city we fell in with some negros who had been brought from maryland. we stopped over one day with them, to rest, and two of them concluded to go with us. we were furnished with a lot of cooked provisions, and starting one night made forty-two miles before morning. we kept the negros in advance. i told hommat that it was a poor command that could not afford an advance guard. after traveling two nights with the negros, we came near baldwin. here i was very much afraid of recapture, and i did not want the negros with us, if we were, lest we should be shot for slave-stealing. about daylight of the second morning we gave them the slip. we had to skirt baldwin closely, to head the st. mary's river, or cross it where that was easiest. after crossing the river we came to a very large swamp, in the edge of which we lay all day. before nightfall we started to go through it, as there was no fear of detection in these swamps. we got through before it was very dark, and as we emerged from it we discovered a dense cloud of smoke to our right and quite close. we decided this was a camp, and while we were talking the band began to play. this made us think that probably our forces had come out from fernandina, and taken the place. i proposed to hommat that we go forward and reconnoiter. he refused, and leaving him alone, i started forward. i had gone but a short distance when a soldier came out from the camp with a bucket. he began singing, and the song he sang convinced me that he was a rebel. rejoining hommat, we held a consultation and decided to stay where we were until it became darker, before trying to get out. it was the night of the 22d of december, and very cold for that country. the camp guard had small fires built, which we could see quite plainly. after starting we saw that the pickets also had fires, and that we were between the two lines. this discovery saved us from capture, and keeping about an equal distance between the two, we undertook to work our way out. we first crossed a line of breastworks, then in succession the fernandina railroad, the jacksonville railroad, and pike, moving all the time nearly parallel with the picket line. here we had to halt. hommat was suffering greatly with his feet. the shoes that had been given him by the widow lady were worn out, and his feet were much torn and cut by the terribly rough road we had traveled through swamps, etc. we sat down on a log, and i, pulling off the remains of my army shirt, tore it into pieces, and hommat wrapped his feet up in them. a part i reserved and tore into strips, to tie up the rents in our pantaloons. going through the swamps and briers had torn them into tatters, from waistband to hem, leaving our skins bare to be served in the same way. we started again, moving slowly and bearing towards the picket fires, which we could see for a distance on our left. after traveling some little time the lights on our left ended, which puzzled us for a while, until we came to a fearful big swamp, that explained it all, as this, considered impassable, protected the right of the camp. we had an awful time in getting through. in many places we had to lie down and crawl long distances through the paths made in the brakes by hogs and other animals. as we at length came out, hommat turned to me and whispered that in the morning we would have some lincoln coffee. he seemed to think this must certainly end our troubles. we were now between the jacksonville railroad and the st. john's river. we kept about four miles from the railroad, for fear of running into the rebel outposts. we had traveled but a few miles when hommat said he could go no farther, as his feet and legs were so swelled and numb that he could not tell when he set them upon the ground. i had some matches that a negro had given me, and gathering together a few pine knots we made a fire--the first that we had lighted on the trip--and laid down with it between us. we had slept but a few minutes when i awoke and found hommat's clothes on fire. rousing him we put out the flames before he was badly burned, but the thing had excited him so as to give him new life, and be proposed to start on again. by sunrise we were within eight miles of our lines, and concluding that it would be safe to travel in the daytime, we went ahead, walking along the railroad. the excitement being over, hommat began to move very slowly again. his feet and legs were so swollen that he could scarcely walk, and it took us a long while to pass over those eight miles. at last we came in sight of our pickets. they were negros. they halted us, and hommat went forward to speak to them. they called for the officer of the guard, who came, passed us inside, and shook hands cordially with us. his first inquiry was if we knew charley marseilles, whom you remember ran that little bakery at andersonville. we were treated very kindly at jacksonville. general scammon was in command of the post, and had only been released but a short time from prison, so he knew how it was himself. i never expect to enjoy as happy a moment on earth as i did when i again got under the protection of the old flag. hommat went to the hospital a few days, and was then sent around to new york by sea. oh, it was a fearful trip through those florida swamps. we would very often have to try a swamp in three or four different places before we could get through. some nights we could not travel on account of its being cloudy and raining. there is not money enough in the united states to induce me to undertake the trip again under the same circumstances. our friend clipson, that made his escape when we did, got very nearly through to our lines, but was taken sick, and had to give himself up. he was taken back to andersonville and kept until the next spring, when he came through all right. there were sixty-one of company k captured at jonesville, and i think there was only seventeen lived through those horrible prisons. you have given the best description of prison life that i have ever seen written. the only trouble is that it cannot be portrayed so that persons can realize the suffering and abuse that our soldiers endured in those prison hells. your statements are all correct in regard to the treatment that we received, and all those scenes you have depicted are as vivid in my mind today as if they had only occurred yesterday. please let me hear from you again. wishing you success in all your undertakings, i remain your friend, walter, hartsough, late of k company, sixteenth illinois volunteer of infantry. chapter lxxvi. the peculiar type of insanity prevalent at florence--barrett's wantonness of cruelty--we learn of sherman's advance into south carolina--the rebels begin moving the prisoners away--andrews and i change our tactics, and stay behind--arrival of five prisoners from sherman's command--their unbounded confidence in sherman's success, and its beneficial effect upon us. one terrible phase of existence at florence was the vast increase of insanity. we had many insane men at andersonville, but the type of the derangement was different, partaking more of what the doctors term melancholia. prisoners coming in from the front were struck aghast by the horrors they saw everywhere. men dying of painful and repulsive diseases lined every step of whatever path they trod; the rations given them were repugnant to taste and stomach; shelter from the fiery sun there was none, and scarcely room enough for them to lie down upon. under these discouraging circumstances, home-loving, kindly-hearted men, especially those who had passed out of the first flush of youth, and had left wife and children behind when they entered the service, were speedily overcome with despair of surviving until released; their hopelessness fed on the same germs which gave it birth, until it became senseless, vacant-eyed, unreasoning, incurable melancholy, when the victim would lie for hours, without speaking a word, except to babble of home, or would wander aimlessly about the camp--frequently stark naked--until he died or was shot for coming too near the dead line. soldiers must not suppose that this was the same class of weaklings who usually pine themselves into the hospital within three months after their regiment enters the field. they were as a rule, made up of seasoned soldiery, who had become inured to the dangers and hardships of active service, and were not likely to sink down under any ordinary trials. the insane of florence were of a different class; they were the boys who had laughed at such a yielding to adversity in andersonville, and felt a lofty pity for the misfortunes of those who succumbed so. but now the long strain of hardship, privation and exposure had done for them what discouragement had done for those of less fortitude in andersonville. the faculties shrank under disuse and misfortune, until they forgot their regiments, companies, places and date of capture, and finally, even their names. i should think that by the middle of january, at least one in every ten had sunk to this imbecile condition. it was not insanity so much as mental atrophy--not so much aberration of the mind, as a paralysis of mental action. the sufferers became apathetic idiots, with no desire or wish to do or be anything. if they walked around at all they had to be watched closely, to prevent their straying over the dead line, and giving the young brats of guards the coveted opportunity of killing them. very many of such were killed, and one of my midwinter memories of florence was that of seeing one of these unfortunate imbeciles wandering witlessly up to the dead line from the swamp, while the guard--a boy of seventeen--stood with gun in hand, in the attitude of a man expecting a covey to be flushed, waiting for the poor devil to come so near the dead line as to afford an excuse for killing him. two sane prisoners, comprehending the situation, rushed up to the lunatic, at the risk of their own lives, caught him by the arms, and drew him back to safety. the brutal barrett seemed to delight in maltreating these demented unfortunates. he either could not be made to understand their condition, or willfully disregarded it, for it was one of the commonest sights to see him knock down, beat, kick or otherwise abuse them for not instantly obeying orders which their dazed senses could not comprehend, or their feeble limbs execute, even if comprehended. in my life i have seen many wantonly cruel men. i have known numbers of mates of mississippi river steamers--a class which seems carefully selected from ruffians most proficient in profanity, obscenity and swift-handed violence; i have seen negro-drivers in the slave marts of st. louis, memphis and new orleans, and overseers on the plantations of mississippi and louisiana; as a police reporter in one of the largest cities in america, i have come in contact with thousands of the brutalized scoundrels--the thugs of the brothel, bar-room and alley--who form the dangerous classes of a metropolis. i knew captain wirz. but in all this exceptionally extensive and varied experience, i never met a man who seemed to love cruelty for its own sake as well as lieutenant barrett. he took such pleasure in inflicting pain as those indians who slice off their prisoners' eyelids, ears, noses and hands, before burning them at the stake. that a thing hurt some one else was always ample reason for his doing it. the starving, freezing prisoners used to collect in considerable numbers before the gate, and stand there for hours gazing vacantly at it. there was no special object in doing this, only that it was a central point, the rations came in there, and occasionally an officer would enter, and it was the only place where anything was likely to occur to vary the dreary monotony of the day, and the boys went there because there was nothing else to offer any occupation to their minds. it became a favorite practical joke of barrett's to slip up to the gate with an armful of clubs, and suddenly opening the wicket, fling them one after another, into the crowd, with all the force he possessed. many were knocked down, and many received hurts which resulted in fatal gangrene. if he had left the clubs lying where thrown, there would have been some compensation for his meanness, but he always came in and carefully gathered up such as he could get, as ammunition for another time. i have heard men speak of receiving justice--even favors from wirz. i never heard any one saying that much of barrett. like winder, if he had a redeeming quality it was carefully obscured from the view of all that i ever met who knew him. where the fellow came from, what state was entitled to the discredit of producing and raising him, what he was before the war, what became of him after he left us, are matters of which i never heard even a rumor, except a very vague one that he had been killed by our cavalry, some returned prisoner having recognized and shot him. colonel iverson, of the fifth georgia, was the post commander. he was a man of some education, but had a violent, ungovernable temper, during fits of which he did very brutal things. at other times he would show a disposition towards fairness and justice. the worst point in my indictment against him is that he suffered barrett to do as he did. let the reader understand that i have no personal reasons for my opinion of these men. they never did anything to me, save what they did to all of my companions. i held myself aloof from them, and shunned intercourse so effectually that during my whole imprisonment i did not speak as many words to rebel officers as are in this and the above paragraphs, and most of those were spoken to the surgeon who visited my hundred. i do not usually seek conversation with people i do not like, and certainly did not with persons for whom i had so little love as i had for turner, ross, winder, wirz, davis, iverson, barrett, et al. possibly they felt badly over my distance and reserve, but i must confess that they never showed it very palpably. as january dragged slowly away into february, rumors of the astonishing success of sherman began to be so definite and well authenticated as to induce belief. we knew that the western chieftain had marched almost unresisted through georgia, and captured savannah with comparatively little difficulty. we did not understand it, nor did the rebels around us, for neither of us comprehended the confederacy's near approach to dissolution, and we could not explain why a desperate attempt was not made somewhere to arrest the onward sweep of the conquering armies of the west. it seemed that if there was any vitality left in rebeldom it would deal a blow that would at least cause the presumptuous invader to pause. as we knew nothing of the battles of franklin and nashville, we were ignorant of the destruction of hood's army, and were at a loss to account for its failure to contest sherman's progress. the last we had heard of hood, he had been flanked out of atlanta, but we did not understand that the strength or morale of his force had been seriously reduced in consequence. soon it drifted in to us that sherman had cut loose from savannah, as from atlanta, and entered south carolina, to repeat there the march through her sister state. our sources of information now were confined to the gossip which our men--working outside on parole,--could overhear from the rebels, and communicate to us as occasion served. these occasions were not frequent, as the men outside were not allowed to come in except rarely, or stay long then. still we managed to know reasonably, soon that sherman was sweeping resistlessly across the state, with hardee, dick taylor, beauregard, and others, vainly trying to make head against him. it seemed impossible to us that they should not stop him soon, for if each of all these leaders had any command worthy the name the aggregate must make an army that, standing on the defensive, would give sherman a great deal of trouble. that he would be able to penetrate into the state as far as we were never entered into our minds. by and by we were astonished at the number of the trains that we could hear passing north on the charleston & cheraw railroad. day and night for two weeks there did not seem to be more than half an hour's interval at any time between the rumble and whistles of the trains as they passed florence junction, and sped away towards cheraw, thirty-five miles north of us. we at length discovered that sherman had reached branchville, and was singing around toward columbia, and other important points to the north; that charleston was being evacuated, and its garrison, munitions and stores were being removed to cheraw, which the rebel generals intended to make their new base. as this news was so well confirmed as to leave no doubt of it, it began to wake up and encourage all the more hopeful of us. we thought we could see some premonitions of the glorious end, and that we were getting vicarious satisfaction at the hands of our friends under the command of uncle billy. one morning orders came for one thousand men to get ready to move. andrews and i held a council of war on the situation, the question before the house being whether we would go with that crowd, or stay behind. the conclusion we came to was thus stated by andrews: "now, mc., we've flanked ahead every time, and see how we've come out. we flanked into the first squad that left richmond, and we were consequently in the first that got into andersonville. may be if we'd staid back we'd got into that squad that was exchanged. we were in the first squad that left andersonville. we were the first to leave savannah and enter millen. may be if we'd staid back, we'd got exchanged with the ten thousand sick. we were the first to leave millen and the first to reach blackshear. we were again the first to leave blackshear. perhaps those fellows we left behind then are exchanged. now, as we've played ahead every time, with such infernal luck, let's play backward this time, and try what that brings us." "but, lale," (andrews's nickname--his proper name being bezaleel), said i, "we made something by going ahead every time--that is, if we were not going to be exchanged. by getting into those places first we picked out the best spots to stay, and got tent-building stuff that those who came after us could not. and certainly we can never again get into as bad a place as this is. the chances are that if this does not mean exchange, it means transfer to a better prison." but we concluded, as i said above, to reverse our usual order of procedure and flank back, in hopes that something would favor our escape to sherman. accordingly, we let the first squad go off without us, and the next, and the next, and so on, till there were only eleven hundred --mostly those sick in the hospital--remaining behind. those who went away--we afterwards learned, were run down on the cars to wilmington, and afterwards up to goldsboro, n. c. for a week or more we eleven hundred tenanted the stockade, and by burning up the tents of those who had gone had the only decent, comfortable fires we had while in florence. in hunting around through the tents for fuel we found many bodies of those who had died as their comrades were leaving. as the larger portion of us could barely walk, the rebels paroled us to remain inside of the stockade or within a few hundred yards of the front of it, and took the guards off. while these were marching down, a dozen or more of us, exulting in even so much freedom as we had obtained, climbed on the hospital shed to see what the outlook was, and perched ourselves on the ridgepole. lieutenant barrett came along, at a distance of two hundred yards, with a squad of guards. observing us, he halted his men, faced them toward us, and they leveled their guns as if to fire. he expected to see us tumble down in ludicrous alarm, to avoid the bullets. but we hated him and them so bad, that we could not give them the poor satisfaction of scaring us. only one of our party attempted to slide down, but the moment we swore at him he came back and took his seat with folded arms alongside of us. barrett gave the order to fire, and the bullets shrieked aver our heads, fortunately not hitting anybody. we responded with yells of derision, and the worst abuse we could think of. coming down after awhile, i walked to the now open gate, and looped through it over the barren fields to the dense woods a mile away, and a wild desire to run off took possession of me. it seemed as if i could not resist it. the woods appeared full of enticing shapes, beckoning me to come to them, and the winds whispered in my ears: "run! run! run!" but the words of my parole were still fresh in my mind, and i stilled my frenzy to escape by turning back into the stockade and looking away from the tempting view. once five new prisoners, the first we had seen in a long time, were brought in from sherman's army. they were plump, well-conditioned, well-dressed, healthy, devil-may-care young fellows, whose confidence in themselves and in sherman was simply limitless, and their contempt for all rebels and especially those who terrorized over us, enormous. "come up here to headquarters," said one of the rebel officers to them as they stood talking to us; "and we'll parole you." "o go to h--with your parole," said the spokesman of the crowd, with nonchalant contempt; "we don't want none of your paroles. old billy'll parole us before saturday." to us they said: "now, you boys want to cheer right up; keep a stiff upper lip. this thing's workin' all right. their old confederacy's goin' to pieces like a house afire. sherman's promenadin' through it just as it suits him, and he's liable to pay a visit at any hour. we're expectin' him all the time, because it was generally understood all through the army that we were to take the prison pen here in on our way." i mentioned my distrust of the concentration of rebels at cheraw, and their faces took on a look of supreme disdain. "now, don't let that worry you a minute," said the confident spokesman. "all the rebels between here and lee's army can't prevent sherman from going just where he pleases. why, we've quit fightin' 'em except with the bummers advance. we haven't had to go into regular line of battle against them for i don't know how long. sherman would like anything better than to have 'em make a stand somewhere so that he could get a good fair whack at 'em." no one can imagine the effect of all this upon us. it was better than a carload of medicines and a train load of provisions would have been. from the depths of despondency we sprang at once to tip-toe on the mountain-tops of expectation. we did little day and night but listen for the sound of sherman's guns and discuss what we would do when he came. we planned schemes of terrible vengeance on barrett and iverson, but these worthies had mysteriously disappeared--whither no one knew. there was hardly an hour of any night passed without some one of us fancying that he heard the welcome sound of distant firing. as everybody knows, by listening intently at night, one can hear just exactly what he is intent upon hearing, and so was with us. in the middle of the night boys listening awake with strained ears, would say: "now, if ever i heard musketry firing in my life, that's a heavy skirmish line at work, and sharply too, and not more than three miles away, neither." then another would say: "i don't want to ever get out of here if that don't sound just as the skirmishing at chancellorsville did the first day to us. we were lying down about four miles off, when it began pattering just as that is doing now." and so on. one night about nine or ten, there came two short, sharp peals of thunder, that sounded precisely like the reports of rifled field pieces. we sprang up in a frenzy of excitement, and shouted as if our throats would split. but the next peal went off in the usual rumble, and our excitement had to subside. chapter lxxvii. fruitless waiting for sherman--we leave florence--intelligence of the fall of wilmington communicated to us by a slave--the turpentine region of north carolina--we come upon a rebel line of battle--yankees at both ends of the road. things had gone on in the way described in the previous chapter until past the middle of february. for more than a week every waking hour was spent in anxious expectancy of sherman--listening for the far-off rattle of his guns--straining our ears to catch the sullen boom of his artillery--scanning the distant woods to see the rebels falling back in hopeless confusion before the pursuit of his dashing advance. though we became as impatient as those ancient sentinels who for ten long years stood upon the grecian hills to catch the first glimpse of the flames of burning troy, sherman came not. we afterwards learned that two expeditions were sent down towards us from cheraw, but they met with unexpected resistance, and were turned back. it was now plain to us that the confederacy was tottering to its fall, and we were only troubled by occasional misgivings that we might in some way be caught and crushed under the toppling ruins. it did not seem possible that with the cruel tenacity with which the rebels had clung to us they would be willing to let us go free at last, but would be tempted in the rage of their final defeat to commit some unparalleled atrocity upon us. one day all of us who were able to walk were made to fall in and march over to the railroad, where we were loaded into boxcars. the sick --except those who were manifestly dying--were loaded into wagons and hauled over. the dying were left to their fate, without any companions or nurses. the train started off in a northeasterly direction, and as we went through florence the skies were crimson with great fires, burning in all directions. we were told these were cotton and military stores being destroyed in anticipation of a visit from, a part of sherman's forces. when morning came we were still running in the same direction that we started. in the confusion of loading us upon the cars the previous evening, i had been allowed to approach too near a rebel officer's stock of rations, and the result was his being the loser and myself the gainer of a canteen filled with fairly good molasses. andrews and i had some corn bread, and we, breakfasted sumptuously upon it and the molasses, which was certainly none-the-less sweet from having been stolen. our meal over, we began reconnoitering, as much for employment as anything else. we were in the front end of a box car. with a saw made on the back of a case-knife we cut a hole through the boards big enough to permit us to pass out, and perhaps escape. we found that we were on the foremost box car of the train--the next vehicle to us being a passenger coach, in which were the rebel officers. on the rear platform of this car was seated one of their servants--a trusty old slave, well dressed, for a negro, and as respectful as his class usually was. said i to him: "well, uncle, where are they taking us?" he replied: "well, sah, i couldn't rightly say." "but you could guess, if you tried, couldn't you?" "yes sah." he gave a quick look around to see if the door behind him was so securely shut that he could not be overheard by the rebels inside the car, his dull, stolid face lighted up as a negro's always does in the excitement of doing something cunning, and he said in a loud whisper: "dey's a-gwine to take you to wilmington--ef dey kin get you dar!" "can get us there!" said i in astonishment. "is there anything to prevent them taking us there?" the dark face filled with inexpressible meaning. i asked: "it isn't possible that there are any yankees down there to interfere, is it?" the great eyes flamed up with intelligence to tell me that i guessed aright; again he glanced nervously around to assure himself that no one was eavesdropping, and then he said in a whisper, just loud enough to be heard above the noise of the moving train: "de yankees took wilmington yesterday mawning." the news startled me, but it was true, our troops having driven out the rebel troops, and entered wilmington, on the preceding day--the 22d of february, 1865, as i learned afterwards. how this negro came to know more of what was going on than his masters puzzled me much. that he did know more was beyond question, since if the rebels in whose charge we were had known of wilmington's fall, they would not have gone to the trouble of loading us upon the cars and hauling us one, hundred miles in the direction of a city which had come into the hands of our men. it has been asserted by many writers that the negros had some occult means of diffusing important news among the mass of their people, probably by relays of swift runners who traveled at night, going twenty-five or thirty miles and back before morning. very astonishing stories are told of things communicated in this way across the length or breadth of the confederacy. it is said that our officers in the blockading fleet in the gulf heard from the negros in advance of the publication in the rebel papers of the issuance of the proclamation of emancipation, and of several of our most important victories. the incident given above prepares me to believe all that has been told of the perfection to which the negros had brought their "grapevine telegraph," as it was jocularly termed. the rebels believed something of it, too. in spite of their rigorous patrol, an institution dating long before the war, and the severe punishments visited upon negros found off their master's premises without a pass, none of them entertained a doubt that the young negro men were in the habit of making long, mysterious journeys at night, which had other motives than love-making or chicken-stealing. occasionally a young man would get caught fifty or seventy-five miles from his "quarters," while on some errand of his own, the nature of which no punishment could make him divulge. his master would be satisfied that he did not intend running away, because he was likely going in the wrong direction, but beyond this nothing could be ascertained. it was a common belief among overseers, when they saw an active, healthy young "buck" sleepy and languid about his work, that he had spent the night on one of these excursions. the country we were running through--if such straining, toilsome progress as our engine was making could be called running--was a rich turpentine district. we passed by forests where all the trees were marked with long scores through the bark, and extended up to a hight of twenty feet or more. into these, the turpentine and rosin, running down, were caught, and conveyed by negros to stills near by, where it was prepared for market. the stills were as rude as the mills we had seen in eastern tennessee and kentucky, and were as liable to fiery destruction as a powder-house. every few miles a wide space of ground, burned clean of trees and underbrush, and yet marked by a portion of the stones which had formed the furnace, showed where a turpentine still, managed by careless and ignorant blacks, had been licked up by the breath of flame. they never seemed to re-build on these spots--whether from superstition or other reasons, i know not. occasionally we came to great piles of barrels of turpentine, rosin and tar, some of which had laid there since the blockade had cut off communication with the outer world. many of the barrels of rosin had burst, and their contents melted in the heat of the sun, had run over the ground like streams of lava, covering it to a depth of many inches. at the enormous price rosin, tar and turpentine were commanding in the markets of the world, each of these piles represented a superb fortune. any one of them, if lying upon the docks of new york, would have yielded enough to make every one of us upon the train comfortable for life. but a few months after the blockade was raised, and they sank to one-thirtieth of their present value. these terebinthine stores were the property of the plantation lords of the lowlands of north carolina, who correspond to the pinchbeck barons of the rice districts of south carolina. as there, the whites and negros we saw were of the lowest, most squalid type of humanity. the people of the middle and upland districts of north carolina are a much superior race to the same class in south carolina. they are mostly of scotch-irish descent, with a strong infusion of english-quaker blood, and resemble much the best of the virginians. they make an effort to diffuse education, and have many of the virtues of a simple, non-progressive, tolerably industrious middle class. it was here that the strong union sentiment of north carolina numbered most of its adherents. the people of the lowlands were as different as if belonging to another race. the enormous mass of ignorance--the three hundred and fifty thousand men and women who could not read or write--were mostly black and white serfs of the great landholders, whose plantations lie within one hundred miles of the atlantic coast. as we approached the coast the country became swampier, and our old acquaintances, the cypress, with their malformed "knees," became more and more numerous. about the middle of the afternoon our train suddenly stopped. looking out to ascertain the cause, we were electrified to see a rebel line of battle stretched across the track, about a half mile ahead of the engine, and with its rear toward us. it was as real a line as was ever seen on any field. the double ranks of "butternuts," with arms gleaming in the afternoon sun, stretched away out through the open pine woods, farther than we could see. close behind the motionless line stood the company officers, leaning on their drawn swords. behind these still, were the regimental officers on their horses. on a slight rise of the ground, a group of horsemen, to whom other horsemen momentarily dashed up to or sped away from, showed the station of the general in command. on another knoll, at a little distance, were several-field pieces, standing "in battery," the cannoneers at the guns, the postillions dismounted and holding their horses by the bits, the caisson men standing in readiness to serve out ammunition. our men were evidently close at hand in strong force, and the engagement was likely to open at any instant. for a minute we were speechless with astonishment. then came a surge of excitement. what should we do? what could we do? obviously nothing. eleven hundred, sick, enfeebled prisoners could not even overpower their guards, let alone make such a diversion in the rear of a line-of-battle as would assist our folks to gain a victory. but while we debated the engine whistled sharply--a frightened shriek it sounded to us--and began pushing our train rapidly backward over the rough and wretched track. back, back we went, as fast as rosin and pine knots could force the engine to move us. the cars swayed continually back and forth, momentarily threatening to fly the crazy roadway, and roll over the embankment or into one of the adjacent swamps. we would have hailed such a catastrophe, as it would have probably killed more of the guards than of us, and the confusion would have given many of the survivors opportunity to escape. but no such accident happened, and towards midnight we reached the bridge across the great pedee river, where our train was stopped by a squad of rebel cavalrymen, who brought the intelligence that as kilpatrick was expected into florence every hour, it would not do to take us there. we were ordered off the cars, and laid down on the banks of the great pedee, our guards and the cavalry forming a line around us, and taking precautions to defend the bridge against kilpatrick, should he find out our whereabouts and come after us. "well, mc," said andrews, as we adjusted our old overcoat and blanket on the ground for a bed; "i guess we needn't care whether school keeps or not. our fellows have evidently got both ends of the road, and are coming towards us from each way. there's no road--not even a wagon road --for the johnnies to run us off on, and i guess all we've got to do is to stand still and see the salvation of the lord. bad as these hounds are, i don't believe they will shoot us down rather than let our folks retake us. at least they won't since old winder's dead. if he was alive, he'd order our throats cut--one by one--with the guards' pocket knives, rather than give us up. i'm only afraid we'll be allowed to starve before our folks reach us." i concurred in this view. chapter lxxviii. return to florence and a short sojourn there--off towards wilmington again--cruising a rebel officer's lunch--signs of approaching our lines --terror of our rascally guards--entrance into god's country at last. but kilpatrick, like sherman, came not. perhaps he knew that all the prisoners had been removed from the stockade; perhaps he had other business of more importance on hand; probably his movement was only a feint. at all events it was definitely known the next day that he had withdrawn so far as to render it wholly unlikely that he intended attacking florence, so we were brought back and returned to our old quarters. for a week or more we loitered about the now nearly-abandoned prison; skulked and crawled around the dismal mud-tents like the ghostly denizens of some potter's field, who, for some reason had been allowed to return to earth, and for awhile creep painfully around the little hillocks beneath which they had been entombed. a few score, whose vital powers were strained to the last degree of tension, gave up the ghost, and sank to dreamless rest. it mattered now little to these when sherman came, or when kilpatrick's guidons should flutter through the forest of sighing pines, heralds of life, happiness, and home- after life's fitful fever they slept well treason had done its worst. nor steel nor poison: malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing could touch them farther. one day another order came for us to be loaded on the cars, and over to the railroad we went again in the same fashion as before. the comparatively few of us who were still able to walk at all well, loaded ourselves down with the bundles and blankets of our less fortunate companions, who hobbled and limped--many even crawling on their hands and knees--over the hard, frozen ground, by our sides. those not able to crawl even, were taken in wagons, for the orders were imperative not to leave a living prisoner behind. at the railroad we found two trains awaiting us. on the front of each engine were two rude white flags, made by fastening the halves of meal sacks to short sticks. the sight of these gave us some hope, but our belief that rebels were constitutional liars and deceivers was so firm and fixed, that we persuaded ourselves that the flags meant nothing more than some wilful delusion for us. again we started off in the direction of wilmington, and traversed the same country described in the previous chapter. again andrews and i found ourselves in the next box car to the passenger coach containing the rebel officers. again we cut a hole through the end, with our saw, and again found a darky servant sitting on the rear platform. andrews went out and sat down alongside of him, and found that he was seated upon a large gunny-bag sack containing the cooked rations of the rebel officers. the intelligence that there was something there worth taking andrews communicated to me by an expressive signal, of which soldiers campaigning together as long as he and i had, always have an extensive and well understood code. i took a seat in the hole we had made in the end of the car, in reach of andrews. andrews called the attention of the negro to some feature of the country near by, and asked him a question in regard to it. as he looked in the direction indicated, andrews slipped his hand into the mouth of the bag, and pulled out a small sack of wheat biscuits, which he passed to me and i concealed. the darky turned and told andrews all about the matter in regard to which the interrogation had been made. andrews became so much interested in what was being told him, that he sat up closer and closer to the darky, who in turn moved farther away from the sack. next we ran through a turpentine plantation, and as the darky was pointing out where the still, the master's place, the "quarters," etc., were, andrews managed to fish out of that bag and pass to me three roasted chickens. then a great swamp called for description, and before we were through with it, i had about a peck of boiled sweet potatos. andrews emptied the bag as the darky was showing him a great peanut plantation, taking from it a small frying-pan, a canteen of molasses, and a half-gallon tin bucket, which had been used to make coffee in. we divided up our wealth of eatables with the rest of the boys in the car, not forgetting to keep enough to give ourselves a magnificent meal. as we ran along we searched carefully for the place where we had seen the line-of-battle, expecting that it would now be marked with signs of a terrible conflict, but we could see nothing. we could not even fix the locality where the line stood. as it became apparent that we were going directly toward wilmington, as fast as our engines could pull us, the excitement rose. we had many misgivings as to whether our folks still retained possession of wilmington, and whether, if they did, the rebels could not stop at a point outside of our lines, and transfer us to some other road. for hours we had seen nobody in the country through which we were passing. what few houses were visible were apparently deserted, and there were no towns or stations anywhere. we were very anxious to see some one, in hopes of getting a hint of what the state of affairs was in the direction we were going. at length we saw a young man--apparently a scout--on horseback, but his clothes were equally divided between the blue and the butternut, as to give no clue to which side he belonged. an hour later we saw two infantrymen, who were evidently out foraging. they had sacks of something on their backs, and wore blue clothes. this was a very hopeful sign of a near approach to our lines, but bitter experience in the past warned us against being too sanguine. about 4 o'clock p. m., the trains stopped and whistled long and loud. looking out i could see--perhaps half-a-mile away--a line of rifle pits running at right angles with the track. guards, whose guns flashed as they turned, were pacing up and down, but they were too far away for me to distinguish their uniforms. the suspense became fearful. but i received much encouragement from the singular conduct of our guards. first i noticed a captain, who had been especially mean to us while at florence. he was walking on the ground by the train. his face was pale, his teeth set, and his eyes shone with excitement. he called out in a strange, forced voice to his men and boys on the roof of the cars: "here, you fellers git down off'en thar and form a line." the fellows did so, in a slow, constrained, frightened ways and huddled together, in the most unsoldierly manner. the whole thing reminded me of a scene i once saw in our line, where a weak-kneed captain was ordered to take a party of rather chicken-hearted recruits out on the skirmish-line. we immediately divined what was the matter. the lines in front of us were really those of our people, and the idiots of guards, not knowing of their entire safety when protected by a flag of truce, were scared half out of their small wits at approaching so near to armed yankees. we showered taunts and jeers upon them. an irishman in my car yelled out: "och, ye dirty spalpeens; it's not shootin' prisoners ye are now; it's cumin' where the yankee b'ys hev the gun; and the minnit ye say thim yer white livers show themselves in yer pale faces. bad luck to the blatherin' bastards that yez are, and to the mothers that bore ye." at length our train moved up so near to the line that i could see it was the grand, old loyal blue that clothed the forms of the men who were pacing up and down. and certainly the world does not hold as superb looking men as these appeared to me. finely formed, stalwart, full-fed and well clothed, they formed the most delightful contrast with the scrawny, shambling, villain-visaged little clay-eaters and white trash who had looked down upon us from the sentry boxes for many long months. i sprang out of the cars and began washing my face and hands in the ditch at the side of the road. the rebel captain, noticing me, said, in the old, hateful, brutal, imperious tone: "git back in dat cah, dah." an hour before i would have scrambled back as quickly as possible, knowing that an instant's hesitation would be followed by a bullet. now, i looked him in the face, and said as irritatingly as possible: "o, you go to ----, you rebel. i'm going into uncle sam's lines with as little rebel filth on me as possible." he passed me without replying. his day of shooting was past. descending from the cars, we passed through the guards into our lines, a rebel and a union clerk checking us off as we passed. by the time it was dark we were all under our flag again. the place where we came through was several miles west of wilmington, where the railroad crossed a branch of the cape fear river. the point was held by a brigade of schofield's army--the twenty-third army corps. the boys lavished unstinted kindness upon us. all of the brigade off duty crowded around, offering us blankets, shirts shoes, pantaloons and other articles of clothing and similar things that we were obviously in the greatest need of. the sick were carried, by hundreds of willing hands, to a sheltered spot, and laid upon good, comfortable beds improvised with leaves and blankets. a great line of huge, generous fires was built, that every one of us could have plenty of place around them. by and by a line of wagons came over from wilmington laden with rations, and they were dispensed to us with what seemed reckless prodigality. the lid of a box of hard tack would be knocked off, and the contents handed to us as we filed past, with absolute disregard as to quantity. if a prisoner looked wistful after receiving one handful of crackers, another was handed to him; if his long-famished eyes still lingered as if enchained by the rare display of food, the men who were issuing said: "here, old fellow, there's plenty of it: take just as much as you can carry in your arms." so it was also with the pickled pork, the coffee, the sugar, etc. we had been stinted and starved so long that we could not comprehend that there was anywhere actually enough of anything. the kind-hearted boys who were acting as our hosts began preparing food for the sick, but the surgeons, who had arrived in the meanwhile, were compelled to repress them, as it was plain that while it was a dangerous experiment to give any of us all we could or would eat, it would never do to give the sick such a temptation to kill themselves, and only a limited amount of food was allowed to be given those who were unable to walk. andrews and i hungered for coffee, the delightful fumes of which filled the air and intoxicated our senses. we procured enough to make our half-gallon bucket full and very strong. we drank so much of this that andrews became positively drunk, and fell helplessly into some brush. i pulled him out and dragged him away to a place where we had made our rude bed. i was dazed. i could not comprehend that the long-looked for, often-despaired-of event had actually happened. i feared that it was one of those tantalizing dreams that had so often haunted my sleep, only to be followed by a wretched awakening. then i became seized with a sudden fear lest the rebel attempt to retake me. the line of guards around us seemed very slight. it might be forced in the night, and all of us recaptured. shivering at this thought, absurd though it was, i arose from our bed, and taking andrews with me, crawled two or three hundred yards into a dense undergrowth, where in the event of our lines being forced, we would be overlooked. chapter lxxix. getting used to freedom--delights of a land where there is enough of everything--first glimpse of the old flag--wilmington and its history --lieutenant cushing--first acquaintance with the colored troops--leaving for home--destruction of the "thorn" by a torpedo--the mock monitor's achievement. after a sound sleep, andrews and i awoke to the enjoyment of our first day of freedom and existence in god's country. the sun had already risen, bright and warm, consonant with the happiness of the new life now opening up for us. but to nearly a score of our party his beams brought no awakening gladness. they fell upon stony, staring eyes, from out of which the light of life had now faded, as the light of hope had done long ago. the dead lay there upon the rude beds of fallen leaves, scraped together by thoughtful comrades the night before, their clenched teeth showing through parted lips, faces fleshless and pinched, long, unkempt and ragged hair and whiskers just stirred by the lazy breeze, the rotting feet and limbs drawn up, and skinny hands clenched in the last agonies. their fate seemed harder than that of any who had died before them. it was doubtful if many of them knew that they were at last inside of our own lines. again the kind-hearted boys of the brigade crowded around us with proffers of service. of an ohio boy who directed his kind tenders to andrews and me, we procured a chunk of coarse rosin soap about as big as a pack of cards, and a towel. never was there as great a quantity of solid comfort got out of that much soap as we obtained. it was the first that we had since that which i stole in wirz's headquarters, in june --nine months before. we felt that the dirt which had accumulated upon us since then would subject us to assessment as real estate if we were in the north. hurrying off to a little creek we began our ablutions, and it was not long until andrews declared that there was a perceptible sand-bar forming in the stream, from what we washed off. dirt deposits of the pliocene era rolled off feet and legs. eocene incrustations let loose reluctantly from neck and ears; the hair was a mass of tangled locks matted with nine months' accumulation of pitch pine tar, rosin soot, and south carolina sand, that we did not think we had better start in upon it until we either had the shock cut off, or had a whole ocean and a vat of soap to wash it out with. after scrubbing until we were exhausted we got off the first few outer layers--the post tertiary formation, a geologist would term it--and the smell of many breakfasts cooking, coming down over the hill, set our stomachs in a mutiny against any longer fasting. we went back, rosy, panting, glowing, but happy, to get our selves some breakfast. should providence, for some inscrutable reason, vouchsafe me the years of methuselah, one of the pleasantest recollections that will abide with me to the close of the nine hundredth and sixty-ninth year, will be of that delightful odor of cooking food which regaled our senses as we came back. from the boiling coffee and the meat frying in the pan rose an incense sweeter to the senses a thousand times than all the perfumes of far arabia. it differed from the loathsome odor of cooking corn meal as much as it did from the effluvia of a sewer. our noses were the first of our senses to bear testimony that we had passed from the land of starvation to that of plenty. andrews and i hastened off to get our own breakfast, and soon had a half-gallon of strong coffee, and a frying-pan full, of meat cooking over the fire--not one of the beggarly skimped little fires we had crouched over during our months of imprisonment, but a royal, generous fire, fed with logs instead of shavings and splinters, and giving out heat enough to warm a regiment. having eaten positively all that we could swallow, those of us who could walk were ordered to fall in and march over to wilmington. we crossed the branch of the river on a pontoon bridge, and took the road that led across the narrow sandy island between the two branches, wilmington being situated on the opposite bank of the farther one. when about half way a shout from some one in advance caused us to look up, and then we saw, flying from a tall steeple in wilmington, the glorious old stars and stripes, resplendent in the morning sun, and more beautiful than the most gorgeous web from tyrian looms. we stopped with one accord, and shouted and cheered and cried until every throat was sore and every eye red and blood-shot. it seemed as if our cup of happiness would certainly run over if any more additions were made to it. when we arrived at the bank of the river opposite wilmington, a whole world of new and interesting sights opened up before us. wilmington, during the last year-and-a-half of the war, was, next to richmond, the most important place in the southern confederacy. it was the only port to which blockade running was at all safe enough to be lucrative. the rebels held the strong forts of caswell and fisher, at the mouth of cape fear river, and outside, the frying pan shoals, which extended along the coast forty or fifty miles, kept our blockading fleet so far off, and made the line so weak and scattered, that there was comparatively little risk to the small, swift-sailing vessels employed by the blockade runners in running through it. the only way that blockade running could be stopped was by the reduction of forts caswell and fisher, and it was not stopped until this was done. before the war wilmington was a dull, sleepy north carolina town, with as little animation of any kind as a breton pillage. the only business was the handling of the tar, turpentine, rosin, and peanuts produced in the surrounding country, a business never lively enough to excite more than a lazy ripple in the sluggish lagoons of trade. but very new wine was put into this old bottle when blockade running began to develop in importance. then this sleepy hollow of a place took on the appearance of san francisco in the hight of the gold fever. the english houses engaged in blockade running established branches there conducted by young men who lived like princes. all the best houses in the city were leased by them and fitted up in the most gorgeous style. they literally clothed themselves in purple and fine linen and fared sumptuously every day, with their fine wines and imported delicacies and retinue of servants to wait upon them. fast young rebel officers, eager for a season of dissipation, could imagine nothing better than a leave of absence to go to wilmington. money flowed like water. the common sailors--the scum of all foreign ports--who manned the blockade runners, received as high as one hundred dollars in gold per month, and a bounty of fifty dollars for every successful trip, which from nassau could be easily made in seven days. other people were paid in proportion, and as the old proverb says, "what comes over the devil's back is spent under his breast," the money so obtained was squandered recklessly, and all sorts of debauchery ran riot. on the ground where we were standing had been erected several large steam cotton presses, built to compress cotton for the blockade runners. around them were stored immense quantities of cotton, and near by were nearly as great stores of turpentine, rosin and tar. a little farther down the river was navy yard with docks, etc., for the accommodation, building and repair of blockade runners. at the time our folks took fort fisher and advanced on wilmington the docks were filled with vessels. the retreating rebels set fire to everything--cotton, cotton presses, turpentine, rosin, tar, navy yard, naval stores, timber, docks, and vessels, and the fire made clean work. our people arrived too late to save anything, and when we came in the smoke from the burned cotton, turpentine, etc., still filled the woods. it was a signal illustration of the ravages of war. here had been destroyed, in a few hours, more property than a half-million industrious men would accumulate in their lives. almost as gratifying as the sight of the old flag flying in triumph, was the exhibition of our naval power in the river before us. the larger part of the great north atlantic squadron, which had done such excellent service in the reduction of the defenses of wilmington, was lying at anchor, with their hundreds of huge guns yawning as if ardent for more great forts to beat down, more vessels to sink, more heavy artillery to crush, more rebels to conquer. it seemed as if there were cannon enough there to blow the whole confederacy into kingdom-come. all was life and animation around the fleet. on the decks the officers were pacing up and down. one on each vessel carried a long telescope, with which he almost constantly swept the horizon. numberless small boats, each rowed by neatly-uniformed men, and carrying a flag in the stern, darted hither and thither, carrying officers on errands of duty or pleasure. it was such a scene as enabled me to realize in a measure, the descriptions i had read of the pomp and circumstance of naval warfare. while we were standing, contemplating all the interesting sights within view, a small steamer, about the size of a canal-boat, and carrying several bright brass guns, ran swiftly and noiselessly up to the dock near by, and a young, pale-faced officer, slender in build and nervous in manner, stepped ashore. some of the blue jackets who were talking to us looked at him and the vessel with the greatest expression of interest, and said: "hello! there's the 'monticello' and lieutenant cushing." this, then, was the naval boy hero, with whose exploits the whole country was ringing. our sailor friends proceeded to tell us of his achievements, of which they were justly proud. they told us of his perilous scouts and his hairbreadth escapes, of his wonderful audacity and still more wonderful success--of his capture of towns with a handful of sailors, and the destruction of valuable stores, etc. i felt very sorry that the man was not a cavalry commander. there he would have had full scope for his peculiar genius. he had come prominently into notice in the preceding autumn, when he had, by one of the most daring performances narrated in naval history, destroyed the formidable ram "albermarle." this vessel had been constructed by the rebels on the roanoke river, and had done them very good service, first by assisting to reduce the forts and capture the garrison at plymouth, n. c., and afterward in some minor engagements. in october, 1864, she was lying at plymouth. around her was a boom of logs to prevent sudden approaches of boats or vessels from our fleet. cushing, who was then barely twenty-one, resolved to attempt her destruction. he fitted up a steam launch with a long spar to which he attached a torpedo. on the night of october 27th, with thirteen companions, he ran quietly up the sound and was not discovered until his boat struck the boom, when a terrific fire was opened upon him. backing a short distance, he ran at the boom with such velocity that his boat leaped across it into the water beyond. in an instant more his torpedo struck the side of the "albemarle" and exploded, tearing a great hole in her hull, which sank her in a few minutes. at the moment the torpedo went off the "albermarle" fired one of her great guns directly into the launch, tearing it completely to pieces. lieutenant cushing and one comrade rose to the surface of the seething water and, swimming ashore, escaped. what became of the rest is not known, but their fate can hardly be a matter of doubt. we were ferried across the river into wilmington, and marched up the streets to some vacant ground near the railroad depot, where we found most of our old florence comrades already assembled. when they left us in the middle of february they were taken to wilmington, and thence to goldsboro, n. c., where they were kept until the rapid closing in of our armies made it impracticable to hold them any longer, when they were sent back to wilmington and given up to our forces as we had been. it was now nearly noon, and we were ordered to fall in and draw rations, a bewildering order to us, who had been so long in the habit of drawing food but once a day. we fell in in single rank, and marched up, one at a time, past where a group of employees of the commissary department dealt out the food. one handed each prisoner as he passed a large slice of meat; another gave him a handful of ground coffee; a third a handful of sugar; a fourth gave him a pickle, while a fifth and sixth handed him an onion and a loaf of fresh bread. this filled the horn of our plenty full. to have all these in one day--meat, coffee, sugar, onions and soft bread--was simply to riot in undreamed-of luxury. many of the boys--poor fellows--could not yet realize that there was enough for all, or they could not give up their old "flanking" tricks, and they stole around, and falling into the rear, came up again for' another share. we laughed at them, as did the commissary men, who, nevertheless, duplicated the rations already received, and sent them away happy and content. what a glorious dinner andrews and i had, with our half gallon of strong coffee, our soft bread, and a pan full of fried pork and onions! such an enjoyable feast will never be, eaten again by us. here we saw negro troops under arms for the first time--the most of the organization of colored soldiers having been, done since our capture. it was startling at first to see a stalwart, coal-black negro stalking along with a sergeant's chevrons on his arm, or to gaze on a regimental line of dusky faces on dress parade, but we soon got used to it. the first strong peculiarity of the negro soldier that impressed itself, upon us was his literal obedience of orders. a white soldier usually allows himself considerable discretion in obeying orders--he aims more at the spirit, while the negro adheres to the strict letter of the command. for instance, the second day after our arrival a line of guards were placed around us, with orders not to allow any of us to go up town without a pass. the reason of this was that many weak--even dying-men would persist in wandering about, and would be found exhausted, frequently dead, in various parts of the city. andrews and i concluded to go up town. approaching a negro sentinel he warned us back with, "stand back, dah; don't come any furder; it's agin de awdahs; you can't pass." he would not allow us to argue the case, but brought his gun to such a threatening position that we fell back. going down the line a little farther, we came to a white sentinel, to whom i said: "comrade, what are your orders:" he replied: "my orders are not to let any of you fellows pass, but my beat only extends to that out-house there." acting on this plain hint, we walked around the house and went up-town. the guard simply construed his orders in a liberal spirit. he reasoned that they hardly applied to us, since we were evidently able to take care of ourselves. later we had another illustration of this dog like fidelity of the colored sentinel. a number of us were quartered in a large and empty warehouse. on the same floor, and close to us, were a couple of very fine horses belonging to some officer. we had not been in the warehouse very long until we concluded that the straw with which the horses were bedded would be better used in making couches for ourselves, and this suggestion was instantly acted upon, and so thoroughly that there was not a straw left between the animals and the bare boards. presently the owner of the horses came in, and he was greatly incensed at what had been done. he relieved his mind of a few sulphurous oaths, and going out, came back soon with a man with more straw, and a colored soldier whom he stationed by the horses, saying: "now, look here. you musn't let anybody take anything sway from these stalls; d'you understand me?--not a thing." he then went out. andrews and i had just finished cooking dinner, and were sitting down to eat it. wishing to lend our frying-pan to another mess, i looked around for something to lay our meat upon. near the horses i saw a book cover, which would answer the purpose admirably. springing up, i skipped across to where it was, snatched it up, and ran back to my place. as i reached it a yell from the boys made me look around. the darky was coming at me "full tilt," with his gun at a "charge bayonets." as i turned he said: "put dat right back dah!" i said: "why, this don't amount to anything, this is only an old book cover. it hasn't anything in the world to do with the horses." he only replied: "put dat right back dah!" i tried another appeal: "now, you woolly-headed son of thunder, haven't you got sense enough to know that the officer who posted you didn't mean such a thing as this! he only meant that we should not be allowed to take any of the horses' bedding or equipments; don't you see?" i might as well have reasoned with a cigar store indian. he set his teeth, his eyes showed a dangerous amount of white, and foreshortening his musket for a lunge, he hissed out again "put dat right back dah, i tell you!" i looked at the bayonet; it was very long, very bright, and very sharp. it gleamed cold and chilly like, as if it had not run through a man for a long time, and yearned for another opportunity. nothing but the whites of the darky's eyes could now be seen. i did not want to perish there in the fresh bloom of my youth and loveliness; it seemed to me as if it was my duty to reserve myself for fields of future usefulness, so i walked back and laid the book cover precisely on the spot whence i had obtained it, while the thousand boys in the house set up a yell of sarcastic laughter. we staid in wilmington a few days, days of almost purely animal enjoyment--the joy of having just as much to eat as we could possibly swallow, and no one to molest or make us afraid in any way. how we did eat and fill up. the wrinkles in our skin smoothed out under the stretching, and we began to feel as if we were returning to our old plumpness, though so far the plumpness was wholly abdominal. one morning we were told that the transports would begin going back with us that afternoon, the first that left taking the sick. andrews and i, true to our old prison practices, resolved to be among those on the first boat. we slipped through the guards and going up town, went straight to major general schofield's headquarters and solicited a pass to go on the first boat--the steamer "thorn." general schofield treated us very kindly; but declined to let anybody but the helplessly sick go on the "thorn." defeated here we went down to where the vessel was lying at the dock, and tried to smuggle ourselves aboard, but the guard was too strong and too vigilant, and we were driven away. going along the dock, angry and discouraged by our failure, we saw a surgeon, at a little distance, who was examining and sending the sick who could walk aboard another vessel--the "general lyon." we took our cue, and a little shamming secured from him tickets which permitted us to take our passage in her. the larger portion of those on board were in the hold, and a few were on deck. andrews and i found a snug place under the forecastle, by the anchor chains. both vessels speedily received their complement, and leaving their docks, started down the river. the "thorn" steamed ahead of us, and disappeared. shortly after we got under way, the colonel who was put in command of the boat--himself a released prisoner--came around on a tour of inspection. he found about one thousand of us aboard, and singling me out made me the non-commissioned officer in command. i was put in charge, of issuing the rations and of a barrel of milk punch which the sanitary commission had sent down to be dealt out on the voyage to such as needed it. i went to work and arranged the boys in the best way i could, and returned to the deck to view the scenery. wilmington is thirty-four miles from the sea, and the river for that distance is a calm, broad estuary. at this time the resources of rebel engineering were exhausted in defense against its passage by a hostile fleet, and undoubtedly the best work of the kind in the southern confederacy was done upon it. at its mouth were forts fisher and caswell, the strongest sea coast forts in the confederacy. fort caswell was an old united states fort, much enlarged and strengthened. fort fisher was a new work, begun immediately after the beginning of the war, and labored at incessantly until captured. behind these every one of the thirty-four miles to wilmington was covered with the fire of the best guns the english arsenals could produce, mounted on forts built at every advantageous spot. lines of piles running out into the water, forced incoming vessels to wind back and forth across the stream under the point-blank range of massive armstrong rifles. as if this were not sufficient, the channel was thickly studded with torpedoes that would explode at the touch of the keel of a passing vessel. these abundant precautions, and the telegram from general lee, found in fort fisher, stating that unless that stronghold and fort caswell were held he could not hold richmond, give some idea of the importance of the place to the rebels. we passed groups of hundreds of sailors fishing for torpedos, and saw many of these dangerous monsters, which they had hauled up out of the water. we caught up with the "thorn," when about half way to the sea, passed her, to our great delight, and soon left a gap between us of nearly half-a-mile. we ran through an opening in the piling, holding up close to the left side, and she apparently followed our course exactly. suddenly there was a dull roar; a column of water, bearing with it fragments of timbers, planking and human bodies, rose up through one side of the vessel, and, as it fell, she lurched forward and sank. she had struck a torpedo. i never learned the number lost, but it must have been very great. some little time after this happened we approached fort anderson, the most powerful of the works between wilmington and the forts at the mouth of the sea. it was built on the ruins of the little town of brunswick, destroyed by cornwallis during the revolutionary war. we saw a monitor lying near it, and sought good positions to view this specimen of the redoubtable ironclads of which we had heard and read so much. it looked precisely as it did in pictures, as black, as grim, and as uncompromising as the impregnable floating fortress which had brought the "merrimac" to terms. but as we approached closely we noticed a limpness about the smoke stack that seemed very inconsistent with the customary rigidity of cylindrical iron. then the escape pipe seemed scarcely able to maintain itself upright. a few minutes later we discovered that our terrible cyclops of the sea was a flimsy humbug, a theatrical imitation, made by stretching blackened canvas over a wooden frame. one of the officers on board told us its story. after the fall of fort fisher the rebels retired to fort anderson, and offered a desperate resistance to our army and fleet. owing to the shallowness of the water the latter could not come into close enough range to do effective work. then the happy idea of this sham monitor suggested itself to some one. it was prepared, and one morning before daybreak it was sent floating in on the tide. the other monitors opened up a heavy fire from their position. the rebels manned their guns and replied vigorously, by concentrating a terrible cannonade on the sham monitor, which sailed grandly on, undisturbed by the heavy rifled bolts tearing through her canvas turret. almost frantic with apprehension of the result if she could not be checked, every gun that would bear was turned upon her, and torpedos were exploded in her pathway by electricity. all these she treated with the silent contempt they merited from so invulnerable a monster. at length, as she reached a good easy range of the fort, her bow struck something, and she swung around as if to open fire. that was enough for the rebels. with schofield's army reaching out to cut off their retreat, and this dreadful thing about to tear the insides out of their fort with four-hundred-pound shot at quarter-mile range, there was nothing for them to do but consult their own safety, which they did with such haste that they did not spike a gun, or destroy a pound of stores. chapter lxxx. visit to fort fisher, and inspection of that stronghold--the way it was captured--out on the ocean sailing--terribly seasick--rapid recovery --arrival at annapolis--washed, clothed and fed--unbounded luxury, and days of unadulterated happiness. when we reached the mouth of cape fear river the wind was blowing so hard that our captain did not think it best to venture out, so he cast anchor. the cabin of the vessel was filled with officers who had been released from prison about the same time we were. i was also given a berth in the cabin, in consideration of my being the non-commissioned officer in charge of the men, and i found the associations quite pleasant. a party was made up, which included me, to visit fort fisher, and we spent the larger part of a day very agreeably in wandering over that great stronghold. we found it wonderful in its strength, and were prepared to accept the statement of those who had seen foreign defensive works, that it was much more powerful than the famous malakoff, which so long defied the besiegers of sebastopol. the situation of the fort was on a narrow and low spit of ground between cape fear river and the ocean. on this the rebels had erected, with prodigious labor, an embankment over a mile in length, twenty-five feet thick and twenty feet high. about two-thirds of this bank faced the sea; the other third ran across the spit of land to protect the fort against an attack from the land side. still stronger than the bank forming the front of the fort were the traverses, which prevented an enfilading fire these were regular hills, twenty-five to forty feet high, and broad and long in proportion. there were fifteen or twenty of them along the face of the fort. inside of them were capacious bomb proofs, sufficiently large to shelter the whole garrison. it seemed as if a whole township had been dug up, carted down there and set on edge. in front of the works was a strong palisade. between each pair of traverses were one or two enormous guns, none less than one-hundred-and-fifty pounders. among these we saw a great armstrong gun, which had been presented to the southern confederacy by its manufacturer, sir william armstrong, who, like the majority of the english nobility, was a warm admirer of the jeff. davis crowd. it was the finest piece of ordnance ever seen in this country. the carriage was rosewood, and the mountings gilt brass. the breech of the gun had five reinforcements. to attack this place our government assembled the most powerful fleet ever sent on such an expedition. over seventy-five men-of-war, including six monitors, and carrying six hundred guns, assailed it with a storm of shot and shell that averaged four projectiles per second for several hours; the parapet was battered, and the large guns crushed as one smashes a bottle with a stone. the garrison fled into the bomb-proofs for protection. the troops, who had landed above the fort, moved up to assail the land face, while a brigade of sailors and marines attacked the sea face. as the fleet had to cease firing to allow the charge, the rebels ran out of their casemates and, manning the parapet, opened such a fire of musketry that the brigade from the fleet was driven back, but the soldiers made a lodgment on the land face. then began some beautiful cooperative tactics between the army and navy, communication being kept up with signal flags. our men were on one side of the parapets and the rebels on the other, with the fighting almost hand-to-hand. the vessels ranged out to where their guns would rake the rebel line, and as their shot tore down its length, the rebels gave way, and falling back to the next traverse, renewed the conflict there. guided by the signals our vessels changed their positions, so as to rake this line also, and so the fight went on until twelve traverses had been carried, one after the other, when the rebels surrendered. the next day the rebels abandoned fort caswell and other fortifications in the immediate neighborhood, surrendered two gunboats, and fell back to the lines at fort anderson. after fort fisher fell, several blockade-runners were lured inside and captured. never before had there been such a demonstration of the power of heavy artillery. huge cannon were pounded into fragments, hills of sand ripped open, deep crevasses blown in the ground by exploding shells, wooden buildings reduced to kindling-wood, etc. the ground was literally paved with fragments of shot and shell, which, now red with rust from the corroding salt air, made the interior of the fort resemble what one of our party likened it to "an old brickyard." whichever way we looked along the shores we saw abundant evidence of the greatness of the business which gave the place its importance. in all directions, as far as the eye could reach, the beach was dotted with the bleaching skeletons of blockade-runners--some run ashore by their mistaking the channel, more beached to escape the hot pursuit of our blockaders. directly in front of the sea face of the fort, and not four hundred yards from the savage mouths of the huge guns, the blackened timbers of a burned blockade-runner showed above the water at low tide. coming in from nassau with a cargo of priceless value to the gasping confederacy, she was observed and chased by one of our vessels, a swifter sailer, even, than herself. the war ship closed rapidly upon her. she sought the protection of the guns of fort fisher, which opened venomously on the chaser. they did not stop her, though they were less than half a mile away. in another minute she would have sent the rebel vessel to the bottom of the sea, by a broadside from her heavy guns, but the captain of the latter turned her suddenly, and ran her high up on the beach, wrecking his vessel, but saving the much more valuable cargo. our vessel then hauled off, and as night fell, quiet was restored. at midnight two boat-loads of determined men, rowing with muffled oars moved silently out from the blockader towards the beached vessel. in their boats they had some cans of turpentine, and several large shells. when they reached the blockade-runner they found all her crew gone ashore, save one watchman, whom they overpowered before he could give the alarm. they cautiously felt their way around, with the aid of a dark lantern, secured the ship's chronometer, her papers and some other desired objects. they then saturated with the turpentine piles of combustible material, placed about the vessel to the best advantage, and finished by depositing the shells where their explosion would ruin the machinery. all this was done so near to the fort that the sentinels on the parapets could be heard with the greatest distinctness as they repeated their half-hourly cry of "all's well." their preparations completed, the daring fellows touched matches to the doomed vessel in a dozen places at once, and sprang into their boats. the flames instantly enveloped the ship, and showed the gunners the incendiaries rowing rapidly away. a hail of shot beat the water into a foam around the boats, but their good fortune still attended them, and they got back without losing a man. the wind at length calmed sufficiently to encourage our captain to venture out, and we were soon battling with the rolling waves, far out of sight of land. for awhile the novelty of the scene fascinated me. i was at last on the ocean, of which i had heard, read and imagined so much. the creaking cordage, the straining engine, the plunging ship, the wild waste of tumbling billows, everyone apparently racing to where our tossing bark was struggling to maintain herself, all had an entrancing interest for me, and i tried to recall byron's sublime apostrophe to the ocean: thou glorious mirror, where the almighty's form classes itself in tempest: in all time, calm or convulsed-in breeze, or gale, or storm, icing the pole, or in the torrid clime dark-heaving--boundless, endless, and sublime- the image of eternity--the throne of the invisible; even from out thy slime the monsters of the deep are made; each zone obey thee: thou goest forth, dread, fathomless, alone, just then, my reverie was broken by the strong hand of the gruff captain of, the vessel descending upon my shoulder, and he said: "see, here, youngster! ain't you the fellow that was put in command of these men?" i acknowledged such to be the case. "well," said the captain; "i want you to 'tend to your business and straighten them around, so that we can clean off the decks." i turned from the bulwark over which i had been contemplating the vasty deep, and saw the sorriest, most woe-begone lot that the imagination can conceive. every mother's son was wretchedly sea-sick. they were paying the penalty of their overfeeding in wilmington; and every face looked as if its owner was discovering for the first time what the real lower depths of human misery was. they all seemed afraid they would not die; as if they were praying for death, but feeling certain that he was going back on them in a most shameful way. we straightened them around a little, washed them and the decks off with a hose, and then i started down in the hold to see how matters were with the six hundred down there. the boys there were much sicker than those on deck. as i lifted the hatch there rose an odor which appeared strong enough to raise the plank itself. every onion that had been issued to us in wilmington seemed to lie down there in the last stages of decomposition. all of the seventy distinct smells which coleridge counted at cologne might have been counted in any given cubic foot of atmosphere, while the next foot would have an entirely different and equally demonstrative "bouquet." i recoiled, and leaned against the bulwark, but soon summoned up courage enough to go half-way down the ladder, and shout out in as stern a tone as i could command: "here, now! i want you fellows to straighten around there, right off, and help clean up!" they were as angry and cross as they were sick. they wanted nothing in the world so much as the opportunity i had given them to swear at and abuse somebody. every one of them raised on his elbow, and shaking his fist at me yelled out: "o, you go to ----, you ----------. just come down another step, and i'll knock the whole head off 'en you." i did not go down any farther. coming back on the deck my stomach began to feel qualmish. some wretched idiot, whose grandfather's grave i hope the jackasses have defiled, as the turks would say, told me that the best preventive of sea-sickness was to drink as much of the milk punch as i could swallow. like another idiot, i did so. i went again to the side of the vessel, but now the fascination of the scene had all faded out. the restless billows were dreary, savage, hungry and dizzying; they seemed to claw at, and tear, and wrench the struggling ship as a group of huge lions would tease and worry a captive dog. they distressed her and all on board by dealing a blow which would send her reeling in one direction, but before she had swung the full length that impulse would have sent her, catching her on the opposite side with a stunning shock that sent her another way, only to meet another rude buffet from still another side. i thought we could all have stood it if the motion had been like that of a swing-backward and forward--or even if the to and fro motion had been complicated with a side-wise swing, but to be put through every possible bewildering motion in the briefest space of time was more than heads of iron and stomachs of brass could stand. mine were not made of such perdurable stuff. they commenced mutinous demonstrations in regard to the milk punch. i began wondering whether the milk was not the horrible beer swill, stump-tail kind of which i had heard so much. and the whisky in it; to use a vigorous westernism, descriptive of mean whisky, it seemed to me that i could smell the boy's feet who plowed the corn from which it was distilled. then the onions i had eaten in wilmington began to rebel, and incite the bread, meat and coffee to gastric insurrection, and i became so utterly wretched that life had no farther attractions. while i was leaning over the bulwark, musing on the complete hollowness of all earthly things, the captain of the vessel caught hold of me roughly, and said: "look here, you're just playin' the very devil a-commandin' these here men. why in ---don't you stiffen up, and hump yourself around, and make these men mind, or else belt them over the head with a capstan bar! now i want you to 'tend to your business. d'you understand me?" i turned a pair of weary and hopeless eyes upon him, and started to say that a man who would talk to one in my forlorn condition of "stiffening up," and "belting other fellows over the head with a capstan bar," would insult a woman dying with consumption, but i suddenly became too full for utterance. the milk punch, the onions, the bread, and meat and coffee tired of fighting it out in the narrow quarters where i had stowed them, had started upwards tumultuously. i turned my head again to the sea, and looking down into its smaragdine depths, let go of the victualistic store which i had been industriously accumulating ever since i had come through the lines. i vomited until i felt as empty and hollow as a stove pipe. there was a vacuum that extended clear to my toe-nails. i feared that every retching struggle would dent me in, all over, as one sees tin preserving cans crushed in by outside pressure, and i apprehended that if i kept on much longer my shoe-soles would come up after the rest. i will mention, parenthetically, that, to this day i abhor milk punch, and also onions. unutterably miserable as i was i could not refrain from a ghost of a smile, when a poor country boy near me sang out in an interval between vomiting spells: "o, captain, for god's sake, stop the boat and lem'me go ashore, and i swear i'll walk every step of the way home." he was like old gonzalo in the 'tempest:' now world i give a thousand furlongs of sea for an acre of barren ground; long heath; brown furze; anything. the wills above be done! but i would fain die a dry death. after this misery had lasted about two days we got past cape hatteras, and out of reach of its malign influence, and recovered as rapidly as we had been prostrated. we regained spirits and appetites with amazing swiftness; the sun came out warm and cheerful, we cleaned up our quarters and ourselves as best we could, and during the remainder of the voyage were as blithe and cheerful as so many crickets. the fun in the cabin was rollicking. the officers had been as sick as the men, but were wonderfully vivacious when the 'mal du mer' passed off. in the party was a fine glee club, which had been organized at "camp sorgum," the officers' prison at columbia. its leader was a major of the fifth iowa cavalry, who possessed a marvelously sweet tenor voice, and well developed musical powers. while we were at wilmington he sang "when sherman marched down to the sea," to an audience of soldiers that packed the opera house densely. the enthusiasm he aroused was simply indescribable; men shouted, and the tears ran down their faces. he was recalled time and again, each time with an increase in the furore. the audience would have staid there all night to listen to him sing that one song. poor fellow, he only went home to die. an attack of pneumonia carried him off within a fortnight after we separated at annapolis. the glee club had several songs which they rendered in regular negro minstrel style, and in a way that was irresistibly ludicrous. one of their favorites was "billy patterson." all standing up in a ring, the tenors would lead off: "i saw an old man go riding by," and the baritones, flinging themselves around with the looseness of christy's minstrels, in a "break down," would reply: "don't tell me! don't tell me!" then the tenors would resume: "says i, ole man, your horse'll die." then the baritones, with an air of exaggerated interest; "a-ha-a-a, billy patterson!" tenors: "for. it he dies, i'll tan his skin; an' if he lives i'll ride him agin," all-together, with a furious "break down" at the close: "then i'll lay five dollars down, and count them one by one; then i'll lay five dollars down, if anybody will show me the man that struck billy patterson." and so on. it used to upset my gravity entirely to see a crowd of grave and dignified captains, majors and colonels going through this nonsensical drollery with all the abandon of professional burnt-cork artists. as we were nearing the entrance to chesapeake bay we passed a great monitor, who was exercising her crew at the guns. she fired directly across our course, the huge four hundred pound balls shipping along the water, about a mile ahead of us, as we boys used to make the flat stones skip in the play of "ducks and drakes." one or two of the shots came so. close that i feared she might be mistaking us for a rebel ship intent on some raid up the bay, and i looked up anxiously to see that the flag should float out so conspicuously that she could not help seeing it. the next day our vessel ran alongside of the dock at the naval academy at annapolis, that institution now being used as a hospital for paroled prisoners. the musicians of the post band came down with stretchers to carry the sick to the hospital, while those of us who were able to walk were ordered to fall in and march up. the distance was but a few hundred yards. on reaching the building we marched up on a little balcony, and as we did so each one of us was seized by a hospital attendant, who, with the quick dexterity attained by long practice, snatched every one of our filthy, lousy rags off in the twinkling of an eye, and flung them over the railing to the ground, where a man loaded them into a wagon with a pitchfork. with them went our faithful little black can, our hoop-iron spoon, and our chessboard and men. thus entirely denuded, each boy was given a shove which sent him into a little room, where a barber pressed him down upon a stool, and almost before he understood what was being done, had his hair and beard cut off as close as shears would do it. another tap on the back sent the shorn lamb into a room furnished with great tubs of water and with about six inches of soap suds on the zinc-covered floor. in another minute two men with sponges had removed every trace of prison grime from his body, and passed him on to two more men, who wiped him dry, and moved him on to where a man handed him a new shirt, a pair of drawers, pair of socks, pair of pantaloons, pair of slippers, and a hospital gown, and motioned him to go on into the large room, and array himself in his new garments. like everything else about the hospital this performance was reduced to a perfect system. not a word was spoken by anybody, not a moment's time lost, and it seemed to me that it was not ten minutes after i marched up on the balcony, covered with dirt, rags, vermin, and a matted shock of hair, until i marched out of the room, clean and well clothed. now i began to feel as if i was really a man again. the next thing done was to register our names, rank, regiment, when and where captured, when and where released. after this we were shown to our rooms. and such rooms as they were. all the old maids in the country could not have improved their spick-span neatness. the floors were as white as pine plank could be scoured; the sheets and bedding as clean as cotton and linen and woolen could be washed. nothing in any home in the land was any more daintily, wholesomely, unqualifiedly clean than were these little chambers, each containing two beds, one for each man assigned to their occupancy. andrews doubted if we could stand all this radical change in our habits. he feared that it was rushing things too fast. we might have had our hair cut one week, and taken a bath all over a week later, and so progress down to sleeping between white sheets in the course of six months, but to do it all in one day seemed like tempting fate. every turn showed us some new feature of the marvelous order of this wonderful institution. shortly after we were sent to our rooms, a surgeon entered with a clerk. after answering the usual questions as to name, rank, company and regiment, the surgeon examined our tongues, eyes, limbs and general appearance, and communicated his conclusions to the clerk, who filled out a blank card. this card was stuck into a little tin holder at the head of my bed. andrews's card was the same, except the name. the surgeon was followed by a sergeant, who was chief of the dining-room, and the clerk, who made a minute of the diet ordered for us, and moved off. andrews and i immediately became very solicitous to know what species of diet no. 1 was. after the seasickness left us our appetites became as ravenous as a buzz-saw, and unless diet no. 1 was more than no. 1 in name, it would not fill the bill. we had not long to remain in suspense, for soon another non-commissioned officer passed through at the head of a train of attendants, bearing trays. consulting the list in his hand, he said to one of his followers, "two no. 1's," and that satellite set down two large plates, upon each of which were a cup of coffee, a shred of meat, two boiled eggs and a couple of rolls. "well," said andrews, as the procession moved away, "i want to know where this thing's going to stop. i am trying hard to get used to wearing a shirt without any lice in it, and to sitting down on a chair, and to sleeping in a clean bed, but when it comes to having my meals sent to my room, i'm afraid i'll degenerate into a pampered child of luxury. they are really piling it on too strong. let us see, mc.; how long's it been since we were sitting on the sand there in florence, boiling our pint of meal in that old can?" "it seems many years, lale," i said; "but for heaven's sake let us try to forget it as soon as possible. we will always remember too much of it." and we did try hard to make the miserable recollections fade out of our minds. when we were stripped on the balcony we threw away every visible token that could remind us of the hateful experience we had passed through. we did not retain a scrap of paper or a relic to recall the unhappy past. we loathed everything connected with it. the days that followed were very happy ones. the paymaster came around and paid us each two months' pay and twenty-five cents a day "ration money" for every day we had been in prison. this gave andrews and i about one hundred and sixty-five dollars apiece--an abundance of spending money. uncle sam was very kind and considerate to his soldier nephews, and the hospital authorities neglected nothing that would add to our comfort. the superbly-kept grounds of the naval academy were renewing the freshness of their loveliness under the tender wooing of the advancing spring, and every step one sauntered through them was a new delight. a magnificent band gave us sweet music morning and evening. every dispatch from the south told of the victorious progress of our arms, and the rapid approach of the close of the struggle. all we had to do was to enjoy the goods the gods were showering upon us, and we did so with appreciative, thankful hearts. after awhile all able to travel were given furloughs of thirty days to visit their homes, with instructions to report at the expiration of their leaves of absence to the camps of rendezvous nearest their homes, and we separated, nearly every man going in a different direction. chapter lxxxi. captain wirz the only one of the prison-keepers punished--his arrest, trial and execution. of all those more or less concerned in the barbarities practiced upon our prisoners, but one--captain henry wirz--was punished. the turners, at richmond; lieutenant boisseux, of belle isle; major gee, of salisbury; colonel iverson and lieutenant barrett, of florence; and the many brutal miscreants about andersonville, escaped scot free. what became of them no one knows; they were never heard of after the close of the war. they had sense enough to retire into obscurity, and stay there, and this saved their lives, for each one of them had made deadly enemies among those whom they had maltreated, who, had they known where they were, would have walked every step of the way thither to kill them. when the confederacy went to pieces in april, 1865, wirz was still at andersonville. general wilson, commanding our cavalry forces, and who had established his headquarters at macon, ga., learned of this, and sent one of his staff--captain h. e. noyes, of the fourth regular cavalry --with a squad. of men, to arrest him. this was done on the 7th of may. wirz protested against his arrest, claiming that he was protected by the terms of johnson's surrender, and, addressed the following letter to general wilson: andersonville, ga., may 7, 1865. general:--it is with great reluctance that i address you these lines, being fully aware how little time is left you to attend to such matters as i now have the honor to lay before you, and if i could see any other way to accomplish my object i would not intrude upon you. i am a native of switzerland, and was before the war a citizen of louisiana, and by profession a physician. like hundreds and thousands of others, i was carried away by the maelstrom of excitement and joined the southern army. i was very severely wounded at the battle of "seven pines," near richmond, va., and have nearly lost the use of my right arm. unfit for field duty, i was ordered to report to brevet major general john h. winder, in charge of the federal prisoners of war, who ordered me to take charge of a prison in tuscaloosa, ala. my health failing me, i applied for a furlough and went to europe, from whence i returned in february, 1864. i was then ordered to report to the commandant of the military prison at andersonville, ga., who assigned me to the command of the interior of the prison. the duties i had to perform were arduous and unpleasant, and i am satisfied that no man can or will justly blame me for things that happened here, and which were beyond my power to control. i do not think that i ought to be held responsible for the shortness of rations, for the overcrowded state of the prison, (which was of itself a prolific source of fearful mortality), for the inadequate supply of clothing, want of shelter, etc., etc. still i now bear the odium, and men who were prisoners have seemed disposed to wreak their vengeance upon me for what they have suffered--i, who was only the medium, or, i may better say, the tool in the hands of my superiors. this is my condition. i am a man with a family. i lost all my property when the federal army besieged vicksburg. i have no money at present to go to any place, and, even if i had, i know of no place where i can go. my life is in danger, and i most respectfully ask of you help and relief. if you will be so generous as to give me some sort of a safe conduct, or, what i should greatly prefer, a guard to protect myself and family against violence, i should be thankful to you, and you may rest assured that your protection will not be given to one who is unworthy of it. my intention is to return with my family to europe, as soon as i can make the arrangements. in the meantime i have the honor general, to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, hy. wirz, captain c. s. a. major general t. h. wilson, commanding, macon. ga. he was kept at macon, under guard, until may 20, when captain noyes was ordered to take him, and the hospital records of andersonville, to washington. between macon and cincinnati the journey was a perfect gauntlet. our men were stationed all along the road, and among them everywhere were ex-prisoners, who recognized wirz, and made such determined efforts to kill him that it was all that captain noyes, backed by a strong guard, could do to frustrate them. at chattanooga and nashville the struggle between his guards and his would-be slayers, was quite sharp. at louisville, noyes had wirz clean-shaved, and dressed in a complete suit of black, with a beaver hat, which so altered his appearance that no one recognized him after that, and the rest of the journey was made unmolested. the authorities at washington ordered that he be tried immediately, by a court martial composed of generals lewis wallace, mott, geary, l. thomas, fessenden, bragg and baller, colonel allcock, and lieutenant-colonel stibbs. colonel chipman was judge advocate, and the trial began august 23. the prisoner was arraigned on a formidable list of charges and specifications, which accused him of "combining, confederating, and conspiring together with john h. winder, richard b. winder, isaiah ii. white, w. s. winder, r. r. stevenson and others unknown, to injure the health and destroy the lives of soldiers in the military service of the united states, there held, and being prisoners of war within the lines of the so-called confederate states, and in the military prisons thereof, to the end that the armies of the united states might be weakened and impaired, in violation of the laws and customs of war." the main facts of the dense over-crowding, the lack of sufficient shelter, the hideous mortality were cited, and to these added a long list of specific acts of brutality, such as hunting men down with hounds, tearing them with dogs, robbing them, confining them in the stocks, cruelly beating and murdering them, of which wirz was personally guilty. when the defendant was called upon to plead he claimed that his case was covered by the terms of johnston's surrender, and furthermore, that the country now being at peace, he could not be lawfully tried by a court-martial. these objections being overruled, he entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges and specifications. he had two lawyers for counsel. the prosecution called captain noyes first, who detailed the circumstances of wirz's arrest, and denied that he had given any promises of protection. the next witness was colonel george c. gibbs, who commanded the troops of the post at andersonville. he testified that wirz was the commandant of the prison, and had sole authority under winder over all the prisoners; that there was a dead line there, and orders to shoot any one who crossed it; that dogs were kept to hunt down escaping prisoners; the dogs were the ordinary plantation dogs, mixture of hound and cur. dr. j. c. bates, who was a surgeon of the prison hospital, (a rebel), testified that the condition of things in his division was horrible. nearly naked men, covered with lice, were dying on all sides. many were lying in the filthy sand and mud. he went on and described the terrible condition of men--dying from scurvy, diarrhea, gangrenous sores, and lice. he wanted to carry in fresh vegetables for the sick, but did not dare, the orders being very strict against such thing. he thought the prison authorities might easily have sent in enough green corn to have stopped the scurvy; the miasmatic effluvia from the prison was exceedingly offensive and poisonous, so much so that when the surgeons received a slight scratch on their persons, they carefully covered it up with court plaster, before venturing near the prison. a number of other rebel surgeons testified to substantially the same facts. several residents of that section of the state testified to the plentifulness of the crops there in 1864. in addition to these, about one hundred and fifty union prisoners were examined, who testified to all manner of barbarities which had come under their personal observation. they had all seen wirz shoot men, had seen him knock sick and crippled men down and stamp upon them, had been run down by him with hounds, etc. their testimony occupies about two thousand pages of manuscript, and is, without doubt, the most, terrible record of crime ever laid to the account of any man. the taking of this testimony occupied until october 18, when the government decided to close the case, as any further evidence would be simply cumulative. the prisoner presented a statement in which he denied that there had been an accomplice in a conspiracy of john h. winder and others, to destroy the lives of united states soldiers; he also denied that there had been such a conspiracy, but made the pertinent inquiry why he alone, of all those who were charged with the conspiracy, was brought to trial. he said that winder has gone to the great judgment seat, to answer for all his thoughts, words and deeds, "and surely i am not to be held culpable for them. general howell cobb has received the pardon of the president of the united states." he further claimed that there was no principle of law which would sanction the holding of him--a mere subordinate --guilty, for simply obeying, as literally as possible, the orders of his superiors. he denied all the specific acts of cruelty alleged against him, such as maltreating and killing prisoners with his own hands. the prisoners killed for crossing the dead line, he claimed, should not be charged against him, since they were simply punished for the violation of a known order which formed part of the discipline, he believed, of all military prisons. the statement that soldiers were given a furlough for killing a yankee prisoner, was declared to be "a mere idle, absurd camp rumor." as to the lack of shelter, room and rations for so many prisoners, he claimed that the sole responsibility rested upon the confederate government. there never were but two prisoners whipped by his order, and these were for sufficient cause. he asked the court to consider favorably two important items in his defense: first, that he had of his own accord taken the drummer boys from the stockade, and placed them where they could get purer air and better food. second, that no property taken from prisoners was retained by him, but was turned over to the prison quartermaster. the court, after due deliberation, declared the prisoner guilty on all the charges and specifications save two unimportant ones, and sentenced him to be hanged by the neck until dead, at such time and place as the president of the united states should direct. november 3 president johnson approved of the sentence, and ordered major general c. c. augur to carry the same into effect on friday, november 10, which was done. the prisoner made frantic appeals against the sentence; he wrote imploring letters to president johnson, and lying ones to the new york news, a rebel paper. it is said that his wife attempted to convey poison to him, that he might commit suicide and avoid the ignomy of being hanged. when all hope was gone he nerved himself up to meet his fate, and died, as thousands of other scoundrels have, with calmness. his body was buried in the grounds of the old capitol prison, alongside of that of azterodt, one of the accomplices in the assassination of president lincoln. chapter lxxxii. the responsibility--who was to blame for all the misery--an examination of the flimsy excuses made for the rebels--one document that convicts them--what is desired. i have endeavored to tell the foregoing story as calmly, as dispassionately, as free from vituperation and prejudice as possible. how well i have succeeded the reader must judge. how difficult this moderation has been at times only those know who, like myself, have seen, from day to day, the treason-sharpened fangs of starvation and disease gnaw nearer and nearer to the hearts of well-beloved friends and comrades. of the sixty-three of my company comrades who entered prison with me, but eleven, or at most thirteen, emerged alive, and several of these have since died from the effects of what they suffered. the mortality in the other companies of our battalion was equally great, as it was also with the prisoners generally. not less than twenty-five thousand gallant, noble-hearted boys died around me between the dates of my capture and release. nobler men than they never died for any cause. for the most part they were simple-minded, honest-hearted boys; the sterling products of our northern home-life, and northern common schools, and that grand stalwart northern blood, the yeoman blood of sturdy middle class freemen--the blood of the race which has conquered on every field since the roman empire went down under its sinewy blows. they prated little of honor, and knew nothing of "chivalry" except in its repulsive travesty in the south. as citizens at home, no honest labor had been regarded by them as too humble to be followed with manly pride in its success; as soldiers in the field, they did their duty with a calm defiance of danger and death, that the world has not seen equaled in the six thousand years that men have followed the trade of war. in the prison their conduct was marked by the same unostentatious but unflinching heroism. death stared them in the face constantly. they could read their own fate in that of the loathsome, unburied dead all around them. insolent enemies mocked their sufferings, and sneered at their devotion to a government which they asserted had abandoned them, but the simple faith, the ingrained honesty of these plain-mannered, plain-spoken boys rose superior to every trial. brutus, the noblest roman of them all, says in his grandest flight: set honor in one eye and death in the other, and i will look on both indifferently. they did not say this: they did it. they never questioned their duty; no repinings, no murmurings against their government escaped their lips, they took the dread fortunes brought to them as calmly, as unshrinkingly as they had those in the field; they quailed not, nor wavered in their faith before the worst the rebels could do. the finest epitaph ever inscribed above a soldier's grave was that graven on the stone which marked the resting-place of the deathless three hundred who fell at thermopylae: go, stranger, to lacedaemon,- and tell sparta that we lie here in obedience to her laws. they who lie in the shallow graves of andersonville, belle isle, florence and salisbury, lie there in obedience to the precepts and maxims inculcated into their minds in the churches and common schools of the north; precepts which impressed upon them the duty of manliness and honor in all the relations and exigencies of life; not the "chivalric" prate of their enemies, but the calm steadfastness which endureth to the end. the highest tribute that can be paid them is to say they did full credit to their teachings, and they died as every american should when duty bids him. no richer heritage was ever bequeathed to posterity. it was in the year 1864, and the first three months of 1865 that these twenty-five thousand youths mere cruelly and needlessly done to death. in these fatal fifteen months more young men than to-day form the pride, the hope, and the vigor of any one of our leading cities, more than at the beginning of the war were found in either of several states in the nation, were sent to their graves, "unknelled, uncoffined, and unknown," victims of the most barbarous and unnecessary cruelty recorded since the dark ages. barbarous, because the wit of man has not yet devised a more savage method of destroying fellow-beings than by exposure and starvation; unnecessary, because the destruction of these had not, and could not have the slightest effect upon the result of the struggle. the rebel leaders have acknowledged that they knew the fate of the confederacy was sealed when the campaign of 1864 opened with the north displaying an unflinching determination to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. all that they could hope for after that was some fortuitous accident, or unexpected foreign recognition that would give them peace with victory. the prisoners were non-important factors in the military problem. had they all been turned loose as soon as captured, their efforts would not have hastened the confederacy's fate a single day. as to the responsibility for this monstrous cataclysm of human misery and death: that the great mass of the southern people approved of these outrages, or even knew of them, i do not, for an instant, believe. they are as little capable of countenancing such a thing as any people in the world. but the crowning blemish of southern society has ever been the dumb acquiescence of the many respectable, well-disposed, right-thinking people in the acts of the turbulent and unscrupulous few. from this direful spring has flowed an iliad of unnumbered woes, not only to that section but to our common country. it was this that kept the south vibrating between patriotism and treason during the revolution, so that it cost more lives and treasure to maintain the struggle there than in all the rest of the country. it was this that threatened the dismemberment of the union in 1832. it was this that aggravated and envenomed every wrong growing out of slavery; that outraged liberty, debauched citizenship, plundered the mails, gagged the press, stiffled speech, made opinion a crime, polluted the free soil of god with the unwilling step of the bondman, and at last crowned three-quarters of a century of this unparalleled iniquity by dragging eleven millions of people into a war from which their souls revolted, and against which they had declared by overwhelming majorities in every state except south carolina, where the people had no voice. it may puzzle some to understand how a relatively small band of political desperados in each state could accomplish such a momentous wrong; that they did do it, no one conversant with our history will deny, and that they--insignificant as they were in numbers, in abilities, in character, in everything save capacity and indomitable energy in mischief--could achieve such gigantic wrongs in direct opposition to the better sense of their communities is a fearful demonstration of the defects of the constitution of southern society. men capable of doing all that the secession leaders were guilty of--both before and during the war--were quite capable of revengefully destroying twenty-five thousand of their enemies by the most hideous means at their command. that they did so set about destroying their enemies, wilfully, maliciously, and with malice prepense and aforethought, is susceptible of proof as conclusive as that which in a criminal court sends murderers to the gallows. let us examine some of these proofs: 1. the terrible mortality at andersonville and elsewhere was a matter of as much notoriety throughout the southern confederacy as the military operations of lee and johnson. no intelligent man--much less the rebel leaders--was ignorant of it nor of its calamitous proportions. 2. had the rebel leaders within a reasonable time after this matter became notorious made some show of inquiring into and alleviating the deadly misery, there might be some excuse for them on the ground of lack of information, and the plea that they did as well as they could would have some validity. but this state of affairs was allowed to continue over a year--in fact until the downfall of the confederacy--without a hand being raised to mitigate the horrors of those places--without even an inquiry being made as to whether they were mitigable or not. still worse: every month saw the horrors thicken, and the condition of the prisoners become more wretched. the suffering in may, 1864, was more terrible than in april; june showed a frightful increase over may, while words fail to paint the horrors of july and august, and so the wretchedness waxed until the end, in april, 1865. 3. the main causes of suffering and death were so obviously preventible that the rebel leaders could not have been ignorant of the ease with which a remedy could be applied. these main causes were three in number: a. improper and insufficient food. b. unheard-of crowding together. c. utter lack of shelter. it is difficult to say which of these three was the most deadly. let us admit, for the sake of argument, that it was impossible for the rebels to supply sufficient and proper food. this admission, i know, will not stand for an instant in the face of the revelations made by sherman's march to the sea; and through the carolinas, but let that pass, that we may consider more easily demonstrable facts connected with the next two propositions, the first of which is as to the crowding together. was land so scarce in the southern confederacy that no more than sixteen acres could be spared for the use of thirty-five thousand prisoners? the state of georgia has a population of less than one-sixth that of new york, scattered over a territory one-quarter greater than that state's, and yet a pitiful little tract--less than the corn-patch "clearing" of the laziest "cracker" in the state--was all that could be allotted to the use of three-and-a-half times ten thousand young men! the average population of the state does not exceed sixteen to the square mile, yet andersonville was peopled at the rate of one million four hundred thousand to the square mile. with millions of acres of unsettled, useless, worthless pine barrens all around them, the prisoners were wedged together so closely that there was scarcely room to lie down at night, and a few had space enough to have served as a grave. this, too, in a country where the land was of so little worth that much of it had never been entered from the government. then, as to shelter and fire: each of the prisons was situated in the heart of a primeval forest, from which the first trees that had ever been cut were those used in building the pens. within a gun-shot of the perishing men was an abundance of lumber and wood to have built every man in prison a warm, comfortable hut, and enough fuel to supply all his wants. supposing even, that the rebels did not have the labor at hand to convert these forests into building material and fuel, the prisoners themselves would have gladly undertaken the work, as a means of promoting their own comfort, and for occupation and exercise. no tools would have been too poor and clumsy for them to work with. when logs were occasionally found or brought into prison, men tore them to pieces almost with their naked fingers. every prisoner will bear me out in the assertion that there was probably not a root as large as a bit of clothes-line in all the ground covered by the prisons, that eluded the faithfully eager search of freezing men for fuel. what else than deliberate design can account for this systematic withholding from the prisoners of that which was so essential to their existence, and which it was so easy to give them? this much for the circumstantial evidence connecting the rebel authorities with the premeditated plan for destroying the prisoners. let us examine the direct evidence: the first feature is the assignment to the command of the prisons of "general" john h. winder, the confidential friend of mr. jefferson davis, and a man so unscrupulous, cruel and bloody-thirsty that at the time of his appointment he was the most hated and feared man in the southern confederacy. his odious administration of the odious office of provost marshal general showed him to be fittest of tools for their purpose. their selection--considering the end in view, was eminently wise. baron haynau was made eternally infamous by a fraction of the wanton cruelties which load the memory of winder. but it can be said in extenuation of haynau's offenses that he was a brave, skilful and energetic soldier, who overthrew on the field the enemies he maltreated. if winder, at any time during the war, was nearer the front than richmond, history does not mention it. haynau was the bastard son of a german elector and of the daughter of a village, druggist. winder was the son of a sham aristocrat, whose cowardice and incompetence in the war of 1812 gave washington into the hands of the british ravagers. it is sufficient indication of this man's character that he could look unmoved upon the terrible suffering that prevailed in andersonville in june, july, and august; that he could see three thousand men die each month in the most horrible manner, without lifting a finger in any way to assist them; that he could call attention in a self-boastful way to the fact that "i am killing off more yankees than twenty regiments in lee's army," and that he could respond to the suggestions of the horror-struck visiting inspector that the prisoners be given at least more room, with the assertion that he intended to leave matters just as they were--the operations of death would soon thin out the crowd so that the survivors would have sufficient room. it was winder who issued this order to the commander of the artillery: order no. 13. headquarters military prison, andersonville, ga., july 27, 1864. the officers on duty and in charge of the battery of florida artillery at the time will, upon receiving notice that the enemy has approached within seven miles of this post, open upon the stockade with grapeshot, without reference to the situation beyond these lines of defense. john h. winder, brigadier general commanding. diabolical is the only word that will come at all near fitly characterizing such an infamous order. what must have been the nature of a man who would calmly order twenty-five guns to be opened with grape and canister at two hundred yards range, upon a mass of thirty thousand prisoners, mostly sick and dying! all this, rather than suffer them to be rescued by their friends. can there be any terms of reprobation sufficiently strong to properly denounce so malignant a monster? history has no parallel to him, save among the blood-reveling kings of dahomey, or those sanguinary asiatic chieftains who built pyramids of human skulls, and paved roads with men's bones. how a man bred an american came to display such a timour-like thirst for human life, such an oriental contempt for the sufferings of others, is one of the mysteries that perplexes me the more i study it. if the rebel leaders who appointed this man, to whom he reported direct, without intervention of superior officers, and who were fully informed of all his acts through other sources than himself, were not responsible for him, who in heaven's name was? how can there be a possibility that they were not cognizant and approving of his acts? the rebels have attempted but one defense to the terrible charges against them, and that is, that our government persistently refused to exchange, preferring to let its men rot in prison, to yielding up the rebels it held. this is so utterly false as to be absurd. our government made overture after overture for exchange to the rebels, and offered to yield many of the points of difference. but it could not, with the least consideration for its own honor, yield up the negro soldiers and their officers to the unrestrained brutality of the rebel authorities, nor could it, consistent with military prudence, parole the one hundred thousand well-fed, well-clothed, able-bodied rebels held by it as prisoners, and let them appear inside of a week in front of grant or sherman. until it would agree to do this the rebels would not agree to exchange, and the only motive--save revenge--which could have inspired the rebel maltreatment of the prisoners, was the expectation of raising such a clamor in the north as would force the government to consent to a disadvantageous exchange, and to give back to the confederacy, at its most critical period one hundred thousand fresh, able-bodied soldiers. it was for this purpose, probably, that our government and the sanitary commission were refused all permission to send us food and clothing. for my part, and i know i echo the feelings of ninety-nine out of every hundred of my comrades, i would rather have staid in prison till i rotted, than that our government should have yielded to the degrading demands of insolent rebels. there is one document in the possession of the government which seems to me to be unanswerable proof, both of the settled policy of the richmond government towards the union prisoners, and of the relative merits of northern and southern treatment of captives. the document is a letter reading as follows: city point, va., march 17, 1863. sir:--a flag-of-truce boat has arrived with three hundred and fifty political prisoners, general barrow and several other prominent men among them. i wish you to send me on four o'clock wednesday morning, all the military prisoners (except officers), and all the political prisoners you have. if any of the political prisoners have on hand proof enough to convict them of being spies, or of having committed other offenses which should subject them to punishment, so state opposite their names. also, state whether you think, under all the circumstances, they should be released. the arrangement i have made works largely in our favor. we get rid of a set of miserable wretches, and receive some of the best material i ever saw. tell captain turner to put down on the list of political prisoners the names of edward p. eggling, and eugenia hammermister. the president is anxious that they should get off. they are here now. this, of course, is between ourselves. if you have any political prisoners whom you can send off safely to keep her company, i would like you to send her. two hundred and odd more political prisoners are on their way. i would be more full in my communication if i had time. yours truly, robert ould, commissioner of exchange. to brigadier general john h. winder. but, supposing that our government, for good military reasons, or for no reason at all, declined to exchange prisoners, what possible excuse is that for slaughtering them by exquisite tortures? every government has ap unquestioned right to decline exchanging when its military policy suggests such a course; and such declination conveys no right whatever to the enemy to slay those prisoners, either outright with the edge of the sword, or more slowly by inhuman treatment. the rebels' attempts to justify their conduct, by the claim that our government refused to accede to their wishes in a certain respect, is too preposterous to be made or listened to by intelligent men. the whole affair is simply inexcusable, and stands out a foul blot on the memory of every rebel in high place in the confederate government. "vengeance is mine," saith the lord, and by him must this great crime be avenged, if it ever is avenged. it certainly transcends all human power. i have seen little indication of any divine interposition to mete out, at least on this earth, adequate punishment to those who were the principal agents in that iniquity. howell cobb died as peacefully in his bed as any christian in the land, and with as few apparent twinges of remorse as if he had spent his life in good deeds and prayer. the arch-fiend winder died in equal tranquility, murmuring some cheerful hope as to his soul's future. not one of the ghosts of his hunger-slain hovered around to embitter his dying moments, as he had theirs. jefferson davis "still lives, a prosperous gentleman," the idol of a large circle of adherents, the recipient of real estate favors from elderly females of morbid sympathies, and a man whose mouth is full of plaints of his wrongs, and misappreciation. the rest of the leading conspirators have either departed this life in the odor of sanctity, surrounded by sorrowing friends, or are gliding serenely down the mellow autumnal vale of a benign old age. only wirz--small, insignificant, miserable wirz, the underling, the tool, the servile, brainless, little fetcher-and-carrier of these men, was punished--was hanged, and upon the narrow shoulders of this pitiful scapegoat was packed the entire sin of jefferson davis and his crew. what a farce! a petty little captain made to expiate the crimes of generals, cabinet officers, and a president. how absurd! but i do not ask for vengeance. i do not ask for retribution for one of those thousands of dead comrades, the glitter of whose sightless eyes will follow me through life. i do not desire even justice on the still living authors and accomplices in the deep damnation of their taking off. i simply ask that the great sacrifices of my dead comrades shall not be suffered to pass unregarded to irrevocable oblivion; that the example of their heroic self-abnegation shall not be lost, but the lesson it teaches be preserved and inculcated into the minds of their fellow-countrymen, that future generations may profit by it, and others be as ready to die for right and honor and good government as they were. and it seems to me that if we are to appreciate their virtues, we must loathe and hold up to opprobrium those evil men whose malignity made all their sacrifices necessary. i cannot understand what good self-sacrifice and heroic example are to serve in this world, if they are to be followed by such a maudlin confusion of ideas as now threatens to obliterate all distinction between the men who fought and died for the right and those who resisted them for the wrong. [illustration] recollections of a confederate staff officer [illustration: very truly yrs gill sorrell] recollections of a confederate staff officer by gen. g. moxley sorrel _lieutenant-colonel and chief of staff, longstreet's 1st army corps_; _brigadier-general commanding sorrel's brigade, a. p. hill's 3rd army corps, army of northern virginia_ second edition [illustration] with introduction by senator john w. daniel the neale publishing company 440 fourth avenue york 1917 copyright, 1905, by the neale publishing company _to my wife_ _this volume is affectionately_ _dedicated_ _in illness and tedious convalescence it was she who suggested these reminiscences of the past, as a solace, giving me cheerful encouragement and material assistance in their preparation, for which my grateful thanks are ever hers._ contents page introduction 13 chapter i battle of manassas, july 21, 1861 23 ii after manassas at centerville 35 iii reminiscences and horses 45 iv sketches 53 v our national hymn 61 vi the peninsula and battle of williamsburg, may 5, 1862 65 vii battle of seven pines, may 31, 1862 71 viii battles of the chickahominy, june 26 to july 2, 1862 76 ix rivalry and more reminiscences 87 x second battle of manassas, august 29 and 30, 1862 94 xi battles of south mountain (boonsboro gap) and sharpsburg (antietam), september 14 and 17, 1862 103 xii battle of sharpsburg, continued 110 xiii battle of sharpsburg, concluded 115 xiv our personnel--visitors 120 xv the staff 124 xvi events preceding fredericksburg 129 xvii battle of fredericksburg, december 13, 1862 136 xviii after fredericksburg--reminiscences 143 xix to south virginia for supplies 150 xx preparing for gettysburg 156 xxi battle of gettysburg, july 1, 2, 3, 1863 163 xxii gettysburg aftermath 173 xxiii in virginia again 179 xxiv longstreet to reinforce bragg 184 xxv battle of chickamauga, september 20, 1863 188 xxvi chattanooga--incidents 195 xxvii the east tennessee campaign, november, 1863, to april, 1864 204 xxviii the east tennessee campaign, continued 212 xxix at home in savannah--sketches 220 xxx battle of the wilderness, may 6, 1864 228 xxxi coincidences--longstreet's successor 240 xxxii battle of spottsylvania c. h., may 10 and 12, and cold harbor, june 3, 1864 244 xxxiii the siege of petersburg june, 1864, to march, 1865 254 xxxiv longstreet's return--farewell to lee 265 appendix 283 recollections of a confederate staff officer introduction by john w. daniel _formerly major and assistant adjutant-general early's division, second corps, a. n. v._ a few months ago i entered a room where a group of five or six gentlemen were seated around a table in conversation. as i took my seat to join them, one of the number, a distinguished northern senator, of high cultivation and who is a great reader of history, made this remark to his companions: "the army of northern virginia was in my opinion the strongest body of men of equal numbers that ever stood together upon the earth." as an ex-confederate soldier i could not feel otherwise than pleased to hear such an observation from a gentleman of the north who was a student of military history. as the conversation continued there seemed to be a general concurrence in the opinion he stated, and i doubt if any man of intelligence who would give sedate consideration to the subject, would express a different sentiment. the army of the potomac, the valiant and powerful antagonist of the army of northern virginia, was indeed of much larger numbers, and better equipped and fed; but it would have nevertheless failed but for its high quality of soldiership which are by none more respected than by its former foes. both armies were worthy of any steel that was ever forged for the business of war, and when general grant in his "memoirs" describes the meeting after the surrender of the officers of both sides around the mclean house, he says that they seemed to "enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag." he prophesied in his last illness that "we are on the eve of a new era when there is to be great harmony between the federal and confederate." that era came to meridian when the federal government magnanimously returned to the states of the south the captured battle-flags of their regiments. the story of the war will be told no longer at soldiers' camp-fires with the feelings of bygone years, or with even stifled reproach, but solely with a design to cultivate friendship and to unfold the truth as to one of the most stupendous conflicts of arms that ever evoked the heroism of the human race. "recollections of a confederate staff officer," by brigadier-general g. moxley sorrel, of the army of northern virginia, is a valuable contribution to this great history. its author received his "baptism of fire" in the first battle of manassas, july 21, 1861, while serving on the staff of brigadier-general james longstreet as a volunteer aid, with the complimentary rank of captain. the forces under general beauregard at bull run were known at that time as "the army of the potomac." the name of the antagonist of the federal "army of the potomac" was soon changed to the "army of northern virginia"; and longstreet, the senior brigadier, became major-general and then lieutenant-general. sorrel followed the fortunes of his chief, serving as adjutant-general of his brigade, division, and corps, with rank successively as captain, major, and lieutenant-colonel, and distinguished himself many times by his gallantry and efficiency. during the siege of petersburg the tardy promotion which he had long deserved and for which he had been time and again recommended, came to him and he succeeded brigadier-general girardey, a gallant soldier, who had been killed in battle, as commander of a brigade in mahone's division, a. p. hill's third corps. when promoted he showed the right spirit by making a faithful and brave courier his aide-de-camp. as a general, as well as while on the staff, sorrel often had his "place near the flashing of the guns." at sharpsburg he leaped from his horse, with fairfax, goree, manning, and walton, of longstreet's staff, to serve as cannoneers at the guns of the washington artillery, whose soldiers had been struck down. while he was carrying a message to a brigade commander his horse was shot under him, and still later on the same field a fragment of a shell struck him senseless and he was for a while disabled. he passed through the maelstrom of gettysburg, here and there upon that field of blood; the hind legs of his horse were swept away by a cannon ball, and at the same time he and latrobe, of longstreet's staff, were carrying in their arms saddles taken from horses slain under them. at the wilderness, may 6, 1864, he was at the side of his chief when that officer was badly wounded, and when general jenkins, of south carolina, and captain dobie of the staff were killed. he won his general's wreath that day, although it was some time before it reached him. at the crisis when longstreet's corps was going to the rescue he was entrusted with marshalling three brigades to flank the advancing forces of general hancock. moving forward with the line of the twelfth virginia infantry, of mahone's brigade, he endeavored to take its colors as it advanced to the onset, but ben may, the stout-hearted standard-bearer, refused him that honor and himself carried them to victory. when this battle was over general lee saluted him as "general sorrel." he was wounded in the leg while commanding his brigade on the right of the confederate line near petersburg; and again he was shot in the lungs at hatcher's run in january, 1865, the same action in which fell the brave general john pegram, then commanding early's old division. during the illness resulting from this wound, general sorrel was cared for by relatives in roanoke county, virginia, and having recovered sufficiently returned to the field. he was in lynchburg, virginia, on his way back to his command when the surrender at appomattox ended the career of the army of northern virginia. scarcely any figure in that army was more familiar to its soldiers than that of general sorrel, and certainly none more so to the soldiers of the first corps. tall, slender, and graceful, with a keen dark eye, a trim military figure, and an engaging countenance, he was a dashing and fearless rider, and he attracted attention in march and battle by his constant devotion to his duties as adjutant-general, and became as well known as any of the commanders. general sorrel has not attempted a military history. he has simply related the things he saw and of which he was a part. he says of his writings, "that they are rough jottings from memory without access to any data or books of reference and with little attempt at sequence." what his book will therefore lack in the precision and detail as to military strategy or movement, will be compensated for by the naturalness and freshness which are found in the free, picturesque, and salient character of his work. general sorrel was of french descent on his father's side. his grandfather, antoine sorrel des riviere, had been a colonel of engineers in the french army, and afterwards held estates in san domingo, from which he was driven by the insurrection of the negroes in the early part of the nineteenth century. he then moved to louisiana. his father, francis sorrel, became a successful business man in savannah, georgia, and his mother was a lady of virginia. if he inherited from one those distinctively american qualities which were so attractive in his character, we can but fancy that he inherited in some degree at least from his sire the delicate touch with the pen which is so characteristic of the french. they have written more entertaining memoirs than any other people, and this memoir of general sorrel is full of sketches, incidents, anecdotes, and of vivid portraitures and scenes which remind the reader no little of the military literature of the french. no military writer has yet undertaken to produce a complete history of either the army of the potomac or the army of northern virginia. indeed, it has scarce been practicable to write such a history. the rolls of the two armies have not yet been published, and while the war records have furnished a great body of most valuable matter and there are many volumes of biography and autobiography which shed light on campaigns and battles, the deposit of historical material will not be finished before the whole generation who fought the war has passed from earth. this volume will be useful to the historian in giving him an insight to the very image and body of the times. it will carry him to the general's headquarters and from there to the picket-line; from the kitchen camp-fire and baking-oven to the hospital and ordnance wagon; from the devices of the commissary and quarter-master to the trenches in the battlefield; from the long march to the marshalled battle line; from the anxieties of the rear-guard of the retreat to the stern array of the charging columns. he will find some graphic accounts of leading characters, such as longstreet, ewell, d. h. hill, a. p. hill, jeb stuart, early, anderson, mahone, van dorn, polk, bragg, and many others who shone in the lists of the great tourney. the private soldier is justly recognized, and appears in his true light all along the line, of which he was the enduring figure. lee, great and incomparable, shines as he always does, in the endearing majesty of his matchless character and genius. general sorrel's book is written in the temper and spirit which we might expect of the accomplished and gallant soldier that he was. it is without rancor, as he himself declares, and it is without disposition unduly to exalt one personage or belittle another. it bespeaks the catholic mind of an honest man. it tells things as he saw them, and he was one who did his deed from the highest and purest motives. the staff of the army of northern virginia (of which g. m. sorrel, assistant adjutant-general, was a bright, particular star) was for the most part an improvised affair, as for the most part was the whole confederate army, and indeed the federal army was almost as much so. it showed, as did the line of civilians turned quickly into soldiers, the aptitude of our american people for military service and accomplishment. even the younger officers of military training were needed in armies of raw and inexperienced recruits for many commands. the staff had to be made up for the most part of alert young men, some of them yet in their teens, and it is remarkable that they were so readily found and so well performed their duties. at twenty-two years of age sorrel was a clerk in a savannah bank, and a private in a volunteer company of savannah. he slipped away from his business to see the bombardment of fort sumter in april, 1861, and a little later we then find him at his father's country estate some ten miles from manassas junction, looking forward to a second lieutenancy as the fulfilment of his then ambition. an introduction from col. thomas jordan, the adjutant-general of beauregard, to general longstreet fixed his career with that officer, and he was by his side transacting his business and carrying his orders from the start to well-nigh the finish. on the peninsula, and in the trenches at yorktown, at williamsburg and seven pines, in the seven days battle around richmond, at second manassas and sharpsburg, at suffolk in southeast virginia, at gettysburg, chickamauga, at knoxville, at the wilderness, and in many combats along the richmond and petersburg lines, general sorrel shared in many adventures and was a part of many matters of great pith and moment. like sandy pendleton, the adjutant of jackson, of ewell, and of early as commanders of the second corps of the army of northern virginia, and like w. h. palmer, of richmond, the adjutant of a. p. hill, he had no special preparation for his military career; and all three of these valuable officers, like many others who might be mentioned, are simply illustrations of the fine inherent qualities that pertain to the scions of a free people. i have not written this introduction in the hope that i could add anything to the attractiveness of general sorrel's recollections, nor have i undertaken to edit them or to pass upon the opinions which he expressed concerning men or things or battles. my part is simply that of a friend who belonged also to the staff of the army of northern virginia, and of one who, from opportunities to observe general sorrel on many occasions and to know him personally, learned to honor and admire him. i deem it fitting, however, to say that in some respects i differ from general sorrel's opinions and would vary some of his observations respecting ewell, stuart, early, and a few other conspicuous leaders. "fortunate indeed is the man who like general sorrel is entitled to remind those around his death-bed that he did his best to do his duty and to serve his country with heart and soul. the records of his life tell us how well, how faithfully he did serve her, and if anything can console you and others for his loss it must be that fact." these are the words of field marshal wolseley, written to mrs. sorrel, the widow of the general upon his death at "the barrens" near roanoke, va., the home of his brother, dr. francis sorrel. they are worthy of repetition in connection with general sorrel's name by reason of their just estimate of his worth as a patriot and a soldier, and of the high spirit which they breathe; and that they are uttered by a soldier and a man of such character and ability as field marshal wolseley impresses all the more their inherent merit. they better introduce the volume of general sorrel's composition than anything i can say, for they reveal in short compass the nature of the man, the principle that actuated his life, and the estimate formed of him by an eminent soldier who had no partial relation to him or his deeds. john w. daniel. washington, d. c., may 1, 1905. recollections of a confederate staff officer chapter i battle of manassas, july 21, 1861 forbears and home at savannah--fort sumter attacked--hostilities begin--leave for virginia--visit to my father--beauregard's camp at manassas--colonel jordan--introduced to general longstreet--sketch--general stuart--general johnston--the battle--enemy defeated--pursuit stopped--march to centerville--stonewall jackson--prince napoleon--the review--colonel skinner--his exploits. my forbears were french on my father's side. his father, antoine sorrel des riviere, colonel du genie (engineer corps) in the french army, was on his estates in the island of san domingo when the bloody insurrection of the blacks broke out at the opening of the century. he had the tragic horror of witnessing the massacre of many relatives and friends. his property was destroyed, and his life barely saved by concealment and flight to cuba, thence to louisiana, where a refuge was found among friendly kindred. there he died at a great age. his son francis, my father, was saved from the rage of bloodthirsty blacks by the faithful devotion of the household slaves, and some years later succeeded in reaching maryland, where he was educated. he married in virginia, engaging in business in the early part of the century at savannah, georgia. my maternal great-grandfather, alvin moxley, was from westmoreland county, virginia. he was one of the signers of what is known as the richard henry lee bill of rights, 1765, the first recorded protest in america against taxation without representation, and which twelve years later led directly to the revolutionary war. the original document is now preserved and framed in the virginia historical society at richmond. death bereft my father of his wife in time's flight. an eminent merchant, successful and prominent, we find him in the civil war in health and ease, happy in the love of many children and the esteem of hosts of friends. as a child he had seen some horrors of the insurrection, but never could he be persuaded to speak of them, so deep and painful were even their distant memories. at the culmination of the political troubles in 1861 i was a young chap just twenty-two, at home in my native city, savannah, peacefully employed with the juniors of the banking force of the central railroad. when sumter was bombarded at charleston in april, i slipped away for a day or two and witnessed the scenes of wild excitement that attended its fall. it spread everywhere, and like all the youth of the country i was quickly drawn in. for a year or two before, like many of my associates in savannah, i was a member, a private, of the georgia hussars, a fine volunteer cavalry company, with a creditable history of almost a century. on the secession of georgia, now soon following, fort pulaski was seized and the various military commands did their tour of duty there, the hussars among them. this was my first service. the company also immediately offered itself to the confederate government just organized at montgomery, alabama, and was eager to get into the field; but delay ensued, although it was mustered in for thirty days' service on the coast of skidaway island, near savannah. there i served again as private until mustered out. a confederate army was being collected in virginia under beauregard, the capital having been settled in richmond. becoming impatient of inaction at savannah, our company apparently not being wanted, i decided to go to virginia and seek employment there. richmond looked like a camp when i arrived, in july. it was full of officers in their smart uniforms, all busy with their duties, and the greatest efforts were made for equipping and arming the men now pouring in from the south. they were posted first in camps of instruction, where, by means of younger officers, they attained some drill before being sent to the army. how happy should i be could i get a commission as second lieutenant and plunge into work with the men. my brother, dr. francis sorrel, had just arrived from california and was gazetted to a high position in the surgeon-general's department. he aided me all possible, but i got nothing, and so about july 15, my cash running down, betook myself to my father's pretty country place at greenwich, about ten miles north of warrenton, fauquier county. it was also about ten miles from manassas junction, the headquarters of general beauregard, now in command of the army that was to fight mcdowell and defend richmond. my father said it was unfortunate i had not come a day or two earlier, because he had driven his daughters across the country for a visit to the camps, where they met many friends. among these was col. thomas jordon, the all-powerful adjutant-general of beauregard's army, then termed the army of the potomac. many years before, jordon, when a lieutenant, had been stationed in savannah, and enjoyed my father's generous hospitality. this was my opportunity. i asked for just a few lines of introduction to jordon, and a horse out of the stables. i knew them well and could get a good mount for the field. my dear father willingly acceded, and parted from me cheerfully but with moist eyes. on the way to the camp i came up with meredith, a relation (not long ago united states congressman from virginia), and soon i found colonel jordon. he had been doing an enormous amount of work and was almost exhausted. jordon was considered a brilliant staff officer, and justly so; but there appeared something lacking in his make-up as a whole that disappointed his friends. at all events, his subsequent military career failed and he sank out of prominent notice. he was kind to me, read my note, said nothing could be done then; but--"come again to-morrow." this turned me loose in the camp. the soldiers from the valley under j. e. johnston and j. e. b. stuart began to make an appearance in small numbers, principally cavalry. we slept that night at meredith's, about three miles from camp. jordon, the next day, was still unable to do anything for me, and i began to be doubtful of success, but could at least go as a private with a good horse under me. again at meredith's and awakened very early by cannon, we were up in a moment and galloping to beauregard's. there i was made happy on the 21st day of july. the adjutant-general handed me three lines of introduction to longstreet, commanding a brigade at blackburn's ford several miles distant. with a good-by to meredith i was swiftly off. approaching the ford, shot and shell were flying close overhead; and feeling a bit nervous, my first time under fire, i began to inquire what folly had brought me into such disturbing scenes. the feeling passed, however, and longstreet, who had called on beauregard for staff officers, received me cordially. his acting adjutant-general, lieutenant frank armistead, a west point graduate and of some service in the united states army, was ordered to announce me to the brigade as captain and volunteer aide-de-camp. brig.-gen. james longstreet was then a most striking figure, about forty years of age, a soldier every inch, and very handsome, tall and well proportioned, strong and active, a superb horseman and with an unsurpassed soldierly bearing, his features and expression fairly matched; eyes, glint steel blue, deep and piercing; a full brown beard, head well shaped and poised. the worst feature was the mouth, rather coarse; it was partly hidden, however, by his ample beard. his career had not been without mark. graduating from west point in 1842, he was assigned to the fourth infantry, the regiment which grant joined one year later. the mexican war coming on, longstreet had opportunity of service and distinction which he did not fail to make the most of; wounds awaited him, and brevets to console such hurts. after peace with mexico he was in the indian troubles, had a long tour of duty in texas, and eventually received the appointment of major and paymaster. it was from that rank and duty that he went at the call of his state to arm and battle for the confederacy. history will tell how well he did it. he brought to our army a high reputation as an energetic, capable, and experienced soldier. at west point he was fast friends with grant, and was his best man at the latter's marriage. grant, true as steel to his friends, never in all his subsequent marvelous career failed longstreet when there was need. such was the brigadier-general commanding four regiments of virginia infantry, the first, eleventh, seventeenth, and twenty-fourth, and a section of the washington artillery of new orleans. the eighteenth virginia infantry was afterwards added. three days previously, longstreet, just joined his command, had opportunity of showing his mettle. his position at the ford was fiercely assailed by the federals, and his coolness, good disposition, and contagious courage brought about their defeat, and was the beginning of that devotion which his men gave him up to appomattox. his staff officers at the time were lieutenant armistead, lieutenant manning of mississippi, ordnance officer; captain walton of mississippi, aid; captain goree of texas, aid; and some quartermasters and commissaries detailed from the regiments. the army had scarcely made an attempt yet at good organization. at manassas junction, while waiting on jordon, i first saw gen. joseph e. johnston and j. e. b. stuart. the first was full bearded, dusty, and worn from long marching; a high-bred, stern-looking soldier of faultless seat and bearing in the saddle. i had the good fortune to know him well and most happily in the coming years. once long after the close of the war i was chatting with him in his best humor. we were speaking of his varied military life and the several wounds he had received in mexico, with indians, and in the recent confederate war. he had many, and as he sat in face of me the general's splendid, dome-like head was something to admire. quite bald, it was scarred in several places, and looking at the mark of an ugly gash i inquired, "and, general, where did you get that one?" the smile that irradiated that strong, expressive face was brilliant and contagious as he answered, "i got _that_, sir, out of a cherry tree!" and then followed a laughing account of what a fall he had, and how he had been chased by the farmer. stuart, red bearded, ruddy faced, alert and ever active, was dirtier even than johnston; but there stood the tireless cavalryman, the future right arm of the great lee, the eyes and ears to his army. alas! that his pure soldier's life, crowned with such splendid fame, should have ended so needlessly, late in the war, by a stray shot. i should say here there is to be no attempt at describing battles--the military works are full of them. i shall content myself with bare outlines, and some observations of men and things, adding such incidents and personal happenings as may, i hope, prove of interest. longstreet's brigade had practically no part in the battle of manassas. it sustained some desultory artillery fire, and there was a demonstration against it, but it amounted to nothing. blackburn's ford was on the right, where the attack was expected, but mcdowell found his way to beauregard's left and nearly smashed him until johnston and jackson "ventre a terre" and turned the doubtful tide of battle into a ruinous rout of the enemy. it was late in the afternoon, but we soon heard of it at our ford, and longstreet, waiting for no man, was immediately in pursuit. he was halted first by bonham, who ranked him, to permit his brigade to take the lead. then resuming the march hot-footed, after the flying foe, we were again stopped, this time by major whiting, of johnston's staff, with orders from beauregard to attempt no pursuit. painful was this order. we knew the federals were in full flight, and we had only to show ourselves to bag the whole outfit. we dismounted among some young pines to await further orders, and i saw longstreet in a fine rage. he dashed his hat furiously on the ground, stamped, and bitter words escaped him. however, the night was on us, some food was picked up by hook or crook, and we slept well under the stars. the soundness of the order stopping pursuit has been viewed in many different ways, and i shall not add my own opinion, except to suggest that while in the condition of our army it was practically impossible to seize washington, it was yet the proper thing to keep on the heels of those frightened soldiers until they reached the potomac. many thousand prisoners, and much loot and stores, ammunition, guns, colors, and other material would have fallen into our hands. next day the field and highways showed the terrible battle that had raged, and the ground was covered with the debris of the panic-stricken army. our brigade moved leisurely on, and halted for some time at centerville. the army was concentrated in the neighborhood, and about fairfax court house and fairfax station, our headquarters being for some time at the former place. about this time longstreet was joined by two noted scouts and rangers whom he had known in texas--the celebrated frank terry and tom lubbock, powerful men, both of them, in the prime of life. scouting and fighting had been their part from boyhood. they were of much use to longstreet. from fairfax court house and vicinity we sent regular details, called the advanced forces, to occupy mason's and munson's hills, only a few miles from washington. at night the dome of the capitol could be seen from those positions, lighted up with great splendor. there was sharp sniping in front of the hills, and terry and lubbock generally bagged their man apiece, each day, besides bringing in valuable information. both men soon returned to texas and organized a regiment of cavalry in the confederate service under terry. it was said to be the finest body of horsemen and fighters imaginable, and subsequently did great service in the west. terry fell among them at their head. it was while we lay in the neighborhood that i saw prince jerome napoleon, "plon plon." it seems he was making a short visit of curiosity (he was no friend of the south), and was at beauregard's headquarters some distance off. the general sent notice to longstreet that he was coming with his staff and guest to call on him, and suggested that he try to get up something in the way of a small review of our best-clad soldiers. longstreet started me off at once to borrow a regiment from stonewall jackson and one from d. r. jones (south carolina), both commands being near by. the first virginia infantry, the richmond regiment, was the contingent from our own brigade. i soon found myself saluting general t. j. jackson, the first time i had seen the soldier. he was seated in a low, comfortable chair in front of his quarters, quite shabbily dressed, but neat and clean--little military ornament about him. it was the eye full of fire and the firm, set face that drew attention. his hand was held upright; a ball at the recent battle had cut off a piece of his finger, and that position eased it. he was all courtesy to the young subaltern awaiting his answer. "say to general longstreet, with my compliments, that he shall have my best-looking regiment, and that immediately. the colonel will report at the point you may designate." this done, jones gave up his best, some good-looking carolinians, with palmetto badges, and then spurring back to meet beauregard and party to guide them to the reviewing ground, he presented me to his highness the prince, who, well mounted, was riding by his side. i could not keep my eyes off the frenchman's face. it was almost a replica of the great napoleon, his uncle, but unpleasantly so; skin pasty and flabby, bags under the eyes, and beefy all over. a large man, tall, but without dignity of movement or attitude. the review was soon over. the three picked regiments, with a good band, looked well, although the richmond boys were a bit out at the seat; but, as old skinner, the colonel, said to the frenchman as they marched by, "the enemy won't see that part of them." the spot was on a nice piece of turf near an old wooden church, and we had gathered a few refreshments for the occasion, but the prince would have nothing. coldly and impassively he raised his hat in parting salute, entered the carriage that was awaiting him, and, escorted by a lieutenant of cavalry and a half dozen men under a flag of truce, we willingly sent him back to his friends, the enemy. on returning to france he published what ill he could find to say of us. "plon plon's" abuse was not to hurt or disturb honest men with brave hearts. a word about old skinner, colonel of the first virginia. he was an old maryland fox hunter, handsome and distinguished looking, and had lived long in france, almost domiciled there. he was connected with many of the best people of maryland and virginia, and had hosts of friends. fond of good liquor, it was almost every night that he was a bit full, and then there were wild scenes with his well-known hunter, who could do anything or go anywhere with the colonel on him. skinner was a fine swordsman, and had brought from france a long, straight, well-balanced double-edged cuirassier's saber. in his cups the fine old colonel would swear he should die happy could he have one chance to use that steel on the enemy. the chance came and skinner was ready for it. at the second battle of manassas a battery of six guns was mauling some of our infantry horribly. his regiment, the gallant first virginia, was thrown at it, "old fred," as the men affectionately called him, leading well in advance. out flashed the french saber, and he was among the gunners in a trice. his execution was wonderful; sabering right and left he seemed invulnerable, but down he came at last, just as his men swept over the guns in a fine charge. it was the end of the colonel's soldiering, but although frightfully wounded in the chest and body he survived for many years. so lively was the old beau sabreur, that only a few years ago he came to new york to fight john wise because of some fancied slight to a member of his family--wise, too, his lifelong friend! as there could be no fighting, wise had to do some nice diplomatic work to soothe the irate colonel and smooth over the affair. chapter ii after manassas at centerville commissioned as captain and acting adjutant-general--pay of officers--assigned to longstreet's brigade--the oglethorpe infantry, of savannah--enemy preparing for winter quarters--beauregard takes command in west--confederate flag--presentation of battle-flags--starting a theatre--georgia hussars--a sleigh ride. something must now be said as to what happened to me several weeks after the manassas battle. it will be remembered i was a volunteer aid with the rank by courtesy, but no pay. when i saw my messmates taking theirs in very comfortably, it occurred to me i should make another effort for a commission, so i wrote my application to the secretary of war asking to be appointed a second lieutenant, c. s. a., and assigned as might be thought proper. blushing like a girl, i asked general longstreet if he could endorse it favorably. glancing hastily at the paper, he said, "certainly," and then added carelessly, "but it isn't necessary." the words made no impression at the time, but they came to mind later. after the battle we had not been idle; at least i was set to work. there was no commissary to the brigade, and for a week or two i did the duty after a fashion until an officer of that department was assigned--major chichester. his papers, correspondence, and duties seemed to fall on me, naturally, by his consent, and the brigadier-general soon began to look to me for assistance. this had been going on for some time until the official mail one fine morning brought me a commission as captain in the adjutant-general's department, with orders to report to longstreet. then his words leaped to my memory. he had a right to nominate his own adjutant-general and had applied for me while i was fishing around for a second lieutenancy. i had no military training except some drill and tactics at school, but it seemed he thought i took to the work handily. he instructed me to relieve armistead and take over all the duties of the office. i rose with longstreet to be major and lieutenant-colonel in that department, and brigadier-general commanding in hill's corps, and my affection for him is unfailing. such efficiency on the field as i may have displayed came from association with him and the example of that undismayed warrior. he was like a rock in steadiness when sometimes in battle the world seemed flying to pieces. armistead left us, carrying our good wishes for his future. i think the pay of a captain (mounted) was $140 per month and forage for two horses; a major, $162 a month; a lieutenant-colonel, $187. all general officers got $301 per month. a soldier said the $1 was for what they did, the $300 just thrown in to please them. johnny reb must have his little joke. the first company to leave savannah for virginia was the oglethorpe infantry, a fine body of eager young men commanded by captain bartow. he was well known all through the state as an ardent confederate, a distinguished lawyer and orator. he took his young men to joe johnston in the valley, wildly enthusiastic; but bartow could not long remain their captain. his wide reputation quickly placed him colonel of the eighth georgia infantry, and with that historic regiment the company fought at manassas, and the entire war thereafter in longstreet's command. bartow was commissioned a brigadier and served as such at manassas. on july 31st many anxious eyes were fixed on it in savannah. then was its baptism of fire, and nobly did the young men stand it. many were the mourners at home for the killed and wounded of these devoted youth. their officers--west, cooper, butler--led them handsomely; their colonel was lost to them and to the country. bartow was shot down at the head of the eighth. "they have killed me, boys, but never give up the fight," was his last gasp, and his soul, with the gallant bee's, sought its upward flight. the company became famous. it left its dead and wounded on every battlefield from manassas to appomattox, wherever longstreet's corps was engaged. revived now and honored it is at its old home, one of the leading military organizations of georgia. never do the men forget the memories of that day of battle on its recurring anniversaries, or fail in pride of their glorious predecessors. as the winter approached, the enemy drew in their front and lined the fortifications and defenses on the potomac. mcclellan evidently determined not to attack and that the winter must pass idly on their part. the _gaudium certaminis_ was no part of him. on ours johnston drew in his scattered forces, concentrating about centerville, which he fortified, and there they were, the two armies making faces at each other, and the northern papers telling wonders about us, all believed by mcclellan, whose imagination always doubled, trebled, quadrupled the fighting strength of those desperate rebels. while at centerville the army underwent its first reorganization. beauregard was sent west to important duty and j. e. johnston assumed command of the eastern army, to be forever known and glorious as the army of northern virginia. it was then in four divisions, the second of the three brigades under major-general longstreet (second virginia and first south carolina brigade). first division, also of three brigades, under major-general holmes (down on lower potomac), and the district of the valley, under major-general t. j. jackson (stonewall), made up this army, besides artillery and cavalry; the latter under stuart. the first flag of the confederacy was the stars and bars, but it was found on the battlefield dangerously similar to the northern stars and stripes. the battle-flag under which we fought to the finish was then substituted, and it was while we were at centerville that the military function of presenting the new colors to the battalions was arranged. the day for our division went off admirably. it was brilliant weather, and all were in their best outfits, and on their best mounts. the troops looked well as the colonels successively received their colors to defend. arrangements had been made for a generous hospitality at our division headquarters. we were occupying a dismantled old wooden farm-house well situated in the shade of fine trees. there a sumptuous repast was spread, and the principal officers of the divisions became our guests after the flag ceremonies. these arrangements were made by major john w. fairfax, whom longstreet had had appointed a major and inspector on his staff. fairfax was a rich man, owning the beautiful broad estate of president monroe, oak hill, on the upper potomac, in loudoun county, near aldie, also a fine property on the lower potomac. major fairfax was then of middle age, tall, courtly and rather impressive. he had attached himself at once to longstreet, and took charge of his mess and small wants, presented him with a superb mount, and did the best he could with his new military duties. he lacked nothing in courage; was brave and would go anywhere. but fairfax had two distinctions--he was the most pious of churchmen and was a born bon vivant, knowing and liking good things. whiskey later was hard to get, yet he managed to have always a good supply on hand. he is now a hale and hearty man, wonderfully well preserved. it was fairfax, as i said, that provided the feast, drawing the richest materials from his beautiful broad pastures in loudoun. everything was plentiful in that stage of the war and much liquor and wine were consumed. johnston, g. w. smith, van dorn, beauregard, and others of high rank were present, and we had great merriment and singing. suddenly came a clash of steel in the crowded room. longstreet, with great quickness, had thrown a pair of swords out of the window. dr. cullen and captain walton, both of his staff (too much wine taken), had suddenly quarreled, and walton had given the doctor a blow in the face. longstreet's quick movement disposed of the matter for the time, but it could not so end. after the entertainment, and when done with some hard racing and leaping by the wilder young mounted officers, colonel ransome calhoun of south carolina called on major walton. it was to demand a meeting in expiation of the blow. walton referred calhoun to me, and our _pourparler_ opened most courteously. he was an admirable gentleman, and but for his good sense and forbearance there must have been an ugly meeting. my difficulties were increased by longstreet, who, suspecting something, ordered me to put a stop to the whole affair, adding that i was chief of the staff and would be held responsible were not a hostile meeting avoided. we managed to close the thing by explanations from cullen and regrets from walton. both men seemed well satisfied. colonel calhoun, of whom i then formed a high opinion, returned to duty at charleston, and there incurred the enmity of colonel rhett. after some time, and many efforts of friends to bring about a better feeling, they met with pistols, and calhoun was killed. a high-minded, honorable gentleman! walton was quite a friend of mine. walton was quite a friend of mine and fond of me. gifted with uncommon intellectual attainments, the favorite scholar of l. q. c. lamar at the university of mississippi, he was of the most uncertain, unexpected temper and exactions; he could be dangerous at times, and only the greatest firmness held him in check until the humor passed off and then he was all lovely. when the war ended he returned to mississippi, quarreled with a man, and killed him. moving to alabama he found himself in the thick of the yellow fever epidemic of 1878. dropping all personal interests he devoted himself wholly to the sick and dying, until himself struck down by death. his memory is sweet in that part of the state. one day, as the winter came on, longstreet sent for me. "the men will want amusement and entertainment the long winter days," he said. "we must get them up a theater and a good company. see to it at once and lose no time. issue such orders as may be necessary." that was all, and quite easy for the general. draw a theater and company, properties and all out of one's pocket like a ripe apple! but it could be done with the resources of a division of infantry at one's hand, and i set about it at once. the colonels each received a note asking help and details from the ranks of actors with some experience. they were sure to be found there. but more than all, i wanted a manager, and he soon came out of the first virginia infantry to take charge of the play. it was theodore hamilton, an actor of some experience. i have met him in several places acting since the peace, and he always comes to me as an old friend, although he was not to tread the boards at the "centerville theater." "now, captain," he said, "for scenery and properties. you have the building, i have the company; what about the rest?" it was easy; painters were found in the ranks for scenery, and many of the officers chipping in, we got together enough money to send hamilton to richmond to get the costumes and properties. i don't think he made the most of his time there, but he got something, and after many delays we began to think we should see some acting after all. but alas! just then, johnston, discovering mcclellan's movements to the peninsula, broke up his camp, his officers destroying needlessly an immense amount of valuable supplies, and off we marched merrily to face our old friend, the young napoleon. such was the beginning and the end of our first and only attempt at theatricals. it was while we were about centerville that a great change came over longstreet. he was rather gay in disposition with his chums, fond of a glass, and very skilful at poker. he, van dorn, and g. w. smith were accustomed to play almost every night with t. j. rhett, general johnston's adjutant-general, and we sometimes heard of rather wild scenes amid these old army chums--all from west point, all having served in mexico and against the indians. longstreet's wife and children were at richmond. he was devoted to them. suddenly scarlet fever broke out and three of the children died within one week. he was with them, and some weeks after resumed his command a changed man. he had become very serious and reserved and a consistent member of the episcopal church. his grief was very deep and he had all our sympathies; later years lightened the memory of his sorrow and he became rather more like his old cheerful self, but with no dissipation of any kind. before parting with centerville it should be said that my old troop, the georgia hussars, had at last got their services accepted and were brought to richmond under my friend, captain f. waring, and mustered in for the war. they were thrown into a regiment known as the jeff davis legion, commanded by colonel will t. martin, which was to prove itself a fine body of horse. while in quarters this winter there were several light falls of snow, a novelty to most of our southern fellows. not many of them were familiar with such descents from the clouds. there came, however, a storm anything but interesting. snow was lying deep and camps were almost hidden. my staff comrade, peyton manning, and myself decided it was the time for a sleigh ride of our own. no cutters were to be had, but we improvised one. securing a stout, well-made box of good size, a plank seat in it for two made it the body of the fabric. then the forests yielded a couple of slim saplings, which, bent at the ends over the fire, were not bad for runners. on these, braced and crossed, with shafts attached, our box, well elevated, was securely fastened, and there was our cutter. we settled that the team should be stylish and made it "tandem," in good extemporized harness. my charger was put in the shafts and manning's in the lead, both high-spirited animals. each horse was mounted by a small negro, postilion-fashion, good riders both, and supposed to add some safety as well as novelty to the equipage. manning undertook to handle the long reins from the bits, and we started, the observed of many curious, and amid the worst lot of evil prophecies of what would befall us that it was ever my fate to hear. the outfit took the road handsomely, cheered by the soldiers, our black postilions grinning with delight. all went well for a time and then the devil himself broke loose! the spirit of the horses rising, especially that fiery brute of manning's, they were off entirely beyond control. over the deep-snowed roads and fields, across ditches and broken fences the gallant pair in mad race took everything on a full run, their postilions now ashy hue with terror and clinging like burs to the bounding animals. the finish came quickly. there seemed to be a sudden great fall of stars from the midday skies and manning and i were hurled right and left into deep snow drifts, everything in pieces, horses and little niggers quite out of sight. digging ourselves out we took a good look at each other and some ugly words were said; but although scratched and bruised no bones were broken, and we slowly trod our way back to camp, wiser if not better men from our first and last sleigh ride in old virginia. the horses were brought back to quarters but never again were their black postilions seen in those parts. chapter iii reminiscences and horses visit to mr. francis sorrel's country-seat--interment of captain tillinghast, u. s. a.--sir william howard russell, _times_ correspondent--mcdowell and july 21st--seward and the french princes--army begins to march to peninsula. not long after the battle i set out on a visit to my father's country place, ireland, fifteen miles from our camp. hitching up two good mules to a light army ambulance, what we needed was put in, our intention being to bring back some delicacies for the messes. captain thompson, of mississippi, one of the aids, accompanied me. he was an extraordinary looking person. nature had been unkind. the son of jacob thompson, buchanan's secretary of the interior, he had much to hope for, but for his affliction. his teeth and jaws were firmly set and locked, and no surgical ingenuity had yet succeeded in opening them. liquids could be conveniently taken, but mechanical arrangements had to be made for solid food by the removal of some teeth. this young officer showing a great desire to go along with me, was taken, although i could not help picturing some surprise on the part of my father and young sisters. we were made very welcome, as fresh from the glorious battlefield, and the day was a happy one. the girls had made a captain's coat for me out of homespun cloth; but such a fit! big enough for two captains of my thickness, it hung at all angles and flapped furiously in high winds. but love had prompted its making and i would never suffer any ugly remarks about it. something better soon came. my brother, doctor sorrel, in richmond, was always mindful of his juniors in the field, and getting possession of a blockade bolt of fine gray cloth, he soon had enough snipped off to make me two good confederate suits, suitably laced and in regulation trim, besides a long gray cape, or cloak, well lined, which was to do me good service for years. at "ireland" they loaded our ambulance with good things and there were shouts of joy when we reached the camp with the delicacies. captain thompson was not subject to military duty and soon returned to his home. it should be said here that these jottings are without the aid of a scrap of notes or other memoranda. the memory alone is called on, and as the events go back forty years it is something of a test; but i hope i am rather strong on that point and do not fear falling into inventions or imaginations. there were some dry notes of dates and marches, but they cannot be found, and they would be of no use with these jottings, as no attempt at dates is made. it is a lasting regret to me that as a staff officer with opportunities of seeing and knowing much, i did not keep up a careful diary or journal throughout the war. it should be made one of the duties of the staff. this is odd. the day after the battle i came across the body of captain tillinghast at the federal field infirmary near the stone bridge. the year previous i had been much in baltimore at the maryland club and had there played billiards with tillinghast, then a captain of artillery, u. s. a., and an agreeable acquaintance; consequently there could be no mistake when i recognized his dead body. the federal surgeon also identifying him, i set about giving him decent burial, and managed it finally by the help of some men of bartow's savannah company who knew me. the ground was baked hard and we could not make the grave deep, but it was enough; and with my own hands i carved his name on the bark of a tree, under which the soldier found his last bivouac--"otis h. tillinghast." some time after, a blockade-runner, passing the lines took a letter from me to my cousin, robert fisher, in baltimore, a friend also of tillinghast. it was on other matters, but i let him know that tillinghast's body had been recognized on the field, had received decent burial, and the spot marked. i described the location and then the matter passed out of my mind. after peace came i was with fisher in baltimore and learned from him that my letter had been received and the information as to captain tillinghast considerately conveyed to his family. fisher was answered soon after with thanks, "but there was some mistake," captain tillinghast was buried by his old classmate samuel jones, a confederate brigadier-general, in a different part of the field and his body later removed to the family vault. astonishing! if they got a body from a spot not where i had laid him they got the wrong husband. sam jones quite likely saw tillinghast, but he had no hand in our burial of him. stranger things, however, have happened. * * * * * here are some trifles of talk remembered as coming from the famous war correspondent, sir william howard russell, whose letters from the crimea broke the aberdeen ministry and made him one of the leading men of the kingdom. he was not long ago knighted at great age for his service all over the world in that field of letters. i met him several years ago in new york, in the train of the notorious colonel north, the chilean nitrate king. russell had always some good stories on hand, and laughed at his chase from bull run battlefield, whither he had gone with the federal army to write up their victory pictures. it gave him the name of "bull run russell," which stuck to him. he admitted being very far to the rear, but said there were some generals and colonels who outstripped him to washington! some years after the war he met in europe general mcdowell, who said, "russell, do you know what day this is?" "no, i don't recall any special occurrence." "it is," said mcdowell, "the 21st of july, and had i succeeded on that day in '61 i should have been the greatest man in america and you the most popular." russell also had something about the french princes come to join mcclellan's army. the two young men, comte de paris and duc de chartres, were under the care and tutelage of their uncle, the prince de joinville, who did not follow them to the army. on landing they received their commissions as captains, and quickly equipped themselves with handsome regulation uniforms and military appointments. they proceeded to washington to make formal calls of ceremony before reporting to mcclellan. among their first visits was that to seward, the secretary of state. on that evening he was holding a large reception. seward himself leaving the ceremony to his son frederick, was upstairs with some cronies drinking whiskey. "seward was screwed, you know," said russell, "undoubtedly screwed." when the two princes entered the hall, trim in their new uniforms, erect and soldierly, they were met by frederick seward, who at once went to announce them. "tell them to come right up," said the old politician; "bring them right up and they shall have some good whiskey." "that will never do," said his son. "you must come down to them; it is etiquette and strictly in rule." and down the secretary went. "screwed" a little, for as soon as he spied the frenchmen, out he broke: "captain chatters, glad to see you; welcome to washington. and you too, captain paris. i am pleased to have you in my house. both of you come up with me. you won't dislike the whiskey you shall taste." but the watchful frederick came to the rescue and carried off the astonished princes with all propriety. russell declared this to be literally true; but if not, it at least as the italians say, "ben trovato." sir william was then a picturesque figure in dark blue dress coat, brass buttons, and ruffled shirt. always interesting, he had exhaustless stores of information and adventure. a pretty young italian wife accompanied him. something as to horses. i had left a good one in savannah, in care of a member of the troop. hearing that the horse was with him in virginia i sent over for my property and got for answer that he was not mine; that he belonged to the man in savannah, who not being able to enlist had contributed this fine animal to the outfit of the troop. a nice business indeed. it was easy to be patriotic with my horse, but it was soon settled. captain waring heard the statement, and recognizing the animal as mine had him sent to me; but the horse had been so neglected and diseased that he was no good and i was obliged to leave him by the roadside. i had, during the war, many horses, some good, some very poor. among the best was the tough-looking clay-bank i took from my father when joining the army. he was capable of anything in speed and endurance, but with a walk so slow and a trot so bone-breaking that i had to swap him for one not so good. many of my animals broke down from hard staff service in campaign, and a magnificent mare was killed under me in pickett's charge at gettysburg. a shell burst directly under her and the poor beast was instantly done for. i was not touched. in tennessee, in 1864, i picked up a delightful little white mare, sound, fleet and enduring. i could not always get to my other horses at the outbreak of firing, and the mare's color was against us both. it was always among the soldiers, "fire at the fellow on the white horse." she was at my brigade quarters at appomattox and my brother rode her to savannah. when the two appeared in front of our residence, my sisters rushed out, but could not believe that the poor, tired little mare was their brother's war horse. their imagination had been at work. my brother claxton, my junior, was a fine, well set up young fellow and eager for the fray. he was also a private in the hussars, and like myself had not waited for the company, but came on to richmond. here he fell in with some young georgians from athens, the troop artillery, a six-gun battery under command of captain carlton. claxton joined and became a good artillerist and was a corporal when transferred. the first georgia regulars was organized by the state among the first, its officers being appointed by the governor and the men enlisted anywhere. its drill and discipline were supposed to be severer than that of other troops. this regiment was brought to virginia and assigned to g. t. anderson's (tige anderson) georgia brigade. with some influence and much hard work, my brother, doctor sorrel, succeeded in getting a commission as second lieutenant in this regiment for claxton. its officers were not elected; they were appointed by the executive. claxton's service was thenceforward with this regiment, its officers showing some of the best names in georgia, and its reputation correspondingly high. later i gave captain sorrel a temporary detail on the staff of brigadier-general garnett, and still later he was appointed captain in the assistant adjutant-general's department and served with general john bratton. when we moved from centerville my father had long since returned to savannah with his family, and his "ireland" place was unoccupied (it was later burned by the union soldiers). but my cousin, mrs. lucy green, and children, were at their place, "the lawn," which would be in the enemy's territory after our withdrawal. our first halt was near gainesville and after getting the troops comfortably into camp i rode over to see her, about three miles. the situation was clearly described and he decided to pack her carriages and wagons and move to richmond. i gave her a safe escort in a man from lynchburg, mr. paxton, a member of blackford's cavalry company. with farewells i rode back through the night, the better by a pair of english boots my cousin gave me. she and the children, with servants, under good paxton's charge, made next morning a start for richmond, where they arrived safely. referring again to horses, the hussar horse had been my mount at the short service on skidaway. henry taylor was my messmate and rode next me on a good bay precisely the same color as mine, with considerable resemblance between them. taylor was rich, lazy, despised discipline, and was a trial to the captain. he gave his horse no attention and the beast would have starved but for others. the captain could stand it no longer. sending for taylor he read him a severe lecture and promised punishment if the horse was not kept clean and tended. taylor was persuaded he must do something, and the next morning he was up at stable-call at the picket ropes, brush and curry comb in hand. it was very early and misty. my horse was picketed next to taylor's and i had the satisfaction of seeing my lazy friend give him the best morning's rub he had received for many days. when taylor woke up to what he had done and that his own horse was still to be tended he could not immediately see the joke, but soon took it in good part and had something ready for me not long after, which he thought squared us. chapter iv sketches brigadier-generals elzey and early--leaping horses--confederate uniforms--ladies at fairfax station--colonel stuart's maryland line--longstreet made major-general--sketches of brigadier-generals ewell and pickett--general anderson--major-general van dorn--major-general g. w. smith--brigadier early--brigadier-general d. r. jones. one fine day not long after the manassas battle, and while we were at fairfax court house, longstreet called on me to ride over to the station on a visit. it was to general elzey, who was found with general early in a dilapidated old church. refreshments were ordered and a good deal of whiskey consumed by the three brigadiers, some colonels and staff officers. early had been a strong union man until virginia seceded, and he then took arms, devotedly and ever bravely, for his state and the confederacy. he was, however, of a snarling, rasping disposition, and seemed to irritate elzey, who, not a union man, had come south without the secession of his state, maryland. there were some hot words all around, but peace was made, however, and we all quit the drinks and adjourned to the horses and fine weather outside. leaping fences and ditches at once began, my mount doing well and coming some daring trials. longstreet was mounted on a fine bay not quite up to such work, with his weight, and the general turned him over to me. the bay did splendidly, surpassing all others present, and the generals were much pleased. colonel duncan mcrae, fifth north carolina, had just received from richmond a handsome new confederate uniform and outfit. alas! it soon came to grief. the colonel, in taking a high fence, lost his seat and came down very hard, splitting his fine coat in the back, from collar to waist. a word here as to uniforms and insignia. so fast does the memory of things pass that perhaps it may be well to make a note of what was the confederate uniform. it was designed and settled on by a board of officers of the war department. for all officers, a close-fitting double-breasted gray tunic. for generals, staff and all field officers, dark blue trousers. the arm of service was shown by collar and cuff--generals and staff officers, buff; cavalry, yellow; artillery, red; infantry, blue; medical department, black. dark blue trousers had broad gold stripes on outer seams, except generals, who wore two narrower and slightly apart. trousers for all line officers under rank of major were light blue with broad cloth stripe, color of service arm. rank was shown on collar and sleeve. generals wore on collar a gold wreath enclosing three stars in line, the middle one slightly larger. on their sleeves was the ornamental hungarian knot of four braids width. they usually wore their buttons in groups of twos or threes. there was no difference in the uniform or rank mark among the several grades of general officers. colonels wore three stars in line, same size; lieutenant-colonels, two, and majors, one. the knot on the sleeve was three braids width for the three grades of field officers--colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and major. for captains, rank was shown by three short bars lateral on front of collar; first lieutenant, two bars, and second lieutenant, one bar. captains wore on sleeve hungarian knot of two braids width, and first and second lieutenants, one braid. for headgear the french "kepi," color of arm of service, richly embroidered, was first provided; but the felt hat, black or any color that could be had, speedily pushed it aside almost before it had an existence. the intention of the board of officers was to adopt the tunic like the short, close-fitting, handsome austrian garment, but it went completely by default. the officers would none of it. they took to the familiar cut of frock coat with good length of tail. longstreet and two or three of us tried the tunic, but it was not popular. confederate uniforms were in great number at the flag presentations a little later, of which i have already spoken. we were then bravely dressed in the bright and handsome confederate gray. but now "place aux dames." a splendid maryland regiment of elzey's brigade was at fairfax station near by, and two lovely women, descendants of a distinguished virginia family, were then visiting their numerous friends serving with it. they were the beautiful carys, hetty and her cousin constance. the three generals, gallantly inclined, decided they must call on the ladies, and this they did, shutting out their staffs for the time. then evening coming on dress parade was in order and colonel george stewart soon had his fine marylanders in line. he insisted on the two ladies taking position by him, and when time for the manual came, handed his sword to hetty, and stepping aside prompted her with the orders, and thus the regiment, amid much enthusiasm, was put through its manual by the prettiest woman in virginia. they soon returned to richmond and occupied themselves in the good work of the southern women. hetty, a really glorious beauty, married brig.-gen. john pegram in january, 1865. three weeks after he fell at hatcher's run, at the same time that i received what was thought a fatal wound. the _new york herald_ a few days later published both our obituaries. (see appendix.) constance married, after the peace, my friend burton n. harrison, president davis's accomplished private secretary. he began his law practice in new york, succeeding well, and his wife soon became established and admired as a woman of taste and uncommon social and literary attainments. her books have gained deserved popularity and wide circulation. * * * * * longstreet being now a major-general, with three brigades, the new brigadiers are to be introduced. r. s. ewell took our old brigade. he was a distant relative of mine and one of the strangest of warriors; had served with distinction in mexico, and all his life against indians. he was without a superior as a cavalry captain and of the most extraordinary appearance. bald as an eagle, he looked like one; had a piercing eye and a lisping speech. a perfect horseman and lover of horses (racers), he never tired of talking of his horse "tangent," in texas, who appears to have never won a race and always to have lost his owner's money. but the latter's confidence never weakened and he always believed in "tangent." general ewell became a very distinguished soldier, and justly so. to uncommon courage and activity he added a fine military instinct, which could make him a good second in command in any army. he was not long with us. his fortunes were with stonewall jackson in the valley operations, and he rose to be major-general and lieutenant-general. in the latter rank he commanded the second corps at gettysburg, having previously lost a leg in the second manassas campaign. his command suffered great loss in the slaughter of malvern hill. the morning after, i found him doubled up on the floor of a little shanty, his head covered up; the ground was covered with our slain. raising himself he instantly recognized me, and lisped out, "mather thorrel, can you tell me why we had five hundred men killed dead on this field yesterday?" that was all; the soul of the brave general was fit to burst for the awful and useless sacrifice. it was a fearful blunder somewhere and has not yet been boldly and clearly lighted up. kemper, a fine virginian colonel, succeeded ewell in the command of the fourth brigade, and served well until he was left for dead in front of his men in pickett's charge at gettysburg. our second brigade was also virginian. one evening at dark i was in my narrow office when an officer was announced. i turned and had quite a start at my visitor's appearance. it was george pickett, just made brigadier-general, and reporting for command. a singular figure indeed! a medium-sized, well-built man, straight, erect, and in well-fitting uniform, an elegant riding-whip in hand, his appearance was distinguished and striking. but the head, the hair were extraordinary. long ringlets flowed loosely over his shoulders, trimmed and highly perfumed; his beard likewise was curling and giving out the scents of araby. he was soon made at home, and having already received longstreet's instructions, was assigned to his brigade. pickett became very friendly, was a good fellow, a good brigadier. he had been in longstreet's old army regiment, and the latter was exceedingly fond of him. taking longstreet's orders in emergencies, i could always see how he looked after pickett, and made us give him things very fully; indeed, sometimes stay with him to make sure he did not get astray. such was the man whose name calls up the most famous and heroic charge, possibly, in the annals of war. pickett's charge at gettysburg stirs every heart that beats for great deeds, and will forever live in song and story. afterwards his division was relieved to rest and recruit, and grew strong and fit. it was, however, badly mauled at five forks by sheridan, although its commander is said to have made excellent disposition of his troops and fought them gallantly. the third brigade was of south carolina regiments under command of brig.-gen. richard h. anderson, a west point graduate and an experienced officer of the old army. of him and also the artillery attached to the division there is more to be said later. at the centerville camp major-general earl van dorn commanded a division. a small, handsome man, the very picture of a thorough light cavalryman, he enjoyed a high reputation from service in mexico and against the indians. soon after he was transferred to a command in mississippi, and there falling into a private quarrel was killed. maj.-gen. g. w. smith also had a division near centerville. from this officer much was expected. he had left the academy with high honors, and served many years with distinction. he resigned from the army to become street commissioner in new york, a lucrative office, and thence he came south for service. there was no opportunity to show his abilities in the field until the battle of seven pines in may-june, 1862, and then general lee taking command of the army, smith withdrew, and was, i think, not again heard of in active field work. after the war he wrote a book, his "apologies," in which he threw all the blame on his once bosom friend, james longstreet, and upon general johnston for field work, up to the time of his retirement. jubal early, brigadier-general, was one of the ablest soldiers in the army. intellectually he was perhaps the peer of the best for strategic combinations, but he lacked ability to handle troops effectively in the field; that is, he was deficient in tactical skill. his irritable disposition and biting tongue made him anything but popular, but he was a very brave and able commander. his appearance was quite striking, having a dark, handsome face, regular features, and deep piercing eyes. he was the victim of rheumatism, and although not old was bent almost double, like an aged man. of high scholarly and fine political attainments, he never married, but led the life of a recluse in virginia, entirely apart from social and public affairs. d. r. jones, brigadier-general, was also near us. a very agreeable, lovable man, tall and stately, he made a brave appearance, and well merited the sobriquet of "neighbor jones," as they pleasantly called him at west point. his wife, a relative of president davis, was much with him in camp, and a very decided character by the side of her indulgent husband. he could not figure with much success, his health being poor, and after sharpsburg was transferred to some easier service elsewhere, and soon after died. chapter v our national hymn singing among the troops--van dorn--longstreet--smith and "i puritani" for national hymn--surgeon francis sorrel, c. s. a.--life in richmond--troops passing through--toombs and his brigade--general d. h. hill. among the troops at centerville there was much singing, some of it very sweet and touching. "lorena," set to a tender, sentimental air, was heard everywhere. "my maryland" was a great favorite, and of course "dixie" was always in evidence. there were, however, other sweet southern melodies that the soldiers took up, seemingly mellowing stern hearts and bringing tender memories of home. there was constant talk of a national air, "dixie" being thought by some as of not sufficient dignity. "my maryland" had many advocates, but there were some that thought the noble strain of the great liberty duet from "i puritani" was the thing for the confederacy. general van dorn was enthusiastic about it. at the banquet at longstreet's, after the flag presentation, the talk turned on this air, and van dorn began to sing it. "up on the table and, show yourself; we can't see you!" said longstreet. "not unless you stand by me!" shouted van dorn; and no sooner said than longstreet, g. w. smith, and van dorn, the ranking major-generals, were clinging to each other on a narrow table and roaring out the noble bars of "i puritani." johnston and beauregard stood near with twinkling eyes of amusement and enjoyment. so much for wine and "entoosy moosy," as byron calls it; but for all this good start, the soldiers declined the impressive air and stuck to their dixie. it was always gratifying to me to note the good equipment in which the troops from my state were sent to the front for the confederacy. governor brown was thorough in doing the best for them that the blockade of the coast and his factories permitted. they came forward with good clothing, shoes and underwear, which, although of home make, were warm, comfortable and serviceable. my brother, dr. francis sorrel, was many years my senior. he had served in the united states army as assistant surgeon, but had resigned and was in california when the war began. he immediately came to share the fortunes of his state. dr. moore, the confederate surgeon-general, without delay had him appointed to full rank and assigned for service as his close confidential assistant (the pair were forever rolling cigarettes). there his influence and powers were considerable and the doctor was always helpful to his friends. he was instrumental in assigning dr. james b. read, of savannah, to the officers' hospital in richmond, and in read's hands it became celebrated. he kept a good lookout for his two junior brothers in the field and we had many evidences of his thoughtfulness. with a wide acquaintance in richmond, he knew the principal members of congress and was liked by all the cabinet. his previous service in the united states army put him in good touch with many high officers, and his position in all respects was enviable. occasionally i managed to make a short visit to richmond, and then my brother gave me introductions to pleasant men and charming women. there may be more to say of him later. life at richmond at this time--january, february, march, april, 1862--seemed gay and happy, with but little outward sign of apprehension or anxieties for the future. food supplies were abundant and the pinch for clothing and shoes was being eased by the remarkable achievement of the several states in equipping their contingents for the field. most of the troops passed through richmond en route to the peninsula, and there was much excitement and cheering. main street was thronged with people shouting wildly as the regiments marched down to rocketts, where they were to take boat for part of the route. general toombs was quite conspicuous. every one knows that that luminous intellect embraced no soldier's talent. it might have been so with study, but the georgian was for once and all a politician, and in the wrong shop with a sword and uniform on. he marched his troops down main street, past the crowds at spottswood hotel, with childlike delight. he put himself at the head of one regiment and moved it out of sight amid hurrahs, then galloping back he brought on another, ready himself for cheers, until the brigade was down the street and near the embarkation. it was somewhat amusing, but a harmless entertainment for the brilliant orator and statesman. being quite without notes i had almost omitted a jotting about one of longstreet's brigadiers at centerville--a marked and peculiar character. this was general d. h. hill, not long with us. he was soon made major-general and sent elsewhere to command. hill was a small, delicate man, rather bent, and cursed with dyspepsia, which seemed to give color to his whole being. he was out of west point with a good class number, was a capable, well-read soldier, and positively about the bravest man ever seen. he seemed not to know peril and was utterly indifferent to bullets and shell, but with all these qualities was not successful. his backbone seemed a trifle weak. he would take his men into battle, fight furiously for some time and then something weakened about him. unless there was some strong character near by, like longstreet, for instance, on whom he leaned, his attack would be apt to fail and his first efforts go unrewarded. his speech was bitter, although a most devout presbyterian elder. he had resigned long before from the united states army, and had a large school in north carolina. he was accustomed to sneer at cavalry, and once went so far as to say he had "yet to see a dead man with spurs on." it may be imagined what stuart's gallant troopers thought of him. but hill had brains, and rose. he was later on sent west to command in bragg's army, was promoted to lieutenant-general, and is said to have failed grievously at chickamauga, for which bragg suspended him from command; and he was not, i think, restored to any service in the field. he was really a good man, but of sharp prejudice and intemperate language. if there was one department of the army well administered amid almost impossibilities, requiring most ingenious and inventive resources, it was the ordnance, under colonel gorgas. hill took a hatred to it because a gun burst in action, and his imputations on the faith of the department and its abilities were quite unworthy of him or of any good soldier. chapter vi the peninsula and battle of williamsburg, may 5, 1862 arrival at yorktown--major-general magruder--his skilful defense--lines at warwick river--major-general mcclellan--retreat from yorktown--battle of williamsburg, may 5--death of colonel mott, nineteenth mississippi--destruction of armored ram _virginia_--charge by georgia hussars--explosives behind rearguard rebuked--promoted major. but i must hasten to the peninsula, where at yorktown and along the lines of the little warwick river, mcclellan and johnston are frowning at each other; the former, as usual, tripling the confederate force and bawling for more men. persons and things i have left behind will probably come into these jottings in the loose way they fall from the pen. longstreet with his staff and some of his regiments were among the first arrivals to face mcclellan and gave great relief to magruder. this officer, a major-general, commanding some 10,000 to 12,000 men, had offered a most extraordinary and successful defense. it was a wonderful piece of bluff and could have won only against mcclellan. yorktown was strongly armed and well defended. thence stretching across the peninsula was a sluggish little stream known as the warwick river. it was fordable in almost all places, in some nearly dry-shod. magruder's engineers had strengthened the defenses by some dams that gathered a good spread of water to be passed in an attack. the warwick, of many miles extent, was necessarily thinly defended. magruder put his whole force behind it, an attenuated line, up and down which he constantly rode in full sight of the enemy. he was known in the old army as "prince john," from the splendor of his appearance and his dress. of commanding form and loving display, he had assembled a numerous staff, all, like himself, in the most showy uniforms. to these he added a fine troop of cavalry, and when the cavalcade at full gallop inspected the thin lines of the warwick, it was a sight for men and gods. i am persuaded he so impressed "little mac" that he sang out for more men and thus lost his opportunity. in very truth he was so strong and magruder so weak that the union ramrods should have sufficed to break the defense and gobble up the magnificent "prince john." longstreet's arrival was therefore a great relief, and soon johnston had his army in full position, making mcclellan almost frantic; he more than doubled johnston's actual strength. a strong attack should have prevailed to drive us away; and if briskly followed, eventually into the york river. but johnston knew his man, as did indeed every confederate leader later on. lee, longstreet, jackson, the hills all knowing his points, while serving in the u. s. army, could now rightly measure him. mcclellan was a lovable man, an admirable organizer, but with little taste for battle unless largely outnumbering his opponent. here in the trenches occurred remarkable scenes. many of the southern regiments had enlisted for only twelve months and the time expired in april. re-enlistments and elections of the officers took place under fire of the enemy! our men were splendid, and with rare exceptions they refused home and re-enlisted, this time for the war. inactivity continued for some time, longstreet commanding the center with his own and other troops, until it was soon apparent to johnston that richmond was too much exposed to attacks on the north side of the james river. the capital must be covered; besides, both our flanks were endangered by the enemy's immense superiority on the water. preparations therefore began for a move, and on the night of may 3 the army was successfully drawn from its trenches and started on its deliberate, well-ordered retreat. on may 5 our rearguard was overtaken and attacked in force at williamsburg, longstreet in command, with a considerable part of the army. it was a stubborn, all-day fight, with serious losses on both sides, but the enemy was beaten off and we resumed the march that night, the federals having enough of it. we were not again molested. this was our first severe fight, and the steadiness and order of officers and men appeared to be very satisfactory. i was promoted to be major soon afterwards, the commission dating may 5, the day of the action. there was a gruesome but affecting sight during the battle. colonel mott, of high reputation, had brought from his state the nineteenth mississippi infantry. it was hotly engaged in a long, fierce fight, and mott fell. his black servant in the rear immediately took a horse and went to the firing line for his master's body. i met the two coming out of the fire and smoke. the devoted negro had straddled the stiffened limbs of his master on the saddle before him, covered his face with a handkerchief, and thus rescued his beloved master's body for interment with his fathers on the old mississippi estate. the celebrated l. q. c. lamar was lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, and succeeded to the command, until forced by physical disability, he retired to richmond for other service. the army moving on soon neared the capital and took up the several positions assigned its divisions. mcclellan's huge force following, threw itself across the chickahominy, and the siege of richmond may be said to have begun. on the withdrawal of the army from the peninsula, norfolk and gloucester point became indefensible and the destruction of immense quantities of material both for field use and for construction had to be submitted to. the blow was not made lighter by the loss of the famous _virginia_, formerly the _merrimac_, that did such havoc at newport news. she could not be permitted to fall into the enemy's hands and was of too deep draft for service on the james river. her commander, admiral josiah tatnall, was therefore reluctantly forced to her destruction. she was blown up and disappeared. other vessels, cruisers and gun-boats, boilers, engines, and great quantities of material for construction had to be destroyed for similar reasons. the loss was bitter to us, as so much could have been done with it all for a little fighting navy. it was during the action at williamsburg that i was ready to shout for joy at seeing my old troop, the georgia hussars, in a gallant charge. their regiment, the jeff davis legion, had been prematurely thrown at the enemy in a position he was thought about leaving. the cavalry colonel was wrong. our georgians went forward in fine style, expecting to carry everything, but quickly found themselves in a very hot place. the enemy was not retiring, but on the contrary gave the legion so warm a reception as to empty many saddles. they all came back pell-mell, "the devil take the hindmost," my hussar comrades wondering what their colonel had got them "into that galley for!" it was a severe lesson but a salutary one, and the regiment was not again caught that way. longstreet saw them close by as they dashed forward, and said, "they must soon come back; the colonel is ahead of the right moment." general johnston was present on the field all day, but seeing longstreet, the rearguard commander, carrying things very handsomely, generously forbore any interference and left the battle to his handling. he sent the latter such additional troops as he had to call for from time to time. when night came it was horrible. there were many dead and wounded and the weather nasty; the roads ankle deep in mud and slush. but the march had to be again taken up. on the retreat from yorktown, brigadier-general rains was commanding the rearguard. he was a brother of the other rains who at augusta, georgia, achieved the apparently impossible task of supplying ammunition. both brothers were given to experiments in explosives and fond of that study. when gabriel began moving out on our march he amused himself planting shells and other explosives in the roadway after us to tickle the pursuers. hearing this i reported the matter to longstreet, who instantly stopped it. he caused me to write rains a rather severe note, reminding him that such practises were not considered in the limits of legitimate warfare, and that if he would put them aside and pay some attention to his brigade his march would be better and his stragglers not so numerous. this officer did not remain long on duty in the field. his talents, like those of his more celebrated brother, lay elsewhere. after getting into position before richmond, less than a month intervened between the reorganization and strengthening of the army and change of its commander. i shall therefore defer any observations that i may recall as to its composition and personnel until it took its more permanent form under lee, contenting myself with some stray reflections on the battle of seven pines, which by the deplorable wounding of johnston gave us for leader robert e. lee. chapter vii battle of seven pines, may 31, 1862 position taken in front of richmond--reception at president davis's--sketch--mr. benjamin, secretary of state--storm-bound--richmond--general johnston wounded--von borcke, the german volunteer--his armament. our positions were so near richmond as to permit frequent visits there during the pleasant month of may. mcclellan was hugging himself in security and reinforcements beyond the chickahominy, and the earthwork defenses of richmond which we were guarding seemed to us then all-sufficing. later, we could realize how little they were worth without men and guns and rifles and a leader in the field. these defenses had been scientifically constructed by the engineers headed by general lee and maj.-gen. j. f. gilmer. the latter was a distinguished officer not long since resigned from the united states army, had married in savannah in the family of dear friends of ours, and when the war broke out at once placed his unquestioned engineering abilities at the service of the government. on one of my visits to the city i was persuaded by my brother, dr. sorrel, to stay the night and attend, a reception at the president's. it was interesting and striking. the highest and most brilliant of the southland were there; bright, witty, confident, carrying everything with a high hand. the men generally in full uniform and the women in finery, that seems somehow always to turn up for them under all circumstances. after presentation to mr. and mrs. davis i had a good look at that remarkable man. a most interesting study, calm and self-contained, gracious with some sternness; his figure was straight, slim and elegant. a well-poised, ample head was faced with high-bred features and an expression that could be very winning and agreeable. his wife, varina, was a rather large woman, handsome and brilliant, a bit inclined to be caustic of speech, but withal a good and gracious help to her husband. her devotion when he was a prisoner was later beautifully manifested. senators and congressmen were there in abundance. our own representative, julien hartridge, characteristically indifferent to such assemblages, was taking his pleasure elsewhere. mr. benjamin was a most interesting character--a short, squatty jewish figure. his silvery speech charmed all hearers with its wit, persiflage and wisdom. his wonderful legal abilities made him _facile princeps_ in equity law. his after career was extraordinary. when the collapse of the confederate army came he was still in mr. davis's cabinet and joined his chief in flight. separating, however, benjamin escaped to one of the west india islands and thence to london. it seems his nativity had actually been in a british colony, and this fact and his great legal acquirements, with some routine attendance at the courts, quickly permitted his admittance to the bar and he was q. c. in almost no time. he immediately took up an immense special practise and made much money. i had the pleasure of meeting him in 1872 in paris, at a breakfast given by mr. francis corbin in his splendid hotel on the faubourg st. germain. needless to say, mr. benjamin was delightful. it was on one of these visits to my brother that i nearly came to trouble. i intended to ride back to camp quite early, but he had visits for me to make with him and pressed me so affectionately that i was late in starting back. then a furious storm of rain and wind nearly drowned my good horse and myself and i was concerned for the late hour at which i finally reported to my chief. i found him provoked at my absence, because much had happened. in the afternoon a council of war had agreed with the commander-in-chief to attack mcclellan the next morning. the opportunity was a good one because mcclellan had posted his forces so that the chickahominy cut them in two and they might be destroyed in detail. i was not too late, however, for the duties, and both longstreet and myself were soon in good humor again. orders for the dispositions of the troops were quickly gotten out and the time and line of march given. we had six strong brigades and d. h. hill's four were to join us under longstreet, besides a strong force of artillery and a body of cavalry on the right. when the day came (may 31) the movement began, and never was the opening for battle more unsatisfactory. the same storm that put mcclellan's army in decided peril by destroying his bridges and cutting communication between his two wings, impeded our march at every step. little rivulets were now raging torrents. bridges had to be improvised and causeways made by which the column could be moved. everything seemingly lost us time, and our attack, instead of being early in the day, was delayed until 4 p. m. there shall be no attempt to describe or discuss this battle. g. w. smith with a large command was on our left. general johnston with him and major-general huger with a strong division was expected to support our right, but for some reason we did not get it. d. h. hill with his four brigades and our six, attacked with great fury. smith's attack on the left was retarded and unsuccessful. we made quick progress, but with heavy losses in our ten fine brigades. the enemy could not stand before them and casey's division, posted at seven points, gave way after heavy losses and was crushed. cannon and colors fell into our hands. darkness was then coming on and no supports, much to longstreet's chagrin. further attack on our part was deferred until the morning. meantime, while smith was making on the left his abortive attack, our gallant general joseph e. johnston had been struck down by a severe wound and borne from the field. the second in command was g. w. smith, but as operations for the day had ceased there was no occasion for him to make any change in existing dispositions of the troops, and gen. robert e. lee was the next day placed in command of the army of northern virginia. seven pines should under all circumstances have been a magnificent victory for us. it was really far from that, and while encouraging the soldiers in fighting and the belief in their ability to beat the enemy, it was waste of life and a great disappointment. walton, of longstreet's staff, was wounded in the head, the bullet making a long furrow in his bald scalp. here we saw for the first time the german von borcke, who, attached later to stuart's cavalry, made some reputation. he had just arrived and could not speak a word of english; was splendidly mounted on a powerful sorrel and rode well. he was an ambulating arsenal. a double-barreled rifle was strapped across his back, a winchester carbine hung by his hip, heavy revolvers were in his belt, right and left side; an enormous straight double-edged sharp-pointed cuirasseur's saber hung together with sabertasche to his left thigh, and a short "couteau de chasse" finished up his right. besides, his english army saddle bore two large holsters, one for his field-glasses, the other for still another revolver, bigger and deadlier than all the others. von borcke was a powerful creature--a tall, blonde, active giant. when i next saw him he had discarded--taught by experience--all his arsenal except his good saber and a couple of handy revolvers. he stayed with us to the end and received an ugly wound in the throat. chapter viii battles of the chickahominy, june 26 to july 2, 1862 general lee in command--sketch--reinforced--preparing for campaign--general lee's staff--longstreet second in command--his division--artillery reorganized--washington artillery of new orleans--colonel e. p. alexander commanding artillery--general w. w. mackall reports--sketch--civilian prisoners at fort warren--general miles and president davis--the battles around richmond--mcclellan's defeat--stonewall jackson not on time--ochiltree and eastern fighting--lord edward st. maur a visitor--mcclellan on james river in position--later we take again positions by richmond. when general lee took command it was my first sight of him. he had been employed in the northwest virginia mountains, on the south atlantic coast, and at richmond, generally as adviser to the president. his appearance had, it seems, changed. up to a short time before seven pines he had worn for beard only a well-kept moustache, soon turned from black to grizzled. when he took us in hand his full gray beard was growing, cropped close, and always well tended. an unusually handsome man, he has been painted with brush and pen a hundred times, but yet there is always something to say of that noble, unostentatious figure, the perfect poise of head and shoulders and limbs, the strength that lay hidden and the activity that his fifty-five years could not repress. withal graceful and easy, he was approachable by all; gave attention to all in the simplest manner. his eyes--sad eyes! the saddest it seems to me of all men's--beaming the highest intelligence and with unvarying kindliness, yet with command so firmly set that all knew him for the unquestioned chief. he loved horses and had good ones, and rode carefully and safely, but i never liked his seat. the general was always well dressed in gray sack-coat of confederate cloth, matching trousers tucked into well-fitting riding-boots--the simplest emblems of his rank appearing, and a good, large black felt army hat completed the attire of our commander. he rarely wore his sword, but his binoculars were always at hand. fond of the company of ladies, he had a good memory for pretty girls. his white teeth and winning smile were irresistible. while in savannah and calling on my father, one of my sisters sang for him. afterwards, in virginia, almost as soon as he saw me he asked after his "little singing-bird." the touch of the leader's hand was soon apparent in the reorganization of the army and its increased strength. the administration reposing a perfect confidence in lee, gave him all he asked for in men and material that could be furnished. it is proper to add that so moderate was the man and so fully understanding the situation and difficulties of supply, that he rarely asked for what could not be given him. his staff was small and efficient. i suppose that at this date there are some hundreds of men in the south who call themselves members of lee's staff, and so they were if teamsters, sentry men, detailed quartermasters (commissary men), couriers and orderlies, and all the rest of the following of general headquarters of a great army are to be so considered. but by staff we usually confine ourselves to those responsible officers immediately about a general, and lee had selected carefully. four majors (afterwards lieutenant-colonels and colonels) did his principal work. walter taylor, from the virginia military institute, was adjutant-general, and better could not be found for this important post. charles venable, a scholar and mathematician, and with some study of strategy, together with charles marshall, a distinguished lawyer by inheritance from his ancestor, the chief justice, and his own attainments, did much of the correspondence under dictation. talcot was the engineer officer, and long, of the old army, a close friend of the general, was ranked as military secretary and did various duties. at a later date brig.-gen. r. h. chilton, a. a. g., was assigned to confidential duties with the general, and was sometimes called chief of staff. but lee really had no such chief about him. the officer practically nearest its duties was his extremely efficient adjutant-general, w. h. taylor. maj. h. e. young was also attached later--an excellent officer. there were possible one or two young lieutenants for personal aids, but this was lee's staff, although perhaps i have made some omissions. of course it does not include the important administrative officers like cole, chief commissary; corley, chief quartermaster; doctor guild, medical director, and his chiefs of ordnance and other organizations. longstreet was second in command and it soon became apparent that he was to be quite close to lee. his camps and bivouacs were near by the general's, and thus my acquaintance with him and his staff became quite free and i was often honored by the kind interest of the commander-in-chief. in the new organization longstreet had a powerful division of six brigades, and a. p. hill (major-general) one of six, also a fine body which hill happily christened as the light division. the artillery was much improved, and loose batteries were gathered and organized into well-found battalions, generally of four batteries of six guns each, and a battalion assigned to each division. the celebrated washington artillery of new orleans was given to us, and glad we were to have such gunners. e. p. alexander commanded in reserve a fine battalion of six batteries and was to do much good service with it. a word about this splendid fellow. he was from georgia and a dear friend of mine. leaving west point with very high honors, he was immediately commissioned into the engineers, and sent to the pacific, whence he came south to fight. his was the happiest and most hopeful nature. he was sure of winning in everything he took up, and never did he open his guns on the enemy but that he knew he should maul him into smithereens. an accomplished engineer, he was often called on both by lee and longstreet for technical work and special reconnoitering. his future in peace, after appomattox, was varied and distinguished, and he still is with us, eager, enthusiastic, most interesting, and of undiminished abilities. the washington artillery was an ancient and wealthy organization of new orleans, numbering five well-equipped, well-manned batteries. there were many men of wealth and family serving as gunners. four batteries under colonel walton came to virginia, the fifth was sent west. walton was large and imposing in appearance, looking, as indeed did the whole battalion, rather french. this arose from their uniform, which from "kepi" to gaiters was handsomely french, and made them very fine beside our homespun infantry fellows. it was a most efficient organization, serving with longstreet throughout the war; it always did good service and constantly distinguished itself most conspicuously. our own staff will not be touched on just yet, preferring to wait for the creation of the two army corps in october, when we were put in more permanent shape for the remainder of the war. at present there had been but few additions to it, since longstreet's command was limited to a single brigade, and the staff work consequently was sometimes hard on us. i think it was in this month, september, that i rode to one of the lower landings of the james to meet general mackall, my brother-in-law. he had been a prisoner of war at fort warren near boston, and was to land, exchanged with some others from the federal steamer. he was quite well and i sent him on to richmond, where doctor sorrel saw to his comfort. mackall married my father's eldest daughter. he was an army man out of west point, and an able, accomplished soldier. he should have achieved much in the confederate war, but circumstances were against him. when it broke out he was lieutenant-colonel in the adjutant-general's department, considered a very enviable billet. stationed on the pacific, his intimates were j. e. johnston, j. f. gilmer, halleck, and others of that type. the marylander had a tedious time in richmond waiting for active service suitable to his abilities. at last he was sent to report to a. s. johnston at bowling green, kentucky. after shiloh, at beauregard's earnest request, he was made brigadier-general and ordered to hold island no. 10, a fortified position in the mississippi, immediately to fall by reason of other combinations. in less than a week after assuming command the inevitable happened. the island was surrendered and the garrison made prisoners of war. mackall was sent to fort warren, from which he was exchanged in 1863. he then took duty with bragg's army as chief of staff; and after bragg with j. e. johnston, one of his dearest friends, until the general was supplanted by hood. mackall was afterwards given a command at mobile, from which, however, he soon had to withdraw his force by reason of the successes of the federal fleet. and there, i think, his active service ended. he was of a high order of mind and of the finest and nicest elevation of character; there was something supercritical, however, that would stand in his way without reason. when general mackall was exchanged out of fort warren he told me of two other prisoners, civilians, andrew low and charles green. the latter had married my cousin, and both were englishmen of the regular holdfast, energetic type. they constituted the most important business house in savannah, were making quantities of money, but had quarrelled and were about separating on the worst terms, when seward's detectives, suspicious of their movements (they had both married in savannah and were truly southern and confederate), clapped them in fort warren. there by the irony of fate they were the sole occupants of the same casemate, these quondam friends, now bitter, non-speaking enemies. the situation was difficult and rather enjoyed by some gentlemen outside who knew of the partners' troubles. treatment of prisoners of war at fort warren (boston harbor) appears to have been proper and unobjectionable. the governor, colonel dimmock, was a gentleman and knew what was due to his own reputation, as well as what his prisoners had a right to expect. there were marked contrasts elsewhere, as at fort johnston, but in all the four years there was yet to be found a prison commandant surpassing the brutalities of miles. his chief distinction then appears to have been in manacling the helpless president of the confederate states, who was advanced in years, feeble in health, with no friends near, and that in the strongest fortress in the united states, with a large garrison and a guard literally standing over the prisoner night and day, and not a confederate organized force in existence. lee was an aggressive general, a fighter. to succeed, he knew battles were to be won, and battles cost blood, and blood he did not mind in his general's work. although always considerate and sparing of his soldiers, he would pour out their blood when necessary or when strategically advisable. his army had become much strengthened, troops filled its ranks from georgia, south and north carolina, being drawn from the coast, where they were doing nothing. his divisions had among them longstreet's, a. p. hill's, magruder's, d. h. hill's, mclane's, d. r. jones's, huger's, and whiting's--a splendid force, nearly eighty thousand men, including jackson's. the latter was in the valley, soon to be with us. lawton had just taken his immense brigade of six thousand men from savannah to reinforce him, and the georgians were having some lively marching and fighting in "stonewall" jackson's way. it was evident that the general was soon to make his great attack to crush mcclellan, whose dispositions were so faulty as to offer a tempting mark. his army greatly outnumbered ours. he had thrown it across the chickahominy and its two wings were again exposed. there were quiet but intense preparations for the important movement. it was of great extent and covered nearly seven days. jackson was to move secretly and swiftly from the valley and join lee in the attack on the federal right. he was late, and when lee crossed at mechanicsville, june 26, a. p. hill was thrown at the defenses on beaver dam, and was nearly sacrificed. his losses were pitiable, as were d. h. hill's in the same attack. had jackson been in position the enemy would have melted before us. he had promised to be there on the morning of the 26th. on the 27th, longstreet, a. p. hill, whiting, and others stormed the heights at gaines's mill, suffering heavy loss, but defeating the enemy badly, taking many prisoners, guns and colors, and driving him in panic after the retreating mcclellan. there was great maneuvering on the 26th, and a severe combat at savage's station. on the 30th the enemy showed front at fraser's farm, and longstreet, supported by a. p. hill, instantly attacked with great fury. the enemy was stubborn and contested every foot. jackson was to be with us, and had he been, our success was undoubted, but for some reason he could not get through white oak swamp, and denied us. of huger on the right we also heard nothing. the combination had failed. the enemy was thus suffered to escape, but with heavy loss. our own was far from light. malvern hill followed with its bloody fields and crest. the reckoning there was awful and apparently for no good. mcclellan abandoned the hill at night and soon found himself safe at harrison's landing under cover of his cruisers and gun-boats. his army was beaten and dispirited and the siege of richmond broken up; but "little mac" raised a faint cry of partial victory and did not fail to torment poor mr. lincoln for more men; "heavy reinforcements could alone save the army," etc. jackson's firmest friends have been obliged to admit some faults in their hero. as to these movements--either from miscalculation or something else, he was fatally late on the 26th. that he was not on hand at fraser's farm was also a serious disaster. some of munford's cavalry had got through white oak swamp, bad as it was with a heavy rain falling, and it would seem that a soldier so great and energetic as jackson would have found means to push through to the help of fighting, hard-pressed comrades. it is possible that he was overdone with work and fatigue, but his men should have been there as planned. i saw him on the 28th, and he seemed brisk enough. longstreet had sent me after gaines's mill to find him and establish connections and communications. he was cheerful and pleasant. "explain, major, to general longstreet where i am and how my troops are lying, and say, with my compliments, i am ready to obey any orders he may send me." when i set out to find him, tom ochiltree, fresh and breezy from texas, was with us for a week as a volunteer by longstreet's consent. ochiltree said, that familiar with fighting in texas, he wanted to see how we did it in the east. he had also a great desire to see the celebrated "stonewall" before returning home. he asked permission to ride with me. we trotted off together, our route taking us by an extensive field-infirmary, where the surgeons were at their bloody work on the wounded. we halted for a few minutes. the scene was sickening and cured ochiltree of battle sights. "sorrel," he said very seriously, "this gives me enough; i don't want any more. it seems now i have seen everything--too much, nothing for me to do here. better for me to ride back to richmond and take train for texas. sorry not to see 'stonewall,' but i travel the other way. good-by and good luck to you." and off he went after just about four days' service with the confederates in the east. during these movements there was a young englishman with us, our guest. he had brought letters to authorities in richmond. it was lord edward st. maur, a scion of the ducal house of somerset. he was about twenty-one, just from the university, where he had taken high honors, and was around now with an englishman's curiosity. a singularly handsome young man he was, with pure olive skin and beautiful features. he was always courteous, always reserved. he came as a neutral for observation, and in all the freedom of our fighting week and rough bivouacs nothing stirred him from that attitude. in truth, i don't think he approved of us. i afterwards heard he was something of a prig but destined for high political life. the battle of fraser's farm broke out in the afternoon with great suddenness and severity. i had given st. maur a mount and we happened to be on the line among the men when firing began, but notwithstanding the cannonading and heavy musketry he was quite cool. "this is not my place," he said, "and with your permission i shall retire," doing so with entire deliberation; he so placed himself as to see something and we talked it over when we met at night. when mcclellan took cover at harrison's landing, st. maur was given an officer and flag of truce and soon landed in the home of his fathers. a very careful, neutral chap. i was sorry for his end--hunting big game in india soon after, he was mauled and eaten by a tiger. when mcclellan was safely at harrison's landing under cover of heavy guns (some fifteen-inch spherical shell), there was nothing to keep our army there. besides, it left richmond somewhat exposed from the direction of fredericksburg. general lee, therefore, gave the word and we were soon again in, or near, our old positions. everything was made ship-shape, the wounded mending and returning to duty, damages repaired, and the waste of that extraordinary movement and series of battles made good as best could be. mcclellan could not now see the spires of richmond from his headquarters. additional reinforcements were brought from the south in preparation for lee's next move, for he was not the man to stay idly behind defenses when there was an enemy about that he might hopefully strike. longstreet's division of six brigades was in fine condition, with filling ranks, and so was a. p. hill's light division, which lay near us, and thereby hangs a tale which must be recited, i fear, at some little length. chapter ix rivalry and more reminiscenses longstreet's and a. p. hill's divisions--rivalry between the two--publications in _richmond examiner_ and _whig_--general hill resentful--refuses recognition of longstreet's adjutant-general--hill in arrest--personal difficulty between the two major-generals adjusted by general lee's influence--general hill cherishes no rancor--later gave me a brigade--army busy drilling--quartermaster potts and major fairfax--books among the troops--gambling. there was some rivalry between the two splendid divisions. each had done its full share of fighting in the recent battles and each had won glory and renown. hill had handled his men well and fought them gallantly. needless to say how longstreet had held his men, as it were, in the hollow of his hand (his abilities for handling large bodies under fire being remarkable), and how his never-failing valor and tenacity had supported them. the papers came out of richmond daily, with fetching headlines and columns of description giving the events of the previous day. one of the widest read of these was _the examiner_, very brilliantly edited. it seemed to have taken hill's division under its special favor. every movement was chronicled, every clash of arms, no matter how trifling, was written up, and the grand movements and actions of the division given such prominence as to dwarf all other commands. there was some feeling growing up about it, especially since it was known that a newspaper man from _the examiner_ office was serving temporarily on hill's staff. nothing was then done about the matter, but longstreet's young staff officers were quite at the fighting point, as our division had come in for some animadversions in _the examiner_. after the short campaign, while we were occupying some of our old positions about richmond, hill lying near by, under command of longstreet, the latter came one day to me with a rough draft of a short communication to _the whig_, a richmond paper. it flatly contradicted _the examiner_, so far as longstreet's division was concerned, and criticized the major-general who could suffer such reports to emanate from his own staff; it was short but positive. longstreet asked if i objected to send such a communication to _the whig_, signed by myself officially, as adjutant-general. he would answer for it, because i should not be expected alone to attack or criticize my superior officer. i was only too willing to carry out these wishes. the little note was prepared for the press and published in _the whig_. it was stiff, but with military civility, and made some comment on the taste of having such correspondents along with military operations. it was not regarded as offensive, but was certainly pointed in some contradiction. to my regret i have no copy. such was the bomb-shell that was to burst over us in a few days. having occasion for some routine report or information from general a. p. hill, a note was sent him for it in the usual form. it was returned endorsed that "general hill declined to hold further communication with major sorrel." of course i was surprised, but it was apparent that trouble was brewing and that longstreet must show his hand. the note was handed him and he was at once on fire at such disobedience. "write him again," said he, "and say that note was written by my command, and must be answered satisfactorily." to this hill insisted on holding to his refusal. the correspondence was then taken up by longstreet personally with hill. i did not see the letters, but several passed, until finally, a day or two later, general longstreet came to me with, "major, you will be good enough to put on your sword and sash, mount, and place major-general hill in arrest, with orders to confine himself to limits of his camp and vicinity." it was my first duty of that kind with such rank, but i was soon on my way, followed by an orderly. the general was in his tent seated in a low chair, and rose as i entered, returning stiffly my salute. bowing, when i had communicated the orders, he resumed his chair without speech, and saluting again, i was quickly on the road to my own friendly camp. i know only by hearsay what took place afterwards. it was kept quite out of reach of the staff and confined to the two principals. certain it is, however, that some angry letters passed and intimate friends (d. h. hill and toombs for longstreet) were called in and a hostile meeting between the two generals was almost certain. general lee, however, heard of it, and acted quickly and effectively, using his unvarying tact and great influence. he brought matters, through other friends, to an adjustment honorable to both. a few days later general hill's division was shifted out of reach of longstreet's command and nothing more was known of the affair. later on longstreet and hill became fairly good friends, but i naturally supposed i had incurred his hatred. for a year or two we did not meet--his division being in jackson's corps--except occasionally on the march, and then the general's manner seemed to me stiff and menacing. if so, it was only the manner, not the feeling, because in 1864 i received from general hill the very highest evidence of his appreciation and friendliness. on several occasions previously, longstreet recommended me for promotion to command, and it must necessarily be to a brigade of georgians. but where a brigadier was wanted for them, there were always good colonels of long service in the brigade that properly gained the preference. this was so general that i despaired of leaving the staff for higher promotion, until one day in september, 1864, a commission of brigadier-general came to me with orders to report to lieut-gen. a. p. hill. my preparations began at once for the change and it was necessary for me to go to the war department, richmond. there i found in the adjutant-general's office capt. john w. reilly, a. a. g., a fine young virginia officer, who had once served under me. "did you ever see, general, the paper that brought about your promotion?" it was entirely new to me. he drew from a file a letter from gen. a. p. hill, commenting on the bad condition of his fine georgia brigade, which, left without a brigadier by the wounds of wright and the death of girardy, was then in the hands of a brave but incompetent colonel. he concluded by asking with great earnestness that lieutenant-colonel sorrel, of longstreet's corps, should be promoted and sent to him. the letter was referred to general lee for his opinion and then passed between the adjutant-general, the secretary of war, and the president, who finally scrawled, "make the appointment, j. d." i tried to get the paper from reilly as an autographic souvenir, but it was against orders and i was obliged to content myself with a certified copy. "it never rains but it pours;" some days after, major-general kershaw wrote me that he (kershaw) had asked for my promotion to command one of his georgia brigades. hill was a west point man of medium height, a light, good figure, and most pleasing soldierly appearance. he surely handled his division on all occasions with great ability and courage and justly earned high reputation. when lee created the third army corps he placed him in command of it, and it was thought hill did not realize in that high position all that was hoped of him. his health was impaired toward the close of the war, and his noble life ended by a stray bullet at petersburg after withdrawal of the lines. it was unnecessary and he should have had years before him. it is not necessary to say how much i appreciated his action toward myself. it proved him magnanimous and free of petty spite in that affair, and such was his nature. when i reported to him no one could have been more warmly welcomed, and thenceforward i had nothing but kindness and the most valuable support and help while with his corps. a. p. hill was very close to both generals lee and stonewall jackson at different times. perhaps only a coincidence, but certainly significant it is, that, the last dying words of the two military chiefs were said to be of hill. "send word to a. p. hill," whispered the expiring jackson. "tell hill he must come up," were the last words on lee's lips. july and early august, 1862, were busy months. in front of richmond general lee kept the army well exercised in drill and the new men had to get into shape. our staff work had been severe and our horses had suffered. i was obliged to keep two good mounts at least, sometimes more. it was here i fell in love with a perfect little stallion named voltaire, and paid a round price for him; he soon proved too delicate for army work and i gave him to my brother in richmond. there he should have thriven, but i think soon went to pieces. i succeeded in finding a handsome, powerful chestnut mare, from which i got good service until she was killed at gettysburg. longstreet was admirably mounted on two bays; one he had brought to the army with him, the other, a finer beast, was a present from major fairfax, whose horse judgment was excellent. for himself, he rode a superb gray stallion, "saltron," widely known, which he had raised at his loudoun estate. fairfax lost him at sharpsburg. a round shot struck him under the tail, fairly in the fundament, and it was at once all over with the stallion. fairfax was excitable, and rushing to longstreet, sitting grimly on his horse directing the battle, he broke out, "general, general, my horse is killed; saltron is shot; shot right in the back!" longstreet gave the major a queer look and consoled him with, "never mind, major, you ought to be glad you are not shot in your own back!" frank potts, a quartermaster in the corps, tells a story of these two. fairfax messed general longstreet, took good care of all his wants, and kept him in whiskey and in all else that was needful. potts says that in one of the campaigns he had parked his animals and wagons in a nice spot by the roadside at a good hour and everything was made snug for the night's bivouac until the early march next morning. suddenly he saw a figure galloping wildly across the fields to him, taking fences and ditches as he came. "now," grumbled potts, "it's a move; here are the orders coming." it was major fairfax in full uniform. he pulled up sharply before the quartermaster, saluted, and then, "captain potts, can you tell me where a washerwoman is to be found for general longstreet?" relieved the irishman and tickled his humor. during the war the men were without many books and eagerly clung to a novel when one came their way. many old volumes were sent from home, but they did not go far among such numbers. victor hugo's "les miserables," and muhlbach's novels, translated from the german, and reprinted at mobile, had begun to appear and were devoured by readers. later on, after gettysburg, freemantle's "three months in the southern states" was reprinted at mobile and widely read. these old volumes are now a curiosity and not to be had except at great price. the dirty old type, blurred and worn, the rough paper with florid designs, all attested the stress of the confederacy in everything entering into life. among the soldiers in camp there was the usual gambling going on; they played some odd sorts of games, but the greasiest packs of cards were their stand-by. one day longstreet received a note from general lee, after a ride through our camps. this informed the corps commander that he regretted to see so much gambling among the men; they nearly all seemed absorbed in a game called "chuck-a-luck." "could anything be done to better the matter?" longstreet had served much with soldiers, and knew they would, many of them, gamble in camp in spite of all orders and watching; never yet had he found anything that would completely cure the evil. he would, however, see what could be done--but nothing came of it. chapter x second battle of manassas, august 29 and 30, 1862 major-general pope in command of union troops in northern virginia--religious observances in our army--homesickness--furloughs--rations--march against pope--artillery duel at rappahannock--spy captured and hung--jackson's marches--thoroughfare gap--longstreet's attack--enemy routed--general wilcox and union general--wilcox's and couch's baptismals--brig.-gen. a. g. evans--general toombs and the picket--his arrest--released and joins brigade in the fight. mcclellan still lay at westover, recruiting and reorganizing. it was apparent that his army would not be long in that position. confidence in him had been lost, and there was a new paladin in the field, the doughty john pope, major-general, with "headquarters in the saddle." he was a man of some ability, but did not have a reputation for high character in the old army; and now with elevated rank and command thrust upon him, he turned into abuse of his enemy, explained how he meant to whip him, and filled the air with bombast and threatening. he was in command in northern virginia, and lee had marked him for his own. we were rather a devout army. the men came from their homes deeply tinged with religion. methodists were in large numbers and next to them baptists and presbyterians. there were many meetings and addresses conducted by worthy chaplains. these devoted ministers could always be counted on to follow beside their men, in camp or on the firing line. the men were fond of hearing in camp any kind of address, and were an easy prey to sharpers. i recall that some years later, on the petersburg line, a crank came along with what he called an artis-avis (a bird of art) with him, and some fifty thousand like it; he was to drop a shell into grant's army and fleet and destroy them! he wanted permission to address my men and solicit cash for building his wonderful birds. he was sent out of camp. the soldiers were fond of chanting hymns and quaint old plantation airs, and at times they were touching with the recollections of home. homesickness was often very prevalent, and the awful nostalgia came near crippling us. there is a general order from longstreet on that matter somewhere and i may be able to find it to attach to these leaves. at this date, july and august, 1862, food was plentiful and good. no variety, but fresh beef or bacon, flour, coffee and sugar were issued in full rations. there was an abundance of whiskey, but comparatively little drunkenness. encouragement and incentives to good conduct came from the general-in-chief down through the officers. previous to the chickahominy campaign a balloon had been constructed for reconnoitering. the enemy had several and we also wanted one, so the women--heaven bless them!--came to the front with, it may be, tearful eyes but willing hearts and chipped in all their pretty silk frocks and gowns. it was a wonderfully picturesque balloon and at first did some little service, captive to a locomotive pushed far to the front. then it was packed on a little steamboat in an adventurous cruise down the james. she ran aground, was gobbled up, with the bright ball-dress balloon, by the delighted yankees, and that was the last of the pretty things of our sisters, sweethearts, and wives. but the march against pope is now beginning and must have a little space. the movement was masked as much as possible, a few troops only being at first concentrated at gordonsville by rail. lee collected then his outlying commands with great skill and started in earnest against his braggart opponent. pope seems to have quite underestimated or disbelieved what was awaiting him, and his dispositions were all in favor of lee. his first rude awakening was the shock jackson gave him at cedar mountain, very costly to him; but we lost charles winder, one of the finest and most promising of the brigadiers. the march of the army was in tactical language "left in front," jackson's position throwing him on the left; and this formation was necessarily observed by all the commands of the army. in these operations stuart and his cavalry were exceedingly active and performed most valuable service. our command, the full division, and two smaller ones under d. r. jones and n. g. evans, came to a halt hunting a ford on the rappahannock and found a strong force of the enemy, with good artillery, at the railroad bridge. the gunners (ours the washington artillery) on both sides took up an artillery duel for nearly all day, but nothing decisive was achieved. we forded the river in another place without opposition. it was in these operations that a spy was taken. he had murdered one of our cavalry couriers, and was caught almost red-handed, and with papers on him compromising enough to hang a dozen spies. nevertheless, we gave him a trial. i convened a drum-head court martial of three brigadiers and they sentenced him to be hanged immediately. the wretch was mounted, arms tied, on a horse, with the noose and limb of a tree connected. he finally admitted he was a spy from loudoun county, virginia, but to the last stuck out he had not shot the cavalry courier. a smart blow with the flat of a saber started the horse on the jump and left the spy breathless, and there he hung until the army, continuing its march, passed almost under the tree and perhaps took the lesson to heart. jackson's marches, in swiftness, daring, and originality of execution, were almost extraordinary. at one time there was great fear for his safety, widely separated as he was from the right wing under longstreet. general lee's route was near longstreet's and night and day he was always close to us. longstreet was delayed by the enemy at thoroughfare gap. this is a mountain gorge, not long, but narrow, rocky, and precipitous. it was capable of stubborn defense. its echoes were wonderful--a gun fired in its depths gave forth roars fit to bring down the skies. here longstreet had to stop impatiently until he could work his way through. he knew jackson was hard pressed on the other side and praying for a sight of him. it took a little time, but we sent a flanking force over the mountains by a rocky path and the enemy gave way speedily and left the gap early. pushing through we saw the dust of jackson's masses miles away and heard his guns. forward we pressed almost at a run, and in time. the attack on stonewall ceased as soon as longstreet came on the scene. this was early enough in the day to permit us in turn to make a combined attack. the enemy was disheartened, and jackson's column, although fatigued and losing heavily, was triumphant and still capable of great efforts. our own force was large, comparatively fresh, and eager to crush john pope, but for some reason the attack was not made, although i think general lee preferred it to waiting. the great battle that followed, and all these operations covering several days, were called the second manassas. some of the ground was identical with the first. most of it lay beautifully for good tactical operations, and as the country was quite open much could be observed at considerable distances. when the enemy's masses began again pressing stonewall on the 30th of august, longstreet moved quickly up to support. their dense columns had been left exposed to artillery fire from our position and longstreet instantly saw it. planting a battery in the road, the first shots, together with jackson's incessant fire, began to tell. we were near enough to see some wavering in the blue masses, then halt, and then a flight back to cover. but it was all up with john pope. no rest was given his army. longstreet started every man of us to his division to push them into attack, and soon everything was hotly engaged. the easy, rounded ridges ran at right angles to the turnpike, and over these infantry and artillery poured in pursuit. the artillery would gallop furiously to the nearest ridge, limber to the front, deliver a few rounds until the enemy were out of range, and then a gallop again to the next ridge. and thus it went on until black darkness stopped operations--the enemy defeated at all points and hastening back to the potomac. many prisoners, guns, colors, small arms, and large quantities of stores and equipments fell into our hands. j. e. b. stuart was highly tickled at his capture of pope's wagon and personal effects, including a very fine uniform. losses on both sides were heavy. alas! the butcher's bill is always to be paid after these grand operations, and at manassas especially there were some splendid young lives laid down for our cause and our homes. longstreet was seen at his best during the battle. his consummate ability in managing troops was well displayed that day and his large bodies of men were moved with great skill and without the least confusion. as general c. m. wilcox was moving forward at the head of his brigade in the open field, he was attracted by the waving of a handkerchief at some little distance. he found time to go to the spot and there mortally wounded was a federal general, wilcox's old army friend, who had recognized the confederate as he passed and wanted to say farewell. his soul soon took flight and his body was cared for by his old-time comrade--the name is forgotten. wilcox told me that he once officiated at a christening with d. n. couch, afterwards a federal major-general. wilcox's baptismals were cadmus marcellus, and couch's darius narcissus. it is said that when these sonorous designations reached the parson's ear he almost dropped the baby in round-eyed astonishment! n. g. evans ("shank" evans) had two brigades with longstreet and was a rather marked character. a regular soldier, he had served well in mexico, and at manassas, on july 21, had done exceedingly well with a small command, a good eye, and quick decision. it was he, too, that commanded at ball's bluff on the upper potomac when baker attempted to take it with a fine regiment and lost some 800 men. baker was senator from oregon and only a few days before had addressed the united states senate in full uniform in farewell. it was forever, for he died with hundreds of his men in the waters of the potomac. evans was difficult to manage and we found him so. he had a prussian orderly, with a wooden vessel holding a gallon of whiskey always strapped on his back, and there was the trouble. at the little artillery fight he had on the rappahannock, g. t. anderson (tige), commanding one of the georgia brigades, was ordered by evans to attack a powerful battery and silence it. in vain did anderson explain that it was on the far side of a deep river and that without a bridge his infantry could not get to it. evans would not listen to reason and anderson came to me. of course he was told to make no such attempt, and i proceeded to hunt up evans, finding him under a tree, too near his "barrelita," as he called his whiskey holder. but he had to listen and comply. in the progress of the campaign after the manassas battle he became so unruly as to arrest without reason hood, one of his brigadiers, and longstreet had to get him out of the way in some manner. he disappeared afterwards from field work and i don't know his end. he had been a very brave, experienced cavalry officer. anderson's indignation at the impossibility of the order to take the battery was highly amusing. in the early part of the march against pope we made a bivouac near where some federal cavalry were reported to have been prowling. the enemy had no troops near by to disturb us except this body of horse. it was therefore thought prudent to post a regiment at the cross-road which would warn our camps. general toombs was ordered to detail one and i saw that it was posted. during the night a cavalry picket reported that the regiment had been withdrawn. i awoke longstreet to ascertain if by his orders. "no, but place immediately in arrest the officer who has done so." it proved to be toombs. he was a great lawyer and a good politician, but in the wrong place when posing as a soldier. he had taken a notion that his regiment was not really needed at the cross-road and the men would be more comfortable with the others in bivouac. toombs was therefore put in arrest and the march continued. the next evening on halting it was reported to me that he had followed, as was proper, in rear of his brigade, but had worn his sword, and upon his men going into camp had made them a violent speech. i felt called on to make this known to general longstreet, whereupon he directed me to order general toombs back to gordonsville and confine himself there; also to prefer charges against him on two grounds--withdrawing the regiment from picket duty and breaking his arrest. this was done and toombs went back to gordonsville, not many miles away, whence he wrote a short note asking to be released of the charge of breaking arrest, saying he had worn his sword only for convenience and there was nothing improper in his speech to the men. longstreet always had a decided liking for toombs, and upon seeing this note he not only withdrew that charge, but the other also and sent him back to duty. knowing that we should soon be engaged he advised me to be quick about it if i wanted the georgian to see something of hot work. an intelligent courier was sent to toombs with the latest orders, and meantime we were marching forward. he returned; general toombs was not at gordonsville. i might well have left the matter there, but it seemed to me that one of our foremost georgians should have a chance with the army and i sent a second man after him; this time he was found. the situation was explained to him and he was advised to lose no time in joining his men if he desired to be with them in the smoke of battle. and so toombs came; late, but just in time to be with his brigade in its last victorious charge when everything, as already described, was turned loose. toombs stuck to the army through sharpsburg, where he did good service, and then returned to more congenial fields--politics and oratory. in after years he always showed me much kindness and appreciation for the trouble i had taken to get him back to his brigade for fighting at the second manassas. chapter xi battles of south mountain (boonsboro gap) and sharpsburg (antietam), sept. 14th and 17th, 1862 accident to general lee--to longstreet also--fight at chantilly--general kearny killed--cross the potomac--lee's confidential order found by mcclellan--straggling. when we got back to virginia and toombs's resignation had gone in, longstreet sent for me to say he had, some time before, about august, 1862, recommended me for promotion to brigadier-general. that toombs's retirement now left a georgia brigade open and he wanted me to have it and that i must put out for richmond forthwith and try to work it through by help of my congressman and other strong friends. i lost no time about this and was soon on the ground. hartridge, our m. c., did all he could in my behalf; but there was no possible chance while the brigade had four colonels, well known representative georgia men, ready each for the command. it was given to colonel, formerly judge, benning, and his record in command of it was excellent. the day after great manassas, general lee suffered a painful accident. it had rained and he was wearing a rubber poncho and over-alls, his body and legs being thus well protected. with a number of his officers he was dismounted in a thick piece of woods, making some disposition for following the enemy. his horse, a gentle, intelligent animal, was at the general's shoulder, reins on neck; he made some slight movement as if to start away, and lee taking a step ahead for the bridle tripped in his over-alls and fell forward, not prone, but catching on his hands. he was instantly on his feet, erect, but his hands were badly damaged; one had a small bone broken and the other was nearly as bad with the twist and strain. both were put into splints, but were painful and most uncomfortable. for some time the saddle had to be given up and the ambulance called into use. general lee made the campaign on wheels. at sharpsburg he was far enough cured to allow him to ride a little. this accident caused widespread report of the general having been wounded, and of course the enemy's papers gave facts in detail of the serious character of the wound and how it was received. some little time afterwards longstreet also got himself damaged. a boot chafed his heel, which took on an ugly look and refused to heal. "peter" (this was his west point sobriquet, much used for him by his army friends and to this day not forgotten) therefore was obliged to don a slipper, and at sharpsburg he was in no good humor at such footwear and the need of occasionally walking in it. in fact, a wobbly carpet slipper was not a good-looking thing for a commander on the field. general lee took his army forward to the potomac. only a detachment of the enemy was encountered by jackson, and this was at chantilly, where toward dark, and in a furious storm, there was a short combat in which major-general kearny was killed and left in our hands. kearny had been a conspicuous young officer in the mexican war, where he lost an arm, and coming of a wealthy new jersey family had resigned from the army and retired to private life. i saw his body next morning. it was given up to the enemy at their request, and his horse also, i think. he was a small, dashing-looking man, possessed, it was thought, of considerable military ability. after such successes there was a fair prospect of driving the enemy out of washington or bringing him to terms. general lee moved his army into maryland, passing most of the troops across the river at white ford. the soldiers crossed with joyful excitement, singing "my maryland," and the whole round of their musical stock, with bands playing and all cheering as well-known officers came in sight. indeed there was some reason for elation and hope. the enemy had suffered a serious defeat and was driven into his capital, his numbers again very great, but of demoralized and raw-recruited men. on the other hand, lee also had a strong army (for confederate numbers--we had been accustomed to be outnumbered). the men were triumphantly rejoicing and confident, and as they believed were moving into the friendly fields of a sister state, whose men would surely rise and join us; and more than all, they were commanded by the first general of the day. it was early september and delightful marching over maryland's good roads and through her fields of plenty. we had not yet been pushed for food, the transport so far having kept us supplied. general lee made a short halt at frederick city, where we took a rest and got loose ends of the army together; and from here began the movement that after two bloody battles was to send us disappointed back to the virginia side of the potomac. general lee there issued his famous confidential general order on which the army moved. it provided in detail for the march of his troops and his objective points. it was so full that when a copy came in my possession i wondered what could be done with it in event of my falling into the enemy's hands. by it jackson was to move to harper's ferry and capture its large garrison--it was a menace to lee's rear. mclaws was to occupy maryland heights, and j. g. walker, loudoun heights, in co-operation with jackson. troops were also sent to crampton's gap. d. h. hill was to occupy south mountain, or boonsboro gap, as it was variously called. longstreet's strong column was to be in the vicinity of hagerstown, twelve miles from d. h. hill's position. proper directions were provided for stuart's large cavalry force. the army moved from frederick under the confidential order. all should have gone well. the programme would have been carried out, the severed army reunited, with harper's ferry captured at it was, and once in front of the already half-beaten mcclellan (who had succeeded pope in command of the army of the potomac), what great victory would surely have awaited us! but fate or an unlucky chance decided otherwise. a copy of general lee's confidential order was handed to mcclellan when he reached frederick. he says in his official report that it was picked up by one of his men on our late camping ground. had lee whispered into the federal general's ear his inmost plans the latter could have asked for nothing more than the information brought him on that fatal paper. the effect on mcclellan was immediate. his march, up to then, had been cautious and timid, not more than eight or nine miles a day. when the order came to him he knew all about us. he knew that d. h. hill's five brigades at boonsboro would be nearly all that lay in his path to cross the mountain, and he began footing it with great speed. his march was rapid, and for mcclellan confident. he actually struck d. h. hill on september 14, on the mountain, with an overwhelming force. hill defended himself valiantly, drayton's and anderson's brigades reinforcing him. hearing his guns near hagerstown, longstreet's quick military instinct told him what was happening. we instantly broke camp and raced out for hill's relief. the distance was covered in extraordinary time and we happily got to hill just as he was being driven from the crest of the mountain, and in time to save him. darkness coming on, he was able to assemble his shattered battalions below, where with our force a front was shown that mcclellan hesitated on immediately attacking. at sun up we prepared to move and were soon on the march to antietam creek, behind which part of the army took position on the 15th and 16th. but i must go back to frederick city, asking how a document so vitally important as general lee's order could have suffered loss. it has often been discussed in special papers, in magazine articles, and in letters. mcclellan says it was addressed to major-general d. h. hill. there is no disputing this because the document is on file for evidence. general hill and his adjutant-general, col. archer anderson, both declare it impossible to have been hill's copy. they are to be implicitly believed. in addition, colonel anderson is able to produce a copy addressed to his chief.[1] thus we find ourselves in a dilemma. [1] colonel anderson was not there, being at home wounded. the explanation suggested is that perhaps two copies were sent hill. although now an independent division, jackson considered hill under his command and sent him a copy of the order. one copy certainly reached him direct from general lee. jackson and hill, although connected by marriage, had it is said no great personal liking for each other, and i can imagine the cross and dyspeptic hill, with the order from lee in his pocket, receiving another copy from jackson with careless irritation. if this theory does not work out, we seem to be quite baffled in finding a solution. we had a bad night on the mountain, extracting d. h. hill. he had made a magnificent defense, but was terribly mauled and broken up. drayton's brigade had been dispersed. there was great straggling to the rear by some of the men and our staff had to make sharp play with the flats of our swords on the backs of these fellows. it tired and disgusted me. the mountain roads were filled with broken regiments and companies and it was very late before they got to the foot of the mountain and in some sort of order. the material of our army was such that it did not take long for the men to shape up after disaster. it was near daylight before i got to longstreet's bivouac, made a brief report of things, and threw myself on some fence rails in the bad weather for a chance to sleep. not for long, however. all hands were soon afoot preparing for the march. during the day i came up with my old friend and schoolmate "sandy" duncan, of the hussars. he was a comical object, but doing good service mounted on a little beast, almost skin and bones, with scarcely any hair. the animal looked badly scalded. he bore duncan and his arms however, the trooper bearded and with as odd an appearance as his mount. he was gathering stragglers and pushing them forward with hard words and sometimes blows. we had never a campaign when there was so much straggling. duncan was an excellent cavalry soldier and devoted to his troop. in full health to-day at savannah, he is considered justly good authority on all things confederate. chapter xii battle of sharpsburg, continued marching through frederick--barbara fritchie and stonewall jackson--commissariat broken down--green corn for rations--stampede of horses of a cavalry regiment--d. h. hill's horse shot--longstreet's staff served guns of washington artillery--cannoneers killed--colonel john r. cooke's gallant fight--am wounded and carried off the field. when the army marched through frederick city it was fine weather, and the poet whittier has told of barbara frietchie and stonewall jackson--a stirring poem in winning lines, but quite without fact at bottom. but that matters not in the least. the lines are good and we can well afford to throw in with all the hard words and abuse of those days, the poet's ideas about our stonewall. the country through which we marched was beautiful, rich, and fertile, but we were constantly hungry. there were two lines of whittier's unquestionably true: "fair as a garden of the lord, to the eyes of the famished rebel horde." in all parts of the army straggling was principally caused by want of food. the commissariat had about broken down and the troops had recourse to anything. the fields were full of ripened corn, of which too much was eaten. parched and salted it would help a little, but eaten as it was, bad attacks of diarrhoea followed and such sickness became serious. on the night before the battle we were getting some sleep under thick trees when a stampede of horses nearly trampled us. it was a very surprising thing that happened to the jeff davis legion. the regiment was well lined and picketed in front, part of the officers and men asleep, guards and pickets on good watch, and everything deadly quiet and still, the night went on. suddenly something seemed to pass through the animals like a quiver of motion, a faint sound as of a sign, and then the wildest scene ensued. the horses for no reason that could be found had become stampeded, in the greatest panic and excitement. they broke away from their picket ropes, and droves of different sizes, some few, some many, were thundering along over the country and about the army in wild confusion. fortunately, they drew to our rear, and the troopers were all night and part of the next day recovering them. duncan has well described to me this extraordinary stampede, the like of which did not occur during the four years' war. the morning of september 17 opened with battle before us, presaged by the booming of cannon already beginning their noisy work. longstreet held the right center, the other wing being trusted to jackson, hood, richard h. anderson, mclaws, and other divisions. the fall of harper's ferry had released the attacking forces and enabled jackson and part of his command to join lee, but only after great exhaustion and fatal straggling. the enemy called this battle antietam, from the little stream that traverses the field. we gave it the name of sharpsburg, the village that nestled in the hills by the turnpike some little distance back of antietam. it was a dreadful day of fighting. beginning early, we were at it until nightfall. outnumbered three to one, it seemed that at almost any time a strong effort by mcclellan would drive us back, but that effort was not made. a third of his fine army did not fire a rifle. in the early afternoon lee, longstreet, and d. h. hill ascended a little acclivity near the turnpike to make some observations. all others--staff and orderlies--were kept back under the brow of the hill to avoid drawing fire on the three generals. in truth, they did look conspicuous on the crest, silhouetted against the bright skies, and the shot of course came, a little wide, but the second was from a good gunner. this shot struck the front legs of hill's horse, cutting them sharp off at the knees. the poor beast did not fall immediately, and made no sound, but put his nose into the grass, nibbling at it seemingly. the small general in a high-cantled saddle could not get his leg over in the position of the horse until longstreet helped him down. there is occasional talk of groans and shrieks of horses when wounded. i have seen many badly hurt, but cannot recall an instance in which the animal made any noise. this "gunning" has recently been associated with another incident on the field, with which it has really no connection. it was rather later in the day that we came on two of miller's washington artillery guns that had been doing splendid work, but were now silent. the gunners had fallen by their places, which were temporarily without cannoneers. longstreet was with us. fairfax, goree, manning, walton, myself, and perhaps some others took our horses' bridles as we leaped from them to the guns. the position was most important and it would never do for those "barkers" to be dumb, even for a minute; so at it we went, the improvised gunners, and were afterwards cheered by being told we did it well and could always get a gunner's berth when we might want it. i had the rammer, no. 1, i think it is in the drill. our fire was really strong and effective, until some reliefs from the washington artillery came up "ventre ã  terre," and with hearty shouts took their guns in hand. the enemy opened a severe fire on us, but fortunately none of our party was hurt. we mounted again with cheerful grins at our sudden adventure, and longstreet, much pleased, turned his attention to other imperiled points. now, some fellow writing recently says it was mcclellan's own hands that fired at hill's horse in the morning; and that, in revenge, longstreet seeing his position in the afternoon, guessed it must be mcclellan and his staff and dispersed them with his own hands on the guns. an awful lot of lies circulate nowadays about the civil war, and it is so long ago there is hardly anybody to contradict them. longstreet, whose eyes were everywhere, had noticed a regiment well advanced that had been fighting steadily for hours. it had gathered a few rails and stones for a chance protection to its brave fellows, all the time keeping up a good steady fire on the force in front of them, whose ranks looked so thick as to make one wonder they did not walk over our poor little regiment. longstreet never failed to encourage good work; he praised freely and liberally where he thought it due, constantly recommending meritorious young officers for promotion. there was no illiberality about him, and the officers knew it and tried for his notice. "major sorrel," he said, "go down to that regiment with my compliments to the colonel. say he has fought splendidly and must keep it up. we are hard pressed and if he loses his position there is nothing left behind him; his men have made noble sacrifices, but are to do still more." it was col. john r. cooke, commanding a north carolina regiment, that received this message. there were many dead along his lines and some severely wounded who could not be got away. my horse was wounded on the way to him, and the enemy's rifle firing was incessant, while from the saddle longstreet's praises and encouragement were given this brave officer. profanity is justly considered objectionable. i do not approve of it, but there are times when it may be overlooked, and never did such words sound so sweet as when i looked into cooke's eyes and heard him: "major, thank general longstreet for his good words, but say, by ---almighty, he needn't doubt me! we will stay here, by j. c., if we must all go to hell together! that ---thick line of the enemy has been fighting all day, but my regiment is still ready to lick this whole ---outfit. start away, major, quick, or you'll be getting hurt too, exposed as you are on that horse!" this is only a faint reproduction of the colonel's gift of language, but it left me with no doubt that the position would stand until that gallant heart gave the word to leave it. he stuck there until ordered off at night. it was some time before i was able to send a report to longstreet, the hour being about 5 p. m., but he had cooke promoted immediately. i had scarcely drawn my hand from cooke's when a shell burst over us and a fragment struck me senseless from my horse. chapter xiii battle of sharpsburg, concluded toombs's georgia brigade--longstreet on the field--lee's war horse--mcclellan superseded by burnside--a horse trade--richard h. anderson's division--a lost opportunity--walton and myself find quarters at shepherdstown among wounded--driven away by enemy's shells. toombs's brigade of georgians had fought well at the bridge on the right. it was contested all day and was the scene of some bloody encounters. some fresher men under a. p. hill at last came up late, almost dark, and a general advance on the enemy's lines persuaded the timorous mcclellan that we were not done fighting, and he ceased his operations. lee was left, after the long day's work, with thin ranks holding the ground he stood on in the morning, and nothing lost by us in guns, colors, or prisoners. the casualties, however, were very heavy, our list of wounded and killed being awful. here fell my dear personal friends of school days, mcintosh and parkman. i had lost several in the battles preceding and my heart was heavy. longstreet's conduct on this great day of battle was magnificent. he seemed everywhere along his extended lines, and his tenacity and deep-set resolution, his inmost courage, which appeared to swell with the growing peril to the army, undoubtedly stimulated the troops to greater action, and held them in place despite all weakness. my staff comrades described to me later his appearance and reception by lee when they met at night after firing ceased. longstreet, big, heavy, and red, grimly stern after this long day's work, that called for all we could stomach, rolled in on his clumsy carpet slippers. lee immediately welcomed him with unconcealed joy. "here comes my war horse just from the field he has done so much to save!" his arm affectionately around "peter's" shoulder. the latter should surely have been proud and well satisfied. lee held his ground that night and all the next day (the 18th), caring for his wounded and burying his dead. on the night of the 18th he quietly moved out and successfully passed the potomac to virginia ground without loss. that mcclellan with his great army, a third of which had taken no part in the two battles, permitted this escape is unaccountable. in olden times generals lost their heads for such stupidities. "little mac" lost his place instead, being soon superseded by burnside. i was never good at a horse trade, and here is a story of one. i had a nice little mare of good paces, but she was undersized for my long legs. walton, my staff comrade, had a big, fine bay, well gaited and apparently all that i could wish. walton, being a small man, liked the mare, and was ready to trade; but just before getting to boonsboro, the big bay, "mott" (he had been brought from mississippi by that colonel mott who was killed at williamsburg, and we named him "mott"), had broken loose and was astray somewhere, walton being unable to find him. having some mounted men i could use and knowing the cavalry officers near by, i believed he could be found, so taking the chances i made the trade by paying walton $275 to boot, and this too in '62, when confederate money was not so very _bad_. that much cash could then buy considerable stuff. longstreet was an excellent judge of horseflesh and to him i gave the details of my trade. in answer i got a little stare and smile as he said, "why, major, i would not give $275 for the horse tied to a corn crib; no quartermaster in this army can furnish forage enough for that beast!" this was soothing and encouraging to be sure, and in the mean time bay "mott" refused to be found. boonsboro and sharpsburg were fought, the army back in virginia, and i on my way back, when at last came my cavalrymen, bay "mott" in hand, and in a fortnight or so i was on him, a powerful, well-paced animal; but longstreet was right, he could never get enough to eat, and after some time his ribs and bones were disagreeably in evidence, and the beast was turned over to a quartermaster to do with as he would. he had pickings in the corral and was probably hitched to a hay wagon. when struck down by that bursting shell, colonel cooke had me immediately carried off on a stretcher to a less exposed place, and on regaining consciousness good old fairfax was pouring whiskey down my throat. we had been severed by one of those unnecessary camp differences and were not on good terms. needless to say all that was now forgotten and we were comrades once more. he managed to get an ambulance and sent me off to the army field-infirmary. there was another officer stretched by me in the ambulance, very bloody and very terribly wounded. i did not think i was hurt badly, but seemed to have no motion or feeling about the legs. we were soon at the surgeon's camp, dr. guild medical director in charge. i knew him well, a cheerful soul. "what, you too!" he cried. "now, turn over." and he began pinching my legs unmercifully. i kicked and cried out loudly, and he laughed and said: "o, you are quite right, i feared for your back. now away to the rear across the river; you will be on duty again in a fortnight." the hurt was a violent contusion below the right shoulder and made the whole side of the body black and blue with extravasated blood. off we started and came up with my staff comrade, walton, slowly trotting to the rear with a bullet in his shoulder. he took charge of things energetically, managed by threats and bullying to get a boat, and had us ferried across the river at shepherdstown. there walton got some men to carry me, hunting a resting place; he tried everywhere, his wound paining him all the time. the little town was full of wounded and it looked as if we should have to lie out in the street, but some gentle hearts were melted. at the house of the hamtrammocks, already crowded with wounded, the ladies gave up their last room and put us in it, fed and cheered us, providing that sweet sympathy and goodness that was ever present among the noble women of battle-torn virginia. the hamtrammock family was unknown to me, but stood very well in the village and all through the valley. it was said that their father, long dead, had commanded a virginia regiment in the mexican war. the only members of the family we saw were the two pleasant girls, elsie and florence, and an aunt, miss sheperd. that evening the doctor relieved walton of acute suffering by cutting out the bullet, which had buried itself in the muscles of the shoulder, and dressed my battered back. so we awoke next morning refreshed and easier, charmed with our luck in such good quarters. we were soon quite ready to be entertained by the young ladies, and they were nothing loth after the nurses had made us presentable. there was a georgian in the house, captain d'antignac, badly wounded in the head, and in charge of miss sheperd. she would sometimes rush into our room, laughing immoderately; the poor fellow was out of his head and talking all sorts of nonsense. our hostesses were very gracious, gay, happy, well educated girls; they played and sang prettily, and were such confederates! we had much curiosity to know how they had fared during the night, since they had been robbed of their rooms; it finally came out that they had shared the bathroom between them. but this elysium could not last long, for next day the enemy planted some guns on the river bank and began shelling everything. the wounded were in great peril and the surgeons hurried them to the rear. an ambulance was sent at once for us, and with grateful farewells to our friends, we were taken away to a little old farmhouse fifteen miles distant, behind lee's army. chapter xiv our personnel--visitors on duty again, recovered--army refreshed and in good condition--reorganization--first and second army corps, longstreet and stonewall commanding--divisions composing them--cavalry under stuart--visitors to our camp in valley--three englishmen, wolseley, lawley, and vizitelly. within the fortnight i was returned to duty, rather stiff but quite fit, and pleased with the hearty welcome of my brother officers. walton's wound proved severe and he was sent to a hospital at richmond. the army had picked up wonderfully, stragglers were back in ranks, the lightly wounded were again ready with their rifles, rations were abundant; some clothing and shoes had come, for a small part of it, and we were just eager for burnside or any other fellow. our general, like his army, was high in spirit and controlling absolutely its destiny. its devotion for lee and unfaltering confidence in him had never been surpassed. it was now that he found it necessary to reorganize its various commands. they were all comfortably camped in the valley, except a small detachment sent to the vicinity of fredericksburg, and covered a good deal of ground. the enemy was silent and showed no sign of movement, but we could guess where he was likely to strike next. somewhere about spottsylvania or fredericksburg, lee divided his army into two great infantry corps--the first army corps under lieut.-gen. james longstreet; the second army corps under lieut-gen. t. j. jackson. the first had five divisions under pickett, mclaws, hood, richard anderson, and j. g. walker; all had from four to five brigades; except walker's, only two, but it was known that his command was to be but temporarily with the virginia army. jackson's second army corps had also four divisions under a. p. hill, r. s. ewell, d. h. hill, and jackson's old division under taliaferro. the strength of the two great bodies was thus about equal. to each division there was a battalion of artillery of four batteries, and to each corps a reserve battalion of six batteries. longstreet had two of them, the washingtons, and alexander's battalion. there was also a strong body of reserve artillery to the army under command (and indeed he claimed some authority over the rest) of brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton. this officer had graduated from west point, had changed his uniform to the cassock and was rector of an episcopal church in western virginia. he was an especial friend of general lee, and leaving his pulpit brought a good battery to jackson's command. a well-meaning man, without qualities for the high post he claimed--chief of artillery of the army. the cavalry under stuart completed the good organization of that wonderful army. an excellent body of horse it was, in fit hands, and its commander, true body and soul to lee, was already a great cavalry leader. it was not, however, until next year that he rose with it to its high-water mark of strength, efficiency, and renown. while camped there in the valley we had all at once three interesting visitors, col. garnet wolseley, of the british army; hon. francis lawley, correspondent at the south for _the london times_, and frank vizitelly, southern correspondent and artist for _the london illustrated news_. wolseley was on duty in canada and had just slipped across the border and the army lines to have a look at the confederate forces. he was a small, spare man, modest and soldierly. it was from lawley that we learned more about him, and that he had distinguished himself while a subaltern in the crimea and was considered a rising officer. it fell to me to make better acquaintance with wolseley and we have kept up some communication since. it has, therefore, been good to follow his "steps" and note the more than fulfillment of the favorable expectations of him. commander of the red river expedition; general in charge of the ashantee war; severe, successful service in india; command in egypt and defeat of arabi at tel-el-kebir; operations in the soudan--these have been some of his various services up to five years ago, when he was made commander-in-chief of the forces, his tour of duty having just ended. we had a review of one of our divisions, gave him a good mount, and he rode well with longstreet, admiring with an experienced eye the hardy material of our soldiers. in a day or two he returned to canada. he has attained the rank of field marshal, and is viscount wolseley in the peerage of england, with many high orders of merit. this distinguished officer has written well and often of his confederate observations. he places lee in the first rank of generals of the english-speaking race, with marlborough and wellington; and his admiration for our leader is constant--of the very highest. a letter pointing to his interest in confederate autographs will be found in the appendix. frank lawley, tall, handsome, and of distinguished appearance, had started in english political life with everything in his favor. a fine university education, natural aptitude, and a polished pen aided him in becoming secretary to mr. gladstone when chancellor of the exchequer. soon, however, a shadow fell on lawley. he gave up his post and political life, taking to writing, for which he was well fitted. _the times_ had sent him south, and he was about lee's army nearly two years, making many friends. he is now one of the principal editors of the _london telegram_, with a great salary, which, as of old, does not go far with him. frank vizitelly (italian family, for centuries settled in england) was a burly-looking, reckless "bohemian," of many accomplishments. he could write, could sing, could draw and paint, could dance and ride, could tell good stories (good only in the telling, not in the matter) by the hour, and, finally, could drink like a fish, and did so. he made spirited drawings of battles, persons, and all sorts of scenes during the two years he was with us in the south, and managed to get them through the blockade to his paper. when vizitelly left us he served his paper all over the world, whenever there was war; and finally joining hicks pasha's expedition for subduing the soudan, perished in the complete massacre of that ill-fated column. his name, with six other war correspondents who fell at their several posts elsewhere, is carved in a tablet set in the walls of st. paul's cathedral, london. i never thought vizitelly could possibly come to such respectable distinction. chapter xv the staff staff of first corps--kirkwood rangers escort--a camp dinner party in state--lee's aggressiveness--ropes's description of lee--duties of the staff. the organization of the army having been described, it is time to show the staff of the first army corps; thus, october, 1862: major g. m. sorrel, a. a. g. and chief of staff. major john w. fairfax, a. a. g. and inspector. major osmun latrobe, a. a. g. and inspector. lieut.-col. p. t. manning, chief of ordnance. captain f. w. dawson, assistant to chief of ordnance. major thomas walton, a. d. c. captain thomas goree, a. d. c. lieutenant blackwell, a. d. c. major r. j. moses, chief commissary of subsistence. major mitchell, chief quartermaster. captain j. h. manning, signal officer. surgeon j. s. d. cullen, medical director. surgeon r. barksdale, medical inspector. surgeon kellum, medical inspector. assistant surgeon thomas maury, assistant to medical director. major chichester, commissary of subsistence. major i. g. clarke, engineer corps. of the names of those starting out with longstreet at the beginning only a few have already been given. the others were added as the command grew in strength and wants. some of those here named may not have joined until a little later than this time, which i fix at about november 15, 1862. latrobe, a marylander, had been serving with d. r. jones's small division. upon its being broken up he came to us and proved most acceptable to the lieutenant-general, and a valuable staff officer. he was eventually to succeed me when i was in 1864 promoted to command in another corps. moses, the chief commissary, had been a leading lawyer in georgia, and was now a most intelligent, efficient officer. he was much older than most of us, but "bon comrade," and had an exhaustless fund of incident and anecdote, which he told inimitably. latrobe, whom i often see, is my dear friend as i write; in fine health and good condition; big in body and frame as he is in heart. to corps headquarters at this time was attached a good troop of cavalry for courier and escort service. it was the kirkwood rangers, from south carolina, first commanded by captain shannon, then by captain tobey. captain shannon was that excellent man, somewhat advanced in years, and retired, who was forced into a duel in south carolina, and killed. the staff well understood their general and he knew them; they worked together with good results and never did one of them fail him. an officer who might also be numbered on the staff was colonel e. p. alexander, although he commanded the reserve artillery; but longstreet thought so well of his engineering and reconnoitering abilities that he kept him very near headquarters. while the three englishmen were visiting us it was decided to give them a dinner. two hospital tents were thrown together and made a fine mess hall, embellished with trophies of arms and flags. flowers and ferns did the rest for decoration. for the table there were planks on trestles, and the same for seats. the countryside was generous in lending, as well as giving provisions, and our fãªte did not lack a good white covering over its bare boards. provisions were plentiful outside the army rations, and i aver that on this occasion they were paid for honestly. young pig, well fattened, turkeys, fowls, fresh beef, and vegetables topped off the commissary's pork and hardtack. there were good cooks at our call, and the negro servants of the officers fairly grinned with delight at such a feast. we had many officers of note to meet our guests, and the function went off most agreeably. the absence of wine was conspicuous, but no one lacked for good whiskey, and perhaps before parting it had been tasted too often by some. after dinner came cards--poker. the englishmen, except wolseley, knew the game and enjoyed it. i know that i was a considerable loser, then a turn of chance brought me even, and soon we quit for bed, my last real game of poker to this date. the army had now been long enough under lee to satisfy all that he meant fighting, always fighting. that was the business of the army, and only by fighting could virginia be cleared of the enemy and richmond made secure. when he first took command there were a few unthinking speeches made. he had fortified richmond, and like a skilful general knew the value of field-works and temporary entrenchments. some in the army were given to speak of him as the "king of spades" who would never allow us to show fighting. the past fourteen months had indeed opened the eyes of these sneerers. ropes, the distinguished northern military historian, writing always, even in the most heated controversy, fairly and dispassionately, has this to say for our hero, en passant, in one of his books, having already once declared him "the most accomplished soldier of the day": at the time of his appointment to the command of the army of northern virginia, general lee was 55 years of age, in perfect health, vigorous, robust, of a commanding presence. his character, public and private, was of the highest. in intellect it may be doubted whether he was superior to the able soldier whom he succeeded; indeed, joseph e. johnston possessed as good a military mind as any general on either side; but in that fortunate combination of qualities, physical, mental, and moral, which go to make up a great commander, general lee was unquestionably more favored than any of the leaders of the civil war. he possessed at once the entire confidence of his government and the unquestioning and enthusiastic devotion of the army. he had no rival, either in the councils of the richmond war department or in the colloquies around camp-fires. lee's position was unique. no army commander on either side was so universally believed in, so absolutely trusted. nor was there ever a commander who better deserved the support of his government and the affection and confidence of his soldiers. with the growth of longstreet's command my duties had become doubly important, and with weighty responsibilities. the general left much to me, both in camp and on the field. as chief of his staff it was my part to respond to calls for instruction and to anticipate them. the general was kept fully advised after the event, if he was not near by at the time; but action had to be swift and sure, without waiting to hunt him up on a different part of the field. the change of movement of a brigade or division in battle certainly carried a grave responsibility, but it has often to be faced by the chief staff officer if the general happened to be out of reach. nearly two years of war on a grand scale had given me experience and confidence, and longstreet was always generous with good support when things were done apparently for the best. this gave me good prestige in our large corps, and i found hosts of friends among officers and men. the reorganization had made the first corps 40,000 strong, effective, by the time it got to fredericksburg in december. jackson's second corps was fully 38,000 strong. chapter xvi events preceding fredericksburg burnside in command of army of the potomac--sketch--lee's plans--at fredericksburg--general patrick, u. s. a.--flag of truce--arrival of army in position--poor defensive works--bad-weather march--some expedients by longstreet--the stone wall--major-general mclaws, major-general hood, major-general anderson, major-general walker--sketches. the new commander of the army of the potomac was one of the most highly respected officers of the united states army, but he was not equal to the command, and so stated to the officers who brought him mr. lincoln's commission and orders. mcclellan was of decided ability in many respects; timorous, but safe; and there was no better organizer. he seemed to hate battle, and it is surprising that with such a record he should have secured and retained the devotion and confidence of his men to the very end. there was no lack of physical courage; it was a mental doubt with him. burnside had no prominent reputation, but made a success of an unimportant expedition into north carolina. he conspicuously failed at sharpsburg, where all day the bridge on the right was the scene of combat, without his movement to seize it. his great corps, held idly in hand, was equal to it ten times over. but he may have been waiting on mcclellan, with whom he was in the closest intimacy of friendship. at all events, burnside could and would fight, even if he did not know how, and after "little mac" this was what mr. lincoln was trying for. he was a handsome man, from rhode island, of fine, courteous bearing. franklin should have been, i think, the man for lincoln; but who knows? there was a powerful clique always about mcclellan, most unwisely at difference, sometimes, with the administration. a pause in the operations ensued while we lay about bunker hill and winchester. but lee had, in the first half of november, decided where he should make burnside fight. it was fredericksburg. longstreet had previously sent mclaws's division east of the mountains to the vicinity of culpeper, and about november 16 started him for the old town on the rappahannock, following a day or two later from his valley camps with the remainder of the corps. the gaps of the blue ridge were well occupied and defended by jackson and stuart's cavalry during lee's transfer of his army in this delicate strategical operation. i parted from longstreet for a day or two, and arrived near fredericksburg with some of the leading troops, before him. my ride was in the worst weather, roads deep in mud, with rain in torrents. fredericksburg is one of the oldest and most aristocratic of the virginia towns. a dwindling trade had thinned the population and quieted its ambitions. at this time the place was the home of families of historical importance and present interest, with a thorough knowledge of good living, and still respectable cellars of old madeira that had been imported by them many years before. the enemy had a small garrison there and a provost marshal, an elderly united states officer, kind and gentle in his authority, and much liked by the citizens. from this officer i received a request to meet him under flag of truce, and we made acquaintance in a little block-house just outside the town. the good old general patrick was quite in ignorance apparently of the great operation that was then culminating. expecting to hold the city with his little garrison he wished to avert any shelling of the town by our guns. his friends had not yet made their appearance on the falmouth hills, commanding the town on the left bank of the river. we had outstripped their march. general patrick was informed that he must at once withdraw from fredericksburg, that we should occupy it in force. he smiled, thinking it a bluff, and wanted to know where the soldiers were. on this point he got no information, of course, and we parted. however, he was soon to see our men pouring forward, and mclaws's division seizing the city and posting his gallant mississippians on the river front, under the intrepid barksdale. patrick's little gang had, of course, immediately slipped away when they saw what was coming. this i think was about november 21. the entire army soon after arrived and took position behind the rappahannock, a wide, undulating plain for the most part stretching between our lines and the river itself. longstreet took the left and jackson the right; the former's most important point being the stone wall and sunken road at the foot of marye's hill. looking back at the situation, it seems surprising that we did so little in the way of defensive field-works. the enemy in great masses were crowding the falmouth hills, and we knew intended to cross and strike us. but yet we contented ourselves with the little stone wall (which proved helpful), and two or three tiers of light trenchwork extended on the slope of the hill behind and on our left. the like observation applies to jackson, whose lines were above the same as ours in strength, except the stone wall. later in the war such a fault could not have been found. experience had taught us that to win, we must fight; and that fighting under cover was the thing to keep up the army and beat the enemy. he knew it, too, and practised it, so later on veterans no sooner got to facing each other than they began to dig, if ever so little; a little trench, a tiny hillock is often a very helpful defense and protection. the march to fredericksburg in bad weather and over almost bottomless roads had caused great suffering to the men and some losses among the animals. it was then that longstreet told his men of an expedient that as an old soldier he had often resorted to. "rake," he sent word to the men, "the coals and ashes from your cooking fires and sleep on that ground; it will be dry and warm." and so it proved. also, there being many barefooted men, "take the rawhides of the beef cattle, killed for food; cut roughly for a moccasin-like covering for the feet, and there you are with something to walk in." but this did not go. the foot-wear had nothing like soles of stiffening, and in the mud and icy slush of the virginian roads the moist, fresh skins slipped about as if on ice. the wearers, constantly up or down, finally kicked them aside and took the road as best they could, barefooted or wrapped with rags or straw. richmond did its best to supply, but there was always trouble for want of shoes. great quantities were run in from england by blockade, but they were worthless, shoddy things that might be done for in a day's use. i once wore a pair of them, and in a single day of wet and mud the cheats came to pieces and developed bits of paper and odds of leather things, where should be good, strong, well tanned cow skin. it is said that our friends, the enemy, across the lines fared badly as well in shoddy, and that too from their own neighbors and countrymen. it was awfully nasty work getting down to that stone wall for giving orders or receiving information, the way swept by the enemy's volume of fire over every foot. once at the wall it was fairly snug, but the coming back was still worse, and one drew a long breath on emerging safely from the deadly fusilade. we could only manage it on foot by making short rushes from point to point, affording perhaps some little cover. it was on such a duty that my friend lord king was killed. he was a. d. c. to mclaws, of the family of kings of southern georgia. the ranking major-general of our corps was l. mclaws, his division made up of georgians, mississippians, and south carolinians. he was an officer of much experience and most careful. fond of detail, his command was in excellent condition, and his ground and position well examined and reconnoitered; not brilliant in the field or quick in movement there or elsewhere, he could always be counted on and had secured the entire confidence of his officers and men. maj.-gen. john b. hood's appearance was very striking; in age only 34, he had a personality that would attract attention anywhere. very tall and somewhat loose-jointed; a long, oval face shaded by yellowish beard, plentiful hair of same color, and voice of great power and compass. with very winning manners, he is said to have used these advantages actively for his own advancement. but apart from that, his services in the field were of the best. resigning from the united states army he was made colonel of one of the three texas regiments that were sent to virginia. there he quickly showed his soldierly qualities and was made brigadier-general over the brigade formed of the three texas regiments and the third arkansas. it was conspicuous in all of the many combats in which it was engaged, and hood soon came on for promotion to one of the divisions of longstreet's corps. as major-general he continued to display high qualities and he might be considered an ideal officer of that rank and command. at gettysburg he received a wound in the arm. it is said that at richmond, while convalescing, he suffered himself to criticize very freely our operations in pennsylvania. as soon as recovered he resumed his division, which he took to chickamauga, where his conduct was magnificent. there he lost a leg. longstreet immediately recommended him to promotion to lieutenant-general, which was done, and on recovery hood was assigned to the western army under j. e. johnston. there i must leave him. his biographers will relate his promotion to the rank of full general; his superseding johnston; his march to the enemy's rear; the sanguinary battles of franklin and nashville, and the crushing defeat of his expedition by thomas, making possible the great decisive strategic operation of sherman's "march to the sea." maj.-gen. g. e. pickett we already know. he had a very fine division of five virginia brigades, all well commanded by brigadiers who greatly helped the major-general to the high reputation gained by this gallant body of men. maj.-gen. richard h. anderson, of south carolina, had been a captain of cavalry in the united states army, and was rather an interesting character. his courage was of the highest order, but he was indolent. his capacity and intelligence excellent, but it was hard to get him to use them. withal, of a nature so true and lovable that it goes against me to criticize him. he had served well as a brigadier-general, and now with longstreet, commanding a division, had more to do. longstreet knew him well and could get a good deal out of him, more than any one else. his division was of georgians, south carolinians, alabamians and mississippians. maj.-gen. j. b. walker was commanding two brigades of north carolinians. i had no intimate knowledge of this officer, who it was known would be with the virginia army but for a short time. he bore a high reputation among those of his acquaintance. chapter xvii battle of fredericksburg, december 13, 1862 enemy massed on stafford heights--heavy artillery fire--the pontoon bridge--splendid defense of mississippians--enemy crosses--preparing for his assault--sumner's attack on marye's hill--the deadly stone wall--general cobb killed--general lee's position--jackson in uniform--his answer to longstreet--franklin's attack on jackson--enemy escapes across the river--strength and losses--bursting of a gun--old madeiras in fredericksburg--an incident, "one touch of nature"--enemy not pursued. but now it is time to sketch something of the remarkable battle that the quiet waters of the rappahannock were to see fiercely fought in torrents of blood across the plain that bordered the stream. i attempt no description, limiting myself to some stray observations. the enemy had finally massed his great force (122,500 men) on stafford heights and was to force the passage of the river. franklin had wisely advised burnside to do the work with half the army against our right, and burnside, at first assenting, then resumed his original intention to attack our center with sumner's grand division. well for us that he did so! on december 11 his movements began by attempting to set his pontoon bridge opposite the city for the crossing. it was opposed by general barksdale's mississippi brigade of mclaws's division, and stands as one of the finest acts of heroism and stubborn resistance in our military annals. burnside first poured an artillery fire in the devoted town and defending brigade--that was literally an "enfer." there had been nothing like it before in this war. every shot, all kinds of missiles, were thrown at the mississippians to dislodge them. the brave fellows were there, however, to stay. they hid themselves in cellars, wells, holes of any kind where they could get a little cover, while their rifles picked off the pontooners pluckily trying to throw their boats across the stream. the latter fell in great numbers and this went on nearly all day. the confederates would not budge, although so stubborn a defense had been no part of our expectation. we knew the town would be seized. quite late the bridge effort was abandoned by the federal engineers. calling for volunteers to fill the boats and cross in mass, it was gallantly answered. a number of them were quickly crowded, and notwithstanding our fire their landing was soon made and the town occupied, but not before barksdale had safely withdrawn his hard-fighting fellows. they had the cheers of the army for their day's brave work. then began that night and all next day and night the movement of burnside's great army across the river. more brigades were added and there were several in franklin's possession. he had no trouble in laying what he wanted in his front. thus stood burnside, his army facing us with nothing between, on december 13, and bitter cold, franklin operating on his left against jackson. sumner in the center and center-right against longstreet, who also guarded the lines extended considerably to our left. hooker's grand division was held on stafford heights during the night of the 12th. but marye's hill was our strong point. burnside wanted it and there he threw his men in blind and impotent fury. it was held by t. r. r. cobb's brigade of georgians behind a stone wall at first and another brigade in support. the front here was quite narrow. ransom's and cook's north carolina brigades were in light trenches higher up the hill, but in position to deliver deadly fire, and did so. the defense at the stone wall was also kept carefully reinforced as needed. there was some artillery in pits near the crest of the hill that did effective service. general lee's position with his staff during the day was on a small hill with a good plateau, from which he had a fair view of sumner's attack on longstreet, as well as franklin's on jackson. longstreet was much of the time with him. before the hot work began, "stonewall" rode up to have a word with lee. as he dismounted we broke into astonished smiles. he was in a spick and span new overcoat, new uniform with rank marks, fine black felt hat, and a handsome sword. we had never seen the like before, and gave him our congratulations on his really fine appearance. he said he "believed it was some of his friend stuart's doings." franklin was in great masses before jackson, and before mounting, longstreet called out, "jackson, what are you going to do with all those people over there?" "sir," said stonewall, with great fire and spirit, "we will give them the bayonet." there is really now but little more to be said in detail of the battle. in front of us it was hammer and tongs all day from 11 a. m. until finally burnside had to desist in sheer weariness of slaughter. his troops advanced to their assaults with the finest intrepidity, but it was impossible for them to stand before our fire. i afterwards saw that perhaps not more than half a dozen of their men had got within sixty yards of our wall and dropped there. not once was there any sign of faltering or weakness among our troops; the solid bodies of troops attacking might easily have made it otherwise with unseasoned soldiers. on our right franklin had been more successful. he managed to pierce a salient that should have been corrected and worsted a considerable number of jackson's men. the line was retaken and restored, but with some loss, among whom was captain edward lawton, a young brother of general lawton, of georgia. we also lost at marye's hill general cobb (t. r. r.), of georgia, deeply mourned as one of the most promising officers and whole-souled patriots of the south. when darkness fell on this great tragedy, hostile movements ceased and the two armies were caring for the "butcher's bill." ours was small comparatively, but the enemy had lost very heavily. a thick fog or mist also arose and enveloped the enemy's movements in strangeness and uncertainty. they were actually started on hastily recrossing the river, but we don't appear to have known it. most of the day of the 14th it was thick and misty, veiling successfully the enemy's movements, but all the time he was preparing for his retreat. he was not attacked while in this exposed position. why not? it is generally thought it would have been fatal to the federals and it is indisputable that they were in hourly dread of it. some say jackson proposed a night attack, but i doubt it, and am glad it was not made. it is impossible to describe the confusion of such an attempt or to anticipate what might happen. i was in one later on with three picked brigades of the highest order and efficiency. the roar of battle between lookout mountain and brown's ferry on the tennessee river words cannot express, and in the black darkness the three brigades achieved worse than nothing. but why did we not attack on the 14th in daylight? not my part to attempt this explanation, but it looks much as if we were "building a bridge of gold for the flying enemy." on the night of the 17th burnside withdrew his army to his old camp in the falmouth hills. we lost in killed and wounded--longstreet, 1,519; jackson, 2,682; total, 4,201. jackson was also reported as having lost in missing 526. these figures are also adopted by ropes, and he gives burnside's army as 122,500, ours as 78,500. i do not think that more than half of our forces were engaged on the 13th. the federal losses, attacks on marye's hill, 8,000; loss of whole army, federal, 12,650 killed and wounded. (ropes figures.) the hill referred to as affording general lee at fredericksburg a point of view, had a light trench in which was mounted a 30-pounder parrott gun, made in richmond. the 10-pounder guns of that make had done well, but those of heavy caliber were treacherous. the one on "lee's hill," as it came to be called, burst after a few discharges. happily it did not send fragments flying about, and no one was hurt. the immense breech just appeared to have split into a dozen pieces of various sizes and then fallen heavily to the ground. we were rather glad to have done with such a piece of metal. the old wines of the good people of fredericksburg have been referred to. they suffered in the fortunes of war. a few nights before the opening of the battle, which was then imminent, considerable quantities of fine old madeira and other varieties were taken out of cellars and bins, and sent by the citizens to our fellows in camp, equally ready for drink or for battle. it was known that the town would be shelled and occupied by the federals, probably looted and plundered; therefore it was thought safest to see priceless old vintages passed around campfires and quaffed in gulps from tincups. of course the men would have better liked whiskey, but they did not refuse the wine. an incident on the river may bear telling. it was after the battle, when the pickets had resumed their posts and had become friendly; more given to trading than shooting each other at less than one hundred yards. the authorities had to set their faces sternly against this trading. it led to desertion. a fine federal band came down to the river bank one afternoon and began playing pretty airs, among them the northern patriotic chants and war songs. "now give us some of ours!" shouted our pickets, and at once the music swelled into dixie, my maryland, and the bonnie blue flag. then, after a mighty cheer, a slight pause, the band again began, all listening; this time it was the tender, melting bars of home, sweet home, and on both sides of the river there were joyous shouts, and many wet eyes could be found among those hardy warriors under the flags. "one touch of nature makes the whole world kin." of course the enemy's powerful artillery on stafford heights would have been an efficient aid in resisting an attack on his infantry before, and while recrossing the river. but they were badly demoralized and would probably not have stood long with that threatening river in their rear and the triumphant confederates in the front. there was much private discussion then, and after, among the intelligent of the federals as to why they were not struck after their sanguinary defeat. a general belief existed among them that we were deficient in ammunition, the only explanation many of them were able to arrive at. we had no want of it. chapter xviii after fredericksburg--reminiscences fredericksburg after the battle--flag of truce--burying dead--general wadsworth, u. s. a.--again on enemy's side with flag of truce--at their picket fire--colonel brown, of rhode island--bitter cold--all night in their camp--luxuries for the wounded--first georgia regulars--they are ordered home--want of shoes--captain cuthbert, of south carolina. the battle was indeed fought and finished, and although the triumph of victory rested with us, and the enemy was back in his lines, beaten and dispirited, yet it cannot be said that there had been achieved a result so decisive as to bring us near the end of the war. we were caring for our dead. the enemy was to do so for his. they lay in great numbers on the plain. general lee wrote burnside and i carried the letter under a flag of truce through the town to the ferry, where was found a pontoon, and my men took me across. it was pitiful riding through the town, considerably damaged as it was by the artillery fire from stafford heights, but more still from the plundering and looting that had gone on while in possession of the united states troops. furniture, bedding, mattresses, carpets, china, domestic utensils, indeed all that went to make up those comfortable homes, were strewn helter skelter, broken and ruined about the streets. the streets were filled with distressed women and children, both black and white. but we passed on--"c'est ã  la guerre comme ã  la guerre!" my pontoon landed me at the foot of a steep road that ascended the hill and i was immediately met by a number of officers in brilliant uniforms. for myself i must have been awfully shabby; never at any time given to military finery, while campaigning, i think i was worse off than usual here at fredericksburg. the weather had been atrocious, and mud and i were closely acquainted day and night. there was, too, so much to do that one had no time for repairing damages. but my reception by the federal officers was extremely courteous while awaiting an answer to general lee's missive, now on its way to burnside, whose headquarters were near by. there were major-general park, chief of staff to the army; major-general wadsworth (whom i was to see in eighteen months at the "wilderness" under different circumstances); brig.-gen. jim hardie, and many others, all having some inquiries to make for friends on our side. general wadsworth asked me how many dead i thought lay on our front. "i ask, major," he said, "so as to make my burying parties strong enough." i said: "i cannot possibly guess with any approach to accuracy. i have only ridden through the slain in front of marye's hill, and it seemed that there must be at least 800 there awaiting burial." "my god, my god!" groaned the old officer, deeply impressed by such mortality. instead of 800, they buried nearly 1,200 men in that small front, besides some 300 in front of jackson's position. general burnside's answer soon came, and saluting my federal acquaintances i was quickly on our own side of the river and the federal commander's letter in lee's possession. strong burial parties immediately came across for their ghastly duty. general wadsworth was a wealthy, middle-aged man from the lovely genesee valley, new york, owning great tracts of land; but considered it his patriotic duty to raise some battalions for the army and did so, placing himself at their head. the government showed him all honor, conferring at once high rank. a day or two later it became necessary to see the northerners again. their burying parties were making hideous work with the dead soldiers; throwing them in heaps in shallow trenches, barely covered; filling the country ice houses and wells with them; indeed, doing this work most brutally for themselves, and intolerably for our citizens. general lee called burnside's attention to the revolting conduct of the latter's men and i went across the river, with also some verbal details. the pontoon had been drawn in by the owners and was in the union rear with the bridge train. there was naught to cross in except a broken, leaky little batteau that was found in a cellar. the river was smooth and one of my men managed to paddle the crazy thing safely across. there i was met by colonel brown, commanding a rhode island regiment on picket duty, who civilly invited me to the comfort of his camp fire while awaiting the communication from his army headquarters, now quite a distance off. i was detained some time, and the colonel (a lawyer of high reputation from providence, rhode island), had time for much general talk. at last, making my thanks and farewell, i started back, only to find my man at the river's edge almost frozen and the batteau sunk out of sight with darkness on us! a pretty kettle of fish, indeed! the water rough, wind strong, and already freezing. there was nothing for it but to take my man back with me to the picket and get a message to headquarters of my plight, with request of assistance to cross. after another considerable wait there came an officer and several mounted orderlies leading a good horse; this was for me. the officer brought a civil message from the adjutant-general regretting that they had nothing at hand to float (their pontoons being in the rear), and hoping i could be made comfortable for the night. leaving my soldier to the good care of the friendly pickets, i mounted and was led to the large house on the hill, at that time in use as a hospital. there my escort left me and i found myself for the night in the great kitchen of the establishment, filled with bright warmth and savory smells of good food. a blanket or two had to do me for bedding, but i was soon asleep, after the soldier cooks had given me food, always with full respect to rank and authority. to see what they had, its quality, its abundance, filled one's heart with envy when contrasted with the doled-out, bare necessities of life the lot of our own uncomplaining fellows. here in this great kitchen were huge swinging vessels of odorous real coffee; immense chunks of fat, fresh beef of all parts of the animal; great slabs of dessicated vegetables, which, when thrown with knuckles of meat and good flesh into the boiling cauldron, puffed out, swelling each vegetable into something like freshness, and then with free dashes of salt and pepper, behold, a soup of strength and tastiness fit for faint heart to fight on. they gave me of it all and i tasted all, sleeping well and early up. my man, who had fared well too, was soon at hand, and the boat raised, bailed out, landed us safely on our own bank. the soldier with me was jesse beall, private from milledgeville in a georgia regiment. i was disposed at first to be vexed by such rough lodgings (a parlementaire being entitled to the best), but colonel kip explained that there was really nothing else to be done at that hour of night. of course they could not carry me through the lines to their own comfortable staff quarters in the rear. many years after, hearing that there was in savannah, passing through, a colonel brown, of rhode island, with his wife, i called on him. it proved to be my friend of the picket fire, and his wife, with much enthusiasm, declared he had spoken of the incident fifty times. colonel brown had some more talk this time, quite free, and like very many union officers marveled why they were not attacked after a repulse so bloody and disastrous. he said that want of ammunition could only explain it to him. brown was a middle aged, delicate man, a member of the well-known brown family of rhode island. he said he had raised his regiment from patriotic convictions and carried it through the battle of fredericksburg; then he gave way to younger, stronger men and resigned. he was a broad, fair-minded man, with no deep prejudices against the south. next year he died, his townsmen showing in every way the honor and respect in which he was held. the first georgia regulars were posted at hamilton's crossing, near fredericksburg, and had its ranks much thinned by the casualties of several campaigns. it could not be recruited like other regiments, being enlisted from all parts, and the department therefore ordered it home to fill its ranks. i rode myself, orders in hand, to its camp. i had many friends among the officers and knew how delighted they would be; and so it was, a wild shout of happiness at seeing old georgia again, and the skeleton battalion began packing almost immediately for the route. after doing some enlistment it took an honorable part in the battle of olustee, fought in florida. lieutenant sorrel was with them until a captain's commission in the adjutant-general's department sent him to report in virginia to gen. john bratton's south carolina brigade. i was in europe in the summer of 1860, and traveled on the continent a few weeks with george cuthbert, of beaufort, south carolina. he was a pleasant fellow, and handsome, of good height and figure, and the fairest blonde, with beautiful blue eyes. even in fair-haired saxony, people turned to look at him. the war broke out and i did not know where cuthbert would be serving. one day, however, in the winter of 1862-63, riding by the lines of one of our south carolina regiments, up rose cuthbert, and i was immediately on my feet beside him. he was a line captain, had been wounded, and was at the moment as shabby a confederate soldier as could be found anywhere. razors had been discarded, and the german girls who liked to look at the handsome southerner would not have deigned him a glance. i resolved to do something for his advancement, but the channels were such that i could not get him out of them. soon after, however, an order came from richmond to detail 160 shoemakers for the use of the quartermaster-general--such was the stress we were in for shoes. half the detail was ordered from jackson's corps and half from longstreet's. i sent out orders for our eighty crispins, and when they were picked out of the whole corps, word was given to captain cuthbert to report at corps headquarters and a brief colloquy opened. "i say, cuthbert, would you like to go to richmond?" "wouldn't i!--clean clothes, soap, a bath and a shave!" "eighty shoemakers are to be taken there by rail and then turned over to the quartermaster-general, and an officer must take the detail. will you have it?" "my dear sorrel, give it to me; for god's sake, give it to me--such a change after my long trench service. i'd land them safely with the q. m. g. if they were eighty raving demons instead of the happy fellows they doubtless are in getting such a detail." "all right, old chap, take your fellows off by train to-morrow; here are the orders. and i say, cuthbert, while you are in richmond don't hurry too much; you can make the duty last you a week or ten days." he was very grateful for being thought of, performed his work satisfactorily, and then enjoyed himself hugely. i was glad to think of this later, since he was one of many personal friends who gave up his life in battle. the incident also illustrated the great straits the confederate supply department was in to keep the troops equipped for the field. this was especially the case with shoes. chapter xix to south virginia for supplies burnside's "mud march"--his removal--hooker superseding him--our great want of supplies--longstreet ordered to south virginia--hood's and pickett's divisions with him--i precede them--inspecting fort at washington, n. c.--rejoin the command at suffolk--gathering supplies--operations against suffolk not successful--ordered back to lee--all haste--no time lost, but too late for chancellorsville--pickett's courtship--harrison, the scout--death of stonewall jackson--lieutenant habersham. here then for some weeks did the two armies lay in the peace of camp life after the fever of battle. burnside attempted a movement, known as the mud march, quickly made abortive by the condition of roads, and then mr. lincoln reluctantly removed him, placing hooker--"fighting joe hooker"--in command of the army of the potomac. it was in may before he attempted his disastrous move against lee and jackson. meantime, our army was in want of all supplies. the subsistence department lacked fresh meat. in southern virginia and eastern north carolina there were said to be large quantities of small cattle which, fattened on the good virginia pasture lands, would greatly help the subsistence officers. there were also there large stores of bacon and corn. it was decided to send part of lee's army to operate in that region, and, at the same time, by covering large wagon trains, we should be enabled to use that part of the country for the virginia army. it had sometimes been occupied by the enemy, at all times exposed to their sudden incursions. but these, it is thought, formed the least of the reasons governing lee when sending longstreet and two of his strong divisions to nansemond and suffolk. it was daring to make such a large draft on his army, but lee was given to daring efforts, with a great objective in view. the northern army was becoming dangerously strong for him to view calmly, and another strong body was preparing to threaten richmond from a different quarter. lee may have reasoned, as he did in some of his valley operations, that by detaching longstreet, hooker would be quickly induced to follow him, by sending from his army a still larger force for the safety of the threatened districts. but it proved they had enough troops for such reinforcements without impairing hooker's great strength. our two divisions, hood's and pickett's, and a battalion of artillery broke camp and halted at petersburg, whence the force found camps on the nansemond river, in a manner besieging the town of suffolk, strongly held by the federals. by longstreet's order i set out alone for a short visit of inspection to the eastern boundary of north carolina. it was the little town of washington, on the head of a tidal river, that, i think, i first visited. there was nothing there but a well-built, strong earthwork fort, and a fine, full regiment, doing nothing and eager for action. it was not likely to come to them at that dull place, and on my recommendation the regiment was sent to lee. the lieutenant-colonel (lamb) gave me a warm fur collar, which was always a comfort, and he was delighted with the pair of spurs i made him accept from me (they were made from the brass trunnion beds of the monitor _keokuk_, sunk by our forces at charlestown). poor lamb was killed in the first engagement of his regiment. my instructions were to lose no time, but, after a glance around, hasten back to the command. when i returned it was seen that nothing had been achieved. some little bluffing had been made at the town of suffolk, in which we lost two pieces of artillery and gained nothing. time was passing, the virginia roads improving, and some restlessness apparent among us. we knew, of course, that hooker must soon fight, and that we should be there. at last general lee sent for us in haste, not a moment was to be lost. not a moment was lost; we threw everything into movement, realizing how keenly our beloved commander and comrades on the rappahannock would be wanting their lieutenant-general and his two splendid divisions. but it was humanly impossible. we were late, hooker had attacked rather earlier than expected, and on may 3 the battle was given, and our great jackson fell in glorious victory while we were miles distant by railroad from the memorable field of chancellorsville. general pickett was a widower, but had recently suffered himself to fall in love with all the ardor of youth. the object of these fiery, if mature, affections dwelt not far from suffolk. pickett's visits were frequent, a long night ride and return for duty early next day. perhaps he had wearied longstreet by frequent applications to be absent, but once he came to me for the authority. my answer was, "no, you must go to the lieutenant-general." "but he is tired of it, and will refuse. i swear, sorrel, i'll be back before anything can happen in the morning." i could not permit myself to be moved. if anything did happen, such as a movement of his division or any demonstration against it, my responsibility for the absence of the major-general could not be explained. but pickett went all the same, nothing could hold him back from that pursuit. he married some time after. i don't think his division benefited by such carpet-knight doings in the field. while longstreet was holding this brief independent command, a scout, more properly a spy, was placed at his service by the war department. he was a man of about thirty years, calling himself a mississippian, and was altogether an extraordinary character. he was paid in united states greenbacks. i approved requisition on the quartermaster every month for $150 for him. his time seemed to be passed about equally within our lines and the enemy's. harrison (such was his name) always brought us true information. there was invariable confirmation of his reports afterwards. while always suspicious that such secret instruments give away as much as they bring and may be in the pay of both sides, it was difficult to be sure of this in harrison's case. he went everywhere, even through stanton's war office at washington itself, and brought in much. we could never discover that he sold anything against us; besides, we had means, and did verify his account of himself as coming from mississippi. when longstreet gave him up in september, he was sorry afterwards and missed the man. he made me try to get him back for our command, but i failed. there will be more to say of harrison before losing him. on the whole he appears to have been a daring southerner, hating yankees most bitterly, but loving their greenbacks, and fond of secret, perilous adventure. latrobe recently heard from him in baltimore, in want, and asking some small assistance. upon rejoining our army after chancellorsville we were, of course, eager questioners and listeners for everything about the battle. gratifying it was to hear on all sides of the conduct of our two divisions, which bore so large a part of the attacks on lee. anderson and mclaws had never fought better; while lee, to hold his position and beat off hooker, had to have the very best every man could give him. it was a battle most extraordinary in its execution and development. the powerful movement on lee's rear by sedgwick's force from fredericksburg was enough to disconcert any ordinary commander. lee, calm and undismayed, met it by thinning out his lines to almost a frazzle, and throwing a good division before john sedgwick, while he and jackson were preparing the blow that made "fighting joe hooker's" head split with surprise and agony and sent him flying back across the rappahannock. the great flank movement of stonewall had been carefully planned by lee and most brilliantly executed by the lieutenant. but the army had suffered the irreparable loss of that hero. struck down in the gloaming and thick foliage of the forest, by his own men, his dauntless spirit clung to his army for a week, among ever-hopeful soldiers, and then took its warrior's flight to its supreme maker. there was none left in his place; there was but one jackson. when marye's hill was attacked by sedgwick in lee's rear, the battery in action there had to make a hurried escape. one of its officers, a dear friend of mine, lieut. frederick habersham, had been killed at his section. his comrades determined to have his body, and lashed it to the trail of a gun, and there it hung, firmly bound, a sight not often witnessed, while the battery, already late in retiring, was at a gallop in escape from the pursuing enemy. it was accomplished handsomely, and the brave fellow received his interment by the hands of loving wife and friends at his home in savannah. it was my brother, doctor sorrel, in richmond, who, with many difficulties, arranged for the care and transportation home of the slain artillerist. chapter xx preparing for gettysburg preparations for summer campaign--army reorganized--three army corps--a. p. hill made lieutenant-general, commanding third corps--lieutenant-general ewell commanding second corps--stuart's cavalry reviewed--its fine condition--longstreet and his scout harrison--lee's intricate operations--stuart's cavalry movements--he crosses below--the loss to lee--the march through maryland and pennsylvania--no depredations--halt at chambersburg--scout harrison reports meade in command, superseding hooker--ewell ordered to leave--march resumed, a. p. hill leading, gaining decided success. general lee began now to prepare for his summer campaign. it was secretly settled that it should be an invasion of pennsylvania. there were many things that assisted in arriving at this decision in the conferences with the president and chiefs of the government at richmond. virginia had been fiercely fought over, and ravaged by the tramp of hostile armies. now, it looked as if the enemy should feel something of such sacrifices. if we could live on the supplies we hoped to find north of the potomac, the already serious question of food and forage for our men and animals would lighten up temporarily, at least; and finally, the men of arms were eager for the movement and most enthusiastic at the start. first of all, lee had to reorganize his army. jackson's death made this necessary; besides, the two corps had grown, individually, rather large for effective handling. he created a third corps and placed a. p. hill in command of it, perhaps the best arrangement possible at the time. one division was taken from longstreet--anderson's; one from jackson--heth's, and the third, under pender, was made up of unassigned commands, of which there were quite a number between richmond and the general's camps. the second (ewell's) was of early's, rodes's, and e. johnson's divisions. the first (longstreet's) was of hood's, mclaws's and pickett's divisions. suitable artillery details were made to meet these changes, which went in effect smoothly and effectively. on the cavalry, special care was bestowed. it had been heavily strengthened and much improved by selections of men and horses. for some time, during inaction, they had been getting good forage and pasturage. now, when the time was near for the use of this formidable arm under stuart, its able and famous leader, it was ready for the commander-in-chief. what irony of fate that the great approaching campaign should be fought and lost without that bold leader and his riders being at lee's touch, when indeed he wanted them, bitterly missing having stuart and his great body of unsurpassed horse near by him. the activity of preparation went through all departments--quartermaster's, subsistence, ordnance, and medical. it could be guessed that the military operations would be of great severity and exaction and it behooved all officers of supply to be ready; to fail would be fatal. the cavalry were assembled under stuart in northern virginia, on lands growing richer and richer in grass with the advancing weeks. it was a magnificent day, befitting the superb body of cavalry that, under stuart, marched rapidly in review before the commander-in-chief. a sight it was not soon to be forgotten. the utmost order prevailed. there could be no doubt that the cavalry was as ready for the work before us as was our matchless infantry. longstreet sent for his favorite scout, harrison. his instructions were to proceed into the enemy's lines, where he was to stay until the last part of june. then he was to report to general longstreet, it was hoped, with the amplest and most accurate information. "where shall i find you, general, to make this report?" asked harrison. "with the army," was longstreet's grim answer; "i shall be sure to be with it." he was very far from giving even to his trusted scout information as to his movements. but harrison knew all the same; he knew pretty much everything that was going on. the operation now performed by general lee was intricate, of much delicacy and hazard. it was to move from his position in front of hooker without exposing any part of his forces, or richmond, to be attacked in detail, and this important part of the grand maneuver was left to longstreet and his corps, with the cavalry in communication. the corps of ewell (formerly jackson's) and a. p. hill were sent ahead by easy marches, keeping a certain distant touch with longstreet. the mountain gaps were filled with stuart's cavalry and the enemy held in close observation. all went well. hooker made no attempt to follow. lee moved toward washington leisurely, as if to meet him there later. stuart's part with his cavalry was now most important. it is contended by some that lee left it finally optional for him to decide upon his movements. whether to follow the army by crossing the river in the west of the ridge or by one of the lower fords. in the latter event it was, as it proved, to lose lee and leave him without his strong arm in an enemy's country. it has been attempted to show also that the order by which stuart moved came from longstreet. but this must be dismissed; positive information to the contrary being at hand. surprising to say, it now appears that stuart left the army with his fine command and started on his too fascinating raid, not only by his own preference, but actually in violation of lee's orders, which failed to reach him. all doubt had passed from lee's mind and he had ordered stuart to keep with him. the latter was raiding, and lee's campaign was lost. major mcclellan, stuart's a. a. g. and chief of staff, in his history of that cavalry (an excellent work) declares that in his opinion the absence of stuart was the cause of lee's trouble; and for myself i have never doubted it. it is not to be supposed that no cavalry whatever was left with the army. stuart's defenders have taken pains to point that out. there was a squadron or two, here and there, a regiment at one place, and a brigade under an efficient commander left in the rear. but these separate little commands amounted to nothing. it was the great body of that splendid horse under their leader stuart that lee wanted. he was the eyes and ears and strong right arm of the commander, and well may he have missed him. all through the marches he showed it. stuart was on a useless, showy parade almost under the guns of the washington forts, and his horse, laurel-wreathed, bore the gay rider on amid songs and stories. he had some opposition, of course, and had a share of fighting in ashby's gap and the plain on the east. when he rejoined lee it was with exhausted horses and half worn-out men in the closing hours of gettysburg. had he been with lee where would our commander have made his battle? possibly, not on that unfavorable ground of gettysburg. lee with his personally weak opponent, and stuart by him, could almost have chosen the spot where he would be sure to defeat the union army. this, however, somewhat anticipates; going back we find our three corps with their military pushed across the river with energy. the second (ewell's), the third (a. p. hill's), and longstreet last. all infantry and artillery across, leaving only about a brigade of cavalry on the south side. the enemy for some days had quite disappeared from our observations. the march proceeded through maryland and pennsylvania in good form, general lee's orders against depredations being most peremptory. at chambersburg a halt was made over sunday and our corps had the place well guarded and protected from plunder by loose bodies of men. our chief commissary, moses, made a forced requisition and got some supplies and necessaries, not very much. at night i was roused by a detail of the provost guard bringing up a suspicious prisoner. i knew him instantly; it was harrison, the scout, filthy and ragged, showing some rough work and exposure. he had come to "report to the general, who was sure to be with the army," and truly his report was long and valuable. i should here say that in every respect it was afterwards fully confirmed by events and facts. harrison gave us the first complete account of the operations of the enemy since hooker left our front. he brought his report down to a day or two, and described how they were even then marching in great numbers in the direction of gettysburg, with intention apparently of concentrating there. he also informed us of the removal of hooker and the appointment of george meade to command of the army of the potomac. how many commanders had lee made for that army! harrison's report was so exceedingly important that i took him at once with me, and woke longstreet. he was immediately on fire at such news and sent the scout by a staff officer to general lee's camp near by. the general heard him with great composure and minuteness. it was on this, the report of a single scout, in the absence of cavalry, that the army moved. important as was the change, the commanding general was not long in deciding. he sent orders to bring ewell immediately back from the north about harrisburg, and join his left. then he started a. p. hill off at sunrise for gettysburg, followed by longstreet. the enemy was there, and there our general would strike him. the march was much impeded by too many troops and trains on one road and ewell's men breaking in on the route next day to get to their position. the army thus moved forward, and a. p. hill leading, struck the enemy near, and in, the town of gettysburg sharply on the afternoon of july 1. we were following some little distance in the rear, and heard the lively fire of cannon and rifles, and soon after got the news of hill's and ewell's decided success in an important preliminary engagement. many prisoners and much material remained with the confederates. this stimulated every one forward, and ewell taking position on our left, we were all snugly in bivouac at a good hour, with longstreet's two divisions, mclaws and hood, about four miles in rear, but ready for movement next day. pickett had been doing guard duty at chambersburg and was not yet up, but would be in the morning. the serious mishap of the day was ewell's failure to seize the heights on the left. general lee expected it of him, and we know of no impediment. chapter xxi battle of gettysburg, july 1, 2, 3, 1863 expectation of revelations--longstreet and lee--attacks not in good combination between the three corps--july 2, situation unfavorable--our heavy attack on the right--ground and guns taken--round top reinforced checks us--longstreet leads--hood and longstreet--am slightly wounded--lieutenant-colonel freemantle, coldstream guards--captain ross, austrian army--july 3, necessity of a stroke--pickett's charge--his repulse--lee's noble encouragements--july 4, not attacked--holding ground--withdrawal at night--the retreat, and passage of the river. on the tremendous and decisive battle of gettysburg, now about to engage the two armies, more has probably been written than on any battle since waterloo. there seems to be a feeling abroad that great secrets explaining why we were beaten are yet to be told and that they are locked up in the breasts of a few men, one of them the present writer, longstreet's chief of staff. there is absolutely nothing in that expectation; no living man knows more about the battle than has already been written. lee has made his report. longstreet has written a book and said his say. the staff has little or nothing to add. communications were in the main between lee and longstreet, verbally, or occasionally by note direct. the story has been in part told by longstreet. we can discover that he did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the general-in-chief. as longstreet was not to be made willing and lee refused to change or could not change, the former failed to conceal some anger. there was apparent apathy in his movements. they lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield. his plans may have been better than lee's, but it was too late to alter them with the troops ready to open fire on each other. ewell on the left, a. p. hill and longstreet on the right, seemed never able to work together, and i can well imagine the great soul of our commander deeply furrowed with the difficulties about him and what was going on to the disadvantage of the army. this is all i shall permit myself to express on this well-worn but ever interesting subject. one can build many theories, but theories only will they be; besides, my opinion is already given that the loss of the campaign was due to the absence of stuart's cavalry. i proceed to jot down idly some "choses vues" of the military events and incidents of the three great days of this remarkable historic battle and the days immediately about it. the situation on the morning of the 2nd was far from favorable to us. first of all, our position, compared with the enemy's, was not good. it may be said to have been decidedly inferior. we were the outer line, he held the inner. we were the cord to the arc on which his heavy columns were massed. true, there were some positions on the left that were in ewell's possession and could be well used. round top and his high shoulders were on our right, and held by us would be everything. this lee quickly saw and tried for. they made the key for the position, and with it dangling at our girdle the lock would have yielded and the door opened. but we were too late on our right. an attack, powerful indeed, at 4 p. m. was quite different from the commanding general's expectation of one in the forenoon. late on the first, and early on the second, hill and ewell were heavily engaged with apparently no satisfactory results. on the second, quite late, 4 p. m., longstreet made his long-deferred attack on the enemy's left. it was done in smashing style by mclaws's and hood's divisions and a few of hill's troops, longstreet personally leading the attack with splendid effect. his fine horsemanship as he rode, hat in hand, and martial figure, were most inspiring. we gained ground rapidly and almost carried round top, but the morning delay was fatal. it had been heavily reinforced while we were pottering around in sullen inactivity. undoubtedly lee's intention was to make the attack in the forenoon and support it with strong movements by hill and ewell. i think it would have won, notwithstanding the difficulties of the position. the attempt was made to move the troops to the right into position without discovery by the enemy, but it was abortive. we were seen from the start and signaled constantly. much valuable time was lost by this trial, which with better knowledge of the ground by general lee's engineers would not have been attempted. at nightfall the combat was over and we were dragging off our captured cannon and standards, and caring for our dead and wounded. the loss in storming the position on the right was heavy. when hood's division was across the turnpike, under orders to attack, he begged me to look at it, report its extreme difficulty, and implore longstreet to make the attack another way. this was done, but the answer i took to hood was that the attack must instantly be made, that general lee had so directed; and forward and upward the gallant hood charged, almost gaining the plateau of round top, the key of the enemy's left. the staff had been hard at work day and night, and my exhausted frame found rest that night in the snuggest fence corner in sight. the ground to weary bones felt as good as a feather bed. in addition, i had been suffering from a painful but not serious wound. riding with dearing's artillery late in the afternoon, while exchanging some shots, a shrapnel burst directly over us, one of the large projectiles striking me on the right arm near the shoulder. it was not broken or pierced, paralyzed for use for at least ten days, and quite black down to the wrist. painful, of course, it was, but a small matter where there was so much death and mangling. on the march through virginia we had received a delightful acquisition to our headquarters party, in lieutenant-colonel freemantle, of the coldstream guards. he had entered the confederacy on a visit of observation, well fortified with credentials from his own government, and, traveling through all the confederate states, had arrived in richmond just in time to join lee's army in its invasion of pennsylvania. with good letters of introduction he had been sent to us and there could not be a finer fellow. he roughed it with the hardest, and took everything as it came. a quick, observant eye and indefatigable sightseer, apparently nothing escaped him. when the campaign was ended and the confederates making their way back to virginia, freemantle said his farewells and made the best of his way to new york, whence he immediately took steamer for england. there he published an entertaining little book, "three months in the southern states," which was later reproduced by a worn-out, decrepit old press at mobile, a copy of the issue being now a great rarity. freemantle had met southern men of all kinds, and his book has many pen pictures by this fine officer and friend of ours. his regiment a corps d'ã©lite, soon sent him to the staff, where he distinguished himself, and successively obtained rank as major-general, lieutenant-general, and general, with several military orders of coveted distinction. he is now sir arthur lyon-freemantle, k. c. m. g.,[1] and of other good-service orders. he commanded the brigade of guards in egypt, and has just finished (about retiring) his four years' tour of duty as governor of malta, one of the greatest of the british military posts. he is delightful to every confederate he can put his hands upon. [1] sir lyon-freemantle has since died. there was another foreign officer with us at this time, and for some months later, captain fitzgerald ross, very scotch as to name, but austrian to the core. he came of one of those military scotch or north of ireland families that centuries ago settled in many parts of europe and generally rose to distinction. on the morning of july 3, it was apparent that a great blow must be delivered to meade's army. he could not be persuaded to leave his formidable positions and instruments and attack us, and lee could not retreat without another effort, indecisive as had been those of the 2d. our general, as has been said, did not mind blood when it had to be shed. it is the soldier's calling. here was a case in point: his army and trains could only be saved by a tremendous strike straight at the enemy. the time for maneuvering had passed and he prepared for what was before him. he believed his troops could do what he asked of them; never yet had they failed him. the attack was to be made as soon as possible, under direction of lee's "war horse," that stout warrior james longstreet, with three brigades of pickett's division (right), heth's division of hill's corps (left), with supports of several brigades of other divisions thrown into position. an artillery "feu d'enfer" was to precede the attack, directed by e. p. alexander, who was to give the signal when in his judgment the artillery had made the greatest impression, and then the troops were to move instantly across the wide, lead-swept plain, against the heavy masses of blue on the crest of the heights. all this was done at about 2 o'clock, longstreet accepting alexander's signal message with dejection, it seemed. indeed, the delay in attacking which undoubtedly hurt us was apparently caused by his objections made known to the commander-in-chief, but of course all this is set out from that standpoint in longstreet's own book. it was soon over. pickett's men got far up the acclivity and many were soon among the enemy. there was, however, some wavering on our left, which weakened us, and we broke, tearing back pell-mell torn by shot and shell across the width of that bloody plain, a sight never before witnessed--part of the army of northern virginia in full, breathless flight. but there was no pursuit and the run soon stopped. the soldiers got together, picked up arms, and in a short time were ready for another combat. if there was repulse and its usual result, a quick flight for cover, there was also something else. a charge that, considering the difficulties of position, comparison of numbers, was so steady to the objective point, and so near success as to make it one of the greatest feats of arms in all the annals of war. every brigade commander and colonel and lieutenant-colonel of pickett's division was shot down. the brave armistead and garnett at the head of their brigades fell inside the enemy's parapet, and the gallant kemper, hard hit and left for dead, lay with the men of his leading line. to-day, the detail of the great charge, not as barely hinted at here, but as described in full with ample particulars, mounts one's blood, stirs all hearts with deep tragedy and pride. well do we know that amid all things to happen, the memory of pickett's charge will forever live in song and story of that fair land for which the southern soldier poured out his blood like water. while longstreet by no means approved the movement, his soldierly eye watched every feature of it. he neglected nothing that could help it and his anxiety for pickett and the men was very apparent. fearing some flank attacks if we succeeded, he had sent latrobe to the left to warn the officer against its possibility. i went sharply off in search of pickett to watch his right and if necessary move some troops in for meeting such an attempt. i did not meet with general pickett and was soon up with garnett and armistead. the former was ill that morning, but was at the head of his men where he was to fall. just here a shell burst under my horse (my best), a splendid chestnut mare, and down she came, both hind legs off. i luckily got another from a mounted man near by, who rather ruefully gave up his horse and saved my saddle for me. latrobe also had his horse killed over on the left; other staff officers were also sent forward with the troops and shared in the charge. general lee's extreme agitation when he witnessed the repulse and race of our men for cover from that murderous fire has not been exaggerated in the prints. the noble soul was stirred to its inmost depths at the sight of the awful and fruitless sacrifices his men had made at his command. his generous heart could only say, "it is my fault, i take it all--get together, men, we shall yet beat them." i saw no man fail him. it was on july 3 that a mail from the department at richmond brought my commission as lieutenant-colonel, a. a. g. latrobe's and fairfax's, as inspectors, came along a few days later. notwithstanding our great losses of the second and third, we were permitted to hold the field on the fourth by meade's inactivity. his army was very strong, had not suffered as had ours, and an enterprising general might seemingly have had us on the run in short order. but no! he had taken a taste of our mettle the day before and wanted no more of it. a bridge of gold for his enemy was the card for meade's hands. it is said on good authority that at a council called by meade he was in favor of retiring, and it was only by strenuous, bold opposition of two or three of his generals that he was prevented and induced to keep his ground. thus during all the fourth we were in preparation for the rear movement that must begin that night. lee's position had become serious, but undismayed were the confederate chief and his three corps commanders. he knew he could count on their tried courage and experience. the night of july 4, 1863, was of awful weather--rain in torrents, howling winds, and roads almost impassable; all trains had been sent back during the day, as well as the reserve artillery. at night artillery in position and pickets were withdrawn and the army moved back by its left--ewell, hill, and longstreet. it marched all night and part of next day, and then lee with characteristic audacity selected a line of defense, entrenched and fortified it, and offered meade battle for several days, while his immense trains were safely crossing the potomac. meade declined the challenge, and lee resuming the retreat, crossed on the bridge of boats that had been thrown over the river at falling waters by the engineers--and a crazy affair it was, too. our corps was all night crossing, and at dawn i was able to approach general lee on the south bank, "tãªte de pont," with a report to that effect, adding that now everything was clear for general hill's infantry. the general's anxiety was intense. he expected to be attacked at the passage of the river. there was good reason to fear; why meade failed to do so is yet to be explained. general lee, like every one, had been up the whole night, and his staff officers were stretched in sleep on the ground. he desired me to recross the bridge for him, see general hill in person, and urge him to the utmost haste in getting his men over, stopping only when imperatively necessary. i immediately pushed back, finding the road deep in mud but clear of any impediment to the men. broken wagons or a dismounted gun or two had been cleared away and thrown one side. general lee's message was given and hill asked me to assure the commander that he should safely get across, notwithstanding a slight attack that was even then developing itself on his rear brigade--pettigrew's. some men were captured, but we suffered most loss in the death of that promising officer. returning, i reported to the general that "all was clear. hill was about three-quarters of a mile from the bridge and marching rapidly to it." "what was his leading division?" i was asked. "general anderson, sir." "i am sorry, colonel; my friend dick is quick enough pursuing, but in retreat i fear he will not be as sharp as i should like." just then a heavy gun was fired lower down, filling the gorge of the river with most threatening echoes. "there," said the general, "i was expecting it, the beginning of the attack." but he was wrong. the enemy made no further demonstration and hill came safely across. our corps had found camp some ten miles south of the river and there i soon threw myself down for rest and food. after a week of the most exhausting physical and mental trial it was indeed time for some repose. chapter xxii gettysburg aftermath retrospective--invasion of pennsylvania--some characteristics--pickett and perfumery--an acquisition--the inhabitants, pennsylvania dutch--their cookery--colonel freemantle's activity--figures as to strength and losses--lieutenant dawson--a curious meeting--the sweating soldier--death of captain fraser. the invasion of pennsylvania had many features of interest to our army. the country itself contrasted greatly with our own. it was rolling in plenty, high cultivation was apparent on all sides, and the ripening wheat stood tall and golden. general lee's orders caused it to be well protected, and there was not much looting. the people seemed a queer lot. hostile looks and imprecations were constantly leveled at the good-natured southerners footing it amid such new scenes. the cherries were ripe and the trees bending with delicious fruit. i recall one especial tree near chambersburg that seemed beyond all others to tempt me. sitting quietly in saddle, branch after branch was gently drawn down to the rider's thirsty lips almost to repletion, and good is the recollection even to this present day. the roads were magnificent in our eyes--metaled macadams, bearing the heaviest loads, and well drained and graded. the animals were nearly all for farm use, great lumbering, powerful horses, capable of enormous draughts on those hard roads, but quite impossible to do anything out of a heavy walk. we thought to renew some of our quartermaster's and cavalry mounts from this source and a few horses were got across the river. they proved useless and were soon abandoned. as we marched, the people were drawn to the roadside arrayed in their sunday best, gazing viciously at the invaders. all work in town and country had stopped. chambersburg being quite a town, was subject to requisition, which did not, i think, yield much. we "persuaded," however, the principal shopkeepers to keep open, and they displayed some of their wares, doubtless old or unsalable stuff that they could not hide. everything was strictly paid for in our national currency--confederate bills! i did get something, however. our good commissary, major moses, managed to secure (by payment, of course) a bolt of excellent velveteen, wearing quite as well as corduroy. indeed, he got some of the latter also, and sent the plunder to our headquarters, where the stuff went around sufficiently to give me a coat and trousers, which did good service, i think, till the end of things. he also managed to get a few felt hats, and deserved more, for he was grumbling furiously at the ill success of his important requisition for cash, stores, and army supplies; also for the sound rating and liberal abuse he had taken from the irate females in furious rage at his work. lee and longstreet were bivouacked near by in a beautiful grove of large trees not far from town. they both had many visits from citizens, generally with some trumped-up complaint as a means of seeing the two celebrated soldiers. the women of the country were a hard-featured lot. the population, principally pennsylvania dutch, are an ignorant offshoot of a certain class of germans long settled there. many can speak no english. a hard-working, thrifty class, with, it seems, no thought but for their big horses and barns, huge road-wagons like ships at sea, and the weekly baking, and apple-butter. this last appeared to be their staple food. on the morning of the 3d, already mentioned, waking in my fence-corner, i took thought of breakfast and sent my man to an abandoned farm-house near by. the terrible shell and musketry fire of the previous day had driven off the owners hurriedly, for safety. but here was food galore. my soldier came back loaded with loaves of well-baked bread and jars of apple-butter--a week's baking of the bread, and the abominable butter once a year, i suppose. it did for once or so when very hungry, but i don't call it a nice breakfast anywhere. the drain of war had not here shown itself--none of the men out of this populous region seemed to have gone to the front. there was no need. the government, the state, counties, towns, and villages were all paying great bounties for the substitutes. the drafted man was serving at home, and there was joy at so much money among the foreign mercenaries brought over by the rich northern and eastern states, and among the ever-present and agile bounty-jumpers, who were indeed making their golden harvest. our british friend, colonel freemantle, was bound to see everything. during one of the hottest hours of fire he climbed a tree with great agility, and notwithstanding i bawled to him to come down, there he stuck with his binoculars. he was a very small, slight man, wiry, and much enduring. i don't believe he changed his clothing or boots while with us, and i never saw him use a note-book or any scrap of paper as an aid to memory, and yet his book puts down things with much accuracy. in this great campaign and battle the numbers and casualties and lists may be fairly accepted as follows: col. w. h. taylor's figures as to strength--army of the potomac, of all arms, 105,000; army of northern virginia, of all arms, 63,000 or say 50,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery. his figures are about right as to the army of northern virginia. they would be verified by those of our own corps. confederate losses, 2,292 killed; 12,709 wounded; 5,150 missing. it was about this time that lieut. f. w. dawson, c. s. artillery, reported to our corps for duty. a few words of the career of this young man may not be without interest. he was an englishman of university education, able and capable. he had come to see hard service. colonel manning, chief of ordnance, wanting some assistance at that time, i assigned dawson to do duty with the ordnance train. he was thoroughly competent, and made himself indispensable to manning, whose taste took him more to adventures in the field. dawson was made captain and also acquitted himself well under fire. with return of peace i lost sight of him until a year or two later he turned up as the able and aggressive editor and part proprietor of a leading newspaper of charleston, south carolina, and had reason to call for my help in a dangerous crisis. he was strongly on the respectable white side in the dark days of reconstruction, was bold and unflinching, showed extraordinary abilities, made many friends, married, and was assassinated at the very height of an adventurous career. this is curious in the way of happenings. it has been mentioned that the soldier who passed the night at fredericksburg with me inside the enemy's lines was private jesse beall. it has not been said, though, that my staff comrade and friend, manning, had been desperately assailed, stabbed almost to death, by a fellow-student at the georgia military institute. manning recovered after long care, spoke only once, even to me, of what had happened, and then with a curious tension of feature. another time we were riding together across fallow fields near camp, when a soldier came out, saluting us, and asked to speak with colonel manning. on rejoining me, manning's face was set and deathly pale. "sorrel," he said, "that was the man who came so near murdering me. i had sworn to kill him on sight, and it was all i could do to stop myself while he stood by my horse. but he had a tale, and i believed him. it was remorse and horror of his deed. he humbly begged my forgiveness. nothing else would content him, and i yielded to the man's suffering and evident sincerity. i gave him my hand in parting, but never do i wish to see him again." it was jesse beall, manning's assailant, and my man of the batteau. he was afterwards killed in battle. on a hot day's march across the river, general lee, longstreet, and their people had made a short midday halt in a little rising grove by the roadside, where we found a spring to wash down our soldier's fare. it was the hottest of july days, and the troops were moving by in long column, listlessly, and suffering from the heat. soon i saw one of the men leave the ranks and approach general lee. some one tried to stop him, but the general kindly encouraged his coming forward. he was a stout, well-built soldier, equal to any work, but sweating awfully. "what is it you want?" said lee. "please, general, i don't want much, but it's powerful wet marching this weather. i can't see for the water in my eyes. i came aside to this old hill to get a rag or _something_ to wipe the sweat out of my eyes." "will this do?" said the general, handkerchief in hand. "yes, _my lordy_, that indeed!" broke out the soldier. "well, then take it with you, and back quick to ranks; no straggling this march, you know, my man." lee's talk and manner with the soldier were inimitable in their encouraging kindness. it is only a single little example of what he was with them. at gettysburg, on the 3d, i lost another dear personal friend, captain john c. fraser, of georgia, commanding a battery of artillery. he was working it most effectively in action when struck down. only a few days before he made me a visit, and noticing his very bad hat, i sent him off rejoicing in one of the felts major moses had given us. then it pillowed his shattered head. chapter xxiii in virginia again lee moves across the ridge into the piedmont country--camps taken near rapidan--our headquarters at taylor's--festivities and gaieties--buying remounts--scout harrison again--longstreet and two divisions start for chickamauga--in richmond--harrison as cassius--his dismissal--the first army corps--dissensions in hood's division--jenkins and law. the army being after some days refreshed and strengthened by rest and food and the return of wounded and stragglers, general lee began preparing to move to a good position east of the mountains. it lay now in the valley, and general meade with great consideration molested us not nor gave us any uneasiness. as usual the cavalry filled the gaps of the ridge and covered efficiently every approach, while the army slowly poured through its defiles to well-known camping grounds on the sunny slopes of the piedmont glades and meadows. gradually without incident we found good camps for several weeks in a rolling country bordered by the rapidan. our headquarters were in the grounds of mr. erasmus taylor, a well-known gentleman, farming largely in that county, and everything was done by him for our comfort and amusement. the house was spacious, well fitted for dances and entertainments, and being crowded with joyous, happy virginia girls there was no lack of fun and gaiety. we got out our best, cleaned up, kept the barber busy, became very particular as to the shine of our boots, and put forth all of our long disused bravery in honor of the lovely eyes and true virginia hearts that were joyfully giving us welcome. there were for those young officers who had time to give, dances by day and evening at taylor's or elsewhere in the well-settled neighborhood, horses in plenty for riding parties, picnics, excursions--everything indeed for the happiness of the young warriors and their captivating maidens. hard, brave work had earned the guerdon and it was no niggard hand that gave it. it was here i had to provide my remounts. my best had been lost in pickett's charge and the other had broken down and was left. i was consequently up to buying two horses, and after many trials and tests selected from a certain commissary given to horse dealing, two beasts that i thought would do my work. they both broke down under the demands of our georgia and tennessee expedition, and later i shall have something to say about the sharp officer who was so ready to put these animals on me. i have already said that i cannot call myself successful in horse selection. these two cost about $2,500. ah! those were lovely days; that short rest amid such delightful environments. we were soon to change it, plunge into the forests of georgia and tennessee, and fight in the former one of the fiercest, bloodiest battles on record. but meanwhile time went merrily and there was enjoyment throughout the army. the soldiers were in high spirits and ready any day for the enemy. supplies of clothing and shoes had come down from richmond and the ranks looked decidedly better. harrison, our scout, had been with us since gettysburg. his report, all important as to the results of that campaign, was not forgotten. with no immediate duties assigned him, he trotted along from day to day, but he was sure of something to come, and it came. he asked permission to go to richmond for a few days. as there was nothing to keep him, leave was given. "colonel," said this dark character, "if by any chance you should be in richmond next week, i hope you will take in the theater one evening." (there was then not the slightest expectation of my being in richmond at that time.) "what is the attraction?" i asked. "myself," said harrison. "i have made a bet of $50 greenbacks that i play cassio and play him successfully." "are you an actor?" i asked. "no, but i can play." the matter was dismissed as so much nonsense, but he was not a man for nonsense. it so happened that i was in richmond the next week with longstreet and the staff on the way to georgia to strike our great strategic coup, and _did_ happen into a friend's box at the theater. "othello" was on the boards with all the splendor the times could muster, and my harrison and "cassio," one and the same, were before me. he had lied in part. his acting was as if he had regularly strutted the boards for a stock company. but the play was rather lively at times. "othello" was in drink, "cassius" was really quite far gone, and even "desdemona" was under more than one suspicion that evening. the occurrence induced me next day to set on foot some minute inquiries about harrison's life. i learned that he was drinking and gambling. on reporting it to general longstreet he thought it better to let him go and so directed me; accordingly i had him paid off, with an order to report to the secretary of war, from whom he had originally come. this is the last i saw of the mysterious fellow. longstreet missed him afterwards while we were in east tennessee, and i made a careful effort to find him and bring him out to us. while writing i hear from latrobe that the man is alive and in baltimore, seeking some small assistance from the confederate veterans. i should like to see his last days made comfortable. the organization of our first army corps had suffered no material damage. the ranks were kept fairly well filled by constant recruiting, and the feeling of confidence and pride of this splendid force of infantry and artillery could not be surpassed, from the lieutenant-general down to the teamster. it was a very remarkable body, inspired by great sacrifices and victories in its history, and with a cohesive strength and belief in itself that spoke nobly for the future. this is said on the eve of a separation of many months, by which the larger part of the corps was sent to strange fields and new sacrifices and laurels. there was, however, an ugly flaw in one of the divisions, that long uncured was eventually to lead to disaster. when hood was borne wounded from the gettysburg field his division of five brigades--alabama, texas, georgia, and south carolina--fell under the command of the senior brigadier, mr. jenkins, of south carolina. between this officer and general e. m. law, of alabama, there was the most intense rivalry. they were both from south carolina, and it was but a continuation, it was said, of what stirred them at school together, at college, at military exercises, and finally in longstreet's corps. they had been made colonels about the same time--law of an alabama regiment--and had advanced almost contemporaneously to be brigadier-generals. longstreet had recommended them both for promotion to major-general, and they were both unquestionably officers of high attainments and the greatest promise. here we had a situation that made it useless to think of one of these men serving under the other in the same division. a major-general must be assigned to command, or else one of the aspiring brigadiers transferred to another place. neither was immediately done and longstreet had considerable trouble. both officers were highly valued by him and he wanted full justice done to each, but the situation grew no better with time and service, and longstreet's efforts at the department commanded apparently no attention. chapter xxiv longstreet to reinforce bragg the movement to reinforce bragg--good work of the quartermaster-general--general a. r. lawton, of georgia--the journey through the states--ovations to the troops. the important movement now impending was the subject of deep and secret discussion by the president, generals lee and longstreet, and general lawton, quartermaster-general, whose part in it would be of the first consideration. its gravity can scarcely be overstated. rosecrans, commanding the federal forces in tennessee and georgia, had suffered himself to be in position inviting attack by a competent force. it was believed that bragg, his opponent, if reinforced, could strike a swift, crushing blow, relieve the wide region in which he was operating from the presence of the enemy, and enable masterly reinforcements to return rapidly to virginia without endangering the safety of the confederate capital or that of lee's army, thus temporarily weakened. indeed it was the military calculation that so large a detachment from the southern army would be instantly followed by a still greater withdrawal of troops from lee's front, and that too by the outer line of the segment, while our own contingent was hurrying by the short, straight cord of the circle. this expectation proved correct. meade was silent and inactive, and our own army was stiffening in material and numbers. meade was apparently without a plan. his predecessors had suffered so cruelly at fredericksburg and chancellorsville that his well-known prudence and lack of initiative might be trusted to keep him quiet during our great strategic coup. the movement was, therefore, determined on, and in the first half of september the details were settled. longstreet was to take on the expedition his two splendid divisions, mclaws and hood, the latter by this time quite cured of his wound, and alexander's battalion of artillery--six batteries. supply trains were to be furnished at destination. the movement was to be wholly by train, and to any one familiar with the railroad service at the south in the last part of 1863 little need be said of the difficulties facing the quartermaster-general. he was to pick up their camps near gordonsville and the rapidan, nine strong brigades of infantry and six batteries of artillery, and land them without serious accident and no delay with their ambulances and light vehicles near chattanooga or lookout mountain. this feat was accomplished without stint of honor or praise, be it said, to the quartermaster-general's department. never before were so many troops moved over such worn-out railways, none first-class from the beginning. never before were such crazy cars--passenger, baggage, mail, coal, box, platform, all and every sort wabbling on the jumping strap-iron--used for hauling good soldiers. but we got there nevertheless. the trains started day after day from virginia and worked through north carolina, south carolina, and georgia by different routes, all converging at a point not far east of chattanooga--catoosa station, i think, was the name. the quartermaster-general, brig.-gen. a. r. lawton, was my fellow-townsman. he had graduated from west point in the class of '39 and entered the artillery. soon resigning, he took up the study and practise of law, married, and resided in savannah, where he achieved success. an admirable, well-rounded character, with many friends, lawton was a leading man in municipal and state affairs for years. when the clash came in 1861 there was no doubt as to where he would stand. it was for his state, and he was immediately commissioned a brigadier-general, stationed on the coast assembling and organizing troops. called by general lee to virginia in 1862, he took a brigade of nearly 6,000 strong to jackson in the valley operations, and served with distinction in the chickahominy battles, the campaign against pope, and at sharpsburg. at the latter he was severely wounded and retired from field service. he was, however, not long left in quiet ease. lawton's abilities suggested him for administrative work, and he was made quartermaster-general. it was by him and his department that our reinforcements were moved to the help of bragg and the victory of chickamauga--an admirable piece of railroad military transportation under adverse conditions. general lawton was minister to austria during cleveland's administration. the journey through the states from virginia was a continuous ovation to the troops. they were fed at every stopping place and must have hated the sight of food. kisses and tokens of love and admiration for these war-worn heroes were ungrudgingly passed around, and as the two divisions were from states all south of virginia, it was good for the men to show up in this fashion even for a few minutes with their home people. many of the companies were carried through their own towns and villages and surrounded by the eager faces of kinsfolk and neighbors. but there were no desertions or stops. the brave fellows pressed stoutly on with comrades to meet the foe. the first arrivals plunged into the battle of september 19th, and on the 20th, when the final stroke was delivered, five of our brigades were up and hotly engaged in that bloody, all-day battle. the glory and renown of the army of northern virginia were fully upheld by longstreet's men. some general outlines of the day's events will be attempted in the next chapter, to be filled out at close, as hitherto tried, with brief reflections and observations on the occurrences of the great struggle and the days before and after it. chapter xxv battle of chickamauga, september 20, 1863 arrival at catoosa--riding to general bragg--the meeting--order of battle--polk the right wing, longstreet the left--attack to begin on right--delayed some hours--left wing takes it up victoriously--attack on right checked--thomas reinforces his right against longstreet's assaults--cannot stand and retreats toward chattanooga--a great victory for the confederates--pursuit next day expected--bragg says no--army marches to positions in front of chattanooga--a barren result--lieutenant-general polk--sketch. it was about three o'clock in the afternoon of september 19 that our rickety train pulled up, with jerks and bangs, at the little railway landing, called catoosa platform. longstreet and some of his personal staff, colonels sorrel and manning, were in this train and immediately took horse. the remainder of the staff, with most of the horses, were on a train two or three hours later. the lieutenant-general and part of his staff at once started to find general bragg. that general should surely have had guides to meet and conduct us to the conference on which so much depended. a sharp action had taken place during the day and it would appear that if bragg wanted to see anybody, longstreet was the man. but we were left to shift for ourselves, and wandered by various roads and across small streams through the growing darkness of the georgia forest in the direction of the confederate general's bivouac. at one point in our hunt for him we narrowly escaped capture, being almost in the very center of a strong picket of the enemy before our danger was discovered. a sharp right-about gallop, unhurt by the pickets' hasty and surprised fire, soon put us in safety, and another road was taken for bragg, about whom by this time some hard words were passing. but all things have an end, even a friendly hunt for an army commander, and between 10 and 11 o'clock that night we rode into the camp of gen. braxton bragg. he was asleep in his ambulance, and when aroused immediately entered into private conference with longstreet. it lasted about an hour, and in that time the plan of battle for next day was definitely settled, and then we all took to the leafy ground under the tall oaks and hickories for some sleep against the work before us. an hour was quite enough to settle the plan and details, since nothing could be simpler than the operation proposed for rosecrans's destruction. bragg's army was already occupying favorable ground and but little preliminary movement was positively necessary. the enemy's force was not far off in our immediate front, seemingly easy to attack. bragg's army was, however, strange to say, rather deficient in artillery, and its want was felt the next day. our own batteries, under alexander, had not yet detrained. bragg made a good disposition of his separate divisions and commands, dividing his army into two wings, the right under lieutenant-general polk and the left under lieutenant-general longstreet. there was consequently thrown under the latter three of hood's brigades and two of mclaws's (under hood), and stuart's and preston's divisions (under buckner), and a division of b. r. johnson's, and hindman's with artillery. the order for the day was simple in the extreme. there was no question about all the troops being in position by daylight, and at that hour the attack was to be opened by general polk on the extreme right and followed up vigorously by the lines to the left, until the entire front of bragg's fine army should be engaged and charging the enemy, exposed to an attack so furious it was not believed he could sustain it, and he could not. it will be shown how he was partially saved after the roughest handling he had had since bull run. the right wing was formed of breckinridge's and cleburne's divisions under d. h. hill, walker's and biddell's divisions under walker, and cheatham's division, besides artillery. longstreet's front had wheeler's cavalry on his extreme left, then hindman, hood's corps, stuart, and preston in the order named, and they were ready for their work at daylight on the 20th, the other commands in close support. unhappily, a most serious delay occurred on the right, by which polk's attack was retarded until near 10 o'clock, a loss of at least four previous hours. lieutenant-general hill's command was on polk's extreme right and should have begun the attack. orders sent during the night by general polk failed to reach him. on our part we waited with the utmost impatience for the guns, but no sound came until 10 o'clock. then polk's attack was made, but does not appear to have achieved a decided success. the enemy were able to hold their ground against most of the right wing commands. when it came, as it quickly did, to the left wing to put in its work there was another tale. the ground was in parts difficult in front of us, but never was a more determined, dashing attack made, never a more stubborn resistance. but our men would not be denied. the fighting lasted nearly all day. finally everything broke before us, and the enemy's right was in full flight. it was a panic-stricken host that fled. our virginia contingent was always to the front and seemed to fire their western comrades with emulation of the grand example of the army of northern virginia. unhappily, amid shouts of victory, general hood was shot down at the head of his seasoned veterans. his leg was taken off on the field, the operation being well borne. but we were forced into a temporary halt. reinforcements were pouring fresh and ready against our front. the attack of the right wing having partly broken down, the enemy in front of polk was not held to their own, but were in large numbers free for a masterly movement by that fine soldier, gen. george thomas. he was a virginian, and it is said started to join his southern friends at the beginning, but was finally won over to the northern side. he was one of the ablest of their soldiers, perhaps none equaled him, and i heartily wish he had been anywhere but at chickamauga. thomas pressed rapid columns to relieve his overwhelmed right and was in time to make a good stand, but it was unavailing, although costing more blood and time. his defenses were finally broken down, about dark, by our incessant hammering, and it was right-about-face and hasty retreat to chattanooga. this was just as darkness spread its mantle over the fields and forests, and simultaneously there sprang up on that bloodstained battle-ground camp fires innumerable, and the wildest confederate cheers and yells for victory that ever stirred the hearts of warriors--and such warriors as had that day borne the battle-flags forward. it was one of the greatest of the many confederate successes. that night was passed in caring for the wounded, burying the dead, and cooking rations, for in all that host there was probably only one who did not believe that "pursuit" would be the word early next day, and that was the commander-in-chief. it is thought by some that general bragg did not know a victory had been gained. he does not appear to have been closely present on the battlefield, nor for that matter was rosecrans. a unique instance of a great battle being fought out of the immediate presence of the respective commanders. the next morning bragg asked longstreet for suggestions. "move instantly against rosecrans's rear to destroy him," was the instant reply. "should we fail, we can put him in retreat, and then clear east tennessee of burnside and the union forces." apparently, bragg adopted this view, and gave orders to march out at 4 p. m. the right wing marched about eight miles, ours next day at daylight. we were halted at the chickamauga red house ford, i think it was, and then directed to march to chattanooga. at the close of the battle we could have strolled into that town; now it was vigorously defended. this was the fruit of the great battle; the pitiable end of the glorious victory that was ours. the spoils were 8,000 prisoners, 36 pieces of artillery, 15,000 small arms, and 25 stands of colors. it was a lasting regret that i had no more than a passing glimpse during these operations of the distinguished soldier, lieut.-gen. leonidas polk, second in command of bragg's army. a pure and lofty character, nothing but the most self-sacrificing, patriotic convictions, and the almost peremptory wishes of the executive had led him to lay down his great episcopal station and duties and take to arms. his training at west point had well prepared him for the stern efforts in the field awaiting southern men. throughout his army career he was never without a desire to put by his sword and take up again his dearly loved people, his bishop's staff, for prayer and strength and consolation in their many trials and sufferings. but the president, holding him in the highest esteem and confidence, insisted on retaining him in the armies of the confederacy. he could not but yield. of commanding presence and most winning address, he served with distinction and renown. while suffering at the hands of bragg treatment unjust and harsh, he on the other hand had won to himself the abiding affection and confidence of all officers and men whom he commanded. on june 1, 1864, near marietta, georgia, that noble life ended. in the distance lay the hills of the etowah; on the right, kenesaw reared its lofty heights. the generals--johnston, hardee, and polk--had together walked off to observe a portion of the enemy's lines, some distance away. soon after they slowly separated. dr. w. m. polk, the general's son, eminent in his profession, and author of his interesting biography, simply relates what then happened (vol. ii, p. 349): general polk walked to the crest of the hill, and, entirely exposed, turned himself around as if to take a farewell view. folding his arms across his breast, he stood intently gazing on the scene below. while thus he stood, a cannon shot crashed his breast, and opening a wide door, let free that indomitable spirit. he fell upon his back with his feet to the foe. amid the shot and shell now poured upon the hill, his faithful escort gathered up the body and bore it to the foot of the hill. there in a sheltered ravine his sorrow-stricken comrades, silent and in tears, gathered around his mangled corpse. chapter xxvi chattanooga--incidents the western army--its general appearance--feeling toward bragg--president davis's visit--an incident in battle--general w. w. mackall, chief of bragg's staff--losses--a captured saber--general forrest--general benning and longstreet--vizitelly's battle-picture--quartermaster mitchell dead--manning wounded--president davis's escort--the austrian captain's brilliant uniform. we were therefore marched back to what was called the siege of chattanooga, finding the enemy there in fine spirits after the indulgent reprieve granted him; strengthening his works, perfecting his communications with the rear, and pouring in men from the east, who, following our own movements, were necessarily late in arriving by the outer line. bragg put his army in position across missionary creek (subject to perilous overflow) and occupied lookout mountain with his left and missionary ridge with his right, and here i shall leave the army while jotting down some observations and incidents since we left virginia. the personal appearance of bragg's army was, of course, matter of interest to us of virginia. the men were a fine-looking lot, strong, lean, long-limbed fighters. the western tunic was much worn by both officers and men. it is an excellent garment, and its use could be extended with much advantage. the army gave one the feeling of a very loose organization. there were indeed corps, so called, but not that compact, shoulder-to-shoulder make-up of lee's army. there a first corps man would so speak of himself, just as a third georgia regiment man would speak of the regiment to which he belonged. the artillery, which seemed to me not as strong as should be, looked a bit primitive. the battalion unit was not often met with; but, on the contrary, many single independent batteries, nominally attached to infantry commands, but on the day of the battle wandering loose, hunting for their supports. the subsistence and quartermaster's departments were well supplied with food and forage, but weak in transportation. the tone of the army among its higher officers toward the commander was the worst conceivable. bragg was the subject of hatred and contempt, and it was almost openly so expressed. his great officers gave him no confidence as a general-in-chief. the army was thus left a helpless machine, and its great disaster in november at missionary ridge and lookout mountain could easily be foreseen with bragg retained in command. mr. davis made his celebrated visit to the camp to see and hear for himself. it is difficult, even now, to recall and realize that unprecedented scene. the president, with the commander-in-chief, and the great officers of the army, assembled to hear the opinion of the general's fitness for command. in the presence of bragg and his corps commanders he asked of each his opinion, and his reasons if adverse. this was eye to eye with the president, the commander-in-chief, and the generals. there was no lack of candor in answer to such challenge with men like longstreet, cheatham, hill, cleburne, and stewart. some very plain language was used in answer, but it seems that one and all were quite agreed as to bragg's unfitness for command of that army. these opinions were received by the president and his general without comment, and mr. davis got more than he came for. an incident of the day of battle will indicate some differences between the eastern and western armies in the reception of orders. while thomas was heavily reinforcing his right, a column of fours was seen marching across gen. a. p. stewart's front. if attacked, its destruction was certain. i pointed out the opportunity to general stewart, his position being admirable for the purpose. his answer was that he was there by orders and could not move until he got others. i explained that i was chief of staff to longstreet and felt myself competent to give such an order as coming from my chief, and that this was customary in our virginia service. general stewart, however, courteously insisted that he could not accept them unless assured the orders came direct from longstreet. valuable time was being lost, but i determined to have a whack at those quick-moving blue masses. asking general stewart to get ready, that i hoped soon to find longstreet, i was off, and luckily did find him after an eager chase. longstreet's thunderous tones need not be described when, in the first words of explanation, he sent me back with orders to stewart to fall on the reinforcing column with all his power. stewart was ready and pushed forward handsomely. in a few minutes, with little or no loss to himself, he had broken up thomas's men and taken many prisoners. this was quite late in the afternoon, twilight coming on. my brother-in-law, general w. w. mackall, was serving with bragg as chief of staff, although his rank and attainments qualified him for higher duties. but the executive at richmond was not favorably disposed toward him, and the best that could be had for service must content him. it seems that he and bragg had been long friends, having served together in the old army. i was glad to come up with him, and delighted his soul by a gift of a five-pound bale of virginia killikinick smoking tobacco, in place of the vile stuff he was blowing off. the numbers on both sides, and the casualties, are generally accepted as follows: rosecrans's strength, 60,867; bragg's strength, 60,366. rosecrans's losses, 16,550; bragg's losses, 17,800. it was during the battle that i became the possessor of a handsomely mounted saber. in a part of the field near us there was a sudden sharp, deadly scrimmage between some of our mounted men and the enemy, a small force on each side. it was soon over, and hardy, one of my couriers, a stout, ready georgian, came to me with a beautiful saber, evidently a presentation to the lieutenant-colonel whose name was engraved on it. my fellow made me a gift of the handsome blade, and i wore it until peace came. what became of the lieutenant-colonel i could never ascertain. "his sword it is rust, his bones they are dust, his soul is with the saints, i trust." the good sword was treasured until a few years ago, when the ladies of the confederate museum at richmond asked me to put it among their collection, and there it hangs to-day, i hope for many years. it was on the 20th that i had my look at the celebrated forrest. truly a most powerful, impressive figure of a great cavalryman. he was yet to become still greater, as one of the first commanders of the south, and subsequent studies of his life and career only expand this admiration into deeper feelings for the great soldier. dr. john wyeth's interesting biography of forrest, published only in the past few years, is most fascinating, and has gone far to place him as one of the greatest leaders of the civil war. during the battle a queer scene between longstreet and the valiant old brigadier, benning, commanding one of hood's brigades, illustrates longstreet's grim calm in action, and the excitability of "old rock," as his men called him. a sudden counter-stroke of the enemy had smashed his brigade and they were badly scattered. benning thought that they were "all gone." seizing an artillery horse that was galloping by, harness flying, he threw himself on the terrified animal and found longstreet. "general," said the brigadier, "i am ruined; my brigade was suddenly attacked and every man killed; not one is to be found. please give orders where i can do some fighting." longstreet saw the excitement and quickly cooled it. "nonsense, general, you are not so badly hurt. look about you. i know you will find at least one man, and with him on his feet report your brigade to me, and you two shall have a place in the fighting-line." benning saw it, took the hint, hunted up his men, who were not so badly mauled after all, and with a respectable body was soon ready for work. vizitelly, the english artist, had started from richmond with us, to sketch and draw for the campaign; something stopped him on the way, drink, probably. at all events, he arrived very sheep-faced, long after the battle. he took me aside with: "colonel, i am in an awful mess. i must send drawings and a picture of this great battle to my paper somehow. cannot you help me?" we were at the time not very far from a little field that had a scene during the fighting which struck me, even then, as somewhat picturesque. the open field crowned with thick woods at one side, through which frowned half a dozen federal guns and a brigade of ours moving up in beautiful order to capture it. i said as much as this to vizitelly, and sent him to look at the spot. he returned, on fire with his artist's fancies, and shut himself up for several days. then he emerged with drawings, and much letter-press of what he had _actually_ seen; and principally a very large drawing beautifully finished of the so-called "little scene." but heavens! all resemblance had ceased. instead of the slight affair, three solid lines of infantry were moving across a great stretch of ground against hundreds of guns that were devastating our troops in fire and smoke. in the central portion there was the wounding and fall of a great officer and the closing in of the soldiers to protect him. "what think you?" said the proud vizitelly. "splendid, but nothing like it took place." "no matter, it might have happened, and besides all battle-pictures are drawn with such freedom." "who is the general just falling?" "that, sir, is general hood, drawn the instant of being shot." "but, my good vizitelly, hood was not within a mile of that little field i gave you." "no matter, he was shot, no one will deny that; and i must have a great interesting center for my picture. you fellows are altogether too particular. this goes by first underground chance, and you will see it in the _london illustrated news_." and so i did in the quiet sitting-room of a northern friend later on. he is not the only one of artistic imagination for battle-pictures. at chickamauga, we lost our quartermaster, major mitchell, of virginia, a valuable officer. a sudden attack of diphtheria carried him off like a stroke of lightning. major erasmus taylor, of orange court house, virginia, was immediately appointed in his place, and served with us efficiently until the close of the war. lieutenant-colonel manning, of our staff, was slightly wounded in the battle of the 20th. a fragment of shell pierced his scalp, causing much loss of blood, but otherwise no great damage. he was soon about his ordnance duties as good as ever. when president davis came to bragg's army on his visit of conciliation and support to his general, there was a universal turnout to give the executive our best reception. at all headquarters the least shabby uniforms were looked up and our best belongings for horse and man were brought out. mr. davis had a really fine escort to the top of lookout mountain and back to quarters. at first corps headquarters we still had the pleasure of captain fitzgerald ross with us, a companionable and honorable officer and gentleman. on this occasion we thought it time for ross to show the quality of his austrian corps, and most reluctantly he consented to ride with us in full uniform. it was a beauty and a wonder! sky-blue tunic and trousers, fitting skin-tight to the body and legs, loaded down with the richest gold braid and ornaments. tiny boots, tasseled and varnished, incased the captain's shapely hussar legs. and then the pelisse hanging from the left shoulder!--it would be the envy of any woman. the color, still sky-blue, of the finest cloth, lined with buff satin, gold braided and richly furred. a smart, richly plumed hungarian busby, with handsomely mounted curved saber and gold cords, completed the costume of this brilliant representative of his corps d'ã©lite. we gave ross our plaudits and thanks for his fine appearance, and only on returning was there any annoyance. the large cortege about the president parted and some of us found ourselves riding with ross under maj.-gen. john c. breckinridge. our route lay through one of his divisions camped in the noble primeval forests. the men were scattered all about attending to their personal matters, cooking, cleaning arms, mending, and, as it seemed, many stripped to the waist examining very closely their shirts and undergarments. without going into particulars, all soldiers in the field must be careful in this respect. long-worn clothing had a way of "gathering" things, and it was what had to be done in all our armies. but when the scattered troops saw the brilliant apparition of captain ross riding with their general there was a shout and a rush to him. such was the rough admiration exhibited that harm might have come to him but for breckinridge. he motioned the men back, said the captain was his guest, and, "when you fellows get to his army on a visit you will find him treating you more civilly; so get back to your bivouacs and make yourselves clean." there was a good-natured cheer for breckinridge, ross, the president, and all the rest of us, and we got back to camp with much cheerful chaff for poor ross and his gay uniform. chapter xxvii the east tennessee campaign, november 1863, to april, 1864 ordered by bragg to move against burnside and knoxville--our two divisions--wheeler's cavalry with artillery--burnside's strength--at sweetwater, november 21st--disappointed in supplies--the railway--pontoons, but no train--cross holston at loudon--enemy escapes into knoxville--hood's old division--generals jenkins and law--siege of knoxville--bull winthrop--mclaws ready for an assault--troops ordered to support--general leadbetter, of bragg's staff, orders assault--brigadiers wofford, humphreys, and bryan attacked--repulsed at fort saunders--general longstreet assumes the blame--losses. after a long wait, general bragg settled on something. he decided to make a move against burnside and knoxville. about november 3, longstreet received his instructions. they were about in line with what the lieutenant-general wanted instantly after chickamauga and what should have been done, but the general-in-chief could not see it, and, welcoming the orders even at this late day, we prepared for a hearty support and active campaign. the troops of the expedition were to be the two divisions (nine brigades of infantry) brought from virginia and alexander's fine battalion of artillery, six batteries; also leyden's artillery, and wheeler's powerful body of cavalry (four brigades) and horse artillery. we were also to take up all the loose bodies of troops to be found in the wide district to be covered. a force of about 3,000 men was promised from southwest virginia. it was an ill-disciplined body, not well organized, but accomplished wonders under wheeler as a screen to the army, and an unceasing menace to the enemy's communications. he had some able officers with him, generals w. j. martin, john t. morgan, g. g. dibbrell, and thomas harrison. when wheeler left us with instructions for a movement calling for some night work his cheerful words to his fellows were: "come, boys, mount. the war child rides to-night." that being, it seems, one of his pet names among the men. major-general wheeler was not long with us, bragg, to whom his services were invaluable, having sent for him. i saw him i think but once. he had reported to longstreet for orders and was followed by a rather numerous staff and escort. a small, slight man, very quick and alert in his movements, quite young, only recently from west point, he had justly earned great distinction as the cavalry leader of our western army. burnside's force south of knoxville was computed at about 15,000, and if we could get all the troops bragg held out to our commander, there would be enough of us to crush burnside. but the federal general had within reach some five thousand more men than general bragg estimated. the expedition, glad to be on the move, set out smartly for tyner's station, where it was to be entrained for sweetwater, but things went decidedly wrong. we had brought no transportation from virginia and general bragg's officers supplied us with wagons and teams, but held themselves under bragg's order. a most inconvenient disposition then, and until we parted company with that commander for good. with these and other difficulties it was november 12th before the last of our brigades came to sweetwater. here there were more disappointments as to rations, supplies, and transportation. we were dependent on bragg's provisions, which cruelly failed us. not to dwell too long on these mishaps, i need only add that they beset the entire campaign. the cars and railway by which we helped the transportation were almost comical in their inefficiency. the railroad was of heavy grades and the engines light-powered. when a hill was reached the long train would be instantly emptied--platforms, roofs, doors, and windows--of our fellows, like ants out of a hill, who would ease things by trudging up the dirt road and catching on again at the top; and so it went on as far as the railroad would serve us. a bridge train had been prepared by the engineers, and it had been our intention to use it across the little tennessee, or halston, above its confluence and through marysville. but here again was disappointment; there were pontoons but no train for hauling. we were thus forced to throw our bridge across at loudon, where, fortunately, the boats could be floated direct from cars without need of wagons, and there that curious bridge was laid by our worthy engineers. it was a sight to remember. the current was strong, the anchorage insufficient, the boats and indeed entire outfit quite primitive, and when lashed finally to both banks it might be imagined a bridge; but a huge letter "s" in effect it was with its graceful reverse curves. but no man should abuse the bridge by which he safely crosses, and this one took us over, using care and caution. i shall always love the looks of that queer bridge. the enemy was well advised as to our movements, and evidently conducted his retreat with skill and no serious losses. at lenoir's station he was forced to leave nearly a hundred loaded wagons, though the running-gear had been broken up so as to make them of no immediate use to us. i do not give in-detail the various movements of our advance from one point to another, their character generally not being of the highest credit to us in rapidity or co-operation of our several commands. a fine opportunity of crushing burnside was lost at campbell's station. burnside's retreat was in time to cover the roads leading into it, and there he had to make a stand. we should have beaten him badly, but he escaped and was soon safe in knoxville. the roads were deep in mud and caused hard travel and labor, but they were no better for the union force. campbell's station cannot be termed a serious battle. it was principally an artillery fight, in which the gallant alexander was tormented by defective ammunition. it should have been a strong and decisive battle, but things went wrong with the infantry divisions and an effective co-operation was not secured. ah! would that we could have had hood again at the head of his division. as it was, the five brigades of this fine command were practically paralyzed by the differences between the senior brigadier in command, jenkins, and his competitor, general e. m. law. it was a most unhappy condition of things, but by no fault of longstreet. when mr. davis visited us at chickamauga the lieutenant-general laid the situation before him and urged the promotion and appointment of jenkins, to which mr. davis would not listen. he was asked then to appoint law, but this also met the executive's "no," that officer being junior; and then longstreet begged the assignment of any good major-general to be found elsewhere. but none came then; months after one was sent when irretrievable mischief had been done by the unfortunate condition of the division. it lasted during all the subsequent operations in east tennessee throughout the winter. thus it came about that the enemy eluded us at campbell's station, and the next day was behind his works at knoxville, except his cavalry, which lingered to retard our march. our army followed closely, at once put the enemy's works under fire, and so began what is called the "siege of knoxville." by many it is thought to have been a serious error on the part of the confederate commander, the resorting to so slow a process. "he should have attacked immediately"; and i am disposed to consider intelligent statements of union officers and citizens of knoxville, long after, as indicating that an energetic movement, without the slightest delay, would have carried us into the town and brought burnside to terms. on the 18th of november mclaws advanced against some defenses of skirmishers, but part of his line halted before reaching the crest of the hill. captain winthrop, an englishman serving with alexander, dashed forward, and encouraging the men got through the hill in handsome style. it was well done by "bull" winthrop, as we called him, and he picked up a nasty wound in the doing of it. burnside's strongest defense was fort loudon, later called fort saunders, for the gallant officer of that name who fell in its defense. it was a strong earthwork, closely under mclaws's eye, who was expected to capture it. of course he had done much work toward it--ditches, parallels, and many devices for success. a night attack was proposed and at one time favored. on the 22d general mclaws thought the time had come and he was ordered to prepare his assaulting column, supported by the division. longstreet also ordered up other troops for support and following up a success. later on mclaws reported that his officers preferred daylight for the work before them and the movement was for the time deferred. on the 23d we heard that bragg had been attacked at chattanooga. bushrod johnson's division of two brigades was at loudon moving to us, and our strength then would be eleven brigades of infantry, wheeler's cavalry of four brigades (wheeler himself had been ordered back by bragg, leaving the horse under command of maj.-gen. will t. martin), alexander's artillery, and leyden's battalion. on the 25th, bragg's chief engineer, general leadbetter, brought orders from the former to attack immediately. longstreet was reluctant. troops from virginia were on the march, due with us in eight or ten days, and with them the investment could be made complete. the enemy was also said to be on half rations, and an attack now with chances of our repulse would be all in his favor. but leadbetter felt that bragg's orders were imperative and the assault must be attempted. minute orders were then sent to mclaws for the effort. the details are rather lengthy for the scope of these recollections. it was intended for the 28th, but because of bad weather put off until the 29th. at the appointed time the vigorous assault was made in fine form by the brigades of wofford, humphreys, and bryan in the early gray of the morning. at first we seemed to be going right ahead, shoving everything aside, but some stops were made and the wounded men began coming back. general longstreet says that when major goggin, an old army man on mclaws's staff, reported to him that it would be useless to persevere, that the fort was so surrounded with net-works of wire that no progress could be made without axes and not an axe was to be found--"without a second thought, i ordered the recall." he says later that the accounts of general poe, the engineer in charge of the works, convinced him that the few wires met with were far from being the serious obstacle reported and that we could have gone in without axes. it also seemed sure that the fort was nearly ours by the retirement of part of its garrison, only some two hundred men being kept with the guns. general longstreet takes upon himself the failure of the assault. it seems conclusive to him that it was due to the order for recall. he had long known goggin. some of our men pushed into the fort. one gallant young officer, adjutant cumming, from augusta, georgia, leaped through an embrasure and instantly demanded the surrender of fort and garrison. the union troops cheered the feat while making him a prisoner of war. almost immediately after the repulse general longstreet received a telegram from the president to the effect that "bragg had been forced back by numbers and that we were to co-operate with his army." a euphemism on the part of the president--bragg had suffered a severe defeat and was in full retreat. he made for dalton, which put out of the question any co-operation by us. our own safety was to be considered and how it could be accomplished. the casualties at knoxville are thus given: confederate loss in assault, 822; union loss in assault, 673; confederate loss in campaign, 1,296; union loss in campaign, 1,481. chapter xxviii the east tennessee campaign, continued in front of knoxville after repulse--position serious--bragg defeated at missionary ridge--reinforcements pressing to burnside--we withdraw to the eastward--halt at rogersville--foraging good--supplies in valleys sufficient--we decide to winter there--occasional operations without importance--affair at bean's station--much uneasiness at washington at longstreet's presence in east tennessee--general grant ordered to drive him out--affair at dandridge--great want of shoes--a supply from quartermaster general--general mclaws relieved from duty--the correspondence--general mclaws's resignation--intense cold--roads almost impassable--inhabitants of the valleys and mountaineers--the fierce old woman--mountain fastnesses--deserters from a north carolina regiment--their capture and execution--general schofield in command of union army--we take position and make camps near bull's gap. our position was now becoming serious. some additional troops under ransom would soon join us, but the enemy was being heavily reinforced. grant had decided to drive us out of east tennessee. a letter from him to burnside by courier was captured, advising him of three columns en route for his relief--one on south side by general sherman, one by dechared under general elliott, and one by cumberland gap under general foster. longstreet decided to march past knoxville on the north side of the river and aim for the column reported coming from cumberland gap. the enemy did not see fit to molest our flank as we marched past his defenses on the 2d of december. there was good foraging in the country, and we halted at rogersville on the 9th to accumulate supplies. up to this date it had not been our general's intention to stay in the tennessee valley. he was looking eastward, but more hopefully toward some combinations and increase of force by which a powerful demonstration could be made into kentucky through cumberland gap. but at rogersville the foraging officers brought in roseate reports of plenty in the land. it appeared to be overflowing with subsistence for any army; cattle, swine, corn, sorghum, and honey were abundant, and it was decided we should winter in these beautiful valleys, watered by the holston, the french broad, the mouth of chucky and nolachucky. truly was it a fertile and smiling land to be still showing all this abundance, ravaged and harried as it had been alternately by union and confederate forces, and with such a population! it could well be said that "only man was vile." general longstreet in his book, "manassas to appomattox," has written up his movements from the time he left bragg to that of leaving tennessee, at great length and with extreme particularity. its recital had apparently occupied him more than any part of the four years' war. we may therefore well leave these details; they are correctly stated, although without the interest of a successful campaign. we turn therefore to matters more general, but perhaps attractive, of our doings in that country. there was occasional skirmishing and outpost fighting, but nothing of importance. at the affair of bean's station we expected to accomplish something, but little came of it. gradually a good force had been assembled at scattered points under longstreet's orders, and he was most confident and eager for an opportunity to deal the enemy a blow. president davis, on december 10th, gave him discretionary authority over all the troops in the department, and on this he held, for the present, martin's cavalry by him, that bragg had called for. it was positively necessary for holding east tennessee, which seemed the best possible use to make of the troops while bragg's army was in a state of demoralization and uncertainty. indeed, in the published annals there is appearance of intense uneasiness by halleck and mr. lincoln as to longstreet's presence in tennessee. the emphatic tone of many letters and orders from the federal capital was that we should, under any circumstances and apparently at any sacrifices, be driven out. our presence there took the form of a political peril. as long as we had a good foothold and a good army in reach of cumberland gap there was the chance of a successful movement into kentucky, and once there that state would have been in an unpleasant and dangerous attitude to the federals. its confederate sentiments were in parts still strong and shared by large numbers of the population. longstreet's correspondence always took a squint at such an eventuality, and nothing would have better pleased him than to lead such a movement. but the winter coming on sharp, we found camps in the great forest about morristown before christmas and began collection of food supplies in earnest. the men were happy and cheerful, but awfully in want of clothing and shoes. some of the latter were made by themselves, but this supply could not go far. i recall a movement against general granger at dandridge when the corps turned out to march. it was bitter winter weather, the ground hard and sharp with ice, and not less than 2,000 of our little army were without shoes. their bleeding feet left marks at every step. they were useless for the work and quickly sent back to camp. not long after, however, all were made happy by a shipment of three thousand pairs of shoes by general lawton, our quartermaster-general. he had listened to our earnest, almost desperate appeals. about the middle of december, major-general mclaws was relieved from command of his division by lieutenant-general longstreet and ordered to augusta, georgia. part of the correspondence concerning this matter will be found in the appendix, sufficiently explanatory. the commanding general had for some time been dissatisfied with his second in command. later on, at greenville, mclaws had the court of inquiry for which he at once applied. the charges were three in number, principally alleging neglect and want of preparation at knoxville, supported each by one specification. the court absolved mclaws from all fault, but found him guilty on one of the specifications. the proceedings went to the president, who immediately disapproved them, restored mclaws to duty, and assigned him to a command in georgia. general e. m. law handed in his resignation and asked leave of absence on it--this about december 20th. it was cheerfully granted, and then general law asked the privilege of taking the resignation himself to richmond. it was unusual, but was allowed. from this afterwards grew serious complications, involving law's arrest by longstreet, his support by the executive, and longstreet's threat of resignation from the army, in which he was upheld by general lee. and the lieutenant-general had his way. law was not again in longstreet's command. the cold was intense, the record showing the lowest temperature for many years. during the last days of 1863 the glass went down to zero and the entire army was quiet in the effort to keep warm. fortunately there was fuel in abundance. the primeval forests of oak and hickory were food for some of the grandest campfires ever seen, but we froze in front while scorching in back, and vice versa. and as to sleeping, many a fine fellow woke to find his shoes crisp from the too generous blaze. at this time the roads were so bad as to be almost impassable; artillery and wagons would be drawn hub deep. the artillery horses, leyden's especially, were in bad condition, very weak, and six or eight pairs would be hitched to a single gun or caisson. it amused the infantry footing it on the side paths, and they would call out, "here comes the cavalry, but what's that gun tied to the tail for?" the people of these valleys made an interesting study. they doubtless went through much during the civil war, and part of their disposition at the period of our occupation may be accounted for. there were, of course, some exceptions to be found in families of wealth, intelligence, and breeding, but the general run of people was hard in the extreme. apparently they were without pity or compassion--generosity and sympathy were strangers to them; but hatred and revenge made their homes in the breasts of these farmers. when the confederates came on the ground, then was the time for acts of brutality against their union neighbors, the political feeling in the valleys being about equally divided. burnings, hangings, whippings were common--all acts of private vengeance and retaliation. when the turn came and the unionists were in authority, confederate sympathizers were made to suffer in the same way, and so it went on throughout the bloody strife. once an old woman came to my quarters with a request. she was a fierce, hard creature, strong, of wrinkled skin, but set, relentless features, clothed in the homespun worn by all, and like all, dipping snuff. stick in mouth she made her statement. some men had come to her house that morning--she knew them name by name. they had taken her old man from her and hung him to a tree by his own porch, and there left him--dead. she wanted the murderers caught and punished. not a word of sorrow or softness, not a tear of regret, but only vengeance, and that instantly. i immediately sent a good troop of cavalry to seize the men, if to be found, but little hoped it. they had, as usual, taken refuge in the mountains, quite inaccessible to ordinary attack, and were safe there with numbers of others. these mountain fastnesses were filled with evil-doers of both sides, union and confederate; murderers, thieves, deserters--all crimes could there be known. the authorities had found it quite impossible to break up these formidable gangs by any ordinary force. a special expedition for the express purpose would be necessary. it was to these mountains that a large body of deserters from a north carolina regiment in virginia was making a little time back. a whole company had broken away, but were overtaken at a crossing of the james above richmond. they showed fight and killed several of the pursuers, but were taken back and the leaders tried by court martial. ten were convicted and sentenced to be shot. there had been too much leniency, and general lee had the sentence executed. the unfortunates were tied to small sunken crosses in line about ten feet apart, with a firing party in front of each. their division, major-general edward johnson's, was drawn up in three sides of a hollow square, the deserters being on the fourth. at the word the firing was accurately executed and the men sank dead or dying at their stakes. the division was then marched by, close to their bodies, and it was hoped the lesson would be salutary. general grant made a visit to knoxville about january 1st, general foster in command. before leaving he ordered foster to expel us from tennessee, if not altogether, at least beyond bull's gap and red bridge. washington was still uneasy and pressing him hard to put us out of the way. preparing for it, he ordered the ninth and the twenty-third corps to mossy creek, fourth corps to strawberry plain and the cavalry to dandridge--a formidable force. that army moved about january 15th. dandridge is on the french broad river, about thirty miles from knoxville, and was the enemy's objective. general foster was invalided, and sheridan for a short time took command until relieved by the corps commander, gordon granger. a smart affair ensued, general martin's cavalry doing our principal work. granger retired and longstreet rode into dandridge and was soon in the house occupied by his old friend granger. pursuit was made impracticable by the condition of roads and want of a bridge train. practically nothing was accomplished on this trial, and our troops as well as the enemy were sent back to camps. on february 9th general schofield took command at knoxville of the union army in east tennessee. the pressure on him continued from halleck, whose uneasiness at one time became almost uncontrollable. grant at first made strong effort to carry out these wishes, but we were not moved. later on he found the field too far from his other operations and likely to interrupt plans for the summer. he preferred resting on the apparent apathy at the south and using his east tennessee strength in virginia and georgia where he should have full need for it. this view was to leave us in inactivity in east tennessee, and no further serious effort was made. longstreet had to move east when he was refused more troops for extended aggressive operations and received orders for return of martin's cavalry to georgia. our march was begun about february 20, 1864, and was not disturbed. a fair position was found at bull's gap, and then we distributed our commands in good camps from the holston to the nolachucky. chapter xxix at home in savannah--sketches leave of absence--visiting home with doctor sorrel--traveling by rail--old savannah--few changes--many friends--happiness in meeting them--return to the army--longstreet's correspondence with schofield--attempt in same line near richmond with general ord--general grant declines negotiations for peace--andrew johnson's masonic paraphernalia saved by captain goree--sketch--longstreet at richmond--in conference with president and general lee--without result--first corps ordered back to lee--began moving late in april--arrived at mechanicsville last of month--major-general field assigned to command of hood's division--sketch--congress votes thanks to first corps (see appendix)--charlottesville--sketch--prices of various articles. i had now opportunity for yielding to my father's pressing urgency to take leave of absence and see him once more in life. i arranged for thirty days absence. the railroad was not yet fully repaired and my nearest station was about fifteen miles to ride. an agreeable medical officer gave me his company so far, but was constantly weeping that he was not on his way "to see his dear, beautiful little wife." i tried to comfort him by the reminder that no such attraction was waiting for me, but without success. he was, however, braced up by a horse trade we managed to get off, which as usual i incline to think i got the worst of. i think so by reason of a memorandum about horses in which the animal then acquired is named "deceit." the train soon reached bristol, whence a change of cars brought me through lynchburg to richmond. there doctor sorrel met me, like myself on leave, and light-hearted we started for home to see our dear kith and kin. it was my first absence from duty since july 21, 1861. slow railway traveling in those days was the rule without exception--gauges not uniform, routes deviating, and engines of low power. the time was, i think, quite three days between richmond and savannah, traveling day and night, and of course such luxuries as sleeping-cars were then unknown. it was a great delight to see home again; to be welcomed and made much of, after the stern scenes of more than two years. our friends were not backward or ungenerous. hospitalities were showered upon us, but better than all was the loving home circle of aging father and happy young sisters. the latter, gladdened to have their brothers once more with them, sang, played, and danced to heart's delight. there were many changes. only six companies had gone to the eastern army. the remainder of the very large forces sent by the city was distributed through the western armies and the coast defenses; consequently i had seen but few of my old comrades and associates in virginia. the happiness of meeting many awaited me in savannah, and it will easily be imagined what our talk was about--the camp, the battle, the march, the enemy, and our own commands. there was no great change in the appearance of the town, then of about 30,000 population. eighteen miles from the sea, and beautifully situated on a high bluff, it enjoyed a large commerce and much lucrative business. shady walks, numerous small wooded parks, and thousands of branching, leafy trees made it a very attractive and beautiful little city. the rigors of war had not yet touched it. the forts at the entrance to the river were the enemy's, but he had not yet penetrated to the city. that was preserved for sherman in december, from the west. the days slipped by. our time was nearly up, and with cheerful farewells we were soon on our way back to virginia. dropping my brother, the doctor, at richmond, i went directly back to my familiar duties with our army in its winter camp in east tennessee. affairs had been very quiet within that thirty days, and i was well satisfied to be again with the colors. my leave and my home became, as it were, but a pleasant bit of dreaming. not long after schofield took command of the union forces our lieutenant-general succeeded in getting into a short correspondence with him. the federal commander was an able soldier, of liberal views, from which longstreet had hopes. the latter's intentions were commendable. like most of us, he wanted peace and the honorable termination of the war and cessation of bloodshed. he felt that it was not to be accomplished by the politicians. they had plunged the country into civil war, he reasoned. they would be the last to bring it to an end. the hope was that the generals on both sides might give the movement such an impetus that statecraft must necessarily take it up with probably good results. it was with this view that some letters passed between longstreet and schofield. the former pressed that view, and, assuming the union general, like himself, wanted peace, he urged a joint initiative from which much could be hoped. it was illusory. schofield's letter was calm and noncommittal. finally he had to say what was sure to be said, that it was not his part to deal with such matters, which were properly to be discussed by the executive in washington. it was necessarily so. the military were not clothed with authority for the purpose. even the convention between sherman and johnston at the close of hostilities was disapproved and annulled by the federal civil authorities. the idea, however, did not vanish from longstreet's thoughts. it took fresh shape later in front of richmond through general ord, the officer immediately in command, as intermediary by which it was hoped a meeting between grant and lee could be achieved. general grant declined a meeting for discussion on such a subject. the correspondence relating to these two incidents is probably to be found in the records published by congress, and should be interesting. i refer to them entirely from memory. while quartered near greenville some straggling soldiers found their way into the house once occupied by andrew johnson, afterwards vice-president. he was a mason of high degree, and the emblems and paraphernalia of the order were very numerous in the dwelling. our fellows thought they had made a find of value and were about starting off with it when halted by captain goree, a. d. c. of our staff. he had everything carefully repacked and put in a safe place for the rightful owner. i have never known whether he finally recovered them uninjured. goree was a texan and had been with longstreet from the beginning. the general was fortunate in having an officer so careful, observing, and intelligent. his conduct on all occasions was excellent and his intrepidity during exposure in battle could always be counted on. he was with the corps until appomattox, and then returned to texas, where he occupied responsible public office by vote of the people for many years. he enjoys good health and good confederate memories now at his home in galveston. about this time generals lee, johnston, and longstreet were called on by the richmond authorities for suggestions as to further operations on a comprehensive scale. general bragg was in office as adviser to the president. having failed in all field operations, he had now the president's ear and the president's support for experimental strategy. longstreet submitted an elaborate proposition, having for its objective a powerful demonstration in kentucky by combination with general johnston's army and the eventual command of the state under confederate auspices. it is said that plan had general lee's approval when submitted to the president in counsel with the secretary of war, general bragg, and general lee. the proposition was not accepted and nothing apparently was settled. general lee returned immediately to his army on the rapidan and the lieutenant-general set out for his headquarters at greenville. feeling himself entitled to the privilege, he stopped two days at petersburg to see his wife, and to have his infant son christened "robert lee." it appears this short stop subjected him to rebuke by the president for loitering. the country was now in wintry weather and there was much snow. everything went into quarters that could and all military operations were suspended. the second division of general johnston's cavalry was ordered to him through the mountains--a hard march. it should be stated that johnston was now for some time in command of the army of tennessee in bragg's place. in the first half of april our command started back to join general lee on the rapidan. it was made on cars collected as fast as possible. the troop detrained at charlottesville. after a short stop in that country, we began, about the 22d, the march to mechanicsville, not far from gordonsville, and on the last of the month had the happiness to be reviewed by our beloved commander, general lee. the troubles in hood's old division would, it was hoped, be ended. maj-gen. charles w. fields had been some time back assigned to command and was to prove an active and capable commander. he was an old army man of much experience and unquestioned valor. in the appendix may be read the vote of thanks given by congress to lieutenant-general longstreet and his command. when we detrained at charlottesville i had the good fortune to meet some most hospitable friends. judge william j. robertson, eminent on the bench, and his charming wife insisted on having me in their handsome residence and agreeable family circle. it was a welcome contrast to the asperities of a winter campaign in east tennessee. the town itself was interesting and full of virginia historic lore. its chief pride is the alma mater of many southern men, the university of virginia, beloved of jefferson. near by, on steep monticello, stands his own house, where youth and age, in admiration of the sage, the statesman, the philosopher, sought him for a word, a touch of the hand. the property is still well maintained by its present owner, proud of its history as part of thomas jefferson. the county of albemarle (its deep red-clay soil remembered by many a sore-footed soldier), is of ancient settlement, abounding in wood and meadow and shining streams. its tasty, luscious pippins are widely known to lovers of the apple. some stately old residences, the "great houses" of large estates of the early virginia families, are still to be seen; but alas! the ravages of war and its bitter results have left such properties but as so many reminders of an opulent past. it was this delightful resting place of a few days that we were now to leave for the great campaign of the wilderness and its subsequent battles. in april, 1864, the confederacy had reached a point of great financial embarrassment, as shown by the depreciation of its paper currency. the pay of the officers was in reality a pittance, and those without other resources were often in straits. many boxes and hampers, however, came to the camps from home and were of some help to all. a petition from officers in the field had gone to the war department, asking that rations might be issued to them as to the private soldiers. it had attached a scale of prices charged the officers by the army commissaries, presumably the average cost price, and not the price of retail market. the officers paid for bacon, $2.20 per pound; beef, 75 cents; lard, $2.20 per pound; molasses, $6 per gallon; sugar, $1.50 per pound. a coat cost $350; boots, $250; trousers, $125; hat, $80 to $125; shirt, $50; socks, $10 per pair. general johnston in approving and verifying the petition said that at existing prices the pay of company officers was worth less than that of a private soldier. the shrinkage of the value of our paper currency continued with the progress of the war until, near the close, it almost ceased to have any purchasing power whatever. chapter xxx battle of the wilderness, may 6, 1864. general grant in command of all the union forces--takes station with army of the potomac--his career--his successes--later kind feelings of southern people toward him--his dinner party at savannah--his plan of campaign--the policy of attrition--grant moves his army--the wilderness--disparity of numbers--courier service an example of our economy in men--kershaw promoted major-general, commanding mclaws's division--sketch--lee decides to strike--grant on the march--they meet on may 5th--an indecisive partial contest--early on may 6 longstreet comes up--finds situation serious--hancock's successful attack on third corps--it is checked--our flank attack on hancock's left--he is rolled up and sent back--general lee wants to lead troops--longstreet wounded and jenkins killed by fire of our own men--major-general wadsworth, u. s. a., killed--attack resumed later--not successful--night ends long day's fighting. the army of northern virginia was now to deal with a new force--a general with the great prestige of repeated victories in the west, and of undeniable ability. lieutenant-general u. s. grant had been made commander-in-chief of all the federal armies in the field, and realizing the extraordinary achievements of lee's army, left the scene of his operations, and retaining meade in command of the army of the potomac, took his station by that army for the supreme direction of military affairs. grant's career was wonderful; were it not a fact, it would be thought a fairy tale. a west point graduate of mediocrity, serving well in mexico, but so given over to drink that his retirement from the army may be said to have been compulsory. this was followed by hard-working attempts to make a living for his family, in humble occupations, until the stirring events of 1861 brought him forward, as they did every one who had enjoyed the opportunity of a soldier's education. obtaining command of an illinois regiment, his field service began, and was followed up with much success; until, placed in command of important armies in tennessee and kentucky, he was able to break up the confederate plans, and finally, by his crushing defeat of bragg at missionary ridge, prepared the way for hood's destruction at franklin and nashville, and sherman's "march to the sea." now came his work in virginia, which is to be touched on, and then his presidency for two terms. during much of this time he was said to be intemperate, but if true it made no difference in the results accomplished. mr. lincoln was thought to be looking up grant's brand of whiskey for some of his other generals. this general's character made him very dear to his friends. he was always true and helpful to them, and possessed a certain directness and simplicity of action that was in itself most attractive. general grant's conduct toward our leader in the closing scenes at appomattox and his vigorous defense of lee when threatened by unprincipled and powerful northern politicians are not likely to be forgotten by the southern people. with the passing of time his fame as a great commander appears to be growing, and will probably still grow after careful study of his campaigns. only once did i have the opportunity of meeting this remarkable man. it was during the "third term" plans of the republican party that his friends were carrying him on visits to various parts of the country. he was in savannah with sheridan and others for a few days and was entertained at a handsome dinner-party, of some dozen or more leading gentlemen of the city, by general henry r. jackson, a wealthy and prominent democratic citizen. he was himself a marked personality--a lawyer of eminence; had been minister to austria under buchanan; was to be minister to mexico under cleveland; was a poet and an orator, besides of the highest character, attainments, and social attractions. the dinner was a great success, served lavishly in the old southern fashion, with various courses of wine, which the rough sheridan brusquely put aside. "he wanted champagne, must have it at once." and he _did_ have it from start to finish. grant was in excellent form, looked well and talked well; his glass was not touched. fresh from his tour around the world he had much to say. he had been deeply interested in japan and talked incisively of that wonderful country, really a monologue of a full hour, the table intent and absorbed in the fresh observations that fell from him. then it became time for his departure to meet a public appointment, and we rose to bow him out. resuming our seats and attention to the old madeiras, we agreed that for a silent man grant was about the most interesting one we had recently found. his talk was clean-cut, simple, direct, and clear. the general-in-chief made his headquarters near culpeper. the army of the potomac was about 130,000 strong in aggregate, and consisted of hancock's second corps, warren's fifth, and sedgwick's sixth; besides burnside's ninth, held apart near rappahannock railroad bridge. lee's army lay west of the rapidan, r. h. anderson's division facing madison court house; the second and third corps (ewell's and hill's), two divisions of the first and alexander's artillery were at mechanicsville; pickett's division of the first was south of the james. our strength is stated by colonel taylor to have been 63,998. we were at no loss to understand grant's intention. the northern papers, as well as himself, had boldly and brutally announced the purpose of "attrition"--that is, the federals could stand the loss of four or five men to the confederate's one, and threw nice strategy into the background. it was known that we were almost past recruiting our thin ranks, and the small figures of the army as it now stood; while the double numbers of the federals could be reproduced from the immense resources in population, not to speak of their foreign field of supplies under inducement of liberal bounties. grant started his march the night of may 3d, via germanna and elys fords, wilson's and gregg's cavalry leading. burnside was also ordered to him. the wilderness was a wild, tangled forest of stunted trees, with in places impassable undergrowth, lying between fredericksburg and orange court house, probably sixteen or seventeen miles square. some farm clearings and a shanty or two for a few poor inhabitants might occasionally be seen. two principal roads penetrated this repulsive district, the orange plank road and the turnpike. the ground generally lay flat and level. and now was to begin the last and greatest of the campaigns of the army of northern virginia. the campaign of _attrition_ on one side met and foiled by the fine flower of the ablest strategy on the other. it was grant's stubborn perseverance, indifferent to the loss of life, against lee's clear insight and incessant watchfulness. our army always ready, ever fighting, was to hold the federal forces from the wilderness to the final break at petersburg, from may to march, ten months of supreme effort, most exhaustive to a commander. marshall marmont says, "the attacking general has, to a large extent, command of the mind of his defensive opponents." it is doubtless true, but lee often gave his mind necessary relief and chanced success by a sudden initiative against grant. the latter would unexpectedly find part of his army attacked with swift energy and would get something for his mind to work on besides the control of lee's. referring to the disparity of numbers, we did in truth want men. a little detail will show how we had to economize them. until recently there had been small cavalry details at general headquarters and with corps and division chiefs. these, however, were all sent back to serve with the regimental colors, and the courier service they had been doing taken up by assignments of men from the infantry ranks who could keep themselves mounted. six were allowed for corps headquarters, four for divisions, and two for brigades. being picked men, the service was well performed; but the time was not far off when these able men had again to take up their muskets by their colors. disabled fellows who could ride but did no marching were put at the important courier duties and did well! the enemy said we were robbing the cradle and the grave, and it was more or less true. maj.-gen. j. b. kershaw, a lawyer from south carolina, was one of the most distinguished and efficient officers of the virginia army. his service had been long and uninterrupted. coming out with a fine south carolina regiment among the first to be sent to virginia, his abilities soon made him its colonel. he served long in that rank, his steady courage and military aptitude invariably showing handsomely in the arduous service of his regiment. it was one of those forming the south carolina brigade of mclaws's division. longstreet was quick to perceive kershaw's merit and recommended him for promotion. it was sometime coming. but when he was brigadier-general and placed in command of the brigade he maintained his high reputation fully. in 1864 he was promoted to be major-general, and continuing his service with longstreet's corps, his conduct and abilities were conspicuous until the very end of hostilities. general kershaw was of most attractive appearance, soldierly and handsome, of medium size, well set up, light hair and moustache, with clean-cut, high-bred features. grant's movement was soon made known to lee, and the latter prepared to strike. it was his way, he waited not for the blow; better give it, was a large part of his strategy. it was thought grant could best be met by a stroke as he marched. the second and third corps were ordered forward by the plank road. our own two divisions, field's and kershaw's, the latter commanding in mclaws's place, and alexander's batteries were near gordonsville and ordered to move by the plank road to parker's store. the route was changed at general longstreet's request, and he found a good guide in james robinson, well known to our quartermaster taylor, who lived at orange court house. we were at richard's shop at 5 p. m. on may 5th, rosser's cavalry then being engaged at that point with part of sheridan's; the latter moving off when we came up. the march had been twenty-eight miles, and there orders from the commanding general were received for changing direction so as to unite with other troops on the plank road. directions conforming were issued to resume march at midnight. both armies being now in quick motion, the collision was soon to come; indeed, had already come with heth's and wilcox's divisions, ending late that night after fierce battle. i make no attempt at detail of all confederate and union movements, but the great battle of the wilderness is now to be fought and the important part in it taken by the first army corps briefly sketched. strange to say, the two divisions of our third corps, heth's and wilcox's, after their severe battle made no attempt at defensive field work or trenching when firing ceased that night. in explanation, it is said they expected to be withdrawn and consequently did no work nor replenished their ammunition. but hancock, accomplished general that he was, suffered himself to fall into no such pit. he had his men at work all night strengthening his position, and was thus enjoying the soldier's high feeling of confidence; and then with the sun he let fly at the troops in front of him, apparently inviting attack with no ground defenses whatever. it was distressing to realize such failure in the field work, and the result came near a great disaster. longstreet had moved at 1 a. m., the march being difficult and slow in the dense forest by side tracks and deep furrowed roadways. at daylight he was on the plank road and in close touch with lee when hancock struck the two unprepared divisions. the situation when we came on the scene, that of may 6th, was appalling. fugitives from the broken lines of the third corps were pouring back in disorder and it looked as if things were past mending. but not so to james longstreet; never did his great qualities as a tenacious, fighting soldier shine forth in better light. he instantly took charge of the battle, and threw his two divisions across the plank road, kershaw on the right, field on the left. none but seasoned soldiers like the first corps could have done even that much. i have always thought that in its entire splendid history the simple act of forming line in that dense undergrowth, under heavy fire and with the third corps men pushing to the rear through the ranks, was perhaps its greatest performance for steadiness and inflexible courage and discipline. hill's men were prompt to collect and reform in our rear and soon were ready for better work. general lee was under great excitement immediately on the left. he wanted to lead some of our troops into action, but the texas brigade was about him and swore they would do nothing unless he retired. a confident message from longstreet through colonel venable that his line would be restored within an hour also helped him to regain his calm; and then at it we went in earnest, on both sides of the road. hancock's success had loosened his ranks somewhat, which helped us when we fell on him. it was a hard shock of battle by six of our brigades, three on each side of the road. no artillery came into play, the ground not being fit for it. the enemy's advance was checked, then wavered, and finally relinquished; our troops pushing forward into the recovered lines. longstreet had redeemed his promise to his commander. meantime sharp work had also been going on at the left by lieutenant-general ewell--the never sleeping ewell--and the prospects were bright. r. h. anderson, with hill's corps, had come up and reported to longstreet, who posted part of it on the right. latrobe, of our staff, had received painful wounds in the thigh and hand, in this fight, while pushing the men forward. it had taken several hours to achieve this and a slight pause in the activities of the armies occurred. gen. m. l. smith, an engineer from general headquarters, had reported to longstreet and examined the situation on our right, where he discovered the enemy's left somewhat exposed and inviting attack; and now came our turn. general longstreet, calling me, said: "colonel, there is a fine chance of a great attack by our right. if you will quickly get into those woods, some brigades will be found much scattered from the fight. collect them and take charge. form a good line and then move, your right pushed forward and turning as much as possible to the left. hit hard when you start, but don't start until you have everything ready. i shall be waiting for your gun fire, and be on hand with fresh troops for further advance." no greater opportunity could be given to an aspiring young staff officer, and i was quickly at work. the brigades of anderson, mahone, and wofford were lined up in fair order and in touch with each other. it was difficult to assemble them in that horrid wilderness, but in an hour we were ready. the word was given, and then with heavy firing and ringing yells we were upon hancock's exposed left, the brigades being ably commanded by their respective officers. it was rolled back line after line. i was well mounted, and despite the tangled growth could keep with our troops in conspicuous sight of them, riding most of the charge with mahone's men and the eighteenth virginia. some correspondence will be found in the appendix about it. a stand was attempted by a reserve line of hancock's, but it was swept off its feet in the tumultuous rush of our troops, and finally we struck the plank road lower down. on the other side of it was wadsworth's corps in disorder. (i had last seen him under flag of truce at fredericksburg.) though the old general was, doing all possible to fight it, his men would not stay. a volley from our pursuing troops brought down the gallant new yorker, killing both rider and horse. there was still some life left in the general, and every care was given him by our surgeon. before they could get to him, however, some of his valuables--watch, sword, glasses, etc.--had disappeared among the troops. one of the men came up with, "here, colonel, here's his map." it was a good general map of virginia, and of use afterwards. we were then so disorganized by the chase through the woods that a halt was necessary to reform, and i hastened back to general longstreet to press for fresh troops. there was no need with him. he had heard our guns, knew what was up, and was already marching, happy at the success, to finish it with the eager men at his heels. there was quite a party of mounted officers and men riding with him--generals kershaw and jenkins, the staff, and orderlies. jenkins, always enthusiastic, had thrown his arm about my shoulder, with, "sorrel, it was splendid; we shall smash them now." and turning back i was riding by longstreet's side, my horse's head at his crupper, when firing broke out from our own men on the roadside in the dense tangle. the lieutenant-general was struck. he was a heavy man, with a very firm seat in the saddle, but he was actually lifted straight up and came down hard. then the lead-torn coat, the orifice close to the right shoulder pointed to the passage of the heavy bullet of those days. his staff immediately dismounted him, at the foot of a branching tree, bleeding profusely. the shot had entered near the throat and he was almost choked with blood. doctor cullen, his medical director, was quickly on the spot. even then the battle was in the leader's mind, and he sent word to major-general field to go straight on. he directed me to hasten to general lee, report what had been accomplished, and urge him to continue the movement he was engaged on; the troops being all ready, success would surely follow, and grant, he firmly believed, be driven back across the rapidan. i rode immediately to general lee, and did not again see my chief until his return to duty in october. the fatal firing that brought him down also killed captain jenkins, captain foley, and several orderlies. jenkins was a loss to the army--brave, ardent, experienced and highly trained, there was much to expect of him. the firing began among some of the virginia troops that had rushed the attack. our detour was such that it was quite possible to expect the capture of prisoners, and when longstreet's party was seen, followed by jenkins's brigade and part of kershaw's command, in the shaded light of the dense tangle, a shot or two went off, then more, and finally a strong fusilade. the officers of our party acted splendidly in the effort to avert confusion and stop the deadly firing. general kershaw was conspicuous about it, and our signal officer, captain j. h. manning, deliberately, calmly rode through the fire up to the virginians, holding up his hands and making signs that we were friends. this happened between twelve and one o'clock. my report to general lee was, as instructed, immediate. i found him greatly concerned by the wounding of longstreet and his loss to the army. he was most minute in his inquiries and was pleased to praise the handling of the flank attack. longstreet's message was given, but the general was not in sufficient touch with the actual position of the troops to proceed with it as our fallen chief would have been able to do; at least, i received that impression, because activity came to a stop for the moment. a new attack with stronger forces was settled on. it was to be made direct on the enemy's works, lower down the plank road, in the hope of dislodging him. but meantime the foe was not idle. he had used the intervening hours in strengthening his position and making really formidable works across the road. when the confederate troops assaulted them late in the afternoon they met with a costly repulse, and with this the principal operations on our part of the field ceased for the day; it was coming on dark. chapter xxxi coincidences--longstreet's successor longstreet borne from the field--his letter to lee from lynchburg--return of general wadsworth's map to his son--coincidence in the wounding of jackson and longstreet--general lee summons me--talks of assignment to command of first corps--he decides on general richard h. anderson. general longstreet was first taken to the house of his quartermaster, major taylor, near by, and thence, when he could be moved, to lynchburg. from there he wrote to general lee of this attack on hancock's left as conducted by myself, and i trust it may not be considered out of place to insert that letter here. general longstreet's book has caused to be brought forth quite a number of incidents of the late war which that distinguished confederate necessarily passed over briefly in his narrative. in the battle of the wilderness, may 6, 1864, longstreet's corps moved to the support of a. p. hill's corps early in the morning and checked the onward movement of the enemy. in this attack general g. m. sorrel (then lieutenant-colonel and chief of staff of general longstreet), under the orders of his chief, took mahone's, wofford's and g. t. anderson's brigades, and, swinging around to the right, the confederates carried everything before them. for his gallantry on that occasion, colonel sorrel was made a brigadier-general on the recommendation of general longstreet, in the subjoined letter: lynchburg, va., may 19, 1864. general r. e. lee, _commanding, etc._ sir: the peculiar character of the position occupied by the enemy in my front on the 6th inst. was such as to render a direct assault impracticable. after a brief consultation with the commanding general, a move was agreed upon, turning and attacking the enemy's left flank. lieutenant-colonel sorrel, my chief of staff, was assigned to represent me in this flank movement, with instructions as to the execution of it. the flank attack, made by three brigades, was to be followed by a corresponding movement of the other brigades of the command. this attack, made under the supervision of lieutenant-colonel sorrel, was executed with much skill, promptness, and address, and the enemy was driven from his position in haste and some confusion. it occurs to me that this is one of the instances of skill, ability and gallantry on the battle-field which should commend itself to the high approval of the executive. i, therefore, take great pleasure in recommending lieutenant-colonel sorrel's promotion to brigadier-general for distinguished conduct on this occasion. i should have reported this case much earlier and asked for promotion upon the spot, but that i was struck down by a painful wound a few moments after the execution of the movement. i am still unable to write and hence must ask the privilege of signing this by my aide-de-camp. i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, (signed.) j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. (signed.) by t. j. goree, _aide-de-camp_. hancock said long after to longstreet, "you rolled me up like a wet blanket and it was some hours before i could reorganize for battle." many years after this great struggle opportunity was given me of placing with hon. james wadsworth, m. c., son of the general, the map before referred to as taken from his father when he fell. in making his acknowledgments it was gratifying to learn that nearly all the other belongings of this gallant officer had gradually, by kindness of friends, found their way back into the family possessions. some coincidences in the fall of jackson and longstreet are not without interest. on _may 3, 1863_, lieutenant-general jackson, great corps commander of the army of northern virginia, was struck down by the fire of his own men while executing a successful flank movement in the wilderness at the battle of chancellorsville. on _may 6, 1864_, just one year later, lieutenant-general longstreet, the other great corps commander of the army of northern virginia, was also struck down by the fire of his own men while conducting a successful flank movement, and this on almost the same ground. while one fell (unhappily mortally wounded) at chancellorsville and the other at wilderness, both names apply to that singular district, and the two points were not very wide apart. at sunrise, on the 7th, i was summoned to the commander-in-chief and promptly reported. general lee received me most kindly and at once withdrew under a neighboring tree. "i must speak to you, colonel," he opened, "about the command of the first corps." he then in substance went on to say that the two major-generals of the corps present were too recent for the command (pickett does not appear to have been thought of) and an officer must be assigned. he had three in mind: major-generals early, edward johnson, and richard h. anderson, and did me the honor to invite my opinion. "you have," he said, "been with the corps since it started as a brigade, and should be able to help me." at once i saw the need of giving all the assistance possible and that i must use every care in judgment. thanking the general for his unprecedented confidence, i said that probably early would be the ablest commander of the three named, but would also be the most unpopular in our corps. his flings and irritable disposition had left their marks, and there had been one or two occasions when some ugly feelings had been aroused while operating in concert. i feared he would be objectionable to both officers and men. "and now, colonel, for my friend ed. johnson; he is a splendid fellow." "all say so, general," was my answer--and i fully believed it--"but he is quite unknown to the corps. his reputation is so high that perhaps he would prove all that could be wished, but i think that some one personally known to the corps would be preferred." this brought the commander to gen. richard h. anderson, and i was led to say, without presuming to criticize him or point out his merits or demerits (there are probably plenty of both), "we _know him_ and shall be satisfied with him." he was long a brigadier with us, tried and experienced; then a major-general until withdrawn to make up the third corps. "thank you, colonel," said general lee. "i have been interested, but early would make a fine corps commander." being dismissed, i hastened back to camp, full of thoughts as to who was to command us. it looked from the general's closing words as if it would be early (i am sure he preferred him), but no, anderson was the man. later, the same day, came the order assigning chivalrous, deliberate "dick" anderson to the command of the first army corps and it was not very long before he was made lieutenant-general. chapter xxxii battles of spottsylvania c. h., may 10 and 12, and cold harbor, june 3, 1864 the night's horrors--the forest on fire--sufferings of the wounded--on same ground may 7th--anderson in command of first corps--characteristics--the great strategic contest between grant and lee--grant moves for spottsylvania court house--lee follows in time--both sides entrench--union attack of 10th checked--not so on the 12th--edward johnson's division suddenly assailed--is captured with guns and colors--a serious loss keenly felt--salient was exposed--new line established--terrific fire for its possession by gordon's fresh troops--we hold the new ground after heavy losses--sedgwick killed on 10th--stuart, our cavalry leader, shot on may 12--general lee not in good health--attack by grant at cold harbor--great slaughter of union soldiers--assaults abandoned--grant asks for truce to bury dead--lee in doubt as to enemy's movements--grant stole a march and nearly had petersburg--saved by beauregard--reinforcements and losses--an accident by falling chimney--death of colonel edward willis--general hampton assigned to command of cavalry--sketch. the night was hideous. the brush and undergrowth had taken fire from the musketry and flames and smoke were obscuring everything. the numerous parties out for burying the dead and gathering the wounded were much impeded and many wounded must have perished, hidden from sight of man in that awful burnt tangle. these duties and close search continued all next day. our new commander, general anderson, took the corps early on the 7th, during which the armies lay quiet after the battle. grant was not aggressive, nor were we. the federal commander's reflections may have been sombre. expecting only a march, he had found bloody battles, for the army of northern virginia was always in front of him. on the other hand, lee was doubtless in the full gravity of the immense responsibilities before him and his severe losses. it was from now until june 14th, when grant reached his pontoon bridge over the james on his way to the new scene of action at petersburg, a game to the death for the possession of richmond. his able and powerful movements were to throw his army between lee and our capital. he found lee always, not the capital, and the movements, which shall not be detailed too much, were steadily on that line. our general invariably penetrated his adversary's design and objective and was there--perhaps in a hurry and breathless, but there; and enough of us were ready to make necessary another march of the union left. following then his original plan, grant, on the night of the 7th, made a rapid flank movement to secure spottsylvania court house. immediately part of our corps moved with general anderson and arrived at the court house contemporaneously with the northerners. the march through the scorched and smoking wilderness was most painful. the union men, a little advance, had seized the best strategic point, but were driven off by our arrival, and on the 9th we found each other in line of battle, both sides entrenching wherever they might stand. on the 10th the enemy made a handsome dash at ewell's left and dislodged it, taking two guns. general lee wanted to lead for recovery, but was dissuaded. the enemy being attacked was made to give up the line and the guns. it was in this affair that maj.-gen. john sedgwick, commander of grant's sixth corps, was killed. a bullet pierced his head from a great distance. he and lee had been warm friends, and the latter expressed many regrets. there was a salient on ewell's line, occupied by edward johnson's division, that lee rightly considered dangerous to our security. another line across the base was ordered constructed and the exposed artillery transferred to it. before arrangements could be completed and before the artillery could be pushed forward again, johnson was fiercely assailed at sunrise on the 12th by a heavy column massed for the purpose during the night. most of the division was captured, including major-general johnson and brigadier-general stewart. lee's position instantly became perilous. he was cut in twain and fully realized it. good work was done in repairing the break and strong bodies of troops moved from right and left to check the enemy's further advance. general lee was under intense anxiety, plainly evinced, and was quite on the point of leading his fresh troops for restoring the line. gen. j. b. gordon, however, came on the scene, got the general back in his right place, and after a short, impassioned address to the troops, attacked most vigorously with the other generals. truly it was the center of a fire from hell itself! the federals lining the two sides of the captured salient and the confederates at the base poured forth a fusilade that could not be exceeded. nothing uncovered could live in such a fire--trees were felled, trunks cut by small-arm bullets! the union advance was checked, but we failed to recover our first lines and rested with a new one better drawn. the army felt keenly the loss of johnson's division and guns, but our lines were not again forced in the field. reinforcements poured into the union army, grant waiting quietly until the 18th for assembling them from washington, occasionally also doing some maneuvering. our own army was likewise in quiet inaction, but unhappily receiving no such reinforcements. general anderson, as already stated, was well known to us, and fell easily into position as corps commander. during the events just sketched he had shown commendable prudence and an intelligent comprehension of the work in hand. he was a very brave man, but of a rather inert, indolent manner for commanding troops in the field, and by no means pushing or aggressive. my relations with him were uniformly pleasant. he seemed to leave the corps much to his staff, while his own meditative disposition was constantly soothed by whiffs from a noble, cherished meerschaum pipe in process of rich coloring. he was a short, thick, stocky figure, with good features and agreeable expression. i sometimes found myself sleeping in the same tent with him. he had a way on waking of sitting on his bed and proceeding to mend and patch his belongings out of a well-filled tailor's "necessaire" he always carried--clothing, hats, boots, bridles, saddles, everything came handy to him. he caught me once watching this work, and said, smiling: "you are wondering, i see; so did my wife when first married. she thought she should do the mending, but i told her i ought to have a little recreation occasionally." we heard of stewart's death near the yellow tavern on may 12th. it caused indescribable feeling in the army. the great cavalry leader was so known to us all, officers and men; had passed through so much without hurt; his devotion to lee was so thoroughly appreciated, and our sense of security against surprise so confident with him in the saddle that deep was our grief. his disposition so happy and sunny, his enterprise so untiring, his soul so valiant, all sprang to our memories. it was really after the battle that he fell, by an outpost bullet, when he should have been safe. long years after, on a glorious day in may, confederate veterans thronged richmond to dedicate the statue of their beloved commander. the flower-strewn city--grim war having long since given way to gentle peace--was gay with lovely women and their happy smiles; while bright bunting, our own starry cross and the stars and stripes, conspicuous with flags of all nations, made the streets a mass of flaming color. it was as one of the marshals that i was assisting on the memorable occasion, and dear friends at the fine old virginia estate, the stewart's hospitable "brook hill," near the city, had made me their guest. the gracious hostess, growing if possible more lovely with advancing years, recalled from far back that historic toast and beauty of old virginia, evelyn byrd, from whose family she descended; there this pictured chatelaine of brook hill, encompassed by accomplished daughters, dispensed a charming hospitality. on one of those days miss stewart drove me to the spot where stewart fell, about half way between their residence and the old yellow tavern. a small stone shaft by the roadside marked it. there we feelingly recalled his deeds and fame, and placed upon it our flower tokens. it was pleasant to see, too, the young people and children of the countryside tenderly placing their own remembrances on the hero's column. the valiant rider was not forgotten! on the 18th we sustained on our lines another attack. it was easily resisted, and then grant, two days after, started toward bowling green. lee was quick to move for hanover junction and offered battle there. grant declining, moved about may 25th on a detour to the east--lee always parallel and richmond behind him. our commander-in-chief was far from well physically. colonel taylor, his adjutant-general, says the indisposition was more serious than generally supposed. those near him were very apprehensive lest he should be compelled to give up. general early writes: "one of his three corps commanders had been disabled by wounds at wilderness. another was too ill to command his corps, while he himself was suffering from a most annoying and weakening disease." only his indomitable will and devotion could keep him in the field. to them we owe his patriotic adherence to the command of his unexampled army. about the 30th the confederate army was in battle order near atlee's station, but general grant continued his flank movement, lee by him, in an easterly direction, and on june 3d the two armies confronted each other at cold harbor, the confederates hastily entrenching, as usual. it was historic ground. we had fought on part of it on the eventful days of june 26, 27, 28, 1862. here the federal commander, weary of lee and the oft-repeated march, made up his mind evidently to finish things. he attacked us with the utmost ferocity, but in vain. the assaults were delivered repeatedly but always repulsed with frightful carnage, and finally men could do no more. the officers with drawn swords pointed the way, but the men stood motionless in their ranks, a silent, effective protest against further "attrition." our men were steady in their field works and suffered but little loss. a section of a savannah battery, commanded by lieutenant robert faligant, was on our line and conspicuous for its brilliant work. swinton, the historian, says, "the loss on the union side in this sanguinary action was over 13,000, while on the part of the confederates it is doubtful if it reached that many hundreds." general grant was late in asking for a truce to bury his dead, but finally did so. the sight in our front was sickening, heartrending to the stoutest soldier. nothing like it was seen during the war, and that awful mortality was inflicted in but little more than an hour! the union commander afterwards announced in general orders that no more assaults on entrenched lines should be made. he then continued his movement eastward. lee was for a short time in painful doubt whether grant would cross the river or hold his route up the north side. it was solved by grant's bridge and rapid crossing, lee having barely time to throw his van into petersburg. grant had nearly stolen the march on him. the latter had expected to capture the town by surprise, a coup de main. he was foiled by beauregard and wise and some brave militia and home guards. they defended the position until succor came, by the head of lee's column hastening to the rescue. beauregard's conduct on this occasion was admirable, and much was owing to him, for which i doubt if full acknowledgment has been made. according to official returns the union losses since may 5th had been 60,700 killed, wounded and missing--3,000 more than lee numbered at the opening of the campaign. grant had received in reinforcements 51,000 muskets, including smith's four brigades. lee's were 14,000. from wilderness to cold harbor: lee's aggregate, 78,400; grant's aggregate, 192,600. i place here an incident less dismal than the reflections brought up by the foregoing gruesome figures. at one of the small rivers in the sharp campaign just ended we were in line on the south side inviting battle. the enemy were on the other side, but with no intention of crossing. he contented himself with abundant artillery practise, and made everything uncomfortable in range of his shell. we found no need of making reply and saved our ammunition. our corps headquarters had made halt for the time in a beautiful grove, where stood a large, old-fashioned virginia residence, a great house of wooden framing, with two immense brick chimneys at each gable, the chimneys stretching far above the roof apex. the shelling was so frequent and the small fragments flying everywhere so annoying that most of us got under the lee of a gable. we knew it would not resist a shell, but could fend off the offensive fragments. general anderson was coolly walking about the grove, sucking his big pipe, and warned us that if a shell struck one of the chimneys there might be trouble. we were perhaps two dozen sitting there, officers, orderlies, and some horses held by the bridle. anderson was right. a crash, a bursting roar, and down came bricks and mortar on those not quick enough to skip out of the way. i myself lost no time, and was unhurt, as also were the others of the staff. but two of the couriers had a bad time of it. hardy, my chickamauga man, and tucker, from milledgeville, had, one a broken leg, the other a fractured arm. both were put into an ambulance and, cursing and reviling at being wounded by loose brick-bats instead of honorable bullets, were carried to the rear. the laugh was decidedly on us. a loss, personal to me as well as to the army, happened during the marches, in which there was sometimes severe fighting by parts of the armies not mentioned in the narrative. general early, a most enterprising, resourceful officer, was much given to forced reconnaissances. they usually seemed to me unnecessary and wasted men by death and wounds. their intention was to ascertain accurately the positive strength and morale of the enemy, and generally a brigade was told off for the service. it appeared to me that the information could be gathered by scouts and picked men without sacrificing the ranks, but general early thought differently. on one of these movements the virginia brigade of pegram (who was absent, wounded) was commanded by col. edward willis, of the twelfth georgia infantry. his was a fine character. just from west point at the outbreak of the war, he threw himself into the army with ardor, became colonel of the fine twelfth georgia infantry, worthily succeeding ed. johnson, and was about to be made brigadier-general when ordered to the reconnaissance in force. he was shot down, mortally wounded--the gallant, fair-headed, white-skinned, slight young colonel (he was very young), valiantly leading the brigade. our position was at some distance, but i was immediately sent for. our families had long been neighbors and friends in savannah, and young willis was soon to be one of us by a still closer tie. i was quickly by his side. he died on my arm, but not before whispering loving messages for home and to that one he bore on his brave heart to its last beat. the remains of this brilliant young soldier were sent home, accompanied by a guard of honor picked from the brigade by his division commander. major-general hampton succeeded stuart in command of the cavalry. this officer had served from the very beginning of the war with high distinction, had proved himself a careful, vigilant, as well as enterprising cavalry leader, and possessed the confidence of the cavalry troops. general lee gave him his own without reservation and his hearty support in every situation. general hampton was of fine presence, a bold horseman, a swordsman, and of the most undaunted courage. he had received several wounds, but was now in robust health. his family were identified with south carolina from its earliest settlement, and grew to be of commanding importance and wealth. he rose to the rank of lieutenant-general, and after the war performed great political services to his state within her borders and as her senator at washington. chapter xxxiii the siege of petersburg, june, 1864, to march, 1865 siege of petersburg--lines closely drawn--attacks on lee's right--mahone's defense--mining for an explosion--north side threatened--troops sent--capture of battery harrison--lee's attempt to retake it--the repulse--general lee and general pemberton--attack on fort gilmer--negroes in the van--general lee's activity--his headquarters--enemy's fire on petersburg--meeting with twelfth virginia infantry--lee attacks in front of richmond--beats kautz and takes his cannon--kautz retreats to a fort--lee attacks and is repulsed--union troops armed with spencer rifles--general lee's quick eye for horses--ewell's fall from his horse--kershaw's division sent to valley--destruction of barns and houses--kershaw returns--capture of a remount--the crater--intercourse between pickets--continuous firing--general e. p. alexander's love of shooting. the siege of petersburg had now begun. it is certain that lee had had a narrow escape in getting there in time. grant had nearly beaten him and indeed should have taken the place, notwithstanding beauregard's boldness. the union generals had been explaining with some heated recriminations how they failed to be in possession before lee came up. the latter on the north side had been for hours under intense anxious uncertainty in discovering grant's move, whether a crossing or continued march on the north side. the lines were closely drawn and severe fighting ensued. digging began in earnest on both sides. salients, traverses, bastions, forts, trenches, covered ways, parallel, zig-zags, and all the other devices for the taking and defense of fortified cities were resorted to. our left rested on the appomattox river and was so close to the enemy's line that a biscuit could be thrown across, and conversation went on constantly between the fighters, who the next minute were firing at any head or arm that might be incautiously exposed. our works stretched from the left around the town to the weldon road on the right, and this was an object of lee's constant solicitude. it was our direct railroad to the south, and grant in possession would have our communications cut and supplies broken off. for months it was the federal general's incessant effort to accomplish it. his great numbers made it possible, but lee always managed, notwithstanding, to have a defense. at reams station major-general mahone performed great service in beating back the force sent to seize the road at that point. later in the siege, mining began by the enemy. the result was the appalling hour of the crater explosion by which very many confederates perished, and then in the great combat that followed for recapturing the ground, hundreds of federals fell. mahone was conspicuous in restoring the broken lines. but the story of the siege of petersburg--eight months--is not to be told in a few pages. it was a struggle from day to day, night to night, and filled with picturesque scenes of individual daring and valor, sorties and strategems. there was often quiet massing of columns for heavy assaults on points supposed to be relatively weak. we sustained many of these but the lines were maintained. lee also made some hard drives at his opponent with varying success. all, however, pointed to only one thing--the wasting of our unrecruited strength and the apparently limitless numbers available for the union army. while such operations were carried on south of the james, general grant was not idle on the north side. a strong force was held there threatening richmond, and our commander had to provide for it out of his thin ranks and keep some show of strength in front of our capital, immensely aided, however, by the excellent lines of field works that environed the city. these conditions brought about considerable shifting of our two divisions. field and kershaw were between the petersburg lines and the north side, and pickett's division was defending what was known as the chesterfield lines between petersburg and richmond, but was not threatened. a strong force of the enemy had massed north of the james and captured a powerful earthwork known as battery harrison on our extreme right. general lee had come on the scene with one of the first corps divisions and other troops. he decided to retake the fort, attaching great importance to its possession. an assaulting column of three good brigades was organized, bratton's south carolina regiments among them. captain sorrel, then adjutant-general, shook hands with me as they started forward, almost a "forlorn hope," and i thought never to see him alive again. but he came out safe among many killed and wounded, the assault being repulsed with great loss. a new line was entrenched and fortified, thrown back to right and rear. general lee, when he liked, could sit down pretty hard on words not agreeable to him. an example was given that night. with his staff and several general officers he was at the chaffin farm-house on the james, reviewing the serious events of the day. general pemberton, after the fall of vicksburg, being without assignment, had assumed his rank of lieutenant-colonel in the regular army, and as such was on engineer duty on the richmond line of defense. he was present and, speaking of battery harrison, said with something like superior confidence, "i presume, general, you will retake the fort, coã»te que coã»te." lee's sad, steady eyes rested on that unfortunate officer as he slowly said: "general pemberton, i made my effort this morning and failed, losing many killed and wounded. i have ordered another line provided for that point and shall have no more blood shed at the fort unless you can show me a practical plan of capture; perhaps you can. i shall be glad to have it." there was no answer from pemberton. general lee had had an anxious day; all of it was occupied in meeting the enemy's attacks. there was an especially severe one on fort gilmer by ben butler's command, with negro regiments pushed in front of the assailing whites. fortunately we had a staunch regiment in the fort, which beat back the attacking column. a hundred or two of the negroes, half crazed with whiskey, got into the ditch of the fort and refused surrender. our men lighted some shells, rolled them over the parapet and quickly brought the darkies to subjection. it was an ugly affair all through. and so the siege passed. one day strong detachments must be made to meet powerful movements against our extreme right flank, and requires the leaders' presence. truly never was a leader called on for greater performance. general lee's health was now fortunately stronger and his activity most wonderful. he was in comfortable quarters at the turnbull house, offered for his use by the owner. our own were not far distant, and quite comfortable in tents and small houses. the routine life of the town passed from day to day without excitement. the people had become accustomed to shell and bullets and made no ado when they whizzed about their heads. i do not think the enemy's fire was directed especially at the non-combatant part of the town, but much of it got there all the same. a new accession to our staff was captain dunn, of petersburg, an excellent gentleman, with us now for several months. a shell burst on him while bathing in his house, and smashed things all around, but the a. d. c. and his family escaped. a bullet had found his leg before this good luck. the citizens were very hospitable and very self-sacrificing. too much could not be done for the soldiers. but this was the feeling and the practise all over virginia. as we entered petersburg i came up with the regiments of mahone's brigade, the twelfth among them. they had not forgotten the wilderness, gave me a rousing cheer, and cried that we must again together charge these fellows in front of petersburg. their brave survivors keep me in mind still, after these many years. general lee, always aggressive, was quick to find opportunity of attack. he saw his enemy rather exposed at a point in front of richmond, quickly got some troops in position, and made a dash at them in great style. it was a strong force of infantry and cavalry under general kautz, and he left eight or nine guns, many prisoners, and some colors in our hands, retiring to a strong fort and defenses about a mile in his rear. our general decided to have it and follow up his first success. gregg's texas brigade and two others--seasoned troops--were thrown at kautz's fort. we could not live against its fire--no troops could. his men were armed with the spencer magazine rifles and such a fire had never before jarred and stunned us. we had to retire and resume our positions. losses were considerable, among them brig.-gen. john gregg, commanding the texas brigade--a very able officer. general lee was fond of horses and had always an eye to them. when the first attack was made my brother, captain sorrel, was mounted on a nice young mare i had just given him. at the first onset she was shot, and horse and rider were both in the mud. it happened almost under general lee's eyes. some days after, the general meeting sorrel on the road kindly asked if he were hurt, and was sorry for the loss of the mare. "but i have got another, general," said the captain. "yes, two it seems," the general answered as he rode off, smiling. sorrel's bewilderment was removed when later on it became plain that the new purchase was in foal. when ewell, one leg gone, was forced to relinquish field work and take leave of his corps, the old warrior insisted on other duty, and was assigned to command of the inner line of defenses about richmond. general lee, with ewell, anderson, and a number of other officers, and some of our staff, was examining a new line of defense with that trained engineer's eye of his, ewell riding by him. the latter was so good a horseman that his one leg was equal to most riders' two, but his horse stumbling, down came both--an awful cropper. i made sure the general's head and neck were cracked. he was picked up, no bones broken, but an "object" about the head; scratched, bruised, torn and bloody. lee instantly ordered him back to richmond and to stay there until completely well. in two or three hours he was again on the lines, and such a sight! painfully comical it was. he had gone to the hospital, where the bald head and face were dressed. he returned swathed in bandages from crown of head to shoulders. two little apertures for his piercing eyes and two small breathing spaces were all that was left open for the lieutenant-general. quite indifferent, however, to such mishaps, he was sharp about his work and lisping out directions as usual. general lee thought to weaken the pressure on him at petersburg and richmond by transferring some of it to the open field of the valley, where skilful maneuvering might offset inferior numbers. he had the temerity to detach part of his army for the purpose, and with some other commands sent general anderson with kershaw's division across the mountains. most of the staff went with the expedition and had opportunity of witnessing sheridan's work in destroying all the resources of that fighting-ground. as we marched forward, the enemy slowly retiring, smoke was seen ahead on a wide range from the burning barns and granaries of the non-combatant people. sheridan was arranging for his "crow" to carry his own rations should he venture into the valley. general lee's ingenious and bold attempt did not result as he hoped. grant could not be tempted that way. his business was at petersburg and richmond, and besides there were already enough of his troops in the valley and covering washington to answer for the safety of that capital. our expedition was therefore soon terminated and came back to the james. the division had but two encounters in the valley. one at charlestown, a small affair, in which general humphreys, commanding the mississippi brigade, was wounded. another was at front royal, in which wofford's brigade got caught in a bend of the river and was beaten off with loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. a dear friend, colonel edward stiles, sixteenth georgia regiment, was killed. i had chance, however, before marching, after a sharp night's ride, to pay a flying visit at their home to the good ladies hamtrammock, who had cared for me wounded at sharpsburg. they were as pleasant as ever and the hour seemed all too short. while in the federal lines they had supplied themselves with all sorts of little things for soldiers in the field, as tokens of remembrance, and i had pressed on me a pair of fine gauntlets, which seemed about everything that i wanted at the moment. on our way back to lee the division (kershaw's) suddenly came up with a union regiment of cavalry foraging at the foot of the mountains. it was a surprise to the riders, and they at once took to their heels, pressing up on the side of the mountains for escape. we had nothing but food with us, and most of the mounted regiment got safely away in small parties. two fully-equipped ambulances, however, could not follow the riders, and were overturned in a mountain gulley. one of them furnished me with an excellent mount. two soldiers were going through its beautiful equipment, and coming among the medicines to a large vessel labeled "spiritus frumenti" it was tossed aside with the rest of the pharmacopoeia. but some one suggested that "spiritus frumenti" might be another way of spelling whiskey--and then to see those fellows go for it! while the commander and most of the troops of the first corps were on the north side, the enemy's mines at petersburg were "spring making." "the crater" was a frightful affair, and should, it appears to me, have been prevented. we knew they were mining. our shaft had been sunk and short galleries run out. their working parties could be heard. should we not have countermined actively and fought their men off in their own galleries? however, it was not done, and the "blow up," considered only barely possible, was upon us. when it came it was all that the enemy could wish. his plans were excellent, but miscarried by the conduct of one or more of his leading officers. the crater was at once filled with their men, many negroes among them--negroes who, as usual, primed with whiskey, had been pushed to the front and into the breach, but support failed them. then came the confederates' great work of destroying these men and recovering their mutilated line. mahone did brilliant service. his division of five brigades was thrown at the invaders, and with other forces seized the "hole," captured or killed the unfortunates in it, and the day was ours with the works and integrity of the line restored. i had heard much of this remarkable fight from the georgia brigade (it had been very conspicuous in it) that i took command of some days after. this amusing story was told me by one of its men. exhausted in the crater fight, he sank wearily on a log for a short rest. it moved gently and an old-fashioned negro's voice came from the log-like darky, "please, marster, don't shoot; i'se doin' nuttin'." the rascal had doubtless been one of the first in the crater, wild with liquor; but the southerner was merciful and sent him to the rear. of course the men on both sides behind the works, so close sometimes, got tired of "potting" at each other, and taking a rest became altogether too friendly. firing would cease and individuals and small parties appear in front bartering and chaffing with the boys in blue. our tobacco was always good for coffee and a northern paper. it got to be too familiar and led to desertions of our men. their rations were of the poorest (one-half pound of bacon and three-quarters of a pound of cornmeal), their clothing and shoes worn and unfit for the field, and their work and duties of the hardest on our attenuated lines. reliefs were few and far between. no wonder they sometimes weakened to better themselves, as they supposed, and stayed with the fat-jowled, well-clad, coddled-up masses opposite them. but we had to stop the desertions at any price, so at night steady, continuous musketry firing was ordered, sweeping the glacis in front of our entrenchments. it cost a lot of lead and powder, but did something in holding back the weaklings in our command. the enemy, nothing loth, returned the fire, and were good enough to send plenty of their own lead. there was considerable to be gathered during the day, and this got my friend, gen. e. p. alexander, into trouble. he was a many-sided character--an engineer of the highest abilities, an artillerist of great distinction, a good reconnoitering officer and an enthusiastic sportsman besides. in the early days of the war i one day met him, mounted as usual on a very sorry, doubtful-looking beast, with a pair of enormous holsters on his saddle-horn. "and what have you there, alexander?" i asked, thinking possibly of some good edibles. "these," he said, and drew out his long telescope for reconnaissance--a very powerful glass--and from the other an enormous old-fashioned horse-pistol of immense calibre, some tiny cubes of lead, cut from bullets, and a pinch or two of gunpowder. "quail," he said, "are eating up this country and i like them. this old pistol gives me many a mess of birds." at petersburg his only want for his private gunning was lead to melt into small shot, and gathering some (after working his big gun) he received an unexpected contribution--a bullet in his shoulder, hot from the enemy, which made him a very uncomfortable wound. chapter xxxiv longstreet's return--farewell to lee return of longstreet--am promoted brigadier-general--parting with the first corps--report to a. p. hill and mahone--sketches--assume command of brigade of georgians--its staff--drill and exercises--laying out a camp--general lee's encouragement--want of field officers--captain h. h. perry--mahone's bread ovens--christmas, 1864--sherman's march in georgia--grant's virginia strategy--our division moves out in bitter cold--demonstration on our extreme right against the railroad--brigade forms line--no close firing--enemy rejoins his main command--received a slight wound--the return to camp--its bad condition in our absence--valuable boots burnt in bivouac--in february again ordered out to right--serious collision with enemy in force at hatcher's run--general pegram killed--am shot in lung and borne from the field--moved to richmond and thence to colonel watts's, in southwest virginia for convalescence--my recovery--marriage of doctor sorrel--at lynchburg--hear of lee's surrender--take to the mountains--again at colonel watts's--hunter and crook--homeward bound--lady godiva--farewell to lee and the army of northern virginia. it was in october, our corps (two divisions) being on the north side, that we had the happiness of welcoming our chief back to his command. his right arm was quite paralyzed and useless. he had taught himself to write legibly and easily with his left. following the advice of his doctor, he was forever pulling at the disabled arm to bring back its life and action. he succeeded, for, though never strong, its use was partially restored in later years and his pen went back to it. i was with him but a few days. my commission as brigadier-general came unexpectedly, a note from my friend burton harrison, the president's secretary, to the effect that it had been signed, reaching me the evening before. this was the first inkling i had of the promotion. elsewhere it has been told how it came about, and i began preparing to move, my orders being to report to lieut.-gen. a. p. hill for command in mahone's division. hill's corps was on the south side in front of petersburg. lieut.-col. o. latrobe succeeded me as a. a. g. and chief of staff; an excellent assignment. a brigadier going to an organized command carries no staff with him. that is attached to the brigade, not to the general. he has one appointment, that of a. d. c. (captain's rank), personal to himself. there were many applications for the place, but sending for spencer, private, fort alabama, my sergeant of couriers for several years, i almost floored the modest fellow by asking if he should like to go with me as captain. "of course" he should, and did, and was part and parcel of that brigade of georgians in no time until appomattox dispersed us. i had made no mistake in him; an exceedingly useful staff officer. few can know how painful it was to part with my corps and its chief. i had started with them at the opening battle, handled its growing battalions into brigades and divisions, and shared its battles, expeditions, and campaigns; was proud of its renown; was known to officers and men of every regiment and had, i believe, their confidence and respect. it was much to give up, but the duty called, and on a fine morning i mounted with my a. d. c. to cross the river and take up my new billet. i shall be excused, i hope, if a little homesickness is confessed. my comrades did not let me go easily. the night before there was a farewell party of many officers at headquarters. a goodly quantity of apple-toddy was consumed, but not to hurt, and the party, general longstreet with us for a time, was full of feeling, touching me keenly by its spontaneous demonstration. here ended the staff officer's duties, but his recollections will yet carry him a little way forward while commanding his brigade. the end was fast approaching, and my concluding jottings seem to belong to what has gone before. turning my back, then, for the first time on the glorious old first army corps, i reported next day at a. p. hill's quarters. nothing could exceed his kindness in receiving me; it continued all through my service in his corps and i had every evidence of the good feeling of this distinguished officer. i was to report next to general mahone for command of his georgia brigade. this remarkable man was at breakfast when i entered and immediately had me seated with him. maj.-gen. william mahone was a virginian, about forty years of age. his appearance arrested attention. very small both in height and frame, he seemed a mere atom with little flesh. his wife said "none." when he was shot (slightly) she was told it was only a flesh wound. "now i know it is serious," said the good lady, "for william has no flesh whatever." sallow of feature, sharp of eye, and very active in movement was the general; in dress quite unconventional, he affected jackets rather than coats, and on a certain hot summer's day that i recall he was seen, a major-general indeed, but wonderfully accoutered! a plaited brown linen jacket, _buttoned to trousers_, of same material, like a boy's; topped off by a large panama straw hat of the finest and most beautiful texture, met our eyes, and i must say he looked decidedly comfortable. but not always was he thus attired. he could be strictly uniformed when he chose. he had been president of the railroad between petersburg and norfolk, and retaining the office, managed the road all through the campaigns. finally the enemy captured his wagon-load of railroad papers, records, etc., and mahone was raging. it was that railway, when hostilities ended, that he combined with others connecting and gained a start into the political power and mischief he exercised in virginia. his brigade of virginians had not seen much hard fighting until the wilderness, and there they did well. it was at petersburg, in command of his division of five brigades from virginia, georgia, alabama, mississippi, and florida that he justly won great reputation for brilliant achievements in defense of the beleaguered city. he was undoubtedly a general of very uncommon ability. while we sat, i enjoyed his breakfast. a high liver, nothing could excel it, and he was never without the materials. a cow was always by his quarters and laying hens cackled loud, besides many luxuries. delicate in physique, he had to nourish himself carefully. i received his orders to take command of my georgians, and mounted on my way to them. mahone was said to be irritable and in some instances tyrannical, but for myself i had invariably nothing but consideration, and often good help from him. the brigade was in trenches far on the right, not in very close touch with the enemy, and was having a quiet time of it with col. william gibson in command. he was well known in georgia politics for some years, and a very brave officer; repeatedly wounded, but without discipline or organization. leave of absence was allowed him to return to georgia. on assuming command, captain evans, a line officer detailed as a. a. g., supposing that i was bringing an officer of the staff department with me, suggested that probably i should wish him to rejoin his regiment. but i wanted him with me. he had long filled the post, was acquainted with almost every officer and man of the brigade, and was a brave and qualified officer. the command consisted of the second, twenty-second, forty-eighth, and sixty-fourth regiments and second and tenth battalions, georgia infantry. the sixty-fourth regiment and tenth battalion were late levies and had not made the great reputation of the others, while serving under wright and girardy. the latter was a most promising officer promoted from captain in the brigade, and was killed at the head of it two weeks after taking command. the third georgia enjoyed a reputation excelled by none in the army. my first thought was to get supplies of clothing and shoes for the men and have the command relieved from trench duty, to which it was entitled by the length of service in them. our work strengthening the defenses always went on, and there was no time for much-needed drill and military exercise. general lee, taking his daily ride about the lines, came on me while the working parties were digging and spading. his greeting was, "good-morning, my young friend; i feel sorry for you." "why so, general?" "because you have so much to do," answered the commander, the gleaming white teeth showing his pleasant humor as he continued his ride. he generally had some such words to let one know he expected a lot of work out of him. i was not unsuccessful as to my wants. a fair quantity of supplies were issued and orders came for relief from the trenches and to pitch good winter camps a little in the rear. it was great joy to the troops. a good piece of woods was selected and a fine camp of winter huts laid out and built according to regulations, with battalion fronts and company streets and all the rest in good soldiery form. once settled, drill became the order of the day in good weather. there were fine open fields near by furnishing good ground, and company drill, battalion drill, and evolutions of the line by the brigade were followed up vigorously, as well as all military exercises and street duties practised and perfected. the men were in much need of the instruction. decided neglect in these respects had fallen on this fine brigade after the stern and gallant wright left it, and the good effects of the efforts now working out were soon apparent. the greatest want was in field officers; so many had been wounded and left with the enemy at gettysburg, besides others sick at home or in the hospital, that the regiments suffered thereby. i wrote urgently and personally to mr. ould, our commissioner for exchange, to get back to me certain officers whom i wanted badly. he managed to get only one, colonel snead, of the third georgia, and him i was glad to have. the brigade was well equipped with staff officers of the subsistence, quartermaster, ordnance, and medical departments. the commissary, major hughes, an excellent fellow, was the same who had sold me those two sorry mounts that broke down in the chickamauga campaign. on reporting, he evidently thought i might recall him unfavorably and was a bit uneasy, until shown that no ill feelings were harbored against him. in horse dealing it is "caveat emptor"--the buyer must look sharply to himself. it was not long before capt. h. h. perry, of the adjutant-general's department, was transferred from benning's brigade to report to me as a. a. g. there being two of that department with benning and none with me, perry was summarily transferred without any question. he had always performed inspection duty, and preferring it, was assigned to that branch of his department in my brigade, thus retaining evans as a. a. g. "old rock" (general benning) always believed i was at the bottom of the whole business and never forgave me. i was surely fortunate in securing so excellent a staff officer. highly educated, experienced with troops, active and resourceful, he soon became prominent and strong in the brigade as well as attached to his brigadier. he is still with the living in georgia, numbered among my dear friends. at times the soldier's ration was execrable, really unfit. some bacon from nassau was coming through the blockade, and it would not be incredible for the blockading fleet to allow it to come through in hope of poisoning us. a third of a pound of this stuff and some corn-meal was often the full extent of the daily ration. sometimes we got better allowances of wheat flour, and then general mahone took a notion to improve on it by baking. the brigade commissaries were ordered to set up ovens--plenty of bricks and material lying about--and issue the flour baked in good loaves. there is, too, a slight gain in weight in baking. but the men would none of such food, it was too light and wholesome. their stomachs wanted the flour stirred with grease in a skillet and cooked solid and hard. when a chunk was eaten it stayed with the soldier and kept his appetite partly appeased. but these new-fangled loaves--so easily digested! hunger came again, almost before finishing one of them. not for johnny reb was this thing; he wanted, like tommy atkins, "some bulk in his inside," and one fine morning mahone's ovens were found completely demolished. the soldiers took again to their old-time toothsome and staying morsels out of the skillet. christmas of 1864 was now at hand. the birth of the prince of peace was given such honor amid the warlike scenes of the siege as our small resources permitted. some boxes came from loving hearts at home, the commissaries did all they could, and the army of northern virginia actually feasted, trying to forget for an hour or two the perils and hardships that beset it. at christmas general sherman was in savannah, his march to the sea a complete success. my people at home suffered no great annoyance. sherman as a young lieutenant had shared my father's hospitality and had not forgotten it. the old gentleman, however, persistently fastened on him the crime of burning his comfortable country establishment in virginia. sherman's march and other movements in the west were in grant's strategic combination for the destruction of lee's army and should be considered in estimating his abilities outside of operating in virginia. indeed, it might be said that sherman contributed to the fall of richmond almost as much as did the army of the potomac. early in january it came on to be very cold, and during the worst of it our division was ordered out to meet a threatening demonstration against our right at a considerable distance. my brigade marched instantly, our camp being occupied by gen. c. a. evans's georgia brigade to fill our position on the line. evans was in luck to get his men into such well-prepared camps. we moved rapidly and in two days came up with a large force of the enemy, formed in line and prepared for battle. it appears, however, that he was not ready this time, or that he overestimated the confederate strength sent against him. some shelling was indulged in and small-arm long-distance firing. it seems that but two or three of us were touched, among them myself. i was sitting on the white mare (my other mount gone suddenly lame) in front of the line, with no thought of firing then, so distant was the enemy,--quite out of range,--when a long-range rifle sent a bullet through many folds of thick clothing and striking on the hip bone knocked me out of the saddle. it proved to be nothing serious. the ball had glanced off, stiffening and bruising the leg rather painfully, so that remounting after some bandaging, it stuck out like a wooden leg. i did not think that just such a hit could unhorse me. my men said the brigade was unlucky for its commanders. general wright had been repeatedly and dangerously wounded; several colonels commanding, wounded or killed, and general girardy killed. i began to think there might be something in it. the enemy took up the march, and leisurely rejoining their main body to the right, mahone's division began moving for the camps just vacated. it continued very cold, much ice and snow lying about the roads. at our last bivouac some miles from camp i suffered a loss, nothing less than a noble pair of riding-boots, a present, kept for extra work. at the bivouac the negro servant had taken them out of the blanket roll and failed to replace them. as soon as they were missed, back he went and returned with the precious leathers burned to a crisp! our campfires had spread through the forest. at this period boots cost five or six hundred dollars of our currency, if to be had at any price. on starting back i sent word to general evans of our approach so that my camps could be vacated in good order. the men were utterly disgusted and indignant when they re-entered their quarters. they were little like the well-kept camps they had temporarily vacated. evans's officers had not properly restrained the careless, reckless soldiers. i made vigorous complaint at headquarters, but at this date there was perhaps too much else to think of. general evans is now chief of the veterans in georgia and held in great respect by their dwindling numbers. mahone's other brigades were efficiently commanded by finnegan, florida; harris, mississippi; weisiger, virginia; sanders, alabama. in the first days of february another demonstration was made against lee's extreme right, this time in great force and meaning business. our division and other troops with cavalry at once pushed out to meet it, with finnegan in command of division (mahone was absent, sick). the collision came at hatcher's run by some preliminary skirmishing on february 5th, a sanguinary action on the 6th, followed up by the enemy feebly on the 7th. on the 6th, my georgians were hotly engaged in the afternoon and made a handsome, successful charge, which dislodged and forced back the federals. the contest went on until darkness stopped it, and the night passed entrenching where we stood, caring for wounded and burying dead. early next morning the enemy, driving back my pickets, got too close to us, and a rifleman put a bullet through my right lung, smashing the ribs front and rear. i was down this time for good, i supposed, the breath gushing through the orifices instead of its natural channel. the surgeon, dr. wood, however, soon relieved that by plastering the holes, and sent me back that night. the roads being frozen and very rough, my brave fellows made two relief gangs and bore their commander by litter on their shoulders eight miles to a small shanty, where rest was taken. all through the night, while passing stray troops on the road, i could hear the question, "who have you there?" "general sorrel." "is he badly hurt?" "yes, mortally wounded." the soldier habitually takes a gloomy view of things. very soon i was in comfortable quarters near petersburg, in the hands of my excellent brigade surgeon, dr. sampson pope, and progressed so well that in a fortnight i could be moved to doctor sorrel's quarters in richmond, under treatment of my friend dr. j. b. reid, and with that ended the staff officer's soldiering. a few closing words will bring me to the end of these "recollections" nearly forty years behind us. my wound healing satisfactorily, doctor sorrel proposed in march taking me to "the oaklands," the beautiful estate in roanoke county of colonel wm. watts, who had kindly sent me an invitation to visit him. he was the invalided colonel of the twenty-eighth virginia, of the first corps, a fine officer and most hospitable, the leading man of the county. to him we went, the change being very beneficial. then the railroad station was big lick, a post-office, shop, and tavern. it is now grown to be roanoke, a prosperous city of 25,000. colonel watts's widowed sister, mrs. rives, presided over the delightful old virginia establishment. her lovely character won all hearts. the stately figure and attractive features were known and admired widely over the countryside. to me she was kindness itself, and no marvel is it that i mended rapidly. there was an engagement of a few months' standing between doctor sorrel and mrs. rives, and soon after our coming the uncertain future was considered. they decided to wed without longer waiting, and the ceremony, quite private, was performed at the residence, myself in full uniform as the doctor's best man, propped on my feet by the dignified, silver-haired black major-domo. while in this part of the country i heard much about hunter's expedition into it the previous year and the devastation he had brought in the region round about. truly maj.-gen. david hunter, of the united states army, was a torch bearer if nothing else. he had no military distinction, but had served against the indians, it is said, with the same cruelties it was now his delight to apply to non-combatant dwellers in southwest virginia and the head of the shenandoah valley. no property within reach of his destroying hand seemed safe from him. his fame lay not in the soldier's hard-fought battles, but in burning farmers' houses and barns. the extensive schools at lexington aroused his hate and were laid in ashes by his torch. general crook, the fine soldier then serving with him, said, "he would have burned the natural bridge could he have compassed it." marvel it is that hunter did not blow it up. he was, however, beaten off by early's forces and the home guards, and the country cleared of that devastator. there was little more heard of him as a soldier. maj.-gen. george crook was altogether a different character. he was a soldier of high training and tried courage, making no war on women and children, houses and barns. some time later, one of our daring rangers, ncneil, with a small following, achieved a bold exploit. while crook was commanding a department at cumberland, md., the ranger penetrated many miles within the blue lines, took the general out of bed, mounted him well, and landed his distinguished prisoner safely in richmond. there doctor sorrel, who had served with him in the old army, called to see to his comforts. crook as a thorough-going indian fighter was not without some admiration for the way ncneil had gathered him in. "but, sorrel," said he, "i shall get even with that fellow at his own work. just as soon as i get out of this my commission will drop for a few weeks, while i raise a hundred men with whom i undertake to beat master ncneil at his own game." such was perhaps his intention then, but, exchanged soon after, there was other and more important work awaiting this gallant and respected officer. early in april, after grateful farewells to my host and new sister, we started to rejoin the army. at lynchburg came to us the accounts of the surrender at appomattox, with all the pathetic, harrowing details attaching to that event; the feeling of the soldiers, their overflowing affection for lee and sympathy with him and his own hidden but overwhelming grief--i pass them by. my brigade was on hand in good shape, with captain perry looking after it, and paroled stronger than any brigade in the army. (see appendix.) the commandant at lynchburg, general lomax, placed at my disposal an ambulance and mules to get out of reach of the union forces. we could not yet realize that the war was ended with the life of lee's army. i took to the mountains for some days, and then finding things really ended and my troublesome wound breaking out afresh, ventured again on colonel watts's hospitality. it was as generous as the day. but it was time to move, and after farewell to hospitable oaklands the doctor and i started on our return home. the rails were sufficiently repaired to take up to lynchburg, where we were paroled by the united states officer. between us we had just fifteen dollars good money, and it came to me in this way. when i was last in lynchburg, as already described, one of our quartermasters pressed on me $20 in gold, four half-eagles; "a barrel of confederate money not good," as he said, "for the price of a dinner." some time after i came up with a young maryland cavalryman making his way back to baltimore. he had no coat or jacket, although the rest of him was good, and i wanted to know why. "well," said young latrobe (it was my friend's brother), "my horse wanted a set of shoes. the farrier would not look at my money, but took the jacket, and i got my shoes." it was quite certain the young fellow would part with his remaining outfit, piece by piece, with the same easy nonchalance, if need be, and i insisted on his taking one of my half-eagles. but for that the "peeping toms" of baltimore might possibly have seen a new godiva, "clothed only with chastity," riding through their streets fresh from the southern armies. their blushes and the young cavalryman's were saved by that golden half-eagle. from lynchburg to richmond the route was tedious and wearying. it was partly by rail, partly in an army wagon, and partly on foot. on arriving at the confederate capital we were amid the ruins of the great fire that nearly destroyed it. the army of occupation was in force, everywhere the union army filled one with wonder. it was like the ant in numbers, and i really could not take in its unstinted equipment in wagons, ambulances, mules, draught horses, light artillery, and horse furniture, all apparently new and of the best class for field work. the contrast with our own inadequate equipment was very decided, and still greater was the splendor of their officers, mounts and uniforms, and the good clothing of the soldiers, with what on our part had contented us. in richmond, nursing our dwindling cash, we found a frugal but cheerful hospitality while preparing for the next move to baltimore, where we were sure of meeting my good father's provision for us. my weak condition would not permit me making the journey home on horse-back; it must be by sea. at richmond we took the oath, as prescribed, to the united states government, the courteous federal officer asking pleasantly if it "tasted bad?" this done we hoped to get a permit to leave by boat for baltimore, but were refused. no movements of confederate officers, except marylanders returning, were suffered in that direction. the decision was then forced on us that we must go, "coã»te que coã»te." it was managed successfully with some little risk. by the help of friends we were smuggled on board just as the boat was starting. the doctor was in mufti and i had doffed as much military attire as i could. we kept very quiet and secluded on the main deck of the boat as she glided down the river of so many warlike scenes of the preceding years! past frowning drewry's bluff, past bristling chappin's farm, city point, westover, and harrison's landing, turkey bend and butler's dutch gap canal--all saddening and depressing in the retrospect, crossing thoughts of the misty future. at the fortress a short stop was made, and then the voyage up the noble chesapeake resumed. one of the coal passers here recognized me with a wide, astonished grin. he was one of my brigade fellows, in now for a job at anything. the night was passed on the bay and could have been very comfortable with a trifle more cash. we had, however, just about enough to pay for passage, without bed or meals. so we stood out the long night and could provide some small refreshments. when morning came we were moored to the wharf, and i soon found my good baltimore relatives most hospitably inclined, and our troubles for the time were done with. there were many confederate officers and soldiers about the city, all watched quite closely by the federal authorities. general hancock was in command of the department, and from his adjutant-general i received an order to report in person. upon so doing i was questioned as to my reasons for being in baltimore and my intentions. upon explaining why i was returning home by that route and that i should have to go to new york to find a steamer for savannah, he was civil and obliging; allowed a stay of a week in baltimore; but i was required to report once in every twenty-four hours. the next day this considerate officer dispensed with such visits, adding, "you shall not, general, be troubled in any way while you are stopping here." here doctor sorrel left me. deciding to defer his visit home, he returned at once to virginia. a few days later i was in new york at the new york hotel, mr. cranston the proprietor, and for years past, as then, the resort of everything southern. there were many officers in the hotel, some i suspect by cranston's good nature and kindness. after a visit to some relatives and friends, who had only thought of me as one dead, i took passage for savannah on a small, crowded, most uncomfortable little steamer. the rough voyage was safely made, and i landed on my own shores in dear old georgia, greeted by kindred and friends, with hands outstretched in a hearty welcome home. and now these recollections approach their close. there are many more thronging, pulsing memories that could interest, perhaps instruct. what is here gathered has been an inexpressible comfort and occupation in the colorless hours of recent tedious convalescence, and could be extended, but the parting word must be spoken. it is farewell to the army of northern virginia and its ever-glorious commander. his name, his fame shall forever live! his sword, unstained, be ever a soldier's shining light and bright example! "ah muse! you dare not claim a nobler man than he, nor nobler man hath less of blame nor blameless man hath purer name, nor purer name hath grander fame, nor fame, another lee!" his army incomparable holds, after long years, the abiding love of its surviving veterans. who that marched with it, fought with it, took part in its victories and its defeats, shared its sufferings and its joys, shall ever be deaf when its deeds are sung or mute when ring out its plaudits! for my part, when the time comes to cross the river like the others, i shall be found asking at the gates above, "where is the army of northern virginia? for there i make my camp." appendix "headquarters near bean's station, "december 17, 1863. "special orders no. 27. "major-general l. mclaws is relieved from further duty with this army, and will proceed to augusta, georgia, from which place he will report by letter to the adjutant and inspector-general. he will turn over the command of the division to the senior brigadier present. "by command of lieut.-general longstreet. "g. m. sorrel, "_lieut.-col. and assistant adjutant-general_. "major-general mclaws, "confederate states army." * * * * * "camp on bean's station gap road, "december 17th, 1863. "lieut.-col. sorrel, "_assistant adjutant-general_. "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of special orders no. 27 from your headquarters, of this date, relieving me from further duty with this army. if there is no impropriety in making inquiry, and i cannot imagine there is, i respectfully request to be informed of the particular reason for the order. "very respectfully, "l. mclaws, "_major-general._" * * * * * "headquarters near bean's station, "december 17th, 1863. "major-general mclaws, "confederate states army. "general: i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, asking for the particular reason for the issue of the order relieving you from duty with this army. "in reply i am directed to say that throughout the campaign on which we are engaged, you have exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts and plans which the commanding general has thought proper to adopt, and he is apprehensive that this feeling will extend more or less to the troops under your command. "under these circumstances the commanding general has felt that the interest of the public service would be advanced by your separation from him, and as he could not himself leave, he decided upon the issue of the order which you have received. "i have the honor to be, general, with great respect, "g. m. sorrel, "_lieut.-col. and assistant adjutant-general_." * * * * * from _the savannah news_, 1899. "during the siege of petersburg, va., there was a severe combat at hatcher's run, resisting one of grant's attacks on lee's right flank. "brig.-gen. john pegram was killed and brig.-gen. sorrel was, for some time, thought to be mortally wounded. "the action took place on february 6, 1865. a time-stained clipping from the _new york herald_, a few days later, gives 'sketches of the dead rebel generals,' with some detail, indicating considerable acquaintance with the confederate personnel. "we print what it had to say of our townsman, who, still with us, is thus permitted to read his own obituary from the _herald's_ columns: "'brigadier-general g. m. sorrel "'the rebel gen. sorrel, reported seriously wounded in the battle on hatcher's run, has been permitted to enjoy his rank but a short time. he has been but lately appointed to the rank and assigned to duty. "'gen. sorrel was a native of georgia, and, at the commencement of the war, was a teller in the central railroad bank in savannah. he had no military education. to his established character as a quiet, taciturn business man and accountant and to some influence from an extensive family to which he belongs, he owes his appointment on the staff of gen. longstreet at the beginning of the war. he served in the capacity of assistant adjutant-general to gen. longstreet, at bull run, july 21, 1861, was wounded at antietam, september 17, 1862, and since followed the varied fortunes of longstreet. he has been advanced from a lieutenancy to a lieutenant-colonelcy in the adjutant-general's department of the rebel army. "'during the battle of the wilderness, fought in may, lieut.-col. sorrel displayed great gallantry and evinced much ability in directing and managing a division whose commander had fallen, and of which he was placed in command by longstreet. generals lee and longstreet awarded him high praise for his conduct, and recommended him for promotion. he was in consequence appointed brigadier-general, november 1, 1864, and assigned to the command of the brigade formerly commanded by gen. wright. in relieving him from duty as his assistant adjutant-general, gen. longstreet paid the following compliment to young sorrel: "'"general order no. 15--headquarters first army corps, november 4, 1864. col. g. m. sorrel, assistant adjutant-general, having been promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and assigned to the command of a brigade in the third corps, is relieved from duty as assistant adjutant-general of this corps. the loss of this officer to the first corps, with which he has been so permanently connected since its organization, will be severely felt. distinguished alike for gallantry in the field and for energy and skill in the administration of his department, his value cannot be over-estimated. he will carry with him to his new command, so richly won, a sure promise of success in the record of the past. "'"by command of lieut.-gen. longstreet. "'"official: "'"o. latrobe, "'"_assistant adjutant-general_." "'the rebel papers of february 9th report gen. sorrel dead of the wounds received on the 6th inst.'" _from an address delivered by comrade john r. turner before a. p. hill camp of confederate veterans of petersburg, va., on the evening of march 3, 1892._ "my letter to general sorrel i mailed to savannah, ga., and was as follows: "'petersburg, va., january 13, 1892. "'gen. g. m. sorrel, "'savannah, ga. "'dear general: being anxious to know if your recollection and mine accorded, as to certain movements made at the battle of the wilderness, may 6th, 1864, in which we both participated, i take the liberty of addressing you this communication, and hope (if not trespassing too much upon your time) you will do me the kindness to favor me with a reply. "'you will remember mahone's brigade of anderson's division was quartered near madison run station. we broke camp on the morning, i think, of the 4th, and bivouacked near rapidan station that night. in the early morning of the 6th we made a forced march to the battlefield, which we reached about 10 o'clock. "'mahone's brigade was ordered very soon afterwards to the right in the wilderness. after going some distance through the thicket, we encountered the enemy apparently bivouacking, and little expecting any attack from that direction. they fled pell-mell before us, leaving their light camp equipage scattered in every direction, making scarcely any resistance until they reached the orange plank road; when, having a natural fortification, strengthened hurriedly by them, they stoutly resisted us. just at this point you dashed up to the front of my regiment, the twelfth virginia, and approaching our color-bearer, benj. h. may (as gallant a soldier as ever carried a flag or shouldered a musket, and who was killed at spottsylvania court house the 12th of may), asked him for his colors to lead the charge. he refused to give up his colors, but said: "we will follow you." with great enthusiasm we followed you in the direction of the plank road. the enemy broke and fled before us. i remember seeing you then dash with great speed up the road in the direction, i suppose, of general longstreet, to inform him that the way was clear. our color-bearer, in the excitement of the moment, failed to observe that the other regiments of the brigade had halted at the plank road. we became detached and passed over the road forty or fifty yards before halting. our colonel, d. a. weisiger, observing that we were in advance of the brigade, ordered us to fall back in line with the brigade. in doing so the other regiments, mistaking us for the enemy, fired into us, killing and wounding several of our men, and i always thought the same volley killed general jenkins and wounded general longstreet, this apparently putting an end to all operations for the day, as there seemed to be very little done afterwards during the day. "'i had the pleasure of a short conversation with general longstreet returning from gettysburg three years ago, and he told me that, while he knew he was wounded by his own men, he never knew exactly how it occurred. he said everything was working beautifully up to this point, and what seemed to be an opportunity for a brilliant victory was lost by this unfortunate circumstance. "'i have often thought of your bravery and gallant bearing as you led us through the woods up to the plank road. i feel that i would like to know with certainty whether or not my recollections are correct as to the part you took in that charge. "'wishing you a long life, much happiness and great prosperity, i am very truly, your comrade, "'john r. turner.' "to this letter general sorrel replied as follows: "'new york, january 19, 1892. "'lee's birthday. "'john r. turner, esq., "'a. p. hill camp, c. v., "'petersburg, va. "'dear sir: your letter of january 14th was forwarded to me from savannah, and i am very glad to hear from you. the events you describe are so long ago, that one's memory may be pardoned if slightly treacherous as to details, but i may say at once that your recital of the incident and the movements of mahone's brigade at the battle of the wilderness conform accurately to my own recollection of it, excepting, of course, the too-partial and flattering view you take of my own personal service there. but i will give you briefly my own version of it, which really is near your own. "'longstreet's corps had to move at the earliest hour in the morning of the 6th of may, and arriving at the battlefield was just in time to be thrown across the plank road and check the enemy, whose attack had begun on a. p. hill's corps. this of itself was a magnificent performance of the corps to form line in the dense thicket after a hasty march, in the midst of troops suddenly attacked and retiring from the front in disorder. being done during the enemy's attack it displayed the steadiness characteristic of longstreet's famous corps. this checked that attempt and for some time there was some quiet. it was then, too, you will recollect, that general lee was about to lead the texas brigade into action, so threatening was the situation. he was almost forcibly stopped by his officers and the entreaties of the soldiers. it was soon after this that general longstreet said to me that if i were to collect some troops over on the right, get them in good line and in touch with each other, and make a strong movement forward, swinging by the right, he felt sure a splendid success would follow. i proceeded to follow out these directions, with full authority to control the movement. there were three brigades, in addition, perhaps, to other troops, that i succeeded in getting into good form and ready to move. these were mahone's, wofford's, and anderson's. the movement soon began, at a given signal, our right swinging swiftly around, driving everything before it. the lines in front of us made some sharp resistance, but they were quickly overcome, and our troops, mahone's brigade notably distinguished in the affair, rushed forward through the dense undergrowth, carrying everything before them. it was then that the incident occurred of which you speak, about poor ben may. he was doing all that man could do with his colors, but seemed to be somewhat embarrassed by the bushes, and i thought perhaps i might help to get them forward, mounted as i was. as you say, he positively refused to let them leave his own hands. i was filled with admiration of his splendid courage. i think it was on the 12th that poor may was shot, and i received from a member of the twelfth virginia an affectionate message that he sent me. i have always remembered him as one of the bravest of confederate soldiers. the twelfth virginia did splendid service that day, and the regiment and myself became great friends. till the end of the war, whenever in marches or elsewhere i met it, i was always honored with its friendly greetings. as our troops reached the plank road, you will recollect that a volley was given to the enemy, who were trying to rally on the opposite side. by this volley general wadsworth and his horse (while trying to rally his men) were both killed, and his soldiers could make no stand against us. our rapid movements through the woods had disordered our line, as you correctly describe it. leaving them for a moment, while recovering good order, i hastened to general longstreet with a view to bringing up supports to follow up our splendid success. i met the general near by, jenkins's brigade immediately behind him. he had heard the sound of our rifles, and, with the quick instinct of the general that he was, was following us up with a strong and powerful support to pursue his victory. i had scarcely taken more than a few steps with him when a sudden and unexpected fire, at first scattering, then heavier, broke out from our men. the general was shot down by my side, and at the same time general jenkins, one or two staff officers, and several couriers. i have never known accurately who started this fire; there is yet some confusion about it, but it was fatal, and had the effect, by disabling the general, of putting a stop to the heavy blow he was about inflicting on the disordered enemy. later in the day, you will remember, we made another attack, rather more direct, with a strong force, on the enemy, who had got behind some entrenchments; but we there sustained a repulse, and that about closed the principal features of the battle of the wilderness on the 6th of may. "'the importance of our flank attack, which i have described here so briefly, was not under-estimated by the enemy in his subsequent reports. the official report of the battle by general grant, or his immediate subordinate, describes the tremendous attack of these three brigades, which turned his own left flank and nearly brought about a widespread disaster to the federal army. i cannot but think it would have ended so, had not general longstreet, in the flush of his success, and with ardent, fresh troops in hand, been struck down in the very act of delivering this blow. "'i am sketching this off to you hastily, and entirely from memory, and while there may be some omissions or inaccuracies as to detail, i think the account is not far from wrong. "'with best wishes, i am, yours very truly and sincerely, "'g. m. sorrel.'" _from colonel freemantle's (coldstream guards) "three months in the southern states."_ "30th june, tuesday.--this morning before marching from chambersburg, general longstreet introduced me to the commander-in-chief. general lee is, almost without exception, the handsomest man of his age i ever saw. he is 56 years old, tall, broad shouldered, very well made, well set up, a thorough soldier in appearance, and his manners are most courteous and full of dignity. he is a perfect gentleman in every respect. i imagine no man has so few enemies, or is so universally esteemed. throughout the south, all agree in pronouncing him to be as near perfection as man can be. he has none of the small vices, such as smoking, drinking, chewing or swearing, and his bitterest enemy never accused him of any of the greater ones. he generally wears a well-worn long gray jacket, a high black felt hat, and blue trousers tucked into wellington boots. i never saw him carry arms, and the only mark of his military rank are the three stars on his collar. he rides a handsome horse which is extremely well groomed. he, himself, is very neat in his dress and person, and in the most arduous marches he always looks smart and clean. "in the old army he was always considered one of its best officers; and at the outbreak of these troubles he was lieutenant-colonel of the second cavalry. he was a rich man--but his fine estate was one of the first to fall into the enemy's hands. i believe he has never slept in a house since he has commanded the virginian army, and he invariably declines all offers of hospitality for fear the person offering it may afterwards get into trouble for having sheltered the rebel general." * * * * * _from viscount wolseley._ "office of commander-in-chief, "london, 10th july, 1899. "my dear general sorrel: i have great pleasure in complying with your request, and hope mrs. sorrel will do me the honor of accepting the enclosed latest photograph i have had taken. "i am a collector of autograph letters, but i lack letters from the confederate commanders. i am very glad to have your letter to add to my collection. if you happen to have any letters from the southern generals that you could spare me i should esteem it a great favor. "believe me to be, with a very keen and pleasant remembrance of all the kindness i received when in the southern states, "sincerely yours, "wolseley. "to general sorrel, "new york." * * * * * _thanks of the confederate congress to lieutenant-general james longstreet and his command._ _"resolved by the congress of the confederate states of america._ "that the thanks of congress are due and hereby cordially tendered to lieutenant-general james longstreet and the officers and men of his command for their patriotic services and brilliant achievements in the present war, sharing as they have, the arduous fatigues and privations of many campaigns in virginia, maryland, pennsylvania, georgia, and tennessee, and participating in nearly every great battle fought in those states, the commanding general ever displaying great ability, skill, and prudence in command, and the officers and men the most heroic bravery, fortitude, and energy in every duty they have been called upon to perform. "_resolved_, that the president be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolution to lieutenant-general longstreet for publication to his command. "approved february 17, 1864." _j. longstreet to secretary of war._ "headquarters near chattanooga, "september 26th, 1863. "hon. j. a. seddon, _secretary of war_. "sir: may i take the liberty to advise you of our condition and our wants. on the 20th instant, after a very severe battle, we gained a complete and glorious victory--the most complete victory of the war, except perhaps the first manassas. on the morning of the 21st general bragg asked my opinion as to our best course. i suggested at once to strike at burnside and if he made his escape to march upon rosecrans's communication in rear of nashville. he seemed to adopt the suggestion and gave the order to march at four o'clock in the afternoon. the right wing of the army marched some eight or ten miles, my command following next day at daylight. i was halted at the crossing of the chickamauga, and on the night of the 22d the army was ordered to march for chattanooga, thus giving the enemy two days and a half to strengthen the fortifications here already prepared for him by ourselves. here we have remained under instructions that the enemy shall not be assaulted. to express my conviction in a few words, our chief has done but one thing that he ought to have done since i joined his army--that was to order the attack upon the 20th. all other things that he has done he ought not to have done. i am convinced that nothing but the hand of god can save us and help us as long as we have our present commander. "now to our wants. can't you send us general lee? the army in virginia can operate defensively, while our operations here should be offensive, until we have recovered tennessee at all events. "we need some such great mind as general lee's (nothing more) to accomplish this. you will be surprised that this army has neither organization nor mobility and i have doubts if this commander can give it to them. in an ordinary war i could serve without complaint under any one whom the government might place in authority; but we have too much at stake in this to remain quiet under such distressing circumstances. our most precious blood is now flowing in streams from the atlantic to the rocky mountains and may yet be exhausted before we have succeeded. then goes honor, treasure, and independence. when i came here i hoped to find our commander willing and anxious to do all things that would aid us in our great cause and ready to receive what aid he could get from his subordinates. "it seems that i was greatly mistaken. it seems that he cannot adopt and adhere to any plan or course whether of his own or some one else. i desire to impress upon your mind that there is no exaggeration in these statements. on the contrary i have failed to express my convictions to the fullest extent. all that i can add without making this letter exceedingly long is to pray you to help us and speedily. "i remain, with the greatest respect, your most obedient servant, "j. longstreet, "_lieutenant general_." * * * * * _captain h. h. perry, a. a. g., sorrel's brigade, writes of grant's first demand for lee's surrender at appomattox._ "the eventful night "it was night, april 7th, 1865. we had crossed the river, near farmville, and had taken up a position about, as near as i can remember, a mile from the crossing, which the confederates had attempted to burn, but unsuccessfully. general miles, commanding a federal brigade, made a mad attempt to throw the confederates into confusion on their left by a flank movement (perhaps that was his purpose), but it was a very unfortunate move, for his lines were in a few minutes nearly cut to pieces and his brigade placed hors de combat. a furious picket firing and sharp-shooting began on both sides, while the wounded and dead federals lay between the two lines. "mahone's division was now the rearguard at this point of general lee's army. general lee's forces were reduced now to their minimum strength, but a fiercer, more determined body of men never lived. they simply waited for general lee's orders. "about five o'clock p. m. a flag of truce appeared in front of general sorrel's brigade (general wright's old brigade), of which the writer of this account was the adjutant-general. a courier was sent to division headquarters to announce it. colonel tayloe, a splendid young virginian, had been assigned temporarily to the command of general sorrel's brigade, general sorrel having been almost mortally wounded near petersburg. in a short while colonel tayloe was ordered to send a staff officer to answer to the flag of truce. "the writer was assigned to this duty at the confederate front lines. as the top of the earthworks was reached, a number of federal sharpshooters fired at me, and two balls passed through the uniform coat i wore, and one ball wounded a confederate soldier in the hand, who had risen up with others from behind the works, out of curiosity to see what was going to take place. that ended the truce business for that afternoon. after nightfall and after everything on both sides had lapsed into silence, pickets were put in front of our lines about one hundred yards. captain james w. english, one of the bravest, coolest, most faithful and vigilant officers in the confederate army, was in charge of the line in front of our brigade. i had selected him for the reason that i knew that he would not fail me if i depended on his courage and faith. colonel tayloe knew nothing of our command or its officers, and the responsibility rested on me to select the right man in the crisis there was now upon us. we apprehended a night attack. "about nine o'clock at night, as soon as the moon was about to rise, captain english reported that a flag of truce was again offered on the federal lines on our front. it was reported again at our division headquarters and i was again sent out to answer it as before. i put on an army revolver, put aside my sword, and advanced about fifty yards from our pickets, halted, and called for the flag. where i stood there were scattered around several federal dead and wounded. "one of the latter asked me to do something for him. i told him i would very soon, making this promise only to encourage him, for i could really do nothing for lack of authority, as well as lack of means. i asked his name and was rather astonished when he said he was general miles's adjutant-general and that his name was boyd, as i now remember it. a response to my call in front took my attention, though i remember that the wounded officer said he had been shot through the thigh. "i advanced some distance and met a very handsomely dressed federal officer. we stepped in front of each other about seven or eight feet apart. i soon recognized the fact that my worn confederate uniform and slouch hat, even in the dim light, would not compare favorably with his magnificence; but as i am six feet high i drew myself up as proudly as i could, and put on the appearance as well as possible of being perfectly satisfied with my personal exterior. the officer spoke first introducing himself as gen. seth williams, of general grant's staff. "after i had introduced myself, he felt in his side pocket for documents, as i thought, but the document was a very nice-looking silver flask, as well as i could distinguish. he remarked that he hoped i would not think it was an unsoldierly courtesy if he offered me some very fine brandy. i will own up now that i wanted that drink awfully. worn down, hungry and dispirited, it would have been a gracious godsend if some old confederate and i could have emptied that flask between us in that dreadful hour of misfortune. but i raised myself about an inch higher, if possible, bowed and refused politely, trying to produce the ridiculous appearance of having feasted on champagne and pound-cake not ten minutes before, and that i had not the slightest use for so plebeian a drink as 'fine brandy.' he was a true gentleman, begged pardon, and placed the flask in his pocket again, without touching the contents in my presence. if he had taken a drink, and my confederate olfactories had obtained a whiff of the odor of it, it is possible that i should have 'caved.' the truth is, i had not eaten two ounces in two days, and i had my coat-tail then full of corn, waiting to parch it as soon as opportunity might present itself. i did not leave it behind me because i had nobody i could trust it with. "as an excuse which i felt i ought to make for refusing his proffered courtesy, i rather haughtily said that i had been sent forward only to receive any communication that was offered and could not properly accept or offer any courtesies. in fact, if i had offered what i could it would have taken my corn. "he then handed to me a letter, which he said was from general grant to general lee, and asked that general lee should get it immediately if possible. i made no reply except to ask him if that was all we had to transact, or something to that effect. he said that was all. we bowed very profoundly to each other and turned away. "in twenty minutes after i got back in our lines, a confederate courier riding a swift horse had placed in general lee's hands the letter which was handed to me, the first demand for surrender of his devoted army. in an hour's time we were silently pursuing our way toward the now famous field of appomattox. we marched all day of the 8th of april and slept in bivouac not more than three or four miles from appomattox, where the demand was made again and was acceded to, and the confederacy of the south went down in defeat, but with glory. "we arrived on the field of appomattox about 9 o'clock on the 9th day of april, the day of capitulation. the negotiations lasted during that day. the general order from general lee was read to the army on the 10th of april. that is, as i remember it, general lee published his last order to his soldiers on that day. i sat down and copied it on a piece of confederate paper, using a drum-head for a desk, the best i could do. i carried this copy to general lee, and asked him to sign it for me. he signed it and i have it now. it is the best authority along with my parole that i can produce why, after that day, i no longer raised a soldier's hand for the south. there were tears in his eyes when he signed it for me, and when i turned to walk away there were tears in my own eyes. he was in all respects the greatest man that ever lived, and as an humble officer of the south, i thank heaven that i had the honor of following him. "waynesboro, georgia, 1896." * * * * * _some extracts from colonel freemantle's "three months in the southern states."_ "gettysburg--pickett's charge "i determined to make my way to general longstreet. it was then about 2.30. after passing general lee and his staff i rode on through the woods in the direction in which i had left longstreet. i soon began to meet many wounded men returning from the front; many of them asked in piteous tones the way to a doctor or an ambulance. the farther i got the greater became the number of the wounded. some were walking alone on crutches composed of two rifles, others were supported by men less badly wounded than themselves, and others were carried on stretchers by the ambulance corps; but in no case did i see a sound man helping the wounded to the rear, unless he carried the red badge of the ambulance corps. i saw all this in much less time than it takes to write it, and although astonished to meet such vast numbers of wounded, i had not seen _enough_ to give me an idea of the real extent of the mischief. "when i got close to general longstreet i saw one of his regiments advancing through the woods in good order; so thinking i was in time to see the attack i remarked to the general that '_i wouldn't have missed this for anything._' longstreet was seated at the top of a snake fence at the edge of the wood and looking perfectly calm and unperturbed. he replied: 'the devil you wouldn't! i would liked to have missed it very much; we've attacked and been repulsed; look there!' "for the first time i then had a view of the open space between the two positions and saw it covered with confederates slowly and sulkily returning toward us in small, broken parties under a heavy fire of artillery. the general told me that pickett's division had succeeded in carrying the enemy's position and capturing the guns, but after remaining there some minutes it had been forced to retire. no person could have been more calm or self-possessed than general longstreet under these trying circumstances, aggravated as they now were by the movements of the enemy, who began to show a strong disposition to advance. i could now thoroughly appreciate the term 'bulldog,' which i had heard applied to him by the soldiers. "difficulties seemed to make no other impression upon him than to make him a little more savage. "major walton was the only officer with him when i came up--all the rest had been put into the charge. in a few minutes major latrobe arrived on foot, carrying his saddle, having just had his horse killed. colonel sorrel was also in the same predicament and captain goree's horse was wounded in the mouth. "the general was making the best arrangements in his power to resist the threatened advance, by advancing some artillery, rallying the stragglers. "i remember seeing a general come up to him and report that he was 'unable to bring up his men again.' longstreet turned upon him and replied with some sarcasm, 'very well, never mind, then, general, just let them remain where they are; the enemy's going to advance and it will spare you the trouble.' he asked for something to drink. i gave him some rum out of my silver flask, which i begged he would keep in remembrance of the occasion; he smiled, and to my great satisfaction accepted the memorial. "if longstreet's conduct was admirable, that of general lee was perfectly sublime. he was engaged in rallying and encouraging the broken troops, and was riding about a little in front of the wood, quite alone--the whole of his staff being engaged in a similar manner farther to the rear. his face, which is always placid and cheerful, did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance; and he was addressing every soldier he met, a few words of encouragement, such as: 'all this will come right in the end, we'll talk it over afterwards; but in the meantime all good men must rally. we want all good and true men just now,' etc. he spoke to all the wounded men that passed him, and the slightly wounded he exhorted 'to bind up their hurts and take up a musket in this emergency.' very few failed to answer his appeal, and i saw many badly wounded men take off their hats and cheer him. he said to me, 'this has been a sad day for us, colonel, a sad day; but we can't expect always to gain victories.'" [from "the battle of the wilderness," by general morris schaff, pages 267-273, here quoted with the kind permission of the author. boston and new york: houghton mifflin & company, 1910.] general m. l. smith, a new yorker and a distinguished graduate of west point, doing engineer duty with lee's army, had examined our left, and, finding it inviting attack, so reported to longstreet. now there is on longstreet's staff a tall, trim, graceful young georgian, with keen dark eyes and engaging face, whose courage and ability to command, longstreet knows well, for he has been with him on many a field. his name is sorrel, and his gallant clay is lying in the cemetery at savannah, the long, pendulant southern moss swaying softly over it. his "recollections of a confederate staff officer" has for me, like all the books i love, a low, natural, wild music; and, as sure as i live, the spirits who dwell in that self-sown grove called literature were by his side when he wrote the last page of his recollections, his pen keeping step with his beating heart. longstreet, on hearing smith's report, called sorrel to him, and told him to collect some scattered brigades, form them in a good line on our left, and then, with his right pushed forward, to hit hard. "but don't start till you have everything ready. i shall be waiting for your gun-fire, and be on hand with fresh troops for further advance," said longstreet. sorrel picked up g. t. anderson's, wofford's, davis's of heth's, and mahone's brigades, and led them to the old unfinished railroad bed; and, having stretched them out on it, formed them, facing north, for advance. of course, had gibbon obeyed hancock's order, this movement of sorrel's could not have been made; as it was, the coast was clear. on birney's left, as everywhere along the front, our forces were in several broken lines, and those of the first had changed places with the second, to take advantage of the little fires at which they had boiled their coffee to boil some for themselves; for many of the troops had not had a bite since half-past three in the morning, and it was now past eleven. save the skirmish line, the men were lying down, and not expecting any danger, when suddenly, from the heavy undergrowth, sorrel's three widely-winged brigades burst on their flank with the customary yell, and before our people could change front, or, in some cases, even form, they were on them. fighting mcalister tried his best to stay the tempest, and so did others, many little groups of their men selling their lives dearly; for the color-bearers planted their banners on nearly every knoll, and brave young fellows would rally around them; but being overpowered, panic set in, and the lines melted away. as soon as carroll, lewis a. grant, birney, webb, and wadsworth heard sorrel's quick volleys, they were all on their feet at once, for the character of the firing and the cheers told them that peril had snapped its chain and was loose. in a few minutes fleeing individuals, then squads, and then broken regiments, began to pour through the woods from the left. kershaw and field, being notified by longstreet to resume the offensive as soon as they should hear sorrel, now pressed forward, seriously and exultingly active. wadsworth, to stay the threatening disaster (for that lunatic, panic, travels fast, and every officer of experience dreads its first breath), flew to the thirty-seventh massachusetts at the head of eustis's brigade, which was just getting back from the junction, and ordered edwards, a resolute man, to throw his regiment across the front of field, who, with several pieces of artillery raking the road, was advancing. the thirty-seventh moved quickly by flank into the woods, and then, undismayed, heard the command, "forward." and with it went my friends, lieutenants casey and chalmers, and that pleasant and true one of many a day, captain "tom" colt of pittsfield, whose mother was a saint. "you have made a splendid charge!" exclaimed wadsworth, and so they had--the ground behind them showed it; they thrust field back, gaining a little respite for all hands before disaster; and very valuable it proved to be, for some of the broken commands thereby escaped utter destruction. while field and kershaw assailed carroll, birney, and wadsworth fiercely, fire was racing through the woods, adding its horrors to sorrel's advance; and with the wind driving the smoke before him, he came on, sweeping everything. seeing his lines falter, sorrel dashed up to the color-bearer of the twelfth virginia, "ben" may, and asked for the colors to lead the charge. "we will follow you," said the smiling youth spiritedly, refusing to give them up; and so they did. in the midst of the raging havoc, webb, under instructions from wadsworth, now in an almost frantic state of mind, tried to align some troops beyond the road so as to meet sorrel, whose fire was scourging the flanks of carroll and the green mountain men, through whom and around whom crowds of fugitives, deaf to all appeals to rally, were forcing their way to the rear. but the organizations, so severely battered in the morning, were crumbling so fast, and the tumult was so high, that webb saw it was idle to expect they could hold together in any attempted change of position; he therefore returned to his command, and quickly brought the fifty-sixth massachusetts, griswold's regiment, alongside the road. fortunately his nineteenth maine, withdrawn during the lull to replenish its ammunition, had been wheeled up by the gallant connor at the first ominous volley from the south. they had barely braced themselves on the road before carroll, and then the old vermont brigade, had to go; and now connor and griswold open on sorrel, checking him up roundly. wadsworth undertook to wheel the remnants of rice's regiments who had stood by him, so as to fire into the enemy on the other side of the road. in trying to make this movement he ran squarely onto perrin's alabama brigade, of anderson's division, which had relieved a part of field's, who rose and fired a volley with fatal effect, breaking wadsworth's formation, the men fleeing in wild confusion. in this alabama brigade was the eighth regiment, commanded that morning by hilary a. herbert who lost his arm. this gallant man, soldier, member of congress, and distinguished lawyer was mr. cleveland's secretary of the navy. the heroic wadsworth did not or could not check his horse till within twenty odd feet of the confederate line. then, turning, a shot struck him in the back of the head, his brain spattering the coat of earl m. rogers, his aide at his side. the rein of wadsworth's horse, after the general fell, caught in a snag, and, rogers's horse having been killed by the volley, he vaulted into the saddle, and escaped through the flying balls. wadsworth lies unconscious within the enemy's lines; his heart, that has always beaten so warmly for his country, is still beating, but hears no response now from the generous manly, truth-viewing brain. i believe that morning, noon, and night the bounteous valley of the genesee, with its rolling fields and tented shocks of bearded grain, holds wadsworth in dear remembrance. everything on the right of the nineteenth maine, fifty-sixth and thirty-seventh massachusetts is gone, and they, with fragments of other gallant regiments, will soon have to go, too, for sorrel comes on again with a rush. griswold, pistol in hand, advances the colors to meet him, and is killed almost instantly; connor, on foot and in the road, is struck and, as he falls, webb calls out, "connor, are you hit?" "yes, i've got it this time." and his men sling him in a blanket and carry him to the rear. webb, seeing the day is lost, tells the bitterly-tried regiments to scatter, and the wreckage begins to drift sullenly far and wide, some in cutler's tracks, and some toward where burnside is still pottering; but naturally the main stream is back on both sides of the plank to the brock road, and there it straggles across it hopelessly toward chancellorsville. chaplain washiell, fifty-seventh massachusetts, says, "i well remember the route as the men streamed by in panic, some of them breaking their guns to render them useless in the hands of the rebels. nothing could stop them until they came to the cross-roads." where now is the morning's vision of victory which babcock raised? all of hancock's right wing, together with wadsworth's division of the fifth corps, getty's of the sixth, and one brigade of the ninth all smashed to pieces! the plank road is lee's,--and the brock, the strategic key, is almost within his grasp too! for longstreet, followed by fresh brigades at double-quick, is coming down determined to clinch the victory!! his spirits are high, and field's hand still tingles with his hearty grasp congratulating him on the valor of his troops. jenkins, a sensitive, enthusiastic south carolinian, "abreast with the foremost in battle and withal an humble christian," says longstreet, has just thrown his arms around sorrel's shoulder,--for the graceful hero has ridden to meet his chief, and tell him the road is clear,--and says, "sorrel, it was splendid, we shall smash them now." and then, after conferring with kershaw, who had already been directed to follow on and complete hancock's overthrow, jenkins rides up to longstreet's side and with overflowing heart says, "i am happy. i have felt despair of the cause for some months, but am relieved and feel assured that we shall put the enemy back across the rapidan before night." put the enemy back across the rapidan! that means the army of the potomac defeated again, and grant's prestige gone!! the end * * * * * transcriber's notes: italic text is denoted by _underscores_. every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings, inconsistent punctuation that does not interfere with meaning, and other inconsistencies. obvious punctuation and spelling errors and minor printer errors repaired. transcription of author's handwritten autograph added by transcriber: '--very truly yrs, gill sorrell.' proofreading team. [illustration] a life of gen. robert e. lee. by john esten cooke. "duty is the sublimest word in our language." "human virtue should be equal to human calamity." lee. 1876 contents. part i. _lee's early life_. i.--introduction ii.--the lees of virginia iii.--general "light-horse harry" lee iv.--stratford v.--lee's early manhood and career in the united states army vi.--lee and scott vii.--lee resigns viii.--his reception at richmond ix.--lee in 1861 x.--the war begins xi.--lee's advance into western virginia xii.--lee's last interview with bishop meade part ii. _in front of richmond_. i.--plan of the federal campaign ii.--johnston is wounded iii.--lee assigned to the command--his family at the white house iv.--lee resolves to attack v.--stuart's "ride around mcclellan" part iii. _on the chickahominy_. i.--the two armies ii.--lee's plan of assault iii.--the battle of the chickahominy iv.--the retreat v.--richmond in danger--lee's views vi.--lee and mcclellan--their identity of opinion part iv. _the war advances northward_. i.--lee's protest ii.--lee's manoeuvres iii.--lee advances from the rapidan iv.--jackson flanks general pope v.--lee follows vi.--the second battle of manassas part v. _lee invades maryland_. i.--his designs ii.--lee in maryland iii.--movements of the two armies iv.--the prelude to sharpsburg v.--the battle of sharpsburg vi.--lee and mcclellan--their merits in the maryland campaign vii.--lee and his men viii.--lee passes the blue ridge ix.--lee concentrates at fredericksburg x.--the battle of fredericksburg xi.--final movements of 1862 xii.--the year of battles xiii.--lee in december, 1862 part vi. _chancellorsville and gettysburg_. i.--advance of general hooker ii--the wilderness iii.--lee's determination iv.--jackson's attack and fall v.--the battle of chancellorsville vi.--flank movement of general sedgwick vii.--lee's generalship and personal demeanor during the campaign viii.--personal relations of lee and jackson ix.--circumstances leading to the invasion of pennsylvania x.--lee's plans and objects xi.--the cavalry-fight at fleetwood xii.--the march to gettysburg xiii.--lee in pennsylvania xiv.--concentration at gettysburg xv.--the first day's fight at gettysburg xvi.--the two armies in position xvii.--the second day xviii.--the last charge at gettysburg xix.--lee after the charge xx.--lee's retreat across the potomac xxi.--across the blue ridge again part vii. _last campaigns of the year_ 1863. i.--the cavalry of lee's army ii.--lee flanks general meade iii.--a race between two armies iv.--the fight at buckland v.--the advance to mine run vi.--lee in the autumn and winter of 1863 part viii. _lee's last campaigns and last days_. i.--general grant crosses the rapidan ii.--the first collision in the wilderness iii.--the battle of the 6th of may iv.--the 12th of may v.--from spottsylvania to the chickahominy vi.--first battles at petersburg vii.--the siege of richmond begun viii.--lee threatens washington ix.--the mine explosion x.--end of the campaign of 1864 xi.--lee in the winter of 1864-'65 xii.--the situation at the beginning of 1865 xiii.--lee attacks the federal centre xiv.--the southern lines broken xv.--lee evacuates petersburg xvi.--the retreat and surrender xvii.--lee returns to richmond xviii.--general lee after the war xix.--general lee's last years and death _appendix_. i.--the funeral of general lee ii.--tributes to general lee a life of general robert edward lee. part i. _lee's early life_, i. introduction. the name of lee is beloved and respected throughout the world. men of all parties and opinions unite in this sentiment, not only those who thought and fought with him, but those most violently opposed to his political views and career. it is natural that his own people should love and honor him as their great leader and defender in a struggle of intense bitterness--that his old enemies should share this profound regard and admiration is due solely to the character of the individual. his military genius will always be conceded, and his figure remain a conspicuous landmark in history; but this does not account for the fact that his very enemies love the man. his private character is the origin of this sentiment. the people of the north, no less than the people of the south, feel that lee was truly great; and the harshest critic has been able to find nothing to detract from this view of him. the soldier was great, but the man himself was greater. no one was ever simpler, truer, or more honest. those who knew him best loved him the most. reserved and silent, with a bearing of almost austere dignity, he impressed many persons as cold and unsympathetic, and his true character was long in revealing itself to the world. to-day all men know what his friends knew during his life--that under the grave exterior of the soldier, oppressed with care and anxiety, beat a warm and kindly heart, full of an even extraordinary gentleness and sweetness; that the man himself was not cold, or stiff, or harsh, but patient, forbearing, charitable under many trials of his equanimity, and magnanimous without effort, from the native impulse of his heart. friend and foe thus to-day regard him with much the same sentiment, as a genuinely honest man, incapable of duplicity in thought or deed, wholly good and sincere, inspired always under all temptations by that _prisca fides_ which purifies and ennobles, and resolutely bent, in the dark hour, as in the bright, on the full performance of his duty. "duty is the sublimest word in our language," he wrote to his son; and, if we add that other august maxim, "human virtue should be equal to human calamity," we shall have in a few words a summary of the principles which inspired lee. the crowning grace of this man, who was thus not only great but good, was the humility and trust in god, which lay at the foundation of his character. upon this point we shall quote the words of a gentleman of commanding intellect, a bitter opponent of the south in the war: "lee is worthy of all praise. as a man, he was fearless among men. as a soldier, he had no superior and no equal. in the course of nature my career on earth may soon terminate. god grant that, when the day of my death shall come, i may look up to heaven with that confidence and faith which the life and character of robert e. lee gave him. he died trusting in god as a good man, with a good life, and a pure conscience." he had lived, as he died, with this supreme trust in an overruling and merciful providence; and this sentiment, pervading his whole being, was the origin of that august calmness with which he greeted the most crushing disasters of his military career. his faith and humble trust sustained him after the war, when the woes of the south wellnigh broke his great spirit; and he calmly expired, as a weary child falls asleep, knowing that its father is near. of this eminent soldier and man whose character offers so great an example, a memoir is attempted in this volume. the work will necessarily be "popular" rather than full and elaborate, as the public and private correspondence of lee are not at this time accessible. these will throw a fuller light on the subject; but sufficient material is at the disposal of the writer to enable him to present an accurate likeness of lee, and to narrate clearly the incidents of his career. in doing so, the aim of the author is to measure out full justice to all--not to arouse old enmities, which should be allowed to slumber, but to treat his subject with the judicial moderation of the student of history. a few words will terminate this preface. the volume before the reader was begun in 1866. the writer first, however, informed general lee of his design, and had the honor to receive from him in reply the assurance that the work "would not interfere with any he might have in contemplation; he had not written a line of any work as yet, and might never do so; but, should he write a history of the campaigns of the army of northern virginia, the proposed work would be rather an assistance than a hinderance." as the writer had offered promptly to discontinue the work if it were not agreeable to general lee, this reply was regarded in the light of an assurance that he did not disapprove of it. the composition was, however, interrupted, and the work laid aside. it is now resumed and completed at a time when the death of the illustrious soldier adds a new and absorbing interest to whatever is connected with his character or career. ii. the lees of virginia. the lees of virginia spring from an ancient and respectable family of essex, in england. of some members of the family, both in the old world and the new, a brief account will be given. the origin of an individual explains much that is striking and peculiar in his own character; and it will be found that general lee inherited many of the traits of his ancestors, especially of some eminent personages of his name in virginia. the family pedigree is traced back by lee, in the life of his father, to launcelot lee, of london, in france, who accompanied william the conqueror to england. after the battle of hastings, which subjected england to the sway of the normans, launcelot lee, like others, was rewarded by lands wrested from the subdued saxons. his estate lay in essex, and this is all that is known concerning him. lionel lee is the next member of the family of whom mention is made. he lived during the reign of richard coeur de lion, and, when the king went on his third crusade, in the year 1192, lionel lee raised a company of gentlemen, and marched with him to the holy land. his career there was distinguished; he displayed special gallantry at the siege of acre, and for this he received a solid proof of king richard's approbation. on his return he was made first earl of litchfield; the king presented him with the estate of "ditchley," which became the name afterward of an estate of the lees in virginia; and, when he died, the armor which he had worn in the holy land was placed in the department of "horse armory" in the great tower of london. the name of richard lee is next mentioned as one of the followers of the earl of surrey in his expedition across the scottish border in 1542. two of the family about this period were "knights companions of the garter," and their banners, with the lee arms above, were suspended in st. george's chapel in windsor castle. the coat-of-arms was a shield "band sinister battled and embattled," the crest a closed visor surmounted by a squirrel holding a nut. the motto, which may be thought characteristic of one of general lee's traits as a soldier, was, "_non incautus futuri_" such are the brief notices given of the family in england. they seem to have been persons of high character, and often of distinction. when richard lee came to virginia, and founded the family anew there, as launcelot, the first lee, had founded it in england, he brought over in his veins some of the best and most valiant blood of the great norman race. this richard lee, the _princeps_ of the family in virginia, was, it seems, like the rest of his kindred, strongly cavalier in his sentiments; indeed, the lees seem always to have been cavalier. the reader will recall the stately old representative of the family in scott's "woodstock"--sir henry lee of ditchley--who is seen stalking proudly through the great apartments of the palace, in his laced doublet, slashed boots, and velvet cloak, scowling darkly at the puritan intruders. sir henry was not a fanciful person, but a real individual; and the political views attributed to him were those of the lee family, who remained faithful to the royal cause in all its hours of adversity. it will be seen that richard lee, the first of the virginia lees, was an ardent monarchist. he came over during the reign of charles i., but returned to england, bequeathing all his lands to his servants; he subsequently came back to virginia, however, and lived and died there. in his will he styles himself "richard lee, of strafford langton, in the county of essex, esquire." it is not certainly known whether he sought refuge in virginia after the failure of the king's cause, or was tempted to emigrate with a view to better his fortunes in the new world. either may have been the impelling motive. great numbers of cavaliers "came over" after the overthrow of charles at naseby; but a large emigration had already taken place, and took place afterward, induced by the salubrity of the country, the ease of living, and the cheapness and fertility of the lands on the great rivers, where families impoverished or of failing fortunes in england might "make new settlements" and build on a new foundation. this would amply account for the removal of richard lee to virginia, and for the ambition he seems to have been inspired with, to build and improve, without attributing to him any apprehension of probable punishment for his political course. very many families had the first-named motives, and commenced to build great manor-houses, which were never finished, or were too costly for any one of their descendants to possess. the abolition of primogeniture, despite the opposition of pendleton and others, overthrew all this; and the lees, like other families, now possess few of the broad acres which their ancestors acquired. to return, however, to richard lee. he had already visited virginia in some official capacity under the royal governor, sir william berkeley, and had been so much pleased with the soil and climate of the country, that he, as we have said, emigrated finally, and cast his lot in the new land. he brought a number of followers and servants, and, coming over to westmoreland county, in the northern neck of virginia, "took up" extensive tracts of land there, and set about building manor-houses upon them. among these, it is stated, was the original "stratford" house, afterward destroyed by fire. it was rebuilt, however, and became the birthplace of richard henry lee, and afterward of general robert e. lee. we shall speak of it more in detail after finishing, in a few words, our notice of richard lee, its founder, and the founder of the lee family in virginia. he is described as a person of great force of character and many virtues--as "a man of good stature, comely visage, enterprising genius, sound head, vigorous spirit, and generous nature." this may be suspected to partake of the nature of epitaph; but, of his courage and energy, the proof remains in the action taken by him in connection with charles ii. inheriting, it would seem, in full measure, the royalist and cavalier sentiments of his family, he united with sir william berkeley, the royal governor, in the irregular proclamation of charles ii. in virginia, a year or two before his reinstallment on the english throne. he had already, it is reported on the authority of well-supported tradition, made a voyage across the atlantic to breda, where charles ii. was then in exile, and offered to erect his standard in virginia, and proclaim him king there. this proposition the young monarch declined, shrinking, with excellent good sense, from a renewal, under less favorable circumstances, of the struggle which terminated at worcester. lee was, therefore, compelled to return without having succeeded in his enterprise; but he had made, it seems, a very strong impression in favor of virginia upon the somewhat frivolous young monarch. when he came to his throne again, charles ii. graciously wore a coronation-robe of virginia silk, and virginia, who had proved so faithful to him in the hour of his need, was authorized, by royal decree, to rank thenceforward, in the british empire, with england, scotland, and ireland, and bear upon her shield the motto, "_en dat virginia quartam._" richard lee returned, after his unsuccessful mission, to the northern neck, and addressed himself thenceforward to the management of his private fortunes and the affairs of the colony. he had now become possessed of very extensive estates between the potomac and rappahannock rivers and elsewhere. besides stratford, he owned plantations called "mocke neck," "mathotick," "paper-maker's neck," "war captain's neck," "bishop's neck," and "paradise," with four thousand acres besides, on the potomac, lands in maryland, three islands in chesapeake bay, an interest in several trading-vessels, and innumerable indented and other servants. he became a member of the king's council, and lived in great elegance and comfort. that he was a man of high character, and of notable piety for an age of free living and worldly tendencies, his will shows. in that document he bequeaths his soul "to that good and gracious god that gave it me, and to my blessed redeemer, jesus christ, assuredly trusting, in and by his meritorious death and passion, to receive salvation." the attention of the reader has been particularly called to the character and career of richard lee, not only because he was the founder of the family in virginia, but because the traits of the individual reappear very prominently in the great soldier whose life is the subject of this volume. the coolness, courage, energy, and aptitude for great affairs, which marked richard lee in the seventeenth century, were unmistakably present in the character of robert e. lee in the nineteenth century. we shall conclude our notice of the family by calling attention to that great group of celebrated men who illustrated the name in the days of the revolution, and exhibited the family characteristics as clearly. these were richard henry lee, of chantilly, the famous orator and statesman, who moved in the american congress the declaration of independence; francis lightfoot lee, a scholar of elegant attainments and high literary accomplishments, who signed, with his more renowned brother, the declaration; william lee, who became sheriff of london, and ably seconded the cause of the colonies; and arthur lee, diplomatist and representative of america abroad, where he displayed, as his diplomatic correspondence indicates, untiring energy and devotion to the interests of the colonies. the last of these brothers was philip ludwell lee, whose daughter matilda married her second cousin, general henry lee. this gentleman, afterward famous as "light-horse harry" lee, married a second time, and from this union sprung the subject of this memoir. iii. general "light-horse harry" lee. this celebrated soldier, who so largely occupied the public eye in the revolution, is worthy of notice, both as an eminent member of the lee family, and as the father of general robert e. lee. he was born in 1756, in the county of westmoreland--which boasts of being the birthplace of washington, monroe, richard henry lee, general henry lee, and general robert e. lee, presidents, statesmen, and soldiers--and, after graduating at princeton college, entered the army, in 1776, as captain of cavalry, an arm of the service afterward adopted by his more celebrated descendant, in the united states army. he soon displayed military ability of high order, and, for the capture of paulus's hook, received a gold medal from congress. in 1781 he marched with his "legion" to join greene in the carolinas, carrying with him the high esteem of washington, who had witnessed his skilful and daring operations in the jerseys. his career in the arduous campaigns of the south against cornwallis, and the efficient commander of his cavalry arm. colonel tarleton, may be best understood from general greene's dispatches, and from his own memoirs of the operations of the army, which are written with as much modesty as ability. from these it is apparent that the small body of the "legion" cavalry, under its active and daring commander, was the "eye and ear" of greene's army, whose movements it accompanied everywhere, preceding its advances and covering its retreats. few pages of military history are more stirring than those in lee's "memoirs" describing greene's retrograde movement to the dan; and this alone, if the hard work at the eutaws and elsewhere were left out, would place lee's fame as a cavalry officer upon a lasting basis. the distinguished soldier under whose eye the virginian operated did full justice to his courage and capacity. "i believe," wrote greene, "that few officers, either in europe or america, are held in so high a position of admiration as you are. everybody knows i have the highest opinion of you as an officer, and you know i love you as a friend. no man, in the progress of the campaign, had equal merit with yourself." the officer who wrote those lines was not a courtier nor a diplomatist, but a blunt and honest soldier who had seen lee's bearing in the most arduous straits, and was capable of appreciating military ability. add washington's expression of his "love and thanks," in a letter written in 1789, and the light in which he was regarded by his contemporaries will be understood. his "memoirs of the war in the southern department" is a valuable military history and a very interesting book. the movements of greene in face of cornwallis are described with a precision which renders the narrative valuable to military students, and a picturesqueness which rivets the attention of the general reader. from these memoirs a very clear conception of the writer's character may be derived, and everywhere in them is felt the presence of a cool and dashing nature, a man gifted with the _mens aequa in arduis_, whom no reverse of fortune could cast down. the fairness and courtesy of the writer toward his opponents is an attractive characteristic of the work,[1] which is written with a simplicity and directness of style highly agreeable to readers of judgment.[2] [footnote 1: see his observations upon the source of his successes over tarleton, full of the generous spirit of a great soldier. he attributes them in no degree to his own military ability, but to the superior character of his large, thorough-bred horses, which rode over tarleton's inferior stock. he does not state that the famous "legion" numbered only two hundred and fifty men, and that tarleton commanded a much larger force of the best cavalry of the british army.] [footnote 2: a new edition of this work, preceded by a life of the author, was published by general robert e. lee in 1869.] after the war general henry lee served a term in congress; was then elected governor of virginia; returned in 1799 to congress; and, in his oration upon the death of washington, employed the well-known phrase, "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen." he died in georgia, in the year 1818, having made a journey thither for the benefit of his health. general henry lee was married twice; first, as we have said, to his cousin matilda, through whom he came into possession of the old family estate of stratford; and a second time, june 18,1793, to miss anne hill carter, a daughter of charles carter, esq., of "shirley," on james river. the children of this second marriage were three sons and two daughters--charles carter, _robert edward_, smith, ann, and mildred. [illustration: "stratford house." the birthplace of gen. lee.] iv. stratford. robert edward lee was born at stratford, in westmoreland county, virginia, on the 19th of january, 1807.[1] [footnote 1: the date of general lee's birth has been often given incorrectly. the authority for that here adopted is the entry in the family bible, in the handwriting of his mother.] before passing to lee's public career, and the narrative of the stormy scenes of his after-life, let us pause a moment and bestow a glance upon this ancient mansion, which is still standing--a silent and melancholy relic of the past--in the remote "northern neck." as the birthplace of a great man, it would demand attention; but it has other claims still, as a venerable memorial of the past and its eminent personages, one of the few remaining monuments of a state of society that has disappeared or is disappearing. the original stratford house is supposed, as we have said, to have been built by richard lee, the first of the family in the new world. whoever may have been its founder, it was destroyed in the time of thomas lee, an eminent representative of the name, early in the eighteenth century. thomas lee was a member of the king's council, a gentleman of great popularity; and, when it was known that his house had been burned, contributions were everywhere made to rebuild it. the governor, the merchants of the colony, and even queen anne in person, united in this subscription; the house speedily rose again, at a cost of about eighty thousand dollars; and this is the edifice still standing in westmoreland. the sum expended in its construction must not be estimated in the light of to-day. at that time the greater part of the heavy work in house-building was performed by servants of the manor; it is fair, indeed, to say that the larger part of the work thus cost nothing in money; and thus the eighty thousand dollars represented only the english brick, the carvings, furniture, and decorations. the construction of such an edifice had at that day a distinct object. these great old manor-houses, lost in the depths of the country, were intended to become the headquarters of the family in all time. in their large apartments the eldest son was to uphold the name. generation after generation was to pass, and some one of the old name still live there; and though all this has passed away now, and may appear a worn-out superstition, and, though some persons may stigmatize it as contributing to the sentiment of "aristocracy," the strongest opponents of that old system may pardon in us the expression of some regret that this love of the hearthstone and old family memories should have disappeared. the great man whose character is sought to be delineated in this volume never lost to the last this home and family sentiment. he knew the kinships of every one, and loved the old country-houses of the old virginia families--plain and honest people, attached, like himself, to the virginia soil. we pass to a brief description of the old house in which lee was born. stratford, the old home of the lees, but to-day the property of others, stands on a picturesque bluff on the southern bank of the potomac, and is a house of very considerable size. it is built in the form of the letter h. the walls are several feet in thickness; in the centre is a saloon thirty feet in size; and surmounting each wing is a pavilion with balustrades, above which rise clusters of chimneys. the front door is reached by a broad flight of steps, and the grounds are handsome, and variegated by the bright foliage of oaks, cedars, and maple-trees. here and there in the extensive lawn rises a slender and ghostly old lombardy poplar--a tree once a great favorite in virginia, but now seen only here and there, the relic of a past generation. within, the stratford house is as antique as without, and, with its halls, corridors, wainscoting, and ancient mouldings, takes the visitor back to the era of powder and silk stockings. such was the mansion to which general harry lee came to live after the revolution, and the sight of the old home must have been dear to the soldier's heart. here had flourished three generations of lees, dispensing a profuse and open-handed hospitality. in each generation some one of the family had distinguished himself, and attracted the "best company" to stratford; the old walls had rung with merriment; the great door was wide open; everybody was welcome; and one could see there a good illustration of a long-passed manner of living, which had at least the merit of being hearty, open-handed, and picturesque. general harry lee, the careless soldier, partook of the family tendency to hospitality; he kept open house, entertained all comers, and hence, doubtless, sprung the pecuniary embarrassments embittering an old age which his eminent public services should have rendered serene and happy. our notice of stratford may appear unduly long to some readers, but it is not without a distinct reference to the subject of this volume. in this quiet old mansion--and in the very apartment where richard henry and francis lightfoot lee first saw the light--robert e. lee was born. the eyes of the child fell first upon the old apartments, the great grounds, the homely scenes around the old country-house--upon the tall lombardy poplars and the oaks, through which passed the wind bearing to his ears the murmur of the potomac. he left the old home of his family before it could have had any very great effect upon him, it would seem; but it is impossible to estimate these first influences, to decide the depth of the impression which the child's heart is capable of receiving. the bright eyes of young robert lee must have seen much around him to interest him and shape his first views. critics charged him with family pride sometimes; if he possessed that virtue or failing, the fact was not strange. stratford opened before his childish eyes a memorial of the old splendor of the lees. he saw around him old portraits, old plate, and old furniture, telling plainly of the ancient origin and high position of his family. old parchments contained histories of the deeds of his race; old genealogical trees traced their line far back into the past; old servants, grown gray in the house, waited upon the child; and, in a corner of one of the great apartments, an old soldier, gray, too, and shattered in health, once the friend of washington and greene, was writing the history of the battles in which he had drawn his sword for his native land. amid these scenes and surroundings passed the first years of robert e. lee. they must have made their impression upon his character at a period when the mind takes every new influence, and grows in accordance with it; and, to the last, the man remained simple, hearty, proud, courteous--the _country virginian_ in all the texture of his character. he always rejoiced to visit the country; loved horses; was an excellent rider; was fond of plain country talk, jests, humorous anecdote, and chit-chat--was the plain country gentleman, in a word, preferring grass and trees and streams to all the cities and crowds in the world. in the last year of his life he said to a lady: "my visits to florida and the white sulphur have not benefited me much; but it did me good to go to the white house, and see _the mules walking round, and the corn growing_." we notice a last result of the child's residence now, or visits afterward to the country, and the sports in which he indulged--the superb physical health and strength which remained unshaken afterward by all the hardships of war. lee, to the last, was a marvel of sound physical development; his frame was as solid as oak, and stood the strain of exhausting marches, loss of sleep, hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, without failing him. when he died, it was care which crushed his heart; his health was perfect. v. lee's early manhood and career in the united states army. of lee's childhood we have no memorials, except the words of his father, long afterward. "_robert was always good_," wrote general henry lee.[1] [footnote 1: to c.c. lee, february 9, 1817.] that is all; but the words indicate much--that the good man was "always good." it will be seen that, when he went to west point, he never received a demerit. the good boy was the good young officer, and became, in due time, the good commander-in-chief. in the year 1811 general henry lee left stratford, and removed with his family to alexandria, actuated, it seems, by the desire of affording his children facilities for gaining their education. after his death, in 1818, mrs. lee continued to reside in alexandria; was a communicant of christ church; and her children were taught the episcopal catechism by young william meade, eventually bishop of virginia. we shall see how bishop meade, long afterward, recalled those early days, when he and his pupil, young robert lee, were equally unknown--how, when about to die, just as the war began in earnest, he sent for the boy he had once instructed, now the gray-haired soldier, and, when he came to the bedside, exclaimed: "god bless you, robert! i can't call you 'general'--i have heard you your catechism too often!" alexandria continued to be the residence of the family until the young man was eighteen years of age, when it was necessary for him to make choice of a profession; and, following the bent of his temperament, he chose the army. application was made for his appointment from virginia as a cadet at west point. he obtained the appointment, and, in 1825, at the age of eighteen, entered the military academy. his progress in his studies was steady, and it is said that, during his stay at west point, he was never reprimanded, nor marked with a "demerit." he graduated, in july, 1829, second in his class, and was assigned to duty, with the rank of lieutenant, in the corps of engineers. [illustration: r.e. lee, as a young officer new york d apololay & co.] he is described, by those who saw him at this time, as a young man of great personal beauty; and this is probably not an exaggeration, as he remained to the last distinguished for the elegance and dignity of his person. he had not yet lost what the cares of command afterward banished--his gayety and _abandon_--and was noted, it is said, for the sweetness of his smile and the cordiality of his manners. the person who gave the writer these details added, "he was a perfect gentleman." three years after graduating at west point--in the year 1832--he married mary custis, daughter of mr. george washington parke custis, of arlington, the adopted son of general washington; and by this marriage he came into possession of the estate of arlington and the white house--points afterward well known in the war. the life of lee up to the beginning of the great conflict of 1861-'65 is of moderate interest only, and we shall not dwell at length upon it. he was employed on the coast defences, in new york and virginia; and, in 1835, in running the boundary line between the states of ohio and michigan. in september, 1836, he was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant; in july, 1838, to a captaincy; in 1844 he became a member of the board of visitors to the military academy; in 1845 he was a member of the board of engineers; and in 1846, when the mexican war broke out, was assigned to duty as chief engineer of the central army of mexico, in which capacity he served to the end of the war. up to the date of the mexican war, captain lee had attracted no public attention, but had impressed the military authorities, including general winfield scott, with a favorable opinion of his ability as a topographical engineer. for this department of military science he exhibited endowments of the first class--what other faculties of the soldier he possessed, it remained for events to show. this opportunity was now given him in the mexican war; and the efficient character of his services may be seen in scott's autobiography, where "captain lee, of the engineers," is mentioned in every report, and everywhere with commendation. from the beginning of operations, the young officer seems to have been summoned to the councils of war, and general scott particularly mentions that held at vera cruz--so serious an affair, that "a death-bed discussion could hardly have been more solemn." the passages in which the lieutenant-general mentions lee are too numerous, and not of sufficient interest to quote, but two entries will exhibit the general tenor of this "honorable mention." after cerro gordo, scott writes, in his official report of the battle: "i am compelled to make special mention of captain r.e. lee, engineer. this officer greatly distinguished himself at the siege of vera cruz; was again indefatigable during these operations, in reconnoissance as daring, as laborious, and of the utmost value." after chapultepec, he wrote: "captain lee, so constantly distinguished, also bore important orders for me (september 13th), until he fainted from a wound, and the loss of two nights' sleep at the batteries." we may add here the statement of the hon. reverdy johnson, that he "had heard general scott more than once say that his success in mexico was largely due to the skill, valor, and undaunted energy of robert e. lee." for these services lee received steady promotion. for meritorious conduct at cerro gordo, he was made brevet major; for the same at contreras and cherubusco, brevet lieutenant-colonel; and, after chapultepec, he received the additional brevet of colonel--distinctions fairly earned by energy and courage. when the war ended, lee returned to his former duties in the engineer corps of the u.s.a., and was placed in charge of the works, then in process of construction, at fort carroll, near baltimore. his assignment to the duty of thus superintending the military defences of hampton roads, new york bay, and the approaches to baltimore, in succession, would seem to indicate that his abilities as engineer were highly esteemed. of his possession of such ability there can be no doubt. the young officer was not only thoroughly trained in this high department of military science, but had for his duties unmistakable natural endowments. this fact was clearly indicated on many occasions in the confederate struggle--his eye for positions never failed him. it is certain that, had lee never commanded troops in the field, he would have left behind him the reputation of an excellent engineer. in 1855 he was called for the first time to command men, for his duties hitherto had been those of military engineer, astronomer, or staff-officer. the act of congress directing that two new cavalry regiments should be raised excited an ardent desire in the officers of the army to receive appointments in them, and lee was transferred from his place of engineer to the post of lieutenant-colonel in the second cavalry, one of the regiments in question. the extraordinary number of names of officers in this regiment who afterward became famous is worthy of notice. the colonel was albert sydney johnston; the lieutenant-colonel, r.e. lee; the senior major, william j. hardee; the junior major, george h. thomas; the senior captain, earl yan dorn; the next ranking captain, kirby smith; the lieutenants, hood, fields, cosby, major, fitzhugh lee, johnson, palmer, and stoneman, all of whom became general officers afterward on the southern side, with the exception of thomas, and the three last named, who became prominent generals in the federal army. it is rare that such a constellation of famous names is found in the list of officers of a single regiment. the explanation is, nevertheless simple. positions in the new regiments were eagerly coveted by the best soldiers of the army, and, in appointing the officers, those of conspicuous ability only were selected. the second regiment of cavalry thus became the _corps d'ã©lite_ of the united states army; and, after albert sydney johnston, robert e. lee was the ranking officer. lee proceeded with his regiment to texas, remaining there for several years on frontier duty, and does not reappear again until 1859. such was the early career in the army of the soldier soon to become famous on a greater theatre--that of a thoroughly-trained, hard-working, and conscientious officer. with the single exception of his brief record in the mexican war, his life had been passed in official duties, unconnected with active military operations. he was undoubtedly what is called a "rising man," but he had had no opportunity to display the greatest faculties of the soldier. the time was coming now when he was to be tested, and the measure of his faculties taken in one of the greatest wars which darken the pages of history. a single incident of public importance marks the life of lee between 1855 and 1861. this was what is known to the world as the "john brown raid"--an incident of the year 1859, and preluding the approaching storm. this occurrence is too well known to require a minute account in these pages, and we shall accordingly pass over it briefly, indicating simply the part borne in the affair by lee. he was in washington at the time--the fall of 1859--on a visit to his family, then residing at arlington, near the city, when intelligence came that a party of desperadoes had attacked and captured harper's ferry, with the avowed intent of arming and inciting to insurrection the slaves of the neighborhood and entire state. lee was immediately, thereupon, directed by president buchanan to proceed to the point of danger and arrest the rioters. he did so promptly; found upon his arrival that brown and his confederates had shut themselves up in an engine-house of the town, with a number of their prisoners. brown was summoned to surrender, to be delivered over to the authorities for civil trial--he refused; and lee then proceeded to assault, with a force of marines, the stronghold to which brown had retreated. the doors were driven in, brown firing upon the assailants and killing or wounding two; but he and his men were cut down and captured; they were turned over to the virginia authorities, and lee, having performed the duty assigned him returned to washington, and soon afterward to texas. he remained there, commanding the department, until the early spring of 1861. he was then recalled to washington at the moment when the conflict between the north and the south was about to commence. vi. lee and scott. lee found the country burning as with fever, and the air hot with contending passions. the animosity, long smouldering between the two sections, was about to burst into the flame of civil war; all men were taking sides; the war of discussion on the floor of congress was about to yield to the clash of bayonets and the roar of cannon on the battle-field. any enumeration of the causes which led to this unhappy state of affairs would be worse than useless in a volume like the present. even less desirable would be a discussion of the respective blame to be attached to each of the great opponents in inaugurating the bitter and long-continued struggle. such a discussion would lead to nothing, and would probably leave every reader of the same opinion as before. it would also be the repetition of a worn-out and wearisome story. these events are known of all men; for the political history of the united states, from 1820, when the slavery agitation began, on the question of the missouri restriction, to 1861, when it ended in civil convulsion, has been discussed, rediscussed, and discussed again, in every journal, great and small, in the whole country. the person who is not familiar, therefore, with the main points at issue, must be ignorant beyond the power of any writer to enlighten him. we need only say that the election of abraham lincoln, the nominee of the republican party, had determined the gulf states to leave the union. south carolina accordingly seceded, on the 20th of december, 1860; and by the 1st of february, 1861, she had been followed by mississippi, florida, alabama, georgia, louisiana, and texas. the struggle thus approached. military movements began at many points, like those distant flashes of lightning and vague mutterings which herald the tempest. early in february jefferson davis, of mississippi, was elected president of the confederate states, at montgomery. on the 13th of april fort sumter surrendered to general beauregard, and on the next day, april 14, 1861, president lincoln issued his proclamation declaring the gulf states in rebellion, and calling upon the states which had not seceded for seventy-five thousand men to enforce the federal authority. tip to this time the older state of virginia had persistently resisted secession. her refusal to array herself against the general government had been based upon an unconquerable repugnance, it seemed, for the dissolution of that union which she had so long loved; from real attachment to the flag which she had done so much to make honorable, and from a natural indisposition to rush headlong into a conflict whose whole fury would burst upon and desolate her own soil. the proclamation of president lincoln, however, decided her course. the convention had obdurately refused, week after week, to pass the ordinance of secession. now the naked question was, whether virginia should fight with or against her sisters of the gulf states. she was directed to furnish her quota of the seventy-five thousand troops called for by president lincoln, and must decide at once. on the 17th of april, 1861, accordingly, an ordinance of secession passed the virginia convention, and that commonwealth cast her fortunes for weal or woe with the southern confederacy. such is a brief and rapid summary of the important public events which had preceded, or immediately followed, lee's return to washington in march, 1861. a grave, and to him a very solemn, question demanded instant decision. which side should he espouse--the side of the united states or that of the south? to choose either caused him acute pain. the attachment of the soldier to his flag is greater than the civilian can realize, and lee had before him the brightest military prospects. the brief record which we have presented of his military career in mexico conveys a very inadequate idea of the position which he had secured in the army. he was regarded by the authorities at washington, and by the country at large, as the ablest and most promising of all the rising class of army officers. upon general winfield scott, commander-in-chief of the federal army, he had made an impression which is the most striking proof of his great merit. general scott was enthusiastic in his expressions of admiration for the young virginian; and with the death of that general, which his great age rendered a probable event at any moment, lee was sure to become a candidate for the highest promotion in the service. to this his great ability gave him a title at the earliest possible moment; and other considerations operated to advance his fortunes. he was conceded by all to be a person of the highest moral character; was the descendant of an influential and distinguished family, which had rendered important services to the country in the revolution; his father had been the friend of washington, and had achieved the first glories of arms, and the ample estates derived from his wife gave him that worldly prestige which has a direct influence upon the fortunes of an individual. colonel lee could thus look forward, without the imputation of presumption, to positions of the highest responsibility and honor under the government. with the death of scott, and other aged officers of the army, the place of commander-in-chief would fall to the most deserving of the younger generation; and of this generation there was no one so able and prominent as lee.[1] [footnote 1: "general scott stated his purpose to recommend lee as his successor in the chief command of the army."--_hon. reverdy johnson_.] the personal relations of lee with general scott constituted another powerful temptation to decide him against going over to the southern side. we have referred to the great admiration which the old soldier felt for the young officer. he is said to have exclaimed on one occasion: "it would be better for every officer in the army, including myself, to die than robert lee." there seems no doubt of the fact that scott looked to lee as his ultimate successor in the supreme command, for which his character and military ability peculiarly fitted him. warm personal regard gave additional strength to his feelings in lee's favor; and the consciousness of this regard on the part of his superior made it still more difficult for lee to come to a decision. vii. lee resigns. it is known that general scott used every argument to persuade lee not to resign. to retain him in the service, he had been appointed, on his arrival at washington, a full colonel, and in 1860 his name had been sent in, with others, by scott, as a proper person to fill the vacancy caused by the death of brigadier-general jessup. to these tempting intimations that rapid promotion would attend his adherence to the united states flag, scott added personal appeals, which, coming from him, must have been almost irresistible. "for god's sake, don't resign, lee!" the lieutenant-general is said to have exclaimed. and, in the protracted interviews which took place between the two officers, every possible argument was urged by the elder to decide lee to remain firm. the attempt was in vain. lee's attachment to the flag he had so long fought under, and his personal affection for general scott, were great, but his attachment to his native state was still more powerful. by birth a virginian, he declared that he owed his first duty to her and his own people. if she summoned him, he must obey the summons. as long as she remained in the union he might remain in the united states army. when she seceded from the union, and took part with the gulf states, he must follow her fortunes, and do his part in defending her. the struggle had been bitter, but brief. "my husband has wept tears of blood," mrs. lee wrote to a friend, "over this terrible war; but he must, as a man and a virginian, share the destiny of his state, which has solemnly pronounced for independence." the secession of virginia, by a vote of the convention assembled at richmond, decided lee in his course. he no longer hesitated. to general scott's urgent appeals not to send in his resignation, he replied: "i am compelled to. i cannot consult my own feelings in this matter." he accordingly wrote to general scott from arlington, on the 20th of april, enclosing his resignation. the letter was in the following words: general: since my interview with you, on the 18th instant, i have felt that i ought not longer to retain my commission in the army. i therefore tender my resignation, which i request you will recommend for acceptance. it would have been presented at once but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service to which i have devoted all the best years of my life, and all the ability i possessed. during the whole of that time--more than a quarter of a century--i have experienced nothing but kindness from my superiors, and the most cordial friendship from my comrades. to no one, general, have i been as much indebted as to yourself for uniform kindness and consideration, and it has always been my ardent desire to merit your approbation. i shall carry to the grave the most grateful recollections of your kind consideration, and your name and fame will always be dear to me. save in defence of my native state, i never desire again to draw my sword. be pleased to accept my most earnest wishes for the continuance of your happiness and prosperity, and believe me, most truly yours, r.e. lee. lieutenant-general winfield scott, _commanding united states army_. in this letter, full of dignity and grave courtesy, lee vainly attempts to hide the acute pain he felt at parting from his friend and abandoning the old service. another letter, written on the same day, expresses the same sentiment of painful regret: arlington, virginia, _april 20,1861_. my dear sister: i am grieved at my inability to see you ... i have been waiting "for a more convenient season," which has brought to many before me deep and lasting regret. now we are in a state of war which will yield to nothing. the whole south is in a state of revolution, into which virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn, and, _though i recognize no necessity for this state of things_, and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person i had to meet the question, _whether i should take part against my native state_. with all my devotion to the union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an american citizen, i have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. i have, therefore, resigned my commission in the army, and, save in defence of my native state, with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed, i hope i may never be called on to draw my sword. i know you will blame me, but you must think as kindly of me as you can, and believe that i have endeavored to do what i thought right. to show you the feeling and struggle it has cost me, i send a copy of my letter to general scott, which accompanied my letter of resignation. i have no time for more.... may god guard and protect you and yours, and shower upon you every blessing, is the prayer of your devoted brother, r.e. lee. the expression used in this letter--"though i recognize no necessity for this state of things"--conveys very clearly the political sentiments of the writer. he did not regard the election of a republican president, even by a strictly sectional vote, as sufficient ground for a dissolution of the union. it may be added here, that such, we believe, was the opinion of a large number of southern officers at that time. accustomed to look to the flag as that which they were called upon to defend against all comers, they were loath to admit the force of the reasoning which justified secession, and called upon them to abandon it. their final action seems to have been taken from the same considerations which controlled the course of lee. their states called them, and they obeyed. in resigning his commission and going over to the south, lee sacrificed his private fortunes, in addition to all his hopes of future promotion in the united states army. his beautiful home, arlington, situated upon the heights opposite washington, must be abandoned forever, and fall into the hands of the enemy. this old mansion was a model of peaceful loveliness and attraction. "all around here," says a writer, describing the place, "arlington heights presents a lovely picture of rural beauty. the 'general lee house,' as some term it, stands on a grassy lot, surrounded with a grove of stately trees and underwood, except in front, where is a verdant sloping ground for a few rods, when it descends into a valley, spreading away in beautiful and broad expanse to the lovely potomac. this part of the splendid estate is apparently a highly-cultivated meadow, the grass waving in the gentle breeze, like the undulating bosom of old atlantic. to the south, north, and west, the grounds are beautifully diversified into hill and valley, and richly stored with oak, willow, and maple, though the oak is the principal wood. the view from the height is a charming picture. washington, georgetown, and the intermediate potomac, are all before you in the foreground." in this old mansion crowning the grassy hill, the young officer had passed the happiest moments of his life. all around him were spots associated with his hours of purest enjoyment. each object in the house--the old furniture and very table-sets--recalled the memory of washington, and were dear to him. here were many pieces of the "martha washington china," portions of the porcelain set presented to mrs. washington by lafayette and others--in the centre of each piece the monogram "m.w." with golden rays diverging to the names of the old thirteen states. here were also fifty pieces, remnants of the set of one thousand, procured from china by the cincinnati society, and presented to washington--articles of elaborate decoration in blue and gold, "with the coat-of-arms of the society, held by fame, with a blue ribbon, from which is suspended the eagle of the order, with a green wreath about its neck, and on its breast a shield representing the inauguration of the order." add to these the tea-table used by washington and one of his bookcases; old portraits, antique furniture, and other memorials of the lee family from stratford--let the reader imagine the old mansion stored with these priceless relics, and he will understand with what anguish lee must have contemplated what came duly to pass, the destruction, by rude hands, of objects so dear to him. that he must have foreseen the fate of his home is certain. to take sides with virginia was to give up arlington to its fate. there is no proof, however, that this sacrifice of his personal fortunes had any effect upon him. if he could decide to change his flag, and dissolve every tie which bound him to the old service, he could sacrifice all else without much regret. no one will be found to say that the hope of rank or emolument in the south influenced him. the character and whole career of the man contradict the idea. his ground of action may be summed up in a single sentence. he went with his state because he believed it was his duty to do so, and because, to ascertain what was his duty, and perform it, was the cardinal maxim of his life. viii. his reception at richmond. no sooner had intelligence of lee's resignation of his commission in the united states army reached richmond, than governor letcher appointed him major-general of the military forces of virginia. the appointment was confirmed by the convention, rather by acclamation than formal vote; and on the 23d of april, lee, who had meanwhile left washington and repaired to richmond, was honored by a formal presentation to the convention. the address of president janney was eloquent, and deserves to be preserved. lee stood in the middle aisle, and the president, rising, said: "major-general lee: in the name of the people of our native state, here represented, i bid you a cordial and heart-felt welcome to this hall, in which we may almost yet hear the echoes of the voices of the statesmen, the soldiers, and sages of by-gone days, who have borne your name, and whose blood now flows in your veins. "we met in the month of february last, charged with the solemn duty of protecting the rights, the honor, and the interests of the people of this commonwealth. we differed for a time as to the best means of accomplishing that object, but there never was, at any moment, a shade of difference among us as to the great object itself; and now, virginia having taken her position, as far as the power of this convention extends, we stand animated by one impulse, governed by one desire and one determination, and that is, that she shall be defended, and that no spot of her soil shall be polluted by the foot of an invader. "when the necessity became apparent of having a leader for our forces, all hearts and all eyes, by the impulse of an instinct which is a surer guide than reason itself, turned to the old county of westmoreland. we knew how prolific she had been in other days of heroes and statesmen. we knew she had given birth to the father of his country, to richard henry lee, to monroe, and last, though not least, to your own gallant father, and we knew well, by your deeds, that her productive power was not yet exhausted. "sir, we watched with the most profound and intense interest the triumphal march of the army led by general scott, to which you were attached, from vera cruz to the capital of mexico. we read of the sanguinary conflicts and the blood-stained fields, in all of which victory perched upon our own banners. we knew of the unfading lustre that was shed upon the american arms by that campaign, and we know, also, what your modesty has always disclaimed, that no small share of the glory of those achievements was due to your valor and your military genius. "sir, one of the proudest recollections of my life will be the honor that i yesterday had of submitting to this body confirmation of the nomination, made by the governor of this state, of you as commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of this commonwealth. i rose to put the question, and when i asked if this body would advise and consent to that appointment, there rushed from the hearts to the tongues of all the members an affirmative response, which told with an emphasis that could leave no doubt of the feeling whence it emanated. i put the negative of the question, for form's sake, but there was an unbroken silence. "sir, we have, by this unanimous vote, expressed our convictions that you are at this day, among the living citizens of virginia, 'first in war.' we pray to god most fervently that you may so conduct the operations committed to your charge that it may soon be said of you that you are 'first in peace,' and when that time comes you will have earned the still prouder distinction of being 'first in the hearts of your countrymen.'" the president concluded by saying that virginia on that day intrusted her spotless sword to lee's keeping, and lee responded as follows: "mr. president and gentlemen of the convention: profoundly impressed with the solemnity of the occasion, for which i must say i was not prepared, i accept the position assigned me by your partiality. i would have much preferred had your choice fallen upon an abler man. trusting in almighty god, an approving conscience, and the aid of my fellow-citizens, i devote myself to the service of my native state, in whose behalf alone will i ever again draw my sword." such were the modest and dignified expressions of lee in accepting the great trust. the reply is brief and simple, but these are very great merits on such an occasion. no portion of the address contains a phrase or word denunciatory of the federal government, or of the motives of the opponents of virginia; and this moderation and absence of all rancor characterized the utterances of lee, both oral and written, throughout the war. he spoke, doubtless, as he felt, and uttered no expression of heated animosity, because he cherished no such sentiment. his heart was bleeding still from the cruel trial it had undergone in abruptly tearing away from the old service to embark upon civil war; with the emotions of the present occasion, excited by the great ovation in his honor, no bitterness mingled--or at least, if there were such bitterness in his heart, he did not permit it to rise to his lips. he accepted the trust confided to him in terms of dignity and moderation, worthy of washington; exchanged grave salutations with the members of the convention; and then, retiring from the hall where he had solemnly consecrated his life to his native commonwealth, proceeded at once to energetic work to get the state in a posture of defence. the sentiment of the country in reference to lee was even warmer than that of the convention. for weeks, reports had been rife that he had determined to adhere to the federal government in the approaching struggle. such an event, it was felt by all, would be a public calamity to virginia; and the general joy may be imagined when it was known that lee had resigned and come to fight with his own people. he assumed command, therefore, of all the virginia forces, in the midst of universal public rejoicing; and the fact gave strength and consistency to the general determination to resist the federal government to the last. ix. lee in 1861. at this time--april, 1861--general lee was fifty-four years of age, and may be said to have been in the ripe vigor of every faculty. physically and intellectually he was "at his best," and in the bloom of manhood. his figure was erect, and he bore himself with the brief, somewhat stiff air of command derived from his military education and service in the army. this air of the professional soldier, which characterized generally the graduates of west point, was replaced afterward by a grave dignity, the result of high command and great responsibilities. in april, 1861, however, he was rather the ordinary army officer in bearing than the commander-in-chief. he had always been remarkable for his manly beauty, both of face and figure, and the cares of great command had not yet whitened his hair. there was not a gray hair in his head, and his mustache was dark and heavy. the rest of his face was clean-shaven, and his cheeks had that fresh, ruddy hue which indicates high physical health. this was not at that time or afterward the result of high living. of all the prominent personages of his epoch. lee was, perhaps, the most temperate. he rarely drank even so much as a single glass of wine, and it was a matter of general notoriety in the army afterward, that he cared not what he ate. the ruddy appearance which characterized him from first to last was the result of the most perfectly-developed physical health, which no species of indulgence had ever impaired. he used no tobacco then or afterward, in any shape--that seductive weed which has been called "the soldier's comfort"--and seemed, indeed, superior to all those small vices which assail men of his profession. grave, silent, with a military composure of bearing which amounted at times, as we have said, to stiffness, he resembled a machine in the shape of a man. at least this was the impression which he produced upon those who saw him in public at this time. the writer's design, here, is to indicate the personal appearance and bearing of general lee on the threshold of the war. it may be said, by way of summing up all, that he was a full-blooded "west-pointer" in appearance; the _militaire_ as distinguished from the civilian; and no doubt impressed those who held official interviews with him as a personage of marked reserve. the truth and frankness of the man under all circumstances, and his great, warm heart, full of honesty and unassuming simplicity, became known only in the progress of the war. how simple and true and honest he was, will appear from a letter to his son, g.w. custis lee, written some time before: "you must study," he wrote, "to be frank with the world; frankness is the child of honesty and courage. say just what you mean to do on every occasion, and take it for granted you mean to do right. if a friend asks a favor, you should grant it, if it is reasonable; if not, tell him plainly why you cannot: you will wrong him and wrong yourself by equivocation of any kind. never do a wrong thing to make a friend or keep one; the man who requires you to do so, is dearly purchased at a sacrifice. deal kindly, but firmly, with all your classmates; you will find it the policy which wears best. above all, do not appear to others what you are not. if you have any fault to find with any one, tell him, not others, of what you complain; there is no more dangerous experiment than that of undertaking to be one thing before a man's face and another behind his back. we should live, act, and say, nothing to the injury of any one. it is not only best as a matter of principle, but it is the path to peace and honor. "in regard to duty, let me, in conclusion of this hasty letter, inform you that, nearly a hundred years ago, there was a day of remarkable gloom and darkness--still known as 'the dark day'--a day when the light of the sun was slowly extinguished, as if by an eclipse. the legislature of connecticut was in session, and, as its members saw the unexpected and unaccountable darkness coming on, they shared in the general awe and terror. it was supposed by many that the last day--the day of judgment--had come. some one, in the consternation of the hour, moved an adjournment. then there arose an old puritan legislator, davenport, of stamford, and said that, if the last day had come, he desired to be found at his place doing his duty, and, therefore, moved that candles be brought in, so that the house could proceed with its duty. there was quietness in that man's mind, the quietness of heavenly wisdom and inflexible willingness to obey present duty. duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language. do your duty in all things, like the old puritan. you cannot do more, you should never wish to do less. never let me and your mother wear one gray hair for any lack of duty on your part." the maxims of this letter indicate the noble and conscientious character of the man who wrote it. "frankness is the child of honesty and courage." "say just what you mean to do on every occasion." "never do a wrong thing to make a friend or keep one." "duty is the sublimest word in our language ... do your duty in all things ... you cannot do more." that he lived up to these great maxims, amid all the troubled scenes and hot passions of a stormy epoch, is lee's greatest glory. his fame as a soldier, great as it is, yields to the true glory of having placed duty before his eyes always as the supreme object of life. he resigned his commission from a sense of duty to his native state; made this same duty his sole aim in every portion of his subsequent career; and, when all had failed, and the cause he had fought for was overthrown, it was the consciousness of having performed conscientiously, and to his utmost, his whole duty, which took the sting from defeat, and gave him that noble calmness which the whole world saw and admired. "human virtue should be equal to human calamity," were his august words when all was lost, and men's minds were sinking under the accumulated agony of defeat and despair. those words could only have been uttered by a man who made duty the paramount object of living--the performance of it, the true glory and crown of virtuous manhood. it may be objected by some critics that he mistook his duty in espousing the southern cause. doubtless many persons will urge that objection, and declare that the words here written are senseless panegyric. but that will not affect the truth or detract from lee's great character. he performed at least what in his inmost soul _he_ considered his duty, and, from the beginning of his career, when all was so bright, to its termination, when all was so dark, it will be found that his controlling sentiment was, first, last, and all the time, this performance of duty. the old puritan, whose example he admired so much, was not more calm and resolute. when "the last day" of the cause he fought for came--in the spring of 1865--it was plain to all who saw the man, standing unmoved in the midst of the general disaster, that his sole desire was to be "found at his place, and doing his duty." from this species of digression upon the moral constituents of the individual, we pass to the record of that career which made the great fame of the soldier. the war had already begun when lee took command of the provisional forces of virginia, and the collisions in various portions of the gulf states between the federal and state authorities were followed by overt acts in virginia, which all felt would be the real battle-ground of the war. the north entered upon the struggle with very great ardor and enthusiasm. the call for volunteers to enforce obedience to the federal authority was tumultuously responded to throughout the entire north, and troops were hurried forward to washington, which soon became an enormous camp. the war began in virginia with the evacuation and attempted destruction of the works at harper's ferry, by the federal officer in command there. this was on the 19th of april, and on the next day reinforcements were thrown into fortress monroe; and the navy-yard at norfolk, with the shipping, set on fire and abandoned. lee thus found the commonwealth in a state of war, and all his energies were immediately concentrated upon the work of placing her in a condition of defence. he established his headquarters in the custom-house at richmond; orderlies were seen coming and going; bustle reigned throughout the building, and by night, as well as by day, general lee labored incessantly to organize the means of resistance. from the first moment, all had felt that virginia, from her geographical position, adjoining the federal frontier and facing the federal capital, would become the arena of the earliest, longest, and most determined struggle. her large territory and moral influence, as the oldest of the southern states, also made her the chief object of the federal hostility. it was felt that if virginia were occupied, and her people reduced under the federal authority again, the southern cause would be deprived of a large amount of its prestige and strength. the authorities of the gulf states accordingly hurried forward to richmond all available troops; and from all parts of virginia the volunteer regiments, which had sprung up like magic, were in like manner forwarded by railway to the capital. every train brought additions to this great mass of raw war material; large camps rose around richmond, chief among which was that named "camp lee;" and the work of drilling and moulding this crude material for the great work before it was ardently proceeded with under the supervision of lee. an executive board, or military council, had been formed, consisting of governor letcher and other prominent officials; but these gentlemen had the good sense to intrust the main work of organizing an army to lee. as yet the great question at richmond was to place virginia in a state of defence--to prepare that commonwealth for the hour of trial, by enrolling her own people. it will be remembered that lee held no commission from the confederate states; he was major-general of the provisional army of virginia, and to place this provisional army in a condition to take the field was the first duty before him. it was difficult, not from want of ardor in the population, but from the want of the commonest material necessary in time of war. there were few arms, and but small supplies of ammunition. while the federal government entered upon the war with the amplest resources, the south found herself almost entirely destitute of the munitions essential to her protection. all was to be organized and put at once into operation--the quartermaster, commissary, ordnance, and other departments. transportation, supplies of rations, arms, ammunition, all were to be collected immediately. the material existed, or could be supplied, as the sequel clearly showed; but as yet there was almost nothing. and it was chiefly to the work of organizing these departments, first of all, that general lee and the military council addressed themselves with the utmost energy. the result was, that the state found herself very soon in a condition to offer a determined resistance. the troops at the various camps of instruction were successively sent to the field; others took their places, and the work of drilling the raw material into soldiers went on; supplies were collected, transportation found, workshops for the construction of arms and ammunition sprung up; small-arms, cannon, cartridges, fixed and other ammunition, were produced in quantities; and, in a time which now seems wholly inadequate for such a result, the commonwealth of virginia was ready to take the field against the federal government. x. the war begins. early in may, virginia became formally a member of the southern confederacy, and the troops which she had raised a portion of the confederate states army. when richmond became the capital soon afterward, and the southern congress assembled, five brigadier-generals were appointed, generals cooper, albert s. johnston, lee, j.e. johnston, and beauregard. large forces had been meanwhile raised throughout the south; virginia became the centre of all eyes, as the scene of the main struggle; and early in june occurred at bethel, in lower virginia, the first prominent affair, in which general butler, with about four thousand men, was repulsed and forced to retire. the affair at bethel, which was of small importance, was followed by movements in northern and western virginia--the battles at rich mountain and carrick's ford; johnston's movements in the valley; and the advance of the main federal army on the force under beauregard, which resulted in the first battle of manassas. in these events, general lee bore no part, and we need not speak of them further than to present a summary of the results. the federal design had been to penetrate virginia in three columns. one was to advance from the northwest under general mcclellan; a second, under general patterson, was to take possession of the valley; and a third, under general mcdowell, was to drive beauregard back from manassas on richmond. only one of these columns--that of mcclellan--succeeded in its undertaking. johnston held patterson in check in the valley until the advance upon manassas; then by a flank march the confederate general hastened to the assistance of beauregard. the battle of manassas followed on sunday, the 21st of july. after an unsuccessful attempt to force the confederate right, general mcdowell assailed their left, making for that purpose a long _dã©tour_--and at first carried all before him. reã«nforcements were hurried forward, however, and the confederates fought with the energy of men defending their own soil. the obstinate stand made by evans, bee, bartow, jackson, and their brave associates, turned the fortunes of the day, and, when reã«nforcements subsequently reached the field under general kirby smith and general early, the federal troops retreated in great disorder toward washington. xi. lee's advance into western virginia. general lee nowhere appears, as we have seen, in these first great movements and conflicts. he was without any specific command, and remained at richmond, engaged in placing that city in a state of defence. the works which he constructed proved subsequently of great importance to the city, and a northern officer writes of lee: "while the fortifications of richmond stand, his name will evoke admiration; the art of war is unacquainted with any defence so admirable." lee's first appearance in the war, as commander of troops in the field, took place in the fall of 1861, when he was sent to operate against the forces under general rosecrans in the fastnesses of western virginia. this indecisive and unimportant movement has been the subject of various comment; the official reports were burned in the conflagration at richmond, or captured, and the elaborate plans drawn up by lee of his intended movement against general reynolds, at cheat mountain, have in the same manner disappeared. under these circumstances, and as the present writer had no personal knowledge of the subject, it seems best to simply quote the brief statement which follows. it is derived from an officer of high rank and character, whose statement is only second in value to that of general lee himself: "after general garnett's death, general lee was sent by the president to ascertain what could be done in the trans-alleghany region, and to endeavor to harmonize our movements, etc., in that part of the state. he was not ordered to take command of the troops, nor did he do so, during the whole time he was there. "soon after his arrival he came to the decided conclusion that _that_ was not the line from which to make an offensive movement. the country, although not hostile, was not friendly; supplies could not be obtained; the enemy had possession of the baltimore and ohio railroad, from which, and the ohio river as a base, he could operate with great advantage against us, and our only chance was to drive him from the railroad, take possession, and use it ourselves. we had not the means of doing this, and consequently could only try to hold as much country as possible, and occupy as large a force of the enemy as could be kept in front of us. the movement against cheat mountain, which failed, was undertaken with a view of causing the enemy to contract his lines, and enable us to unite the troops under generals jackson (of georgia) and loring. after the failure of this movement on our part, general rosecrans, feeling secure, strengthened his lines in that part of the country, and went with a part of his forces to the kanawha, driving our forces across the gauley. general lee then went to that line of operations, to endeavor to unite the troops under generals floyd and wise, and stop the movements under rosecrans. general loring, with a part of his force from valley mountain, joined the forces at sewell mountain. rosecrans's movement was stopped, and, the season for operations in that country being over, general lee was ordered to richmond, and soon afterward sent to south carolina, to meet the movement of the enemy from port royal, etc. he remained in south carolina until shortly before the commencement of the campaign before richmond, in 1862." the months spent by general lee in superintending the coast defences of south carolina and georgia, present nothing of interest, and we shall therefore pass to the spring of 1862, when he returned to richmond. his services as engineer had been highly appreciated by the people of the south, and a writer of the period said: "the time will yet come when his superior abilities will be vindicated, both to his own renown and the glory of his country." the time was now at hand when these abilities, if the individual possessed them, were to have an opportunity to display themselves. xii. lee's last interview with bishop meade. a touching incident of lee's life belongs to this time--the early spring of 1862. bishop meade, the venerable head of the episcopal church in virginia, lay at the point of death, in the city of richmond. when general lee was informed of the fact, he exhibited lively emotion, for the good bishop, as we have said in the commencement of this narrative, had taught him his catechism when he was a boy in alexandria. on the day before the bishop's death. general lee called in the morning to see him, but such was the state of prostration under which the sick man labored, that only a few of his most intimate friends were permitted to have access to his chamber. in the evening general lee called again, and his name was announced to bishop meade. as soon as he heard it, he said faintly, for his breathing had become much oppressed, and he spoke with great difficulty: "i must see him, if only for a few moments." general lee was accordingly introduced, and approached the dying man, with evidences of great emotion in his countenance. taking the thin hand in his own, he said: "how do you feel, bishop?" "almost gone," replied bishop meade, in a voice so weak that it was almost inaudible; "but i wanted to see you once more." he paused for an instant, breathing heavily, and looking at lee with deep feeling. "god bless you! god bless you, robert!" he faltered out, "and fit you for your high and responsible duties. i can't call you 'general'--i must call you 'robert;' i have heard you your catechism too often." general lee pressed the feeble hand, and tears rolled down his cheeks. "yes, bishop--very often," he said, in reply to the last words uttered by the bishop. a brief conversation followed, bishop meade making inquiries in reference to mrs. lee, who was his own relative, and other members of the family. "he also," says the highly-respectable clergyman who furnishes these particulars, "put some pertinent questions to general lee about the state of public affairs and of the army, showing the most lively interest in the success of our cause." it now became necessary to terminate an interview which, in the feeble condition of the aged man, could not be prolonged. much exhausted, and laboring under deep emotion, bishop meade shook the general by the hand, and said: "heaven bless you! heaven bless you! and give you wisdom for your important and arduous duties!" these were the last words uttered during the interview. general lee pressed the dying man's hand, released it, stood for several minutes by the bedside motionless and in perfect silence, and then went out of the room. on the next morning bishop meade expired. [illustration: environs of richmond.] part ii. _in front of richmond_. i. plan of the federal campaign. the pathetic interview which we have just described took place in the month of march, 1862. by the latter part of that month, general mcclellan, in command of an army of more than one hundred thousand men, landed on the peninsula between the james and york rivers, and after stubbornly-contested engagements with the forces of general johnston, advanced up the peninsula--the confederates slowly retiring. in the latter part of may, a portion of the federal forces had crossed the chickahominy, and confronted general johnston defending richmond. such was the serious condition of affairs in the spring of 1862. the federal sword had nearly pierced the heart of virginia, and, as the course of events was about to place lee in charge of her destinies, a brief notice is indispensable of the designs of the adversaries against whom he was to contend on the great arena of the state. while the south had been lulled to sleep, as it were, by the battle of manassas, the north, greatly enraged at the disaster, had prepared to prosecute the war still more vigorously. the military resources of the south had been plainly underestimated. it was now obvious that the north had to fight with a dangerous adversary, and that the people of the south were entirely in earnest. many journals of the north had ridiculed the idea of war; and one of them had spoken of the great uprising of the southern states from the potomac to the gulf of mexico as a mere "local commotion" which a force of fifty thousand men would be able to put down without difficulty. a column of twenty-five thousand men, it was said, would be sufficient to carry all before it in virginia, and capture richmond, and the comment on this statement had been the battle of manassas, where a force of more than fifty thousand had been defeated and driven back to washington. it was thus apparent that the war was to be a serious struggle, in which the north would be compelled to exert all her energies. the people responded to the call upon them with enthusiasm. all the roving and adventurous elements of northern society flocked to the federal standard, and in a short time a large force had once more assembled at washington. the work now was to drill, equip, and put it in efficient condition for taking the field. this was undertaken with great energy, the congress coã¶perating with the executive in every manner. the city of washington resounded with the wheels of artillery and the tramp of cavalry; the workshops were busy night and day to supply arms and ammunition; and the best officers devoted themselves, without rest, to the work of drilling and disciplining the mass. by the spring of 1862 a force of about two hundred thousand men was ready to take the field in virginia. general scott was not to command in the coming campaigns. he had retired in the latter part of the year 1861, and his place had been filled by a young officer of rising reputation--general george b. mcclellan, who had achieved the successes of rich mountain and carrick's ford in western virginia. general mcclellan was not yet forty, but had impressed the authorities with a high opinion of his abilities. a soldier by profession, and enjoying the distinction of having served with great credit in the mexican war, he had been sent as united states military commissioner to the crimea, and on his return had written a book of marked ability on the military organizations of the powers of europe. when the struggle between the north and south approached, he was said--with what truth we know not--to have hesitated, before determining upon his course; but it is probable that the only question with him was whether he should fight for the north or remain neutral. in his politics he was a democrat, and the war on the south is said to have shocked his state-rights view. but, whatever his sentiments had been, he accepted command, and fought a successful campaign in western virginia. from that moment his name became famous; he was said to have achieved "two victories in one day," and he received from the newspapers the flattering name of "the young napoleon." the result of this successful campaign, slight in importance as it was, procured for general mcclellan the high post of commander-in-chief of the armies of the united states. operations in every portion of the south were to be directed by him; and he was especially intrusted with the important work of organizing the new levies at washington. this he performed with very great ability. under his vigorous hand, the raw material soon took shape. he gave his personal attention to every department; and the result, as we have said, in the early spring of 1862, was an army of more than two hundred thousand men, for operations in virginia alone. the great point now to be determined was the best line of operations against richmond. president lincoln was strongly in favor of an advance by way of manassas and the orange and alexandria railroad, which he thought would insure the safety of the federal capital. this was always, throughout the whole war, a controlling consideration with him; and, regarded in the light of subsequent events, this solicitude seems to have been well founded. more than once afterward, general lee--to use his own expression--thought of "swapping queens," that is to say, advancing upon washington, without regard to the capture of richmond; and president lincoln, with that excellent good sense which he generally exhibited, felt that the loss of washington would prove almost fatal to the federal cause.--such was the origin of the president's preference for the manassas line. general mcclellan did not share it. he assented it seems at first, but soon resolved to adopt another plan--an advance either from urbanna on the rappahannock, or from west point on the york. against his views and determination, the president and authorities struggled in vain. mcclellan treated their arguments and appeals with a want of ceremony amounting at times nearly to contempt; he adhered to his own plan resolutely, and in the end the president gave way. in rueful protest against the continued inactivity of general mcclellan, president lincoln had exclaimed, "if general mcclellan does not want to use the army, i would like to borrow it;" and "if something is not soon done, the bottom will be out of the whole affair." at last general mcclellan carried his point, and an advance against richmond from the peninsula was decided upon. in order to assist this movement, general fremont was to march through northwestern virginia, and general banks up the valley; and, having thus arranged their programme, the federal authorities began to move forward to the great work. to transport an army of more than one hundred thousand men by water to the peninsula was a heavy undertaking; but the ample resources of the government enabled them to do so without difficulty. general mcclellan, who had now been removed from his post of commander-in-chief of the armies of the united states, and assigned to the command only of the army to operate against richmond, landed his forces on the peninsula, and, after several actions of an obstinate description, advanced toward the chickahominy, general johnston, the confederate commander, deliberately retiring. johnston took up a position behind this stream, and, toward the end of may, mcclellan crossed a portion of his forces and confronted him. ii. johnston is wounded. the army thus threatening the city which had become the capital of the confederacy was large and excellently equipped. it numbered in all, according to general mcclellan's report, one hundred and fifty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight men, of whom one hundred and fifteen thousand one hundred and two were effective troops--that is to say, present and ready for duty as fighting-men in the field. results of such magnitude' were expected from this great army, that all the resources of the federal government had been taxed to bring it to the highest possible state of efficiency. the artillery was numerous, and of the most approved description; small-arms of the best patterns and workmanship were profusely supplied; the ammunition was of the finest quality, and almost inexhaustible in quantity; and the rations for the subsistence of the troops, which were equally excellent and abundant, were brought up in an unfailing stream from the white house, in general mcclellan's rear, over the york river railroad, which ran straight to his army. such was the admirable condition of the large force under command of general mcclellan. it would be difficult to imagine an army better prepared for active operations; and the position which it held had been well selected. the left of the army was protected by the wellnigh impassable morass of the white-oak swamp, and all the approaches from the direction of richmond were obstructed by the natural difficulties of the ground, which had been rendered still more forbidding by an abattis of felled trees and earthworks of the best description. unless the right of mcclellan, on the northern bank of the chickahominy, were turned by the confederates, his communications with his base at the white house and the safety of his army were assured. and even the apparently improbable contingency of such an assault on his right had been provided for. other bodies of federal troops had advanced into virginia to coã¶perate with the main force on the peninsula. general mcdowell, the able soldier who had nearly defeated the confederates at manassas, was at fredericksburg with a force of about forty thousand men, which were to advance southward without loss of time and unite with general mcclellan's right. this would completely insure the communications of his army from interruption; and it was no doubt expected that generals fremont and banks would coã¶perate in the movement also. fremont was to advance from northwestern virginia, driving before him the small confederate force, under jackson, in the valley; and general banks, then at winchester, was to cross the blue ridge mountains, and, posting his forces along the manassas railroad, guard the approaches to washington when mcdowell advanced from fredericksburg to the aid of general mcclellan. thus richmond would be half encircled by federal armies. general mcclellan, if permitted by the confederates to carry out his plan of operations, would soon be in command of about two hundred thousand men, and with this force it was anticipated he would certainly be able to capture richmond. such was the federal programme of the war in virginia. it promised great results, and ought, it would seem, to have succeeded. the confederate forces in virginia did not number in all one hundred thousand men; and it is now apparent that, without the able strategy of johnston, lee, and jackson, general mcclellan would have been in possession of richmond before the summer. prompt action was thus necessary on the part of the sagacious soldier commanding the army at richmond, and directing operations throughout the theatre of action in virginia. the officer in question was general joseph e. johnston, a virginian by birth, who had first held general patterson in check in the shenandoah valley, and then hastened to the assistance of general beauregard at manassas, where, in right of his superior rank, he took command. before the enemy's design to advance up the peninsula had been developed, johnston had made a masterly retreat from manassas. reappearing with his force of about forty thousand men on the peninsula, he had obstinately opposed mcclellan, and only retired when he was compelled by numbers to do so, with the resolution, however, of fighting a decisive battle on the chickahominy. in face, figure, and character, general johnston was thoroughly the soldier. above the medium height, with an erect figure, in a close-fitting uniform buttoned to the chin; with a ruddy face, decorated with close-cut gray side-whiskers, mustache, and tuft on the chin; reserved in manner, brief of speech, without impulses of any description, it seemed, general johnston's appearance and bearing were military to stiffness; and he was popularly compared to "a gamecock," ready for battle at any moment. as a soldier, his reputation was deservedly high; to unshrinking personal courage he added a far-reaching capacity for the conduct of great operations. throughout his career he enjoyed a profound public appreciation of his abilities as a commander, and was universally respected as a gentleman and a patriot. general johnston, surveying the whole field in virginia, and penetrating, it would seem, the designs of the enemy, had hastened to direct general jackson, commanding in the valley, to begin offensive operations, and, by threatening the federal force there--with washington in perspective--relieve the heavy pressure upon the main arena. jackson carried out these instructions with the vigor which marked all his operations. in march he advanced down the valley in the direction of winchester, and, coming upon a considerable force of the enemy at kernstown, made a vigorous assault upon them; a heavy engagement ensued, and, though jackson was defeated and compelled to retreat, a very large federal force was retained in the valley to protect that important region. a more decisive diversion soon followed. jackson advanced in may upon general banks, then at strasburg, drove him from that point to and across the potomac; and such was the apprehension felt at washington, that president lincoln ordered general mcdowell, then at fredericksburg with about forty thousand men, to send twenty thousand across the mountains to strasburg in order to pursue or cut off jackson. thus the whole federal programme in virginia was thrown into confusion. general banks, after the fight at kernstown, was kept in the valley. after jackson's second attack upon him, when general banks was driven across the potomac and washington threatened, general mcdowell was directed to send half his army to operate against jackson. thus general mcclellan, waiting at richmond for mcdowell to join him, did not move; with a portion of his army on one side of the stream, and the remainder on the other side, he remained inactive, hesitating and unwilling, as any good soldier would have been, to commence the decisive assault. his indecision was brought to an end by general johnston. discovering that the force in his front, near "seven pines," on the southern bank of the chickahominy, was only a portion of the federal army, general johnston determined to attack it. this resolution was not in consequence of the freshet in the chickahominy, as has been supposed, prompting johnston to attack while the federal army was cut in two, as it were. his resolution, he states, had already been taken, and was, with or without reference to the rains, that of a good soldier. general johnston struck at general mcclellan on the last day of may, just at the moment, it appears, when the federal commander designed commencing his last advance upon the city. the battle which took place was one of the most desperate and bloody of the war. both sides fought with obstinate courage, and neither gained a decisive advantage. on the confederate right, near "seven pines," the federal line was broken and forced back; but, on the left, at fair oaks station, the confederates, in turn, were repulsed. night fell upon a field where neither side could claim the victory. the most that could be claimed by the southerners was that mcclellan had received a severe check; and they sustained a great misfortune in the wound received by general johnston. he was struck by a fragment of shell while superintending the attack at fair oaks, and the nature of his wound rendered it impossible for him to retain command of the army. he therefore retired from the command, and repaired to richmond, where he remained for a long time an invalid, wholly unable to continue in service in the field. this untoward event rendered it necessary to find a new commander for the army without loss of time. general lee had returned some time before from the south, and to him all eyes were turned. he had had no opportunity to display his abilities upon a conspicuous theatre--the sole command he had been intrusted with, that in trans-alleghany virginia, could scarcely be called a real command--and he owed his elevation now to the place vacated by general johnston, rather to his services performed in the old army of the united states, than to any thing he had effected in the war of the confederacy. the confidence of the virginia people in his great abilities had never wavered, and there is no reason to suppose that the confederate authorities were backward in conceding his merits as a soldier. whatever may have been the considerations leading to his appointment, he was assigned on the 3d day of june to the command of the army, and thus the virginians assembled to defend the capital of their state found themselves under the command of the most illustrious of their own countrymen. iii. lee assigned to the command--his family at the white house. lee had up to this time effected, as we have shown, almost nothing in the progress of the war. intrusted with no command, and employed only in organizing the forces, or superintending the construction of defences, he had failed to achieve any of those successes in the field which constitute the glory of the soldier. he might possess the great abilities which his friends and admirers claimed for him, but he was yet to show the world at large that he did really possess them. the decisive moment had now arrived which was to test him. he was placed in command of the largest and most important army in the confederacy, and to him was intrusted the defence of the capital not only of virginia, but of the south. if richmond were to fall, the confederate congress, executive, and heads of departments, would all be fugitives. the evacuation of virginia might or might not follow, but, in the very commencement of the conflict, the enemy would achieve an immense advantage. recognition by the european powers would be hopeless in such an event, and the wandering and fugitive government of the confederacy would excite only contempt. such were the circumstances under which general lee assumed command of the "army of northern virginia," as it was soon afterward styled. the date of his assignment to duty was june 3, 1862--three days after general johnston had retired in consequence of his wound. thirty days afterward the great campaign around richmond had been decided, and to the narrative of what followed the appointment of lee we shall at once proceed, after giving a few words to another subject connected with his family. when general lee left "washington to repair to richmond," he removed the ladies of his family from arlington to the "white house" on the pamunkey, near the spot where that river unites with the mattapony to form the york river. this estate, like the arlington property, had come into possession of general lee through his wife, and as arlington was exposed to the enemy, the ladies had taken refuge here, with the hope that they would be safe from intrusion or danger. the result was unfortunate. the white house was a favorable "base" for the federal army, and intelligence one day reached mrs. lee and her family that the enemy were approaching. the ladies therefore hastened from the place to a point of greater safety, and before her departure mrs. lee is said to have affixed to the door a paper containing the following words: "northern soldiers who profess to reverence washington, forbear to desecrate the home of his first married life, the property of his wife, now owned by her descendants. "a grand-daughter of mrs. washington." when the federal forces took possession of the place, a northern officer, it is said, wrote beneath this: "a northern officer has protected your property, in sight of the enemy, and at the request of your overseer." the resolute spirit of mrs. lee is indicated by an incident which followed. she took refuge with her daughters in a friend's house near richmond, and, when a federal officer was sent to search the house, handed to him a paper addressed to "the general in command," in which she wrote: "sir: i have patiently and humbly submitted to the search of my house, by men under your command, who are satisfied that there is nothing here which they want. all the plate and other valuables have long since been removed to richmond, and are now beyond the reach of any northern marauders who may wish for their possession. "wife of robert lee, general c.s.a." the ladies finally repaired for safety to the city of richmond, and the white house was burned either before or when general mcclellan retreated. the place was not without historic interest, as the scene of washington's first interview with martha custis, who afterward became his wife. he was married either at st. peter's church near by, or in the house which originally stood on the site of the one now destroyed by the federal forces. its historic associations thus failed to protect the white house, and, like arlington, it fell a sacrifice to the pitiless hand of war. from this species of digression we come back to the narrative of public events, and the history of the great series of battles which were to make the banks of the chickahominy historic ground. on taking command, lee had assiduously addressed himself to the task of increasing the efficiency of the army: riding incessantly to and fro, he had inspected with his own eyes the condition of the troops; officers of the commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance departments were held to a strict accountability; and, in a short time, the army was in a high state of efficiency. "what was the amount of the confederate force under command of lee?" it may be asked. the present writer is unable to state this number with any thing like exactness. the official record, if in existence, is not accessible, and the matter must be left to conjecture. it is tolerably certain, however, that, even after the arrival of jackson, the army numbered less than seventy-five thousand. officers of high rank and character state the whole force to have been sixty or seventy thousand only. it will thus be seen that the federal army was larger than the confederate; but this was comparatively an unimportant fact. the event was decided rather by generalship than the numbers of the combatants. iv lee resolves to attack. general lee assumed command of the army on the 3d of june. a week afterward, jackson finished the great campaign of the valley, by defeating generals fremont and shields at port republic. such had been the important services performed by the famous "stonewall jackson," who was to become the "right arm" of lee in the greater campaigns of the future. retreating, after the defeat of general banks, and passing through strasburg, just as fremont from the west, and the twenty thousand men of general mcdowell from the east, rushed to intercept him, jackson had sullenly fallen back up the valley, with all his captured stores and prisoners, and at cross keys and port republic had achieved a complete victory over his two adversaries. fremont was checked by ewell, who then hastened across to take part in the attack on shields. the result was a federal defeat and retreat down the valley. jackson was free to move in any direction; and his army could unite with that at richmond for a decisive attack upon general mcclellan. the attack in question had speedily been resolved on by lee. any further advance of the federal army would bring it up to the very earthworks in the suburbs of the city; and, unless the confederate authorities proposed to undergo a siege, it was necessary to check the further advance of the enemy by a general attack. how to attack to the best advantage was now the question. the position of general mcclellan's army has been briefly stated. advancing up the peninsula, he had reached and passed the chickahominy, and was in sight of richmond. to this stream, the natural line of defence of the city on the north and east, numerous roads diverged from the capital, including the york river railroad, of which the federal commander made such excellent use; and general mcclellan had thrown his left wing across the stream, advancing to a point on the railroad four or five miles from the city. here he had erected heavy defences to protect that wing until the right wing crossed in turn. the tangled thickets of the white-oak swamp, on his left flank, were a natural defence; but he had added to these obstacles, as we have stated, by felling trees, and guarding every approach by redoubts. in these, heavy artillery kept watch against an approaching enemy; and any attempt to attack from that quarter seemed certain to result in repulse. in front, toward seven pines, the chance of success was equally doubtful. the excellent works of the federal commander bristled with artillery, and were heavily manned. it seemed thus absolutely necessary to discover some other point of assault; and, as the federal right beyond the chickahominy was the only point left, it was determined to attack, if possible, in that quarter. an important question was first, however, to be decided, the character of the defences, if any, on general mcclellan's right, in the direction of old church and cold harbor. a reconnoissance in force was necessary to acquire this information, and general lee accordingly directed general stuart, commanding the cavalry of the army, to proceed with a portion of his command to the vicinity of old church, in the federal rear, and gain all the information possible of their position and defences. v. stuart's "ride around mcclellan." general james e.b. stuart, who now made his first prominent appearance upon the theatre of the war, was a virginian by birth, and not yet thirty years of age. resigning his commission of lieutenant in the united states cavalry at the beginning of the war, he had joined johnston in the valley, and impressed that officer with a high opinion of his abilities as a cavalry officer; proceeded thence to manassas, where he charged and broke a company of "zouave" infantry; protected the rear of the army when johnston retired to the rappahannock, and bore an active part in the conflict on the peninsula. in person he was of medium height; his frame was broad and powerful; he wore a heavy brown beard flowing upon his breast, a huge mustache of the same color, the ends curling upward; and the blue eyes, flashing beneath a "piled-up" forehead, had at times the dazzling brilliancy attributed to the eyes of the eagle. fond of movement, adventure, bright colors, and all the pomp and pageantry of war, stuart had entered on the struggle with ardor, and enjoyed it as the huntsman enjoys the chase. young, ardent, ambitious, as brave as steel, ready with jest or laughter, with his banjo-player following him, going into the hottest battles humming a song, this young virginian was, in truth, an original character, and impressed powerfully all who approached him. one who knew him well wrote: "every thing striking, brilliant, and picturesque, seemed to centre in him. the war seemed to be to stuart a splendid and exciting game, in which his blood coursed joyously, and his immensely strong physical organization found an arena for the display of all its faculties. the affluent life of the man craved those perils and hardships which flush the pulses and make the heart beat fast. he swung himself into the saddle at the sound of the bugle as the hunter springs on horseback; and at such moments his cheeks glowed and his huge mustache curled with enjoyment. the romance and poetry of the hard trade of arms seemed first to be inaugurated when this joyous cavalier, with his floating plume and splendid laughter, appeared upon the great arena of the war in virginia." precise people shook their heads, and called him frivolous, undervaluing his great ability. those best capable of judging him were of a different opinion. johnston wrote to him from the west: "how can i eat or sleep in peace without _you_ upon the outpost?" jackson said, when he fell at chancellorsville: "go back to general stuart, and tell him to act upon his own judgment, and do what he thinks best, i have implicit confidence in him." lee said, when he was killed at yellow tavern: "i can scarcely think of him without weeping." and the brave general sedgwick, of the united states army, said: "stuart is the best cavalry officer ever _foaled_ in north america!" in the summer of 1862, when we present him to the reader, stuart had as yet achieved little fame in his profession, but he was burning to distinguish himself. he responded ardently, therefore, to the order of lee, and was soon ready with a picked force of about fifteen hundred cavalry, under some of his best officers. among them were colonels william h.f. lee and fitz-hugh lee--the first a son of general lee, a graduate of west point, and an officer of distinction afterward; the second, a son of smith lee, brother of the general, and famous subsequently in the most brilliant scenes of the war as the gay and gallant "general fitz lee," of the cavalry. with his picked force, officered by the two lees, and other excellent lieutenants, stuart set out on his adventurous expedition to old church. he effected more than he anticipated, and performed a daring feat of arms in addition. driving the outposts from hanover court-house, he charged and broke a force of federal cavalry near old church; pushed on to the york river railroad, which he crossed, burning or capturing all federal stores met with, including enormous wagon-camps; and then, finding the way back barred against him, and the federal army on the alert, he continued his march with rapidity, passed entirely around general mcclellan's army, and, building a bridge over the chickahominy, safely reã«ntered the confederate lines just as a large force made its appearance in his rear. the temporary bridge was destroyed, however, and stuart hastened to report to his superiors. his information was important. general mcclellan's right and rear were unprotected by works of any strength. if the confederate general desired to attack in that quarter, there was nothing to prevent. the results of stuart's famous "ride around mcclellan," as the people called it, determined general lee to make the attack on the north bank of the stream, if he had not already so decided. it was necessary now to bring jackson's forces from the valley without delay, and almost equally important to mask the movement from general mcclellan. to this end a very simple _ruse_ was adopted. on the 11th of june, whiting's division was embarked on the cars of the danville railroad at richmond, and moved across the river to a point near belle isle, where at that moment a considerable number of federal prisoners were about to be released and sent down james river. here the train, loaded with confederate troops, remained for some time, and _the secret_ was discovered by the released prisoners. general lee was reã«nforcing jackson, in order that the latter might march on washington. such was the report carried to general mcclellan, and it seems to have really deceived him. [footnote: "i have no doubt jackson has been reã«nforced from here."--_general mcclellan to president lincoln, june 20th_.] whiting's division reached lynchburg, and was thence moved by railway to charlottesville--jackson marched and countermarched with an elaborate pretence of advancing down the valley--at last, one morning, the astute confederate, who kept his own counsels, had disappeared; he was marching rapidly to join lee on the chickahominy. not even his own soldiers knew what direction they were taking. they were forbidden by general order to inquire even the names of the towns they passed through; directed to reply "i don't know" to every question; and it is said that when jackson demanded the name and regiment of a soldier robbing a cherry-tree, he could extract from the man no reply but "i don't know." jackson advanced with rapidity, and, on the 25th of june, was near ashland. here he left his forces, and rode on rapidly to richmond. passing unrecognized through the streets, after night, he went on to general lee's headquarters, at a house on the "nine-mile road," leading from the new bridge road toward fair oaks station; and here took place the first interview, since the commencement of the war, between lee and jackson. what each thought of the other will be shown in the course of this narrative. we shall proceed now with the history of the great series of battles for which jackson's appearance was the signal. part iii. _on the chickahominy_. i. the two armies. the chickahominy, whose banks were now to be the scene of a bitter and determined conflict between the great adversaries, is a sluggish and winding stream, which, rising above richmond, describes a curve around it, and empties its waters into the james, far below the city. its banks are swampy, and thickly clothed with forest or underwood. from the nature of these banks, which scarcely rise in many places above the level of the water, the least freshet produces an overflow, and the stream, generally narrow and insignificant, becomes a sort of lake, covering the low grounds to the bases of the wooded bluffs extending upon each side. numerous bridges cross the stream, from bottom's bridge, below the york river railroad, to meadow bridge, north of the city. of these, the mechanicsville bridge, about four miles from the city, and the new bridge, about nine miles, were points of the greatest importance. general mcclellan's position has been repeatedly referred to. he had crossed a portion of his army east of richmond, and advanced to within four or five miles of the city. the remainder, meanwhile, lay on the north bank of the stream, and swept round, in a sort of crescent, to the vicinity of mechanicsville, where it had been anticipated general mcdowell would unite with it, thereby covering its right flank, and protecting the communications with the federal base at the white house. that this disposition of the federal troops was faulty, in face of adversaries like johnston and lee, there could be no doubt. but general mcclellan was the victim, it seems, of the shifting and vacillating policy of the authorities at washington. with the arrival of the forty thousand men under mcdowell, his position would have been a safe one. general mcdowell did not arrive; and this unprotected right flank--left unprotected from the fact that mcdowell's presence was counted on--became the point of the confederate attack. the amount of blame, if any, justly attributable to general mcclellan, first for his inactivity, and then for his defeat by lee, cannot be referred to here, save in a few brief sentences. a sort of feud seems to have arisen between himself and general halleck, the commander-in-chief, stationed at washington; and general halleck then and afterward appears to have regarded mcclellan as a soldier without decision or broad generalship. and yet mcclellan does not seem to have merited the censure he received. he called persistently for reinforcements, remaining inactive meanwhile, because he estimated the confederate army before him at two hundred thousand men, and was unwilling to assail this force, under command of soldiers like johnston and lee, until his own force seemed adequate to the undertaking. another consideration was, the confederate position in front of the powerful earthworks of the city. these works would double the confederate strength in case of battle in front of them; and, believing himself already outnumbered, the federal commander was naturally loath to deliver battle until reã«nforced. the faulty disposition of his army, divided by a stream crossed by few bridges, has been accounted for in like manner--he so disposed the troops, expecting reã«nforcements. but jackson's energy delayed these. washington was in danger, it was supposed, and general mcdowell did not come. it thus happened that general mcclellan awaited attack instead of making it, and that his army was so posted as to expose him to the greatest peril. a last point is to be noted in vindication of this able soldier. finding, at the very last moment, that he could expect no further assistance from the president or general halleck, he resolved promptly to withdraw his exposed right wing and change his base of operations to james river, where at least his communications would be safe. this, it seems, had been determined upon just before the confederate attack; or, if he had not then decided, general mcclellan soon determined upon that plan. to pass now to the confederate side, where all was ready for the great movement. general lee's army lay in front of richmond, exactly corresponding with the front of general mcclellan. the divisions of magruder and huger, supported by those of longstreet and d.h. hill, were opposite mcclellan's left, on the williamsburg and york river roads, directly east of the city. from magruder's left, extended the division of general a.p. hill, reaching thence up the river toward mechanicsville; and a brigade, under general branch lay on hill's left near the point where the brook turnpike crosses the chickahominy north of richmond. the approaches from the east, northeast, and north, were thus carefully guarded. as the confederates held the interior line, the whole force could be rapidly concentrated, and was thoroughly in hand, both for offensive or defensive movements. the army thus held in lee's grasp, and about to assail its great federal adversary, was composed of the best portion of the southern population. the rank and file was largely made up of men of education and high social position. and this resulted from the character of the struggle. the war was a war of invasion on the part of the north; and the ardent and high-spirited youth of the entire south threw themselves into it with enthusiasm. the heirs of ancient families and great wealth served as privates. personal pride, love of country, indignation at the thought that a hostile section had sent an army to reduce them to submission, combined to draw into the confederate ranks the flower of the southern youth, and all the best fighting material. deficient in discipline, and "hard to manage," this force was yet of the most efficient character. it could be counted on for hard work, and especially for offensive operations. and the officers placed over it shared its character. among these, general a.p. hill, a virginian by birth, was soon to be conspicuous as commander of the "light division," and representative of the spirit and dash and enthusiasm of the army. under forty years of age, with a slender figure, a heavily-bearded face, dark eyes, a composed and unassuming bearing, characterized when off duty by a quiet cordiality, he was personally popular with all who approached him, and greatly beloved, both as man and commander. his chief merit as a soldier was his dash and impetus in the charge. a braver heart never beat in human breast; throughout the war he retained the respect and admiration of the army and the country; and a strange fact in relation to this eminent soldier is, that his name was uttered by both jackson and lee as they expired. associated with him in the battles of the chickahominy, and to the end, was the able and resolute longstreet--an officer of low and powerful stature, with a heavy, brown beard reaching to his breast, a manner marked by unalterable composure, and a countenance whose expression of phlegmatic tranquillity never varied in the hottest hours of battle. longstreet was as famous for his bull-dog obstinacy, as hill for his dash and enthusiasm. general lee styled him his "old war-horse," and depended upon him, as will be seen, in some of the most critical operations of the war. of the young and ardent virginian, general magruder, the brave and resolute north-carolinian, d.h. hill, and other officers who subsequently acquired great reputations in the army, we have no space at present to speak. all were to coã¶perate in the assault on general mcclellan, and do their part. on the night of the 25th of june, all was ready for the important movement, and the troops rested on their arms, ready for the coming battle. ii. lee's plan of assault. general lee had been hitherto regarded as a soldier of too great caution, but his plan for the assault on general mcclellan indicated the possession of a nerve approaching audacity. fully comprehending his enemy's strength and position, and aware that a large portion of the federal army had crossed the chickahominy, and was directly in his front, he had resolved to pass to the north bank of the stream with the bulk of his force, leaving only about twenty-five thousand men to protect the city, and deliver battle where defeat would prove ruinous. this plan indicated nothing less than audacity, as we have already said; but, like the audacity of the flank movement at chancellorsville afterward, and the daring march, in disregard of general hooker, to pennsylvania in 1864, it was founded on profound military insight, and indicated the qualities of a great soldier. lee's design was to attack the federal right wing with a part of his force, while jackson, advancing still farther to the left, came in on their communications with the white house, and assailed them on their right and rear. meanwhile richmond was to be protected by general magruder with his twenty-five thousand men, on the south bank; if mcclellan fell back down the peninsula, this force was to cross and unite with the rest; thus the federal army would be driven from all its positions, and the fate of the whole campaign against richmond would be decided. lee's general order directing the movement of the troops is here given. it possesses interest as a clear and detailed statement of his intended operations; and it will be seen that what was resolved on by the commander in his tent, his able subordinates translated detail by detail, with unimportant modifications, into action, under his eyes in the field: headquarters army of northern virginia, _june_ 24, 1862. general orders no. 75. i. general jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from ashland toward the slash church, and encamp at some convenient point west of the central railroad. branch's brigade, of a.p. hill's division, will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the chickahominy, near half sink. at three o'clock thursday morning, 26th instant, general jackson will advance on the road leading to pale green church, communicating his march to general branch, who will immediately cross the chickahominy, and take the road leading to mechanicsville. as soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, general a.p. hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the chickahominy near meadow bridge, and move direct upon mechanicsville. to aid his advance, the heavy batteries on the chickahominy will at the proper time open upon the batteries at mechanicsville. the enemy being driven from mechanicsville, and the passage across the bridge opened, general longstreet, with his division and that of general d.h. hill, will cross the chickahominy at or near that point--general d.h. hill moving to the support of general jackson, and general longstreet supporting general a.p. hill--the four divisions keeping in communication with each other, and moving in _echelon_ on separate roads, if practicable; the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending in their front, will sweep down the chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above new bridge; general jackson, bearing well to his left, turning beaver dam creek, and taking the direction toward cold harbor. they will then press forward toward york river railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the chickahominy. any advance of the enemy toward richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear, and crippling and arresting his progress. ii. the divisions under generals huger and magruder will hold their positions in front of the enemy against attack, and make such demonstrations, thursday, as to discover his operations. should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack; and, should an abandonment of his intrenchments by the enemy be discovered, he will be closely pursued. iii. the third virginia cavalry will observe the charles city road. the fifth virginia, the first north carolina, and the hampton legion cavalry will observe the darbytown, varina, and osborne roads. should a movement of the enemy, down the chickahominy, be discovered, they will close upon his flank, and endeavor to arrest his march. iv. general stuart, with the first, fourth, and ninth virginia cavalry, the cavalry of cobb's legion, and the jeff davis legion, will cross the chickahominy, to-morrow, and take position to the left of general jackson's line of march. the main body will be held in reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left. general stuart will keep general jackson informed of the movements of the enemy on his left, and will coã¶perate with him in his advance. the sixteenth virginia cavalry, colonel davis, will remain on the nine-mile road. v. general ransom's brigade, of general holmes's command, will be placed in reserve on the williamsburg road, by general huger, to whom he will report for orders. vi. commanders of divisions will cause their commands to be provided with three days' cooked rations. the necessary ambulances and ordinance-trains will be ready to accompany the divisions, and receive orders from their respective commanders. officers in charge of all trains will invariably remain with them. batteries and wagons will keep on the right of the road. the chief-engineer, major stevens, will assign engineer officers to each division, whose duty it will be to make provision for overcoming all difficulties to the progress of the troops. the staff-departments will give the necessary instructions to facilitate the movements herein directed. by command of general lee: r.h. chilton, _a.a. general_. this order speaks for itself, and indicates lee's plan of battle in all its details. further comment is unnecessary; and we proceed to narrate the events which followed. in doing so, we shall strive to present a clear and intelligible account of what occurred, rather than to indulge in the warlike splendors of style which characterized the "army correspondents" of the journals during the war. such a treatment of the subject is left to others, who write under the influence of partisan afflatus, rather than with the judicious moderation of the historian. nor are battles themselves the subjects of greatest interest to the thoughtful student. the combinations devised by great commanders are of more interest than the actual struggles. we have therefore dwelt at greater length upon the plans of generals lee and mcclellan than we shall dwell upon the actual fighting of their armies. iii. the battle of the chickahominy. on the morning of the 26th of june, 1862, all was ready for the great encounter of arms between the confederates and the federal forces on the chickahominy. general jackson had been delayed on his march from the mountains, and had not yet arrived; but it was known that he was near, and would soon make his appearance; and, in the afternoon, general lee accordingly directed that the movement should commence. at the word, general a.p. hill moved from his camps to meadow bridge, north of richmond; crossed the chickahominy there, and moved rapidly on mechanicsville, where a small federal force, behind intrenchments, guarded the head of the bridge. this force was not a serious obstacle, and hill soon disposed of it. he attacked the federal works, stormed them after a brief struggle, and drove the force which had occupied them back toward beaver dam creek, below. the mechanicsville bridge was thus cleared; and, in compliance with his orders from lee, general longstreet hastened to throw his division across. hill had meanwhile pressed forward on the track of the retreating enemy, and, a mile or two below, found himself in front of a much more serious obstruction than that encountered at the bridge, namely, the formidable position held by the enemy on beaver dam creek. the ground here is of a peculiar character, and admirably adapted for a defensive position against an enemy advancing from above. on the opposite side of a narrow valley, through which runs beaver dam creek, rises a bold, almost precipitous, bluff, and the road which the confederates were compelled to take bends abruptly to the right when near the stream, thus exposing the flank of the assaulting party to a fire from the bluff. as hill's column pushed forward to attack this position, it was met by a determined fire of artillery and small-arms from the crest beyond the stream, where a large force of riflemen, in pits, were posted, with infantry supports. before this artillery-fire, raking his flanks and doing heavy execution, hill was compelled to fall back. it was impossible to cross the stream in face of the fusillade and cannon. the attack ended after dark with the withdrawal of the confederates; but at dawn hill resumed the struggle, attempting to cross at another point, lower down the stream. this attempt was in progress when the federal troops were seen rapidly falling back from their strong position; and intelligence soon came that this was in consequence of the arrival of jackson, who had passed around the federal right flank above, and forced them to retire toward the main body of the federal army below. no time was now lost. the memorable 27th of june had dawned clear and cloudless, and the brilliant sunshine gave promise of a day on which no interference of the elements would check the bloody work to be performed. hill advanced steadily on the track of the retiring federal forces, who had left evidences of their precipitate retreat all along the road, and, about noon, came in front of the very powerful position of the main body of the enemy, near cold harbor. general mcclellan had drawn up his forces on a ridge along the southern bank of powhite creek, a small water-course which, flowing from the northeast, empties below new bridge into the chickahominy. his left, nearest the chickahominy, was protected by a deep ravine in front, which he had filled with sharp-shooters; and his right rested upon elevated ground, near the locality known as maghee's house. in front, the whole line of battle, which described a curve backward to cover the bridges in rear, was protected by difficult approaches. the ground was either swampy, or covered with tangled undergrowth, or both. the ridge held by the federal forces had been hastily fortified by breastworks of felled trees and earth, behind which the long lines of infantry, supported by numerous artillery, awaited the attack. the amount of the federal force has been variously stated. the impression of the confederates differed from the subsequent statements of federal writers. "the principal part of the federal army," says general lee, in his report, "was now on the north side of the chickahominy." the force has been placed by northern writers at only thirty, or at most thirty-five thousand. if this was the whole number of troops engaged, from first to last, in the battle, the fact is highly creditable to the federal arms, as the struggle was long doubtful. no doubt the exact truth will some day be put upon record, and justice will be done to both the adversaries. the federal force was commanded by the brave and able general fitz-john porter, with general morell commanding his right, general sykes his left, and general mccall forming a second line. slocum's division, and the brigades of generals french and meagher, afterward reã«nforced porter, who now prepared, with great coolness, for the confederate attack. the moment had come. a.p. hill, pressing forward rapidly, with longstreet's division on the right, reached cold harbor, in front of the federal centre, about noon. hill immediately attacked, and an engagement of the most obstinate character ensued. general lee, accompanied by general longstreet, had ridden from his headquarters, on the nine-mile road, to the scene of action, and now witnessed in person the fighting of the troops, who charged under his eye, closing in in a nearly hand-to-hand conflict with the enemy. this was, no doubt, the first occasion on which a considerable portion of the men had seen him--certainly in battle--and that air of supreme calmness which always characterized him in action must have made a deep impression upon them. he was clad simply, and wore scarcely any badges of rank. a felt hat drooped low over the broad forehead, and the eyes beneath were calm and unclouded. add a voice of measured calmness, the air of immovable composure which marked the erect military figure, evidently at home in the saddle, and the reader will have a correct conception of general lee's personal appearance in the first of the great battles of his career. hill attacked with that dash and obstinacy which from this time forward characterized him, but succeeded in making no impression on the federal line. in every assault he was repulsed with heavy loss. the federal artillery, which was handled with skill and coolness, did great execution upon his column, as it rushed forward, and the infantry behind their works stood firm in spite of the most determined efforts to drive them from the ridge. three of hill's regiments reached the crest, and fought hand to hand over the breastworks, but they were speedily repulsed and driven from the crest, and, after two hours' hard fighting, hill found that he had lost heavily and effected nothing. it was now past two o'clock in the afternoon, and general lee listened with anxiety for the sound of guns from the left, which would herald the approach of general jackson. nothing was heard from that quarter, however, and affairs were growing critical. the confederate attack had been repulsed--the federal position seemed impregnable--and "it became apparent," says general lee, "that the enemy were gradually gaining ground." under these circumstances, general mcclellan might adopt either one of the two courses both alike dangerous to the confederates. he might cross a heavy force to the assistance of general porter, thus enabling that officer to assume the offensive; or, finding lee thus checked, he might advance on magruder, crush the small force under him, and seize on richmond, which would be at his mercy. it was thus necessary to act without delay, while awaiting the appearance of jackson. general lee, accordingly, directed general longstreet, who had taken position to the right of cold harbor, to make a feint against the federal left, and thus relieve the pressure on hill. longstreet proceeded with promptness to obey the order; advanced in face of a heavy fire, and with a cross-fire of artillery raking his right from over the chickahominy, and made the feint which had been ordered by general lee. it effected nothing; and, to attain the desired result, it was found necessary to turn the feint into a real attack. this longstreet proceeded to do, first dispersing with a single volley a force of cavalry which had the temerity to charge his infantry. as he advanced and attacked the powerful position before him, the roar of guns, succeeded by loud cheers, was heard on the left of lee's line. jackson had arrived and thrown his troops into action without delay. he then rode forward to cold harbor, where general lee awaited him, and the two soldiers shook hands in the midst of tumultuous cheering from the troops, who had received intelligence that jackson's corps had joined them. the contrast between the two men was extremely striking. we have presented a brief sketch of lee's personal appearance upon the occasion--of the grave commander-in-chief, with his erect and graceful seat in the saddle, his imposing dignity of demeanor, and his calm and measured tones, as deliberate as though he were in a drawing-room. jackson was a very different personage. he was clad in a dingy old coat, wore a discolored cadet-cap, tilted almost upon his nose, and rode a rawboned horse, with short stirrups, which raised his knees in the most ungraceful manner. neither in his face nor figure was there the least indication of the great faculties of the man, and a more awkward-looking personage it would be impossible to imagine. in his hand he held a lemon, which he sucked from time to time, and his demeanor was abstracted and absent. as jackson approached, lee rode toward him and greeted him with a cordial pressure of the hand. "ah, general," said lee, "i am very glad to see you. i hoped to be with you before!" jackson made a twitching movement of his head, and replied in a few words, rather jerked from the lips than deliberately uttered. lee had paused, and now listened attentively to the long roll of musketry from the woods, where hill and longstreet were engaged; then to the still more incessant and angry roar from the direction of jackson's own troops, who had closed in upon the federal forces. "that fire is very heavy," said lee. "do you think your men can stand it?" jackson listened for a moment, with his head bent toward one shoulder, as was customary with him, for he was deaf, he said, in one ear, "and could not hear out of the other," and replied briefly: "they can stand almost any thing! they can stand that!" he then, after receiving general lee's instructions, immediately saluted and returned to his corps--lee remaining still at cold harbor, which was opposite the federal centre. [illustration: lee and jackson at cold harbor.] the arrival of jackson changed in a moment the aspect of affairs in every part of the field. whitney's division of his command took position on longstreet's left; the command of general d.h. hill, on the extreme right of the whole line, and ewell's division, with part of jackson's old division, supported a.p. hill. no sooner had these dispositions been made, than general lee ordered an attack along the whole line. it was now five or six o'clock, and the sun was sinking. from that moment until night came, the battle raged with a fury unsurpassed in any subsequent engagement of the war. the texan troops, under general hood, especially distinguished themselves. these, followed by their comrades, charged the federal left on the bluff, and, in spite of a desperate resistance, carried the position. "the enemy were driven," says general lee, "from the ravine to the first line of breastworks, over which one impetuous column dashed, up to the intrenchments on the crest." here the federal artillery was captured, their line driven from the hill, and in other parts of the field a similar success followed the attack. as night fell, their line gave way in all parts, and the remnants of general porter's command retreated to the bridges over the chickahominy. the first important passage of arms between general mcclellan and general lee--and it may be added the really decisive one--had terminated in a great success on the side of the confederates. iv. the retreat. the battle of cold harbor--or, as general lee styles it in his report, the "battle of the chickahominy"--was the decisive struggle between the great adversaries, and determined the fate of general mcclellan's campaign against richmond. this view is not held by writers on the northern side, who represent the battle in question as only the first of a series of engagements, all of pretty nearly equal importance, and mere incidents attending general mcclellan's change of base to the shores of the james river. such a theory seems unfounded. if the battle at cold harbor had resulted in a federal victory, general mcclellan would have advanced straight on richmond, and the capture of the city would inevitably have followed. but at cold harbor he sustained a decisive defeat. his whole campaign was reversed, and came to naught, from the events occurring between noon and nightfall on the 27th of june. the result of that obstinate encounter was not a federal success, leading to the fall of richmond, but a federal defeat, which led to the retreat to the james river, and the failure of the whole campaign against the confederate capital. it is conceded that general mcclellan really intended to change his base; but after the battle of cold harbor every thing had changed. he no longer had under him a high-spirited army, moving to take up a stronger position, but a weary and dispirited multitude of human beings, hurrying along to gain the shelter of the gunboats on the james river, with the enemy pursuing closely, and worrying them at every step. to the condition of the federal army one of their own officers testifies, and his expressions are so strong as wellnigh to move the susceptibilities of an opponent. "we were ordered to retreat," says general hooker, "and it was like the retreat of a whipped army. we retreated like a parcel of sheep; everybody on the road at the same time; and a few shots from the rebels would have panic-stricken the whole command."[1] [footnote 1: report of the committee on the conduct of the war, part i., p. 580.] such was the condition of that great army which had fought so bravely, standing firm so long against the headlong assaults of the flower of the southern troops. it was the battle at cold harbor which had produced this state of things, thereby really deciding the result of the campaign. to attribute to that action, therefore, no more importance than attached to the engagements on the retreat to james river, seems in opposition to the truth of history. we shall present only a general narrative of the famous retreat which reflected the highest credit upon general mcclellan, and will remain his greatest glory. he, at least, was too good a soldier not to understand that the battle of the 27th was a decisive one. he determined to retreat, without risking another action, to the banks of the james river, where the federal gunboats would render a second attack from the confederates a hazardous undertaking; and, "on the evening of the 27th of june," as he says in his official report, "assembled the corps commanders at his headquarters, and informed them of his plan, its reasons, and his choice of route, and method of execution." orders were then issued to general keyes to move with his corps across the white-oak swamp bridge, and, taking up a position with his artillery on the opposite side, cover the passage of the rest of the troops; the trains and supplies at savage station, on the york river railroad, were directed to be withdrawn; and the corps commanders were ordered to move with such provisions, munitions, and sick, as they could transport, on the direct road to harrison's landing. these orders were promptly carried out. before dawn on the 29th the federal army took up the line of march, and the great retrograde movement was successfully begun. an immense obstacle to its success lay in the character of the country through which it was necessary to pass. white oak swamp is an extensive morass, similar to that skirting the banks of the chickahominy, and the passage through it is over narrow, winding, and difficult roads, which furnish the worst possible pathways for wagons, artillery, or even troops. it was necessary, however, to use these highways or none, and general mcclellan resolutely entered upon his critical movement. general lee was yet in doubt as to his opponent's designs, and the fact is highly creditable to general mcclellan. a portion of the federal army still remained on the left bank of the chickahominy, and it might be the intention of mcclellan to push forward reã«nforcements from the peninsula, fight a second battle for the protection of his great mass of supplies at the white house, or, crossing his whole army to the left bank of the chickahominy by the lower bridges, retreat down the peninsula by the same road followed in advancing. all that general lee could do, under these circumstances, was to remain near cold harbor with his main body, send a force toward the york river road, on the eastern bank of the chickahominy, to check any federal attempt to cross there, and await further developments. it was not until the morning of the 29th that general mcclellan's designs became apparent. it was then ascertained that he had commenced moving toward james river with his entire army, and lee issued prompt orders for the pursuit. while a portion of the confederate army followed closely upon the enemy's rear, other bodies were directed to move by the williamsburg and charles city roads, and intercept him, or assail his flanks. if these movements were promptly made, and no unnecessary delay took place, it was expected that the federal army would be brought to bay in the white-oak swamp, and a final victory be achieved by the confederates. these complicated movements were soon in full progress, and at various points on the line of retreat fierce fighting ensued. general magruder, advancing to savage station, an important depot of federal stores, on the york river railroad, encountered on the 29th, the powerful federal rear-guard, which fought obstinately until night, when it retired. next day generals longstreet and a.p. hill had pushed down the long bridge road, and on the next day (june 30th) came on the retreating column which was vigorously engaged. from the character of the ground, little, however, was effected. the enemy fought with obstinate courage, and repulsed every assault. the battle raged until after nightfall, when the federal army continued to retreat. these actions were the most important, and in both the confederates had failed to effect any important results. even jackson, who had been delayed, by the destruction of the chickahominy bridges, in crossing to the south bank from the vicinity of cold harbor, and had followed in rear of the rest of the army, found himself checked by general mcclellan's admirable disposition for the protection of his rear. jackson made every effort to strike a decisive blow at the federal rear in the white-oak swamp, but he found a bridge in his front destroyed, the enemy holding the opposite side in strong force, and, when he endeavored to force a passage, the determined fire from their artillery rendered it impossible for him to do so. general mcclellan had thus foiled the generalship of lee, and the hard fighting of stonewall jackson. his excellent military judgement had defeated every attempt made to crush him. on the 1st of july he had successfully passed the terrible swamp, in spite of all his enemies, and his army was drawn up on the wellnigh impregnable heights of malvern hill. a last struggle took place at malvern hill, and the confederate assault failed at all points. owing to the wooded nature of the ground, and the absence of accurate information in regard to it, the attack was made under very great difficulties and effected nothing. the federal troops resisted courageously, and inflicted heavy loss upon the assailing force, which advanced to the muzzles of the federal cannon, but did not carry the heights; and at nightfall the battle ceased, the confederates having suffered a severe repulse. on the next morning, general mcclellan had disappeared toward harrison's landing, to which he conducted his army safely, without further molestation, and the long and bitter struggle was over. v. richmond in danger--lee's views. we have presented a sufficiently full narrative of the great battles of the chickahominy to enable the reader to form his own opinion of the events, and the capacity of the two leaders who directed them. full justice has been sought to be done to the eminent military abilities of general mcclellan, and the writer is not conscious that he has done more than justice to general lee. lee has not escaped criticism, and was blamed by many persons for not putting an end to the federal army on the retreat through white-oak swamp. to this criticism, it may be said in reply, that putting an end to nearly or quite one hundred thousand men is a difficult undertaking; and that in one instance, at least, the failure of one of his subordinates in arriving promptly, reversed his plans at the most critical moment of the struggle. general lee himself, however, states the main cause of failure: "under ordinary circumstances," he says, "the federal army should have been destroyed. its escape is due to the causes already stated. prominent among them is the want of timely and correct information. this fact, attributed chiefly to the character of the country, enabled general mcclellan skilfully to conceal his retreat, and to add much to the obstruction with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns. but regret that more was not accomplished, gives way to gratitude to the sovereign ruler of the universe for the results achieved." the reader will form his own opinion whether lee was or was not to blame for this want of accurate information, which would seem, however, to be justly attributable to the war department at richmond, rather than to an officer who had been assigned to command only three or four weeks before. other criticisms of lee referred to his main plan of operations, and the danger to which he exposed richmond by leaving only twenty-five thousand men in front of it, when he began his movement against general mcclellan's right wing, beyond the chickahominy. general magruder, who commanded this force of twenty-five thousand men left to guard the capital, expressed afterward, in his official report, his views of the danger to which the city had been exposed. he wrote: "from the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to this side of the chickahominy, and destroyed the bridges, to the moment of his evacuation, that is, from friday night until saturday morning, i considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. the larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the chickahominy. the bridges had been all destroyed; but one was rebuilt--the new bridge--which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns from goulding's; and there were but twenty-five thousand men between his army of one hundred thousand and richmond.... had mcclellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at austerlitz under similar circumstances by the greatest captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about richmond, and consequently the city, might have been his reward. his failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent." to this portion of general magruder's report general lee appended the following "remarks" in forwarding it: "general magruder is under a misapprehension as to the separation of troops operating on the north side of the chickahominy from those under himself and general huger on the south side. he refers to this subject on pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of his report. "the troops on the two sides of the river were only separated until we succeeded in occupying the position near what is known as new bridge, which occurred before twelve o'clock m. on friday, june 27th, and before the attack on the enemy at gaines's mill. "from the time we reached the position referred to, i regarded communication between the two wings of our army as reã«stablished. "the bridge referred to, and another about three-quarters of a mile above, were ordered to be repaired before noon on friday, and the new bridge was sufficiently rebuilt to be passed by artillery on friday night, and the one above it was used for the passage of wagons, ambulances, and troops, early on saturday morning. "besides this, all other bridges above new bridge, and all the fords above that point, were open to us." to this general magruder subsequently responded as follows: "new bridge was finished on friday evening, the 27th, instead of saturday, 28th of june. "i wrote from memory in reference to the time of its being finished. "it was reported to me that the bridge three-quarters of a mile above was attempted to be crossed by troops (i think ransom's brigade), on saturday morning, from the south to the north side, but that, finding the bridge or the approach to it difficult, they came down and crossed at new bridge on the same morning. "my statement in regard to these bridges was not intended as a criticism on general lee's plan, but to show the position of the troops, with a view to the proper understanding of my report, and to prove that the enemy might have reasonably entertained a design, after concentrating his troops, to march on richmond." we shall not detain the reader by entering upon a full discussion of the interesting question here raised. general lee, as his observations on general magruder's report show, did not regard richmond as exposed to serious danger, and was confident of his ability to recross the chickahominy and go to its succor in the event of an attack on the city by general mcclellan. had this prompt recrossing of the stream here, even, been impracticable, it may still be a question whether general lee did not, in his movement against the federal right wing with the bulk of his army, follow the dictates of sound generalship. in war, something must be risked, and occasions arise which render it necessary to disregard general maxims. it is one of the first principles of military science that a commander should always keep open his line of retreat; but the moment may come when his best policy is to burn the bridges behind him. of lee's movement against general mcclellan's right, it may be said that it was based on the broadest good sense and the best generalship. the situation of affairs rendered an attack in some quarter essential to the safety of the capital, which was about to be hemmed in on all sides. to attack the left of general mcclellan, promised small results. it had been tried and had failed; his right alone remained. it was possible, certainly, that he would mass his army, and, crushing magruder, march into richmond; but it was not probable that he would make the attempt. the federal commander was known to be a soldier disposed to caution rather than audacity. the small amount of force under general magruder was a secret which he could not be expected to know. that general lee took these facts into consideration, as general magruder intimates, may or may not have been the fact; and the whole discussion may be fairly summed up, perhaps, by saying that success vindicated the course adopted. "success, after all, is the test of merit," said the brave albert sydney johnston, and talleyrand compressed much sound reasoning in the pithy maxim, "nothing succeeds like success." on the 2d of july the campaign was over, and general mcclellan must have felt, in spite of his hopeful general orders to the troops, and dispatches to his government, that the great struggle for richmond had virtually ended. a week before, he had occupied a position within a few miles of the city, with a numerous army in the highest spirits, and of thorough efficiency. now, he lay on the banks of james river, thirty miles away from the capital, and his army was worn out by the tremendous ordeal it had passed through, and completely discouraged. we have not dwelt upon the horrors of the retreat, and the state of the army, which northern writers painted at the time in the gloomiest colors. for the moment, it was no longer the splendid war-engine it had been, and was again afterward. nothing could be done with it, and general mcclellan knew the fact. without fresh troops, a renewed advance upon richmond was a mere dream. no further attack was made by general lee, who remained for some days inactive in the hot forests of charles city. his reasons for refraining from a new assault on general mcclellan are summed up in one or two sentences of his report: "the federal commander," he says, "immediately began to fortify his position, which was one of great natural strength, flanked on each side by a creek, and the approach to his front commanded by the heavy guns of his shipping, in addition to those mounted in his intrenchments. it was deemed inexpedient to attack him, and in view of the condition of our troops, who had been marching and fighting almost incessantly for seven days under the most trying circumstances, it was determined to withdraw, in order to afford them the repose of which they stood so much in need." on the 8th of july, general lee accordingly directed his march back toward richmond, and the troops went into camp and rested. vi. lee and mcclellan--their identity of opinion. general lee had thus, at the outset of his career, as commander of the confederate army, saved the capital by a blow at the enemy as sudden as it was resistless. the class of persons who are never satisfied, and delight in fault-finding under all circumstances, declared that a great general would have crushed the enemy on their retreat; these certainly were in a minority; the people at large greeted lee as the author of a great deliverance worked out for them, and, on his return to richmond, he was received with every mark of gratitude and honor. he accepted this public ovation with the moderation and dignity which characterized his demeanor afterward, under all circumstances, either of victory or defeat. it was almost impossible to discover in his bearing at this time, as on other great occasions, any evidences whatever of elation. success, like disaster, seemed to find him calm, collected, and as nearly unimpressible as is possible for a human being. the character of the man led him to look upon success or failure with this supreme composure, which nothing seemed able to shake; but in july, 1862, he probably understood that the confederate states were still as far as ever from having achieved the objects of the war. general mcclellan had been defeated in battle, but the great resources of the united states government would enable it promptly to put other and larger armies in the field. even the defeated army was still numerous and dangerous, for it consisted, according to mcclellan's report, of nearly or quite ninety thousand men; and the wise brain of its commander had devised a plan of future operations which promised far greater results than the advance on richmond from the chickahominy. we shall touch, in passing, on this interesting subject, but shall first ask the reader's attention to a communication addressed, by general mcclellan, at this time to president lincoln. it is one of those papers which belong to history, and should be placed upon record. it not only throws the clearest light on the character and views of general lee's great adversary, but expresses with admirable lucidity the sentiments of a large portion of the federal people at the time. the president had invited a statement of general mcclellan's views on the conduct of the war, and on july 7th, in the very midst of the scenes of disaster at harrison's landing, mcclellan wrote these statesmanlike words: "this rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles know to christian civilization. it should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any state in any event. it should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organization. neither confiscation of property, political executions, territorial organizations of states, nor forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. in prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. slaves contraband under the act of congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. the right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave-labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. "this principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves of a particular state, thus working manumission in such state; and in missouri, perhaps in western virginia also, and possibly even in maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. "a system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the almighty. "unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. a declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. "the policy of the government must be supported by concentrations of military power. the national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the confederate states. those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist. "in carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army--one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. i do not ask that place for myself. i am willing to serve you in such positions as you may assign me, and i will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. i may be on the brink of eternity, and, as i hope forgiveness from my maker, i have written this letter with sincerity toward you, and from love for my country." this noble and earnest exposition of his opinion, upon the proper mode of conducting the war, will reflect honor upon general mcclellan when his military achievements are forgotten. it discusses the situation of affairs, both from the political and military point of view, in a spirit of the broadest statesmanship, and with the acumen of a great soldier. that it had no effect, is the clearest indication upon which the war was thenceforward to be conducted. the removal of general mcclellan, as holding views opposed to the party in power, is said to have resulted from this communication. it certainly placed him in open antagonism to general halleck, the federal secretary of war, and, as this antagonism had a direct effect upon even connected with the subject of our memoir, we shall briefly relate now it was now displayed. defeated on the chickahominy, and seeing little to encourage an advance, on the left bank of the james, upon richmond, general mcclellan proposed to cross that river and operate against the capital and its communications, near petersburg. the proof of mcclellan's desire to undertake this movement, which afterward proved so successful under general grant, is found in a memorandum, by general halleck himself, of what took place on a visit paid by him to mcclellan, at harrison's landing, on july 25, 1862. "i stated to him," says general halleck, "that the object of my visit was to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future operations. he said that he proposed to cross the james river at that point, attack petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by that route south, making no further demonstration for the present against richmond. i stated to him very frankly my views in regard to the manner and impracticability of the plan;" and nothing further, it seems, was said of this highly "impracticable" plan of operations. it became practicable afterward under general grant; mcclellan was not permitted to essay it in july, 1862, from the fact that it had been resolved to relieve him from command, or from general halleck's inability to perceive its good sense. general lee's views upon this subject coincided completely with those of general mcclellan. he expressed at this time, to those in his confidence, the opinion that richmond could be assailed to greater advantage from the south, as a movement of the enemy in that direction would menace her communications with the gulf states; and events subsequently proved the soundness of this view. attacks from all other quarters failed, including a repetition by general grant of mcclellan's attempt from the side of the chickahominy. when general grant carried out his predecessor's plan of assailing the city from the direction of petersburg, he succeeded in putting an end to the war. part iv. _the war advances northward_ i. lee's protest. general lee remained in front of richmond, watching general mcclellan, but intelligence soon reached him from the upper rappahannock that another army was advancing in that quarter, and had already occupied the county of culpepper, with the obvious intention of capturing gordonsville, the point of junction of the orange and alexandria and virginia central railroads, and advancing thence upon richmond. the great defeat on the chickahominy had only inspired the federal authorities with new energy. three hundred thousand new troops were called for, large bounties were held out as an inducement to enlistment, negro-slaves in regions occupied by the united states armies were directed to be enrolled as troops, and military commanders were authorized to seize upon whatever was "necessary or convenient for their commands," without compensation to the owners. this indicated the policy upon which it was now intended to conduct the war, and the army occupying culpepper proceeded to carry out the new policy in every particular. this force consisted of the troops which had served under generals banks, mcdowell, and fremont--a necleus--and reã«nforcements from the army of mcclellan, together with the troops under general burnside, were hastening to unite with the newly-formed army. it was styled the "army of virginia," and was placed under command of major-general john pope, who had hitherto served in the west. general pope had procured the command, it is said, by impressing the authorities with a high opinion of his energy and activity. in these qualities, general mcclellan was supposed to be deficient; and the new commander, coming from a region where the war was conducted on a different plan, it was said, would be able to infuse new life into the languid movements in virginia. general pope had taken special pains to allay the fears of the federal authorities for the safety of washington. he intended to "lie off on the flanks" of lee's army, he said, and render it impossible for the rebels to advance upon the capital while he occupied that threatening position. when asked if, with an army like general mcclellan's, he would find any difficulty in marching through the south to new orleans, general pope replied without hesitation, "i should suppose not." this confident view of things seems to have procured general pope his appointment, and it will soon be seen that he proceeded to conduct military operations upon principles very different from those announced by general mcclellan. war, as carried on by general pope, was to be war _ã  l'outrance._ general mcclellan had written: "the war should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces ... all private property, taken for military use, should be paid for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked." the new commander intended to act upon a very different principle, and to show that he possessed more activity and resolution than his predecessor. general pope's assumption of the command was signalized by much pomp and animated general orders. he arrived in a train decked out with streamers, and issued an order in which he said to the troops: "i desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which i am sorry to find much in vogue among you. i hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them, _of lines of retreat and bases of supplies_. let us discard such ideas. the strongest position which a soldier should desire to occupy is the one from which he can most easily advance upon the enemy. let us study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, _and leave our own to take care of itself. let us look before, and not behind. disaster and shame look in the rear_." the result, as will be seen, furnished a grotesque commentary upon that portion of general pope's order which we have italicized. in an address to the army, he added further: "i have come to you from the west, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies--from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when found--where policy has been attack, and not defence. i presume i have been called here to pursue the same system." such was the tenor of general pope's orders on assuming command--orders which were either intended seriously as an announcement of his real intentions, or as a blind to persuade the confederates that his force was large. unfortunately for the region in which he now came to operate, general pope did not confine himself to these flourishes of rhetoric. he proceeded to inaugurate a military policy in vivid contrast to general mcclellan's. his "expatriation orders" directed that all male citizens disloyal to the united states should be immediately arrested; the oath of allegiance to the united states government should be proffered them, and, "if they furnished sufficient security for its observance," they should be set free again. if they refused the oath, they should be sent beyond the federal lines; and, if afterward found within his lines, they should be treated as spies, "and shot, their property to be seized and applied to the public use." all communication with persons living within the southern lines was forbidden; such communication should subject the individual guilty of it to be treated as _a spy_. lastly, general pope's subordinates were directed to arrest prominent citizens, and hold them as hostages for the good behavior of the population. if his soldiers were "bushwhacked"--that is to say, attacked on their foraging expeditions--the prominent citizens thus held as hostages were to _suffer death_. it is obvious that war carried on upon such principles is rapine. general pope ventured, however, upon the new programme; and a foreign periodical, commenting upon the result, declared that this commander had prosecuted hostilities against the south "in a way that cast mankind two centuries back toward barbarism." we shall not pause to view the great outrages committed by the federal troops in culpepper. they have received thus much comment rather to introduce the following communication to the federal authorities, from general lee, than to record what is known now to the old world as well as the new. profoundly outraged and indignant at these cruel and oppressive acts, general lee, by direction of the confederate authorities, addressed, on the 2d of august, the following note to general halleck: headquarters army of the c.s., / near richmond, va., _august_ 2, 1862.; _to the general commanding the u.s. army, washington_: general: in obedience to the order of his excellency, the president of the confederate states, i have the honor to make you the following communication: on the 22d of july last a cartel for a general exchange of prisoners was signed by major-general john a. dix, on behalf of the united states, and by major-general d.h. hill, on the part of this government. by the terms of that cartel it is stipulated that all prisoners of war hereafter taken shall be discharged on parole until exchanged. scarcely had the cartel been signed, when the military authorities of the united states commenced a practice changing the character of the war, from such as becomes civilized nations, into a campaign of indiscriminate robbery and murder. a general order issued by the secretary of war of the united states, in the city of washington, on the very day that the cartel was signed in virginia, directs the military commanders of the united states to take the property of our people, for the convenience and use of the army, without compensation. a general order issued by major-general pope, on the 23d of july last, the day after the date of the cartel, directs the murder of our peaceful citizens as spies, if found quietly tilling their farms in his rear, even outside of his lines. and one of his brigadier-generals, steinwehr, has seized innocent and peaceful inhabitants, to be held as hostages, to the end that they may be murdered in cold blood if any of his soldiers are killed by some unknown persons whom he designates as "bushwhackers." some of the military authorities seem to suppose that their end will be better attained by a savage war in which no quarter is to be given, and no age or sex is to be spared, than by such hostilities as are alone recognized to be lawful in modern times. we find ourselves driven by our enemies by steady progress toward a practice which we abhor, and which we are vainly struggling to avoid. under these circumstances, this government has issued the accompanying general order, which i am directed by the president to transmit to you, recognizing major-general pope and his commissioned officers to be in the position which they have chosen for themselves--that of robbers and murderers, and not that of public enemies, entitled, if captured, to be treated as prisoners of war. the president also instructs me to inform you that we renounce our right of retaliation on the innocent, and will continue to treat the private soldiers of general pope's army as prisoners of war; but if, after notice to your government that they confine repressive measures to the punishment of commissioned officers who are willing to participate in these crimes, the savage practices threatened in the orders alluded to be persisted in, we shall reluctantly be forced to the last resort of accepting the war on the terms chosen by our enemies, until the voice of an outraged humanity shall compel a respect for the recognized usages of war. while the president considers that the facts referred to would justify a refusal on our part to execute the cartel by which we have agreed to liberate an excess of prisoners of war in our hands, a sacred regard for plighted faith, which shrinks from the semblance of breaking a promise, precludes a resort to such an extremity, nor is it his desire to extend to any other forces of the united states the punishment merited by general pope and such commissioned officers as choose to participate in the execution of his infamous order. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, r.e. lee, _general commanding_. this communication requires no comment. it had the desired effect, although general halleck returned it as couched in language too insulting to be received. on the 15th of august, the united states war department so far disapproved of general pope's orders as to direct that "no officer or soldier might, without proper authority, leave his colors or ranks to take private property, or to enter a private house for the purpose, under penalty of death." ii. lee's manoeuvres. general pope had promptly advanced, and his army lay in culpepper, the right reaching toward the blue ridge, and the left extending nearly to the rapidan. the campaign now became a contest of brains between lee and the federal authorities. their obvious aim was to leave him in doubt whether a new advance was intended under mcclellan from james river, or the real movement was to be against richmond from the north. under these circumstances, general lee remained with the bulk of his army in front of richmond; but, on the 13th of july, sent jackson with two divisions in the direction of gordonsville. the game of wits had thus begun, and general lee moved cautiously, looking in both directions, toward james river and the upper rappahannock. as yet the real design of the enemy was undeveloped. the movement of general pope might or might not be a real advance. but general mcclellan remained inactive, and, on the 27th of july, a.p. hill's division was sent up to reã«nforce jackson--while, at the same time, general d.h. hill, commanding a force on the south bank of the james river, was directed to make demonstrations against mcclellan's communications by opening fire on his transports. the moment approached now when the game between the two adversaries was to be decided. on the 2d of august, jackson assumed the offensive, by attacking the enemy at orange court-house; and, on the 5th, general mcclellan made a prompt demonstration to prevent lee from sending him further reinforcements. a large federal force advanced to malvern hill, and was drawn up there in line of battle, with every indication on the part of general mcclellan of an intention to advance anew upon richmond. lee promptly went to meet him, and a slight engagement ensued on curl's neck. but, on the next morning, the federal army had disappeared, and the whole movement was seen to have been a feint. this state of indecision continued until nearly the middle of august. an incident then occurred which clearly indicated the enemy's intentions. general burnside was known to have reached hampton roads from the southern coast with a considerable force, and the direction which his flotilla now took would show the design of the federal authorities. if a new advance was intended from the james, the flotilla would ascend that river; if general pope's army was looked to for the real movement, general burnside would go in that direction. the secret was discovered by the afterward celebrated colonel john s. mosby, then a private, and just returned, by way of fortress monroe, from prison in washington. he ascertained, when he disembarked, that burnside's flotilla was about to move toward the rappahannock, and, aware of the importance of the information, hastened to communicate it to general lee. he was admitted, at the headquarters of the latter near richmond, to a private interview, and when general lee had finished his conversation with the plain-looking individual, then almost unknown, he was in possession of the information necessary to determine his plans. the rappahannock, and not the james, was seen to be the theatre of the coming campaign, and general lee's whole attention was now directed to that quarter. jackson had already struck an important blow there, coã¶perating vigorously, as was habitual with him, in the general plan of action. general mcclellan had endeavored by a feint to hold lee at richmond. by a battle now, jackson hastened the retreat of the army under mcclellan from james river. with his three divisions, jackson crossed the rapidan, and, on the 9th of august, attacked the advance force of general pope at cedar mountain. the struggle was obstinate, and at one time jackson's left was driven back, but the action terminated at nightfall in the retreat of the federal forces, and the confederate commander remained in possession of the field. he was too weak, however, to hold his position against the main body of the federal army, which was known to be approaching; he accordingly recrossed the rapidan to the vicinity of gordonsville, and here he was soon afterward joined by general lee, with the great bulk of the confederate army. such were the events which succeeded the battles of the chickahominy, transferring hostilities to a new theatre, and inaugurating the great campaigns of the summer and autumn of 1862 in northern virginia and maryland. iii. lee advances from the rapidan. general lee, it will thus be seen, had proceeded in his military manoeuvres with the utmost caution, determined to give his adversaries no advantage, and remain in front of the capital until it was free from all danger. but for the daring assault upon general mcclellan, on the chickahominy, his critics would no doubt have charged him with weakness and indecision now; but, under any circumstances, it is certain that he would have proceeded in the same manner, conducting operations in the method which his judgment approved. at length the necessity of caution had disappeared. general burnside had gone to reã«nforce general pope, and a portion of mcclellan's army was believed to have followed. "it therefore seemed," says general lee, "that active operations on the james were no longer contemplated," and he wisely concluded that "the most effectual way to relieve richmond from any danger of attack from that quarter would be to reã«nforce general jackson, and advance upon general pope." in commenting upon these words, an able writer of the north exclaims: "veracious prophecy, showing that _insight_ which is one of the highest marks of generalship!" the movement, indeed, was the right proceeding, as the event showed; and good generalship may be defined to be the power of seeing what is the proper course, and the decision of character which leads to its adoption. general lee exhibited throughout his career this mingled good judgment and daring, and his cautious inactivity was now succeeded by one of those offensive movements which, if we may judge him, by his subsequent career, seemed to be the natural bent of his character. with the bulk of his army, he marched in the direction of general pope; the rest were speedily ordered to follow, and active operations began for driving the newly-formed federal "army of virginia" back toward washington. we have presented lee's order for the attack on general mcclellan, and here quote his order of march for the advance against general pope, together with a note addressed to stuart, commanding his cavalry, for that officer's guidance. headquarters army northern virginia, _august_ 19, 1862. special order no. 185. i. general longstreet's command, constituting the right wing of the army, will cross the rapidan at raccoon ford, and move in the direction of culpepper court-house. general jackson's command, constituting the left wing, will cross at summerville ford, and move in the same direction, keeping on the left of general longstreet. general anderson's division will cross at summerville ford, follow the route of general jackson, and act in reserve. the battalion of light artillery, under colonel s.d. lee, will take the same route. the cavalry, under general stuart, will cross at morton's ford, pursue the route by stevensburg to rappahannock station, destroy the railroad bridge, cut the enemy's communications, telegraph line, and, operating toward culpepper court-house, will take position on general longstreet's right. ii. the commanders of each wing will designate the reserve for their commands. medical and ammunition wagons will alone follow the troops across the rapidan. the baggage and supply trains will be parked under their respective officers, in secure positions on the south side, so as not to embarrass the different roads. iii. cooked rations for three days will be carried in the haversacks of the men, and provision must be made for foraging the animals. straggling from the ranks is strictly prohibited, and commanders will make arrangements to secure and punish the offenders. iv. the movements herein directed will commence to-morrow, 20th instant, at dawn of day. by command of general r.e. lee: a.p. mason, _a.a. g_. headquarters crenshaw's farm,} _august_ 19, 1862.} _general j.e.b. stuart, commanding cavalry_: general: i desire you to rest your men to-day, refresh your horses, prepare rations and every thing for the march to-morrow. get what information you can of fords, roads, and position of the enemy, so that your march can be made understandingly and with vigor. i send to you captain mason, an experienced bridge-builder, etc., whom i think will be able to aid you in the destruction of the bridge, etc. when that is accomplished, or when in train of execution, as circumstances permit, i wish you to operate back toward culpepper court-house, creating such confusion and consternation as you can, without unnecessarily exposing your men, till you feel longstreet's right. take position there on his right, and hold yourself in reserve, and act as circumstances may require. i wish to know during the day how you proceed in your preparations. they will require the personal attention of all your officers. the last reports from the signal-stations yesterday evening were, that the enemy was breaking up his principal encampments, and moving in direction of culpepper court-house. very respectfully, etc., r.e. lee, _general_. these orders indicate general lee's design--to reach the left flank of the enemy, prevent his retreat by destroying the bridges on the rappahannock, and bring him to battle in the neighborhood of culpepper court-house. the plan failed in consequence of a delay of two days, which took place in its execution--a delay, attributed at that time, we know not with what justice, to the unnecessarily deliberate movements of the corps commanded by general longstreet. this delay enabled the enemy to gain information of the intended movement; and when general lee advanced on the 20th of august, instead of on the 18th, as he had at first determined to do, it was found that general pope had broken up his camps, and was in rapid retreat. lee followed, and reached the rappahannock only to find that the federal army had passed that stream. general pope, who had promised to conduct none but offensive operations, and never look to the rear, had thus hastened to interpose the waters of the rappahannock between himself and his adversary, and, when general lee approached, he found every crossing of the river heavily defended by the federal infantry and artillery. in face of this large force occupying a commanding position on the heights, general lee made no effort to cross. he determined, he says, "not to attempt the passage of the river at that point with the army," but to "seek a more favorable place to cross, higher up the river, and thus gain the enemy's right." this manoeuvre was intrusted to jackson, whose corps formed the confederate left wing. jackson advanced promptly to the warrenton springs ford, which had been selected as the point of crossing, drove away a force of the enemy posted at the place, and immediately began to pass the river with his troops. the movement was however interrupted by a severe rain-storm, which swelled the waters of the rappahannock, and rendered a further prosecution of it impracticable. general lee was thus compelled to give up that plan, and ordered jackson to withdraw the force which had crossed. this was done, and general lee was now called upon to adopt some other method of attack; or to remain inactive in face of the enemy. but to remain inactive was impossible. the army must either advance or retire; information which had just reached the confederate general rendered one of these two proceedings indispensable. the information referred to had been obtained by general stuart. the activity and energy of this officer, especially in gaining intelligence, now proved, as they proved often afterward, of the utmost importance to lee. stuart had been directed by general lee to make an attack, with a cavalry force, on the orange and alexandria railroad, in the enemy's rear; he had promptly carried out his orders by striking the federal communications at catlett's station, had destroyed there all that he found, and torn up the railroad, but, better than all, had captured a box containing official papers belonging to general pope. these papers, which stuart hastened--marching day and night, through storm and flood--to convey to general lee, presented the clearest evidence of the enemy's movements and designs. troops were hastening from every direction to reã«nforce general pope, the entire force on james river especially was to be brought rapidly north of the rappahannock, and any delay in the operations of the confederates would thus expose them to attack from the federal forces concentrated from all quarters in their front. [illustration: map--upper rappahannock] iv. jackson flanks general pope. it was thus necessary to act with decision, and general lee resolved upon a movement apparently of the most reckless character. this was to separate his army into two parts, and, while one remained confronting the enemy on the rappahannock, send the other by a long circuit to fall on the federal rear near manassas. this plan of action was opposed to the first rule of the military art, that a general should never divide his force in the face of an enemy. that lee ventured to do so on this occasion can only be explained on one hypothesis, that he did not highly esteem the military ability of his opponent. these flank attacks undoubtedly, however, possessed a great attraction for him, as they did for jackson, and, in preferring such movement, lee was probably actuated both by the character of the troops on both sides and by the nature of the country. the men of both armies were comparatively raw levies, highly susceptible to the influence of "surprise," and the appearance of an enemy on their flanks, or in their rear, was calculated to throw them into disorder. the wooded character of the theatre of war generally rendered such movements practicable, and all that was requisite was a certain amount of daring in the commander who was called upon to decide upon them. this daring lee repeatedly exhibited, and the uniform success of the movements indicates his sound generalship. to command the force which was now to go on the perilous errand of striking general pope's rear, general lee selected jackson, who had exhibited such promptness and decision in the campaigns of the valley of virginia. rapidity of movement was necessary above all things, and, if any one could be relied upon for that, it was the now famous stonewall jackson. to him the operation was accordingly intrusted, and his corps was at once put in motion. crossing the rappahannock at an almost forgotten ford, high up and out of view of the federal right, jackson pushed forward day and night toward manassas, reached thoroughfare gap, in the bull run mountain, west of that place, passed through, and completely destroyed the great mass of supplies in the federal depot at manassas. the whole movement had been made with such rapidity, and general stuart, commanding the cavalry, had so thoroughly guarded the flank of the advancing column from observation, that manassas was a mass of smoking ruins almost before general pope was aware of the real danger. intelligence soon reached him, however, of the magnitude of the blow aimed by lee, and, hastily breaking up his camps on the rappahannock, he hurried to attack the force assailing his communications. the first part of general lee's plan had thus fully succeeded. general pope, who had occupied every ford of the rappahannock, so as to render the passage difficult, if not impossible, had disappeared suddenly, to go and attack the enemy in his rear. general lee promptly moved in his turn, with the great corps under longstreet, and pushed toward manassas, over nearly the same road followed by jackson. [illustration: t.j. jackson] v. lee follows. the contest of generalship had now fully begun, and the brain of general lee was matched against the brain of general pope. it is no part of the design of the writer of this volume to exalt unduly the reputation of lee, and detract from the credit due his adversaries. justice has been sought to be done to general mcclellan; the same measure of justice will be dealt out to his successors on the federal side; nor is it calculated to elevate the fame of lee, to show that his opponents were incapable and inefficient. of general pope, however, it must be said that he suffered himself to be outgeneralled in every particular; and the pithy comment of general lee, that he "did not appear to be aware of his situation," sums up the whole subject. it is beyond our purpose to enter upon any thing resembling a detailed narrative of the confused and complicated movements of the various corps of the army under general pope. these have been the subject of the severest criticism by his own followers. we shall simply notice the naked events. jackson reached manassas on the night of august 26th, took it, and on the next day destroyed the great depot. general pope was hastening to protect it, but was delayed by ewell at bristoe, and a force sent up from washington, under the brave general taylor, was driven off with loss. then, having achieved his aim, jackson fell back toward sudley. if the reader will look at the map, he will now understand the exact condition of affairs. jackson had burned the federal depot of supplies, and retired before the great force hastening to rescue them. he had with him about twenty thousand men, and general pope's force was probably triple that number. thus, the point was to hold general pope at arm's-length until the arrival of lee; and, to accomplish this great end, jackson fell back beyond groveton. there he formed line of battle, and waited. it is obvious that, under these circumstances, the true policy of general pope was to obstruct thoroughfare gap, the only road by which lee could approach promptly, and then crush jackson. on the night of the 27th, general mcdowell was accordingly sent thither with forty thousand men; but general pope ordered him, on the next morning, to manassas, where he hoped to "bag the whole crowd," he said--that is to say, the force under jackson. this was the fatal mistake made by general pope. thoroughfare gap was comparatively undefended. while general pope was marching to attack jackson, who had disappeared, it was the next thing to a certainty that general lee would attack _him_. all parties were thus moving to and fro; but the confederates enjoyed the very great advantage over general pope of knowing precisely how affairs stood, and of having determined upon their own plan of operations. jackson, with his back to the mountain, was waiting for lee. lee was approaching rapidly, to unite the two halves of his army. general pope, meanwhile, was marching and countermarching, apparently ignorant of the whereabouts of jackson,[1] general lee, in personal command of longstreet's corps, reached the western end of thoroughfare gap about sunset, on the 28th, and the sound of artillery from the direction of groveton indicated that jackson and general pope had come in collision. jackson had himself brought on this engagement by attacking the flank of one of general pope's various columns, as it marched across his front, over the warrenton road, and this was the origin of the sound wafted to general lee's ears as he came in sight of thoroughfare. it was certainly calculated to excite his nerves if they were capable of being excited. jackson was evidently engaged, and the disproportion between his forces and those of general pope rendered such an engagement extremely critical. lee accordingly pressed forward, reached the gap, and the advance force suddenly halted: the gap was defended. the federal force posted here, at the eastern opening of the gap, was small, and wholly inadequate for the purpose; but this was as yet unknown to general lee. his anxiety under these circumstances must have been great. jackson might be crushed before his arrival. he rode up to the summit of the commanding hill which rises just west of the gap, and dismounting directed his field-glass toward the shaggy defile in front. [footnote 1: "not knowing at the time where was the enemy."--_general porter_.] and undecided what course to pursue. [illustration: lee reconnoitring at throughfare gap.] the writer of these pages chanced to be near the confederate commander at this moment, and was vividly impressed by the air of unmoved calmness which marked his countenance and demeanor. nothing in the expression of his face, and no hurried movement, indicated excitement or anxiety. here, as on many other occasions, lee impressed the writer as an individual gifted with the most surprising faculty of remaining cool and unaffected in the midst of circumstances calculated to arouse the most phlegmatic. after reconnoitring for some moments without moving, he closed his glass slowly, as though he were buried in reflection, and deliberating at his leisure, and, walking back slowly to his horse, mounted and rode down the hill. the attack was not delayed, and flanking columns were sent to cross north of the gap and assail the enemy's rear. but the assault in front was successful. the small force of the enemy at the eastern opening of the gap retired, and, by nine o'clock at night, general longstreet's corps was passing through. all the next morning (august 29th), longstreet's troops were coming into position on the right of jackson, under the personal supervision of lee. by noon the line of battle was formed.[1] lee's army was once more united. general pope had not been able to crush less than one-half that army, for twenty-four hours nearly in his clutches, and it did not seem probable that he would meet with greater success, now that the whole was concentrated and held in the firm hand of lee. [footnote 1: the hour of longstreet's arrival has been strangely a subject of discussion. the truth is stated in the reports of lee, longstreet, jones, and other officers. but general pope was ignorant of longstreet's presence _at five in the evening_; and general porter, his subordinate, was dismissed from the army for not at that hour attacking jackson's right, declared by general pope to be undefended. longstreet was in line of battle by noon.] vi. the second battle of manassas. lee's order of battle for the coming action was peculiar. it resembled an open v, with the opening toward the enemy--jackson's corps forming the left wing, and extending from near sudley, to a point in rear of the small village of groveton, longstreet's corps forming the right wing, and reaching from jackson's right to and beyond the warrenton road which runs to stonebridge. the field of battle was nearly identical with that of july 21, 1861. the only difference was, that the confederates occupied the ground formerly held by the federal troops, and that the latter attacked, as johnston and beauregard had attacked, from the direction of manassas, and the tableland around the well-known henry house. the southern order of battle seems to have contemplated a movement on one or both of general pope's flanks while he attacked in front. an assault on either wing would expose him to danger from the other, and it will be seen that the fate of the battle was decided by this judicious arrangement of the confederate commander. the action began a little after noon, when the federal right, consisting of the troops of generals banks, sigel, and others, advanced and made a vigorous attack on jackson's left, under a.p. hill. an obstinate conflict ensued, the opposing lines fighting almost bayonet to bayonet, "delivering their volleys into each other at the distance of ten paces." at the first charge, an interval between two of hill's brigades was penetrated by the enemy, and that wing of jackson's corps was in great danger of being driven back. this disaster was, however, prevented by the prompt stand made by two or three regiments; the enemy was checked, and a prompt counter-charge drove the federal assaulting columns back into the woods. the attempt to break jackson's line at this point was not, however, abandoned. the federal troops returned again and again to the encounter, and general hill reported "six separate and distinct assaults" made upon him. they were all repulsed, in which important assistance was rendered by general early. that brave officer attacked with vigor, and, aided by the fire of the confederate artillery from the elevated ground in jackson's rear, drove the enemy before him with such slaughter that one of their regiments is said to have carried back but three men. this assault of the enemy had been of so determined a character, that general lee, in order to relieve his left, had directed hood and evans, near his centre, to advance and attack the left of the assaulting column. hood was about to do so, when he found a heavy force advancing to charge his own line. a warm engagement followed, which resulted in the repulse of the enemy, and hood followed them a considerable distance, inflicting heavy loss. it was now nearly nine o'clock at night, and the darkness rendered further operations impossible. the troops which had driven the enemy were recalled from their advanced position, the southern line was reformed on the same ground occupied at the commencement of the action, and general lee prepared for the more decisive struggle of the next day. morning came (august 30th), but all the forenoon passed without a resumption of the battle. each of the adversaries seemed to await some movement on the part of the other, and the federal commander made heavy feints against both the confederate right and left, with the view of discovering some weak point, or of inducing lee to lay himself open to attack. these movements had, however, no effect. lee remained obstinately in his strong position, rightly estimating the advantage it gave him, and no doubt taking into consideration the want of supplies general pope must labor under, a deficiency which rendered a prompt assault on his part indispensable. the armies thus remained in face of each other, without serious efforts upon either side, until nearly or quite the hour of three in the afternoon. general pope then resumed the assault on lee's left, under jackson, with his best troops. the charge was furious, and a bloody struggle ensued; but jackson succeeded in repulsing the force. it fell back in disorder, but was succeeded by a second and a third line, which rushed forward at the "double-quick," in a desperate attempt to break the southern line. these new attacks were met with greater obstinacy than at first, and, just as the opponents had closed in, a heavy fire was directed against the federal column by colonel s.d. lee, commanding the artillery at lee's centre. this fire, which was of the most rapid and destructive character, struck the enemy in front and flank at once, and seemed to sweep back the charging brigades as they came. the fire of the cannon was then redoubled, and jackson's line advanced with cheers. before this charge, the federal line broke, and jackson pressed forward, allowing them no respite. general lee then threw forward longstreet, who, knowing what was expected of him, was already moving. the enemy were pressed thus in front and on their flank, as lee had no doubt intended, in forming his peculiar line. the corps of jackson and longstreet closed in like two iron arms; the federal forces were driven from position to position; the glare of their cannon, more and more distant, indicated that they had abandoned further contest, and at ten at night the darkness put an end to the battle and pursuit. general pope was retreating with his defeated forces toward washington. on the next day, lee dispatched jackson to turn centreville and cut off the retreat of general pope. the result was a severe engagement near germantown, which was put an end to by a violent storm. general pope, now reã«nforced by the commands of generals sumner and franklin, had been enabled to hold his ground until night. when, on the next day (september 2d), the confederates advanced to fairfax court-house, it was found that the entire federal army was in rapid retreat upon washington. such had been the fate of general pope. part v. _lee invades maryland_. i. his designs. the defeat of general pope opened the way for movements not contemplated, probably, by general lee, when he marched from richmond to check the advance in culpepper. his object at that time was doubtless simply to arrest the forward movement of the new force threatening gordonsville. now, however, the position of the pieces on the great chess-board of war had suddenly changed, and it was obviously lee's policy to extract all the advantage possible from the new condition of things. he accordingly determined to advance into maryland--the fortifications in front of washington, and the interposition of the potomac, a broad stream easily defended, rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. on the 3d of september, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army, which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching and fighting since it had left the rapidan, general lee moved toward leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to the music of the bands playing the popular air, "maryland, my maryland," advanced to frederick city, which he occupied on the 7th of september. lee's object in invading maryland has been the subject of much discussion, one party holding the view that his sole aim was to surround and capture a force of nine or ten thousand federal troops stationed at harper's ferry; and another party maintaining that he proposed an invasion of pennsylvania as far as the susquehanna, intending to fight a decisive battle there, and advance thereafter upon philadelphia, baltimore, or washington. the course pursued by an army commander is largely shaped by the progress of events. it can only be said that general lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words. his object was to draw the federal forces out of virginia first. the movement culminating in the victory over the enemy at manassas had produced the effect of paralyzing them in every quarter. on the coast of north carolina, in western virginia, and in the shenandoah valley, had been heard the echo of the great events in middle and northern virginia. general burnside's force had been brought up from the south, leaving affairs at a stand-still in that direction; and, contemporaneously with the retreat of general pope, the federal forces at washington and beyond had fallen back to the potomac. this left the way open, and lee's farther advance, it was obvious, would now completely clear virginia of her invaders. the situation of affairs, and the expected results, are clearly stated by general lee: "the war was thus transferred," he says, "from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible to our army. to prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict other injury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be the transfer of the army into maryland." the state of things in maryland was another important consideration. that great commonwealth was known to be sectionally divided in its sentiment toward the federal government, the eastern portion adhering generally to the side of the south, and the western portion generally to the federal side. but, even as high up as frederick, it was hoped that the southern cause would find adherents and volunteers to march under the confederate banner. if this portion of the population had only the opportunity to choose their part, unterrified by federal bayonets, it was supposed they would decide for the south. in any event, the movement would be important. the condition of affairs in maryland, general lee says, "encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the washington government to retain all its available force to provide for contingencies which its course toward the people of that state gave it reason to apprehend," and to cross the potomac "might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty." it may be said, in summing up on this point, that lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the federal government, and the army certainly shared this expectation. the identity of sentiment generally between the people of the states of maryland and virginia, and their strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result afterward was extremely bitter. such were the first designs of lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. by advancing into maryland and threatening baltimore and washington, he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops from the south bank of the potomac, where they menaced the confederate communications with richmond; when this was accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross the maryland extension of the blue ridge, called there the south mountain, advance by way of hagerstown into the cumberland valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies, while his own communications would remain open by way of the shenandoah valley. this was essentially the same plan pursued in the campaign of 1863, which terminated in the battle of gettysburg. general lee's movements now indicated similar intentions. he doubtless wished, in the first place, to compel the enemy to pursue him--then to lead them as far as was prudent--and then, if circumstances were favorable, bring them to decisive battle, success in which promised to open for him the gates of washington or baltimore, and end the war. it will now be seen how the delay caused by the movement of jackson against harper's ferry, and the discovery by general mcclellan of the entire arrangement devised by lee for that purpose, caused the failure of this whole ulterior design. [illustration: map--map of the maryland campaign.] ii. lee in maryland. the southern army was concentrated in the neighborhood of frederick city by the 7th of september, and on the next day general lee issued an address to the people of maryland. we have not burdened the present narrative with lee's army orders and other official papers; but the great force and dignity of this address render it desirable to present it in full: headquarters army of northern virginia,} near fredericktown, _september_ 8, 1862.} _to the people of maryland_: it is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your state, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves. the people of the confederate states have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the states of the south by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties. they have seen, with profound indignation, their sister state deprived of every right, and reduced to the condition of a conquered province. under the pretence of supporting the constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned upon no charge, and contrary to all forms of law. the faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by the venerable and illustrious marylanders--to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right in vain--was treated with scorn and contempt. the government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech have been suppressed; words have been declared offences by an arbitrary desire of the federal executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by military commission for what they may dare to speak. believing that the people of maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the south have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore independence and sovereignty to your state. in obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you, with the power of its arms, in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled. this, citizens of maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. no constraint upon your free will is intended--no intimidation will be allowed. within the limits of this army, at least, marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech. we know no enemies among you, and will protect all of every opinion. it is for you to decide your destiny, freely, and without constraint. this army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and, while the southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will. r.e. lee, _general commanding_. this address, full of grave dignity, and highly characteristic of the confederate commander, was in vivid contrast with the harsh orders of general pope in culpepper. the accents of friendship and persuasion were substituted for the "rod of iron." there would be no coercive measures; no arrests, with the alternative presented of an oath to support the south, or instant banishment. no intimidation would be permitted. in the lines of the southern army, at least, marylanders should enjoy freedom of thought and speech, and every man should "decide his destiny freely, and without constraint." this address, couched in terms of such dignity, had little effect upon the people. either their sentiment in favor of the union was too strong, or they found nothing in the condition of affairs to encourage their southern feelings. a large federal force was known to be advancing; lee's army, in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his standard, the population in general remaining hostile or neutral. the condition of the army was indeed forlorn. it was worn down by marching and fighting; the men had scarcely shoes upon their feet; and, above the tattered figures, flaunting their rags in the sunshine, were seen gaunt and begrimed faces, in which could be read little of the "romance of war." the army was in no condition to undertake an invasion; "lacking much of the material of war, feeble in transportation, poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of them destitute of shoes," is lee's description of his troops. such was the condition of the better portion of the force; on the opposite side of the potomac, scattered along the hills, could be seen a weary, ragged, hungry, and confused multitude, who had dragged along in rear of the rest, unable to keep up, and whose miserable appearance said little for the prospects of the army to which they belonged. from these and other causes resulted the general apathy of the marylanders, and lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his own men for success in his future movements. he faced that conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against the people of maryland, resolutely commenced his movements looking to the capture of harper's ferry and the invasion of pennsylvania.[1] [footnote 1: the reader will perceive that the intent to _invade_ pennsylvania is repeatedly attributed in these pages to general lee. his own expression is, "by _threatening_ pennsylvania, to induce the enemy," etc. that he designed invasion, aided by the recruits anticipated in maryland, seems unquestionable; since, even after discovering the lukewarmness of the people there by the fact that few joined his standard, he still advanced to hagerstown, but a step from the pennsylvania line. these facts have induced the present writer to attribute the design of actual invasion to lee with entire confidence; and all the circumstances seem to him to support that hypothesis.] the promises of his address had been kept. no one had been forced to follow the southern flag; and now, when the people turned their backs upon it, closing the doors of the houses in the faces of the southern troops, they remained unmolested. lee had thus given a practical proof of the sincerity of his character. he had promised nothing which he had not performed; and in maryland, as afterward in pennsylvania, in 1863, he remained firm against the temptation to adopt the harsh course generally pursued by the commanders of invading armies. he seems to have proceeded on the principle that good faith is as essential in public affairs as in private, and to have resolved that, in any event, whether of victory or disaster, his enemies should not have it in their power to say that he broke his plighted word, or acted in a manner unbecoming a christian gentleman. prompt action was now necessary. the remnants of general pope's army, greatly scattered and disorganized by the severe battle of manassas, had been rapidly reformed and brought into order again, and to this force was added a large number of new troops, hurried forward from the northern states to washington. this new army was not to be commanded by general pope, who had been weighed and found wanting in ability to contend with lee. the force was intrusted to general mcclellan, in spite of his unpopularity with the federal authorities; and the urgent manner in which he had been called upon to take the head of affairs and protect the federal capital, is the most eloquent of all commentaries upon the position which he held in the eyes of the country and the army. it was felt, indeed, by all that the federal ship was rolling in the storm, and an experienced pilot was necessary for her guidance. general mcclellan was accordingly directed, after general pope's defeat, to take command of every thing, and see to the safety of washington; and, finding himself at length at the head of an army of about one hundred thousand men, he proceeded, after the manner of a good soldier, to protect the federal capital by advancing into upper maryland in pursuit of lee. iii. movements of the two armies. general lee was already moving to the accomplishment of his designs, the capture of harper's ferry, and an advance into the cumberland valley. his plan to attain the first-mentioned object was simple, and promised to be successful. jackson was to march around by way of "williamsport and martinsburg," and thus approach from the south. a force was meanwhile to seize upon and occupy the maryland heights, a lofty spot of the mountain across the potomac, north of the ferry. in like manner, another body of troops was to cross the potomac, east of the blue ridge, and occupy the loudon heights, looking down upon harper's ferry from the east. by this arrangement the retreat of the enemy would be completely cut off in every direction. harper's ferry must be captured, and, having effected that result, the whole confederate force, detached for the purpose, was to follow the main body of this army in the direction of hagerstown, to take part in the proposed invasion of pennsylvania. this excellent plan failed, as will be seen, from no fault of the great soldier who devised it, but in consequence of unforeseen obstacles, and especially of one of those singular incidents which occasionally reverse the best-laid schemes and abruptly turn aside the currents of history. jackson and the commanders coã¶perating with him moved on september 10th. general lee then with his main body crossed the south mountain, taking the direction of hagerstown. meanwhile, general mcclellan had advanced cautiously and slowly, withheld by incessant dispatches from washington, warning him not to move in such a manner as to expose that city to danger. such danger existed only in the imaginations of the authorities, as the army in advancing extended its front from the potomac to the baltimore and ohio railroad. general mcclellan, nevertheless, moved with very great precaution, feeling his way, step by step, like a man in the dark, when on reaching frederick city, which the confederates had just evacuated, good fortune suddenly came to his assistance. this good fortune was the discovery of a copy of general lee's orders of march for the army, in which his whole plan was revealed. general mcclellan had therein the unmistakable evidence of his opponent's intentions, and from that moment his advance was as rapid as before it had been deliberate. the result of this fortunate discovery was speedily seen. general lee, while moving steadily toward hagerstown, was suddenly compelled to turn his attention to the mountain-passes in his rear. it had not been the intention of lee to oppose the passage of the enemy through the south mountain, as he desired to draw general mcclellan as far as possible from his base, but the delay in the fall of harper's ferry now made this necessary. it was essential to defend the mountain-defiles in order to insure the safety of the confederate troops at harper's ferry; and lee accordingly directed general d.h. hill to oppose the passage of the enemy at boonsboro gap, and longstreet was sent from hagerstown to support him. an obstinate struggle now ensued for the possession of the main south mountain gap, near boonsboro, and the roar of jackson's artillery from harper's ferry must have prompted the assailants to determined efforts to force the passage. the battle continued until night (september 14th), and resulted in heavy loss on both sides, the brave general reno, of the united states army, among others, losing his life. darkness put an end to the action, the federal forces not having succeeded in passing the gap; but, learning that a column of the enemy had crossed below and threatened him with an attack in flank, general lee determined to retire in the direction of sharpsburg, where jackson and the forces coã¶perating with him could join the main body of the army. this movement was effected without difficulty, and lee notices the skill and efficiency of general fitz lee in covering the rear with his cavalry. the federal army failed to press forward as rapidly as it is now obvious it should have done. the head of the column did not appear west of the mountain until eight o'clock in the morning (september 15th), and, nearly at the same moment ("the attack began at dawn; in about two hours the garrison surrendered," says general lee), harper's ferry yielded to jackson. fast-riding couriers brought the welcome intelligence of jackson's success to general lee, as the latter was approaching sharpsburg, and official information speedily came that the result had been the capture of more than eleven thousand men, thirteen thousand small-arms, and seventy-three cannon. it was probably this large number of men and amount of military stores falling into the hands of the confederates which afterward induced the opinion that lee's sole design in invading maryland had been the reduction of harper's ferry. general mcclellan had thus failed, in spite of every effort which he had made, to relieve harper's ferry,[1] and no other course remained now but to follow lee and bring him to battle. the federal army accordingly moved on the track of its adversary, and, on the afternoon of the same day (september 15th), found itself in sight of lee's forces drawn up on the western side of antietam creek, near the village of sharpsburg. [footnote 1: all along the march he had fired signal-guns to inform the officer in command at harper's ferry of his approach.] at last the great opponents were in face of each other, and a battle, it was obvious, could not long be delayed. iv. the prelude to sharpsburg. general lee had once more sustained a serious check from the skill and soldiership of the officer who had conducted the successful retreat of the federal army from the chickahominy to james river. the defeat and dispersion of the army of general pope on the last day of august seemed to have opened pennsylvania to the confederates. on the 15th of september, a fortnight afterward, general mcclellan, at the head of a new army, raised in large measure by the magic of his name, had pursued the victorious confederate, checked his further advance, and, forcing him to abandon his designs of invasion, brought him to bay a hundred miles from the capital. this was generalship, it would seem, in the true acceptation of the term, and mcclellan, harassed and hampered by the authorities, who looked but coldly upon him, could say, with coriolanus, "alone i did it." lee was thus compelled to give up his movement in the direction of pennsylvania, and concentrate his army to receive the assault of general mcclellan. jackson, marching with his customary promptness, joined him with a portion of the detached force on the next day (september 16th), and almost immediately those thunders which prelude the great struggles of history began. general lee had drawn up his army on the high ground west of the antietam, a narrow and winding stream which flows, through fields dotted with homesteads and clumps of fruit and forest trees, to the potomac. longstreet's corps was posted on the right of the road from sharpsburg to boonsboro, his right flank guarded by the waters of the stream, which here bends westward; on the left of the boonsboro road d.h. hill's command was stationed; two brigades under general hood were drawn up on hill's left; and when jackson arrived lee directed him to post his command on the left of hood, his right resting on the hagerstown road, and his left extending backward obliquely toward the potomac, here making a large bend, where stuart with his cavalry and horse-artillery occupied the ground to the river's bank. this arrangement of his troops was extremely judicious, as the sequel proved. it was probable that general mcclellan would direct his main attack against the confederate left, with the view of turning that flank and hemming in the southern army, or driving it into the river. by retiring jackson's left, lee provided for this contingency, and it will be seen that the design attributed by him to his adversary was that determined upon. general mcclellan occupied the ground on the eastern bank of the antietam. he had evidently massed his forces opposite the confederate left, but a heavy order of battle stood opposite the centre and right of lee, where bridges crossed the stream. the respective numbers of the adversaries can be stated with accuracy. "our forces at the battle of antietam," said general mcclellan, when before the committee of investigation afterward, "were, total in action, eighty-seven thousand one hundred and sixty-four." general lee says in his report: "this great battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on our side." colonel walter h. taylor, a gentleman of the highest character, and formerly adjutant-general of the army, makes the confederate numbers somewhat less. in a memorandum before the writer, he says: our strength at sharpsburg. i think this is correct: jackson _(including a.p. hill_) 10,000 longstreet 12,000 d.h. hill and walker 7,000 ______ effective infantry 29,000 cavalry and artillery 8,000 ______ total of all arms 37,000 this disproportion was very great, amounting, as it did, to more than two for one. but this was unavoidable. the southern army had been worn out by their long marching and fighting. portions of the command were scattered all over the roads of northern virginia, wearily dragging their half-clothed limbs and shoeless feet toward winchester, whither they were directed to repair. this was the explanation of the fact that, in spite of the ardent desire of the whole army to participate in the great movement northward, lee had in line of battle at sharpsburg "less than forty thousand men." general mcclellan made a demonstration against his adversary on the evening of the 16th, before the day of the main struggle. he threw his right, commanded by general hooker, across the antietam at a point out of range of fire from the confederates, and made a vigorous attack on jackson's two divisions lying near the hagerstown road running northward, and thus parallel with lee's line of battle. a brief engagement took place in the vicinity of the "dunker church," in a fringe of woods west of the road, but it was too late to effect any thing of importance; night fell, and the engagement ceased. general hooker retaining his position on the west side of the stream. the opposing lines then remained at rest, waiting for the morning which all now saw would witness the commencement of the more serious conflict. v. the battle of sharpsburg. the battle of sharpsburg, or antietam, for it is known by both names, began at early dawn on the 17th of september. general mcclellan had obviously determined to direct his main assault against the confederate left, a movement which general lee had foreseen and provided for,[1] and at dawn commenced a rapid fire of artillery upon that portion of the confederate line. under cover of this fire, general hooker then advanced his infantry and made a headlong assault upon jackson's line, with the obvious view of crushing that wing of lee's army, or driving it back on sharpsburg and the river. the federal force making this attack, or advancing promptly to support it, consisted of the corps of generals hooker, mansfield, and sumner, and numbered, according to general sumner, forty thousand men, of whom eighteen thousand belonged to general hooker's corps. [footnote 1: "in anticipation of a movement to turn the line of antietam, hood's two brigades had been transferred from the right to the left," etc.--_lee_.] jackson's whole force was four thousand men. of the truth of this statement of the respective forces, proof is here given: "i have always believed," said general sumner afterward, before the war committee, "that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets, had general mcclellan authorized me to march _there forty thousand men_ on the left flank of the enemy," etc. "hooker formed his corps of _eighteen thousand_ men," etc., says mr. swinton, the able and candid northern historian of the war. jackson's force is shown by the confederate official reports. his corps consisted of ewell's division and "jackson's old division." general jones, commanding the latter, reported: "the division at the beginning of the fight numbered not over one thousand six hundred men." early, commanding ewell's division,[1] reported the three brigades to number: lawton's 1,150 hayes's 550 walker's 700 2,400 "old division," as above 1,600 jackson's corps 4,000 [footnote 1: after general lawton was disabled.] this was the entire force carried by general jackson into the fight, and these four thousand men, as the reader will perceive, bore the brunt of the first great assault of general mcclellan. just as the light broadened in the east above the crest of mountains rising in rear of the federal lines. general hooker made his assault. his aim was plainly to drive the force in his front across the hagerstown road and back on the potomac, and in this he seemed about to succeed. jackson had placed in front ewell's division of twenty-four hundred men. this force received general hooker's charge, and a furious struggle followed, in which the division was nearly destroyed. a glance at the casualties will show this. they were remarkable. general lawton, division commander, was wounded and carried from the field; colonel douglas, brigade commander, was killed; colonel walker, also commanding brigade, was disabled; lawton's brigade lost five hundred and fifty-four killed and wounded out of eleven hundred and fifty, and five out of six regimental commanders. hayes's brigade lost three hundred and twenty-three out of five hundred and fifty, and all the regimental commanders. walker's brigade lost two hundred and twenty-eight out of less than seven hundred, and three out of four regimental commanders; and, of the staff-officers of the division, scarcely one remained. in an hour after dawn, this heavy slaughter had been effected in ewell's division, and the detailed statement which we have given will best show the stubborn resistance offered by the southern troops. still, they were unable to hold their ground, and fell back at last in disorder before general hooker, who pressed forward to seize the hagerstown road and crush the whole confederate left. he was met, however, by jackson's old division of sixteen hundred men, who had been held in reserve; and general lee hastened to the point threatened hood's two small brigades, one of which. general hood states, numbered but eight hundred and sixty-four men. with this force jackson now met the advancing column of general hooker, delivering a heavy fire from the woods upon the federal forces. in face of this fire they hesitated, and hood made a vigorous charge, general stuart opening at the same time a cross-fire on the enemy with his horse-artillery. the combined fire increased their disorganization, and it now turned into disorder. jackson seized the moment, as always, throwing forward his whole line, and the enemy were first checked, and then driven back in confusion, the confederates pursuing and cheering. the first struggle had thus resulted in favor of the confederates--with about six thousand they had repulsed eighteen thousand--and it was obvious to general mcclellan that, without reinforcements, his right could not hold its ground. he accordingly, just at sunrise, sent general mansfield's corps to the aid of general hooker, and at nine o'clock general sumner's corps was added, making in all forty thousand men. the appearance of affairs at this moment was discouraging to the federal commander. his heavy assaulting column had been forced back with great slaughter; general hooker had been wounded and borne from the field; general mansfield, while forming his line, had been mortally wounded; and now, at nine o'clock, when the corps of general sumner arrived, the prospect was depressing. of the condition of the federal forces, general sumner's own statement conveys a very distinct conception: "on going upon the field," said general sumner, before the war committee, "i found that general hooker's corps had been dispersed and routed. i passed him some distance in the rear, where he had been carried wounded, but i saw nothing of his corps at all, as i was advancing with my command on the field. i sent one of my staff-officers to find where they were, and general ricketts, the only officer we could find, stated that he could not raise three hundred men of the corps." general mansfield's corps also had been checked, and now "began to waver and break." such had been the result of the great federal assault, and it was highly creditable to the confederate arms. with a comparatively insignificant force, jackson had received the attack of the entire federal right wing, and had not only repulsed, but nearly broken to pieces, the large force in his front. the arrival of general sumner, however, completely changed the face of affairs, and, as his fresh troops advanced, those which had been so roughly handled by jackson had an opportunity to reform. this was rapidly effected, and, having marshalled his troops, general sumner, an officer of great dash and courage, made a vigorous charge. from this moment the battle began to rage with new fury. general lee had sent to the left the brigades of colquitt, ripley, and mcrae, and with these, the troops of hood, and his own shattered division, jackson presented a stubborn front, but his loss was heavy. general starke, of the old division, was killed; the brigade, regimental, and company officers fell almost without an exception, and the brigades dwindled to mere handfuls. under the great pressure, jackson was at length forced back. one of general sumner's divisions drove the right of the confederates beyond the hagerstown road, and, at this moment the long struggle seemed ended; the great wrestle in which the adversaries had so long staggered to and fro, advancing and retreating in turn, seemed at last virtually decided in favor of the federal arms. this was undoubtedly the turning-point of the battle of sharpsburg, and general lee had witnessed the conflict upon his left with great anxiety. it was impossible, however, to send thither more troops than he had already sent. as will be seen in a moment, both his centre and right were extremely weak. a.p. hill and general mclaws had not arrived from harper's ferry. thus the left had been reã«nforced to the full extent of lee's ability, and now that portion of his line seemed about to be crushed. fortunately, however, general mclaws, who had been delayed longer than was expected by general lee, at last arrived, and was hurried to the left. it was ten o'clock, and in that one hour the fighting of an entire day seemed to have been concentrated. jackson was holding his ground with difficulty when the divisions of mclaws and walker were sent to him. as soon as they reached the field, they were thrown into action, and general lee had the satisfaction of witnessing a new order of things. the advance--it might rather be called the onward rush--of the federal line was checked. jackson's weary men took fresh heart; that great commander promptly assumed the offensive, and, advancing his whole line, drove the enemy before him until he reoccupied the ground from which general sumner had forced him to retire. from the ground thus occupied, the federal forces were unable to dislodge him, and the great struggle of "the left at sharpsburg" was over. it had begun at dawn and was decided by ten or eleven o'clock, and the troops on both sides had fought as resolutely as in any other action of the war. the event had been decided by the pertinacity of the southern troops, and by the prompt movement of reã«nforcements by general lee from his right and centre. posted near his centre, he had surveyed at one glance the whole field of action; the design of general mcclellan to direct his main assault upon the confederate left was promptly penetrated, and the rapid concentration of the southern forces in that quarter had, by defeating this movement, decided the result of the battle. attacks on the confederate centre and right followed that upon the left. in the centre a great disaster was at one time imminent. owing to a mistake of orders, the brave general rhodes had drawn back his brigade posted there--this was seen by the enemy--and a sudden rush was made by them with the view of piercing lee's centre. the promptness and courage of a few officers and a small body of troops defeated this attempt. general d.h. hill rallied a few hundred men, and opened fire with a single gun, and colonel cooke faced the enemy with his regiment, "standing boldly in line," says general lee, "without a cartridge." the stand made by this small force saved the army from serious disaster; the federal line retired, but a last assault was soon begun, this time against the confederate right. it continued in a somewhat desultory manner until four in the evening, when, having massed a heavy column under general burnside, opposite the bridge in front of lee's right wing, general mcclellan forced the bridge and carried the crest beyond. the moment was critical, as the confederate force at this point was less than three thousand men. but, fortunately, reã«nforcements arrived, consisting of a.p. hill's forces from harper's ferry. these attacked the enemy, drove him from the hill across the antietam again; and so threatening did the situation at that moment appear to general mcclellan, that he is said to have sent general burnside the message: "hold your ground! if you cannot, then the bridge, to the last man. always the bridge! if the bridge is lost, all is lost!" the urgency of this order sufficiently indicates that the federal commander was not without solicitude for the safety of his own left wing. ignorant, doubtless, of the extremely small force which had thus repulsed general burnside, in all four thousand five hundred men, he feared that general lee would cross the bridge, assail his left, and that the hard-fought day might end in disaster to his own army. that general lee contemplated this movement, in spite of the disproportion of numbers, is intimated in his official report. "it was nearly dark," he says, "and the federal artillery was massed to defend the bridge, with general porter's corps, consisting of fresh troops, behind it. under these circumstances," he adds, "it was deemed injudicious to push our advantage further in the face of fresh troops of the enemy much exceeding our own." the idea of an advance against the federal left was accordingly abandoned, and a movement of jackson's command, which lee directed, with the view of turning the federal right, was discontinued from the same considerations. night had come, both sides were worn out, neither of the two great adversaries cared to risk another struggle, and the bitterly-contested battle of sharpsburg was over. the two armies remained facing each other throughout the following day. during the night of this day, lee crossed with his army back into virginia. he states his reasons for this: "as we could not look for a material increase of strength," he says, "and the enemy's force could be largely and rapidly augmented, it was not thought prudent to wait until he should be ready again to offer battle." general mcclellan does not seem to have been able to renew the struggle at that time. "the next morning," he says, referring to the day succeeding the battle, "i found that our loss had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that i did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day." this decision of general mcclellan's subjected him subsequently to very harsh criticism from the federal authorities, the theory having obtained at washington that he had had it in his power, by renewing the battle, to cut lee to pieces. of the probability of such a result the reader will form his own judgment. the ground for such a conclusion seems slight. the loss and disorganization were, it would seem, even greater on the federal than on the confederate side, and lee would have probably been better able to sustain an attack than general mcclellan to make it. it will be seen that general meade afterward, under circumstances more favorable still, declined to attack lee at williamsport. if one of the two commanders be greatly censured, the other must be also, and the world will be always apt to conclude that they knew what could be effected better than the civilians. but general mcclellan did make an attempt to "crush lee," such as the authorities at washington desired, and its result may possibly throw light on the point in discussion. on the night of the 19th, lee having crossed the potomac on the night of the 18th, general mcclellan sent a considerable force across the river near shepherdstown, which drove off the confederate artillery there, and at daylight formed line of battle on the south bank, protected by their cannon north of the river. of the brief but bloody engagement which followed--an incident of the war little dwelt upon in the histories--general a.p. hill, who was sent by lee to repulse the enemy, gives an animated account. "the federal artillery, to the number of seventy pieces," he says, "lined the opposite heights, and their infantry was strongly posted on the crest of the virginia hills. when he advanced with his division, he was met by the most tremendous fire of artillery he ever saw," but the men continued to move on without wavering, and the attack resulted in the complete rout of the enemy, who were "driven pell-mell into the river," the current of which was "blue with floating bodies." general hill chronicles this incident in terms of unwonted eloquence, and declares that, by the account of the enemy themselves, they lost "three thousand men killed and drowned from one brigade," which appears to be an exaggeration. his own loss was, in killed and wounded, two hundred and sixty-one. this repulse was decisive, and general mcclellan made no further attempt to pursue the adversary, who, standing at bay on the soil of virginia, was still more formidable than he had been on the soil of maryland. as we have intimated on a preceding page, the result of this attempt to pursue would seem to relieve general mcclellan from the criticism of the washington authorities. if he was repulsed with heavy slaughter in his attempt to strike at lee on the morning of september 20th, it is not probable that an assault on his adversary on september 18th would have had different results. no further crossing at that time was undertaken by the federal commander. his army was moved toward harper's ferry, an important base for further operations, and lee's army went into camp along the banks of the opequan. vi. lee and mcclellan--their merits in the maryland campaign. general lee and his adversary had displayed conspicuous merit in the campaign thus terminated, and we shall pause for a moment to glance back upon this great passage at arms. to give precedence to general mcclellan, he had assembled an army, after the defeat at manassas, with a promptness for which only his own great personal popularity can adequately account, had advanced to check lee, and had fully succeeded in doing so; and had thus not only protected the fertile territory of pennsylvania from invasion, but had struck a death-blow for the time to any designs general lee might have had to advance on the federal capital. if the situation of affairs at that moment be attentively considered, the extreme importance of these results will not fail to appear. it may perhaps be said with justice, that general mcclellan had saved the federal cause from decisive defeat. there was no army to protect washington but the body of troops under his command; these were largely raw levies, which defeat would have broken to pieces, and thus the way would have been open for lee's march upon washington or toward philadelphia--a movement whose probable result would have been a treaty of peace and the independence of the southern confederacy. all these hopes were reversed by mcclellan's rapid march and prompt attack. in the hours of a single autumn day, on the banks of the antietam, the triumphant advance of the confederates was checked and defeated. and, if the further fact be considered that the adversary thus checkmated was lee, the military ability of general mcclellan must be conceded. it is the fashion, it would appear, in some quarters, to deny him this quality. history will decide. the merit of lee was equally conspicuous, and his partial failure in the campaign was due to circumstances over which he had no control. his plan, as was always the case with him, was deep-laid, and every contingency had been provided for. he was disappointed in his aim by three causes which he could not foresee. one was the great diminution of his force, owing to the rapidity of his march, and the incessant fighting; another, the failure in obtaining recruits in maryland; and a third, the discovery by general mcclellan of the "lost dispatch," as it is called, which revealed lee's whole plan to his adversary. in consequence of the "finding" of the order of march, mcclellan advanced with such rapidity that the laggards of the southern army on the hills north of leesburg had no opportunity of joining the main body. the gaps in the ranks of the army thus made were not filled up by maryland recruits; lee fell back, and his adversary followed, no longer fearful of advancing too quickly; jackson had no time after reducing harper's ferry to rejoin lee at hagerstown; thus concentration of his troops, and a battle somewhere near sharpsburg, were rendered a necessity with general lee. in this tissue of adverse events, the discovery of the order of march by general mcclellan occupies a very prominent place. this incident resembles what the french call a fatality. who was to blame for the circumstance still remains a mystery; but it may be said with entire certainty that the brave officer upon whom it was charged was entirely guiltless of all fault in the matter. [footnote: the officer here referred to is general d.h. hill. general mcclellan said in his testimony afterward, before the congressional committee: "when at frederick, we found the original order issued to d.h. hill," etc. the inference was thus a natural one that general hill was to blame, but that officer has proved clearly that he had nothing to do with the affair. he received but one copy of the order, which was handed to him by general jackson in person, and, knowing its great importance, he placed it in his pocket-book, and still retains it in his possession. this fact is conclusive, since general hill could not have "lost" what he continues to hold in his hands. this mystery will be cleared up at some time, probably; at present, but one thing is certain, that general hill was in no manner to blame. the present writer desires to make this statement as explicit as possible, as, in other accounts of these transactions, he was led by general mcclellan's language to attribute blame to general hill where he deserved none.] whatever may have been the secret history of the "lost dispatch," however, it certainly fell into general mcclellan's hands, and largely directed the subsequent movements of the opposing armies. from what is here written, it will be seen that lee was not justly chargeable with the result of the maryland campaign. he had provided for every thing as far as lay in his power. had he not been disappointed in events to be fairly anticipated, it seemed his force would have received large accessions, his rear would have closed up, and the advance into pennsylvania would have taken place. instead of this, he was forced to retire and fight a pitched battle at sharpsburg; and this action certainly exhibited on lee's part military ability of the highest order. the force opposed to him had been at least double that of his own army, and the federal troops had fought with a gallantry unsurpassed in any other engagement of the war. that their assault on lee failed, was due to the fighting qualities of his troops and his own generalship. his army had been manoeuvred with a rapidity and precision which must have excited even the admiration of the distinguished soldier opposed to him. he had promptly concentrated his forces opposite every threatened point in turn, and if he had not been able to carry out the axiom of napoleon, that a commander should always be superior to the enemy at the point of contact, he had at least done all that was possible to effect that end, and had so far succeeded as to have repulsed if not routed his adversary. this is the main feature to be noticed in lee's handling of his troops at sharpsburg. an unwary or inactive commander would have there suffered decisive defeat, for the confederate left wing numbered, throughout the early part of the battle, scarcely more than four thousand men, while the column directed against it amounted first to eighteen thousand, and in all to forty thousand men. to meet the impact of this heavy mass, not only desperate fighting, but rapid and skilful manoeuvring, was necessary. the record we have presented will enable the reader to form his own opinion whether lee was equal to this emergency involving the fate of his army. military critics, examining this great battle with fair and candid eyes, will not fail, we think, to discern the truth. that the southern army, of less than forty thousand men, repulsed more than eighty thousand in the battle of sharpsburg, was due to the hard fighting of the smaller force, and the skill with which its commander manoeuvred it. vii. lee and his men. general lee and his army passed the brilliant days of autumn in the beautiful valley of the shenandoah. this region is famous for its salubrity and the beauty of its scenery. the mountain winds are pure and invigorating, and the forests, which in the season of autumn assume all the colors of the rainbow, inspire the mind with the most agreeable sensations. the region, in fact, is known as the "garden of virginia," and the benign influence of their surroundings was soon seen on the faces of the troops. a northern writer, who saw them at sharpsburg, describes them as "ragged, hungry, and in all ways miserable;" but their forlorn condition, as to clothing and supplies of every description, made no perceptible difference in their demeanor now. in their camps along the banks of the picturesque little stream called the opequan, which, rising south of winchester, wanders through beautiful fields and forests to empty into the potomac, the troops laughed, jested, sang rude camp-ballads, and exhibited a joyous indifference to their privations and hardships, which said much for their courage and endurance. those who carefully considered the appearance and demeanor of the men at that time, saw that much could be effected with such tough material, and had another opportunity to witness, under circumstances calculated to test it, the careless indifference, to the past as well as the future, peculiar alike to soldiers and children. these men, who had passed through a campaign of hard marches and nearly incessant battles, seemed to have forgotten all their troubles and sufferings. the immense strain upon their energies had left them apparently as fresh and efficient as when the campaign begun. there was no want of rebound; rather an excessive elasticity and readiness to undertake new movements. they had plainly acquired confidence in themselves, rightly regarding the event of the battle of sharpsburg, where they were so largely outnumbered, as highly honorable to them, and they had acquired still greater confidence in the officers who commanded them. we shall hereafter speak more particularly of the sentiment of the troops toward general lee at this period of his connection with the army. the great events of the war continually modified the relations between him and his men; as they came to know him better and better, he steadily rose in their admiration and regard. at this time--the autumn of 1862--it may be said that the troops had already begun to love their leader, and had bestowed upon him as an army commander their implicit confidence. without this confidence on the part of his men, a general can effect little; with it, he may accomplish almost any thing. the common soldier is a child, and feels that the directing authority is above him; that he should look upon that authority with respect and confidence is the first necessity of effecting military organization. lee had already inspired the troops with this sentiment, and it was mainly the secret of his often astounding successes afterward. the men universally felt that their commander was equal to any and every emergency. such a repute cannot be usurped. troops measure their leaders with instinctive acumen, and a very astonishing accuracy. they form their opinions for themselves on the merits of the question; and lee had already impressed the army with a profound admiration for his soldiership. from this to the sentiment of personal affection the transition was easy; and the kindness, consideration, and simplicity of the man, made all love him. throughout the campaign, lee had not been heard to utter one harsh word; a patient forbearance and kindness had been constantly exhibited in all his dealings with officers and men; he was always in front, indifferent plainly to personal danger, and the men looked now with admiring eyes and a feeling of ever-increasing affection on the erect, soldierly figure in the plain uniform, with scarce any indication of rank, and the calm face, with its expression of grave dignity and composure, which remained unchanged equally on the march and in battle. it may be said that, when he assumed command of the army before richmond, the troops had taken him on trust; now they had come to love him, and when he appeared the camps buzzed, the men ran to the road, called out to each other: "there goes mas' robert!" or "old uncle robert!" and cheers followed him as he rode by. the country generally seemed to share the opinion of the army. there was exhibited, even at this early period of the war, by the people at large, a very great admiration and affection for general lee. while in the shenandoah valley, where jackson was beloved almost beyond expression, lee had evidences of the position which he occupied in the eyes of the people, which must have been extremely gratifying to him. gray-haired men came to his camp and uttered prayers for his health and happiness as the great leader of the south; aged ladies greeted him with faltering expressions full of deep feeling and pathetic earnestness; and, wherever he went, young girls and children received him with their brightest smiles. the august fame of the great soldier, who has now passed away, no doubt renders these memories of personal interviews with him dear to many. even the most trifling incidents are cherished and kept fresh by repetition; and the writer of these pages recalls at the moment one of these trifles, which may possibly interest some readers. there stood and still stands an ancient and hospitable homestead on the south bank of the opequan, the hearts of whose inmates, one and all, were ardently with the south in her struggle. soon after sharpsburg, general lee one day visited the old manor-house crowning the grassy hill and overshadowed by great oaks; generals jackson, longstreet, and stuart, accompanied him, and the reception which he met with, though we cannot describe it, was such as would have satisfied the most exacting. the children came to him and held out their small hands, the ladies divided their attention between him and the beloved "hero of the valley," jackson; and the lady of the manor could only express her sense of the great honor of receiving such company, by declaring, with a smile, that the dinner resembled the famous _breakfast at tillietudlem_ in scott's "old mortality." general lee highly enjoyed this, and seemed disposed to laugh when the curious fact was pointed out to him that he had seated himself at table in a chair with an open-winged _united states eagle_ delineated upon its back. the result of this visit, it appeared afterward, was a sentiment of great regard and affection for the general personally by all at the old country-house. old and young were charmed by his grave sweetness and mild courtesy, and doubtless he inspired the same sentiment in other places. his headquarters were at this time in a field some miles from winchester. an englishman, who visited him there, described the general and his surroundings with accuracy, and, from the account printed in _blackwood's magazine_, we quote the following sentences: "in visiting the headquarters of the confederate generals, but particularly those of general lee, any one accustomed to see european armies in the field cannot fail to be struck with the great absence of all the 'pomp and circumstance of war' in and around their encampments. lee's headquarters consisted of about seven or eight pole-tents, pitched with their backs to a stake fence, upon a piece of ground so rocky that it was unpleasant to ride over it, its only recommendation being a little stream of good water which flowed close by the general's tent. in front of the tents were some three four-wheeled wagons, drawn up without any regularity, and a number of horses roamed loose about the field. the servants, who were, of course, slaves, and the mounted soldiers, called 'couriers,' who always accompany each general of division in the field, were unprovided with tents, and slept in or under the wagons. wagons, tents, and some of the horses, were marked 'u.s.,' showing that part of that huge debt in the north has gone to furnishing even the confederate generals with camp equipments. no guard or sentries were to be seen in the vicinity; no crowd of aides-de-camp loitering about, making themselves agreeable to visitors, and endeavoring to save their generals from receiving those who had no particular business. a large farm-house stands close by, which, in any other army, would have been the general's residence _pro tem_., but, as no liberties are allowed to be taken with personal property in lee's army, he is particular in setting a good example himself. his staff are crowded together, two or three in a tent; none are allowed to carry more baggage than a small box each, and his own kit is but very little larger. every one who approaches him does so with marked respect, although there is none of that bowing and flourishing of forage caps which occurs in the presence of european generals; and, while all honor him, and place implicit faith in his courage and ability, those with whom he is most intimate feel for him the affection of sons to a father. old general scott was correct in saying that, when lee joined the southern cause, it was worth as much as the accession of twenty thousand men to the 'rebels.' since then every injury that it was possible to inflict, the northerners have heaped upon him. notwithstanding all these personal losses, however, when speaking of the yankees, he neither evinced any bitterness of feeling, nor gave utterance to a single violent expression, but alluded to many of his former friends and companions among them in the kindest terms. he spoke as a man proud of the victories won by his country, and confident of ultimate success, under the blessing of the almighty, whom he glorified for past successes, and whose aid he invoked for all future operations." the writer adds that the troops "regarded him in the light of infallible love," and had "a fixed and unshakable faith in all he did--a calm confidence of victory when serving under him." the peculiarly interesting part of this foreign testimony, however, is that in which the writer speaks of general lee's religious sentiment, of his gratitude for past mercies, and prayers for the assistance of the almighty in the hours of conflict still to come. this point we shall return to, endeavoring to give it that prominence which it deserves. at present we shall leave the subject of general lee, in his private and personal character, and proceed to narrate the last campaign of the year 1862. viii. lee passes the blue ridge from the central frontier of his headquarters, near winchester, the key of the lower valley, general lee was able to watch at once the line of the potomac in his front, beyond which lay general mcclellan's army, and the gaps of the blue ridge on his right, through which it was possible for the enemy, by a rapid movement, to advance and attack his flank and rear. if lee had at any time the design of recrossing into maryland, he abandoned it. general mcclellan attributed that design to him. "i have since been confirmed in the belief," he wrote, "that if i had crossed the potomac below harper's ferry in the early part of october, general lee would have recrossed into maryland." of lee's ability to thus reã«nter maryland there can be no doubt. his army was rested, provisioned, and in high spirits; the "stragglers" had rejoined their commands, and it is certain that the order for a new advance would have been hailed by the mercurial troops with enthusiasm. no such order was, however, issued, and soon the approach of winter rendered the movement impossible. more than a month thus passed, the two armies remaining in face of each other. no engagement of any importance occurred during this period of inactivity, but once or twice the federal commander sent heavy reconnoitring forces across the potomac; and stuart, now mounting to the zenith of his reputation as a cavalry-officer, repeated his famous "ride around mcclellan," on the chickahominy. the object of general lee in directing this movement of the cavalry was the ordinary one, on such occasions, of obtaining information and inflicting injury upon the enemy. stuart responded with ardor to the order. he had conceived a warm affection for general lee, mingled with a respect for his military genius nearly unbounded, and at this time, as always afterward, received the orders of his commander for active operations with enthusiasm. with about eighteen hundred troopers and four pieces of horse-artillery, stuart crossed the potomac above williamsport, marched rapidly to chambersburg, in pennsylvania, where he destroyed the machine-shops, and other buildings containing a large number of arms and military stores; and continued his way thence toward frederick city, with the bold design of completely passing around the federal army, and recrossing the river east of the blue ridge. in this he succeeded, thanks to his skill and audacity, in spite of every effort of the enemy to cut off and destroy him. reaching white's ford, on the potomac, north of leesburg, he disposed his horse-artillery so as to cover this movement, cut his way through the federal cavalry disputing his passage, and recrossed into virginia with a large number of captured horses, and without losing a man. this expedition excited astonishment, and a prominent officer of the federal army declared that he would not have believed that "horse-flesh could stand it," as the distance passed over in about forty-eight hours, during which considerable delay had occurred at chambersburg, was nearly or quite one hundred miles. general mcclellan complained that his orders had not been obeyed, and said that after these orders he "did not think it possible for stuart to recross," and believed "the destruction or capture of his entire force perfectly certain." soon afterward the federal commander attempted reconnoissances in his turn. a considerable force of infantry, supported by artillery, crossed the potomac and advanced to the vicinity of the little village of leetown, but on the same evening fell back rapidly, doubtless fearful that lee would interpose a force between them and the river and cut off their retreat. this was followed by a movement of the federal cavalry, which crossed at the same spot and advanced up the road leading toward martinsburg. these were met and subsequently driven back by colonel w.h.f. lee, son of the general. a third and more important attempt to reconnoitre took place toward the end of october. general mcclellan then crossed a considerable body of troops both at shepherdstown and harper's ferry; the columns advanced to kearneysville and charlestown respectively, and near the former village a brief engagement took place, without results. general mcclellan, who had come in person as far as charlestown, then returned with his troops across the potomac, and further hostilities for the moment ceased. these reconnoissances were the prelude, however, of an important movement which the federal authorities had been long urging general mcclellan to make. although the battle of sharpsburg had been indecisive in one acceptation of the term, in another it had been entirely decisive. a drawn battle of the clearest sort, it yet decided the future movements of the opposing armies. general lee had invaded maryland with the design of advancing into pennsylvania--the result of sharpsburg was, that he fell back into virginia. general mcclellan had marched from washington with no object but an offensive-defensive campaign to afford the capital protection; he was now enabled to undertake anew the invasion of virginia. to the success of such a movement the federal commander seems rightly to have considered a full and complete equipment of his troops absolutely essential. he was directed at once, after sharpsburg, to advance upon lee. he replied that it was impossible, neither his men nor his horses had shoes or rations. new orders came--general halleck appearing to regard the difficulties urged by general mcclellan as imaginary. new protests followed, and then new protests and new orders again, until finally a peremptory dispatch came. this dispatch was, "cross the potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south," an order bearing the impress of the terse good sense and rough directness of the federal president. this order it was necessary in the end to obey, and general mcclellan, having decided in favor of a movement across the potomac east instead of west of the mountain, proceeded, in the last days of october, to cross his army. his plan was excellent, and is here set forth in his own words: "the plan of campaign i adopted during this advance," he says, "was to move the army well in hand, parallel to the blue ridge, taking warrenton as the point of direction for the main army, seizing each pass on the blue ridge by detachments as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed, as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the potomac.... we depended upon harper's ferry and berlin for supplies until the manassas gap railway was reached. when that occurred, the passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in any direction. it was my intention, if, upon reaching ashby's or any other pass, the enemy were in force between it and the potomac, in the valley of the shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear." from this statement of general mcclellan it will be seen that his plan was judicious, and displayed a thorough knowledge of the country in which he was about to operate. the conformation of the region is peculiar. the valley of the shenandoah, in which lee's army lay waiting, is separated from "piedmont virginia," through which general mcclellan was about to advance, by the wooded ramparts of the blue ridge mountains, passable only at certain points. these _gaps_, as they are called in virginia, are the natural doorways to the valley; and as long as general mcclellan held them, as he proposed to do, by strong detachments, he would be able both to protect his own communications with the potomac, and, if he thought fit to do so, enter the valley and assail the confederate rear. that he ever seriously contemplated the latter design is, however, extremely doubtful. it is not credible that he would have undertaken to "cut off" lee's whole army; and, if he designed a movement of that description against any portion of the southern army which might be detached, the opportunity was certainly presented to him by lee, when jackson was left, as will be seen, at millwood. no sooner had general mcclellan commenced crossing the potomac, east of the mountain, than general lee broke up his camp along the opequan, and moved to check this new and formidable advance into the heart of virginia. it was not known, however, whether the whole of the federal forces had crossed east of the blue ridge; and, to guard against a possible movement on his rear from the direction of harper's ferry, as well as on his flank through the gaps of the mountain, lee sent jackson's corps to take position on the road from charlestown to berryville, where he could oppose an advance of the enemy from either direction. the rest of the army then moved guardedly, but rapidly, across the mountain into culpepper. under these circumstances, general mcclellan had an excellent opportunity to strike a heavy blow at jackson, who seemed to invite that movement by crossing soon afterward, in accordance with directions from lee, one of his divisions to the east side of the mountain on the federal rear. that general mcclellan did not strike is not creditable to him as a commander. the confederate army was certainly divided in a very tempting manner. longstreet was in culpepper on the 3d of november, the day after general mcclellan's rear-guard had passed the potomac, and nothing would seem to have been easier than to cut the confederate forces by interposing between them. by seizing the blue ridge gaps, and thus shutting up all the avenues of exit from the valley, general mcclellan would have had it in his power, it would seem, to crush jackson; or if that wily commander escaped, longstreet in culpepper was exposed to attack. general mcclellan did not embrace this opportunity of a decisive blow, and lee seems to have calculated upon the caution of his adversary. jackson's presence in the valley only embarrassed mcclellan, as lee no doubt intended it should. no attempt was made to strike at him. on the contrary, the federal army continued steadily to concentrate upon warrenton, where, on the 7th of november, general mcclellan was abruptly relieved of the command. he was in his tent, at rectortown, at the moment when the dispatch was handed to him--brought by an officer from washington through a heavy snow-storm then falling. general ambrose e. burnside was in the tent. mcclellan read the dispatch calmly, and, handing it indifferently to his visitor, said, "well, burnside, you are to command the army." such was the abrupt termination of the military career of a commander who fills a large space in the history of the war in virginia. the design of this volume is not such as to justify an extended notice of him, or a detailed examination of his abilities as a soldier. that he possessed military endowments of a very high order is conceded by most persons, but his critics add that he was dangerously prone to caution and inactivity. such was the criticism of his enemies at washington and throughout the north, and his pronounced political opinions had gained him a large number. it may, however, be permitted one who can have no reason to unduly commend him, to say that the retreat to james river, and the arrest of lee in his march of invasion toward pennsylvania, seem to indicate the possession of something more than "inactivity," and of that species of "caution" which achieves success. it will probably, however, be claimed by few, even among the personal friends of this general, that he was a soldier of the first ability--one competent to oppose lee. as to the personal qualities of general mcclellan, there seems to be no difference of opinion. he was a gentleman of high breeding, and detested all oppression of the weak and non-combatants. somewhat prone to _hauteur_, in presence of the importunities of the executive and other civilians unskilled in military affairs, he was patient, mild, and cordial with his men. these qualities, with others which he possessed, seem to have rendered him peculiarly acceptable to the private soldier, and it is certain that he was, beyond comparison, the most popular of all the generals who, one after another, commanded the "army of the potomac." ix. lee concentrates at fredericksburg. in returning from the valley, general lee had exhibited that combination of boldness and caution which indicates in a commander the possession of excellent generalship. one of two courses was necessary: either to make a rapid march with his entire army, in order to interpose himself between general mcclellan and what seemed to be his objective point, gordonsville; or, to so manoeuvre his forces as to retard and embarrass his adversary. of these, lee chose the latter course, exposing himself to what seemed very great danger. jackson was left in the valley, and longstreet sent to culpepper; under these circumstances, general mcclellan might have cut off one of the two detached bodies; but lee seems to have read the character of his adversary accurately, and to have felt that a movement of such boldness would not probably be undertaken by him. provision had nevertheless been made for this possible contingency. jackson was directed by lee, in case of an attack by general mcclellan, to retire, by way of strasburg, up the valley, and so rejoin the main body. that this movement would become necessary, however, was not, as we have said, contemplated. it was not supposed by lee that his adversary would adopt the bold plan of crossing the blue ridge to assail jackson; thus, to leave that commander in the valley, instead of being a military blunder, was a stroke of generalship, a source of embarrassment to general mcclellan, and a standing threat against the federal communications, calculated to clog the movements of their army. that lee aimed at this is obvious from his order to jackson to cross a division to the eastern side of the blue ridge, in general mcclellan's rear. when this was done, the federal commander abandoned, if he had ever resolved upon, the design of striking in between the confederate detachments, as is claimed by his admirers to have been his determination; gave up all idea of "moving into the valley and endeavoring to gain their rear;" and from that moment directed his whole attention to the concentration of his army near warrenton, with the obvious view of establishing a new base, and operating southward on the line of the orange and alexandria railroad. lee's object in these manoeuvres, besides the general one of embarrassing his adversary, seems to have been to gain time, and thus to render impossible, from the lateness of the season, a federal advance upon richmond. had general mcclellan remained in command, it is probable that this object would have been attained, and the battle of fredericksburg would not have taken place. the two armies would have lain opposite each other in culpepper and fauquier respectively, with the upper rappahannock between them throughout the winter; and the confederate forces, weary and worn by the long marches and hard combats of 1862, would have had the opportunity to rest and recover their energies for the coming spring. the change of commanders defeated these views, if they were entertained by general lee. on assuming command, general burnside conceived the project, in spite of the near approach of winter, of crossing the rappahannock at fredericksburg, and marching on richmond. this he now proceeded to attempt, by steadily moving from warrenton toward the lower rappahannock, and the result, as will be seen, was a federal disaster to wind up this "year of battles." we have spoken with some particularity of the character and military abilities of general mcclellan, the first able commander of the federal forces in virginia. of general burnside, who appears but once, and for a brief space only, on that great theatre, it will be necessary to say only a few words. a modest and honorable soldier, cherishing for general mcclellan a cordial friendship, he was unwilling to supersede that commander, both from personal regard and distrust of his own abilities. he had not sought the position, which had rather been thrust upon him. he was "surprised" and "shocked," he said, at his assignment to the command; he "did not want it, it had been offered to him twice before, and he did not feel that he could take it; he had told them that he was not competent to command such an army as this; he had said the same over and over again to the president and the secretary of war." he was, however, directed to assume command, accepted the responsibility, and proceeded to carry out the unexpected plan of advancing upon richmond by way of fredericksburg. to cover this movement, general burnside made a heavy feint as though designing to cross into culpepper. this does not seem to have deceived lee, who, on the 17th of november, knew that his adversary was moving. no sooner had the fact been discovered that general burnside was making for fredericksburg, than the confederate commander, by a corresponding movement, passed the rapidan and hastened in the same direction. as early as the 17th, two divisions of infantry, with cavalry and artillery, were in motion. on the morning of the 19th, longstreet's corps was sent in the same direction; and when, on november 20th, general burnside arrived with his army, the federal forces drawn up on the hills north of fredericksburg saw, on the highlands south of the city, the red flags and gray lines of their old adversaries. as general jackson had been promptly directed to join the main body, and was already moving to do so, lee would soon be able to oppose general burnside with his whole force. such were the movements of the opposing armies which brought them face to face at fredericksburg. lee had acted promptly, and, it would seem, with good judgment; but the question has been asked, why he did not repeat against general burnside the strategic movement which had embarrassed general mcclellan, and arrest the march upon fredericksburg by threatening, with the detachment under jackson, the federal rear. the reasons for not adopting this course will be perceived by a glance at the map. general burnside was taking up a new base--aquia creek on the potomac--and, from the character of the country, it was wholly impossible for lee to prevent him from doing so. he had only to fall back before jackson, or any force moving against his flank or rear; the potomac was at hand, and it was not in the power of lee to further annoy him. the latter accordingly abandoned all thought of repeating his old manoeuvre, moved longstreet and the other troops in culpepper toward fredericksburg, and, directing jackson to join him there, thus concentrated his forces directly in the federal front with the view of fighting a pitched battle, army against army. this detailed account of lee's movements may appear tedious to some readers, but it was rather in grand tactics than in fighting battles that he displayed his highest abilities as a soldier. he uniformly adopted the broadest and most judicious plan to bring on battle, and personally directed, as far as was possible, every detail of his movements. when the hour came, it may be said of him that he felt he had done his best--the actual fighting was left largely in the hands of his corps commanders. the feints and slight encounters preceding the battle of fredericksburg are not of much interest or importance. general burnside sent a force to port royal, about twenty-five miles below the city, but lee promptly detached a portion of his army to meet it, if it attempted to cross, and that project was abandoned. no attempt was made by general burnside to cross above, and it became obvious that he must pass the river in face of lee or not at all. such was the condition of affairs at fredericksburg in the first days of december. x. the battle of fredericksburg. to a correct understanding of the interesting battle of fredericksburg, a brief description of the ground is essential. the city lies on the south bank of the rappahannock, which here makes a considerable bend nearly southward; and along the northern bank, opposite, extends a range of hills which command the city and the level ground around it. south of the river the land is low, but from the depth of the channel forms a line of bluffs, affording good shelter to troops after crossing to assail a force beyond. the only good position for such a force, standing on the defensive, is a range of hills hemming in the level ground. this range begins near the western suburbs of the city, where it is called "marye's hill," and sweeps round to the southward, gradually receding from the stream, until, at hamilton's crossing, on the richmond and potomac railroad, a mile or more from the river, it suddenly subsides into the plain. this plain extends to the right, and is bounded by the deep and difficult channel of massaponnax creek. as marye's hill is the natural position for the left of an army posted to defend fredericksburg, the crest above hamilton's crossing is the natural position for the right of such a line, care being taken to cover the extreme right with artillery, to obstruct the passage of the ground between the crest and the massaponnax. [illustration: map--battle of fredericksburg.] behind the hills on the north side general burnside's army was posted, having the railroad to aquia creek for the transportation of their supplies. on the range of hills which we have described south of the city, general lee was stationed, the same railroad connecting him with richmond. longstreet's corps composed his left wing, and extended from marye's hill to about the middle of the range of hills. there jackson's line began, forming the right wing, and extending to the termination of the range at hamilton's crossing. on jackson's right, to guard the plain reaching to the massaponnax, stuart was posted with cavalry and artillery. the numbers of the adversaries at fredericksburg can be stated with accuracy upon one side, but not upon the other. general lee's force may be said to have been, in round numbers, about fifty thousand of all arms. it could scarcely have exceeded that, unless he received heavy reã«nforcements after sharpsburg; and the present writer has never heard or read that he received reã«nforcements of any description. the number, fifty thousand, thus seems to have been the full amount of the army. that of general burnside's forces seems to have been considerably larger. the federal army consisted of the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, ninth, and eleventh corps; the latter a corps of reserve and large. if these had been recruited to the full number reported by general mcclellan at sharpsburg, and the additional troops (fifth and eleventh corps) be estimated, the federal army must have exceeded one hundred thousand men. this estimate is borne out by federal authorities. "general franklin," says a northern writer, "had now with him about one-half the whole army;" and general meade says that franklin's force "amounted to from fifty-five thousand to sixty thousand men," which would seem to indicate that the whole army numbered from one hundred and ten thousand to one hundred and twenty thousand men. a strong position was obviously essential to render it possible for the southern army, of about fifty thousand men, to successfully oppose the advance of this force of above one hundred thousand. lee had found this position, and constructed earthworks for artillery, with the view of receiving the attack of the enemy after their crossing. he was unable to obstruct this crossing in any material degree; and he states clearly the grounds of this inability. "the plain of fredericksburg," he says, "is so completely commanded by the stafford heights, that no effectual opposition could be made to the construction of bridges, or the passage of the river, without exposing our troops to the destructive fire of the numerous batteries of the enemy.... our position was, therefore, selected with a view to resist the enemy's advance after crossing, and the river was guarded only by a force sufficient to impede his movements until the army could be concentrated." the brief description we have presented of the character of the ground around fredericksburg, and the position of the adversaries, will sufficiently indicate the conditions under which the battle was fought. both armies seem to have been in excellent spirits. that of general burnside had made a successful march, during which they had scarcely seen an enemy, and now looked forward, probably, to certain if not easy victory. general lee's army, in like manner, had undergone recently no peculiar hardships in marching or fighting; and, to whatever cause the fact may be attributed, was in a condition of the highest efficiency. the men seemed to be confident of the result of the coming conflict, and, in their bivouacs on the line of battle, in the woods fringing the ridge which they occupied, laughed, jested, cheered, on the slightest provocation, and, instead of shrinking from, looked forward with eagerness to, the moment when general burnside would advance to attack them. this buoyant and elastic spirit in the southern troops was observable on the eve of nearly every battle of the war. whether it was due to the peculiar characteristics of the race, or to other causes, we shall not pause here to inquire; but the fact was plain to the most casual observation, and was never more striking than just before fredericksburg, unless just preceding the battle of gettysburg. nothing of any importance occurred, from the 20th of november, when general burnside's army was concentrated on the heights north of fredericksburg, until the 11th of december, when the federal army began crossing the rappahannock to deliver battle. lee's reasons for not attempting to resist the passage of the river have been given above. the plain on which it would have been necessary to draw up his army, in order to do so, was too much exposed to the numerous artillery of the enemy on the northern bank. lee resolved, therefore, not to oppose the crossing of the federal troops, but to await their assault on the commanding ground west and south of the city. on the morning of december 11th, before dawn, the dull boom of lee's signal-guns indicated that the enemy were moving, and the southern troops formed line of battle to meet the coming attack. general burnside had made arrangements to cross the river on pontoon bridges, one opposite the city, and another a mile or two lower down the stream. general franklin, commanding the two corps of the left grand division, succeeded, without trouble, in laying the lower bridge, as the ground did not permit lee to offer material obstruction; and this large portion of the army was now ready to cross. the passage of the stream at fredericksburg was more difficult. although determined not to make a serious effort to prevent the enemy from crossing, general lee had placed two regiments of barksdale's mississippians along the bank of the river, in the city, to act as sharp-shooters, and impede the construction of the pontoon bridges, with the view, doubtless, of thus giving time to marshal his troops. the success of this device was considerable. the workmen, busily engaged in laying the federal pontoons, were so much interrupted by the fire of the confederate marksmen--who directed their aim through the heavy fog by the noise made in putting together the boats--that, after losing a number of men, the federal commander discontinued his attempt. it was renewed again and again, without success, as before, when, provoked apparently by the presence of this hornet's nest, which reversed all his plans, general burnside, about ten o'clock, opened a furious fire of artillery upon the city. the extent of this bombardment will be understood from the statement that one hundred and forty-seven pieces of artillery were employed, which fired seven thousand three hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition, in one instance piercing a single small house with fifty round-shot. an eye-witness of this scene says: "the enemy had planted more than a hundred pieces of artillery on the hills to the northern and eastern sides of the town, and, from an early hour in the forenoon, swept the streets with round-shot, shell, and case-shot, firing frequently a hundred guns a minute. the quick puffs of smoke, touched in the centre with tongues of flame, ran incessantly along the lines of their batteries on the slopes, and, as the smoke slowly drifted away, the bellowing roar came up in one continuous roll. the town was soon fired, and a dense cloud of smoke enveloped its roofs and steeples. the white church-spires still rose serenely aloft, defying shot or shell, though a portion of one of them was torn off. the smoke was succeeded by lurid flame, and the crimson mass brought to mind the pictures of moscow burning." the same writer says: "men, women, and children, were driven from the town, and hundreds of ladies and children were seen wandering, homeless, and without shelter, over the frozen highway, in thin clothing, knowing not where to find a place of refuge." [illustration: fredericksburg] general lee watched this painful spectacle from a redoubt to the right of the telegraph road, not far from his centre, where a shoulder jutting out from the ridge, and now called "lee's hill," afforded him a clear view of the city. the destruction of the place, and the suffering of the inhabitants, aroused in him a deep melancholy, mingled with exasperation, and his comment on the scene was probably as bitter as any speech which he uttered during the whole war. standing, wrapped in his cape, with only a few officers near, he looked fixedly at the flames rising from the city, and, after remaining for a long time silent, said, in his grave, deep voice: "these people delight to destroy the weak, and those who can make no defence; it just suits them." general burnside continued the bombardment for some hours, the mississippians still holding the river-bank and preventing the laying of the pontoons, which was again begun and again discontinued. at about four in the afternoon, however, a force was sent across in barges, and by nightfall the city was evacuated by lee, and general burnside proceeded rapidly to lay his pontoon bridge, upon which his army then began to pass over. the crossing continued throughout the next day, not materially obstructed by the fire of lee's artillery, as a dense fog rendered the aim of the cannoneers unreliable. by nightfall (of the 12th) the federal army was over, with the exception of general hooker's centre grand division, which was held in reserve on the north bank. general burnside then proceeded to form his line of battle. it stretched from the western suburbs of fredericksburg down the river, along what is called the river road, for a distance of about four miles, and consisted of the right grand division, under general sumner, at the city, and the left grand division, under general franklin, lower down, and opposite lee's right. general franklin's grand division numbered, according to general meade, from fifty-five to sixty thousand men; the numbers of generals sumner and hooker are not known to the present writer, but are said by federal authorities, as we have stated, to have amounted together to about the same. at daybreak, on the morning of december 13th, a muffled sound, issuing from the dense fog covering the low ground, indicated that the federal lines were preparing to advance. to enable the reader to understand general burnside's plan of attack, it is necessary that brief extracts should be presented from his orders on the occasion, and from his subsequent testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war. despite the length of time since his arrival at fredericksburg--a period of more than three weeks--the federal commander had, it appears, been unable to obtain full and accurate information of the character of the ground occupied by lee, and thus moved very much in the dark. he seems to have formed his plan of attack in consequence of information from "a colored man." his words are: "the enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where we made our attack.... i obtained, from a colored man at the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road which proved to be correct. i wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left." it is difficult for those familiar with the ground referred to, to understand how this "new road," a mere country bridle-path, as it were, extending along in the rear of lee's right wing, could have been regarded as a topographical feature of any importance. the road, which remains unchanged, and may be seen by any one to-day, was insignificant in a military point of view, and, in attaching such importance to seizing it, the federal commander committed a grave error. what seems to have been really judicious in his plan, was the turning movement determined on against lee's right, along the old richmond road, running from the direction of the river past the end of the ridge occupied by the confederates, and so southward. to break through at this point was the only hope of success, and general burnside had accordingly resolved, he declared, upon "a rapid movement down the old richmond road" with franklin's large command. unfortunately, however, this wise design was complicated with another, most unwise, to send forward _a division_, first, to seize the crest of the ridge near the point where it sinks into the plain. on this crest were posted the veterans of jackson, commanded in person by that skilful soldier. three lines of infantry, supported by artillery, were ready to receive the federal attack, and, to force back this stubborn obstacle, general burnside sent a division. the proof is found in his order to general franklin at about six o'clock on the morning of the battle: "send out a division at least ... to seize, if possible, the heights near captain hamilton's," which was the ground whereon jackson's right rested. an attack on the formidable position known as marye's hill, on lee's left, west of fredericksburg, was also directed to be made by the same small force. the order to general sumner was to "form a column of _a division_, for the purpose of pushing in the direction of the telegraph and plank roads, for the purpose of seizing the heights in the rear of the town;" or, according to another version, "up the plank road to its intersection with the telegraph road, where they will divide, with the object of seizing the heights on both sides of those roads." the point of "intersection" here referred to was the locality of what has been called "that sombre, fatal, terrible stone wall," just under marye's hill, where the most fearful slaughter of the federal forces took place. marye's hill is a strong position, and its importance was well understood by lee. longstreet's infantry was in heavy line of battle behind it, and the crest bristled with artillery. there was still less hope here of effecting any thing with "a division" than on the confederate right held by jackson. general burnside seems, however, to have regarded success as probable. he added in his order: "holding these heights, with the heights near captain hamilton's, will, i hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points." in his testimony afterward, he said that, in the event of failure in these assaults on lee's flanks, he "proposed to make a direct attack on their front, and drive them out of their works." these extracts from general burnside's orders and testimony clearly indicate his plan, which was to assail both lee's right and left, and, in the event of failure, direct a heavy blow at his centre. that the whole plan completely failed was mainly due, it would seem, to the inconsiderable numbers of the assaulting columns. we return now to the narrative of the battle which these comments have interrupted. general lee was ready to receive the federal attack, and, at an early hour of the morning, rode from his headquarters, in rear of his centre, along his line of battle toward the right, where he probably expected the main assault of the enemy to take place. he was clad in his plain, well-worn gray uniform, with felt hat, cavalry-boots, and short cape, without sword, and almost without any indications of his rank. in these outward details, he differed much from generals jackson and stuart, who rode with him. the latter, as was usual with him, wore a fully-decorated uniform, sash, black plume, sabre, and handsome gauntlets. general jackson, also, on this day, chanced to have exchanged his dingy old coat and sun-scorched cadet-cap for a new coat[1] covered with dazzling buttons, and a cap brilliant with a broad band of gold lace, in which (for him) extraordinary disguise his men scarcely knew him. [footnote 1: this coat was a present from stuart.] as lee and his companions passed along in front of the line of battle, the troops cheered them. it was evident that the army was in excellent spirits, and ready for the hard work which the day would bring. lee proceeded down the old richmond, or stage road--that mentioned in general burnside's order as the one over which his large flanking column was to move--and rode on with stuart until he was near the river road, running toward fredericksburg, parallel to the federal line of battle. here he stopped, and endeavored to make out, through the dense fog covering the plain, whether the federal forces were moving. a stifled hum issued from the mist, but nothing could be seen. it seemed, however, that the enemy's skirmishers--probably concealed in the ditches along the river road--had sharper eyes, as bullets began to whistle around the two generals, and soon a number of black specks were seen moving forward. general lee remained for some time longer, in spite of the exposure, conversing with great calmness and gravity with stuart, who was all ardor. he then rode back slowly, passed along his line of battle, greeted wherever he was seen with cheers, and took his position on the eminence in his centre, near the telegraph road, the same commanding point from which he had witnessed the bombardment of fredericksburg. the battle did not commence until ten o'clock, owing to the dense fog, through which the light of the sun could scarcely pierce. at that hour the mist lifted and rolled away, and the confederates posted on the ridge saw a heavy column of infantry advancing to attack their right, near the hamilton house. this force was meade's division, supported by gibbon's, with a third in reserve, general franklin having put in action as many troops as his orders ("a division at least") permitted. general meade was arrested for some time by a minute but most annoying obstacle. stuart had placed a single piece of artillery, under major john pelham, near the point where the old richmond and river roads meet--that is, directly on the flank of the advancing column--and this gun now opened a rapid and determined fire upon general meade. major pelham--almost a boy in years--continued to hold his exposed position with great gallantry, although the enemy opened fire upon him with several batteries, killing a number of his gunners. general lee witnessed this duel from the hill on which he had taken his stand, and is said to have exclaimed, "it is glorious to see such courage in one so young!" [footnote: general lee's opinion of major pelham appears from his report, in which he styles the young officer "the gallant pelham," and says: "four batteries immediately turned upon him, but he sustained their heavy fire with the unflinching courage that ever distinguished him." pelham fell at kelly's ford in march, 1863.] pelham continued the cannonade for about two hours, only retiring when he received a peremptory order from jackson to do so; and it would seem that this one gun caused a considerable delay in the attack. "meade advanced across the plain, but had not proceeded far," says mr. swinton, "before he was compelled to stop and silence a battery that stuart had posted on the port royal road." having brushed away this annoying obstacle, general meade, with a force which he states to have amounted to ten thousand men, advanced rapidly to attack the hill upon which the confederates awaited him. he was suffered to approach within a few hundred yards, when jackson's artillery, under colonel walker, posted near the end of the ridge, opened a sudden and furious fire, which threw the federal line into temporary confusion. the troops soon rallied, however, and advanced again to the attack, which fell on jackson's front line under a.p. hill. the struggle which now ensued was fierce and bloody, but, a gap having been left between the brigades of archer and lane, the enemy pierced the opening, turning the left of one brigade and the right of the other, pressed on, attacked gregg's brigade of hill's reserve, threw it into confusion, and seemed about to carry the crest. gregg's brigade was quickly rallied, however, by its brave commander, who soon afterward fell, mortally wounded; the further progress of the enemy was checked, and, jackson's second line rapidly advancing, the enemy were met and forced back, step by step, until they were driven down the slope again. here they were attacked by the brigades of hoke and atkinson, and driven beyond the railroad, the confederates cheering and following them into the plain. the repulse had been complete, and the slope and ground in front of it were strewed with federal dead. they had returned as rapidly as they had charged, pursued by shot and shell, and general lee, witnessing the spectacle from his hill, murmured, in his grave and measured voice: "it is well this is so terrible! we should grow too fond of it!" the assault on the confederate right had thus ended in disaster, but almost immediately another attack took place, whose results were more bloody and terrible still. as general meade fell back, pursued by the men of jackson, the sudden roar of artillery from the confederate left indicated that a heavy conflict had begun in that quarter. the federal troops were charging marye's hill, which was to prove the cemetery hill of fredericksburg. this frightful charge--for no other adjective can describe it--was made by general french's division, supported by general hancock. the federal troops rushed forward over the broken ground in the suburbs of the city, and, "as soon as the masses became dense enough,"[1] were received with a concentrated artillery fire from the hill in front of them. this fire was so destructive that it "made gaps that could be seen at the distance of a mile." the charging division had advanced in column of brigades, and the front was nearly destroyed. the troops continued to move forward, however, and had nearly reached the base of the hill, when the brigades of cobb and cooke, posted behind a stone wall running parallel with the telegraph road, met them with a sudden fire of musketry, which drove them back in terrible disorder. nearly half the force was killed or lay disabled on the field, and upon the survivors, now in full retreat, was directed a concentrated artillery-fire from, the hill. [footnote 1: longstreet.] in face of this discharge of cannon, general hancock's force, supporting french, now gallantly advanced in its turn. the charge lasted about fifteen minutes, and in that time general hancock lost more than two thousand of the five thousand men of his command. the repulse was still more bloody and decisive than the first. the second column fell back in disorder, leaving the ground covered with their dead. general burnside had hitherto remained at the "phillips house," a mile or more from the rappahannock. he now mounted his horse, and, riding down to the river, dismounted, walked up and down in great agitation, and exclaimed, looking at marye's hill: "that crest must be carried to-night."[1] [footnote 1: the authority for this incident is mr. william swinton, who was present.] in spite of the murderous results of the first charges, the federal commander determined on a third. general hooker's reserve was ordered to make it, and, although that officer protested against it, general burnside was immovable, and repeated his order. general hooker sullenly obeyed, and opened with artillery upon the stone wall at the foot of the hill, in order to make a breach in it. this fire continued until nearly sunset, when humphrey's division was formed for the charge. the men were ordered to throw aside their knapsacks, and not to load their guns, "for there was no time there to load and fire," says general hooker. the word was given about sunset, and the division charged headlong over the ground already covered with dead. a few words will convey the result. of four thousand men who charged, seventeen hundred and sixty were left dead or wounded on the field. the rest retreated, pursued by the fire of the batteries and infantry; and night fell on the battle-field. this charge was the real termination of the bloody battle of fredericksburg, but, on the confederate right, jackson had planned and begun to execute a decisive advance on the force in his front. this he designed to undertake "precisely at sunset," and his intention was to depend on the bayonet, his military judgment or instinct having satisfied him that the _morale_ of the federal army was destroyed. the advance was discontinued, however, in consequence of the lateness of the hour and the sudden artillery-fire which saluted him as he began to move. a striking feature of this intended advance is the fact that jackson had placed his artillery _in front_ of his line of battle, intending to attack in that manner. as darkness settled down, the last guns of stuart, who had defended the confederate right flank with about thirty pieces of artillery, were heard far in advance, and apparently advancing still. the federal lines had fallen back, wellnigh to the banks of the river, and there seems little room to doubt that the _morale_ of the men was seriously impaired. "from what i knew of our want of success upon the right," says general franklin, when interrogated on this point, "and the demoralized condition of the troops upon the right and centre, as represented to me by their commanders, i confess i believe the order to recross was a very proper one." general burnside refused to give the order; and, nearly overwhelmed, apparently, by the fatal result of the attack, determined to form the ninth corps in column of regiments, and lead it in person against marye's hill, on the next morning. such a design, in a soldier of ability, indicates desperation. to charge marye's hill with a corps in column of regiments, was to devote the force to destruction. it was nearly certain that the whole command would be torn to pieces by the southern artillery, but general burnside seems to have regarded the possession of the hill as worth any amount of blood; and, in face of the urgent appeals of his officers, gave orders for the movement. at the last moment, however, he yielded to the entreaties of general sumner, and abandoned his bloody design. still it seemed that the federal commander was unable to come to the mortifying resolution of recrossing the rappahannock. the battle was fought on the 13th of december, and until the night of the 15th general burnside continued to face lee on the south bank of the river--his bands playing, his flags flying, and nothing indicating an intention of retiring. to that resolve he had however come, and on the night of the 15th, in the midst of storm and darkness, the federal army recrossed to the north bank of the rappahannock. xi final movements of 1862 the battle of fredericksburg was another defeat of the federal programme of invasion, as decisive, and in one sense as disastrous, as the second battle of manassas. general burnside had not lost as many men as general pope, and had not retreated in confusion, pursued by a victorious enemy; but, brief as the conflict had been--two or three hours summing up all the real fighting--its desperate character, and the evident hopelessness of any attempt to storm lee's position, profoundly discouraged and demoralized the northern troops. we have quoted the statement of general franklin, commanding the whole left wing, that from "the demoralized condition of the troops upon the right and centre, as represented to him by their commanders, he believed the order to recross was a very proper one." nor is there any ground to suppose that the feeling of the left wing was greatly better. that wing of the army had not suffered as heavily as the right, which had recoiled with such frightful slaughter from marye's hill; but the repulse of general meade in their own front had been equally decisive, and the non-success of the right must have reacted on the left, discouraging that also. northern writers, in a position to ascertain the condition of the troops, fully bear out this view: "that the _morale_ of the army of the potomac became seriously impaired after the disaster at fredericksburg," says mr. swinton, the able and candid historian of the campaign, "was only too manifest. indeed, it would be impossible to imagine a graver or gloomier, a more sombre or unmusical body of men than the army of the potomac a month after the battle. and, as the days went by, despondency, discontent, and all evil inspirations, with their natural consequent, desertion, seemed to increase rather than to diminish, until, for the first time, the army of the potomac could be said to be really demoralized." general sumner noticed that a spirit of "croaking" had become diffused throughout the forces. for an army to display that tendency clearly indicates that the troops have lost the most important element of victory--confidence in themselves and their leader. and for this sentiment there was valid reason. columns wholly inadequate in numbers had been advanced against the formidable confederate positions, positions so strong and well defended that it is doubtful if thrice the force could have made any impression upon them, and the result was such as might have been expected. the men lost confidence in the military capacity of their commander, and in their own powers. after the double repulse at marye's hill and in front of jackson, the troops, looking at the ground strewed with dead and wounded, were in no condition to go forward hopefully to another struggle which promised to be equally bloody. the southern army was naturally in a condition strongly in contrast with that of their adversary. they had repulsed the determined assault of the federal columns with comparative ease on both flanks. jackson's first line, although pierced and driven back, soon rallied, and checked the enemy until the second line came up, when general meade was driven back, the third line not having moved from its position along the road near the hamilton house. on the left, longstreet had repulsed the federal charge with his artillery and two small brigades. the loss of the confederates in both these encounters was much less than that of their adversaries[1], a natural result of the circumstances; and thus, instead of sharing the depression of their opponents, the southern troops were elated, and looked forward to a renewal of the battle with confidence in themselves and in their leader. [footnote 1: "our loss during the operation, since the movements of the enemy began, amounts to about eighteen hundred killed and wounded."--_lee's report_. federal authorities state the northern loss at a little over twelve thousand; the larger part, no doubt, in the attack on marye's hill.] it is not necessary to offer much comment upon the manner in which general burnside had attacked. he is said, by his critics, not to have, at the time, designed the turning movement against general lee's right, upon which point the present writer is unable to decide. that movement would seem to have presented the sole and only chance of success for the federal arms, as the successful advance of general franklin's fifty-five or sixty thousand men up the old richmond road would have compelled lee to retire his whole right wing, to protect it from an assault in flank and reverse. what dispositions he would have made under these circumstances must be left to conjecture; but, it is certain that the blow would have proved a serious one, calling for the display of all his military ability. in the event, however, that this was the main great aim of general burnside, his method of carrying out his design insured, it would seem, its failure. ten thousand men only were to clear the way for the flanking movement, in order to effect which object it was necessary to crush jackson. so that it may be said that the success of the plan involved the repulse of one-half lee's army with ten thousand men. the assault on marye's hill was an equally fatal military mistake. that the position could not be stormed, is proved by the result of the actual attempt. it is doubtful if, in any battle ever fought by any troops, men displayed greater gallantry. they rushed headlong, not only once, but thrice, into the focus of a frightful front and cross fire of artillery and small-arms, losing nearly half their numbers in a few minutes; the ground was littered with their dead, and yet the foremost had only been able to approach within sixty yards of the terrible stone wall in advance of the hill. there they fell, throwing up their hands to indicate that they saw at last that the attempt to carry the hill was hopeless. these comments seem justified by the circumstances, and are made with no intention of casting obloquy upon the commander who, displaying little ability, gave evidences of unfaltering courage. he had urged his inability to handle so large an army, but the authorities had forced the command upon him; he had accepted it and done his best, and, like a brave soldier, determined to lead the final charge in person, dying, if necessary, at the head of his men. general lee has not escaped criticism any more than general burnside. the southern people were naturally dissatisfied with the result--the safe retreat of the federal army--and asked why they had not been attacked and captured or destroyed. the london _times_, at that period, and a military critic recently, in the same journal, declared that lee had it in his power to crush general burnside, "horse, foot, and dragoons," and, from his failure to do so, argued his want of great generalship. a full discussion of the question is left by the present writer to those better skilled than himself in military science. it is proper, however, to insert here general lee's own explanation of his action: "the attack on the 13th," he says, "had been so easily repulsed, and by so small a part of our army, that it was not supposed the enemy would limit his efforts to one attempt, which, in view of the magnitude of his preparations, and the extent of his force, seemed to be comparatively insignificant. believing, therefore, that he would attack us, it was not deemed expedient to lose the advantages of our position and expose the troops to the fire of his inaccessible batteries beyond the river, by advancing against him. but we were necessarily ignorant of the extent to which he had suffered, and only became aware of it when, on the morning of the 16th, it was discovered that he had availed himself of the darkness of night, and the prevalence of a violent storm of wind and rain, to recross the river." this statement was no doubt framed by general lee to meet the criticisms which the result of the battle occasioned. in conversing with general stuart on the subject, he added that he felt too great responsibility for the preservation of his troops to unnecessarily hazard them. "no one knows," he said, "how _brittle_ an army is." the word may appear strange, applied to the army of northern virginia, which had certainly vindicated its claim, under many arduous trials, to the virtues of toughness and endurance. but lee's meaning was plain, and his view seems to have been founded on good sense. the enemy had in all, probably, two hundred pieces of artillery, a large portion of which were posted on the high ground north of the river. had lee descended from his ridge and advanced into the plain to attack, this large number of guns would have greeted him with a rapid and destructive fire, which must have inflicted upon him a loss as nearly heavy as he had inflicted upon general burnside at marye's hill. from such a result he naturally shrunk. it has been seen that the federal troops, brave as they were, had been demoralized by such a fire; and lee was unwilling to expose his own troops to similar slaughter. there is little question, it seems, that an advance of the description mentioned would have resulted in a conclusive victory, and the probable surrender of the whole or a large portion of the federal army. whether the probability of such a result was sufficient to compensate for the certain slaughter, the reader will decide for himself. general lee did not think so, and did not order the advance. he preferred awaiting, in his strong position, the second assault which general burnside would probably make; and, while he thus waited, the enemy secretly recrossed the river, rendering an attack upon them by lee impossible. general burnside made a second movement to cross the rappahannock--this time at banks's ford, above fredericksburg--in the inclement month of january; but, as he might have anticipated, the condition of the roads was such that it was impossible to advance. his artillery, with the horses dragging the pieces, sank into the almost bottomless mud, where they stuck fast--even the foot-soldiers found it difficult to march through the quagmire--and the whole movement was speedily abandoned. when general burnside issued the order for this injudicious advance, two of his general officers met, and one asked: "what do you think of it?" "it don't seem to have the _ring_" was the reply. "no--the bell is broken," the other added. this incident, which is given on the authority of a northern writer, probably conveys a correct idea of the feeling of both the officers and men of general burnside's army. the disastrous day of fredericksburg had seriously injured the troops. "the army of the potomac," the writer adds, "was sadly fractured, and its tones had no longer the clear, inspiring ring of victory." xii. the year of battles. the stormy year 1862 had terminated, thus, in a great confederate success. in its arduous campaigns, following each other in rapid succession, general lee had directed the movements of the main great army, and the result of the year's fighting was to gain him that high military reputation which his subsequent movements only consolidated and increased. a rapid glance at the events of the year in their general outlines will indicate the merit due the southern commander. the federal plan of invasion in the spring had been extremely formidable. virginia was to be pierced by no less than four armies--from the northwest, the shenandoah valley, the potomac, and the peninsula--the whole force to converge upon richmond, the "heart of the rebellion." of these, the army of general mcclellan was the largest and most threatening. it advanced, with little opposition, until it reached the chickahominy, crossed, and lay in sight of richmond. the great force of one hundred and fifty thousand men was about to make the decisive assault, when lee attacked it, and the battle which ensued drove the federal army to a point thirty miles from the city, with such loss as to render hopeless any further attempt to assail the capital. such was the first act of the drama; the rest speedily followed. a new army was raised promptly by the federal authorities, and a formidable advance was made against richmond again, this time from the direction of alexandria. lee was watching general mcclellan when intelligence of the new movement reached him. remaining, with a portion of his troops, near richmond, he sent jackson to the rapidan. the battle of cedar mountain resulted in the repulse of general pope's vanguard; and, discovering at last that the real danger lay in the direction of culpepper, lee moved thither, drove back general pope, flanked him, and, in the severe battle of manassas, routed his army, which was forced to retire upon washington. two armies had thus been driven from the soil of virginia, and the confederate commander had moved into maryland, in order to draw the enemy thither, and, if practicable, transfer the war to the heart of pennsylvania. unforeseen circumstances had defeated the latter of these objects. the concentration on sharpsburg was rendered necessary; an obstinately-fought battle ensued there; and, not defeated, but forced to abandon further movements toward pennsylvania, lee had retired into virginia, where he remained facing his adversary. this was the first failure of lee up to that point in the campaigns of the year; and an attentive consideration of the circumstances will show that the result was not fairly attributable to any error which he had committed. events beyond his control had shaped his action, and directed all his movements; and it will remain a question whether the extrication of his small force from its difficult position did not better prove lee's generalship than the victory at manassas. the subsequent operations of the opposing armies indicated clearly that the southern forces were still in excellent fighting condition; and the movements of lee, during the advance of general mcclellan toward warrenton, were highly honorable to his military ability. with a force much smaller than that of his adversary, he greatly embarrassed and impeded the federal advance; confronted them on the upper rappahannock, completely checking their forward movement in that direction; and, when they moved rapidly to fredericksburg, crossed the rapidan promptly, reappearing in their front on the range of hills opposite that city. the battle which followed compensated for the failure of the maryland campaign and the drawn battle of sharpsburg. general burnside had attacked, and sustained decisive defeat. the stormy year, so filled with great events and arduous encounters, had thus wound up with a pitched battle, in which the enemy suffered a bloody repulse; and the best commentary on the decisive character of this last struggle of the year, was the fault found with general lee for not destroying his adversary. in less than six months lee had thus fought four great pitched battles--all victories to his arms, with the exception of sharpsburg, which was neither a victory nor a defeat. the result was thus highly encouraging to the south; and, had the army of northern virginia had its ranks filled up, as the ranks of the northern armies were, the events of the year 1862 would have laid the foundation of assured success. an inquiry into the causes of failure in this particular is not necessary to the subject of the volume before the reader. it is only necessary to state the fact that the army of northern virginia, defending what all conceded to be the territory on which the decisive struggle must take place, was never sufficiently numerous to follow up the victories achieved by it. at the battles of the chickahominy the army numbered at most about seventy-five thousand; at the second manassas, about fifty thousand; at sharpsburg, less than forty thousand; and at fredericksburg, about fifty thousand. in the following year, it will be seen that these latter numbers were at first but little exceeded, and, as the months passed on, that they dwindled more and more, until, in april, 1865, the whole force in line of battle at petersburg was scarcely more than thirty thousand men. such had been the number of the troops under command of lee in 1862. the reader has been informed of the number of the federal force opposed to him. this was one hundred and fifty thousand on the chickahominy, of whom one hundred and fifteen thousand were effective; about one hundred thousand, it would seem, under general pope, at the second battle of manassas; eighty-seven thousand actually engaged at the battle of sharpsburg; and at fredericksburg from one hundred and ten to one hundred and twenty thousand. these numbers are stated on the authority of federal officers or historians, and lee's force on the authority of his own reports, or of gentlemen of high character, in a situation to speak with accuracy. of the truth of the statements the writer of these pages can have no doubt; and, if the fighting powers of the northern and southern troops be estimated as equal, the fair conclusion must be arrived at that lee surpassed his adversaries in generalship. the result, at least, of the year's fighting, had been extremely encouraging to the south, and after the battle of fredericksburg no attempts were made to prosecute hostilities during the remainder of the year. the scheme of crossing above fredericksburg proved a _fiasco_, beginning and ending in a day. thereafter all movements ceased, and the two armies awaited the return of spring for further operations. xiii. lee in december, 1862. before passing to the great campaigns of the spring and summer of 1863, we propose to say a few words of general lee, in his private and personal character, and to attempt to indicate the position which he occupied at this time in the eyes of the army and the country. unknown, save by reputation, when he assumed command of the forces in june, 1862, he had now, by the winter of the same year, become one of the best-known personages in the south. neither the troops nor the people had perhaps penetrated the full character of lee; and they seem to have attributed to him more reserve and less warmth and impulse than he possessed; but it was impossible for a human being, occupying so prominent a station before the general eye, to hide, in any material degree, his main great characteristics, and these had conciliated for lee an exalted and wellnigh universal public regard. he was felt by all to be an individual of great dignity, sincerity, and earnestness, in the performance of duty. destitute plainly of that vulgar ambition which seeks personal aggrandizement rather than the general good, and dedicated as plainly, heart and soul, to the cause for which he fought, he had won, even from those who had denounced him for the supposed hesitation in his course in april, 1861, and had afterward criticised his military operations, the repute of a truly great man, as well as of a commander of the first ability. it was felt by all classes that the dignity of the southern cause was adequately represented in the person and character of the commander of her most important army. while others, as brave and patriotic, no doubt, but of different temperament, had permitted themselves to become violent and embittered in their private and public utterances in reference to the north, lee had remained calm, moderate, and dignified, under every provocation. his reports were without rhodomontade or exaggeration, and his tone uniformly modest, composed, and uninflated. after his most decisive successes, his pulse had remained calm; he had written of those successes with the air of one who sees no especial merit in any thing which he has performed; and, so marked was this tone of moderation and dignity, that, in reading his official reports to-day, it seems wellnigh impossible that they could have been written in the hot atmosphere of a war which aroused the bitterest passions of the human soul. upon this point of lee's personal and official dignity it is unnecessary to dwell further, as the quality has long since been conceded by every one acquainted with the character of the individual, in the old world and the new. it is the trait, perhaps, the most prominent to the observer, looking back now upon the individual; and it was, doubtless, this august moderation, dignity, and apparent exemption from natural infirmity, which produced the impression upon many persons that lee was cold and unimpressible. we shall speak, in future, at greater length of his real character than is necessary in this place; but it may here be said, that the fancy that he was cold and unimpressible was a very great error. no man had stronger or warmer feelings, or regarded the invasion of the south with greater indignation, than himself. the sole difference was, that he had his feelings under greater control, and permitted no temptation to overcome his sense of that august dignity and composure becoming in the chief leader of a great people struggling for independent government. the sentiment of the southern people toward lee may be summed up in the statement that they regarded him, in his personal and private character, with an admiration which was becoming unbounded, and reposed in him, as commander of the army, the most implicit confidence. these expressions are strong, but they do not convey more than the truth. and this confidence was never withdrawn from him. it remained as strong in his hours of disaster as in his noontide of success. a few soured or desponding people might lose heart, indulge in "croaking," and denounce, under their breath, the commander of the army as responsible for failure when it occurred; but these fainthearted people were in a small minority, and had little encouragement in their muttered criticisms. the southern people, from virginia to the utmost limits of the gulf states, resolutely persisted in regarding lee as one of the greatest soldiers of history, and retained their confidence in him unimpaired to the end. the army had set the example of this implicit reliance upon lee as the chief leader and military head of the confederacy. the brave fighting-men had not taken his reputation on trust, but had seen him win it fairly on some of the hardest-contested fields of history. the heavy blow at general mcclellan on the chickahominy had first shown the troops that they were under command of a thorough soldier. the rout of pope at manassas had followed in the ensuing month. at sharpsburg, with less than forty thousand men, lee had repulsed the attack of nearly ninety thousand; and at fredericksburg general burnside's great force had been driven back with inconsiderable loss to the southern army. these successes, in the eyes of the troops, were the proofs of true leadership, and it did not detract from lee's popularity that, on all occasions, he had carefully refrained from unnecessary exposure of the troops, especially at fredericksburg, where an ambitious commander would have spared no amount of bloodshed to complete his glory by a great victory. such was lee's repute as army commander in the eyes of men accustomed to close scrutiny of their leaders. he was regarded as a thorough soldier, at once brave, wise, cool, resolute, and devoted, heart and soul, to the cause. personally, the commander-in-chief was also, by this time, extremely popular. he did not mingle with the troops to any great extent, nor often relax the air of dignity, somewhat tinged with reserve, which was natural with him. this reserve, however, never amounted to stiffness or "official" coolness. on the contrary, lee was markedly free from the chill demeanor of the martinet, and had become greatly endeared to the men by the unmistakable evidences which he had given them of his honesty, sincerity, and kindly feeling for them. it cannot, indeed, be said that he sustained the same relation toward the troops as general jackson. for the latter illustrious soldier, the men had a species of familiar affection, the result, in a great degree, of the informal and often eccentric demeanor of the individual. there was little or nothing in jackson to indicate that he was an officer holding important command. he was without reserve, and exhibited none of that formal courtesy which characterized lee. his manners, on the contrary, were quite informal, familiar, and conciliated in return a familiar regard. we repeat the word _familiar_ as conveying precisely the idea intended to be expressed. it indicated the difference between these two great soldiers in their outward appearance. lee retained about him, upon all occasions, more or less of the commander-in-chief, passing before the troops on an excellent and well-groomed horse, his figure erect and graceful in the saddle, for he was one of the best riders in the army; his demeanor grave and thoughtful; his whole bearing that of a man intrusted with great responsibilities and the general care of the whole army. jackson's personal appearance and air were very different. his dress was generally dingy: a faded cadet-cap tilted over his eyes, causing him to raise his chin into the air; his stirrups were apt to be too short, and his knees were thus elevated ungracefully, and he would amble along on his rawboned horse with a singularly absent-minded expression of countenance, raising, from time to time, his right hand and slapping his knee. this brief outline of the two commanders will serve to show the difference between them personally, and it must be added that jackson's eccentric bearing was the source, in some degree, of his popularity. the men admired him immensely for his great military ability, and his odd ways procured for him that familiar liking to which we have alluded. it is not intended, however, in these observations to convey the idea that general lee was regarded as a stiff and unapproachable personage of whom the private soldiers stood in awe. such a statement would not express the truth. lee was perfectly approachable, and no instance is upon record, or ever came to the knowledge of the present writer, in which he repelled the approach of his men, or received the humblest of them with any thing but kindness. he was naturally simple and kind, with great gentleness and patience; and it will not be credible, to any who knew the man, that he ever made any difference in his treatment of those who approached him from a consideration of their rank in the army. his theory, expressed upon many occasions, was, that the private soldiers--men who fought without the stimulus of rank, emolument, or individual renown--were the most meritorious class of the army, and that they deserved and should receive the utmost respect and consideration. this statement, however, is doubtless unnecessary. men of lee's pride and dignity never make a difference in their treatment of men, because one is humble, and the other of high rank. of such human beings it may be said that _noblesse oblige_. the men of the army had thus found their commander all that they could wish, and his increasing personal popularity was shown by the greater frequency with which they now spoke of him as "marse robert," "old uncle robert," and by other familiar titles. this tendency in troops is always an indication of personal regard; these nicknames had been already showered upon jackson, and general lee was having his turn. the troops regarded him now more as their fellow-soldier than formerly, having found that his dignity was not coldness, and that he would, under no temptation, indulge his personal convenience, or fare better than themselves. it was said--we know not with what truth--that the habit of northern generals in the war was to look assiduously to their individual comfort in selecting their quarters, and to take pleasure in surrounding themselves with glittering staff-officers, body-guards, and other indications of their rank, and the consideration which they expected. in these particulars lee differed extremely from his opponents, and there were no evidences whatever, at his headquarters, that he was the commander-in-chief, or even an officer of high rank. he uniformly lived in a tent, in spite of the urgent invitations of citizens to use their houses for his headquarters; and this refusal was the result both of an indisposition to expose these gentlemen to annoyance from the enemy when he himself retired, and of a rooted objection to fare better than his troops. they had tents only, often indeed were without even that much covering, and it was repugnant to lee's feelings to sleep under a good roof when the troops were so much exposed. his headquarters tent, at this time (december, 1862), as before and afterward, was what is called a "house-tent," not differing in any particular from those used by the private soldiers of the army in winter-quarters. it was pitched in an opening in the wood near the narrow road leading to hamilton's crossing, with the tents of the officers of the staff grouped near; and, with the exception of an orderly, who always waited to summon couriers to carry dispatches, there was nothing in the shape of a body-guard visible, or any indication that the unpretending group of tents was the army headquarters. within, no article of luxury was to be seen. a few plain and indispensable objects were all which the tent contained. the covering of the commander-in-chief was an ordinary army blanket, and his fare was plainer, perhaps, than that of the majority of his officers and men. this was the result of an utter indifference, in lee, to personal convenience or indulgence. citizens frequently sent him delicacies, boxes filled with turkeys, hams, wine, cordials, and other things, peculiarly tempting to one leading the hard life of the soldier, but these were almost uniformly sent to the sick in some neighboring hospital. lee's principle in so acting seems to have been to set the good example to his officers of not faring better than their men; but he was undoubtedly indifferent naturally to luxury of all descriptions. in his habits and feelings he was not the self-indulgent man of peace, but the thorough soldier, willing to live hard, to sleep upon the ground, and to disregard all sensual indulgence. in his other habits he was equally abstinent. he cared nothing for wine, whiskey, or any stimulant, and never used tobacco in any form. he rarely relaxed his energies in any thing calculated to amuse him; but, when not riding along his lines, or among the camps to see in person that the troops were properly cared for, generally passed his time in close attention to official duties connected with the well-being of the army, or in correspondence with the authorities at richmond. when he relaxed from this continuous toil, it was to indulge in some quiet and simple diversion, social converse with ladies in houses at which he chanced to stop, caresses bestowed upon children, with whom he was a great favorite, and frequently in informal conversation with his officers. at "hayfield" and "moss neck," two hospitable houses below fredericksburg, he at this time often stopped and spent some time in the society of the ladies and children there. one of the latter, a little curly-headed girl, would come up to him always to receive her accustomed kiss, and one day confided to him, as a personal friend, her desire to kiss general jackson, who blushed like a girl when lee, with a quiet laugh, told him of the child's wish. on another occasion, when his small friend came to receive his caress, he said, laughing, that she would show more taste in selecting a younger gentleman than himself, and, pointing to a youthful officer in a corner of the room, added, "there is the handsome major pelham!" which caused that modest young soldier to blush with confusion. the bearing of general lee in these hours of relaxation, was quite charming, and made him warm friends. his own pleasure and gratification were plain, and gratified others, who, in the simple and kindly gentleman in the plain gray uniform, found it difficult to recognize the commander-in-chief of the southern army. these moments of relaxation were, however, only occasional. all the rest was toil, and the routine of hard work and grave assiduity went on month after month, and year after year, with little interruption. with the exceptions which we have noted, all pleasures and distractions seemed of little interest to lee, and to the present writer, at least, he seemed on all occasions to bear the most striking resemblance to the traditional idea of washington. high principle and devotion to duty were plainly this human being's springs of action, and he went through the hard and continuous labor incident to army command with a grave and systematic attention, wholly indifferent, it seemed, to almost every species of diversion and relaxation. this attempt to show how lee appeared at that time to his solders, has extended to undue length, and we shall be compelled to defer a full notice of the most interesting and beautiful trait of his character. this was his humble and profound piety. the world has by no means done him justice upon this subject. no one doubted during the war that general lee was a sincere christian in conviction, and his exemplary moral character and life were beyond criticism. beyond this it is doubtful if any save his intimate associates understood the depth of his feeling on the greatest of all subjects. jackson's strong religious fervor was known and often alluded to, but it is doubtful if lee was regarded as a person of equally fervent convictions and feelings. and yet the fact is certain that faith in god's providence and reliance upon the almighty were the foundation of all his actions, and the secret of his supreme composure under all trials. he was naturally of such reserve that it is not singular that the extent of this sentiment was not understood. even then, however, good men who frequently visited him, and conversed with him upon religious subjects, came away with their hearts burning within them. when the rev. j. william jones, with another clergyman, went, in 1863, to consult him in reference to the better observance of the sabbath in the army, "his eye brightened, and his whole countenance glowed with pleasure; and as, in his simple, feeling words, he expressed his delight, we forgot the great warrior, and only remembered that we were communing with an humble, earnest christian." when he was informed that the chaplains prayed for him, tears started to his eyes, and he replied: "i sincerely thank you for that, and i can only say that i am a poor sinner, trusting in christ alone, and that i need all the prayers you can offer for me." on the day after this interview he issued an earnest general order, enjoining the observance of the sabbath by officers and men, urging them to attend public worship in their camps, and forbidding the performance on sunday of all official duties save those necessary to the subsistence or safety of the army. he always attended public worship, if it were in his power to do so, and often the earnestness of the preacher would "make his eye kindle and his face glow." he frequently attended the meetings of his chaplains, took a warm interest in the proceedings, and uniformly exhibited, declares one who could speak from personal knowledge, an ardent desire for the promotion of religion in the army. he did not fail, on many occasions, to show his men that he was a sincere christian. when general meade came over to mine run, and the southern army marched to meet him, lee was riding along his line of battle in the woods, when he came upon a party of soldiers holding a prayer-meeting on the eve of battle. such a spectacle was not unusual in the army then and afterward--the rough fighters were often men of profound piety--and on this occasion the sight before him seems to have excited deep emotion in lee. he stopped, dismounted--the staff-officers accompanying him did the same--and lee uncovered his head, and stood in an attitude of profound respect and attention, while the earnest prayer proceeded, in the midst of the thunder of artillery and the explosion of the enemy's shells.[1] [footnote 1: these details are given on the authority of the rev. j. william jones, of lexington, va.] [illustration: lee at the soldiers' prayer meeting.] other incidents indicating the simple and earnest piety of lee will be presented in the course of this narrative. the fame of the soldier has in some degree thrown into the background the less-imposing trait of personal piety in the individual. no delineation of lee, however, would be complete without a full statement of his religious principles and feelings. as the commander-in-chief of the army of northern virginia, he won that august renown which encircles his name with a halo of military glory, both in america and europe. his battles and victories are known to all men. it is not known to all that the illustrious soldier whose fortune it was to overthrow, one after another, the best soldiers of the federal army, was a simple, humble, and devoted christian, whose eyes filled with tears when he was informed that his chaplains prayed for him; and who said, "i am a poor sinner, trusting in christ alone, and need all the prayers you can offer for me." part vi. chancellorsville and gettysburg i. advance of general hooker. lee remained throughout the winter at his headquarters in the woods south of fredericksburg, watching the northern army, which continued to occupy the country north of the city, with the potomac river as their base of supplies. with the coming of spring, it was obviously the intention of the federal authorities to again essay the crossing of the rappahannock at some point either above or below fredericksburg; and as the movement above was less difficult, and promised more decisive results, it was seen by general lee that this would probably be the quarter from which he might expect an attack. general stuart, a soldier of sound judgment, said, during the winter, "the next battle will take place at chancellorsville," and the position of lee's troops seemed to indicate that this was also his own opinion. his right remained still "opposite fredericksburg," barring the direct approach to richmond, but his left extended up the rappahannock beyond chancellorsville, and all the fords were vigilantly guarded to prevent a sudden flank movement by the enemy in that direction. as will be seen, the anticipations of lee were to be fully realized. the heavy blow aimed at him, in the first days of spring, was to come from the quarter in which he had expected it. the federal army was now under command of general joseph hooker, an officer of dash, energy, excellent administrative capacity, and, northern writers add, extremely prone to "self-assertion." general hooker had harshly criticised the military operations both of general mcclellan on the chickahominy, and of general burnside at fredericksburg, and so strong an impression had these strictures made upon the minds of the authorities, that they came to the determination of intrusting the command of the army to the officer who made them, doubtless concluding that his own success would prove greater than that of his predecessors. this opinion seemed borne out by the first proceedings of general hooker. he set to work energetically to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the army, did away with general burnside's defective "grand division" arrangement, consolidated the cavalry into an effective corps, enforced strict discipline among officers and men alike, and at the beginning of spring had brought his army to a high state of efficiency. his confident tone inspired the men; the depression resulting from the great disaster at fredericksburg was succeeded by a spirit of buoyant hope, and the army was once more that great war-engine, ready for any undertaking, which it had been under mcclellan. it numbered, according to one federal statement, one hundred and fifty-nine thousand three hundred men; but according to another, which appears more reliable, one hundred and twenty thousand infantry and artillery, and twelve thousand cavalry; in all, one hundred and thirty-two thousand troops. the army of general lee was considerably smaller. two divisions of longstreet's corps had been sent to suffolk, south of james river, to obtain supplies in that region, and this force was not present at the battle of chancellorsville. the actual numbers under lee's command will appear from the following statement of colonel walter h. taylor, assistant adjutant-general of the army: our strength at chancellorsville: anderson and mclaws........................... 13,000 jackson (hill, rodes, and trimble)............ 21,000 early (fredericksburg)........................ 6,000 _______ 40,000 cavalry and artillery......................... 7,000 _______ total of all arms............................. 47,000 as the federal infantry numbered one hundred and twenty thousand, according to the smallest estimate of federal authorities, and lee's infantry forty thousand, the northern force was precisely three times as large as the southern. [illustration: map--battle of chancellorsville.] general hooker had already proved himself an excellent administrative officer, and his plan of campaign against lee seemed to show that he also possessed generalship of a high order. he had determined to pass the rappahannock above fredericksburg, turn lee's flank, and thus force him to deliver battle under this disadvantage, or retire upon richmond. the safe passage of the stream was the first great object, and general hooker's dispositions to effect this were highly judicious. a force of about twenty thousand men was to pass the rappahannock at fredericksburg, and thus produce upon lee the impression that the federal army was about to renew the attempt in which they had failed under general burnside. while general lee's attention was engaged by the force thus threatening his right, the main body of the northern army was to cross the rappahannock and rapidan above chancellorsville, and, sweeping down rapidly upon the confederate left flank, take up a strong position between chancellorsville and fredericksburg. the column which had crossed at the latter point to engage the attention of the confederate commander, was then to recross to the northern bank, move rapidly to the upper fords, which the advance of the main body would by that time have uncovered; and, a second time crossing to the southern bank, unite with the rest. thus the whole federal army would be concentrated on the southern bank of the rappahannock, and general lee would be compelled to leave his camps on the hills of the massaponnax, and fight upon ground dictated by his adversary. if he did not thus accept battle, but one other course was left. he must fall back in the direction of richmond, to prevent his adversary from attacking his rear, and capturing or destroying his army. in order to insure the success of this promising plan of attack, a strong column of well-mounted cavalry was to cross in advance of the army and strike for the railroads in lee's rear, connecting him with richmond and the southwest. thus flanked or cut off, and with all his communications destroyed, it seemed probable that general lee would suffer decisive defeat, and that the federal army would march in triumph to the capture of the confederate capital. this plan was certainly excellent, and seemed sure to succeed. it was, however, open to some criticism, as the event showed. general hooker was detaching, in the beginning of the movement, his whole cavalry force for a distant operation, and dividing his army by the _ruse_ at fredericksburg, in face of an adversary not likely to permit that great error to escape him. while advancing thus, apparently to the certain destruction of lee, general hooker was leaving a vulnerable point in his own armor. lee would probably discover that point, and aim to pierce his opponent there. at most, general hooker was wrapping in huge folds the sword of lee, not remembering that there was danger to the _cordon_ as well as to the weapon. such was the plan which general hooker had devised to bring back that success of the federal arms in the spring of 1863 which had attended them in the early spring of 1862. at this latter period a heavy cloud rested upon the confederate cause. donaldson and roanoke island, fort macon, and the city of new orleans, had then fallen; at elkhorn, kernstown, newbern, and other places, the federal forces had achieved important successes. these had been followed, however, by the southern victories on the chickahominy, at manassas, and at fredericksburg. near this last-named spot now, where the year had wound up with so mortifying a federal failure, general hooker hoped to reverse events, and recover the federal glories of the preceding spring. operations began as early as the middle of march, when general averill, with about three thousand cavalry, crossed the rappahannock at kelly's ford, above its junction with the rapidan, and made a determined attack upon nearly eight hundred horsemen there, under general fitz lee, with the view of passing through culpepper, crossing the rapidan, and cutting lee's communications in the direction of gordonsville. the obstinate stand of general fitz lee's small force, however, defeated this object, and general averill was forced to retreat beyond the rappahannock again with considerable loss, and abandon his expedition. in this engagement fell major john pelham, who had been styled in lee's first report of the battle of fredericksburg "the gallant pelham," and whose brave stand on the port royal road had drawn from lee the exclamation, "it is glorious to see such courage in one so young." pelham was, in spite of his youth, an artillerist of the first order of excellence, and his loss was a serious one, in spite of his inferior rank. after this action every thing remained quiet until toward the end of april--general lee continuing to hold the same position with his right at fredericksburg, his left at the fords near chancellorsville, and his cavalry, under stuart, guarding the banks of the rappahannock in culpepper. on the 27th of april, general hooker began his forward movement, by advancing three corps of his army--the fifth, eleventh, and twelfth--to the banks of the river, near kelly's ford; and, on the next day, this force was joined by three additional corps--the first, third, and sixth--and the whole, on wednesday (the 29th), crossed the river without difficulty. that this movement was a surprise to lee, as has been supposed by some persons, is a mistake. stuart was an extremely vigilant picket-officer, and both he and general lee were in the habit of sending accomplished scouts to watch any movements in the federal camps. as soon as these movements--which, in a large army, cannot be concealed--took place, information was always promptly brought, and it was not possible that general hooker could move three large army corps toward the rappahannock, as he did on april 27th, without early knowledge on the part of his adversary of so important a circumstance. as the federal infantry thus advanced, the large cavalry force began also to move through culpepper toward the central railroad in lee's rear. this column was commanded by general stoneman, formerly a subordinate officer in lee's old cavalry regiment in the united states army; and, as general stoneman's operations were entirely separate from those of the infantry, and not of much importance, we shall here dismiss them in a few words. he proceeded rapidly across culpepper, harassed in his march by a small body of horse, under general william h.f. lee; reached the central railroad at trevillian's, below gordonsville, and tore up a portion of it; passed on to james river, ravaging the country, and attempted the destruction of the columbia aqueduct, but did not succeed in so doing; when, hearing probably of the unforeseen result at chancellorsville, he hastened back to the rapidan, pursued and harassed as in his advance, and, crossing, regained the federal lines beyond the rappahannock. to return to the movements of the main federal force, under the personal command of general hooker. this advanced rapidly across the angle between the two rivers, with no obstruction but that offered by the cavalry under stuart, and on thursday, april 30th, had crossed the rapidan at germanna and ely's fords, and was steadily concentrating around chancellorsville. at the same time the second corps, under general couch, was preparing to cross at united states ford, a few miles distant; and general sedgwick, commanding the detached force at fredericksburg, having crossed and threatened lee, in obedience to orders, now began passing back to the northern bank again, in order to march up and join the main body. thus all things seemed in train to succeed on the side of the federal army. general hooker was over with about one hundred thousand men--twenty thousand additional troops would soon join him. lee's army seemed scattered, and not "in hand" to oppose him; and there was some ground for the ebullition of joy attributed to general hooker, as he saw his great force massing steadily in the vicinity of chancellorsville. to those around him he exclaimed: "the rebel army is now the legitimate property of the army of the potomac. they may as well pack up their haversacks and make for richmond, and i shall be after them!" in a congratulatory order to his troops, he declared that they occupied now a position so strong that "the enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." such were the joyful anticipations of general hooker, who seems to have regarded the campaign as virtually ended by the successful passage of the river. his expressions and his general order would seem to indicate an irrepressible joy, but it is doubtful if the skilful soldiers under him shared this somewhat juvenile enthusiasm. the gray cavalier at fredericksburg was not reported to be retiring, as was expected. on the contrary, the southern troops seemed to be moving forward with the design of accepting battle. lee had determined promptly upon that course as soon as stuart sent him information of the enemy's movements. chancellorsville was at once seen to be the point for which general hooker was aiming, and lee's dispositions were made for confronting him there and fighting a pitched battle. the brigades of posey and mahone, of anderson's division, had been in front of banks's and ely's fords, and this force of about eight thousand men was promptly ordered to fall back on chancellorsville. at the same time wright's brigade was sent up to reã«nforce this column; but the enemy continuing to advance in great force, general anderson, commanding the whole, fell back from chancellorsville to tabernacle church, on the road to fredericksburg, where he was joined on the next day by jackson, whom lee had sent forward to his assistance. the _ruse_ at fredericksburg had not long deceived the confederate commander. general sedgwick, with three corps, in all about twenty-two thousand men, had crossed just below fredericksburg on the 29th, and lee had promptly directed general jackson to oppose him there. line of battle was accordingly formed in the enemy's front beyond hamilton's crossing; but as, neither on that day nor the next, any further advance was made by general sedgwick, the whole movement was seen to be a feint to cover the real operations above. lee accordingly turned his attention in the direction of chancellorsville. jackson, as we have related, was sent up to reã«nforce general anderson, and lee followed with the rest of the army, with the exception of about six thousand men, under general early, whom he left to defend the crossing at fredericksburg. such were the positions of the opposing forces on the 1st day of may. each commander had displayed excellent generalship in the preliminary movements preceding the actual fighting. at last, however, the opposing lines were facing each other, and the real struggle was about to begin. ii. the wilderness. the "wilderness," as the region around chancellorsville is called, is so strange a country, and the character of the ground had so important a bearing upon the result of the great battle fought there, that a brief description of the locality will be here presented. the region is a nearly unbroken expanse of dense thicket pierced only by narrow and winding roads, over which the traveller rides, mile after mile, without seeing a single human habitation. it would seem, indeed, that the whole barren and melancholy tract had been given up to the owl, the whippoorwill, and the moccasin, its original tenants. the plaintive cries of the night-birds alone break the gloomy silence of the desolate region, and the shadowy thicket stretching in every direction produces a depressing effect upon the feelings. chancellorsville is in the centre of this singular territory, on the main road, or rather roads, running from orange court-house to fredericksburg, from which latter place it is distant about ten miles. in spite of its imposing name, chancellorsville was simply a large country-house, originally inhabited by a private family, but afterward used as a roadside inn. a little to the westward the "old turnpike" and orange plank-road unite as they approach the spot, where they again divide, to unite a second time a few miles to the east, where they form the main highway to fredericksburg. from the north come in roads from united states and ely's fords; germanna ford is northwest; from the south runs the "brock road" in the direction of the rapidan, passing a mile or two west of the place. the whole country, the roads, the chance houses, the silence, the unending thicket, in this dreary wilderness, produce a sombre effect. a writer, familiar with it, says: "there all is wild, desolate, and lugubrious. thicket, undergrowth, and jungle, stretch for miles, impenetrable and untouched. narrow roads wind on forever between melancholy masses of stunted and gnarled oak. little sunlight shines there. the face of nature is dreary and sad. it was so before the battle; it is not more cheerful to-day, when, as you ride along, you see fragments of shell, rotting knapsacks, rusty gun-barrels, bleached bones, and grinning skulls.... into this jungle," continues the same writer, "general hooker penetrated. it was the wolf in his den, ready to tear any one who approached. a battle there seemed impossible. neither side could see its antagonist. artillery could not move; cavalry could not operate; the very infantry had to flatten their bodies to glide between the stunted trees. that an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men should have chosen that spot to fight forty thousand, and not only chosen it, but made it a hundred times more impenetrable by felling trees, erecting breastworks, disposing artillery _en masse_ to sweep every road and bridle-path which led to chancellorsville--this fact seemed incredible." it was no part of the original plan of the federal commander to permit himself to be cooped up in this difficult and embarrassing region, where it was impossible to manoeuvre his large army. the selection of the wilderness around chancellorsville, as the ground of battle, was dictated by lee. general hooker, it seems, endeavored to avoid being thus shut up in the thicket, and hampered in his movements. finding that the confederate force, retiring from in front of ely's and united states fords, had, on reaching chancellorsville, continued to fall back in the direction of fredericksburg, he followed them steadily, passed through the wilderness, and, emerging into the open country beyond, rapidly began forming line of battle on ground highly favorable to the manoeuvring of his large force in action. a glance at the map will indicate the importance of this movement, and the great advantages secured by it. the left of general hooker's line, nearest the river, was at least five miles in advance of chancellorsville, and commanded banks's ford, thereby shortening fully one-half the distance of general sedgwick's march from fredericksburg, by enabling him to use the ford in question as a place of crossing to the south bank, and uniting his column with the main body. the centre and right of the federal army had in like manner emerged from the thickets of the wilderness, and occupied cleared ground, sufficiently elevated to afford them great advantages. this was in the forenoon of the 1st of may, when there was no force in general hooker's front, except the eight thousand men of anderson at tabernacle church. jackson had marched at midnight from the massaponnax hills, with a general order from lee to "attack and repulse the enemy," but had not yet arrived. there was thus no serious obstacle in the path of the federal commander, who had it in his power, it would seem, to mass his entire army on the commanding ground which his vanguard already occupied. lee was aware of the importance of the position, and, had he not been delayed by the feint of general sedgwick, would himself have seized upon it. as it was, general hooker seemed to have won the prize in the race, and lee would, apparently, be forced to assail him on his strong ground, or retire in the direction of richmond. the movements of the enemy had, however, been so rapid that lee's dispositions seem to have been made before they were fully developed and accurately known to him. he had sent forward jackson, and now proceeded to follow in person, leaving only a force of about six thousand men, under early, to defend the crossing at fredericksburg. the promptness of these movements of the confederate commander is noticed by northern writers. "lee, with instant perception of the situation," says an able historian, "now seized the masses of his force, and, with the grasp of a titan, swung them into position, as a giant might fling a mighty stone from a sling." [footnote: mr. swinton, in "campaigns of the army of the potomac." whether the force under lee could be justly described as "mighty," however, the reader will form his own opinion.] such were the relative positions of the two armies on the 1st of may: general hooker's forces well in advance of chancellorsville, and rapidly forming line of battle on a ridge in open country; general lee's, stretching along the whole distance, from fredericksburg to tabernacle church, and certainly not in any condition to deliver or accept battle. the federal commander seemed to have clearly outgeneralled his adversary, and, humanly speaking, the movements of the two armies, up to this time, seemed to point to a decisive federal success. general hooker's own act reversed all this brilliant promise. at the very moment when his army was steadily concentrating on the favorable ground in advance of chancellorsville, the federal commander, for some reason which has never been divulged, sent a peremptory order that the entire force should fall back into the wilderness. this order, reversing every thing, is said to have been received "with mingled amazement and incredulity" by his officers, two of whom sent him word that, from the great advantages of the position, it should be "held at all hazards." general hooker's reply was, "return at once." the army accordingly fell back to chancellorsville. this movement undoubtedly lost general hooker all the advantages which up to that moment he had secured. what his motive for the order in question was, it is impossible for the present writer to understand, unless the approach of lee powerfully affected his imagination, and he supposed the thicket around chancellorsville to be the best ground to receive that assault which the bold advance of his opponent appeared to foretell. whatever his motive, general hooker withdrew his lines from the open country, fell back to the vicinity of chancellorsville, and began to erect elaborate defences, behind which to receive lee's attack. in this backward movement he was followed and harassed by the forces of jackson, the command of anderson being in front. jackson's maxim was to always press an enemy when he was retiring; and no sooner had the federal forces begun to move, than he made a prompt attack. he continued to follow them up toward chancellorsville until nightfall, when the fighting ceased, the confederate advance having been pushed to alrich's house, within about two miles of chancellorsville. here the outer line of the federal works was found, and jackson paused. he was unwilling at so late an hour to attempt an assault upon them with his small force, and, directing further movements to cease, awaited the arrival of the commander-in-chief. lee arrived, and a consultation was held. the question now was, the best manner, with a force of about thirty-five thousand, to drive the federal army, of about one hundred thousand, beyond the rappahannock. iii. lee's determination. on this night, of the 1st of may, the situation of affairs was strange indeed. general hooker had crossed the rappahannock with a force of one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, and had, without obstruction, secured a position so strong, he declared, that lee must either "ingloriously fly," or fight a battle in which "certain destruction awaited him." so absolutely convinced, indeed, was the federal commander, of the result of the coming encounter, that he had jubilantly described the southern army as "the legitimate property of the army of the potomac," which, in the event of the retreat of the confederates, would "be after them." there seemed just grounds for this declaration, whatever question may have arisen of the good taste displayed by general hooker in making it. the force opposed to him was in all about forty-seven thousand men, but, as cavalry take small part in pitched battles, lee's fighting force was only about forty thousand. to drive back forty thousand with one hundred and twenty thousand would not apparently prove difficult, and it was no doubt this conviction which had occasioned the joyous exclamation of general hooker. but his own act, and the nerve of his adversary, had defeated every thing. instead of retreating with his small force upon richmond, lee had advanced to accept or deliver battle. this bold movement, which general hooker does not seem to have anticipated, paralyzed his energies. he had not only crossed the two rivers without loss, but had taken up a strong position, where he could manoeuvre his army perfectly, when, in consequence of lee's approach with the evident intent of fighting, he had ceased to advance, hesitated, and ended by retiring. this is a fair summary of events up to the night of the 1st of may. general hooker had advanced boldly; he was now falling back. he had foretold that his adversary would "ingloriously fly;" and that adversary was pressing him closely. the army of the potomac, he had declared, would soon be "after" the army of northern virginia; but, from the appearance of things at the moment, the army of northern virginia seemed "after" the army of the potomac. we use general hooker's own phrases--they are expressive, if not dignified. they are indeed suited to the subject, which contains no little of the grotesque. that anticipations and expressions so confident should have been met with a "commentary of events" so damaging, was sufficient, had the occasion not been so tragic, to cause laughter in the gravest of human beings. lee's intent was now unmistakable. instead of falling back from the rappahannock to some line of defence nearer richmond, where the force under longstreet, at suffolk, might have rejoined him, with other reã«nforcements, he had plainly resolved, with the forty or fifty thousand men of his command, to meet general hooker in open battle, and leave the event to providence. a design so bold would seem to indicate in lee a quality which at that time he was not thought to possess--the willingness to risk decisive defeat by military movements depending for their success upon good fortune alone. such seemed now the only _deus ex machina_ that could extricate the southern army from disaster; and a crushing defeat at that time would have had terrible results. there was no other force, save the small body under longstreet and a few local troops, to protect richmond. had lee been disabled and afterward pressed by general hooker, it is impossible to see that any thing but the fall of the confederate capital could have been the result. from these speculations and comments we pass to the narrative of actual events. general hooker had abandoned the strong position in advance of chancellorsville, and retired to the fastnesses around that place, to receive the southern attack. his further proceedings indicated that he anticipated an assault from lee. the federal troops had no sooner regained the thicket from which they had advanced in the morning, than they were ordered to erect elaborate works for the protection of infantry and artillery. this was promptly begun, and by the next morning heavy defences had sprung up as if by magic. trees had been felled, and the trunks interwoven so as to present a formidable obstacle to the southern attack. in front of these works the forest had been levelled, and the fallen trunks were left lying where they fell, forming thus an _abatis_ sufficient to seriously delay an assaulting force, which would thus be, at every step of the necessarily slow advance, under fire. on the roads piercing the thicket in the direction of the confederates, cannon were posted, to rake the approaches to the federal position. having thus made his preparations to receive lee's attack, general hooker awaited that attack, no doubt confident of his ability to repulse it. his line resembled in some degree the two sides of an oblong square--the longer side extending east and west in front, that is to say, south of chancellorsville, and the shorter side north and south nearly, east of the place. his right, in the direction of wilderness tavern, was comparatively undefended, as it was not expected that lee would venture upon a movement against that remote point. this line, it would appear, was formed with a view to the possible necessity of falling back toward the rappahannock. a commander determined to risk everything would, it seems, have fronted lee boldly, with a line running north and south, east of chancellorsville. general hooker's main front was nearly east and west, whatever may have been his object in so establishing it. on the night of the 1st of may, as we have said, lee and jackson held a consultation to determine the best method of attacking the federal forces on the next day. all the information which they had been able to obtain of the federal positions east and south of chancellorsville, indicated that the defences in both these quarters were such as to render an assault injudicious. jackson had found his advance obstructed by strong works near alrich's house, on the road running eastward from the enemy's camps; and general stuart and general wright, who had moved to the left, and advanced upon the enemy's front near the point called "the furnace," had discovered the existence of powerful defences in that quarter also. they had been met by a fierce and sudden artillery-fire from federal epaulements; and here, as to the east of chancellorsville, the enemy had evidently fortified their position. under these circumstances, it was necessary to discover, if possible, some more favorable opening for an attack. there remained but one other--general hooker's right, west of chancellorsville; but to divide the army, as would be necessary in order to attack in that quarter, seemed an undertaking too hazardous to be thought of. to execute such a plan of assault with any thing like a hope of success, general lee would be compelled to detach considerably more than half of his entire force. this would leave in general hooker's front a body of troops too inconsiderable to make any resistance if he advanced his lines, and thus the movement promised to result in the certain destruction of one portion of the army, to be followed by a triumphant march of the federal forces upon richmond. in the council of war between lee and jackson, on the night of the 1st of may, these considerations were duly weighed, and the whole situation discussed. in the end, the hazardous movement against general hooker's right, beyond chancellorsville, was determined upon. this was first suggested, it is said, by jackson--others have attributed the suggestion to lee. the point is not material. the plan was adopted, and lee determined to detach a column of about twenty-one thousand men, under jackson, to make the attack on the next day. his plan was to await the arrival of jackson at the point selected for attack, meanwhile engaging the enemy's attention by demonstrations in their front. when jackson's guns gave the signal that he was engaged, the force in front of the enemy was to advance and participate in the assault; and thus, struck in front and flank at once. general hooker, it was hoped, would be defeated and driven back across the rappahannock. there was another possible result, the defeat of lee and jackson by general hooker. but the desperate character of the situation rendered it necessary to disregard this risk. by midnight this plan had been determined upon, and at dawn jackson began to move. jackson's attack and fall. on the morning of the 2d of may, general lee was early in the saddle, and rode to the front, where he remained in personal command of the force facing the enemy's main line of battle throughout the day. this force consisted of the divisions of anderson and mclaws, and amounted to thirteen thousand men. that left at fredericksburg, as we have said, under general early, numbered six thousand men; and the twenty-one thousand which jackson had taken with him, to strike at the enemy's right, made up the full body of troops under lee, that is to say, a little over forty thousand, artillerymen included. the cavalry, numbering four or five thousand, were, like the absent federal cavalry, not actually engaged. in accordance with the plan agreed upon between lee and jackson, the force left in the enemy's front proceeded to engage their attention, and desultory fighting continued throughout the day. general lee meanwhile awaited the sound of jackson's guns west of chancellorsville, and must have experienced great anxiety at this trying moment, although, with his accustomed self-control, he displayed little or none. we shall now leave this comparatively interesting portion of the field, and invite the attention of the reader to the movements of general jackson, who was about to strike his last great blow, and lose his own life in the moment of victory. jackson set out at early dawn, having under him three divisions, commanded by rhodes and trimble, in all about twenty-one thousand men, and directed his march over the old mine road toward "the furnace," about a mile or so from and in front of the enemy's main line. stuart moved with his cavalry on the flank of the column, with the view of masking it from observation; and it reached and passed "the furnace," where a regiment with artillery was left to guard the road leading thence to chancellorsville, and repel any attack which might be made upon the rear of the column. just as the rear-guard passed on, the anticipated attack took place, and the regiment thus left, the twenty-third georgia, was suddenly surrounded and the whole force captured. the confederate artillery, however, opened promptly upon the assailing force, drove it back toward chancellorsville, and jackson proceeded on his march without further interruption. he had thus been seen, but it seems that the whole movement was regarded by general hooker as a retreat of the confederates southward, a bend in the road at this point toward the south leading to that supposition. "we know the enemy is flying," general hooker wrote, on the afternoon of this day, to general sedgwick, "trying to save his trains; two of sickles's divisions are among them." soon after leaving "the furnace," however, jackson, following the same wood-road, turned westward, and, marching rapidly between the walls of thicket, struck into the brock road, which runs in a direction nearly northwest toward germanna and ely's fords. this would enable him to reach, without discovery, the orange plank-road, or old turnpike, west of chancellorsville, as the woods through which the narrow highway ran completely barred him from observation. unless federal spies were lurking in the covert, or their scouting-parties of cavalry came in sight of the column, it would move as secure from discovery as though it were a hundred miles distant from the enemy; and against the latter danger of cavalry-scouts, stuart's presence with his horsemen provided. the movement was thus made without alarming the enemy, and the head of jackson's column reached the orange plank-road, near which point general fitz lee invited jackson to ride up to a slight elevation, from which the defences of the enemy were visible. jackson did so, and a glance showed him that he was not yet sufficiently upon the enemy's flank. he accordingly turned to an aide and said, pointing to the orange plank-road: "tell my column to cross that road." the column did so, continuing to advance toward the rapidan until it reached the old turnpike running from the "old wilderness tavern" toward chancellorsville. at this point, jackson found himself full on the right flank of general hooker, and, halting his troops, proceeded promptly to form line of battle for the attack. it was now past four in the afternoon, and the declining sun warned the confederates to lose no time. the character of the ground was, however, such as to dismay any but the most resolute, and it seemed impossible to execute the intended movement with any thing like rapidity in such a jungle. on both sides of the old turnpike rose a wall of thicket, through which it was impossible to move a regular line of battle. all the rules of war must be reversed in face of this obstacle, and the assault on general hooker's works seemed destined to be made in column of infantry companies, and with the artillery moving in column of pieces. despite these serious obstacles, jackson hastened to form such order of battle as was possible, and with rodes's division in front, followed by colston (trimble) and hill, advanced steadily down the old turnpike, toward chancellorsville. he had determined, not only to strike the enemy's right flank, but to execute, if possible, a still more important movement. this was, to extend his lines steadily to the left, swing round his left wing, and so interpose himself between general hooker and the rapidan. this design of unsurpassed boldness continued to burn in jackson's brain until he fell, and almost his last words were an allusion to it. the federal line of works, which the confederates thus advanced to assault, extended across the old turnpike near the house of melzi chancellor, and behind was a second line, which was covered by the federal artillery in the earthworks near chancellorsville. the eleventh corps, under general howard, was that destined to receive jackson's assault. this was made at a few minutes past five in the evening, and proved decisive. the federal troops were surprised at their suppers, and were wholly unprepared. they had scarcely time to run to their muskets, which were stacked[1] near at hand, when rodes burst upon them, stormed their works, over which the troops marched almost unresisted, and in a few minutes the entire corps holding the federal right was in hopeless disorder. rodes pressed on, followed by the division in his rear, and the affair became rather a hunt than a battle. the confederates pursued with yells, killing or capturing all with whom they could come up; the federal artillery rushed off at a gallop, striking against tree-trunks and overturning, and the army of general hooker seemed about to be hopelessly routed. this is the account given by northern writers, who represent the effect of jackson's sudden attack as indescribable. it had a serious effect, as will be subsequently shown, on the _morale_ both of general hooker and his army. while opposing the heavy demonstrations of general lee's forces on their left and in front, this storm had burst upon them from a quarter in which no one expected it; they were thus caught between two fires, and, ignorant as they were of the small number of the confederates, must have regarded the army as seriously imperilled. [footnote 1: "their arms were stacked, and the men were away from them and scattered about for the purpose of cooking their suppers."--_general hooker_.] jackson continued to pursue the enemy on the road to chancellorsville, intent now upon making his blow decisive by swinging round his left and cutting off the federal army from the rappahannock. it was impossible, however, to execute so important a movement until his troops were well in hand, and the two divisions which had made the attack had become mixed up in a very confused manner. they were accordingly directed to halt, and general a.p. hill, whose division had not been engaged, was sent for and ordered to advance to the front, thus affording the disordered divisions an opportunity to reform their broken lines. soon after dispatching this order, jackson rode out in front of his line, on the chancellorsville road, in order to reconnoitre in person, and ascertain, if possible, the position and movements of the enemy, then within a few hundred yards of him. it was now between nine and ten o'clock at night. the fighting had temporarily ceased, and the moon, half-seen through misty clouds, lit up the dreary thickets, in which no sound was heard but the incessant and melancholy cries of the whippoorwills. jackson had ridden forward about a hundred yards in advance of his line, on the turnpike, accompanied by a few officers, and had checked his horse to listen for any sound coming from the direction of chancellorsville, when suddenly a volley was fired by his own infantry on the right of the road, apparently directed at him and his companions, under the impression that they were a federal reconnoitring-party. several of the party fell from their horses, and, wheeling to the left, jackson galloped into the wood to escape a renewal of the fire. the result was melancholy. he passed directly in front of his men, who had been warned to guard against an attack of cavalry. in their excited state, so near the enemy, and surrounded by darkness, jackson was supposed to be a federal cavalryman. the men accordingly fired upon him, at not more than twenty paces, and wounded him in three places--twice in the left arm, and once in the right hand. at the instant when he was struck he was holding his bridle with his left hand, and had his right hand raised, either to protect his face from boughs, or in the strange gesture habitual to him in battle. as the bullets passed through his arm he dropped the bridle of his horse from his left hand, but seized it again with the bleeding fingers of his right hand, when the animal, wheeling suddenly, darted toward chancellorsville. in doing so he passed beneath the limb of a pine-tree, which struck the wounded man in the face, tore off his cap, and threw him back on his horse, nearly dismounting him. he succeeded, however, in retaining his seat, and regained the road, where he was received in the arms of captain wilbourn, one of his staff-officers, and laid at the foot of a tree. the fire had suddenly ceased, and all was again still. only captain wilbourn and a courier were with jackson, but a shadowy figure on horseback was seen in the edge of the wood near, silent and motionless. when captain wilbourn called to this person, and directed him to ride back and see what troops had thus fired upon them, the silent figure disappeared, and did not return. who this could have been was long a mystery, but it appears, from a recent statement of general revere, of the federal army, that it was himself. he had advanced to the front to reconnoitre, had come on the group at the foot of the tree, and, receiving the order above mentioned, had thought it prudent not to reveal his real character. he accordingly rode into the wood, and regained his own lines. a few words will terminate our account of this melancholy event in the history of the war--the fall of jackson. he was supported to the rear by his officers, and during this painful progress gave his last order. general pender recognized him, and stated that he feared he could not hold his position. jackson's eye flashed, and he replied with animation, "you must hold your ground, general pender! you must hold your ground, sir!" he was now so weak as to be unable to walk, even leaning on the shoulders of his officers. he was accordingly placed on a litter, and borne toward the rear. before the litter had gone far a furious artillery-fire swept the road from the direction of chancellorsville, and the bearers lowered it to the earth and lay down beside it. the fire relaxing, they again moved, but one of the bearers stumbled over a root and let the litter fall. jackson groaned, and as the moonlight fell upon his face it was seen to be so pale that he appeared to be about to die. when asked if he was much hurt, he opened his eyes, however, and said, "no, my friend, don't trouble yourself about me." he was then borne to the rear, placed in an ambulance, and carried to the hospital at the old wilderness tavern, where he remained until he was taken to guinea's station, where he died. such was the fate of lee's great lieutenant--the man whom he spoke of as his "right arm"--whose death struck a chill to the hearts of the southern people from which they never recovered. v. the battle of chancellorsville. general lee was not informed of the misfortune which had befallen his great lieutenant until toward daybreak on the next morning. this fact was doubtless attributable to the difficult character of the country; the interposition of the federal army between the two confederate wings, which rendered a long dã©tour necessary in reaching lee; and the general confusion and dismay attending jackson's fall. it would be difficult, indeed, to form an exaggerated estimate of the condition of jackson's corps at this time. the troops had been thrown into what seemed inextricable disorder, in consequence of the darkness and the headlong advance of the second (calston's) division upon the heels of rhodes, which had resulted in a complete intermingling of the two commands; and, to make matters worse, general a.p. hill, the second in command, had been wounded and disabled, nearly at the same moment with jackson, by the artillery-fire of the enemy. this transferred the command, of military right, to the brave and skilful general rhodes, the ranking officer after hill; but rhodes was only a brigadier-general, and had, for that reason, never come into personal contact with the whole corps, who knew little of him, and was not aware of jackson's plans, and distrusted, under these circumstances, his ability to conduct to a successful issue so vitally important an operation as that intrusted to this great wing of the southern army. stuart, who had gone with his cavalry toward ely's ford to make a demonstration on the federal rear, was therefore sent for, and rode as rapidly as possible to the scene of action, and the command was formally relinquished to him by general rhodes. jackson sent stuart word from wilderness tavern to "act upon his own judgment, and do what he thought best, as he had implicit confidence in him;" but, in consequence of the darkness and confusion, it was impossible for stuart to promptly reform the lines, and thus all things remained entangled and confused. it was essential, however, to inform general lee of the state of affairs, and jackson's chief-of-staff, colonel pendleton, requested captain wilbourn, who had witnessed all the details of the painful scene in the wood, to go to general lee and acquaint him with what had taken place, and receive his orders. from a ms. statement of this meritorious officer, we take these brief details of the interview: lee was found lying asleep in a little clump of pines near his front, covered with an oil-cloth to protect him from the dews of the night, and surrounded by the officers of his staff, also asleep. it was not yet daybreak, and the darkness prevented the messenger from distinguishing the commander-in-chief from the rest. he accordingly called for major taylor, lee's adjutant-general, and that officer promptly awoke when he was informed of what had taken place. as the conversation continued, the sound awoke general lee, who asked, "who is there?" major taylor informed him, and, rising upon his elbow, lee pointed to his blankets, and said: "sit down here by me, captain, and tell me all about the fight last evening." he listened without comment during the recital, but, when it was finished, said with great feeling: "ah! captain, any victory is dearly bought which deprives us of the services of general jackson, even for a short time." from this reply it was evident that he did not regard the wounds received by jackson as of a serious character--as was natural, from the fact that they were only flesh-wounds in the arm and hand--and believed that the only result would be a temporary absence of his lieutenant from command. as captain wilbourn continued to speak of the incident, lee added with greater emotion than at first: "ah! don't talk about it; thank god it is no worse!" he then remained silent, but seeing captain wilbourn rise, as if to go, he requested him to remain, as he wished to "talk with him some more," and proceeded to ask a number of questions in reference to the position of the troops, who was in command, etc. when informed that rhodes was in temporary command, but that stuart had been sent for, he exclaimed: "rhodes is a gallant, courageous, and energetic officer;" and asked where jackson and stuart could be found, calling for paper and pencil to write to them. captain wilbourn added that, from what he had heard jackson say, he thought he intended to get possession, if possible, of the road to united states ford in the federal rear, and so cut them off from the river that night, or early in the morning. at these words, lee rose quickly and said with animation, "these people must be pressed to-day." it would seem that at this moment a messenger--probably captain hotchkiss, jackson's skilful engineer--arrived from wilderness tavern, bringing a note from the wounded general. lee read it with much feeling, and dictated the following reply: general: i have just received your note informing me that you were wounded. i cannot express my regret at the occurrence. could i have directed events, i should have chosen, for the good of the country, to have been disabled in your stead. i congratulate you upon the victory, which is due to your skill and energy. r.e. lee, _general_. this was dispatched with a second note to stuart, directing him to assume command, and press the enemy at dawn. lee then mounted his horse, and, just as the day began to break, formed line of battle opposite the enemy's front, his line extending on the right to the plank-road running from chancellorsville in the direction of fredericksburg. this force, under the personal command of lee, amounted, as we have said, originally to about thirteen thousand men; and, as their loss had not been very severe in the demonstrations made against the enemy on the preceding days, they were in good condition. the obvious course now was to place the troops in a position which would enable them, in the event of stuart's success in driving the federal right, to unite the left of lee's line with the right of stuart, and so press the federal army back on chancellorsville and the river. we shall now return to the left wing of the army, which, in spite of the absence of the commanding general, was the column of attack, which was looked to for the most important results. in response to the summons of the preceding night, stuart had come back from the direction of ely's ford, at a swift gallop, burning with ardor at the thought of leading jackson's great corps into battle. the military ambition of this distinguished commander of lee's horse was great, and he had often chafed at the jests directed at the cavalry arm, and at himself as "only a cavalry-officer." he had now presented to him an opportunity of showing that he was a trained soldier, competent by his nerve and military ability to lead any arm of the service, and greeted the occasion with delight. the men of jackson had been accustomed to see that commander pass slowly along their lines on a horse as sedate-looking as himself, a slow-moving figure, with little of the "poetry of war" in his appearance. they now found themselves commanded by a youthful and daring cavalier on a spirited animal, with floating plume, silken sash, and a sabre which gleamed in the moonlight, as its owner galloped to and fro cheering the men and marshalling them for the coming assault as he led the lines afterward with joyous vivacity, his sabre drawn, his plume floating proudly, one of the men compared him to henry of navarre at the battle of ivry. but stuart's spirit of wild gayety destroyed the romantic dignity of the scene. he led the men of jackson against general hooker's breastworks bristling with cannon, singing "old joe hooker, will you come out of the wilderness!" this sketch will convey a correct idea of the officer who had now grasped the bã¢ton falling from the hand of the great marshal of lee. it was probable that the advance of the infantry under such a commander would partake of the rush and rapidity of a cavalry-charge; and the sequel justified this view. at early dawn the southern lines began to move. either in consequence of orders from lee, or following his own conception, stuart reversed the movement of jackson, who had aimed to swing round his left and cut off the enemy. he seemed to have determined to extend his right, with the view of uniting with the left of anderson's division under lee, and enclosing the enemy in the angle near chancellorsville. lee had moved at the same moment on their front, advancing steadily over all obstacles, and a northern writer, who witnessed the combined attack, speaks of it in enthusiastic terms: "from the large brick house which gives the name to this vicinity," says the writer, speaking of chancellorsville, "the enemy could be seen, sweeping slowly but confidently, determinedly and surely, through the clearings which extended in front. nothing could excite more admiration for the qualities of the veteran soldiers than the manner in which the enemy swept out, as they moved steadily onward, the forces which were opposed to them. we say it reluctantly, and for the first time, that the enemy have shown the finest qualities, and we acknowledge on this occasion their superiority in the open field to our own men. they delivered their fire with precision, and were apparently inflexible and immovable under the storm of bullets and shell which they were constantly receiving. coming to a piece of timber, which was occupied by a division of our own men, half the number were detailed to clear the woods. it seemed certain that here they would be repulsed, but they marched right through the wood, driving our own soldiers out, who delivered their fire and fell back, halted again, fired, and fell back as before, seeming to concede to the enemy, as a matter of course, the superiority which they evidently felt themselves. our own men fought well. there was no lack of courage, but an evident feeling that they were destined to be beaten, and the only thing for them to do was to fire and retreat." this description of the steady advance of the southern line applies rather to the first portion of the attack, which compelled the front line of the federal army to retire to the stronger ground in rear. when this was reached, and the troops of lee saw before them the last citadel, the steady advance became a rush. the divisions of anderson and mclaws, on the right, made a determined charge upon the great force under generals hancock, slocum, and others, in that quarter, and stuart closed in on the federal right, steadily extending his line to join on to anderson. the spectacle here was superb. as the troops rushed on, stuart shouted, "charge! and remember jackson!" and this watchword seemed to drive the line forward. with stuart leading them, and singing, in his joyous voice, "old joe hooker, will you come out of the wilderness!"--for courage, poetry, and seeming frivolity, were strangely mingled in this great soldier--the troops went headlong at the federal works, and in a few moments the real struggle of the battle of chancellorsville had begun. from this instant, when the lines, respectively commanded in person by lee and by stuart, closed in with the enemy, there was little manoeuvring of any description. it was an open attempt of lee, by hard fighting, to crush in the enemy's front, and force them back upon the river. in this arduous struggle it is due to stuart to say that his generalship largely decided the event, and the high commendation which he afterward received from general lee justifies the statement. as his lines went to the attack, his quick military eye discerned an elevated point on his right, from which it appeared an artillery-fire woulden filade the federal line. about thirty pieces of cannon were at once hastened to this point, and a destructive fire opened on the lines of general slocum, which threw his troops into great confusion. so serious was this fire that general slocum sent word to general hooker that his front was being swept away by it, to which the sullen response was, "i cannot make soldiers or ammunition!" general hooker was indeed, it seems, at this moment in no mood to take a hopeful view of affairs. the heavy assault of jackson appears to have as much demoralized the federal commander as his troops. during the night he had erected a semicircular line of works, in the form of a redan, in his rear toward the river, behind which new works he no doubt contemplated falling back. he now awaited the result of the southern attack, leaning against a pillar of the porch at the chancellorsville house, when a cannon-ball struck the pillar, throwing it down, and so stunning the general as to prevent him from retaining the command, which was delegated to general couch. [illustration: chancellorsville] the fate of the day had now been decided. the right wing of the southern army, under lee, had gradually extended its left to meet the extension of stuart's right; and this junction of the two wings having been effected, lee took personal command of all, and advanced his whole front in a decisive assault. before this the federal front gave way, and the disordered troops were huddled back--now only a confused and disorganized mass--upon chancellorsville. the southern troops pursued with yells, leaping over the earthworks, and driving all before them. a scene of singular horror ensued. the chancellorsville house, which had been set on fire by shell, was seen to spout flame from every window, and the adjoining woods had, in like manner, caught fire, and were heard roaring over the dead and wounded of both sides alike. the thicket had become the scene of the cruellest of all agonies for the unfortunates unable to extricate themselves. the whole spectacle in the vicinity of the chancellorsville house, now in lee's possession, was frightful. fire, smoke, blood, confused yells, and dying groans, mingled to form the dark picture. lee had ridden to the front of his line, following up the enemy, and as he passed before the troops they greeted him with one prolonged, unbroken cheer, in which those wounded and lying upon the ground united. in that cheer spoke the fierce joy of men whom the hard combat had turned into blood-hounds, arousing all the ferocious instincts of the human soul. lee sat on his horse, motionless, near the chancellorsville house, his face and figure lit up by the glare of the burning woods, and gave his first attention, even at this exciting moment, to the unfortunates of both sides, wounded, and in danger of being burned to death. while issuing his orders on this subject, a note was brought to him from jackson, congratulating him upon his victory. after reading it, with evidences of much emotion, he turned to the officer who had brought it and said: "say to general jackson that the victory is his, and that the congratulation is due to him." the federal army had fallen back in disorder, by this time, toward their second line. it was about ten o'clock in the morning, and chancellorsville was in lee's possession. flank movement of general sedgwick. lee hastened to bring the southern troops into order again, and succeeded in promptly reforming his line of battle, his front extending, unbroken, along the old turnpike, facing the river. his design was to press general hooker, and reap those rich rewards of victory to which the hard fighting of the men had entitled them. of the demoralized condition of the federal forces there can be no doubt, and the obvious course now was to follow up their retreat and endeavor to drive them in disorder beyond the rappahannock. the order to advance upon the enemy was about to be given, when a messenger from fredericksburg arrived at full gallop, and communicated intelligence which arrested the order just as it was on lee's lips. a considerable force of the enemy was advancing up the turnpike from fredericksburg, to fall upon his right flank, and upon his rear in case he moved beyond chancellorsville. the column was that of general sedgwick. this officer, it will be remembered, had been detached to make a heavy demonstration at fredericksburg, and was still at that point, with his troops drawn up on the southern bank, three miles below the city, on saturday night, while jackson was fighting. on that morning general hooker had sent for reynolds's corps, but, even in the absence of this force, general sedgwick retained under him about twenty-two thousand men; and this column was now ordered to storm the heights at fredericksburg, march up the turnpike, and attack lee in flank. general sedgwick received the order at eleven o'clock on saturday night, about the time when jackson was carried wounded to the rear. he immediately made his preparations to obey, and at daylight moved up from below the city to storm the ridge at marye's, and march straight upon chancellorsville. in the first assaults he failed, suffering considerable loss from the fire of the southern troops under general barksdale, commanding the line at that point; but, subsequently forming an assaulting column for a straight rush at the hill, he went forward with impetuosity; drove the southern advanced line from behind the "stone wall," which generals sumner and hooker had failed in reaching, and, about eleven in the morning, stormed marye's hill, and killed, captured, or dispersed, the entire southern force there. the confederates fought hand to hand over their guns with the enemy for the possession of the crest, but their numbers were inadequate; the entire surviving force fell back over the telegraph road southward, and general sedgwick promptly advanced up the turnpike leading from fredericksburg to chancellorsville, to assail general lee. it was the intelligence of this threatening movement which now reached lee, and induced him to defer further attack at the moment upon general hooker. he determined promptly to send a force against general sedgwick, and this resolution seems to have been based upon sound military judgment. there was little to be feared now from general hooker, large as the force still was under that officer. he was paralyzed for the time, and would not probably venture upon any attempt to regain possession of chancellorsville. with general sedgwick it was different. his column was comparatively fresh, was flushed with victory, and numbered, even after his loss of one thousand, more than twenty thousand men. compared with the entire federal army, this force was merely a detachment, it was true, but it was a detachment numbering as many men, probably, as the effective of lee's entire army at chancellorsville. he had carried into that fight about thirty-four thousand men. his losses had been heavy, and the commands were much shaken. to have advanced under these circumstances upon general hooker, without regard to general sedgwick's twenty thousand troops, inspired by recent victory, would have resulted probably in disaster. these comments may detract from that praise of audacity accorded to lee in making this movement. it seems rather to have been the dictate of common-sense; to have advanced upon general hooker would have been the audacity. it was thus necessary to defer the final blow at the main federal army in his front, and general lee promptly detached a force of about five brigades to meet general sedgwick, which, with early's command, now in rear of the federal column, would, it was supposed, suffice. this body moved speedily down the turnpike to check the enemy, and encountered the head of his column about half-way, near salem church. general wilcox, who had been sent by lee to watch banks's ford, had already moved to bar the federal advance. when the brigades sent by lee joined him, the whole force formed line of battle: a brisk action ensued, continuing from about four in the afternoon until nightfall, when the fighting ceased, and general sedgwick made no further attempt to advance on that day. these events took place, as we have said, on sunday afternoon, the day of the federal defeat at chancellorsville. on monday morning (may 4th), the theatre of action on the southern bank of the rappahannock presented a very remarkable complication. general early had been driven from the ridge at fredericksburg; but no sooner had general sedgwick marched toward chancellorsville, than early returned and seized upon marye's heights again. he was thus in general sedgwick's rear, and ready to prevent him from recrossing the rappahannock at fredericksburg. sedgwick meanwhile was moving to assail lee's flank and rear, and lee was ready to attack general hooker in front. such was the singular entanglement of the northern and southern forces on monday morning after the battle of chancellorsville. what the result was to be the hours of that day were now to decide. lee resolved first, if possible, to crush general sedgwick, when it was his design to return and make a decisive assault upon general hooker. in accordance with this plan, he on monday morning went in personal command of three brigades of anderson's division, reached the vicinity of salem church, and proceeded to form line of battle with the whole force there. owing to unforeseen delays, the attack was not begun until late in the afternoon, when the whole line advanced upon general sedgwick, lee's aim being to cut him off from the river. in this he failed, the stubborn resistance of the federal forces enabling them to hold their ground until night. at that time, however, they seemed to waver and lose heart, whether from receiving intelligence of general hooker's mishap, or from other causes, is not known. they were now pressed by the southern troops, and finally gave way. general sedgwick retreated rapidly but in good order to banks's ford, where a pontoon had been fortunately laid, and this enabled him to cross his men. the passage was effected under cover of darkness, the southern cannon firing upon the retreating column; and, with this, ended the movement of general sedgwick. on tuesday morning lee returned with his men toward chancellorsville, and during the whole day was busily engaged in preparation for a decisive attack upon general hooker on the next morning. when, however, the southern sharp-shooters felt their way, at daylight, toward the federal position, it was found that the works were entirely deserted. general hooker had recrossed the river, spreading pine-boughs on the pontoon bridge to muffle the sound of his artillery-wheels. so the great advance ended. vii. lee's generalship and personal demeanor during the campaign. the movements of the two armies in the chancellorsville campaign, as it is generally styled, have been so fully described in the foregoing pages, that little comment upon them is here necessary. the main feature which attracts attention, in surveying the whole series of operations, is the boldness, amounting to apparent recklessness, of lee; and, first, the excellent generalship, and then the extraordinary tissue of military errors, of general hooker. up to the 1st of may, when he emerged from the chancellorsville thicket, every thing had succeeded with the federal commander, and deserved to succeed. he had successfully brought over his great force, which he himself described as the "finest army on the planet," and occupied strong ground east of chancellorsville, on the road to fredericksburg. general sedgwick was absent at the latter place with a strong detachment of the army, but the main body covered banks's ford, but twelve miles from the city, and by the afternoon of this day the whole army might have been concentrated. then the fate of lee would seem to have been decided. he had not only a very small army, but that army was scattered, and liable to be cut off in detail. general sedgwick menaced his right at fredericksburg--general hooker was in front of his left near chancellorsville--and to crush one of these wings before the other could come to its assistance seemed a work of no very great difficulty. general hooker appears, however, to have distrusted his ability to effect this result, and, finding that general lee was advancing with his main body to attack him, retired, from his strong position in the open country, to the dense thicket around chancellorsville. that this was a grave military error there can be no doubt, as, by this retrograde movement, general hooker not only discouraged his troops, who had been elated by his confident and inspiring general orders, but lost the great advantage of the open country, where his large force could be successfully manoeuvred. lee took instant advantage of this fault in his adversary, and boldly pressed the force retiring into the wilderness, where, on the night of the 1st of may, general hooker was shut up with his army. this unforeseen result presented the adversaries now in an entirely new light. the federal army, which had been promised by its commander a speedy march upon richmond in pursuit of lee, had, instead of advancing, made a backward movement; and lee, who it had been supposed would retreat, was now following and offering them battle. the daring resolution of lee, to divide his army and attack the federal right, followed. it would seem unjust to general hooker greatly to blame him for the success of that blow, which could not have been reasonably anticipated. in determining upon this, one of the most extraordinary movements of the war, general lee proceeded in defiance of military rules, and was only justified in his course by the desperate character of the situation of affairs. it was impossible to make any impression upon general hooker's front or left, owing to the elaborate defences in both quarters; it was, therefore, necessary either to retire, or attack in a different direction. as a retreat, however, upon richmond would have surrendered to the enemy a large and fertile tract of country, it was desirable, if possible, to avoid that alternative; and the attack on the federal right followed. the results of this were truly extraordinary. the force routed and driven back in disorder by general jackson was but a single corps, and that corps, it is said, not a legitimate part of the old army of the potomac; but the disorder seems to have communicated itself to the whole army, and to have especially discouraged general hooker. in describing the scene in question, we refrained from dwelling upon the full extent of the confusion into which the federal forces were thrown: some sentences, taken from northern accounts, may lead to a better understanding of the result. after jackson's assault, a northern historian says: "the open plain around chancellorsville presented such a spectacle as a simoom sweeping over the desert might make. through the dusk of nightfall a rushing whirlwind of men and artillery and wagons swept down the road, past headquarters, and on toward the fords of the rappahannock; and it was in vain that the staff opposed their persons and drawn sabres to the panic-stricken fugitives." another writer, an eye-witness, says the spectacle presented was that of "solid columns of infantry retreating at double-quick; a dense mass of beings flying; hundreds of cavalry-horses, left riderless at the first discharge from the rebels, dashing frantically about in all directions; scores of batteries flying from the field; battery-wagons, ambulances, horses, men, cannon, caissons, all jumbled and tumbled together in one inextricable mass--the stampede universal, the disgrace general." after all, however, it was but one corps of the federal army which had been thus thrown into disorder, and general hooker had no valid grounds for distrusting his ability to defeat lee in a more decisive action. there are many reasons for coming to the conclusion that he did from that moment distrust his powers. he had courageously hastened to the assailed point, ordering the men to "throw themselves into the breach," and receive jackson's troops "on the bayonet;" but, after this display of soldierly resolution, general hooker appears to have lost some of that nerve which should never desert a soldier, and on the same night sent engineers to trace out a new line of defences in his rear, to which, it seems, he already contemplated the probability of being forced to retire. why he came to take this depressed view of the situation of affairs, it is difficult to say. one of general sedgwick's corps reached him on this night, and his force at chancellorsville still amounted to between ninety and one hundred thousand men, about thrice that of lee. no decisive trial of strength had yet taken place between the two armies; and yet the larger force was constructing defences in rear to protect them from the smaller--a circumstance not tending, it would seem, to greatly encourage the troops whose commander was thus providing for a safe retreat. the subsequent order to general sedgwick to march up from fredericksburg and assail lee's right was judicious, and really saved the army from a great disaster. lee was about to follow up the discouraged forces of general hooker as they fell back toward the river; and, as the southern army was flushed with victory, the surrender of the great body might have ensued. this possible result was prevented by the flank movement of general sedgwick, and some gratitude for assistance so important from his able lieutenant would have seemed natural and graceful in general hooker. this view of the subject does not seem, however, to have been taken by the federal commander. he subsequently charged the defeat of chancellorsville upon general sedgwick, who he declared had "failed in a prompt compliance with his orders."[1] the facts do not bear out this charge, as the reader has seen. general sedgwick received the order toward midnight on saturday, and, at eleven o'clock on sunday morning, had passed over that stubborn "stone wall" which, in the battle of the preceding december, general hooker's column had not even been able to reach; had stormed marye's hill, which general hooker had described, in vindication of his own failure to carry the position, as "masonry," "a fortification," and "a mountain of rock;" and had marched thereafter so promptly as to force lee, in his own defence, to arrest the second advance upon the federal main body, and divert a considerable force to meet the attack on his flank. [footnote 1: general hooker in report of the committee on the conduct of the war, part i., page 130. this great collection is a valuable repository of historic details, and contains the explanation of many interesting questions.] after the repulse of general sedgwick, and his retreat across the rappahannock, general hooker seems to have been completely discouraged, and hastened to put the river between himself and lee. his losses in the battles of saturday and sunday had amounted to seventeen thousand one hundred and ninety-seven killed and wounded and missing, fourteen pieces of artillery, and twenty thousand stand of arms. the confederate loss was ten thousand two hundred and eighty-one. contrary to the ordinary course of things the assailing force had lost a less number of men than that assailed. the foregoing reflections, which necessarily involve a criticism of general hooker, arise naturally from a review of the events of the campaign, and seem justified by the circumstances. there can be no inducement for the present writer to underrate the military ability of the federal commander, as that want of ability rather detracts from than adds to the merit of general lee in defeating him. it may be said, indeed, that without these errors and shortcomings of general hooker, lee, humanly speaking, must have been either defeated or forced to retire upon richmond. after giving full weight, however, to all the advantages derived from the extraordinary federal oversights and mistakes, general lee's merit in this campaign was greater, perhaps, than in any other during his entire career. had he left behind him no other record than this, it alone would have been sufficient to have conferred upon him the first glories of arms, and handed his name down to posterity as that of one of the greatest soldiers of history. it is difficult to discover a single error committed by him, in the whole series of movements, from the moment when general sedgwick crossed at fredericksburg, to the time of general hooker's retreat beyond the rappahannock. it may appear that there was unnecessary delay in permitting tuesday to pass without a final advance upon general hooker, in his second line of intrenchments; but, no doubt, many circumstances induced lee to defer this attack--the fatigue of his troops, consequent upon the fighting of the four preceding days, friday, saturday, sunday, and monday; the necessity of reforming his battalions for the final blow; and the anticipation that general hooker, who still had at his command a force of more than one hundred thousand men, would not so promptly relinquish his campaign, and retire. with the exception of this error, if it be such, lee had made no single false step in the whole of his movements. the campaign was round, perfect, and complete--such as a student of the art of war might pore over, and analyze as an instance of the greatest principles of military science "clothed in act." the most striking features of lee's movements were their rapidity and audacity. it had been the fashion with some persons to speak of lee as slow and cautious in his operations, and this criticism had not been completely silenced even in the winter of 1862, when his failure to crush general burnside afforded his detractors another opportunity of repeating the old charge. after the chancellorsville campaign these fault-finders were silenced--no one could be found to listen to them. the whole southern movement completely contradicted their theory. at the first intelligence of the advance of general hooker's main body across the upper rappahannock, lee rode rapidly in that direction, and ordered his troops at the fords of the river to fall back to chancellorsville. he then returned, and, finding that general sedgwick had crossed at fredericksburg, held a prompt consultation with jackson, when it was decided at once to concentrate the main body of the army in front of general hooker's column. at the word, jackson moved; lee followed. on the 1st of may, the enemy were pressed back upon chancellorsville; on the 2d, his right was crushed, and his army thrown into confusion; on the 3d, he was driven from chancellorsville, and, but for the flank movement of general sedgwick, which lee was not in sufficient force to prevent, general hooker would, upon that same day, sunday, have in all probability suffered a decisive defeat. in the course of four days lee had thus advanced, and checked, and then attacked and repulsed with heavy slaughter, an army thrice as large as his own. on the last day of april he had been nearly enveloped by a host of about one hundred and twenty thousand men. on the 3d day of may their main body was in disorderly retreat; and at daylight on the morning of the 6th there was not a federal soldier, with the exception of the prisoners taken, on the southern bank of the rappahannock. during all these critical scenes, when the fate of the confederate capital, and possibly of the southern cause, hung suspended in the balance, general lee preserved, as thousands of persons can testify, the most admirable serenity and composure, without that jubilant confidence displayed by general hooker in his address to the troops, and the exclamations to his officers. lee was equally free from gloom or any species of depression. his spirits seemed to rise under the pressure upon him, and at times he was almost gay. when one of general jackson's aides hastened into his tent near fredericksburg, and with great animation informed him that the enemy were crossing the river, in heavy force in his front, he seemed to be amused by that circumstance, and said, smiling: "well, i _heard_ firing, and i was beginning to think it was time some of you lazy young fellows were coming to tell me what it was all about. say to general jackson that he knows just as well what to do with the enemy as i do." the commander-in-chief who could find time at such a moment to indulge in _badinage_, must have possessed excellent nerve; and this composure, mingled with a certain buoyant hopefulness, as of one sure of the event, remained with lee throughout the whole great wrestle with general hooker. he retained to the end his simple and quiet manner, divested of every thing like excitement. in the consultation with jackson, on the night of the 1st of may, when the crisis was so critical, his demeanor indicated no anxiety; and when, as we have said, the news came of jackson's wound, he said simply, "sit down here, by me, captain, and tell me all about the fight last evening"--adding, "ah! captain, any victory is dearly bought which deprives us of the services of general jackson even for a short time. don't talk about it--thank god, it is no worse!" the turns of expression here are those of a person who permits nothing to disturb his serenity, and indulges his gentler and tenderer feelings even in the hot atmosphere of a great conflict. the picture presented is surely an interesting and beautiful one. the human being who uttered the good-natured criticism at the expense of the "lazy young fellows," and who greeted the news of jackson's misfortune with a sigh as tender as that of a woman, was the soldier who had "seized the masses of his force with the grasp of a titan, and swung them into position as a giant might fling a mighty stone." to general hooker's threat to crush him, he had responded by crushing general hooker; nearly surrounded by the huge cordon of the federal army, he had cut the cordon and emerged in safety. general hooker with his one hundred thousand men had retreated to the north bank of the rappahannock, and, on the south bank, lee with his thirty thousand remained erect, threatening, and triumphant. we have not presented in these pages the orders of lee, on various occasions, as these papers are for the most part of an "official" character, and not of great interest to the general reader. we shall, however, occasionally present these documents, and here lay before the reader the orders of both general hooker and general lee, after the battle of chancellorsville, giving precedence to the former. the order of the federal commander was as follows: headquarters army of the potomac, _may_ 6,1863. the major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. if it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. it is sufficient to say, they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resources. in withdrawing from the south bank of the rappahannock, before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence in its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it represents. by fighting at a disadvantage, we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the army of the potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command it. by the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and passage of the river were undisputed, and on our withdrawal not a rebel dared to follow us. the events of the last week may well cause the heart of every officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride. we have added new laurels to our former renown. we have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments, and, whenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have received. we have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners, and fifteen colors, captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed _hors de combat_ eighteen thousand of our foe's chosen troops. we have destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores, damaged his communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. we have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions, and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitration of battle. by command of major-general hooker: s. williams, _assistant adjutant-general_ general lee's order was as follows: headquarters army of northern virginia, _may_ 7,1863. with heart-felt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged. under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields forced him once more to seek safety beyond the rappahannock. while this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to return our grateful thanks to the only giver of victory, for the signal deliverances he has wrought. it is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite on sunday next in ascribing unto the lord of hosts the glory due unto his name. let us not forget, in our rejoicing, the brave soldiers who have fallen in defence of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example. the army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one to whose bravery, energy, and skill, they are so much indebted for success. the following letter from the president of the confederate states is communicated to the army, as an expression of his appreciation of their success: "i have received your dispatch, and reverently unite with you in giving praise to god for the success with which he has crowned our arms. in the name of the people i offer my cordial thanks, and the troops under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series of great victories which our army has achieved. the universal rejoicing produced by this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and the wounded." r.e. lee, _general_. viii. personal relations of lee and jackson. the most important incident of the great battle of chancellorsville was the fall of jackson. the services of this illustrious soldier had now become almost indispensable to general lee, who spoke of him as his "right arm;" and the commander-in-chief had so long been accustomed to lean upon the strong shoulder of his lieutenant, that now, when this support was withdrawn, he seems to have felt the loss of it profoundly. in the war, indeed, there had arisen no soldier who so powerfully drew the public eye as jackson. in the opinion of many persons, he was a greater and abler commander than lee himself; and, although such an opinion will not be found to stand after a full review of the characters and careers of the two leaders, there was sufficient ground for it to induce many fair and intelligent persons to adopt it. jackson had been almost uniformly successful. he had conducted to a triumphant issue the arduous campaign of the valley, where he was opposed in nearly every battle by a force much larger than his own; and these victories, in a quarter so important, and at a moment so critical, had come, borne on the wind of the mountain, to electrify and inspire the hearts of the people of richmond and the entire confederacy. jackson's rapid march and assault on general mcclellan's right on the chickahominy had followed; he then advanced northward, defeated the vanguard of the enemy at cedar mountain, led the great column of lee against the rear of general pope, destroyed manassas, held his ground until lee arrived, and bore an important part in the battle which ensued. thence he had passed to maryland, fallen upon harper's ferry and captured it, returned to fight with lee at sharpsburg, and in that battle had borne the brunt of the enemy's main assault with an unbroken front. that the result was a drawn battle, and not a southern defeat, was due to lee's generalship and jackson's fighting. the retrograde movement to the lowland followed, and jackson was left in the valley to embarrass mcclellan's advance. in this he perfectly succeeded, and then suddenly reappeared at fredericksburg, where he received and repulsed one of the two great assaults of the enemy. the battle of chancellorsville followed, and lee's statement of the part borne in this hard combat by jackson has been given. the result was due, he said, not to his own generalship, but to the skill and energy of his lieutenant, whose congratulations he refused to receive, declaring that the victory was jackson's. here had at last ended the long series of nearly unbroken victories. jackson had become the _alter ego_ of lee, and it is not difficult to understand the sense of loss felt by the commander-in-chief. in addition to this natural sentiment, was deep regret at the death of one personally dear to him, and to whom he was himself an object of almost reverent love. the personal relations of lee and jackson had, from first to last, remained the same--not the slightest cloud had ever arisen to disturb the perfect union in each of admiration and affection for the other. it had never occurred to these two great soldiers to ask what their relative position was in the public eye--which was most spoken of and commended or admired. human nature is weak at best, and the fame of jackson, mounting to its dazzling zenith, might have disturbed a less magnanimous soul than lee's. there is not, however, the slightest reason to believe that lee ever gave the subject a thought. entirely free from that vulgar species of ambition which looks with cold eyes upon the success of others, as offensive to its own _amour-propre_ lee never seems to have instituted any comparison between himself and jackson--greeted praise of his famous lieutenant with sincere pleasure--and was the first upon every occasion, not only to express the fullest sense of jackson's assistance, and the warmest admiration of his genius as a soldier, but to attribute to him, as after the battle of chancellorsville, _all_ the merit of every description. it is not possible to contemplate this august affection and admiration of the two soldiers for each other, without regarding it as a greater glory to them than all their successes in arms. lee's opinion of jackson, and personal sentiment toward him, have been set forth in the above sentences. the sentiment of jackson for lee was as strong or stronger. he regarded him with mingled love and admiration. to excite such feelings in a man like jackson, it was necessary that lee should be not only a soldier of the first order of genius, but also a good and pious man. it was in these lights that jackson regarded his commander, and from first to last his confidence in and admiration for him never wavered. he had defended lee from the criticism of unskilled or ignorant persons, from the time when he assumed command of the army, in the summer of 1862. at that time some one spoke of lee, in jackson's presence, as "slow." the criticism aroused the indignation of the silent soldier, and he exclaimed: "general lee is _not_ 'slow.' no one knows the weight upon his heart--his great responsibilities. he is commander-in-chief, and he knows that, if an army is lost, it cannot be replaced. no! there may be some persons whose good opinion of me may make them attach some weight to my views, and, if you ever hear that said of general lee, i beg you will contradict it in my name. i have known general lee for five-and-twenty years. he is cautious. he ought to be. but he is _not_ 'slow.' lee is a phenomenon. he is the only man whom i would follow blindfold!" the abrupt and energetic expressions of jackson on this occasion indicate his profound sense of the injustice done lee by these criticisms; and it would be difficult to imagine a stronger statement than that here made by him. it will be conceded that he himself was competent to estimate soldiership, and in jackson's eyes lee was "a phenomenon--the only man whom he would follow blindfold." the subsequent career of lee seems to have strengthened and intensified this extreme admiration. what lee advised or did was always in jackson's eyes the very best that could be suggested or performed. he yielded his own opinions, upon every occasion, with perfect readiness and cheerfulness to those of lee, as to the master-mind; loved him, revered him, looked up to him, and never seems to have found fault with him but upon one occasion--when he received lee's note of congratulation after chancellorsville. he then said: "general lee is very kind; but he should give the glory to god." this affection and admiration were fully returned by general lee, who consulted jackson upon every occasion, and confided in him as his personal friend. there was seldom any question between them of superior and subordinate--never, except when the exigency required that the decision should be made by lee as commander-in-chief. jackson's supreme genius, indeed, made this course natural, and no further praise is due lee in this particular, save that of modesty and good sense; but these qualities are commendable and not universal. he committed the greatest undertakings to jackson with the utmost confidence, certain that he would do all that could be done; and some words of his quoted above express this entire confidence. "say to general jackson," he replied to the young staff-officer at fredericksburg, "that he knows just as well what to do with the enemy as i do." lee's personal affection was strikingly displayed after the battle of chancellorsville, when jackson lay painfully, but no one supposed mortally, wounded, first at wilderness tavern, and then at ginney's. prevented from visiting the wounded man, by the responsibilities of command, now all the greater from jackson's absence, and not regarding his hurt as serious, as indeed it did not appear to be until toward the last, lee sent him continual messages containing good wishes and inquiries after his health. the tone of these messages is very familiar and affectionate, and leaves no doubt of the character of the relations between the two men. "give him my affectionate regards," he said to one officer, "and tell him to make haste and get well, and come back to me as soon as he can. he has lost his left arm, but i have lost my right." when the wound of the great soldier took a bad turn, and it began to be whispered about that the hurt might prove fatal, lee was strongly moved, and said with deep feeling: "surely general jackson must recover! god will not take him from us, now that we need him so much. surely he will be spared to us, in answer to the many prayers which are offered for him!" he paused after uttering these words, laboring evidently under very deep and painful emotion. after remaining silent for some moments, he added: "when you return i trust you will find him better. when a suitable occasion offers, give him my love, and tell him that i wrestled in prayer for him last night, as i never prayed, i believe, for myself." the tone of these messages is, as we have said, that of familiar affection, as from one valued friend to another. the expression, "give him my love," is a virginianism, which is used only when two persons are closely and firmly bound by long association and friendship. such had been the case with lee and jackson, and in the annals of the war there is no other instance of a friendship so close, affectionate, and unalloyed. jackson died on the 10th of may, and the unexpected intelligence shocked lee profoundly. he mourned the death of the illustrious soldier with a sorrow too deep almost to find relief in tears; and issued a general order to the troops, which was in the following words: with deep grief the commanding general announces to the army the death of lieutenant-general t.j. jackson, who expired on the 10th inst., at quarter-past three p.m. the daring, skill, and energy of this great and good soldier, by the decree of an all-wise providence, are now lost to us. but, while we mourn his death, we feel that his spirit still lives, and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in god, as our hope and strength. let his name be a watchword to his corps, who have followed him to victory on so many fields. let his officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do every thing in defence of our beloved country. r.e. lee, _general_. it is probable that the composition of this order cost general lee one of the severest pangs he ever experienced. ix. circumstances leading to the invasion of pennsylvania. the defeat of general hooker at chancellorsville was the turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was apparently a possibility of inducing the federal government to relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate authority in the south. the idea of the formation of a southern confederacy, distinct from the old union, had, up to this time, been repudiated by the authorities at washington as a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the federal arms in the two great battles of the rappahannock had caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt whether the south could be coerced to return to the union; and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of president lincoln, declaring the slaves of the south free, and placing the united states virtually under martial law, aroused a violent clamor from the great democratic party of the north, who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was disappearing. this combination of non-success in military affairs and usurpation by the government emboldened the advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the liberties of the country. journals and periodicals, violently denunciatory of the course pursued by the government, all at once made their appearance in new york and elsewhere. a peace convention was called to meet in philadelphia. mr. vallandigham, nominee of the democratic party for governor of ohio, eloquently denounced the whole policy of endeavoring to subjugate the sovereign states of the south; and judge curtis, of boston, formerly associate judge of the supreme court of the united states, published a pamphlet in which the federal president was stigmatized as a usurper and tyrant. "i do not see," wrote judge curtis, "that it depends upon the executive decree whether a servile war shall be invoked to help twenty millions of the white race to assert the rightful authority of the constitution and laws of their country over those who refuse to obey them. but i do see that this proclamation" (emancipating the southern slaves) "asserts the power of the executive to make such a decree! i do not perceive how it is that my neighbors and myself, residing remote from armies and their operations, and where all the laws of the land may be enforced by constitutional means, should be subjected to the possibility of arrest and imprisonment and trial before a military commission, and punishment at its discretion, for offences unknown to the law--a possibility to be converted into a fact at the mere will of the president, or of some subordinate officer, clothed by him with this power. but i do perceive that this executive power is asserted.... it must be obvious to the meanest capacity that, if the president of the united states has an _implied_ constitutional right, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of war, to disregard any one positive prohibition of the constitution, or to exercise any one power not delegated to the united states by the constitution, because in his judgment he may thereby 'best subdue the enemy,' he has the same right, for the same reason, to disregard each and every provision of the constitution, and to exercise all power _needful in his opinion_ to enable him 'best to subdue the enemy.' ... the time has certainly come when the people of the united states _must_ understand and _must_ apply those great rules of civil liberty which have been arrived at by the self-devoted efforts of thought and action of their ancestors during seven hundred years of struggle against arbitrary power." so far had reached the thunder of lee's guns at chancellorsville. their roar seemed to have awakened throughout the entire north the great party hitherto lulled to slumber by the plea of "military necessity," or paralyzed by the very extent of the executive usurpation which they saw, but had not had heart to oppose. on all sides the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard raising their importunate voices; and in the north the hearts of the people began to thrill with the anticipation of a speedy termination of the bloody and exhausting struggle. the occasion was embraced by mr. stephens, vice-president of the confederate states, to propose negotiations. this able gentleman wrote from georgia on the 12th of june to president davis, offering to go to washington and sound the authorities there on the subject of peace. he believed that the moment was propitious, and wished to act before further military movements were undertaken--especially before any further projects of invasion by lee--which would tend, he thought, to silence the peace party at the north, and again arouse the war spirit. the letter of mr. stephens was written on the 12th of june, and president davis responded by telegraph a few days afterward, requesting mr. stephens to come to richmond. he reached that city on the 22d or 23d of june, but by that time lee's vanguard was entering maryland, and gettysburg speedily followed, which terminated all hopes of peace. the plan of moving the southern army northward, with the view of invading the federal territory, seems to have been the result of many circumstances. the country was elated with the two great victories of fredericksburg and chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of southern steel. the army, which had been largely augmented by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall of longstreet's two divisions from suffolk, shared the general enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the authorities and on general lee, in favor of a forward movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a treaty of peace. lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it. he was not opposed to an offensive policy, and seems, indeed, to have shared the opinion of jackson that "the scipio africanus policy" was the best for the south. his theory from the beginning of the war had been, that the true policy of the south was to keep the enemy as far as possible from the interior, fighting on the frontier or on federal soil, if possible. that of the south would there thus be protected from the ravages of the enemy, and the further advantage would accrue, that the confederate capital, richmond, would at all times be safe from danger. this was an important consideration, as events subsequently showed. as long as the enemy were held at arm's-length, north of the rappahannock, richmond, with her net-work of railroads connecting with every part of the south, was safe, and the government, undisturbed in their capital, remained a power in the eyes of the world. but, with an enemy enveloping the city, and threatening her lines of communication, the tenure of the place by the government was uncertain. when general grant finally thus enveloped the city, and laid hold upon the railroads, lee's army was defeated, and the government became fugitive, which alone would have struck a mortal blow to its prestige and authority. it was to arrive at these results, which his sagacity discerned, that lee always advocated such movements as would throw back the enemy, and drive him, if possible, from the soil of virginia. another important consideration was the question of supplies. these were at all times deficient in the confederate armies, and it was obviously the best policy to protect as much territory, from which supplies might be drawn, as possible. more than ever before, these supplies were now needed; and when general lee sent, in may or june, a requisition for rations to richmond, the commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper, "if general lee wishes rations, let him seek them in pennsylvania." the considerations here stated were the main inducements for that great movement northward which followed the battle of chancellorsville. the army and country were enthusiastic; the government rather followed than led; and, throughout the month of may, lee was busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the decisive advance. experience had now dictated many alterations and improvements in the army. it was divided into three _corps d'armã©e_, each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. longstreet remained at the head of his former corps, ewell succeeded jackson in command of "jackson's old corps," and a.p. hill was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two others. the infantry was thus rearranged in a manner to increase greatly its efficiency, and the artillery arm was entirely reorganized. the old system of assigning one or more batteries or battalions to each division or corps was done away with, and the artillery of the army was made a distinct command, and placed under general w.n. pendleton, a brave and energetic officer, who was thenceforward lee's "chief of artillery." the last arm, the cavalry, was also increased in efficiency; and, on the last day of may, general lee had the satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped and admirably-officered army of sixty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty-two bayonets, and nearly ten thousand cavalry and artillery--in all, about eighty thousand men. never before had the southern army had present for duty, as fighting men, so large a number, except just before the battles on the chickahominy. there was, however, this great difference between the army then and at this time: in those first months of 1862, it was made up largely of raw troops who had never heard the discharge of a musket in their lives: while now, in may, 1863 the bulk of the army consisted of lee's veterans, men who had followed him through the fire of manassas, sharpsburg, fredericksburg, and chancellorsville, and could be counted on to effect any thing not absolutely beyond human power. general longstreet, conversing after the war with a gentleman of the north, declared as much. the army at that time, he said, was in a condition to undertake _any thing_. x. lee's plans and objects. the great game of chess was now about to commence, and, taking an illustration from that game, general lee is reported to have said that he believed he would "swap queens," that is, advance and attempt to capture the city of washington, leaving general hooker at liberty, if he chose so to do, to seize in turn upon richmond. what the result of so singular a manoeuvre would have been, it is impossible to say; it would certainly have proved one of the strangest incidents of a war fruitful in varied and shifting events. such a plan of operations, however, if ever seriously contemplated by lee, was speedily abandoned. he nowhere makes mention of any such design in his published reports, and he probably spoke of it only in jest. his real aim in the great movement now about to commence, is stated with brevity and reserve--then absolutely necessary--but also with sufficient clearness, in his official report. the position of the enemy opposite fredericksburg was, he says, such as to render an attack upon him injudicious. it was, therefore, desirable to manoeuvre him out of it--force him to return toward maryland--and thus free the country of his forces. a further result was expected from this movement. the lower shenandoah valley was occupied by the enemy under general milroy, who, with his headquarters at winchester, harassed the whole region, which he ruled with a rod of iron. with the withdrawal of the federal army under general hooker, and before the advance of the confederates, general milroy would also disappear, and the fertile fields of the valley be relieved. the whole force of the enemy would thus, says lee, "be compelled to leave virginia, and possibly to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country." he adds: "in this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations and the preparations that they would require. in addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success," that is to say, by a battle which lee intended to fight when circumstances were favorable. that he expected to fight, not merely to manoeuvre the enemy from virginia, is apparent from another sentence of the report. "it was thought," he says, "that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might _offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army therein, commanded by general hooker_" the word "therein" referring to the region "north of the potomac." in the phrase, "other valuable results which might be attained by military success," the reference is plainly to the termination of the contest by a treaty of peace, based upon the independence of the south. these sentences, taken from the only publication ever made by lee on the subject of the gettysburg campaign, express guardedly, but distinctly, his designs. he aimed to draw general hooker north of the potomac, clear the valley, induce the enemy to send troops in other quarters to the assistance of the main federal army, and, when the moment came, attack general hooker, defeat him if possible, and thus end the war. that a decisive defeat of the federal forces at that time in maryland or pennsylvania, would have virtually put an end to the contest, there seems good reason to believe. following the southern victories of fredericksburg and chancellorsville, a third bloody disaster would, in all human probability, have broken the resolution of the federal authorities. with lee thundering at the gates of washington or philadelphia, and with the peace party encouraged to loud and importunate protest, it is not probable that the war would have continued. intelligent persons in the north are said to have so declared, since the war, and the declaration seems based upon good sense. before passing from this necessary preface to the narrative of events, it is proper to add that, in the contemplated battle with general hooker, when he had drawn him north of the potomac, lee did not intend to assume a _tactical offensive_, but to force the federal commander, if possible, to make the attack. [footnote: "it had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy."--_lee's report_] from this resolution he was afterward induced by circumstances to depart, and the result is known. what is above written will convey to the reader a clear conception of lee's views and intentions in undertaking his last great offensive campaign; and we now proceed to the narrative of the movements of the two armies, and the battle of gettysburg. xi. the cavalry-fight at fleetwood. lee began his movement northward on the 3d day of june, just one month after the battle of chancellorsville. from this moment to the time when his army was concentrated in the vicinity of gettysburg, his operations were rapid and energetic, but with a cautious regard to the movements of the enemy. pursuing his design of manoeuvring the federal army out of virginia, without coming to action, lee first sent forward one division of longstreet's corps in the direction of culpepper, another then followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of june, ewell's entire corps was sent in the same direction--a.p. hill remaining behind on the south bank of the rappahannock, near fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to richmond. these movements became speedily known to general hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below fredericksburg, and crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite hill. this threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by lee to arrest his own movements. seeing that the presence of the enemy there was "intended for the purpose of observation rather than attack," and only aimed to check his operations, he continued the withdrawal of his troops, by way of culpepper, in the direction of the shenandoah valley. a brilliant pageant, succeeded by a dramatic and stirring incident, was now to prelude the march of lee into the enemy's territory. on the 8th of june, the day of the arrival of lee's head of column in culpepper, a review of stuart's cavalry took place in a field east of the court-house. the review was a picturesque affair. general lee was present, sitting his horse, motionless, on a little knoll--the erect figure half concealed by the short cavalry-cape falling from his shoulders, and the grave face overshadowed by the broad gray hat--while above him, from a lofty pole, waved the folds of a large confederate flag. the long column of about eight thousand cavalry was first drawn up in line, and afterward passed in front of lee at a gallop--stuart and his staff-officers leading the charge with sabres at tierce point, a species of military display highly attractive to the gallant and joyous young commander. the men then charged in mimic battle the guns of the "stuart horse-artillery," which were posted upon an adjoining hill; and, as the column of cavalry approached, the artillerists received them with a thunderous discharge of blank ammunition, which rolled like the roar of actual battle among the surrounding hills. this sham-fight was kept up for some time, and no doubt puzzled the enemy on the opposite shore of the rappahannock. on the next morning--either in consequence of a design formed before the review, or to ascertain what this discharge of artillery meant--two divisions of federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of "picked infantry," were sent across the river at kelly's and beverley's fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the quarters of stuart and find what was going on in the southern camps. the most extensive cavalry-fight, probably, of the whole war, followed. one of stuart's brigades, near beverley's ford, was nearly surprised and resolutely attacked at daylight by buford's division, which succeeded in forcing back the brigade a short distance toward the high range called fleetwood hill, in the rear. from this eminence, where his headquarters were established, stuart went to the front at a swift gallop, opened a determined fire of artillery and sharp-shooters upon the advancing enemy, and sent hampton's division to attack them on their left. meanwhile, however, the enemy were executing a rapid and dangerous movement against stuart's, rear. general gregg, commanding the second federal cavalry division, crossed at kelly's ford below, passed the force left in that quarter, and came in directly on stuart's rear, behind fleetwood hill. in the midst of the hard fight in front, stuart was called now to defend his rear. he hastened to do so by falling back and meeting the enemy now charging the hill. the attack was repulsed, and the enemy's artillery charged in turn by the southerners. this was captured and recaptured two or three times, but at last remained in the hands of stuart. general gregg now swung round his right, and prepared to advance along the eastern slope of the hill. stuart had, however, posted his artillery there, and, as the federal line began to move, arrested it with a sudden and destructive fire of shell. at the same time a portion of hampton's division, under the brave georgian, general p.m.b. young, was ordered to charge the enemy. the assault was promptly made with the sabre, unaided by carbine or pistol fire, and young cut down or routed the force in front of him, which dispersed in disorder toward the river. the dangerous assault on the rear of fleetwood hill was thus repulsed, and the advance of the enemy on the left, near the river, met with the same ill success. general w.h.f. lee, son of the commanding general, gallantly charged them in that quarter, and drove them back to the rappahannock, receiving a severe wound, which long confined him to his bed. hampton had followed the retreating enemy on the right, under the fire of stuart's guns from fleetwood hill; and by nightfall the whole force had recrossed the rappahannock, leaving several hundred dead and wounded upon the field. [footnote: the southern loss was also considerable. colonel williams was killed, generals lee and butler severely wounded--the latter losing his foot--and general stuart's staff had been peculiarly unfortunate. of the small group of officers, captain farley was killed, captain white wounded, and lieutenant goldsborough captured. the federal force sustained a great loss in the death of the gallant colonel davis, of the eighth new-york cavalry, and other officers.] this reconnoissance in force--the federal numbers probably amounting to fifteen thousand--had no other result than the discovery of the fact that lee had infantry in culpepper. finding that the event of the fight was critical, general lee had moved a body of infantry in the direction of the field of action, and the gleam of the bayonets was seen by the enemy. the infantry was not, however, engaged on either side, unless the federal infantry participated in the initial skirmish near beverley's ford, and general lee's numbers and position were not discovered. we have dwelt with some detail upon this cavalry combat, which was an animated affair, the hand-to-hand encounter of nearly twenty thousand horsemen throughout a whole day. general stuart was censured at the time for allowing himself to be "surprised," and a ball at culpepper court-house, at which some of his officers were present several days before, was pointed to as the origin of this surprise. the charge was wholly unjust, stuart not having attended the ball. nor was there any truth in the further statement that "his headquarters were captured" in consequence of his negligence. his tents on fleetwood hill were all sent to the rear soon after daylight; nothing whatever was found there but a section of the horse-artillery, who fought the charging cavalry with sabres and sponge-staffs over the guns; that fleetwood hill was at one time in the hands of the enemy, was due not to stuart's negligence, but to the numbers and excellent soldiership of general gregg, who made the flank and rear attack while stuart was breasting that in front. these detached statements, which may seem unduly minute, are made in justice to a brave soldier, who can no longer defend himself. xii. the march to gettysburg. this attempt of the enemy to penetrate his designs had not induced general lee to interrupt the movement of his infantry toward the shenandoah valley. the federal corps sent across the rappahannock at fredericksburg, still remained facing general hill; and, two days after the fleetwood fight. general hooker moved up the river with his main body, advancing the third corps to a point near beverley's ford. but these movements were disregarded by lee. on the same day ewell's corps moved rapidly toward chester gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by way of front royal, and reached winchester on the evening of the 13th, having in three days marched seventy miles. the position of the southern army now exposed it to very serious danger, and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of soldiership in the general commanding it. in face of an enemy whose force was at least equal to his own,[footnote: general hooker stated his "effective" at this time to have been diminished to eighty thousand infantry.] lee had extended his line until it stretched over a distance of about one hundred miles. when ewell came in sight of winchester, hill was still opposite fredericksburg, and longstreet half-way between the two in culpepper. between the middle and rear corps was interposed the rapidan river, and between the middle and advanced corps the blue ridge mountains. general hooker's army was on the north bank of the rappahannock, well in hand, and comparatively massed, and the situation of lee's army seemed excellent for the success of a sudden blow at it. it seems that the propriety of attacking the southern army while thus _in transitu_, suggested itself both to general hooker and to president lincoln, but they differed as to the point and object of the attack. in anticipation of lee's movement, general hooker had written to the president, probably suggesting a counter-movement across the rappahannock, somewhere near fredericksburg, to threaten richmond, and thus check lee's advance. this, however. president lincoln refused to sanction. "in case you find lee coming to the north of the rappahannock," president lincoln wrote to general hooker, "i would by no means cross to the south of it. i would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, _like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other_" five days afterward the president wrote: "i think lee's army, and not richmond, is your true objective point. if he comes toward the upper potomac, fight him when opportunity offers. if he stays where he is, _fret him and fret him_." when intelligence now reached washington that the head of lee's column was approaching the upper potomac, while the rear was south of the rappahannock, the president wrote to general hooker: "_if the head of lee's army is at martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road_ between fredericksburg and chancellorsville, the _animal must be very slim somewhere--could you not break him?_" general hooker did not seem to be able to determine upon a decisive course of action, in spite of the tempting opening presented to him by lee. it would seem that nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an attack upon hill at fredericksburg, which would certainly have checked lee's movement by recalling longstreet from culpepper, and ewell from the valley. but this bold operation did not appear to commend itself to the federal authorities. instead of reã«nforcing the corps sent across at fredericksburg and attacking hill, general hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall back toward manassas, and even remained in ignorance, it seems, of all connected with his adversary's movements. even as late as the 17th of june, his chief-of-staff, general butterfield, wrote to one of his officers; "try and hunt up somebody from pennsylvania who knows something, and has a cool enough head to judge what is the actual state of affairs there with regard to the enemy. _my impression is, that lee's movement on the upper potomac is a cover for a cavalry-raid on the south side of the river.... we cannot go boggling around until we know what we are going after._" such was the first result of lee's daring movement to transfer military operations to the region north of the potomac. a northern historian has discerned in his plan of campaign an amount of boldness which "seemed to imply a great contempt for his opponent." this is perhaps a somewhat exaggerated statement of the case. without "boldness" a commander is but half a soldier, and it may be declared that a certain amount of that quality is absolutely essential to successful military operations. but the question is, did lee expose himself, by these movements of his army, to probable disaster, if his adversary--equal to the occasion--struck at his flank? a failure of the campaign of invasion would probably have resulted from such an attack either upon hill at fredericksburg, or upon longstreet in culpepper, inasmuch as ewell's column, in that event, must have fallen back. but a _defeat_ of the combined forces of hill and longstreet, who were within supporting distance of each other, was not an event which general hooker could count upon with any degree of certainty. the two corps numbered nearly fifty thousand men--that is to say, two-thirds of the southern army; general hooker's whole force was but about eighty thousand; and it was not probable that the eighty thousand would be able to rout the fifty thousand, when at chancellorsville less than this last number of southerners had defeated one hundred and twenty thousand. there seems little reason to doubt that general lee took this view of the subject, and relied on hill and longstreet to unite and repulse any attack upon them, while ewell's great "raiding column" drove forward into the heart of the enemy's territory. that the movement was bold, there can certainly be no question; that it was a reckless and hazardous operation, depending for its success, in lee's eyes, solely on the supposed inefficiency of general hooker, does not appear. these comments delay the narrative, but the subject is fruitful in suggestion. it may be pardoned a southern writer if he lingers over this last great offensive movement of the southern army. the last, it was also one of the greatest and most brilliant. the war, therefore, was to enter upon its second stage, in which the south was to simply maintain the defensive. but lee was terminating the first stage of the contest by one of those great campaigns which project events and personages in bold relief from the broad canvas, and illumine the pages of history. events were now in rapid progress. ewell's column--the sharp head of the southern spear--reached winchester on the 13th of june, and rodes, who had been detached at front royal to drive the enemy from berryville, reached the last-named village on the same day when the force there retreated to winchester. on the next morning early's division attacked the forces of milroy at winchester, stormed and captured their "star fort," on a hill near the place, and so complete was the rout of the enemy that their commander, general milroy, had scarcely time to escape, with a handful of his men, in the direction of the potomac. for this disaster the unfortunate officer was harshly criticised by general hooker, who wrote to his government, "in my opinion, milroy's men will fight better _under a soldier_." after thus clearing the country around winchester, ewell advanced rapidly on martinsburg, where he took a number of prisoners and some artillery. the captures in two days had been more than four thousand prisoners and twenty-nine cannon, with four hundred horses and a large amount of stores. ewell continued then to advance, and, entering maryland, sent a portion of his cavalry, under general imboden, westward, to destroy the baltimore and ohio railroad, and another body, under general jenkins, in advance, toward chambersburg. meanwhile, the rest of the army was moving to join him. hill, finding that the enemy had disappeared from his front near fredericksburg, hastened to march from that vicinity, and was sent forward by lee, on the track of ewell, passing in rear of longstreet, who had remained in culpepper. the latter was now directed by lee to move along the eastern side of the blue ridge, and, by occupying ashby's and snicker's gaps, protect the flank of the column in the valley from attack--a work in which stuart's cavalry, thrown out toward the enemy, assisted. such was the posture of affairs when general hooker's chief-of-staff became so much puzzled, and described the federal army as "boggling around," and not knowing "what they were going after." lee's whole movement, it appears, was regarded as a feint to "cover a cavalry-raid on the south side of the river"--a strange conclusion, it would seem, in reference to a movement of such magnitude. it now became absolutely necessary that lee's designs should be unmasked, if possible; and to effect this object stuart's cavalry force, covering the southern flank, east of the blue ridge, must be driven back. this was undertaken in a deliberate manner. three corps of cavalry, with a division of infantry and a full supply of artillery, were sent forward from the vicinity of manassas, to drive stuart in on all the roads leading to the mountain. a fierce struggle followed, in which stuart, who knew the importance of his position, fought the great force opposed to him from every hill and knoll. but he was forced back steadily, in spite of a determined resistance, and at upperville a hand-to-hand sabre-fight wound up the movement, in which the federal cavalry was checked, when stuart fell back toward paris, crowned the mountain-side with his cannon, and awaited a final attack. this was not, however, made. night approaching, the federal force fell back toward manassas, and on the next morning stuart followed them, on the same road over which he had so rapidly retreated, beyond middleburg. lee paid little attention to these operations on his flank east of the mountains, but proceeded steadily, in personal command of his infantry, in the direction of the cumberland valley. ewell was moving rapidly toward harrisburg, with orders to "take" that place "if he deemed his force adequate,"[1] general jenkins, commanding cavalry, preceding the advance of his infantry. he had thus pierced the enemy's territory, and it was necessary promptly to support him. hill and longstreet were accordingly directed to pass the potomac at shepherdstown and williamsport. the columns united at hagerstown, and on the 27th of june entered chambersburg. [footnote 1: this statement of lee's orders is derived by the writer from lieutenant-general ewell.] general hooker had followed, crossing the potomac, opposite leesburg, at about the moment when lee's rear was passing from maryland into pennsylvania. the direction of the federal march was toward frederick, from which point general hooker could move in either one of two directions--either across the mountain toward boonsboro, which would throw him upon lee's communications, or northward to westminster, or gettysburg, which would lead to an open collision with the invading army in a pitched battle. at this juncture of affairs, just as the federal army was concentrating near frederick, general hooker, at his own request, was relieved from command. the occasion of this unexpected event seems to have been a difference of opinion between himself and general halleck, the federal general-in-chief, on the question whether the fortifications at harper's ferry should or should not be abandoned. the point at issue would appear to have been unimportant, but ill feeling seems to have arisen: general hooker resented the action of the authorities, and requested to be relieved; his request was complied with, and his place was filled by major-general george g. meade. [illustration: map--sketch of the country around gettysburg.] general meade, an officer of excellent soldiership, and enjoying the repute of modesty and dignity, assumed command of the federal army, and proceeded rapidly in pursuit of lee. the design of moving directly across the south mountain on lee's communications, if ever entertained by him, was abandoned. the outcry from pennsylvania drew him perforce. ewell, with one division, had penetrated to carlisle; and early, with another division, was at york; everywhere the horses, cattle, and supplies of the country, had been seized upon for the use of the troops; and general meade was loudly called upon to go to the assistance of the people thus exposed to the terrible rebels. his movements were rapid. assuming command on june 28th, he began to move on the 29th, and on the 30th was approaching the town of gettysburg.[1] [footnote 1: the movements of the federal commander were probably hastened by the capture, about this time at hagerstown, of a dispatch from president davis to general lee. lee, it seems, had suggested that general beauregard should be sent to make a demonstration in the direction of culpepper, and by thus appearing to threaten washington, embarrass the movements of the northern army. to this suggestion the president is said to have replied that he had no troops to make such a movement; and general meade had thus the proof before him that washington was in no danger. the confederacy was thus truly unfortunate again, as in september, 1862, when a similar incident came to the relief of general mcclellan.] xiii. lee in pennsylvania. lee, in personal command of the corps of hill and longstreet, had meanwhile moved on steadily in the direction of the susquehanna, and, reaching chambersburg on the 27th of june, "made preparations to advance upon harrisburg." at chambersburg he issued an order to the troops, which should find a place in every biography of this great soldier. the course pursued by many of the federal commanders in virginia had been merciless and atrocious beyond words. general pope had ravaged the counties north of the rappahannock, especially the county of culpepper, in a manner which reduced that smiling region wellnigh to a waste; general milroy, with his headquarters at winchester, had so cruelly oppressed the people of the surrounding country as to make them execrate the very mention of his name; and the excesses committed by the troops of these officers, with the knowledge and permission of their commanders, had been such, said a foreign writer, as to "cast mankind two centuries back toward barbarism." now, the tables were turned, and the world looked for a sudden and merciless retaliation on the part of the southerners. lee was in pennsylvania, at the head of an army thirsting to revenge the accumulated wrongs against their helpless families. at a word from him the fertile territory of the north would be made to feel the iron pressure of military rule, proceeding on the theory that retaliation is a just principle to adopt toward an enemy. fire, slaughter, and outrage, would have burst upon pennsylvania, and the black flag, which had been virtually raised by generals pope and milroy, would have flaunted now in the air at the head of the southern army. instead of permitting this disgraceful oppression of non-combatants, lee issued, at chambersburg, the following general order to his troops: headquarters army of northern virginia, chambersburg, pa., _june_ 27, 1863. the commanding general has observed with much satisfaction the conduct of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results commensurate with the high spirit they have manifested. no troops could have displayed greater fortitude, or better performed the arduous marches of the past ten days. their conduct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been in keeping with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise. there have, however, been instances of forgetfulness, on the part of some, that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties exacted of us by civilization and christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own. the commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and, through it, our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages on the innocent and defenceless, and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators, and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movements. it must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemy, without offending against him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain. the commanding general, therefore, earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, with most scrupulous care, from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property; and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject. r.e. lee, _general_. the noble maxims and truly christian spirit of this paper will remain the undying glory of lee. under what had been surely a bitter provocation, he retained the calmness and forbearance of a great soul, saying to his army: "the duties exacted of us by civilization and christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own.... no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of outrage upon the innocent and defenceless.... we make war only upon armed men, and cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without offending against him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain." such were the utterances of lee, resembling those we might attribute to the ideal christian warrior; and, indeed, it was such a spirit that lay under the plain uniform of the great virginian. what he ordered was enforced, and no one was disturbed in his person or property. of this statement many proofs could be given. a pennsylvania farmer said to a northern correspondent, in reference to the southern troops: "i must say they acted like gentlemen, and, their cause aside, i would rather have forty thousand rebels quartered on my premises than one thousand union troops." from the journal of colonel freemantle, an english officer accompanying the southern army, we take these sentences: "in passing through greencastle we found all the houses and windows shut up, the natives in their sunday clothes, standing at their doors regarding the troops in a very unfriendly manner. i saw no straggling into the houses, nor were any of the inhabitants disturbed or annoyed by the soldiers. sentries were placed at the doors of many of the best houses, to prevent any officer or soldier from getting in on any pretence.... i entered chambersburg at 6 p.m.... sentries were placed at the doors of all the principal houses, and the town was cleared of all but the military passing through or on duty.... no officer or soldier under the rank of a general is allowed in chambersburg without a special order from general lee, which he is very chary of giving, and i hear of officers of rank being refused this pass.... i went into chambersburg again, and witnessed the singularly good behavior of the troops toward the citizens. i heard soldiers saying to one another that they did not like being in a town in which they were very naturally detested. to any one who has seen, as i have, the ravages of the northern troops in southern towns, this forbearance seems most commendable and surprising." a northern correspondent said of the course pursued by general jenkins, in command of ewell's cavalry: "by way of giving the devil his due, it must be said that, although there were over sixty acres of wheat and eighty acres of corn and oats in the same field, he protected it most carefully, and picketed his horses so that it could not be injured. no fences were wantonly destroyed, poultry was not disturbed, nor did he compliment our blooded cattle so much as to test the quality of their steak and roast." of the feeling of the troops these few words from the letter of an officer written to one of his family will convey an idea: "i felt when i first came here that i would like to revenge myself upon these people for the devastation they have brought upon our own beautiful home--that home where we could have lived so happily, and that we loved so much, from which their vandalism has driven you and my helpless little ones. but, though i had such severe wrongs and grievances to redress, and such great cause for revenge, yet, when i got among these people, i could not find it in my heart to molest them." such was the treatment of the people of pennsylvania by the southern troops in obedience to the order of the commander-in-chief. lee in person set the example. a southern journal made the sarcastic statement that he became irate at the robbing of cherry-trees; and, if he saw the _top rail_ of a fence lying upon the ground as he rode by, would dismount and replace it with his own hands. xiv. concentration at gettysburg. this was the position of the great adversaries in the last days of june. lee was at chambersburg, in the cumberland valley, about to follow ewell, who was approaching harrisburg. early had captured york; and the federal army was concentrating rapidly on the flank of the southern army, toward gettysburg. lee had ordered the movement of early upon york, with the object of diverting the attention of the federal commander from his own rear, in the cumberland valley. the exact movements and position of general meade were unknown to him; and this arose in large measure from the absence of stuart's cavalry. this unfortunate incident has given rise to much comment, and stuart has been harshly criticised for an alleged disobedience of lee's plain orders. the question is an embarrassing one. lee's statement is as follows: "general stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains" (ashby's and other gaps in the blue ridge, in virginia), "and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible should he attempt to cross the potomac. _in that event, general stuart was directed to move into maryland, crossing the potomac east or west of the blue ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced._" this order was certainly plain up to a certain point. stuart was to harass and embarrass the movements of the enemy, in case they attempted to cross to the north bank of the potomac. when they did cross, he also was to pass the river, either east or west of the blue ridge, "as in his judgment should seem best." so far the order was unmistakable. the river was to be crossed at such point as stuart should select, either on the lower waters, or in the valley. lee added, however, that this movement should be made in such a manner as to enable stuart to "take position on the right of our column as it advanced"--the meaning appearing to be that the cavalry should move _between_ the two armies, in order to guard the southern flank as it advanced into the cumberland valley. circumstances arose, however, which rendered it difficult for stuart to move on the line thus indicated with sufficient promptness to render his services valuable. the enemy crossed at leesburg while the southern cavalry was near middleburg; and, from the jaded condition of his horses, stuart feared that he would be unable, in case he crossed above, to place his column between the two armies then rapidly advancing. he accordingly took the bold resolution of passing the potomac _below_ leesburg, designing to shape his course due northward toward harrisburg, the objective point of the southern army. this he did--crossing at seneca falls--but on the march he was delayed by many incidents. near rockville he stopped to capture a large train of federal wagons; at westminster and hanovertown he was temporarily arrested by combats with the federal cavalry; and, ignorant as he was of the concentration of lee's troops upon gettysburg, he advanced rapidly toward carlisle, where, in the midst of an attack on that place, he was recalled by lee. such were the circumstances leading to, and the incidents attending, this movement. the reader must form his own opinion of the amount of blame to be justly attached to stuart. he always declared, and asserted in his report of these occurrences, that he had acted in exact obedience to his orders; but, on the contrary, as appears from general lee's report, those orders were meant to prescribe a different movement. he had marched in one sense on "the right" of the southern column "as it advanced;" but in another sense he had not done so. victory at gettysburg would have silenced all criticism of this difference of construction; but, unfortunately, the event was different, and the strictures directed at stuart were natural. the absence of the cavalry unquestionably embarrassed lee greatly; but, in his report, he is moderate and guarded, as usual, in his expressions. "the absence of cavalry," he says, "rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information" of general meade's movements; and "the march toward gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the federal army been known." [illustration: map--battle of gettysburg] to return now to the movements of lee's infantry, after the arrival of the main body at chambersburg. lee was about to continue his advance in the direction of harrisburg, when, on the night of the 29th, his scouts brought him intelligence that the federal army was rapidly advancing, and the head of the column was near the south mountain. a glance at the map will indicate the importance of this intelligence. general meade would be able, without difficulty, in case the southern army continued its march northward, to cross the south-mountain range, and place himself directly in lee's rear, in the cumberland valley. then the southern forces would be completely intercepted--general meade would be master of the situation--and lee must retreat east of the mountain or cut his way through the federal army. a battle was thus clearly about to be forced upon the southern commander, and it only remained for him to so manoeuvre his army as to secure a position in which he could receive the enemy's attack with advantage. lee accordingly put his column in motion across the mountain toward gettysburg, and, sending couriers to ewell and early to return from harrisburg and york toward the same point, made his preparations to take position and fight. on the morning of the 1st day of july, this was then the condition of affairs. general meade was advancing with rapidity upon the town of gettysburg, and lee was crossing the south mountain, opposite chambersburg, to meet him. when the heads of the two columns came together in the vicinity of gettysburg, the thunders of battle began. xv. the first day's fight at gettysburg. the sanguinary struggle which now ensued between the army of northern virginia and the army of the potomac continued for three days, and the character of these battles, together with their decisive results, have communicated to the events an extraordinary interest. every fact has thus been preserved, and the incidents of the great combat, down to the most minute details, have been placed upon record. the subject is, indeed, almost embarrassed by the amount of information collected and published; and the chief difficulty for a writer, at this late day, is to select from the mass such salient events as indicate clearly the character of the conflict. this difficulty the present writer has it in his power to evade, in great measure, by confining himself mainly to the designs and operations of general lee. these were plain and simple. he had been forced to relinquish his march toward the susquehanna by the dangerous position of general meade so near his line of retreat; this rendered a battle unavoidable; and lee was now moving to accept battle, designing, if possible, to secure such a position as would give him the advantage in the contest. before he succeeded in effecting this object, battle was forced upon him--not by general meade, but by simple stress of circumstances. the federal commander had formed the same intention as that of his adversary--to accept, and not deliver, battle--and did not propose to fight near gettysburg. he was, rather, looking backward to a strong position in the direction of westminster, when suddenly the head of his column became engaged near gettysburg, and this determined every thing. a few words are necessary to convey to the reader some idea of the character of the ground. gettysburg is a town, nestling down in a valley, with so many roads centring in the place that, if a circle were drawn around it to represent the circumference of a wheel, the roads would resemble the spokes. a short distance south of the town is a ridge of considerable height, which runs north and south, bending eastward in the vicinity of gettysburg, and describing a curve resembling a hook. from a graveyard on this high ground it is called cemetery hill, or ridge. opposite this ridge, looking westward, is a second and lower range called seminary ridge. this extends also north and south, passing west of gettysburg. still west of seminary ridge are other still lower ranges, between which flows a small stream called willoughby run; and beyond these, distant about ten miles, rise the blue heights of the south mountain. across the south mountain, by way of the village of cashtown, lee, on the morning of the 1st of july, was moving steadily toward gettysburg, when hill, holding the front, suddenly encountered the head of the enemy's column in the vicinity of willoughby run. this consisted of general buford's cavalry division, which had pushed on in advance of general reynolds's infantry corps, the foremost infantry of the federal army, and now, almost before it was aware of hill's presence, became engaged with him. general buford posted his horse-artillery to meet hill's attack, but it soon became obvious that the federal cavalry could not stand before the southern infantry fire, and general reynolds, at about ten in the morning, hastening forward, reached the field. an engagement immediately took place between the foremost infantry divisions of hill and reynolds. a brigade of hill's, from mississippi, drove back a federal brigade, seizing upon its artillery; but, in return, archer's brigade was nearly surrounded, and several hundred of the men captured. almost immediately after this incident the federal forces sustained a serious loss; general reynolds--one of the most trusted and energetic lieutenants of general meade--was mortally wounded while disposing his men for action, and borne from the field. the federal troops continued, however, to fight with gallantry. some of the men were heard exclaiming, "we have come to stay!" in reference to which, one of their officers afterward said, "and a very large portion of them never left that ground."[1] [footnote 1: general doubleday: report of committee on the conduct of the war, part i., p. 307.] battle was now joined in earnest between the two heads of column, and on each side reã«nforcements were sent forward to take part in this unexpected encounter. neither general lee nor general meade had expected or desired it. both had aimed, in manoeuvring their forces, to select ground suitable for receiving instead of making an attack, and now a blind chance seemed about to bring on a battle upon ground unknown to both commanders. when the sound of the engagement was first heard by lee, he was in the rear of his troops at the headquarters which hill had just vacated, near cashtown, under the south mountain. the firing was naturally supposed by him to indicate an accidental collision with some body of the enemy's cavalry, and, when intelligence reached him that hill was engaged with the federal infantry, the announcement occasioned him the greatest astonishment. general meade's presence so near him was a circumstance completely unknown to lee, and certainly was not desired by him. but a small portion of his forces were "up." longstreet had not yet passed the mountain, and the forces of general ewell, although that officer had promptly fallen back, in obedience to his orders, from the susquehanna, were not yet in a position to take part in the engagement. under these circumstances, if the whole of general meade's army had reached gettysburg, directly in lee's front, the advantage in the approaching action must be largely in favor of the federal army, and a battle might result in a decisive confederate defeat. no choice, however, was now left general lee. the head of his advancing column had come into collision with the enemy, and it was impossible to retire without a battle. lee accordingly ordered hill's corps to be closed up, and reã«nforcements to be sent forward rapidly to the point of action. he then mounted his horse and rode in the direction of the firing, guided by the sound, and the smoke which rose above the tranquil landscape. it was a beautiful day and a beautiful season of the year. the fields were green with grass, or golden with ripening grain, over which passed a gentle breeze, raising waves upon the brilliant surface. the landscape was broken here and there by woods; in the west rose the blue range of the south mountain; the sun was shining through showery clouds, and in the east the sky was spanned by a rainbow. this peaceful scene was now disturbed by the thundering of artillery and the rattle of musketry. the sky was darkened, here and there, by clouds of smoke rising from barns or dwelling-houses set on fire by shell; and beneath rose red tongues of flame, roaring in response to the guns. each side had now sent forward reinforcements to support the vanguards, and an obstinate struggle ensued, the proportions of the fight gradually increasing, until the action became a regular battle. hill, although suffering from indisposition, which the pallor of his face indicated, met the federal attack with his habitual resolution. he was hard pressed, however, when fortunately one of general ewell's divisions, under rodes, dã©bouched from the carlisle road, running northward from gettysburg, and came to his assistance. ewell had just begun to move from carlisle toward harrisburg--his second division, under early, being at york--when a dispatch from lee reached him, directing him to return, and "proceed to gettysburg or cashtown, as his circumstances might direct." he promptly obeyed, encamped within about eight miles of gettysburg on the evening of the 30th, and was now moving toward cashtown, where johnson's division of his corps then was, when hill sent him word that he needed his assistance. rodes was promptly sent forward to the field of action. early was ordered to hurry back, and rodes soon reached the battle-field, where he formed his line on high ground, opposite the federal right. the appearance of this important reã«nforcement relieved hill, and caused the enemy to extend his right to face rodes. the federal line thus resembled a crescent, the left half, fronting hill, toward the northwest; and the right, half-fronting rodes, toward the north--the town of gettysburg being in rear of the curve. an obstinate attack was made by the enemy and by rodes at nearly the same moment. the loss on both sides was heavy, but rodes succeeded in shaking the federal right, when early made his appearance from the direction of york. this compelled the federal force to still farther extend its right, to meet the new attack. the movement greatly weakened them. rodes charged their centre with impetuosity; early came in on their right, with gordon's brigade in front, and under this combined attack the federal troops gave way, and retreated in great disorder to and through gettysburg, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded to the number of about five thousand, and the same number of prisoners in the hands of the confederates. the first collision of the two armies had thus resulted in a clear southern victory, and it is to be regretted that this important success was not followed up by the seizure of the cemetery range, south of the town, which it was in the power of the southern forces at that time to do. to whom the blame--if blame there be--of this failure, is justly chargeable, the writer of these pages is unable to state. all that he has been able to ascertain with certainty is the following: as soon as the federal forces gave way, general lee rode forward, and at about four o'clock in the afternoon was posted on an elevated point of seminary ridge, from which he could see the broken lines of the enemy rapidly retreating up the slope of cemetery range, in his front. the propriety of pursuit, with a view to seizing this strong position, was obvious, and general lee sent an officer of his staff with a message to general ewell, to the effect that "he could see the enemy flying, that they were disorganized, and that it was only necessary to push on vigorously, and the cemetery heights were ours." [footnote: the officer who carried the order is our authority for this statement.] just about the moment, it would seem, when this order was dispatched--about half-past four--general hill, who had joined lee on the ridge, "received a message from general ewell, requesting him (hill) to press the enemy in front, while he performed the same operation on his right." this statement is taken from the journal of colonel freemantle, who was present and noted the hour. he adds: "the pressure was accordingly applied, in a mild degree, but the enemy were too strongly posted, and it was too late in the evening for a regular attack." general ewell, an officer of great courage and energy, is said to have awaited the arrival of his third division (johnson's) before making a decisive assault. upon the arrival of johnson, about sunset, general ewell prepared to advance and seize upon the eastern terminus of the cemetery range, which commanded the subsequent federal position. at this moment general lee sent him word to "proceed with his troops to the [confederate] right, in case he could do nothing where he was;" he proceeded to general lee's tent thereupon to confer with him, and the result was that it was agreed to first assault the hill on the right. it was now, however, after midnight, and the attack was directed by lee to be deferred until the next morning. it was certainly unfortunate that the advance was not then made; but lee, in his report, attributes no blame to any one. "the attack," he says, "was not pressed that afternoon, _the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops._" the failure to press the enemy immediately after their retreat, with the view of driving them from and occupying cemetery heights, is susceptible of an explanation which seems to retrieve the southern commander and his subordinates from serious criticism. the federal forces had been driven from the ground north and west of gettysburg, but it was seen now that the troops thus defeated constituted only a small portion of general meade's army, and lee had no means of ascertaining, with any degree of certainty, that the main body was not near at hand. the fact was not improbable, and it was not known that cemetery hill was not then in their possession. the wooded character of the ground rendered it difficult for general lee, even from his elevated position on seminary ridge, to discover whether the heights opposite were, or were not, held by a strong force. infantry were visible there; and in the plain in front the cavalry of general buford were drawn up, as though ready to accept battle. it was not until after the battle that it was known that the heights might have been seized upon--general hancock, who had succeeded reynolds, having, to defend them, but a single brigade. this fact was not known to lee; the sun was now declining, and the advance upon cemetery hill was deferred until the next day. when on the next morning, between daybreak and sunrise, general lee, accompanied by hill, longstreet, and hood, ascended to the same point on seminary ridge, and reconnoitred the opposite heights through his field-glass, they were seen to be occupied by heavy lines of infantry and numerous artillery. the moment had passed; the rampart in his front bristled with bayonets and cannon. general hancock, in command of the federal advance, had hastened back at nightfall to general meade, who was still some distance in rear, and reported the position to be an excellent one for receiving the southern attack. upon this information general meade had at once acted; by one o'clock in the morning his headquarters were established upon the ridge; and when lee, on seminary hill opposite, was reconnoitring the heights, the great bulk of the federal army was in position to receive his assault. the adversaries were thus face to face, and a battle could not well be avoided. lee and his troops were in high spirits and confident of victory, but every advantage of position was seen to be on the side of the enemy. xvi. the two armies in position. the morning of the 2d of july had arrived, and the two armies were in presence of each other and ready for battle. the question was, which of the great adversaries would make the attack. general meade was as averse to assuming the offensive as his opponent. lee's statement on this subject has been given, but is here repeated: "it had not been intended to fight a general battle," he wrote, "at such a distance from our base, _unless attacked by the enemy_." general meade said before the war committee afterward, "it was my desire to fight a defensive rather than an offensive battle," and he adds the obvious explanation, that he was "satisfied his chances of success were greater in a defensive battle than an offensive one." there was this great advantage, however, on the federal side, that the troops were on their own soil, with their communications uninterrupted, and could wait, while general lee was in hostile territory, a considerable distance from his base of supplies, and must, for that reason, either attack his adversary or retreat. he decided to attack. to this decision he seems to have been impelled, in large measure, by the extraordinary spirit of his troops, whose demeanor in the subsequent struggle was said by a federal officer to resemble that of men "drunk on champagne." general longstreet described the army at this moment as able, from the singular afflatus which bore it up, to undertake "any thing," and this sanguine spirit was the natural result of a nearly unbroken series of victories. at fredericksburg, chancellorsville, and in the preliminary struggle of gettysburg, they had driven the enemy before them in disorder, and, on the night succeeding this last victory, both officers and men spoke of the coming battle "as a certainty, and the universal feeling in the army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they had beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages."[1] [footnote 1: colonel freemantle. he was present, and speaks from observation.] contempt of an adversary is dangerous, and pride goes before a fall. the truth of these pithy adages was now about to be shown. general lee, it is said, shared the general confidence of his troops, and was carried away by it. he says in his report "finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountain with our large trains; at the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging-parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. a battle thus became in a measure unavoidable." but, even after the battle, when the southern army was much weaker, it was found possible, without much difficulty, to "withdraw through the mountains" with the trains. a stronger motive than this is stated in the next sentence of general lee's report:" _encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of general meade_, it was thought advisable to renew the attack." the meaning of the writer of these words is plain. the federal troops had been defeated with little difficulty in the first day's fight; it seemed probable that a more serious conflict would have similar results; and a decisive victory promised to end the war. general meade, it seems, scarcely expected to be attacked. he anticipated a movement on lee's part, over the emmetsburg road southward. [footnote: testimony of general meade before the war committee.] by giving that direction to his army, general lee would have forced his adversary to retire from his strong position on cemetery hill, or come out and attack him; whether, however, it was desirable on general lee's part to run the risk of such an attack on the southern column _in transitu_, it is left to others better able than the present writer to determine. this unskilled comment must pass for what it is worth. it is easy, after the event, for the smallest to criticise the greatest. under whatever influences, general lee determined not to retreat, either through the south mountain or toward emmetsburg, but marshalled his army for an attack on the position held by general meade. the southern lines were drawn up on seminary ridge, and on the ground near gettysburg. longstreet's corps was posted on the right, opposite the federal left, near the southern end of cemetery ridge. next came hill's corps, extending along the crest nearly to gettysburg. there it was joined by ewell's line, which, passing through the town, bent round, adapting itself to the position of the federal right which held the high ground, curving round in the shape of a hook, at the north end of the ridge. the federal lines thus occupied the whole cemetery range--which, being higher, commanded seminary ridge--and consisted, counting from right to left, of the troops of generals howard, hancock, sickles, sykes, and sedgwick; the two latter forming a strong reserve to guard the federal left. the position was powerful, as both flanks rested upon high ground, which gave every advantage to the assailed party; but on the federal left an accidental error, it seems, had been committed by general sickles. he had advanced his line to a ridge in front of the main range, which appeared to afford him a better position; but this made it necessary to retire the left wing of his corps, to cover the opening in that direction. the result was, an angle--the effect of which is to expose troops to serious danger--and this faulty disposition of the federal left seems to have induced general lee to direct his main attack at the point in question, with the view of breaking the federal line, and seizing upon the main ridge in rear. "in front of general longstreet," he says, "the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond." in order to coã¶perate in this, the main attack, ewell was ordered at the same time to assail the federal right toward gettysburg, and hill directed to threaten their centre, and, if there were an opening, make a real attack. these demonstrations against the enemy's right and centre, lee anticipated, would prevent him from reã«nforcing his left. longstreet would thus, he hoped, be "enabled to reach the west of the ridge" in rear of the federal line; and general meade afterward said, "if they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which i subsequently held at the last"--that is to say, that he would have been driven from the entire cemetery range. such was the position of the two adversaries, and such the design of lee, on the 2d of july, when the real struggle was about to begin. xvii. the second day. throughout the forenoon of the day about to witness one of those great passages of arms which throw so bloody a glare upon the pages of history, scarcely a sound disturbed the silence, and it was difficult to believe that nearly two hundred thousand men were watching each other across the narrow valley, ready at the word to advance and do their best to tear each other to pieces. during all these long hours, when expectation and suspense were sufficient to try the stoutest nerves, the two commanders were marshalling their lines for the obstinate struggle which was plainly at hand. general meade, who knew well the ability of his opponent, was seeing, in person, to every thing, and satisfying himself that his lines were in order to receive the attack. lee was making his preparations to commence the assault, upon which, there could be little doubt, the event of the whole war depended. from the gallantry which the federal troops displayed in this battle, they must have been in good heart for the encounter. it is certain that the southern army had never been in better condition for a decisive conflict. we have spoken of the extraordinary confidence of the men, in themselves and in their commander. this feeling now exhibited itself either in joyous laughter and the spirit of jesting among the troops, or in an air of utter indifference, as of men sure of the result, and giving it scarcely a thought. the swarthy gunners, still begrimed with powder from the work of the day before, lay down around the cannon in position along the crest, and passed the moments in uttering witticisms, or in slumber; and the lines of infantry, seated or lying, musket in hand, were as careless. the army was plainly ready, and would respond with alacrity to lee's signal. of the result, no human being in this force of more than seventy thousand men seemed to have the least doubt. lee was engaged during the whole morning and until past noon in maturing his preparations for the assault which he designed making against the enemy's left in front of longstreet. all was not ready until about four in the afternoon; then he gave the word, and longstreet suddenly opened a heavy artillery-fire on the position opposite him. at this signal the guns of hill opened from the ridge on his left, and ewell's artillery on the southern left in front of gettysburg thundered in response. under cover of his cannon-fire, longstreet then advanced his lines, consisting of hood's division on the right, and mclawe's division on the left, and made a headlong assault upon the federal forces directly in his front. the point aimed at was the salient, formed by the projection of general sickles's line forward to the high ground known as "the peach orchard." here, as we have already said, the federal line of battle formed an angle, with the left wing of sickles's corps bending backward so as to cover the opening between his line and the main crest in his rear. hood's division swung round to assail the portion of the line thus retired, and so rapid was the movement of this energetic soldier, that in a short space of time he pushed his right beyond the federal left flank, had pierced the exposed point, and was in direct proximity to the much-coveted "crest of the ridge," upon the possession of which depended the fate of the battle. hood was fully aware of its importance, and lost not a moment in advancing to seize it. his troops, largely composed of those famous texas regiments which lee had said "fought grandly and nobly," and upon whom he relied "in all tight places," responded to his ardent orders: a small run was crossed, the men rushed up the slope, and the crest was almost in their very grasp. success at this moment would have decided the event of the battle of gettysburg, and in all probability that of the war. all that was needed was a single brigade upon either side--a force sufficient to seize the crest, for neither side held it--and with this brigade a rare good fortune, or rather the prompt energy of a single officer, according to northern historians, supplied the federal commander. hood's line was rushing up with cheers to occupy the crest, which here takes the form of a separate peak, and is known as "little round top," when general warren, chief-engineer of the army, who was passing, saw the importance of the position, and determined, at all hazards, to defend it. he accordingly ordered the federal signal-party, which had used the peak as a signal-station, but were hastily folding up their flags, to remain where they were, laid violent hands upon a brigade which was passing, and ordered it to occupy the crest; and, when hood's men rushed up the rocky slope with yells of triumph, they were suddenly met by a fusillade from the newly-arrived brigade, delivered full in their faces. a violent struggle ensued for the possession of the heights. the men fought hand to hand on the summit, and the issue remained for some time doubtful. at last it was decided in favor of the federal troops, who succeeded in driving hood's men from the hill, the summit of which was speedily crowned with artillery, which opened a destructive fire upon the retreating southerners. they fell back sullenly, leaving the ground strewed with their dead and wounded. hood had been wounded, and many of his best officers had fallen. for an instant he had grasped in his strong hand the prize which would have been worth ten times the amount of blood shed; but he had been unable to retain his hold; he was falling back from the coveted crest, pursued by that roar of the enemy's cannon which seemed to rejoice in his discomfiture. an obstinate struggle was meanwhile taking place in the vicinity of the peach orchard, where the left of hood and the division of mclaws had struck the front of general sickles, and were now pressing his line back steadily toward the ridge in his rear. in spite of resolute resistance the federal troops at this point were pushed back to a wheat-field in the rear of the peach orchard, and, following up this advantage, longstreet charged them and broke their line, which fell back in disorder toward the high ground in rear. in this attack mclaws was assisted by hill's right division--that of anderson. with this force longstreet continued to press forward, and, piercing the federal line, seemed about to inflict upon them a great disaster by seizing the commanding position occupied by the federal left. nothing appears to have saved them at this moment from decisive defeat but the masterly concentration of reã«nforcements after reã«nforcements at the point of danger. the heavy reserves under generals sykes and sedgwick were opposite this point, and other troops were hastened forward to oppose longstreet. this reã«nforcement was continuous throughout the entire afternoon. in spite of lee's demonstrations in other quarters to direct attention, general meade--driven by necessity--continued to move fresh troops incessantly to protect his left; and success finally came as the reward of his energy and soldiership. longstreet found his weary troops met at every new step in advance by fresh lines, and, as night had now come, he discontinued the attack. the federal lines had been driven considerably beyond the point which they had held before the assault, and were now east of the wheat-field, where some of the hardest fighting of the day had taken place, but, in spite of this loss of ground, they had suffered no serious disaster, and, above all, lee had not seized upon that "crest of the ridge," which was the keystone of the position. thus longstreet's attack had been neither a success nor a failure. he had not accomplished all that was expected, but he had driven back the enemy from their advanced position, and held strong ground in their front. a continuance of the assault was therefore deferred until the next day--night having now come--and general longstreet ordered the advance to cease, and the firing to be discontinued. during the action on the right, hill had continued to make heavy demonstrations on the federal centre, and ewell had met with excellent success in the attack, directed by lee, to be made against the enemy's right. this was posted upon the semicircular eminence, a little southeast of gettysburg, and the federal works were attacked by ewell about sunset. with early's division on his right, and johnson's on his left, ewell advanced across the open ground in face of a heavy artillery-fire, the men rushed up the slope, and in a brief space of time the federal artillerists and infantry were driven from the works, which at nightfall remained in ewell's hands. such had been the fate of the second struggle around gettysburg. the moon, which rose just as the fighting terminated, threw its ghastly glare upon a field where neither side had achieved full success. lee had not failed, and he had not succeeded. he had aimed to drive the federal forces from the cemetery range, and had not been able to effect that object; but they had been forced back upon both their right and left, and a substantial advantage seemed thus to have been gained. that the confederate success was not complete, seems to have resulted from the failure to seize the round-top hill. the crisis of the battle had undoubtedly been the moment when hood was so near capturing this position--in reference to the importance of which we quoted general meade's own words. it was saved to the federal army by the presence of mind, it seems, of a single officer, and the gallantry of a single brigade. such are the singular chances of battle, in which the smallest causes so often effect the greatest results. general lee, in company with general hill, had, during the battle, occupied his former position on seminary ridge, near the centre of his line--quietly seated, for the greater portion of the time, upon the stump of a tree, and looking thoughtfully toward the opposite heights which longstreet was endeavoring to storm. his demeanor was entirely calm and composed. an observer would not have concluded that he was the commander-in-chief. from time to time he raised his field-glass to his eyes, and rising said a few words to general hill or general long, of his staff. after this brief colloquy, he would return to his seat on the stump, and continue to direct his glass toward the wooded heights held by the enemy. a notable circumstance, and one often observed upon other occasions, was that, during the entire action, he scarcely sent an order. during the time longstreet was engaged--from about half-past four until night--he sent but one message, and received but one report. having given full directions to his able lieutenants, and informed them of the objects which he desired to attain, he, on this occasion as upon others, left the execution of his orders to them, relying upon their judgment and ability. a singular incident occurred at this moment, which must have diverted lee, temporarily, from his abstracted mood. in the midst of the most furious part of the cannonade, when the air was filled with exploding shell, a confederate band of music, between the opposing lines, just below general lee's position, began defiantly playing polkas and waltzes on their instruments. the incident was strange in the midst of such a hurly-burly. the bloody battle-field seemed turned into a ballroom. with nightfall the firing sunk to silence. the moon had risen, and the pale light now lit up the faces of the dead and wounded of both sides. lee's first great assault had failed to secure the full results which he had anticipated from it. xviii. the last charge at gettysburg. the weird hours of the moonlit night succeeding the "second day at gettysburg" witnessed a consultation between lee and his principal officers, as to the propriety of renewing the attack on the federal position, or falling back in the direction of the potomac. in favor of the latter course there seemed to be many good reasons. the supplies, both of provisions and ammunition, were running short. the army, although unshaken, had lost heavily in the obstinately-disputed attack. in the event of defeat now, its situation might become perilous, and the destruction of the army of northern virginia was likely to prove that of the southern cause. on the other hand, the results of the day's fighting, if not decisive, had been highly encouraging. on both the federal wings the confederates had gained ground, which they still held. longstreet's line was in advance of the peach orchard, held by the enemy on the morning of the second, and ewell was still rooted firmly, it seemed, in their works near gettysburg. these advantages were certainly considerable, and promised success to the southern arms, if the assault were renewed. but the most weighty consideration prompting a renewal of the attack was the condition of the troops. they were undismayed and unshaken either in spirit or efficiency, and were known both to expect and to desire a resumption of the assault. even after the subsequent charge of pickett, which resulted so disastrously, the ragged infantry were heard exclaiming: "we've not lost confidence in the old man! this day's work won't do him no harm! uncle robert will get us into washington yet!" add to this the fact that the issue of the second day had stirred up in lee himself all the martial ardor of his nature; and there never lived a more thorough _soldier_, when he was fully aroused, than the virginian. all this soldiership of the man revolted at the thought of retreating and abandoning his great enterprise. he looked, on the one hand, at his brave army, ready at the word to again advance upon the enemy--at that enemy scarce able on the previous day to hold his position--and, weighing every circumstance in his comprehensive mind, which "looked before and after," lee determined on the next morning to try a decisive assault upon the federal troops; to storm, if possible, the cemetery range, and at one great blow terminate the campaign and the war. the powerful influences which we have mentioned, coã¶perating, shaped the decision to which lee had come. he would not retreat, but fight. the campaign should not be abandoned without at least one great charge upon the federal position; and orders were now given for a renewal of the attack on the next morning. "the general plan of attack," lee says, "was unchanged, except that one division and two brigades of hill's corps were ordered to support longstreet." from these words it is obvious that lee's main aim now, as on the preceding day, was to force back the federal left in front of longstreet, and seize the high ground commanding the whole ridge in flank and reverse. to this end longstreet was reã«nforced, and the great assault was evidently intended to take place in that quarter. but circumstances caused an alteration, as will be seen, in lee's plans. the centre, thus weakened, was from stress of events to become the point of decisive struggle. the assaults of the previous day had been directed against the two extremities of the enemy; the assault of the third day, which would decide the fate of the battle and the campaign, was to be the furious rush of pickett's division of virginian troops at the enemy's centre, on cemetery hill. a preliminary conflict, brought on by the federal commander, took place early in the morning. ewell had continued throughout the night to hold the enemy's breastworks on their right, from which he had driven them in the evening. as dawn approached now, he was about to resume the attack; and, in obedience to lee's orders, attempt to "dislodge the enemy" from other parts of the ridge, when general meade took the initiative, and opened upon him a furious fire of cannon, which was followed by a determined infantry charge to regain the hill. ewell held his ground with the obstinate nerve which characterized him, and the battle raged about four hours--that is, until about eight o'clock. at that time, however, the pressure of the enemy became too heavy to stand. general meade succeeded in driving ewell from the hill, and the federal lines were reã«stablished on the commanding ground which they had previously occupied. this event probably deranged, in some degree, general lee's plans, which contemplated, as we have seen, an attack by ewell contemporaneous with the main assault by longstreet. ewell was in no condition at this moment to assume the offensive again; and the pause in the fighting appears to have induced general lee to reflect and modify his plans. throughout the hours succeeding the morning's struggle, lee, attended by generals hill and longstreet, and their staff-officers, rode along the lines, reconnoitring the opposite heights, and the cavalcade was more than once saluted by bullets from the enemy's sharp-shooters, and an occasional shell. the result of the reconnoissance seems to have been the conclusion that the federal left--now strengthened by breastworks, behind which powerful reserves lay waiting--was not a favorable point for attack. general meade, no doubt, expected an assault there; and, aroused to a sense of his danger by the confederate success of the previous day, had made every preparation to meet a renewal of the movement. the confederate left and centre remained, but it seemed injudicious to think of attacking from ewell's position. a concentration of the southern force there would result in a dangerous separation of the two wings of the army; and, in the event of failure, the enemy would have no difficulty in descending and turning lee's right flank, and thus interposing between him and the potomac. the centre only was left, and to this lee now turned his attention. a determined rush, with a strong column at cemetery hill in his front, might wrest that point from the enemy. then their line would be pierced; the army would follow; lee would be rooted on this commanding ground, directly between the two federal wings, upon which their own guns might be turned, and the defeat of general meade must certainly follow. such were, doubtless, the reflections of general lee, as he rode along the seminary range, scanning, through his field-glass, the line of the federal works. his decision was made, and orders were given by him to prepare the column for the assault. for the hard work at hand, pickett's division of virginian troops, which had just arrived and were fresh, was selected. these were to be supported by heth's division of north carolina troops, under general pettigrew, who was to move on pickett's left; and a brigade of hill's, under general wilcox, was to cover the right of the advancing column, and protect it from a flank attack. the advance of the charging column was preceded by a tremendous artillery-fire, directed from seminary ridge at the enemy's left and centre. this began about an hour past noon, and the amount of thunder thus unloosed will be understood from the statement that lee employed one hundred and forty-five pieces of artillery, and the enemy replied with eighty--in all _two hundred and twenty-five_ guns, all discharging at the same time. for nearly two hours this frightful hurly-burly continued, the harsh roar reverberating ominously in the gorges of the hills, and thrown back, in crash after crash, from the rocky slopes of the two ridges. to describe this fire afterward, the cool soldier, general hancock, could find no other but the word _terrific_. "their artillery-fire," he says, "was the most terrific cannonade i ever witnessed, and the most prolonged.... it was a most terrific and appalling cannonade--one possibly hardly ever paralleled." while this artillery-duel was in progress, the charging column was being formed on the west of seminary ridge, opposite the federal centre on cemetery hill. pickett drew up his line with kemper's and garnett's brigades in front, and armistead's brigade in rear. the brigade under general wilcox took position on the right, and on the left was placed the division under pettigrew, which was to participate in the charge. the force numbered between twelve and fifteen thousand men; but, as will be seen, nearly in the beginning of the action pickett was left alone, and thus his force of about five thousand was all that went forward to pierce the centre of the federal army. the opposing ridges at this point are about one mile asunder, and across this space pickett moved at the word, his line advancing slowly, and perfectly "dressed," with its red battle-flags flying, and the sunshine darting from the gun-barrels and bayonets. the two armies were silent, concentrating their whole attention upon this slow and ominous advance of men who seemed in no haste, and resolved to allow nothing to arrest them. when the column had reached a point about midway between the opposing heights the federal artillery suddenly opened a furious fire upon them, which inflicted considerable loss. this, however, had no effect upon the troops, who continued to advance slowly in the same excellent order, without exhibiting any desire to return the fire. it was impossible to witness this steady and well-ordered march under heavy fire without feeling admiration for the soldiership of the troops who made it. where shell tore gaps in the ranks, the men quietly closed up, and the hostile front advanced in the same ominous silence toward the slope where the real struggle, all felt, would soon begin. they were within a few hundred yards of the hill, when suddenly a rapid cannon-fire thundered on their right, and shell and canister from nearly fifty pieces of artillery swept the southern line, enfilading it, and for an instant throwing the right into some disorder. this disappeared at once, however. the column closed up, and continued to advance, unmoved, toward the height. at last the moment came. the steady "common-time" step had become "quick time;" this had changed to "double-quick;" then the column rushed headlong at the enemy's breastworks on the slope of the hill. as they did so, the real thunder began. a fearful fire of musketry burst forth, and struck them in the face, and this hurricane scattered the raw troops of pettigrew as leaves are scattered by a wind. that whole portion of the line gave way in disorder, and fled from the field, which was strewed with their dead; and, as the other supports had not kept up, the virginians under pickett were left alone to breast the tempest which had now burst upon them in all its fury. they returned the fire from the breastworks in their front with a heavy volley, and then, with loud cheers, dashed at the enemy's works, which they reached, stormed, and took possession of at the point of the bayonet. their loss, however, was frightful. garnett was killed; armistead fell, mortally wounded, as he leaped on the breastworks, cheering and waving his hat; kemper was shot and disabled, and the ranks of the virginians were thinned to a handful. the men did not, however, pause. the enemy had partially retreated, from their first line of breastworks, to a second and stronger one about sixty yards beyond, and near the crest; and here the federal reserve, as northern writers state, was drawn up "four deep." this line, bristling with bayonets and cannon, the virginians now charged, in the desperate attempt to storm it with the bayonet, and pierce, in a decisive manner, the centre of the federal army. but the work was too great for their powers. as they made their brave rush they were met by a concentrated fire full in their faces, and on both flanks at the same moment. this fire did not so much cause them to lose heart, as literally hurl them back. before it the whole charging column seemed to melt and disappear. the bravest saw now that further fighting was useless--that the works in their front could not be stormed--and, with the frightful fire of the enemy still tearing their lines to pieces, the poor remnants of the brave division retreated from the hill. as they fell back, sullenly, like bull-dogs from whom their prey had been snatched just as it was in their grasp, the enemy pursued them with a destructive fire both of cannon and musketry, which mowed down large numbers, if large numbers, indeed, can be said to have been left. the command had been nearly annihilated. three generals, fourteen field-officers, and three-fourths of the men, were dead, wounded, or prisoners. the virginians had done all that could be done by soldiers. they had advanced undismayed into the focus of a fire unsurpassed, perhaps, in the annals of war; had fought bayonet to bayonet; had left the ground strewed with their dead; and the small remnant who survived were now sullenly retiring, unsubdued; and, if repulsed, not "whipped." such was the last great charge at gettysburg. lee had concentrated in it all his strength, it seemed. when it failed, the battle and the campaign failed with it. [illustration: lee at gettysburg.] xix. lee after the charge. the demeanor of general lee at this moment, when his hopes were all reversed, and his last great blow at the enemy had failed, excited the admiration of all who witnessed it, and remains one of the greatest glories of his memory. seeing, from his place on seminary ridge, the unfortunate results of the attack, he mounted his horse and rode forward to meet and encourage the retreating troops. the air was filled with exploding shell, and the men were coming back without order. general lee now met them, and with his staff-officers busied himself in rallying them, uttering as he did so words of hope and encouragement. colonel freemantle, who took particular notice of him at this moment, describes his conduct as "perfectly sublime." "lee's countenance," he adds, "did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance," but preserved the utmost placidity and cheerfulness. the hurry and confusion of the scene seemed not to move him in any manner, and he rode slowly to and fro, saying in his grave, kindly voice to the men: "all this will come right in the end. we'll talk it over afterward, but in the mean time all good men must rally. we want all good and true men just now." numbers of wounded passed him, some stretched on litters, which men wearing the red badge of the ambulance corps were bearing to the rear, others limping along bleeding from hurts more or less serious. to the badly wounded lee uttered words of sympathy and kindness; to those but slightly injured, he said: "come, bind up your wound and take a musket," adding "my friend," as was his habit. an evidence of his composure and absence of flurry was presented by a slight incident. an officer near him was striking his horse violently for becoming frightened and unruly at the bursting of a shell, when general lee, seeing that the horse was terrified and the punishment would do no good, said, in tones of friendly remonstrance: "don't whip him, captain, don't whip him. i've got just such a foolish horse myself, and whipping does no good." meanwhile the men continued to stream back, pursued still by that triumphant roar of the enemy's artillery which swept the whole valley and slope of seminary ridge with shot and shell. lee was everywhere encouraging them, and they responded by taking off their hats and cheering him--even the wounded joining in this ceremony. although exposing himself with entire indifference to the heavy fire, he advised colonel freemantle, as that officer states, to shelter himself, saying: "this has been a sad day for us, colonel, a sad day. but we can't expect always to gain victories." as he was thus riding about in the fringe of woods, general wilcox, who, about the time of pickett's repulse, had advanced and speedily been thrown back with loss, rode up and said, almost sobbing as he spoke, that his brigade was nearly destroyed. lee held out his hand to him as he was speaking, and, grasping the hand of his subordinate in a friendly manner, replied with great gentleness and kindness: "never mind, general, all this has been _my_ fault. it is _i_ who have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can." this supreme calmness and composure in the commander-in-chief rapidly communicated itself to the troops, who soon got together again, and lay down quietly in line of battle in the fringe of woods along the crest of the ridge, where lee placed them as they came up. in front of them the guns used in the great cannonade were still in position, and lee was evidently making every preparation in his power for the highly probable event of an instant assault upon him in his disordered condition, by the enemy. it was obvious that the situation of affairs at the moment was such as to render such an attack highly perilous to the southern troops--and a sudden cheering which was now heard running along the lines of the enemy on the opposite heights, seemed clearly to indicate that their forces were moving. every preparation possible under the circumstances was made to meet the anticipated assault; the repulsed troops of pickett, like the rest of the army, were ready and even eager for of the attack--but it did not come. the cheering was afterward ascertained to have been simply the greeting of the men to some one of their officers as he rode along the lines; and night fell without any attempt on the federal side to improve their success. that success was indeed sufficient, and little would have been gained, and perhaps much perilled, by a counter-attack. lee was not defeated, but he had not succeeded. general meade could, with propriety, refrain from an attack. the battle of gettysburg had been a federal victory. thus had ended the last great conflict of arms on northern soil--in a decisive if not a crushing repulse of the southern arms. the chain of events has been so closely followed in the foregoing pages, and the movements of the two armies have been described with such detail, that any further comment or illustration is unnecessary. the opposing armies had been handled with skill and energy, the men had never fought better, and the result seems to have been decided rather by an occult decree of providence than by any other circumstance. the numbers on each side were nearly the same, or differed so slightly that, in view of past conflicts, fought with much greater odds in favor of the one side, they might be regarded as equal. the southern army when it approached gettysburg numbered sixty-seven thousand bayonets, and the cavalry and artillery probably made the entire force about eighty thousand. general meade's statement is that his own force was about one hundred thousand. the federal loss was twenty-three thousand one hundred and ninety. the southern losses were also severe, but cannot be ascertained. they must have amounted, however, to at least as large a number, even larger, perhaps, as an attacking army always suffers more heavily than one that is attacked. what is certain, however, is that the southern army, if diminished in numbers and strength, was still unshaken. xx. lee's retreat across the potomac. lee commenced his retreat in the direction of the potomac on the night of the 4th of july. that the movement did not begin earlier is the best proof of the continued efficiency of his army and his own willingness to accept battle if the enemy were inclined to offer it. after the failure of the attack on the federal centre, he had withdrawn ewell from his position southeast of gettysburg, and, forming a continuous line of battle on seminary ridge, awaited the anticipated assault of general meade. what the result of such an assault would have been it is impossible to say, but the theory that an attack would have terminated in the certain rout of the southern army has nothing whatever to support it. the _morale_ of lee's army was untouched. the men, instead of being discouraged by the tremendous conflicts of the preceding days, were irate, defiant, and ready to resume the struggle. foreign officers, present at the time, testify fully upon this point, describing the demeanor of the troops as all that could be desired in soldiers; and general longstreet afterward stated that, with his two divisions under hood and mclaws, and his powerful artillery, he was confident, had the enemy attacked, of inflicting upon them a blow as heavy as that which they had inflicted upon pickett. the testimony of general meade himself fully corroborates these statements. when giving his evidence afterward before the war committee, he said: "my opinion is, now, that general lee evacuated that position, _not from the fear that he would be dislodged from it by any active operations on my part_, but that he was fearful that a force would be sent to harper's ferry to cut off his communications.... that was what caused him to retire." when asked the question, "did you discover, after the battle of gettysburg, any symptoms of demoralization in lee's army?" general meade replied, "no, sir; i saw nothing of that kind."[1] [footnote 1: report of committee on conduct of war, part i., page 337.] there was indeed no good reason why general lee should feel any extreme solicitude for the safety of his army, which, after all its losses, still numbered more than fifty thousand troops; and, with that force of veteran combatants, experience told him, he could count upon holding at bay almost any force which the enemy could bring against him. at chancellorsville, with a less number, he had nearly routed a larger army than general meade's. if the _morale_ of the men remained unbroken, he had the right to feel secure now; and we have shown that the troops were as full of fight as ever. the exclamations of the ragged infantry, overheard by colonel freemantle, expressed the sentiment of the whole army. recoiling from the fatal charge on cemetery hill, and still followed by the terrible fire, they had heart to shout defiantly: "we've not lost confidence in the old man! this day's work won't do him no harm! uncle robert will get us into washington yet--you bet he will!" lee's reasons for retiring toward the potomac were unconnected with the _morale_ of his army. "the difficulty of procuring supplies," he says, "rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were." what he especially needed was ammunition, his supply of which had been nearly exhausted by the three days' fighting, and it was impossible to count upon new supplies of these essential stores now that the enemy were in a condition to interrupt his communications in the direction of harper's ferry and williamsport. the danger to which the army was thus exposed was soon shown not to have been overrated. general meade promptly sent a force to occupy harper's ferry, and a body of his cavalry, hastening across the south mountain, reached the potomac near falling waters, where they destroyed a pontoon bridge laid there for the passage of the southern army. lee accordingly resolved to retire, and, after remaining in line of battle on seminary ridge throughout the evening and night of the 3d and the whole of the 4th, during which time he was busy burying his dead, began to withdraw, by the fairfield and chambersburg roads, on the night of this latter day. the movement was deliberate, and without marks of haste, the rear-guard not leaving the vicinity of gettysburg until the morning of the 5th. those who looked upon the southern army at this time can testify that the spirit of the troops was unsubdued. they had been severely checked, but there every thing had ended. weary, covered with dust, with wounds whose bandages were soaked in blood, the men tramped on in excellent spirits, and were plainly ready to take position at the first word from lee, and meet any attack of the enemy with a nerve as perfect as when they had advanced. for the reasons stated by himself, general meade did not attack. he had secured substantial victory by awaiting lee's assault on strong ground, and was unwilling now to risk a disaster, such as he had inflicted, by attacking lee in position. the enthusiasm of the authorities at washington was not shared by the cool commander of the federal army. he perfectly well understood the real strength and condition of his adversary, and seems never to have had any intention of striking at him unless a change of circumstances gave him some better prospect of success than he could see at that time. the retrograde movement of the southern army now began, lee's trains retiring by way of chambersburg, and his infantry over the fairfield road, in the direction of hagerstown. general meade at first moved directly on the track of his enemy. the design of a "stern chase" was, however, speedily abandoned by the federal commander, who changed the direction of his march and moved southward toward frederick. when near that point he crossed the south mountain, went toward sharpsburg, and on the 12th of july found himself in front of the southern army near williamsport, where lee had formed line of battle to receive his adversary's attack. the deliberate character of general meade's movements sufficiently indicates the disinclination he felt to place himself directly in his opponent's front, and thus receive the full weight of his attack. there is reason, indeed, to believe that nothing could better have suited the views of general meade than for lee to have passed the potomac before his arrival--which event would have signified the entire abandonment of the campaign of invasion, leaving victory on the side of the federal army. but the elements seemed to conspire to bring on a second struggle, despite the reluctance of both commanders. the recent rains had swollen the potomac to such a degree as to render it unfordable, and, as the pontoon near williamsport had been destroyed by the federal cavalry, lee was brought to bay on the north bank of the river, where, on the 12th, as we have said, general meade found him in line of battle. lee's demeanor, at this critical moment, was perfectly undisturbed, and exhibited no traces whatever of anxiety, though he must have felt much. in his rear was a swollen river, and in his front an adversary who had been reã«nforced with a considerable body of troops, and now largely outnumbered him. in the event of battle and defeat, the situation of the southern army must be perilous in the extreme. nothing would seem to be left it, in that event, but surrender, or dispersion among the western mountains, where the detached bodies would be hunted down in detail and destroyed or captured. confidence in himself and his men remained, however, with general lee, and, with his line extending from near hagerstown to a point east of williamsport, he calmly awaited the falling of the river, resolved, doubtless, if in the mean time the enemy attacked him, to fight to the last gasp for the preservation of his army. no attack was made by general meade, who, arriving in front of lee on the 12th, did no more, on that day, than feel along the southern lines for a point to assault. on the next day he assembled a council of war, and laid the question before them, whether or not it were advisable to make an assault. the votes of the officers were almost unanimously against it, as lee's position seemed strong and the spirit of his army defiant; and the day passed without any attempt of the federal army to dislodge its adversary. while general meade was thus hesitating, lee was acting. a portion of the pontoon destroyed by the enemy was recovered, new boats were built, and a practicable bridge was completed, near falling waters, by the evening of the 13th. the river had also commenced falling, and by this time was fordable near williamsport. toward dawn on the 14th the army commenced moving, in the midst of a violent rain-storm, across the river at both points, and lee, sitting his horse upon the river's bank, superintended the operation, as was his habit on occasions of emergency. loss of rest and fatigue, with that feeling of suspense unavoidable under the circumstances, had impaired the energies of even his superb physical constitution. as the bulk of the rear-guard of the army safely passed over the shaky bridge, which lee had looked at with some anxiety as it swayed to and fro, lashed by the current, he uttered a sigh of relief, and a great weight seemed taken from his shoulders. seeing his fatigue and exhaustion. general stuart gave him some coffee; he drank it with avidity, and declared, as he handed back the cup, that nothing had ever refreshed him so much. when general meade, who is said to have resolved on an attack, in spite of the opposition of his officers, looked, on the morning of the 14th, toward the position held on the previous evening by the southern army, he saw that the works were deserted. the army of northern virginia had vanished from the hills on which it had been posted, and was at that moment crossing the potomac. pressing on its track toward falling waters, the federal cavalry came up with the rear, and in the skirmish which ensued fell the brave pettigrew, who had supported pickett in the great charge at gettysburg, where he had waved his hat in front of his men, and, in spite of a painful wound, done all in his power to rally his troops. with this exception, and a few captures resulting from accident, the army sustained no losses. the movement across the potomac had been effected, in face of the whole federal army, as successfully as though that army had been a hundred miles distant.[1] [footnote 1: upon this point different statements were subsequently made by generals lee and meade, and lee's reply to the statements of his opponent is here given: headquarters army northern virginia, _july 21, 1863._ _general s. cooper, adjutant and inspector-general c.s.a., richmond, va_.: general: i have seen in northern papers what purported to be an official dispatch from general meade, stating that he had captured a brigade of infantry, two pieces of artillery, two caissons, and a large number of small-arms, as this army retired to the south bank of the potomac, on the 13th and 14th inst. this dispatch has been copied into the richmond papers, and, as its official character may cause it to be believed, i desire to state that it is incorrect. the enemy did not capture any organized body of men on that occasion, but only stragglers, and such as were left asleep on the road, exhausted by the fatigue and exposure of one of the most inclement nights i have ever known at this season of the year. it rained without cessation, rendering the road by which our troops marched to the bridge at falling waters very difficult to pass, and causing so much delay that the last of the troops did not cross the river at the bridge until 1 p.m. on the 14th. while the column was thus detained on the road a number of men, worn down by fatigue, lay down in barns, and by the roadside, and though officers were sent back to arouse them, as the troops moved on, the darkness and rain prevented them from finding all, and many were in this way left behind. two guns were left on the road. the horses that drew them became exhausted, and the officers went forward to procure others. when they returned, the rear of the column had passed the guns so far that it was deemed unsafe to send back for them, and they were thus lost. no arms, cannon, or prisoners, were taken by the enemy in battle, but only such as were left behind under the circumstances i have described. the number of stragglers thus lost i am unable to state with accuracy, but it is greatly exaggerated in the dispatch referred to. i am, with great respect, your obedient servant, r.e. lee, _general_. the solicitude here exhibited by the southern commander, that the actual facts should be recorded, is natural, and displayed lee's spirit of soldiership. he was unwilling that his old army should appear in the light of a routed column, retreating in disorder, with loss of men and munitions, when they lost neither.] xxi. across the blue ridge again. lee moved his army to the old encampment on the banks of the opequan which it had occupied after the retreat from sharpsburg, in september, 1862, and here a few days were spent in resting. we have, in the journal of a foreign officer, an outline of lee's personal appearance at this time, and, as we are not diverted from these characteristic details at the moment by the narrative of great events, this account of lee, given by the officer in question--colonel freemantle, of the british army--is laid before the reader: "general lee is, almost without exception, the handsomest man of his age i ever saw. he is tall, broad-shouldered, very well made, well set up--a thorough soldier in appearance--and his manners are most courteous, and full of dignity. he is a perfect gentleman in every respect. i imagine no man has so few enemies, or is so universally esteemed. throughout the south, all agree in pronouncing him as near perfection as man can be. he has none of the small vices, such as smoking, drinking, chewing, or swearing; and his bitterest enemy never accused him of any of the greater ones. he generally wears a well-worn, long gray jacket, a high black-felt hat, and blue trousers, tucked into his wellington boots. i never saw him carry arms, and the only marks of his military rank are the three stars on his collar. he rides a handsome horse, which is extremely well governed. he himself is very neat in his dress and person, and in the most arduous marches he always looks smart and clean.... it is understood that general lee is a religious man, though not so demonstrative in that respect as jackson, and, unlike his late brother-in-arms, he is a member of the church of england. his only faults, so far as i can learn, arise from his excessive amiability." this personal description is entirely correct, except that the word "jacket" conveys a somewhat erroneous idea of lee's undress uniform coat, and his hat was generally gray. otherwise, the sketch is exactly accurate, and is here presented as the unprejudiced description and estimate of a foreign gentleman, who had no inducement, such as might be attributed to a southern writer, to overcolor his portrait. such, in personal appearance, was the leader of the southern army--a plain soldier, in a plain dress, without arms, with slight indications of rank, courteous, full of dignity, a "perfect gentleman," and with no fault save an "excessive amiability." the figure is attractive to the eye--it excited the admiration of a foreign officer, and remains in many memories now, when the sound of battle is hushed, and the great leader, in turn, has finished his life-battle and lain down in peace. the movements of the two armies were soon resumed, and we shall briefly follow those movements, which led the adversaries back to the rappahannock. lee appears to have conceived the design, after crossing the potomac at williamsport, to pass the shenandoah river and the blue ridge, and thus place himself in the path of general meade if he crossed east of the mountain, or threaten washington. this appears from his own statement. "owing," he says, "to the swollen condition of _the shenandoah river, the plan of operations which had been contemplated when we recrossed the potomac could not be put in execution_". the points fixed upon by lee for passing the mountain were probably snicker's and ashby's gaps, opposite berryville and millwood. the rains had, however, made the river, in these places, unfordable. on the 17th and 18th days of july, less than a week after lee's crossing at williamsport, general meade passed the potomac above leesburg, and lee moved his army in the direction of chester gap, near front royal, toward culpepper. the new movements were almost identically the same as the old, when general mcclellan advanced, in november, 1862, and the adoption of the same plans by general meade involves a high compliment to his predecessor. he acted with even more energy. as lee's head of column was defiling toward chester gap, beyond front royal, general meade struck at it through manassas gap, directly on its flank, and an action followed which promised at one time to become serious. the enemy was, however, repulsed, and the southern column continued its way across the mountain. the rest of the army followed, and descended into culpepper, from which position, when longstreet was detached to the west, lee retired, taking post behind the rapidan. general meade thereupon followed, and occupied culpepper, his advance being about half-way between culpepper court-house and the river. such was the position of the two armies in the first days of october, when lee, weary, it seemed, of inactivity, set out to flank and fight his adversary. part vii. _last campaigns of the year_ 1863. i. the cavalry of lee's army. in a work of the present description, the writer has a choice between two courses. he may either record the events of the war in all quarters of the country, as bearing more or less upon his narrative, or may confine himself to the life of the individual who is the immediate subject of his volume. of these two courses, the writer prefers the latter for many reasons. to present a narrative of military transactions in all portions of the south would expand this volume to undue proportions; and there is the further objection that these occurrences are familiar to all. it might be necessary, in writing for persons ignorant of the events of the great conflict, to omit nothing; but this ignorance does, not probably exist in the case of the readers of these pages; and the writer will continue, as heretofore, to confine himself to the main subject, only noting incidentally such prominent events in other quarters as affected lee's movements. one such event was the fall of vicksburg, which post surrendered at the same moment with the defeat at gettysburg, rendering thereafter impossible all movements of invasion; and another was the advance of general rosecrans toward atlanta, which resulted, in the month of september, in a southern victory at chickamauga. the immediate effect of the federal demonstration toward chattanooga had been to detach longstreet's corps from general lee's army, for service under general bragg. general meade's force is said to have also been somewhat lessened by detachments sent to enforce the draft in new york; and these circumstances had, in the first days of october, reduced both armies in virginia to a less force than they had numbered in the past campaign. general meade, however, presented a bold front to his adversary, and, with his headquarters near culpepper court-house, kept close watch upon lee, whose army lay along the south bank of the rapidan. for some weeks no military movements took place, and an occasional cavalry skirmish between the troopers of the two armies was all which broke the monotony of the autumn days. this inactivity, however, was now about to terminate. lee had resolved to attempt a flank movement around general meade's right, with the view of bringing him to battle; and a brief campaign ensued, which, if indecisive, and reflecting little glory upon the infantry, was fruitful in romantic incidents and highly creditable to the cavalry of the southern army. in following the movements, and describing the operations of the main body of the army--the infantry--we have necessarily been compelled to pass over, to a great extent, the services of the cavalry in the past campaign. these had, nevertheless, been great--no arm of the service had exhibited greater efficiency; and, but for the fact that in all armies the brunt of battle falls upon the foot-soldiers, it might be added that the services of the cavalry had been as important as those of the infantry. stuart was now in command of a force varying from five to eight thousand sabres, and among his troopers were some of the best fighting-men of the south. the cavalry had always been the favorite arm with the southern youth; it had drawn to itself, as privates in the ranks, thousands of young men of collegiate education, great wealth, and the highest social position; and this force was officered, in virginia, by such resolute commanders as wade hampton, fitz lee, william h.f. lee, rosser, jones, wickham, young, munford, and many others. under these leaders, and assisted by the hard-fighting "stuart horse-artillery" under pelham and his successors, the cavalry had borne their full share in the hard marches and combats of the army. on the chickahominy; in the march to manassas, and the battles in maryland; in the operations on the rappahannock, and the incessant fighting of the campaign to gettysburg, stuart and his troopers had vindicated their claim to the first honors of arms; and, if these services were not duly estimated by the infantry of the army, the fact was mainly attributable to the circumstance that the fighting of the cavalry had been done at a distance upon the outposts, far more than in the pitched battles, where, in modern times, from the improved and destructive character of artillery, playing havoc with horses, the cavalry arm can achieve little, and is not risked. the actual losses in stuart's command left, however, no doubt of the obstinate soldiership of officers and men. since the opening of the year he had lost general hampton, cut down in a hand-to-hand sabre-fight at gettysburg; general w.h.f. lee, shot in the fight at fleetwood; colonels frank hampton and williams, killed in the same action; colonel butler, torn by a shell; major pelham, chief of artillery, killed while leading a charge; [footnote: in this enumeration the writer mentions only such names as occur at the moment to his memory. a careful examination of the records of the cavalry would probably furnish the names of ten times as many, equally brave and unfortunate.] about six officers of his personal staff either killed, wounded, or captured; and in the gettysburg campaign he had lost nearly one-third of his entire command. of its value to the army, the infantry might have their doubts, but general lee had none. stuart and his horsemen had been the eyes and ears of the army of northern virginia; had fought incessantly as well as observed the enemy; and lee never committed the injustice of undervaluing this indispensable arm, which, if his official commendation of its operations under stuart is to be believed, was only second in importance in his estimation to the infantry itself. the army continued, nevertheless, to amuse itself at the expense of the cavalry, and either asserted or intimated, on every favorable occasion, that the _real fighting_ was done by themselves. this flattering assumption might be natural under the circumstances, but it was now about to be shown to be wholly unfounded. a campaign was at hand in which the cavalry were to turn the tables upon their jocose critics, and silence them; where the infantry were doomed to failure in nearly all which they attempted, and the troopers were to do the greater part of the fighting and achieve the only successes. to the narrative of this brief and romantic episode of the war we now proceed. general lee's aim was to pass around the right flank of his adversary, and bring him to battle; and, although the promptness of general meade's movements defeated the last-named object nearly completely, the manoeuvres of the two armies form a highly-interesting study. the eminent soldiers commanding the forces played a veritable game of chess with each other. there was little hard fighting, but more scientific manoeuvring than is generally displayed in a campaign. the brains of lee and meade, rather than the two armies, were matched against each other; and the conflict of ideas proved more interesting than the actual fighting. ii. lee flanks general meade. in prosecution of the plan determined upon, general lee, on the morning of the 9th of october, crossed the rapidan at the fords above orange court-house, with the corps of ewell and a.p. hill, and directed his march toward madison court-house. stuart moved with hampton's cavalry division on the right of the advancing column--general fitz lee having been left with his division to guard the front on the rapidan--and general imboden, commanding west of the blue ridge, was ordered by lee to "advance down the valley, and guard the gaps of the mountains on our left." we have said that lee's design was to bring general meade to battle. it is proper to state this distinctly, as some writers have attributed to him in the campaign, as his real object, the design of manoeuvring his adversary out of culpepper, and pushing him back to the federal frontier. his own words are perfectly plain. he set out "with the design," he declares, "of _bringing on an engagement with the federal army_"--that is to say, of _fighting_ general meade, not simply forcing him to fall back. his opponent, it seems, was not averse to accepting battle; indeed, from expressions attributed to him, he appears to have ardently desired it, in case he could secure an advantageous position for receiving the southern attack. it is desirable that this readiness in both commanders to fight should be kept in view. the fact adds largely to the interest of this brief "campaign of manoeuvres," in which the army, falling back, like that advancing, sought battle. to proceed to the narrative, which will deal in large measure with the operations of the cavalry--that arm of the service, as we have said, having borne the chief share of the fighting, and achieved the only successes. stuart moved out on the right of the infantry, which marched directly toward madison court-house, and near the village of james city, directly west of culpepper court-house, drove in the cavalry and infantry outposts of general kilpatrick on the main body beyond the village. continuous skirmishing ensued throughout the rest of the day--stuart's object being to occupy the enemy, and divert attention from the infantry movement in his rear. in this he seems to have fully succeeded. lee passed madison court-house, and moving, as he says, "by circuitous and concealed roads," reached the vicinity of griffinsburg, on what is called the sperryville road, northwest of culpepper court-house. a glance at the map will show the relative positions of the two armies at this moment. general meade lay around culpepper court-house, with his advance about half-way between that place and the rapidan, and lee had attained a position which gave him fair hopes of intercepting his adversary's retreat. that retreat must be over the line of the orange and alexandria railroad; but from griffinsburg to manassas was no farther than from culpepper court-house to the same point. if the federal army fell back, as lee anticipated, it would be a question of speed between the retreating and pursuing columns; and, as the narrative will show, the race was close--a few hours lost making the difference between success and failure in lee's movement. on the morning of the 10th while the infantry were still near griffinsburg, general stuart moved promptly down upon culpepper court-house, driving the enemy from their large camps near stonehouse mountain. these were elaborately provided with luxuries of every description, and there were many indications of the fact that the troops had expected to winter there. no serious fighting occurred. a regiment of infantry was charged and dispersed by the jefferson company of captain baylor, and stuart then proceeded rapidly to culpepper court-house, where the federal cavalry, forming the rear-guard of the army, awaited him. general meade was already moving in the direction of the rappahannock. the presence of the southern army near griffinsburg had become known to him; he was at no loss to understand lee's object; and, leaving his cavalry to cover his rear, he moved toward the river. as stuart attacked the federal horse posted on the hills east of the village, the roar of cannon on his right, steadily drawing nearer, indicated that general fitz lee was forcing the enemy in that direction to fall back. stuart was now in high spirits, and indulged in hearty laughter, although the enemy's shells were bursting around him. "ride back to general lee," he said to an officer of his staff, "and tell him we are forcing the enemy back on the rappahannock, and i think i hear fitz lee's guns toward the rapidan." the officer obeyed, and found general lee at his headquarters, which consisted of one or two tents, with a battle-flag set up in front, on the highway, near griffinsburg. he was conversing with general ewell, and the contrast between the two soldiers was striking. ewell was thin, cadaverous, and supported himself upon a crutch, for he had not yet recovered from the wound received at manassas. general lee, on the contrary, was erect, ruddy, robust, and exhibited indications of health and vigor in every detail of his person. when stuart's message was delivered to him, he bowed with that grave courtesy which he exhibited alike toward the highest and the lowest soldier in his army, and said: "thank you. tell general stuart to continue to press them back toward the river." he then smiled, and added, with that accent of sedate humor which at times characterized him: "but tell him, too, to spare his horses--to spare his horses. it is not necessary to send so many messages." he turned as he spoke to general ewell, and, pointing to the officer who had come from stuart, and another who had arrived just before him, said, with lurking humor: "i think these two young gentlemen make _eight_ messengers sent me by general stuart!" he then said to ewell: "you may as well move on with your troops, i suppose, general;" and soon afterward the infantry began to advance. stuart was meanwhile engaged in an obstinate combat with the federal cavalry near brandy, in the immediate vicinity of fleetwood hill, the scene of the great fight in june. the stand made by the enemy was resolute, but the arrival of general fitz lee decided the event. that officer had crossed the rapidan and driven general buford before him. the result now was that, while stuart was pressing the enemy in his front, general buford came down on stuart's rear, and fitz lee on the rear of buford. the scene which ensued was a grand commingling of the tragic and serio-comic. every thing was mingled in wild confusion, but the day remained with the southern cavalry, who, at nightfall, had pressed their opponents back toward the river, which the federal army crossed that night, blowing up the railroad bridge behind them. such was the first act of the bustling drama. at the approach of lee, general meade had vanished from culpepper, and so well arranged was the whole movement, in spite of its rapidity, that scarce an empty box was left behind. lee's aim to bring his adversary to battle south of the rappahannock had thus failed; but the attempt was renewed by a continuation of the flanking movement toward warrenton springs, "with the design," lee says, "of reaching the orange and alexandria railroad, north of the river, and interrupting the retreat of the enemy." unfortunately, however, for this project, which required of all things rapidity of movement, it was found necessary to remain nearly all day on the 11th near culpepper court-house, to supply the army with provisions. it was not until the 12th that the army again moved. stuart preceded it, and after a brisk skirmish drove the enemy from warrenton springs--advancing in person in front of his column as it charged through the river and up the hill beyond, where a considerable body of federal marksmen were put to flight. the cavalry then pressed on toward warrenton, and the infantry, who had witnessed their prowess and cheered them heartily, followed on the same road. the race between lee and general meade was in full progress. it was destined to become complicated, and an error committed by general meade came very near exposing him to serious danger. it appears that, after retreating across the rappahannock, the federal commander began to entertain doubt whether the movement had not been hasty, and would not justly subject him to the charge of yielding to sudden panic. influenced apparently by this sentiment, he now ordered three corps of the federal army, with a division of cavalry, back to culpepper; and this, the main body, accordingly crossed back, leaving but one corps north of the river. such was now the very peculiar situation of the two armies. general lee was moving steadily in the direction of warrenton to cut off his adversary from manassas, and that adversary was moving back into culpepper to hunt up lee there. the comedy of errors was soon terminated, but not so soon as it otherwise would have been but for a _ruse de guerre_ played by generals rosser and young. general rosser had been left by stuart near brandy, with about two hundred horsemen and one gun; and, when the three infantry corps and the cavalry division of general meade moved forward from the river, they encountered this obstacle. insignificant as was his force. general rosser so manoeuvred it as to produce the impression that it was considerable; and, though forced, of course, to fall back, he did so fighting at every step. assistance reached him just at dusk in the shape of a brigade of cavalry, from above the court-house under general young, the same officer whose charge at the fleetwood fight had had so important a bearing upon the result there. young now formed line with his men dismounted, and, advancing with a confident air, opened fire upon the federal army. the darkness proved friendly, and, taking advantage of it, general young kindled fires along a front of more than a mile, ordered his band to play, and must have caused the enemy to doubt whether lee was not still in large force near culpepper court-house. they accordingly went into camp to await the return of daylight, when at midnight a fast-riding courier came with orders from general meade. these orders were urgent, and directed the federal troops to recross the river with all haste. general lee, it was now ascertained, had left an insignificant force in culpepper, and, with nearly his whole army, was moving rapidly toward warrenton to cut off his adversary. iii. a race between two armies. the game of hide-and-seek--to change the figure--was now in full progress, and nothing more dramatic could be conceived of than the relative positions of the two armies. at midnight, on monday, october 12th, lee's army was near warrenton springs, ready to advance in the morning upon warrenton, while three of the four corps under general meade were half-way between the rappahannock and culpepper court-house, expecting battle there. thus a choice of two courses was presented to the federal commander: to order back his main force, and rapidly retreat toward manassas, or move the fourth corps to support it, and place his whole army directly in lee's rear. the occasion demanded instant decision. every hour now counted. but, unfortunately for general meade, he was still in the dark as to the actual amount of lee's force in culpepper. the movement toward warrenton might be a mere _ruse_. the great master of the art of war to whom he was opposed might have laid this trap for him--have counted upon his falling into the snare--and, while a portion of the southern force was engaged in culpepper, might design an attack with the rest upon the federal right flank or rear. in fact, the situation of affairs was so anomalous and puzzling that lee might design almost any thing, and succeed in crushing his adversary. the real state of the case was, that lee designed nothing of this description, having had no intimation whatever of general meade's new movement back toward culpepper. he was advancing toward warrenton, under the impression that his adversary was retreating, and aimed to come up with him somewhere near that place and bring him to battle. upon this theory his opponent now acted by promptly ordering back his three corps to the north bank of the rappahannock. they began to march soon after midnight; recrossed the river near the railroad; and on the morning of the 13th hastened forward by rapid marches to pass the dangerous point near warrenton, toward which lee was also moving with his infantry. in this race every advantage seemed to be on the side of lee. the three federal corps had fully twice as far to march as the southern forces. lee was concentrating near warrenton, while they were far in the rear; and, if the confederates moved with only half the rapidity of their adversaries, they were certain to intercept them, and compel them either to surrender or cut their way through. these comments--tedious, perhaps--are necessary to the comprehension of the singular "situation." we proceed now with the narrative. stuart had pushed on past warrenton with his cavalry, toward the orange railroad, when, on the night of the 13th, he met with one of those adventures which were thickly strewed throughout his romantic career. he was near auburn, just at nightfall, when, as his rear-guard closed up, information reached him from that quarter that the federal army was passing directly in his rear. nearly at the same moment intelligence arrived that another column of the enemy, consisting, like the first, of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was moving across his front. stuart was now in an actual trap, and his situation was perilous in the extreme. he was enclosed between two moving walls of enemies, and, if discovered, his fate seemed sealed. but one course was left him: to preserve, if possible, complete silence in his command; to lie _perdu_ in the wood, and await the occurrence of some fortunate event to extricate him from his highly-embarrassing situation. he accordingly issued stringent orders to the men that no noise of any description should be made, and not a word be uttered; and there was little necessity to repeat this command. the troopers remained silent and motionless in the saddle throughout the night, ready at any instant to move at the order; and thus passed the long hours of darkness--the southern horsemen as silent as phantoms; the federal columns passing rapidly, with the roll of artillery-wheels, the tramp of cavalry-horses, and the shuffling sound of feet, on both sides of the command--the column moving in rear of stuart being distant but two or three hundred yards. this romantic incident was destined to terminate fortunately for stuart, who, having dispatched scouts to steal through the federal column, and announce his situation to general lee, prepared to seize upon the first opportunity to release his command from its imminent peril. the opportunity came at dawn. the federal rear, under general caldwell, had bivouacked near, and had just kindled fires to cook their breakfast, when, from the valley beneath the hill on which the troops had halted, stuart opened suddenly upon them with his horse-artillery, and, as he says in his report, knocked over coffee-pots and other utensils at the moment when the men least expected it. he then advanced his sharp-shooters and directed a rapid fire upon the disordered troops; and, under cover of this fire, wheeled to the left and emerged safely toward warrenton. the army greeted him with cheers, and he was himself in the highest spirits. he had certainly good reason for this joy, for he had just grazed destruction. as stuart's artillery opened, the sound was taken up toward warrenton, where ewell, in obedience to lee's orders, had attacked the federal column. nothing resulted, however, from this assault: general meade had concentrated his army, and was hastening toward manassas. all now depended again upon the celerity of lee's movements in pursuit. he had lost many hours at warrenton, where "another halt was made," he says, "to supply the troops with provisions." thus, on the morning of the 14th he was as far from intercepting general meade as before; and all now depended upon the movements of hill, who, while ewell moved toward greenwich, had been sent by way of new baltimore to come in on the federal line of retreat at bristoe station, near manassas. in spite, however, of his excellent soldiership and habitual promptness, hill did not arrive in time. he made the dã©tour prescribed by lee, passed new baltimore, and hastened on toward bristoe, where, on approaching that point, he found only the rear-guard of the federal army--the whole force, with this exception, having crossed broad run, and hastened on toward manassas. hill's arrival had thus been tardy: it would have been fortunate for him if he had not arrived at all. seeing the federal column under general warren hastening along the railroad to pass broad run, he ordered a prompt attack, and cooke's brigade led the charge. the result was unfortunate for the confederates. general warren, seeing his peril, had promptly disposed his line behind the railroad embankment at the spot, where, protected by this impromptu breastwork, the men rested their guns upon the iron rails and poured a destructive fire upon the southerners rushing down the open slope in front. by this fire general cooke was severely wounded and fell, and his brigade lost a considerable part of its numbers. before a new attack could be made, general warren hastily withdrew, carrying off with him in triumph a number of prisoners, and five pieces of artillery, captured on the banks of the run. before his retreat could be again interrupted, he was safe on the opposite side of the stream, and lost no time in hurrying forward to join the main body, which was retreating on centreville. general meade had thus completely foiled his adversary. lee had set out with the intention of bringing the federal commander to battle; had not succeeded in doing so, owing to the rapidity of his retreat; had come up only with his rear-guard, under circumstances which seemed to seal the fate of that detached force, and the small rear-guard had repulsed him completely, capturing prisoners and artillery from him, and retiring in triumph. such had been the issue of the campaign; all the success had been on the side of general meade. he is said to have declared that "it was like pulling out his eye-teeth not to have had a fight;" but something resembling _bona-fide_ fighting had occurred on the banks of broad run, and the victory was clearly on the side of the federal troops. to turn to general lee, it would be an interesting question to discuss whether he really desired to _intercept_ general meade, if there were any data upon which to base a decision. the writer hazards the observation that it seems doubtful whether this was lee's intention. he had a high opinion of general meade, and is said to have declared of that commander, that he "gave him" (lee) "as much trouble as any of them." lee was thus opposed to a soldier whose ability he respected, and it appears doubtful whether he desired to move so rapidly as to expose his own communications to interruption by his adversary. this view seems to derive support from the apparently unnecessary delays at culpepper court-house and warrenton. there was certainly no good reason why, under ordinary circumstances, an army so accustomed to rapid marches as the army of northern virginia should not have been able to reach warrenton from the neighborhood of culpepper court-house in less than _four days._ "we were _compelled_ to halt," lee writes of the delay at culpepper; but of that at warrenton he simply says, "another halt was made." whether these views have, or have not foundation, the reader must judge. we shall aim, in a few pages, to conclude our account of this interesting campaign. iv. the fight at buckland. lee rode forward to the field upon which general hill had sustained his bloody repulse, and hill--depressed and mortified at the mishap--endeavored to explain the _contretemps_ and vindicate himself from censure. lee is said to have listened in silence, as they rode among the dead bodies, and to have at length replied, gravely and sadly: "well, well, general, bury these poor men, and let us say no more about it." he had issued orders that the troops should cease the pursuit, and riding on the next morning, with general stuart, to the summit of a hill overlooking broad run, dismounted, and held a brief conversation with the commander of his cavalry, looking intently, as he spoke, in the direction of manassas. his demeanor was that of a person who is far from pleased with the course of events, and the word _glum_ best describes his expression. the safe retreat of general meade, with the heavy blow struck by him in retiring, was indeed enough to account for this ill-humor. the campaign was altogether a failure, since general meade's position at centreville was unassailable; and, if he were only driven therefrom, he had but to retire to the defences at washington. lee accordingly gave stuart directions to follow up the enemy in the direction of centreville, and, ordering the orange and alexandria railroad to be torn up back to the rappahannock, put his infantry in motion, and marched back toward culpepper. we shall now briefly follow the movements of the cavalry. stuart advanced to manassas, following up the federal rear, and hastening their retreat across bull run beyond. he then left fitz lee's division near manassas in the federal front, and moving, with hampton's division, to the left toward groveton, passed the little catharpin, proceeded thence through the beautiful autumn forest toward frying pan, and there found and attacked, with his command dismounted and acting as sharp-shooters, the second corps of the federal army. this sudden appearance of southern troops on the flank of centreville, is said to have caused great excitement there, as it was not known that the force was not general lee's army. the fact was soon apparent, however, that it was merely a cavalry attack. the federal infantry advanced, whereupon stuart retired; and the adventurous southern horsemen moved back in the direction of warrenton. they were not to rejoin lee's army, however, before a final conflict with the federal cavalry; and the circumstances of this conflict were as dramatic and picturesque as the _ruse de guerre_ of young in culpepper, and the midnight adventure of stuart near auburn. the bold assault on the second corps seemed to have excited the ire of the federal commander, and he promptly sent forward a considerable body of his cavalry, under general kilpatrick, to pursue stuart, and if possible come up with and defeat him. stuart was near the village of buckland, on the road to warrenton, when intelligence of the approach of the federal cavalry reached him. the movement which followed was suggested by general fitz lee. he proposed that stuart should retire toward warrenton with hampton's division, while he, with his own division, remained on the enemy's left flank. then, at a given signal, stuart was to face about; he, general fitz lee, would attack them in flank; when their rout would probably ensue. this plan was carried out to the letter. general kilpatrick, who seems to have been confident of his ability to drive stuart before him, pressed forward on the warrenton road, closely following up his adversary, when the sudden boom of artillery from general fitz lee gave the signal. stuart wheeled at the signal, and made a headlong charge upon his pursuers. fitz lee came in at the same moment and attacked them in flank; and the result was that general kilpatrick's entire command was routed, and retreated in confusion, stuart pursuing, as he wrote, "from within three miles of warrenton to buckland, the horses at full speed the whole distance." so terminated an incident afterward known among the troopers of stuart by the jocose title of "the buckland races," and the southern cavalry retired without further molestation behind the rappahannock. the coã¶peration of general imboden in the campaign should not be passed over. that officer, whose special duty had been to guard the gaps in the blue ridge, advanced from berryville to charlestown, attacked the federal garrison at the latter place, drove them in disorder toward harper's ferry, and carried back with him four or five hundred prisoners. the enemy followed him closely, and he was forced to fight them off at every step. he succeeded, however, in returning in safety, having performed more than the duty expected of him. lee was now behind the rappahannock, and it remained to be seen what course general meade would pursue--whether he would remain near centreville, or strive to regain his lost ground. all doubt was soon terminated by the approach of the federal army, which, marching from centreville on october 19th, and repairing the railroad as it advanced, reached the rappahannock on the 7th of november. lee's army at this time was in camp toward culpepper court-house, with advanced forces in front of kelly's ford and the railroad bridge. general meade acted with vigor. on his arrival he promptly sent a force across at kelly's ford; the southern troops occupying the rifle-pits there were driven off, with the loss of many prisoners; and an attack near the railroad bridge had still more unfortunate results for general lee. a portion of early's division had been posted in the abandoned federal works, on the north bank at this point, and these were now attacked, and, after a fierce resistance, completely routed. nearly the whole command was captured--the remnant barely escaping--and, the way having thus been cleared, general meade threw his army across into culpepper. general lee retired before him with a heavy heart and a deep melancholy, which, in spite of his great control over himself, was visible in his countenance. the infantry-fighting of the campaign had begun, and ended in disaster for him. in the thirty days he had lost at least two thousand men, and was back again in his old camps, having achieved absolutely nothing. v. the advance to mine run. november of the bloody year 1863 had come; and it seemed not unreasonable to anticipate that a twelvemonth, marked by such incessant fighting at chancellorsville, fredericksburg, salem church, winchester, gettysburg, front royal, bristoe, and along the rappahannock, would now terminate in peace, permitting the combatants on both sides, worn out by their arduous work, to go into winter-quarters, and recuperate their energies for the operations of the ensuing spring. but general meade had otherwise determined. he had resolved to try a last advance, in spite of the inclement weather; and lee's anticipations of a season of rest and refreshment for his troops, undisturbed by hostile demonstrations on the part of the enemy, were destined speedily to be disappointed. the southern army had gone regularly into winter-quarters, south of the rapidan, and the men were felicitating themselves upon the prospect of an uninterrupted season of leisure and enjoyment in their rude cabins, built in sheltered nooks, or under their breadths of canvas raised upon logs, and fitted with rough but comfortable chimneys, built of notched pine-saplings, when suddenly intelligence was brought by scouts that the federal army was in motion. the fact reversed all their hopes of rest, and song, and laughter, by the good log-fires. the musket was taken from its place on the rude walls, the cartridge-box assumed, and the army was once more ready for battle--as gay, hopeful, and resolved, as in the first days of spring. general meade had, indeed, resolved that the year should not end without another blow at his adversary, and the brief campaign, known as the "advance to mine run," followed. it was the least favorable of all seasons for active operations; but the federal commander is vindicated from the charge of bad soldiership by two circumstances which very properly had great weight with him. the first was, the extreme impatience of the northern authorities and people at the small results of the bloody fighting of the year. gettysburg had seemed to them a complete defeat of lee, since he had retreated thereafter without loss of time to virginia; and yet three months afterward the defeated commander had advanced upon and forced back his victorious adversary. that such should be the result of the year's campaigning seemed absurd to the north. a clamorous appeal was made to the authorities to order another advance; and this general sentiment is said to have been shared by general meade, who had declared himself bitterly disappointed at missing a battle with lee in october. a stronger argument in favor of active operations lay in the situation, at the moment, of the southern army. lee, anticipating no further fighting during the remainder of the year, opposed the enemy on the rapidan with only one of his two corps--that of ewell; while the other--that of hill--was thrown back, in detached divisions, at various points on the orange and the virginia central railroads, for the purpose of subsistence during the winter. this fact, becoming known to general meade, dictated, it is said, his plan of operations. an advance seemed to promise, from the position of the southern forces, a decisive success. ewell's right extended no farther than morton's ford, on the rapidan, and thus the various fords down to chancellorsville were open. if general meade could cross suddenly, and by a rapid march interpose between ewell and the scattered divisions of hill far in rear, it appeared not unreasonable to conclude that lee's army would be completely disrupted, and that the two corps, one after another, might be crushed by the federal army. this plan, which is given on the authority of northern writers, exhibited good soldiership, and, if lee were to be caught unawares, promised to succeed. without further comment we shall now proceed to the narrative of this brief movement, which, indecisive as it was in its results, was not uninteresting, and may prove as attractive to the military student as other operations more imposing and accompanied by bloodier fighting. general meade began to move toward the rapidan on november 26th, and every exertion was made by him to advance with such secrecy and rapidity as to give him the advantage of a surprise. in this, however, he was disappointed. no sooner had his orders been issued, and the correspondent movements begun, than the accomplished scouts of stuart hurried across the rapidan with the intelligence. stuart, whose headquarters were in a hollow of the hills near orange, and not far from general lee's, promptly communicated in person to the commander-in-chief this important information, and lee dispatched immediately an order to general a.p. hill, in rear, to march at once and form a junction with ewell in the vicinity of verdierville. the latter officer was directed to retire from his advanced position upon the rapidan, which exposed him to an attack on his right flank and rear, and to fall back and take post behind the small stream called mine run. in following with a critical eye the operations of general lee, the military student must be struck particularly by one circumstance, that in all his movements he seemed to proceed less according to the nice technicalities of the art of war, than in accordance with the dictates of a broad and comprehensive good sense. it may be said that, in choosing position, he always chose the right and never the wrong one; and the choice of mine run now as a defensive line was a proof of this. the run is a small water-course which, rising south of the great highway between orange and chancellorsville, flows due northward amid woods and between hills to the rapidan, into which it empties itself a few miles above germanna, general meade's main place of crossing. this stream is the natural defence of the right flank of an army posted between orange and the rapidan. it is also the natural and obvious line upon which to receive the attack of a force marching from below toward gordonsville. behind mine run, therefore, just east of the little village of verdierville, general lee directed his two corps to concentrate; and at the word, the men, lounging but now carelessly in winter-quarters, sprung to arms, "fell in," and with burnished muskets took up the line of march. we have spoken of the promptness with which the movement was made, and it may almost be said that general meade had scarcely broken up his camps north of the rapidan, when lee was in motion to go and meet him. on the night of the 26th, stuart, whose cavalry was posted opposite the lower fords, pushed forward in person, and bivouacked under some pines just below verdierville; and before daylight general lee was also in the saddle, and at sunrise had reached the same point. the night had been severely cold, for winter had set in in earnest; but general lee, always robust and careless of weather, walked down, without wrapping, and wearing only his plain gray uniform, to stuart's _impromptu_ headquarters under the pines, where, beside a great fire, and without other covering than his army-blanket, the commander of the cavalry had slept since midnight. as lee approached, stuart came forward, and lee said, admiringly, "what a hardy soldier!" they consulted, stuart walking back with general lee, and receiving his orders. he then promptly mounted, and hastened to the front, where, taking command of his cavalry, he formed it in front of the advancing enemy, and with artillery and dismounted sharp-shooters, offered every possible impediment to their advance. general meade made the passage of the rapidan without difficulty; and, as his expedition was unencumbered with wagons, advanced rapidly. the only serious obstruction to his march was made by johnson's division of ewell's corps, which had been thrown out beyond the run, toward the river. upon this force the federal third corps, under general french, suddenly blundered, by taking the wrong road, it is said, and an active engagement followed, which resulted in favor of the southerners. the verdict of lee's troops afterward was, that the enemy fought badly; but general french probably desired nothing better than to shake off this hornets'-nest into which he had stumbled, and to reach, in the time prescribed by general meade, the point of federal concentration near robertson's tavern. toward that point the northern forces now converged from the various crossings of the river; and stuart continued to reconnoitre and feel them along the entire front, fighting obstinately, and falling back only when compelled to do so. every step was thus contested with sharp-shooters and the horse-artillery, from far below to above new-hope church. the federal infantry, however, continued steadily to press forward, forcing back the cavalry, and on the 27th general meade was in face of mine run. lee was ready. hill had promptly marched, and his corps was coming into position on the right of ewell. receiving intelligence of the enemy's movement only upon the preceding day, lee had seemed to move the divisions of hill, far back toward charlottesville, as by the wave of his hand. the army was concentrated; the line of defence occupied; and general meade's attempt to surprise his adversary, by interposing between his widely-separated wings, had resulted in decisive failure. if he fought now, the battle must be one of army against army; and, what was worst of all, it was lee who held all the advantages of position. we have spoken of mine run: it is a strong defensive position, on its right bank and on its left. flowing generally between hills, and with densely-wooded banks, it is difficult to cross from either side in face of an opposing force; and it was lee's good fortune to occupy the attitude of the party to be assailed. he seemed to feel that he had nothing to fear, and was in excellent spirits, as were the men; an eye-witness describes them as "gay, lively, laughing, magnificent." in front of his left wing he had already erected works; his centre and right were as yet undefended, but the task of strengthening the line at these points was rapidly prosecuted. lee superintended in person the establishment of his order of battle, and it was plain to those who saw him thus engaged that the department of military engineering was a favorite one with him. riding along the western bank of the water-course, a large part of which was densely clothed in oak, chestnut, and hickory, he selected, with the quick eye of the trained engineer, the best position for his line--promptly moved it when it had been established on bad ground--pointed out the positions for artillery; and, as he thus rode slowly along, the works which he had directed seemed to spring up behind him as though by magic. as the troops of hill came up and halted in the wood, the men seized axes, attacked the large trees, which soon fell in every direction, and the heavy logs were dragged without loss of time to the prescribed line, where they were piled upon each other in double walls, which were filled in rapidly with earth; and thus, in an inconceivably short space of time the men had defences breast-high which would turn a cannon-shot. in front, for some distance, too, the timber had been felled and an _abatis_ thus formed. a few hours after the arrival of the troops on the line marked out by lee, they were rooted behind excellent breastworks, with forest, stream, and _abatis_ in front, to delay the assailing force under the fire of small-arms and cannon. this account of the movements of the army, and the preparations made to receive general meade's attack, may appear of undue length and minuteness of detail, in view of the fact that no battle ensued. but the volume before the reader is not so much a history of the battles of virginia, which have often been described, as an attempt to delineate the military and personal character of general lee, which displayed itself often more strikingly in indecisive events than in those whose results attract the attention of the world. it was the vigorous brain, indeed, of the great soldier, that made events indecisive--warding off, by military acumen and ability, the disaster with which he was threatened. at mine run, lee's quick eye for position, and masterly handling of his forces, completely checkmated an adversary who had advanced to deliver decisive battle. with felled trees, breastworks, and a crawling stream, lee reversed all the calculations of the commander of the federal army. from the 27th of november to the night of the 1st of december, general meade moved to and fro in front of the formidable works of his adversary, feeling them with skirmishers and artillery, and essaying vainly to find some joint in the armor through which to pierce. there was none. lee had inaugurated that great system of breastworks which afterward did him such good service in his long campaign with general grant. a feature of the military art unknown to jomini had thus its birth in the woods of america; and this fact, if there were naught else of interest in the campaign, would communicate to the mine-run affair the utmost interest. general meade, it seems, was bitterly opposed to foregoing an attack. in spite of the powerful position of his adversary, he ordered an assault, it is said; but this did not take place, in consequence, it would appear, of the reluctance of general warren to charge the confederate right. this seemed so strong that the men considered it hopeless. when the order was communicated to them, each one wrote his name on a scrap of paper and pinned it to his breast, that his corpse might be recognized, and, if possible, conveyed to his friends. this was ominous of failure: general warren suspended the attack; and general meade, it is said, acquiesced in his decision. he declared, it is related, that he could carry the position _with a loss of thirty thousand men_; but, as that idea was frightful, there seemed nothing to do but retreat. lee seemed to realize the embarrassment of his adversary, and was in excellent heart throughout the whole affair. riding to and fro along his line among his "merry men"--and they had never appeared in finer spirits, or with greater confidence in their commander--he addressed encouraging words to them, exposed himself with entire indifference to the shelling, and seemed perfectly confident of the result. it was on this occasion that, finding a party of his ragged soldiers devoutly kneeling in one of the little glades behind the breastworks, and holding a praying-meeting in the midst of bursting shells, he dismounted, took off his hat, and remained silently and devoutly listening until the earnest prayer was concluded. a great revival was then going on in the army, and thousands were becoming professors of religion. the fact may seem strange to those who have regarded lee as only a west-pointer and soldier, looking, like all soldiers, to military success; but the religious enthusiasm of his men in this autumn of 1863 probably gave him greater joy than any successes achieved over his federal adversary. those who saw him on the lines at mine run will remember the composed satisfaction of his countenance. an eye-witness recalls his mild face, as he rode along, accompanied by "hill, in his drooping hat, simple and cordial; early, laughing; ewell, pale and haggard, but with a smile _de bon coeur_" [footnote: journal of a staff-officer.] he was thus attended, sitting his horse upon a hill near the left of his line, when a staff officer rode up and informed him that the enemy were making a heavy demonstration against his extreme right. "infantry or cavalry?" he asked, with great calmness. "infantry, i think, general, from the appearance of the guns. general wilcox thinks so, and has sent a regiment of sharp-shooters to meet them." "who commands the regiment?" asked general lee; and it was to introduce this question that this trifle has been mentioned. lee knew his army man by man almost, and could judge of the probable result of the movement here announced to him by the name of the officer in command. finding that general meade would not probably venture to assail him. lee determined, on the night of december 1st, to attack his adversary on the next morning. his mildness on this night yielded to soldierly ardor, and he exclaimed: "they must be attacked! they must be attacked!" his plan is said to have contemplated a movement of his right wing against the federal left flank, for which the ground afforded great advantages. all was ready for such a movement, and the orders are said to have been issued, when, as the dawn broke over the hills, the federal camps were seen to be deserted. general meade had abandoned his campaign, and was in full retreat toward the rapidan. the army immediately moved in pursuit, with lee leading the column. the disappearance of the enemy was an astounding event to them, and they could scarcely realize it. an entertaining illustration of this fact is found in the journal of a staff-officer, who was sent with an order to general hampton. "in looking for him," says the writer, "i got far to our right, and in a hollow of the woods found a grand guard of the eleventh cavalry, with pickets and videttes out, gravely sitting their horses, and watching the wood-roads for the advance of an enemy who was then retreating across ely's ford!" stuart was pressing their rear with his cavalry, while the infantry were steadily advancing. but the pursuit was vain. general meade had disappeared like a phantom, and was beyond pursuit, to the extreme regret and disappointment of general lee, who halted his troops, in great discouragement, at parker's store. "tell general stuart," he said, with an air of deep melancholy, to an officer whom he saw passing, "that i had received his dispatch when he turned into the brock road, and have halted my infantry here, not wishing to march them unnecessarily." even at that early hour all chance of effective pursuit was lost. general meade, without wagons, and not even with the weight of the rations brought over, which the men had consumed, had moved with the rapidity of cavalry, and was already crossing the river far below. he was afterward asked by a gentleman of culpepper whether in crossing the rapidan he designed a real advance. "certainly," he is reported by the gentleman in question to have replied, "i meant to go to richmond if i could, but lee's position was so strong that to storm it would have cost me thirty thousand men. i could not remain without a battle--the weather was so cold that my sentinels froze to death on post." the pursuit was speedily abandoned by general lee as entirely impracticable, and the men were marched back between the burning woods, set on fire by the federal campfires. the spectacle was imposing--the numerous fires, burning outerward in the carpet of thick leaves, formed picturesque rings of flame resembling brilliant necklaces; and, as the flames reached the tall trees, wrapped to the summit in dry vines, these would blaze aloft like gigantic torches--true "torches of war"--let fall by the federal commander in his hasty retrograde. twenty-four hours afterward the larger part of general lee's army were back in their winter-quarters. in less than a week the mine-run campaign had begun and ended. the movement of general meade might have been compared to that of the king of france and his forty thousand men in the song; but the campaign was not ill devised, was rather the dictate of sound military judgment. all that defeated it was the extreme promptness of lee, the excellent choice of position, and the beginning of that great system of impromptu breastworks which afterward became so powerful an engine against general grant. vi. lee in the autumn and winter of 1863. general lee's headquarters remained, throughout the autumn and winter of 1863, in a wood on the southern slope of the spur called clarke's mountain, a few miles east of orange court-house. here his tents had been pitched, in a cleared space amid pines and cedars; and the ingenuity of the "couriers," as messengers and orderlies were called in the southern army, had fashioned alleys and walks leading to the various tents, the tent of the commanding general occupying the centre. of the gentlemen of general lee's staff we have not considered it necessary to speak; but it may here be said that it was composed of officers of great efficiency and of the most courteous manners, from colonel taylor, the indefatigable adjutant-general, to the youngest and least prominent member of the friendly group. among these able assistants of the commander-in-chief were colonel marshall, of maryland, a gentleman of distinguished intellect; colonel peyton, who had entered the battle of manassas as a private in the ranks, but, on the evening of that day, for courage and efficiency, occupied the place of a commissioned officer on beauregard's staff; and others whose names were comparatively unknown to the army, but whose part in the conduct of affairs, under direction of lee, was most important. with the gentlemen of his staff general lee lived on terms of the most kindly regard. he was a strict disciplinarian, and abhorred the theory that a commissioned officer, from considerations of rank, should hold himself above the private soldiers; but there was certainly no fault of this description to be found at army headquarters, and the general and his staff worked together in harmonious coã¶peration. the respect felt for him by gentlemen who saw him at all hours, and under none of the guise of ceremony, was probably greater than that experienced by the community who looked upon him from a distance. that distant perspective, hiding little weaknesses, and revealing only the great proportions of a human being, is said to be essential generally to the heroic sublime. no man, it has been said, can be great to those always near him; but in the case of general lee this was far from being the fact. he seemed greater and nobler, day by day, as he was better and more intimately known; and upon this point we shall quote the words of the brave john b. gordon, one of his most trusted lieutenants: "it has been my fortune in life," says general gordon, "from circumstances, to have come in contact with some whom the world pronounced great--some of the earth's celebrated and distinguished; but i declare it here to-day, that of any mortal man whom it has ever been my privilege to approach, he was the greatest; and i assert here, that, _grand as might be your conception of the man before, he arose in incomparable majesty on more familiar acquaintance_. this can be affirmed of few men who have ever lived or died, and of no other man whom it has ever been my fortune to approach. like niagara, the more you gazed, the more its grandeur grew upon you, the more its majesty expanded and filled your spirit with a full satisfaction that left a perfect delight without the slightest feeling of oppression. grandly majestic and dignified in all his deportment, he was genial as the sunlight of this beautiful day; and not a ray of that cordial social intercourse but brought warmth to the heart as it did light to the understanding." upon this point, general breckinridge, too, bears his testimony: "during the last year of that unfortunate struggle," he says, "it was my good fortune to spend a great deal of time with him. i was almost constantly by his side, and it was during the two months immediately preceding the fall of richmond that i came to know and fully understand the true nobility of his character. in all those long vigils, he was considerate and kind, gentle, firm, and self-poised. i can give no better idea of the impression it made upon me, than to say it inspired me with an ardent love of the man and a profound veneration of his character. it was so massive and noble, so grand in its proportions, that all men must admire its heroism and gallantry, yet so gentle and tender that a woman might adopt and claim it as her own." we beg the reader to observe that in these two tributes to the worth of the great soldier, his distinguished associates dwell with peculiar emphasis upon the charms of private intercourse with him, and bear their testimony to the fact that to know him better was to love and admire him more and more. the fact is easily explained. there was in this human being's character naught that was insincere, assumed, or pretentious. it was a great and massive soul--as gentle, too, and tender, as a woman's or a child's--that lay beneath the reserved exterior, and made the soldier more beloved as its qualities were better known. other men reveal their weaknesses on nearer acquaintance--lee only revealed his greatness; and he was more and more loved and admired. the justice of these comments will be recognized by all who had personal intercourse with the illustrious soldier; and, in this autumn and winter of 1863, his army, lying around him along the rapidan, began to form that more intimate acquaintance which uniformly resulted in profound admiration for the man. in the great campaigns of the two past years the gray soldier had shared their hardships, and never relaxed his fatherly care for all their wants; he had led them in battle, exposing his own person with entire indifference; had never exposed _them_ when it was possible to avoid it; and on every occasion had demanded, often with disagreeable persistence from the civil authorities, that the wants of his veterans should be supplied if all else was neglected. these facts were now known to the troops, and made lee immensely popular. from the highest officers to the humblest private soldiers he was universally respected and beloved. the whole army seemed to feel that, in the plainly-clad soldier, sleeping, like themselves, under canvas, in the woods of orange, they had a guiding and protecting head, ever studious of their well-being, jealous of their hard-earned fame, and ready, both as friend and commander, to represent them and claim their due. we have spoken of the great revival of religion which at this time took place in the army. the touching spectacle was presented of bearded veterans, who had charged in a score of combats, kneeling devoutly under the rustic roofs of evergreens, built for religious gatherings, and praying to the god of battles who had so long protected them. a commander-in-chief of the old european school might have ridiculed these emotional assemblages, or, at best, passed them without notice, as freaks in which he disdained to take part. lee, on the contrary, greeted the religious enthusiasm of his troops with undisguised pleasure. he went among them, conversed with the chaplains, assisted the good work by every means in his power; and no ordained minister of the gospel could have exhibited a simpler, sincerer, or more heartfelt delight than himself at the general extension of religious feeling throughout the army. we have related how, in talking with army-chaplains, his cheeks flushed and his eyes filled with tears at the good tidings. he begged them to pray for him too, as no less needing their pious intercession; and in making the request he was, as always, simple and sincere. unaccustomed to exhibit his feelings upon this, the profoundest and most sacred of subjects, he was yet penetrated to his inmost soul by a sense of his own weakness and dependence on divine support; and, indeed, it may be questioned whether any other element of the great soldier's character was so deep-seated and controlling as his spirit of love to god. it took, in the eyes of the world, the form of a love of duty; but with lee the word duty was but another name for the will of the almighty; and to discover and perform this was, first and last, the sole aim of his life. we elaborate this point before passing to the last great campaign of the war, since, to understand lee in those last days, it is absolutely necessary to keep in view this utter subjection of the man's heart to the sense of an overruling providence--that providence which "shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will." we shall be called upon to delineate the soldier meeting adverse circumstances and disaster at every turn with an imperial calmness and a resolution that never shook; and, up to a certain point, this noble composure may be attributed to the stubborn courage of the man's nature. there came in due time, however, a moment of trial when military courage simply was of no avail--when that human being never lived, who, looking to earthly support alone, would not have lost heart and given up the contest. lee did not, in this hour of conclusive trial, either lose heart or give up the struggle; and the world, not understanding the phenomenon, gazed at him with wonder. few were aware of the true explanation of his utter serenity when all things were crumbling around him, and when he knew that they were crumbling. the stout heart of the soldier who will not yield to fate was in his breast; but he had a still stronger sentiment than manly courage to support him--the consciousness that he was doing his duty, and that god watched over him, and would make all things work together for good to those who loved him. as yet that last great wrestle of the opposing armies lay in the future. the veterans of the army of northern virginia defended the line of the rapidan, and the gray commander-in-chief, in his tent on clarke's mountain, serenely awaited the further movements of the enemy. during the long months of winter he was busily engaged, as usual, in official correspondence, in looking to the welfare of his men, and in preparations for the coming campaign. he often rode among the camps, and the familiar figure in the well-known hat, cape, and gray uniform, mounted upon the powerful iron-gray--the famous "traveller," who survived to bear his master after the war--was everywhere greeted by the ragged veterans with cheers and marks of the highest respect and regard. at times his rides were extended to the banks of the rapidan, and, in passing, he would stop at the headquarters of general stuart, or other officers. on these occasions he had always some good-humored speech for all, not overlooking the youngest officer; but he shone in the most amiable light, perhaps, in conversing with some old private soldier, gray-haired like himself. at such moments the general's countenance was a pleasant spectacle. a kindly smile lit up the clear eyes, and moved the lips half-concealed by the grizzled mustache. the _bonhomie_ of this smile was irresistible, and the aged private soldier, in his poor, tattered fighting-jacket, was made to feel by it that his commander-in-chief regarded him as a friend and comrade. we dwell at too great length, perhaps, upon these slight personal traits of the soldier, but all relating to such a human being is interesting, and worthy of record. to the writer, indeed, this is the most attractive phase of his subject. the analysis and description of campaigns and battles is an unattractive task to him; but the personal delineation of a good and great man, even in his lesser and more familiar traits, is a pleasing relief--a portion of his subject upon which he delights to linger. what the writer here tries to draw, he looked upon with his own eyes, the figure of a great, calm soldier, with kindly sweetness and dignity, but, above all, a charming sincerity and simplicity in every movement, accent, and expression. entirely free from the trappings of high command, and with nothing to distinguish him from any other soldier save the well-worn stars on the collar of his uniform-coat, the commander-in-chief was recognizable at the very first glance, and no less the simple and kindly gentleman. his old soldiers remember him as he appeared on many battle-fields, and will describe his martial seat in the saddle as he advanced with the advancing lines. but they will speak of him with even greater pleasure as he appeared in the winters of 1862 and 1863, on the rappahannock and the rapidan--a gray and simple soldier, riding among them and smiling kindly as his eyes fell upon their tattered uniforms and familiar faces. part viii. _lee's last campaigns and last days_. i. general grant crosses the rapidan. in the first days of may, 1864, began the immense campaign which was to terminate only with the fall of the confederacy. for this, which was regarded as the decisive trial of strength, the federal authorities had made elaborate preparations. new levies were raised by draft to fill up the ranks of the depleted forces; great masses of war material were accumulated at the central depots at washington, and the government summoned from the west an officer of high reputation to conduct hostilities on what was more plainly than ever before seen to be the theatre of decisive conflict--virginia. the officer in question was general ulysses s. grant, who had received the repute of eminent military ability by his operations in the west; he was now commissioned lieutenant-general, and president lincoln assigned him to the command of "all the armies of the united states," at that time estimated to number one million men. general grant promptly accepted the trust confided to him, and, relinquishing to major-general sherman the command of the western forces, proceeded to culpepper and assumed personal command of the army of the potomac, although nominally that army remained under command of general meade. the spring campaign was preceded, in february, by two movements of the federal forces: one the advance of general b.f. butler up the peninsula to the chickahominy, where for a few hours he threatened richmond, only to retire hastily when opposed by a few local troops; the other the expedition of general kilpatrick with a body of cavalry, from the rapidan toward richmond, with the view of releasing the federal prisoners there. this failed completely, like the expedition up the peninsula. general kilpatrick, after threatening the city, rapidly retreated, and a portion of his command, under colonel dahlgren, was pursued, and a large portion killed, including their commander. it is to be hoped, for the honor of human nature, that colonel dahlgren's designs were different from those which are attributed to him on what seems unassailable proof. papers found upon his body contained minute directions for releasing the prisoners and giving up the city to them, and for putting to death the confederate president and his cabinet. to return to the more important events on the rapidan. general grant assumed the direction of the army of the potomac under most favorable auspices. other commanders--especially general mcclellan--had labored under painful disadvantages, from the absence of coã¶peration and good feeling on the part of the authorities. the new leader entered upon the great struggle under very different circumstances. personally and politically acceptable to the government, he received their hearty coã¶peration: all power was placed in his hands; he was enabled to concentrate in virginia the best troops, in large numbers; and the character of this force seemed to promise him assured victory. general mcclellan and others had commanded troops comparatively raw, and were opposed by confederate armies in the full flush of anticipated success. general grant had now under him an army of veterans, and the enemy he was opposed to had, month by month, lost strength. under these circumstances it seemed that he ought to succeed in crushing his adversary. the federal army present and ready for duty may 1, 1864, numbered one hundred and forty-one thousand one hundred and sixty-six men. that of general lee numbered fifty-two thousand six hundred and twenty-six. colonel taylor, adjutant-general of the army, states the strictly effective at a little less, viz.: ewell 13,000 hill 17,000 longstreet 10,000 infantry 40,000 cavalry and artillery 10,000 total 50,000 the two statements do not materially differ, and require no discussion. the force at lee's command was a little over one-third of general grant's; and, if it be true that the latter commander continued to receive reã«nforcements between the 1st and 4th days of may, when he crossed the rapidan, lee's force was probably less than one-third of his adversary's. longstreet, it will be seen, had been brought back from the west, but the confederates labored under an even more serious disadvantage than want of sufficient force. lee's army, small as it was, was wretchedly supplied. half the men were in rags, and, worse still, were but one-fourth fed. against this suicidal policy, in reference to an army upon which depended the fate of the south, general lee had protested in vain. whether from fault in the authorities or from circumstances over which they could exercise no control, adequate supplies of food did not reach the army; and, when it marched to meet the enemy, in the first days of may, the men were gaunt, half-fed, and in no condition to enter upon so arduous a campaign. there was naught to be done, however, but to fight on to the end. upon the army of northern virginia, depleted by casualties, and unprovided with the commonest necessaries, depended the fate of the struggle. generals grant and lee fully realized that fact; and the federal commander had the acumen to perceive that the conflict was to be long and determined. he indulged no anticipations of an early or easy success. his plan, as stated in his official report, was "to _hammer continuously_ against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until _by mere attrition_, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left of him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and the laws." the frightful cost in blood of this policy of hammering continuously and thus wearing away his adversary's strength by mere attrition, did or did not occur to general grant. in either case he is not justly to be blamed. it was the only policy which promised to result in federal success. pitched battles had been tried for nearly three years, and in victory or in defeat the southern army seemed equally unshaken and dangerous. this fact was now felt and acknowledged even by its enemies. "lee's army," said a northern writer, referring to it at this time, "is an army of veterans: it is an instrument sharpened to a perfect edge. you turn its flanks--well, its flanks are made to be turned. this effects little or nothing. all that we reckon as gained, therefore, is the loss of life inflicted on the enemy." with an army thus trained in many combats, and hardened against misfortune, defeat in one or a dozen battles decided nothing. general grant seems to have understood this, and to have resolutely adopted the programme of "attrition"--coldly estimating that, even if he lost ten men to general lee's one, he could better endure that loss, and could afford it, if thereby he "crushed the rebellion." the military theory of the federal commander having thus been set forth in his own words, it remains to notice his programme for the approaching campaign. he had hesitated between two plans--"one to cross the rapidan below lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left." the last was abandoned, from the difficulty of keeping open communication with any base of supplies, and the latter adopted. general grant determined to "fight lee between culpepper and richmond, if he would stand;" to advance straight upon the city and invest it from the north and west, thereby cutting its communications in three directions; and then, crossing the james river above the city, form a junction with the left of major-general butler, who, moving with about thirty thousand men from fortress monroe, at the moment when the army of the potomac crossed the rapidan, was to occupy city point, advance thence up the south side of james river, and reach a position where the two armies might thus unite. it is proper to keep in view this programme of general grant. lee completely reversed it by promptly moving in front of his adversary at every step which he took in advance; and it will be seen that the federal commander was finally compelled to adopt a plan which does not seem to have entered his mind, save as a _dernier ressort_, at the beginning of the campaign. on the morning of the 4th of may, general grant commenced crossing the rapidan at germanna and other fords above chancellorsville, and by the morning of the 5th his army was over. it appears from his report that he had not anticipated so easy a passage of the stream, and greatly felicitated himself upon effecting it so successfully. "this i regarded," he says, "as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehension i had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army." lee had made no movement to dispute the passage of the stream, from the fact, perhaps, that his army was _not_ either "large" or "well-appointed." he preferred to await the appearance of his adversary, and direct an assault on the flank of his column as it passed across his front. from a speech attributed to general meade, it would seem to have been the impression in the federal army that lee designed falling back to a defensive position somewhere near the south anna. his movements were, however, very different. instead of retiring before general grant in the direction of richmond, he moved with his three corps toward the wilderness, to offer battle. [illustration: routes of lee & grant, may and june 1864.] the head of the column consisted of ewell's corps, which had retained its position on the rapidan, forming the right of lee's line. general a.p. hill, who had been stationed higher up, near liberty mills, followed; and longstreet, who lay near gordonsville, brought up the rear. these dispositions dictated, as will be seen, the positions of the three commands in the ensuing struggle. ewell advanced in front down the old turnpike, that one of the two great highways here running east and west which is nearest the rapidan; hill came on over the orange plank-road, a little south of the turnpike, and thus formed on ewell's right; and longstreet, following, came in on the right of hill. general grant had plunged with his army into the dense and melancholy thicket which had been the scene of general hooker's discomfiture. his army, followed by its great train of four thousand wagons, indicating the important nature of the movement, had reached wilderness tavern and that brock road over which jackson advanced in his secret flank-march against the federal right in may, 1863. in may of 1864, now, another federal army had penetrated, the sombre and depressing shadows of the interminable thickets of the wilderness, and a more determined struggle than the first was to mark with its bloody hand this historic territory. ii. the first collision in the wilderness. to understand the singular combat which now ensued, it is necessary to keep in view the fact that nothing more surprised general grant than the sudden appearance of his adversary face to face with him in the wilderness. it had not been supposed, either by the lieutenant-general or his corps-commanders, that lee, with his small army, would have recourse to a proceeding so audacious. it was anticipated, indeed, that, somewhere on the road to richmond, lee would make a stand and fight, in a carefully-selected position which would enable him to risk collision with his great adversary; but that lee himself would bring on this collision by making an open attack, unassisted by position of any sort, was the last thing which seems to have occurred to his adversary. such, however, as has been said, was the design, from the first, of the southern commander, and he moved with his accustomed celerity and energy. as soon as general grant broke up his camps north of the rapidan, lee was apprised of the fact, and ordered his three corps to concentrate in the direction of chancellorsville. those who were present in the southern army at this time will bear record to the soldierly promptness of officers and men. on the evening of the 3d of may the camps were the scenes of noise, merriment, and parade: the bands played; the woods were alive; nothing disturbed the scene of general enjoyment of winter-quarters. on the morning of the 4th all this was changed. the camps were deserted; no sound was anywhere heard; the troops were twenty miles away, fully armed and ready for battle. general lee was in the saddle, and his presence seemed to push forward his column. ewell, marching with celerity, bivouacked that night directly in face of the enemy; and it was the suddenly-discovered presence of the troops of this commander which arrested general grant, advancing steadily in the direction of spottsylvania court-house. he must have inwardly chafed at a circumstance so unexpected and embarrassing. it had been no part of his plan to fight in the thickets of the wilderness, and yet an adversary of but one-third his own strength was about to reverse his whole programme, and dictate the terms of the first battles of the campaign. there was nothing to do, however, but to fight, and general grant hastened to form order of battle for that purpose, with general sedgwick commanding his right, generals warren and burnside his centre, and general hancock his left, near the brock road. the line thus formed extended from northwest to southeast, and, as the right wing was in advance with respect to lee, that circumstance occasioned the first collision. this occurred about mid-day on the 5th of may, and was brought on by general warren, who attacked the head of swell's column, on the old turnpike. an obstinate engagement ensued, and the division which received the assault was forced back. it quickly, however, reformed, and being reã«nforced advanced in turn against general warren, and, after a hard fight, he was driven back with a loss of three thousand men and two pieces of artillery. this first collision of the armies on the confederate left was followed almost immediately by a bloody struggle on the centre. this was held by a.p. hill, who had marched down the plank-road, and was near the important point of junction of that road with the brock road, when he was suddenly attacked by the enemy. the struggle which ensued was long and determined. general lee wrote: "the assaults were repeated and desperate, but every one was repulsed." when night fell, hill had not been driven back, but had not advanced; and the two armies rested on their arms, awaiting the return of light to continue the battle. iii. the battle of the 6th of may. the morning of the 6th of may came, and, with the first light of dawn, the adversaries, as by a common understanding, advanced at the same moment to attack each other. the battle which followed is wellnigh indescribable, and may be said, in general terms, to have been naught but the blind and desperate clutch of two great bodies of men, who could scarcely see each other when they were but a few feet apart, and who fired at random, rather by sound than sight. a southern writer, describing the country and the strange combat, says: "the country was sombre--a land of thicket, undergrowth, jungle, ooze, where men could not see each other twenty yards off, and assaults had to be made by the compass. the fights there were not even as easy as night attacks in open country, for at night you can travel by the stars. death came unseen; regiments stumbled on each other, and sent swift destruction into each other's ranks, guided by the crackling of the bushes. it was not war--military manoeuvring: science had as little to do with it as sight. two wild animals were hunting each other; when they heard each other's steps, they sprung and grappled. the conqueror advanced, or went elsewhere. the dead were lost from all eyes in the thicket. the curious spectacle was here presented of officers advancing to the charge, in the jungle, _compass in hand_, attacking, not by sight, but by the bearing of the needle. in this mournful and desolate thicket did the great campaign of 1864 begin. here, in blind wrestle as at midnight, did two hundred thousand men in blue and gray clutch each other--bloodiest and weirdest of encounters. war had had nothing like it. the genius of destruction, tired apparently of the old commonplace killing, had invented the 'unseen death.' at five in the morning, the opponents closed in, breast to breast, in the thicket. each had thrown up here and there slight, temporary breastworks of saplings and dirt; beyond this, they were unprotected. the question now was, which would succeed in driving his adversary from these defences, almost within a few yards of each other, and from behind which crackled the musketry. never was sight more curious. on the low line of these works, dimly seen in the thicket, rested the muzzles spouting flame; from the depths rose cheers; charges were made and repulsed, the lines scarcely seeing each other; men fell and writhed, and died unseen--their bodies lost in the bushes, their death-groans drowned in the steady, continuous, never-ceasing crash." these sentences convey a not incorrect idea of the general character of this remarkable engagement, which had no precedent in the war. we shall now proceed to speak of general lee's plans and objects, and to indicate where they failed or succeeded. the commanders of both armies labored under great embarrassments. general grant's was the singular character of the country, with which he was wholly unacquainted; and general lee's, the delay in the arrival of longstreet. owing to the distance of the camps of the last-named officer, he had not, at dawn, reached the field of battle. as his presence was indispensable to a general assault, this delay in his appearance threatened to result in unfortunate consequences, as it was nearly certain that general grant would make an early and resolute attack. under these circumstances, lee resolved to commence the action, and did so, counting, doubtless, on his ability, with the thirty thousand men at his command, to at least maintain his ground. his plan seems to have been to make a heavy demonstration against the federal right, and, when longstreet arrived, throw the weight of his whole centre and right against the federal left, with the view of seizing the brock road, running southward, and forcing back the enemy's left wing into the thickets around chancellorsville. this brilliant conception, which, if carried out, would have arrested general grant in the beginning of his campaign, was very near meeting with success. the attack on the federal right, under general sedgwick, commenced at dawn, and the fighting on both sides was obstinate. it continued with indecisive results throughout the morning, gradually involving the federal centre; but, nearly at the moment when it began, a still more obstinate conflict was inaugurated between general hancock, holding the federal left, and hill, who opposed him on the plank-road. the battle raged in this quarter with great fury for some time, but, attacked in front and flank at once by his able opponent, hill was forced back steadily, and at last, in some disorder, a considerable distance from the ground which had witnessed the commencement of the action. at this point, however, he was fortunately met by longstreet. that commander rapidly brought his troops into line, met the advancing enemy, attacked them with great fury, and, after a bloody contest, in which general wadsworth was killed, drove them back to their original position on the brock road. it now seemed nearly certain that lee's plan of seizing upon this important highway would succeed. general hancock had been forced back with heavy loss, longstreet was pressing on, and, as he afterward said, he "thought he had another bull run on them," when a singular casualty defeated all. general longstreet, who had ridden in front of his advancing line, turned to ride back, when he was mistaken by his own men for a federal cavalryman, fired upon, and disabled by a musket-ball. this threw all into disorder, and the advance was discontinued. general lee, as soon as he was apprised of the accident, hastened to take personal command of the corps, and, as soon as order was restored, directed the line to press forward. the most bloody and determined struggle of the day ensued. the thicket filled the valleys, and, as at chancellorsville, a new horror was added to the horror of battle. a fire broke out in the thicket, and soon wrapped the adversaries in flame and smoke. they fought on, however, amid the crackling flames. lee continued to press forward; the federal breastworks along a portion of their front were carried, and a part of general hancock's line was driven from the field. the struggle had, however, been decisive of no important results, and, from the lateness of the hour when it terminated, it could not be followed up. on the left lee had also met with marked but equally indecisive success. general gordon had attacked the federal right, driven the force at that point in disorder from their works, and but for the darkness this success might have been followed up and turned into a complete defeat of that wing of the enemy. it was only discovered on the next morning what important successes gordon had effected with a single brigade; and there is reason to believe that with a larger force this able soldier might have achieved results of a decisive character.[1] [footnote 1: general early, in his "memoir of the last year of the war for independence," bears his testimony to the important character of the blow struck by general gordon. he says: "at light, on the morning of the 7th, an advance was made, which disclosed the fact that the enemy had given up his line of works in front of my whole line and a good portion of johnson's. between the lines a large number of his dead had been left, and at his breastworks a large number of muskets and knapsacks had been abandoned, and there was every indication of great confusion. it was not till then that we understood the full extent of the success attending the movement of the evening before." general gordon had proposed making the attack on the _morning_ of the 6th, but was overruled.] such had been the character and results of the first conflicts between the two armies in the thickets of the wilderness. as we have already said, the collision there was neither expected nor desired by general grant, who, unlike general hooker, in may of the preceding year, seems fully to have understood the unfavorable nature of the region for manoeuvring a large army. his adversary had, however, forced him to accept battle, leaving him no choice, and the result of the actions of the 5th and 6th had been such as to determine the federal commander to emerge as soon as possible from the tangled underwood which hampered all his movements. on the 7th he accordingly made no movement to attack lee, and on the night of that day marched rapidly in the direction of hanover junction, following the road by todd's tavern toward spottsylvania court-house. for this determination to avoid further fighting in the wilderness, general grant gives a singular explanation. "on the morning of the 7th," he says, "reconnoissance showed that the enemy _had fallen behind his intrenched lines_, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. from this it was evident that the two-days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, _notwithstanding his advantage of position_, and that he would wait an attack behind his works." the "intrenched lines" and "advantage of position" of lee, were both imaginary. no lines of intrenchment had been made, and the ground was not more favorable on general lee's side than on general grant's. both armies had erected impromptu breastworks of felled trees and earth, as continued to be their habit throughout the campaign, and the flat country gave no special advantage to either. the forward movement of general grant is susceptible of much easier explanation. the result of the two-days' fighting had very far from pleased him; he desired to avoid further conflict in so difficult a country, and, taking advantage of the quiescence of lee, and the hours of darkness, he moved with his army toward the more open country. iv. the 12th of may. throughout the entire day succeeding this first great conflict, general lee remained quiet, watching for some movement of his adversary. his success in the preliminary straggle had been gratifying, considering the great disproportion of numbers, but he indulged no expectation of a retrograde movement across the rapidan, on the part of general grant. he expected him rather to advance, and anxiously awaited some development of this intention. there were no indications of such a design up to the night of the 7th, but at that time, to use the words of a confidential member of lee's staff, "he all at once seemed to conceive the idea that his enemy was preparing to forsake his position, and move toward hanover junction _via_ the spottsylvania court-house, and, believing this, he at once detailed anderson's division with orders to proceed rapidly toward the court-house." general anderson commenced his march about nine o'clock at night, when the federal column was already upon its way. a race now began for the coveted position, and general stuart, with his dismounted sharp-shooters behind improvised breastworks, harassed and impeded the federal advance, at every step, throughout the night. this greatly delayed their march, and their head of column did not reach the vicinity of spottsylvania court-house until past sunrise. general warren, leading the federal advance, then hurried forward, followed by general hancock, when suddenly he found himself in front of breastworks, and was received with a fire of musketry. lee had succeeded in interposing himself between general grant and richmond. on the same evening the bulk of the two armies were facing each other on the line of the po. by the rapidity of his movements general lee had thus completely defeated his adversary's design to seize on the important point, spottsylvania court-house. general grant, apparently conceiving some explanation of this untoward event to be necessary, writes: "the enemy, having become aware of our movement, and _having the shorter line_, was enabled to reach there first." the statement that general lee had the shorter of the two lines to march over is a mistake. the armies moved over parallel roads until beyond todd's tavern, after which the distance to the south bank of the po was greater by lee's route than general grant's. the map will sufficiently indicate this. two other circumstances defeated general grant's attempt to reach the point first--the extreme rapidity of the march of the confederate advance force, and the excellent fighting of stuart's dismounted men, who harassed and delayed general warren, leading the federal advance throughout the entire night. an additional fact should be mentioned, bearing upon this point, and upon general lee's designs. "general lee's orders to me," says general early, who, from the sickness of a.p. hill, had been assigned to the command of the corps, "were to _move by todd's tavern along the brock road_, to spottsylvania court-house, as soon as our front was clear of the enemy." from this order it would appear either that general lee regarded the brock road, over which general grant moved, as the "shorter line," or that he intended the movement of early on the enemy's rear to operate as a check upon them, while he went forward to their front with his main body. these comments may seem tedious to the general reader, but all that illustrates the military designs, or defends the good soldiership of lee, is worthy of record. we proceed now to the narrative. in the wilderness general grant had found a dangerous enemy ready to strike at his flank. he now saw in his front the same active and wary adversary, prepared to bar the direct road to richmond. general lee had taken up his position on the south bank of one of the four tributaries of the mattapony. these four streams are known as the mat, ta, po, and nye rivers, and bear the same relation to the main stream that the fingers of the open hand do to the wrist. general lee was behind the po, which is next to the nye, the northernmost of these water-courses. both were difficult to cross, and their banks heavily wooded. it was now to be seen whether, either by a front attack or a turning movement, general grant could oust his adversary, and whether general lee would stand on the defensive or attack. all day, during the 9th, the two armies were constructing breastworks along their entire fronts, and these works, from the rapidan to the banks of the chickahominy, remain yet in existence. on the evening of this day a federal force was thrown across the po, on the confederate left, but soon withdrawn; and on the 10th a similar movement took place near the same point, which resulted in a brief but bloody conflict, during which the woods took fire, and many of the assaulting troops perished miserably in the flames. the force was then recalled, and, during that night and the succeeding day, nothing of importance occurred, although heavy skirmishing and an artillery-fire took place along the lines. on the morning of the 12th, at the first dawn of day, general grant made a more important and dangerous assault than any yet undertaken in the campaign. this was directed at a salient on general lee's right centre, occupied by johnson's division of ewell's corps, and was one of the bloodiest and most terrible incidents of the war. for this assault general grant is said to have selected his best troops. these advanced in a heavy charging column, through the half darkness of dawn, passed silently over the confederate skirmishers, scarcely firing a shot, and, just as the first streak of daylight touched the eastern woods, burst upon the salient, which they stormed at the point of the bayonet. in consequence of the suddenness of the assault and the absence of artillery--against whose removal general johnston is stated to have protested, and which arrived too late--the federal forces carried all before them, and gained possession of the works, in spite of a stubborn and bloody resistance. such was the excellent success of the federal movement, and the southern line seemed to be hopelessly disrupted. nearly the whole of johnson's division were taken prisoners--the number amounting to about three thousand--and eighteen pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the assaulting column. the position of affairs was now exceedingly critical; and, unless general lee could reform his line at the point, it seemed that nothing was left him but an abandonment of his whole position. the federal army had broken his line; was pouring into the opening; and, to prevent him from concentrating at the point to regain possession of the works, heavy attacks were begun by the enemy on his right and left wings. it is probable that at no time during the war was the southern army in greater danger of a bloody and decisive disaster. at this critical moment general lee acted with the nerve and coolness of a soldier whom no adverse event can shake. those who saw him will testify to the stern courage of his expression; the glance of the eye, which indicated a great nature, aroused to the depth of its powerful organization. line of battle was promptly formed a short distance in rear of the salient then in the enemy's possession, and a fierce charge was made by the southerners, under the eye of lee, to regain it. it was on this occasion that, on fire with the ardor of battle, which so seldom mastered him, lee went forward in front of his line, and, taking his station beside the colors of one of his virginian regiments, took off his hat, and, turning to the men, pointed toward the enemy. a storm of cheers greeted the general, as he sat his gray war-horse, in front of the men--his head bare, his eyes flashing, and his cheeks flushed with the fighting-blood of the soldier. general gordon, however, spurred to his side and seized his rein. "general lee!" he exclaimed, "this is no place for you. go to the rear. these are virginians and georgians, sir--men who have never failed!--men, you will not fail now!" he cried, rising in his stirrups and addressing the troops. "no, no!" was the reply of the men; and from the whole line burst the shout, "lee to the rear! lee to the rear!" instead of being needed, it was obvious that his presence was an embarrassment, as the men seemed determined not to charge unless he retired. he accordingly did so, and the line advanced to the attack, led by general gordon and other officers of approved ability and courage. the charge which followed was resolute, and the word ferocious best describes the struggle which followed. it continued throughout the entire day, lee making not less than five distinct assaults in heavy force to recover the works. the fight involved the troops on both flanks, and was desperate and unyielding. the opposing flags were at times within only a few yards of each other, and so incessant and concentrated was the fire of musketry, that a tree of about eighteen inches in diameter was cut down by bullets, and is still preserved, it is said, in the city of washington, as a memorial of this bloody struggle. [illustration: the wilderness. "lee to the rear"] the fighting only ceased several hours after dark. lee had not regained his advanced line of works, but he was firmly rooted in an interior and straighter line, from which the federal troops had found it impossible to dislodge him. this result of the stubborn action was essentially a success, as general grant's aim in the operation had been to break asunder his adversary's army--in which he very nearly succeeded. at midnight all was again silent. the ground near the salient was strewed with dead bodies. the loss of the three thousand men and eighteen guns of johnson had been followed by a bloody retaliation, the federal commander having lost more than eight thousand men. v. from spottsylvania to the chickahominy. after the bloody action of the 12th of may, general grant remained quiet for many days, "awaiting," he says, "the arrival of reã«nforcements from washington." the number of these fresh troops is not known to the present writer. general lee had no reinforcements to expect, and continued to confront his adversary with his small army, which must have been reduced by the heavy fighting to less than forty thousand men, while that of general grant numbered probably about one hundred and forty thousand. finding that his opponent was not disposed to renew hostilities. general lee, on the 19th of may, sent general ewell to turn his right flank; but this movement resulted in nothing, save the discovery by general ewell that the federal army was moving. this intelligence was dispatched to general lee on the evening of the 21st, and reached him at souther's house, on the banks of the po, where he was calmly reconnoitring the position of the enemy. as soon as he read the note of general ewell, he mounted his horse, saying, in his grave voice, to his staff, "come, gentlemen;" and orders were sent to the army to prepare to move. the troops began their march on the same night, in the direction of hanover junction, which they reached on the evening of the 22d. when, on may 23d, general grant reached the banks of the north anna, he found lee stationed on the south bank, ready to oppose his crossing. the failure of general grant to reach and seize upon the important point of hanover junction before the arrival of lee, decided the fate of the plan of campaign originally devised by him. if the reader will glance at the map of virginia, this fact will become apparent. hanover junction is the point where the virginia central and richmond and fredericksburg railroads cross each other, and is situated in the angle of the north anna and south anna rivers, which unite a short distance below to form the pamunkey. once in possession of this point, general grant would have had easy communication with the excellent base of supplies at aquia creek; would have cut the virginia central railroad; and a direct march southward would have enabled him to invest richmond from the north and northwest, in accordance with his original plan. lee had, however, reached the point first, and from that moment, unless the southern force were driven from its position, the entire plan of campaign must necessarily be changed. the great error of general grant in this arduous campaign would seem to have been the feebleness of the attack which he here made upon lee. the position of the southern army was not formidable, and on his arrival they had had no time to erect defences. the river is not difficult of crossing, and the ground on the south bank gives no decided advantage to a force occupying it. in spite of these facts--which it is proper to say general grant denies, however--nothing was effected, and but little attempted. a few words will sum up the operations of the armies during the two or three days. reaching the river, general grant threw a column across some miles up the stream, at a point known as jericho ford, where a brief but obstinate encounter ensued between generals hill and warren, and this was followed by the capture of an old redoubt defending the chesterfield bridge, near the railroad crossing, opposite lee's right, which enabled another column to pass the stream at that point. these two successful passages of the river on lee's left and right seemed to indicate a fixed intention on the part of his adversary to press both the southern flanks, and bring on a decisive engagement; and, to coã¶perate in this plan, a third column was now thrown over opposite lee's centre. these movements were, however, promptly met. lee retired his two wings, but struck suddenly with his centre at the force attempting to cross there; and then active operations on both sides ceased. in spite of having passed the river with the bulk of his army, and formed line of battle, general grant resolved not to attack. his explanation of this is that lee's position was found "stronger than either of his previous ones." such was the result of the able disposition of the southern force at this important point. general grant found his whole programme reversed, and, on the night of the 26th, silently withdrew and hastened down the north bank of the pamunkey toward hanovertown preceded by the cavalry of general sheridan. that officer had been detached from the army as it approached spottsylvania court-house, to make a rapid march toward richmond, and destroy the confederate communications. in this he partially succeeded, but, attempting to ride into richmond, was repulsed with considerable loss. the only important result, indeed, of the expedition, was the death of general stuart. this distinguished commander of general lee's cavalry had been directed to pursue general sheridan; had done so, with his customary promptness, and intercepted his column near richmond, at a spot known as the yellow tavern; and here, in a stubborn engagement, in which stuart strove to supply his want of troops by the fury of his attack, the great chief of cavalry was mortally wounded, and expired soon afterward. his fall was a grievous blow to general lee's heart, as well as to the southern cause. endowed by nature with a courage which shrunk from nothing; active, energetic, of immense physical stamina, which enabled him to endure any amount of fatigue; devoted, heart and soul, to the cause in which he fought, and looking up to the commander of the army with childlike love and admiration, stuart could be ill spared at this critical moment, and general lee was plunged into the deepest melancholy at the intelligence of his death. when it reached him he retired from those around him, and remained for some time communing with his own heart and memory. when one of his staff entered, and spoke of stuart, general lee said, in a low voice, "i can scarcely think of him without weeping." the command of the cavalry devolved upon general hampton, and it was fought throughout the succeeding campaign with the nerve and efficiency of a great soldier; but stuart had, as it were, formed and moulded it with his own hands; he was the first great commander of horse in the war; and it was hard for his successors, however great their genius, to compete with his memory. his name will thus remain that of the greatest and most prominent cavalry-officer of the war. crossing the pamunkey at hanovertown, after a rapid night-march, general grant sent out a force toward hanover court-house to cut off lee's retreat or discover his position. this resulted in nothing, since general lee had not moved in that direction. he had, as soon as the movement of general grant was discovered, put his lines in motion, directed his march across the country on the direct route to cold harbor, and, halting behind the tottapotomoi, had formed his line there, to check the progress of his adversary on the main road from hanovertown toward richmond. for the third time, thus, general grant had found his adversary in his path; and no generalship, or rapidity in the movement of his column, seemed sufficient to secure to him the advantages of a surprise. on each occasion the march of the federal army had taken place in the night; from the wilderness on the night of may 7th; from spottsylvania on the night of may 21st; and from near the north anna on the night of may 26th. lee had imitated these movements of his opponent, interposing on each occasion, at the critical moment, in his path, and inviting battle. this last statement may be regarded as too strongly expressed, as it seems the opinion of northern writers that lee, in these movements, aimed only to maintain a strict defensive, and, by means of breastworks, simply keep his adversary at arm's length. this is an entire mistake. confident of the efficiency of his army, small as it was, he was always desirous to bring on a decisive action, under favorable circumstances. general early bears his testimony to the truth of this statement. "i happen to know," says this officer, "that general lee had always the greatest anxiety to strike at grant in the open field." during the whole movement from the wilderness to cold harbor, the confederate commander was in excellent spirits. when at hanover junction he spoke of the situation almost jocosely, and said to the venerable dr. gwathmey, speaking of general grant, "if i can get one more pull at him, i will defeat him." this expression does not seem to indicate any depression or want of confidence in his ability to meet general grant in an open pitched battle. it may, however, be asked why, if such were his desire, he did not come out from behind his breastworks and fight. the reply is, that general grant invariably defended his lines by breastworks as powerful as--in many cases much more powerful than--his adversary's. the opposing mounds of earth and trees along the routes of the two armies remain to prove the truth of what is here stated. at cold harbor, especially, the federal works are veritable forts. in face of them, the theory that general grant uniformly acted upon the offensive, without fear of offensive operations in turn on the part of lee, will be found untenable. nor is this statement made with the view of representing general grant as over-cautious, or of detracting from his merit as a commander. it was, on the contrary, highly honorable to him, that, opposed to an adversary of such ability, he should have neglected nothing. reaching the tottapotomoi, general grant found his opponent in a strong position behind that sluggish water-course, prepared to dispute the road to richmond; and it now became necessary to force the passage in his front, or, by another flank march, move still farther to the left, and endeavor to cross the chickahominy somewhere in the vicinity of cold harbor. this last operation was determined upon by general grant, and, sending his cavalry toward cold harbor, he moved rapidly in the same direction with his infantry. this movement was discovered at once by lee; he sent longstreet's corps forward, and, when the federal army arrived, the southern forces were drawn up in their front, between them and richmond, thus barring, for the fourth time in the campaign, the road to the capital. during these movements, nearly continuous fighting had taken place between the opposing columns, which clung to each other, as it were, each shaping its march more or less by that of the other. at last they had reached the ground upon which the obstinate struggle of june, 1862, had taken place, and it now became necessary for general grant either to form some new plan of campaign, or, by throwing his whole army, in one great mass, against his adversary, break through all obstacles, cross the chickahominy, and seize upon richmond. this was now resolved upon. heavy fighting took place on june 2d, near bethesda church and at other points, while the armies were coming into position; but this was felt to be but the preface to the greater struggle which general lee now clearly divined. it came without loss of time. on the morning of the 3d of june, soon after daylight, general grant threw his whole army straightforward against lee's front--all along his line. the conflict which followed was one of those bloody grapples, rather than battles, which, discarding all manoeuvring or brain-work in the commanders, depend for the result upon the brute strength of the forces engaged. the action did not last half an hour, and, in that time, the federal loss was thirteen thousand men. when general lee sent a messenger to a.p. hill, asking the result of the assault on his part of the line, hill took the officer with him in front of his works, and, pointing to the dead bodies which were literally lying upon each other, said: "tell general lee it is the same all along my front." the federal army had, indeed, sustained a blow so heavy, that even the constant mind and fixed resolution of general grant and the federal authorities seem to have been shaken. the war seemed hopeless to many persons in the north after the frightful bloodshed of this thirty minutes at cold harbor, of which fact there is sufficient proof. "so gloomy," says a northern historian,[1] "was the military outlook after the action on the chickahominy, and to such a degree, by consequence, had the moral spring of the public mind become relaxed, that there was at this time great danger of a collapse of the war. the history of this conflict, truthfully written, will show this. the archives of the state department, when one day made public, will show how deeply the government was affected by the want of military success, and to what resolutions the executive had in consequence come. had not success elsewhere come to brighten the horizon, it would have been difficult to have raised new forces to recruit the army of the potomac, which, shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thousands of its ablest officers killed and wounded, was the army of the potomac no more." [footnote 1: mr. swinton, in his able and candid "campaigns of the army of the potomac."] the campaign of one month--from may 4th to june 4th--had cost the federal commander sixty thousand men and three thousand officers--numbers which are given on the authority of federal historians--while the loss of lee did not exceed eighteen thousand. the result would seem an unfavorable comment upon the choice of the route across the country from culpepper instead of that by the james. general mcclellan, two years before, had reached cold harbor with trifling losses. to attain the same point had cost general grant a frightful number of lives. nor could it be said that he had any important successes to offset this loss. he had not defeated his adversary in any of the battle-fields of the campaign; nor did it seem that he had stricken him any serious blow. the army of northern virginia, not reã«nforced until it reached hanover junction, and then only by about nine thousand men under generals breckinridge and pickett, had held its ground against the large force opposed to it; had repulsed every assault; and, in a final trial of strength with a force largely its superior, had inflicted upon the enemy, in about an hour, a loss of thirteen thousand men. these facts, highly honorable to lee and his troops, are the plainest and most compendious comment we can make upon the campaign. the whole movement of general grant across virginia is, indeed, now conceded even by his admirers to have been unfortunate. it failed to accomplish the end expected from it--the investment of richmond on the north and west--and the lives of about sixty thousand men were, it would seem, unnecessarily lost, to reach a position which might have been attained with losses comparatively trifling, and without the unfortunate prestige of defeat. vi. first battles at petersburg. general lee remained facing his adversary in his lines at cold harbor, for many days after the bloody struggle of the 3d of june, confident of his ability to repulse any new attack, and completely barring the way to richmond. the federal campaign, it was now seen, was at an end on that line, and it was obvious that general grant must adopt some other plan, in spite of his determination expressed in the beginning of the campaign, to "fight it out on that line if it took all the summer." the summer was but begun, and further fighting on that line was hopeless. under these circumstances the federal commander resolved to give up the attempt to assail richmond from the north or east, and by a rapid movement to petersburg, seize upon that place, cut the confederate railroads leading southward, and thus compel an evacuation of the capital. [illustration: map of petersburg and environs.] it would be interesting to inquire what the course of general lee would have been in the event of the success of this plan, and how the war would have resulted. it would seem that, under such circumstances, his only resource would have been to retire with his army in the direction of lynchburg, where his communications would have remained open with the south and west. if driven from that point, the fastnesses of the alleghanies were at hand; and, contemplating afterward the possibility of being forced to take refuge there, he said: "with my army in the mountains of virginia, i could carry on this war for twenty years longer." that spectacle was lost to the world--lee and his army fighting from mountain fastness to mountain fastness--and the annals of war are not illustrated by a chapter so strange. that lee was confident of his ability to carry on such a struggle successfully is certain; and washington had conceived the same idea in the old revolution, when he said that if he were driven from the seaboard he would take refuge in west augusta, and thereby prolong the war interminably. to return from these speculations to the narrative of events. general grant remained in front of lee until the 12th of june, when, moving again by his left flank, he crossed the chickahominy, proceeded in the direction of city point, at which place the appomattox and james rivers mingle their waters, and, crossing the james on pontoons, hastened forward in order to seize upon petersburg. this important undertaking had been strangely neglected by major-general butler, who, in obedience to general grant's orders, had sailed from fortress monroe on the 4th of may, reached bermuda hundred, the peninsula opposite city point, made by a remarkable bend in james river, and proceeded to intrench himself. it was in his power on his arrival to have seized upon petersburg, but this he failed to do at that time, and the appearance of a force under general beauregard, from the south, soon induced him to give his entire attention to his own safety. an attack by beauregard had been promptly made, which nearly resulted in general butler's destruction. he succeeded, however, in retiring behind his works across the neck of the peninsula, in which he now found himself completely shut up; and so powerless was his situation, with his large force of thirty thousand men, that general grant wrote, "his army was as completely shut off ... as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked." the attempt of general grant to seize upon petersburg by a surprise failed. his forces were not able to reach the vicinity of the place until the 15th, when they were bravely opposed behind impromptu works by a body of local troops, who fought like regular soldiers, and succeeded in holding the works until night ended the contest. when morning came long lines were seen defiling into the breastworks, and the familiar battle-flags of the army of northern virginia rose above the long line of bayonets giving assurance that the possession of petersburg would be obstinately disputed. general lee had moved with his accustomed celerity, and, as usual, without that loss of time which results from doubt of an adversary's intentions. if general grant retired without another battle on the chickahominy, it was obvious to lee that he must design one of two things: either to advance upon richmond from the direction of charles city, or attempt a campaign against the capital from the south of james river. lee seems at once to have satisfied himself that the latter was the design. an inconsiderable force was sent to feel the enemy near the white-oak swamp; he was encountered there in some force, but, satisfied that this was a feint to mislead him, general lee proceeded to cross the james river above drury's bluff, near "wilton," and concentrate his army at petersburg. on the 16th he was in face of his adversary there. general grant had adopted the plan of campaign which lee expected him to adopt. general mcclellan had not been permitted in 1862 to carry out the same plan; it was now undertaken by general grant, who sustained better relations toward the government, and the result would seem to indicate that general mcclellan was, after all, a soldier of sound views. as soon as general lee reached petersburg, he began promptly to draw a regular line of earthworks around the city, to the east and south, for its defence. it was obvious that general grant would lose no time in striking at him, in order to take advantage of the slight character of the defences already existing; and this anticipation was speedily realized. general lee had scarcely gotten his forces in position on the 16th when he was furiously attacked, and such was the weight of this assault that lee was forced from his advanced position, east of the city, behind his second line of works, by this time well forward in process of construction. against this new line general grant threw heavy forces, in attack after attack, on the 17th and 18th, losing, it is said, more than four thousand men, but effecting nothing. on the 21st general lee was called upon to meet a more formidable assault than any of the preceding ones--this time more to his right, in the vicinity of the weldon railroad, which runs southward from petersburg. a heavy line was advanced in that quarter by the enemy; but, observing that an interval had been left between two of their corps, general lee threw forward a column under general hill, cut the federal lines, and repulsed their attack, bearing off nearly three thousand prisoners. on the same night an important cavalry expedition, consisting of the divisions of general wilson and kautz, numbering about six thousand horse, was sent westward to cut the weldon, southside, and danville railroads, which connected the southern army with the south and west. this raid resulted in apparently great but really unimportant injury to the confederate communications against which it was directed. the federal cavalry tore up large portions of the tracks of all three railroads, burning the wood-work, and laying waste the country around; but the further results of the expedition were unfavorable. they were pursued and harassed by a small body of cavalry under general w. h.f. lee, and, on their return in the direction of reams's station, were met near sapponey church by a force of fifteen hundred cavalry under general hampton. that energetic officer at once attacked; the fighting continued furiously throughout the entire night, and at dawn the federal horse retreated in confusion. their misfortunes were not, however, ended. near reams's, at which point they attempted to cross the weldon railroad, they were met by general fitz lee's horsemen and about two hundred infantry under general mahone, and this force completed their discomfiture. after a brief attempt to force their way through the unforeseen obstacle, they broke in disorder, leaving behind them twelve pieces of artillery, and more than a thousand prisoners, and, with foaming and exhausted horses, regained the federal lines. such was the result of an expedition from which general grant probably expected much. the damage done to lee's communications was inconsiderable, and did not repay the federal commander for the losses sustained. the railroads were soon repaired and in working order again; and the federal cavalry was for the time rendered unfit for further operations. it was now the end of june, and every attempt made by general grant to force lee's lines had proved unsuccessful. it was apparent that surprise of the able commander of the confederate army was hopeless. his works were growing stronger every day, and nothing was left to his great adversary but to lay regular siege to the long line of fortifications; to draw lines for the protection of his own front from attack; and, by gradually extending his left, reach out toward the weldon and southside railroads. to obtain possession of these roads was from this time general grant's great object; and all his movements were shaped by that paramount consideration. vii. the siege of richmond begun. the first days of july, 1864, witnessed, at petersburg, the commencement of a series of military manoeuvres, for which few, if any, precedents existed in all the annals of war. an army of forty or fifty thousand men, intrenched along a line extending finally over a distance of nearly forty miles, was defending, against a force of about thrice its numbers, a capital more than twenty miles in its rear; and, from july of one year to april of the next, there never was a moment when, to have broken through this line, would not have terminated the war, and resulted in the destruction of the confederacy. a few words in reference to the topography of the country and the situation will show this. petersburg is twenty-two miles south of richmond, and is connected with the south and west by the weldon and southside railroads, which latter road crosses the danville railroad, the main line of communication between the capital and the gulf states. with the enemy once holding these roads and those north of the city, as they were preparing to do, the capital would be isolated, and the confederate government must evacuate virginia. in that event the army of northern virginia had also nothing left to it but retreat. virginia must be abandoned; the federal authority would be extended over the oldest and one of the largest and most important members of the confederacy; and, under circumstances so adverse, it might well be a question whether, disheartened as they would be by the loss of so powerful an ally, the other states of the confederacy would have sufficient resolution to continue the contest. these considerations are said to have been fully weighed by general lee, whose far-reaching military sagacity divined the exact situation of affairs, and the probable results of a conflict so unequal as that which general grant now forced upon him. we have noticed, on a preceding page, his opinions upon this subject, expressed to a confidential friend as far back as 1862. he then declared that the true line of assault upon richmond was that now adopted by general grant. as long as the capital was assailed from the north or the east, he might hope with some reason, by hard fighting, to repulse the assault, and hold richmond. but, with an enemy at petersburg, threatening with a large force the southern railroads, it was obviously only a question of time when richmond, and consequently virginia, must be abandoned. general lee, we repeat, fully realized the facts here stated, when his adversary, giving up all other lines, crossed james river to petersburg. lee is said, we know not with what truth, to have coolly recommended an evacuation of richmond. but this met with no favor. a powerful party, including both the friends and enemies of the executive, spoke of the movement as a "pernicious idea." if recommended by lee, it was speedily abandoned, and all the energies of the government were concentrated upon the difficult task of holding the enemy at arm's length south of the appomattox and in charles city. in a few weeks after the appearance of the adversaries opposite each other at petersburg, the lines of leaguer and defence were drawn, and the long struggle began. general grant had crossed a force into charles city, on the north bank of james river, and thus menaced richmond with an assault from that quarter. his line extended thence across the neck of the peninsula of bermuda hundred, and east and south of petersburg, where, day by day, it gradually reached westward, approaching nearer and nearer to the railroads feeding the southern army and capital. lee's line conformed itself to that of his adversary. in addition to the works east and southeast of richmond, an exterior chain of defences had been drawn, facing the hostile force near deep bottom; and the river at drury's bluff, a fortification of some strength, had been guarded, by sunken obstructions, against the approach of the federal gunboats. the southern lines then continued, facing those of the enemy north of the appomattox, and, crossing that stream, extended around the city of petersburg, gradually moving westward in conformity with the works of general grant. a glance at the accompanying diagram will clearly indicate the positions and relations to each other of the federal and confederate works. these will show that the real struggle was anticipated, by both commanders, west of petersburg; and, as the days wore on, it was more and more apparent that somewhere in the vicinity of dinwiddie court-house the last great wrestle of the opposing armies must take place. to that conclusive trial of strength we shall advance with as few interruptions as possible. the operations of the two armies at petersburg do not possess, for the general reader, that dramatic interest which is found in battles such as those of chancellorsville and gettysburg, deciding for the time the fates of great campaigns. at petersburg the fighting seemed to decide little, and the bloody collisions had no names. the day of pitched battles, indeed, seemed past. it was one long battle, day and night, week after week, and month after month--during the heat of summer, the sad hours of autumn, and the cold days and nights of winter. it was, in fact, the siege of richmond which general grant had undertaken, and the fighting consisted less of battles, in the ordinary acceptation of that word, than of attempts to break through the lines of his adversary--now north of james river, now east of petersburg, now at some point in the long chain of redans which guarded the approaches to the coveted southside railroad, which, once in possession of the federal commander, would give him victory. of this long, obstinate, and bloody struggle we shall describe only those prominent incidents which rose above the rest with a species of dramatic splendor. for the full narrative the reader must have recourse to military histories aiming to chronicle the operations of each corps, division, and brigade in the two armies--a minuteness of detail beyond our scope, and probably not desired by those who will peruse these pages. viii. lee threatens washington. the month of july began and went upon its way, with incessant fighting all along the confederate front, both north of james river and south of the appomattox. general grant was thus engaged in the persistent effort to, at some point, break through his opponent's works, when intelligence suddenly reached him, by telegraph from washington, that a strong confederate column had advanced down the shenandoah valley, crossed the potomac, and was rapidly moving eastward in the direction of the federal capital. this portentous incident was the result of a plan of great boldness devised by general lee, from which he expected much. a few words will explain this plan. a portion of general grant's plan of campaign had been an advance up the valley, and another from western virginia, toward the lynchburg and tennessee railroad--the two columns to coã¶perate with the main army by cutting the confederate communications. the column in western virginia effected little, but that in the valley, under general hunter, hastened forward, almost unopposed, from the small numbers of the southern force, and early in june threatened lynchburg. the news reached lee at cold harbor soon after his battle there with general grant, and he promptly detached general early, at the head of about eight thousand men, with orders to "move to the valley through swift-run gap, or brown's gap, attack hunter, and then cross the potomac and threaten washington." [footnote: this statement of his orders was derived from lieutenant-general early.] general early, an officer of great energy and intrepidity, moved without loss of time, and an engagement ensued between him and general hunter near lynchburg. the battle was soon decided. general hunter, who had more cruelly oppressed the inhabitants of the valley than even general milroy, was completely defeated, driven in disordered flight toward the ohio, and early hastened down the valley, and thence into maryland, with the view of threatening washington, as he had been ordered to do by lee. his march was exceedingly rapid, and he found the road unobstructed until he reached the monocacy near frederick city, where he was opposed by a force under general wallace. this force he attacked, and soon drove from the field; he then pressed forward, and on the 11th of july came in sight of washington. it was the intelligence of this advance of a confederate force into maryland, and toward the capital, which came to startle general grant while he was hotly engaged with lee at petersburg. the washington authorities seem to have been completely unnerved, and to have regarded the capture of the city as nearly inevitable. general grant, however, stood firm, and did not permit the terror of the civil authorities to affect him. he sent forward to washington two army corps, and these arrived just in time. if it had been in the power of general early to capture washington--which seems questionable--the opportunity was lost. he found himself compelled to retire across the potomac again to avoid an attack in his rear; and this he effected without loss, taking up, in accordance with orders from lee, a position in the valley, where he remained for some months a standing threat to the enemy. such was the famous march of general early to washington; and there seems at present little reason to doubt that the federal capital had a narrow escape from capture by the confederates. what the result of so singular an event would have been, it is difficult to say; but it is certain that it would have put an end to general grant's entire campaign at petersburg. then--but speculations of this character are simply loss of time. the city was not captured; the war went upon its way, and was destined to terminate by pure exhaustion of one of the combatants, unaffected by _coups de main_ in any part of the theatre of conflict. we have briefly spoken of the engagement between generals early and hunter, near lynchburg, and the abrupt retreat of the latter to the western mountains and thence toward the ohio. it may interest the reader to know general lee's views on the subject of this retreat, which, it seems, were drawn from him by a letter addressed to him by general hunter: "as soon after the war as mail communications were opened," writes the gentleman of high character from whom we derive this incident, "general david hunter wrote to general lee, begging that he would answer him frankly on two points:" 'i. his (hunter's) campaign in 1864 was undertaken on information received by general halleck that general lee was about to detach forty thousand picked troops to send to georgia. did not his (hunter's) move prevent this? 'ii. when he found it necessary to retreat from lynchburg, did he not take the most feasible route?' general lee wrote a very courteous reply, in which he said: 'i. general halleck was misinformed. i had _no troops to spare_, and forty thousand would have taken nearly my whole army. 'ii. i am not advised as to the motives which induced you to adopt your line of retreat, and am not, perhaps, competent to judge of the question; _but i certainly expected you to retreat by way_ of the shenandoah valley.' "general hunter," adds our correspondent, "never published this letter, but i heard general lee tell of it one day with evident pleasure." lee's opinion of the military abilities of both generals hunter and sheridan was indeed far from flattering. he regarded those two commanders--especially general sheridan--as enjoying reputations solely conferred upon them by the exhaustion of the resources of the confederacy, and not warranted by any military efficiency in themselves. ix. the mine explosion. the end of the month of july was now approaching, and every attempt made by general grant to break through lee's lines had resulted in failure. at every point which he assailed, an armed force, sufficient to repulse his most vigorous attacks, seemed to spring from the earth; and no movement of the federal forces, however sudden and rapid, had been able to take the confederate commander unawares. the campaign was apparently settling down into stubborn fighting, day and night, in which the object of general grant was to carry out his programme of attrition. such was the feeling in both armies when, at dawn on the 30th of july, a loud explosion, heard for thirty miles, took place on the lines near petersburg, and a vast column of smoke, shooting upward to a great height, seemed to indicate the blowing up of an extensive magazine. instead of a magazine, it was a mine which had thus been exploded; and the incident was not the least singular of a campaign unlike any which had preceded it. the plan of forming a breach in the southern works, by exploding a mine beneath them, is said by northern writers to have originated with a subordinate officer of the federal army, who, observing the close proximity of the opposing works near petersburg, conceived it feasible to construct a subterranean gallery, reaching beneath those of general lee. the undertaking was begun, the earth being carried off in cracker-boxes; and such was the steady persistence of the workmen that a gallery five hundred feet long, with lateral openings beneath the confederate works, was soon finished; and in these lateral recesses was placed a large amount of powder. all was now ready, and the question was how to utilize the explosion. general grant decided to follow it by a sudden charge through the breach, seize a crest in rear, and thus interpose a force directly in the centre of lee's line. a singular discussion, however, arose, and caused some embarrassment. should the assaulting column consist of white or negro troops? this question was decided, general grant afterward declared, by "pulling straws or tossing coppers"--the white troops were the fortunate or unfortunate ones--and on the morning of july 30th the mine was exploded. the effect was frightful, and the incident will long be remembered by those present and escaping unharmed. the small southern force and artillery immediately above the mine were hurled into the air. an opening, one hundred and fifty feet long, sixty feet wide, and thirty feet deep, suddenly appeared, where a moment before had extended the confederate earthworks; and the federal division, selected for the charge, rushed forward to pierce the opening. the result did not justify the sanguine expectations which seem to have been excited in the breasts of the federal officers. a southern writer thus describes what ensued: "the 'white division' charged, reached the crater, stumbled over the _dã©bris_, were suddenly met by a merciless fire of artillery, enfilading them right and left, and of infantry fusillading them in front; faltered, hesitated, were badly led, lost heart, gave up the plan of seizing the crest in rear, huddled into the crater, man on top of man, company mingled with company; and upon this disordered, unstrung, quivering mass of human beings, white and black--for the black troops had followed--was poured a hurricane of shot, shell, canister, musketry, which made the hideous crater a slaughter-pen, horrible and frightful beyond the power of words. all order was lost; all idea of charging the crest abandoned. lee's infantry was seen concentrating for the carnival of death; his artillery was massing to destroy the remnants of the charging divisions; those who deserted the crater, to scramble over the _dã©bris_ and run back, were shot down; then all that was left to the shuddering mass of blacks and whites in the pit was to shrink lower, evade the horrible _mitraille_, and wait for a charge of their friends to rescue them or surrender." these sentences sufficiently describe the painful scene which followed the explosion of the mine. the charging column was unable to advance in face of the very heavy fire directed upon them by the southern infantry and artillery; and the effect of this fire was so appalling that general mahone, commanding at the spot, is said to have ordered it to cease, adding that the spectacle made him sick. the federal forces finally succeeded in making their way back, with a loss of about four thousand prisoners; and general lee, whose losses had been small, reã«stablished his line without interruption. before passing from this incident, a singular circumstance connected with it is deserving of mention. this was the declaration of the congressional committee, which in due time investigated the whole affair. the conclusion of the committee was not flattering to the veteran army of the potomac. the report declared that "the first and great cause of disaster was the employment of white instead of black troops to make the charge." x. end of the campaign of 1864. throughout the months of august and september, lee continued to be attacked at various points along his entire front, but succeeded in repulsing every assault. general grant's design may be said, in general terms, to have been a steady extension of his left toward the confederate communications west of petersburg, while taking the chances, by attacks north of james river, to break through in that quarter and seize upon richmond. it is probable that his hopes of effecting the last-mentioned object were small; but operations in that direction promised the more probable result of causing lee to weaken his right, and thus uncover the southside railroad. an indecisive attack on the north of james river was followed, toward the end of august, by a heavy advance, to seize upon the weldon railroad near petersburg. in this general grant succeeded, an event clearly foreseen by lee, who had long before informed the authorities that he could not hold this road. general grant followed up this success by sending heavy forces to seize reams's station, on the same road, farther south, and afterward to destroy it to hicksford--which, however, effected less favorable results, lee meeting and defeating both forces after obstinate engagements, in which the federal troops lost heavily, and were compelled to retreat. these varying successes did not, however, materially affect the general result. the federal left gradually reached farther and farther westward, until finally it had passed the vaughan, squirrel level, and other roads, running south-westward from petersburg, and in october was established on the left bank of hatcher's run, which unites with gravelly run to form the rowanty. it was now obvious that a further extension of the federal left would probably enable general grant to seize upon the southside railroad. an energetic attempt was speedily made by him to effect this important object, to which it is said he attached great importance from its anticipated bearing on the approaching presidential election. on the 27th of october a heavy column was thrown across hatcher's run, in the vicinity of burgess's mill, on the boydton road, and an obstinate attack was made on lee's lines there with the view of breaking through to the southside road. in this, however, general grant did not succeed. his column was met in front and flank by generals hampton--who here lost his brave son, preston--and w.h.f. lee, with dismounted sharp-shooters; infantry was hastened to the threatened point by general lee, and, after an obstinate struggle, the federal force was driven back. general lee reporting that general mahone charged and "broke three lines of battle."[1] [footnote 1: _dispatch of lee, october_ 28, 1864.--it was the habit of general lee, throughout the last campaign of the war, to send to richmond, from time to time, brief dispatches announcing whatever occurred along the lines; and these, in the absence of official reports of these occurrences on the confederate side, are valuable records of the progress of affairs. these brief summaries are reliable from the absence of all exaggeration, but cannot be depended upon by the historian, for a very singular reason, namely, that almost invariably the confederate successes are understated. on the present occasion, the federal loss in prisoners near burgess's mill and east of richmond--where general grant had attacked at the same time to effect a diversion--are put down by general lee at eight hundred, whereas thirteen hundred and sixty-five were received at richmond. lee's dispatch of october 28th is here given, as a specimen of these brief military reports. headquarters army northern virginia, _october_ 28, 1864. _hon. secretary of war_: general hill reports that the attack of general heth upon the enemy on the boydton plank-road, mentioned in my dispatch last evening, was made by three brigades under general mahone in front, and general hampton in the rear. mahone captured four hundred prisoners, three stand of colors, and six pieces of artillery. the latter could not be brought off, the enemy having possession of the bridge. in the attack subsequently made by the enemy general mahone broke three lines of battle, and during the night the enemy retreated from the boydton road, leaving his wounded and more than two hundred and fifty dead on the field. about nine o'clock p.m. a small force assaulted and took possession of our works on the baxter road, in front of petersburg, but were soon driven out. on the williamsburg road general field captured upward of four hundred prisoners and seven stand of colors. the enemy left a number of dead in front of our works, and to-day retreated to his former position. r.e. lee] with this repulse of the federal forces terminated active operations of importance for the year; and but one other attempt was made, during the winter, to gain ground on the left. this took place early in february, and resulted in failure like the former--the confederates losing, however, the brave general john pegram. the presidential election at the north had been decided in favor of mr. lincoln--general mcclellan and mr. pendleton, the supposed advocates of peace, suffering defeat. the significance of this fact was unmistakable. it was now seen that unless the confederates fought their way to independence, there was no hope of a favorable termination of the war, and this conclusion was courageously faced by general lee. the outlook for the coming year was far from encouraging; the resources of the confederacy were steadily being reduced; her coasts were blockaded; her armies were diminishing; discouragement seemed slowly to be invading every heart--but, in the midst of this general foreboding, the commander of the army of northern virginia retained an august composure; and, conversing with one of the southern senators, said, "for myself, i intend to die sword in hand." that his sense of duty did not afterward permit him to do so, was perhaps one of the bitterest pangs of his whole life. xi. lee in the winter of 1864-'65. before entering upon the narrative of the last and decisive campaign of the war, we shall speak of the personal demeanor of general lee at this time, and endeavor to account for a circumstance which astonished many persons--his surprising equanimity, and even cheerfulness, under the pressure of cares sufficient, it would seem, to crush the most powerful organization. he had established his headquarters a mile or two west of petersburg, on the cox road, nearly opposite his centre, and here he seemed to await whatever the future would bring with a tranquillity which was a source of surprise and admiration to all who were thrown in contact with him. many persons will bear their testimony to this extraordinary composure. his countenance seldom, if ever, exhibited the least traces of anxiety, but was firm, hopeful, and encouraged those around him in the belief that he was still confident of success. that he did not, however, look forward with any thing like hope to such success, we have endeavored already to show. from the first, he seems to have regarded his situation, unless his army were largely reã«nforced, as almost desperate; those reã«nforcements did not come; and yet, as he saw his numbers day by day decreasing, and general grant's increasing a still larger ratio, he retained his courage, confronting the misfortunes closing in upon him with unmoved composure, and at no time seemed to lose his "heart of hope." of this phenomenon the explanation has been sought in the constitutional courage of the individual, and that instinctive rebound against fate which takes place in great organizations. this explanation, doubtless, is not without a certain amount of truth; but an attentive consideration of the principles which guided this eminent soldier throughout his career, will show that his equanimity, at a moment so trying, was due to another and more controlling sentiment. this sentiment was his devotion to duty--"the sublimest word in our language." throughout his entire life he had sought to discover and perform his duty, without regard to consequences. that had been with him the great question in april, 1861, when the war broke out: he had decided in his own mind what he ought to do, and had not hesitated. from that time forward he continued to do what duty commanded without a murmur. in the obscure campaign of western virginia--in the unnoted work of fortifying the southern coast--in the great campaigns which he had subsequently fought--and everywhere, his consciousness of having performed his duty to the best of his knowledge and ability sustained him. it sustained him, above all, at gettysburg, where he had done his best, giving him strength to take upon himself the responsibility of that disaster; and, now, in these last dark days at petersburg, it must have been the sense of having done his whole duty, and expended upon the cause every energy of his being, which enabled him to meet the approaching catastrophe with a calmness which seemed to those around him almost sublime. if this be not the explanation of the composure of general lee, throughout the last great struggle with the federal army, the writer of these pages is at a loss to account for it. the phenomenon was plain to all eyes, and crowned the soldier with a glory greater than that which he had derived from his most decisive military successes. great and unmoved in the dark hour as in the bright, he seemed to have determined to perform his duty to the last, and to shape his conduct, under whatever pressure of disaster, upon the two maxims, "do your duty," and "human virtue should be equal to human calamity." there is little reason to doubt that general lee saw this "calamity" coming, for the effort to reã«nforce his small army with fresh levies seemed hopeless. the reasons for this unfortunate state of things must be sought elsewhere. the unfortunate fact will be stated, without comment, that, while the federal army was regularly and largely reã«nforced, so that its numbers at no time fell below one hundred and fifty thousand men. lee's entire force at petersburg at no time reached sixty thousand, and in the spring of 1865, when he still continued to hold his long line of defences, numbered scarcely half of sixty thousand. this was the primary cause of the failure of the struggle. general grant's immense hammer continued to beat upon his adversary, wearing away his strength day by day. no new troops arrived to take the places of those who had fallen; and general lee saw, drawing closer and closer, the inevitable hour when, driven from his works, or with the federal army upon his communications, he must cut his way southward or surrender. a last circumstance in reference to general lee's position at this time should be stated; the fact that, from the autumn of 1864 to the end in the spring of 1865, he was felt by the country and the army to be the sole hope of the confederacy. to him alone now all men looked as the _deus ex machinã¢_ to extricate them from the dangers surrounding them. this sentiment needed no expression in words. it was seen in the faces and the very tones of voice of all. old men visited him, and begged him with faltering voices not to expose himself, for, if he were killed, all would be lost. the troops followed him with their eyes, or their cheers, whenever he appeared, feeling a singular sense of confidence from the presence of the gray-haired soldier in his plain uniform, and assured that, as long as lee led them, the cause was safe. all classes of the people thus regarded the fate of the confederacy as resting, not partially, but solely, upon the shoulders of lee; and, although he was not entitled by his rank in the service to direct operations in other quarters than virginia, there was a very general desire that the whole conduct of the war everywhere should be intrusted to his hands. this was done, as will be seen, toward the spring of 1865, but it was too late. these notices of general lee individually are necessary to a clear comprehension of the concluding incidents of the great conflict. it is doubtful if, in any other struggle of history, the hopes of a people were more entirely wrapped up in a single individual. all criticisms of the eminent soldier had long since been silenced, and it may, indeed, be said that something like a superstitious confidence in his fortunes had become widely disseminated. it was the general sentiment, even when lee himself saw the end surely approaching, that all was safe while he remained in command of the army. this hallucination must have greatly pained him, for no one ever saw more clearly, or was less blinded by irrational confidence. lee fully understood and represented to the civil authorities--with whom his relations were perfectly friendly and cordial--that if his lines were broken at any point, the fate of the campaign was sealed. feeling this truth, of which his military sagacity left him in no doubt, he had to bear the further weight of that general confidence which he did not share. he did not complain, however, or in any manner indicate the desperate straits to which he had come. he called for fresh troops to supply his losses; when they did not arrive he continued to oppose his powerful adversary with the remnant still at his command. these were now more like old comrades than mere private soldiers under his orders. what was left of the army was its best material. the fires of battle had tested the metal, and that which emerged from the furnace was gold free from alloy. the men remaining with lee were those whom no peril of the cause in which they were fighting could dishearten or prompt to desert or even temporarily absent themselves from the southern standard; and this _corps d' ã©lite_ was devoted wholly to their commander. for this devotion they certainly had valid reason. never had leader exhibited a more systematic, unfailing, and almost tender care of his troops. lee seemed to feel that these veterans in their ragged jackets, with their gaunt faces, were personal friends of his own, who were entitled to his most affectionate exertions for their welfare. his calls on the civil authorities in their behalf were unceasing. the burden of these demands was that, unless his men's wants were attended to, the southern cause was lost; and it plainly revolted his sense of the fitness of things that men upon whom depended the fate of the south should be shoeless, in tatters, and forced to subsist on a quarter of a pound of rancid bacon and a little corn bread, when thousands remaining out of the army, and dodging the enrolling-officers, were well clothed and fed, and never heard the whistle of a bullet. the men understood this care for them, and returned the affectionate solicitude of their commander in full. he was now their ideal of a leader, and all that he did was perfect in their eyes. all awe of him had long since left them--they understood what treasures of kindness and simplicity lay under the grave exterior. the tattered privates approached the commander-in-chief without embarrassment, and his reception of them was such as to make them love him more than ever. had we space we might dwell upon this marked respect and attention paid by general lee to his private soldiers. he seemed to think them more worthy of marks of regard than his highest officers. and there was never the least air of condescension in him when thrown with them, but a perfect simplicity, kindness, and unaffected sympathy, which went to their hearts. this was almost a natural gift with lee, and arose from the genuine goodness of his heart. his feeling toward his soldiers is shown in an incident which occurred at this time, and was thus related in one of the richmond journals: "a gentleman who was in the train from this city to petersburg, a very cold morning not long ago, tells us his attention was attracted by the efforts of a young soldier, with his arm in a sling, to get his overcoat on. his teeth, as well as his sound arm, were brought into use to effect the object; but, in the midst of his efforts, an officer rose from his seat, advanced to him, and very carefully and tenderly assisted him, drawing the coat gently over his wounded arm, and buttoning it up comfortably; then, with a few kind and pleasant words, returning to his seat. now the officer in question was not clad in gorgeous uniform, with a brilliant wreath upon his collar, and a multitude of gilt lines upon the sleeves, resembling the famous labyrinth of crete, but he was clad in a simple suit of gray, distinguished from the garb of a civilian only by the three stars which every confederate colonel in the service, by the regulations, is entitled to wear. and yet he was no other than our chief, general robert e. lee, who is not braver than he is good and modest." to terminate this brief sketch of general lee, personally, in the winter of 1864. he looked much older than at the beginning of the war, but by no means less hardy or robust. on the contrary, the arduous campaigns through which he had passed seemed to have hardened him--developing to the highest degree the native strength of his physical organization. his cheeks were ruddy, and his eye had that clear light which indicates the presence of the calm, self-poised will. but his hair had grown gray, like his beard and mustache, which were worn short and well-trimmed. his dress, as always, was a plain and serviceable gray uniform, with no indications of rank save the stars on the collar. cavalry-boots reached nearly to his knees, and he seldom wore any weapon. a broad-brimmed gray-felt hat rested low upon the forehead; and the movements of this soldierly figure were as firm, measured, and imposing, as ever. it was impossible to discern in general lee any evidences of impaired strength, or any trace of the wearing hardships through which he had passed. he seemed made of iron, and would remain in his saddle all day, and then at his desk half the night, without apparently feeling any fatigue. he was still almost an anchorite in his personal habits, and lived so poorly that it is said he was compelled to borrow a small piece of meat when unexpected visitors dined with him. such, in brief outline, was the individual upon whose shoulders, in the last months of 1864 and the early part of 1865, rested the southern confederacy. xii. the situation at the beginning of 1865. in approaching the narrative of the last tragic scenes of the confederate struggle, the writer of these pages experiences emotions of sadness which will probably be shared by not a few even of those readers whose sympathies, from the nature of things, were on the side of the north. to doubt this would be painful, and would indicate a contempt for human nature. not only in the eyes of his friends and followers, but even in the eyes of his bitterest enemies, lee must surely have appeared great and noble. right or wrong in the struggle, he believed that he was performing his duty; and the brave army at his back, which had fought so heroically, were inspired by the same sentiment, and risked all on the issue. this great soldier was now about to suffer the cruellest pang which the spite of fate can inflict, and his army to be disbanded, to return in poverty and defeat to their homes. that spectacle was surely tragic, and appealed to the hardest heart; and if any rejoiced in such misery he must have been unsusceptible of the sentiment of admiration for heroism in misfortune. the last and decisive struggle between the two armies at petersburg began in march, 1865. but events of great importance in many quarters had preceded this final conflict, the result of which had been to break down all the outer defences of the confederacy, leaving only the inner citadel still intact. the events in question are so familiar to those who will peruse these pages, that a passing reference to them is all that is necessary. affairs in the valley of virginia, from autumn to spring, had steadily proceeded from bad to worse. in september, general sheridan, with a force of about forty-five thousand, had assailed general early near winchester, with a force of about eight or nine thousand muskets, and succeeded in driving him up the valley beyond strasburg, whence, attacked a second time, he had retreated toward staunton. this was followed, in october, by another battle at cedar run, where early attacked and nearly crushed general sheridan, but eventually was again repulsed, and forced a second time to retreat up the valley to waynesboro', where, in february, his little remnant was assailed by overwhelming numbers and dispersed. general sheridan, who had effected this inglorious but important success, then proceeded to the lowlands, joined general grant's army, and was ready, with his large force of horse, to take part in the coming battles. a more important success had attended the federal arms in the west. general johnston, who had been restored to command there at the solicitation of lee, had found his force insufficient to oppose general sherman's large army; the confederates had accordingly retreated; and general sherman, almost unresisted, from the exhaustion of his adversary, marched across the country to savannah, which fell an easy prize, and thence advanced to goldsborough, in north carolina, where he directly threatened lee's line of retreat from virginia. such was the condition of affairs in the months of february and march, 1865. in the former month, commissioners from the confederate government had met president lincoln in hampton roads, but no terms of peace could be agreed upon; the issue was still left to be decided by arms, and every advantage was upon the federal side. general lee, who had just been appointed "general-in-chief"--having thus imposed upon him the mockery of a rank no longer of any value--saw the armies of the enemy closing in upon him, and did not deceive himself with the empty hope that he could longer hold his lines at petersburg. the country, oppressed as it was, and laboring under a sentiment akin to despair, still retained in almost undiminished measure its superstitious confidence in him; but he himself saw clearly the desperate character of the situation. general grant was in his front with a force of about one hundred and fifty thousand men, and general sherman was about to enter virginia with an army of about the same numbers. lee's force at petersburg was a little over thirty thousand men--that of johnston was not so great, and was detained by sherman. under these circumstances, it was obviously only a question of time when the army of northern virginia would be overwhelmed. in february, 1865, these facts were perfectly apparent to general lee: but one course was left to him--to retreat from virginia; and he promptly began that movement in the latter part of the month, ordering his trains to amelia court-house, and directing pontoons to be got ready at roanoke river. his aim was simple--to unite his army with that of general johnston, and retreat into the gulf states. in the mountains of virginia he could carry on the war, he had said, for twenty years; in the fertile regions of the south he might expect to prolong hostilities, or at least make favorable terms of peace--which would be better than to remain in virginia until he was completely surrounded, and an unconditional submission would alone be left him. it will probably remain a subject of regret to military students, that lee was not permitted to carry out this retreat into the gulf states. the movement was arrested after a consultation with the civil authorities at richmond. upon what grounds a course so obviously necessary was opposed, the present writer is unable to declare. whatever the considerations, lee yielded his judgment; the movement suddenly stopped; and the army of northern virginia--if a skeleton can be called such--remained to await its fate. the condition of the army in which "companies" scarce existed, "regiments" were counted by tens, and "divisions" by hundreds only, need not here be elaborately dwelt upon. it was indeed the phantom of an army, and the gaunt faces were almost ghostly. shoeless, in rags, with just sufficient coarse food to sustain life, but never enough to keep at arm's-length the gnawing fiend hunger, lee's old veterans remained firm, scattered like a thin skirmish-line along forty miles of works; while opposite them lay an enemy in the highest state of efficiency, and numbering nearly five men to their one. that the soldiers of the army retained their nerve under circumstances so discouraging is surely an honorable fact, and will make their names glorious in history. they remained unshaken and fought undismayed to the last, although their courage was subjected to trials of the most exhausting character. day and night, for month after month, the incessant fire of the federal forces had continued, and every engine of human destruction had been put in play to wear away their strength. they fought all through the cheerless days of winter, and, when they lay down in the cold trenches at night, the shell of the federal mortars rained down upon them, bursting, and mortally wounding them. all day long the fire of muskets and cannon--then, from sunset to dawn, the curving fire of the roaring mortars, and the steady, never-ceasing crack of the sharp-shooters along the front. snow, or blinding sleet, or freezing rains, might be falling, but the fire went on--it seemed destined to go on to all eternity. in march, 1865 however, the end was approaching, and general lee must have felt that all was lost. his last hope had been the retreat southward in the month of february. that hope had been taken from him; the result was at hand; and his private correspondence, if he intrusted to paper his views of the situation, will probably show that from that moment he gave up all anticipation of success, and prepared to do his simple duty as a soldier, leaving the issue of affairs to providence. whatever may have been his emotions, they were not reflected in his countenance. the same august composure which had accompanied him in his previous campaigns remained with him still, and cheered the fainting hearts around him. to the 2d of april, and even up to the end, this remarkable calmness continued nearly unchanged, and we can offer no explanation of a circumstance so astonishing, save that which we have already given in a preceding chapter. xiii. lee attacks the federal centre. general lee became aware, as the end of march drew near, that preparations were being made in the federal army for some important movement. what that movement would be, there was little reason to doubt. the federal lines had been extended gradually toward the southside railroad; and it was obvious now that general grant had in view a last and decisive advance in that quarter, which should place him on his opponent's communications, and completely intercept his retreat southward. the catastrophe which general lee had plainly foreseen for many months now stared him in the face, and, unless he had recourse to some expedient as desperate as the situation, the end of the struggle must soon come. the sole course left to him was retreat, but this now seemed difficult, if not impossible. general grant had a powerful force not far from the main roads over which lee must move; and, unless a diversion of some description were made, it seemed barely possible that the southern army could extricate itself. this diversion general lee now proceeded to make; and although we have no authority to state that his object was to follow up the blow, if it were successful, by an evacuation of his lines at petersburg, it is difficult to conceive what other design he could have had in risking an operation so critical. he had resolved to throw a column against the federal centre east of petersburg, with the view to break through there and seize the commanding ground in rear of the line. he would thus be rooted in the middle of general grant's army, and the federal left would probably be recalled, leaving the way open if he designed to retreat. if he designed, however, to fight a last pitched battle which should decide all, he would be able to do so, in case the federal works were broken, to greater advantage than under any other circumstances. the point fixed upon was fort steadman, near the south bank of the appomattox, where the opposing works were scarcely two hundred yards from each other. the ground in front was covered with _abatis_, and otherwise obstructed, but it was hoped that the assaulting column would be able to pass over the distance undiscovered. in that event a sudden rush would probably carry the works--a large part of the army would follow--the hill beyond would be occupied--and general grant would be compelled to concentrate his army at the point, for his own protection. on the morning of march 25th, before dawn, the column was ready. it consisted of three or four thousand men under general gordon, but an additional force was held in reserve to follow up the attack if it succeeded. just as dawn appeared, gordon put his column in motion. it advanced silently over the intervening space, made a rush for the federal works, mounted them, drove from them in great confusion the force occupying them, and a loud cheer proved that the column of gordon had done its work. but this auspicious beginning was the only success achieved by the confederates. for reasons unknown to the present writer, the force directed by lee to be held in readiness, and to move at once to gordon's support, did not go forward; the brave commander and his men were left to breast the whole weight of the federal onslaught which ensued; and disaster followed the first great success. the forts to the right and left of fort steadman suddenly opened their thunders, and something like a repetition of the scene succeeding the mine explosion ensued. a considerable portion of the assaulting column was unable to get back, and fell into the enemy's hands; their works were quickly reoccupied; and lee saw that his last hope had failed. nothing was left to him now but such courageous resistance as it was in his power to make, and he prepared, with the worn weapon which he still held in his firm grasp, to oppose as he best could the immense "hammer"--to use general grant's own illustration--which was plainly about to be raised to strike. xiv. the southern lines broken. the hour of the final struggle now rapidly drew near. on the 29th of march, general lee discovered that a large portion of the federal army was moving steadily in the direction of his works beyond burgen mill, and there could be no doubt what this movement signified. general grant was plainly about to make a decisive attack on the confederate right, on the white-oak road; and, if that attack succeeded, lee was lost. had not general lee and his men become accustomed to retain their coolness under almost any circumstances of trial, the prospect now before them must have filled them with despair. the bulk of the federal army was obviously about to be thrown against the confederate right, and it was no secret in the little body of southerners that lee would be able to send thither only a painfully inadequate force, unless his extensive works were left in charge of a mere line of skirmishers. this could not be thought of; the struggle on the right must be a desperate one, and the southern troops must depend upon hard fighting rather than numbers if they hoped to repulse the attack of the enemy. such was the situation of affairs, and neither the confederate commander nor his men shrunk in the hour of trial. leaving longstreet to confront the enemy north of the james, and gordon in command of ewell's corps--if it could be called such--in front of petersburg, lee moved with nearly the whole remainder of his small force westward, beyond hatcher's run, to meet the anticipated attack. the force thus moved to the right to receive general grant's great assault consisted of about fifteen thousand infantry, and about two thousand cavalry under general fitz lee, who, in consequence of the departure of hampton to north carolina, now commanded the cavalry of the army. this force, however, was cavalry only in name; and general lee, speaking afterward of general sheridan, said that his victories were won "when we had no horses for our cavalry, and no men to ride the few broken-down steeds that we could muster." with this force, amounting in all to about seventeen thousand men, lee proceeded to take position behind the works extending along the white-oak road, in the direction of five forks, an important _carrefour_ beyond his extreme right. the number of men left north of james river and in front of petersburg was a little under twenty thousand. as general grant had at his command a force about four times as great as his adversary's, it seemed scarcely possible that lee would be able to offer serious resistance. it soon became evident, however, that, in spite of this great disproportion of force, general lee had determined to fight to the last. to attribute this determination to despair and recklessness, would be doing injustice to the great soldier. it was still possible that he might be able to repulse the assault upon his right, and, by disabling the federal force there, open his line of retreat. to this hope he no doubt clung, and the fighting-blood of his race was now thoroughly aroused. at chancellorsville and elsewhere the odds had been nearly as great, and a glance at his gaunt veterans showed him that they might still be depended upon for a struggle as obstinate as any in the past history of the war. the event certainly vindicated the justice of this latter view, and we shall briefly trace the occurrences of the next three or four days which terminated the long conflict at petersburg. general grant's assaulting force was not in position near the boydton road, beyond hatcher's run, until march 31st, when, before he could attack, lee suddenly advanced and made a furious onslaught on the federal front. before this attack, the divisions first encountered gave way in confusion, and it seemed that the confederate commander, at a single blow, was about to extricate himself from his embarrassing situation. the force opposed to him, however, was too great, and he found himself unable to encounter it in the open field. he therefore fell back to his works, and the fighting ceased, only to be renewed, however, at five forks. this had been seized by the cavalry of general sheridan, and, as the point was one of importance, lee detached a small body of infantry to drive away the federal horse. this was done without difficulty, and the confederate infantry then advanced toward dinwiddie court-house; but late at night it was withdrawn, and the day's fighting ended. on the next day, the 1st of april, a more determined struggle ensued, for the possession of five forks, where lee had stationed the small remnants of the divisions of pickett and johnson. these made a brave resistance, but were wholly unable to stand before the force brought against them. they maintained their ground as long as possible, but were finally broken to pieces and scattered in confusion, the whole right of the confederate line and the southside road falling into the hands of the enemy. [illustration: lee at petersburg] this was virtually the end of the contest, but general grant, it would appear, deemed it inexpedient to venture any thing. so thinly manned were the lines in front of petersburg, in the absence of longstreet north of james river, and the troops sent beyond hatcher's run, that on the 1st of april the federal commander might have broken through the works at almost any point. he elected to wait, however, until the following day, thereby running the risk of awaking to find that lee had retreated. at dawn on the 2d the long struggle ended. the federal forces advanced all along the confederate front, made a furious attack, and, breaking through in front of the city, carried all before them. the forts, especially fort gregg, made a gallant resistance. this work was defended by the two hundred and fifty men of harris's mississippi brigade, and these fought until their numbers were reduced to thirty, killing or wounding five hundred of the assailants. the fort was taken at last, and the federal lines advanced toward the city. in this attack fell the eminent soldier general a.p. hill, whose record had been so illustrious, and whose fortune it was to thus terminate his life while the southern flag still floated. xv. lee evacuates petersburg. any further resistance upon the part of general lee seemed now impossible, and nothing appeared to be left him but to surrender his army. this course he does not seem, however, to have contemplated. it was still possible that he might be able to maintain his position on an inner line near the city until night; and, if he could do so, the friendly hours of darkness might enable him to make good his retreat to the north bank of the appomattox, and shape his course toward north carolina, where general johnston awaited him. if the movements of the federal forces, however, were so prompt as to defeat his march in that direction, he might still be able to reach lynchburg, beyond which point the defiles of the alleghanies promised him protection against the utmost efforts of his enemy. of his ability to reach north carolina, following the line of the danville railroad, lee, however, seems to have had no doubt. the federal army would not probably be able to concentrate in sufficient force in his path to bar his progress if his march were rapid; if detached bodies only opposed him on his line of retreat, there was little doubt that the army of northern virginia, reduced as it was, would be able to cut its way through them. this preface is necessary to an intelligent comprehension of lee's movements on the unfortunate 2d of april when his lines were broken. this occurrence took place, as we have said, about sunrise, and, an hour or two afterward, the federal forces pressed forward all along the line, surging toward the suburbs of petersburg. we have mentioned the position of general lee's headquarters, about a mile and a half west of the city, on the cox road, nearly opposite the tall federal observatory. standing on the lawn, in front of his headquarters, general lee now saw, approaching rapidly, a heavy column of federal infantry, with the obvious design of charging a battery which had opened fire upon them from a hill to the right. the spectacle was picturesque and striking. across the extensive fields houses set on fire by shell were sending aloft huge clouds of smoke and tongues of flame; at every instant was seen the quick glare of the federal artillery, firing from every knoll, and in front came on the charging column, moving at a double quick, with burnished gun-barrels and bayonets flashing in the april sunshine. general lee watched with attention, but with perfect composure, this determined advance of the enemy; and, although he must have realized that his army was on the verge of destruction, it was impossible to discern in his features any evidences of emotion. he was in full uniform, and had buckled on his dress-sword, which he seldom wore--having, on this morning declared, it is said, that if he were compelled to surrender he would do so in full harness. of his calmness at this trying moment the writer is able to bear his personal testimony. chancing to hear a question addressed to a member of his staff, general lee turned with great courtesy, raised his gray hat in response to the writer's salute, and gave him the desired information in a voice entirely measured and composed. it was impossible to regard a calmness so striking without strong sentiments of admiration, and lee's appearance and bearing at this moment will always remain vividly impressed upon the writer's memory. the federal column was soon in dangerous proximity to the battery on the hill, and it was obliged to retire at a gallop to escape capture. an attempt was made to hold the ground near the headquarters, but a close musketry-fire from the enemy rendered this also impossible--the artillery was withdrawn--and general lee, mounting his iron-gray, slowly rode back, accompanied by a number of officers, toward his inner line. he still remained entirely composed, and only said to one of his staff, in his habitual tone: "this is a bad business, colonel." "well, colonel," he said afterward to another officer, "it has happened as i told them it would at richmond. the line has been stretched until it has broken." the federal column was now pressing forward along the cox road toward petersburg, and general lee continued to ride slowly back in the direction of the city. he was probably recognized by officers of the federal artillery, or his _cortã©ge_ drew their fire. the group was furiously shelled, and one of the shells burst a few feet in rear of him, killing the horse of an officer near him, cutting the bridle-reins of others, and tearing up the ground in his immediate vicinity. this incident seemed to arouse in general lee his fighting-blood. he turned his head over his right shoulder, his cheeks became flushed, and a sudden flash of the eye showed with what reluctance he retired before the fire directed upon him. no other course was left him, however, and he continued to ride slowly toward his inner line--a low earthwork in the suburbs of the city--where a small force was drawn up, ardent, hopeful, defiant, and saluting the shell, now bursting above them, with cheers and laughter. it was plain that the fighting-spirit of the ragged troops remained unbroken; and the shout of welcome with which they received lee indicated their unwavering confidence in him, despite the untoward condition of affairs. arrangements were speedily made to hold the inner line, if possible, until night. to general gordon had been intrusted the important duty of defending the lines east of the city, and general longstreet had been directed to vacate the works north of james river, and march at once to the lines of petersburg. this officer made his appearance, with his small force, at an early hour of the day; and, except that the federal army continued firing all along the front, no other active operations took place. to those present on the confederate side this fact appeared strange. as the force beyond hatcher's run had been completely defeated and dispersed, general lee's numbers for the defence of petersburg on this day did not amount to much, if any, more than fifteen thousand men. general grant's force was probably one hundred and fifty thousand, of whom about one hundred thousand might, it would appear, have been concentrated in an hour or two directly in front of the city. that, with this large force at his disposal, the federal commander did not at once attack, and so end all on that day, surprised the confederate troops, and still continues to surprise the writer. night came at last, and general lee began his retreat. he had sent, early in the morning, a dispatch to the civil authorities, at richmond, informing them of the fact that his lines had been broken, and that he would that night retreat from petersburg. orders had also been sent to all the forces holding the lines north of james river to move at once and join him, and, just at nightfall, the army at petersburg began crossing the appomattox. this movement was effected without interruption from the enemy; and the army, turning into what is called the hickory road, leading up the north bank of the river, moved on steadily through the half light. its march was superintended by lee in person. he had stationed himself at the mouth of the hickory road, and, standing with the bridle of his horse in his hand, gave his orders. his bearing still remained entirely composed, and his voice had lost none of its grave strength of intonation. when the rear was well closed up, lee mounted his horse, rode on slowly with his men; and, in the midst of the glare and thunder of the exploding magazines at petersburg, the small remnant of the army of northern virginia, amounting to about fifteen thousand men, went on its way through the darkness. xvi. the retreat and surrender. on the morning of the 3d of april, general lee, after allowing his column a brief period of rest, continued his march up the north bank of the appomattox. the aspect of affairs at this time was threatening, and there seemed little ground to hope that the small force would be able to make good its retreat to north carolina. general grant had a short and direct route to the danville railroad--a considerable portion of his army was already as far west as dinwiddie court-house--and it was obvious that he had only to use ordinary diligence to completely cut general lee off in the vicinity of burkesville junction. a glance at the map will indicate the advantages possessed by the federal commander. he could move over the chord, while lee was compelled to follow the arc of the circle. unless good fortune assisted lee and ill fortune impeded his opponent, the event seemed certain; and it will be seen that these conditions were completely reversed. under the circumstances here stated, it appeared reasonable to expect in lee and his army some depression of spirits. the fact was strikingly the reverse. the army was in excellent spirits, probably from the highly-agreeable contrast of the budding april woods with the squalid trenches, and the long-unfelt joy of an unfettered march through the fields of spring. general lee shared this hopeful feeling in a very remarkable degree. his expression was animated and buoyant, his seat in the saddle erect and commanding, and he seemed to look forward to assured success in the critical movement which he had undertaken. "i have got my army safe out of its breastworks," he said, on the morning of this day, "and, in order to follow me, the enemy must abandon his lines, and can derive no further benefit from his railroads or james river." the design of the confederate commander has been already stated, but an important condition upon which he depended for success has not been mentioned. this was a supply of food for his army. the troops, during the whole winter, had lived, from day to day, on quarter-rations, doled out to them with a sparing hand; and, in moving now from petersburg, lee saw that he must look to supplies somewhere upon his line of retreat. these he had directed to be brought from the south and deposited at amelia court-house; and the expectation of finding at that point full subsistence for his men, had doubtless a great effect in buoying up his spirits. an evil chance, however, reversed all the hopes based on this anticipation. from fault or misapprehension, the train loaded with supplies proceeded to richmond without depositing the rations at amelia court-house; there was no time to obtain other subsistence, and when, after unforeseen delay, in consequence of high water in the appomattox, lee, at the head of his half-starved soldiers, reached amelia court-house, it was only to find that there was nothing there for the support of his army, and to realize that a successful retreat, under the circumstances, was wellnigh hopeless. those who accompanied the southern army on this arduous march will recall the dismayed expression of the emaciated faces at this unlooked-for calamity; and no face wore a heavier shadow than that of general lee. the failure of the supply of rations completely paralyzed him. he had intended, and was confident of his ability, to cut his way through the enemy; but an army cannot march and fight without food. it was now necessary to halt and send out foraging parties into the impoverished region around. meanwhile general grant, with his great force, was rapidly moving to bar his adversary's further advance; the want of a few thousand pounds of bread and meat had virtually terminated the war. an anxious and haggard expression came to general lee's face when he was informed of this great misfortune; and, at once abandoning his design of cutting his way through to north carolina, he turned westward, and shaped his march toward lynchburg. this movement began on the night of the 5th of april, and it would seem that general grant had had it in his power to arrest it by an attack on lee at amelia court-house. general sheridan was in the immediate vicinity, with a force of about eighteen thousand well-mounted cavalry, and, although it was not probable that this command could effect any thing against lee's army of about the same number of infantry, it might still have delayed him by constructing breastworks in his way, and thus giving the federal infantry time to come up and attack. [illustration: lee at the surrender.] the opportunity of crushing his adversary at amelia court-house was thus allowed to pass, and general grant now pressed forward his infantry, to bring lee to bay, if possible, before he reached lynchburg. from this moment began the struggle between the adversaries which was to continue, day and night, without intermission, for the next four days. the phenomenon was here presented of an army, reduced to less than twenty thousand men, holding at arm's-length an enemy numbering about one hundred and fifty thousand, and very nearly defeating every effort of the larger force to arrest their march. it would not interest the reader, probably, to follow in minute detail the circumstances of this melancholy retreat. from the importance of the transactions, and the natural attention directed to them, both north and south, they are doubtless familiar to all who will read these pages. we shall only speak of one or two incidents of the retreat, wherein general lee appeared prominent personally, leaving to the imagination of the reader the remainder of the long and tragic struggle whose result decided the fate of the confederacy. general grant doubtless saw now that every thing depended upon the celerity of his movements, and, sending in advance his large body of cavalry, he hastened forward as rapidly as possible with his infantry, bent on interposing, if possible, a heavy force in his adversary's front. lee's movements were equally rapid. he seemed speedily to have regained his old calmness, after the trying disappointment at amelia court-house; and those who shared his counsels at this time can testify that the idea of surrender scarcely entered his mind for a moment--or, if it did so, was speedily banished. under the pressure of circumstances so adverse that they seemed calculated to break down the most stubborn resolution. general lee did not falter; and throughout the disheartening scenes of the retreat, from the moment when he left amelia court-house to the hour when his little column was drawing near appomattox, still continued to believe that the situation was not desperate, and that he would be able to force his way through to lynchburg. on the evening of the 6th, when the army was near farmville, a sudden attack was made by the federal cavalry on the trains of the army moving on a parallel road; and the small force of infantry guarding them was broken and scattered. this occurrence took place while general lee was confronting a body of federal infantry near sailor's creek; and, taking a small brigade, he immediately repaired to the scene of danger. the spectacle which followed was a very striking and imposing one, and is thus described by one who witnessed it: "the scene was one of gloomy picturesqueness and tragic interest. on a plateau raised above the forest from which they had emerged, were the disorganized troops of ewell and anderson, gathered in groups, un-officered, and uttering tumultuous exclamations of rage and defiance. rising above the weary groups which had thrown themselves upon the ground, were the grim barrels of cannon, in battery, ready to fire, as soon as the enemy appeared. in front of all was the still line of battle, just placed by lee, and waiting calmly. general lee had rushed his infantry over, just at sunset, leading it in person, his face animated, and his eye brilliant with the soldier's spirit of fight, but his bearing unflurried as before. an artist desiring to paint his picture, ought to have seen the old cavalier at this moment, sweeping on upon his large iron-gray, whose mane and tail floated in the wind; carrying his field-glass half-raised in his right hand; with head erect, gestures animated, and in the whole face and form the expression of the hunter close upon his game. the line once interposed, he rode in the twilight among the disordered groups above mentioned, and the sight of him aroused a tumult. fierce cries resounded on all sides, and, with hands clinched violently and raised aloft, the men called on him to lead them against the enemy. 'it's general lee!' 'uncle robert!' 'where's the man who won't follow uncle robert?' i heard on all sides--the swarthy faces full of dirt and courage, lit up every instant by the glare of the burning wagons. altogether, the scene was indescribable." on the 7th the army pressed on beyond farmville, still harassed as it advanced by the federal infantry and cavalry; but, in some of these encounters, the pursuing force met with what was probably a very unexpected discomfiture. general fitz lee, bringing up the rear of the army with his force of about fifteen hundred cavalry on broken-down horses, succeeded not only in repulsing the attacks of the large and excellently-mounted force under general sheridan, but achieved over them highly-honorable successes. one such incident took place on the 7th, when general gregg attacked with about six thousand horse, but was met, defeated, and captured by general fitz lee, to the great satisfaction of general lee, who said to his son, general w.h.f. lee: "keep your command together and in good spirits, general--don't let them think of surrender--i will get you out of this." on the 8th and 9th, however, this hope seemed unwarranted by the circumstances, and the commander-in-chief appeared to be almost the only human being who remained sanguine of the result. the hardships of the retreat, arising chiefly from want of food, began to seriously impair the resolution of the troops, and the scenes through which they advanced were not calculated to raise their spirits. "these scenes," declares one who witnessed them, "were of a nature which can be apprehended only by men who are thoroughly familiar with the harrowing details of war. behind and on either flank, a ubiquitous and increasingly adventurous enemy--every mud-hole and every rise in the road choked with blazing wagons--the air filled with the deafening reports of ammunition exploding, and shells bursting when touched by the flames, dense columns of smoke ascending to heaven from the burning and exploding vehicles, exhausted men, worn-out mules and horses, lying down side by side--gaunt famine glaring hopelessly from sunken, lack-lustre eyes--dead mules, dead horses, dead men everywhere--death many times welcomed as god's messenger in disguise--who can wonder if many hearts, tried in the fiery furnace of four unparalleled years, and never hitherto found wanting, should have quailed in presence of starvation, fatigue, sleeplessness, misery, unintermitted for five or six days, and culminating in hopelessness?" it cannot, however, be said with truth, that any considerable portion of the southern forces were greatly demoralized, to use the military phrase, as the fighting of the last two days, when the suffering of the retreat culminated, will show. the men were almost entirely without food, and were glad to find a little corn to eat; but those who were not physically unable longer to carry their muskets--and the number of these latter was large--still marched and fought with soldierly cheerfulness and resolution. general lee's spirits do not seem at any time to have flagged, and up to a late period of the retreat he had not seriously contemplated surrender. the necessity for this painful course came home to his corps commanders first, and they requested general pendleton, the efficient chief of artillery of the army, to inform general lee that in their opinion further struggle was hopeless. general pendleton informed general lee of this opinion of his officers, and it seemed to communicate something like a shock to him. "surrender!" he exclaimed with a flash of the eye, "i have too many good fighting-men for that!" nevertheless, the necessity of seriously contemplating this result was soon forced upon him. since the morning of the 7th, a correspondence had taken place between himself and general grant; and, as these notes are interesting, we here present those which were exchanged up to the night of the 8th: _april_ 7, 1865. _general r.e. lee, commanding c.s.a._: general: the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate southern army known as the army of northern virginia. very respectfully, your obedient servant, u.s. grant, _lieutenant-general commanding armies of the united states_. _april_ 7, 1865. general: i have received your note of this day. though not entirely of the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. r.e. lee, _general_. to lieutenant-general u.s. grant, _commanding armies of the united states_. _april_ 8, 1865. _to general r.e. lee, commanding c.s.a_.: general: your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date, asking the conditions on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia is just received. in reply, i would say, that peace being my first desire, there is but one condition that i insist upon, viz.: that the men surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will he received. very respectfully, your obedient servant, u.s. grant, _lieutenant-general, commanding armies of the united states_. _april_ 8, 1865. general: i received, at a late hour, your note of to-day, in answer to mine of yesterday. i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender. but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desire to know whether your proposals would tend to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the army of northern virginia; but so far as your proposition may affect the confederate states forces under my command and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at 10 a.m. to-morrow, on the old stage-road to richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. very respectfully, your obedient servant, r.e. lee, _general c.s.a._ to lieutenant-general grant, _commanding armies of the united states_. [illustration: last council of war.] no reply was received to this last communication from general lee, on the evening of the 8th, and that night there was held, around a bivouac-fire in the woods, the last council of war of the army of northern virginia. the scene was a very picturesque one. the red glare from the bivouac-fire lit up the group, and brought out the details of each figure. none were present but general lee and generals longstreet, gordon, and fitz lee, all corps commanders. generals gordon and fitz lee half reclined upon an army-blanket near the fire; longstreet sat upon a log, smoking; and general lee stood by the fire, holding in his hand the correspondence which had passed between himself and general grant. the question what course it was advisable to pursue, was then presented, in a few calm words, by general lee to his corps commanders, and an informal conversation ensued. it was finally agreed that the army should advance, on the next morning, beyond appomattox court-house, and, if only general sheridan's cavalry were found in front, brush that force from its path, and proceed on its way to lynchburg. if, however, the federal infantry was discovered in large force beyond the court-house, the attempt to break through was to be abandoned, and a flag dispatched to general grant requested an interview for the arrangement of the terms of a capitulation of the southern army. with a heavy heart, general lee acquiesced in this plan of proceeding, and soon afterward the council of war terminated--the corps commanders saluting the commander-in-chief, who returned their bows with grave courtesy, and separating to return to their own bivouacs. in spite, however, of the discouraging and almost desperate condition of affairs, general lee seems still to have clung to the hope that he might be able to cut his way through the force in his front. he woke from brief slumber beside his bivouac-fire at about three o'clock in the morning, and calling an officer of his staff, colonel venable, sent him to general gordon, commanding the front, to ascertain his opinion, at that moment, of the probable result of an attack upon the enemy. general gordon's reply was, "tell general lee that my old corps is reduced to a frazzle, and, unless i am supported by longstreet heavily, i do not think we can do any thing more." general lee received this announcement with an expression of great feeling, and after a moment's silence said: "there is nothing left but to go to general grant, and i would rather die a thousand deaths!" his staff-officers had now gathered around him, and one of them said: "what will history say of our surrendering if there is any possibility of escape? posterity will not understand it." to these words, general lee replied: "yes, yes, they will not understand our situation; but that is not the question. the question is, whether it is _right_; and, if it is right, i take the responsibility." his expression of buoyant hopefulness had now changed to one of deep melancholy, and it was evident to those around him that the thought of surrender was worse to him than the bitterness of death. for the first time his courage seemed to give way, and he was nearly unmanned. turning to an officer standing near him, he said, his deep voice filled with hopeless sadness: "how easily i could get rid of this, and be at rest! i have only to ride along the line and all will be over!" he was silent for a short time after uttering these words, and then added, with a heavy sigh: "but it is our duty to live. what will become of the women and children of the south, if we are not here to protect them?" the moment had now come when the fate of the retreat was to be decided. to general gordon, who had proved himself, in the last operations of the war, a soldier of the first ability, had been intrusted the command of the advance force; and this was now moved forward against the enemy beyond appomattox court-house. gordon attacked with his infantry, supported by fitz lee's cavalry, and the artillery battalion of colonel carter, and such was the impetuosity of his advance that he drove the federal forces nearly a mile. but at that point he found himself in face of a body of infantry, stated afterward, by federal officers, to number about eighty thousand. as his own force was less than five thousand muskets, he found it impossible to advance farther; and the federal lines were already pressing forward to attack him, in overwhelming force, when the movement suddenly ceased. seeing the hopelessness of further resistance. general lee had sent a flag to general grant, requesting an interview looking to the arrangement, if possible, of terms of surrender; and to this end the forward movement of the federal forces was ordered to be discontinued. the two armies then remained facing each other during the interview between the two commanders, which took place in a farm-house in appomattox court-house. general lee was accompanied only by colonel marshall, of his staff, and on the federal side only a few officers were present. general grant's demeanor was courteous, and that of general lee unmarked by emotion of any description. the hardships of the retreat had somewhat impaired his strength, and his countenance exhibited traces of fatigue; but no other change had taken place in his appearance. he was erect, calm, courteous, and confined his observations strictly to the disagreeable business before him. the interview was brief; and, seated at a plain table, the two commanders wrote and exchanged the accompanying papers: appomattox court-house, _april_ 9, 1865. _general r.e. lee, commanding c.s.a._.: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., i propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern virginia on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual parole not to take arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery, and public property, to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside. very respectfully, u.s. grant, _lieutenant-general_. headquarters army of northern virginia, _april_ 9,1865. _lieut.-general u.s. grant, commanding u.s.a_.: general: i have received your letter of this date, containing the terms of surrender of the army of northern virginia, as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. very respectfully, your obedient servant, r.e. lee, _general_. the two generals then bowed to each other, and, leaving the house, general lee mounted his gray, and rode back to his headquarters. the scene as he passed through the army was affecting. the men gathered round him, wrung his hand, and in broken words called upon god to help him. this pathetic reception by his old soldiers profoundly affected lee. the tears came to his eyes, and, looking at the men with a glance of proud feeling, he said, in suppressed tones, which trembled slightly: "we have fought through the war together. i have done the best i could for you. my heart is too full to say more!" these few words seemed to be all he could utter. he rode on, and, reaching his headquarters in the woods, disappeared in his tent, whither we shall not follow him. on the next day the army of northern virginia, numbering about twenty-six thousand men, of whom but seven thousand eight hundred carried muskets, was formally surrendered, and the confederate war was a thing of the past. xvii. lee returns to richmond. general lee, on the day following the capitulation of his army, issued an address to his old soldiers, which they received and read with very deep emotion. the address was in these words: headquarters army northern virginia, _april_ 10, 1865. after four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the army of northern virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources. i need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that i have consented to this result from no distrust of them; but, feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, i have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen. by the terms of agreement, officers and men can return to their homes and remain there until exchanged. you will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed; and i earnestly pray that a merciful god will extend to you his blessing and protection. with an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, i bid you an affectionate farewell. r.e. lee, _general_. the painful arrangements connected with the capitulation were on this day concluded; and general lee prepared to set out on his return to richmond--like his men, a "paroled prisoner of the army of northern virginia." the parting between him and his soldiers was pathetic. he exchanged with all near him a close pressure of the hand, uttered a few simple words of farewell, and, mounting his iron-gray, "traveller," who had passed through all the fighting of the campaign unharmed, rode slowly in the direction of richmond. he was escorted by a detachment of federal cavalry, preceded only by a guidon; and the party, including the officers who accompanied him, consisted of about twenty-five horsemen. the _cortã©ge_ was followed by several wagons carrying the private effects of himself and his companions, and by the well-known old black open vehicle which he had occasionally used during the campaigns of the preceding year, when indisposition prevented him from mounting his horse. in this vehicle it had been his custom to carry stores for the wounded--it had never been used for articles contributing to his personal convenience. general lee's demeanor on his way to richmond was entirely composed, and his thoughts seemed much more occupied by the unfortunate condition of the poor people, at whose houses he stopped, than by his own situation. when he found that all along his route the impoverished people had cooked provisions in readiness for him, and were looking anxiously for him, with every indication of love and admiration, he said to one of his officers: "these good people are kind--too kind. their hearts are as full as when we began our first campaigns in 1861. they do too much--more than they are able to do--for us." his soldierly habits remained unchanged, and he seemed unwilling to indulge in any luxuries or comforts which could not be shared by the gentlemen accompanying him at a house which he reached just as night came, a poor woman had prepared an excellent bed for him, but, with a courteous shake of the head, he spread his blanket, and slept upon the floor. stopping on the next day at the house of his brother, charles carter lee, in powhatan, he spent the evening in conversation; but, when bedtime came, left the house, in spite of the fact that it had begun to rain, and, crossing the road into the woods, took up his quarters for the night on the hard planks of his old black vehicle. on the route he exhibited great solicitude about a small quantity of oats which he had brought with him, in one of the wagons, for his old companion, "traveller," mentioning it more than once, and appearing anxious lest it should be lost or used by some one. [illustration: lee's entry into richmond after the surrender.] the party came in sight of richmond at last, and, two or three miles from the city, general lee rode ahead of his escort, accompanied only by a few officers, and, crossing the pontoon bridge below the ruins of mayo's bridge, which had been destroyed when the confederate forces retreated, entered the capital. the spectacle which met his eyes at this moment must have been exceedingly painful. in the great conflagration which had taken place on the morning of the 3d of april, a large portion of the city had been burned; and, as general lee rode up main street, formerly so handsome and attractive, he saw on either hand only masses of blackened ruins. as he rode slowly through the opening between these masses of _dã©bris_, he was recognized by the few persons who were on the street, and instantly the intelligence of his presence spread through the city. the inhabitants hastened from their houses and flocked to welcome him, saluting him with cheers and the waving of hats and handkerchiefs. he seemed desirous, however, of avoiding this ovation, and, returning the greeting by simply raising his hat, rode on and reached his house on franklin street, where, respecting his desire for privacy under circumstances so painful, his admirers did not intrude upon him. we have presented this brief narrative of the incidents attending general lee's return to his home after the surrender, to show with what simplicity and good sense he accepted his trying situation. a small amount of diplomacy--sending forward one of his officers to announce his intended arrival; stopping for a few moments as he ascended main street; making an address to the citizens who first recognized him, and thus affording time for a crowd to assemble--these proceedings on the part of general lee would have resulted in an ovation such as a vanquished commander never before received at the hands of any people. nothing, however, was less desired by general lee than this tumultuous reception. the native modesty of the man not only shrunk from such an ovation; he avoided it for another reason--the pretext it would probably afford to the federal authorities to proceed to harsh measures against the unfortunate persons who took part in it. in accordance with these sentiments, general lee had not announced his coming, had not stopped as he rode through the city; and now, shutting himself up in his house, signified his desire to avoid a public reception, and to be left in privacy. this policy he is well known to have pursued from that time to the end of his life. he uniformly declined, with great courtesy, but firmly, invitations to attend public gatherings of any description, where his presence might arouse passions or occasion discussions connected with the great contest in which he had been the leader of the south. a mind less firm and noble would doubtless have yielded to this great temptation. it is sweet to the soldier, who has been overwhelmed and has yielded up his sword, to feel that the love and admiration of a people still follow him; and to have the consolation of receiving public evidences of this unchanged devotion. that this love of the southern people for lee deeply touched him, there can be no doubt; but it did not blind him to his duty as the representative individual of the south. feeling that nothing was now left the southern people but an honest acceptance of the situation, and a cessation, as far as possible, of all rancor toward the north, he refused to encourage sentiments of hostility between the two sections, and did all in his power to restore amicable feeling. "i am very glad to learn," he said in a note to the present writer, "that your life of general jackson is of the character you describe. i think all topics or questions calculated to excite angry discussion or hostile feelings should be avoided." these few words convey a distinct idea of general lee's views and feelings. he had fought to the best of his ability for southern independence of the north; the south had failed in the struggle, and it was now, in his opinion, the duty of every good citizen to frankly acquiesce in the result, and endeavor to avoid all that kept open the bleeding wounds of the country. his military career had placed him, in the estimation of the first men of his time, among the greatest soldiers of history; but the dignity and moderation of the course pursued by him, from the end of the war to the time of his death, will probably remain, in the opinion of both his friends and enemies, the noblest illustration of the character of the man. xviii. general lee after the war. in the concluding pages of this volume we shall not be called upon to narrate either military or political events. with the surrender at appomattox court-house the confederate war ended--no attempt was made by general johnston or other commanders to prolong it--in that great whirlpool all hopes of further resistance disappeared. we have, therefore, now no task before us but to follow general lee into private life, and present a few details of his latter years, and his death. these notices will be brief, but will not, we hope, be devoid of interest. the soldier who had so long led the confederate armies was to enter in his latter days upon a new field of labor; and, if in this field he won no new glories, he at least displayed the loftiest virtues, and exhibited that rare combination of greatness and gentleness which makes up a character altogether lovely. adhering to the resolution, formed in 1861, never again to draw his sword except in defence of virginia, general lee, after the surrender, sought for some occupation, feeling the necessity, doubtless, of in some manner employing his energies. he is said to have had offered to him, but to have courteously declined, estates in england and ireland; and to have also declined the place of commercial agent of the south in new york, which would have proved exceedingly lucrative. in the summer of 1865, however, he accepted an offer more congenial to his feelings--that of the presidency of washington college at lexington--and in the autumn of that year entered upon his duties, which he continued to perform with great energy and success to the day of his death. of the excellent judgment and great administrative capacity which he displayed in this new field of labor, we have never heard any question. it was the name and example, however, of lee which proved so valuable, drawing to the college more than five hundred students from all portions of the south, and some even from the north. upon the subject of general lee's life at washington college, a more important authority than that of the present writer will soon speak. in the "memorial volume," whose publication will probably precede or immediately follow the appearance of this work, full details will, no doubt, be presented of this interesting period. the subject possesses rare interest, and the facts presented will, beyond all question, serve to bring out new beauties in a character already regarded with extraordinary love and admiration by men of all parties and opinions. to the volume in question we refer the reader who desires the full-length portrait of one concerning whom too much cannot be written. during the period extending between the end of the war and general lee's death, he appeared in public but two or three times--once at washington, as a "witness" before a congressional committee, styled "the reconstruction committee," to inquire into the condition of things in the south; again, as a witness on the proposed trial of president davis; and perhaps on one or two additional occasions not of great interest or importance. his testimony was not taken on the trial of the president, which was deferred and finally abandoned; but he was subjected before the washington committee to a long and searching examination, in which it is difficult to decide whether his own calmness, good sense, and outspoken frankness, or the bad taste of some of the questions prepounded to him, were the more remarkable. as the testimony of general lee, upon this occasion, presents a full exposition of his views upon many of the most important points connected with the condition of the south, and the "reconstruction" policy, a portion of the newspaper report of his evidence is here given, as both calculated to interest the reader, and to illustrate the subject. the examination of general lee took place in march, 1866, and the following is the main portion of it: general robert e. lee, sworn and examined by mr. howard: question. where is your present residence? answer. lexington, va. q. how long have you resided in lexington? a. since the 1st of october last--nearly five months. the feeling in virginia. q. are you acquainted with the state of feeling among what we call secessionists in virginia, at present, toward the government of the united states? a. i do not know that i am; i have been living very retired, and have had but little communication with politicians; i know nothing more than from my own observation, and from such facts as have come to my knowledge. q. from your observation, what is your opinion as to the loyalty toward the government of the united states among the secession portion of the people of that state at this time? a. so far as has come to my knowledge, i do not know of a single person who either feels or contemplates any resistance to the government of the united states, or indeed any opposition to it; no word has reached me to either purpose. q. from what you have observed among them, is it your opinion that they are friendly toward the government of the united states, and that they will coã¶perate to sustain and uphold the government for the future? a. i believe that they entirely acquiesce in the government of the united states, and, so far as i have heard any one express an opinion, they are for coã¶perating with president johnson in his policy. q. in his policy in regard to what? a. his policy in regard to the restoration of the whole country; i have heard persons with whom i have conversed express great confidence in the wisdom of his policy of restoration, and they seem to look forward to it as a hope of restoration. q. how do they feel in regard to that portion of the people of the united states who have been forward and zealous in the prosecution of the war against the rebellion? a. well, i don't know as i have heard anybody express any opinion in regard to it; as i said before, i have not had much communication with politicians in the country, if there are any; every one seems to be engaged in his own affairs, and endeavoring to restore the civil government of the state; i have heard no expression of a sentiment toward any particular portion of the country. q. how do the secessionists feel in regard to the payment of the debt of the united states contracted in the prosecution of the war? a. i have never heard anyone speak on the subject; i suppose they must expect to pay the taxes levied by the government; i have heard them speak in reference to the payment of taxes, and of their efforts to raise money to pay taxes, which, i suppose, are for their share of the debt; i have never heard any one speak in opposition to the payment of taxes, or of resistance to their payment; their whole effort has been to try and raise the money for the payment of the taxes. the debt. q. from your knowledge of the state of public feeling in virginia, is it your opinion that the people would, if the question were left to them, repudiate and reject that debt? a. i never heard any one speak on that subject; but, from my knowledge of the people, i believe that they would be in favor of the payment of all just debts. q. do they, in your opinion, regard that as a just debt? a. i do not know what their opinion is on the subject of that particular debt; i have never heard any opinion expressed contrary to it; indeed, as i said in the beginning, i have had very little discussion or intercourse with the people; i believe the people will pay the debts they are called upon to pay; i say that from my knowledge of the people generally. q. would they pay that debt, or their portion of it, with as much alacrity as people ordinarily pay their taxes to their government? a. i do not know that they would make any distinction between the two. the taxes laid by the government, so far as i know, they are prepared to pay to the best of their ability. i never heard them make any distinction. q. what is the feeling of that portion of the people of virginia in regard to the payment of the so-called confederate debt? a. i believe, so far as my opinion goes--i have no facts to go upon, but merely base my opinion on the knowledge i have of the people--that they would be willing to pay the confederate debt, too. q. you think they would? a. i think they would, if they had the power and ability to do so. i have never heard any one in the state, with whom i have conversed, speak of repudiating any debt. q. i suppose the confederate debt is almost entirely valueless, even in the market in virginia? a. entirely so, as far as i know. i believe the people generally look upon it as lost entirely. i never heard any question on the subject. q. do you recollect the terms of the confederate bonds--when they were made payable? a. i think i have a general recollection that they were made payable six months after a declaration of peace. q. six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the united states and the confederate government? a. i think they ran that way. q. so that the bonds are not due yet by their terms? a. i suppose, unless it is considered that there is a peace now, they are not due. the freedmen. q. how do the people of virginia, secessionists more particularly, feel toward the freedmen? a. every one with whom i associate expresses the kindest feelings toward the freedmen. they wish to see them get on in the world, and particularly to take up some occupation for a living, and to turn their hands to some work. i know that efforts have been made among the farmers near where i live to induce them to engage for the year at regular wages. q. do you think there is a willingness on the part of their old masters to give them fair living wages for their labor? a. i believe it is so; the farmers generally prefer those servants who have been living with them before; i have heard them express their preferences for the men whom they knew, who had lived with them before, and their wish to get them to return to work. q. are you aware of the existence of any combination among the "whites" to keep down the wages of the "blacks?" a. i am not; i have heard that in several counties the land-owners have met in order to establish a uniform rate of wages, but i never heard, nor do i know of any combination to keep down wages or establish any rule which they did not think fair; the means of paying wages in virginia are very limited now, and there is a difference of opinion as to how much each person is able to pay. q. how do they feel in regard to the education of the blacks? is there a general willingness to have them educated? a. where i am, and have been, the people have exhibited a willingness that the blacks should be educated, and they express an opinion that it would be better for the blacks and better for the whites. q. general, you are very competent to judge of the capacity of black men for acquiring knowledge--i want your opinion on that capacity as compared with the capacity of white men? a. i do not know that i am particularly qualified to speak on that subject, as you seem to intimate, but i do not think that the black man is as capable of acquiring knowledge as the white man. there are some more apt than others. i have known some to acquire knowledge and skill in their trade or profession. i have had servants of my own who learned to read and write very well. q. do they show a capacity to obtain knowledge of mathematics and the exact sciences? a. i have no knowledge on that subject; i am merely acquainted with those who have learned the common rudiments of education. q. general, are you aware of the existence among the blacks of virginia, anywhere within the limits of the state, of combinations, having in view the disturbance of the peace, or any improper or unlawful acts? a. i am not; i have seen no evidence of it, and have heard of none; wherever i have been they have been quiet and orderly; not disposed to work; or, rather, not disposed to any continuous engagement to work, but just very short jobs to provide them with the immediate means of subsistence. q. has the colored race generally as great love of money and property as the white race possesses? a. i do not think it has; the blacks with whom i am acquainted look more to the present time than to the future. q. does that absence of a lust of money and property arise more from the nature of the negro than from his former servile condition? a. well, it may be in some measure attributed to his former condition; they are an amiable, social race; they like their ease and comfort, and i think look more to their present than to their future condition. in case of war, would virginia join our enemies? q. in the event of a war between the united states and any foreign power, such as england or france, if there should be held out to the secession portion of the people of virginia, or the other recently rebel states, a fair prospect of gaining their independence and shaking off the government of the united states, is it or is it not your opinion that they would avail themselves of that opportunity? a. i cannot answer with any certainty on that point; i do not know how far they might be actuated by their feelings; i have nothing whatever to base an opinion upon; so far as i know, they contemplate nothing of the kind now; what may happen in the future i cannot say. q. do you not frequently hear, in your intercourse with secessionists in virginia, expressions of a hope that such a war may break out? a. i cannot say that i have heard it; on the contrary, i have heard persons--i do not know whether you could call them secessionists or not, i mean those people in virginia with whom i associate--express the hope that the country may not be led into a war. q. in such an event, do you not think that that class of people whom i call secessionists would join the common enemy? a. it is possible; it depends upon the feeling of the individual. q. if it is a fair question--you may answer or not, as you choose--what, in such an event, might be your choice? a. i have no disposition now to do it, and i never have had. q. and you cannot foresee that such would be your inclination in such an event? a. no; i can only judge from the past; i do not know what circumstances it may produce; i cannot pretend to foresee events; so far as i know the feeling of the people of virginia, they wish for peace. q. during the civil war, was it not contemplated by the government of the confederacy to form an alliance with some foreign nation if possible? a. i believe it was their wish to do so if they could; it was their wish to have the confederate government recognized as an independent government; i have no doubt that if it could have made favorable treaties it would have done so, but i know nothing of the policy of the government; i had no hand or part in it; i merely express my own opinion. q. the question i am about to put to you, you may answer or not, as you choose. did you take an oath of fidelity, or allegiance, to the confederate government? a. i do not recollect having done so, but it is possible that when i was commissioned i did; i do not recollect whether it was required; if it was required, i took it, or if it had been required i would have taken it; but i do not recollect whether it was or not. q. (by mr. blow.) in reference to the effect of president johnson's policy, if it were adopted, would there be any thing like a return of the old feeling? i ask that because you used the expression "acquiescing in the result." a. i believe it would take time for the feelings of the people to be of that cordial nature to the government they were formerly. q. do you think that their preference for that policy arises from a desire to have peace and good feeling in the country, or from the probability of their regaining political power? president johnson's policy. a. so far as i know the desire of the people of the south, it is for restoration of their civil government, and they look upon the policy of president johnson as the one which would most clearly and most surely reã«stablish it. condition of the poorer classes. q. do you see any change among the poorer classes in virginia, in reference to industry? are they as much, or more, interested in developing their material interests than they were? a. i have not observed any change; every one now has to attend to his business for his support. q. the poorer classes are generally hard at work, are they? a. so far as i know, they are; i know nothing to the contrary. q. is there any difference in their relations to the colored people? is their prejudice increased or diminished? a. i have noticed no change; so far as i do know the feelings of all the people of virginia, they are kind to the colored people; i have never heard any blame attributed to them as to the present condition of things, or any responsibility. q. there are very few colored laborers employed, i suppose? a. those who own farms have employed, more or less, one or two colored laborers; some are so poor that they have to work themselves. q. can capitalists and workingmen from the north go into any portion of virginia with which you are familiar and go to work among the people? a. i do not know of any thing to prevent them. their peace and pleasure there would depend very much on their conduct. if they confined themselves to their own business and did not interfere to provoke controversies with their neighbors, i do not believe they would be molested. q. there is no desire to keep out capital? a. not that i know of. on the contrary, they are very anxious to get capital into the state. q. you see nothing of a disposition to prevent such a thing? a. i have seen nothing, and do not know of any thing, as i said before; the manner in which they would be received would depend entirely upon the individuals themselves; they might make themselves obnoxious, as you can understand. q. (by mr. howard.) is there not a general dislike of northern men among secessionists? a. i suppose they would prefer not to associate with them; i do not know that they would select them as associates. q. do they avoid and ostracize them socially? a. they might avoid them; they would not select them as associates unless there was some reason; i do not know that they would associate with them unless they became acquainted; i think it probable they would not admit them into their social circles. the position of the colored race. q. (by mr. blow.) what is the position of the colored men in virginia with reference to persons they work for? do you think they would prefer to work for northern or southern men? a. i think it very probable they would prefer the northern man, although i have no facts to go upon. q. that having been stated very frequently in reference to the cotton states, does it result from a bad treatment on the part of the resident population, or from the idea that they will be more fairly treated by the new-comers? what is your observation in that respect in regard to virginia? a. i have no means of forming an opinion; i do not know any case in virginia; i know of numbers of the blacks engaging with their old masters, and i know of many to prefer to go off and look for new homes; whether it is from any dislike of their former masters, or from any desire to change, or they feel more free and independent, i don't know. the material interests of virginia. q. what is your opinion in regard to the material interests of virginia; do you think they will be equal to what they were before the rebellion under the changed aspect of affairs? a. it will take a long time for them to reach their former standard; i think that after some years they will reach it, and i hope exceed it; but it cannot be immediately, in my opinion. q. it will take a number of years? a. it will take a number of years, i think. q. on the whole, the condition of things in virginia is hopeful both in regard to its material interests and the future peace of the country? a. i have heard great hopes expressed, and there is great cheerfulness and willingness to labor. q. suppose this policy of president johnson should be all you anticipate, and that you should also realize all that you expect in the improvement of the material interests, do you think that the result of that will be the gradual restoration of the old feeling? a. that will be the natural result, i think; and i see no other way in which that result can be brought about. q. there is a fear in the public mind that the friends of the policy in the south adopt it because they see in it the means of repairing the political position which they lost in the recent contest. do you think that that is the main idea with them, or that they merely look to it, as you say, as the best means of restoring civil government and the peace and prosperity of their respective states? a. as to the first point you make, i do not know that i ever heard any person speak upon it; i never heard the points separated; i have heard them speak generally as to the effect of the policy of president johnson; the feeling is, so far as i know now, that there is not that equality extended to the southern states which is enjoyed by the north. q. you do not feel down there that, while you accept the result, we are as generous as we ought to be under the circumstances? a. they think that the north can afford to be generous. q. that is the feeling down there? a. yes; and they think it is the best policy; those who reflect upon the subject and are able to judge. q. i understand it to be your opinion that generosity and liberality toward the entire south would be the surest means of regaining their good opinion? a. yes, and the speediest. q. (by mr. howard.) i understand you to say generally that you had no apprehension of any combination among the leading secessionists to renew the war, or any thing of the kind? a. i have no reason in the world to think so. q. have you heard that subject talked over among any of the politicians? a. no, sir; i have not; i have not heard that matter even suggested. q. let me put another hypothetical state of things. suppose the executive government of the united states should be held by a president who, like mr. buchanan, rejected the right of coercion, so called, and suppose a congress should exist here entertaining the same political opinions, thus presenting to the once rebel states the opportunity to again secede from the union, would they, or not, in your opinion, avail themselves of that opportunity, or some of them? a. i suppose it would depend: upon the circumstances existing at the time; if their feelings should remain embittered, and their affections alienated from the rest of the states, i think it very probable they might do so, provided they thought it was to their interests. q. do you not think that at the present time there is a deep-seated feeling of dislike toward the government of the united states on the part of the secessionists? a. i do not know that there is any deep-seated dislike; i think it is probable there may be some animosity still existing among the people of the south. q. is there not a deep-seated feeling of disappointment and chagrin at the result of the war? a. i think that at the time they were disappointed at the result of the war. q. do you mean to be understood as saying that there is not a condition of discontent against the government of the united states among the secessionists generally? a. i know none. q. are you prepared to say that they respect the government of the united states, and the loyal people of the united states, so much at the present time as to perform their duties as citizens of the united states, and of the states, faithfully and well? a. i believe that they will perform all the duties that they are required to perform; i think that is the general feeling so far as i know. q. do you think it would be practicable to convict a man in virginia of treason for having taken part in this rebellion against the government by a virginian jury without packing it with direct reference to a verdict of guilty? a. on that point i have no knowledge, and i do not know what they would consider treason against the united states--if you refer to past acts. mr. howard: yes, sir. witness: i have no knowledge what their views on that subject in the past are. q. you understand my question. suppose a jury was impanelled in your own neighborhood, taken by lot, would it be possible to convict, for instance, jefferson davis, for having levied war upon the united states, and thus having committed the crime of treason? a. i think it is very probable that they would not consider he had committed treason. their views of treason. q. suppose the jury should be clearly and plainly instructed by the court that such an act of war upon the part of mr. davis or any other leading man constituted the crime of treason under the constitution of the united states, would the jury be likely to heed that instruction, and, if the facts were plainly in proof before them, convict the offender? a. i do not know, sir, what they would do on that question. q. they do not generally suppose that it was treason against the united states, do they? a. i do not think that they so consider it. q. in what light would they view it? what would be their excuse or justification? how would they escape, in their own mind? i refer to the past--i am referring to the past and the feelings they would have? a. so far as i know, they look upon the action of the state in withdrawing itself from the government of the united states as carrying the individuals of the state along with it; that the state was responsible for the act, not the individuals, and that the ordinance of secession, so called, or those acts of the state which recognized a condition of war between the state and the general government stood as their justification for their bearing arms against the government of the united states; yes, sir, i think they would consider the act of the state as legitimate; that they were merely using the reserved rights, which they had a right to do. q. state, if you please--and if you are disinclined to answer the question you need not do so--what your own personal views on that question are? a. that was my view; that the act of virginia in withdrawing herself from the united states carried me along as a citizen of virginia, and that her laws and her acts were binding on me. q. and that you felt to be your justification in taking the course you did? a. yes, sir. q. i have been told, general, that you have remarked to some of your friends, in conversation, that you were rather wheedled or cheated into that course by politicians? a. i do not recollect ever making any such remark; i do not think i ever made it. q. if there be any other matter about which you wish to speak on this occasion, do so, freely. a. only in reference to that last question you put to me. i may have said and may have believed that the positions of the two sections which they held to each other was brought about by the politicians of the country; that the great masses of the people, if they understood the real question, would have avoided it; but not that i had been individually wheedled by the politicians. q. that is probably the origin of the whole thing. a. i may have said that, but i do not even recollect that; but i did believe at the time that it was an unnecessary condition of affairs, and might have been avoided if forbearance and wisdom had been practised on both sides. q. you say that you do not recollect having sworn allegiance and fidelity to the confederate government? a. i do not recollect it, nor do i know it was ever required. i was regularly commissioned in the army of the confederate states, but i do not really recollect that that oath was required. if it was required, i have no doubt i took it; or, if it had been required, i would have taken it. q. is there any other matter which you desire to state to the committee? a. no, sir; i am ready to answer any question which you think proper to put to me. negro citizenship. q. how would an amendment to the constitution be received by the secessionists, or by the people at large, allowing the colored people, or certain classes of them, to exercise the right of voting at elections? a. i think, so far as i can form an opinion, in such an event they would object. q. they would object to such an amendment? a. yes, sir. q. suppose an amendment should nevertheless be adopted, conferring on the blacks the right of suffrage, would that, in your opinion, lead to scenes of violence or breaches of the peace between the two races in virginia? a. i think it would excite unfriendly feelings between the two races; i cannot pretend to say to what extent it would go, but that would be the result. q. are you acquainted with the proposed amendment now pending in the senate of the united states? a. no, sir, i am not; i scarcely ever read a paper. [the substance of the proposed amendment was here explained to the witness by mr. conkling.] so far as i can see, i do not think that the state of virginia would object to it. q. would she consent, under any circumstances, to allow the black people to vote, even if she were to gain a large number of representatives in congress? a. that would depend upon her interests; if she had the right of determining that, i do not see why she would object; if it were to her interest to admit these people to vote, that might overrule any other objection that she had to it. q. what, in your opinion, would be the practical result? do you think that virginia would consent to allow the negro to vote? a. i think that at present she would accept the smaller representation; i do not know what the future may develop; if it should be plain to her that these persons will vote properly and understandingly, she might admit them to vote. q. (by mr. blow.) do you not think it would turn a good deal, in the cotton states, upon the value of the labor of the black people? upon the amount which they produce? a. in a good many states in the south, and in a good many counties in virginia, if the black people were allowed to vote, it would, i think, exclude proper representation--that is, proper, intelligent people would not be elected, and, rather than suffer that injury, they would not let them vote at all. q. do you not think that the question as to whether any southern state would allow the colored people the right of suffrage in order to increase representation would depend a good deal on the amount which the colored people might contribute to the wealth of the state, in order to secure two things--first, the larger representation, and, second, the influence desired from those persons voting? a. i think they would determine the question more in reference to their opinion as to the manner in which those votes would be exercised, whether they consider those people qualified to vote; my own opinion is, that at this time they cannot vote intelligently, and that giving them the right of suffrage would open the door to a good deal of demagogism, and lead to embarrassments in various ways; what the future may prove, how intelligent they may become, with what eyes they may look upon the interests of the state in which they may reside, i cannot say more than you can. the above extract presents the main portion of general lee's testimony, and is certainly an admirable exposition of the clear good sense and frankness of the individual. once or twice there is obviously an under-current of dry satire, as in his replies upon the subject of the confederate bonds. when asked whether he remembered at what time these bonds were made payable, he replied that his "general recollection was, that they were made payable six months after a declaration of peace." the correction was at once made by his interrogator in the words "six months after _the ratification of a treaty of peace_" etc. "i think they ran that way," replied general lee. "so that," retorted his interrogator, "the bonds are not yet due by their terms?" general lee's reply was, "i suppose, _unless it is considered that there is a peace now, they are not due_." this seems to have put an abrupt termination to the examination on that point. to the question whether he had taken an oath of allegiance to the confederate government, he replied: "i do not recollect having done so, but it is possible that when i was commissioned i did; i do not recollect whether it was required; if it was required, i took it, or if it had been required, i would have taken it." if this reply of general lee be attentively weighed by the reader, some conception may be formed of the bitter pang which he must have experienced in sending in, as he did, to the federal government, his application for pardon. the fact cannot be concealed that this proceeding on the part of general lee was a subject of deep regret to the southern people; but there can be no question that his motive was disinterested and noble, and that he presented, in so doing, the most remarkable evidence of the true greatness of his character. he had no personal advantage to expect from a pardon; cared absolutely nothing whether he were "pardoned" or not; and to one so proud, and so thoroughly convinced of the justice of the cause in which he had fought, to appear as a supplicant must have been inexpressibly painful. he, nevertheless, took this mortifying step--actuated entirely by that sense of duty which remained with him to the last, overmastering every other sentiment of his nature. he seems in this, as in many other things, to have felt the immense import of his example. the old soldiers of his army, and thousands of civilians, were obliged to apply for amnesty, or remain under civic disability. brave men, with families depending upon them, had been driven to this painful course, and general lee seems to have felt that duty to his old comrades demanded that he, too, should swallow this bitter draught, and share their humiliation as he had shared their dangers and their glory. if this be not the explanation of the motives controlling general lee's action, the writer is unable to account for the course which he pursued. that it is the sole explanation, the writer no more doubts than he doubts the fact of his own existence. xix. general lee's last years and death. for about five years--from the latter part of 1865 nearly to the end of 1870--general lee continued to concentrate his entire attention and all his energies upon his duties as president of washington college, to which his great name, and the desire of southern parents to have their sons educated under a guide so illustrious, attracted, as we have said, more than five hundred students. the sedentary nature of these occupations was a painful trial to one so long accustomed to lead a life of activity; but it was not in the character of the individual to allow personal considerations to interfere with the performance of his duty; and the laborious supervision of the education of this large number of young gentlemen continued, day after day, and year after year, to occupy his mind and his time, to the exclusion, wellnigh, of every other thought. his personal popularity with the students was very great, and it is unnecessary to add that their respect for him was unbounded. by the citizens of lexington, and especially the graver and more pious portion, he was regarded with a love and admiration greater than any felt for him during the progress of his military career. this was attributable, doubtless, to the franker and clearer exhibition by general lee, in his latter years, of that extraordinary gentleness and sweetness, culminating in devoted christian piety, which--concealed from all eyes, in some degree, during the war--now plainly revealed themselves, and were evidently the broad foundation and controlling influences of his whole life and character. to speak first of his gentleness and moderation in all his views and utterances. of these eminent virtues--eminent and striking, above all, in a defeated soldier with so much to embitter him--general lee presented a very remarkable illustration. the result of the war seemed to have left his great soul calm, resigned, and untroubled by the least rancor. while others, not more devoted to the south, permitted passion and sectional animosity to master them, and dictate acts and expressions full of bitterness toward the north, general lee refrained systematically from every thing of that description; and by simple force of greatness, one would have said, rose above all prejudices and hatreds of the hour, counselling, and giving in his own person to all who approached him the example of moderation and christian charity. he aimed to keep alive the old southern traditions of honor and virtue; but not that sectional hatred which could produce only evil. to a lady who had lost her husband in the war, and, on bringing her two sons to the college, indulged in expressions of great bitterness toward the north, general lee said, gently: "madam, do not train up your children in hostility to the government of the united states. remember that we are one country now. dismiss from your mind all sectional feeling, and bring them up to be americans." a still more suggestive exhibition of his freedom from rancor was presented in an interview which is thus described: "one day last autumn the writer saw general lee standing at his gate, talking pleasantly to an humbly-clad man, who seemed very much pleased at the cordial courtesy of the great chieftain, and turned off, evidently delighted, as we came up. after exchanging salutations, the general said, pointing to the retreating form, 'that is one of our old soldiers, who is in necessitous circumstances.' i took it for granted that it was some veteran confederate, when the noble-hearted chieftain quietly added, 'he fought on the other side, but we must not think of that.' i afterward ascertained--not from general lee, for he never alluded to his charities--that he had not only spoken kindly to this 'old soldier' who had 'fought on the other side,' but had sent him on his way rejoicing in a liberal contribution to his necessities." of the extent of this christian moderation another proof was given by the soldier, at a moment when he might not unreasonably have been supposed to labor under emotions of the extremest bitterness. soon after his return to richmond, in april, 1865, when the _immedicabile vulnus_ of surrender was still open and bleeding, a gentleman was requested by the federal commander in the city to communicate to general lee the fact that he was about to be indicted in the united states courts for treason.[1] in acquitting himself of his commission, the gentleman expressed sentiments of violent indignation at such a proceeding. but these feelings general lee did not seem to share. the threat of arraigning him as a traitor produced no other effect upon him than to bring a smile to his lips; and, taking the hand of his friend, as the latter rose to go, he said, in his mildest tones: "we must forgive our enemies. i can truly say that not a day has passed since the war began that i have not prayed for them." [footnote 1: this was afterward done by one of the federal judges, but resulted in nothing.] the incidents here related define the views and feelings of general lee as accurately as they could be set forth in a whole volume. the defeated commander, who could open his poor purse to "one of _our_ old soldiers who _fought on the other side_," and pray daily during the bitterest of conflicts for his enemies, must surely have trained his spirit to the perfection of christian charity. of the strength and controlling character of general lee's religious convictions we have more than once spoken in preceding pages of this volume. these now seemed to exert a more marked influence over his life, and indeed to shape every action and utterance of the man. during the war he had exhibited much greater reserve upon this the most important of all subjects which can engage the attention of a human being; and, although he had been from an early period, we believe, a communicant of the protestant episcopal church, he seldom discussed religious questions, or spoke of his own feelings, presenting in this a marked contrast, as we have said, to his illustrious associate general jackson. even during the war, however, as the reader has seen in our notices of his character at the end of 1863, general lee's piety revealed itself in conversations with his chaplains and other good men; and was not concealed from the troops, as on the occasion of the prayer-meeting in the midst of the fighting at mine run. on another occasion, when reviewing his army near winchester, he was seen to raise his hat to a chaplain with the words, "i salute the church of god;" and again, near petersburg, was observed kneeling in prayer, a short distance from the road, as his troops marched by. still another incident of the period--that of the war--will be recorded here in the words of the rev. j. william jones, who relates it: "not long before the evacuation of petersburg, the writer was one day distributing tracts along the trenches, when he perceived a brilliant cavalcade approaching. general lee--accompanied by general john b. gordon, general a.p. hill, and other general officers, with their staffs--was inspecting our lines and reconnoitring those of the enemy. the keen eye of gordon recognized, and his cordial grasp detained, the humble tract-distributor, as he warmly inquired about his work. general lee at once reined in his horse and joined in the conversation, the rest of the party gathered around, and the humble colporteur thus became the centre of a group of whose notice the highest princes of earth might well be proud. general lee asked if we ever had calls for prayer-books, and said that if we would call at his headquarters he would give us some for distribution--'that some friend in richmond had given him a new prayer-book, and, upon his saying that he would give his old one, that he had used ever since the mexican war, to some soldier, the friend had offered him a dozen new books for the old one, and he had, of course, accepted so good an offer, and now had twelve instead of one to give away.' we called at the appointed hour. the general had gone out on some important matter, but (even amid his pressing duties) had left the prayer-books with a member of his staff, with instructions concerning them. he had written on the fly-leaf of each, 'presented by r.e. lee,' and we are sure that those of the gallant men to whom they were given who survive the war will now cherish them as precious legacies, and hand them down as heirlooms in their families." these incidents unmistakably indicate that general lee concealed, under the natural reserve of his character, an earnest religious belief and trust in god and our saviour. nor was this a new sentiment with him. after his death a well-worn pocket bible was found in his chamber, in which was written, "r.e. lee, lieutenant-colonel, u.s. army." it was plain, from this, that, even during the days of his earlier manhood, in mexico and on the western prairies, he had read his bible, and striven to conform his life to its teachings. with the retirement of the great soldier, however, from the cares of command which necessarily interfered in a large degree with pious exercises and meditations, the religious phase of his character became more clearly defined, assuming far more prominent and striking proportions. the sufferings of the southern people doubtless had a powerful effect upon him, and, feeling the powerlessness of man, he must have turned to god for comfort. but this inquiry is too profound for the present writer. he shrinks from the attempt to sound the depths of this truly great soul, with the view of discovering the influences which moulded it into an almost ideal perfection. general lee was, fortunately for the world, surrounded in his latter days by good and intelligent men, fully competent to present a complete exposition of his views and feelings--and to these the arduous undertaking is left. our easier task is to place upon record such incidents as we have gathered, bearing upon the religious phase of the illustrious soldier's character. his earnest piety cannot be better displayed than in the anxiety which he felt for the conversion of his students, conversing with the rev. dr. kirkpatrick, of the presbyterian church, on the subject of the religious welfare of those intrusted to his charge, "he was so overcome by emotion," says dr. kirkpatrick, "that he could not utter the words which were on his tongue." his utterance was choked, but recovering himself, with his eyes overflowing with tears, his lips quivering with emotion, and both hands raised, he exclaimed: "oh! doctor, if i could only know that all the young men in the college were good christians, i should have nothing more to desire." when another minister, the rev. mr. jones, delivered an earnest address at the "concert of prayer for colleges," urging that all christians should pray for the aid of the holy spirit in changing the hearts of the students, general lee, after the meeting, approached the minister and said with great warmth: "i wish, sir, to thank you for your address. it was just what we needed. our great want is a revival, which shall bring these young men to christ." one morning, while the venerable dr. white was passing general lee's house, on his way to chapel, the general joined him, and they entered into conversation upon religious subjects. general lee said little, but, just as they reached the college, stopped and remarked with great earnestness, his eyes filling with tears as he spoke: "i shall be disappointed, sir, i shall fail in the leading object that brought me here, unless the young men all become real christians; and i wish you and others of your sacred profession to de all you can to accomplish this result." when a great revival of religious feeling took place at the virginia military institute, in 1868, general lee said to the clergyman of his church with deep feeling: "that is the best news i have heard since i have been in lexington. would that we could have such a revival in all our colleges!" although a member of the protestant episcopal church, and preferring that communion, general lee seems to have been completely exempt from sectarian feeling, and to have aimed first and last to be a true christian, loving god and his neighbor, and not busying himself about theological dogmas. when he was asked once whether he believed in the apostolic succession, he replied that he had never thought of it, and aimed only to become a "real christian." his catholic views were shown by the letters of invitation, which he addressed, at the commencement of each session of the college, to ministers of all religious denominations at lexington, to conduct, in turn, the religious exercises at the college chapel; and his charities, which were large for a person of his limited means, were given to all alike. these charities he seems to have regarded as a binding duty, and were so private that only those receiving them knew any thing of them. it only came to be known accidentally that in 1870 he gave one hundred dollars for the education of the orphans of southern soldiers, one hundred dollars to the young men's christian association, and regularly made other donations, amounting in all to considerable sums. nearly his last act was a liberal contribution to an important object connected with his church. we shall conclude these anecdotes, illustrating general lee's religious character, with one for which we are indebted to the kindness of a reverend clergyman, of lexington, who knew general lee intimately in his latter years, and enjoyed his confidence. the incident will present in an agreeable light the great soldier's simplicity and love for children, and no less his catholic feelings in reference to sects in the christian church: "i will give you just another incident," writes the reverend gentleman, "illustrating general lee's love for children, and their freedom with him. when i first came to lexington, my boy carter (just four years old then) used to go with me to chapel service when it was my turn to officiate. the general would tell him that he must always sit by him; and it was a scene for a painter, to see the great chieftain reverentially listening to the truths of god's word, and the little boy nestling close to him. one sunday our sunday-school superintendent told the children that they must bring in some new scholars, and that they must bring old people as well as the young, since none were too old or too wise to learn god's word. the next sabbath carter was with me at the chapel, from which he was to go with me to the sunday-school. at the close of the service, i noticed that carter was talking very earnestly with general lee, who seemed very much amused, and, on calling him to come with me, he said, with childish simplicity: 'father, i am trying to get general lee to go to the sunday-school and _be my scholar_.' 'but,' said i, 'if the general goes to any school, he will go to his own.' 'which is his own, father?' 'the episcopal,' i replied. heaving a deep sigh, and with a look of disappointment, the little fellow said: 'i am very sorry he is '_piscopal._ i wish he was a baptist, so he could go to _our_ sunday-school, and be my scholar.' the general seemed very much amused and interested as he replied, 'ah! carter, we must all try and be _good christians_--that is the most important thing.' 'he knew all the children in town,' adds mr. jones, 'and their grief at his death was very touching.'" this incident may appear singular to those who have been accustomed to regard general lee as a cold, reserved, and even stern human being--a statue, beneath whose chill surface no heart ever throbbed. but, instead of a marble heart, there lay, under the gray uniform of the soldier, one of warm flesh and blood--tender, impressible, susceptible to the quick touches of all gentle and sweet emotion, and filling, as it were, with quiet happiness, at the sight of children and the sound of their voices. this impressibility has even been made the subject of criticism. a foreign writer declares that the soldier's character exhibited a "feminine" softness, unfitting him for the conduct of affairs of moment. what the confederacy wanted, intimates the writer in question, was a rough dictator, with little regard for nice questions of law--one to lay the rough hand of the born master on the helm, and force the crew, from the highest to the lowest, to obey his will. that will probably remain a question. general lee's _will_ was strong enough to break down all obstacles but those erected by rightful authority; that with this masculine strength he united an exquisite gentleness, is equally beyond question. a noble action flushed his cheek with an emotion that the reader may, if he will, call "feminine." a tale of suffering brought a sudden moisture to his eyes; and a loving message from one of his poor old soldiers was seen one day to melt him to tears. this poor and incomplete attempt to indicate some of the less-known traits of the illustrious commander-in-chief of the southern armies will now be brought to a conclusion; we approach the sorrowful moment when, surrounded by his weeping family,[1] he tranquilly passed away. [footnote 1: general lee had three sons and four daughters, all of whom are living except one of the latter, miss anne lee, who died in north carolina during the war. the sons were general g.w. custis lee, aide-de-camp to president davis--subsequently commander of infantry in the field, and now president of washington and lee college, an officer of such ability and of character so eminent that president davis regarded him as a fit successor of his illustrious father in command of the army of northern virginia--general w.h.f. lee, a prominent and able commander of cavalry, and captain robert e. lee, an efficient member of the cavalry-staff. these gentlemen bore their full share in the perils and hardships of the war, from its commencement to the surrender at appomattox.] on the 28th of september, 1870, after laborious attention to his duties during the early part of the day, general lee attended, in the afternoon, a meeting of the vestry of grace church, of which he was a member. over this meeting he presided, and it was afterward remembered that his last public act was to contribute the sum of fifty-five dollars to some good object, the requisite amount to effect which was thus made up. after the meeting, general lee returned to his home, and, when tea was served, took his place at the table to say grace, as was his habit, as it had been in camp throughout the war. his lips opened, but no sound issued from them, and he sank back in his chair, from which he was carried to bed. the painful intelligence immediately became known throughout lexington, and the utmost grief and consternation were visible upon every face. it was hoped, at first, that the attack would not prove serious, and that general lee would soon be able to resume his duties. but this hope was soon dissipated. the skilful physicians who hastened to his bedside pronounced his malady congestion of the brain, and, from the appearance of the patient, who lay in a species of coma, the attack was evidently of the most alarming character. the most discouraging phase of the case was, that, physically, general lee was--if we may so say--in perfect health. his superb physique, although not perhaps as vigorous and robust as during the war, exhibited no indication whatever of disease. his health appeared perfect, and twenty years more of life might have been predicted for him from simple reference to his appearance. the malady was more deeply seated, however, than any bodily disease; the cerebral congestion was but a symptom of the mental malady which was killing its victim. from the testimony of the able physicians who watched the great soldier, day and night, throughout his illness, and are thus best competent to speak upon the subject, there seems no doubt that general lee's condition was the result of mental depression produced by the sufferings of the southern people. every mail, it is said, had brought him the most piteous appeals for assistance, from old soldiers whose families were in want of bread; and the woes of these poor people had a prostrating effect upon him. a year or two before, his health had been seriously impaired by this brooding depression, and he had visited north carolina, the white sulphur springs, and other places, to divert his mind. in this he failed. the shadow went with him, and the result was, at last, the alarming attack from which he never rallied. during the two weeks of his illness he scarcely spoke, and evidently regarded his condition as hopeless. when one of his physicians said to him, "general, you must make haste and get well; _traveller_ has been standing so long in his stable that he needs exercise." general lee shook his head slowly, to indicate that he would never again mount his favorite horse. he remained in this state, with few alterations in his condition, until wednesday; october 12th, when, about nine in the morning, in the midst of his family, the great soldier tranquilly expired. of the universal grief of the southern people when the intelligence was transmitted by telegraph to all parts of the country, it is not necessary that we should speak. the death of lee seemed to make all hearts stand still; and the tolling of bells, flags at half-mast, and public meetings of citizens, wearing mourning, marked, in every portion of the south, the sense of a great public calamity. it is not an exaggeration to say that, in ten thousand southern homes, tears came to the eyes not only of women, but of bearded men, and that the words, "lee is dead!" fell like a funeral-knell upon every heart. when the intelligence reached richmond, the legislature passed resolutions expressive of the general sorrow, and requesting that the remains of general lee might be interred in holywood cemetery--mr. walker, the governor, expressing in a special message his participation in the grief of the people of virginia and the south. the family of general lee, however, preferred that his remains should rest at the scene of his last labors, and beneath the chapel of washington college they were accordingly interred. the ceremony was imposing, and will long be remembered. on the morning of the 13th, the body was borne to the college chapel. in front moved a guard of honor, composed of old confederate soldiers; behind these came the clergy; then the hearse; in rear of which was led the dead soldier's favorite war-horse "traveller," his equipments wreathed with crape. the trustees and faculty of the college, the cadets of the military institute, and a large number of citizens followed--and the procession moved slowly from the northeastern gate of the president's house to the college chapel, above which, draped in mourning, and at half-mast, floated the flag of virginia--the only one displayed during this or any other portion of the funeral ceremonies. on the platform of the chapel the body lay in state throughout this and the succeeding day. the coffin was covered with evergreens and flowers, and the face of the dead was uncovered that all might look for the last time on the pale features of the illustrious soldier. the body was dressed in a simple suit of black, and the appearance of the face was perfectly natural. great crowds visited the chapel, passing solemnly in front of the coffin--the silence interrupted only by sobs. throughout the 14th the body continued to be in state, and to be visited by thousands. on the 15th a great funeral procession preceded the commission of it to its last resting place. at an early hour the crowd began to assemble in the vicinity of the college, which was draped in mourning. this great concourse was composed of men, women, and children, all wearing crape, and the little children seemed as much penetrated by the general distress as the elders. the bells of the churches began to toll; and at ten o'clock the students of the college, and officers and soldiers of the confederate army--numbering together nearly one thousand persons--formed in front of the chapel. between the two bodies stood the hearse, and the gray horse of the soldier, both draped in mourning. the procession then began to move, to the strains of martial music. the military escort, together with the staff-officers of general lee, moved in front; the faculty and students followed behind the hearse; and in rear came a committee of the legislative dignitaries of the commonwealth, and a great multitude of citizens from all portions of the state. the procession continued its way toward the institute, where the cadets made the military salute as the hearse passed in front of them, and the sudden thunder of artillery awoke the echoes from the hills. the cadets then joined the procession, which was more than a mile in length; and, heralded by the fire of artillery every few minutes, it moved back to the college chapel, where the last services were performed. general lee had requested, it is said, that no funeral oration should be pronounced above his remains, and the rev. william n. pendleton simply read the beautiful burial-service of the episcopal church. the coffin, still covered with evergreens and flowers, was then lowered to its resting-place beneath the chapel, amid the sobs and tears of the great assembly; and all that was mortal of the illustrious soldier disappeared from the world's eyes. what thus disappeared was little. what remained was much--the memory of the virtues and the glory of the greatest of virginians. appendix. we here present to the reader a more detailed account of the ceremonies attending the burial of general lee, and a selection from the countless addresses delivered in various portions of the country when his death was announced. to notice the honors paid to his memory in every city, town, and village of the south, would fill a volume, and be wholly unnecessary. it is equally unnecessary to speak of the great meetings at richmond, baltimore, and elsewhere, resulting in the formation of the "lee memorial association" for the erection of a monument to the dead commander. the addresses here presented are placed on record rather for their biographical interest, than to do honor to the dead. of him it may justly be said that he needs no record of his virtues and his glory. his illustrious memory is fresh to-day, and will be fresh throughout all coming generations, in every heart. i. _the funeral of general lee_. the morning of the obsequies of general lee broke bright and cheerful over the sorrowful town of lexington. toward noon the sun poured down with all the genial warmth of indian summer, and after mid-day it was hot, though not uncomfortably so. the same solemnity of yesterday reigned supreme, with the difference, that people came thronging into town, making a mournful scene of bustle. the gloomy faces, the comparative silence, the badges and emblems of mourning that everywhere met the eye, and the noiseless, strict decorum which was observed, told how universal and deep were the love and veneration of the people for the illustrious dead. every one uniformly and religiously wore the emblematic crape, even to the women and children, who were crowding to the college chapel with wreaths of flowers fringed with mourning. all sorrowfully and religiously paid their last tributes of respect and affection to the great dead, and none there were who did not feel a just pride in the sad offices. at the college grounds. immediately in front of the chapel the scene was peculiarly sad. all around the buildings were gloomily draped in mourning, and the students strolled listlessly over the grounds, awaiting the formation of the funeral procession. ladies thronged about the chapel with tearful eyes, children wept outright, every face wore a saddened expression, while the solemn tolling of the church-bells rendered the scene still more one of grandeur and gloom. the bells of the churches joined in the mournful requiem. the funeral procession. at ten o'clock precisely, in accordance with the programme agreed upon, the students, numbering four hundred, formed in front and to the right of the chapel. to the left an escort of honor, numbering some three hundred ex-officers and soldiers, was formed, at the head of which, near the southwestern entrance to the grounds, was the institute band. between these two bodies--the soldiers and students--stood the hearse and the gray war-steed of the dead hero, both draped in mourning. the marshals of the procession, twenty-one in number, wore spotless white sashes, tied at the waist and shoulders with crape, and carrying _bã¢tons_ also enveloped in the same emblematic material. shortly after ten, at a signal from the chief marshal, the solemn _cortã©ge_ moved off to the music of a mournful dirge. general bradley johnson headed the escort of officers and soldiers, with colonel charles t. venable and colonel walters h. taylor, both former assistant adjutant-generals on the staff of the lamented dead. the physicians of general lee and the faculty of the college fell in immediately behind the hearse, the students following. slowly and solemnly the procession moved from the college grounds down washington street to jefferson, up jefferson street to franklin hall, thence to main street, where they were joined by a committee of the legislature, dignitaries of the state, and the citizens generally. moving still onward, this grand funeral pageant, which had now assumed gigantic proportions, extending nearly a mile in length, soon reached the northeastern extremity of the town, when it took the road to the virginia military institute. at the military institute. here the scene was highly impressive and imposing. in front of the institute the battalion of cadets, three hundred in number, were drawn up in line, wearing their full gray uniform, with badges of mourning, and having on all their equipments and side-arms, but without their muskets. spectators thronged the entire line of the procession, gazing sadly as it wended its way, and the sites around the institute were crowded. as the _cortã©ge_ entered the institute grounds a salute of artillery thundered its arrival, and reverberated it far across the distant hills and valleys of virginia, awakening echoes which have been hushed since lee manfully gave up the struggle of the "lost cause" at appomattox. winding along the indicated route toward the grounds of washington college, the procession slowly moved past the institute, and when the war-horse and hearse of the dead chieftain came in front of the battalion of cadets, they uncovered their heads as a salute of reverence and respect, which was promptly followed by the spectators. when this was concluded, the visitors and faculty of the institute joined the procession, and the battalion of cadets filed into the line in order, and with the greatest precision. order of the procession. the following was the order of the procession when it was completed: music. escort of honor, consisting of officers and soldiers of the confederate army. chaplain and other clergy. hearse and pall-bearers. general lee's horse. the attending physicians. trustees and faculty of washington college. dignitaries of the state of virginia. visitors and faculty of the virginia military institute. other representative bodies and distinguished visitors. alumni of washington college. citizens. cadets virginia military institute. students of washington college as guard of honor at the chapel. after the first salute, a gun was fired every three minutes. moving still to the sound of martial music, in honor of the dead, the procession reã«ntered the grounds of washington college by the northeastern gate, and was halted in front of the chapel. then followed an imposing ceremony. the cadets of the institute were detached from the line, and marched in double file into the chapel up one of the aisles, past the remains of the illustrious dead, which lay in state on the rostrum, and down the other aisle out of the church. the students of washington college followed next, passing with bowed heads before the mortal remains of him they revered and loved so much and well as their president and friend. the side-aisles and galleries were crowded with ladies, emblems of mourning met the eye on all sides, and feminine affection had hung funeral garlands of flowers upon all the pillars and walls. the central pews were filled with the escort of honor, composed of former confederate soldiers from this and adjoining counties, while the spacious platform was crowded with the trustees, faculties, clergy, legislative committee, and distinguished visitors. within and without the consecrated hall the scene was alike imposing. the blue mountains of virginia, towering in the near horizon; the lovely village of lexington, sleeping in the calm, unruffled air, and the softened autumn sunlight; the vast assemblage, mute and sorrowful; the tolling bells, and pealing cannon, and solemn words of funeral service, combined to render the scene one never to be forgotten. the sons of general lee--w.h.f. lee, g.w.c. lee, and robert e. lee--with their sisters, misses agnes and mildred lee, and the nephews of the dead, fitzhugh, henry c., and robert c. lee, entered the church with bowed heads, and silently took seats in front of the rostrum. the funeral services and interment. then followed the impressive funeral services of the episcopal church for the dead, amid a silence and solemnity that were imposing and sublimely grand. there was no funeral oration, in compliance with the expressed wish of the distinguished dead; and at the conclusion of the services in the chapel the vast congregation went out and mingled with the crowd without, who were unable to gain admission. the coffin was then carried by the pall-bearers to the library-room, in the basement of the chapel, where it was lowered into the vault prepared for its reception. the funeral services were concluded in the open air by prayer, and the singing of general lee's favorite hymn, commencing with the well-known line- "how firm a foundation, ye saint of the lord, is laid for your faith in his excellent word!" and thus closed the funeral obsequies of robert edward lee, to whom may be fitly applied the grand poetic epitaph: "ne'er to the mansions where the mighty rest, since their foundations, came a nobler guest; nor e'er was to the bowers of bliss conveyed a purer saint or a more welcome shade." ii. _tributes to general lee_. in the deep emotion with which the death of general lee has filled all classes of our people--says the _southern magazine_, from whose pages this interesting summary is taken--we have thought that a selection of the most eloquent or otherwise interesting addresses delivered at the various memorial meetings may not be unacceptable. louisville, ky. on october 15th nearly the whole city was draped in mourning, and business was suspended. a funeral service was held at st. paul's church. in the evening an immense meeting assembled at weissiger hall, and, after an opening address by mayor baxter, the following resolutions were adopted: "_resolved_, that, in the death of robert e. lee, the american people, without regard to states or sections, or antecedents, or opinions, lose a great and good man, a distinguished and useful citizen, renowned not less in arms than in the arts of peace; and that the cause of public instruction and popular culture is deprived of a representative whose influence and example will be felt by the youth of our country for long ages after the passions in the midst of which he was engaged, but which he did not share, have passed into history, and the peace and fraternity of the american republic are cemented and restored by the broadest and purest american sentiment." "_resolved_, that a copy of these resolutions be forwarded to the family of general lee, to the trustees of washington college, and to the governor and general assembly of virginia." address of general breckinridge. "_mr. president, ladies, and gentlemen_: in the humble part which it falls to me to take in these interesting ceremonies, if for any cause it has been supposed that i am to deliver a lengthy address, i am not responsible for the origination of that supposition. i came here to-night simply to mingle my grief with yours at the loss of one of our most distinguished citizens, and, indeed, i feel more like silence than like words. i am awe-stricken in the presence of this vast assemblage, and my mind goes back to the past. it is preoccupied by memories coming in prominent review of the frequent and ever-varying vicissitudes which have characterized the last ten years. i find myself in the presence of a vast assemblage of the people of this great and growing city, who meet together, without distinction of party, and presided over by your chief officer, for the purpose of expressing respect to the memory of the man who was the leader of the confederate armies in the late war between the states. it is in itself the omen of reunion. i am not surprised at the spectacle presented here. throughout the entire south one universal cry of grief has broken forth at the death of general lee, and in a very large portion of the north manly and noble tributes have been paid to his memory. "my words shall be brief but plain. why is it that at the south we see this universal, spontaneous demonstration? first, because most of the people mourn the loss of a leader and a friend, but beyond that i must say they seem to enter an unconscious protest against the ascription either to him or them of treason or personal dishonor. it may be an unconscious protest against the employment by a portion of the public press of those epithets which have ceased to be used in social intercourse. it is an invitation on their part to the people of the north and south, east and west, if there be any remaining rancor in their bosoms, to bury it in the grave forever. i will not recall the past. i will not enter upon any considerations of the cause of that great struggle. this demonstration we see around us gives the plainest evidence that there is no disposition to indulge in useless repinings at the results of that great struggle. it is for the pen of the historian to declare the cause, progress, and probable consequences of it. in regard to those who followed general lee, who gloried in his successes and shared his misfortunes, i have but this to say: the world watched the contest in which they were engaged, and yet gives testimony to their gallantry, "the magnanimity with which they accepted the results of their defeat, the obedience they have yielded to the laws of the federal government, give an exhibition so rare that they are ennobled by their calm yet noble submission. for the rest their escutcheon is unstained. the conquerors themselves, for their own glory, must confess that they were brave. neither, my friends, do i come here to-night to speak of the military career of general lee. i need not speak of it this evening. i believe that this is universally recognized, not only in the united states, but in europe; it has made the circuit of the world. i come but to utter my tribute to him as a man and as a citizen. as a man he will be remembered in history as a man of the epoch. how little need i to speak of his character after listening to the thrilling delineation of it which we had this morning! we all know that he was great, noble, and self-poised. he was just and moderate, but was, perhaps, misunderstood by those who were not personally acquainted with him. he was supposed to be just, but cold. far from it. he had a warm, affectionate heart. during the last year of that unfortunate struggle it was my good fortune to spend a great deal of time with him. i was almost constantly by his side, and it was during the two months immediately preceding the fall of richmond that i came to know and fully understand the true nobility of his character. in all those long vigils he was considerate and kind, gentle, firm, and self-poised. i can give no better idea of the impression it made upon me than to say it inspired me with an ardent love of the man and a profound veneration of his character. it was so massive and noble, so grand in its proportions, that all men must admire its heroism and gallantry, yet so gentle and tender that a woman might adopt and claim it as her own. if the spirit which animates the assembly before me to-night shall become general and permeate the whole country, then may we say the wounds of the late war are truly healed. we ask for him only what we give to others. among the more eminent of the departed federal generals who were distinguished for their gallantry, their nobility of character, and their patriotism, may be mentioned thomas and mcpherson. what confederate is there who would refuse to raise his cap as their funeral-train went by or hesitate to drop a flower upon their graves? why? because they were men of courage, honor, and nobility; because they were true to their convictions of right, and soldiers whose hands were unstained by cruelty or pillage. "those of us who were so fortunate as to know him, and who have appeared before this assemblage, composed of all shades of opinion, claim for him your veneration, because he was pure and noble, and it is because of this that we see the cities and towns of the south in mourning. this has been the expression throughout the whole south, without distinction of party, and also of a large portion of the north. is not this why these tributes have been paid to his memory? is it not because his piety was humble and sincere? because he accorded in victory; because he filled his position with admirable dignity; because he taught his prostrate comrades how to suffer and be strong? in a word, because he was one of the noblest products of this hemisphere, a fit object to sit in the niche which he created in the temple of fame. "but he failed. the result is in the future. it may be for better or for worse. we hope for the better. but this is not the test for his greatness and goodness. success often gilds the shallow man, but it is disaster alone that reveals the qualities of true greatness. was his life a failure? is only that man successful who erects a material monument of greatness by the enforcement of his ideas? is not that man successful also, who, by his valor, moderation, and courage, with all their associate virtues, presents to the world such a specimen of true manhood as his children and children's children will be proud to imitate? in this sense he was not a failure. "pardon me for having detained you so long. i know there are here and there those who will reach out and attempt to pluck from his name the glory which surrounds it, and strike with malignant fury at the honors awarded to him; yet history will declare that the remains which repose in the vault beneath the little chapel in the lovely virginia valley are not only those of a valorous soldier, but those of a great and good american." general john w. finnell next addressed the audience briefly, and was followed by. general william preston. "_mr. chairman, ladies, and gentlemen_: i feel that it would be very difficult for me to add any eulogy to those which are contained in the resolutions of the committee, or a more merited tribute of praise than those which have already fallen from the lips of the gentlemen who have preceded me. yet, on an occasion like this, i am willing to come forward and add a word to testify my appreciation of the great virtues and admirable character of one that commands, not only our admiration, but that of the entire country. not alone of the entire country, but his character has excited more admiration in europe than among ourselves. in coming ages his name will be marked with lustre, and will be one of the richest treasures of the future. i speak of one just gone down to death; ripe in all the noble attributes of manhood, and illustrious by deeds the most remarkable in character that have occurred in the history of america since its discovery. it is now some two-and-twenty years since i first made the acquaintance of general lee. he was then in the prime of manhood, in mexico, and i first saw him as the chief-engineer of general scott in the valley of mexico. i see around me two old comrades who then saw general lee. he was a man of remarkable personal beauty and great grace of body. he had a finished form, delicate hands, graceful in person, while here and there a gray hair streaked with silver the dark locks with which nature had clothed his noble brow. there were discerning minds that appreciated his genius, and saw in him the coming captain of america. his commander and his comrades appreciated his ability. to a club which was then organized he belonged, together with general mcclellan, general albert sydney johnston, general beauregard, and a host of others. they recognized in lee a master-spirit.. "he was never violent; he never wrangled. he was averse to quarrelling, and not a single difficulty marked his career; but all acknowledged his justness and wonderful evenness of mind. rare intelligence, combined with these qualities, served to make him a fit representative of his great prototype, general washington. he had been accomplished by every finish that a military education could bestow. "i remember when general lee was appointed lieutenant-colonel, at the same time that sydney johnston was appointed colonel, and general scott thought that lee should have been colonel. i was talking with general scott on the subject long before the late struggle between the north and south took place, and he then said that lee was the greatest living soldier in america. he did not object to the other commission, but he thought lee should have been first promoted. finally, he said to me with emphasis, which you will pardon me for relating, 'i tell you that, if i were on my death-bed to-morrow, and the president of the united states should tell me that a great battle was to be fought for the liberty or slavery of the country, and asked my judgment as to the ability of a commander, i would say with my dying breath, let it be robert e. lee.' ah! great soldier that he was, princely general that he was, he has fulfilled his mission, and borne it so that no invidious tongue can level the shafts of calumny at the great character which he has left behind him. "but, ladies and gentlemen, it was not in this that the matchless attributes of his character were found. you have assembled here, not so much to do honor to general lee, but to testify your appreciation of the worth of the principles governing his character; and if the minds of this assemblage were explored, you would find there was a gentleness and a grace in his character which had won your love and brought forth testimonials of universal admiration. take but a single instance. at the battle of gettysburg, after the attack on the cemetery, when his troops were repulsed and beaten, the men threw up their muskets and said, 'general, we have failed, and it is our fault.' 'no, my men,' said he, knowing the style of fighting of general stonewall jackson, 'you have done well; 'tis my fault; i am to blame, and no one but me.' what man is there that would not have gone to renewed death for such a leader? so, when we examine his whole character, it is in his private life that you find his true greatness--the christian simplicity of his character and his great veneration for truth and nobility, the grand elements of his greatness. what man could have laid down his sword at the feet of a victorious general with greater dignity than did he at appomattox court-house? he laid down his sword with grace and dignity, and secured for his soldiers the best terms that fortune would permit. in that he shows marked greatness seldom shown by great captains. "after the battle of sedan, the wild cries of the citizens of paris went out for the blood of the emperor; but at appomattox, veneration and love only met the eyes of the troops who looked upon their commander. i will not trespass upon your time much farther. when i last saw him the raven hair had turned white. in a small village church his reverent head was bowed in prayer. the humblest step was that of robert e. lee, as he entered the portals of the temple erected to god. in broken responses he answered to the services of the church. noble, sincere, and humble in his religion, he showed forth his true character in laying aside his sword to educate the youth of his country. never did he appear more noble than at that time. he is now gone, and rests in peace, and has crossed that mysterious stream that stonewall jackson saw with inspired eyes when he asked that he might be permitted to take his troops across the river and forever rest beneath the shadows of the trees." after a few remarks from hon. d.y. lyttle, the meeting adjourned. augusta, ga. a meeting was held at augusta, on october 18th, at the city hall. the preamble and resolutions adopted were as follows: "_whereas_, this day, throughout all this southern land, sorrow, many-tongued, is ascending to heaven for the death of robert e. lee, and communities everywhere are honoring themselves in striving to do honor to that great name; and we, the people of augusta, who were not laggards in upholding his glorious banner while it floated to the breeze, would swell the general lamentation of his departure: therefore be it "_resolved_, that no people in the tide of time has been bereaved as we are bereaved; for no other people has had such a man to lose. greece, rich in heroes; rome, prolific mother of great citizens, so that the name of roman is the synonyme of all that is noblest in citizenship--had no man coming up to the full measure of this great departed. on scores of battle-fields, consummate commander; everywhere, bravest soldier; in failure, sublimest hero; in disbanding his army, most pathetic of writers; in persecution, most patient of power's victims; in private life, purest of men--he was such that all christendom, with one consent, named him great. we, recalling that so also mankind have styled alexander, caesar, frederick, and napoleon, and beholding in the confederate leader qualities higher and better than theirs, find that language poor indeed which only enables us to call him 'great'--him standing among the great of all ages preã«minent. "_resolved_, that our admiration of the man is not the partial judgment of his adherents only; but so clear stand his greatness and his goodness, that even the bitterest of foes has not ventured to asperse him. while the air has been filled with calumnies and revilings of his cause, none have been aimed at him. if there are spirits so base that they cannot discover and reverence his greatness and his goodness, they have at least shrunk from encountering the certain indignation of mankind. this day--disfranchised by stupid power as he was; branded, as he was, in the perverted vocabulary of usurpers as rebel and traitor--his death has even in distant lands moved more tongues and stirred more hearts than the siege of a mighty city and the triumphs of a great king. "_resolved_, that, while he died far too soon for his country, he had lived long enough for his fame. this was complete, and the future could unfold nothing to add to it. in this age of startling changes, imagination might have pictured him, even in the years which he yet lacked of the allotted period of human life, once more at the head of devoted armies and the conqueror of glorious fields; but none could have been more glorious than those he had already won. wrong, too, might again have triumphed over right, and he have borne defeat with sublimest resignation; but this he had already done at appomattox. unrelenting hate to his lost cause might have again consigned him to the walks of private life, and he have become an exemplar of all the virtues of a private station; but this he had already been in the shades of lexington. the contingencies of the future could only have revealed him greatest soldier, sublimest hero, best of men; and he was already all of these. the years to come were barren of any thing which could add to his perfect name and fame. he had nothing to lose; but, alas! we, his people, every thing by his departure from this world, which was unworthy of him, to that other where the good and the pure of all ages will welcome him. thither follow him the undying love of every true southern man and woman, and the admiration of all the world." address of general a.r. wright. "_mr. chairman_: i rise simply to move the adoption of the resolutions which have just been read to the meeting by major cumming. you have heard, and the people here assembled have heard, these resolutions. they are truthful, eloquent, and expressive. although announced as a speaker on this sad occasion, i had determined to forego any such attempt; but an allusion, a passing reference to one of the sublime virtues of the illustrious dead, made in the resolutions which have just been read in your hearing, has induced me to add a word or two. your resolutions speak of general lee's patience under the persecutions of power. it was this virtue which ennobled the character, as it was one of the most prominent traits in the life, of him for whose death a whole nation, grief-stricken, mourns, and to pay a tribute to the memory of whom this multitude has assembled here this morning. while general lee was all, and more than has been said of him--the great general, the true christian, and the valiant soldier--there was another character in which he appeared more conspicuously than in any of the rest--the quiet dignity with which he encountered defeat, and the patience with which he met the persecution of malignant power. we may search the pages of all history, both sacred and profane, and there seems to be but one character who possessed in so large a degree this remarkable trait. take general lee's whole life and examine it; observe his skill and courage as a soldier, his patriotism and his fidelity to principle, the purity of his private life, and then remember the disasters which he faced and the persecutions to which he was subjected, and it would seem that _no one_ ever endured so much--not even david, the sweet singer of israel. job has been handed down to posterity by the pages of sacred history as the embodiment of patience, as the man who, overwhelmed with the most numerous and bitter afflictions, never lost his fortitude, and who endured every fresh trial with uncomplaining resignation; but it seems to me that even job displayed not the patience of our own loved hero; for, while job suffered much, he endured less than general lee. job was compelled to lose his children, his friends, and his property, but he was never required to give up country; general lee was, and, with more than the persecutions of job, he stands revealed to the world the truest and the most sublime hero whom the ages have produced. to a patriot like lee the loss of country was the greatest evil which could be experienced, and it was this last blow which has caused us to assemble here to-day to mourn his departure. he lost friends and kindred and property in the struggle, and yet, according to the news which the telegraph brought us this morning, it was the loss of his cause which finally sundered the heart-strings of the hero, and drew him from earth to heaven. yes, the weight of this great sorrow which first fell upon him under the fatal apple-tree at appomattox, has dwelt with him, growing heavier and more unendurable with each succeeding year, from that time until last wednesday morn when the soul of lee passed away. "as i said before, mr. chairman, i only rose to move the adoption of the resolutions; and if i have said more than i ought to have said, it is because i knew the illustrious dead, because i loved him, and because i mourn his loss." address of judge hilliard. "it is proper that the people should pay a public tribute to the memory of a great man when he dies. not a ruler, not one who merely holds a great public position, but a great man, one who has served his day and generation. it cannot benefit the dead, but it is eminently profitable to the living. the consciousness than when we cease to live our memory will be cherished, is a noble incentive to live well. this great popular demonstration is due to general lee's life and character. it is not ordered by the government--the government ignored him; but is rendered as a spontaneous tribute to the memory of an illustrious man--good, true, and great. he held no place in the government, and since the war has had no military rank; but he was a true man. after all, that is the noblest tribute you can pay to any man, to say of him he was a true man. "general lee's character was eminently american. in europe they have their ideas, their standards of merit, their rewards for great exploits. they cover one with decorations; they give him a great place in the government; they make him a marshal. wellington began his career with humble rank. he was young wellesley; he rose to be the duke of wellington. in our country we have no such rewards for great deeds. one must enjoy the patronage of the government, or he must take the fortunes of private life. "general lee was educated at the great military academy, west point. he entered the army; was promoted from time to time for brilliant services; in mexico fought gallantly under the flag of the united states; and was still advancing in his military career in 1861, when virginia became involved in the great contest that then grew up between the states. virginia was his mother; she called him to her side to defend her, and, resigning his commission in the army of the united states, not for a moment looking for advancement there, not counting the cost, not offering his sword to the service of power, nor yet laying it down at the feet of the government--he unsheathed it and took his stand in defence of the great principles asserted by virginia in the revolution, when she contended with great britain the right of every people to choose their own form of government. lost or won, to him the cause was always the same--it was the cause of constitutional liberty. he stood by it to the last. what must have been the convictions of a man like general lee, when, mounted on the same horse that had borne him in battle, upon which he was seated when the lines of battle formed by his own heroic men wavered, and he seized the standard to lead the charge; but his soldiers rushed to him, and laying their hands on his bridle, said, 'general, we cannot fire a gun unless you retire?' what must have been his emotions as he rode, through his own lines at appomattox, to the commander of the opposing army, and tendered his sword? search the annals of history, ancient and modern; consult the lives of heroes; study the examples of greatness recorded in greece leading the way on the triumphs of popular liberty, or in rome in the best days of her imperial rule; take statesmen, generals, or men of patient thought who outwatched the stars in exploring knowledge, and i declare to you that i do not find anywhere a sublimer sentiment than general lee uttered when he said, 'human virtue ought to be equal to human calamity.' it will live forever. "general lee died at the right time. his sun did not go down in the strife of battle, in the midst of the thunder of cannon, dimmed by the lurid smoke of war. he survived all this: lived with so much dignity; silent, yet thoughtful; unseduced by the offers of gain or of advancement however tempting; disdaining to enter into contests for small objects, until the broad disk went down behind the virginia hills, shedding its departing lustre not only upon this country but upon the whole world. his memory is as much respected in england as it is here; and at the north as well as at the south true hearts honor it. "there is one thing i wish to say before i take my seat. general lee's fame ought to rest on the true base. he did not draw his sword to perpetuate human slavery, whatever may have been his opinions in regard to it; he did not seek to overthrow the government of the united states. he drew it in defence of constitutional liberty. that cause is not dead, but will live forever. the result of the war established the authority of the united states; the union will stand--let it stand forever. the flag floats over the whole country from the atlantic to the pacific; let it increase in lustre, and let the power of the government grow; still the cause for which general lee struck is not a lost cause. it is conceded that these states must continue united under a common government. we do not wish to sunder it, nor to disturb it. but the great principle that underlies the government of the united states--the principle that the people have a right to choose their own form of government, and to have their liberties protected by the provisions of the constitution--is an indestructible principle. you cannot destroy it. like milton's angels, it is immortal; you may wound, but you cannot kill it. it is like the volcanic fires that flame in the depths of the earth; it will yet upheave the ocean and the land, and flame up to heaven. "young emmett said, 'let no man write my epitaph until my country is free, and takes her place among the nations of the earth.' but you may write general lee's epitaph now. the principle for which he fought will survive him. his evening was in perfect harmony with his life. he had time to think, to recall the past, to prepare for the future. an offer, originating in georgia, and i believe in this very city, was made to him to place an immense sum of money at his disposal if he would consent to reside in the city of new york and represent southern commerce. millions would have flowed to him. but he declined. he said: 'no; i am grateful, but i have a self-imposed task which i must accomplish. i have led the young men of the south in battle; i have seen many of them fall under my standard. i shall devote my life now to training young men to do their duty in life.' and he did. it was beautiful to see him in that glorious valley where lexington stands, the lofty mountains throwing their protecting shadows over its quiet home. general lee's fame is not bounded by the limits of the south, nor by the continent. i rejoice that the south gave him birth; i rejoice that the south will hold his ashes. but his fame belongs to the human race. washington, too, was born in the south and sleeps in the south. but his great fame is not to be appropriated by this country; it is the inheritance of mankind. we place the name of lee by that of washington. they both belong to the world." new orleans. a meeting was held in the st. charles theatre, as the largest building in the city. the hon. w.m. burwell delivered an eloquent address, of which we regret that we have been able to obtain no report. the meeting was then addressed by the hon. thomas j. semmes. "robert e. lee is dead. the potomac, overlooked by the home of the hero, once dividing contending peoples, but now no longer a boundary, conveys to the ocean a nation's tears. south of the potomac is mourning; profound grief pervades every heart, lamentation is heard from every hearth, for lee sleeps among the slain whose memory is so dear to us. in the language of moina: 'they were slain for us, and their blood flowed out in a rain for us, red, rich, and pure, on the plain for us; and years may go, but our tears shall flow o'er the dead who have died in vain for us.' "north of the potomac not only sympathizes with its widowed sister, but, with respectful homage, the brave and generous, clustering around the corpse of the great virginian, with one accord exclaim: 'this earth that bears thee dead, bears not alive so stout a gentleman.' "sympathetic nations, to whom our lamentations have been transmitted on the wings of lightning, will with pious jealousy envy our grief, because robert e. lee was an american. seven cities claimed the honor of having given birth to the great pagan poet; but all christian nations, while revering america as the mother of robert e. lee, will claim for the nineteenth century the honor of his birth. there was but one lee, the great christian captain, and his fame justly belongs to christendom. the nineteenth century has attacked every thing--it has attacked god, the soul, reason, morals, society, the distinction between good and evil. christianity is vindicated by the virtues of lee. he is the most brilliant and cogent argument in favor of a system illustrated by such a man; he is the type of the reign of law in the moral order--that reign of law which the philosophic duke of argyll has so recently and so ably discussed as pervading the natural as well as the supernatural world. one of the chief characteristics of the christian is duty. throughout a checkered life the conscientious performance of duty seems to have been the mainspring of the actions of general lee. in his relations of father, son, husband, soldier, citizen, duty shines conspicuous in all his acts. his agency as he advanced to more elevated stations attracts more attention, and surrounds him with a brighter halo of glory; but he is unchanged; from first to last it is robert e. lee. "the most momentous act of his life was the selection of sides at the commencement of the political troubles which immediately preceded the recent conflict. high in military rank, caressed by general scott, courted by those possessed of influence and authority, no politician, happy in his domestic relations, and in the enjoyment of competent fortune, consisting in the main of property situated on the borders of virginia--nevertheless impelled by a sense of duty, as he himself testified before a congressional committee since the war, general lee determined to risk all and unite his fortunes with those of his native state, whose ordinances as one of her citizens he considered himself bound to obey. "having joined the confederate army, he complained not that he was assigned to the obscure duty of constructing coast-defences for south carolina and georgia, nor that he was subsequently relegated to unambitious commands in western virginia. the accidental circumstance that general joseph e. johnston was wounded at the battle of seven pines in may, 1862, placed lee in command of the army of northern virginia. as commander of that army he achieved world-wide reputation, without giving occasion during a period of three years to any complaint on the part of officers, men, or citizens, or enemies, that he had been guilty of any act, illegal, oppressive, unjust, or inhuman in its character. this is the highest tribute possible to the wisdom and virtue of general lee; for, as a general rule, law was degraded; officers, whether justly or unjustly, were constantly the subject of complaint and discord, and jealousy prevailed in camp and in the senate-chamber. there was a fraction of our people represented by an unavailing minority in congress, who either felt, or professed to feel, a jealousy whose theory was just, but whose application, at such a time, was unsound. they wished to give as little power as possible because they dreaded a military despotism, and thus desired to send our armies forth with half a shield and broken swords to protect the government from its enemies, lest, if the bucklers were entire and the swords perfect, they might be tempted, in the heyday of victory, to smite their employers. but this want of confidence never manifested itself toward general lee, whose conduct satisfied the most suspicious that his ambition was not of glory but of the performance of duty. the army always felt this: the fact that he sacrificed no masses of human beings in desperate charges that he might gather laurels from the spot enriched by their gore. a year or more before he was appointed commander-in-chief of all the confederate forces, a bill passed congress creating that office. it failed to become a law, the president having withheld his approval. lee made no complaints; his friends solicited no votes to counteract the veto. when a bill for the same purpose was passed at a subsequent period, it was whispered about that he could not accept the position. to a committee of virginians who had called on him to ascertain the truth, his reply was, that he felt bound to accept any post the duties of which his country believed him competent to perform. after the battle of gettysburg he tendered his resignation to president davis, because he was apprehensive his failure, the responsibility for which he did not pretend to throw on his troops or officers, would produce distrust of his abilities and destroy his usefulness. i am informed the president, in a beautiful and touching letter, declined to listen to such a proposition. during the whole period of the war he steadily declined all presents, and when, on one occasion, a gentleman sent him several dozen of wine, he turned it over to the hospitals in richmond, saying the wounded and sick needed it more than he. he was extremely simple and unostentatious in his habits, and shared with his soldiers their privations as well as their dangers. toward the close of the war, meat was very scarce within the confederate lines in the neighborhood of the contending armies. an aide of the president, having occasion to visit general lee en official business in the field, was invited to dinner. the meal spread on the table consisted of corn-bread and a small piece of bacon buried in a large dish of greens. the quick-eyed aide discovered that none of the company, which was composed of the general's personal staff, partook of the meat, though requested to do so in the most urbane manner by the general, who presided; he, therefore, also declined, and noticed that the meat was carried off untouched. after the meal was over, he inquired of one of the officers present what was the reason for this extraordinary conduct. his reply was, 'we had borrowed the meat for the occasion, and promised to return it.' "duty alone induced this great soldier to submit to such privation, for the slightest intimation given to friends in richmond would have filled his tent with all the luxuries that blockade-runners and speculators had introduced for the favored few able to purchase. "this performance of duty was accompanied by no harsh manner or cynical expressions; for the man whose soul is ennobled by true heroism, possesses a heart as tender as it is firm. his calmness under the most trying circumstances, and his uniform sweetness of manner, were almost poetical. they manifested 'the most sustained tenderness of soul that ever caressed the chords of a lyre.' in council he was temperate and patient, and his words fell softly and evenly as snow-flakes, like the sentences that fell from the lips of ulysses. "on the termination of the war, his conduct until his death has challenged the admiration of friends and foes; he honestly acquiesced in the inevitable result of the struggle; no discontent, sourness, or complaint, has marred his tranquil life at washington college, where death found him at his post of duty, engaged in fitting the young men of his country, by proper discipline and education, for the performance of the varied duties of life. it is somewhat singular that both lee and his great lieutenant, jackson, should in their last moments have referred to hill. it is reported that general lee said, 'let my tent be struck; send for hill;' while the lamented jackson in his delirium cried out, 'let a.p. hill prepare for action; march the infantry rapidly to the front. let us cross over the river and rest under the shade of the trees.' both heroes died with commands for military movements on their lips; both the noblest specimens of the christian soldier produced by any country or any age; both now rest under the shade of the trees of heaven." rev. dr. palmer then spoke as follows: "_ladies and gentlemen_: i should have been better pleased had i been permitted to sit a simple listener to the eloquent tribute paid to the immortal chieftain who now reposes in death, by the speaker who has just taken his seat. the nature of my calling so far separates me from public life that i am scarcely competent for the office of alluding to the elements which naturally gather around his career. when informed that other artists would draw the picture of the warrior and the hero, i yielded a cheerful compliance, in the belief that nothing was left but to describe the christian and the man. you are entirely familiar with the early life of him over whose grave you this night shed tears; with his grave and sedate boyhood giving promise of the reserved force of mature manhood; with his academic career at west point, where he received the highest honors of a class brilliant with such names as general joseph e. johnston; his seizure of the highest honors of a long apprenticeship in that institution, and his abrupt ascension in the mexican war from obscurity to fame--all are too firmly stamped in the minds of his admirers to require even an allusion. you are too familiar to need a repetition from my lips of that great mental and spiritual struggle passed, not one night, but many, when, abandoning the service in which he had gathered so much of honor and reputation, he determined to lay his heart upon the altar of his native state, and swear to live or die in her defence. "it would be a somewhat singular subject of speculation to discover how it is that national character so often remarkably expresses itself in single individuals who are born as representatives of a class. it is wonderful, for it has been the remark of ages, how the great are born in clusters; sometimes, indeed, one star shining with solitary splendor in the firmament above, but generally gathered in grand constellations, filling the sky with glory. what is that combination of influences, partly physical, partly intellectual, but somewhat more moral, which should make a particular country productive of men great over all others on earth and to all ages of time? ancient greece, with her indented coast, inviting to maritime adventures, from her earliest period was the mother of heroes in war, of poets in song, of sculptors and artists, and stands up after the lapse of centuries the educator of mankind, living in the grandeur of her works and in the immortal productions of minds which modern civilization with all its cultivation and refinement and science never surpassed and scarcely equalled. and why in the three hundred years of american history it should be given to the old dominion to be the grand mother, not only of states, but of the men by whom states and empires are formed, it might be curious were it possible for us to inquire. unquestionably, mr. president, there is in this problem the element of race; for he is blind to all the truths of history, to all the revelations of the past, who does not recognize a select race as we recognize a select individual of a race, to make all history; but pretermitting all speculation of that sort, when virginia unfolds the scroll of her immortal sons--not because illustrious men did not precede him gathering in constellations and clusters, but because the name shines out through those constellations and clusters in all its peerless grandeur--we read the name of george washington. and then, mr. president, after the interval of three-quarters of a century, when your jealous eye has ranged down the record and traced the names that history will never let die, you come to the name--the only name in all the annals of history that can be named in the perilous connection--of robert e. lee, the second washington. well may old virginia be proud of her twin sons! born almost a century apart, but shining like those binary stars which open their glory and shed their splendor on the darkness of the world. "sir, it is not an artifice of rhetoric which suggests this parallel between two great names in american history; for the suggestion springs spontaneously to every mind, and men scarcely speak of lee without thinking of a mysterious connection that binds the two together. they were alike in the presage of their early history--the history of their boyhood. both earnest, grave, studious; both alike in that peculiar purity which belongs only to a noble boy, and which makes him a brave and noble man, filling the page of a history spotless until closed in death; alike in that commanding presence which seems to be the signature of heaven sometimes placed on a great soul when to that soul is given a fit dwelling-place; alike in that noble carriage and commanding dignity, exercising a mesmeric influence and a hidden power which could not be repressed, upon all who came within its charm; alike in the remarkable combination and symmetry of their intellectual attributes, all brought up to the same equal level, no faculty of the mind overlapping any other--all so equal, so well developed, the judgment, the reason, the memory, the fancy, that you are almost disposed to deny them greatness, because no single attribute of the mind was projected upon itself, just as objects appear sometimes smaller to the eye from the exact symmetry and beauty of their proportions; alike, above all, in that soul-greatness, that christian virtue to which so beautiful a tribute has been rendered by my friend whose high privilege it was to be a compeer and comrade with the immortal dead, although in another department and sphere; and yet alike, mr. president, in their external fortune, so strangely dissimilar--the one the representative and the agent of a stupendous revolution which it pleased heaven to bless and give birth to one of the mightiest nations on the globe; the other the representative and agent of a similar revolution, upon which it pleased high heaven to throw the darkness of its frown; so that, bearing upon his generous heart the weight of this crushed cause, he was at length overwhelmed; and the nation whom he led in battle gathers with spontaneity of grief over all this land which is ploughed with graves and reddened with blood, and the tears of a widowed nation in her bereavement are shed over his honored grave. "but these crude suggestions, which fall almost impromptu from my lips, suggest that which i desire to offer before this audience to-night. i accept robert e. lee as the true type of the american man and the southern gentleman. a brilliant english writer has well remarked, with a touch of sound philosophy, that when a nation has rushed upon its fate, the whole force of the national life will sometimes shoot up in one grand character, like the aloe which blooms at the end of a hundred years, shooting up in one single spike of glory, and then expires. and wherever philosophy, refinement, and culture, have gone upon the globe, it is possible to place the finger upon individual men who are the exemplars of a nation's character, those typical forms under which others less noble, less expanded, have manifested themselves. that gentle, that perfect moderation, that self-command which enabled him to be so self-possessed amid the most trying difficulties of his public career, a refinement almost such as that which marks the character of the purest woman, were blended in him with that massive strength, that mighty endurance, that consistency and power which gave him and the people whom he led such momentum under the disadvantages of the struggle through which he passed. born from the general level of american society, blood of a noble ancestry flowed in his veins, and he was a type of the race from which he sprang. such was the grandeur and urbaneness of his manner, the dignity and majesty of his carriage, that his only peer in social life could be found in courts and among those educated amid the refinements of courts and thrones. in that regard there was something beautiful and appropriate that he should become, in the later years of his life, the educator of the young. sir, it is a cause for mourning before high heaven to-night that he was not spared thirty years to educate a generation for the time that is to come; for, as in the days when the red banner streamed over the land, the south sent her sons to fight under his flag and beneath the wave of his sword, these sons have been sent again to sit at his feet when he was the disciple of the muses and the teacher of philosophy. oh, that he might have brought his more than regal character, his majestic fame, all his intellectual and moral endowments, to the task of fitting those that should come in the crisis of the future to take the mantle that had fallen from his shoulders and bear it to the generations that are unborn! "general lee i accept as the representative of his people, and of the temper with which this whole southland entered into that gigantic, that prolonged, and that disastrous struggle which has closed, but closed as to us in grief. sir, they wrong us who say that the south was ever impatient to rupture the bonds of the american union. the war of 1776, which, sir, has no more yet a written history than has the war of 1861 to 1865, tells us that it was this southland that wrought the revolution of 1776. we were the heirs of all the glory of that immortal struggle. it was purchased with our blood, with the blood of our fathers which yet flows in these veins, and which we desire to transmit, pure and consecrated, to the sons that are born to our loins. the traditions of the past sixty years were a portion of our heritage, and it never was easy for any great heart and reflective mind even to seem to part with that heritage to enter upon the perilous effort of establishing a new nationality. "mr. president, it was my privilege once to be thrilled in a short speech, uttered by one of the noblest names clustering upon the roll of south carolina; for, sir, south carolina was virginia's sister, and south carolina stood by virginia in the old struggle, as virginia stood by south carolina in the new, and the little state, small as greece, barren in resources but great only in the grandeur of the men, in their gigantic proportions, whom she, like virginia, was permitted to produce--i heard, sir, one of south carolina's noblest sons speak once thus: 'i walked through the tower of london, that grand repository where are gathered the memorials of england's martial prowess; and when the guide, in the pride of his english heart, pointed to the spoils of war collected through centuries of the past,' said this speaker, lifting himself upon tiptoe that he might reach to his greatest height, 'i said, "you cannot point to one single trophy from my people, or my country, though england engaged in two disastrous wars with her."' sir, this was the sentiment. we loved every inch of american soil, and loved every part of that canvas [pointing to the stars and stripes above him], which, as a symbol of power and authority, floated from the spires and from the mast-head of our vessels; and it was after the anguish of a woman in birth that this land, that now lies in her sorrow and ruin, took upon herself that great peril; but it is all emblematized in the regret experienced by him whose praises are upon our lips, and who, like the english nelson, recognized duty engraved in letters of light as the only ensign he could follow, and who, tearing away from all the associations of his early life, and, abandoning the reputation gained in the old service, made up his mind to embark in the new, and, with that modesty and that firmness belonging only to the truly great, expressed his willingness to live and die in the position assigned to him. "and i accept this noble chieftain equally as the representative of this southland in the spirit of his retirement from struggle. it could not escape any speaker upon this platform to allude to the dignity of that retirement; how, from the moment he surrendered he withdrew from observation, holding aloof from all political complications, and devoting his entire energies to the great work he had undertaken to discharge. in this he represents--an the true attitude of the south since the close of the war attitude of quiet submission to the conquering power and of obedience to all exactions; but without resiling from those great principles which were embalmed in the struggle, and which, as the convictions of a lifetime, no honest mind could release. "all over this land of ours there are men like lee--not as great, not as symmetrical in the development of character, not as grand in the proportions which they have reached, but who, like him, are sleeping upon memories that are holy as death, and who, amid all reproach, appeal to the future, and to the tribunal of history, when she shall render her final verdict in reference to the struggle closed, for the vindication of the people embarked in that struggle. we are silent, resigned, obedient, and thoughtful, sleeping upon solemn memories, mr. president; but, as said by the poet-preacher in the good book, 'i sleep, but my heart waketh,' looking upon the future that is to come, and powerless in every thing except to pray to almighty god, who rules the destinies of nations, that those who have the power may at least have the grace given them to preserve the constitutional principles which we have endeavored to maintain. and, sir, were it my privilege to speak in the hearing of the entire nation, i would utter with the profoundest emphasis this pregnant truth: that no people ever traversed those moral ideas which underlie its character, its constitution, its institutions, and its laws, that did not in the end perish in disaster, in shame, and in dishonor. whatever be the glory, the material civilization, of which such a nation may boast, it still holds true that the truth is immortal, and that ideas rule the world. "and now i have but a single word to say, and that is, that the grave of this noble hero is bedewed with the most tender and sacred tears ever shed upon a human tomb. i was thinking in my study this afternoon, striving to strike out something i might utter on this platform, and this parallel between the first washington and the second occurred to me. i asked my own heart the question, 'would you not accept the fame and the glory and the career of robert e. lee just as soon as accept the glory and career of the immortal man who was his predecessor?' sir, there is a pathos in fallen fortunes which stirs the sensibilities, and touches the very fountain of human feeling. i am not sure that at this moment napoleon, the enforced guest of the prussian king, is not grander than when he ascended the throne of france. there is a grandeur in misfortune when that misfortune is borne by a noble heart, with the strength of will to endure, and endure without complaining or breaking. perhaps i slip easily into this train of remarks, for it is my peculiar office to speak of that chastening with which a gracious providence visits men on this earth, and by which he prepares them for heaven hereafter; and what is true of individuals in a state of adversity, is true of nations when clothed in sorrow. sir, the men in these galleries that once wore the gray are here to-night that they may bend the knee in reverence at the grave of him whose voice and hand they obeyed amid the storms of battle: the young widow, who but as yesterday leaned upon the arm of her soldier-husband, but now clasps wildly to her breast the young child that never beheld its father's face, comes here to shed her tears over this grave to-night; and the aged matron, with the tears streaming from her eyes as she recalls her unforgotten dead, lying on the plains of gettysburg, or on the heights of fredericksburg, now, to-night, joins in our dirge over him who was that son's chieftain and counsellor and friend. a whole nation has risen up in the spontaneity of its grief to render the tribute of its love. sir, there is a unity in the grapes when they grow together in the clusters upon the vine, and holding the bunch in your hand you speak of it as one; but there is another unity when you throw these grapes into the wine-press, and the feet of those that bruise these grapes trample them almost profanely beneath their feet together in the communion of pure wine; and such is the union and communion of hearts that have been fused by tribulation and sorrow, and that meet together in the true feeling of an honest grief to express the homage of their affection, as well as to render a tribute of praise to him upon whose face we shall never look until on that immortal day when we shall behold it transfigured before the throne of god." the meeting then adopted the following preamble and resolutions: "_whereas_, like orphans at the grave of a parent untimely snatched away, our hearts have lingered and brooded, with a grief that no cunning of speech could interpret, over the thought that robert edward lee exists no more, in bodily life, in sensible form, in visible presence, for our love and veneration, for our edification and guidance, for our comfort and solace; and-"_whereas_, we have invoked all mute funeral emblems to aid us with their utmost eloquence of woe, and we cannot content ourselves with contemplating, from the depth and the gloom of our bereavement, the exalted and radiant virtues of the dead: "_resolved_, that we, the people of new orleans, have come together under one common impulse to render united homage to the memory which holds mastery in our minds, whether we turn with bitter regard to the past, or with prayerful and chastened aspirations to the future. "_resolved_, that as louisianians, as southerners, as americans, we proudly claim our share in the fame of lee as an inheritance rightfully belonging to us, and endowed with which we shall piously cherish, though all calamities should rain upon us, true poverty--the poverty indeed that abases and starves the spirit can never approach us with its noisome breath and withering look. "_resolved_, that it is infinitely more bitter to have to mourn the loss of our lee, than not to have learned to prize him as the noblest gift which could have been allotted to a people and an epoch; a grand man, rounded to the symmetry of equal moral and intellectual powers, graces, and accomplishments; a man whose masterly and heroic energy left nothing undone in defending a just cause while there was a possibility of striking for it a rational and hopeful blow, and whose sublime resignation when the last blow was struck in vain, and when human virtue was challenged to match itself with the consummation of human adversity, taught wiser, more convincing, more reassuring, more soul-sustaining lessons than were to be found in all the philosophies of all books. "_resolved_, that worthily to show our veneration for this majestic and beautiful character, we must revolve it habitually in our thoughts, and try to appropriate it to the purification and elevation of our lives, and so educate our children that they shall, if possible, grow up into its likeness. "_resolved_, that while it is honorable for a people to deeply lament the death of such a man, it would be glorious for a generation to mould itself after his model; for it would be a generation fraught with all high manly qualities, tempered with all gentle and christian virtues; for truth, love, goodness, health, strength, would be with it, and consequently victory, liberty, majesty, and beauty. "_resolved_, that we would hail the erection of the proposed monument as well adapted to the purpose of preserving this admirable and most precious memory as a vital and beneficent influence for all time to come, and we will therefore cordially aid in promoting the lee monument which has just been inaugurated." atlanta, ga. a crowded meeting assembled in this city on october 15th. after an impressive prayer from the rev. dr. brantly, the meeting was addressed by general john b. gordon. "_my friends_: we have met to weep, to mingle our tears, and give vent to our bursting hearts. the sorrowing south, already clad in mourners' weeds, bows her head afresh to-day in a heart-stricken orphanage; and if i could have been permitted to indulge the sensibilities of my heart, i would have fled this most honorable task, and in solitude and silence have wept the loss of the great and good man whose death we so deplore. i loved general lee; for it was my proud privilege to know him well. i loved him with a profound and all-filial love, with a sincere and unfaded affection. i say i would have retired from this flattering task which your kindness has imposed, but remembering that his words, his deeds, his great example, has taught us that duty was the most commanding obligation, i yield this morning to your wishes. "we have met to honor general lee, to honor him dead whom we loved while living. honor general lee! how utterly vain, what a mockery of language do these words seem! honor lee! why, my countrymen, his deeds have honored him! the very trump of fame itself is proud to honor him! europe and the civilized world have united to honor him supremely, and history itself has caught the echo and made it immortal. honor lee! why, sir, as the sad news of his death is with the speed of thought communicated to the world, it will carry a pang even to the hearts of marshals and of monarchs; and i can easily fancy that, amid the din and clash and carnage of war, the cannon itself, in mute pause at the whispering news, will briefly cease its roar around the walls of paris. the task is not without pain, while yet his manly frame lies stretched upon his bier, to attempt to analyze the elements that made him truly great. it has been my fortune in life from circumstances to have come in contact with some whom the world pronounced great--some of the earth's celebrated and distinguished; but i declare it here to-day that, of any mortal man whom it has ever been my privilege to approach, he was the greatest; and i assert here that, grand as might be your conceptions of the man before, he arose in incomparable majesty on more familiar acquaintance. this can be affirmed of few men who have ever lived or died, and of no other man whom it has ever been my fortune to approach. like niagara, the more you gazed the more his grandeur grew upon you, the more his majesty expanded and filled your spirit with a full satisfaction that left a perfect delight without the slightest feeling of oppression. grandly majestic and dignified in all his deportment, he was genial as the sunlight of this beautiful day, and not a ray of that cordial, social intercourse but brought warmth to the heart as it did light to the understanding. "but as one of the great captains will general lee first pass review and inspection before the criticism of history. we will not compare him with washington. the mind will halt instinctively at the comparison of two such men, so equally and gloriously great. but with modest, yet calm and unflinching confidence we place him by the side of the marlboroughs and wellingtons who take high niches in the pantheon of immortality. let us dwell for a moment, my friends, on this thought. marlborough never met defeat, it is true. victory marked every step of his triumphant march; but when, where, and whom did marlborough fight? the ambitious and vain but able louis xiv. but he had already exhausted the resources of his kingdom before marlborough stepped upon the stage. the great marshals turenne and condã© were no more, and luxembourg the beloved had vanished from the scene. marlborough, preã«minently great as he certainly was, nevertheless led the combined forces of england and of holland, in the freshness of their strength and the fulness of their financial ability, against prostrate france, with a treasury depleted, a people worn out, discouraged, and dejected. but let us turn to another comparison. the great von moltke, who now rides upon the whirlwind and commands the storm of prussian invasion, has recently declared that general lee, in all respects, was fully the equal of wellington, and you may the better appreciate this admission when you remember that wellington was the benefactor of prussia, and probably von moltke's special idol. but let us examine the arguments ourselves. france was already prostrate when wellington met napoleon. that great emperor had seemed to make war upon the very elements themselves, to have contended with nature, and to have almost defeated providence itself. the enemies of the north, more savage than goth or vandal, mounting the swift gales of a russian winter, had carried death, desolation, and ruin, to the very gates of paris. wellington fought at waterloo a bleeding and broken nation--a nation electrified, it is true, to almost superhuman energy by the genius of napoleon, but a nation prostrate and bleeding nevertheless. compare this, my friends, the condition of france and the condition of the united states, in the freshness of her strength, in the luxuriance of her resources, in the lustihood of her gigantic youth. tell me whether to place the chaplet of military superiority with him, or with marlborough, or wellington? even the greatest of captains, in his italian campaigns, flashing fame in lightning splendor over the world, even bonaparte met and crushed in battle but three or four (i think) austrian armies; while our lee, with one army badly equipped, in time incredibly short, met and hurled back in broken and shattered fragments five of the greatest prepared and most magnificently appointed invasions. yea, more! he discrowned, in rapid succession, one after another of the united states' most, accomplished and admirable commanders. "lee was never really defeated. lee could not be defeated! overpowered, foiled in his efforts, he might be; but never defeated until the props which supported him gave way. never, until the platform sank beneath him, did any enemy ever dare pursue. on that melancholy occasion, the downfall of the confederacy, no leipsic, no waterloo, no sedan, can ever be recorded. "general lee is known to the world as a military man; but it is easy to divine from his history how mindful of all just authority, how observant of all constitutional restriction, would have been his career as a civilian. when, near the conclusion of the war, darkness was thickening about the falling fortunes of the confederacy, when its very life was in the sword of lee, it was my proud privilege to know with a special admiration the modest demeanor, the manly decorum, respectful homage, which marked all his dealings with the constituted authorities of his country. clothed with all power, he hid its very symbol behind a genial modesty, and refused ever to exert it save in obedience to law. and even in his triumphant entry into the territory of the enemy, so regardful was he of civilized warfare, that the observance of his general orders as to private property and private rights left the line of his march marked and marred by no devastated fields, charred ruins, or desolated homes. but it is in his private character, or rather i should say his personal emotion and virtue, which his countrymen will most delight to consider and dwell upon. his magnanimity, transcending all historic precedent, seemed to form a new chapter in the book of humanity. witness that letter to jackson, after his wounds at chancellorsville, in which he said: 'i am praying for you with more fervor than i have ever prayed for myself;' and that other, more disinterested and pathetic: 'i could, for the good of my country, wish that the wounds which you have received had been inflicted upon my own body;' or that of the latter message, saying to general jackson that 'his wounds were not so severe as mine, for he loses but his left arm, while i, in my loss, lose my right;' or that other expression of unequalled magnanimity which enabled him to ascribe the glory of their joint victory to the sole credit of the dying hero. did i say unequalled? yes, that was an avowal of unequalled magnanimity, until it met its parallel in his own grander self-negation in assuming the sole responsibility for the defeat at gettysburg. ay, my countrymen, alexander had his arbela, caesar his pharsalia, napoleon his austerlitz; but it was reserved for lee to grow grander and more illustrious in defeat than even in victory--grander, because in defeat he showed a spirit greater than in the heroism of battles or all the achievements of war, a spirit which crowns him with a chaplet grander far than ever mighty conqueror wore. "i turn me now to that last closing scene at appomattox, and i will draw thence a picture of that man as he laid aside the sword, the unrivalled soldier, to become the most exemplary of citizens. "i can never forget the deferential homage paid this great citizen by even the federal soldiers, as with uncovered heads they contemplated in mute admiration this now captive hero as he rode through their ranks. impressed forever, daguerreotyped on my heart is that last parting scene with that handful of heroes still crowding around him. few indeed were the words then spoken, but the quivering lip and the tearful eye told of the love they bore him, in symphonies more eloquent than any language can describe. can i ever forget? no, never can i forget the words which fell from his lips as i rode beside him amid the defeated, dejected, and weeping soldiery, when, turning to me, he said, 'i could wish that i was numbered among the fallen in the last battle;' but oh! as he thought of the loss of the cause--of the many dead scattered over so many fields, who, sleeping neglected, with no governmental arms to gather up their remains--sleeping neglected, isolated, and alone, beneath the weeping stars, with naught but their soldiers' blankets about them!--oh! as these emotions swept over his great soul, he felt that he would have laid him down to rest in the same grave where lay buried the common hope of his people. but providence willed it otherwise. he rests now forever, my countrymen, his spirit in the bosom of that father whom he so faithfully served, his body beside the river whose banks are forever memorable, and whose waters are vocal with the glories of his triumphs. no sound shall ever wake him to martial glory again; no more shall he lead his invincible lines to victory; no more shall we gaze upon him and draw from his quiet demeanor lessons of life. but oh! it is a sweet consolation to us, my countrymen, who loved him, that no more shall his bright spirit be bowed down to earth with the burdens of the people's wrongs. it is sweet consolation to us that his last victory, through faith in his crucified redeemer, is the most transcendently glorious of all his triumphs. at this very hour, while we mourn here, kind friends are consigning the last that remains of our hero to his quiet sleeping-place, surrounded by the mountains of his native state--mountains the autumnal glory of whose magnificent forests to-day seem but habiliments of mourning. in the valley, the pearly dew-drops seem but tears of sadness upon the grasses and flowers. let him rest! and now as he has gone from us, and as we regard him in all the aspects of his career and character and attainments as a great captain, ranking among the first of any age; as a patriot, whose sacrificing devotion to his country ranks him with washington; as a christian, like havelock, recognizing his duty to his god above every other earthly consideration, with a native modesty that refused to appropriate the glory of his own, and which surrounds now his entire character and career with a halo of unfading light; with an integrity of life and a sacred regard for truth which no man dare assail; with a fidelity to principle which no misfortune could shake--he must ever stand peerless among men in the estimation of christendom, this representative son of the south, robert e. lee, of virginia." richmond, va. a meeting was held on november 3d, presided over by mr. jefferson davis. mr. davis delivered an address, of which we regret that we have received no complete copy. we give it as reported in the richmond _dispatch_. remarks of president davis. as mr. davis arose to walk to the stand, every person in the house stood, and there followed such a storm of applause as seemed to shake the very foundations of the building, while cheer upon cheer was echoed from the throats of veterans saluting one whom they delighted to honor. mr. davis spoke at length, and with his accustomed thrilling, moving eloquence. we shall not attempt, at the late hour at which we write, to give a full report of his address. he addressed his hearers as "soldiers and sailors of the confederacy, comrades and friends: assembled on this sad occasion, with hearts oppressed with the grief that follows the loss of him who was our leader on many a bloody battle-field, a pleasing though melancholy spectacle is presented. hitherto, and in all times, men have been honored when successful; but here is the case of one who amid disaster went down to his grave, and those who were his companions in misfortune have assembled to honor his memory. it is as much an honor to you who give as to him who receives; for, above the vulgar test of merit, you show yourselves competent to discriminate between him who enjoys and him who deserves success. "robert e. lee was my associate and friend in the military academy, and we were friends until the hour of his death. we were associates and friends when he was a soldier and i a congressman; and associates and friends when he led the armies of the confederacy and i presided in its cabinet. we passed through many sad scenes together, but i cannot remember that there was ever aught but perfect harmony between us. if ever there was difference of opinion, it was dissipated by discussion, and harmony was the result. i repeat, _we never disagreed_; and i may add that i never in my life saw in him the slightest tendency to self-seeking. it was not his to make a record, it was not his to shift blame to other shoulders; but it was his, with an eye fixed upon the welfare of his country, never faltering, to follow the line of duty to the end. his was the heart that braved every difficulty; his was the mind that wrought victory out of defeat. "he has been charged with 'want of dash.' i wish to say that i never knew lee to falter to attempt any thing ever man could dare. an attempt has also been made to throw a cloud upon his character because he left the army of the united states to join in the struggle for the liberty of his state. without trenching at all upon politics, i deem it my duty to say one word in reference to this charge. virginian born, descended from a family illustrious in virginia's annals, given by virginia to the service of the united states, he represented her in the military academy at west point. he was not educated by the federal government, but by virginia; for she paid her full share for the support of that institution, and was entitled to demand in return the services of her sons. entering the army of the united states, he represented virginia there also, and nobly. on many a hard-fought field lee was conspicuous, battling for his native state as much as for the union. he came from mexico crowned with honors, covered by brevets, and recognized, young as he was, as one of the ablest of his country's soldiers. and, to prove that he was estimated then as such, let me tell you that when lee was a captain of engineers stationed in baltimore, the cuban junta in new york selected him to be their leader in the struggle for the independence of their native country. they were anxious to secure his services, and offered him every temptation that ambition could desire. he thought the matter over, and, i remember, came to washington to consult me as to what he should do; and when i began to discuss the complications which might arise from his acceptance of the trust, he gently rebuked me, saying that this was not the line upon which he wished my advice: the simple question was, 'whether it was right or not?' he had been educated by the united states, and felt wrong to accept a place in the army of a foreign power. such was his extreme delicacy, such was the nice sense of honor of the gallant gentleman whose death we deplore. but when virginia withdrew, the state to whom he owed his first and last allegiance, the same nice sense of honor led him to draw his sword and throw it in the scale for good or for evil. pardon me for this brief defence of my illustrious friend. "when virginia joined the confederacy, robert lee, the highest officer in the little army of virginia, came to richmond; and, not pausing to inquire what would be his rank in the service of the confederacy, went to western virginia under the belief that he was still an officer of the state. he came back, carrying the heavy weight of defeat, and unappreciated by the people whom he served, for they could not know, as i knew, that if his plans and orders had been carried out the result would have been victory rather than retreat. you did not know, for i would not have known it had he not breathed it in my ear only at my earnest request, and begging that nothing be said about it. the clamor which then arose followed him when he went to south carolina, so that it became necessary on his going to south carolina to write a letter to the governor of that state, telling him what manner of man he was. yet, through all this, with a magnanimity rarely equalled, he stood in silence without defending himself or allowing others to defend him, for he was unwilling to offend any one who was wearing a sword and striking blows for the confederacy." mr. davis then spoke of the straits to which the confederacy was reduced, and of the danger to which her capital was exposed, just after the battle of seven pines, and told how general lee had conceived and executed the desperate plan to turn their flank and rear, which, after seven days of bloody battle, was crowned with the protection of richmond, while the enemy was driven far from the city. the speaker referred also to the circumstances attending general lee's crossing the potomac on the march into pennsylvania. he (mr. davis) assumed the responsibility of that movement. the enemy had long been concentrating his force, and it was evident that if he continued his steady progress the confederacy would be overwhelmed. our only hope was to drive him to the defence of his own capital, we being enabled in the mean time to reã«nforce our shattered army. how well general lee carried out that dangerous experiment need not be told. richmond was relieved, the confederacy was relieved, and time was obtained, if other things had favored, to reã«nforce the army. "but," said mr. davis, "i shall not attempt to review the military career of our fallen chieftain. of the man, how shall i speak? he was my friend, and in that word is included all that i could say of any man. his moral qualities rose to the height of his genius. self-denying; always intent upon the one idea of duty; self-controlled to an extent that many thought him cold, his feelings were really warm, and his heart melted freely at the sight of a wounded soldier, or the story of the sufferings of the widow and orphan. during the war he was ever conscious of the inequality of the means at his control; but it was never his to complain or to utter a doubt; it was always his to do. when, in the last campaign, he was beleaguered at petersburg, and painfully aware of the straits to which we were reduced, he said: 'with my army in the mountains of virginia, i could carry on this war for twenty years longer.' his men exhausted, and his supplies failing, he was unable to carry out his plans. an untoward event caused him to anticipate the movement, and the army of northern virginia was overwhelmed. but, in the surrender, he anticipated conditions that have not been fulfilled; he expected his army to be respected, and his paroled soldiers to be allowed the enjoyments of life and property. whether these conditions have been fulfilled, let others say. "here he now sleeps in the land he loved so well; and that land is not virginia only, for they do injustice to lee who believe he fought only for virginia. he was ready to go anywhere, on any service, for the good of his country; and his heart was as broad as the fifteen states struggling for the principles that our forefathers fought for in the revolution of 1776. he is sleeping in the same soil with the thousands who fought under the same flag, but first offered up their lives. here, the living are assembled to honor his memory, and there the skeleton sentinels keep watch over his grave. this citizen, this soldier, this great general, this true patriot, left behind him the crowning glory of a true christian. his christianity ennobled him in life, and affords us grounds for the belief that he is happy beyond the grave. "but, while we mourn the loss of the great and the true, drop we also tears of sympathy with her who was his helpmeet--the noble woman who, while her husband was in the field leading the army of the confederacy, though an invalid herself, passed the time in knitting socks for the marching soldiers! a woman fit to be the mother of heroes; and heroes are descended from her. mourning with her, we can only offer the consolation of a christian. our loss is not his; but he now enjoys the rewards of a life well spent, and a never-wavering trust in a risen saviour. this day we unite our words of sorrow with those of the good and great throughout christendom, for his fame is gone over the water; his deeds will be remembered, and when the monument we build shall have crumbled into dust, his virtues will still live, a high model for the imitation of generations yet unborn." we have given but a faint idea of the eloquent thoughts and chaste oratory of the speaker. his words were heard with profound attention, and received with frequent applause. memorial resolutions. colonel c.s. venable then presented the following report of the committee on resolutions: "_whereas_, it is a high and holy duty, as well as a noble privilege, to perpetuate the honors of those who have displayed eminent virtues and performed great achievements, that they may serve as incentives and examples to the latest generation of their countrymen, and attest the reverential admiration and affectionate regard of their compatriots; and-"_whereas_, this duty and privilege devolve on all who love and admire general robert e. lee throughout this country and the world, and in an especial manner upon those who followed him in the field, or who fought in the same cause, who shared in his glories, partook of his trials, and were united with him in the same sorrows and adversity, who were devoted to him in war by the baptism of fire and blood, and bound to him in peace by the still higher homage due to the rare and grand exhibition of a character pure and lofty and gentle and true, under all changes of fortune, and serene amid the greatest disasters: therefore, be it "_resolved_, that we favor an association to erect a monument at richmond to the memory of robert e. lee, as an enduring testimonial of our love and respect, and devotion to his fame. "_resolved_, that, while donations will be gladly received from all who recognize in the excellences of general lee's character an honor and an encouragement to our common humanity, and an abiding hope that coming generations may be found to imitate his virtues, it is desirable that every confederate soldier and sailor should make some contribution, however small, to the proposed monument. "_resolved_, that, for the purpose of securing efficiency and dispatch in the erection of the monument, an executive committee of seventy-five, with a president, secretary, treasurer, auditor, etc., be appointed, to invite and collect subscriptions, to procure designs for said monument, to select the best, to provide for the organization of central executive committees in other states, which may serve as mediums of communication between the executive committee of the association and the local associations of these states. "_resolved_, that we respectfully invite the ladies of the hollywood association to lend us their assistance and coã¶peration in the collection of subscriptions. "_resolved_, that we cordially approve of the local monument now proposed to be erected by other associations at atlanta, and at lexington, his last home, whose people were so closely united with him in the last sad years of his life. "_resolved_, that, while we cordially thank the governor and legislature of virginia, for the steps they have taken to do honor to the memory of general lee, yet in deference to the wishes of his loved and venerated widow, with whom we mourn, we will not discuss the question of the most fitting resting-place for his ever-glorious remains, but will content ourselves with expressing the earnest desire and hope that at some future proper time they will be committed to the charge of this association." generals john s. preston, john b. gordon, henry a. wise, and william henry preston, and colonels robert e. withers and charles marshall, delivered eloquent and appropriate speeches, and argued that richmond is the proper place for the final interment of the remains of general lee. the resolutions were adopted, and the meeting adjourned. columbia, s.c. at a meeting in this city the following remarks were made by-general wade hampton. "_fellow-citizens_: we are called together to-day by an announcement which will cause profound sorrow throughout the civilized world, and which comes to us bearing the additional grief of a personal and private bereavement. the foremost man in all the world is no more; and, as that news is carried by the speed of lightning through every town, village, and hamlet of this land which he loved so well, and among those people who loved and honored and venerated him so profoundly, every true heart in the stricken south will feel that the country has lost its pride and glory, and that the citizens of that country have lost a father. i dare not venture to speak of him as i feel. nor do we come to eulogize him. not only wherever the english language is spoken, but wherever civilization extends, the sorrow--a part at least of the sorrow--we feel will be felt, and more eloquent tongues than mine will tell the fame and recount the virtues of robert e. lee. we need not come to praise him. we come only to express our sympathy, our grief, our bereavement. we come not to mourn him, for we know that it is well with him. we come only to extend our sympathy to those who are bereaved. "now that he is fallen, i may mention what i have never spoken of before, to show you not only what were the feelings that actuated him in the duty to which his beloved countrymen called him, but what noble sentiments inspired him when he saw the cause for which he had been fighting so long about to perish. just before the surrender, after a night devoted to the most arduous duties, as one of his staff came in to see him in the morning, he found him worn and weary and disheartened, and the general said to him, 'how easily i could get rid of this and be at rest! i have only to ride along the line, and all will be over. but,' said he--and there spoke the christian patriot--'it is our duty to _live_, for what will become of the women and children of the south if we are not here to protect them?' that same spirit of duty which had actuated him through all the perils and all the hardships of that unequalled conflict which he had waged so heroically, that same high spirit of duty told him that he must live to show that he was great--greater, if that were possible, in peace than in war; live to teach the people whom he had before led to victory how to bear defeat; live to show what a great and good man can accomplish; live to set an example to his people for all time; live to bear, if nothing else, his share of the sorrows, and the afflictions, and the troubles, which had come upon his people. he is now at rest; and surely we of the south can say of him, as we say of his great exemplar, the 'father of his country,' that 'he was first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen.'" baltimore. at a meeting of the officers and soldiers who served under general lee, held in this city on october 15th, a number of addresses were made, which we are compelled to somewhat condense. that of colonel marshall, general lee's chief of staff, was as follows: colonel charles marshall. "in presenting the resolutions of the committee, i cannot refrain from expressing the feelings inspired by the memories that crowd upon my mind when i reflect that these resolutions are intended to express what general lee's surviving soldiers feel toward general lee. the committee are fully aware of their inability to do justice to the sentiments that inspire the hearts of those for whom they speak. how can we portray in words the gratitude, the pride, the veneration, the anguish, that now fill the hearts of those who shared his victories and his reverses, his triumphs and his defeats? how can we tell the world what we can only feel ourselves? how can we give expression to the crowding memories called forth by the sad event we are met to deplore? "we recall him as he appeared in the hour of victory, grand, imposing, awe-inspiring, yet self-forgetful and humble. we recall the great scenes of his triumph, when we hailed him victor on many a bloody field, and when above the paeans of victory we listened with reverence to his voice as he ascribed 'all glory to the lord of hosts, from whom all glories are.' we remember that grand magnanimity that never stooped to pluck those meaner things that grew nearest the earth upon the tree of victory, but which, with eyes turned toward the stars, and hands raised toward heaven, gathered the golden fruits of mercy, pity, and holy charity, that ripen on its topmost boughs beneath the approving smile of the great god of battles. we remember the sublime self-abnegation of chancellorsville, when, in the midst of his victorious legions, who, with the light of battle yet on their faces, hailed him conqueror, he thought only of his great lieutenant lying wounded on the field, and transferred to him all the honor of that illustrious day. "i will be pardoned, i am sure, for referring to an incident which affords to my mind a most striking illustration of one of the grandest features of his character. on the morning of may 3, 1863, as many of you will remember, the final assault was made upon the federal lines at chancellorsville. general lee accompanied the troops in person, and as they emerged from the fierce combat they had waged in 'the depths of that tangled wilderness,' driving the superior forces of the enemy before them across the open ground, he rode into their midst. the scene is one that can never be effaced from the minds of those who witnessed it. the troops were pressing forward with all the ardor and enthusiasm of combat. the white smoke of musketry fringed the front of the line of battle, while the artillery on the hills in the rear of the infantry shook the earth with its thunder, and filled the air with the wild shrieks of the shells that plunged into the masses of the retreating foe. to add greater horror and sublimity to the scene, the chancellorsville house and the woods surrounding it were wrapped in flames. in the midst of this awful scene, general lee, mounted upon that horse which we all remember so well, rode to the front of his advancing battalions. his presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable outbursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have not witnessed them. the fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle; the wounded, crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, all seemed possessed with a common impulse. one long, unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, rose high above the roar of battle and hailed the presence of the victorious chief. he sat in the full realization of all that soldiers dream of--triumph; and, as i looked upon him in the complete fruition of the success which his genius, courage, and confidence in his army, had won, i thought it must have been from some such scene that men in ancient days ascended to the dignity of the gods. his first care was for the wounded of both armies, and he was among the foremost at the burning mansion where some of them lay. but at that moment, when the transports of his victorious troops were drowning the roar of battle with acclamations, a note was brought to him from general jackson. it was brought to general lee as he sat on his horse near the chancellorsville house, and, unable to open it with his gauntleted hands, he passed it to me with directions to read it to him. the note made no mention of the wound that general jackson had received, but congratulated general lee upon the great victory. i shall never forget the look of pain and anguish that passed over his face as he listened. with a voice broken with emotion he bade me say to general jackson that the victory was his, and that the congratulations were due to him. i know not how others may regard this incident, but, for myself, as i gave expression to the thoughts of his exalted mind, i forgot the genius that won the day in my reverence for the generosity that refused its glory. "there is one other incident to which i beg permission to refer, that i may perfect the picture. on the 3d day of july, 1863, the last assault of the confederate troops upon the heights of gettysburg failed, and again general lee was among his baffled and shattered battalions as they sullenly retired from their brave attempt. the history of that battle is yet to be written, and the responsibility for the result is yet to be fixed. but there, with the painful consciousness that his plans had been frustrated by others, and that defeat and humiliation had overtaken his army, in the presence of his troops he openly assumed the entire responsibility of the campaign and of the lost battle. one word from him would have relieved him of this responsibility, but that word he refused to utter until it could be spoken without fear of doing the least injustice. "thus, my fellow-soldiers, i have presented to you our great commander in the supreme moments of triumph and defeat. i cannot more strongly illustrate his character. has it been surpassed in history? is there another instance of such self-abnegation among men? the man rose high above victory in one instance; and, harder still, the man rose superior to disaster in the other. it was such incidents as these that gave general lee the absolute and undoubting confidence and affection of his soldiers. need i speak of the many exhibitions of that confidence? you all remember them, my comrades. have you not seen a wavering line restored by the magic of his presence? have you not seen the few forget that they were fighting against the many, because he was among the few? "but i pass from the contemplation of his greatness in war, to look to his example under the oppressive circumstances of final failure--to look to that example to which it is most useful for us now to refer for our guidance and instruction. when the attempt to establish the southern confederacy had failed, and the event of the war seemed to have established the indivisibility of the federal union, general lee gave his adhesion to the new order of things. his was no hollow truce; but, with the pure faith and honor that marked every act of his illustrious career, he immediately devoted himself to the restoration of peace, harmony, and concord. he entered zealously into the subject of education, believing, as he often declared, that popular education is the only sure foundation of free government. he gave his earnest support to all plans of internal improvements designed to bind more firmly together the social and commercial interests of the country, and among the last acts of his life was the effort to secure the construction of a line of railway communication of incalculable importance as a connecting link between the north and the south. he devoted all his great energies to the advancement of the welfare of his countrymen while shrinking from public notice, and sought to lay deep and strong the foundations of government which it was supposed would rise from the ruins of the old. but i need not repeat to you, my comrades, the history of his life since the war. you have watched it to its close, and you know how faithfully and truly he performed every duty of his position. let us take to heart the lesson of his bright example. disregarding all that malice may impute to us, with an eye single to the faithful performance of our duties as american citizens, and with an honest and sincere resolution to support with heart and hand the honor, the safety, and the true liberties of our country, let us invoke our fellow-citizens to forget the animosities of the past by the side of this honored grave, and, 'joining hands around this royal corpse, friends now, enemies no more, proclaim perpetual truce to battle.'" the following are among the resolutions: "the officers, soldiers, and sailors, of the southern confederacy, residing in maryland, who served under general lee, desiring to record their grief for his death, their admiration for his exalted virtues, and their affectionate veneration for his illustrious memory-"_resolved_, that, leaving with pride the name and fame of our illustrious commander to the judgment of history, we, who followed him through the trials, dangers, and hardships of a sanguinary and protracted war; who have felt the inspiration of his genius and valor in the time of trial; who have witnessed his magnanimity and moderation in the hour of victory, and his firmness and fortitude in defeat, claim the privilege of laying the tribute of our heart-felt sorrow upon his honored grave. "_resolved_, that the confidence and admiration which his eminent achievements deserved and received were strengthened by the noble example of his constancy in adversity, and that we honored and revered him in his retirement as we trusted and followed him on the field of battle. "_resolved_, that, as a token of respect and sorrow, we will wear the customary badge of mourning for thirty days. "_resolved_, that a copy of these resolutions and of the proceedings of this meeting be transmitted to the family of our lamented chief." on the 29th of october a meeting was held to appoint delegates to represent the state of maryland at the richmond lee monumental convention. after some brief remarks by general i.r. trimble, and the adoption of resolutions constituting the lee monument association of maryland, the hon. reverdy johnson addressed the meeting as follows: hon. reverdy johnson. "_mr. chairman and gentlemen_: i am here in compliance with the request of many gentlemen present, and i not only willingly complied with that request, but i am willing to do all i am able, to show my appreciation of the character, civil and military, of robert e. lee. it was my good fortune to know him before the mexican war, in those better days before the commencement of the sad struggle through which we have recently passed. i saw in him every thing that could command the respect and admiration of men, and i watched with peculiar interest his course in the mexican war. it was also my good fortune to know the late lieutenant-general scott. in the commencement of the struggle to which i have alluded, i occupied in washington the position of _quasi_ military adviser to him, and was, in that capacity, intimately associated with him. i have heard him often declare that the glorious and continued success which crowned our arms in the war with mexico was owing, in a large measure, to the skill, valor, and undaunted courage of robert e. lee. he entertained for him the warmest personal friendship, and it was his purpose to recommend him as his successor in the event of his death or inability to perform the duties of his high position. in april, 1861, after the commencement of hostilities between the two great sections of our country, general lee, then lieutenant-colonel of cavalry in the army of the united states, offered his resignation. i was with general scott when he was handed the letter of resignation, and i saw what pain the fact caused him. while he regretted the step his most valuable officer had taken, he never failed to say emphatically, and over and over again, that he believed he had taken it from _an imperative sense of duty_. he was also consoled by the belief that if he was placed at the head of the armies of the then confederation, he would have in him a foeman in every way worthy of him, and one who would conduct the war upon the highest principles of civilized warfare, and that he would not suffer encroachments to be made upon the rights of private property and the rights of unoffending citizens. "some may be surprised that i am here to eulogize robert e. lee. it is well known that i did not agree with him in his political views. at the beginning of the late war, and for many years preceding it, even from the foundation of this government, two great questions agitated the greatest minds of this country. many believed that the allegiance of the citizen was due first to his state, and many were of the opinion that, according to the true reading of the constitution, a state had no right to leave the union and claim sovereign rights and the perpetual allegiance of her citizens. i did not agree in the first-named opinion, but i knew it was honestly entertained. i knew men of the purest character, of the highest ability, and of the most liberal and patriotic feelings, who conscientiously believed it. now the war is over, thank god! and to that thank i am sure this meeting will respond, it is the duty of every citizen of this land to seek to heal the wounds of the war, to forget past differences, and to forgive, as far as possible, the faults to which the war gave rise. in no other way can the union be truly and permanently restored. we are now together as a band of brothers. the soldiers of the confederacy, headed by the great chief we now mourn, have expressed their willingness to abide by the issue of the contest. what a spectacle to the world! after years of military devastation, with tens of thousands dead on her battle-fields, with the flower of her children slain, with her wealth destroyed, her commerce swept away, her agricultural and mechanical pursuits almost ruined, the south yielded. the north, victorious and strong, could not forget what she owed to liberty and human rights. we may well swear now that as long as liberty is virtuous we will be brothers. "robert e. lee is worthy of all praise. as a man, he was peerless; as a soldier, he had no equal and no superior; as a humane and christian soldier, he towers high in the political horizon. you cannot imagine with what delight, when i had the honor to represent this country at the court of great britain, i heard the praises of his fame and character which came from soldiers and statesmen. i need not speak of the comparative merits of general lee and the union generals who opposed him; this is not the place or time for a discussion of their respective successes and defeats; but i may say that, as far as i was able to judge of the sentiments of the military men of great britain, they thought none of the union officers superior to general robert e. lee. their admiration for him was not only on account of his skill on the battle-field, and the skilful manner with which he planned and executed his campaigns, but the humane manner in which he performed his sad duty. they alluded specially to his conduct when invading the territory of his enemy--his restraint upon his men, telling them that the honor of the army depended upon the manner of conducting the war in the enemy's country--and his refusal to resort to retaliatory measures. i know that great influences were brought to bear upon him, when he invaded pennsylvania, to induce him to consent to extreme measures. his answer, however, was, 'no; if i suffer my army to pursue the course recommended, i cannot invoke the blessing of god upon my arms.' he would not allow his troops to destroy private property or to violate the rights of the citizens. when the necessities of his army compelled the taking of commissary stores, by his orders his officers paid for them in confederate money at its then valuation. no burning homesteads illumined his march, no shivering and helpless children were turned out of their homes to witness their destruction by the torch. with him all the rules of civilized war, having the higher sanction of god, were strictly observed. the manly fortitude with which he yielded at appomattox to three times his numbers showed that he was worthy of the honors and the fame the south had given him. this is not the first time since the termination of the war i have expressed admiration and friendship for robert e. lee. when i heard that he was about to be prosecuted in a virginia court for the alleged crime of treason, i wrote to him at once, and with all my heart, that if he believed i could be of any service to him, professionally, i was at his command. all the ability i possess, increased by more than fifty years of study and experience, would have been cheerfully exerted to have saved him, for in saving him i believe i would have been saving the honor of my country. i received a characteristic reply in terms of friendship and grateful thanks. he wrote that he did not think the prosecution would take place. hearing, however, some time after, that the prosecution would commence at richmond, i went at once to that city and saw his legal adviser, hon. william h. mcfarland, one of the ablest men of the bar of virginia. mr. mcfarland showed me a copy of a letter from general lee to general grant, enclosing an application for a pardon which he desired general grant to present to the president, but telling him not to present it if any steps had been taken for his prosecution, as he was willing to stand the test. he wrote that he had understood by the terms of surrender at appomattox that he and all his officers and men were to be protected. that letter, i am glad to say, raised general lee higher in my esteem. general grant at once replied, and he showed his reply to me. he wrote that he had seen the president, and protested against any steps being taken against general lee, and had informed him that he considered his honor and the honor of the nation pledged to him. the president became satisfied, and no proceedings were ever taken. general grant transmitted to the president the application of general lee for pardon, indorsed with his most earnest approval. no pardon was granted. he did not need it here, and, when he appears before that great tribunal before which we must all be called, he will find he has no account to settle there. no soldier who followed general lee could have felt more grief and sympathy at his grave than i would, could i have been present upon the mournful occasion of his burial. i lamented his loss as a private loss, and still more as a public loss. i knew that his example would continue to allay the passions aroused by the war, and which i was not surprised were excited by some acts in that war. i love my country; i am jealous of her honor. i cherish her good name, and i am proud of the land of my birth. i forbear to criticise the lives and characters of her high officers and servants, but i can say with truth that, during the late war, the laws of humanity were forgotten, and the higher orders of god were trodden under foot. "the resolutions need no support which human lips can by human language give. their subject is their support. the name of lee appeals at once, and strongly, to every true heart in this land and throughout the world. let political partisans, influenced by fanaticism and the hope of political plunder, find fault with and condemn us. they will be forgotten when the name of lee will be resplendent with immortal glory. "mr. chairman and gentlemen, in the course of nature my career upon earth must soon terminate. god grant that when the day of my death comes, i may look up to heaven with that confidence and faith which the life and character of robert e. lee gave him! he died trusting in god, as a good man, with a good life and a pure conscience. he was consoled with the knowledge that the religion of christ had ordered all his ways, and he knew that the verdict of god upon the account he would have to render in heaven would be one of judgment seasoned with mercy. he had a right to believe that when god passed judgment upon the account of his life, though he would find him an erring human being, he would find virtue enough and religious faith enough to save him from any other verdict than that of 'well done, good and faithful servant.' the monument will be raised; and when it is raised many a man will visit richmond to stand beside it, to do reverence to the remains it may cover, and to say, 'here lie the remains of one of the noblest men who ever lived or died in america.'" hon. george william brown "_mr. chairman and gentlemen_: the able and eloquent gentlemen who have preceded me have left but little for me to say. i rise, however, to express my hearty assent to the resolutions. their broad and liberal views are worthy of the great and good man whose virtues and fame we seek to commemorate. he has passed away from earth, and our blame or censure is nothing to him now. the most eloquent eulogies that human lips can utter, and the loftiest monuments that human hands can build, cannot affect him now. but it is a satisfaction to us to know that expressions of the love for him which lives in every southern heart--ay, in many a northern heart--were heard long before his death, and that honor shed noble lustre around the last years of his life. he was the representative of a lost cause; he had sheathed his sword forever; he had surrendered his army to superior numbers; he was broken in fortune and in health, and was only president of a virginia college, yet he was one of the foremost men of all the world. "it has been said of general lee, as it has been said of washington, that he was deficient in genius. his character was so complete that what would have seemed evidences of genius with other men, were lost in the combination of his character and mind. he was always, and especially in every great crisis, a leader among men. during the four years of his education at west point he did not receive a single reprimand. as a cavalry-officer, wherever he went he was a marked man; and when general scott made his wonderful march to the capital of mexico, captain lee was his right arm. at the commencement of the late war, though only a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, he was offered the command of the armies of the united states. what a prize for ambition! fortune, fame, and honors, awaited him. where would he have been to-day? probably in the presidential chair of this great nation. but he rejected all to take his chance with his own people, and to unite with them in their resistance to the vast numbers and resources which he knew the north was able to bring against them. there is nothing more remarkable in the annals of warfare than the success with which general lee defeated for years the armies of the united states. consider the six-days' battles around richmond; the second battle of manassas; the battles at antietam, fredericksburg, and gettysburg; the wonderful contest at chancellorsville; then again the remarkable battle of the wilderness, in which it has been said by federal authority that general lee actually killed as many men as he had under his command; the defence at cold harbor, the prolonged defence of richmond and petersburg, and the admirably-conducted retreat with but a handful before an immense army. well has he been spoken of as 'the incomparable strategist.' did any man ever fight against more desperate odds or resources? "but not merely as a great general is general lee to be admired. he claims our admiration as a great man--great in adversity. i think there is nothing more admirable in all his life than his conduct in assuming the sole responsibility at gettysburg. in the midst of defeat lee was calm, unmoved, showing no fear where despair would have been in the heart of any other general, and saying to his officers and men, 'the fault is all mine.' let the monument be raised, not merely by soldiers of general lee, but by all men, no matter of what political feelings, who appreciate and honor that which is manly, great, and patriotic. the monument at richmond will be the resort of pilgrims from the north as well as from the south, and the grave of lee will be second only in the hearts of the people to the grave of washington." lexington, ky. at the meeting at lexington, resolutions were adopted similar to those already given. the meeting was addressed by general preston and others. general w. preston. "i am permitted to accompany the report with a few remarks, although i deem it unnecessary to use one word of commendation on the character of such a man. these resolutions are no doubt very short, but they will testify the feelings of every right-minded, noble-hearted man, no matter what may have been his opinions as to the past. every true and generous soul feels that these resolutions are expressive of the sorrow entertained by the whole country. we speak not only the common voice of america, but of the world at this hour. it is no ordinary case of eulogy over an ordinary being, but over one who was the man of the century; a man who, by mighty armies commanded with admirable skill; by great victories achieved, and yet never stained by exultation; by mighty misfortunes met with a calm eye, and submitted to with all the dignity that belongs to elevated intelligence, and by his simplicity and grandeur, challenged the admiration of civilized mankind; and still more remarkable, after yielding to the greatest vicissitudes that the world ever saw, resigned himself to the improvement of the youth of the country, to the last moment of his mortal life, looking to the glorious life which he contemplated beyond the tomb. i must confess that, notwithstanding the splendor and glory of his career, i envy him the dignity of the pacific close of his life. nothing more gentle, nothing more great, nothing more uncomplaining, has ever been recorded in the history of the world. by returning to napoleon, we find he murmured, we find all the marks of mortality and mortal anger; but in lee we find a man perfect in christian principles--dignified, yet simple. "i knew him first when he was a captain. i was then a young man connected with one of the regiments of this state, in mexico, the fourth kentucky; and when i first saw him he was a man of extreme physical beauty, remarkable for his great gentleness of manner, and for his freedom from all military and social vices. at that time, general scott, by common consent, had fixed upon general lee as the man who would make his mark if ever the country needed his services. he never swore an oath, he never drank, he never wrangled, but there was not a single dispute between gentlemen that his voice was not more potent than any other; his rare calmness, serenity, and dignity, were above all. when the war came on, he followed his native state, virginia, for he was the true representative of the great virginia family at washington. he was the real type of his race. he was possessed of all the most perfect points of washington's character, with all the noble traits of his own. "scott maintained that lee was the greatest soldier in the army. his discerning eye compared men; and i remember when, in some respects, i thought general lee's military education had not fitted him for the great talents which he was destined to display. i remember when general scott made use of these remarkable words: 'i tell you one thing, if i was on my death-bed, and knew there was a battle to be fought for the liberties of my country, and the president was to say to me, "scott, who shall command?" i tell you that, with my dying breath, i should say robert lee. nobody but robert lee! robert lee, and nobody but lee!' that impressed me very much, because, at the beginning of the campaign, lee was not prosperous; and why? because he was building up his men with that science which he possessed. his great qualities were discerned not after his remarkable campaigns; but, long before it, his name was regarded with that respected preã«minence to which it did rise under that campaign. and i now say, and even opposite officers will admit, that no man has displayed greater power, more military ability, or more noble traits of character, than robert e. lee. therefore it is that america has lost much. europe will testify this as well as ourselves in this local community. europe will weigh this, but after-ages will weigh him with moltke and bazaine, with the duke of magenta, and with all military men, and, in my judgment, those ages will say that the greatest fame and ability belonged to robert lee. but let us look to his moral character, to which i have already alluded. through his whole life he had been a fervent and simple christian; throughout his campaigns he was a brave and splendid soldier. if you ask of his friends, you will find that they adore him. if you ask his character from his enemies, you will find that they respect him, and respect is the involuntary tribute which friend and enemy alike have to pay to elevated worth; and, to-day, as the bells toll, their sounds will vibrate with the tenderest feelings through every noble heart. public confessions of his worth and his greatness will be made through thousands of the towns and cities throughout this broad land; and, even where they are silent, monitors within will tell that a great spirit hath fled. this secret monitor will tell that a great and good man has passed away, who has left, in my opinion, no equal behind him." rev. dr. henderson. "since the announcement of the death of robert e. lee, i have been momentarily expecting the appearance of a call to pay some tribute to his splendid memory; but, if a notice had been given of this meeting, it altogether escaped my attention, else i would have been here freely and voluntarily. if i am a stranger in lexington, and my lot has been cast here only during the last three weeks, yet i am happy that my fellow-citizens here have paid me such great respect as to call on me, on such an occasion as the present, to testify to the greatness and glory of general robert e. lee. some public calamity is required to bring us into one great brotherhood. 'one touch of nature makes the whole world kin.' though you are all strangers to me, yet, in that common sympathy which we all feel, we are mourners together at the bier of departed worth. "it does not become one of my profession to take any partisan view of the life of such a man, although it was my fortune to follow the same flag which he carried to victory upon so many fields. when it was furled, it was done with such calm magnificence as to win the admiration of his enemies and of the world. yet i do not stand here to make any reference to that cause which has passed from the theatre of earth's activity, and taken its place only in history. but i do claim the right, from the stand-point which i occupy, of pointing to a man worthy of the emulation of all who love the true nobility of humanity; a man who was magnanimous to his enemies; who would weep at the calamities of his foes; who, throughout the sanguinary struggle, could preserve in himself the fullest share of human sympathy. history will challenge the world to produce a single instance in which this great man ever wantonly inflicted a blow, or ever wilfully imposed punishment upon any of his captives, or ever pushed his victory upon an enemy to gain unnecessary results--a man who, in all his campaigns, showed the same bright example to all the battalions that followed the lead of his sword. and now, since that flag which he carried has been furled, what a magnificent example has been presented to the world! it was said of washington that he was first in war and first in peace, but, in the latter regard, robert e. lee showed more greatness than even the father of his country. he was struck down; the sun that had brightened up the horizon of hopes sank in dark eclipse to set in the shadow of disappointment. calm and magnificent in the repose of conscious strength, he felt that he had lived and struggled for a principle that was dear to him. though dead, it only remained for him to be our example to the stricken and suffering people for whom he labored, and to show how magnanimously a brave and true christian could act even when all he held sacred and dear was shattered by the hand of calamity. and, at the close of his career, he devoted his splendid capacity to the culture of the minds of his country's youth. he came down from the summit on which he had won the world's admiration, to the steady, regular duties of the school-room, to take his place in the vestry of a christian church, and to administer the affairs of a country parish in the interest of christianity. a man who, by his dignity and simplicity, preserved the constant admiration of his enemies, without even giving offence to his friends, such a man should receive a niche in the pantheon of fame. "he stood in that great struggle of which as a star he was the leader, of unclouded brightness, drawing over its mournful history a splendor which is reflected from every sentence of its chronicle. he was an example of a man, who, though branded because of defeat, still, by his exalted character, gave a dignity and nobility to a cause which, doubtless, is forever dead, yet still is rendered immortal by the achievements of robert e. lee's sword and character." new york. "services were held last evening," says a new-york journal, "in the large hall of the cooper institute, in commemoration of the life and character of the late general robert e. lee, of the confederate states army, with especial reference to his civic and christian virtues. the call for the meeting stated that, although it was inaugurated by the southern residents in the city of new york, it was 'yet to be regarded as in no sense born of partisan feeling, but solely from the desire to do honor to the memory of a great and good man--an illustrious american.' the attendance therefore of all, without reference to section or nationality, was cordially invited. "there was no special decoration of the hall. grafulla's band was in attendance, and, prior to the opening of the meeting, played several fine dirges. the choir of st. stephen's church also appeared upon the platform and opened the proceedings by singing 'come, holy spirit.' the choir consisted of madame de luzan, mrs. jennie kempton, dr. bauos, and herr weinlich. mr. h.b. denforth presided at the piano. "among the gentlemen present on the platform were general imboden, ex-governor lowe, general walker, colonel hunter, general daniel w. adams, dr. van avery, mr. m.b. fielding, colonel fellows, general cabell, colonel t.l. gnead, mr. mccormick, mr. t.a. hoyt, etc. "mr. m.b. fielding called the meeting to order, and requested the rev. dr. carter to offer prayer. "the hon. john e. ward was then called to preside, and delivered the following address--all the marked passages of which were loudly applauded: "we meet to pay a tribute of respect to the memory of one whom the whole south revered with more than filial affection. the kind manifestations of sympathy expressed through the press of this great metropolis, this assemblage, the presence of these distinguished men, who join with us this evening, testify that the afflicted voice of his bereaved people has charmed down with sweet persuasion the angry passions kindled by the conflict in which he was their chosen leader. this is not the occasion either for an elaborate review of his life or a eulogy of his character. i propose to attempt neither. born of one of the oldest and most distinguished families of our country--one so renowned in the field and in the cabinet that it seemed almost impossible to give brighter lustre to it--general robert e. lee rendered that family name even more illustrious, and by his genius and virtues extended its fame to regions of the globe where it had never before been mentioned. there is no cause for envy or hatred left now. his soldiers adored him most, not in the glare of his brilliant victories, but in the hour of his deepest humiliation, when his last great battle had been fought and lost--when the government for which he had struggled was crumbling about him--when his staff, asking, in despair, 'what can now be done?' he gave that memorable reply, 'it were strange indeed if human virtue were not at least as strong as human calamity.' this is the key to his life--the belief that trials and strength, suffering and consolation, come alike from god. obedience to duty was ever his ruling principle. infallibility is not claimed for him in the exercise of his judgment in deciding what duty was. but what he believed duty to command, that he performed without thought of how he would appear in the performance. in the judgment of many he may have mistaken his duty when he decided that it did not require him to draw his sword 'against his home, his kindred, and his children.' but lee was no casuist or politician; he was a soldier. 'all that he would do highly that would he do holily.' he taught the world that the christian and the gentleman could be united in the warrior. it was not when in pomp and power--when he commanded successful legions and led armies to victories--but when in sorrow and privation he assumed the instruction and guidance of the youth of virginia, laying the only true foundation upon which a republic can rest, the christian education of its youth--that he reaped the rich harvest of a people's love. goodness was the chief attribute of lee's greatness. uniting in himself the rigid piety of the puritan with the genial, generous impulses of the cavalier, he won the love of all with whom he came in contact, from the thoughtless child, with whom it was ever his delight to sport, to the great captain of the age, with whom he fought all the hard-won battles of mexico. some may believe that the world has given birth to warriors more renowned, to rulers more skilled in statecraft, but all must concede that a purer, nobler man never lived. what successful warrior or ruler, in ancient or modern times, has descended to his grave amid such universal grief and lamentation as our lee? caesar fell by the hands of his own beloved brutus, because, by his tyranny, he would have enslaved rome. frederick the great, the founder of an empire, became so hated of men, and learned so to despise them, that he ordered his 'poor carcass,' as he called it, to be buried with his favorite dogs at potsdam. napoleon reached his giddy height by paths which lee would have scorned to tread, only to be hurled from his eminence by all the powers of europe which his insatiate ambition had combined against him. wellington, the conqueror of napoleon, became the leader of a political party, and lived to need the protection of police from a mob. even our own washington, whose character was as high above that of the mere warrior and conqueror as is the blue vault of heaven above us to the low earth we tread beneath our feet, was libelled in life and slandered in death. such were the fates of the most successful captains and warriors of the world. for four long years lee occupied a position not less prominent than that of the most distinguished among them. the eyes of the civilized world watched his every movement and scanned his every motive. his cause was lost. he was unsuccessful. yet he lived to illustrate to the world how, despite failure and defeat, a soldier could command honor and love from those for whom he struggled, and admiration and respect from his foes, such as no success had ever before won for warrior, prince, or potentate. and, when his life was ended, the whole population of the south, forming one mighty funeral procession, followed him to his grave. his obsequies modestly performed by those most tenderly allied to him, he sleeps in the bosom of the land he loved so well. his spotless fame will gather new vigor and freshness from the lapse of time, and the day is not distant when that fame will be claimed, not as the property of a section, but as the heritage of a united people. his soul, now forever freed from earth's defilements, basks in the sunlight of god.' _pro tumulo ponas patriam, pro tegmine caelum, sidera pro facibus, pro lachrymis maria_.'" (great applause.) general imboden rose and said: "it is with emotions of infinite grief i rise to perform one of the saddest duties of my life. the committee who have arranged the ceremonies on this occasion, deemed it expedient and proper to select a virginian as their organ to present to this large assembly of the people of new york a formal preamble and resolutions, which give expression to their feelings in regard to the death of general robert e. lee. this distinction has been conferred by the committee upon me; and i shall proceed to read their report, without offering to submit any remarks as to the feelings excited in my own heart by this, mournful intelligence:" resolutions. "in this great metropolitan city of america, where men of every clime and of all nationalities mingle in the daily intercourse of pleasure and of business, no great public calamity can befall any people in the world without touching a sympathetic chord in the hearts of thousands. when, therefore, tidings reached us that general robert e. lee, of virginia, was dead, and that the people of that and all the other southern states of the union were stricken with grief, the great public heart of new york was moved with a generous sympathy, which found kindly and spontaneous expression through the columns of the city press of every shade of opinion. "all differences of the past, all bitter memories, all the feuds that have kept two great sections of our country in angry strife and controversy for so long, have been forgotten in the presence of the awe-inspiring fact that no virtues, no deeds, no honors, nor any position, can save any member of the human family from the common lot of all. "the universal and profound grief of our southern countrymen is natural and honorable alike to themselves and to him whom they mourn, and is respected throughout the world; for robert e. lee was allied and endeared to them by all the most sacred ties that can unite an individual to a community. he was born and reared in their midst, and shared their local peculiarities, opinions, and traditional characteristics; and his preã«minent abilities and exalted personal integrity and christian character made him, by common consent, their leader and representative in a great national conflict in which they had staked life, fortune, and honor; and in virginia his family was coeval with the existence of the state, and its name was emblazoned upon those bright pages of her early civil and military annals which record the patriotic deeds of washington and his compeers. "by no act of his did he ever forfeit or impair the confidence thus reposed in him by his own peculiar people; and when he had, through years of heroic trial and suffering, done all that mortal man could do in discharge of the high trust confided by them to his hands, and failed, he bowed with dignified submission to the decree of providence; and from the day he gave his parole at appomattox to the hour of his death, he so lived and acted as to deprive enmity of its malignity, and became to his defeated soldiers and countrymen a bright example of unqualified obedience to the laws of the land, and of support to its established government. nay, more. with a spirit of christian and affectionate duty to his impoverished and suffering people, and with a high estimate of the importance of mental and moral culture to a generation of youth whose earlier years were attended by war's rough teachings, he went from the tented field and the command of armies to the quiet shades of a scholastic institution in the secluded valleys of his own native virginia, and entered with all the earnestness of his nature upon the duties of instruction, and there spent the closing years of his life in training the minds and hearts of young men from all parts of the country for the highest usefulness 'in their day and generation.' by these pursuits, and his exemplary and unobtrusive life since the close of the great war in america, he won the respect and admiration of the enlightened and the good of the whole world. it is meet and natural, therefore, that his own people should bewail his death as a sore personal bereavement to each one of them. those of us here assembled who were his soldiers, friends, and supporters, sharing all the trials and many of the responsibilities of that period of his life which brought him so prominently before the world, honored and trusted him then, have loved and admired him, have been guided by his example since; and now that he is dead, we should be unworthy of ourselves, and unworthy to be called his countrymen, did we not feel and express the same poignant grief which now afflicts those among whom he lived and died. "those of us who were not his soldiers, friends, and supporters, when war raged throughout the land, but who have nevertheless met here to-day with those who were our enemies then, but are now our friends and countrymen, and appreciate with them the character of lee, and admire his rare accomplishments as an american citizen, whose fame and name are the property of the nation, we all unite over his hallowed sepulchre in an earnest prayer that old divisions may be composed, and that a complete and perfect reconciliation of all estrangements may be effected at the tomb, where all alike, in a feeling of common humanity and universal christian brotherhood, may drop their tears of heart-felt sorrow. "therefore, without regard to our former relations toward each other, but meeting as americans by birth or adoption, and in the broadest sense of national unity, and in the spirit above indicated, to do honor to a great man and christian gentleman who has gone down to the grave, we do "_resolve_, that we have received with feelings of profound sorrow intelligence of the death of general robert e. lee. we can and do fully appreciate the grief of our southern countrymen at the death of one so honored by and so dear to them, and we tender to them this expression of our sympathy, with the assurance that we feel in the contemplation of so sad an event that we are and ought to be, henceforth and forever, one great and harmonious national family, sharing on all occasions each others' joys and sympathizing in each others' sorrows. "_resolved_, that a copy of the foregoing preamble, and these resolutions, signed by the president and secretary, be transmitted to the governor of virginia, with a request that the same be preserved in the archives of the state; and that another copy be sent to the family of general lee. "j.d. imboden, ex. norton, john mitchel, c.k. marshall, t.l. snead, norman d. sampson, wm. h. appleton, _committee on resolutions_" "on motion, the resolutions were unanimously adopted by a standing and silent vote, which was followed by a spontaneous outburst of hearty applause." we have given but a small portion of the addresses which were called forth by this national calamity, and these, no doubt, have suffered injustice by imperfect reporting. but we have shown, as we wished to show, the standard by which our people estimate an heroic character, and how the south loves and honors the memory of her great leader. a few extracts from the english press will show the feeling in that country: the pall mall gazette. "even amid the turmoil of the great european struggle, the intelligence from america announcing that general robert e. lee is dead, will be received with deep sorrow by many in this country, as well as by his followers and fellow-soldiers in america. it is but a few years since robert e. lee ranked among the great men of the present time. he was the able soldier of the southern confederacy, the bulwark of her northern frontier, the obstacle to the advance of the federal armies, and the leader who twice threatened, by the capture of washington, to turn the tide of success, and to accomplish a revolution which would have changed the destiny of the united states. six years passed by, and then we heard that he was dying at an obscure town in virginia, where, since the collapse of the confederacy, he had been acting as a school-master. when, at the head of the last eight thousand of his valiant army, the remnants which battle, sickness, and famine had left him, he delivered up his sword to general grant at appomattox court-house, his public career ended; he passed away from men's thoughts; and few in europe cared to inquire the fate of the general whose exploits had aroused the wonder of neutrals and belligerents, and whose noble character had excited the admiration of even the most bitter of his political enemies. if, however, success is not always to be accounted as the sole foundation of renown, general lee's life and career deserve to be held in reverence by all who admire the talents of a general and the noblest qualities of a soldier. his family were well known in virginia. descended from the cavaliers who first colonized that state, they had produced more than one man who fought with distinction for their country. they were allied by marriage to washington, and, previous to the recent war, were possessed of much wealth; general (then colonel) robert lee residing, when not employed with his regiment, at arlington heights, one of the most beautiful places in the neighborhood of washington. when the civil war first broke out, he was a colonel in the united states army, who had served with distinction in mexico, and was accounted among the best of the american officers. to him, as to others, the difficult choice presented itself, whether to take the side of his state, which had joined in the secession of the south, or to support the central government. it is said that lee debated the matter with general scott, then commander-in-chief, that both agreed that their first duty lay with their state, but that the former only put the theory into practice. "it was not until the second year of the war that lee came prominently forward, when, at the indecisive battle of fair oaks, in front of richmond, general johnston having been wounded, he took command of the army; and subsequently drove mcclellan, with great loss, to the banks of the james river. from that time he became the recognized leader of the confederate army of virginia. he repulsed wave after wave of invasion, army after army being hurled against him only to be thrown back, beaten and in disorder. the government at washington were kept in constant alarm by the near vicinity of his troops, and witnessed more than once the entry into their intrenchments of a defeated and disorganized rabble, which a few days previous had left them a confident host. twice he entered the northern states at the head of a successful army, and twice indecisive battles alone preserved from destruction the federal government, and turned the fortune of the war. he impressed his character on those who acted under him. ambition for him had no charms, duty alone was his guide. his simplicity of life checked luxury and display among his officers, while his disregard of hardships silenced the murmurs of his harassed soldiery. by the troops he was loved as a father, as well as admired as a general; and his deeply-religious character impressed itself on all who were brought in contact with him, and made itself felt through the ranks of the virginian army. it is said that, during four years of war, he never slept in a house, but in winter and summer shared the hardships of his soldiers. such was the man who, in mature age, at a period of life when few generals have acquired renown, fought against overwhelming odds for the cause which he believed just. he saw many of his bravest generals and dearest friends fall around him, but, although constantly exposed to fire, escaped without a wound. "the battles which prolonged and finally decided the issue of the contest are now little more than names. antietam, fredericksburg, chancellorsville, and gettysburg, are forgotten in europe by all excepting those who study recent wars as lessons for the future, and would collect from the deeds of other armies experience which they may apply to their own. to them the boldness of lee's tactics at chancellorsville will ever be a subject of admiration; while even those who least sympathize with his cause will feel for the general who saw the repulse of longstreet's charge at gettysburg, and beheld the failure of an attempt to convert a defensive war into one of attack, together with the consequent abandonment of the bold stroke which he had hoped would terminate the contest. quietly he rallied the broken troops; taking all the blame on himself, he encouraged the officers, dispirited by the reverse, and in person formed up the scattered detachments. again, when fortune had turned against the confederacy, when overwhelming forces from all sides pressed back her defenders, lee for a year held his ground with a constantly-diminishing army, fighting battle after battle in the forests and swamps around richmond. no reverses seemed to dispirit him, no misfortune appeared to ruffle his calm, brave temperament. only at last, when he saw the remnants of his noble army about to be ridden down by sheridan's cavalry, when eight thousand men, half-starved and broken with fatigue, were surrounded by the net which grant and sherman had spread around them, did he yield; his fortitude for the moment gave way; he took farewell of his soldiers, and, giving himself up as a prisoner, retired a ruined man into private life, gaining his bread by the hard and uncongenial work of governing lexington college. "when political animosity has calmed down, and when americans can look back on those years of war with feelings unbiassed by party strife, then will general lee's character be appreciated by all his countrymen as it now is by a part, and his name will be honored as that of one of the noblest soldiers who have ever drawn a sword in a cause which they believed just, and at the sacrifice of all personal considerations have fought manfully a losing battle." the saturday review. this journal, after some remarks on the death of admiral farragut, continues: "a still more famous leader in the war has lately closed a blameless life. there may be a difference of opinion on the military qualities of the generals who fought on either side in the civil war; but it is no disparagement to the capacity of grant or of sherman to say that they had no opportunity of rivalling the achievements of general lee. assuming the chief command in the confederate army in the second campaign of the war, he repelled three or four invasions of virginia, winning as many pitched battles over an enemy of enormously superior resources. after driving mcclellan from the peninsula, he inflicted on burnside and pope defeats which would have been ruinous if the belligerents had been on equal terms; but twenty millions of men, with the absolute command of the sea and the rivers, eventually overpowered a third of their number. the drawn battle of gettysburg proved that the invasion of the northern states was a blunder; and in 1863 it became evident that the fall of the confederacy could not be much longer delayed. nevertheless general lee kept grant's swarming legions at bay for the whole summer and autumn, and the loss of the northern armies in the final campaign exceeded the entire strength of the gallant defenders of richmond. when general lee, outnumbered, cut off from his communications, and almost surrounded by his enemies, surrendered at appomattox court-house, he might console himself with the thought that he had only failed where success was impossible. from that moment he used his unequalled and merited authority to reconcile the southern people to the new order of affairs. he had originally dissented from the policy of secession; and he followed the banner of his state exclusively from a sense of duty, in disregard of his professional and private interests. he might at pleasure have been commander-in-chief of the northern army, for he was second in rank to general scott. his ancient home and his ample estate on the potomac were ravaged by the enemy; but he never expressed a regret for the sacrifice of his fortune. there can be no doubt that he was often thwarted by political superiors and by incompetent subordinates, but his equable temper and lofty nature never inclined him to complaint. the regret for his loss which is felt throughout the vast regions of the south is a just tribute to one of the greatest and purest characters in american history." it will not be inappropriate to reproduce here the tribute which appeared in the london _standard_, on the receipt of the news of general lee's illness: the standard. "the announcement that general r.e. lee has been struck down by paralysis and is not expected to recover, will be received, even at this crisis, with universal interest, and will everywhere excite a sympathy and regret which testify to the deep impression made on the world at large by his character and achievements. few are the generals who have earned, since history began, a greater military reputation; still fewer are the men of similar eminence, civil or military, whose personal qualities would bear comparison with his. the bitterest enemies of his country hardly dared to whisper a word against the character of her most distinguished general, while neutrals regarded him with an admiration for his deeds and a respect for his lofty and unselfish nature which almost grew into veneration, and his own countrymen learned to look up to him with as much confidence and esteem as they ever felt for washington, and with an affection which the cold demeanor and austere temper of washington could never inspire. the death of such a man, even at a moment so exciting as the present, when all thoughts are absorbed by a nearer and present conflict, would be felt as a misfortune by all who still retain any recollection of the interest with which they watched the virginian campaigns, and by thousands who have almost forgotten the names of fredericksburg and chancellorsville, the wilderness and spottsylvania. by the south it would be recognized as a national calamity--as the loss of a man not only inexpressibly dear to an unfortunate people by his intimate association with their fallen hopes and their proudest recollections, but still able to render services such as no other man could perform, and to give counsel whose value is enhanced tenfold by the source from which it comes. we hope, even yet, that a life so honorable and so useful, so pure and noble in itself, so valuable to a country that has much need of men like him, may be spared and prolonged for further enjoyment of domestic peace and comfort, for further service to his country; we cannot bear to think of a career so singularly admirable and so singularly unfortunate, should close so soon and so sadly. by the tens of thousands who will feel as we do when they read the news that now lies before us, may be measured the impressions made upon the world by the life and the deeds of the great chief of the army of virginia. "whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the merits of the generals against whom he had to contend, and especially of the antagonist by whom he was at last overcome, no one pretending to understand in the least either the general principles of military science or the particular conditions of the american war, doubts that general lee gave higher proofs of military genius and soldiership than any of his opponents. he was outnumbered from first to last; and all his victories were gained against greatly superior forces, and with troops greatly deficient in every necessary of war except courage and discipline. never, perhaps, was so much achieved against odds so terrible. the southern soldiers--'that incomparable southern infantry' to which a late northern writer renders due tribute of respect--were no doubt as splendid troops as a general could desire; but the different fortune of the east and the west proves that the virginian army owed something of its excellence to its chief. always outnumbered, always opposed to a foe abundantly supplied with food, transport, ammunition, clothing, all that was wanting to his own men, he was always able to make courage and skill supply the deficiency of strength and of supplies; and from the day when he assumed the command after the battle of seven pines, where general joseph johnston was disabled, to the morning of the final surrender at appomattox court-house, he was almost invariably victorious in the field. at gettysburg only he was defeated in a pitched battle; on the offensive at the chickahominy, at centreville, and at chancellorsville, on the defensive at antietam, fredericksburg, the wilderness, and spottsylvania, he was still successful. but no success could avail him any thing from the moment that general grant brought to bear upon the virginian army the inexhaustible population of the north, and, employing sherman to cut them off from the rest of the confederacy, set himself to work to wear them out by the simple process of exchanging two lives for one. from that moment the fate of richmond and of the south was sealed. when general lee commenced the campaign of the wilderness he had, we believe, about fifty thousand men; his adversary had thrice that number at hand, and a still larger force in reserve. when the army of virginia marched out of richmond it still numbered some twenty-six thousand men; after a retreat of six days, in the face of an overwhelming enemy, with a crushing artillery--a retreat impeded by constant fighting, and harassed by countless hordes of cavalry--eight thousand were given up by the capitulation of appomattox court-house. brilliant as were general lee's earlier triumphs, we believe that he gave higher proofs of genius in his last campaign, and that hardly any of his victories were so honorable to himself and his army as that six-days' retreat. "there have, however, been other generals of genius as brilliant, of courage and endurance hardly less distinguished. how many men have ever displayed the perfect simplicity of nature, the utter absence of vanity or affectation, which belongs to the truest and purest greatness, in triumph or in defeat, as general lee has done? when commander-in-chief of the southern armies, he moved from point to point, as duty required, with less parade than a european general of division, wearing no sword, attended by no other staff than the immediate occasion demanded, and chatting with a comrade or a visitor with a simple courtesy which had in it no shade of condescension. only on one occasion does he seem to have, been accoutred with the slightest regard to military display or personal dignity; and that, characteristically, was the last occasion on which he wore the confederate uniform--the occasion of his interview with general grant on april 9, 1865. after the war he retired without a word into privacy and obscurity. ruined by the seizure and destruction of his property, which mcclellan protected, and which his successors gave up to ravage and pillage, the late commander-in-chief of the southern armies accepted the presidency of a virginia college, and devoted himself as simply and earnestly to its duties as if he had never filled a higher station or performed more exciting functions. well aware of the jealous temper of the party dominant in the north, and anxious, above all things, to avoid exasperating that temper against his conquered countrymen, he carefully abstained from appearing in any public ceremony or taking any overt part in political questions. his influence has been exerted, quietly but steadily, in one direction, with a single view to restore harmony and good-will between the two sections, and to reconcile the oppressed southerners to the union from which he fought so gallantly to free them. he has discountenanced all regretful longings after the lost visions of southern independence; all demonstrations in honor of the 'conquered banner;' and has encouraged the south to seek the restoration of her material prosperity and the satisfaction of her national feelings in a frank acceptance of the result of the war, and a loyal adhesion to the federal bond. it was characteristic and worthy of the man that he was among the first to sue for a formal pardon from president johnson; not for any advantage which he personally could obtain thence, but to set the example of submission to his comrades-in-arms, and to reconcile them to a humiliation without which the conquerors refused them that restitution to civil rights necessary to any effort to retrieve their own or their country's fortunes. truer greatness, a loftier nature, a spirit more unselfish, a character purer, more chivalrous, the world has rarely, if ever known. of stainless life and deep religious feeling, yet free from all taint of cant and fanaticism, and as dear and congenial to the cavalier stuart as to the puritan stonewall jackson; unambitious, but ready to sacrifice all at the call of duty; devoted to his cause, yet never moved by his feelings beyond the line prescribed by his judgment; never provoked by just resentment to punish wanton cruelty by reprisals which would have given a character of needless savagery to the war--both north and south owe a deep debt of gratitude to him, and the time will come when both will be equally proud of him. and well they may, for his character and his life afford a complete answer to the reproaches commonly cast on money-grubbing, mechanical america. a country which has given birth to men like him, and those who followed him, may look the chivalry of europe in the face without shame; for the fatherlands of sidney and of bayard never produced a nobler soldier, gentleman, and christian, than general robert e. lee." we may add to these the following just remarks upon the occupation to which general lee devoted himself at the close of his military career, from the old dominion. "surely it should be a cause of thankfulness and encouragement for those who are teachers, that their profession has received this reflection of glory and honor from this choice of his, from this life, and from this death. and it is enduring honor for all the colleges of the south, and for all our schools--an honor in which all may share alike without jealousy--that this pure and bright name is inseparably connected by the will of him that bore it with the cause of education, and is blended now with that of washington in the name of one of our own institutions of learning. we think that so long as the name of lee is honored and loved among us, our southern teachers may rejoice and grow stronger in their work, when they remember that he was one of their number, and that his great heart, that had so bravely borne the fortunes of a great empire, bore also, amid its latest aspirations, the interests, the anxieties, and the hopes of the unpretending but noble profession of teaching. "to leave this out of the account would be, indeed, to do sad injustice to general lee's own memory. and that, not only because his position in this profession was of his own choice, and was steadily maintained with unchanging purpose to the end of his life, but also because the acknowledgment of his service here is necessary to the completeness of his fame. in no position of his life did he more signally develop the great qualities of his character than in this; and it may truly be said that some of the greatest can only be fully understood in the light of the serene patience and of the simple and quiet self-consecration of his latest years. it was then that, far from the tumult of arms and from the great passions of public life, with no great ambition to nerve his heart, nor any great events to obscure the public criticism of his conduct, he displayed in calm and steady light the grandest features of his character, and by this crucial test, added certain confirmation to the highest estimate that could have been formed of his character and of his abilities. it was indeed a 'crucial test' for such a man; and that he sustained it as he did is not among the smallest of his claims to the admiration of his countrymen. no tribute to his memory can be just that does not take this last great service into the account; and no history of his life can be fairly written that shall not place in the strongest light his career and influence as president of washington college." and we may appropriately close with the following thoughtful words from the pen of hon. alexander h. stephens. "in the darkest hour of our trials, in the very midst of our deepest affliction, mourning over the loss of the noble lee, heaven sends to us as consolation the best sign of the times vouchsafed in many a day. it addresses the heart, rent as it is in surveying the desolations around us, as the rainbow upon the breast of the receding storm-cloud when its power and fury are over. "that sign is the unmistakable estimation in which the real merits and worth of this illustrious chieftain of the cause of the southern states is held by all classes of persons, not only in the south, but in the north. "partisans and leaders, aiming at the overthrow of our institutions, may, while temporarily in high places, by fraud and usurpation, keep up the false cry of _rebel_ and _traitor_; but these irrepressible outburstings of popular sentiment, regarding no restraints on great-occasions which cause _nature_ to speak, show clearly how this cry and charge are regarded and looked upon by the masses of the people everywhere. "everywhere lee is honored; not only as a _hero_, but as a _patriot_. this is but the foreshadowing of the general judgment of the people of the whole united states, and of the world, not only upon lee, but upon all of his associates who fought, bled, and died in that glorious cause in which he won his immortality. that cause was the sovereign right of local self-government by the people of the several states of this continent. _that_ cause is not dead! let it never be abandoned; but let its friends rally to its standard in the forum of reason and justice, with the renewed hope and energy from this soul-inspiriting sign that it lies deeply impressed upon the hearts of the great majority of the people in all sections of this country. "in these popular manifestations of respect and veneration for the man who won all his glory in maintaining this cause, present usurpers should read their doom, and all friends of constitutional liberty should take fresh courage in all political conflicts, never to lower their standard of principles." the end [illustration: portion of the valley of virginia] produced from images generously made available by the internet archive.) [illustration: james longstreet] from manassas to appomattox memoirs of the civil war in america by james longstreet, lieutenant-general confederate army _illustrated with plates, maps, portraits, and engravings specially prepared for this work_ philadelphia j. b. lippincott company 1896 copyright, 1895, by j. b. lippincott company. _all rights reserved._ electrotyped and printed by j. b. lippincott company, philadelphia, u.s.a. this work is respectfully dedicated to the officers and soldiers of the first corps of the army of northern virginia to the living and the dead in memory of their brave deeds, their toils, their tribulations, and their triumphs preface. immediately after the surrender of the confederate armies engaged in the war between the states, general lee undertook to write of the campaigns of the army of northern virginia while under his command, and asked such assistance as i could give in supplying reports, despatches, and letters of his, the originals of which had been lost or destroyed. under the impression that they could not be put to better use, such as were then in hand were packed and sent him. he gave up the work, and after a few years his death made it impossible that the world should ever receive the complete story of the confederate campaigns in virginia from the noble mind that projected and controlled them. possibly, had i not expected our commander to write the history of those campaigns, i should have written it myself a decade or so earlier than i have done. but, personally, i am not sorry that i write of the war thirty years after its close, instead of ten or twenty. while i am so constituted, temperamentally, that i could view then almost exactly as i do now the great struggle in which i bore a part, i do not know that others, in any considerable number, might have so regarded it at the earlier periods to which i refer. i believe that now, more fully than then, the public is ready to receive, in the spirit in which it is written, the story which i present. it is not my purpose to philosophize upon the war, but i cannot refrain from expressing my profound thankfulness that providence has spared me to such time as i can see the asperities of the great conflict softened, its passions entering upon the sleep of oblivion, only its nobler--if less immediate--results springing into virile and vast life. i believe there is to-day, _because of the war_, a broader and deeper patriotism in all americans; that patriotism throbs the heart and pulses the being as ardently of the south carolinian as of the massachusetts puritan; that the liberty bell, even now, as i write, on its southern pilgrimage, will be as reverently received and as devotedly loved in atlanta and charleston as in philadelphia and boston. and to stimulate and evolve this noble sentiment all the more, what we need is the resumption of fraternity, the hearty restoration and cordial cultivation of neighborly, brotherly relations, faith in jehovah, and respect for each other; and god grant that the happy vision that delighted the soul of the sweet singer of israel may rest like a benediction upon the north and the south, upon the blue and the gray. the spirit in which this work has been conceived, and in which i have conscientiously labored to carry it out, is one of sincerity and fairness. as an actor in, and an eyewitness of, the events of 1861-65, i have endeavored to perform my humble share of duty in passing the materials of history to those who may give them place in the records of the nation,--not of the south nor of the north,--but in the history of the united nation. it is with such magnified view of the responsibility of saying the truth that i have written. i yield to no one as a champion of the southern soldier wherever he may have fought and in whatever army, and i do not think i shall be charged more now than in war-time with "underestimating the enemy." honor to all! if i speak with some particularity of the first corps of the army of northern virginia, it must be ascribed in part to the affection of a commander, and in part to my desire to relieve its brave officers and men in the ranks from unjust aspersions. after general lee's death, various writers on the southern cause combined with one accord to hold the first corps and its commander responsible for all adversity that befell the army. i being under the political ban, and the political passions and prejudices of the times running high, they had no difficulty in spreading their misrepresentations south and north until some people, through their mere reiteration, came to accept them as facts. i simply present the facts concerning the first corps in all fulness and fairness, attested by indisputable authorities, that the public may judge between it and its detractors. in the accounts of battles and movements, the official war records supply in a measure the place of lost papers, and afford a great mass of most trustworthy statistics. i am under obligations to general e. p. alexander, general g. m. sorrel, colonel osman latrobe, colonel j. w. fairfax, colonel t. j. goree, colonel erasmus taylor, and colonel j. c. haskell for many interesting suggestions. to major george b. davis and mr. l. j. perry, of the war records office, i am under obligations for invaluable assistance; as also to mr. alfred matthews, of philadelphia, for material aid in revising the manuscript of these memoirs. the author. contents. page chapter i. the ante-bellum life of the author. birth--ancestry--school-boy days--appointment as cadet at the united states military academy--graduates of historic classes- assignment as brevet lieutenant--gay life of garrison at jefferson barracks--lieutenant grant's courtship--annexation of texas--army of observation--army of occupation--camp life in texas--march to the rio grande--mexican war 13 chapter ii. from new mexico to manassas. the war-cloud--the journey northward--appointed brigadier-general--report to general beauregard--assigned to command at the scene of the first conflict--personnel of the confronting forces--description of the field of manassas, or bull run--beauregard and mcdowell of the same west point class--battle of blackburn's ford--early's mistake--under fire of friend and foe 29 chapter iii. battle of manassas, or bull run. commanders on both sides generally veterans of the mexican war--general irvin mcdowell's preconceived plan--johnston reinforces beauregard and approves his plans--general bernard e. bee--analysis of the fight--superb work of the federal artillery--christening of "stonewall jackson"--mcdowell's gallant effort to recover lost power--before he was shorn of his artillery he was the samson of the field--the rout- criticism of mcdowell--tyler's reconnoissance--ability of the commanding generals tested 42 chapter iv. the confederates hovering around washington. an early war-time amenity--the author invited to dine with the enemy--"stove-pipe batteries"--j. e. b. stuart, the famous cavalryman--his bold dash on the federals at lewinsville- major-general g. w. smith associated with johnston and beauregard in a council--longstreet promoted major-general- fierce struggle at ball's bluff--dranesville a success for the union arms--mcclellan given the sobriquet of "the young napoleon" 59 chapter v. round about richmond. the defences of the confederate capital--army of northern virginia at centreville--aggressive action--council with the president and secretary of war--mr. davis's high opinion of mcclellan--operations on the peninsula--engagements about yorktown and williamsburg--severe toil added to the soldiers' usual labors by a saturated soil 64 chapter vi. the battle of williamsburg. the attack on fort magruder--hancock occupies two redoubts--the slaughter in early's brigade--the fifth north carolina regiment and twenty-fourth virginia mercilessly exposed--a hard-fought engagement--a confederate victory--mcclellan not on the field the greater part of the day--hancock called "the superb" by mcclellan--johnston pays high tribute to longstreet 72 chapter vii. seven pines, or fair oaks. a new line of defence--positions of the confronting armies- fitz-john porter--terrific storm on the eve of battle--general johnston's orders to longstreet, smith, and huger--lack of co-operation on the confederate side, and ensuing confusion- fatalities among confederate officers--kearny's action--serious wounding of general johnston at the close of the battle- summary and analysis of losses 81 chapter viii. sequelæ of seven pines. the forces under command of g. w. smith after johnston was wounded--the battle of the 1st--longstreet requests reinforcements and a diversion--council held--mclaws alone sustains longstreet's opposition to retiring--severe fighting- pickett's brave stand--general lee assigned to command--he orders the withdrawal of the army--criticism of general smith- confederates should not have lost the battle--keyes's corroboration 103 chapter ix. robert e. lee in command. the great general's assignment not at first assuring to the army--able as an engineer but limited as to field service--he makes the acquaintance of his lieutenants--calls a council- gains confidence by saying nothing--"a little humor now and then"--lee plans a simultaneous attack on mcclellan's front and rear--j. e. b. stuart's daring reconnoissance around the union army 112 chapter x. fighting along the chickahominy. retreat--lee's bold initiative--lee and his lieutenants planning battle--the confederates' loss at mechanicsville- gaines's mill--a. p. hill's fight--longstreet's reserve division put in--mcclellan's change of base--savage station- longstreet engages mcclellan's main force at frayser's farm (or glendale)--president davis on the field--testimony of federal generals--fierce bayonet charges--"greek meets greek"--capture of general mccall--mcclellan's masterly retreat 120 chapter xi. battle of malvern hill. last stand in the great retreat--strength of mcclellan's position--the confederates make poor use of their artillery--a mistake and defeat for lee's army--the campaign as a whole a great success, but it should have been far greater--mcclellan's retreat showed him well equipped in the science of war--review of the campaign--jackson's and magruder's misunderstanding- moral effect of the gunboats on the james river--"there should be a gunboat in every family" 141 chapter xii. halleck and pope in federal command. centres of activity gravitate towards orange and culpeper counties--pope's unsoldierly preliminary orders--jackson's and pope's encounter at cedar mountain--confidence in and esteem for general lee--the confederate commander's plans for cutting off pope miscarry--capture of captain fitzhugh with important orders--longstreet puts general toombs under arrest--general pope withdraws 153 chapter xiii. making ready for manassas again. general lee modifies his order of march--continuous skirmishing--cavalry commander stuart gets into general pope's head-quarters and captures his personal equipment--his uniform coat and hat shown along the confederate lines--jackson's superb flank movement--confederates capture trains, supplies, munitions, and prisoners--hooker and ewell at bristoe station- jackson first on the old field of bull run--longstreet's command joins passing thoroughfare gap--pope practically throws responsibility for aggressive action on mcdowell--preliminary fighting--general pope surprised by jackson--pope's orders to fitz-john porter 163 chapter xiv. second battle of manassas (bull run). battle opened by the federals on jackson's right, followed by kearny--longstreet's reconnoissance--stuart, the cavalry leader, sleeps on the field of battle--pope thought at the close of the 29th that the confederates were retreating--second day--fitz-john porter struck in flank--longstreet takes a hand in the fight late in the day--lee under fire--the federal retreat to centreville--that point turned--pope again dislodged--"stonewall" jackson's appearance and peculiarities- killing of "fighting phil" kearny--losses--review of the campaign 180 chapter xv. the maryland campaign. general lee continues aggressive work--from foraged fields of virginia into a bounteous land--longstreet objected to the movement on harper's ferry--lee thinks the occasion timely for proposal of peace and independence--confederates singing through the streets of fredericktown--mcclellan's movements- cautious marches--lee's lost order handed to the federal chief at frederick 199 chapter xvi. "the lost order"--south mountain. how the federals found the despatch--with every advantage mcclellan "made haste slowly"--lee turns back to meet him at south mountain--longstreet preferred that the stand should be made at sharpsburg--the battle at the pass--many killed- general garland of the confederate and general reno of the union side--a future president among the wounded--estimate of forces engaged 212 chapter xvii. preliminaries of the great battle. confederates retreat from south mountain--federals follow and harass them--franklin and cobb at crampton's pass--a spirited action--fighting around harper's ferry--its capitulation--the confederates take eleven thousand prisoners--jackson rejoins lee--description of the field of antietam--mcclellan posts his corps--lee's lines advantageously placed--hooker's advance on the eve of battle should have been resisted 227 chapter xviii. battle of sharpsburg, or antietam. bloodiest single day of the war--comparison of casualties- hooker opens the fight against jackson's centre--many officers among the fallen early in the day--mclaws and walker in time to meet sumner's advance under sedgwick--around dunker chapel- richardson's splendid advance against the confederate centre the signal of the bursting of another storm--longstreet's and d. h. hill's troops stood before it--fall of general g. b. anderson--general richardson mortally wounded--aggressive spirit of his command broken--wonderful cannon-shot--general d. h. hill's third horse killed under him 239 chapter xix. battle of sharpsburg, or antietam (continued). closing events of the great struggle--burnside crosses the bridge he made famous--toombs made gallant defence, but was outnumbered and dislodged--the confederate brigades from harper's ferry under a. p. hill in time for the final crisis- burnside's advance arrested by them--the battle against burnside "appeared to spring from the earth"--"lee's old war horse"--the killing of a kinsman at the bridge seriously affects general d. r. jones--the sharp fight at shepherdstown- confederates retreat--casualties of the battle--confederate losses in the campaign--neither mcclellan's plan nor execution was strong 256 chapter xx. review of the maryland campaign. confederate expectations--general lee's salutatory to the people of maryland--the "lost despatch"--mcclellan's movements--turn in the tide of war--a miracle great as the throwing down of the walls of jericho--in contempt of the enemy the confederate army was dispersed--harper's ferry a "man-trap"--it diverted the army from the main issue--lee and mcclellan compared and contrasted--tribute to the confederate private soldier 279 chapter xxi. reorganization and rest for both armies. the confederates appoint seven lieutenant-generals--the army of northern virginia organized in corps--general mcclellan relieved, and general burnside appointed commander of the army of the potomac--a lift for the south--mcclellan was growing- burnside's "three grand divisions"--the campaign of the rappahannock--getting ready for fredericksburg--longstreet occupies fredericksburg--the town called to surrender by general sumner--exodus of the inhabitants under a threat to shell the town 290 chapter xxii. battle of fredericksburg. description of the field--marye's heights--position of the troops of longstreet's command--general jackson called down from orange court-house, and preparations made for a determined stand--signal guns at three o'clock in the morning announce the long-expected battle--burnside's bridge-builders thrice driven back from their work--the crossing finally made by boats- federals under hot fire enter fredericksburg--how they obtained their foothold on the west bank of the rappahannock--gallant officers and men--ninety-seven killed or wounded in the space of fifty yards--general burnside's plan of battle--strength of the contending forces 297 chapter xxiii. battle of fredericksburg (continued). the battle-field veiled by a heavy fog--terrific fighting of the 13th of december--forlorn hope of the federals--general meade's division of franklin's command makes the first advance--general french leads against the confederate left- hancock follows--general cobb killed--the sunken road and stone wall below marye's hill--desperate advances and determined repulses--humphreys's heroic assault--the stone wall "a sheet of flame"--general jackson loses his opportunity to advance- the charge of meade's divisions compared with that of pickett, pettigrew, and trimble's columns at gettysburg--forty per cent. killed in charging lines here, and sixty per cent. at gettysburg--total losses--peace to be declared because gold had gone to 200--organization of the army of northern virginia 306 chapter xxiv. preparing for the spring of '63. burnside's abortive moves--the "mud march"--general hooker supersedes burnside--the confederates strengthen their position for the winter--longstreet ordered to petersburg--secretary of war seddon and the author talk of general grant and the confederate situation on the mississippi and in the west- longstreet makes a radical proposition for confederate concentration in tennessee, thus to compel grant to abandon vicksburg--the skilful use of interior lines the only way of equalizing the contest--battle of chancellorsville, lee's brilliant achievement--criticism--death of "stonewall" jackson--the resolve to march northward--the army reorganized in three corps--ewell and a. p. hill appointed lieutenant-generals 322 chapter xxv. invasion of pennsylvania. plan of the confederate march north--general lee hoped to draw troops from the south and develop important results north of the potomac--he wanted beauregard sent to support the movement--the authorities in richmond failed to comprehend--the value of the "interior lines" not appreciated--spirited cavalry fight at brandy station between stuart's and pleasonton's commands--engagement of ewell and milroy at winchester--the question of authority for the cavalry movements- lieutenant-colonel fremantle of the coldstream guards, british army, as a guest and observer--the confederate advance reaches pennsylvania soil--general lee issues orders for a march on harrisburg--municipal authorities of york and gettysburg surrender to general john b. gordon 334 chapter xxvi. gettysburg--first day. information of federal force and positions brought by the scout harrison--general lee declines to credit it--general longstreet suggests a change of direction in conformance with the revelation--general meade had succeeded hooker in command five days before battle--positions on the eve of the first day- confederate cavalry "not in sight"--"the eyes of the army" sadly needed--a description of the famous battle-field- generals ewell and a. p. hill engage the federals--death of general john f. reynolds--the fight on seminary ridge--general hancock in federal command on the field--concerning the absent cavalry and information given by the scout--conditions at the close of the first day's fight 346 chapter xxvii. gettysburg--second day. the confederate commander reviews the field and decides on plan of battle--positions on the morning of july 2--night march of the federal sixth corps--it was excelled by law's brigade of confederates--the battle was opened after mid-day--general hood appeals for permission to turn the federal left--failure to make the flanking movement by the confederate right was a serious mistake--hood, in his usual gallant style, led his troops forward among the rocks--desperate charges against an earnest adversary--hood wounded--general law succeeds him in command of the division--"little round top" an important point--"the citadel of the field"--it was a fight of seventeen thousand confederates against twice their number--quiet along the lines of other confederate commands--"a man on the left who didn't care to make the battle win"--evidence against the alleged order for "battle at sunrise"--the "order" to ewell was discretionary--lee had lost his balance 362 chapter xxviii. gettysburg--third day. the stroke of arms that shook the continent--longstreet opposed the attack as planned and made--the confederate column of assault--it was weak in numbers but strong in spirit- tremendous artillery combat begins the day's fighting--charge of generals pickett, trimble, and pettigrew--armistead falls by the side of the federal guns--the federal cavalry charge of general farnsworth--the commander falls with five mortal wounds--could the assaulting column have been safely augmented from longstreet's right?--testimony as to that point--where rested the responsibility for disaster?--criticism of the battle as a whole--cemetery hill stronger than marye's hill at fredericksburg--controverted points--casualties of the three days' fight--organization of the forces engaged 385 chapter xxix. the wave rolls back. confederates retreat from gettysburg--the federals pursue- crossing the potomac under difficulties--kilpatrick's cavalry dash on pettigrew's command--general lee thought to rest his army in the valley of virginia, but meade followed too fast- engagements that harassed the retreat--general lee wished to be relieved of command, but president davis would not consent to the appointment of joseph e. johnston or general beauregard 426 chapter xxx. longstreet moves to georgia. the author reverts to the perils and opportunities in the west--proposes to the secretary of war to reinforce against rosecrans from the army of northern virginia--makes plan known to general lee--the move finally effected--difficulties of transportation--a roundabout route--general longstreet narrowly escapes capture when seeking bragg's head-quarters--general bragg assigns longstreet to command of the left--instructions for the battle of chickamauga--the armies in position--federals in command of generals rosecrans, crittenden, mccook, and george h. thomas 433 chapter xxxi. battle of chickamauga. tactical features--the battle opened by direct attack on the federals in the early morning of september 20--repeated and determined front assaults--brigadiers helm killed and adams wounded--the union commands lay behind defences--hood's brigades surged through the forest against the covered infantry and artillery--hood wounded--longstreet suggests a plan for progressive action--halting tactics at high tide of success- the confederate left fought a separate battle--general thomas retreats--first confederate victory in the west, and one of the bloodiest battles of the war--forces engaged--losses 445 chapter xxxii. failure to follow success. longstreet differs with general bragg as to movements of pursuit--the confederates on lookout mountain--federals gain comfortable positions around it--superior officers of bragg's command call for his removal--bragg seeks scapegoats--president davis visits the army--tests the temper of the officers towards bragg--he offers the command to longstreet--he declines--his reasons--general bragg ignores signal-service reports and is surprised--general joe hooker's advance--night attack on lookout mountain--colonel bratton's clever work--review of the western movement and combination--it should have been effected in may instead of september--inference as to results had the first proposition been promptly acted upon 461 chapter xxxiii. the east tennessee campaign. general bragg's infatuation--general grant in command of the federal forces--longstreet ordered into east tennessee--his plans for the campaign--poorly supported by his superior- foraging for daily rations--general burnside's forces--advance upon knoxville--affairs at lenoir's and campbell's stations- engagement near knoxville an artillery combat--reprehensible conduct of officers--allegement that one was actuated by jealousy--federals retire behind their works--laying the confederate lines about knoxville 480 chapter xxxiv. besieging knoxville. closing on the enemy's lines--a gallant dash--the federal positions--fort loudon, later called fort sanders--assault of the fort carefully planned--general mclaws advises delay--the order reiterated and emphasized--gallant effort by the brigades of generals wofford, humphreys, and bryan at the appointed time--a recall ordered, because carrying the works was reported impossible--general longstreet is ordered by the president to general bragg's relief--losses during the assault and the campaign 497 chapter xxxv. cut off from east and west. impracticability of joining general bragg--wintering in east tennessee--general longstreet given discretionary authority over the department by president davis--short rations--minor movements of hide-and-seek in the mountains--longstreet's position was of strategic importance--that fact fully appreciated by president lincoln, secretary stanton, and generals halleck and grant--"drive longstreet out of east tennessee and keep him out"--generals robertson and mclaws--the charges against them and action taken--honorable mention for courage and endurance--the army finally fares sumptuously on the fat lands of the french broad 509 chapter xxxvi. strategic importance of the field. longstreet again considers relief from service--general grant at knoxville--shoeless soldiers leave bloody trails on frozen roads--a confederate advance--affair at dandridge--federals retreat--succession of small engagements--general grant urges general foster's army to the offensive--general foster relieved--general schofield in command of federals--general grant's orders--general halleck's estimate of east tennessee as a strategic field--affair of cavalry--advance towards knoxville--longstreet's command called back to defensive for want of cavalry 524 chapter xxxvii. last days in tennessee. longstreet's army at bull's gap--u. s. grant made lieutenant-general--richmond authorities awake to the gravity of the situation--longstreet's proposition for campaign- approved by general lee--richmond authorities fail to adopt it--general bragg's plan--a memorable and unpleasant council at the capital--orders from president davis--the case of general law--longstreet ordered to the army of northern virginia- resolutions of thanks from confederate congress 542 chapter xxxviii. battle of the wilderness. campaign of 1864--general grant in the field--strength of the armies--their positions--description of the wilderness--the battle opened--a brisk day's fighting--longstreet's command faces hancock's on the morning of the second day--an effective flank movement--general wadsworth mortally wounded- general jenkins falls under fire of friends, and longstreet is seriously wounded--carried from the field on a litter--tribute to general jenkins--criticism and controversy 551 chapter xxxix. again in front of richmond. longstreet absent on leave, nursing his wounds--hears of the death of cavalry leader j. e. b. stuart--returns to virginia- assigned to command on the north side of james river--affair on the williamsburg road--lee's apprehension of grant's march into richmond--closing scenes of the campaign of 1864 about the confederate capital--general benjamin f. butler's move against fort fisher--remote effects on the situation in virginia 572 chapter xl. talk of peace. second federal move against fort fisher and wilmington harbor- confederate disaffection--act of congress appointing a supreme commander of the armies--montgomery blair's peace conference- longstreet has a meeting with general ord, commander of the army of the james--military convention proposed--correspondence between general grant and general lee--longstreet's suggestions for measures in the critical juncture near the close of the war 582 chapter xli. battle of five forks. various affairs of the closing campaign--the massing of grant's forces--sortie against fort steadman--captured but quickly retaken--general grant's move around the confederate right- general lee anticipates with aggressive work--sheridan makes battle with his whole force at five forks--desperate situation of the confederates--disparity of numbers--splendid stand and battle of generals pickett and ransom--colonel pegram mortally wounded--w. h. f. lee, the "noble son of a noble sire"--corse's division--pickett's generalship--casualties 590 chapter xlii. petersburg. the fierce concerted assault by the federals--death of a. p. hill--general lee announces to richmond authorities that he must retreat--reception of the news by president davis at church service--federals take forts gregg and whitworth--the retreat harassed by continuous fighting--longstreet saves high bridge, a vital point--ewell and others compelled to surrender--general mahone's account of interesting scenes- magnitude of the disaster--"is the army dissolving?"--general reed mortally wounded--panic occurs, but order is restored- general gregg and part of his cavalry command captured by rosser and mumford 603 chapter xliii. appomattox. some of general lee's officers say to him that "further resistance is hopeless"--longstreet does not approve--general grant calls for surrender--"not yet"--the confederate chieftain asks terms--his response to his officers as represented by general pendleton--correspondence of generals lee and grant- morning of april 9--general lee rides to meet the federal commander, while longstreet forms the last line of battle- longstreet endeavors to recall his chief, hearing of a break where the confederate troops could pass--custer demands surrender of longstreet--reminded of irregularity, and that he was "in the enemy's lines"--meeting with general grant- capitulation--last scenes 618 chapter xliv. post-bellum pendant. old friends and their kindness--general grant--his characteristic letter of introduction to president johnson--in business in new orleans--political unfriendliness--cause of criticism of military career--appointed surveyor of customs- the old nurse 632 appendix. letters of general robert e. lee and general longstreet 639 list of illustrations. page general james longstreet (1895) _frontispiece._ colonel john b. richardson 37 colonel t. j. goree 47 general j. e. b. stuart 60 general r. e. lee 112 general thomas j. jackson 166 battle at thoroughfare gap 174 defeat of the federal troops by longstreet's corps (second manassas) 188 general lafayette mclaws 231 colonel john w. fairfax 250 the battle of antietam (burnside's bridge) 263 general james longstreet (1862) 290 the battle of fredericksburg (from the battery on lee's hill) 308 colonel osmun latrobe 316 lieutenant-colonel arthur lyon fremantle 343 the confederate scout harrison 346 gettysburg (second day's battle) 374 general e. p. alexander 388 general george e. pickett 392 william blake 408 retreat from gettysburg (accident during the night-crossing of the potomac on a pontoon bridge) 430 colonel r. j. moses 451 battle of chickamauga (confederates flanking the union forces) 454 the assault on fort sanders, knoxville 506 general g. m. sorrel 518 the wounding of general longstreet (battle of the wilderness) 564 colonel erasmus taylor 572 general charles w. field 577 the last line of battle (appomattox) 624 fac-simile of letter from general r. e. lee 638 list of maps. page first battle of bull run 42 battle of seven pines 96 battle of mechanicsville 124 battle of malvern hill 142 second battle of bull run (opening) 186 second battle of bull run (nightfall) 196 battle of sharpsburg 246 battle of fredericksburg 298 strategic map of the theatre of war, may, 1863 328 battle of gettysburg 362 position of confederate first corps, gettysburg, third day 399 battle of chickamauga 446 confederates around chattanooga 462 siege of knoxville 498 battle of the wilderness 556 battle of five forks 601 from manassas to appomattox. chapter i. the ante-bellum life of the author. birth--ancestry--school-boy days--appointment as cadet at the united states military academy--graduates of historic classes--assignment as brevet lieutenant--gay life of garrison at jefferson barracks--lieutenant grant's courtship--annexation of texas--army of observation--army of occupation--camp life in texas--march to the rio grande--mexican war. i was born in edgefield district, south carolina, on the 8th of january, 1821. on the paternal side the family was from new jersey; on my mother's side, from maryland. my earliest recollections were of the georgia side of savannah river, and my school-days were passed there, but the appointment to west point academy was from north alabama. my father, james longstreet, the oldest child of william longstreet and hannah fitzrandolph, was born in new jersey. other children of the marriage, rebecca, gilbert, augustus b., and william, were born in augusta, georgia, the adopted home. richard longstreet, who came to america in 1657 and settled in monmouth county, new jersey, was the progenitor of the name on this continent. it is difficult to determine whether the name sprang from france, germany, or holland. on the maternal side, grandfather marshall dent was first cousin of john marshall, of the supreme court. that branch claimed to trace their line back to the conqueror. marshall dent married a magruder, when they migrated to augusta, georgia. father married the eldest daughter, mary ann. grandfather william longstreet first applied steam as a motive power, in 1787, to a small boat on the savannah river at augusta, and spent all of his private means upon that idea, asked aid of his friends in augusta and elsewhere, had no encouragement, but, on the contrary, ridicule of his proposition to move a boat without a pulling or other external power, and especially did they ridicule the thought of expensive steam-boilers to be made of iron. to obviate costly outlay for this item, he built boilers of heavy oak timbers and strong iron bands, but the augusta marines were incredulous, as the following from the city papers of the times will indicate: "can you row the boat ashore, billy boy, billy boy; can you row the boat ashore, gentle billy? can you row the boat ashore, without paddle or an oar, billy boy?" full of confidence, the inventor thought to appeal to the governor, and his letter is still preserved in the state archives: "augusta, georgia, september 26, 1790. "sir,--i make no doubt but you have often heard of my steamboat, and as often heard it laughed at, but in this i have only shared the fate of other projectors, for it has uniformly been the custom of every country to ridicule the greatest inventions until they had proved their utility. in not reducing my scheme to active use it has been unfortunate for me, i confess, and perhaps the people in general; but, until very lately, i did not think that artists or material could be had in the place sufficient. however, necessity, that grand mother of invention, has furnished me with an idea of perfecting my plan almost entirely of wooden material, and by such workmen as may be had here; and, from a thorough confidence of its success, i have presumed to ask your assistance and patronage. should it succeed agreeably to my expectations, i hope i shall discover that sense of duty which such favors always merit; and should it not succeed, your reward must lay with other unlucky adventures. "for me to mention all of the advantages arising from such a machine would be tedious, and, indeed, quite unnecessary. therefore i have taken the liberty to state, in this plain and humble manner, my wish and opinion, which i hope you will excuse, and i shall remain, either with or without your approbation, "your excellency's most obedient and humble servant, "wm. longstreet. "governor telfair." he failed to secure the necessary aid, and the discovery passed into the possession of certain new yorkers, who found the means for practicable application, and now steam is the goddess that enlightens the world. my father was a planter. from my early boyhood he conceived that he would send me to west point for army service, but in my twelfth year he passed away during the cholera epidemic at augusta. mother moved to north alabama with her children, whence in my sixteenth year i made application through a kinsman, congressman reuben chapman, for appointment as cadet, received the coveted favor, and entered with the class that was admitted in 1838. as cadet i had more interest in the school of the soldier, horsemanship, sword exercise, and the outside game of foot-ball than in the academic courses. the studies were successfully passed, however, until the third year, when i failed in mechanics. when i came to the problem of the pulleys, it seemed to my mind that a soldier could not find use for such appliances, and the pulleys were passed by. at the january examination i was called to the blackboard and given the problem of the pulleys. the drawing from memory of recitation of classmates was good enough, but the demonstration failed to satisfy the sages of the academic board. it was the custom, however, to give those who failed in the general examination a second hearing, after all of the classes were examined. this gave me two days to "cram" mechanics, and particularly on pulleys. but the professors were too wily to introduce them a second time, and took me through a searching examination of the six months' course. the bridge was safely passed, however, and mechanics left behind. at the june examination, the end of the academic year, i was called to demonstrate the pulleys. the professor thought that i had forgotten my old friend the enemy, but i smiled, for he had become dear to me,--in waking hours and in dreams,--and the cadet passed easily enough for a maximum mark. the cadets had their small joys and sometimes little troubles. on one occasion a cadet officer reported me for disobedience of orders. as the report was not true, i denied it and sent up witnesses of the occasion. dick garnett, who fell in the assault of the 3d, at gettysburg, was one witness, and cadet baker, so handsome and lovable that he was called betsy, was the other. upon overlooking the records i found the report still there, and went to ask the superintendent if other evidence was necessary to show that the report was not true. he was satisfied of that, but said that the officer complained that i smiled contemptuously. as that could only be rated as a single demerit, i asked the benefit of the smile; but the report stands to this day, disobedience of orders and _three_ demerits. the cadet had his revenge, however, for the superintendent was afterwards known as _the punster_. there were sixty-two graduating members of the class of 1842, my number being sixty. i was assigned to the fourth united states infantry as brevet lieutenant, and found my company with seven others of the regiment at jefferson barracks, missouri, in the autumn of 1842. of the class graduating the year that we entered were g. t. beauregard and irvin mcdowell, who, twenty-three years later, commanded the hostile armies on the plains of manassas, in virginia. braxton bragg and w. j. hardee were of the same class. the head man of the next class (1839) was i. i. stevens, who resigned from the army, and, after being the first governor of washington territory, returned to military service, and fell on the sanguinary field of chantilly on the 1st of september, 1862. next on the class roll was henry wager halleck, who was commander-in-chief of the united states armies from july, 1862, to march, 1864. w. t. sherman and george h. thomas, of the union army, and r. s. ewell, of the confederate army, were of the same class (1840). the class of 1841 had the largest list of officers killed in action. irons, ayers, ernst, gantt, morris, and burbank were killed in the mexican war. n. lyon, r. s. garnett, j. f. reynolds, r. b. garnett, a. w. whipple, j. m. jones, i. b. richardson, and j. p. garesché fell on the fields of the late war. of the class of 1842 few were killed in action, but several rose to distinguished positions,--newton, eustis, rosecrans, lovell, van dorn, pope, sykes, g. w. smith, m. l. smith, r. h. anderson, l. mclaws, d. h. hill, a. p. stewart, b. s. alexander, n. j. t. dana, and others. but the class next after us (1843) was destined to furnish the man who was to eclipse all,--to rise to the rank of general, an office made by congress to honor his services; who became president of the united states, and for a second term; who received the salutations of all the powers of the world in his travels as a private citizen around the earth; of noble, generous heart, a lovable character, a valued friend,--ulysses s. grant. i was fortunate in the assignment to jefferson barracks, for in those days the young officers were usually sent off among the indians or as near the borders as they could find habitable places. in the autumn of 1842 i reported to the company commander, captain bradford r. alden, a most exemplary man, who proved a lasting, valued friend. eight companies of the third infantry were added to the garrison during the spring of 1843, which made garrison life and society gay for the young people and interesting for the older classes. all of the troops were recently from service in the swamps and everglades of florida, well prepared to enjoy the change from the war-dance of the braves to the hospitable city of st. louis; and the graceful step of its charming belles became a joy forever. of the class of 1843, ulysses s. grant joined the fourth regiment as brevet lieutenant, and i had the pleasure to ride with him on our first visit to mr. frederick dent's home, a few miles from the garrison, where we first met miss julia dent, the charming woman who, five years later, became mrs. grant. miss dent was a frequent visitor at the garrison balls and hops, where lieutenant hoskins, who was something of a tease, would inquire of her if she could tell where he might find "the small lieutenant with the large epaulettes." in may, 1844, all of our pleasures were broken by orders sending both regiments to louisiana, near fort jessup, where with other troops we were organized as "the army of observation," under general zachary taylor. in march, 1845, i was assigned as lieutenant in the eighth regiment, and joined my company at st. augustine, florida. the soldier's life of those days was not encouraging to those of active aspirations; but influences were then at work that were beginning to brighten the horizon a little. the new republic of texas was seeking annexation with the united states, which would endanger the peace between them and the republic of mexico. annexation of texas became the supreme question of the canvass of 1844. james k. polk was the nominee of the democratic and annexation party, and henry clay was on the other side as the whig nominee. polk was elected, and his party prepared to signalize its triumph by annexation as soon as it came into power; but in the last days of president tyler's administration, through skilful management of secretary of state john c. calhoun, joint resolutions of annexation were passed by both houses of congress, subject to concurrence of the congress of the new republic. strange as it may seem, the resolutions that added to the territory of the united states more than the new england and middle states combined, and which eventually led to extension to the pacific coast and hundreds of miles north, only passed the lower house by twenty-two majority, and the senate by a majority of two. when the resolution was passed, the minister from mexico to our government, general almonte, demanded his passports, and diplomatic relations between the governments ceased. on july 4, 1845, the texas congress accepted and ratified the resolutions of annexation by unanimous vote, and texas was a state of the union. general taylor's little army of observation was ordered to corpus christi, texas, and became "the army of occupation." all other available forces were ordered to join him, including general worth and his forces in florida. at the time there were in the line of the army eight regiments of infantry, four of artillery, and two of dragoons, stationed along the northern frontier from fort kent in the northeast of maine to the west end of lake superior, and along the western frontier from fort snelling to fort leavenworth, and southward to fort jessup in louisiana. by the middle of october, 1846, three thousand eight hundred and sixty men of all arms had concentrated at corpus christi. seven companies of the second dragoons had marched from fort jessup to san patricio on the nueces river, about twenty-eight miles up from corpus christi; the other three companies were halted at san antonio, texas. near our camps were extensive plains well adapted to military manoeuvres, which were put to prompt use for drill and professional instruction. there were many advantages too in the way of amusement, game on the wild prairies and fish in the broad gulf were plentiful, and there was the salt water for bathing. on one occasion during the winter a violent north wind forced the waters over the beach, in some places far enough to disturb our camps, and when they receded, quantities of fish were found in the little puddles left behind, and turtles more than enough to supply the army. the officers built a theatre, depending upon their own efforts to reimburse them. as there was no one outside the army except two rancheros within a hundred miles, our dramatic company was organized from among the officers, who took both male and female characters. in farce and comedy we did well enough, and soon collected funds to pay for the building and incidental expenses. the house was filled every night. general worth always encouraging us, general taylor sometimes, and general twiggs occasionally, we found ourselves in funds sufficient to send over to new orleans for costumes, and concluded to try tragedy. the "moor of venice" was chosen, lieutenant theoderic porter[1] to be the moor, and lieutenant u. s. grant to be the daughter of brabantio. but after rehearsal porter protested that male heroines could not support the character nor give sentiment to the hero, so we sent over to new orleans and secured mrs. hart, who was popular with the garrisons in florida. then all went well, and life through the winter was gay. formal diplomatic relations between the republics were suspended, but quasi negotiations were continued, seeking a course by which war might be averted. the authorities of mexico were not averse to the settlement according to the claims of texas,--the rio grande frontier,--but the political affairs of the country were such that they could not agree. excitement in the united states increased as the suspense continued. but the authorities, having confidence in their negotiations or wishing to precipitate matters, ordered general taylor to march across to the rio grande at matamoras in the spring of 1846. the execution of the order precipitated war. the move from corpus christi to the rio grande made necessary a change of base from st. joseph's island to point isabel and brazos santiago, near the mouth of the rio grande. supplies were sent by sea, under charge of major munroe, with a siege train and field battery, and the army took up its march on the 9th of march, 1846, the advance under general twiggs, consisting of the dragoons and ringgold's field battery. the army was well instructed, under good discipline, and fully prepared for field work, the weather was fine, and the firm turf of the undulating prairies made the march easy. wild horses and cattle, and deer and antelope, were often seen in the distance as they scampered away to hide themselves. on the 19th the head of the column approached arroyo colorado, one hundred and thirty miles from corpus christi. the arroyo was about three feet deep, of salt water. mexican lancers were on the southern side, and gave notice that they had orders to resist our further advance. on the 21st the army was up and deployed along the high banks of the arroyo, the field batteries in position. general worth was ordered to make the crossing, and rode at the head of the column. we looked with confidence for a fight and the flow of blood down the salt water before we could cross, but the mexicans had no artillery, and could not expose their cavalry to the fire of our batteries; they made their formal protest, however, that the crossing would be regarded as a declaration of war. on the 24th of march the column reached the road leading from point isabel to matamoras. general taylor ordered worth to march the greater part of the army towards matamoras and halt at the first good camping-ground, and rode towards point isabel to meet the detachment ordered there under major munroe. he found them already landed, and the mexicans fired their little hamlets and fled. after ordering construction of protection for his supplies and defensive works for the troops, general taylor returned to the army, and rode with general worth towards the rio grande. as the army approached the river the mexicans on the matamoras side made some display of forces, manned their works on that side, and prepared to resist us, under the impression that we would cross at once. general worth was sent over, and was met by general la vega, on the part of general mejia, commanding on that side. he was told that mexico had not declared war, that the american consul was in the exercise of his functions; but worth's request to see the consul was refused, which was denounced as a belligerent act, and he cautioned general la vega against passing mexicans to the north side of the river. camps were pitched in range of the mexican works about matamoras, grounds staked for constructing defensive works, and large details put out to work on them. the mexican forces at this time were three thousand, and they were soon joined by two thousand more. political affairs with them were confused. president herrera was thought to favor the claims of texas to the rio grande border. general paredes made pronunciamento, overthrew the president's government, and had authority as war president. he sent general ampudia to the frontier to take charge, but the appointment was not satisfactory on the border, and general arista was assigned. there was discord over there between the authorities and the generals, while general taylor was too far from his government to be bothered. his army was all that he could wish, except in numbers. marauding parties came over occasionally and made trouble about the ranches on the american side. one party killed colonel cross, our chief quartermaster, on the 10th of april. scouting parties were sent out to look for the intruders. lieutenant theoderic porter, in command of one party, and one of his men were caught in ambush and killed. captain walker, of the texan rangers, while out on a scout lost his camp guard of five men, surprised and killed, and later captains thornton and hardee, of the dragoons, were met at rancho carricitos by a large cavalry force and some infantry under general torrijon, who took captive or killed the entire party. captains thornton and hardee and lieutenant kane were made prisoners. the other commissioned officer of the command, george t. mason, of my class, refused to surrender; being a superior swordsman, he tried to cut his way out, and was killed. this affair was taken as open war, and general taylor called on the governors of texas and louisiana--under his authority from washington--for volunteers of infantry and cavalry. the capture of thornton and hardee created great excitement with the people at home. fanning's massacre and the alamo at san antonio were remembered, and it was reported of general ampudia, who on a recent occasion had captured a general in yucatan, that he boiled his head in oil. so it was thought he would give no quarter; but in a day or two we heard from the officers that they received great kindness from their captors, and that general ampudia had ordered that his government should allow them their full pay and every liberty consistent with their safe-keeping. they declined, however, to accept pay, and were held as the guests of generals arista and ampudia. on the 1st of may our tents were struck, wagons parked, assembly sounded, and the troops were under arms at three a.m., marched at four o'clock, and bivouacked within ten miles of point isabel. no one was advised of the cause of movements, but all knew that our general understood his business. he had been informed that general arista, with his movable forces, had marched to rancho de longoreno, some leagues below us on the river, intending to cross and cut us off from the base at point isabel. major jacob brown was left in charge of the works opposite matamoras with the seventh regiment of infantry, captain sands's company of artillery, and bragg's field battery. by some accident provision was not made complete for arista to make prompt crossing of the river, and that gave general taylor time to reach his base, reinforce it, and draw sufficient supplies. advised of our move by general mejia, at matamoras, general arista was thrown into doubt as to whether our move was intended for matamoras, and sent back part of his forces for its defence. finding, however, that taylor had gone to point isabel, arista crossed the river and put his line athwart our return march at palo alto. to hasten taylor's return, he ordered general mejia, at matamoras, to open his batteries on our troops at fort brown, and make serious demonstrations against them. general taylor started on his return on the 7th of may. we had heard the artillery-fire upon comrades left at the forts, and were anxiously looking for the order. it was received with cheers, and a good march was made, but the night was awful. the mosquitoes seemed as thick as the blades of grass on the prairie, and swarmed and buzzed in clouds, and packs of half-famished wolves prowled and howled about us. there was no need for the sound of reveille. the wolves and mosquitoes, and perhaps some solemn thoughts, kept us on the _qui vive_. arista's army was known to be in line of battle only a few miles off. about one o'clock we halted to fill the canteens, and marched to meet the enemy. the columns were deployed,--fifth infantry on the right, ringgold's battery, third infantry, a two-gun battery of eighteen-pounders, the fourth infantry, battalion of artillery acting as infantry, duncan's field battery and eighth infantry, captains charles may and croghan ker, with squadrons of dragoons, looking to the trains; the third and fourth infantry, the third brigade, under colonel john garland. that brigade, with the fifth regiment, the heavy guns, and ringgold's, were of the right wing, general twiggs commanding. other forces of the left were under colonel william g. belknap, eighth infantry, and duncan's battery. as the lines deployed, lieutenant j. e. blake, of the topographical engineers, dashed forward alone, made a close inspection of the enemy's line with such lightning speed that his work was accomplished before the enemy could comprehend his purpose, rode back and reported to the commanding general. he was one of the heroes of the day, but his laurels were enjoyed only a few hours. as he took his pistol off at night he threw it upon the ground, and an accidental explosion of one of the charges gave him a mortal wound. the line advanced until the puff of smoke from one of the enemy's guns rose, and the ball bounded over the prairie, passed over our heads, and wounded a teamster far in our rear. our infantry was ordered down and our artillery into practice. it was an artillery combat more than a battle, and held until night. the mexican cavalry made a charge against the fifth regiment, and finding our front of square too strong repeated on another front, but were repulsed. presently the grass took fire, and the winds so far favored us as to sweep the smoke in the enemy's faces, and when it passed we found the mexican line had been drawn back a little. may's squadron was sent there, and general taylor advanced the right of his line, but night closed in before decisive work could be done. the armies were near enough during the night to hear the moans of the wounded. major ringgold was mortally wounded, also captain john page, of the fourth infantry, but less than fifty of our troops were lost. early the next morning a few of the mexican troops could be seen, but when the sun rose to light the field it was found vacant. a careful reconnoissance revealed that the enemy was in retreat, and the dragoons reported them in march towards our comrades at fort brown. general taylor remained on the field a few hours to have the killed and wounded of both sides cared for, but sent the dragoons, light infantry, and ringgold's battery in pursuit, the latter under lieutenant randolph ridgely. the light infantry was of two battalions, under captain george a. mccall and captain c. f. smith. the route of march was through a dense chaparral on both sides of the road, the infantry finding their way as best they could through the chaparral, the dragoons and texas rangers moving on the road, and far off from our flanks, wherever they could find ways of passage. the company to which i was attached was of smith's battalion, on the right of the road. after a considerable march the battalion came to the body of a young mexican woman. she had ceased to breathe, but blood heat was still in her body, and her expression life-like. a profusion of black hair covered her shoulders and person, the only covering to her waist. this sad spectacle, so unlike our thoughts of battle, unnerved us a little, but the crush through the thorny bushes soon brought us back to thoughts of heavy work, and then came reports of several guns and of grapeshot flying over our heads and tearing through the wood. a reconnoissance found general arista's army on the south bank of a stream, resaca de la palma, which at this season had dried into lagoons with intervening passes. the road crossed at a wide gap between two extensive lagoons. the most of the enemy's artillery was near the road, the infantry behind the lagoons, with improvised breast defences of pack-saddles and other articles that could be found to stop musket-balls. the lagoons were about a hundred feet wide and from two to three feet deep. the position was so strong that general arista thought it would not be attacked. he left general la vega in command at the road, and made his head-quarters some distance in rear, holding his cavalry in hand to look for any flank move, unpacked his mule-train, and turned the animals out to graze. general taylor received reports of our adventures and reconnoissance when he rode up, deployed his army for battle, and ordered it forward. in the dense chaparral it was not possible to hold the regiments to their lines, and in places the companies were obliged to break files to get along. all of the enemy's artillery opened, and soon his musketry. the lines closed in to short work, even to bayonet work at places. lieutenant-colonel mcintosh had a bayonet thrust through his mouth and neck.[2] lieutenant r. m. cochran, fourth regiment, and t. l. chadbourne, of the eighth, were killed; c. r. gates and c. d. jordan, of the eighth, were severely wounded. the latter, a classmate, was overpowered and about to be slaughtered when rescued by lieutenant george lincoln, of the eighth, who slew with his sword one of the assailants. finding the enemy's strong fight, in defence, by his artillery, general taylor ordered captain may to charge and capture the principal battery. the squadron was of his own and s. p. graham's troops. the road was only wide enough to form the dragoons in column of fours. when in the act of springing to their work, ridgely called, "hold on, charlie, till i draw their fire," and loosed his six guns upon the battery at the road. the return was prompt, but general taylor, not noting the cause of delay, repeated the order. ridgely's work, however, was done, and may's spurs pressing his horses had them on the leap before the order reached his ears. in a minute he was at the guns sabring the gunners, and wheeling right and left got possession of the batteries. general la vega was found at one of his batteries trying to defend it with his sword against one of may's dragoons, but was forced to get in between the wheels of his guns to avoid the horse's heels as they pressed him, when his rank was recognized and he was called to surrender. as may made his dash the infantry on our right was wading the lagoon. a pause was made to dip our cups for water, which gave a moment for other thoughts; mine went back to her whom i had left behind. i drew her daguerreotype from my breast-pocket, had a glint of her charming smile, and with quickened spirit mounted the bank in time to send some of the mixed infantry troops to relieve may of his charge of the captive knight. as a dragoon and soldier may was splendid. he stood six feet four without boots, wore his beard full and flowing, his dark-brown locks falling well over his shoulders. his appearance as he sat on his black horse tom, his heavy sabre over general la vega, was grand and picturesque. he was amiable of disposition, lovable and genial in character. not so grand of stature, or beard, or flowing locks, randolph ridgely was as accomplished a soldier and as charming a companion,--a fitting counterpart in spirit and dash. i have gone thus far into the mexican war for the opportunity to mention two valued friends, whose memory returning refreshes itself. many gallant, courageous deeds have since been witnessed, but none more interesting than ridgely's call for the privilege to draw upon himself the fire that was waiting for may. chapter ii. from new mexico to manassas. the war-cloud--the journey northward--appointed brigadier-general--report to general beauregard--assigned to command at the scene of the first conflict--personnel of the confronting forces--description of the field of manassas, or bull run--beauregard and mcdowell of the same west point class--battle of blackburn's ford--early's mistake--under fire of friend and foe. i was stationed at albuquerque, new mexico, as paymaster in the united states army when the war-cloud appeared in the east. officers of the northern and southern states were anxious to see the portending storm pass by or disperse, and on many occasions we, too, were assured, by those who claimed to look into the future, that the statesman would yet show himself equal to the occasion, and restore confidence among the people. our mails were due semi-monthly, but during winter seasons we were glad to have them once a month, and occasionally had to be content with once in six weeks. when mail-day came the officers usually assembled on the flat roof of the quartermaster's office to look for the dust that in that arid climate announced the coming mail-wagon when five or ten miles away; but affairs continued to grow gloomy, and eventually came information of the attack upon and capture of fort sumter by the confederate forces, which put down speculation and drew the long-dreaded line. a number of officers of the post called to persuade me to remain in the union service. captain gibbs, of the mounted rifles, was the principal talker, and after a long but pleasant discussion, i asked him what course he would pursue if his state should pass ordinances of secession and call him to its defence. he confessed that he would obey the call. it was a sad day when we took leave of lifetime comrades and gave up a service of twenty years. neither union officers nor their families made efforts to conceal feelings of deepest regret. when we drove out from the post, a number of officers rode with us, which only made the last farewell more trying. passing fort craig, on the opposite side of the rio grande, we pitched our camp for the night. a sergeant of the mounted rifle regiment came over to see me, and stated that he was from virginia, and thought that he could go with us to his native state, and at the same time asked that several other soldiers who wished to return to their states might go as my escort. i explained that private soldiers could not go without authority from the war department; that it was different with commissioned officers, in that the latter could resign their commissions, and when the resignations were accepted they were independent of military authority, and could, as other citizens, take such action as they might choose, but that he and his comrades had enlisted for a specified term of years, and by their oaths were bound to the term of enlistment; that i could not entertain the proposition. we stayed overnight at fort fillmore, in pleasant meeting with old comrades, saddened by the reflection that it was the last, and a prelude to occurrences that must compel the ignoring of former friendships with the acceptance of opposing service. speaking of the impending struggle, i was asked as to the length of the war, and said, "at least three years, and if it holds for five you may begin to look for a dictator," at which lieutenant ryan, of the seventh infantry, said, "if we are to have a dictator, i hope that you may be the man." my mind was relieved by information that my resignation was accepted, to take effect on the 1st of june. in our travel next day we crossed the line into the state of texas. from the gloomy forebodings of old friends, it seemed at el paso that we had entered into a different world. all was enthusiasm and excitement, and songs of "dixie and the south" were borne upon the balmy air. but the texas girl did not ascend to a state of incandescent charm until the sound of the first notes of "the bonny blue flag" reached her ear. then her feet rose in gleeful springs, her limbs danced, her hands patted, her eyes glowed, her lips moved, though she did not care to speak, or listen to any one. she seemed lifted in the air, thrilled and afloat, holding to the "single star" in joyful hope of southern rights. friends at el paso persuaded me to leave my family with them to go by a train that was to start in a few days for san antonio, and to take the faster route by stage for myself. our travelling companions were two young men, returning to their northern homes. the ride of our party of four (including the driver) through the indian country was attended with some risk, and required vigilance, to be assured against surprise. the constant watchfulness and possible danger over a five-hundred-miles travel drew us near together, and in closer communion as to our identity and future movements, and suggested to the young men that it would be best to put themselves under my care, trusting that i would see them safely through the confederate lines. they were of the laboring class, and had gone south to find employment. they were advised to be careful, and talk but little when among strangers. nothing occurred to cause apprehension until we reached richmond, texas, where, at supper, i asked for a glass of milk, and was told there was none. "what!" said one of my companions, "haven't the keows come up?" signal was telegraphed under the table to be on guard. the _nom de plume_ of the texas bovine escaped attention, and it passed as an enjoyable _lapsus linguæ_. at galveston we took a small inland sailing-craft, but were a little apprehensive, as united states ships were reported cruising outside in search of all vessels not flying the stars and stripes. our vessel, however, was only boarded once, and that by a large spanish mackerel that made a misleap, fell amidships, and served our little company with a pleasant dinner. aboard this little vessel i first met t. j. goree, an intelligent, clever texan, who afterwards joined me at richmond, and served in faithful duty as my aide-de-camp from bull run to appomattox court-house. at new orleans, my companions found safe-conduct to their northern lines, and i journeyed on to richmond. relatives along the route, who heard of my approach, met me at the stations, though none suggested a stop overnight, or for the next train, but after affectionate salutations waved me on to join "jeff davis, for dixie and for southern rights." at every station old men, women, and children assembled, clapping hands and waving handkerchiefs to cheer the passengers on to richmond. on crossing the virginia line, the feeling seemed to culminate. the windows and doors of every farm-house and hamlet were occupied, and from them came hearty salutations that cheered us on to richmond. the spirit electrified the air, and the laborers of the fields, white and black, stopped their ploughs to lift their hats and wave us on to speedy travel. at stations where meals were served, the proprietors, in response to offers to settle, said, "meals for those going on to join jeff davis are paid." on the 29th of june, 1861, i reported at the war department at richmond, and asked to be assigned for service in the pay department, in which i had recently served (for when i left the line service, under appointment as paymaster, i had given up all aspirations of military honor, and thought to settle down into more peaceful pursuits). on the 1st of july i received notice of my appointment as brigadier-general, with orders to report at manassas junction, to general beauregard. i reported on the 2d, and was assigned to command of the first, eleventh, and seventeenth regiments of virginia volunteers, to be organized as a brigade. the regiments were commanded respectively by colonels ---moore, samuel garland, and m. d. corse, all active, energetic, and intelligent officers, anxious to acquire skill in the new service in which they found themselves. lieutenant frank armstead was assigned to duty at brigade head-quarters, as acting assistant adjutant-general, and lieutenant peyton t. manning as aide-de-camp. dr. j. s. d. cullen, surgeon of the first virginia regiment, became medical director. the regiments were stationed at manassas junction. on the 6th they were marched out, formed as a brigade, and put through the first lessons in evolutions of the line, and from that day to mcdowell's advance had other opportunities to learn more of the drill and of each other. general beauregard had previously settled upon the stream of bull run as his defensive-aggressive line, and assigned his forces accordingly. a brigade under brigadier-general r. s. ewell was posted at union mills ford, on the right of the confederate lines; one under brigadier-general d. r. jones at mclean's ford; brigadier-general bonham's brigade was placed on outpost duty at fairfax court-house with orders to retire, at the enemy's approach, to mitchell's ford, and brigadier-general p. st. george cocke was to hold the fords between mitchell's and the stone bridge, the latter point to be defended by a regiment and a battalion of infantry, and a battery, under brigadier-general n. g. evans. between mitchell's and mclean's fords, and about half a mile from each, is blackburn's ford. the guard at that point was assigned to my command,--the fourth brigade,--which was ordered to be ready, at a moment's warning, to march to position, and prepare for battle. in the mean time i was to study the ground and familiarize myself with the surroundings and avenues of approach and retreat. bull run rises from the foot-hills of the blue ridge and flows southeast through deeps and shallows into the potomac, about forty miles south of alexandria. the swell of the tide-waters up to union mills gives it the depth and volume of water of a river. blackburn's ford is in a great bend of the river, the north bank holding the concave of the turn. on the convex side was a strip of alluvial soil about seventy feet wide, covered by large forest-trees and some tangled undergrowth. outside and extending some three hundred yards from the edge of the woodland was an arable field upon a pretty ascending plain, beyond which was a second growth of pine and oak. on the north bank stood a bluff of fifteen feet, overhanging the south side and ascending towards the heights of centreville. below blackburn's ford the bluff extended, in more or less ragged features, far down to the southeast. just above my position the bluff graded down in even decline to mitchell's ford, the position assigned for bonham's brigade, the latter being on the concave of the river, six hundred yards retired from my left and at the crossing of the direct road between centreville and manassas junction. at the junction well-constructed battery epaulements were prepared for defence. the bluff of the north bank was first designated as my most suitable ground, and i was ordered to open the front, lay out and construct trenches, to be concealed by green pine-boughs. the regiments were from richmond, lynchburg, and alexandria,--more familiar with the amenities of city life than with the axe, pick, spade, or shovel. they managed, however, to bring down as many as half a dozen spreading second-growth pines in the course of two days' work, when general beauregard concluded that the advanced position of the brigade would mar his general plan, and ordered the line to be taken along the river bank of the south side, under the woodland, and close under the bluff, a position only approvable as temporary under accepted rules of warfare, but this proved a favorable exception between the raw forces of the contending armies. in addition to the two brigades on my right, the sixth brigade, under colonel jubal a. early, was posted (with artillery) near the fords. as proximate but separate commands, stood general theo. holmes, thirty miles off to the right, with a brigade, a battery, and cavalry, at and about acquia creek, and general j. e. johnston, sixty miles away, over the blue ridge mountains. holmes's should have been an outpost, but he had ranked beauregard in the old service, and as a point of etiquette was given a separate command. johnston's command should have been an outlying contingent, but he had been assigned to the shenandoah valley when, because threatened with immediate invasion, it was of first importance. beauregard was subsequently assigned to manassas junction, which, under later developments, became the strategic point. as johnston was his senior, another delicate question arose, that was not solved until the tramp of mcdowell's army was heard on the warrenton turnpike. the armies preparing for the first grand conflict were commanded by west point graduates, both of the class of 1838,--beauregard and mcdowell. the latter had been assigned to command of the federal forces at washington, south of the potomac, in the latter part of may, 1861. the former had assumed command of the confederates at manassas junction about the 1st of june. mcdowell marched on the afternoon of the 16th of july at the head of an army of five divisions of infantry, supplemented by nine field batteries of the regular service, one of volunteers, besides two guns operating separately, and seven companies of regular cavalry. in his infantry columns were eight companies of regulars and a battalion of marines, an aggregate of thirty-five thousand men. beauregard stood behind bull run with seven brigades, including holmes, who joined on the 19th, twenty-nine guns, fourteen hundred cavalry,--an aggregate of twenty-one thousand nine hundred men, all volunteers. to this should be added, for the battle of the 21st, reinforcements aggregating eight thousand five hundred men, under general johnston, making the sum of the aggregate, thirty thousand four hundred. the line behind bull run was the best between washington and the rapidan for strategy, tactics, and army supplies. general beauregard gave minute instructions to his brigade commanders of his position and general plan, which in itself was admirable. bonham was to retire from fairfax court-house, as the enemy advanced, and take his place behind mitchell's ford on the centreville and manassas junction road. it was proposed that he should engage his rear-guard so as to try to bring on the battle against him, as he approached his crossing of bull run, when the brigades along the run on his right should cross, wheel to the left and attack on the enemy's left and rear. we had occasional glimpses behind the lines about washington, through parties who managed to evade the eyes of guards and sentinels, which told of mcdowell's work since may, and heard on the 10th of july that he was ready to march. most of us knew him and of his attainments, as well as of those of beauregard, to the credit of the latter, so that on that point we were quite satisfied. but the backing of an organized government, and an army led by the foremost american war-chief, that consummate strategist, tactician, and organizer, general scott, together with the splendid equipment of the field batteries, and the presence of the force of regulars of infantry, gave serious apprehension. [illustration: john b. richardson. captain washington artillery of new orleans; whose battery fired the first gun at manassas, july, 1861, and claims the last gun at appomattox.] on the 16th of july notice came that the advance of mcdowell's army was under definite orders for the next day. my brigade was at once ordered into position at blackburn's ford, and all others were ordered on the alert. cocke's detachments were recalled from the fords between mitchell's and stone bridge, and evans was left to hold the bridge. bonham withdrew from fairfax court-house as mcdowell advanced. he retired behind the run at mitchell's ford, his vedettes following after exchanging shots with the enemy's advance on the 18th. early that morning a section of the washington artillery was posted on a rear line behind blackburn's ford, and trailed across towards the left, so as to flank fire against the direct advance upon bonham at mitchell's ford. at eight o'clock a.m. on the 18th, mcdowell's army concentrated about centreville, his immediate objective being manassas junction. from centreville the warrenton turnpike bears off a little south of west, crossing bull run at stone bridge (four miles). the manassas junction road due south crosses at mitchell's ford (three miles). other farm roads turned to the fords above and below mitchell's. his orders to general tyler, commanding the advance division, were to look well to the roads on the direct route to manassas junction and _via_ the stone bridge, to impress an advance upon the former, but to have care not to bring on a general engagement. at the same time he rode towards his left to know of the feasibility of a turning move around the confederates' right. there were three moves by which it was supposed he could destroy the confederates,--first, by turning their right; second, by direct and forcible march to the junction; third, by turning their left. mcdowell's orders to his leading divisions indicated that he had settled down to a choice as to the two opposite flanking moves; but to justify either he must first test the feasibility of the direct route. the ride to his left disclosed rough ground, rocky heights cut by streamlets, and covered by heavy forest tangle, as formidable to military manoeuvres of raw troops as armed battlements. according to preconceived plans, this eliminated the question of the flanking move by the confederate right. under the instructions, as general tyler construed them, he followed the confederates to the heights of centreville, overlooking the valley of bull run, with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry. from the heights to the run, a mile away, the field was open, and partially disclosed the confederate position on his right. on the left the view was limited by a sparse growth of spreading pines. on the right was mitchell's ford, on the left blackburn's. to have a better knowledge of the latter, he called up a brigade of infantry under general richardson, ayres's battery of six field-guns, and two twenty-pound rifle guns under benjamin. the artillery was brought into action by the twenty-pound rifle guns, the first shot aimed at the section of the washington artillery six-pounders in rear of blackburn's ford, showing superior marksmanship, the ball striking close beside the guns, and throwing the dust over the caissons and gunners. it was noticed that the enemy was far beyond our range, his position commanding, as well as his metal, so i ordered the guns withdrawn to a place of safety, till a fairer opportunity was offered them. the guns were limbered and off before a second shot reached them. artillery practice of thirty minutes was followed by an advance of infantry. the march was made quite up to the bluff overlooking the ford, when both sides opened fire. the first pouring-down volleys were most startling to the new troops. part of my line broke and started at a run. to stop the alarm i rode with sabre in hand for the leading files, determined to give them all that was in the sword and my horse's heels, or stop the break. they seemed to see as much danger in their rear as in front, and soon turned and marched back to their places, to the evident surprise of the enemy. heavy firing was renewed in ten or fifteen minutes, when the federals retired. after about twenty minutes a second advance was made to the top of the bluff, when another rousing fusillade followed, and continued about as long as the first, with like result. i reinforced the front line with part of my reserve, and, thinking to follow up my next success, called for one of the regiments of the reserve brigade. colonel hays, of the seventh louisiana regiment, was sent, but was not in time for the next attack. he was in position for the fourth, and did his share in that fight. after the fourth repulse i ordered the advance, and called for the balance of the reserve brigade. the fourth brigade, in their drills in evolution, had not progressed as far as the passage of defiles. the pass at the ford was narrow, unused, and boggy. the lagoons above and below were deep, so that the crossing was intricate and slow. colonel early came in with his other regiments, formed his line behind my front, and was asked to hurry his troops to the front line, lest the next attack should catch him behind us, when his raw men would be sure to fire on the line in front of them. he failed to comprehend, however, and delayed till the next attack, when his men promptly returned fire at anything and everything before them. i thought to stop the fire by riding in front of his line, but found it necessary to dismount and lie under it till the loads were discharged. with the federals on the bluff pouring down their fire, and early's tremendous fire in our rear, soldiers and officers became mixed and a little confused. part of my men got across the run and partially up the bluff of the enemy's side; a body of the union soldiers were met at the crest, where shots were exchanged, but passing the run, encountering the enemy in front, and receiving fire from our friends in rear were not reassuring, even in handling veterans. the recall was ordered as the few of the enemy's most advanced parties joined issue with captain marye of my advance. federal prisoners were brought in with marks of burnt powder on their faces, and captain marye and some of his men of the seventeenth, who brought them in, had their faces and clothing soiled by like marks. at the first moment of this confusion it seemed that a vigorous pressure by the enemy would force us back to the farther edge of the open field, and, to reach that stronger ground, preparations were considered, but with the aid of colonels garland and corse order was restored, the federals were driven off, and the troops better distributed. this was the last effort on the part of the infantry, and was followed by the federal batteries throwing shot and shell through the trees above our heads. as we were under the bluff, the fire was not annoying, except occasionally when some of the branches of the trees were torn off and dropped among us. one shot passed far over, and dropped in the house in which general beauregard was about to sit down to his dinner. the interruption so annoyed him that he sent us four six-pound and three rifle guns of the washington artillery, under captain eshleman, to return fire and avenge the loss of his dinner. the guns had good cover under the bluff, by pushing them as close up as would admit of effective fire over it; but under tactical formation the limbers and caissons were so far in rear as to bring them under destructive fire. the men, thinking it unsoldier-like to flinch, or complain of their exposure, worked away very courageously till the limbers and caissons were ordered forward, on the right and left of the guns, to safer cover. the combat lasted about an hour, when the federals withdrew to their ground about centreville, to the delight of the confederates. after this lively affair the report came of a threatened advance off to our right. general beauregard recalled early's command to its position in that quarter. he was ordered to march to the right, under the bluff, so that his men could not come within range of the batteries, but he chose to march back on the road leading directly to the rear, when the dust of his columns drew fire of a battery, and several damaging shots were thrown among his troops. the confederate losses were sixty-eight; federal, eighty-three. the effect of this little affair was encouraging to the confederates, and as damaging to the federals. by the double action of success and failure the confederate infantry felt themselves christened veterans. the washington artillery was equally proud of its even combat against the famed batteries of united states regulars. mcdowell was disposed to ignore this fight as unwarranted under his instructions, and not a necessary adjunct of his plans. his course and that of the officers about him reduced the aggressive spirit of the division commander to its minimum, and had some influence upon the troops of the division. for battle at this time mcdowell had 37,300[3] men and forty-nine guns. beauregard had 20,500[4] men and twenty-nine guns. chapter iii. battle of manassas, or bull run. commanders on both sides generally veterans of the mexican war--general irvin mcdowell's preconceived plan--johnston reinforces beauregard and approves his plans--general bernard e. bee--analysis of the fight--superb work of the federal artillery--christening of "stonewall jackson"--mcdowell's gallant effort to recover lost power--before he was shorn of his artillery he was the samson of the field--the rout--criticism of mcdowell--tyler's reconnoissance--ability of the commanding generals tested. before treating of future operations, i should note the situation of the confederate contingents in the shenandoah valley and at acquia creek. the latter was ordered up to reinforce beauregard as soon as the advance from washington took definite shape, and arrived as a supporting brigade to his right on the 19th of july. at the same time orders were sent authorizing johnston's withdrawal from the valley, to join with beauregard for the approaching conflict. the use of these contingents was duly considered by both sides some days before the campaign was put on foot. opposing johnston in the valley was general robert patterson, of philadelphia, a veteran of the war of 1812 and of the mexican war, especially distinguished in the latter by the prestige of the former service. johnston was a veteran of the mexican war, who had won distinction by progressive service and was well equipped in the science of war. beauregard and mcdowell were also veterans of the mexican war, of staff service, and distinguished for intelligent action and attainments, both remarkable for physical as well as mental power. [illustration: battle of bull run july 21st, 1861] between johnston and beauregard the blue ridge stretched out from the potomac southwest far below the southern line of virginia, cut occasionally by narrow passes, quite defensible by small bodies of infantry and artillery. patterson was ordered to hold johnston in the valley, while mcdowell should direct his strength against beauregard. mcdowell seems to have accepted that order as not only possible, but sure of success, while the confederates viewed the question from the other side, in a reverse light, and, as will presently appear, with better judgment. so far as it is possible to project a battle before reaching the field, it seems that mcdowell had concluded upon the move finally made before setting out on his march from washington. it was to give him an open field, with superior numbers and appointments, and when successful was to give him the approach to the base line of his adversary with fine prospects of cutting off retreat. his ride to view the approaches of the confederate right on the morning of the 18th was made to confirm his preconceived plan. the reconnoissance made by tyler on the same morning reinforced his judgment, so that the strategic part of the campaign was concluded on that morning, except as to the means to be adopted to secrete or mislead in his movement as long as possible, leaving, we may say, the result to tactical operations. but tactics is time, and more decisive of results than strategy when wisely adjusted. johnston was sixty miles away from beauregard, but the delay of three days, for mcdowell's march _via_ sudley springs, so reduced the distance in time and space as to make the consolidation easy under well-organized transportation facilities. holmes's brigade and six-gun battery were posted in rear of ewell's brigade. general mcdowell's order for battle on the 21st of july was issued on the afternoon of the 20th, directing his first division to march by the warrenton turnpike, and make a diversion against the crossing of bull run at the stone bridge, while the second and third divisions, following on the turnpike, were to file to the right, along the farm road, about half-way between centreville and the bridge, cross bull run at sudley springs, and bear down against the confederate rear and left; the first division, under tyler, to march at two o'clock in the morning, to be closely followed by the others under hunter and heintzelman; the turning divisions, after crossing, to march down, clear the bridge, and lift tyler over the run, bringing the three into compact battle order. general johnston came in from the shenandoah valley on the 20th with the brigades of bee, bartow, and jackson. the brigades were assigned by beauregard, the former two in reserve near the right of blackburn's ford, the latter near its left. beauregard's order for battle, approved by general johnston, was issued at five a.m. on the 21st,--the brigades at union mills ford to cross and march by the road leading towards centreville, and in rear of the federal reserve at that point; the brigades at mclean's ford to follow the move of those on their right, and march on a converging road towards centreville; those at and near blackburn's to march in co-operative action with the brigades on the right; the reserve brigades and troops at mitchell's ford to be used as emergency called, but in the absence of special orders to seek the most active point of battle. this order was only preliminary, coupled with the condition that the troops were to be held ready to move, but to wait for the special order for action. the brigade at blackburn's ford had been reinforced by the fifth north carolina and twenty-fourth virginia regiments, under lieutenant-colonel jones and colonel kemper. i crossed the run under the five o'clock order, adjusted the regiments to position for favorable action, and gave instructions for their movements on the opening of the battle. while waiting for the order to attack, a clever reconnoissance was made by colonels terry and lubbock, texans, on the brigade staff, which disclosed the march of the heavy columns of the federals towards our left. their report was sent promptly to head-quarters, and after a short delay the brigade was ordered back to its position behind the run. tyler's division moved early on the 21st towards the stone bridge. the march was not rapid, but timely. his first shells went tearing through the elements over the heads of the confederates before six o'clock. the second and third divisions followed his column till its rear cleared the road leading up to the ford at sudley springs, when they filed off on that route. mcdowell was with them, and saw them file off on their course, and followed their march. his fifth division and richardson's brigade of the first were left in reserve at centreville, and the fourth division was left in a position rearward of them. the march of the columns over the single track of the farm road leading up to sudley springs was not only fatiguing, but so prolonged the diversion of tyler's division at the bridge as to expose its real intent, and cause his adversary to look elsewhere for the important work. viewing the zone of operations as far as covered by the eye, evans discovered a column of dust rising above the forest in the vicinity of sudley springs. this, with the busy delay of tyler in front of the bridge, exposed the plans, and told of another quarter for the approaching battle; when evans, leaving four companies of infantry and two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge, moved with the rest of his command to meet the approaching columns off his left. bearing in mind his care of the bridge, it was necessary to occupy grounds north of the pike. the position chosen was the plateau near the matthews house, about a thousand yards north of the pike, and about the same distance from bull run, commanding the road by which the turning divisions of the enemy were to approach. his artillery (two six-pound guns) was posted to his right and left, somewhat retired. meanwhile, tyler's batteries maintained their position at and below the stone bridge, as did those near the lower fords. mcdowell's column crossed at sudley's ford at nine o'clock, and approached evans a few minutes before ten. the leading division under hunter, finding evans's command across its route, advanced the second rhode island regiment and battery of six guns of burnside's brigade to open the way. evans's infantry and artillery met the advance, and after a severe fight drove it back[5] to the line of woodland, when burnside, reinforced by his other three regiments, with them advanced eight guns. this attack was much more formidable, and pressed an hour or more before our forces retired to the woodland. the fight, though slackened, continued, while the brigade under porter advanced to burnside's support. waiting some time to witness the opening of his aggressive fight towards centreville, beauregard found at last that his battle order had miscarried. while yet in doubt as to the cause of delay, his attention was drawn to the fight opened by mcdowell against evans. this affair, increasing in volume, drew him away from his original point and object of observation. he reconsidered the order to attack at centreville, and rode for the field just opening to severe work. the brigades of bee and bartow,--commanded by bee,--and jackson's, had been drawn towards the left, the former two near cocke's position, and jackson from the right to the left of mitchell's ford. they were to await orders, but were instructed, and intrusted, in the absence of orders, to seek the place where the fight was thickest. about twelve o'clock that splendid soldier, bernard e. bee, under orders to find the point of danger, construed it as calling him to evans's support, and marched, without other notice than the noise of increasing battle, with his own and bartow's brigades and imboden's battery. the move against the enemy's reserve at centreville suspended, colonels terry and lubbock, volunteer aides, crossed the run to make another reconnoissance of the positions about centreville. captain goree, of texas, and captain sorrel, of georgia, had also joined the brigade staff. as bee approached evans he formed line upon the plateau at the henry house, suggesting to evans to withdraw to that as a better field than the advance ground held by the latter; but in deference to evans's care for the bridge, which involved care for the turnpike, bee yielded, and ordered his troops to join evans's advance. imboden's artillery, however, failed to respond, remaining on the henry plateau; leaving bee and evans with two six-pounder smoothbore guns to combat the enemy's formidable batteries of eight to twelve guns of superior metal, as well as the accumulating superior infantry forces, imboden's battery making a show of practice with six-pounders at great range. the infantry crossed young's branch under severe fire, and were posted on the line of evans's battle. [illustration: thos. j. goree. captain and aide-de-camp.] burnside was reinforced by porter's brigade, and afterwards by a part of heintzelman's division. ricketts's battery, and subsequently the battery under griffin, pressed their fight with renewed vigor. the batteries, particularly active and aggressive, poured incessant fire upon the confederate ranks, who had no artillery to engage against them except imboden's, far off to the rear, and the section of latham's howitzers. the efforts of the federal infantry were cleverly met and resisted, but the havoc of those splendid batteries was too severe, particularly griffin's, that had an oblique fire upon the confederates. it was the fire of this battery that first disturbed our ranks on their left, and the increasing pounding of that and ricketts's eventually unsettled the line. at this juncture two brigades of tyler's division, with general w. t. sherman and general keyes, crossed the run at a ford some distance above the bridge and approached the confederate right, making more unsettled their position. at the same time the attacking artillery and infantry followed up their opportunity in admirable style, pushed the confederates back, and pursued down to the valley of young's branch. at one p.m., colonels terry and lubbock returned from their reconnoissance of the ground in front of centreville, with a diagram showing points of the union lines and troops there posted. i sent it up to head-quarters, suggesting that the brigades at the lower fords be put across the run, and advance against the reserves as designed by the order of the morning. colonel terry returned with the suggestion approved, and we communicated the same to the brigades at mclean's and union mills fords, commanded by officers of senior dates to myself. the brigades were prepared, however, for concert of action. bee, bartow, and evans made valorous efforts, while withdrawing from their struggle on the matthews plateau, to maintain the integrity of their lines, and with some success, when general wade hampton came with his brigade to their aid, checked the progress of pursuit, and helped to lift their broken ranks to the plateau at the henry house. the fight assumed proportions which called for the care of both general johnston and general beauregard, who, with the movements of their right too late to relieve the pressure of the left, found it necessary to draw their forces to the point at which the battle had been forced by the enemy. at the same time the reserve brigades of their right were called to the left. general thomas j. jackson also moved to that quarter, and reached the rear crest of the plateau at the henry house while yet bee, bartow, evans, and hampton were climbing to the forward crest. quick to note a proper ground, jackson deployed on the crest at the height, leaving the open of the plateau in front. he was in time to secure the imboden battery before it got off the field, and put it into action. stanard's battery, pendleton's, and pelham's, and part of the washington artillery were up in time to aid jackson in his new formation and relieve our discomfited troops rallying on his flank. as they rose on the forward crest, bee saw, on the farther side, jackson's line, serene as if in repose, affording a haven so promising of cover that he gave the christening of "stonewall" for the immortal jackson. "there," said he, "is jackson, standing like a stone wall." general johnston and general beauregard reached the field, and busied themselves in getting the troops together and in lines of defence. other reinforcements were ordered from the right, including the reserve brigades at mclean's and union mills fords, and a number of batteries. bee and evans reformed their lines upon jackson's. after permitting burnside's brigade to retire for rest, mcdowell pushed his battle by his strong artillery arm, advancing against and turning the confederate left, only giving some little time to select positions for his batteries to plunge more effective fire into the confederate ranks. this time, so necessary for mcdowell's renewal, was as important to the confederates in getting their reinforcements of infantry and artillery in position, and proved of even greater value in lengthening out the fight, so as to give kirby smith and elzey, just off the train from the shenandoah valley, time to appear at the last moment. after arranging the new position of the troops about jackson, general johnston rode back to the lewis house, where he could better comprehend the entire field, leaving beauregard in charge of the troops engaged on his left. mcdowell gave especial care to preparing his batteries for renewal against the confederate left. he massed ricketts's and griffin's batteries, and made their practice grand. so well executed was it that the confederate left was again in peril, and, seeing reinforcements approaching towards their rear, general johnston sent orders to the brigades at the lower fords revoking authority given them to advance against centreville, and ordering their return to the south side, and the brigade at union mills was ordered to reinforce the confederate left. the brigade at blackburn's ford received the recall order in ample time, but that at mclean's,--jones's,--being a little farther away, became partially engaged before the recall reached it. the brigades resumed their former position, however, without serious trouble. with this order came a message to me, saying that the federals were pressing severely on our left, and to the limit of its tension, that reinforcements were in sight, approaching their right, which might prove too heavy for our brave men, and force us back, for which emergency our brigades should be held ready to cover retreat. these anxious moments were soon relieved by the approach of general kirby smith's command, that had been mistaken as reinforcements for the enemy. general smith was wounded, but was succeeded in command by the gallant elzey, who by a well-timed attack approached the rear of the massed batteries. at the same time a brave charge on the part of beauregard, in co-operation with this fortunate attack of smith and elzey, captured the greater part of the batteries and turned some of the guns upon the brave men who had handled them so well. mcdowell made a gallant effort to recover his lost power, riding with his troops and urging them to brave efforts, but our convex line, that he was just now pressing back upon itself, was changed. though attenuated, it had become concave by reinforcement, and in elliptical curve was delivering a concentrated fire upon its adversary. before the loss of his artillery he was the samson of the field; now he was not only shorn of his power, but some of his mighty strength was transferred to his adversary, leaving him in desperate plight and exposed to blows increasing in force and effectiveness. although his renewed efforts were brave, his men seemed to have given confidence over to despair. still a show of battle was made until general johnston directed the brigades of holmes and early to good positions for attack, when fight was abandoned and flight ensued. the regulars under sykes maintained order, and with the regular cavalry covered the confused retreat. the confederates in the field and approaching at the moment were ordered in pursuit. at the same time another order was sent the brigades at the lower fords, explaining that the reinforcements, supposed to be federals, proved to be confederates, and that the former were not only forced back, but were then in full retreat, directing our brigades to cross again and strike the retreating line on the turnpike. all of d. r. jones's brigade that had crossed at mclean's ford under the former order had not yet returned to its position under the order to that effect, and ewell had gone from union mills ford to the battle on the extreme left, so that neither of them came in position ready to take part in the pursuit. those at mitchell's and blackburn's fords advanced, the former, under general bonham, with orders to strike at cub run, the latter at centreville. finding some obstruction to his march, general bonham kept the centreville road, and joined the brigade from blackburn's, taking the lead as the ranking officer. through the abandoned camps of the federals we found their pots and kettles over the fire, with food cooking; quarters of beef hanging on the trees, and wagons by the roadside loaded, some with bread and general provisions, others with ammunition. when within artillery range of the retreating column passing through centreville, the infantry was deployed on the sides of the road, under cover of the forest, so as to give room for the batteries ordered into action in the open, bonham's brigade on the left, the other on the right. as the guns were about to open, there came a message that the enemy, instead of being in precipitate retreat, was marching around to attack the confederate right. with this report came orders, or reports of orders, for the brigades to return to their positions behind the run. i denounced the report as absurd, claimed to know a retreat, such as was before me, and ordered that the batteries open fire, when major whiting, of general johnston's staff, rising in his stirrups, said,-"in the name of general johnston, i order that the batteries shall not open." i inquired, "did general johnston send you to communicate that order?" whiting replied, "no; but i take the responsibility to give it." i claimed the privilege of responsibility under the circumstances, and when in the act of renewing the order to fire, general bonham rode to my side and asked that the batteries should not open. as the ranking officer present, this settled the question. by that time, too, it was near night. colonel g. w. lay, of johnston's staff, supported my views, notwithstanding the protest of major whiting. soon there came an order for the brigades to withdraw and return to their positions behind the run. general bonham marched his brigade back, but, thinking that there was a mistake somewhere, i remained in position until the order was renewed, about ten o'clock. my brigade crossed and recrossed the run six times during the day and night. it was afterwards found that some excitable person, seeing jones's brigade recrossing the run, from its advance, under previous orders, took them for federal troops crossing at mclean's ford, and, rushing to head-quarters at the junction, reported that the federals were crossing below and preparing for attack against our right. and upon this report one of the staff-officers sent orders, in the names of the confederate chiefs, revoking the orders for pursuit. from the effective service of the two guns of latham's battery, _at short range_, against the odds brought against them, the inference seems fair that the imboden battery, had it moved under bee's orders, could have so strengthened the position on the matthews plateau as to hold it and give time for them to retire and meet general jackson on the henry plateau. glorious victory spread her generous wings alike over heroes and delinquents. the losses of the confederates in all arms were 1982. federal losses in all arms, 3333[6] officers and soldiers, twenty-five cannon.[7] on the 22d the cavalry troop of captain whitehead was sent forward with colonel terry, volunteer aide, on a ride of observation. they picked up a number of prisoners, and colonel terry cut the lanyards of the federal flag over the court-house at fairfax by a shot from his six-shooter, and sent the bunting to head-quarters. the plan of the union campaign was that their army in the valley of the shenandoah, under general patterson, should stand so surely against the confederates in that field, under general johnston, as to prevent the withdrawal of the latter through the blue ridge, which goes to show that the concentration was considered, and thought possible, and that mcdowell was, therefore, under some pressure to act in time to gain his battle before johnston could have time for his swoop from the mountains. at centreville on the 18th, mcdowell was within five miles of his immediate objective,--manassas junction,--by the route of tyler's reconnoissance. the sudley ford route involved a march of twenty miles and drew him nearer the reach of johnston's forces. so, if tyler's reconnoissance proved the route by blackburn's ford practicable, it was imperative on mcdowell to adopt it. if it was proved impracticable, the route by sudley's ford was necessary and justified the delay. but it has been claimed that the union commander did not intend to have the reconnoissance, and that he could have made his move a success by that route if he had adopted it; which, if true, would put him in a more awkward position than his defeat. he was right in his conclusion that the confederates were prepared for him on that route, but it would have been a grave error to leave the shorter, more direct line for the circuitous route without first so testing the former as to know if it were practicable, knowing as he did that the confederate left was in the air, because of leaven looked for from over the blue ridge. after the trial of general tyler on the 18th, and finding the route closed against him, he should have given credit to the division commander and his troops for their courageous work, but instead he disparaged their efforts and put them under criticism. the experiment and subsequent events go to show that the route was not practicable except for seasoned troops. mcdowell's first mistake was his display, and march for a grand military picnic. the leading proverb impressed upon the minds of young soldiers of the line by old commanders is, "never despise your enemy." so important a part of the soldier's creed is it, that it is enjoined upon subalterns pursuing marauding parties of half a dozen of the aborigines. his over-confidence led him to treat with levity the reconnoissance of general tyler on the 18th, as not called for under his orders, nor necessary to justify his plans, although they involved a delay of three days, and a circuitous march around the confederate left. then, he put upon his division commander the odium of error and uncalled-for exposure of the troops. this broke the confidence between them, and worked more or less evil through the ranks in the after-part of the campaign. had he recognized the importance of the service, and encouraged the conduct of the division commander, he would have drawn the hearts of his officers and soldiers towards him, and toned up the war spirit and _morale_ of his men. tyler was right in principle, in the construction of duty, under the orders, and in his more comprehensive view of the military zodiac. in no other way than by testing the strength along the direct route could mcdowell justify delay, when time was power, and a long march with raw troops in july weather was pending. the delay gave beauregard greater confidence in his preconceived plan, and brought out his order of the 21st for advance towards mcdowell's reserve at centreville, but this miscarried, and turned to advantage for the plans of the latter. had a prompt, energetic general been in command when, on the 20th, his order of battle was settled upon, the division under tyler would have been deployed in front of stone bridge, as soon after nightfall as darkness could veil the march, and the divisions under hunter and heintzelman following would have been stretched along the lateral road in bivouac, so as to be prepared to cross sudley's ford and put in a good day's work on the morrow. had general tyler's action of the 18th received proper recognition, he would have been confident instead of doubting in his service. mcdowell's army posted as it should have been, a march at daylight would have brought the columns to the henry house before seven o'clock, dislodged evans, busied by tyler's display at the bridge, without a chance to fight, and brought the three divisions, reunited in gallant style, along the turnpike with little burning of powder. thus prepared and organized, the compact battle-order of twenty thousand men would have been a fearful array against beauregard's fragmentary left, and by the events as they passed, would have assured mcdowell of victory hours before kirby smith and elzey, of the army of the shenandoah, came upon the field. beauregard's mistake was in failing to ride promptly after his five-o'clock order, and handling his columns while in action. as events actually occurred, he would have been in overwhelming numbers against mcdowell's reserve and supply depot. his adversary so taken by surprise, his raw troops would not have been difficult to conquer. as the experience of both commanders was limited to staff service, it is not surprising that they failed to appreciate the importance of prompt and vigorous manoeuvre in the hour of battle. beauregard gave indications of a comprehensive military mind and reserve powers that might, with experience and thorough encouragement from the superior authorities, have developed him into eminence as a field-marshal. his adversary seemed untoward, not adapted to military organization or combinations. most of his men got back to washington under the sheltering wings of the small bands of regulars. the mistake of supposing kirby smith's and elzey's approaching troops to be union reinforcements for mcdowell's right was caused by the resemblance, at a distance, of the original confederate flag to the colors of federal regiments. this mishap caused the confederates to cast about for a new ensign, brought out our battle-flag, led to its adoption by general beauregard, and afterwards by higher authority as the union shield of the confederate national flag. the supplies of subsistence, ammunition, and forage passed as we marched through the enemy's camps towards centreville seemed ample to carry the confederate army on to washington. had the fight been continued to that point, the troops, in their high hopes, would have marched in terrible effectiveness against the demoralized federals. gaining confidence and vigor in their march, they could well have reached the capital with the ranks of mcdowell's men. the brigade at blackburn's ford (five regiments), those at mclean's and mitchell's fords, all quite fresh, could have been reinforced by all the cavalry and most of the artillery, comparatively fresh, and later by the brigades of holmes, ewell, and early. this favorable aspect for fruitful results was all sacrificed through the assumed authority of staff-officers who, upon false reports, gave countermand to the orders of their chiefs. on the 21st a regiment and battery were discharged from the union army, reducing its aggregate to about 34,000. the confederates had 31,860. mcdowell crossed bull run with 18,500 of his men, and engaged in battle 18,053 confederates. there seem to be no data from which the precise figures can be had. these estimates, though not strictly accurate, are justified by returns so far as they have been officially rendered. the confederate army in this battle was organized as follows: army of the potomac (afterwards first corps), under brig.-gen. g. t. beauregard:--_infantry_: _first brigade_, under brig.-gen. m. s. bonham, 11th n. c., 2d, 3d, 7th, and 8th s. c.; _second brigade_, brig.-gen. r. s. ewell, 5th and 6th ala., 6th la.; _third brigade_, brig.-gen. d. r. jones, 17th and 18th miss., 5th s. c.; _fourth brigade_, brig.-gen. james longstreet, 5th n. c., 1st, 11th, and 17th va.; _fifth brigade_, col. p. st. george cocke, 1st la. battn., 8th va. (seven companies), 18th, 19th, 28th, and 49th va. (latter, three companies); _sixth brigade_, col. j. a. early, 13th miss., 4th s. c., 7th and 24th va.; _troops not brigaded_: 7th and 8th la., hampton legion, s. c., 30th va. (cav.), harrison's battn. (cav.); _independent companies_: 10th cav., washington (la.) cav.; _artillery_: kemper's, latham's, loudoun, and shield's batteries, camp pickens companies. army of the shenandoah (johnston's division), brig.-gen. joseph e. johnston:--_first brigade_, col. t. j. jackson, 2d, 4th, 5th, and 27th va., pendleton's batt.; _second brigade_, col. f. s. bartow, 7th, 8th, and 9th ga., duncan's and pope's ky. battns., alburti's batt.; _third brigade_, brig.-gen. barnard e. bee, 4th ala., 2d and 11th miss., 1st tenn., imboden's batt.; _fourth brigade_, col. a. elzey, 1st md. battn., 3d tenn., 10th and 13th va., grane's batt.; _not brigaded_: 1st va. cav., 33d va. inf. the federal army, commanded by brigadier-general irvin mcdowell, was organized as follows: first division, brig.-gen. daniel tyler:--_first brigade_, col. e. d. keyes, 2d me., 1st, 2d, and 3d conn.; _second brigade_, brig.-gen. r. c. schenck, 2d n. y., 1st and 2d ohio, batt. e, 2d u. s. art.; _third brigade_, col. w. t. sherman, 13th, 69th, and 79th n. y., 2d wis., batt. e, 3d u. s. art.; _fourth brigade_, col. i. b. richardson, 1st mass., 12th n. y., 2d and 3d mich., batt. g, 1st u. s. art., batt. m, 2d u. s. art. second division, (1) col. david hunter (wounded); (2) col. andrew porter:--_first brigade_, col. andrew porter, 8th (militia), 14th, and 27th n. y., battn. u. s. inf., battn. u. s. marines, battn. u. s. cav., batt. d, 5th u. s. art.; _second brigade_, col. a. e. burnside, 2d n. h., 1st and 2d r. i., 71st n. y. third division, col. s. p. heintzelman (wounded):--_first brigade_, col. w. b. franklin, 5th and 11th mass., 1st minn., batt. i, 1st u. s. art.; _second brigade_, col. o. b. wilcox (wounded and captured), 11th n. y. (fire zouaves), 38th n. y., 1st and 4th mich., batt. d, 2d u. s. art.; _third brigade_, col. o. o. howard, 3d, 4th, and 5th me., 2d vt. fourth (reserve) division,[8] brig.-gen. theodore runyon, 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th n. j. (three months), 1st, 2d, and 3d n. j., 41st n. y. (three years). fifth division, col. dixon s. miles:--_first brigade_,[9] col. louis blenker, 8th n. y. (vols.), 29th and 39th n. y., 27th penn., batt. a, 2d u. s. art., rookwood's n. y. batt.; _second brigade_, col. thomas a. davies, 16th, 18th, 31st, and 32d n. y., batt. g, 2d u. s. art. chapter iv. the confederates hovering around washington. an early war-time amenity--the author invited to dine with the enemy--"stove-pipe batteries"--j. e. b. stuart, the famous cavalryman--his bold dash on the federals at lewinsville--major-general g. w. smith associated with johnston and beauregard in a council--longstreet promoted major-general--fierce struggle at ball's bluff--dranesville a success for the union arms--mcclellan given the sobriquet of "the young napoleon." after general mcdowell reached washington my brigade was thrown forward, first to centreville, then to fairfax court-house, and later still to falls church and munson's and mason's hills; the cavalry, under colonel j. e. b. stuart, constituting part of the command. we were provokingly near washington, with orders not to attempt to advance even to alexandria. well-chosen and fortified positions, with soldiers to man them, soon guarded all approaches to the capital. we had frequent little brushes with parties pushed out to reconnoitre. nevertheless, we were neither so busy nor so hostile as to prevent the reception of a cordial invitation to a dinner-party on the other side, to be given to me at the head-quarters of general richardson. he was disappointed when i refused to accept this amenity, and advised him to be more careful lest the politicians should have him arrested for giving aid and comfort to the enemy. he was my singularly devoted friend and admirer before the war, and had not ceased to be conscious of old-time ties. the service at falls church, munson's and mason's hills was first by my brigade of infantry, a battery, and stuart's cavalry. during that service the infantry and batteries were relieved every few days, but the cavalry was kept at the front with me. as the authorities allowed me but one battery, and that was needed from time to time to strike out at anything and everything that came outside the fortified lines, we collected a number of old wagon-wheels and mounted on them stove-pipes of different calibre, till we had formidable-looking batteries, some large enough of calibre to threaten alexandria, and even the national capitol and executive mansion. it is needless to add that munson's hill was so safe as not to disturb our profound slumbers. this was before the federals began to realize all of their advantages by floating balloons above our heads. one of the most conspicuous and successful of our affairs occurred on the 11th of september. a brigade of the enemy's infantry, with eight pieces of artillery and a detachment of cavalry, escorting a reconnoitring party, advanced to lewinsville. if they had secured and fortified a position there they would have greatly annoyed us. colonel stuart, who from the start had manifested those qualities of daring courage, tempered by sagacity, which so admirably fitted him for outpost service, had his pickets so far to the front that he was promptly informed of the presence of the enemy. he was ordered, with about eight hundred infantry, a section of rosser's battery, and captain patrick's troop of cavalry, to give battle, and so adroitly approached the enemy as to surprise him, and by a bold dash drove him off in confusion, with some loss. we had a number of small affairs which served to season the troops and teach the importance of discipline and vigilance. it was while at falls church that major-general g. w. smith reported for duty with the army of northern virginia, and was associated with general johnston and general beauregard, the three forming a council for the general direction of the operations of the army. general mcclellan had by this time been appointed to superior command on the federal side. [illustration: general j. e. b. stuart] despairing of receiving reinforcement to enable him to assume the offensive, general johnston regarded it as hazardous to hold longer the advanced post of munson's and mason's hills, drew the troops back to and near fairfax court-house, and later, about the 19th of october, still farther to centreville, and prepared for winter quarters by strengthening his positions and constructing huts, the line extending to union mills on the right. these points were regarded as stronger in themselves and less liable to be turned than the positions at and in advance of fairfax court-house. we expected that mcclellan would advance against us, but were not disturbed. i was promoted major-general, which relieved me of the outpost service, to which colonel stuart was assigned. the autumn and early winter were not permitted to pass without some stirring incidents in our front. soon after the battle of july 21, colonel eppa hunton was ordered to reoccupy leesburg with his regiment, the eighth virginia. later, the thirteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth mississippi regiments were sent to the same vicinity, and with the regiment already there and a battery constituted the seventh brigade, brigadier-general n. g. evans commanding. to cover a reconnoissance and an expedition to gather supplies made by general mccall's division to dranesville, general mcclellan ordered general c. p. stone, commanding at poolesville, maryland, to make a demonstration in force against leesburg, and, if practicable, to dislodge the confederates at that place. early in the morning of the 21st of october four of general stone's regiments crossed the potomac at edwards's ferry, and about the same time five other regiments, under the immediate command of colonel baker, late united states senator from oregon, crossed the river above at ball's bluff. leaving colonel barksdale with his thirteenth mississippi, with six pieces of artillery as a reserve, to hold in check the force that had crossed at edwards's ferry, evans with his main force assailed the force under colonel baker, and after a long and fierce struggle, under a heavy fire of batteries on both sides of the river, drove them down the bluff to the river, many surrendering, others plunging into the river to recross, overcrowding and sinking the boats that had brought them over; some drowning in the potomac. two months later, december 20, there was an affair at dranesville which for us was by no means so satisfactory as evans's at leesburg and ball's bluff. it was known that food for men and horses could be found in the vicinity of dranesville. all of the available wagons of the army were sent to gather and bring it in, and colonel stuart, with one hundred and fifty of his cavalry, the sumter flying artillery (captain a. s. cutts), and four regiments of infantry detailed from different brigades, was charged with the command of the foraging party. the infantry regiments were the eleventh virginia, colonel samuel garland; tenth alabama, colonel forney; sixth south carolina, lieutenant-colonel secrest; and first kentucky, colonel thomas taylor; the cavalry, ransom's and bradford's. general mccall, commanding the nearest union division, happened just then to want those supplies, or, as seems more probable, had information through a spy of stuart's expedition. he took measures to gather the supplies, or surprise and perhaps capture or destroy stuart's party. however that may be, when stuart reached the vicinity of dranesville he found himself in the presence of general ord, who had under him his own brigade of five regiments of infantry, easton's battery, two twenty-four-pound howitzers and two twelve-pound guns, and two squadrons of cavalry. finding that he was anticipated, and that his only way of saving the train was to order it back to centreville in all haste, stuart decided to attack, in order to give it time to get to a place of safety, and despatched a detachment of cavalry on the turnpike towards leesburg to warn the wagons to hasten back to centreville, the cavalry to march between them and the enemy. he ordered his artillery and infantry to hasten to the front, and as soon as they came up assailed the enemy vigorously, continuing the engagement until he judged that his wagon-train had passed beyond danger; then he extricated his infantry and artillery from the contest, with a much heavier loss than he had inflicted on the enemy, leaving the killed and some of the wounded. it was the first success that had attended the union arms in that quarter, and was magnified and enjoyed on that side. this action advanced mcclellan considerably in popular estimation and led to the bestowal upon him, by some enthusiast, of the sobriquet "the young napoleon." during the autumn and early winter the weather had been unusually fine. the roads and fields in that section were generally firm and in fine condition for marching and manoeuvring armies. with the beginning of the new year winter set in with rain and snow, alternate freezing and thawing, until the roads and fields became seas of red mud. as no effort of general advance was made during the season of firm roads, we had little apprehension of trouble after the winter rains came to make them too heavy for artillery service. chapter v. round about richmond. the defences of the confederate capital--army of northern virginia at centreville--aggressive action--council with the president and secretary of war--mr. davis's high opinion of mcclellan--operations on the peninsula--engagements about yorktown and williamsburg--severe toil added to the soldiers' usual labors by a saturated soil. apropos of the attack upon richmond, apprehended in the winter of 1861-62, it should be borne in mind that there were four routes supposed to be practicable for the advance of the enemy: 1. the original route by manassas junction and the orange and alexandria railroad. 2. by crossing the potomac near potomac creek, thence by fredericksburg to richmond. 3. by land,--the shortest,--to go down the potomac to the lower rappahannock, landing at or near urbana, and thence march for the confederate capital. 4. by transports to fortress monroe, thence by the peninsula, between the james and york rivers. general mcclellan's long delay to march against general johnston, when he was so near and accessible at centreville, indicated that he had no serious thought of advancing by that route. to prepare to meet him on either of the other routes, a line behind the rapidan was the chosen position. general beauregard had been relieved of duty in virginia and ordered west with general a. s. johnston. the withdrawal from centreville was delayed some weeks, waiting for roads that could be travelled, but was started on the 9th of march, 1862, and on the 11th the troops were south of the rappahannock. general whiting's command from occoquan joined general holmes at fredericksburg. generals ewell and early crossed by the railroad bridge and took positions near it. general g. w. smith's division and mine marched by the turnpike to near culpeper court-house. general stuart, with the cavalry, remained on bull run until the 10th, then withdrew to warrenton junction. during the last week of march our scouts on the potomac reported a large number of steamers, loaded with troops, carrying, it was estimated, about one hundred and forty thousand men, passing down and out of the potomac, destined, it was supposed, for fortress monroe, or possibly for the coast of north carolina. we were not left long in doubt. by the 4th of april, mcclellan had concentrated three _corps d'armée_ between fortress monroe and newport news, on the james river. the confederate left crossed the rapidan, and from orange court-house made connection with the troops on the rappahannock at fredericksburg. about the 1st of april, generals johnston and g. w. smith were called to richmond for conference with the war department, leaving me in command. on the 3d i wrote general jackson, in the shenandoah valley, proposing to join him with sufficient reinforcements to strike the federal force in front of him a sudden, severe blow, and thus compel a change in the movements of mcclellan's army. i explained that the responsibility of the move could not be taken unless i was with the detachment to give it vigor and action to meet my views, or give time to get back behind the rapidan in case the authorities discovered the move and ordered its recall. i had been left in command on the rapidan, but was not authorized to assume command of the valley district. as the commander of the district did not care to have an officer there of higher rank, the subject was discontinued. general johnston, assigned to the department of the peninsula and norfolk, made an inspection of his new lines, and on his return recommended that they should be abandoned. meanwhile, his army had been ordered to richmond. he was invited to meet the president to discuss military affairs, and asked general g. w. smith and myself to go with him. the secretary of war and general r. e. lee were with the president when we met. it was the first time that i had been called to such august presence, to deliberate on momentous matters, so i had nothing to say till called on. the views intended to be offered were prefaced by saying that i knew general mcclellan; that he was a military engineer, and would move his army by careful measurement and preparation; that he would not be ready to advance before the 1st of may. the president interrupted, and spoke of mcclellan's high attainments and capacity in a style indicating that he did not care to hear any one talk who did not have the same appreciation of our great adversary. mcclellan had been a special favorite with mr. davis when he was secretary of war in the pierce administration, and he seemed to take such reflections upon his favorites as somewhat personal. from the hasty interruption i concluded that my opinion had only been asked through polite recognition of my presence, not that it was wanted, and said no more. my intention was to suggest that we leave magruder to look after mcclellan, and march, as proposed to jackson a few days before, through the valley of virginia, cross the potomac, threaten washington, and call mcclellan to his own capital. at the time of mcclellan's landing on the peninsula, the confederate army on that line was commanded by major-general j. bankhead magruder, and consisted of eleven thousand men of all arms. the defensive line was pitched behind the warwick river, a sluggish stream that rises about a mile south of yorktown, and flows south to its confluence with james river. the warwick was dammed at different points, thus flooding the intervening low lands as far as lee's mills, where the river spreads into marsh lands. the dams were defended by batteries and rifle-trenches. the left rested at yorktown, which was fortified by continuous earthworks, strong water and land batteries, and rifle-trenches reaching to the right, connecting with those behind the warwick. yorktown is on the right bank of york river, which narrows at that point, with gloucester point on the opposite bank. this point was also fortified, and held by a strong garrison. on the south side of the james, general huger held norfolk, near its mouth, fortified and garrisoned by about ten thousand men, while the james river floated the confederate vessels "virginia" ("merrimac"), "yorktown," "jamestown," and "teaser." mcclellan's army, embarked from alexandria and moved by transports to the vicinity of fortress monroe, as first collected, numbered one hundred and eight thousand of all arms, including the garrison at fortress monroe. magruder was speedily reinforced by a detachment from huger's army, and afterwards by early's brigade of johnston's army, and after a few days by the balance of johnston's army, the divisions of g. w. smith, d. h. hill, and longstreet, with stuart's cavalry, general johnston in command. general mcclellan advanced towards the confederate line and made some efforts at the dams, but it was generally understood that his plan was to break the position by regular approaches. after allowing due time for the completion of his battering arrangements, johnston abandoned his line the night of may 3 and marched back towards richmond, ordering a corresponding move by the troops at norfolk; but the confederate authorities interfered in favor of norfolk, giving that garrison time to withdraw its army supplies. the divisions of g. w. smith and d. h. hill were ordered by the yorktown and williamsburg road, magruder's and longstreet's by the hampton and lee's mill road, stuart's cavalry to cover both routes. anticipating this move as the possible result of operations against his lower line, general magruder had constructed a series of earthworks about two miles in front of williamsburg. the main work, fort magruder, was a bastion. on either side redoubts were thrown up reaching out towards the james and york rivers. the peninsula is about eight miles wide at that point. college creek on the right flows into james river, and queen's creek on the left into the york, both giving some defensive strength, except at mill-dams, which were passable by vehicles. the redoubts on the left of fort magruder commanded the dam in queen's creek at sanders's pond, but the dam in college creek was beyond protection from the redoubts. the four redoubts on the right of fort magruder had commanding positions of the fort. finding the entire line of intrenchments at yorktown empty on the morning of may 4, mcclellan ordered pursuit by his cavalry under its chief, general stoneman, with four batteries of horse artillery, supported by hooker's division on the yorktown road and w. f. smith's on the hampton road. they were followed on the hampton road by general heintzelman (kearny's division), third corps, and couch's and casey's divisions of keyes's (fourth) corps, sumner's (second) corps on the yorktown road. nearing williamsburg, the roads converge and come together in range of field batteries at fort magruder. about eight miles out from yorktown, on the hampton road, stuart, hearing of severe cavalry fight by the part of his command on the yorktown road, thought to ride across to the enemy's rear and confuse his operations, but presently found a part of the enemy's cavalry and a battery under general emory marching in his rear by a cross-road from the yorktown road. he formed and charged in column of fours, gaining temporary success, but fell upon the enemy's battery, and found benson prompt in getting into action, and in turn, with dismounted troopers, drove him back, cutting his line of retreat and forcing him off to the beach road along the james river. the march of emory's cavalry across to the hampton road misled hooker's division to the same march, and that division, crowding the highway, caused smith's division to diverge by a cross-road, which led it over into the yorktown road. these misleadings delayed the advance on both roads. emory followed stuart until the latter in turn came upon strong grounds, where pursuit became isolated and hazardous. the removal of the confederate cavalry from the hampton road left hooker's march free of molestation. but not advised of the opportunity, he took the precautions usual on such occasions. his early approach, however, hurried the movements of the confederate cavalry on the yorktown road, and let the enemy in upon us on that road before we were advised of his approach. general johnston rode near the rear of his army to receive despatches from his cavalry commander. general stuart wrote and sent them, but his couriers found the enemy's cavalry in the way and returned to him. the cavalry fight on the yorktown road was also damaging to the confederates, and not reported to the commanding general. about four p.m., general cook's cavalry and the horse artillery under gibson debouched from the woodlands on the yorktown road and began to examine the open ground in front of the confederate field-works. general johnston, who was at the rear, hurried semmes's brigade of mclaws's division into the nearest redoubts, and ordered mclaws to call back another brigade. kershaw was ordered, and manly's battery. the battery had to go at a run to be sure of their cover in the redoubts. another battery was ordered by mclaws, who rode and took command. when kershaw got to the fort, part of his men were deployed in the wood beyond, to his left. meanwhile, the federal cavalry was advancing, gibson's horse artillery and manly's confederate battery were in severe combat, the latter having the benefit of gun-proof parapets. observing the approach of cavalry near his left, mclaws ordered two of manly's guns into fort magruder, which, with the assistance of kershaw's infantry, drove off that column. some cavalry, riding near the left redoubt with little concern, were first taken for confederates, but the next moment were identified as federals, when the artillery was turned upon them, and, with the confederate cavalry, pushed them quite away. when the left redoubt, commanding the dam at sanders's pond, was occupied by a part of kershaw's men, mccarthy's battery came into action, and, with the assistance of others, gave gibson's battery, in the open, serious trouble. mclaws ordered an advance of part of semmes's brigade, led by colonel cummings. this, with the severe artillery fire from the redoubts and guns afield, cleared the open, leaving one of gibson's guns in the mud, which was secured by mccarthy's men as a trophy of the day's work. ten horses had been sent back to haul the piece off, but the mud was too heavy for them. stuart, with the troopers of his immediate following and his section of horse artillery, crossed college creek near james river, and came in after the action at the redoubts. emory abandoned the pursuit as not feasible, and bivouacked on the route. cavalry rencounters of the day were reported, in which both sides claimed success. stuart reported lieutenant-colonel wickham and four men wounded. of the other side, cooke reported thirty-five killed, wounded, and missing. gibson reported one officer and four men wounded, and one gun abandoned. emory reported two killed and four wounded, and sanders one officer wounded. but most of the federal losses were in the encounters at the redoubts with the artillery and infantry. the enemy's cavalry reported the redoubt on the confederate left unoccupied, and hancock's brigade (smith's division) was ordered forward to take it, but the woods through which he marched were tangled and swampy, and delayed him until night brought him to bivouac. meanwhile, the confederates who drove the cavalry from its reconnoissance had occupied the redoubt. the corps commanders sumner, heintzelman, and keyes and the cavalry leader stoneman were together that night in conference. the highways, over flats but little above tide-water, were saturated by the spring rains, cut into deep ruts by the haul of heavy trains, and puddled by the tramp of infantry and cavalry. the wood and fallow lands were bogs, with occasional quicksands, adding severest labor to the usual toils of battle. so no plans were formed, further than to feel the way forward when there was light to see. the enemy got some of our men who were worn out by the fatigue of the siege and the heavy march of the night and day. chapter vi. the battle of williamsburg. the attack on fort magruder--hancock occupies two redoubts--the slaughter in early's brigade--the fifth north carolina regiment and twenty-fourth virginia mercilessly exposed--a hard-fought engagement--a confederate victory--mcclellan not on the field the greater part of the day--hancock called "the superb" by mcclellan--johnston pays high tribute to longstreet. before quitting his trenches at yorktown, johnston anticipated a move of part of mcclellan's army by transports to the head of york river, to cut his line of march towards richmond, and conceived it important to have a strong force at that point in time to meet and check the move. to that end he ordered magruder to march at two a.m. on the 5th of may with d. r. jones's and mclaws's divisions, to be followed by the divisions of g. w. smith and d. h. hill; longstreet's division to cover the movement of his trains and defend stuart's cavalry in case of severe pressure. late in the afternoon of the 4th i was ordered to send a brigade to the redoubts to relieve mclaws's division. the brigades being small, i sent two, r. h. anderson's and pryor's, with macon's battery, under lieutenant clopton, two guns under captain garrett, and two under captain mccarthy, to report to general anderson, the senior brigadier. at the time it was thought that the army would be on the march by daylight in the morning, and that the rear-guard would closely follow; but after nightfall a down-pour of rain came, flooding thoroughfares and by-ways, woodlands and fields, so that parts of our trains were stalled on the ground, where they stood during the night. it was dark when anderson joined mclaws, who had drawn his men together in readiness to join the advance march. anticipating an early march himself, anderson occupied fort magruder and advanced his pickets so as to cover with their fire the junction of the yorktown and hampton roads. heavy clouds and darkness settling down upon him, he made no effort at a critical survey of the surroundings; while the steady rain through the night gave signs of serious delay in the movements of the army, but he little thought that by the delay he could be called into battle. in the morning when time grew heavier he was advised to call in the brigades near him, in case he should need them, and instructions were sent them to answer his call. at daylight he occupied the redoubts on the right of fort magruder, and two of those on the left. two others farther on the left were not seen through the rain, and no one had been left to tell him of them or of the grounds. the field in his front and far off on his right was open. that in the immediate front had been opened by felling trees. on his left were woodland and the swampy creek. general hooker's division of the third corps came to the open on the hampton road at seven a.m. of the 5th, and engaged by regiments,--the first massachusetts on his left, preceded by a battalion of skirmishers; the second new hampshire on the right, in the same order; hancock's brigade of w. f. smith's division of the fourth corps threatening on the yorktown road; supported by part of davidson's brigade and artillery. after the advance of his infantry in the slashes, general hooker, with the eleventh massachusetts and thirty-sixth pennsylvania regiments of grover's brigade, cleared the way for communication with the troops on the yorktown road, and ordered webber's six-gun battery into action towards the front of the fallen timber. as it burst from the wood our infantry and every gun in reach opened upon it a fire so destructive that it was unmanned before it came into practice. volunteers to man the battery were called, and with the assistance of men of osborn's battery the guns were opened. bramhall's battery was advanced and put into action on the right of webber's, when the two poured an unceasing fire against our troops about the fort and redoubts. it was not very destructive, however, and they thought to reserve their ammunition. the fifth new jersey regiment, of patterson's brigade, was added to the guard of the batteries, and the sixth, seventh, and eighth were deployed on the left in the woodland. anderson called up wilcox's brigade, and ordered it to his right, reinforced it by the men of pryor's brigade not needed at the forts, and presently called for the brigades of a. p. hill and pickett, to further support his right. from the swelling noise of battle i concluded that it would be well to ride to the front, and ordered the remaining brigade (colston's) and the batteries of dearing and stribling to follow. stuart sent his horse artillery under pelham into the action on the open field. viewing the ground on the left, i thought it not so well protected as anderson conceived, and sent to d. h. hill, who was but little advanced on his march, for one of his brigades. early's was sent, to whose brigade were temporarily attached the florida regiment and a mississippi battalion. anderson had left the fort, and was busy handling the brigades engaged in the woods on the right. colston's was put in with the other brigades under anderson, who afterwards called for another regiment. the florida regiment and the mississippi battalion were sent. early, with his brigade, was posted on the field in rear of our left. when it became evident that the fight was for the day, d. h. hill was asked to return with the balance of his division. meanwhile, hooker was bracing the fight on his left. emory reported to him with his cavalry and light battery, but as his fight was in the wood, emory was asked to reconnoitre on his extreme left. the fight growing in the wood, grover drew off part of his brigade to reinforce against it. the seventy-second and seventeenth new york regiments of taylor's brigade were also sent; then the seventy-third and seventy-fourth new york regiments of the same brigade; but the confederates gained ground gradually. they were, however, getting short of ammunition. while holding their line, some of the regiments were permitted to retire a little to fill their cartridge-boxes from those of the fallen of the enemy and of their comrades. this move was misconstrued into an order to withdraw, and the line fell back a little. but the mistake was rectified, and the ground that had been abandoned was recovered. hooker ordered the eleventh massachusetts and twenty-sixth pennsylvania regiments to the support of the batteries, and the second new hampshire regiment to his left. anderson, drawing his troops together near the batteries, made a concentrated move upon them, and cleared them of the gunners, securing four of webber's guns and forty horses. just then he was reinforced by colston's brigade, the florida regiment, and the mississippi battalion. general stuart taking it that the enemy was badly broken and in retreat, rode up with his cavalry, insisting upon a charge and pursuit. as he did not recognize authority except of the commander-in-chief, he was only cautioned that the break was only of the enemy's front, that he would find reinforcements coming up, and this he began to realize by the clearer ring of their muskets. he speedily encountered them, but in time to get away before meeting serious trouble. about three o'clock kearny's division arrived, and only a few minutes later d. h. hill's, of the confederates. on the approach of kearny's leading brigades, one regiment was detached from berry's to reinforce emory's cavalry detachment on their left. the other regiments were deployed, the fifth michigan on the left of the road, the thirty-seventh new york on its left, along the road, one company of the new york regiment from left to rear. six companies of the michigan regiment were broken off to the rear of its right as reserve, leaving its forward battalion partly across the road, while that in rear had two companies on the right and two on the left of the road. two regiments of birney's brigade were deployed, the thirty-eighth on the right of, and the fortieth across, the road, to relieve some of hooker's regiments. then peck's brigade of couch's division came, and was put in on the right, the one hundred and second pennsylvania and the fifty-fifth new york on the left, the sixty-second new york in the wood, the ninety-third pennsylvania on the left, and after a little the ninety-eighth pennsylvania. before the reinforcements arrived for hooker's relief, anderson had established his advance line of skirmishers, so as to cover with their fire webber's guns that were abandoned. the federal reinforcing columns drove back his advance line, when, in turn, he reinforced, recovered the ground, and met general peck, who led the last reinforcing brigade. this advance was so firm that general peck found it necessary to put in his last regiment, the ninety-eighth pennsylvania, but neither our force nor our condition of march could warrant further aggressive work of our right. general couch, left in command on the federal left, posted his troops for the night,--general devens with the seventh massachusetts regiment and second rhode island, general palmer with two, and general keim with three other regiments, supporting general peck. general peck's ammunition being exhausted, his brigade was relieved by six of the new regiments, and reported that "every preparation was made to resist a night attack."[10] on the confederate side, general anderson reported his position safe to hold until the time to withdraw for the march. about noon, general hancock, in command of his own and davidson's brigades in front of our left, started with three of his own regiments and two of davidson's and the six-gun battery under lieutenant carson in search of the unoccupied redoubts in that quarter. he approached by the dam at sanders's pond, passed the dam, and occupied one of the redoubts, leaving three companies to guard a road crossing on the right of his line of march. he put three companies of infantry in the redoubt and advanced his regiments and battery to the field in front. he then found another redoubt not occupied, and posted three other companies in it. he was reinforced by a four-gun battery under captain wheeler, which he posted in rear of his line of battle and awaited developments. when the last engagement on our right had calmed down to exchange of desultory shots, d. h. hill's division was waiting to know if anderson would need further support. meanwhile, some of his officers had made a reconnoissance in front of his ground, and reported a route by which favorable attack could be made upon the federals at the redoubt under hancock. general johnston had arrived at my head-quarters, near fort magruder, when general hill sent to report the reconnoissance, and to ask that he be allowed to make a move against hancock, by early's brigade. general johnston received the message, and referred the officer to me. i ordered that the move should not be made, explaining that we were only fighting for time to draw off our trains, that aggressive battle was necessary on our right in order to keep the enemy back in the woodland from the open, where, by his superior artillery and numbers, he might deploy beyond our limits, and turn us out of position; that on our left there was no cause for apprehension of such action, and we could not risk being drawn into serious delay by starting new work so late in the day. very soon general hill rode over to report of the opportunity: that he thought he could get through before night, and would not be likely to involve delay of our night march. general johnston referred him to me. i said,- "the brigade you propose to use is not in safe hands. if you will go with it, and see that the troops are properly handled, you can make the attack, but don't involve us so as to delay the march after night." in a letter from general hill, after the war, he wrote of the fight by this brigade,- "i cannot think of it, till this day, without horror. the slaughter of the fifth north carolina regiment was one of the most awful things i ever saw, and it was caused by a blunder. at your request, i think, i followed early's brigade, following the right wing." general hill was in advance of the brigade with the fifth and twenty-third north carolina regiments, general early in rear with the twenty-fourth and thirty-eighth virginia regiments. general hill ordered the advance regiments to halt after crossing a streamlet and get under cover of the wood till the brigade could form; but general early, not waiting for orders or the brigade, rode to the front of the twenty-fourth virginia, and with it made the attack. the gallant mcrae, of the fifth north carolina, seeing the twenty-fourth virginia hotly engaged, dashed forward, _nolens volens_, to its relief. the other regiments, seeing the confusion of movements and of orders, failed to go forward. part of my troops, on early's right, seeing that a fight was open on that part of the field, started without orders to go to his relief, but found the fight lost before they were engaged. after the brigade was collected on its first position, general johnston rode to his head-quarters. at dark the confederates were withdrawn and took up the line of march, the division of d. h. hill taking the rear of the column, rains's brigade the rear of the division. on his march, general rains found, in a broken-down ammunition-wagon, several loaded shells, four of them with sensitive fuse primers, which he placed near some fallen trees, cut down as obstructions. he afterwards heard that some of them were tramped upon by the federal cavalry and exploded. the pursuit was not active, hardly annoying. the roads were cut into deep mud by the trains, and the side-ways by troops far out on either side, making puddles ankle-deep in all directions, so that the march was slow and trying, but giving almost absolute safe-conduct against pursuit, and our men were allowed to spread their ranks in search of ground strong enough to bear them. my estimate, made on the field, of the troops engaged was, confederate, 9000; union, 12,000. the casualties of the engagement were, confederate, 1565 aggregate;[11] federal, 2288 aggregate.[12] general mcclellan was at yorktown during the greater part of the day to see franklin's, sedgwick's, and richardson's divisions aboard the transports for his proposed flanking and rear move up york river, but upon receiving reports that the engagement at williamsburg was growing serious and not satisfactory, he rode to the battle, and called the divisions of sedgwick and richardson to follow him. the object of the battle was to gain time to haul our trains to places of safety. the effect, besides, was to call two of the divisions from their flanking move to support the battle, and this so crippled that expedition that it gave us no serious trouble. the trophies of the battle were with the confederates, and they claim the honor to inscribe williamsburg upon their battle-flags. the success of general hancock in holding his position in and about the forts with five regiments and two batteries against the assault of the fifth north carolina and twenty-fourth virginia regiments was given heroic proportions by his chief, who christened him "the superb," to relieve, it is supposed, by the picturesque figure on his right, the discomfiture of his left. but, reading between the lines, the highest compliment was for the two confederate regiments. in his official account, general johnston said,- "the action gradually increased in magnitude until about three o'clock, when general longstreet, commanding the rear, requested that a part of major-general hill's troops might be sent to his aid. upon this i rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a spectator, for general longstreet's clear head and brave heart left no apology for interference." franklin's division was taken by transports to the mouth of pamunkey river, and was supported by the navy. on the 7th a brigade of sedgwick's division joined franklin. on the same day, johnston's army was collected near barhamville. general whiting, with hood's brigade and part of hampton's, engaged the advance of franklin's command and forced it back. this cleared our route of march towards richmond, smith's and magruder's divisions by the road to new kent court-house, hill's and longstreet's nearer the chickahominy. general mcclellan's plans were laid according to strict rules of strategy, but he was not quick or forcible in handling his troops. chapter vii. seven pines, or fair oaks. a new line of defence--positions of the confronting armies--fitz-john porter--terrific storm on the eve of battle--general johnston's orders to longstreet, smith, and huger--lack of co-operation on the confederate side, and ensuing confusion--fatalities among confederate officers--kearny's action--serious wounding of general johnston at the close of the battle--summary and analysis of losses. on the 9th of may the confederate army was halted, its right near long bridge of the chickahominy river; its left and cavalry extending towards the pamunkey through new kent court-house. on the 11th the commander of the confederate ram "virginia" ("merrimac"), finding the water of james river not sufficient to float her to the works near richmond, scuttled and sank the ship where she lay. on the 15th the federal navy attacked our works at chapin's and drury's bluffs, but found them too strong for water batteries. that attack suggested to general johnston that he move nearer richmond to be in position to lend the batteries assistance in case of need. he crossed the chickahominy, his right wing at long bridge, his left by bottom's bridge, and took position from drury's bluff on his right, to the mechanicsville turnpike, with his infantry, the cavalry extending on the left and front to the lower rappahannock and fredericksburg. the right wing, d. h. hill's and longstreet's divisions, under longstreet, from james river to white oak swamp; the left under g. w. smith. smith's division and magruder's command from white oak swamp, extending thence to the mechanicsville pike, with jackson a hundred miles away in the shenandoah valley. after careful study of the works and armaments at drury's bluff, i ventured the suggestion that we recross the chickahominy at mechanicsville and stand behind beaver dam creek, prepared against mcclellan's right when he should be ready to march towards richmond, and call him to relieve his flank before crossing the river. although the country between mcclellan's landing on the pamunkey to the chickahominy was free of all obstacles on the 15th of may, the head of his advance did not reach the banks of the latter river till the 21st. on the 16th he established his permanent depot at the white house, on the pamunkey, and organized two provisional army corps,--the fifth, of fitz-john porter's division, and sykes's, under command of porter; the sixth, of franklin's and w. f. smith's divisions, under franklin. on the 26th the york river railroad as far as the bridge across the chickahominy was repaired and in use. this, with other bridges, was speedily repaired, and new bridges ordered built at such points as should be found necessary to make free communication between the posts of the army. on the 24th parties were advanced on the williamsburg road as far as seven pines, where a spirited affair occurred between general naglee's forces and general hatton's brigade, the latter withdrawing a mile and a half on the williamsburg road. at the same time two other parties of federals were sent up the left bank, one under general davidson, of the cavalry, with artillery and infantry supports, as far as mechanicsville, where he encountered and dislodged a confederate cavalry force under colonel b. h. robertson and occupied the position. the third party, under colonel woodbury, the fourth michigan infantry and a squadron of the second united states cavalry, moved up to new bridge, where the fifth louisiana, colonel hunt, of semmes's brigade, was on picket. finding the bridge well guarded, a party, conducted by lieutenant bowen, topographical engineers, marched up the river, concealing their movements, crossed to the west bank, and, passing down, surprised the fifth louisiana, threw it into disorder, and gained position on the west side. pleased at these successes, general mcclellan sent a sensational despatch to the president. his position thus masked, rested his right upon beaver dam creek, a stream that flows from the height between the chickahominy and pamunkey rivers south to its confluence with the former a few hundred yards below mechanicsville bridge. its banks are scarped, about six feet high, and eight feet apart, making a strong natural ditch for defensive works. on commanding ground south of the creek admirably planned field-works were soon constructed, which made that flank unassailable. two miles out from the river the creek loses its value as a defensive line. from beaver dam the line was extended down the river to new bridge, where it crossed and reached its left out to white oak swamp, and there found as defensible guard as the right at beaver dam creek. the swamp is about a quarter of a mile wide at the left, and down to the chickahominy studded with heavy forest-trees, always wet and boggy, but readily forded by infantry, and at places by cavalry. near the middle of the line, back from new bridge, was stoneman's cavalry. fitz-john porter's corps (fifth) was posted at beaver dam creek, franklin's (sixth) two miles lower down, sumner's (second) near the middle of the line, about three miles from the river. the third and fourth corps were on the south side, kearny's division of the third at savage station of the york river railroad, hooker's division at white oak swamp bridge, with entrenched lines. the fourth corps was posted on the williamsburg road, couch's division about a mile in advance of hooker's, of the third, at the junction of the nine miles road, entrenched, and field of abatis; casey's division of the third half a mile in advance of couch's, entrenched, and field of abatis. the point occupied by couch's division is known as seven pines. his advanced picket-guard on the nine miles road was at fair oaks station of the york river railroad. the line, which was somewhat concave towards richmond, was strengthened at vulnerable points by field-works. general sumner was senior of the corps commanders, and in command of the right wing; general heintzelman, the senior of the south side, was in command of the left wing. the chickahominy is a hundred feet wide as far up as mechanicsville bridge, but narrows above to forty and thirty. along the line of mcclellan's deployment its course was through lowlands of tangled woods that fringe its banks, the valley seldom more than a hundred yards wide. artillery was posted to command all bridges and those ordered for construction. on the 26th, general mcclellan ordered general fitz-john porter to organize a force to march against a confederate outpost near hanover court-house. porter took of morell's division three brigades,--martindale's, butterfield's, and mcquade's,--berdan's sharp-shooters and three batteries, two regiments of cavalry under general emory, and benson's horse battery; warren's brigade to march up the right bank of the pamunkey in connection with operations projected for the fighting column. porter was the most skilful tactician and strongest fighter in the federal army, thoroughly trained in his profession from boyhood, and of some experience in field work. the confederate outpost was commanded by brigadier-general l. o'b. branch, six regiments of infantry, one battery, under captain latham, and a cavalry regiment, under colonel robertson. general branch was a brigadier from civil life. the result of the affair was the discomfiture of general branch, with the loss of one gun and about seven hundred prisoners. losses in action, not including prisoners: confederates, 265; federals, 285. a. p. hill was promoted to major-general, and assigned to command of a division at that outpost and stationed at ashland. on the 27th, general johnston received information that general mcdowell's corps was at fredericksburg, and on the march to reinforce mcclellan's right at mechanicsville. he prepared to attack mcclellan before mcdowell could reach him. to this end he withdrew smith's division from the williamsburg road, relieving it by the division of d. h. hill; withdrew longstreet's division from its position, and a. p. hill's from ashland. the fighting column was to be under general g. w. smith, his next in rank, and general whiting was assigned command of smith's division,--the column to consist of a. p. hill's, whiting's, and d. r. jones's divisions. the latter was posted between the mechanicsville pike and meadow bridge road. a. p. hill was to march direct against mcclellan's outpost at mechanicsville, whiting to cross the river at meadow bridge, and d. r. jones at mechanicsville, thus completing the column of attack on the east side. i was to march by the mechanicsville road to the vicinity of the bridge, and to strike down against the federal right, west of the river, the march to be made during the night; d. h. hill to post a brigade on his right on the charles city road to guard the field to be left by his division, as well as the line left vacant by longstreet's division. at nightfall the troops took up the march for their several assigned positions. before dark general johnston called a number of his officers together for instructions,--viz., smith, magruder, stuart, and longstreet. when we were assembled, general johnston announced later information: that mcdowell's line of march had been changed,--that he was going north. following the report of this information, general smith proposed that the plan for battle should be given up, in view of the very strong ground at beaver dam creek.[13] i urged that the plan laid against the concentrating columns was made stronger by the change of direction of mcdowell's column, and should suggest more prompt and vigorous prosecution. in this magruder and stuart joined me. the _pros_ and _cons_ were talked over till a late hour, when at last general johnston, weary of it, walked aside to a separate seat. i took the opportunity to draw near him, and suggested that the federal position behind beaver dam creek, so seriously objected to by general smith, could be turned by marching to and along the high ground between the chickahominy and pamunkey rivers; that the position of the enemy when turned would be abandoned without a severe struggle, and give a fair field for battle; that we should not lose the opportunity to await another possible one. general johnston replied that he was aware of all that, but found that he had selected the wrong officer for the work. this ended the talk, and i asked to be allowed to halt my columns as soon as possible. the other movements were arrested, except that of a. p. hill's division, which was ordered to continue its march, cross the chickahominy at meadow bridge, and take position between the meadow bridge road and the brooke turnpike. the counter-order reinstated my command of the right wing, including d. h. hill's division on the williamsburg road and extending to the york river railroad. before leaving the conference, i announced that we would fight on the williamsburg road if we had to find the enemy through bayous. the order to halt the columns found smith's division between the mechanicsville and meadow bridge roads, longstreet's near the city at the nine miles road; d. r. jones had not moved. on the 29th and 30th, general d. h. hill sent out reconnoitring parties on the williamsburg and charles city roads. on the 30th he received a fair report of casey's intrenched camp, and the probable strength and extent of the line of his skirmishers reaching out his left front to white oak swamp. on the 29th, general johnston wrote general whiting, commanding smith's division, giving notice of a reconnoissance ordered by general hill, cautioning the former that his division should be drawn towards the right, to be in better position for support of a battle of his right, and adding,- "who knows but that in the course of the morning longstreet's scheme may accomplish itself? if we get into a fight here, you will have to hurry to help us." the report of general d. h. hill's reconnoissance of the 30th was forwarded to head-quarters. i followed it, and found general johnston ready to talk over plans for battle. general huger had reported with three of his brigades, and was in camp near the outskirts of richmond on gillis creek. the plan settled upon was that the attack should be made by general d. h. hill's division on the williamsburg road, supported by longstreet's division. huger's division, just out of garrison duty at norfolk, was to march between hill's right and the swamp against the enemy's line of skirmishers, and move abreast of the battle; g. w. smith's division, under whiting, to march by the gaines road to old tavern, and move abreast of the battle on its left. the field before old tavern was not carefully covered by the enemy's skirmishers north of fair oaks, nor by parties in observation. experience during the discussion of the battle ordered for the 28th caused me to doubt of effective work from the troops ordered for the left flank, but the plan seemed so simple that it was thought impossible for any one to go dangerously wrong; and general johnston stated that he would be on that road, the better to receive from his troops along the crest of the chickahominy information of movements of the enemy on the farther side of the river, and to look to the co-operation of the troops on the nine miles road. to facilitate marches, huger's division was to have the charles city road to the head of white oak swamp, file across it and march down its northern margin; d. h. hill to have the williamsburg road to the enemy's front; longstreet's division to march by the nine miles road and a lateral road leading across the rear of general hill on the williamsburg road; g. w. smith by the gaines road to old tavern on the nine miles road. the tactical handling of the battle on the williamsburg road was left to my care, as well as the general conduct of affairs south of the york river railroad, the latter line being the left of the field to which i had been assigned, the right wing. while yet affairs were under consideration, a terrific storm of vivid lightning, thunderbolts, and rain, as severe as ever known to any climate, burst upon us, and continued through the night more or less severe. in the first lull i rode from general johnston's to my head-quarters, and sent orders for early march. for a more comprehensive view of affairs as ordered, it may be well to explain that general johnston ordered smith's division by the gaines road, so that, in case of delay of its march, mclaws's division, on that road and nearer the field of proposed action, could be brought in to the left of the battle, leaving the place of his division to be occupied by smith's, when the latter reached mclaws's vacated line. there was, therefore, no reason why the orders for march should be misconstrued or misapplied. i was with general johnston all of the time that he was engaged in planning and ordering the battle, heard every word and thought expressed by him of it, and received his verbal orders; generals huger and smith his written orders. general johnston's order to general smith was: "head-quarters department of northern virginia, "may 30, 9.15 p.m. "major-general g. w. smith: "general,--if nothing prevents, we will fall upon the enemy in front of major-general hill (who occupies the position on the williamsburg road from which your troops moved to the neighborhood of meadow bridge) early in the morning, as early as practicable. the chickahominy will be passable only at the bridge, a great advantage to us. please be ready to move by the gaines road, coming as early as possible to the point at which the road to new bridge turns off. should there be cause for haste, major-general mclaws, on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may reinforce general longstreet. "most respectfully your obedient servant, "j. e. johnston."[14] general johnston's order for general huger read: "head-quarters department of northern virginia, "may 30, 1862, 8.30 p.m. "major-general huger: "general,--the reports of major-general d. h. hill give me the impression that the enemy is in considerable strength in his front. it seems to me necessary that we should increase our force also; for that object i wish to concentrate the troops of your division on the charles city road, and to concentrate the troops of major-general hill on the williamsburg road. to do this it will be necessary for you to move, as early in the morning as possible, to relieve the brigade of general hill's division now on the charles city road. i have desired general hill to send you a guide. the road is the second large one diverging to the right from the williamsburg road. the first turns off near the toll-gate. on reaching your position on the charles city road, learn at once the route to the main roads, to richmond on your right and left, especially those to the left, and try to find guides. be ready, if an action should begin on your left, to fall upon the enemy's left flank. "most respectfully your obedient servant, "j. e. johnston. "p.s.--it is necessary to move very early."[15] the nine miles road takes the name from the distance by that road from richmond to seven pines. the williamsburg road to the same point was sometimes called the seven miles road, because of the distance by that road to seven pines. as expressed and repeated in his orders, general johnston's wish was to have the battle pitched as early as practicable. when his orders were issued, he was under the impression that i would be the ranking officer on the right of the york railroad, and would give detailed instructions to govern the later operations of huger's troops. subsequent events seem to call for mention just here that general smith, instead of moving the troops by the route assigned them, marched back to the nine miles road near the city, rode to johnston's head-quarters about six in the morning, and reported that he was with the division, but not for the purpose of taking command from general whiting. as general johnston did not care to order him back to his position as commander of the left wing, he set himself to work to make trouble, complained that my troops were on the nine miles road in the way of his march, and presently complained that they had left that road and were over on the williamsburg road, and induced general johnston to so far modify the plans as to order three of my brigades down the nine miles road to the new bridge fork. the order was sent by lieutenant washington, of johnston's staff, who, unused to campaigning, failed to notice that he was not riding on my line of march, and rode into the enemy's lines. this accident gave the enemy the first warning of approaching danger; it was misleading, however, as it caused general keyes to look for the attack by the nine miles road. the storms had flooded the flat lands, and the waters as they fell seemed weary of the battle of the elements, and inclined to have a good rest on the soft bed of sand which let them gently down to the substratum of clay; or it may have been the purpose of kind providence to so intermix the upper and lower strata as to interpose serious barriers to the passing of artillery, and thus break up the battle of men. my march by the nine miles and lateral roads leading across to the williamsburg road was interrupted by the flooded grounds about the head of gillis creek. at the same time this creek was bank full, where it found a channel for its flow into the james. the delay of an hour to construct a bridge was preferred to the encounter of more serious obstacles along the narrow lateral road, flooded by the storm. as we were earlier at the creek, it gave us precedence over huger's division, which had to cross after us. the division was prepared with cooked rations, had wagons packed at six o'clock, and rested in the rear of general hill's at nine a.m. meanwhile, general g. w. smith's division had marched by the nine miles road and was resting near the fork of the new bridge road at old tavern. upon meeting general huger in the morning, i gave him a succinct account of general johnston's plans and wishes; after which he inquired as to the dates of our commissions, which revealed that he was the ranking officer, when i suggested that it was only necessary for him to take command and execute the orders. this he declined. then it was proposed that he should send two of his brigades across to join on the right of the column of attack, while he could remain with his other brigade, which was to relieve that of general hill on the charles city road. though he expressed himself satisfied with this, his manner was eloquent of discontent. the better to harmonize, i proposed to reinforce his column by three of my brigades, to be sent under general wilcox, to lead or follow his division, as he might order. under this arrangement it seemed that concert of action was assured. i gave especial orders to general wilcox to have care that the head of his column was abreast the battle when it opened, and rode forward to join general hill, my other three brigades advancing along the williamsburg road. opposing and in the immediate front of general hill was the division of general casey, of the fourth (keyes's) corps. the division stood in an intrenched camp across the williamsburg road, with a pentagonal redoubt (unfinished) on the left of his line. half a mile in rear of casey's division was that of couch, of the same corps, behind a second trenched line, at its junction of the nine miles road, part of couch's extending along the latter road to fair oaks station of the york river railroad, and intrenched; farther forward he had a guarded picket station. between couch and casey a skirt of wood stretched from the swamp on their left across the williamsburg and nine miles roads and the railroad. between the stretch of forest and couch was an open; spreading across the roads, and at casey's front, was another open, though more limited, some abatis being arranged along their front lines. these were the only cleared fields on the south side of the railroad within two miles of casey's picket line, our line of march and attack. general d. h. hill stood ready for battle at an early hour, waiting for his brigade on the charles city road. under the delay to relieve that brigade by one of huger's divisions, i sent orders to general wilcox to pull off from column on that road and march for the position assigned him near the head of white oak swamp. the detailed instructions for battle were that the advance should be made in columns of brigades two on each side the williamsburg road, preceded by strong lines of skirmishers; the advance, approaching an open or abatis or trench line, should reinforce the skirmish line to strong engagement, while the lines of battle turned those obstacles by flank or oblique march when the general advance should be resumed. as the wooded field was not convenient for artillery use, we only held the batteries of bondurant and carter ready for call. at eleven o'clock, weary of delay, general hill asked to let loose his signal-gun and engage, but was ordered to wait for his absent brigade. the reports of the hour of opening battle are more conflicting in this than in most battles, owing possibly to the fact that many are fixed by the beginning of the hot battle about the trenched camp, while others are based on the actual firing of the signal-guns. the weight of evidence seems conclusive of the former attack at one p.m., and this would place the firing of the signal-guns back to noon or a little after. as events occurred, however, the hour is not of especial interest, as it is shown that the battle was in time for a finish before night if it had been promptly followed up. i will say, therefore, that general hill's second appeal to open the signal-gun was made a little before noon, and that he stated in this appeal that his brigade from the charles city road was approaching, and would be with him. he was then authorized to march, but to give instructions that the advance should be carefully conducted until all the troops were in place, to give full force to his battle. he had four brigades, and was ordered to advance in columns of brigades, two on each side of the road. garland's and g. b. anderson's brigades in columns, preceded by skirmishers, advanced on the left of the road at the sound of the guns, and engaged after a short march from the starting. as rodes's brigade was not yet in position, some little time elapsed before the columns on the right moved, so that garland's column encountered more than its share of early fight, but rodes, supported by rains's brigade, came promptly to his relief, which steadied the advance. the enemy's front was reinforced and arrested progress of our skirmishers, but a way was found by which the enemy was turned out of position, and by and by the open before the intrenched camp was reached. in the redoubt was a six-gun battery, and on the right another section of two pieces. general hill ordered bondurant's battery to the open into action, and presently the battery of captain carter. garland and g. b. anderson had severe contention at one o'clock, but by pushing front and flank movements got to the enemy's strong line. r. h. anderson's brigade was pushed up in support of their left, when a bold move gave us the section of artillery and that end of the line. at the same time carter's battery was in close practice with five guns within four hundred yards of the redoubt, and the enemy was seriously disturbed; but general hill was disposed to wait a little for huger, thought to be between him and the swamp, to get farther in; then, fearing that longer wait might be hazardous of his opportunity, he ordered rains's brigade past the enemy's left, when rodes seized the moment, rushed in, and gained the redoubt and the battery. the officers at the battery made a brave effort to spike their guns, but were killed in the act. so rodes, who had some artillerists acting as infantry, turned them with some effect upon the troops as they retired. when general hill reported that he must use rains's brigade to march around the redoubt, other orders were sent general wilcox to leave general huger's column and march to his position on the right of general hill's battle, directing, in case there were serious obstacles to his march by the charles city road, to march over to and down the williamsburg road. a slip of paper was sent general johnston reporting progress and asking co-operation on our left. the battle moved bravely on. r. h. anderson's brigade was ordered to support its left at fair oaks, and pickett's, on the railroad, was drawn near. hill met casey's troops rallying, and reinforcements with them coming to recover the lost ground, but they were forced back to the second intrenched line (couch's), where severe fighting ensued, but the line was carried at two o'clock, cutting couch with four regiments and two companies of infantry, and brady's six-gun battery, off at fair oaks station. finding that he could not cut his way back to his command, couch stood back from the railroad and presently opened his battery fire across our advancing lines. as he was standing directly in front of smith's division, we thought that he would soon be attacked and driven off. nevertheless, it was not prudent to leave that point on our flank unguarded until we found smith's division in action. the force was shut off from our view by the thick pine wood, so that we could know nothing of its strength, and only knew of its position from its artillery fire. we could not attack it lest we should fall under the fire of the division in position for that attack. anderson's other regiments, under the gallant colonel m. jenkins, were ordered into hill's forward battle, as his troops were worn. jenkins soon found himself in the van, and so swiftly led on that the discomfited troops found no opportunity to rally. reinforcements from the third corps came, but in the swampy wood jenkins was prompt enough to strike their heads as their retreating comrades passed. right and left and front he applied his beautiful tactics and pushed his battle. general kearny, finding that he could not arrest the march, put berry's brigade off to the swamp to flank and strike it, and took part of jamison's brigade to follow. they got into the swamp and followed it up to the open near the couch intrenchment,[16] but jenkins knew that there was some one there to meet them, and pushed his onward battle. general hill ordered rains's brigade to turn this new force, while rodes attacked, but the latter's men were worn, and some of them were with the advance. kemper's brigade was sent to support the forward battle, but general hill directed it to his right against berry, in front of rains, and it seems that the heavy, swampy ground so obstructed operations on both sides as to limit their work to infantry fusillades until six o'clock. our battle on the williamsburg road was in a sack. we were strong enough to guard our flanks and push straight on, but the front was growing heavy. it was time for wilcox's brigades under his last order, but nothing was heard of them. i asked general stuart, who had joined me, if there were obstacles to wilcox's march between the charles city and williamsburg roads. he reported that there was nothing more than swamp lands, hardly knee-deep. he was asked for a guide, who was sent with a courier bearing orders for them to remain with general wilcox until he reported at my head-quarters. again i reported the cramped condition of our work, owing to the artillery practice from beyond the railroad, and asked general johnston to have the division that was with him drive that force away and loose our left. this note was ordered to be put into general johnston's hands. he gave peremptory commands to that effect, but the movements were so slow that he lost patience and rode with hood's leading brigade, pulled it on, and ordered communication opened with my left. [illustration: field of seven pines (fair oaks). positions of troops may 31st, morning; may 31st, night; june 1st] at one o'clock, general mcclellan, at his head-quarters beyond the river, six miles away, heard the noise of battle and ordered sumner's (second) corps under arms to await orders. general sumner ordered the command under arms, marched the divisions to their separate bridges, and put the columns on the bridges, partly submerged, to hold them to their moorings, anxiously awaiting authority from his chief to march to the relief of his comrades. the bridge where sedgwick's division stood was passable, but richardson's was under water waist-deep, and the flooding river rising. richardson waded one brigade through, but thought that he could save time by marching up to the sedgwick bridge, which so delayed him that he did not reach the field until after night. as general johnston rode with hood's brigade, he saw the detachment under general couch marching north to find at the adams house the road to grapevine bridge, his open way of retreat. directly he heard firing where couch was marching, but thought that smith's other brigades were equal to work that could open up there, and rode on, ordering hood to find communication with my left. smith's other brigades were: whiting's, commanded by colonel law; hampton's, pettigrew's, and hatton's; whiting commanding the division, smith commanding the left wing. smith quotes colonel frobel, who was with him at the time,--viz.: "whiting's brigade was gone; it had been ordered forward to charge the batteries which were firing upon us. the brigade was repulsed, and in a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of woods to the left of the nine miles road, near the crossing. there was only a part of a brigade in this charge. pender soon rallied and reformed them on the edge of the woods. general whiting sent an order to him to reconnoitre the batteries, and if he thought they could be taken, to try it again. before he could do so, some one galloped up, shouting, 'charge that battery!' the men hurried forward at double-quick, but were repulsed as before."[17] it seems that at that moment general sumner reached the field. he reported: "on arriving on the field, i found general couch, with four regiments and two companies of infantry and brady's battery. these troops were drawn up in line near adams's house, and there was a pause in the battle." he received his orders at 2.30 p.m. and marched with sedgwick's division--three brigades--and kirby's battery, and reached the ground of couch's work at 4.30. in less than an hour he had surveyed the ground and placed his troops to receive battle. general smith attacked with hampton's, pettigrew's, and hatton's brigades. it seems he made no use of artillery, though on the field right and left the opportunity was fair. the troops fought bravely, as did all confederate soldiers. we heard the steady, rolling fire of musketry and the boom of cannon that told of deadly work as far as the williamsburg road, but it did not last. general hatton was killed, general pettigrew wounded and a prisoner, and general hampton wounded. general smith was beaten. general sumner reported: "i ordered the following regiments, eighty-second new york, thirty-fourth new york, fifteenth massachusetts, twentieth massachusetts, and seventh michigan, to move to the front and charge bayonets. there were two fences between us and the enemy, but our men gallantly rushed over them, and the enemy broke and fled, and this closed the battle of saturday."[18] general smith sent to call hood's brigade from his right, and posted it, about dark, near fair oaks station. at parting, general hood said, "our people over yonder are whipped." general wilcox filed his three brigades into the williamsburg road, followed by two of huger's division at five o'clock. he was reminded of his orders to be abreast of the battle, and that he was only four hours behind it; but reported that while marching by the first order by the charles city road, he received orders to try the williamsburg road; that, marching for that road, he was called by orders to follow a guide, who brought him back to the charles city road. he confessed that his orders to march with the front of battle were plain and well understood, but his marches did not quite agree with the comprehensive view of his orders. two of his regiments--the eleventh alabama, under colonel sydenham moore, and the nineteenth mississippi, under major mullens--were ordered to join kemper, turn the position of the enemy at that point, and capture or dislodge them. with the other regiments, general wilcox was ordered by the williamsburg road to report to general hill, pryor's brigade to follow him, colston's brigade to support the move under colonel moore. armistead's and mahone's brigades, of huger's division, were sent to r. h. anderson, who was ordered to put them in his position and move his other regiments to the front. colonel moore hurried his leading companies into the turning move against berry's brigade before his regiment was up, and before the mississippi regiment was in supporting distance, and fell mortally wounded. general kearny, seeing the move and other troops marching towards it, ordered his troops out and in retreat through the swamp. he reported of it: "although so critically placed, and despite the masses that gathered on and had passed us, checked the enemy in his intent of cutting off against the white oak swamp. this enabled the advanced regiments, arrested by orders and this contest in the rear, to return from their hitherto victorious career and retire by a remaining wood-path known to our scouts (the saw-mill road), until they once more arrived at and remained in the impregnable position we had left at noon at our own fortified division camp."[19] he states the hour as six p.m. birney's brigade of kearny's division was ordered along the north side of the railroad a little before night, and had several encounters with parts of r. h. anderson's brigade and some regiments of g. b. anderson's. jenkins, nothing daunted, pushed his brave battle forward until the shades of night settled about the wood, and flashes of dark-lanterns began to creep through the pines in search of wounded, friend and foe. at seven o'clock, general johnston ordered his troops on the field to sleep on their lines, and be ready to renew operations in the morning, and ordered general smith to call up other troops of the left wing. at half after seven he was hit by a rifle-ball, then a fragment of shell unhorsed him, and he was borne from the field, so severely wounded that he was for a considerable time incapacitated for duty. the command devolved temporarily upon general g. w. smith. general johnston was skilled in the art and science of war, gifted in his quick, penetrating mind and soldierly bearing, genial and affectionate in nature, honorable and winning in person, and confiding in his love. he drew the hearts of those about him so close that his comrades felt that they could die for him. until his recovery the confederacy experienced a serious deprivation, and when that occurred he was no longer commander-in-chief, for general lee was promptly called to the post of honor. the brigades were so mixed up through the pines when the battle closed that there was some delay in getting the regiments to their proper commands, getting up supplies, and arranging for the morning. d. h. hill's was put in good order and in bivouac near the casey intrenchment; those of longstreet between the williamsburg road and railroad. wilcox's brigade took position on the right, in place of the detachment under jenkins; pryor's brigade next on the left; kemper, anderson, and colston near the stage road (williamsburg). they made blazing fires of pine-knots to dry their clothing and blankets, and these lighted reinforcing union troops to their lines behind the railroad. the brigades of huger's division (armistead's and mahone's) were near the left. pickett was ordered to report to general hill at daylight, also the batteries of maurin, stribling, and watson. it was past eleven o'clock when all things were made ready and the killed and wounded cared for; then i rode to find the head-quarters of our new commander. summary of forces and losses. union troops engaged on the williamsburg road, reported by general heintzelman, commanding casey's, couch's, and kearny's divisions 18,500 hooker's division was at hand, but no part of it engaged. confederates engaged on the williamsburg road, of d. h. hill's division 8900[20] two brigades and two regiments of longstreet's division 5700 --- 14,600 two lines of intrenchments were attacked and carried, six pieces of artillery and several thousand small-arms were captured, and the enemy was forced back to his third line of intrenchments by night, a mile and a half from the point of his opening. sedgwick's division is not separately accounted for, but an average of the divisions reported by general heintzelman will give him 6080 estimate of couch's command 2000 --- union force against general smith 8080 smith's division, five brigades 10,500 but hood's brigade was not engaged 2,100 ----- of smith's division in action 8,400 union losses on the williamsburg road 4563 confederate losses on the williamsburg road 3515 union losses on the nine miles road 468 confederate losses on the nine miles road 1283 chapter viii. sequelæ of seven pines. the forces under command of g. w. smith after johnston was wounded--the battle of the 1st--longstreet requests reinforcements and a diversion--council held--mclaws alone sustains longstreet's opposition to retiring--severe fighting--pickett's brave stand--general lee assigned to command--he orders the withdrawal of the army--criticism of general smith--confederates should not have lost the battle--keyes's corroboration. major-general g. w. smith was of the highest standing of the west point classes, and, like others of the engineers, had a big name to help him in the position to which he had been suddenly called by the incapacitation of the confederate commander. i found his head-quarters at one o'clock in the morning, reported the work of the commands on the williamsburg road on the 31st, and asked for part of the troops ordered up by general johnston, that we might resume battle at daylight. he was disturbed by reports of pontoon bridges, said to be under construction for the use of other reinforcements to join the enemy from the east side, and was anxious lest the enemy might march his two corps on the east side by the upper river and occupy richmond. but after a time these notions gave way, and he suggested that we could renew the battle on the williamsburg road, provided we would send him one of our brigades to help hold his position and make the battle by a wheel on his right as a pivot. as the commands stood, smith's division on our left was at right angles to the york river railroad, facing east, his right near fair oaks station. besides his division of ten thousand, he had magruder's and other commands of fresh troops near him,--twenty thousand. my left lay near smith's right, the line extending parallel to the railroad for a mile, facing north; thence it broke to the rear, and covered the ground from that point to the swamp, the return front facing the enemy's third intrenched line. smith's part of the field was open and fine for artillery practice. the field fronting on the railroad was so shut in by heavy pine forest and tangled swamp that we had no place for a single gun. d. h. hill's division was in reserve near the casey encampment. the enemy stood: sedgwick's division in front of smith; richardson's division in column of three brigades parallel to the railroad and behind it, prepared to attack my left; on richardson's left was birney's brigade behind the railroad, and under the enemy's third intrenched line were the balance of the third and all of the fourth corps. so the plan to wheel on smith's right as a pivot, my right stepping out on the wheel, would have left the third and fourth corps to attack our rear as soon as we moved. besides, it was evident that our new commander would do nothing, and we must look to accident for such aid as might be drawn to us during the battle. the plan proposed could only be considered under the hypothesis that magruder would come in as the pivotal point, and, upon having the enemy's line fully exposed, would find the field fine for his batteries, and put them in practice without orders from his commander, and, breaking the enemy's line by an enfilade fire from his artillery, would come into battle and give it cohesive power. i left head-quarters at three o'clock, and after an hour's repose rode to the front to find general hill. wilcox's brigade was on my right on the return front, pryor's brigade on his left, and r. h. anderson, kemper, colston, armistead, and mahone occupied the line between the williamsburg road and the railroad. pickett's brigade was ordered to be with general hill at daylight, and maurin's, stribling's, and watson's batteries, of pickett's brigade, to take position on the right of armistead's. i found general hill before he had his breakfast, enjoying the comforts of casey's camp. pickett had passed and was in search of his position, which was soon disclosed by a fusillade from the front of richardson's division. a party of "bummers" from richmond had found their way into the camp at fair oaks, and were getting such things as they could put their hands on. they were taken in the gray of the morning for confederate troops and fired upon. this made some confusion with our new troops, and part of them opened fire in the wrong direction, putting two or three bullets through general hill's tent before he got out of it. hood's brigade of smith's division, the pivotal point, came under this fire, and was immediately withdrawn. hood reported his position good, but his orders were to retire. our cavalry had established communication with head-quarters, and gave prompt notice of movements as they occurred. the pivot was moving to the rear, but battle on the williamsburg road steadily advanced, with orders to develop the enemy's battle front through its extent along the railroad; not to make the fancied wheel, but to expose his line to the practice of our batteries on the nine miles road. our infantry moved steadily, engaging french's brigade of richardson's division, which was led by one of howard's regiments. french was supported by howard's brigade, and howard by meagher's, and the firing extended along my line as far as the return front of my right. but magruder was not on the field to seize the opportunity for his artillery. he was nowhere near the battle,--had not been called. general whiting, however, saw the opportunity so inviting, and reported to his commander at half after six o'clock,- "i am going to try a diversion for longstreet, and have found, as reported, a position for artillery. the enemy are in full view and in heavy masses. i have ordered up lee with four pieces. the musketry firing in advance is tremendous."[21] general smith had parties posted along the heights of the chickahominy in close observation of the movements of the enemy's forces on the east bank. these parties reported from time to time that the enemy was moving his forces down the east bank and crossing them over to take part in the fight. the accounts proved false, but they continued to come to head-quarters, and were forwarded to my command on the williamsburg road and gave us some concern. failing to receive approval of his chief, general whiting reported at nine o'clock,- "if i don't receive an answer in half an hour, i shall commence withdrawing my forces."[22] the answer he received was to throw back his right and take position a _little_ nearer to the new bridge fork of the nine miles road,[23] thus swinging the pivot farther back. general smith complained that the enemy was getting into the interval between our lines, but position between two fires was not the place the enemy wanted; he could not know that smith wouldn't shoot. under this long and severe infantry fight there was no point on my part of the field upon which we could post a single gun. part of armistead's new troops gave way, but the gallant brigadier maintained his ground and soon collected his other regiments. before this i had reported ready, and awaiting a guide, the brigade that was to be sent over to the nine miles road. at half after ten o'clock, general smith sent word that he had heard nothing of the brigade expected to come to his support, and renewed his reports of the enemy crossing over and concentrating against us on the williamsburg road. he repeated, too, his wish to have his cavalry keep close communication between the wings of the army. this close communication had been established early in the morning and was maintained through the day, and the reports of the enemy's crossing were all false, but our new commander seemed to forget. at the same time he wrote me,- "i have directed whiting to take close defensive relations with magruder. at any rate, that was absolutely necessary to enable a good defence to be made whilst you are pivoting on whiting's position."[24] whiting's position, instead of being pivotal, began its rearward move at the opening fire at daybreak, and continued in that line of conduct until it reached a point of quiet. general smith was informed that the brigade called for by him would not be sent over; that his troops were doing nothing, while all of mine were in severe battle, except a single brigade, and the enemy was massing his fighting force against me; that the grounds were so flooded that it was difficult to keep up our supply of ammunition; that with the aid of his troops the battle would be ours. but just then he held a council with generals mclaws and whiting and chief engineer stevens, and submitted the question, "must the troops be withdrawn, or the attack continued?" all voted in favor of the former except mclaws. in a letter, since written, he has said,- "i alone urged that you be reinforced and the attack continued, and the question was reconsidered, and i was sent to learn your views."[25] before general mclaws found me, i wrote general smith,- "can you reinforce me? the entire enemy seems to be opposed to me. we cannot hold out unless we get help. if we can fight together, we can finish the work to-day, and mac's time will be up. if i cannot get help, i fear that i must fall back." general mclaws reported of his ride to my lines,- "i went and found you with j. e. b. stuart. you were in favor of resuming the assault, and wanted five thousand men."[26] nothing was sent in reply to mclaws's report, but we soon learned that the left wing of the army was quiet and serene in defensive positions about the new bridge fork of the nine miles road. at the first quiet of our battle, after the left wing quit the field, i ordered the brigades withdrawn to defensive position about the trenches at seven pines, but before the order reached the front the fight was renewed by hooker's division upon wilcox and pryor, and reached out to our left near fair oaks. in the heat of this, general wilcox received the order to retire, and in undue haste pulled his command out, assumed authority over pryor, and ordered him off. pickett, the true soldier, knowing that the order was not intended for such emergency, stood and resisted the attack. colston was sent to his aid, and the attack was repulsed. immediately after this repulse was a quiet advance upon pickett's right. the commander asked, "what troops are these?" "virginians!" "don't fire!" he ordered; "we will capture the last one of these virginians." just then the virginians rose and opened a fearful fire that drove him back to his bushy cover, which ended the battle of seven pines. pickett was withdrawn to position assigned for his brigade, our line of skirmishers remaining near the enemy's during the day and night. general wilcox reported of his battle, when he pulled off from it, that he was doing as well as he could wish, but general hooker reported, "pursuit was hopeless." the failure of the enemy to push the opportunity made by the precipitate retreat of general wilcox, and pickett's successful resistance, told that there was nothing in the reports of troops coming over from the east side to take part in the battle, and we were convinced that the river was not passable. i made an appeal for ten thousand men, that we might renew our battle without regard to general smith and those about him. it received no more consideration than the appeal made through general mclaws. then general lee, having been assigned to command, came upon the field after noon by the nine miles road, and, with general smith, came over to the williamsburg road. a similar proposition was made general lee, but general smith protested that the enemy was strongly fortified. at the time the enemy's main battle front was behind the railroad, fronting against me but exposed to easy enfilade fire of batteries to be posted on his right flank on the nine miles road, while his front against me was covered by the railway embankment. it is needless to add that under the fire of batteries so posted his lines would have been broken to confusion in twenty minutes. general holmes marched down the williamsburg road and rested in wait for general lee. like general huger, he held rank over me. general lee ordered the troops back to their former lines. those on the williamsburg road were drawn back during the night, the rear-guard, pickett's brigade, passing the casey works at sunrise on the 2d unmolested. part of richardson's division mistook the camp at fair oaks for the casey camp, and claimed to have recovered it on the afternoon of the 1st, but it was not until the morning of the 2d that the casey camp was abandoned. the confederate losses in the two days' fight were 6134; the union losses, 5031. it seems from union accounts that all of our dead were not found and buried on the afternoon of the 1st. it is possible, as our battle was in the heavy forest and swamp tangles. general smith has written a great deal about the battle of seven pines during the past twenty or thirty years, in efforts to show that the failure of success was due to want of conduct on the part of the forces on the williamsburg road. he claims that he was only out as a party of observation, to prevent reinforcement of the enemy from the east side of the river, and that he kept sumner off of us. but he waited three hours after the enemy's ranks and lines had been broken, instead of moving with and finishing the battle, thus giving sumner time to march from the east of the river, and strike him and beat him to disorder, and change the lost battle to success. he shows that hill's and longstreet's divisions could have gained the battle unaided,--which may be true enough, but it would have been a fruitless success, for the enemy got forces over to protect those of the west side; whereas, the stronger battle, ordered by the four divisions, could and would have made a complete success of it but for the balky conduct of the divisions ordered to guard the flanks. instead of six hours' hard work to reach the enemy's third line, we could have captured it in the second hour and had the field cleaned up before sumner crossed the river. general keyes, the commander of the fourth corps, in his "fifty years' observations," says,- "the left of my lines were all protected by the white oak swamp, but the right was on ground so favorable to the approach of the enemy, and so far from the chickahominy, that if johnston had attacked them an hour or two earlier than he did, i could have made but a feeble defence comparatively, and every man of us would have been killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or river before assistance could have reached us." general smith lay in wait three hours after the enemy's positions were broken and carried, giving ample time for the march of the succoring forces. the hour of the attack was not so important as prompt and vigorous work. if the battle had opened at sunrise, smith would have made the same wait, and sumner's march would have been in time to beat him. all elements of success were in the plan, but balky troops will mar the strongest plans. he tries to persuade himself that he intended to join our battle on the williamsburg road, but there was no fight in his heart after his maladroit encounter with sedgwick's division on the afternoon of the 31st. the opportunity for enfilade fire of his artillery along the enemy's battle front, at the morning opening and all of the forenoon, was waiting him; while reports of the enemy crossing the river, reinforcing against my single contest, were demanding relief and aid. he reported sick on the 2d and left the army. when ready for duty he was assigned about richmond and the seaboard of north carolina. he applied to be restored to command of his division in the field, but the authorities thought his services could be used better elsewhere. he resigned his commission in the confederate service, went to georgia, and joined joe brown's militia, where he found congenial service, better suited to his ideas of vigorous warfare. chapter ix. robert e. lee in command. the great general's assignment not at first assuring to the army--able as an engineer but limited as to field service--he makes the acquaintance of his lieutenants--calls a council--gains confidence by saying nothing--"a little humor now and then"--lee plans a simultaneous attack on mcclellan's front and rear--j. e. b. stuart's daring reconnoissance around the union army. the assignment of general lee to command the army of northern virginia was far from reconciling the troops to the loss of our beloved chief, joseph e. johnston, with whom the army had been closely connected since its earliest active life. all hearts had learned to lean upon him with confidence, and to love him dearly. general lee's experience in active field work was limited to his west virginia campaign against general rosecrans, which was not successful. his services on our coast defences were known as able, and those who knew him in mexico as one of the principal engineers of general scott's column, marching for the capture of the capital of that great republic, knew that as military engineer he was especially distinguished; but officers of the line are not apt to look to the staff in choosing leaders of soldiers, either in tactics or strategy. there were, therefore, some misgivings as to the power and skill for field service of the new commander. the change was accepted, however, as a happy relief from the existing halting policy of the late temporary commander. [illustration: r. e. lee] during the first week of his authority he called his general officers to meet him on the nine miles road for a general talk. this novelty was not reassuring, as experience had told that secrecy in war was an essential element of success; that public discussion and secrecy were incompatible. as he disclosed nothing, those of serious thought became hopeful, and followed his wise example. the brigadiers talked freely, but only of the parts of the line occupied by their brigades; and the meeting finally took a playful turn. general toombs's brigade was before some formidable works under construction by general franklin. he suggested an elevation a few hundred yards in his rear, as a better defensive line and more comfortable position for his men; a very good military point. this seemed strange in general toombs, however, as he was known to have frequent talks with his troops, complaining of west point men holding the army from battle, digging and throwing up lines of sand instead of showing lines of battle, where all could have fair fight. referring to his suggestion to retire and construct a new line, general d. h. hill, who behind the austere presence of a major-general had a fund of dry humor, said,- "i think it may be better to advance general toombs's brigade, till he can bring franklin's working parties under the fire of his short-range arms, so that the working parties may be broken up." general whiting, who was apprehensive of bayous and parallels, complained of sickness in his command, and asked a change of position from the unfair fair oaks. though of brilliant, highly cultivated mind, the dark side of the picture was always more imposing with him. several of the major-generals failed to join us till the conference was about to disperse. all rode back to their camps little wiser than when they went, except that they found general lee's object was to learn of the temper of those of his officers whom he did not know, and of the condition and tone among their troops. he ordered his engineers over the line occupied by the army, to rearrange its defensive construction, and to put working parties on all points needing reinforcing. whiting's division was broken up. three of the brigades were ordered to a. p. hill's division. he was permitted to choose two brigades that were to constitute his own command. besides his own, he selected hood's brigade. with these two he was ordered by way of lynchburg to report to general jackson, in the valley district. general lee was seen almost daily riding over his lines, making suggestions to working parties and encouraging their efforts to put sand-banks between their persons and the enemy's batteries, and they were beginning to appreciate the value of such adjuncts. above all, they soon began to look eagerly for his daily rides, his pleasing yet commanding presence, and the energy he displayed in speeding their labors. the day after the conference on the nine miles road, availing myself of general lee's invitation to free interchange of ideas, i rode over to his head-quarters, and renewed my suggestion of a move against general mcclellan's right flank, which rested behind beaver dam creek. the strength of the position was explained, and mention made that, in consequence of that strong ground, a move somewhat similar, ordered by general johnston for the 28th of may, was abandoned. at the same time he was assured that a march of an hour could turn the head of the creek and dislodge the force behind it. he received me pleasantly and gave a patient hearing to the suggestions, without indicating approval or disapproval. a few days after he wrote general jackson:[27] "head-quarters, near richmond, va., "june 11, 1862. "brigadier-general thomas j. jackson, "_commanding valley district_: "general,--your recent successes have been the cause of the liveliest joy in this army as well as in the country. the admiration excited by your skill and boldness has been constantly mingled with solicitude for your situation. the practicability of reinforcing you has been the subject of earnest consideration. it has been determined to do so at the expense of weakening this army. brigadier-general lawton, with six regiments from georgia, is on the way to you, and brigadier-general whiting, with eight veteran regiments, leaves here to-day. the object is to enable you to crush the forces opposed to you. leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes covered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, including ewell's division and lawton's and whiting's commands, move rapidly to ashland by rail or otherwise, as you may find most advantageous, and sweep down between the chickahominy and pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications, etc., while this army attacks general mcclellan in front. he will thus, i think, be forced to come out of his intrenchments, where he is strongly posted on the chickahominy, and apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on richmond. keep me advised of your movements, and, if practicable, precede your troops, that we may confer and arrange for simultaneous attack. "i am, with great respect, your obedient servant, "r. e. lee, _general_." the brigades under generals lawton and whiting were transported as above ordered. as indicated in his letter to general jackson, general lee's plan was a simultaneous attack on general mcclellan's army front and rear. following his instructions for general jackson, on the same day he ordered his cavalry, under general stuart, upon a forced reconnoissance around general mcclellan's army to learn if the ground behind his army was open. these plans and the promptness with which they were conceived and put in operation ought to be a sufficient refutation of the silly report that the confederacy had any idea of withdrawing from their capital,--a report which, notwithstanding its unreasonable nature, was given a degree of credence in some quarters.[28] upon nearing richmond, after leaving yorktown, general johnston's first thought had been to stand on the table-lands between the pamunkey and the chickahominy rivers, on the flank of mcclellan's march for richmond, and force him into battle. he selected ground with that view and posted his army, where it remained some eight days, giving general and engineer officers opportunity to ride over and learn the topographical features of the surroundings. a prominent point was beaver dam creek, which was so noted by the officers. when johnston proposed to recross the chickahominy and make battle on the 28th of may, in anticipation of mcdowell's approach, the strong ground at beaver dam creek again came under discussion and was common talk between the generals, so that the position and its approaches became a familiar subject. then stuart's famous ride had correlative relation to the same, and drew us to careful study of the grounds. for the execution of his orders general stuart took twelve hundred cavalry and a section of stuart's horse artillery. the command was composed of parts of the first, fourth, and ninth virginia cavalry. the fourth, having no field officer on duty with it, was distributed for the expedition between the first, colonel fitzhugh lee, and the ninth, colonel w. h. f. lee commanding; also two squadrons of the jeff davis legion, lieutenant-colonel w. t. martin commanding. the section of artillery was under first lieutenant james breathed. on the night of the 12th of june he gathered his squadrons beyond the chickahominy, and the next day marched by the road west of the richmond, fredericksburg, and potomac railroad towards louisa court-house, to produce the impression, should the march be discovered, that he was going to join general jackson. after a march of fifteen miles, he bivouacked in the pine forests of hanover, near the south anna bridge, without light or sound of bugle, and, throwing aside the cares of the day and thoughts of the morrow, sunk to repose such as the soldier knows how to enjoy. an hour before daylight he was up in readiness to move as soon as the first light of morning revealed the line of march. up to that moment no one of the expedition, except the commander, knew the direction or the purpose of the march. he called his principal officers about him and told of the object of the ride, and impressed the necessity for secrecy, prompt and intelligent attention to orders. at the mute signal the twelve hundred men swung into their saddles and took the road leading to the right and rear of mcclellan's army. at hanover court-house a small force of the enemy's cavalry was discovered, but they retired towards their camp, out of the line of stuart's ride. at hawes's shop a picket was driven off and several vedettes captured. they proved to be of the fifth united states cavalry, general lee's old regiment. between hawes's shop and old church the advance-guard, well to the front, reported the presence of the enemy, apparently in some force. the column pressed forward, expecting a fierce encounter of southern volunteers with united states regulars, but the latter was a single troop and retreated beyond totopotomy creek to old church, where there was a camp of four companies of the fifth cavalry under captain royal, which made a brave stand. captain latane led the first squadron, and captain royal received the first shock, and furiously the combat went on, both leaders falling, latane dead and royal severely wounded. the enemy fled and scattered through the woods. a number of prisoners were taken, including several officers, and there were captured horses, arms, equipments, and four guidons. in the enemy's camp, near old church, several officers and privates were captured, a number of horses and arms taken, and the stores and tents were burned. here it became a question whether to attempt to return by way of hanover court-house or to press on and try to make a circuit around the entire army, and take the chance of fording or swimming the chickahominy beyond the enemy's extreme left. stuart decided that the bolder ride "was the quintessence of prudence."[29] arriving opposite garlick's, on the pamunkey,--one of the enemy's supply stations,--a squadron was sent out and burned two transports with army stores and a number of wagons. near tunstall's station a wagon-train was discovered guarded by five companies of cavalry, which manifested a determination to stand and defend it, but they abandoned it and rode away, leaving the train in possession of stuart, who burned it, and, night coming on, the country was brilliantly lighted up by its flames. after resting a few hours at talleysville, the ride was resumed, and the party reached the chickahominy at forges bridge at daylight. the stream was not fordable, but, by exercise of great energy and industry, a rude foot-bridge was laid. that part of the command near it dismounted and walked over, swimming their horses. in a few hours the bridge was made strong and the artillery and other mounts were passed safely over to the richmond side, and resumed the march for their old camp-grounds. this was one of the most graceful and daring rides known to military history, and revealed valuable facts concerning the situation of the union forces, their operations, communications, etc. when congratulated upon his success, general stuart replied, with a lurking twinkle in his eye, that he had left a general behind him. asked as to the identity of the unfortunate person, he said, with his joyful laugh, "general consternation." chapter x. fighting along the chickahominy. retreat--lee's bold initiative--lee and his lieutenants planning battle--the confederates' loss at mechanicsville--gaines's mill--a. p. hill's fight--longstreet's reserve division put in--mcclellan's change of base--savage station--longstreet engages mcclellan's main force at frayser's farm (or glendale)--president davis on the field--testimony of federal generals--fierce bayonet charges--"greek meets greek"--capture of general mccall--mcclellan's masterly retreat. the day after stuart's return i rode over to general lee's head-quarters and suggested that general jackson be withdrawn from the valley to take position on our left, to march against mcclellan's right, and was informed that the order for jackson was sent when whiting's division was detached and sent to join him. then it was that general lee revealed the plan indicated in his instructions of the 11th, for general jackson to march down and attack mcclellan's rear, while he made a simultaneous attack upon his front. the suggestion was offered that the enemy had probably destroyed the bridges and ferries on the pamunkey along the line of his rear, which might leave jackson in perilous condition if the front attack should be delayed; that that attack must be hazardous, as the enemy was in well-fortified positions with four army corps. after deliberation, he changed the plan and accepted the suggestion in favor of combining his fighting columns on the north side of the chickahominy in echelon march against mcclellan's right flank, leaving troops in the trenches in front of mcclellan to defend in case of a move towards richmond. at the first mention of this march before this conference a change of base was spoken of by general d. h. hill, but with our troops to be left in the trenches, so near the flank of such a move, and our columns afield, pressing close upon its rear, it was thought impracticable. general d. h. hill, in view of the possibility, preferred that our attack should be made against the enemy's left by crossing white oak swamp below the enemy's left. jackson was called in advance of his command to meet the hills and myself at general lee's head-quarters for conference on the execution. on the forenoon of the 23d of june we were advised of his approach, and called to head-quarters to meet him. he was there before us, having ridden fifty miles by relay of horses since midnight. we were together in a few minutes after his arrival, in general lee's private office. the general explained the plan briefly: jackson to march from ashland by heights between the chickahominy and pamunkey, turning and dislodging the federal right, thus clearing the way for the march of troops to move on his right; a. p. hill to cross the upper chickahominy and march for mechanicsville, in echelon to jackson; the mechanicsville bridge being clear, d. h. hill's division and mine to cross, the former to reinforce jackson's column, the latter to file to the right and march down the river in right echelon to a. p. hill's direct march through mechanicsville to gaines's mill. general lee then excused himself to attend to office business, asking that we talk the matter over for our better comprehension. turning to jackson, i said,- "you have distance to overcome, and in all probability obstacles will be thrown in the way of your march by the enemy. as your move is the key of the campaign, you should appoint the hour at which the connection may be made co-operative." he promptly responded,- "the morning of the 25th." i expressed doubt of his meeting that hour, and suggested that it would be better to take a little more time, as the movements of our columns could be readily adjusted to those of his. he then appointed the morning of the 26th. upon his return, report was made general lee that the officers understood, and would be prepared to execute the plans; that general jackson had appointed the morning of the 26th, when he would lead the march. verbal instructions were given, followed by written orders, embodying in minute detail the plan already given in general. the topographical features of the ground about beaver dam creek have been given in a former chapter. behind it battery epaulements had been skilfully laid and constructed, as well as rifle-trenches. these were occupied by the troops of the fifth corps, commanded by general fitz-john porter. mccall's division had joined the army of the potomac, and was assigned as part of the fifth corps, with the divisions of sykes and morell. two of mccall's brigades, j. f. reynolds's and seymour's, with thoroughly-equipped artillery, were especially charged with the defences, the third brigade, meade's, in reserve, the other divisions in supporting distance. mccall's advanced brigades had guards at the bridges as far as meadow bridge, and a strong outpost at mechanicsville, under orders to retire when the strength of the enemy's advance was so developed as to warrant their doing so. three batteries, two of six guns each and one of four, manned the epaulements at the opening of the fight. before sunrise on the 26th of june the division of a. p. hill was in position at meadow bridge; his brigade, under general branch, and johnson's battery, seven miles above, at brook turnpike bridge; my division and that of d. h. hill on the heights overlooking the mechanicsville bridge,--all awaiting the approach of the initial column. not anticipating delay, the divisions had no special cause to conceal their presence, nor did the lay of the ground offer good cover. morning came, and noon passed. a few minutes after ten a.m., general branch received a note informing him that, at the hour of its writing, general jackson's column was crossing the central railroad. he assembled his command, crossed the chickahominy, and marched down along the route designated for his column, without sending information to the division commander. of his march he reported,- "interruption by the enemy, but with no other effect than to retard without checking our march. "near crenshaw's the road on which the column commanded by major-general ewell" (of jackson's) "was advancing and that on which i was advancing approach within one-fourth of a mile of each other. the heads of our columns reached this point simultaneously, and, after a short personal interview between general ewell and myself, we proceeded on our respective routes. "after dislodging the enemy from several ambuscades with only a small loss to my command, i reached the meadow bridge road, when i learned from stragglers that major-general hill had crossed the chickahominy, without opposition, with the remainder of the division and gone on to mechanicsville, then distant about one and a half miles. a courier from the general soon assured me of the correctness of the information, and, closing in my skirmishers, i made all haste to join him at mechanicsville. the brigade reached the field almost an hour before sunset."[30] at three o'clock, general a. p. hill, hearing nothing from jackson or his brigade under branch, decided to cross the river and make his move without reference to jackson or branch. he crossed and moved down against mechanicsville, attacked by field's brigade, anderson and archer on field's left, pender and gregg on his right, and six field batteries (four guns each). the outpost was driven in, and hill prepared and attacked against the front at beaver dam creek. meanwhile the mechanicsville bridge had been cleared, and, after a little delay repairing breaks, d. h. hill's and longstreet's divisions crossed. a. p. hill's battle soon became firm, but he waited a little for jackson before giving it full force. jackson came up, marched by the fight without giving attention, and went into camp at hundley's corner, half a mile in rear of the enemy's position of contention. a. p. hill put his force in severe battle and was repulsed. as d. h. hill approached, he was called into the fray by the commanding general, then by the president. he sent ripley's brigade and five batteries, which made the battle strong and hot along the line. the most determined efforts were against the enemy's right, where general mccall, reinforced by kern's battery and griffin's and martindale's brigades (morell's division), edwards's battery, and the third regiment of meade's brigade, beat off the repeated and formidable efforts of a. p. hill, when he essayed a column against the crossing at ellerson's mill, which mccall reinforced by the seventh regiment of meade's, eastman's battery, and before night the fourth michigan, twelfth new york, and berdan's sharp-shooters came in to reinforce the line and relieve regiments exhausted of ammunition. the battle was in close conflict till nine o'clock at night, when hill was obliged to give over till morning. the federal reinforcements were not all engaged, and some that were suffered but little; none very severely. mccall replenished ammunition and prepared to renew the fight the next morning. the federal loss in the engagement was 361 aggregate.[31] no especial account of the confederate loss was made in separate report, but it could not have been less than two thousand, and may have reached three thousand. general d. h. hill reported of his forty-fourth georgia regiment, the lieutenant-colonel, estes (j. b.), wounded, and others, aggregating 334 killed and wounded. of his first north carolina regiment, colonel stokes, major skinner, six captains, and the adjutant killed, and 133 privates killed and wounded. [illustration: battle-field of mechanicsville and beaver dam creek. showing position of troops night of the 26th] during the night general mcclellan ordered his troops withdrawn. they retired at daylight on the 27th, leaving a line of skirmishers to cover their march. the skirmishers were not seriously molested, the confederates being satisfied that the direct assault had failed, and the flanking march non-aggressive. early in the morning, d. h. hill was ordered to march to the left to turn the position, and was on the federal right before their lines were well out of their trenches. he came up with jackson and led the march of that column from hundley's corner. a. p. hill marched by the direct route to gaines's mill, and longstreet, in reserve, moved by the route nearer the river and dr. gaines's house. d. h. hill marched by bethesda church to old cold harbor. he understood the plan of campaign and promptly engaged the new position along the chickahominy heights, on the enemy's right, where he found a well-posted battery of ten guns near swamp lands commanding the only road of approach. he ordered bondurant's battery into action, but the combat was unequal; the latter was forced to retire, and general jackson ordered the division back to selected ground parallel to a road over which he supposed that the federals would presently retreat. as my division was in reserve, it could only be used in the last extremity. so the driving could only be made by the division of a. p. hill, while jackson, with his own, ewell's, d. h. hill's, and whiting's divisions, had more than half of our moving column, organized as our leading battle force, held in ambush for the enemy. the enemy was found strongly posted upon high ground over the grapevine bridge, forming a semicircle, his flanks near the river. a deep and steep chasm in front of his left divided the height upon which he stood from an open plateau over which he must be attacked, if at all, on his left. the side slope leading up to that position was covered by open forest, obstructed and defended by fallen trees. on the crest were felled trees, occasional sand-bags, piles of rails, and knapsacks. behind these lines were the divisions of sykes and morell, with bristling artillery for the first defence, with mccall's division of infantry and a tremendous array of artillery in reserve. further strength was given to the position by a stream which cut in between the two heights with deep scarped banks. his right was covered to some extent by swamp lands and forest tangles almost as formidable as the approach towards his left. general fitz-john porter was the commander on the field. a. p. hill came upon a detachment at gaines's mill, forced his way across the creek, and followed to the enemy's strong position, where he promptly engaged about the time of d. h. hill's withdrawal. he found himself fighting not only strong numbers, but against a very strong defensive ground. as general d. h. hill withdrew, general porter prepared to follow, but the fierce assaults of a. p. hill told him that he must hold his concentration. it was a little after two p.m. when a. p. hill put all of his force into action and pressed his battle with great zeal and courage, but he was alone. jackson, finding the fire of the enemy steady and accumulating against a. p. hill, ordered his troops forward into action. d. h. hill engaged again at the swamp land, and found that he must capture the battery firing across his advance. with the aid of some of elzey's brigade he succeeded in this, temporarily, but sykes doubled on him, recovered it, and put it again into action. parts of ewell and lawton, of jackson's, came in on d. h. hill's right. meanwhile, a. p. hill had fought to exhaustion, and found himself obliged to put his troops down to hold his line. the enemy putting in his reserves, spliced his thinned ranks with artillery and infantry, and fought a desperate and very gallant battle, calling for troops from across the river. my division came up near a. p. hill's rear, being the reserve, and awaited orders. about five o'clock a messenger came from general lee asking a diversion by part of my troops against the enemy's left to draw off troops from his right, so as to let our left in through his weakening lines. three brigades were sent to open fire and threaten their left from the forest edge, with orders not to cross the open. these brigades engaged steadily, and parts of them essayed to pass the field in front as their blood grew hot, but were recalled, with orders repeated to engage steadily, only threatening assault. the army all the while engaged in efforts to find a point that could be forced. finally, a little before sunset, general lee sent to me to say that "all other efforts had failed, and unless i could do something, the day was lost."[32] pickett's brigade and part of r. h. anderson's had been drawn up under the crest in rear of a. p. hill's right, and kemper's brigade was near, also under cover. upon the receipt of the last message, pickett and anderson were ordered into action as assaulting columns, and kemper called up. just as the brigades advanced, general whiting burst through the woods with his own and hood's brigades, reported to me that he had lost sight of his commander, general jackson, in the forest, and asked me to put him into battle. he was ordered to form for assault, and to follow on the left of pickett's and anderson's columns, then in motion, as the columns of direction. as my troops reached the crest under which they had rested they came under the full blaze of the battle, but pickett and anderson were comparatively fresh, and dashed through the open and down the slope before the fire had time to thin their ranks. the steep descent of the hither slope from its crest soon took them below the fire of the batteries, and a. p. hill's severe fight had so thinned the enemy's infantry lines of men and ammunition that their fire grew weaker. whiting's brigade, sore under its recent disastrous effort in the battle of seven pines, drifted from my left towards the woodland, but hood, with his fourth texas regiment and eighteenth georgia, obliqued to the right behind that brigade and closed the interval towards anderson's left, leaving his other regiments, the first and fifth texas, on whiting's left. hood clambered over the deep ravine with his two regiments and maintained position with the assaulting columns, while the balance of whiting's division followed in close echelon. as the advanced lines of pickett, anderson, and hood reached and crowned the stronghold of the enemy, anderson and pickett moved up in pursuit of the broken lines, and were almost in possession of their massed reserve artillery--had it under easy musketry range--when a dash of cavalry admonished them that their ranks, while in order for following the infantry lines, were not in proper form to receive a charge of cavalry. they concentrated well enough to pour a repelling fire into the troopers, but the delay had made time for the retreating infantry to open the field for the reserve batteries, and, night growing apace, they returned to the line of their trophies and used the captured guns against their late owners. general whiting asked for another brigade of jackson's that had reported to me, and turned his forces against the enemy's line on our left. the divisions of ewell and d. h. hill advancing at the same time, the general break seemed almost simultaneous, and was claimed by all. the messages from general lee were so marked by their prompt and successful execution that, in reporting of the battle, it occurred to me that they could be better noted in his report than in mine, but he adopted the claim of a general and simultaneous break along the line. a letter from general porter, written since the war, assures the writer that his guns had become so foul from steady protracted fire that his men had difficulty in ramming their cartridges to the gun-chambers, and that in some instances it could only be accomplished by putting the rammers against trees and hammering them down. the position was too strong to leave room to doubt that it was only the thinning fire, as the battle progressed, that made it assailable; besides, the repulse of a. p. hill's repeated, desperate assaults forcibly testified to the fact. it was, nevertheless, a splendid charge, by peerless soldiers. when the cavalry came upon us our lines were just thin enough for a splendid charge upon artillery, but too thin to venture against a formidable cavalry. five thousand prisoners were turned over to general lee's provost-guard, a number of batteries and many thousand small-arms to the ordnance department, by my command. the confederate commanders, except a. p. hill, claimed credit for the first breach in general porter's lines, but the solid ranks of prisoners delivered to the general provost-guard, and the several batteries captured and turned in to the ordnance department, show the breach to have been made by the columns of anderson, pickett, and hood's two regiments. the troops of the gallant a. p. hill, that did as much and effective fighting as any, received little of the credit properly due them. it was their long and steady fight that thinned the federal ranks and caused them to so foul their guns that they were out of order when the final struggle came. early on the 28th my advance, reaching the river, found the bridges destroyed and the enemy concentrating on the other side. under the impression that the enemy must reopen connection with his base on the pamunkey, general lee sent stuart's cavalry and part of jackson's command (ewell's) to interpose on that line. they cut the line at despatch station, where ewell's division was halted. stuart, following down towards the depot on the pamunkey till he approached the white house, cut off a large detachment of cavalry and horse artillery under general stoneman that retreated down the peninsula. at night stuart rested his command, finding supplies of forage and provisions abandoned by the enemy. at the same time fires were seen along the line of supplies, and houses in flames. on the 29th he followed towards the depot, still in flames. "the command was now entirely out of rations and the horses without forage. i had relied on the enemy at the white house to supply me with those essentials, and i was not disappointed, in spite of their efforts to destroy everything. provisions and delicacies of every description lay in heaps, and men regaled themselves on fruits of the tropics as well as the substantials of the land. large quantities of forage were left also."[33] on the 28th, major meade and lieutenant johnson's engineers were sent from my head-quarters to learn of the enemy's operations or movements. early on the 29th they made their way across the chickahominy, into the grounds and works of the enemy just left vacant, and sent the first account of the enemy's move on his change of base. the conflagrations of the day before told of speedy change of position in some direction, but this was the first information we had from a reliable source. their report was sent to general lee. while planning and ordering pursuit, he received a similar report from general magruder, coupled with the statement that he was preparing to attack one of the enemy's forts. general jackson was ordered to follow on the enemy's rear with his column, including the division of d. h. hill, crossing the river at grapevine bridge, magruder to join pursuit along the direct line of retreat, huger to strike at the enemy's flank; meanwhile, ransom's brigade had joined huger's division. my division was to cross with a. p. hill's at new bridge, march back near richmond, across to and down the darbytown road to interpose between the enemy and james river. stuart was directed to operate against the enemy's left or rear, or front, as best he could. all the commands, being in waiting, marched at the first moment of their orders. jackson was long delayed repairing grapevine bridge. he probably knew that the river was fordable at that season, but preferred to pass his men over dry-shod. general d. h. hill, of that column, reported,- "scouts from hood's brigade and the third alabama (rodes's brigade) succeeded in crossing, and my pioneer corps under captain smith, of the engineers, repaired grapevine bridge on the 29th, and we crossed over at three o'clock that night."[34] on the 28th the seventh and eighth georgia regiments were sent out a little before night to ascertain the probable movements of the enemy, and encountered part of w. f. smith's division, sixth corps, meeting the forty-ninth pennsylvania and thirty-third new york regiments. colonel lamar and lieutenant-colonel towers and adjutant harper, of the eighth georgia regiment, fell into the enemy's hands, and twenty-nine others of the seventh and eighth regiments were taken prisoners. just as this affair was well begun a recall of the regiments was ordered; hence the number of casualties. about the same hour a cavalry affair at despatch station occurred which resulted to the credit of the confederates. at night general mcclellan called his corps commanders to head-quarters and announced his plan for change of base to the james river. the fourth corps had been ordered to prepare the route of crossing at white oak swamp, and pass over to defend it. the fifth and slocum's division of the sixth were to follow at night of the 28th. the second, third, and smith's division of the sixth corps were to defend the crossing against pursuit; the fourth, continuing its move, was to stand at turkey bridge, defending the approach from richmond by the river road; the fifth to stand at malvern hill, with mccall's division across the long bridge road, and slocum's across the charles city road, defending the avenues of approach from richmond. on the 29th, magruder in pursuit came upon sumner's (second) corps at allen's farm, and, after a spirited affair, found sumner too strong for him. after his success, sumner retired to savage station, where he joined franklin with his division under smith. the third corps (heintzelman's), under misconception of orders, or misleading of staff-officers, followed the marching corps across the swamp, leaving the second and smith's division of the sixth as the only defending forces. at savage station, magruder came upon them and again joined battle, but his force was not equal to the occasion. the commander of his left (d. r. jones), realizing the importance of action and the necessity for additional troops, called upon general jackson to co-operate on his left, but jackson reported that he had other important duties to perform. the affair, therefore, against odds was too strong for magruder, so that he was forced back without important results for the confederates, the federals making safe passage of the crossing and gaining position to defend against pursuit in that quarter. on the 29th, general holmes marched down the james river road to new market with part of colonel daniel's brigade and two batteries, and general j. g. walker's brigade and two batteries, and was there reinforced by part of general wise's brigade and two batteries, in co-operative position to my division and that of a. p. hill, on the darbytown and long bridge roads. on his night march along the long bridge road, fitz-john porter got on the wrong end and rubbed up against my outpost, but recognized his adversary in time to recover his route and avert a night collision. he posted mccall's division in front of charles city cross-roads; his divisions under morell and sykes at malvern hill, and warren's brigade, near the fourth corps, on the river routes from richmond. as the divisions of the third corps arrived they were posted,--kearny between the charles city and long bridge roads, on mccall's right; hooker in front of the quaker road, on mccall's left; sedgwick's division, sumner's corps, behind mccall. before noon of the 30th, jackson's column encountered franklin, defending the principal crossing of white oak swamp by the divisions of richardson and w. f. smith and naglee's brigade. about the same time my command marched down the long bridge road and encountered the main force of mcclellan's army posted at the charles city cross-roads (frayser's farm, or glendale). my division was deployed across the long bridge road in front of the divisions of mccall and kearny, holding the division of a. p. hill at rest in the rear, except the brigade under branch, which was posted off to my right and rear to guard against hooker's division, standing behind the quaker road, in threatening position on my right flank. the ground along the front of mccall and kearny was a dark forest, with occasional heavy tangles, as was the ground in front of hooker. the front of slocum, along the charles city road, was something similar, but offering some better opportunities for artillery practice and infantry tactics. as jackson and franklin engaged in artillery combat, my division advanced under desultory fire of skirmishers to close position for battle, awaiting nearer approach of jackson and signal of approach of our troops on the charles city road. in the wait the skirmish-lines were more or less active, and an occasional shot came from one of the federal batteries. during the combat between jackson and franklin, sedgwick's brigades under dana and sully were sent back to reinforce at the crossing, but upon the opening of the engagement at frayser's farm they were brought back on the double-quick. after a time reports of cannon fire came from the direction of charles city road, signalling, as we supposed, the approach of huger's column. to this i ordered one of our batteries to return salutation. the senior brigadier of the division, r. h. anderson, was assigned to immediate supervision of my front line, leaving his brigade under colonel m. jenkins. while awaiting the nearer approach of jackson or the swelling volume of huger's fire, the president, general lee, and general a. p. hill, with their staffs and followers, rode forward near my line and joined me in a little clearing of about three acres, curtained by dense pine forests. all parties engaged in pleasant talk and anticipations of the result of a combination supposed to be complete and prepared for concentrating battle,--jackson attacking in the rear, huger on the right flank, a. p. hill and myself standing in front. very soon we were disturbed by a few shells tearing and screaming through the forests over our heads, and presently one or two burst in our midst, wounding a courier and killing and wounding several horses. the little opening was speedily cleared of the distinguished group that graced its meagre soil, and it was left to more humble, active combatants. near the battery from which the shots came was r. h. anderson's brigade, in which colonel jenkins had a battalion of practised sharp-shooters. i sent orders for jenkins to silence the battery, under the impression that our wait was understood, and that the sharp-shooters would be pushed forward till they could pick off the gunners, thus ridding us of that annoyance; but the gallant jenkins, only too anxious for a dash at a battery, charged and captured it, thus precipitating battle. the troops right and left going in, in the same spirit, mccall's fire and the forest tangle thinned our ranks as the lines neared each other, and the battle staggered both sides, but, after a formidable struggle, the confederates won the ground, and randol's gallant battery. sedgwick's division reinforced the front and crowded back the confederate right, while kearny's, reinforced by slocum, pushed severely against my left, and then part of hooker's division came against my right. thus the aggressive battle became defensive, but we held most of the ground gained from mccall. in his official account, general heintzelman said,- "in less than an hour general mccall's division gave way. general hooker, being on his left, by moving to the right repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner and with great slaughter. general sumner, who was with general sedgwick, in mccall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. they now renewed the attack with vigor on kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss. the attack continued until some time after night. "this attack commenced at four p.m. and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. captain thompson's battery, directed with great skill, firing double charges, swept them back. the whole open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled with the enemy. each repulse brought fresh troops. "seeing that the enemy was giving way, i returned to the forks of the road, where i received a call from general kearny for aid. knowing that all of general sedgwick's troops were unavailable, i was glad to avail myself of the kind offer of general slocum to send the new jersey brigade of his division to general kearny's aid. i rode out far enough on the charles city road to see that we had nothing to fear from that direction."[35] general mccall reported,- "i had ridden into the regiment to endeavor to check them, but with only partial success. it was my fortune to witness one of the fiercest bayonet charges that ever occurred on this continent. bayonet wounds, mortal and slight, were given and received. i saw skulls smashed by the butts of muskets, and every effort made by either party in this life-and-death struggle proving indeed that here greek had met greek. the seventh regiment was at this time on the right of the fourth, and was too closely engaged with a force also of great superiority in numbers to lend any assistance to the gallant few of the fourth who were struggling at their side. in fine, these few men, some seventy or eighty, were borne bodily off among the rebels, and when they reached a gap in the fence walked through it, while the enemy, intent on pursuing those in front of them, passed on without noticing them. "it was at this moment, on witnessing this scene, i keenly felt the want of reinforcements. i had not a single regiment left to send to the support of those so overpowered. there was no running, but my division, reduced by the furious battles to less than six thousand, had to contend with the divisions of longstreet and a. p. hill (considered two of the strongest and best among many of the confederate army, numbering that day eighteen or twenty thousand men), and it was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them. my right was, as i say, literally forced off the ground by the weight simply of the enemy's column." his account is incorrect in the estimate of numbers and the two divisions. hill was not put in until a later hour, and encountered the troops of kearny and slocum. hill's orders were to hold the line gained until jackson and huger approached, to warrant more aggressive battle. magruder's march had been directed to succor holmes. in his official account, general holmes wrote of parts of his cavalry and artillery, "whose conduct was shameful in the extreme." he reported his casualties: "daniel's brigade, 2 killed, 22 wounded; walker's brigade, 12 wounded; artillery, 15 wounded. "the strength of the enemy's position and their imposing numbers were such that to attempt an attack upon them with my small force, unsupported, would have been perfect madness; for to have done this would have required a march of over three-quarters of a mile up a steep hill destitute of cover. i accordingly withdrew about nine p.m. to a position somewhat in advance of that occupied in the morning."[36] in his account of the fight, general kearny wrote,- "at four p.m. the attack commenced on my line with a determination and vigor, and in such masses, as i had never witnessed. thompson's battery, directed with great skill, literally swept the slightly falling open space with the completest execution, and, mowing them down by ranks, would cause the survivors to momentarily halt; but, almost instantly after, increased masses came up, and the wave bore on.... "in concluding my report of this battle, one of the most desperate of the war, the one most fatal, if lost, i am proud to give my thanks and to include in the glory of my own division the first new jersey brigade, general taylor, who held mccall's deserted ground, and general caldwell."[37] a. p. hill's division was held at rest several hours after the battle was pitched (branch's brigade on guard on my right retired, and gregg's on my left). under our plan, that huger was to assault the federal right and jackson the rear, the battle joined; hill was to be put in fresh to crown it. as night approached without indications of attack from either of those columns, hill was advanced to relieve the pressure against my worn troops. at the first dash he again grasped and held randol's battery, that had been the source of contention from the first onset. field's brigade pushed on through the enemy's line, and, supported by pender's and branch's, drove back reinforcements coming to their succor from one of sedgwick's brigades; pushed caldwell's off to kearny's position, where, with the additional aid of part of slocum's division, kearny succeeded in recovering his own ground and in putting caldwell's brigade into part of mccall's original right, leaving the confederates holding part of mccall's first line, field's brigade some little distance in advance of it. archer and branch, on field's right, made strong that part of it. gregg's brigade on the left made little progress beyond holding most of the ground taken by the first assault. the battle thus braced held its full and swelling volume on both sides. my right, thinned by the heavy fighting and tangled forest, found a way around the left of the contention, then gravitating towards its centre. in this effort hooker's division came against its right flank. by change of front a clever fight was made, but branch's brigade, ordered for service at that point, had been withdrawn by general hill to support his centre, so that hooker pushed us off into closed ranks along our line in rear and back; but his gallant onset was checked and failed of progress. general hooker claimed that he threw longstreet over on kearny, but general mccall said that by a little stretch of the hyperbole he could have said that he threw longstreet over the moon. to establish his centre, hill sent in j. r. anderson's brigade astride the long bridge road, which held the battle till the near approach of night, when mccall, in his last desperate effort to reinforce and recover his lost ground, was caught in the dark of twilight and invited to ride to my head-quarters. friends near him discovered his dilemma in time to avert their own capture, and aggressive battle ceased. the artillery combat, with occasional exchanges of shots, held till an hour after the beat of tattoo. it was the forty-seventh virginia regiment that caught and invited general mccall to quarter with the confederates. although his gallant division had been forced from the fight, the brave head and heart of the general were not fallen till he found himself on his lonely ride. he was more tenacious of his battle than any one who came within my experience during the war, if i except d. h. hill at sharpsburg. in years gone by i had known him in pleasant army service, part of the time as a brevet lieutenant of his company. when the name was announced, and as he dismounted, i approached to offer my hand and such amenities as were admissible under the circumstances, but he drew up with haughty mien, which forbade nearer approach, so that the courtesies were concluded by the offer of staff-officers to escort him to the city of richmond. it was during this affair that general holmes's division advanced against the federals at turkey bridge with a six-gun field battery and engaged, and was met by the fire of thirty field guns and the gunboat batteries, which drove him to confusion, abandoning two guns. earlier in the day, magruder's column had been ordered by a long détour to support the fight at frayser's farm, but the trouble encountered by holmes's division seemed serious, and caused the confederate commander to divert magruder's march to support that point, through which a resolute advance might endanger our rear at frayser's farm. after night magruder was called to relieve the troops on the front of my line. his march during the day was delayed by his mistaken guide. the confederates claimed as trophies of the battle ten pieces of artillery, some prisoners, and most of the field from which mccall's division had been dislodged. holmes's division lost two guns in the affair at turkey bridge, but other confederates secured and afterwards made better use of them. during this eventful day the federals were anxiously pushing their trains to cover on the river, and before noon of july 1 all, except those of ammunition necessary for immediate use, had safely passed the field selected for their malvern hill battle. chapter xi. battle of malvern hill. last stand in the great retreat--strength of mcclellan's position--the confederates make poor use of their artillery--a mistake and defeat for lee's army--the campaign as a whole a great success, but it should have been far greater--mcclellan's retreat showed him well equipped in the science of war--review of the campaign--jackson's and magruder's misunderstanding--moral effect of the gunboats on the james river--"there should be a gunboat in every family." at malvern hill, hardly a league away from frayser's, now left to silence save for the moans of the unfortunate fallen, and standing south of the line to turkey bridge, was fitz-john porter with the reserve artillery massed, supported by the divisions of sykes and morell on the left and couch's on the right, from the crew house to j. w. binford's. the field had been carefully selected and as judiciously guarded by well-posted commands, holding the only way left which gave hope of successful passage to cover under the gunboats. during the night of the 30th of june and early morn of the 1st of july this position was reinforced by the retreating federals,--first by the second and third corps, mccall's division of the fifth, and w. f. smith's of the sixth, and later by other troops. among the trains moving for the river was one of ten siege guns under colonel tyler. these were dropped in porter's rear and put in battery, giving them a sweep of the avenues of approach and extensive rake of the woodlands, and a great number of lighter batteries bristled upon the brow and down the slopes of the hill. on either flank the plateau was somewhat guarded by ravines and tangled marsh lands, while the front approach was over ascending slopes, so broken as to make advancing artillery combat slow and hazardous. early on the 1st, the columns under huger, jackson, and magruder met at the charles city cross-roads, but the enemy had given up that position and marched away, leaving to them the abandoned forest land. the disappointment of the confederate commander in the failure of combination ordered for the 30th was noted by those who were near him, while the composure with which it was borne indicated the grander elements of his character, and drew those who knew his plans and purposes closer to him. jackson was ordered to follow on the direct line of the enemy's retreat; huger and magruder marched to co-operate on his right; longstreet's and a. p. hill's divisions were held in reserve. general lee rode near jackson's column to view the army on that front. feeling unwell and much fatigued, he called me to temporary service near him. as he rode to the left, he ordered me, with the columns of huger and magruder, to make reconnoissance of the enemy's new position in that quarter, and to report of the feasibility of aggressive battle. i found some difference between general lee's maps and general magruder's guides, but my authority was only for a reconnoissance, and posting the divisions. an elevated point was found off the enemy's left front, as high as the plateau upon which his army stood, from which a fair view was had of his position and down along his front and the open as far as jackson's field, the latter just filing in by his batteries on much lower but open ground. profound silence rested upon the field. jackson's batteries, yet a little beyond the point of range, marched to their places as quietly as if taking positions for review. porter's field seemed as little concerned at the developments along his flank and front, indicating that there was to be no waste of ammunition on that july day. his guns could not be counted, but blocking them off by batteries there seemed to be eighty on his front, besides the siege battery in rear. his guns were all trailed to jackson's front, thus presenting a flank towards the high point upon which i stood. from the crest at this little ridge the ground dropped off sharply some eighteen inches or two feet to a lower terrace, forming a natural parapet and terre-plein for forty or sixty guns, massed. the spacious open along jackson's front appeared to offer a field for play of a hundred or more guns, and although his lower ground was not inviting of combat even by a hundred guns, it was yet judged that advancing combat by eighty or a hundred guns, in combination with the forty-gun battery of position, might justify assault, and the tremendous game at issue called for adventure. [illustration: battle of malvern hill] i thought it probable that porter's batteries, under the cross-fire of the confederates thus posted on his left and front, could be thrown into disorder, and thus make way for combined assaults of the infantry. i so reported, and general lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending the pioneer corps out to cut a road for the right batteries of position. i suggested position to magruder for his division, but he insisted that the quaker road was not correctly located on general lee's maps, so i left that part of the order to be looked after by general lee's recognized staff. general chilton, chief of staff, was then sent by general lee to assist general magruder in posting the troops, and i was ordered back to locate the batteries. but eight guns came in proper time and were posted. these general magruder proposed to supplement by thirty of his own under colonel s. d. lee, to be reinforced by the others as they came up. with this understanding i returned to head-quarters, made my report, and was permitted to go back to my command proper. the most convenient point for observing the effect of the artillery fire was occupied by general armistead's brigade. that officer was designated by general lee to give notice, if the combat was successful, by advancing his brigade, under the shouts of infantry charge, as the signal for general assault. the eight guns for the right battery were all that got into position on time, and jackson failed to open fire by advancing all of the batteries along his front, so that the practice from those quarters was not forcibly executed. when the eight guns finally opened, porter shifted his aim from his proper front, which jackson failed to combat, and put in the fire of forty guns against the eight-gun battery of our right. the gunboat batteries also came into that practice, but it was found that they damaged friends almost as much as the enemy, and were ordered to discontinue. jackson's cross-fire, feeble at best and at long range, was finally drawn off by other batteries far on the enemy's right, so that the eight guns were soon piled a heterogeneous mass of caissons, guns, limbers, and horses. some other batteries got into action at the same point, eight or ten at a time, but suffered like disaster. so the plan for battle and order of the day were given over by the confederate commander, who sent for me to ride with him over to his left in search of a route by which the enemy's right might be turned. this seemed feasible under the hasty reconnoissance, and he ordered the reserves on that move. as we started on the march the noise of battle reached us and the march was arrested. under the impression that his officers realized the failure and abandonment of his original plan, general lee failed to issue orders specifically recalling the appointed battle. it seems that just as the troops marched to the left under the last order, information was received by some of the officers at the front that the enemy was getting away from us. to ascertain as to this matter, and anxious to atone for lost opportunities of the day before, part of the troops near our right moved forward, and soon encountered the enemy's infantry, as well as the formidable artillery. this impact burst into the noise of battle, and was taken as the signal for assault under the original order of the day. from the right to the left, as far as and including d. h. hill's division, the confederates attacked in splendid style, making repeated brave charges, but they were as firmly met by the enemy, and their dead and wounded were mingled on the same lines. the confederate ranks thinning rapidly, magruder called on me for reinforcements, and jackson was sent to reinforce d. h. hill's left, but night closed in upon us before the reinforcements could get into action. as the order for battle had been given about noon, and had been abandoned some hours before the opening, upon receiving magruder's call, i supposed the conflict had been brought on by the enemy to force our right back and better clear the route of his retreat. i ordered a. p. hill direct to magruder, and my own division for support on our extreme right. the result of the battle was a repulse of the confederates along the entire line and the sacrifice of several thousand brave officers and men, though some of our troops held ground nearer the enemy than at the onset of the battle. during the night the enemy resumed his march for the river, leaving his dead, some of his wounded, and exhibiting other marks of the precipitate character of his retreat. stuart's cavalry had been recalled from north of the chickahominy on the 30th to join us on the south side, and reached jackson's left tuesday night after the battle. the morning of the 2d opened heavy and oppressive. the storm front of bursting cannon and bristling bayonets was changed to a wide sweep of heavy clouds that covered the dead that had grappled and fallen together on malvern hill. the enemy was gone, and reached his lodgement at harrison's landing on james river, the old seat of that family which has given our country two presidents. jackson stood on the direct route of the enemy's retreat, and was ordered to follow it; magruder's and huger's commands to follow jackson. general lee rode with them. d. h. hill's division was left to care for the wounded and dead of malvern hill. to obviate pressure upon a single track, the reserve divisions were ordered by nance's store, but the heavy clouds soon began to let down a pelting rain that became more severe and delayed all movements. the reports of jackson and stuart of the operations of the 3d are conflicting. the former claimed that he was near the landing on the morning of the 3d, and advanced his line of skirmishers. the latter reported that he found during the night of the 2d a fine position on erlington heights, from which the enemy could be shelled out of his new position by artillery; that he occupied and held that position by a squadron and howitzer until driven from it by the enemy at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 3d; that he reported of that position to generals lee and jackson during the night of the 2d. other accounts go with that of stuart. it seems that the "foot cavalry"[38] and the reserve divisions met at the landing late in the afternoon of the 3d. the troops from the valley district had not been engaged in the battles of the march except that of gaines's mill. at daylight of the 4th i rode to the front, and ordered general jackson to drive in the enemy's skirmishers and prepare to attack. d. r. jones's division of magruder's command, coming up, was ordered on jackson's left, a. p. hill's on his right; my own division to support jackson's direct move for erlington heights. after pushing the skirmish line back, jackson reported his troops not in condition for the work, and asked delay until the commanding general was up. as general lee was reported near, attack was delayed, and a note was sent asking him to ride forward as soon as convenient. he rode up in about half an hour, and, after mature deliberation, decided that the attack should not be made. he reinforced his cavalry and horse artillery by a number of his choicest field batteries, and ordered general stuart to use them against the enemy's transports on the lower james. this expedition did some damage, but the superior batteries of the gun-boats, convoys of the transports, enabled them to maintain safe-conduct along the line of supplies and reinforcements. on the 8th he withdrew his army to points more convenient to supplies, and towards the open highway to washington city. passing in critical review the events of the campaign, they fail to disclose a flaw as it was projected by the confederate chief. it even opened up grander possibilities than came within his most hopeful anticipations at the period of projection. the union commander left his fifth corps engaged at beaver dam creek while jackson's column marched by it as far as hundley's corner and went into camp. the object and instructions of jackson's advanced echelon were to have him file in against any force that he might pass and attack it in flank and rear. if, instead of going into camp at hundley's corner on the afternoon of the 26th of june, he had filed to his right behind the fifth corps, he would have had it surrounded by fifty thousand men beyond the reach of succor. he was troubled by conflicting orders. the general order for the campaign and verbal instructions were intended to supersede all others, but general lee's letter of the 11th was not recalled, so he marched with the two orders in his pocket, which made not a little trouble. before jackson's army was called from the valley, it was reinforced and organized for our working column. on the morning of the 27th of june it was further augmented by the division under d. h. hill and stuart's cavalry. his line of march during the day led him around porter's position near gaines's mill to the enemy's right, the most favorable point for attack. he partially engaged by d. h. hill's division, then withdrew it, and posted his troops in a position selected to catch the federals in their flight from a. p. hill's division. finally, when porter's defence developed too much strength for a. p. hill, he deployed into line of battle from left to right, overspreading the enemy's entire front. on the morning of the 28th of june, general lee thought to draw mcclellan out from his works, force him to defend his base on the pamunkey, and to so cripple him on his retreat as to warrant strong detachments from his army in the direction of washington, and thus force him to defend his own capital. before marching to the opening of the campaign, he ordered a detachment of cavalry to the south side of white oak swamp, under careful watch for the enemy's movements by vedettes, even as far as chickahominy river, so that on the night of the 27th he had a cordon of troops and vedettes extending completely around mcclellan's army. notwithstanding precautions so carefully laid, mcclellan started to march for his new base on the night of the 27th, continued his preparations and movements through the day and night of the 28th, and the first reliable information of the move towards james river came from major meade and lieutenant johnson, engineers. the information, though coming from a source least looked for, was more than gratifying to general lee, for he thought the enemy had essayed a move not practicable; that general mcclellan's army was in his power and must be our prize, never to reach the new base. just as he was mapping out orders of pursuit, a staff-officer of general magruder's came from the other side of the river to report the federal army in retreat, and that general magruder was preparing to assault the fort in his immediate front. general lee said,- "my compliments to general magruder, and ask him not to hurt my young friends, major meade and lieutenant johnson, who are occupying that fort." uniformly military, but courteous in his bearing, it was very rare that he became facetious when on parade service, but anticipations that general mcclellan was soon to be his prisoner excused the giving way to impulse born of this unexpected adventure. within an hour his troops on the east side were on the march for their crossings of the chickahominy. he then rode across, gave orders to general magruder, rode with him some distance, and repeated the orders before leaving him. following up the rear-guard, general magruder came upon it in force at savage station. the second corps and franklin's division under w. f. smith of the sixth, under general sumner, were posted there to cover the retreat. magruder planned battling with his own six brigades against their front, two brigades of huger's division to come on the enemy's left down the williamsburg road, jackson's twelve or fifteen brigades to attack their right. but when magruder thought his arrangements complete, he received a message from general huger "that his brigades would be withdrawn."[39] then other information not anticipated came to him,--viz., that general jones, commanding on magruder's left, called for co-operation in that quarter. general jackson sent word in reply that "he had other important duty to perform." referring to jackson's orders of the 29th, general lee wrote general magruder: "head-quarters department of northern virginia, "june 29, 1862. "major-general j. b. magruder, "_commanding division_: "general,--i regret much that you have made so little progress to-day in pursuit of the enemy. in order to reap the fruits of our victory the pursuit should be most vigorous. i must urge you, then, again to press on his rear rapidly and steadily. we must lose no time, or he will escape us entirely. "very respectfully yours, etc., "r. e. lee, "_general_. "p.s.--since the order was written, i learn from major taylor that you are under the impression that general jackson has been ordered not to support you. on the contrary, he has been directed to do so, and to push the pursuit vigorously."[40] sumner, besides his greater force, having some advantage from the earthworks previously constructed, repulsed magruder's attack, and the affair of cross-purposes failed of effect. if jackson could have joined against the right of sumner with his brigades, the latter could have been dislodged, the confederates passing the swamp with him, which would have marked the beginning of the end. the occasion was especially propitious, for heintzelman's corps, that had been designated as part of the rear-guard with sumner and franklin, through some misconception had marched over the swamp, to camp near charles city cross-roads, leaving easy work for jackson and magruder. when, on the forenoon of the 30th, jackson found his way across the swamp blocked by franklin, he had time to march to the head of and across it to the charles city road in season for the engagement contemplated at frayser's farm, the distance being about four miles. general wright, of huger's division, marched his brigade from the head of the swamp to jackson's line at the bridge, and returned, making several halts and crossings to reconnoitre. but little remains to be said of the engagements at frayser's farm and malvern hill. the former was a halting failure of combination of forces; the latter an accident resulting from the armies standing close abreast many hours. malvern hill left out, the two armies would have mingled their lines between that and westover during the 3d and 4th of july. the failure of concert of action by the confederates should not discount the conduct of mcclellan's masterly retreat. in the emergency he showed himself well equipped in the science of war, and prepared to cross swords with his able adversary. at the opening of the campaign he had in hand one hundred and five thousand men. general lee's returns were not accurately made, but a fair estimate puts his numbers between eighty and eighty-five thousand. the losses of the campaign were, on the union side, 15,249; on the confederate side, greater; in the absence of complete returns, it is fair to say that they were from 18,000 to 19,000. up to the time of malvern hill the casualties were about equally divided between the two armies, but in that battle the confederates lost not far from 5000 men, and the federals not more than one-third that number. upon reaching the gunboats, general mcclellan's power was about doubled. although fire from the gun-boats was not very effective against a land battle, the moral effect of fighting batteries that could not be reached was most powerful. it was reported on the confederate side that general mcclellan, on boarding one of the boats, where he spent most of the day of battle, said, "there should be a gunboat in every family." some critics say that mcclellan should have taken richmond during the campaign. the great napoleon would have done so after the disaster at malvern hill with his regularly organized army of veterans. they say, too, that lee should have captured mcclellan and his army. so thought general lee, but some of his leaders were working at cross-purposes, and did not have that close attention that the times called for. we may now consider the probable result of the plan mapped out and ordered by general lee in his letter of june 11th to general jackson had it been followed,--_i.e._, jackson to march down the right bank of the pamunkey with his troops from the valley district and attack mcclellan's rear east of the chickahominy, while lee attacked from the richmond side with his army. on the richmond side, mcclellan had four army corps, well fortified, supported by his powerful artillery. the battle of gaines's mill, where the troops from the valley were reinforced by four of lee's choice divisions and most of his cavalry,--more than doubling jackson's column,--may be significant of the result of jackson's attack on that side if it had been made as ordered. the battle of malvern hill, from an open field, may tell the result of an attack upon the four corps in their fortified position had the attack been made upon them from the richmond front. chapter xii. halleck and pope in federal command. centres of activity gravitate towards orange and culpeper counties--pope's unsoldierly preliminary orders--jackson's and pope's encounter at cedar mountain--confidence in and esteem for general lee--the confederate commander's plans for cutting off pope miscarry--capture of captain fitzhugh with important orders--longstreet puts general toombs under arrest--general pope withdraws. the federals had by this time organized the "army of virginia" from the independent forces in the state,--the first corps under general sigel, the second under general banks, the third under general mcdowell, commanded by major-general john pope, brought from the west for that object and appointed june 26. this army reported july 31, 46,858 strong, for field service. on the 23d of july, general h. w. halleck assumed command of the federal armies as general-in-chief, by order of the president of july 11. the quiet of general mcclellan's army at harrison's landing assured general lee of his opportunity for attention to the movements of the army under general pope, working towards richmond by the orange and alexandria railway. on the 13th of july he ordered general jackson, with his own and ewell's division, to gordonsville, to have a watch upon the federal force operating in that quarter, promising reinforcements as soon as occasion should call for them. stuart was at hanover court-house, in observation towards fredericksburg, and robertson's cavalry was ordered to jackson, to reinforce his cavalry under colonel munford. to engage attention pending these movements, general d. h. hill, in command on the south side of the james, was ordered to have all of his artillery on that side available put in battery on the banks of the river against mcclellan's camps on the north side and his transports on the water. general pope immediately displayed bold front as a diversion, seeking to draw general lee away from mcclellan. so general lee sent general a. p. hill with his division to reinforce jackson, with orders to the latter to strike out for the enemy in his front. the threatening attitude of the confederates at gordonsville caused apprehension at washington, and induced the authorities to consider the withdrawal of mcclellan's army to reinforce the army under pope. upon receipt of an intimation to that effect, general mcclellan ordered a strong force under general hooker to advance in threatening move against general lee on the 4th of august. hooker marched on the 5th, and occupied the ground of the battle of malvern hill. general lee ordered the divisions of mclaws, d. r. jones, that under ripley (d. h. hill's), and my own to march against hooker. it was night when our troops were posted, and before daylight of the next morning hooker had marched back to his camp at harrison's landing. just here, as a digression from following the operations of the armies of lee and pope, it should be remarked that the latter, by injudicious and unsoldierly attitude assumed at the outstart of his campaign, intensely incensed the people of virginia and the south generally, the confederate army to a man, and probably to a considerable degree discomfited the most considerate and thoughtful of his own officers and the authorities behind him. the exigencies of war did not demand some of the harsh measures that he promulgated,--such, for instance, as his notorious "general orders no. 11" and several other of his pronunciamentos: "head-quarters army of virginia, "washington, july 23, 1862. "general orders no. 11.[41] "commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached commands will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines or within their reach in rear of their respective stations. "such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the united states, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes and pursue in good faith their accustomed avocations. those who refuse shall be conducted south beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and be notified that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. "if any person, having taken the oath of allegiance as above specified, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his property seized and applied to the public use. "all communication with any person whatever living within the lines of the enemy is positively prohibited, except through the military authorities and in the manner specified by military law; and any person concerned in writing or in carrying letters or messages in any other way will be considered and treated as a spy within the lines of the united states army. "by command of major-general pope. "geo. d. ruggles, "_colonel, assistant adjutant-general, and chief of staff_." this was a measure of unnecessary severity towards non-combatants, and had an unsalutary effect. when men volunteer to fight in their country's cause they should be credited with faith in its righteousness, and with expectations of meeting soldiers worthy of their mettle. appeals to turn their strength against women and children and non-combatants are offensive to manhood, demoralizing in influence, and more likely to aggravate and prolong war spirit than to open ways of order and amity. besides, such orders indicate a flaw in the armor of the author. general scott set an example worthy of eternal emulation. in his march through mexico he was as strict in the requirement of order and protection for non-combatants as he could have been in marching through his own civil communities. the result was speedy peace, respect from all the people, admiration and affection from many. when a. p. hill's division joined general jackson at gordonsville, general pope's army was posted,--the first corps (sigel's) at sperryville, the second (banks's) at culpeper court-house, the third (mcdowell's), one division near culpeper court-house, and one at fredericksburg--these two under ricketts and king respectively; his cavalry under buford, bayard, and hatch along the rapidan from the blue ridge to fredericksburg. the point held by his left was thought essential by the washington authorities as holding the way for reinforcements from mcclellan's army on the james to join in the contemplated march by general pope's route to richmond. on the 2d of august, jackson sent part of his cavalry forward as far as orange court-house, under colonel w. e. jones, who encountered at that point a formidable cavalry guard of the enemy, when a spirited affair occurred, creditable alike to both sides. this was followed up, on the 8th, by the advance of jackson's entire force, his own division under winder leading, ewell's and a. p. hill's following. general pope's outpost at cedar run, held by cavalry and crawford's brigade of infantry, had meantime been reinforced by the balance of the second corps under banks, and ricketts's division put in supporting position of the advance post. on the 9th, jackson advanced and found the enemy in strong position at cedar run. his division under ewell was posted on the northeast slope of slaughter mountain, his own division under winder formed to the left. the engagement was pitched and soon became severe. while yet posting his troops, winder was mortally struck by a fragment of shell. banks, gaining confidence in his battle, moved forward to closer and severe fight and held it an hour, at points putting jackson's troops in disorder. jackson, reinforced by a. p. hill's brigades, recovered his lost ground, advanced and renewed attack, drove the enemy back, engaged against reinforcements of ricketts's division, continued the fight till near midnight, then reorganized for battle away from the immediate front of the enemy, where he awaited next day. during the evening of the 9th, pope received his first corps under sigel and called up mcdowell's division, under king, from fredericksburg. on the 10th both armies remained quiet. on the 11th a flag of truce was sent in asking for time to bury the dead, which jackson granted, and extended to a late hour of the day. king's division coming up, pope decided to engage again on the 12th, but jackson, having information of the extent of reinforcements, decided to withdraw during the night. [illustration: battle of slaughter mountain. august 9th, 1862] the loss was severe on both sides,--jackson's, 1276, including his most promising brigadier, winder; pope's, 2381, including three brigadiers, two wounded and one taken prisoner. after drawing king's division to his field, general pope had about thirty-six thousand present for service. jackson's reports as to these forces were such that he accepted the advice of prudence and retired to stronger ground on the right bank of the rapidan. in the battle of the 9th the troops engaged were, according to official return of july 31,[42]- second corps (banks's), artillery and infantry 14,567 ricketts's division, half of third corps, artillery and infantry 9,287 ----- total 23,854 the absence of lawton's brigade and one from jackson's division reduced his force to something less than eighteen thousand. the troops engaged in battle, however, were not far from equal, jackson probably the stronger. that this was only a partial success--coming on the heels of the cruel orders of the federal commander--was gratifying to the confederates, and encouraging as well. inaction of the army of the potomac gave general lee opportunity for movement of his troops towards washington and the army under general pope. on the 15th i was ordered to gordonsville by the central railroad with ten brigades. two others under hood at hanover junction were ordered to join me. before despatching my corps, general lee expressed his thought to advance the right column and cavalry by the lower fords of the rapidan, the left by the fords above the railroad bridge, but left the question open, with orders to me to work on it. the brigades that moved with me were d. r. jones's, kemper's, pickett's, pryor's, jenkins's, featherston's, wilcox's, toombs's, evans's, and drayton's. hood's and whiting's joined us near gordonsville, hood commanding the demi-division,--his own and whiting's brigades. it may be well to write just here that experience during the seven days about richmond established between general lee and his first lieutenant relations of confidence and esteem, official and personal, which ripened into stronger ties as the mutations of war bore heavier upon us. he always invited the views of the latter in moves of strategy and general policy, not so much for the purpose of having his own views approved and confirmed as to get new light, or channels for new thought, and was more pleased when he found something that gave him new strength than with efforts to evade his questions by compliments. when oppressed by severe study, he sometimes sent for me to say that he had applied himself so closely to a matter that he found his ideas running around in a circle, and was in need of help to find a tangent. our personal relations remained as sincere after the war until politics came between us in 1867. general pope was industriously increasing his strength. the ninth corps, general burnside, had been ordered to fredericksburg _via_ acquia creek, and a division under general reno of eight thousand of that corps reported to the commander at culpeper court-house on the 14th. besides reinforcements called to support him from general mcclellan's army, pope was authorized to call to his aid the greater part of the army in west virginia under general cox. after reaching gordonsville and learning something of the position of the armies, and more of the features of the country, it occurred to me that a move against general pope's right would give us vantage-ground for battle and pursuit, besides the inviting foot-hills of the blue ridge for strategy, and this preference was expressed to general lee.[43] he joined us on the 15th, and the brigades, including those under hood, were advanced to position for a general march. he thought it better to strike in between general pope's left and the reinforcements that could join him from fredericksburg than to adopt the proposition to move his army by the upper fords of the rapidan and strike down upon the enemy's right, and decided to throw his right wing forward by the raccoon ford, and his left by the somerville ford, the latter above the railroad,--fitzhugh lee and robertson's cavalry with his right, and t. t. munford's with the left wing; general stuart with the column on the right. my command marched on the 16th to position for crossing by the lower fords. jackson was in position for the upper crossings. as all of the cavalry was not up, general lee ordered his march for the 18th, to give time for the arrival of general stuart and his marching troopers. leaving the cavalry on the march, under general fitzhugh lee, with instructions to camp on the plank-road opposite raccoon ford on the 17th, general stuart rode on the cars to general lee's head-quarters, received his orders, and rode out on the plank-road to join his command under fitzhugh lee, then due. the latter, however, "by failure to comply with instructions," as his commander expressed it subsequently, lost a day in a roundabout ride, which so jaded his horses that another day was sacrificed to give them rest. as if this were not sufficient misfortune, captain fitzhugh (general j. e. b. stuart's adjutant) was captured, and, as a crowning disaster, the despatch of the confederate commander giving instructions for the march of his army as ordered for the 18th was lost. the despatch was taken to general pope, who, thus advised by accident, immediately set about retiring from culpeper to the east bank of the rappahannock. general pope reported that "the cavalry expedition sent out on the 16th in the direction of louisa court-house captured the adjutant-general of general stuart, and was very near capturing that officer himself. among the papers taken was an autograph letter of general robert e. lee to general stuart, dated gordonsville, august 15, which made manifest to me the position and force of the army, and their determination to overwhelm the army under my command before it could be reinforced by any portion of the army of the potomac."[44] thus on that day pope put his army in retreat by the several crossings of the rappahannock to its strong camps of the north side, leaving his cavalry in observation. as fitzhugh lee's cavalry failed to get to position on my right on the 17th, i ordered two regiments of infantry to be posted as guard on the road to raccoon ford until the cavalry could relieve them. the detail fell upon toombs's brigade. as we were to be in wait during the 17th, general toombs rode off that morning to visit an old congressional friend, and was absent when the order was received at his brigade head-quarters. the detail was filled by his next in rank, colonel h. l. benning, and duly posted. on his return, general toombs rode upon his picket, claimed that his troops should not have been moved except by orders through himself, and ordered the detail back to their camps. upon learning of general stuart's mishap, and the ride of the federal cavalry by raccoon ford, i sent to inquire how the cavalry happened to escape my picket-guard. finding that the troops had been ordered off by general toombs, the chief of staff was directed to put on his sword and sash and order him under arrest. afterwards he was ordered to the rear, to confine himself to the limits of gordonsville. in addition to reno's command, stevens's division of the ninth corps joined general pope on the 15th. on the 17th, reno sent out a party of two hundred and fifty men and captured jackson's signal-station on clarke's mountain; and it appears from the official report of this occurrence that the federals were misinformed as to our position, and that up to the receipt of the captured despatch, general pope knew nothing of the arrival of the troops of my command. on the 18th report came from clarke's mountain of unusual stir in the federal commands about culpeper court-house, and general lee sent for me to ride with him to the mountain to observe the movements. from the summit we had a fair view of many points, and the camp-flags, as they opened their folds to the fitful breezes, seemed to mark places of rest. changing our glasses to the right and left and rear, the white tops of army wagons were seen moving. half an hour's close watch revealed that the move was for the rappahannock river. changing the field of view to the bivouacs, they seemed serenely quiet, under cover from the noonday august sun. as we were there to learn from personal observation, our vigilance was prolonged until the wagons rolled down the declivities of the rappahannock. then, turning again to view the bivouacs, a stir was seen at all points. little clouds of dust arose which marked the tramp of soldiers, and these presently began to swell into dense columns along the rearward lines. watching without comment till the clouds grew thinner and thinner as they approached the river and melted into the bright haze of the afternoon sun, general lee finally put away his glasses, and with a deeply-drawn breath, expressive at once of disappointment and resignation, said, "general, we little thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us thus early in the campaign." chapter xiii. making ready for manassas again. general lee modifies his order of march--continuous skirmishing--cavalry commander stuart gets into general pope's head-quarters and captures his personal equipment--his uniform coat and hat shown along the confederate lines--jackson's superb flank movement--confederates capture trains, supplies, munitions, and prisoners--hooker and ewell at bristoe station--jackson first on the old field of bull run--longstreet's command joins passing thoroughfare gap--pope practically throws responsibility for aggressive action on mcdowell--preliminary fighting--general pope surprised by jackson--pope's orders to fitz-john porter. under the retrograde of the union army, general lee so modified his order of march as to meet the new conditions. on the 20th of august the march was made, the right wing to the vicinity of kelly's ford on the rappahannock river, the left to the railroad bridge and fords above. at kelly's ford it seemed possible to force a crossing. as we were preparing for it, an order came reporting the upper crossings too well defended, and calling for the right wing to march to that point, while the left marched up in search of more favorable points. as we were leaving kelly's the enemy made a dash to cross, and engaged some of the brigades in a sharp fight, intending to delay our movements, but the main column marched on, while this affair was still in progress. by mutual consent the fight subsided, both parties joined their proper commands and proceeded on their upward march, each on its own side of the stream. at beverley's ford, stuart's cavalry under rosser crossed and made a lodgement on the east bank, but the near approach of the enemy's column threatening, before the infantry could get up in support, made necessary the abandonment of the ground, and the left wing continued to feel along higher up for a crossing. passing up, trimble's brigade was left at beverley's as guard to jackson's rear. the enemy, conceiving an opportunity, crossed at freeman's ford and attacked trimble. meanwhile, a detachment had been called for from the right wing. hood, with his own and whiting's brigade, was ordered, and was in time to join in trimble's fight, which ended in repulse of the adventurous force. the east banks of the rappahannock lifted quite above those occupied by the confederates, giving advantageous position to the union artillery fire, and offering no point above kelly's ford to force a crossing. when the left wing marched from rappahannock bridge, the enemy crossed a considerable force to the west bank, and covered it with a number of superior batteries well posted on the east side. to dislodge that force i put a number of batteries into action, including the washington artillery, and, later, part of the reserved battalion under colonel s. d. lee. the combat consumed much of the day of the 23d, when the enemy withdrew from that bank and burned some of the dwellings as he left. riding along the line of batteries during the combat, we passed a soldier-lad weeping over his brother, who had just been killed; just then a shell came screaming by, exploded, and dashed its fragments into the ground near enough to dust us a little. "dad drat those yankees!" he said; "if i had known that they were going to throw such things as that at a fellow, i would have stayed in texas." he had travelled a thousand miles to volunteer in the same company with his brother. assured of the transfer of mcclellan's forces from the james, general lee called up the divisions of generals d. h. hill, mclaws, the half division under j. g. walker, and hampton's cavalry from richmond. anderson's division was marching from orange court-house as our reserve force. on the 22d, munford's cavalry reported the warrenton road open as far as the vicinity of general pope's head-quarters. general stuart was ordered over, with parts of his brigades, to investigate and make trouble in the enemy's rear. he crossed at waterloo and hunt's mill with fifteen hundred troopers and pelham's horse artillery, and rode to warrenton. passing through, he directed his ride towards catlett's station to first burn the bridge over cedar creek. before reaching catlett's a severe storm burst upon him, bogging the roads and flooding the streams behind him. the heavy roads delayed his artillery so that it was after night when he approached catlett's. he caught a picket-guard and got into a camp about general pope's head-quarters, took a number of prisoners, some camp property, and, meeting an old acquaintance and friend in a colored man, who conducted him to general pope's tents, he found one of the general's uniform coats, a hat, a number of official despatches, a large amount of united states currency, much of the general's personal equipments, and one of the members of his staff, major goulding. he made several attempts to fire the bridge near catlett's, but the heavy rains put out all fires that could be started, when he sought axes to cut it away. by this time the troops about the camps rallied and opened severe fire against him, but with little damage. the heavy rainfall admonished him to forego further operations and return to the army while yet there was a chance to cross cedar creek and the rappahannock before the tides came down. on the night of the 23d he reached sulphur springs, where he met general jackson's troops trying to make comfortable lodgement on the east bank, passed over, and resumed position outside general lee's left. the despatch-book of general pope gave information of his troops and his anxiety for reinforcements, besides mention of those that had joined him, but general stuart's especial pleasure and pride were manifested over the possession of the uniform coat and hat of general pope. stuart rode along the line showing them, and proclaiming that he was satisfied with the exchange that made even his loss at verdierville before the march; but the despatch lost at verdierville was the tremendous blow that could not be overestimated. all of the 23d was spent in severe artillery combat. general jackson had gained the east bank at warrenton (sulphur springs) crossing, and there seemed a fair prospect of making a permanent lodgement, but the tides from the severe storm of the day and night previous were coming down in torrents, threatening floods at all of the fords. on the 22d, pope had formed a plan of concentrating his forces to cross and attack lee's right by the lower fords, but the freshet had shut him off in that quarter; so he turned to the detachment of jackson, on the east side, just cut off from support. marching up the river bank, jackson succeeded in so reinforcing his detachment as to defend it to an upper crossing till it found safe footing on the west bank. the high water cut off all operations by direct moves on the 24th. meanwhile, general pope had received the divisions of kearny and reynolds from mcclellan's army, forty-five hundred and twenty-five hundred respectively. about this time a letter came to head-quarters of the right wing from general toombs, expressing regret at his unfortunate mistake in relieving his troops from picket service, and asking to be released from arrest, that he might have the opportunity to show in the approaching conflicts his deep interest in the cause. the adjutant-general was instructed to say in reply that the chief of corps was pleased to know that the malefeasance was from want of experience, not intentional breach of authority, and that he would be more than welcome back by the general and the troops of his brigade. [illustration: general thomas j. jackson (stonewall).] on the 25th, jackson was ordered to pull away from our main force with the left wing, march by the crossings of the upper tributaries through thoroughfare gap, and strike the railway in the enemy's rear at manassas junction, his supply depot. stuart's cavalry was ordered to follow during the night. by a rapid march jackson crossed the fords of the upper streams and made his bivouac near salem. forcing his march on the 26th, he passed thoroughfare gap to gainesville, where stuart joined him with all of his cavalry. from gainesville he inclined to the right for bristoe station, the cavalry holding the curtain between his column and pope's. a little after sunset he reached the orange and alexandria railroad, a march of thirty miles. approaching the station, trains were heard on the rails. general ewell divided his force and took two points on the rails, so as to cut off the trains. munford's cavalry assisted in the job. two trains and a number of prisoners were taken, the greater part of the detachment at the station making safe retreat. his plans against general lee's right cut off by the high water, general pope extended his right, under sigel, banks, and reno, in search of jackson up the river, who meanwhile had spirited himself away looking towards pope's rear. i was left on the river bank in front, the reserve infantry, r. h. anderson's division, and artillery near at hand. although the night of the 26th was very dark, and his troops were severely worn, to be sure of his opportunity, jackson sent a detachment to manassas junction (seven miles). the gallant trimble, with five hundred of his men, volunteered for the service, and set out at once on the march. stuart was afterwards ordered to join trimble with his cavalry, and as ranking officer to command the operations of the entire force. the infantry advanced and attacked the enemy as soon as it could be formed for work, captured three hundred prisoners, an eight-gun battery complete, and immense quantities of army supplies. feeling the main force of his adversary in his front awaiting opportunity, general pope became anxious about his left and rear, and was further hampered by instructions from the washington authorities to hold his fredericksburg connections and "fight like the devil." (it may have been fortunate for the confederates that he was not instructed to _fight like jackson_.) on the 23d he was informed of strong reinforcements to reach him at warrenton junction on the next day, and that larger forces would be shipped him on the 24th, to join him on the 25th. nevertheless, he began to realize, as he felt jackson's march to his right, that he must abandon the line of the rappahannock and attend on the movements of that command gone astray by the mountains. he concentrated the army of virginia, to which reynolds's division had been assigned, at and near warrenton under mcdowell; reno east of warrenton about three miles, on the turnpike; porter's (fifth) corps near bealton, ordered to join reno, and heintzelman's (third) corps, ten thousand strong, at warrenton junction. the sixth (franklin's) corps, ten thousand strong, army of the potomac, was at alexandria awaiting transportation, as were the divisions of sturgis, ten thousand, and cox, seven thousand,--the latter from west virginia. general pope asked to have franklin's corps march by the warrenton turnpike to join him, and sent instructions to different parties to see that the guards in his rear were strengthened; that at manassas junction by a division. under assurances from washington of the prompt arrival of forces from that quarter, he looked for the approach of franklin as far as gainesville, marching by the warrenton turnpike, and a division to reinforce the command at manassas junction, so that when jackson cut in on his rear and captured the detachment at the junction, he was not a little surprised. he was in position for grand tactics, however, midway between the right and left wings of his adversary's forces, that in his rear worn by severe marches and some fighting, that in his front behind a river, the crossings of which were difficult, and the lines of march to bring the distant wings to co-operation over routes that could be defended by small commands. communication with washington being severed, the forces at and near alexandria were thrown in the dark. to move by rail they were liable to run into the wrong camps, and the rapid change by water to the new position left them short of land transportation. pope stood on the evening of the 27th: mcdowell's corps, including reynolds's division, 15,500; sigel's corps, 9000; banks's, 5000; reno's, 7000; heintzelman's and porter's corps, 18,000,--in all 54,500 men, with 4000 cavalry; platt's brigade, sturgis's division, which joined him on the 26th, not included. in his rear was jackson, 20,000; in front on the rappahannock was my 25,000; r. h. anderson's reserve division, 5000; total, 50,000, with 3000 of cavalry under stuart. on the 26th i moved up to and crossed at hinson's mill ford, leaving anderson's division on the warrenton sulphur springs route. on the 27th, jackson marched at daylight to manassas junction with his own division, under taliaferro, and a. p. hill's, leaving ewell's at bristoe station, with orders to withdraw if severely pressed. approaching the junction, a cavalry regiment came in, threatening attack, and was driven off by colonel baylor's regiment. a field battery came from the direction of centreville, and tried to make trouble at long range, but was driven off by superior numbers. then a brigade of infantry under general taylor, of new jersey, just landed from the cars from alexandria, advanced and made a desperate effort to recover the lost position and equipage at manassas junction. field's, archer's, pender's, and thomas's brigades, moving towards the railroad bridge, met taylor's command and engaged it, at the same time moving towards its rear, threatening to cut off its retreat. it was driven back after a fierce struggle, general taylor, commanding, mortally wounded. part of the kanawha division under general scammon was ordered to its support, but was only in time to assist in its retreat. reporting this affair, general jackson said,- "the advance was made with great spirit and determination, and under a leader worthy of a better cause." the spoils were then quietly divided, such as could be consumed or hauled off, and the balance given to the torch. i marched from the rappahannock, following on jackson's trail, and camped at white plains. the march during the day was delayed about an hour by a large force of cavalry which showed itself on my right front. as i had no cavalry, a little time was spent in learning of its import and following. general pope ordered mcdowell, with his own corps, including reynolds's division and sigel's corps, to march so as to be at gainesville at nightfall; reno's corps and kearny's division of the third to greenwich to support mcdowell. he rode with hooker's division of the third along the route by the railroad for bristoe station, ordered porter's fifth corps to remain at warrenton junction till relieved by banks's corps, then to push on towards gainesville, banks to follow by the railroad route. in the afternoon, hooker encountered ewell at bristoe station, where the divisions engaged in a severe fight, which was handsomely maintained till after night. ewell, under his orders, withdrew to join jackson. the conduct of the affair was about equally creditable to the commands. after this affair, general pope so far modified his order of the day as to call porter to him by direct route, to march at one a.m. and join him at daylight. kearny's division was ordered for bristoe station, reno's corps for manassas junction, and mcdowell, from gainesville, was ordered to swing around to his right and march, guided by the manassas gap railroad, to manassas junction. ewell made his way along the railroad to jackson in time to refresh his men on the good things of the captures and for several hours of sleep. fitzhugh lee, with three regiments of cavalry, was ordered on to fairfax court-house and along the railroad towards alexandria to cut off rail connection. general mcclellan reached alexandria, virginia, on the 27th. on the 28th, jackson was first to move at 12.20 a.m. he applied the torch to the stores of provisions, and marched with his division, under taliaferro, by the new market sudley springs road across the warrenton turnpike, and pitched bivouac on a line from near groveton, towards sudley mills, on the field of first manassas, at daylight. at one a.m., a. p. hill marched from manassas junction, crossed bull run, and halted at centreville. ewell followed at daylight towards centreville, crossed bull run, marched up some distance, recrossed, and joined jackson, forming on taliaferro's left. after the morning fires of the bivouac burned out, jackson's position could not be seen except upon near approach. he was hid away under the cuts and embankments of an unfinished railroad. the road upon which porter marched was crowded during the night, so that he and his officers thought that they would make better time and be in better condition by marching at three a.m. he reached bristoe at ten a.m., kearny at eight, and reno in due season. but it was late in the morning when mcdowell was ready to march, and later in the day when his left swung out on the march to the junction. at twelve o'clock, general pope reached manassas junction. misled by the movements of a. p. hill and ewell, he ordered reno's corps and kearny's and hooker's divisions of the third to centreville, in search of jackson, while the latter was little more than a league from him, resting quietly in his hiding-place, and his detached divisions had doubled on their courses and were marching to join him. mcdowell, having information of my approach, delayed his march, detaching ricketts's division to hold me in check at thoroughfare gap. the first passage at arms of the day was between part of stuart's cavalry, supported by b. t. johnson's infantry, and meade's brigade of mcdowell's command. as the latter swung around for his march to the junction, the brigade approached jackson's right. a detachment was pushed out against meade, and some artillery practice followed. the confederates retired, but reported no loss. under the impression that the force encountered was some cavalry rear-guard or reconnoitring party, mcdowell resumed his march "as soon as the killed and wounded were cared for." the noise made by this affair caused sigel to countermarch his corps, and otherwise delayed the march of mcdowell's entire forces, while it gave no inconvenience to the confederates further than a change of front of part of jackson's command to receive battle, not intended, by his adversary. jackson changed his front, but finding the direction of the enemy changed so as to march away from him, he took the move for a general retreat, made report of it to a. p. hill, who was yet north of bull run, and ordered him to intercept the retreat by manning the lower fords of bull run. the order was received at ten a.m., but general hill had intercepted despatches of general pope giving notice of his preparation for battle at manassas the next day, and thought it better to march on and join jackson. he filed into line on jackson's left about noon. general jackson was right. if general hill had moved as ordered, he would have met detachments ordered by general pope to centreville, and held them back to the south side until jackson could join him to hold the line. the natural sequence of confederate operations was position to intercept general pope's return to washington. the scenes were shifting and inviting of adventure, and the marches should have followed them. general hill was justified by the circumstances that influenced his march. when general pope reached the junction with heintzelman's and reno's corps, the game was on other fields. as the last of the confederate columns had hied away towards centreville, he ordered thither those corps, and called up the fifth to join him. he then changed the orders of mcdowell's column, directing it towards centreville, to mass his cavalry, and find jackson, and presently (at two p.m.) so far modified these as to direct mcdowell to use his own judgment, and give him the benefit of his views, as he knew the country better, but ordered that he should not go farther towards manassas junction. these instructions were urgent, with assurances that mcdowell's moves should be supported by other columns. had these been promptly executed, mcdowell's entire force should have encountered jackson before four o'clock, but mcdowell did not find jackson. as his division, under king, marched along the turnpike a little before night, jackson saw and engaged it in battle, as we shall see. the head of my column reached thoroughfare gap early in the afternoon. reports from general jackson were that he was resting quietly on the flank of the enemy, and between him and washington. parties from the gap reported it clear, and the confederate commander called a rest for the night, but d. r. jones's division was ordered on to occupy the gap. as we approached it, officers riding to the front returned reporting the enemy coming in heavy columns on the other side. jones was ordered to halt his division till he could advance his skirmishers. the ninth georgia regiment, g. t. anderson's brigade, was sent and followed at proper distance by the division. the skirmishers met the enemy's pickets in the gap, drove them off, and followed till they in turn were met by a strong force and pushed back. the enemy's leading brigade reached the plateau running along the eastern side of the mountain, which, with his batteries and infantry, gave him command at that end. anderson reinforced his ninth by the first, then by his other regiments on the mountain-side, to the left of the gap, and advanced till arrested by the impenetrable tangle of the mountain undergrowth. the gap is a pass cut through bull run mountain for the flow of a streamlet, through occoquan creek, to the waters of the potomac. its mean width is eighty yards. its faces of basaltic rock rise in vertical ascent from one hundred to three hundred feet, relieved hither and thither by wild ivy, creeping through their fissures and from the tops of boulders in picturesque drapery. it was in the midst of this bold and beautiful scenery, in this narrow gorge where the indians had doubtless often contested ages ago, that the seasoned soldiers of our civilized armies now battled for right of way. finding his passage over the mountain by the left side of the gap blocked by the mountain tangle, jones called up toombs's brigade, under command of colonel benning, and ordered it over the mountain obstacle by the south side. drayton's brigade was held in rear. by the time the troops were so disposed, ricketts's division was well deployed along the plateau on the east. benning put major waddell, with the twentieth georgia, on the mountain-side as skirmishers, and strengthened it by another under colonel holmes, in double time, to gain the crest on that side. the twentieth gained the crest while the federals were yet about eighty yards below on their side. the georgians knew how to maintain their advantage, and their fire arrested farther advance of the enemy, when, after a spirited fusillade, reinforcements joined them in good season, and extended the line and held it, driving back the second assaulting force and following down the eastern slope. [illustration: battle at thoroughfare gap.] as soon as the fire of the federal batteries opened, hood was ordered with his two brigades to cross the mountain on the north side of the gap away by a cattle-trail, and three other brigades were despatched under general wilcox to hopewell pass, about three miles north of thoroughfare gap. advancing his men, selected for their long-range rifles, benning drove off a battery seeking position to play upon the mountain slope and eastern end of the gorge, and moved forward under cover of a ravine until he gained a flank fire upon the enemy's batteries. this, with the march of wilcox through hopewell pass and the crossing of one of hood's brigades, gave the confederates commanding position, and ricketts withdrew in time to escape disaster. about six o'clock mcdowell put his troops on the countermarch, sigel's corps and reynolds's division back by the new market road for its crossing of the warrenton turnpike, and king's division of his own corps down the turnpike. a. p. hill's and ewell's divisions, returning from the north of bull run, hardly had time for rest, when the march of king's division was reported. about the same time the divisions that had been ordered by pope to centreville reached that point, driving off some confederate cavalry loitering along the way. as king's division was marching by, jackson thought to come out from his lurking-place to learn the meaning of the march. the direction of the move again impressed him that pope was retreating, and that his escape to the north side of bull run would put his army in a position of safety before general lee could join him. it was late, the sun had set, but jackson was moved to prompt action, as the only means of arresting and holding pope for general lee's arrival. he was in plain view of the white smoke of the rifles of my infantry as they climbed over bull run mountain, seven miles away, and in hearing of our artillery as the boom of the big guns, resounding along the rock-faced cliffs, gathered volume to offer salutations and greetings for the union of comrades and commands. he changed the front of his right division, and, noting the movement of sigel's troops along the new market road, called out ewell with his brigades under lawton and trimble, and in addition to the artillery of these commands used the horse artillery under pelham. as formed, this new line was broadside against the turnpike, his left a little way from groveton. the ground upon which the action occurred had been passed an hour before by the division commander, general hatch, who saw no indication of the presence of a foe. as the division marched, the column was made up of the brigades of hatch, gibbon, doubleday, and patrick. the action fell against the brigade commanded by general gibbon, who, taking it for a cavalry annoyance to cover retreat, opened against it, and essayed aggressive fight, till he found himself engaged against a formidable force of infantry and artillery. he was assisted by part of doubleday's brigade, and asked for other assistance, which failed to reach him, till night came and ended the contest. his fight was desperate and courageous against odds, but he held it and his line till dark. his loss was seven hundred and fifty-one, including colonel o'connor and major may, mortally wounded, with many other officers with lighter hurts.[45] general doubleday joined the fight with his brigade, and reported his loss nearly half of the troops engaged. general gibbon called it "a surprise."[46] and well he might, after his division commander had just passed over the route and failed to find any indication of the lurking foe. general jackson reported, "the conflict here was firm and sanguinary." he fails to give his number lost, but acknowledges his severe loss in the division commanders, general ewell losing a leg, and taliaferro severely wounded. during the night the federal commander reported to his subordinates that mcdowell had "intercepted the retreat of jackson, and ordered concentration of the army against him,"[47] whereas it was, of course, jackson who had intercepted mcdowell's march. he seems to have been under the impression that he was about to capture jackson, and inclined to lead his subordinates to the same opinion. of the time, major edward pye reported,- "we were sent forward towards evening to pursue the enemy, who were said to be retreating. found the enemy, but did not see them retreat. a deadly fire from three sides welcomed and drove us back."[48] after night gibbon held his front by a line of skirmishers, and withdrew his command to a place of rest. at one a.m. the division was withdrawn and marched back to manassas. ricketts, finding himself in isolated position at gainesville, left at daylight and marched to bristoe. jackson moved his forces at daylight, and re-established his line behind the unfinished railroad, his own division under general stark, ewell's under general lawton, with a. p. hill on his left. general pope's orders for the night directed the march of kearny's division from centreville by the turnpike at one a.m., to reinforce the troops against jackson; the other division of heintzelman's corps (hooker's) to march by the same route at daylight, and to be followed by the corps under reno. these orders were urgent, and directed that the commands should move promptly, leaving fragments behind if all could not be got together in time; kearny to attack at daylight, to be supported by hooker. mcdowell's operations of the afternoon left sigel's corps and reynolds's division in the vicinity of the field of king's fight. general pope's orders were given under the impression that king's division was still occupying the ground of the late conflict, and that ricketts's division was not far away; but these divisions had been removed to points before mentioned, though special instructions had been sent mcdowell and king to hold the position "at all hazards, to prevent the retreat of jackson," with assurances that at daylight in the morning the entire force from centreville and manassas junction should be up and in prompt co-operation. but mcdowell had probably learned that jackson had no thought of retreating, and king had found that his ground was not tenable. the order intended for king failed to reach him. before he was advised of the withdrawal of king's division, general pope sent orders to general porter directing movements for the 29th, informing him of the orders of kearny and hooker, and directing porter to move at daylight towards centreville, for position in co-operation of the projected battle, and ordering reno to march for the battle by the warrenton turnpike. under the orders, porter marched towards centreville, and reno towards the field for battle. kearny deferred his march till daylight, and was followed by hooker's division at convenient marching distance. reno's column followed the march of the latter. as soon as advised of the withdrawal of king's division from the ground of the 28th, general pope sent as substitutes for his orders of the early morning that general porter should push forward with his corps and king's division of mcdowell's command to gainesville, to co-operate with his movements along the warrenton turnpike.[49] this order was received by porter at 9.30 a.m.,[50] but general mcdowell joined this column, and as ranking officer objected to the transfer of his division under king to other authority, which brought out the joint order to mcdowell and porter to have their joint commands execute the move towards gainesville. chapter xiv. second battle of manassas (bull run). battle opened by the federals on jackson's right, followed by kearny--longstreet's reconnoissance--stuart, the cavalry leader, sleeps on the field of battle--pope thought at the close of the 29th that the confederates were retreating--second day--fitz-john porter struck in flank--longstreet takes a hand in the fight late in the day--lee under fire--the federal retreat to centreville--that point turned--pope again dislodged--"stonewall" jackson's appearance and peculiarities--killing of "fighting phil" kearny--losses--review of the campaign. general pope at daylight sent orders to general sigel's corps, with reynolds's division, to attack as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring the enemy to a stand if possible. at the same time orders were sent heintzelman and reno for their corps to hurry along the turnpike and join on the right of sigel. the batteries opened in an irregular combat on the left, centre, and right a little after eight o'clock, and drew from jackson a monotonous but resolute response. and thus early upon the 29th of august was begun the second battle upon this classic and fateful field. i marched at daylight and filed to the left at gainesville at nine o'clock. as the head of the column approached gainesville the fire of artillery became more lively, and its volume swelled to proportions indicating near approach to battle. the men involuntarily quickened step, filed down the turnpike, and in twenty minutes came upon the battle as it began to press upon jackson's right, their left battery partially turning his right. his battle, as before stated, stood upon its original line of the unfinished railroad. as my columns approached, the batteries of the leading brigades were thrown forward to ground of superior sweep. this display and the deploy of the infantry were so threatening to the enemy's left batteries that he thought prudent to change the front of that end of his line more to his left and rear. hood's two brigades were deployed across the turnpike at right angles, supported by the brigade under evans. a battery advanced on their right to good position and put in some clever work, which caused the enemy to rectify all that end of his line. kemper deployed two of his brigades, supported by the third, on the right of hood. the three brigades under wilcox were posted in rear of hood and evans, and in close supporting distance. on hood's left and near jackson's right was open field, of commanding position. this was selected by colonel walton, of the washington artillery, for his battalion, and he brought it bounding into position as soon as called. the division under d. r. jones was deployed in the order of the others, but was broken off to the rear, across the manassas gap railroad, to guard against forces of the enemy reported in the direction of manassas junction and bristoe. as formed, my line made an obtuse angle forward of jackson's, till it approached manassas gap railroad, where d. r. jones's division was broken in echelon to the rear. at twelve o'clock we were formed for battle. about eleven o'clock, hooker's division filed to the right from the turnpike, to reinforce the federal right under kearny, who, with sigel's corps and reynolds's division, were engaged in a desultory affair against jackson's left, chiefly of artillery. r. h. anderson's division marched at daylight along the warrenton turnpike for gainesville. when i reported my troops in order for battle, general lee was inclined to engage as soon as practicable, but did not order. all troops that he could hope to have were up except r. h. anderson's division, which was near enough to come in when the battle was in progress. i asked him to be allowed to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's ground, and along his left. after an hour's work, mounted and afoot, under the august sun, i returned and reported adversely as to attack, especially in view of the easy approach of the troops reported at manassas against my right in the event of severe contention. we knew of ricketts's division in that quarter, and of a considerable force at manassas junction, which indicated one corps. at two o'clock kearny made an earnest opening against jackson's left, but no information of battle reached us on the right. he made severe battle by his division, and with some success, but was checked by jackson's movements to meet him. general stevens supported his battle, but his numbers were not equal to the occasion. general sigel joined in the affair, and part of general hooker's division, making a gallant fight, but little progress. general grover's brigade made a gallant charge, but a single brigade was a trifle, and it met with only partial success, and was obliged to retire with heavy loss of killed and wounded,--four hundred and eighty-four. at one time the enemy broke through the line, cutting off the extreme left brigade, and gained position on the railroad cut; but jackson and a. p. hill reinforced against that attack, and were in time to push it back and recover the lost ground. their attacks were too much in detail to hold even the ground gained, but they held firmly to the battle and their line until after night, when they withdrew to await orders for the next day. though this fight opened at two o'clock, and was fiercely contested till near night, no account of it came from head-quarters to my command, nor did general jackson think to send word of it. general lee, not entirely satisfied with the report of my reconnoissance, was thinking of sending some of the engineers for more critical survey of his right front, when his chief of cavalry sent to inform him of the approach of a formidable column of infantry and artillery threatening his right. wilcox's division was changed to supporting position of our right, under jones, and i rode to look at this new force, its strength, and the ground of its approach. it was the column of mcdowell's and porter's corps, marching under the joint order. porter's corps in advance deployed morell's division, and ordered butterfield's brigade, preceded by a regiment of skirmishers, to advance on their right, sykes's division to support morell. as this was in process of execution, mcdowell, whose corps was in rear, rode to the front and objected to the plan and attack so far from the main force. a few shots were exchanged, when all became quiet again. we saw nothing of mcdowell's corps, and our cavalry had not been able to get far enough towards their rear to know of its presence or force. he afterwards drew off from porter's column and marched by the sudley springs road to join the main force on the turnpike. i rode back and reported to general lee that the column was hardly strong enough to mean aggressive work from that quarter, and at the same time reported a dust along the new market road which seemed to indicate movement of other troops from manassas. general stuart rode up, making similar report, and asked for orders. as our chief was not ready with his orders at the moment, stuart was asked to wait. the latter threw himself on the grass, put a large stone under his head, asked the general to have him called when his orders were ready for him, and went sound asleep. our chief now returned to his first plan of attack by his right down the turnpike. though more than anxious to meet his wishes, and anticipating his orders, i suggested, as the day was far spent, that a reconnoissance in force be made at nightfall to the immediate front of the enemy, and if an opening was found for an entering wedge, that we have all things in readiness at daylight for a good day's work. after a moment's hesitation he assented, and orders were given for the advance at early twilight. this gave general stuart half an hour _siesta_. when called, he sprang to his feet, received his orders, swung into his saddle, and at a lope, singing, "if you want to have a good time, jine the cavalry," his banjo-player, sweeny, on the jump behind him, rode to his troopers. wilcox was recalled and ordered to march in support of hood and evans when they advanced on the reconnoissance. it so happened that our advance had been anticipated by an order to move from the enemy's side against us. they attacked along the turnpike by king's division about sunset. to the confederates, who had been searching for an opportunity during the greater part of the day, and were about to march through the approaching darkness to find it, this was an agreeable surprise. relieved of that irksome toil, and ready for work, they jumped at the presence, to welcome in countercharge the enemy's coming. a fierce struggle of thirty minutes gave them advantage which they followed through the dark to the base of the high ground held by bayonets and batteries innumerable as compared with their limited ranks. their task accomplished, they were halted at nine o'clock to await the morrow. one cannon, a number of flags, and a few prisoners were taken. generals wilcox and hood were ordered to carefully examine the position of the enemy and report of the feasibility of attack at daylight. they came to corps head-quarters a little before twelve o'clock, and made separate reports, both against attack, with minute items of their conclusions. hood was ordered to have the carriage of the captured gun cut up and left, and both were ordered to withdraw their commands to their first positions. meanwhile, general pope had sent orders to general porter, dated 4.30 p.m., to attack upon my right flank, but the order was not received until it was too late for battle, and the force was not strong enough, and a fight at that hour might have been more unfortunate than the fights by detail on their right. if it had been sent to general mcdowell before he left, the two corps, if he could have been induced to go in, might have given serious trouble. the field on their left was favorable for tactics, but on porter's front it was rough, and r. h. anderson's division was in striking distance of their left, if that effort had been made. anderson marched in the dark as far as hood's front before reporting for position, and was ordered back to gainesville. the 4.30 order was issued under the impression that my troops, or the greater part of them, were still at thoroughfare gap, and general pope said, in his official report,- "i believe, in fact i am positive, that at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, general porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. i believed then, as i am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of jackson and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of longstreet."[51] after night, porter's column marched by its right to follow the route of mcdowell. the morning of the 30th broke fair, and for the federal commander bright with anticipations for the day. he wired the washington authorities of success, that "the enemy was retreating to the mountains," and told of his preparations for pursuit. it seems that he took my reconnoissance for a fight, and my withdrawal for retreat, also interpreting reports from the right as very favorable. he reported,- "general hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least two to one, and general kearny as at least three to one." he construed the operations of the night of the 29th and the reports of the morning of the 30th as indications of retreat of the confederates. prisoners captured during the night, paroled and returning to him, so reported on the morning of the 30th, and his general officers had impressions of the confederate left that confirmed the other accounts, and convinced him that we were in retreat. the forces threatening our right the day before having marched around towards the turnpike, d. r. jones's division was advanced to position near kemper's right. colonel s. d. lee's artillery battalion was advanced to relieve the washington artillery, making our line complete, in battle front. about one o'clock in the afternoon, general pope ordered attack against jackson's front by the corps under general porter, supported by king's division, heintzelman and reno to move forward and attack jackson's left, to turn it and strike down against the flank, ricketts's division in support of it; but ricketts was recalled and put near the turnpike, to support that part of porter's field. during the early part of this severe battle not a gun was fired by my troops, except occasional shots from s. d. lee's batteries of reserve artillery, and less frequent shots from one or two of my other batteries. developments appearing unfavorable for a general engagement, general lee had settled upon a move by sudley springs, to cross bull run during the night and try to again reach pope's rear, this time with his army. [illustration: second battle of bull run. position of troops as the battle engaged aug. 30th, 1862] about three p.m. i rode to the front to prepare to make a diversion a little before dark, to cover the plan proposed for our night march. as i rode, batteries resting on the sides of the turnpike thought that battle was at hand, and called their officers and men to stand to their guns and horses. passing by and beyond my lines, a message came from general jackson reporting his lines heavily pressed, and asking to be reinforced. riding forward a few rods to an open, which gave a view of jackson's field, i came in sight of porter's battle, piling up against jackson's right, centre, and left. at the same time an order came from general lee for a division to be sent general jackson. porter's masses were in almost direct line from the point at which i stood, and in enfilade fire. it was evident that they could not stand fifteen minutes under the fire of batteries planted at that point, while a division marching back and across the field to aid jackson could not reach him in an hour, more time probably than he could stand under the heavy weights then bearing down upon him. boldness was prudence! prompt work by the wing and batteries could relieve the battle. reinforcements might not be in time, so i called for my nearest batteries. ready, anticipating call, they sprang to their places and drove at speed, saw the opportunity before it could be pointed out, and went into action. the first fire was by chapman's battery, followed in rolling practice by boyce's and reilly's. almost immediately the wounded began to drop off from porter's ranks; the number seemed to increase with every shot; the masses began to waver, swinging back and forth, showing signs of discomfiture along the left and left centre. in ten or fifteen minutes it crumbled into disorder and turned towards the rear. although the batteries seemed to hasten the movements of the discomfited, the fire was less effective upon broken ranks, which gave them courage, and they made brave efforts to rally; but as the new lines formed they had to breast against jackson's standing line, and make a new and favorable target for the batteries, which again drove them to disruption and retreat. not satisfied, they made a third effort to rally and fight the battle through, but by that time they had fallen back far enough to open the field to the fire of s. d. lee's artillery battalion. as the line began to take shape, this fearful fire was added to that under which they had tried so ineffectually to fight. the combination tore the line to pieces, and as it broke the third time the charge was ordered. the heavy fumes of gunpowder hanging about our ranks, as stimulating as sparkling wine, charged the atmosphere with the light and splendor of battle. time was culminating under a flowing tide. the noble horses took the spirit of the riders sitting lightly in their saddles. as orders were given, the staff, their limbs already closed to the horses' flanks, pressed their spurs, but the electric current overleaped their speedy strides, and twenty-five thousand braves moved in line as by a single impulse. my old horse, appreciating the importance of corps head-quarters, envious of the spread of his comrades as they measured the green, yet anxious to maintain his _rôle_, moved up and down his limited space in lofty bounds, resolved to cover in the air the space allotted his more fortunate comrades on the plain. leaving the broken ranks for jackson, our fight was made against the lines near my front. as the plain along hood's front was more favorable for the tread of soldiers, he was ordered, as the column of direction, to push for the plateau at the henry house, in order to cut off retreat at the crossings by young's branch. wilcox was called to support and cover hood's left, but he lost sight of two of his brigades,--featherston's and pryor's,--and only gave the aid of his single brigade. kemper and jones were pushed on with hood's right, evans in hood's direct support. the batteries were advanced as rapidly as fields were opened to them, stribling's, j. b. richardson's, eshleman's, and rogers's having fairest field for progress. at the first sound of the charge, general lee sent to revoke his call in favor of jackson, asked me to push the battle, ordered r. h. anderson's division up, and rode himself to join me. [illustration: defeat of the federal troops by longstreet's corps, second manassas.] in the fulness of the battle, general toombs rode up on his iron-gray under sweat and spur, his hat off, and asked for his command. he was told that a courier was about to start with an order for the division commander, and would guide him. he asked to be the bearer of the order, received it, and with the guide rode to find his post in the battle. the meeting of the brigade and its commander was more than joyful. jackson failed to pull up even on the left, which gave opportunity for some of the enemy's batteries to turn their fire across the right wing in enfilade, as we advanced, and the enemy strongly reinforced against us from troops drawn from jackson's front, but we being on the jump, the fire of the batteries was not effective. it was severely threatening upon general lee, however, who would ride under it, notwithstanding appeals to avoid it, until i thought to ride through a ravine, and thus throw a traverse between him and the fire. he sent orders to jackson to advance and drive off or capture the batteries standing in his front and firing across our line, but it was not in season to relieve us. hood's aggressive force was well spent when his troops approached the chinn house, but r. h. anderson was up and put in to reinforce and relieve his battle. general pope drew ricketts's division from his right to brace his left, then reno's command to aid in checking our march, but its progress, furiously resisted, was steady, though much delayed. piatt's brigade was also put against us. this made time for porter to gather his forces. his regulars of sykes's division, particularly, made desperate resistance, that could only be overcome by our overreaching lines threatening their rear. when the last guns were fired the thickening twilight concealed the lines of friend and foe, so that the danger of friend firing against friend became imminent. the hill of the henry house was reached in good time, but darkness coming on earlier because of thickening clouds hovering over us, and a gentle fall of rain closely following, the plateau was shut off from view, and its ascent only found by groping through the darkening rainfall. as long as the enemy held the plateau, he covered the line of retreat by the turnpike and the bridge at young's branch. as he retired, heavy darkness gave safe-conduct to such of his columns as could find their way through the weird mists. captain william h. powell, of the fourth regular infantry, wrote of his experience,- "as we filed from the battle-field into the turnpike leading over the stone bridge, we came upon a group of mounted officers, one of whom wore a peculiar style of hat which had been seen on the field that day, and which had been the occasion of a great deal of comment in the ranks. as we passed these officers, the one with the peculiar hat called out in a loud voice,- "'what troops are those?' "'the regulars,' answered somebody. "'second division, fifth corps,' replied another. "'god bless them! they saved the army,' added the officer. "subsequently we learned that he was general irvin mcdowell. "as we neared the bridge we came upon confusion. men singly and in detachments were mingled with sutlers' wagons, artillery caissons, supply wagons, and ambulances, each striving to get ahead of the other. vehicles rushed through organized bodies and broke the columns into fragments. little detachments gathered by the road-side after crossing the bridge, crying out to members of their regiments as a guide to scattered comrades. and what a night it was! dark, gloomy, and beclouded by the volumes of smoke which had risen from the battle-field."[52] at six o'clock, general pope received report of the sixth corps, that had marched from alexandria under general franklin to the vicinity of centreville, and ordered the several commands to concentrate about that hamlet during the night. the second corps from the army of the potomac under general sumner also joined him at centreville. but for the dropping off of two of wilcox's brigades from close connection with the right wing, and the deflection of drayton's brigade, which was taken off by some unauthorized and unknown person from my right to the support of cavalry, it is possible that my working column could have gained the plateau of the henry house before it was dark. or if jackson had been fresh enough to pull up even with us, he could have retained the commands under reno and sykes's regulars in his front, which could have given us safe sweep to the plateau, an hour before sundown, and in sight of great possibilities. by morning of the 31st everything off the turnpike was nasty and soggy. stuart's cavalry, followed by pryor's brigade, were ordered across the run at stone bridge as a diversion, while we were trying another move to reach the enemy's rear. the confederates had worked all of the winter before, fortifying this new position, just taken by pope at centreville. direct pursuit by the turnpike against these fortifications would therefore be fruitless. general jackson was called to head-quarters early in the morning. upon receiving general lee's orders to cross bull run at sudley's and march by little river turnpike to intercept the enemy's march, he said, "good!" and away he went, without another word, or even a smile. though the suggestion of a smile always hung about his features, it was commonly said that it never fully developed, with a single exception, during his military career, though some claim there were other occasions on which it ripened, and those very near him say that he always smiled at the mention of the names of the federal leaders whom he was accustomed to encounter over in the valley behind the blue ridge. standing, he was a graceful figure, five feet ten inches in height, with brown wavy hair, full beard, and regular features. at first glance his gentle expression repelled the idea of his severe piety, the full beard concealing the lower features, which had they been revealed would have marked the character of the man who claimed "his first duty to god, and his next to jackson and general lee." mounted, his figure was not so imposing as that of the bold dragoon, charley may, on black tom. he had a habit of raising his right hand, riding or sitting, which some of his followers were wont to construe into invocation for divine aid, but they do not claim to know whether the prayers were for the slain, or for the success of other fields. the fact is, he received a shot in that hand at the first bull run, which left the hand under partial paralysis and the circulation through it imperfect. to relieve the pressure and assist the circulation he sometimes raised his arm. i was ordered to look after the dead and those whose misfortune it was to be wounded, till jackson could have time to stretch out on his new march, then to follow him, leaving the work to details and to general d. h. hill's division, just coming in from richmond. after giving orders for the day, general lee rode out towards centreville for personal observation, halted, and dismounted at a point which seemed safe from danger or observation. suddenly alarm was given of "the enemy's cavalry!" the group dispersed in hot haste to have the heels of their animals under them. the rush and confusion frightened the general's horse, so that he pulled him violently to the ground, severely spraining his right wrist, besides breaking some of the bones of the hand. on reaching his head-quarters, jackson ordered the assembly sounded, mounted his horse, and marched for the sudley springs crossing. he cleared the way in time for my column to reach that point at dark, the head of his own column tapping little river turnpike. the march was over a single-track country road, bad enough on the south side of the river, much worn through a post-oak forest over quicksand subsoil on the north side. if jackson had been followed by an enemy whose march he wished to baffle, his gun-carriages could not have made deeper cuts through the mud and quicksand. stuart was ordered over to the little river turnpike, and advanced to the vicinity of ox hill and fairfax court-house. he made some interesting captures and reports of movements by the enemy. he slept near their lines, north of the turnpike, east of chantilly. the little river and warrenton turnpikes converge and join as they near fairfax court-house. at vulnerable points on the latter, general pope posted parts of his command to cover his rearward march. at ox hill (chantilly) were stationed heintzelman's and reno's corps, the divisions of hooker, kearny, stevens, and reno. early on the 1st of september the confederates resumed their march. jackson reached ox hill late in the afternoon, and deployed by inversion,--a. p. hill's division on his right, ewell's under lawton next, his own under stuart on his left, on the right of the road. on the left of the road were stuart's cavalry and the artillery. two of hill's brigades were thrown out to find the enemy, and were soon met by his advance in search of jackson, which made a furious attack, driving back the confederate brigades in some disorder. stevens, appreciating the crisis as momentous, thought it necessary to follow the opportunity by aggressive battle, in order to hold jackson away from the warrenton turnpike. kearny, always ready to second any courageous move, joined in the daring battle. at the critical moment the rain and thunder-storm burst with great violence upon the combatants, the high wind beating the storm in the faces of the confederates. so firm was the unexpected battle that part of jackson's line yielded to the onslaught. at one moment his artillery seemed in danger. stevens was killed when the storm of battle, as well as that of the elements, began to quiet down. stuart's cavalry drew near jackson's left during the progress of the battle. as i rode up and met general jackson, i remarked upon the number of his men going to the rear: "general, your men don't appear to work well to-day." "no," he replied, "but i hope it will prove a victory in the morning." his troops were relieved as mine came up, to give them a respite till morning. while my reliefs were going around, general philip kearny rode to the line in search of his division. finding himself in the presence of confederates, he wheeled his horse and put spurs, preferring the danger of musket-balls to humiliating surrender. several challenges called, but not heeded, were followed by the ring of half a dozen muskets, when he fell mortally hurt, and so perished one of the most gallant and dashing of the union generals. "september 2, 1862. "major-general john pope, "_united states army_: "sir,--the body of general philip kearny was brought from the field last night, and he was reported dead. i send it forward under a flag of truce, thinking the possession of his remains may be a consolation to his family. "i am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, "r. e. lee, "_general_."[53] the rain so concealed the fight in its last struggles that the troops escaped before we were aware that it had been abandoned. as both federal division commanders fell, the accounts fail to do justice to their fight. stevens in his short career gave evidence of courage, judgment, skill, and genius not far below his illustrious antagonist. during the fight stuart had parties out seeking information, and early on the second had his troopers in the saddle in pursuit. the army, ready to move, awaited reports of the cavalry, which came from time to time, as they followed on the line of retreat. from fairfax court-house came the report that the enemy's rear had passed in rapid retreat quite out of reach, approaching the fortifications of alexandria and washington city. arms were ordered stacked, and a good rest was given the troops. stuart's cavalry pursued and engaged the retreating army. in the afternoon the first corps started on the march _via_ dranesville for leesburg and the potomac river, followed on the third by the second. the results to the confederates of the several engagements about manassas plains were seven thousand prisoners, two thousand of the enemy's wounded, thirty pieces of artillery, many thousand small-arms picked up from the field, and many colors, besides the captures made at manassas junction by general jackson.[54] a fair estimate of forces engaged: federal army, aggregate 63,000 confederates 53,500 losses between rappahannock river and washington: federals, aggregate. 15,000 confederates 10,000 the figures are given in round numbers, as the safest approximate estimate, but the records now accessible give accurate details of losses in each command about the same as these. and so it came to pass that from cedar run and bull run we had the term _all run_. it is due to the gallant sumner and his brave corps, however, to say that they so covered the last as to save disgraceful retreat. a cursory review of the campaign reveals the pleasure ride of general fitzhugh lee by louisa court-house as most unseasonable. he lost the fruits of our summer's work, and lost the southern cause. proud troy was laid in ashes. his orders were to meet his commander on the afternoon of the 17th, on the plank-road near raccoon ford, and upon this appointment was based general lee's order of march for the 18th. if the march had been made as appointed, general lee would have encountered the army of general pope upon weak ground from robertson river to near raccoon ford of the rapidan, and thus our march would have been so expedited that we could have reached alexandria and washington before the landing of the first detachment of the army of the potomac at alexandria on the 24th. the artillery and infantry were called to amend the delinquency by severe marches and battles. it would have been possible to make good the lost time, but the despatch lost in the stuart escapade was handed to general pope that morning (the 18th), and gave him notice of our plans and orders. the delay thus brought about gave time for him to quit his weaker ground and retire to strong defensive heights behind the rappahannock river, where he held us in check five days. referring to the solid move proposed before opening the campaign by the upper rapidan to strike pope's right, it may be said that it was not so dependent upon the cavalry that was marching behind us. that used by jackson in his battle of the 9th was enough for immediate use. jackson could have passed the upper rapidan on the 16th, and followed by the right wing in time to strike pope's right on the 17th in solid phalanx, _when time was mightier than cannon-balls_. after losing eight days between orange court-house and the rappahannock, we found at last that we must adopt the move by our left to get around the strong ground of the rappahannock, _and the move must now be made by detachments, not so approved of the usages of war_. i was west of the rappahannock when the command should have been at washington city. [illustration: second battle of bull run. position of troops at nightfall aug. 30th, 1862] the conduct of general pope's army after his receipt of the captured despatch was good, especially his plans and orders for the 27th and 28th. the error was his failure to ride with his working columns on the 28th, to look after and conduct their operations. he left them in the hands of the officer who lost the first battle of manassas. his orders of the 28th for general mcdowell to change direction and march for centreville were received at 3.15 p.m. had they been promptly executed, the commands, king's division, sigel's corps, and reynolds's division, should have found jackson by four o'clock. as it was, only the brigades of gibbon and doubleday were found passing by jackson's position after sunset, when he advanced against them in battle. he reported it "sanguinary." with the entire division of king and that of reynolds, with sigel's corps, it is possible that pope's campaign would have brought other important results. on the 29th he was still away from the active part of his field, and in consequence failed to have correct advice of the time of my arrival, and quite ignored the column under r. h. anderson approaching on the warrenton turnpike. on the 30th he was misled by reports of his officers and others to believe that the confederates were in retreat, and planned his movements upon false premises. jackson's march to bristoe and manassas junction was hazardous, or seemed so, but in view of his peculiar talent for such work (the captured despatch of general pope giving information of his affairs), and lee's skill, it seemed the only way open for progressive manoeuvre. the strength of the move lay in the time it gave us to make issue before all of the army of the potomac could unite with the army under general pope. his game of hide-and-seek about bull bun, centreville, and manassas plains was grand, but marred in completeness by the failure of general a. p. hill to meet his orders for the afternoon of the 28th. as a leader he was fine; as a wheel-horse, he was not always just to himself. he was fond of the picturesque. chapter xv. the maryland campaign. general lee continues aggressive work--from foraged fields of virginia into a bounteous land--longstreet objected to the movement on harper's ferry--lee thinks the occasion timely for proposal of peace and independence--confederates singing through the streets of fredericktown--mcclellan's movements--cautious marches--lee's lost order handed to the federal chief at frederick. "there is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows, and in miseries. on such a full sea are we now afloat." as our columns approached leesburg, "maryland, my maryland" was in the air, and on the lips of every man from general lee down to the youngest drummer. our chief could have safely ordered the ranks to break in virginia and assemble in fredericktown. all that they would ask was a thirty minutes' plunge in the potomac to remove some of the surplus dust, before they encountered the smiles of the winsome lasses of maryland. yet he expressed doubt of trusting so far from home solely to untried and unknown resources for food-supplies. receiving his anxious expressions really as appeals for reinforcement of his unexpressed wish, but warm to brave the venture, i related my mexican war experiences with worth's division, marching around the city of monterey on two days' rations of roasting-ears and green oranges, and said that it seemed to me that we could trust the fields of maryland, laden with ripening corn and fruit, to do as much as those of mexico; that we could in fact subsist on the bounty of the fields until we could open communication with our organized base of supplies. as factors in the problem, important as lee's masterly science and jackson's great skill, stood the fortitude and prowess of the confederate soldiers, and their faith in the friendship and generosity of their countrymen. hungry, sparsely clad, worn with continuous bivouac and battle since the 26th of june, proud of their record from the first to the honors of the second manassas, their cheery smiles and elastic step told better than words of anticipations of welcome from friends in maryland, and of new fields of honor for their solid ranks,--of the day when they should be masters of the field and of a new-born republic. though a losing battle, the union armies had made a splendid fight at second manassas. the stand at ox hill was severe; severe till the march of retreat, so that the army of northern virginia should have held in profound respect its formidable adversary, seasoned by many bloody fields. the policy of the richmond government was defensive rather than aggressive warfare, but the situation called for action, and there was but one opening,--across the potomac. general lee decided to follow his success in its natural leading, and so reported to the richmond authorities. he was not so well equipped as an army of invasion should be, but the many friends in maryland and the fields on the north side of the potomac were more inviting than those of virginia, so freely foraged. he knew from events of the past that his army was equal to the service to which he thought to call it, and ripe for the adventure; that he could march into maryland and remain until the season for the enemy's return into virginia for autumn or winter work had passed, improve his transportation supplies, and the clothing of his army, and do that, if not more, for relief of our southern fields and limited means, besides giving his army and cause a moral influence of great effect at home and abroad. he decided to make his march by the most direct route from chantilly, where he had last fought, to the potomac, and so crossed by the fords near leesburg. marching by this route, he thought to cut off a formidable force of union troops at winchester, at martinsburg, and a strong garrison occupying the fortified position at harper's ferry. to summarize the situation, we were obliged to go into maryland or retreat to points more convenient to supplies and the protection of richmond. at leesburg lee learned that the union troops in the valley had left winchester, and sent back orders to have the crippled and feeble soldiers wending their way to the army march through the valley to join us in maryland. trains of supplies were ordered to move by the same route. on the 5th and 6th the columns crossed the potomac by the fords near leesburg. stuart's cavalry, coming up from the line near alexandria and the long bridge, passed to front and right flank of the army. general mclaws's division, general j. g. walker, with two brigades of his division, and general hampton's cavalry brigade, including colonel baker's north carolina regiment, joined us on the march. on the 7th our infantry and artillery commands came together near frederick city. riding together before we reached frederick, the sound of artillery fire came from the direction of point of rocks and harper's ferry, from which general lee inferred that the enemy was concentrating his forces from the valley, for defence at harper's ferry, and proposed to me to organize forces to surround and capture the works and the garrison. i thought it a venture not worth the game, and suggested, as we were in the enemy's country and presence, that he would be advised of any move that we made in a few hours after it was set on foot; that the union army, though beaten, was not disorganized; that we knew a number of their officers who could put it in order and march against us, if they found us exposed, and make serious trouble before the capture could be accomplished; that our men were worn by very severe and protracted service, and in need of repose; that as long as we had them in hand we were masters of the situation, but dispersed into many fragments, our strength must be greatly reduced. as the subject was not continued, i supposed that it was a mere expression of passing thought, until, the day after we reached frederick, upon going over to head-quarters, i found the front of the general's tent closed and tied. upon inquiring of a member of the staff, i was told that he was inside with general jackson. as i had not been called, i turned to go away, when general lee, recognizing my voice, called me in. the plan had been arranged. jackson, with his three divisions, was to recross the potomac by the fords above harper's ferry, march _via_ martinsburg to bolivar heights; mclaws's division by crampton's gap to maryland heights; j. g. walker's division to recross at cheek's ford and occupy loudoun heights, these heights overlooking the positions of the garrison of harper's ferry; d. h. hill's division to march by the national road over south mountain at turner's gap, and halt at the western base, to guard trains, intercept fugitives from harper's ferry, and support the cavalry, if needed; the cavalry to face the enemy and embarrass his movements. i was to march over the mountain by turner's gap to hagerstown. as their minds were settled firmly upon the enterprise, i offered no opposition further than to ask that the order be so modified as to allow me to send r. h. anderson's division with mclaws and to halt my own column near the point designated for bivouac of general d. h. hill's command. these suggestions were accepted, and the order[55] so framed was issued. it may be well to digress from my narrative for a moment just here to remark that general lee's confidence in the strength of his army, the situation of affairs, and the value of the moral effect upon the country, north and south, was made fully manifest by the nature of the campaign he had just entered upon, especially that portion of it directed against harper's ferry, which, as events were soon to prove, weakened the effectiveness of his army in the main issue, which happened to be antietam. in another and a very different way, and with even greater plainness, his high estimate of opportunity and favoring condition of circumstances existing at the time was indicated to the authorities, though of course not at that time made public. this was his deliberate and urgent advice to president davis to join him and be prepared to make a proposal for peace and independence from the head of a conquering army. fresh from the second manassas, and already entered upon the fateful maryland campaign, he wrote the president this important letter: "head-quarters near fredericktown, md., "september 8, 1862. "his excellency jefferson davis, "_president of the confederate states, richmond, va._: "mr. president,--the present position of affairs, in my opinion, places it in the power of the government of the confederate states to propose with propriety to that of the united states the recognition of our independence. for more than a year both sections of the country have been devastated by hostilities which have brought sorrow and suffering upon thousands of homes, without advancing the objects which our enemies proposed to themselves in beginning the contest. such a proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded as suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the world that our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the attainment of an honorable peace. the rejection of this offer would prove to the country that the responsibility of the continuance of the war does not rest upon us, but that the party in power in the united states elect to prosecute it for purposes of their own. the proposal of peace would enable the people of the united states to determine at their coming elections whether they will support those who favor a prolongation of the war, or those who wish to bring it to a termination, which can but be productive of good to both parties without affecting the honor of either. "i have the honor to be, with great respect, "your obedient servant, "r. e. lee, "_general_."[56] and now i return to my narrative. general walker's division was on detached service at the time of the order, trying to cut the canal. he marched, however, at the appointed time, found cheek's ford under the severe fire of the enemy's batteries, and marched on up the left bank as far as the point of rocks, where he crossed and rested on the 11th. on the 12th he marched to and bivouacked at hillsboro'; on the 13th, to the foot of the blue ridge and occupied loudoun heights by a detachment under colonel cooke. not satisfied with the organization of mclaws's column, i asked and obtained permission on the 10th to strengthen it by three other brigades,--wilcox's, under colonel alfred cumming; featherston's, and pryor's, which were attached to r. h. anderson's division. the different columns from frederick marched as ordered, except in the change authorized for anderson's division. it was a rollicking march, the confederates playing and singing, as they marched through the streets of frederick, "the girl i left behind me." jackson recrossed the potomac on the 11th, at light's ford, ordered a. p. hill's division by the turnpike to martinsburg, his own and ewell's northwest to north mountain depot to intercept troops that might retreat in that direction from martinsburg. general white, commanding the union troops, abandoned martinsburg the night of the 11th, having timely advice of jackson's movements, and retreated to harper's ferry. on the 12th, jackson's troops came together at martinsburg, found some stores of bacon and bread rations, and marched on the 13th for harper's ferry, where he found the union troops in battle array along bolivar heights. i marched across south mountain at turner's pass, and bivouacked near its western base. general lee ordered my move continued to hagerstown. the plans of the confederates, as blocked out, anticipated the surrender of harper's ferry on friday, the 12th, or saturday, the 13th, at latest. the change of my position from boonsborough to hagerstown further misled our cavalry commander and the commanders of the divisions at boonsborough and harper's ferry into a feeling of security that there could be no threatening by the army from washington. d. h. hill's division crossed by turner's gap and halted near boonsborough. mclaws took the left-hand road, marched through burkittsville, and halted for the night at the east base of the mountain, near crampton's and brownsville passes. near crampton's pass on the west the mountain unfolds into two parallel ridges, the eastern, the general range of south mountain, the western, elk ridge, opening out pleasant valley, about three miles from crest to crest. crampton's is the northern of the two passes, and about eight miles south of turner's. one mile south of crampton is the brownsville pass, and four miles from that the river pass, which cuts in between the blue ridge of virginia and south mountain of maryland. through the river pass the baltimore and ohio railway, the canal, and the fredericktown turnpike reach out to the west, and at the pass is the little town of riverton. between riverton and harper's ferry was the hamlet sandy hook, occupied by about fifteen hundred federal troops. two roads wind through pleasant valley, one close under south mountain, the other hugging the foot-hills of elk ridge,--the latter rugged, little used. harper's ferry, against which lee's new movement was directed, nestles at the confluence of the potomac and shenandoah rivers, on the virginia side, under the towering cliffs of maryland or cumberland heights. at harper's ferry the river cuts in so close under maryland heights that they stand almost perpendicularly over it. the crowded space between the heights and the river, filled by the railway, canal, and turnpike, was made by blastings from the southern extremities of maryland heights. under the precipice the railroad bridge crosses the potomac, and a pontoon bridge was laid a few yards above it. mclaws marched over into pleasant valley on the 11th, through brownsville pass, near which and over elk ridge a road passes through solomon's gap of elk ridge. from the top of this gap is a rugged way along the ridge leading down to its southern projections and limits, by which infantry only could find foothold. that southern point is called maryland heights. two brigades--kershaw's and barksdale's--under general kershaw were ordered to ascend elk ridge, march along its summit, driving off opposition, and capture the enemy's position on the heights. general semmes was left near the pass, over which the troops had marched with his own and mahone's brigades, the latter under colonel parham with orders to send a brigade to the top of solomon's gap to cover kershaw's rear. general wright, of anderson's division, was ordered with his brigade and two pieces of artillery along the crest ridge of south mountain to its projection over riverton. general cobb was ordered with his brigade along the base of elk ridge, to be abreast of kershaw's column. with the balance of his command, general mclaws moved down the valley by the south mountain road, connecting his march, by signal, with general kershaw's. kershaw soon met a strong force of skirmishers, which was steadily pushed back till night. general wright, without serious opposition, reached the end of the mountain, when r. h. anderson sent another brigade--pryor's--to occupy weverton. on the 13th, kershaw renewed his fight against very strong positions, forced his way across two abatis, along a rugged plateau, dropping off on both sides, in rocky cliffs of forty or fifty feet, encountered breastworks of logs and boulders, struggled in a severe fight, captured the position, the enemy's signal station, and at four p.m. gained possession of the entire hold. cobb's brigade was advanced, and took possession of sandy hook without serious opposition. the column near south mountain was advanced to complete the grasp against the enemy at harper's ferry. up to this hour general mclaws had heard nothing direct from generals jackson and walker, though from the direction of the former sounds of artillery reached him, and later a courier told that jackson thought his leading division would approach at two o'clock that afternoon. during the day heavy cannonading was heard towards the east and northeast, and rumors reached mclaws of the advance of the enemy from frederick, but the signal-parties and cavalry failed to discover movements, so the firing was not credited as of significance. the morning of the 14th was occupied in cutting a road for his artillery up to the point overlooking harper's ferry, and at two p.m. captains read and carlton had their best guns in position over the town. but during these progressions the confederates on other fields had been called to more serious work. general mcclellan, moving his columns out from the vicinity of washington city on the 5th, made slow and very cautious marches to save fatigue of his men and at the same time cover the capital against unforeseen contingency; so slow and cautious was the march that he only covered forty or fifty miles in seven days. on the 12th his head-quarters were at urbana, where he received the following telegram from president lincoln: "governor curtin telegraphs me, 'i have advices that jackson is crossing the potomac at williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from maryland.'" the president added,- "receiving nothing from harper's ferry or martinsburg to-day, and positive information from wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the potomac. please do not let him get off without being hurt."[57] elsewhere general mcclellan has written of the 12th: "during these movements i had not imposed long marches on the columns. the absolute necessity of refitting and giving some little rest to the troops worn down by previous long-continued marches and severe fighting, together with the uncertainty as to the actual position, strength, and intentions of the enemy, rendered it incumbent upon me to move slowly and cautiously until the head-quarters reached urbana, where i first obtained reliable information that the enemy's object was to move upon harper's ferry and the cumberland valley, and not upon washington and baltimore." his army was organized: right wing, under general burnside: first and ninth corps; the kanawha division, under general j. d. cox, was assigned with the ninth corps about the 8th instant. centre column: second and twelfth corps, under general sumner. left wing: sixth corps and couch's division of the fourth under general franklin; sykes's division, fifth corps, independent.[58] besides the despatches of the 11th and 12th, his cavalry under general pleasonton, which was vigilant and pushing, sent frequent reports of his steady progress. in the afternoon pleasonton and the ninth corps under general reno entered fredericktown. this advance, by the national road, threatened to cut off two of stuart's cavalry regiments left at the monocacy bridge. to detain the enemy till these were withdrawn, the outpost on that road was reinforced. hampton retired his cavalry beyond frederick and posted his artillery to cover the line of march, where he was soon attacked by a formidable force. to make safe the retreat of the brigade, a cavalry charge was ordered, under colonel butler, lieutenant meaghan's squadron leading. colonel moore, of the twenty-eighth ohio cavalry, and a number of other prisoners were captured. this so detained the enemy as to give safe withdrawal for the brigade to middletown, leaving lieutenant-colonel martin's cavalry and two guns on guard at the gap of the catoctin range of mountains. before withdrawing from frederick on the 12th, general stuart sent orders for the brigade under general fitzhugh lee to move around the right of the union army and ascertain the meaning and strength of its march. following his orders of the 12th, general pleasonton detached a cavalry brigade on the 13th and section of artillery under colonel mcreynolds to follow fitzhugh lee, and rush's lancers were sent to jefferson for general franklin's column. with his main force he pursued the confederates towards turner's pass of south mountain. midway between frederick and south mountain, running parallel, is a lesser range, catoctin, where he encountered stuart's rear-guard. after a severe affair he secured the pass, moved on, and encountered a second force near middletown. reinforced by gibson's battery, he attacked and forced the way to a third stand. this in turn was forced back and into the mountain at turner's pass. on that day mcclellan's columns marched: ninth corps, to and near middletown, eight miles; first corps, to the monocacy, eight miles; twelfth corps, to frederick, nine miles; second corps, to frederick, eight miles; sixth corps, to buckeystown, seven miles; couch's division, to licksville, six miles; sykes's division, to frederick, eight miles. at frederick, general lee's special order no. 191 was handed to general mcclellan at his head-quarters with his centre (sumner's) column. how lost and how found we shall presently see, and see that by the mischance and accident the federal commander came in possession of information that gave a spur, and great advantage, to his somewhat demoralized army. chapter xvi. "the lost order"--south mountain. how the federals found the despatch--with every advantage mcclellan "made haste slowly"--lee turns back to meet him at south mountain--longstreet preferred that the stand should be made at sharpsburg--the battle at the pass--many killed--general garland of the confederate and general reno of the union side--a future president among the wounded--estimate of forces engaged. the strange losing and stranger finding of lee's "general order no. 191," commonly referred to as "the lost despatch," which he had issued september 9 for the movement of his army, made a difference in our maryland campaign for better or for worse. before this tell-tale slip of paper found its way to mcclellan's head-quarters he was well advised by his cavalry, and by despatches wired him from east and west, of the movements of lee's army, and later, on that eventful 13th day of september, he received more valuable information, even to a complete revelation of his adversary's plans and purpose, such as no other commander, in the history of war, has had at a time so momentous. so well satisfied was he that he was master of the military zodiac that he despatched the washington authorities of lee's "gross mistake" and exposure to severe penalties. there was not a point upon which he wanted further information nor a plea for a moment of delay. his army was moving rapidly; all that he wished for was that the plans of the enemy would not be changed. the only change that occurred in the plans was the delay of their execution, which worked to his greater advantage. by following the operations of the armies through the complications of the campaign we may form better judgment of the work of the commanders in finding ways through its intricacies: of the efforts of one to grasp the envied crown so haplessly tendered; of the other in seeking refuge that might cover catastrophe involved in the complexity of misconceived plans. the copy of the order that was lost was sent by general jackson to general d. h. hill under the impression that hill's division was part of his command, but the division had not been so assigned, and that copy of the order was not delivered at hill's head-quarters, but had been put to other use. the order sent to general hill from general head-quarters was carefully preserved. when the federals marched into frederick, just left by the confederates, general sumner's column went into camp about noon, and it was then that the despatch was found by colonel silas colgrove, who took it to division head-quarters, whence it was quickly sent to the federal commander. general mcclellan reported to general halleck that the lost order had been handed him in the evening, but it is evident that he had it at the time of his noonday despatch to the president, from his reference to the facts it exposed. it is possible that it was at first suspected as a _ruse de guerre_, and that a little time was necessary to convince mcclellan of its genuineness, which may account for the difference between the hinted information in his despatch to general halleck and the confident statement made at noonday to the president. some of the confederates were a little surprised that a matter of such magnitude was intrusted to pen-and-ink despatches. the copy sent me was carefully read, then used as some persons use a little cut of tobacco, to be assured that others could not have the benefit of its contents. it has been in evidence that the copy that was lost had been used as a wrapper for three fragrant confederate cigars in the interim between its importance when issued by the confederate chief and its greater importance when found by the federals. general halleck thought the capital in imminent peril before he heard from mcclellan on the 13th, as shown on that day by a despatch to general mcclellan: "the capture of this place will throw us back six months, if it should not destroy us." but later, the "lost despatch" having turned up at head-quarters of general mcclellan, that commander apprised the authorities of the true condition of affairs in the following: "head-quarters, frederick, september 13, 1862, 12 m. ("received 2.35 a.m., september 14.) "to the president: "i have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost. i have a difficult task to perform, but with god's blessing will accomplish it. i think lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. the army is in motion as rapidly as possible. i hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain unchanged. we have possession of catoctin. i have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. i now feel that i can count on them as of old. all forces of pennsylvania should be placed to co-operate at chambersburg. my respects to mrs. lincoln. received most enthusiastically by the ladies. will send you trophies. all well, and with god's blessing will accomplish it. "geo. b. mcclellan." "frederick city, md., september 13, 1862, 11 p.m. ("received 1 p.m., september 14.) "major-general h. w. halleck, "_general-in-chief_: "an order from general r. e. lee, addressed to general d. h. hill, which has accidentally come into my hands this evening,--the authenticity of which is unquestionable,--discloses some of the plans of the enemy, and shows most conclusively that the main rebel army is now before us, including longstreet's, jackson's, the two hills's, mclaws's, walker's, r. h. anderson's, and hood's commands. that army was ordered to march on the 10th, and to attack and capture our forces at harper's ferry and martinsburg yesterday, by surrounding them with such a heavy force that they conceived it impossible they could escape. they were also ordered to take possession of the baltimore and ohio railroad; afterwards to concentrate again at boonsborough or hagerstown. that this was the plan of campaign on the 9th is confirmed by the fact that heavy firing has been heard in the direction of harper's ferry this afternoon, and the columns took the roads specified in the order. it may, therefore, in my judgment, be regarded as certain that this rebel army, which i have good reasons for believing amounts to 120,000 men or more, and know to be commanded by lee in person, intended to attempt penetrating pennsylvania. the officers told their friends here that they were going to harrisburg and philadelphia. my advance has pushed forward to-day and overtaken the enemy on the middletown and harper's ferry roads, and several slight engagements have taken place, in which our troops have driven the enemy from their position. a train of wagons, about three-quarters of a mile long, was destroyed to-day by the rebels in their flight. we took over fifty prisoners. this army marches forward early to-morrow morning, and will make forced marches, to endeavor to relieve colonel miles, but i fear, unless he makes a stout resistance, we may be too late. "a report came in just this moment that miles was attacked to-day, and repulsed the enemy, but i do not know what credit to attach to the statement. i shall do everything in my power to save miles if he still holds out. portions of burnside's and franklin's corps move forward this evening. "i have received your despatch of ten a.m. you will perceive, from what i have stated, that there is but little probability of the enemy being in much force south of the potomac. i do not, by any means, wish to be understood as undervaluing the importance of holding washington. it is of great consequence, but upon the success of this army the fate of the nation depends. it was for this reason that i said everything else should be made subordinate to placing this army in proper condition to meet the large rebel force in our front. unless general lee has changed his plans, i expect a severe general engagement to-morrow. i feel confident that there is now no rebel force immediately threatening washington or baltimore, but that i have the mass of their troops to contend with, and they outnumber me when united. "geo. b. mcclellan, "_major-general_."[59] with the knowledge afforded by securing lee's "lost order" the passes of the south mountain became important points. if he could force them, mcclellan might fall on the divided columns of the confederates and reach harper's ferry in time to save its garrison; but lee received intelligence of his only moderate forward movement, and, without knowing then how it came to be made, recalled a force to make resistance, and, so supplementing or complementing by his rapid moves the federal commander's slowness, saved his campaign from the disastrous failure that threatened it. general mcclellan claimed to have been more vigorous in pursuit after he received the "lost despatch," but events do not support the claim. he had time after the despatch was handed him to march his army to the foot of south mountain before night, but gave no orders, except his letter to general franklin calling for vigorous action, which was afterwards tempered by caution to wait for developments at turner's pass. he gave no intimation of the despatch to his cavalry leader, who should have been the first to be advised of the points in his possession. general pleasonton had pushed the confederate cavalry back into the mountains long before night of the 13th under his instructions of the 12th. had he been informed of the points known by his chief in the afternoon, he would have occupied south mountain at turner's pass before any of the confederate infantry was there or apprised of his approach. general mcclellan's orders for the 14th were dated,- "13th, 6.45 p.m., couch to move to jefferson with his whole division, and join franklin. "13th, 8.45 p.m., sumner to move at seven a.m. "13th, 11.30 p.m., hooker to march at daylight to middletown. "13th, 11.30 p.m., sykes to move at six a.m., after hooker on the middletown and hagerstown road. "14th, one a.m., artillery reserve to follow sykes closely. "14th, nine a.m., sumner ordered to take the shockstown road to middletown. "franklin's corps at buckeystown to march for burkittsville."[60] he wrote general franklin at 6.20 p.m., giving the substance of information of the despatch, but not mentioning when or how he came by it, and ordered him to march for the mountain pass at crampton's gap, to seize the pass if it was not strongly guarded, and march for rohrersville, to cut off the command under mclaws about maryland heights, capture it, and relieve the garrison at harper's ferry, and return to co-operate in capturing the balance of the confederate army north of the potomac; but, in case the gap was occupied by a strong force, to await operations against it until he heard the engagement of the army moving upon turner's pass. he wrote general franklin that general pleasonton had cleared the field east of the mountain of confederate cavalry. after relieving harper's ferry, franklin was to destroy bridges and guard against crossing of the confederates to the north side, his idea being to cut the confederate army in two and capture or break it up in detail. his appeal was urgent for the best work that a general could exercise. the division under general couch was ordered to general franklin, without waiting for all of its forces to join. this is the only order of the records that indicates unusual action on the part of the union commander, and general franklin's evidence before the committee on the conduct of the war shows that his orders of the 13th were so modified on the 14th as to direct his wait for couch's division to join him, and the division joined him after nightfall. the divisions of the ninth corps reached middletown on the 13th, under the orders of the 12th, issued before the lost despatch was found, one of them supporting pleasonton's cavalry; but rodman's, under misconception of orders, marched back towards frederick. south mountain range, standing between the armies, courses across maryland northeast and southwest. its average height is one thousand feet; its rugged passes give it strong military features. the pass at turner drops off about four hundred feet. about a mile south of this the old sharpsburg road crosses at a greater elevation through rugged windings; a fork of this road, on the mountain-side, makes a second way over below fox's pass, while another turns to the right and leads back into the turnpike at the summit, or mountain house. on the north side of the turnpike a road leads off to the right, called the old hagerstown road, which winds its course through a valley between a spur and the mountain, and courses back to the turnpike along the top. a more rugged route than this opens a way to the mountain-top by a route nearer the pike. general pleasonton, not advised of the lost despatch, did not push for a careful reconnoissance on the 13th. at the same time, general stuart, forced back into the mountains, finding his cavalry unserviceable, advised general d. h. hill of severe pressure, called for a brigade of infantry, ordered hampton's cavalry down to crampton's pass to assist robertson's brigade, colonel munford commanding, leaving the jeff davis legion, under colonel martin, colonel rosser with another cavalry detachment, and stuart's horse artillery to occupy the passes by the old sharpsburg road. colquitt's brigade of infantry reported to him under his call. after posting it near the east base of the mountain to hold the pass, he rode to join his other cavalry detachments down at crampton's pass. he only knew of two brigades of infantry pressing him back, and so reported. his cavalry, ordered around the union right under general fitzhugh lee, for information of the force in his front, had failed to make report. general hill ordered two brigades, garland's and colquitt's, into the pass to report to stuart, and drew his other three near the foot of the mountain. garland's brigade filed to the right after ascending the mountain, and halted near the turnpike. colquitt's brigade took its position across the turnpike and down towards the base of the mountain, lane's batteries at the summit. it seems that up to the night of the 13th most of the confederates were looking with confidence to the surrender at harper's ferry on the 13th, to be promptly followed by a move farther west, not thinking it possible that a great struggle at and along the range of south mountain was impending; that even on the 14th our cavalry leader thought to continue his retrograde that day. general hill's attention was given more to his instructions to prevent the escape of fugitives from harper's ferry than to trouble along his front, as the instructions covered more especially that duty, while information from the cavalry gave no indication of serious trouble from the front. a little after dark of the 13th, general lee received, through a scout, information of the advance of the union forces to the foot of south mountain in solid ranks. later information confirmed this report, giving the estimated strength at ninety thousand. general lee still held to the thought that he had ample time. he sent for me, and i found him over his map. he told of the reports, and asked my views. i thought it too late to march on the 14th and properly man the pass at turner's, and expressed preference for concentrating d. h. hill's and my own force behind the antietam at sharpsburg, where we could get together in season to make a strong defensive fight, and at the same time check mcclellan's march towards harper's ferry, in case he thought to relieve the beleaguered garrison by that route, forcing him to first remove the obstacle on his flank. he preferred to make the stand at turner's pass, and ordered the troops to march next morning, ordering a brigade left at hagerstown to guard the trains. no warning was sent mclaws to prepare to defend his rear, either by the commanding general or by the chief of cavalry. the hallucination that mcclellan was not capable of serious work seemed to pervade our army, even to this moment of dreadful threatening. after retiring to my couch, reflecting upon affairs, my mind was so disturbed that i could not rest. as i studied, the perils seemed to grow, till at last i made a light and wrote to tell general lee of my troubled thoughts, and appealed again for immediate concentration at sharpsburg. to this no answer came, but it relieved my mind and gave me some rest. at daylight in the morning the column marched (eight brigades with the artillery), leaving toombs's brigade. a regiment of g. t. anderson's that had been on guard all night was not relieved in time to join the march, and remained with toombs. the day was hot and the roads dry and beaten into impalpable powder, that rose in clouds of dust from under our feet as we marched. before sunrise of the 14th, general hill rode to the top of the mountain to view the front to which his brigade had been called the day before. as he rode he received a message from general stuart, informing him that he had sent his main cavalry force to crampton's pass, and was then _en route_ to join it. he found garland's brigade at the summit, near the mountain house, on the right of the road, and colquitt's well advanced down the east side. he withdrew the latter to the summit, and posted two regiments on the north side of the pike behind stone walls, the others on the south side under cover of a woodland. upon learning of the approaches to his position, he ordered the brigade under g. b. anderson and one of ripley's regiments up, leaving rodes's brigade and the balance of ripley's to watch for refugees from harper's ferry. while he was withdrawing and posting colquitt's brigade, general pleasonton was marching by the road three-fourths of a mile south, feeling his way towards fox's gap, with the brigade of infantry under colonel scammon. co-operating with this advance, pleasonton used his cavalry along the turnpike. his batteries were put in action near the foot of the mountain, except one section of mcmullen's under lieutenant crome, which advanced with the infantry. the battle was thus opened by general pleasonton and general cox without orders, and without information of the lost despatch. the latter had the foresight to support this move with his brigade under colonel crook. batteries of twenty-pound parrott guns were posted near the foot of the mountain in fine position to open upon the confederates at the summit. after posting colquitt's brigade, general hill rode off to his right to examine the approach to fox's gap, near the point held by rosser's cavalry and horse artillery. as he passed near the gap he heard noise of troops working their way towards him, and soon artillery opened fire across the gap over his head. he hurried back and sent garland's brigade, with bondurant's battery, to meet the approaching enemy. garland made connection with rosser's detachment and engaged in severe skirmish, arresting the progress of scammon's brigade till the coming of crook's, when cox gave new force to his fight, and after a severe contest, in which garland fell, the division advanced in a gallant charge, which broke the ranks of the brigade, discomfited by the loss of its gallant leader, part of it breaking in confusion down the mountain, the left withdrawing towards the turnpike. g. b. anderson's brigade was in time to check this success and hold for reinforcements. ripley's brigade, called up later, came, but passed to the right and beyond the fight. general hill had posted two batteries on the summit north of the turnpike, which had a destructive cross fire on cox as he made his fight, and part of colquitt's right regiments were put in, in aid of g. b. anderson's men. about two p.m., general cox was reinforced by the division under general wilcox, and a little after three o'clock by sturgis's division, the corps commander, general reno, taking command with his last division under rodman. as sturgis's division came into the fight, the head of my column reached the top of the pass, where the brigades of g. t. anderson and drayton, under general d. r. jones, filed to the right to meet the battle, and soon after general hood with two brigades. the last reinforcement braced the confederate fight to a successful stand, and held it till after night in hot contest, in which many brave soldiers and valuable officers were lost on both sides. the fight was between eight brigades on the union side, with a detachment of cavalry and superior artillery attachments, against two of d. h. hill's and four of my brigades, with rosser's detachment of cavalry and artillery. ripley's brigade of hill's division marched for the fight, but lost its direction and failed to engage. the confederate batteries made handsome combat, but were of inferior metal and munitions. numerically, the union brigades were stronger than the confederates, mine having lost more than half its numbers by the wayside, from exhaustion under its forced march. it seems that several brigades failed to connect closely with the action. ripley's, on the confederate side, general hill said, "didn't pull a trigger." g. t. anderson claimed that some of his skirmishers pulled a few triggers, while harland's union brigade of rodman's division seems to have had little use for its guns. lieutenant crome brought a section of mcmullen's battery up in close connection with cox's advance, put it in, and held it in gallant action till his gunners were reduced to the minimum of working force, when he took the place of cannoneer and fought till mortally wounded. on the union side the officers had their time to organize and place their battle, and showed skill in their work. the confederates had to meet the battle, as it was called, after its opening, on rosser's detachment. the lamented garland, equal to any emergency, was quick enough to get his fine brigade in, and made excellent battle, till his men, discouraged by the loss of their chief, were overcome by the gallant assault under cox. general reno, on the union side, an officer of high character and attainments, was killed about seven o'clock p.m. among the union wounded was colonel rutherford b. hayes; afterwards president of the united states. the pass by the lower trail, old sharpsburg road, was opened by this fight, but the confederates standing so close upon it made it necessary that they should be dislodged before it could be utilized. the first corps marched from the monocacy at daylight and approached the mountain at one p.m. general hooker had three divisions, under generals hatch, ricketts, and meade. general hatch had four brigades, generals ricketts and meade three each, with full artillery appointments. at two o'clock, general hooker was ordered north of the turnpike to make a diversion in favor of the troops operating on the south side under general reno. meade's division was marched, followed by hatch's and ricketts's,--meade's on the right, hatch on meade's left, ricketts in reserve. meade's division was deployed along the foot-hills. a cavalry regiment under colonel williams, first massachusetts, was sent to the far right in observation. meade's advance was followed by hatch and ricketts. general hill's only available force to meet this formidable move was his brigade under general rodes. he ordered rodes to his left to a prominent position about a mile off which commanded that part of the field. cutts's battalion of artillery had been posted on the left of the turnpike, to cover by its fire the route just assigned for hooker's march. the weight of the attack fell upon rodes's brigade, and was handsomely received. evans's brigade, fortunately, came up, and was sent to general hill, who ordered it out to connect with rodes's right. before making close connection it became engaged, and operated near rodes's right, connecting with his fight and dropping back as the troops on his left were gradually forced from point to point. as the brigades under generals kemper, garnett, and colonel walker (jenkins's brigade) approached the mountain, a report reached general head-quarters that the enemy was forcing his way down the mountain by the old sharpsburg road. to meet this general lee ordered those brigades to the right, and they marched a mile and more down a rugged way along the base of the mountain before the report was found to be erroneous, when the brigades were ordered back to make their way to the pike and to the top of the mountain in double time. general rodes had five regiments, one of which he left to partially cover the wide opening between his position and the turnpike. in view of the great force approaching to attack him his fight seemed almost hopeless, but he handled his troops with skill, and delayed the enemy, with the little help that finally came, till night, breaking from time to time as he was forced nearer our centre at the turnpike. gibbon's brigade had been called from hooker's corps, and was ordered up the mountain by the direct route as the corps engaged in its fight farther off on the right. a spur of the mountain trends towards the east, opening a valley between it and the mountain. through this valley and over the rising ground meade's division advanced and made successful attack as he encountered the confederates. cooper's battery marched, and assisted in the several attacks as they were pushed up the mountain slope. the ground was very rough, and the confederates worked hard to make it too rough, but the divisions, with their strong lines of skirmishers, made progress. rodes made an effort to turn the right of the advancing divisions, but hooker put out a brigade from hatch's division, which pushed off the feeble effort, and rodes lost his first position. it was near night when the brigades under generals kemper and garnett and colonel walker returned from their march down the foot of the mountain and reached the top. they were put in as they arrived to try to cover the right of rodes and evans and fill the intervening space to the turnpike. as they marched, the men dropped along the road, as rapidly as if under severe skirmish. so manifest was it that nature was exhausted, that no one urged them to get up and try to keep their ranks. as the brigades were led to places along the line, the divisions of hatch and ricketts were advancing; the former, in range, caught the brigades under fire before their lines were formed. at the same time meade's division was forcing rodes and evans from their positions, back towards the turnpike. general mcclellan claimed fifteen hundred prisoners taken by his troops, and that our loss in killed and wounded was greater than his own, which was fifteen hundred. he estimated the forces as about equal, thirty thousand each. general d. h. hill does not admit that the confederates had more than nine thousand. several efforts have been made to correctly report the numerical strength of my column, some erroneously including the brigades detached with r. h. anderson's, and others the brigade of general toombs and the regiment of g. t. anderson's brigade, that were left at hagerstown. general hill concedes reluctantly that four thousand of my men came to his support in detachments, but does not know how to estimate the loss. considering the severe forced march, the five brigades that made direct ascent of the mountain were in good order. the three that marched south of the turnpike, along a narrow mountain trail part of the way, through woodlands and over boulders, returning, then up the mountain, the last march at double time, were thinned to skeletons of three or four hundred men to a brigade when they reached the mountain house. that they succeeded in covering enough of the position to conceal our retreat after night is sufficient encomium of their valorous spirit. chapter xvii. preliminaries of the great battle. confederates retreat from south mountain--federals follow and harass them--franklin and cobb at crampton's pass--a spirited action--fighting around harper's ferry--its capitulation--the confederates take eleven thousand prisoners--jackson rejoins lee--description of the field of antietam--mcclellan posts his corps--lee's lines advantageously placed--hooker's advance on the eve of battle should have been resisted. at first sight of the situation, as i rode up the mountain-side, it became evident that we were not in time nor in sufficient force to secure our holding at turner's gap, and a note was sent general lee to prepare his mind for disappointment, and give time for arrangements for retreat. after nightfall general hill and i rode down to head-quarters to make report. general lee inquired of the prospects for continuing the fight. i called upon general hill to demonstrate the situation, positions and forces. he explained that the enemy was in great force with commanding positions on both flanks, which would give a cross-fire for his batteries, in good range on our front, making the cramped position of the confederates at the mountain house untenable. his explanation was too forcible to admit of further deliberation. general lee ordered withdrawal of the commands to keedysville, and on the march changed the order, making sharpsburg the point of assembly. general hill's troops were first withdrawn, and when under way, the other brigades followed and were relieved by general fitzhugh lee's cavalry on the mountain at three o'clock in the morning, hood's two brigades, with g. t. anderson's, as rear-guard. general fitzhugh lee's cavalry was ordered to cover our march, but pleasonton pushed upon him so severely with part of the eighth illinois cavalry and tidball's battery that he was forced off from our line through boonsborough and found his way to the potomac off the rear of general lee's left, leaving his killed and wounded and losing two pieces of artillery. otherwise our march was not disturbed. in addition to his regular complement of artillery, general d. h. hill had the battalion under lieutenant-colonel a. s. cutts. the batteries were assigned positions near the ridge under the crest, where they could best cover the fields on the farther side of the stream. a few minutes after our lines were manned, information came of the capitulation of harper's ferry, and of the withdrawal of the troops to the virginia side of the potomac. general toombs's brigade joined us early on the 15th, and was posted over the burnside bridge. he was subsequently ordered to detach two regiments, as guard for trains near williamsport. as long as the armies were linked to harper's ferry, the heights in front of sharpsburg offered a formidable defensive line, and in view of possible operations from harper's ferry, through the river pass, east of south mountain, formed a beautiful point of strategic diversion. but when it transpired that harper's ferry was surrendered and the position was not to be utilized, that the troops there were to join us by a march on the south side, its charms were changed to perplexities. the threatening attitude towards the enemy's rear vanished, his line of communication was open and free of further care, and his army, relieved of entanglements, was at liberty to cross the antietam by the upper fords and bridges, and approach from vantage-ground general lee's left. at the same time the federal left was reasonably secured from aggression by cramped and rugged ground along the confederate right. thus the altered circumstances changed all of the features of the position in favor of the federals. approaching crampton's gap on the morning of the 14th, hampton's cavalry encountered the enemy's and made a dashing charge, which opened his way to munford's, both parties losing valuable officers and men. when general stuart rode up, he saw nothing seriously threatening, and ordered hampton south to the river pass; thinking that there might be something more important at that point, he rode himself to maryland heights to see general mclaws, and to witness the operations at harper's ferry, posting colonel munford with two regiments of cavalry, two regiments of mahone's brigade under colonel parham, part of the tenth georgia infantry, chew's battery of four guns, and a section of navy howitzers, to guard the pass. the infantry regiments were posted behind stone walls at the base of the mountain, the cavalry dismounted on the flanks acting as sharp-shooters. at noon general franklin marched through burkittsville with his leading division under general slocum, holding the division under general w. f. smith in reserve. his orders were to wait until couch's division joined him, but he judged that the wait might be more favorable to the other side. slocum deployed his brigades, bartlett's, newton's, and torbert's, from right to left, posted wolcott's battery of six guns on his left and rear, and followed the advance of his skirmish line, the right brigade leading. when the confederate position was well developed, the skirmishers were retired, and the order to assault followed,--the right regiments of newton's brigade supporting bartlett's assault, the regiments on the left supporting torbert's. the confederates made a bold effort to hold, but the attack was too well organized and too cleverly pushed to leave the matter long in doubt. their flanks, being severely crowded upon, soon began to drop off, when a sweeping charge of slocum's line gained the position. the brigades of general brooks and colonel irwin of general smith's division were advanced to slocum's left and joined in pursuit, which was so rapid that the confederates were not able to rally a good line; the entire mountain was abandoned to the federals, and the pursuit ended. some four hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, and one gun were their trophies in this affair. general franklin's total loss was five hundred and thirty-three.[61] general mclaws had ordered general cobb's brigade and the other regiments of mahone's to reinforce the troops at the gap, but they only came up as the federals were making their sweeping charge, and were driven back with their discomfited comrades. general semmes's brigade at the brownsville pass, a mile south, with five or six guns, attempted to relieve their comrades, but the range was too great for effective work. that mclaws was not prepared for the sudden onslaught is evident from the assurances made him by the cavalry commander. his orders for cobb were severe enough, but franklin was too prompt to allow cobb to get to work. upon hearing the noise of battle, he followed his orders, riding with general stuart, but the game was played before he could take part in it. night came and gave him time to organize his forces for the next day. had the defenders been posted at the crest of the mountain it is probable they could have delayed the assaulting forces until reinforced. but cavalry commanders do not always post artillery and infantry to greatest advantage. general cobb made worthy effort to arrest the retreat and reorganize the forces, but was not able to fix a rallying-point till after the pass was lost and the troops were well out of fire of the pursuers. general semmes came to his aid, with his staff, but could accomplish nothing until he drew two of his regiments from brownsville pass and established them with a battery as a rallying-point. general mclaws reformed his line about a mile and a half south of the lost gap, and drew all of his force not necessary to the bombardment at harper's ferry to that line during the night. [illustration: lafayette mclaws. commanding first division, first army corps, army of northern virginia.] under cover of the night, lieutenant-colonel h. davis, at the head of the union cavalry, left harper's ferry, crossed the potomac, marched up the left bank, through sharpsburg, and made good his escape, capturing some forty or fifty confederate wagons as they were moving south from hagerstown. we left mclaws in possession of maryland heights, on the 14th, with his best guns planted against the garrison at harper's ferry. the potomac river was between his and jackson's and walker's forces, and the shenandoah divided jackson's and walker's commands. walker posted his division to defend against the escape from harper's ferry, and planted three parrott guns of captain french's battery and two rifle pieces of captain branch's on loudoun heights, having effective fire along bolivar heights. general jackson sent word to mclaws and walker that the batteries were not to open till all were ready, but the latter, hearing the engagement along south mountain drawing nearer, and becoming impatient lest delay should prove fatal, ordered his guns to open against the batteries along bolivar heights, and silenced those under range. general jackson ordered a. p. hill's division along the left bank of the shenandoah to turn the enemy's left, the division under lawton down the turnpike in support of hill, and his own division to threaten against the enemy's right. hill's division did its work in good style, securing eligible positions on the enemy's left and left rear of bolivar heights, and planted a number of batteries upon them during the night; and jackson had some of his best guns passed over the shenandoah to commanding points near the base of loudoun heights. at daylight lawton's command moved up close to the enemy. at the same time the batteries of hill's division opened fire, and a little later all the batteries, including those of mclaws and walker. the signal ordered for the storming columns was to be the cessation of artillery fire. in about one hour the enemy's fire ceased, when jackson commanded silence upon his side. pender's brigade started, when the enemy opened again with his artillery. the batteries of pegram and crenshaw dashed forward and renewed rapid fire, when the signal of distress was raised. colonel d. h. miles, the federal commander at harper's ferry, was mortally wounded, and the actual surrender was made by general white, who gave up eleven thousand prisoners, thirteen thousand small-arms, seventy-two cannon, quantities of quartermaster's stores and of subsistence.[62] general franklin had posted his division under general couch at rohrersville on the morning of the 15th, and proceeded to examine mclaws's line established the night before across pleasant valley. he found the confederates strongly posted covering the valley, their flanks against the mountain-side. before he could organize for attack the firing at harper's ferry ceased, indicating surrender of that garrison and leaving the troops operating there free to march against him. he prepared, therefore, for that eventuality. the "lost order" directed the commands of generals jackson, mclaws, and walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they had been detached, to join the main body of the army at boonsborough or hagerstown. under the order and the changed condition of affairs, they were expected, in case of early capitulation at harper's ferry, to march up the rohrersville-boonsborough road against mcclellan's left. there were in those columns twenty-six of general lee's forty brigades, equipped with a fair apportionment of artillery and cavalry. so it seemed to be possible that jackson would order mclaws and walker up the rohrersville road, and move with his own corps through the river pass east of south mountain, against mcclellan's rear, as the speedier means of relief to general lee's forces. but prudence would have gone with the bolder move of his entire command east of the mountain against mcclellan's rear, with a fair field for strategy and tactics. this move would have disturbed mcclellan's plans on the afternoon of the 15th, while there seemed little hope that mcclellan would delay his attack until jackson could join us, marching by the south side. the field, and extreme of conditions, were more encouraging of results than was napoleon's work at arcola. general jackson judged it better to join us by the south side, marched promptly with two of his divisions (leaving a. p. hill with six brigades to receive the surrender and captured property), then ordered walker's and mclaws's troops to follow his march. with his report of surrender of the garrison he sent advice of his march by the south side to join us. at daylight on the 15th the head of general lee's column reached the antietam. general d. h. hill, in advance, crossed and filed into position to the left of the boonsborough turnpike, g. b. anderson on his right, garland's brigade under colonel mcrae, ripley, and colquitt, rodes in rear near sharpsburg, my command on his right. the two brigades under hood were on my right, kemper, drayton, jenkins (under colonel walker), washington artillery, on the ridge near the turnpike, and s. d. lee's artillery. pickett's brigade (under garnett) was in a second line, g. t. anderson's brigade in rear of the battalions, evans's brigade on the north side of the turnpike; toombs's brigade joined and was posted at bridge no. 3 (burnside bridge). as the battalions of artillery attached to the divisions were all that could find places, general lee sent the reserve artillery under general pendleton across the potomac. as soon as advised of the surrender and jackson's march by the south side, my brigades under hood were moved to the extreme left of the line, taking the division of general d. h. hill within my limits, while three of s. d. lee's batteries were sent in support of hood's brigades. the pursuit ordered by general mcclellan was the first, second, and twelfth corps by the boonsborough turnpike, the ninth corps and sykes's division of the fifth by the old sharpsburg road;[63] the ninth and fifth to reinforce franklin by the rohrersville road, or move to sharpsburg. about two o'clock in the afternoon the advance of the union army came in sight. general porter had passed the ninth corps with his division under sykes and joined richardson's division of the second. these divisions deployed on the right and left of the turnpike and posted their batteries, which drew on a desultory fire of artillery, continuing until night. the morning of the 16th opened as the evening of the previous day closed, except for the arrival of the remainder of the union troops. the ninth corps took post at the lower bridge opposite the confederate right, the first, the other divisions of the second, and the twelfth corps resting nearer keedysville. the display of their finely appointed batteries was imposing, as seen from sharpsburg heights. before maturing his plans, general mcclellan had to make a careful reconnoissance, and to know of the disposition to be made of the confederate forces from harper's ferry. of the latter point he was informed, if not assured, before he posted the ninth corps. four batteries of twenty-pound parrotts were planted on the height overlooking the antietam on their right; on the crest near the burnside bridge, weed's three-inch guns and benjamin's twenty-pound parrotts. at intervals between those were posted some ten or more batteries, and the practice became more lively as the day wore on, till, observing the unequal combat, i ordered the confederates to hold their ammunition, and the batteries of the other side, seeming to approve the order, slackened their fire. the antietam, hardly worthy the name river, is a sluggish stream coming down from pennsylvania heights in a flow a little west of south till it nears the potomac, when it bends westward to its confluence. it is spanned by four stone bridges,--at the williamsport turnpike, the boonsborough-sharpsburg turnpike, the rohrersville turnpike, and another near its mouth. the third was afterwards known as the burnside bridge. from the north suburbs of sharpsburg the hagerstown turnpike leads north a little west two miles, when it turns east of north to the vanishing point of operations. a mile and a half from sharpsburg on the west of this road is the dunker chapel, near the southern border of a woodland, which spreads northward half a mile, then a quarter or more westward. east of the pike were open fields of corn and fruit, with occasional woodlands of ten or twenty acres, as far as the stream, where some heavier forests cumbered the river banks. general lee's line stood on the sharpsburg heights, his right a mile southeast of the village, the line extending parallel with the hagerstown turnpike, three miles from his right, the left curved backward towards the rear, and towards the great eastern bend of the potomac, near which were the cavalry and horse artillery. along the broken line were occasional ridges of limestone cropping out in such shape as to give partial cover to infantry lying under them. single batteries were posted along the line, or under the crest of the heights, and the battalions of the washington artillery, cutts's, and s. d. lee's. in forming his forces for the battle, general mcclellan divided his right wing, posted the ninth corps on his left, at the burnside bridge, under general cox, and assigned the first corps, under general hooker, for his right flank. general burnside was retained on his left. the plan was to make the main attack against the confederate left, or to make that a diversion in favor of the main attack, and to follow success by his reserve. at two p.m. of the 16th, hooker's first corps crossed the antietam at the bridge near keedysville and a nearby ford, and marched against my left brigades, generals meade, ricketts, and doubleday commanding the divisions, battalions, and batteries of field artillery. the sharp skirmish that ensued was one of the marked preliminaries of the great battle; but the federals gained nothing by it except an advanced position, which was of little benefit and disclosed their purpose. general jackson was up from harper's ferry with ewell's division and his own, under generals lawton and jones. they were ordered out to general lee's left, and took post west of the hagerstown turnpike, the right of his line resting on my left, under hood, winder's and jones's brigades on the front, starke's and taliaferro's on the second line, early's brigade of ewell's division on the left of jackson's division, with hays's brigade for a second; lawton's and trimble's brigades were left at rest near the chapel; poague's battery on jackson's front; five other batteries prepared for action. following jackson's march to the left, general j. g. walker came up with his two brigades, and was posted on my extreme right in the position left vacant by the change of hood's brigades. general hooker was joined, as he marched that afternoon, by his chief, who rode with him some little distance conversing of pending affairs. it subsequently transpired that hooker thought the afternoon's work ordered for his corps (thirteen thousand) so far from support extremely venturesome, and he was right. jackson was up and in position with two divisions well on the flank of the attack to be made by hooker. hood with s. d. lee's batteries received hooker's attack, and arrested its progress for the day. if jackson could have been put into this fight, and also the brigades under j. g. walker, hooker's command could have been fought out, if not crushed, before the afternoon went out. he was beyond support for the day, and the posting along the antietam was such--we will soon see--as to prevent effective diversion in his favor. events that followed authorize the claim for this combination, that it would have so disturbed the plans of general mcclellan as to give us one or two days more for concentration, and under that preparation we could have given him more serious trouble. hood's skirmish line was out to be driven, or drawn in, but throughout the severe engagement his line of battle was not seriously disturbed. after night general jackson sent the brigades of trimble and lawton, under general lawton, to replace hood's men, who were ordered to replenish ammunition, and, after getting food, to resume their places on my right. preparing for battle, general jackson sent the brigade under general early to support stuart's cavalry and horse artillery, and lawton drew his brigade, under general hays, to support his others on the right of jackson's division. general mansfield crossed during the night with the twelfth corps and took position supporting general hooker's command, with the divisions of generals a. s. williams and george s. greene, and field batteries. a light rain began to fall at nine o'clock. the troops along either line were near enough to hear voices from the other side, and several spats occurred during the night between the pickets, increasing in one instance to exchange of many shots; but for the most part there was silence or only the soft, smothered sound of the summer rain over all that field on which was to break in the morning the storm of lead and iron. chapter xviii. battle of sharpsburg, or antietam. bloodiest single day of the war--comparison of casualties--hooker opens the fight against jackson's centre--many officers among the fallen early in the day--mclaws and walker in time to meet sumner's advance under sedgwick--around dunker chapel--richardson's splendid advance against the confederate centre the signal of the bursting of another storm--longstreet's and d. h. hill's troops stood before it--fall of general g. b. anderson--general richardson mortally wounded--aggressive spirit of his command broken--wonderful cannon-shot--general d. h. hill's third horse killed under him. the field that i have described--the field lying along the antietam and including in its scope the little town of sharpsburg--was destined to pass into history as the scene of the bloodiest single day of fighting of the war, and that 17th of september was to become memorable as the day of greatest carnage in the campaigns between the north and south. gettysburg was the greatest battle of the war, but it was for three days, and its total of casualties on either side, terrible as it was, should be one-third larger to make the average per diem equal to the losses at sharpsburg. viewed by the measure of losses, antietam was the fourth battle of the war, spottsylvania and the wilderness, as well as gettysburg, exceeding it in number of killed and wounded, but each of these dragged its tragedy through several days. taking confederate losses in killed and wounded as the criterion of magnitude in battles, the seven days' battle (following mcclellan's retreat), gettysburg, and chickamauga exceeded sharpsburg, but each of these occupied several days, and on no single day in any one of them was there such carnage as in this fierce struggle. the confederates lost in killed and wounded in the seven days' battle 19,739,--more, it will be observed, than at gettysburg (15,298), though the total loss, including 5150 captured or missing, at the latter, brought the figures up to those of the former (20,614), in which the captured or missing were only 875. our killed and wounded at chickamauga were 16,986, but that was in two days' battle, while at chancellorsville in three days the killed and wounded were 10,746. it is impossible to make the comparison with absolute exactness for the confederate side, for the reason that our losses are given for the entire campaign in maryland, instead of separately for the single great battle and several minor engagements. thus computed they were 12,187.[64] but nearly all of these are known to have been losses at sharpsburg, and, making proper deductions for the casualties in other actions of the campaign, the confederate loss in this single day's fighting was still in excess of that at the _three days' fight_ at chancellorsville (10,746), and for the single day far larger proportionally than in the two days at chickamauga, three days at gettysburg, or seven days on the bloody chickahominy. but the sanguinary character of this battle is most strikingly exhibited by a comparison of the accurate figures of the federal losses, returned specifically for the day. these show a total killed and wounded of 11,657 (or, including the captured and missing, 12,410), as contrasted with 17,567 killed and wounded in _three_ days at gettysburg, 16,141 in _eight_ days at spottsylvania, and 14,283 in the _three_ days at the wilderness, while the _three_ and _two_ days' fighting respectively at chancellorsville and chickamauga were actually productive of less loss than this battle of _one_ day. the exceeding losses of this battle are further shown by the fact that of the 11,657 federals stricken on the field, the great number of 2108 were actually slain,--more than two-thirds of the number killed in three days at gettysburg (3070). and this tremendous tumult of carnage was entirely compassed in the brief hours from dawn to four o'clock in the afternoon. at three o'clock in the morning of the 17th firing along the picket lines of the confronting and expectant armies became quite frequent, and before daylight the batteries began to plough the fields in front of them, feeling, as it were, for the ranks of men whose destruction was better suited to their ugly purpose. as the dawn came, the fire spread along both lines from left to right, across the antietam and back again, and the thunder of the big guns became continuous and increased to mighty volume. to this was presently added the sharper rattling of musketry, and the surge of mingling sound sweeping up and down the field was multiplied and confused by the reverberations from the rocks and hills. and in this great tumult of sound, which shook the air and seemed to shatter the cliffs and ledges above the antietam, bodies of the facing foes were pushed forward to closer work, and soon added the clash of steel to the thunderous crash of cannon-shots. the first impact came from hooker's right division under doubleday, led by the choice brigade under gibbon. it was deployed across the turnpike and struck the centre of jackson's division, when close engagement was strengthened by the brigades of patrick, phelps, and part of hofmann's, ricketts's division, engaged in close connection along lawton's front. hooker supported his battle by his division under meade, which called into action three of d. h. hill's brigades,--ripley's, colquitt's, and mcrae's. hartsuff, the leading spirit of ricketts's division, was the first general officer to fall severely hurt, and later fell the commander of the corps, wounded also. general starke, commanding jackson's division, was killed. at six o'clock the twelfth corps came in, when general lawton called for hood's brigades, "and all the help he could bring." hood's and g. t. anderson's brigades were put in, and the brigades from my right, under j. g. walker, marched promptly in response to this call. the weight of mansfield's fight forced jackson back into the middle wood at the dunker chapel, and d. h. hill's brigades to closer lines. hood was in season to brace them, and hold the line as he found it. in this fight the corps commander, general mansfield, fell, mortally wounded, which took from that corps some of its aggressive power. jackson, worn down and exhausted of ammunition, withdrew his divisions at seven a.m., except early's brigade, that was with the cavalry. this he called back to vacant ground on hood's left. two detachments, one under colonel grigsby, of virginia, the other under colonel stafford, of louisiana, remained on the wooded ground off from the left of jackson's position. one of the regiments of early's brigade was left with the cavalry. stuart retired to position corresponding to the line of jackson's broken front. the brigade under g. t. anderson joined on hood's right, and the brigades under j. g. walker coming up took place on hood's left, walker leaving two regiments to fill a vacant place between anderson's brigade and hood's right. walker, hood, and d. h. hill attacked against the twelfth corps; worn by its fight against jackson, it was driven back as far as the post-and-rail fence in the east open, where they were checked. they were outside of the line, their left in the air and exposed to the fire of a thirty-gun battery posted at long range on the hagerstown road by general doubleday. their left was withdrawn, and the line rectified, when greene's brigade of the twelfth resumed position in the northeast angle of the wood, which it held until sedgwick's division came in bold march. in these fights offensive and defensive the artillery battalions under lieutenant-colonel s. d. lee and major frobel were in active combat, the former from the first shot made before daylight. they had been severely worked, and were nearly exhausted of ammunition. the washington artillery was called on for a battery to assist them, and some of the guns of that battalion were sent for ammunition. miller's battery of four napoleon guns came. as jackson withdrew, general hooker's corps retired to a point on the hagerstown road about three-quarters of a mile north of the battle-ground, where general doubleday established his thirty-gun battery. jackson's and hooker's men had fought to exhaustion, and the battle of the twelfth corps, taken up and continued by mansfield, had taken defensive relations, its chief mortally wounded. generals lawton, ripley, and j. r. jones were severely wounded, and colonel douglas, commanding lawton's brigade, killed. a third of the men of lawton's, hays's, and trimble's brigades were reported killed or wounded. four of the field officers of colquitt's brigade were killed, five were wounded, the tenth and last contused by a shell. all of jackson's and d. h. hill's troops engaged suffered proportionally. hood's, walker's, and g. t. anderson's, though longer engaged, did not lose so severely. general hooker's aggregate of loss was 2590; general mansfield's, 1746. the federal batteries, of position, on the east side were more or less busy during the engagement, having occasional opportunities for a raking fire on the troops along jackson's line and my left. the horse artillery under stuart was strengthening to the confederate left, and had occasional opportunities for destructive fire across the union right when coming into action. although the battle along the line of contention had become defensive, there were threatening movements on the boonsborough pike by sykes's division and the horse artillery under pleasonton, and burnside was busy at his bridge, working to find his way across. at the close of the walker-hood-hill affair, hood found his line making a large angle with the line of the latter, which was rectified, drawing in the angle. early's regiments were in the wood between walker and the cavalry, and the detachments under colonels grigsby and stafford in the wood some distance in advance of early's left. the line thus organized was thin and worn by severe attrition. the men were losing strength and the ammunition getting low. some gathered cartridges from their fallen comrades and distributed them as far as they would go, others went for fresh supplies. mclaws's column came up at nine o'clock. he reported at general lee's head-quarters, where he was ordered at rest, and afterwards reported to me, with general lee's orders for his own division, and asked the disposition to be made of r. h. anderson's. he was ordered to send the latter to report to general d. h. hill. coincident with these arrivals, heavy columns of federal infantry and artillery were seen crossing the antietam. morell's division of the fifth corps was up and relieved richardson's of the second, which had been in our front since its arrival on the 15th. richardson's following the march of the troops by the upper crossing advised us that the next engagement would be by the second corps, under general sumner; sedgwick's division was in the lead as they marched. our left centre was almost exhausted of men and ammunition. the divisions of french and richardson followed in left echelon to sedgwick. hood's brigades had retired for fresh supply of ammunition, leaving the guard to walker's two brigades, g. t. anderson's brigade on walker's right, part of early's brigade on walker's left, and the regiments under colonels grigsby and stafford off the left front. mclaws's division was called for, and on the march under conduct of major taylor of general head-quarters staff. at sight of sumner's march, general early rode from the field in search, as he reported, of reinforcements. his regiments naturally waited on the directions of the leader. general sumner rode with his leading division under general sedgwick, to find the battle. sedgwick marched in column of brigades, gorman, dana, and howard. there was no officer on the union side in charge of the field, the other corps commanders having been killed or wounded. general sumner testified,- "on going upon the field i found that general hooker's corps had been dispersed and routed. i passed him some distance in the rear, where he had been carried wounded, but i saw nothing of his corps at all, as i was advancing with my command on the field. there were some troops lying down on the left which i took to belong to mansfield's command. in the mean time general mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his corps (formerly banks's) had also been thrown into confusion."[65] he passed greene's brigade of the twelfth, and marched through the wood, leaving the dunker chapel on his left. as mclaws approached, general hood was sent to give him careful instructions of the posture, of the grounds, and the impending crisis. he marched with his brigades,--cobb's, kershaw's, semmes's, and barksdale's. the leading brigade filed to the right, before the approaching march. kershaw's leading regiment filed into line as sedgwick's column approached the south side of the dunker chapel wood,--the latter on a diagonal march,--while kershaw's regiment was in fair front against it. the regiment opened prompt fire, and the other regiments came into line in double time, opening fire by company as they came to the front. the other brigades came into line by companies, and forward into line by regiments. armistead's brigade had been drawn from r. h. anderson's column to reinforce mclaws. [illustration: relative positions of mclaws and other confederates and sedgwick at their opening.] sedgwick's diagonal march exposed his left to a scattering fire from walker's left brigade under m. ransom, but he kept his steady march while walker increased his fire. mclaws increasing his fire staggered the march of sedgwick, and presently arrested it. the regiments under colonels stafford and grigsby, coming from their lurking-places, opened fire on sedgwick's right rear. at mclaws's opening sedgwick essayed to form line of battle; the increasing fire on his right and left rear, with the terrible fire in front, was confusing, but the troops were eager to return the fire they found pouring into their lines from three-quarters of a circle. to counter the rear fire of walker, general sumner ordered the rear brigade to face about. the troops, taking this to mean a rearward march, proceeded to execute it without awaiting further orders, which was soon followed by the other brigades. [illustration: battle of sharpsburg] mclaws and walker, pushing their success, were joined by g. t. anderson's, the brigades of d. h. hill's left, and those of r. h. anderson's division, making strong battle through the woodland and open to the post-and-rail fence and to the roulette house, where they encountered sumner's division under french, and parts of the twelfth corps rallied on that part of the field. this contention was firm and wasting on both sides, but held with persevering courage until richardson's reserve, under brooke, was put against hill's right and broke the confederate line back to the woodlands south of the chapel, where early's regiments had formed a rallying line. when hill's right was struck and pressed so severely, rodes's brigade, the reserve of his division, was ordered out to support his right. the brigade advanced in good strong battle, but general rodes reported that he could not move his sixth alabama regiment in time, notwithstanding his personal efforts; that with the support of that regiment the battle line of the confederates could have waited other supports. general sumner was eager in riding with his leading division. he was always anxious to get in in time to use all of his power, and thought others like himself. had he formed the corps into lines of divisions, in close echelon, and moved as a corps, he would have marched through and opened the way for porter's command at bridge no. 2, and pleasonton's cavalry, and for burnside at the third bridge, and forced the battle back to the river bank. he was criticised for his opposition to franklin's proposed attack, but the chances are even that he was right. the stir among franklin's troops was observed from a dead angle of our lines, and preparations were made to meet it. general jackson was marching back to us, and it is possible that the attack might have resulted in mingling our troops with franklin's down on the banks of the antietam. after this fight the artillery battalions of s. d. lee and frobel, quite out of ammunition, retired to replenish. the battery of napoleons was reduced to one section, that short of ammunition and working hands. general hill rallied the greater part of g. b. anderson's and rodes's brigades in the sunken road. some of ripley's men came together near miller's guns at the hagerstown pike. general r. h. anderson and his next in rank, general wright, were wounded. the next officer, general pryor, not advised of his new authority, the brigades assembled at points most suited to their convenience, in rear of d. h. hill's brigades. but time was up. confederate affairs were not encouraging. our men were all leg-weary and heavy to handle, while mcclellan, with his tens of thousands, whom he had marched in healthful exercise the past two weeks, was finding and pounding us from left to right under converging fire of his batteries east and west of the antietam. the signal of the approaching storm was the bursting of richardson's command, augmented by parts of french's division, through the field of corn, hardly ruffled by the affair at the roulette house, spreading its grand march against our centre. they came in brave style, in full appreciation of the work in hand, marched better than on drill, unfolded banners making gay their gallant step. the fifth corps and pleasonton's cavalry were in active preparation to cross at the second bridge and join on richardson's left, and burnside at the third bridge was pressing his claim for a passage against our right. i had posted g. t. anderson's brigade behind a stone fence near the hagerstown pike, about the safest spot to be found on the field of sharpsburg,--a dead angle, so to speak. the batteries on the field north and the long-range thirty-gun battery of general doubleday were playing their fire down the pike, taking their aim by the direction of the road, where they stood. this brought their fire into the field about one hundred yards in rear of anderson's line. as the fire came from an enfilade direction, the troops assumed that they were under enfilade fire, and general anderson changed position without reporting. general d. h. hill got hold of him and moved him to the boonsborough pike to defend against sykes's and pleasonton's forces, advancing in that quarter. thus, when richardson's march approached its objective, the confederates had boyce's battery, well out in the corn-field, facing the march; miller's section of napoleons in the centre, and a single battery at mclaws's rear, with fragments of scattered brigades along the pike, and the twenty-seventh north carolina regiment to hold the left centre, besides the brigades in the sunken road, and the brigades of r. h. anderson's division awaiting the bloody struggle. they received the severe attack in firm holding for a long half-hour, the enemy pressing closer at intervals, until an order of general rodes's was misconstrued and part of his brigade under lieutenant-colonel lightfoot, of the sixth alabama regiment, was forced to the rear, and marched off, informing others that that was the order. general g. b. anderson fell mortally wounded. the enemy pressed in on his outer flank and called for surrender of the forces cut off and outflanked. meagher's brigade was retired to replenish ammunition, and barlow swung to his right and came against our fragments about miller's guns, standing near his flank. miller had two guns, the others off for a supply of ammunition. cooke's twenty-seventh north carolina regiment was well organized, but short of ammunition; fragments of ripley's brigade and some others were on the turnpike; miller was short of hands and ammunition, even for two guns; mclaws's division and the other part of walker's were in front of threatenings of parts of french's division and of troops rallying on their front, and the sixth corps was up and coming against them, so that it seemed hazardous to call them off and leave an open way. our line was throbbing at every point, so that i dared not call on general lee for help. sergeant ellis thought that he could bring up ammunition if he was authorized to order it. he was authorized, and rode for and brought it. i held the horses of some of my staff who helped to man the guns as cannoneers. as the attacking forces drew nearer, colonel cooke reported his ammunition exhausted. he was ordered to hold on with the bayonet, and sent in return that he would "hold till ice forms in regions where it was never known," or words to that effect. as richardson advanced through the corn he cut off the battery under boyce, so that it was obliged to retire to save itself, and as barlow came upon our centre, the battery on our left was for a time thrown out of fire lest they might injure friend as much as foe. barlow marched in steady good ranks, and the remnants before him rose to the emergency. they seemed to forget that they had known fatigue; the guns were played with life, and the brave spirits manning them claimed that they were there to hold or to go down with the guns. as our shots rattled against the armored ranks, colonel fairfax clapped his hands and ran for other charges. the mood of the gunners to a man was one of quiet but unflinching resolve to stand to the last gun. captain miller charged and double-charged with spherical case and canister until his guns at the discharge leaped in the air from ten to twelve inches. [illustration: john w. fairfax. assistant adjutant and inspector-general, first corps.] when the crest was reached, the rush that was expected to sweep us away paused,--the confederates became hopeful. soon the advancing ranks lay behind the crest, and presently drew nearer richardson's part of the line, then mounting the crest over the piper house. this latter point, once established, must cut and break the confederate position as effectually as our centre just saved. he occupied the piper house with two regiments under colonel brooke in advance of his line along the crest, and called up some of his batteries. the confederates meanwhile were collecting other batteries and infantry in defence, when a shot from one of our batteries brought richardson down, mortally wounded. his taking-off broke the aggressive spirit of the division and reduced its fight to the defensive. the regiments at the piper house found their position thus advanced too much exposed, and withdrew to the stronger line of the crest. general meagher's brigade came up with ammunition replenished. general hancock was despatched to take command of the division. in the midst of the tragedy, as richardson approached the east crest, there was a moment of amusement when general hill, with about fifty men and a battle-flag, ran to gain a vantage-point for flank fire against richardson's left. colonel ross, observing the move and appreciating the opportunity, charged with two regiments for the same and secured it. general hill claimed (and rightly) that it had effect in giving the impression that there were other forces coming to support him. another regiment came to the relief of the twenty-seventh, under cooke. the movement of troops in that quarter was construed by the enemy as a threatened flank move against richardson, which caused some little delay in his march. though the confederates had but fragments here and there, the enemy were kept busy and watchful lest they should come upon another surprise move. the confederates were surprised but much relieved when they found this affair reduced to the defensive, and assumed that every missile they sent must have found one or more victims. but accounts of the other side make clear that the result was due to accidental artillery shots that cut down colonel barlow, the aggressive spirit of richardson's right column, and general richardson himself at his culminating moment. barlow fell from a caseor canister-shot, as did richardson. all the union accounts refer to a battery on their right throwing shell, and the "two brass guns in front throwing case and canister," and this latter was the only artillery at work against them at the time of barlow's fall. when barlow's command drew nearer the division the brass guns were turned upon richardson, but at the moment of his taking-off another battery was in action on his left. general d. h. hill thought that carter's battery was in time to divide the honor of the last shot with the section of napoleons under miller. orders were given general pleasonton, at the second bridge, to be ready to enter the battle as soon as the attack by richardson should open the way. to meet these orders skirmishers were advanced, and tidball's battery, by piece, using canister, to drive back the confederate sharp-shooters. the fifth corps (general porter's) was ordered to be ready for like service. when richardson swung his line up along the crest at the piper house, pleasonton advanced troopers and batteries, crossed the bridge at a gallop by the fifth regular cavalry, farnsworth's brigade, rush's brigade, two regiments of the fifth brigade under b. f. davis, and the batteries of tidball, robertson, hains, and gibson. the batteries were put into action under the line of skirmishers, that were reinforced by sykes's division of the fifth and tenth infantry under lieutenant poland. general hill seized a musket and by example speedily collected a number of men, who joined him in reinforcing the line threatened by this heavy display. the parts of brigades under general pryor, colonels cummings, posey, and g. t. anderson afterwards got up to help the brigade of evans already there. by these, with the batteries of squires, gardner, and richardson, this threatening demonstration was checked. then it was reinforced by the batteries of randol, kusserow, and van reed, and the fourth united states infantry, captain dryer; the first battalion of the twelfth, captain blount; second battalion of the twelfth, captain anderson; first battalion of the fourteenth, captain brown, and second battalion of the fourteenth, captain mckibbin, of sykes's division; the batteries posted to command the field, right and left, to cover sumner's and burnside's fronts, as soon as they could rise to the plateau. s. d. lee's batteries were back on the crest, replenished of ammunition, while the union batteries were on low ground, near the river. a very clever well-organized advance was made, but their advantages of position and the tenacious hold of the confederates, even after the attack reached the crest, enabled them to drive back the assaulting forces. the horse batteries went back to positions on the west side after replenishing with ammunition, except gibson's, which was put in defensive attitude on the east. pleasonton, with a comprehensive view of the opportunity, called for additional force, but two of morell's brigades had been ordered by the upper crossing to sumner's relief, and a detachment had been sent to assist burnside, which reduced the fifth corps to the minimum of force necessary to the service to which it was assigned; not equal to the aggressive fight to which it was invited. but for the breaking up of richardson's aggression, this last advance could have gained the field. the third brigade of the second division, sixth corps, made an erratic march across part of the field, the seventh maine regiment leading, and retired like a meteor that loses its own fire. a little after one o'clock this and other parts of the line, except at the burnside bridge, settled down to defensive. burnside was still hard at work in search of a practical line of advance, toombs standing manfully against him. during the lull, after the rencounter of walker's, hill's, and hood's divisions against mansfield's last fight, general lee and myself, riding together under the crest of general d. h. hill's part of the line, were joined by the latter. we were presently called to the crest to observe movements going on in the union lines. the two former dismounted and walked to the crest; general hill, a little out of strength and thinking a single horseman not likely to draw the enemy's fire, rode. as we reached the crest i asked him to ride a little apart, as he would likely draw fire upon the group. while viewing the field a puff of white smoke was seen to burst from a cannon's mouth about a mile off. i remarked, "there is a shot for general hill," and, looking towards him, saw his horse drop on his knees. both forelegs were cut off just below the knees. the dropping forward of the poor animal so elevated his croup that it was not an easy matter for one not an expert horseman to dismount _à la militaire_. to add to the dilemma, there was a rubber coat with other wraps strapped to the cantle of the saddle. failing in his attempt to dismount, i suggested that he throw his leg forward over the pommel. this gave him easy and graceful dismount. this was the third horse shot under him during the day, and the shot was one of the best i ever witnessed. an equally good one was made by a confederate at yorktown. an officer of the topographical engineers walked into the open, in front of our lines, fixed his plane table and seated himself to make a map of the confederate works. a non-commissioned officer, without orders, adjusted his gun, carefully aimed it, and fired. at the report of the gun all eyes were turned to see the occasion of it, and then to observe the object, when the shell was seen to explode as if in the hands of the officer. it had been dropped squarely upon the drawing-table, and lieutenant wagner was mortally wounded.[66] of the first shot, major alfred a. woodhull, under date of june 8, 1886, wrote,- "on the 17th of september, 1862, i was standing in weed's battery, whose position is correctly given in the map, when a man on, i think, a gray horse, appeared about a mile in front of us, and footmen were recognized near. captain weed, who was a remarkable artillerist, himself sighted and fired the gun at the horse, which was struck." chapter xix. battle of sharpsburg, or antietam (continued). closing events of the great struggle--burnside crosses the bridge he made famous--toombs made gallant defence, but was outnumbered and dislodged--the confederate brigades from harper's ferry under a. p. hill in time for the final crisis--burnside's advance arrested by them--the battle against burnside "appeared to spring from the earth"--"lee's old war horse"--the killing of a kinsman at the bridge seriously affects general d. r. jones--the sharp fight at shepherdstown--confederates retreat--casualties of the battle--confederate losses in the campaign--neither mcclellan's plan nor execution was strong. at one or two points near our centre were dead angles into which i rode from time to time for closer observation of the enemy when his active aggression was suspended. general burnside was busy at his crossing, but no report of progress had been sent me. one of my rides towards the dunker chapel revealed efforts of the enemy to renew his work on that part of the field. our troops were ordered to be ready to receive it. its non-aggression suggested an opportunity for the confederates, and i ordered mclaws and walker to prepare to assault. hood was back in position with his brigades, and jackson was reported on his way, all in full supply of ammunition. it seemed probable that by concealing our movements under cover of the wood from the massed batteries of doubleday's artillery on the north, and the batteries of position on the east, we could draw our columns so near to the enemy in front before our move could be known that we would have but a few rods to march before we could mingle our ranks with those of the enemy; that our columns massed and in goodly numbers, pressing severely upon a single point, would give the enemy much trouble, and might cut him in two, and break up his battle arrangements at the lower bridge; but just then general jackson reported, with authority from general lee, that he with the cavalry was ordered to march around and turn the entire position of the enemy by his right flank, and strike at his rear. he found that the march would be long and extremely hazardous, and abandoned his orders. so it appears that counsels were divided on both sides, general mcclellan disapproving the attack proposed by franklin, and general lee preferring a flank move. of the proposed attack from the union side, general franklin reported,- "slocum's division arrived on the field about eleven o'clock. immediately after its arrival two of his brigades (newton's and torbert's) were formed in column of attack to carry the wood in the immediate vicinity of the white church. the other brigade (bartlett's) had been ordered by general sumner to keep near his right. as this brigade was to form the reserve for the column of attack, i waited until it came up. about the same time general sumner arrived on the spot and directed the attack to be postponed, and the enemy at once proceeded to fill the wood with infantry, and planted a battery there which opened a severe fire upon us. shortly afterwards the commanding general came to the position, and decided that it would not be prudent to make the attack, our position on the right being then considerably in advance of what it had been in the morning."[67] general mcclellan claimed that his batteries on the east side dispersed a column marching in the afternoon to reinforce against general sumner. this was probably jackson's command marching to their position on the line. the fire only hurried the march of the troops to the front, where they resumed their position. we left general toombs defending the crossing at the burnside bridge, with the second, twentieth, and fiftieth georgia regiments, and a company of jenkins's brigade of south carolina troops, against the ninth corps, commanded by general j. d. cox, general burnside, the commander of the right wing present, commanding. toombs had in his line of infantry five hundred and fifty men part way up the swell of sharpsburg heights. behind him he posted eubank's battery, and overlooking were j. b. richardson's and eshleman's to rake the bridge; others near. the road on the union side leading to the bridge runs parallel to the river about three hundred yards before it reaches the bridge, and turns up-stream after crossing. on the parallel to this line of march on the confederate side toombs posted his infantry, the south carolina company in a marginal woodland above the bridge. above and near the bridge was a fording-place for infantry; a thousand yards below was a practicable ford for infantry and artillery, by a country road. toombs's orders were, when dislodged, to retire south so as to open the field of fire to all the troops on the heights behind him, the fire of his batteries to be concentrated upon the bridge, and his infantry arranged for a like converging fire. the ravines cutting the swells of the foot-hills gave him fair ground for retreat when he found his position no longer tenable. he was to so manoeuvre as to have a flank fire on the advancing columns, and gradually encircle so as to join his division after passing the crest. early in the morning, general burnside had been ordered to prepare the ninth corps for attack at the bridge, but to await further orders. at eight o'clock orders were sent to carry the bridge, gain possession of the heights, and to advance along their crest upon sharpsburg and its rear. the order was repeated, and, finally, losing patience, general mcclellan sent the inspector-general (colonel sackett) "to deliver to general burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and if necessary to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet, and i ordered colonel sackett to remain with general burnside and see that the order was promptly executed."[68] upon receipt of the first order general burnside advanced his troops, general crook's brigade, supported by general sturgis's division, to the bridge and ford just above it. these were preceded by the eleventh connecticut regiment as skirmishers under colonel kingsbury, who essayed crossing by the upper ford, but after severe skirmish colonel kingsbury was killed and the effort failed. the division under general rodman supported by scammon's brigade (commanded by colonel ewing) moved towards the lower ford. colonel scammon, commanding the kanawha division, moved with this column. wilcox's division was in rear of sturgis, in reserve, and near the left of benjamin's battery. clark's and durell's batteries were posted on the right. one section of simmonds's battery was with crook's brigade, the other with benjamin's battery. dahlgren's boat-howitzers covered the ford at rodman's crossing. the last order was received at ten o'clock. the line of skirmishers advanced and engaged across the river. crook's brigade marched for the bridge. after a severe engagement of some hours, general crook posted two of simmonds's guns in position to cover the bridge, and after some little time general sturgis's division approached the bridge, led by naglee's brigade. the second brigade, general ferrero, was posted a little in reserve. the second maryland, colonel duryea, and sixth new hampshire regiments were ordered forward in double time with bayonets fixed to carry the bridge. they made a gallant, dashing charge, crowding the bridge almost to its western _débouché_, but the fire concentrated a storm that stunned their ranks, thinned and cut them down until they were forced to retire. general burnside repeated the order to force the way at all hazards. arrangements were made, and when concluded the fifty-first new york and fifty-first pennsylvania regiments were sent. they found a route better covered from the confederate fire than that of the first column while marching for the bridge. by a dashing charge on double time they passed it under exulting hurrahs and most gallant work, and gained the west bank. the crossing by rodman's division at the lower ford made our position at the bridge untenable, and general toombs was prepared to retire the moment the west bank was gained in his rear. union troops were hurried over, and organized for advance over sharpsburg heights, but sturgis's division had suffered, and, the ammunition getting low, it was found necessary to replace it by the division under general wilcox, and sturgis was ordered to hold position near the bridge in reserve. the brigades under rodman made their crossing sooner, and waited a little for those at the bridge. as soon as the latter formed on the west bank, rodman drew nearer. he was supported by the scammon brigade of the kanawha division, the brigade under general crook to move with the troops from the bridge. clark's, durell's, cook's, muhlenberg's, and part of simmonds's batteries crossed with the infantry. about four o'clock the troops were over and advanced under very severe fire of artillery and infantry, increasing in force as they ascended the heights, but the march was continued in bold, admirable style, the troops engaging in steady, brave fight as they marched. overreaching my right, they forced it back, breaking off jones's right brigades under drayton, kemper, and garnett. toombs, working his way to the rear, managed to encircle the advancing column and join the other brigades under d. r. jones as they were forced back. jones used some of them in organizing a stand on the flank of the union columns. toombs was joined in his rearward move by his regiments that had been sent off as train guards, by a battalion of the eleventh georgia under major little, and sent the regiments with him to replenish ammunition. meanwhile, steady advancing battle was made by the federals. batteries from all parts of our field drove to general lee, as well as detachments of infantry, including some with fresh wounds from the morning battle, but the battle moved bravely on. when general lee found that general jackson had left six of his brigades under general a. p. hill to receive the property and garrison surrendered at harper's ferry, he sent orders for them to join him, and by magic spell had them on the field to meet the final crisis. he ordered two of them guided by captain latrobe to guard against approach of other forces that might come against him by bridge no. 4, pender's and brockenbrough's, and threw branch's, gregg's and archer's against the fore-front of the battle, while toombs's, kemper's, and garnett's engaged against its right. mcintosh's battery, sent in advance by a. p. hill, was overrun and captured. pegram's and crenshaw's batteries were put in with hill's three brigades. the washington artillery, s. d. lee's, and frobel's found places for parts of their batteries, ammunition replenished. d. h. hill found opportunity to put in parts of his artillery under elliott, boyce, carter, and maurin. toombs's absent regiments returned, as he made his way around to the enemy's right, and joined the right of general d. r. jones. the strong battle concentrating against general burnside seemed to spring from the earth as his march bore him farther from the river. outflanked and staggered by the gallant attack of a. p. hill's brigades, his advance was arrested. the contention about the heights and suburbs of sharpsburg was anxiously held. general cox, reinforced by his reserve under general sturgis, handled well his left against a. p. hill; but, assailed in front and on his flank by concentrating fires that were crushing, he found it necessary to recover his lines and withdraw. a. p. hill's brigades, toombs and kemper, followed. they recovered mcintosh's battery and the ground that had been lost on the right before the slow advancing night dropped her mantle upon this field of seldom equalled strife. when the ninth corps dropped back under the crest they had so bravely won, the battle of sharpsburg virtually ended, though the fire between the lines was continued till nine o'clock. the field made classic by a struggle of eighteen hours, too fearful to contemplate, was yet cumbered by the dead and wounded. after the firing ceased, parties from both sides, by mutual consent, went in search of fallen comrades. after riding along the lines, giving instructions for the night and morning, i rode for general head-quarters to make report, but was delayed somewhat, finding wounded men hidden away under stone walls and in fence corners, not yet looked after, and afterwards in assisting a family whose home had been fired by a shell, so that all the other officers had arrived, made their reports, and were lounging about on the sod, when i rode up. general lee walked up as i dismounted, threw his hands upon my shoulders, and hailed me with, "here is my old war-horse at last!" one of those peculiarly painful personal experiences which are innumerable in war, but seldom get into print (save in fiction), came under my observation in this battle. colonel h. w. kingsbury, who was killed while gallantly leading the eleventh connecticut regiment at the ford near the burnside bridge, was a brother-in-law of general d. r. jones, who commanded the confederates immediately opposing him. his taking-off was a severe blow to jones, and one from which he never recovered. his health had not been strong for some time. he asked leave of absence shortly after this occurrence, and, gradually but hopelessly sinking, in a few months passed over to the silent majority to join his fallen kinsman. [illustration: antietam. the fight at burnside's bridge.] a few shots were exchanged early on the 18th, but a kindly feeling seemed to take possession of the troops, as they were not ordered into action, and excuses were passed between the lines for looking after wounded comrades, which resulted in a _quasi_ truce for the day. the burnside battle may be likened to that contemplated for fitz-john porter under his 4.30 order at the second manassas. the latter, however, had the smaller force, while burnside's numbers were greater. in the afternoon general lee was advised of new arrivals in general mcclellan's army, and, thinking the few stragglers who came up to swell his own ranks were not sufficient to justify him in renewing the battle on the 19th, ordered his trains back, and after night marched his troops across the potomac at the ford near shepherdstown. general stuart was ordered to cross ahead of the general move, recross the potomac at williamsport, and stand guard to the rear of the columns in case of danger to their crossing. the road being clear at nine o'clock, the army marched; the first corps, in advance, crossed about two a.m. on the 19th, awaited to guard the crossing, and at daylight was deployed on the south side. a. p. hill's division covered the retreat of the army, and the cavalry under fitzhugh lee was to follow, relieving lines of picket guards and helping the feeble footmen. the rear of the confederate column crossed into virginia at ten a.m., unmolested. as the pursuit was not threatening, general lee ordered his army to continue the march to proper points of bivouac, holding the artillery reserve under general pendleton and an infantry detail of the brigades of armistead and lawton, commanded by colonels hodges and lamar, as guard at the ford. general pendleton posted some thirty guns in position for converging fire at the ford, and put a line of skirmishers near it, holding the infantry reserve and eleven guns at the rear. about noon the union cavalry appeared on the other bank. the batteries of gibson, tidball, and robertson were put in action, but relieved about two o'clock by artillery of the fifth corps. after a severe combat the fourth michigan regiment and parts of the one hundred and eighteenth pennsylvania and eighteenth and twenty-second massachusetts were ordered over under general griffin. they forced the passage under artillery and infantry fire, scaled the heights, and got possession of five guns of different batteries and a number of small-arms, when, night approaching, the detachment was recalled. general pendleton reported the result to general head-quarters, and general lee ordered general jackson to send his nearest division back to the ford early in the morning. a. p. hill's division was ordered. he was fortunate in approaching the ford (boteler's) before the federals had crossed all of their advancing column; formed his brigades in two lines and advanced to attack. general porter, upon the report of this advance, found that his troops could not get position on the south bank in time to meet this threatening, ordered the troops withdrawn to cover about the canal and adjacent heights, and succeeded in getting most of his men safely back. general hill deployed the brigades of gregg, thomas, and pender as his front line, under command of general gregg. lane's (branch's brigade), archer's, and brockenbrough's brigades were of his second line, commanded by general archer. in this order the division advanced and engaged in a severe struggle. finding the fight on his front heavy, general pender called to general archer for support, and the latter, moving by his left, brought his brigade on pender's left, when the advance was pushed to successful issue. the one hundred and eighteenth pennsylvania regiment was thrown into confusion and suffered heavy loss. one of the guns lost the day before was recovered and two hundred prisoners taken. the losses were between two hundred and fifty and three hundred on each side, the federals losing about twenty more than the confederates. the confederate accounts of this affair were overdrawn, but they were reassuring after the severe experience about south mountain and sharpsburg. the army of northern virginia was then marched to the vicinity of martinsburg, where it remained in repose for several days, then retired to the vicinity of winchester. the army of the potomac concentrated about harper's ferry, refitting its supplies and transportation. we may say of the battle of sharpsburg that the confederates foiled every attack that was made, and brought the army of the potomac to a stand at night, yet the federal commander scored a success that was startling. the commander of the army of the potomac reported his strength as 87,164. his estimate of the strength of the army of northern virginia was 97,445. the confederate commander estimated his own strength for battle at 37,000, and that of his adversary at 90,000. the confederates fought all of their men that were on the field, except two brigades of a. p. hill's division and some of their field batteries. of the federals, the fifth corps, except about one brigade of infantry, was not in action; and the sixth corps, except irwin's brigade, seems to have had little serious work. it is generally conceded that the federals, in addition to advantage of numbers, had their organizations in hand, were better fed and clothed, and better prepared, therefore, to muster a larger portion of their number for battle. the casualties of the first corps, army of northern virginia, in the engagements at south mountain, crampton's gap, maryland heights, harper's ferry, and sharpsburg, as tabulated in the official report, were 7508.[69] neither general jackson's report nor general d. h. hill's furnishes a detailed account of casualties. the former gives aggregate figures 2438, the latter 3241,--making a grand aggregate of 13,187.[70] none of these reports include the losses of the cavalry command, nor is there a report of them found among the records. the army of northern virginia concentrated at and near fredericktown on the 9th of september, 1862, numbered a trifle over 61,000, all arms. general lee's estimate of his troops engaged at sharpsburg was 37,000. this may not include his cavalry arm, conceding which, his force on the field should have been about 41,000. estimating the cavalry loss at 500, our losses of battle should be 13,687, which leaves 20,000 to be accounted for as lost by severe continuous labor and marches. this, added to the losses in action, makes a grand total of 33,687 lost in the maryland campaign. the losses from overwork were only temporary. most of them were back in the ranks within fifteen days after the return to virginia. but all of these large figures are trifles compared to the lamentable loss of the fruits of devoted service from the chickahominy campaign to the potomac. the casualties of the union side, reported by official count, were 12,410. the best tactical moves at antietam were made by generals mclaws, a. p. hill, gibbon, and patrick, and colonels barlow and cross. generals d. h. hill and hood were like game-cocks, fighting as long as they could stand, engaging again as soon as strong enough to rise. general toombs and colonel benning performed very clever work at the burnside bridge. of colonel cooke, the twenty-seventh north carolina regiment, captain miller, sergeant ellis, and their men of the washington artillery, general lee said, "they were heroic." general mcclellan's plan of the battle was not strong, the handling and execution were less so. battles by the extreme right and left, divided by a river, gave us the benefit of interior lines, and it was that that saved the confederate army, for it became manifest early in the day that his reserves were held at the bridge no. 2, which gave us freer use of our inner lines. following is a condensed but accurate presentation of the organization of the contending armies in the battle of sharpsburg and the maryland campaign:[71] army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee commanding. longstreet's corps, major-general james longstreet. mclaws's division, maj.-gen. lafayette mclaws:--_kershaw's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. b. kershaw; 2d s. c., col. john d. kennedy; 3d s. c., col. james d. nance; 7th s. c., col. d. wyatt aiken and capt. john s. hard; 8th s. c., lieut.-col. a. j. hoole. _cobb's brigade_, brig.-gen. howell cobb, lieut.-col. c. c. sanders, lieut.-col. william macrae; 16th and 24th ga., cobb's (ga.) legion, 15th n. c. _semmes's brigade_, brig.-gen. paul j. semmes; 10th ga., capt. p. h. loud; 53d ga., lieut.-col. thomas sloan and capt. s. w. marshborne; 15th va., capts. e. m. morrison and e. j. willis; 32d va., col. e. b. montague. _barksdale's brigade_, brig.-gen. william barksdale; 13th miss., lieut.-col. kennon mcelroy; 17th miss., lieut.-col. john c. fiser; 18th miss., maj. j. c. campbell and lieut.-col. william h. luse; 21st miss., capt. john sims and col. benjamin g. humphreys. _artillery_, maj. s. p. hamilton, col. h. c. cabell; manly's (n. c.) battery, capt. b. c. manly; pulaski (ga.) art., capt. j. p. w. read; richmond (fayette) art., capt. m. c. macon; richmond howitzers (1st co.), capt. e. s. mccarthy; troup (ga.) art., capt. h. h. carlton. anderson's division, maj.-gen. richard h. anderson:--_wilcox's brigade_, col. alfred cumming; 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th ala. _mahone's brigade_, col. william a. parham; 6th, 12th, 16th, 41st, and 61st va. _featherston's brigade_, brig.-gen. winfield s. featherston, col. carnot posey; 12th miss., 16th miss., capt. a. m. feltus; 19th miss., 2d miss. battn. _armistead's brigade_, brig.-gen. lewis a. armistead, col. j. g. hodges; 9th, 14th, 38th, 53d, and 57th va. _pryor's brigade_, brig.-gen. roger a. pryor; 14th ala., 2d and 8th fla., 3d va. _wright's brigade_, brig.-gen. a. r. wright; 44th ala., 3d, 22d, and 48th ga. _artillery_, maj. john s. saunders; donaldsonville (la.) art. (maurin's battery), huger's (va.) battery, moorman's (va.) battery, thompson's (grimes's) (va.) battery. jones's division, brig.-gen. david r. jones:--_toombs's brigade_, brig.-gen. robert toombs, col. henry l. benning; 2d ga., lieut.-col. william r. holmes and major skidmore harris; 15th ga., col. w. t. millican; 17th ga., capt. j. a. mcgregor; 20th ga., col. j. b. cumming. _drayton's brigade_, brig.-gen. thomas f. drayton; 50th ga., lieut.-col. f. kearse; 51st ga., 15th s. c., col. w. d. de saussure. _pickett's brigade_, col. eppa hunton, brig.-gen. r. b. garnett; 8th va., col. eppa hunton; 18th va., maj. george c. cabell; 19th va., col. j. b. strange, lieut. w. n. wood, and capt. j. l. cochran; 28th va., capt. wingfield; 56th va., col. william d. stuart and capt. mcphail. _kemper's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. l. kemper; 1st, 7th, 11th, 17th, and 24th va. _jenkins's brigade_, col. joseph walker; 1st s. c. (vols.), lieut.-col. d. livingston; 2d s. c. rifles, 5th s. c., capt. t. c. beckham; 6th s. c., lieut.-col. j. m. steedman, capt. e. b. cantey; 4th s. c. (battn.), palmetto (s. c.) sharp-shooters. _anderson's brigade_, col. george t. anderson; 1st ga. (regulars), col. w. j. magill; 7th, 8th, and 9th ga.; 11th ga., maj. f. h. little. _artillery_, fauquier (va.) art. (stribling's battery),[72] loudoun (va.) art. (rogers's battery),[72] turner (va.) art. (leake's battery),[72] wise (va.) art. (j. s. brown's battery). walker's division, brig.-gen. john g. walker:--_walker's brigade_, col. van h. manning, col. e. d. hall; 3d ark., capt. john w. reedy; 27th n. c., col. j. r. cooke; 46th n. c., col. e. d. hall; 48th n. c., col. r. c. hill; 30th va., french's (va.) battery, capt, thomas b. french. _ransom's brigade_, brig.-gen. robert ransom, jr.; 24th n. c., lieut.-col. john l. harris; 25th n. c., col. h. m. rutledge; 35th n. c., col. m. w. ransom; 49th n. c., lieut.-col. lee m. mcafee; branch's field art. (va.), capt. branch. hood's division, brig.-gen. john b. hood:--_hood's brigade_, col. w. t. wofford; 18th ga., lieut.-col. s. z. ruff; hampton (s. c.) legion, lieut.-col. m. w. gary; 1st tex., lieut.-col. p. a. work; 4th tex., lieut.-col. b. f. carter; 5th tex., capt. i. n. m. turner. _law's brigade_, col. e. m. law; 4th ala., lieut.-col. o. k. mclemore; 2d miss., col. j. m. stone; 11th miss., col. p. f. liddell; 6th n. c., maj. robert f. webb. _artillery_, maj. b. w. frobel; german art. (s. c.), capt. w. k. bachman; palmetto art. (s. c.), capt. h. r. garden; rowan art. (n. c.), capt. james reilly. evans's brigade, brig.-gen. nathan g. evans, col. p. f. stevens;[73] 17th s. c., col. f. w. mcmaster; 18th s. c., col. w. h. wallace; 22d s. c., lieut.-col. t. c. watkins and maj. m. hilton; 23d s. c., capt. s. a. durham and lieut. e. r. white; holcombe (s. c.) legion, col. p. f. stevens; macbeth (s. c.) art., capt. r. boyce. artillery:--_washington (la.) artillery_, col. j. b. walton; 1st co., capt. c. w. squires; 2d co., capt. j. b. richardson; 3d co., capt. m. b. miller; 4th co., capt. b. f. eshleman. _lee's battalion_, col. s. d. lee; ashland (va.) art., capt. p. woolfolk, jr.; bedford (va.) art., capt. t. c. jordan; brooks (s. c.) art., lieut. william elliott; eubank's (va.) battery, capt. j. l. eubank; madison (la.) light art., capt. g. v. moody; parker's (va.) battery, capt. w. w. parker. jackson's corps, major-general thomas j. jackson. ewell's division, brig.-gen. a. r. lawton, brig.-gen. jubal a. early:--_lawton's brigade_, col. m. douglass, maj. j. h. lowe, col. john h. lamar; 13th and 26th ga., 31st ga., lieut.-col. j. t. crowder; 38th, 60th, and 61st ga. _early's brigade_, brig.-gen. jubal a. early, col. william smith; 13th va., capt. f. v. winston; 25th, 31st, and 44th va.; 49th va., col. william smith; 52d va., col. m. g. harman; 58th va. _trimble's brigade_, col. james a. walker; 15th ala., capt. i. b. feagin; 12th ga., capt. rogers; 21st ga., maj. thomas c. glover; 21st n. c., capt. miller; 1st n. c. battn.[74] _hays's brigade_, brig.-gen. harry t. hays; 5th la., 6th la., col. h. b. strong; 7th, 8th, and 14th la. _artillery_,[75] maj. a. r. courtney; charlottesville (va.) art. (carrington's battery), chesapeake (md.) art. (brown's battery), courtney (va.) art. (latimer's battery), johnson's (va.) battery, la. guard art. (d'aquin's battery), 1st md. batt. (dement's battery), staunton (va.) art. (balthis's battery). hill's light division, maj. gen. ambrose p. hill:--_branch's brigade_, brig.-gen. l. o'b. branch, col. james h. lane; 7th n. c., 18th n. c., lieut.-col. purdie; 28th, 33d, and 37th n. c. _gregg's brigade_, brig.-gen. maxcy gregg; 1st s. c. (provisional army), maj. e. mccrady, jr., col. d. h. hamilton; 1st s. c. rifles, lieut.-col. james m. perrin; 12th s. c., col. dixon barnes, lieut.-col. c. jones, and maj. w. h. mccorkle; 13th s. c., col. o. e. edwards; 14th s. c., lieut.-col. w. d. simpson. _field's brigade_, col. brockenbrough; 40th, 47th, and 55th va., 22d va. battn. _archer's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. j. archer, col. peter turney; 5th ala. battn., captain hooper; 19th ga., maj. j. h. neal and capt. f. m. johnston; 1st tenn. (provisional army), col. peter turney; 7th tenn., maj. s. g. shepard and lieut. g. a. howard; 14th tenn., lieut.-col. j. w. lockert. _pender's brigade_, brig.-gen. william d. pender, col. r. h. brewer; 16th n. c., lieut.-col. stowe; 22d n. c., maj. c. c. cole; 34th and 38th n. c. _thomas's brigade_, col. edward l. thomas; 14th ga., col. r. w. folsom; 35th ga., 45th ga., maj. w. l. grice; 49th ga., lieut.-col. s. m. manning. _artillery_,[76] maj. r. l. walker; branch (n. c.) art. (a. c. latham's battery), crenshaw's (va.) battery, fredericksburg (va.) art. (braxton's battery), letcher (va.) art. (davidson's battery), middlesex (va.) art. (fleet's battery), pee dee (s. c.) art. (mcintosh's battery), purcell (va.) art. (pegram's battery). jackson's division, brig.-gen. john r. jones, brig.-gen. w. e. starke, col. a. j. grigsby:--_winder's brigade_, col. a. j. grigsby, lieut.-col. r. d. gardner (4th va.), maj. h. j. williams; 2d va., capt. r. t. colston; 4th va., lieut.-col. r. d. gardner; 5th va., maj. h. j. williams; 27th va., capt. f. c. wilson; 33d va., capt. golladay and lieut. walton. _taliaferro's brigade_, col. e. t. h. warren, col. j. w. jackson, col. j. l. sheffield; 47th and 48th ala., 10th, 23d, and 37th va. _jones's brigade_, col. b. t. johnson, brig.-gen. j. r. jones, capt, j. e. penn, capt. a. c. page, capt. r. w. withers; 21st va., capt. a. c. page; 42d va., capt. r. w. withers; 48th va., capt. chandler; 1st va. battn., lieut. c. a. davidson. _starke's brigade_, brig.-gen. william e. starke, col. l. a. stafford, col. e. pendleton; 1st la., lieut.-col. m. nolan; 2d la., col. j. m. williams; 9th la., 10th la., capt. h. d. monier; 15th la., coppens's (la.) battalion. _artillery_, maj. l. m. shumaker; alleghany (va.) art. (carpenter's battery), brockenbrough's (md.) battery, danville (va.) art. (wooding's battery), hampden (va.) art. (caskie's battery), lee (va.) batt. (raines's), rockbridge (va.) art. (poague's battery). hill's division, maj.-gen. daniel h. hill:--_ripley's brigade_, brig.-gen. roswell s. ripley, col. george doles; 4th ga., col. george doles; 44th ga., capt. key; 1st n. c., lieut.-col. h. a. brown; 3d n. c., col. william l. de rosset. _rodes's brigade_, brig.-gen. r. e. rodes; 3d ala., col. c. a. battle; 5th ala., maj. e. l. hobson; 6th ala., col. j. b. gordon; 12th ala., col. b. b. gayle and lieut.-col. s. b. pickens; 26th ala., col. e. a. o'neal. _garland's brigade_, brig.-gen. samuel garland, jr., col. d. k. mcrae; 5th n. c., col. d. k. mcrae and capt. t. m. garrett; 12th n. c., capt. s. snow; 13th n. c., lieut.-col. thomas ruffin, jr.; 20th n. c., col. alfred iverson; 23d n. c., col. d. h. christie. _anderson's brigade_, brig.-gen. george b. anderson, col. r. t. bennett; 2d n. c., col. c. c. tew and capt. g. m. roberts; 4th n. c., col. bryan grimes and capts. w. t. marsh and d. p. latham; 14th n. c., col. r. t. bennett; 30th n. c., col. f. m. parker and maj. w. w. sillers. _colquitt's brigade_, col. a. h. colquitt; 13th ala., col. b. d. fry; 6th ga., lieut.-col. j. m. newton; 23d ga., col. w. p. barclay; 27th ga., col. l. b. smith; 28th ga., maj. t. graybill and capt. n. j. garrison. _artillery_,[77] maj. pierson; hardaway's (ala.) battery, capt. r. a. hardaway; jeff davis (ala.) art., capt. j. w. bondurant; jones's (va.) battery, capt. william b. jones; king william (va.) art., capt. t. h. carter. reserve artillery, brig.-gen. william n. pendleton:--_brown's battalion_,[78] col. j. thompson brown; powhatan art. (dance's battery), richmond howitzers, 2d co. (watson's battery), richmond howitzers, 3d co. (smith's battery), salem art. (hupp's battery), williamsburg art. (coke's battery). _cutts's battalion_,[79] lieut.-col. a. s. cutts; blackshears's (ga.) battery, irwin (ga.) art. (lane's battery), lloyd's (n. c.) battery, patterson's (ga.) battery, ross's (ga.) battery. _jones's battalion_,[79] maj. h. p. jones. morris (va.) art. (r. c. m. page's battery), orange (va.) art. (peyton's battery), turner's (va.) battery, wimbish's (va.) battery. _nelson's battalion_, maj. william nelson; amherst (va.) art. (kirkpatrick's battery), fluvanna (va.) art. (ancell's battery), huckstep's (va.) battery, johnson's (va.) battery, milledge (ga.) art. (milledge's battery). _miscellaneous_, cutshaw's (va.) battery, dixie (va.) art. (chapman's battery), magruder (va.) art. (t. j. page, jr.'s, battery), rice's (va.) battery, capt. w. h. rice; thomas's (va.) art. (e. j. anderson's battery).[80] cavalry, maj.-gen. james e. b. stuart:--_hampton's brigade_, brig.-gen. wade hampton; 1st n. c., col. l. s. baker; 2d s. c., col. m. c. butler; 10th va., cobb's (ga.) legion, lieut.-col. p. m. b. young; jeff davis legion, lieut.-col. w. t. martin. _lee's brigade_, brig.-gen. fitzhugh lee; 1st va., lieut.-col. l. tiernan brien; 3d va., lieut.-col. john t. thornton; 4th va., col. william c. wickham; 5th va., col. t. l. rosser; 9th va. _robertson's brigade_, brig.-gen. b. h. robertson, col. thomas t. munford; 2d va., col. t. t. munford and lieut.-col. burks; 6th va.; 7th va., capt. s. b. myers; 12th va., col. a. w. harman; 17th va. battn. horse artillery, capt. john pelham:--chew's (va.) battery, hart's (s. c.) battery, pelham's (va.) battery. army of the potomac,[81] major-general george b. mcclellan, u. s. army. general head-quarters:--_escort_, capt. james b. mcintyre; independent company oneida (n. y.) cav., capt. daniel p. mann; 4th u. s. cav., co. a, lieut. thomas h. mccormick; 4th u. s. cav., co. e, capt. james b. mcintyre. _regular engineer battalion_, capt. james c. duane. _provost guard_, maj. william h. wood. 2d u. s. cav., cos. e, f, h, and k, capt. george a. gordon; 8th u. s. inf., cos. a, d, f, and g, capt. royal t. frank; 19th u. s. inf., co. g, capt. edmund l. smith; 19th u. s. inf., co. h, capt. henry s. welton. _head-quarters guard_, maj. granville o. haller; 93d n. y., lieut.-col. benjamin c. butler. _quartermaster's guard_, 1st u. s. cav., cos. b, c, h, and i, capt. marcus a. reno. first army corps,[82] (1) major-general joseph hooker,[83] (2) brigadier-general george g. meade. _escort_, 2d n. y. cav., cos. a, b, i, and k, capt. john e. naylor. first division, (1) brig.-gen. rufus king,[84] (2) brig.-gen. john p. hatch,[85] (3) brig.-gen. abner doubleday:--_first brigade_, col. walter phelps, jr.; 22d n. y., lieut.-col. john mckie, jr.; 24th n. y., capt. john d. o'brian; 30th n. y., col. william m. searing; 84th n. y. (14th militia), maj. william h. de bovoise; 2d u. s. sharp-shooters, col. henry a. v. post. _second brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. abner doubleday, (2) col. william p. wainwright,[83] (3) lieut.-col. j. william hofmann; 7th ind., maj. ira g. grover; 76th n. y., col. william p. wainwright, capt. john w. young; 95th n. y., maj. edward pye; 56th pa., lieut.-col. j. william hofmann, capt. frederick williams. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. marsena r. patrick; 21st n. y., col. william f. rogers; 23d n. y., col. henry c. hoffman; 35th n. y., col. newton b. lord; 80th n. y. (20th militia), lieut.-col. theodore b. gates. _fourth brigade_, brig.-gen. john gibbon; 19th ind., col. solomon meredith, lieut.-col. alois o. bachman, capt. william w. dudley; 2d wis., col. lucius fairchild, lieut.-col. thomas s. allen; 6th wis., lieut.-col. edward s. bragg, maj. rufus r. dawes; 7th wis., capt. john b. callis. _artillery_, capt. j. albert monroe; n. h. light, first batt., lieut. frederick m. edgell; 1st r. i. light, batt. d, capt. j. albert monroe; 1st n. y. light, batt. l, capt. john a. reynolds; 4th u. s., batt. b, capt. joseph b. campbell, lieut. james stewart. second division, brig.-gen. james b. ricketts:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. abram duryea; 97th n. y., maj. charles northrup; 104th n. y., maj. lewis c. skinner; 105th n. y., col. howard carroll; 107th pa., capt. james mac thomson. _second brigade_, (1) col. william a. christian, (2) col. peter lyle; 26th n. y., lieut.-col. richard h. richardson; 94th n. y., lieut.-col. calvin littlefield; 88th pa., lieut.-col. george w. gile, capt. henry r. myers; 90th pa., col. peter lyle, lieut.-col. william a. leech. _third brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. george l. hartsuff,[83] (2) col. richard coulter; 16th me.,[86] col. asa w. wildes; 12th mass., maj. elisha burbank, capt. benjamin f. cook; 13th mass., maj. j. parker gould; 83d n. y. (9th militia), lieut.-col. william atterbury; 11th pa., col. richard coulter, capt. david m. cook. _artillery_, 1st pa. light, batt. f, capt. ezra w. matthews; pa. light, batt. c, capt. james thompson. third division, (1) brig.-gen. george g. meade, (2) brig.-gen. truman seymour:--_first brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. truman seymour, (2) col. r. biddle roberts; 1st pa. reserves, col. r. biddle roberts, capt. william c. talley; 2d pa. reserves, capt. james n. byrnes; 5th pa. reserves, col. joseph w. fisher; 6th pa. reserves, col. william sinclair; 13th pa. reserves (1st rifles), col. hugh w. mcneil, capt. dennis mcgee. _second brigade_, col. albert l. magilton; 3d pa. reserves, lieut.-col. john clark; 4th pa. reserves, maj. john nyce; 7th pa. reserves, col. henry c. bolinger, major chauncey m. lyman; 8th pa. reserves, maj. silas m. baily. _third brigade_, (1) col. thomas f. gallagher,[87] (2) lieut.-col. robert anderson; 9th pa. reserves, lieut.-col. robert anderson, capt. samuel b. dick; 10th pa. reserves, lieut.-col. adoniram j. warner, capt. jonathan p. smith; 11th pa. reserves, lieut.-col. samuel m. jackson; 12th pa. reserves, capt. richard gustin. _artillery_, 1st pa. light, batt. a, lieut. john g. simpson; 1st pa. light, batt. b, capt, james h. cooper; 1st pa. light, batt. g,[88] lieut. frank p. amsden; 5th u. s., batt. c, capt. dunbar r. ransom. second army corps, major-general edwin v. sumner. _escort_, 6th n. y. cav., co. d, capt. henry w. lyon; 6th n. y. cav., co. k, capt. riley johnson. first division, (1) maj.-gen. israel b. richardson,[89] (2) brig.-gen. john c. caldwell, (3) brig.-gen. winfield s. hancock; _first brigade_, brig.-gen. john c. caldwell; 5th n. h., col. edward e. cross; 7th n. y., capt. charles brestel; 61st and 64th n. y., col. francis c. barlow, lieut.-col. nelson a. miles; 81st pa., maj. h. boyd mckeen. _second brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. thomas f. meagher, (2) col. john burke; 29th mass., lieut.-col. joseph h. barnes; 63d n. y., col. john burke, lieut.-col. henry fowler, maj. richard c. bentley, capt. joseph o'neill; 69th n. y., lieut.-col. james kelly, maj. james cavanagh; 88th n. y., lieut.-col. patrick kelly. _third brigade_, col. john r. brooke; 2d del., capt. david l. stricker; 52d n. y., col. paul frank; 57th n. y., lieut.-col. philip j. parisen, maj. alford b. chapman; 66th n. y., capt. julius wehle, lieut.-col. james h. bull; 53d pa., lieut.-col. richards mcmichael. _artillery_, 1st n. y. light, batt. b, capt. rufus d. pettit; 4th u. s., batts. a and c, lieut. evan thomas. second division, (1) maj.-gen. john sedgwick,[89] (2) brig.-gen. oliver o. howard:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. willis a. gorman; 15th mass., lieut.-col. john w. kimball; 1st minn., col. alfred sully; 34th n. y., col. james a. suiter; 82d n. y. (2d militia), col. henry w. hudson; mass. sharp-shooters, 1st co., capt. john saunders; minn. sharp-shooters, 2d co., capt. william f. russell. _second brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. oliver o. howard, (2) col. joshua t. owen, (3) col. de witt c. baxter; 69th pa., col. joshua t. owen; 71st pa., col. isaac j. wistar, lieut. richard p. smith (adjutant), capt. enoch e. lewis; 72d pa., col. de witt c. baxter; 106th pa., col. turner g. morehead. _third brigade_, (1) brig-.gen. napoleon j. t. dana,[89] (2) col. norman j. hall; 19th mass., col. edward w. hinks, lieut.-col. arthur f. devereux; 20th mass., col. william r. lee; 7th mich., col. norman j. hall, capt. charles j. hunt; 42d n. y., lieut.-col. george n. bomford, maj. james e. mallon; 59th n. y., col. william l. tidball. _artillery_, 1st r. i. light, batt. a, capt. john a. tompkins; 1st u. s., batt. i, lieut. george a. woodruff. third division, brig.-gen. william h. french:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. nathan kimball; 14th ind., col. william harrow; 8th ohio, lieut.-col. franklin sawyer; 132d pa., col. richard a. oakford, lieut.-col. vincent m. wilcox; 7th w. va., col. joseph snider. _second brigade_, col. dwight morris; 14th conn., lieut.-col. sanford h. perkins; 108th n. y., col. oliver h. palmer; 130th pa., col. henry i. zinn. _third brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. max weber,[90] (2) col. john w. andrews; 1st del., col. john w. andrews, lieut.-col. oliver h. hopkinson; 5th md., maj. leopold blumenberg, capt. e. f. m. faehtz; 4th n. y., lieut.-col. john d. mcgregor. _unattached artillery_, 1st n. y. light, batt. g, capt. john d. frank; 1st r. i. light, batt. b, capt. john g. hazard; 1st r. i. light, batt. g, capt. charles d. owen. fourth army corps. first division,[91] maj.-gen. darius n. couch:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. charles devens, jr.; 7th mass., col. david a. russell; 10th mass., col. henry l. eustis; 36th n. y., col. william h. browne; 2d r. i., col. frank wheaton. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. albion p. howe; 62d n. y., col. david j. nevin; 93d pa., col. james m. mccarter; 98th pa., col. john f. ballier; 102d pa., col. thomas a. rowley; 139th pa.,[92] col. frank h. collier. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. john cochrane; 65th n. y., col. alexander shaler; 67th n. y., col. julius w. adams; 122d n. y., col. silas titus; 23d pa., col. thomas h. neill; 61st pa., col. george c. spear; 82d pa., col. david h. williams. _artillery_, n. y. light, 3d batt.,[93] capt. william stuart; 1st pa. light, batt. c, capt, jeremiah mccarthy; 1st pa. light, batt. d, capt. michael hall, 2d u. s., batt. g, lieut. john h. butler. fifth army corps, major-general fitz-john porter. _escort_, 1st maine cavalry (detachment), capt. george j. summat. first division, maj.-gen. george w. morell:--_first brigade_, col. james barnes; 2d me., col. charles w. roberts; 18th mass., lieut.-col. joseph hayes; 22d mass., lieut.-col. william s. tilton; 1st mich., capt. emory w. belton; 13th n. y., col. elisha g. marshall; 25th n. y., col. charles a. johnson; 118th pa., col. charles m. prevost; mass. sharp-shooters, 2d co., capt. lewis e. wentworth. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. charles griffin; 2d d. of c., col. charles m. alexander; 9th mass., col. patrick r. guiney; 32d mass., col. francis j. parker; 4th mich., col. jonathan w. childs; 14th n. y., col. james mcquade; 62d pa., col. jacob b. sweitzer. _third brigade_, col. t. b. w. stockton; 20th me., col. adelbert ames; 16th mich., lieut.-col. norval e. welch; 12th n. y., capt. william huson; 17th n. y., lieut.-col. nelson b. bartram; 44th n. y., maj. freeman conner; 83d pa., capt. orpheus s. woodward; mich. sharp-shooters, brady's co., lieut. jonas h. titus, jr. _artillery_, mass. light, batt. c, capt, augustus p. martin; 1st r. i. light, batt. c, capt. richard waterman; 5th u. s., batt. d, lieut. charles e. hazlett. _sharp-shooters_, 1st u. s., capt. john b. isler. second division, brig.-gen. george sykes:--_first brigade_, lieut.-col. robert c. buchanan; 3d u. s., capt. john d. wilkins; 4th u. s., capt. hiram dryer; 12th u. s., 1st battn., capt. matthew m. blunt; 12th u. s., 2d battn., capt. thomas m. anderson; 14th u. s., 1st battn., capt. w. harvey brown; 14th u. s., 2d battn., capt. david b. mckibbin. _second brigade_, maj. charles s. lovell; 1st and 6th u. s., capt. levi c. bootes; 2d and 10th u. s., capt. john s. poland; 11th u. s., capt. del. floyd-jones; 17th u. s., maj. george l. andrews. _third brigade_, col. gouverneur k. warren; 5th n. y., capt. cleveland winslow; 19th n. y., lieut.-col. john w. marshall. _artillery_, 1st u. s., batts. e and g, lieut. alanson m. randol; 5th u. s., batt. i, capt. stephen h. weed; 5th u. s., batt. k, lieut. william e. van reed. third division,[94] brig.-gen. andrew a. humphreys:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. erastus b. tyler; 91st pa., col. edgar m. gregory; 126th pa., col. james g. elder; 129th pa., col. jacob g. frick; 134th pa., col. matthew s. quay. _second brigade_, col. peter h. allabach; 123d pa., col. john b. clark; 131st pa., lieut.-col. william b. shaut; 133d pa., col. franklin b. speakman; 155th pa., col. edward j. allen. _artillery_, capt. lucius n. robinson; 1st n. y. light, batt. c, capt. almont barnes; 1st ohio light, batt. l, capt. lucius n. robinson. _artillery reserve_, lieut.-col. william hays; 1st battn. n. y. light, batt. a, lieut. bernhard wever; 1st battn. n. y. light, batt. b, lieut. alfred von kleiser; 1st battn. n. y. light, batt. c, capt. robert langner; 1st battn. n. y. light, batt. d, capt. charles kusserow; n. y. light, 5th batt., capt. elijah d. taft; 1st u. s., batt. k, capt. william m. graham; 4th u. s., batt. g, lieut. marcus p. miller. sixth army corps, major-general william b. franklin. _escort_, 6th pa. cav., cos. b and g, capt. henry p. muirheid. first division, maj.-gen. henry w. slocum:--_first brigade_, col. alfred t. a. torbert; 1st n. j., lieut.-col. mark w. collet; 2d n. j., col. samuel l. buck; 3d n. j., col. henry w. brown; 4th n. j., col. william b. hatch. _second brigade_, col. joseph j. bartlett; 5th me., col. nathaniel j. jackson; 16th n. y., lieut.-col. joel j. seaver; 27th n. y., lieut.-col. alexander d. adams; 96th pa., col. henry l. cake. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. john newton; 18th n. y., lieut.-col. george r. myers; 31st n. y., lieut.-col. francis e. pinto; 32d n. y., col. roderick matheson; maj. george f. lemon; 95th pa., col. gustavus w. town. _artillery_, capt. emory upton; md. light, batt. a, capt. john w. wolcott; mass. light, batt. a, capt. josiah porter; n. j. light, batt. a, capt. william hexamer; 2d u. s., batt. d, lieut. edward b. williston. second division, maj.-gen. william f. smith:--_first brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. winfield s. hancock,[95] (2) col. amasa cobb; 6th me., col. hiram burnham; 43d n. y., maj. john wilson; 49th pa., lieut.-col. william brisbane; 137th pa., col. henry m. bossert; 5th wis., col. amasa cobb. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. w. t. h. brooks; 2d vt., maj. james h. walbridge; 3d vt., col. breed n. hyde; 4th vt., lieut.-col. charles b. stoughton; 5th vt., col. lewis a. grant; 6th vt., maj. oscar l. tuttle. _third brigade_, col. william h. irwin; 7th me., maj. thomas w. hyde; 20th n. y., col. ernest von vegesack; 33d n. y., lieut.-col. joseph w. corning; 49th n. y., lieut.-col. william c. alberger, maj. george w. johnson; 77th n. y., capt. nathan s. babcock. _artillery_, capt. romeyn b. ayres; md. light, batt. b, lieut. theodore j. vanneman; n. y. light, 1st batt., capt. andrew cowan; 5th u. s., batt. f, lieut. leonard martin. ninth army corps, major-general ambrose e. burnside,[96] major-general jesse l. reno,[97] brigadier-general jacob d. cox. _escort_, 1st me. cav., co. g, capt. zebulon b. blethen. first division, brig.-gen. orlando b. willcox:--_first brigade_, col. benjamin c. christ; 28th mass., capt. andrew p. carraher; 17th mich., col. william h. withington; 79th n. y., lieut.-col. david morrison; 50th pa., maj. edward overton, capt. william h. diehl. _second brigade_, col. thomas welsh; 8th mich., lieut.-col. frank graves, maj. ralph ely; 46th n. y., lieut.-col. joseph gerhart; 45th pa., lieut.-col. john i. curtin; 100th pa., col. david a. leckey. _artillery_, mass. light, 8th batt., capt. asa m. cook; 2d u. s., batt. e, lieut. samuel n. benjamin. second division, brig.-gen. samuel d. sturgis:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. james naglee; 2d md., lieut.-col. j. eugene duryea; 6th n. h., col. simon g. griffin; 9th n. h., col. enoch q. fellows; 48th pa., lieut.-col. joshua k. sigfried. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. edward ferrero; 21st mass., col. william s. clark; 35th mass., col. edward a. wild, lieut.-col. sumner carruth; 51st n. y., col. robert b. potter; 51st pa., col. john f. hartranft. _artillery_, pa. light, batt. d, capt. john w. durell; 4th u. s., batt. e, capt. joseph c. clark, jr. third division, brig.-gen. isaac p. rodman:[98]--_first brigade_, col. harrison s. fairchild; 9th n. y., lieut.-col. edgar a. kimball; 89th n. y., maj. edward jardine; 103d n. y., maj. benjamin ringold. _second brigade_, col. edward harland; 8th conn., lieut.-col. hiram appelman, maj. john e. ward; 11th conn., col. henry w. kingsbury; 16th conn., col. francis beach; 4th r. i., col. william h. p. steere, lieut.-col. joseph b. curtis. _artillery_, 5th u. s., batt. a, lieut. charles p. muhlenberg. kanawha division, (1) brig.-gen. jacob d. cox, (2) col. eliakim p. scammon. _first brigade_, (1) col. eliakim p. scammon, (2) col. hugh ewing; 12th ohio, col. carr b. white; 23d ohio, lieut.-col. rutherford b. hayes, maj. james m. comly; 30th ohio, col. hugh ewing, lieut.-col. theodore jones, maj. george h. hildt; ohio light art., 1st batt., capt. james r. mcmullin; gilmore's co. w. va. cav., lieut. james abraham; harrison's co. w. va. cav., lieut. dennis delaney. _second brigade_, col. george crook; 11th ohio, lieut.-col. augustus h. coleman, maj. lyman j. jackson; 28th ohio, lieut.-col. gottfried becker; 36th ohio, lieut.-col. melvin clarke; schambeck's co. chicago dragoons, capt. frederick schambeck; ky. light art., simmonds's battery, capt. seth j. simmonds. _unattached_, 6th n. y. cav. (8 cos.), col. thomas c. devin; ohio cav., 3d ind. co., lieut. jonas seamen; 3d u. s. art., batts. l and m, capt. john edwards, jr. twelfth army corps,[99] (1) major-general joseph k. f. mansfield,[100] (2) brigadier-general alpheus s. williams. _escort_, 1st mich. cav., co. l, capt. melvin brewer. first division, (1) brig.-gen. alpheus s. williams, (2) brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford,[101] (3) brig.-gen. george h. gordon. _first brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford, (2) col. joseph f. knipe; 5th conn., capt. henry w. daboll; 10th me., col. george l. beal; 28th n. y., capt. william h. h. mapes; 46th pa., col. joseph f. knipe, lieut.-col. james l. selfridge; 124th pa., col. joseph w. hawley, maj. isaac l. haldeman; 125th pa., col. jacob higgins; 128th pa., col. samuel croasdale, lieut.-col. william w. hamersly, maj. joel b. wanner. _third brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. george h. gordon, (2) col. thomas h. ruger; 27th ind., col. silas colgrove; 2d mass., col. george l. andrews; 13th n. j., col. ezra a. carman; 107th n. y., col. r. b. van valkenburgh; zouaves d'afrique,[102] pa.; 3d wis., col. thomas h. ruger. second division, brig.-gen. george s. greene:--_first brigade_, (1) lieut.-col. hector tyndale,[99] (2) maj. orrin j. crane; 5th ohio, maj. john collins; 7th ohio, maj. orrin j. crane, capt. frederick a. seymour; 29th ohio,[103] lieut. theron s. winship; 66th ohio, lieut.-col. eugene powell; 28th pa., maj. ario pardee, jr. _second brigade_, col. henry j. stainrook; 3d md., lieut.-col. joseph m. sudsburg; 102d n. y., lieut.-col. james c. lane; 109th pa.,[104] capt. george e. seymour; 111th pa., maj. thomas m. walker. _third brigade_, (1) col. william b. goodrich,[105] (2) lieut.-col. jonathan austin; 3d del., maj. arthur maginnis; purnell legion, md., lieut.-col. benjamin l. simpson; 60th n. y., lieut.-col. charles r. brundage; 78th n. y., lieut.-col. jonathan austin, capt. henry r. stagg. _artillery_, capt. clermont l. best; me. light, 4th batt., capt. o'neil w. robinson; me. light, 6th batt., capt. freeman mcgilvery; 1st n. y. light, batt. m., capt. george w. cothran; n. y. light, 10th batt., capt. john t. bruen; pa. light, batt. e, capt. joseph m. knap; pa. light, batt. f, capt. robert b. hampton; 4th u. s., batt. f, lieut. edward d. muhlenberg. cavalry division, brig.-gen. alfred pleasonton:--_first brigade_, maj. charles j. whiting; 5th u. s., capt. joseph h. mcarthur; 6th u. s., capt. william p. sanders. _second brigade_, col. john f. farnsworth; 8th ill., maj. william h. medill; 3d ind., maj. george h. chapman; 1st mass., capt. casper crowninshield; 8th pa., capt. peter keenan. _third brigade_, col. richard h. rush; 4th pa., col. james h. childs, lieut.-col. james k. kerr; 6th pa., lieut.-col. c. ross smith. _fourth brigade_, col. andrew t. mcreynolds; 1st n. y., maj. alonzo w. adams; 12th pa., major james a. congdon. _fifth brigade_, col. benj. f. davis; 8th n. y., col. benjamin f. davis; 3d pa., lieut.-col. samuel w. owen. _artillery_, 2d u. s., batt. a, capt. john c. tidball; 2d u. s., batts. b and l, capt. james m. robertson; 2d u. s., batt. m, lieut. peter c. hains; 3d u. s., batts. c and g, capt. horatio g. gibson. _unattached_, 1st me. cav.,[106] col. samuel h. allen; 15th pa. cav. (detachment), col. william j. palmer. chapter xx. review of the maryland campaign. confederate expectations--general lee's salutatory to the people of maryland--the "lost despatch"--mcclellan's movements--turn in the tide of war--a miracle great as the throwing down of the walls of jericho--in contempt of the enemy the confederate army was dispersed--harper's ferry a "man-trap"--it diverted the army from the main issue--lee and mcclellan compared and contrasted--tribute to the confederate private soldier. for conveying to the reader a comprehensive view of the military zodiac at the time we crossed the quiet potomac, the 5th day of september, 1862, and an understanding of the logical sequence of the events following, something should be added here to the plain narrative of occurrences, and so i undertake a review of the maryland campaign. the army of northern virginia was afield without a foe. its once grand adversary, discomfited under two commanders, had crept into cover of the bulwarks about the national capital. the commercial, social, and blood ties of maryland inclined her people to the southern cause. a little way north of the potomac were inviting fields of food and supplies more plentiful than on the southern side; and the fields for march and manoeuvre, strategy and tactics, were even more inviting than the broad fields of grain and comfortable pasture-lands. propitious also was the prospect of swelling our ranks by maryland recruits. at the head of the army of sixty thousand men encouraged, matured, and disciplined by victory stood the confederate chief, challenging on its own soil the army that had marched to conquer the southern capital. on the 7th he pitched his bivouac about frederick city. on the 8th he made his salutatory to the people in these words: "head-quarters army of northern virginia, "near fredericktown, md., september 8, 1862. "to the people of maryland: "it is right that you should know the purpose that brought the army under my command within the limits of your state, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves. the people of the confederate states have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the states of the south by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties. they have seen with profound indignation their sister state deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province. under the pretence of supporting the constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned upon no charge and contrary to all forms of law. the faithful and manly protest against this outrage made by the venerable and illustrious marylander, to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt; the government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed; words have been declared offences by an arbitrary decree of the federal executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by a military commission for what they may dare to speak. believing that the people of maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the south have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and to restore independence and sovereignty to your state. in obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled. "this, citizens of maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. no constraint upon your free will is intended; no intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army, at least. marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech. we know no enemies among you, and will protect all, of every opinion. it is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. this army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will. "r. e. lee, "_general, commanding_." at this very time the recently displaced commander, general mcclellan, reinstated in command, was marching for an opportunity to recover his good name, and the union cavalry was active and aggressive in work against the confederates at poolesville. on the 9th the confederate commander organized his plans for the surrounding and capture of harper's ferry, and put his army in motion on the 10th. close upon the heels of the march followed the army of the potomac, only twenty-five miles behind the rear of the confederate army, with the cavalry of the armies in contact. the march of the former was as cautious as that of the latter was venturesome. on the 10th the union commander was informed of the march of j. g. walker's brigades up the river from cheek's ford. on the 11th his signal service reported the camp across the river at point of rocks. on the 12th, at urbana, he was informed of the combination against harper's ferry, and the march towards the cumberland valley, and ordered pressing pursuit to force the confederates to a stand. under that order general pleasonton, the federal cavalry leader, hurried his troops and cleared the way to south mountain on the 13th. from day to day the confederates marched their dispersing columns, from day to day the union columns converged in easy, cautious marches. at noon of the 13th, general lee's order distributing his forces and a despatch from the governor of pennsylvania were handed general mcclellan,--the former the celebrated "lost despatch," given on a previous page,--the latter reading as follows: "harrisburg, pa., september 13, 1862. "major-general george b. mcclellan: "when may we expect general reynolds here? services needed immediately. longstreet's division is said to have reached hagerstown last night. jackson crossed the potomac at williamsport to capture martinsburg and harper's ferry. we are assembling militia rapidly at chambersburg. can we do anything to aid your movements? "a. g. curtin, "_governor of pennsylvania_." this told of the change of march of my brigades from turner's pass to hagerstown, and, with the "lost despatch," revealed that hill's five brigades were the only troops at the former place. the same afternoon general mcclellan's signal service despatched him that the union signal station on maryland heights had gone down. general lee's signals failed to connect, so that general mcclellan was better informed of the progress of the confederate movements than was the confederate commander. that afternoon the union army was in hand for battle. the confederates were dispersed and divided by rivers, and drifting thirty and forty and fifty miles apart. under similar circumstances general scott, or general taylor, or general worth would have put the columns at the base of south mountain before night, and would have passed the unguarded gaps before the sun's rays of next morning could have lighted their eastern slopes. the union commander claims to have ordered more vigorous pursuit after the "lost despatch" was handed him, but there is nothing to support the claim except his call on general franklin, and in that he only ordered preparation at crampton's to await events at turner's pass. general pleasonton was at turner's pass on the afternoon of the 13th, and made a reconnoissance of the ways leading up the east side of the mountain. he was not informed of the despatches received by his chief, nor had he any information of confederate movements except such as he had gleaned in closely following their rear. at daylight of the 14th he led general cox and the ninth corps to attack, and in this manner the battle was opened. his orders to call the confederates to a stand did not anticipate the provocation of a general engagement, but a wait for his chief, who rode up about one o'clock. he thought that he was battling against seventeen brigades, while there were but five; and, had the battle been held in wait for mcclellan, his well-known habit of careful reconnoissance would have consumed the balance of the day. his last orders for general franklin directed a wait for couch's division, which joined him at eight o'clock in the evening. it is difficult to find that a quicker move was given the union army in consequence of the "lost despatch;" but one may rather concede general hill's claim, that in consequence of that despatch the union army was so delayed as to give the confederates time to make their way back to the soil of "old virginia." without it, the main column of the union forces could have marched through crampton's pass, and relieved harper's ferry on the 14th, but, guided by it, their commander found it important to first guard against the seventeen brigades that should be at turner's pass, on the right rear of a column, moving against crampton's. the razing of the walls of jericho by encircling marches of priests and soldiers, at the signal of long-drawn blasts of sacred horns and shouts of the multitude, was scarcely a greater miracle than the transformation of the conquering army of the south into a horde of disordered fugitives before an army that two weeks earlier was flying to cover under its homeward ramparts. providence helps those who can avail themselves of his tender care, but permits those who will to turn from him to their own arrogance. that his gracious hand was with the confederates in their struggles on the chickahominy, and even through the errors of the bull run campaign, cannot be questioned. when, however, in self-confidence, they lost sight of his helping hand, and in contempt of the enemy dispersed the army, they were given up to the reward of vainglory. that the disaster was not overwhelming they have to thank the plodding methods of the union commander. with as much faith as captain joshua, his success would have been as complete. but for the proper solution of the campaign we must turn again to the condition of the confederate army when it crossed into maryland. it was then all that its leaders could ask, and its claim as master of the field was established, but it was worn by severe marches and battles, and in need of rest. its record before and after shows that, held in hand and refreshed by easy marchings and comfortable supplies, it would have been prepared to maintain its supremacy. the first necessity was a little time to refresh, while the grand object was to draw the enemy from his intrenched lines to free and open battle. these facts carefully observed, the confederate army would have been assured of its claim and prestige. in the confusion about washington incident to the bull run campaign, general mcclellan was ordered to receive the retreating columns and post them to defend and hold their fortified lines. he had not emerged from the clouds that hung about his untoward campaign in virginia, but, familiar with the provisions that had been made for defence, he was most available for the service. he had hardly posted the troops and arranged the garrison when he found that the confederates, instead of moving against his fortifications, had turned the head of their columns north, and were marching to invade union territory. he was quick to discover his opportunity, and, after posting guards for the works about the capital, assumed command of the army and took the field, lest another commander should be assigned. his clouded fame and assumption of authority committed him to early aggressive work. he had nothing to lose, but the world to gain, and that upon the field of battle. all that the confederates had to do was to hold the army in hand and draw the enemy to a field wide enough for manoeuvre; then call him to his battle. it is possible that ragged affairs about the mountain passes might have given him safe retreat to his capital, leaving the army of the south afield, a free lance. it had been arranged that the southern president should join the troops, and from the head of his victorious army call for recognition. maryland would have put out some of her resources, and her gallant youth would have helped swell the southern ranks,--the twenty thousand soldiers who had dropped from the confederate ranks during the severe marches of the summer would have been with us. volunteers from all parts of the south would have come, swimming the potomac to find their president and his field-marshal, while union troops would have been called from kentucky and tennessee, and would have left easy march for the confederate armies of the west to the ohio river. even though the confederates were not successful, the fall elections were against the federal administration. with the southern armies victorious, the results of the contest at the polls would have been so pronounced as to have called for recognition of the confederacy. general mcclellan wrote general halleck of the effect, in case of defeat of his army,- "but if we should be so unfortunate as to meet with defeat, our country is at their mercy." so much has been said and written about harper's ferry and the surrender of the garrison, that it seems difficult to pass it without notice. in more than one report general mcclellan mentioned it as a "shameful" surrender. he had disapproved the position as false, and asked if it could not be given up. colonel miles, the commander, who gave his life in its defence, was acting under the following order from the department commander,--viz.: "baltimore, september 5, 1862. "colonel miles, harper's ferry: "the position on the heights ought to enable you to punish the enemy passing up the road in the direction of harper's ferry. have your wits about you, and do all you can to annoy the rebels should they advance on you. activity, energy, and decision must be used. you will not abandon harper's ferry without defending it to the last extremity. "john e. wool, "_major-general_."[107] the simple truth is, it was defended to the last extremity. the nearer the approach of the succoring army, the more imperative would have been the demand for action on the part of the confederate columns, and had battle been forced it could not possibly have resulted in any save one way,--confederate victory, and an overwhelming one at that. the position was denounced as a "man-trap," and so it proved to colonel miles and his eleven thousand troops, but it was in fact a far more formidable trap for the confederates, who to seize it sacrificed the fruits of heavy war,--victory in the main battle of the campaign,--and were forced to draw their crippled ranks to homeward defence. general jackson wanted it till he got possession; then gave it up. general mcclellan wanted to give it up before it was taken. after it had been taken and given up, he reoccupied it. it was left severely alone in the gettysburg campaign,--an admission by both sides of its uselessness as a _point d'appui_. a word in closing about the chiefs opposed in this great campaign. general lee and general mcclellan were both graduates of the united states military academy at west point. the former took the second honor of the class of 1829, the latter the second honor of the class of 1846. their service in the united states army was as military engineers. in 1854 they were both selected by secretary of war jefferson davis for promotion to the new cavalry regiments as lieutenant-colonel and captain respectively. their early opportunities, social and educational, were superior. they studiously improved them in youth, and applied them with diligence in after-life. aspirations leading to the higher walks of social and professional life seem to have been alike controlling forces in the character and career of each. they were not unmindful that physical development was important in support of mental improvement. in moral tone and habits they may be called exemplars. in his service, general lee's pride was duty to his government and to the army under his command. he loved admiration of the outside world, but these duties better. general mcclellan's ambition was not so limited. in stature general lee stood five feet ten inches, was of well-developed muscular figure, as trim as a youth, and weighed one hundred and seventy pounds. in features he was a model of manly beauty. his teeth were of ivory whiteness; his mouth handsome and expressive of frankness, kindness, and generosity. his nose and chin were full, regular, strong, and gave his face force and character. 'twas seldom that he allowed his mind to wander to the days of his childhood, and talk of his father and his early associates, but when he did, he was far more charming than he thought. as a commander he was much of the wellington "up-and-at-'em" style. he found it hard, the enemy in sight, to withhold his blows. with mcclellan it was more difficult to strike than to march for the enemy. general mcclellan was of short, stout figure, but was of soldierly presence, graceful, and handsome-featured. in their mounts neither of the great commanders lost anything of his admirable presence. both were masters of the science but not of the art of war. lee was successful in virginia; mcclellan in maryland. unjust criticism has been passed upon the confederate soldiers in the maryland campaign, based principally upon the great number of absentees. to those who have spent their lives near the ranks of soldiers and learned from experience that there is a limit to physical endurance, explanation is not called for; to those who look upon the soldier as a machine, not even needing oil to facilitate motive power, i will say, try to put yourselves in the soldiers' places. another point to be noted was, that in the confederate ranks there were thousands of soldiers who had been wounded once, twice, and in some instances three times, who in any other service would have been on the pension-rolls at their comfortable homes. sickness and weakness that creep into an army from irregular food, collected in the stress of march, were no trifling impediments to the maintenance of our ranks in vigorous form. when, in mature judgment, the historian builds monuments of words for the leaders of the campaign in maryland, there will be flowers left for the private soldiers, and for the private soldiers' graves. the full significance of sharpsburg to the federal authorities lay in the fact that they needed a victory on which to issue the emancipation proclamation, which president lincoln had prepared two months before and had held in abeyance under advice of members of his cabinet until the union arms should win a success. although this battle was by no means so complete a victory as the president wished, and he was sorely vexed with general mcclellan for not pushing it to completion, it was made the most of as a victory, and his emancipation proclamation was issued on the 22d of september, five days after the battle. this was one of the decisive political events of the war, and at once put the great struggle outwardly and openly upon the basis where it had before only rested by tacit and covert understanding. if the southern army had been carefully held in hand, refreshed by easy marches and comfortable supplies, the proclamation could not have found its place in history. on the other hand, the southern president would have been in maryland at the head of his army with his manifesto for peace and independence. chapter xxi. reorganization and rest for both armies. the confederates appoint seven lieutenant-generals--the army of northern virginia organized in corps--general mcclellan relieved, and general burnside appointed commander of the army of the potomac--a lift for the south--mcclellan was growing--burnside's "three grand divisions"--the campaign of the rappahannock--getting ready for fredericksburg--longstreet occupies fredericksburg--the town called to surrender by general sumner--exodus of the inhabitants under a threat to shell the town. under an act not long before passed by the confederate congress authorizing the appointment of seven lieutenant-generals, the authorities at richmond about this time sent commissions to lieutenant-generals longstreet, polk, holmes, hardee, e. k. smith, jackson, and pemberton, and made appointments of a number of major-generals. under these appointments general lee organized the army of northern virginia into corps substantially as it subsequently fought the battle of fredericksburg.[108] the confederate army rested along the lines between the potomac and winchester till late in october. on the 8th, general stuart was ordered across to ride around the union army, then resting about sharpsburg and harper's ferry. his ride caused some excitement among the union troops, and he got safely to the south side with the loss of a few men slightly wounded, on the 12th. on the 26th, general mcclellan marched south and crossed the potomac east of the blue ridge. jackson was assigned the duty of guarding the passes. i marched south, corresponding with the march of the army of the potomac. a division crossed at ashby's gap to upperville to look for the head of mcclellan's army. he bore farther eastward and marched for warrenton, where he halted on the 5th of november. the division was withdrawn from upperville and marched for culpeper court-house, arriving at that point at the same time as mcclellan's at warrenton,--w. h. f. lee's cavalry the day before me. soon after the return to culpeper court-house, evans's brigade was relieved of duty with the first corps and ordered south. hood had a brush with a cavalry force at manassas gap, and part of mclaws's division a similar experience at the east end of chester gap. [illustration: lieutenant-general james longstreet (1862).] i reached culpeper court-house with the divisions of mclaws, r. h. anderson, and pickett. hood's division was ordered behind robertson river, and ransom to madison court-house, general jackson with the second corps remaining in the shenandoah valley, except one division at chester gap of the blue ridge. the washington authorities issued orders on the 5th of november relieving general mcclellan of, and assigning general burnside to, command of the army of the potomac. on the 9th the army was put under general burnside, in due form. when informed of the change, general lee expressed regret, as he thought that mcclellan could be relied upon to conform to the strictest rules of science in the conduct of war. he had been mcclellan's preceptor, they had served together in the engineer corps, and our chief thought that he thoroughly understood the displaced commander. the change was a good lift for the south, however; mcclellan was growing, was likely to exhibit far greater powers than he had yet shown, and could not have given us opportunity to recover the morale lost at sharpsburg, as did burnside and hooker. general burnside, soon after assuming command, and while waiting at warrenton, made a radical change in the organization of the army by consolidating the corps into three "grand divisions" as follows: the right grand division, general sumner commanding.--second army corps, general d. w. couch; ninth army corps, general o. b. wilcox. centre grand division, general joseph hooker commanding.--third army corps, general george stoneman; fifth army corps, general daniel butterfield. left grand division, general w. b. franklin commanding.--first army corps, general j. f. reynolds; sixth army corps, general w. f. smith. cavalry division.--general alfred pleasonton. artillery, siege, and field batteries, 370 guns, general henry j. hunt, chief. at the time of the change of commanders the confederates were looking for a federal move north of culpeper court-house, and were surveying the ground behind robertson river for a point of concentration of the two wings to meet that move. general burnside, however, promptly planned operations on other lines. he submitted to president lincoln his proposition to display some force in the direction of gordonsville as a diversion, while with his main army he would march south, cross the rappahannock at fredericksburg, and reach by a surprise march ground nearer richmond than the holdings of the confederates. this was approved by the president with the suggestion that its success depended upon prompt execution. on the 15th light began to break upon the confederates, revealing a move south from warrenton, but it was not regarded as a radical change from the orange and alexandria railroad line of advance. a battery of artillery was sent with a regiment of infantry to reinforce the confederate outpost at fredericksburg under colonel ball. on the 17th information came that the right grand division under general sumner had marched south, leaving the railroad, and general w. h. f. lee's cavalry was ordered to fredericksburg. the next morning i marched with two divisions, mclaws's and ransom's, the former for fredericksburg, the latter towards the north anna. the same day, general lee ordered a forced reconnoissance by his cavalry to warrenton, found that the union army was all on the march towards fredericksburg, and ordered my other divisions to follow on the 19th. at the first disclosure he was inclined to move for a position behind the north anna, as at that time the position behind fredericksburg appeared a little awkward for the confederates, but, taking into careful consideration the position of the union army on the stafford side, the former appeared the less faulty of the two. defence behind the anna would have been stronger, but the advantage of the enemy's attack would also have been enhanced there. then, too, anticipation of the effect of surprising the enemy in their intended surprise had some influence in favor of fredericksburg. the burnside march was somewhat of the horace greeley "on-to-richmond" _nolens-volens_ style, which, if allowed to run on long enough, sometimes gains headway that is troublesome. general sumner reached falmouth on the 17th, and proposed to cross, but his advance was met and forced back by colonel ball's command. i rode with the leading division for fredericksburg, and was on the heights on the 19th. my head-quarters were there when general sumner called upon the civil authorities to surrender the city by the following communication: "head-quarters army of the potomac, "november 21, 1862. "mayor and common council of fredericksburg: "gentlemen,--under cover of the houses of your city shots have been fired upon the troops of my command. your mills and manufactories are furnishing provisions and the material for clothing for armed bodies in rebellion against the government of the united states. your railroads and other means of transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops. this condition of things must terminate, and, by direction of general burnside, i accordingly demand the surrender of the city into my hands, as the representative of the government of the united states, at or before five o'clock this afternoon. "failing an affirmative reply to this demand by the hour indicated, sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the city of women and children, the sick and wounded and aged, etc., which period having expired, i shall proceed to shell the town. upon obtaining possession of the city, every necessary means will be taken to preserve order and secure the protective operation of the laws and policy of the united states government. "i am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "e. v. sumner, "_bvt. maj.-gen. u. s. army, commanding right grand division_."[109] the officers who received the call, by consent of general patrick, who delivered it, referred the paper to my head-quarters. i asked the civil authorities to reply that the city would not be used for the purposes complained of, but that neither the town nor the south side of the river could be occupied by the union army except by force of arms. general sumner ordered two batteries into position commanding the town, but in a few hours received the following reply from the mayor: "mayor's office, "fredericksburg, november 21, 1862. "brevet major-general e. v. sumner, "_commanding u. s. army_: "sir,--i have received, at 4.40 o'clock this afternoon, your communication of this date. in it you state that, under cover of the houses of this town, shots have been fired upon the troops of your command; that our mills and manufactories are furnishing provisions and the material for clothing for armed bodies in rebellion against the government of the united states; that our railroads and other means of transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops; that this condition of things must terminate; that, by command of major-general burnside, you demand the surrender of this town into your hands, as the representative of the government of the united states, at or before five o'clock this afternoon; that, failing an affirmative reply to this demand by the time indicated, sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the town of the women and children, the sick, wounded, and aged, which period having elapsed, you will proceed to shell the town. "in reply i have to say that this communication did not reach me in time to convene the council for its consideration, and to furnish a reply by the hour indicated (five p.m.). it was sent to me through the hands of the commanding officer of the confederate states near this town, to whom it was first delivered, by consent of general patrick, who bore it from you, as i am informed, and i am authorized by the commander of the confederate army to say that there was no delay in passing it through his hands to me. "in regard to the matters complained of by you, the firing of shot upon your troops occurred upon the northern suburbs of the town, and was the act of the military officer commanding the confederate forces near here, for which matter (neither) the citizens nor civil authorities of this town are responsible. in regard to the other matters of complaint, i am authorized by the latter officer to say that the condition of things therein complained of shall no longer exist; that your troops shall not be fired on from this town; that the mills and manufactories here will not furnish any further supplies of provisions or material for clothing for the confederate troops, nor will the railroads or other means of transportation here convey supplies from the town to the depots of said troops. "outside of the town the civil authorities of fredericksburg have no control, but i am assured by the military authorities of the confederate army near here that nothing will be done by them to infringe the conditions herein named as to matters within the town. but the latter authorities inform us that, while their troops will not occupy the town, they will not permit yours to do so. "you must be aware that there will not be more than three or four hours of daylight within the sixteen hours given by you for the removal of the sick and wounded, the women and children, the aged and infirm, from this place; and i have to inform you that, while there is no railroad transportation accessible to the town, because of the interruption thereof by your batteries, all other means of transportation within the town are so limited as to render the removal of the classes of persons spoken of within the time indicated as an utter impossibility. "i have convened the council, which will remain in session awaiting any further communications you may have to make. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "m. slaughter, "_mayor_." to this general sumner responded the same day,- "mayor and common council of fredericksburg, va.: "your letter of this afternoon is at hand, and, in consideration of your pledges that the acts complained of shall cease, and that your town shall not be occupied by any of the enemy's forces, and your assertion that a lack of transportation renders it impossible to remove the women, children, sick, wounded, and aged, i am authorized to say to you that our batteries will not open upon your town at the hour designated. "general patrick will meet a committee or representative from your town to-morrow morning, at nine o'clock, at the lacy house. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "e. v. sumner, "_brevet major-general, u. s. army, commanding division_." as the inference from the correspondence was that the shelling was only postponed, the people were advised to move with their valuables to some place of safety as soon as possible. without complaint, those who could, packed their precious effects and moved beyond reach of the threatened storm, but many preferred to remain and encounter the dangers rather than to leave their homes and valuables. the fortitude with which they bore their trials quickened the minds of the soldiers who were there to defend them. one train leaving with women and children was fired upon, making some confusion and dismay among them, but the two or three shells did no other mischief, and the firing ceased. chapter xxii. battle of fredericksburg. description of the field--marye's heights--position of the troops of longstreet's command--general jackson called down from orange court-house, and preparations made for a determined stand--signal guns at three o'clock in the morning announce the long-expected battle--burnside's bridge-builders thrice driven back from their work--the crossing finally made by boats--federals under hot fire enter fredericksburg--how they obtained their foothold on the west bank of the rappahannock--gallant officers and men--ninety-seven killed or wounded in the space of fifty yards--general burnside's plan of battle--strength of the contending forces. mclaws's division of my corps was posted on the heights in rear of the city, one brigade in the sunken road in front of the marye mansion, the others extending across the telegraph road through the wood of lee's hill. as the other divisions of the corps came up they were posted, r. h. anderson on taylor's hill; ransom in reserve, near corps head-quarters; pickett in the wood, in rear of mclaws's right; hood at hamilton's crossing. the federal grand divisions under franklin and hooker marched on the 18th of november, and on the 19th pitched their camps, the former at stafford court-house, and the latter at hartwood, each about ten miles from falmouth. a mile and a half above fredericksburg the rappahannock cuts through a range of hills, which courses on the north side in a southeasterly direction, nearly parallel, and close to its margin. this range (stafford heights) was occupied by the enemy for his batteries of position, one hundred and forty-seven siege guns and long-range field batteries. these heights not only command those of the west, but the entire field and flats opened by the spreading out of the range on the west side. at points, however, they stand so close beside the river that the guns on their crest could not be so depressed as to plunge their fire to the water. the heights are cut at points by streamlets and ravines leading into the river, and level up gradually as they approach nearer to the potomac on its west slope, and towards the sea on the south. the city of fredericksburg nestles under those heights on the opposite bank. mclaws had a brigade on picket service, extending its guard up and down the banks of the river, in connection with details from r. h. anderson's division above and hood's below, the latter meeting stuart's cavalry vedettes lower down. at the west end of the ridge where the river cuts through is taylor's hill (the confederate left), which stands at its highest on a level with stafford heights. from that point the heights on the south side spread, unfolding a valley about a mile in width, affording a fine view of the city, of the arable fields, and the heights as they recede to the vanishing limits of sight. next below taylor's is marye's hill, rising to half the elevation of the neighboring heights and dropping back, leaving a plateau of half a mile, and then swelling to the usual altitude of the range. on the plateau is the marye mansion. along its base is a sunken road, with retaining walls on either side. that on the east is just breast-high for a man, and just the height convenient for infantry defence and fire. from the top of the breast-work the ground recedes gradually till near the canal, when it drops off three or four feet, leaving space near the canal of a rod or two of level ground. the north end of the sunken road cuts into the plank or gordonsville road, which is an extension of hanover street from near the heart of the town. at the south end it enters the telegraph road, extending out from the town limits and up over the third, or telegraph hill, called, in its bloody baptismal, "lee's hill." an unfinished railroad lies along the telegraph road as far as the highlands. the fredericksburg and potomac railroad lies nearly parallel with the river four miles, and then turns south through the highlands. the old stage road from the city runs about half-way between the river and the railroad four miles, when it turns southwest and crosses the railroad at hamilton's crossing. the hamlet of falmouth, on the north side of the river, was in front of the right centre of the federal position, half a mile from fredericksburg. [illustration: battle of fredericksburg. dec. 13th, 1862] general jackson, advised of general burnside's move to fredericksburg, drew his corps east of the blue ridge as far as orange court-house. before the end of november it became evident that fredericksburg was to be our winter station and the scene of a severe battle before it could be relieved. general lee advised the citizens who still remained in the place (and some who had returned) to remove their effects. those who had friends found comfortable places of rest, but many took the little that they could get away with, and made their homes in the deep forest till the storm could pass. still, none complained of the severe ordeal which they were called upon to endure. towards the latter part of the month general jackson was called down and assigned position on the right near hamilton's crossing and the massaponax. he objected to the position, preferring the north anna, but general lee had already weighed the matter, and had decided in favor of fredericksburg. hood's division, relieved at hamilton's crossing, was drawn to my right and stretched across the valley of deep run, a little to the rear of jackson's left and mclaws's right. batteries of position were assigned from the reserve artillery along the heights, with orders to cover the guns, by epaulements or pitting them. the work was progressing while the guns were held under cover remote from the enemy's better appointed artillery until the positions were covered by solid banks or good pits. the small field pieces were removed for safety to convenient points for field service in case opportunity called for them. the confederates had three hundred and six guns, including two thirty-pound parrotts of richmond make. these were covered by epaulements on lee's hill. on the 1st of december the batteries of reserve artillery were relieved from the first corps by those of the washington and alexander's artillery. orders were given to examine all lines of approach, and to measure particularly the distance of the crossings of the canal on the plank and telegraph roads; to inspect and improve the parapets and pits along the front, and to traverse all batteries not securely covered against the batteries opposite taylor's hill, and others within range of our lines, and mclaws was directed to open signal line with his brigade and guards along the river bank. the day after jackson joined us several gun-boats were reported in the lower river at port royal. d. h. hill's division was detached with several select batteries to watch and guard at that point against a crossing, should it be attempted, and to engage and try the metal of the gun-boats. after some little practice the boats drew off and dropped down-stream; but hill's division was left near the point in observation with w. h. f. lee's cavalry. the brigade of cavalry under general hampton kept careful watch of the fords of the upper rappahannock. to guard against further encroachments of the gun-boats, a battery was intrenched on the river bank under direction of major t. m. r. talcot, of the general staff. at the river, sharp-shooters, by concealing themselves in the ravines and pits, could escape artillery fire and lie in secure readiness to attack parties engaged in laying bridges. after driving off working parties they were to seek cover till again needed. by such practice they were to delay the bridge-builders till the commands had time to assemble at their points of rendezvous. the narrow, deep bed of the stream, a mile away from any point of the confederate lines where batteries could be planted, and covered as it was by the guns of stafford heights, prevented the thought of successful resistance to laying bridges at any point from falmouth to the extreme left of the federal line; but the strong ground upon which the confederates were to accept battle offset the uncomfortable feeling in regard to the crossing of the river. general burnside made some show of disposition to cross fourteen miles below, at skinker's neck, but that was under guard of d. h. hill's division, and he saw that his purpose could not be effected. the plan which he finally adopted was to span the river by bridges near the centre and lower limits of the city, and two others a mile below the latter, and just below the mouth of deep run, the right grand division to cross by the upper and second bridges, the left grand division by the lower bridges, and the centre grand division to be in position near the others to reinforce their battle. the stir and excitement about the enemy's camps on the 10th of december, as well as the reports of scouts, gave notice that important movements were pending. notice was given the commands, and the batteries were ordered to have their animals in harness an hour before daylight of the next morning, and to continue to hitch up daily at that hour until further orders. at three o'clock on the morning of the 11th the deep boom of a cannon aroused both armies, and a second gun was recognized as the signal for battle. in a few minutes the commands were on the march for their positions. orders were sent to call d. h. hill's division and all of the second corps to their ground along the woodland over hamilton's crossing. barksdale's brigade of mississippians was on picket duty in fredericksburg at the time; the seventeenth and eighteenth regiments, with the eighth florida, of r. h. anderson's division, were on the river line; the other regiments of the brigade and the third georgia, of r. h. anderson's, in reserve. the first noise made by the enemy's bridge-builders was understood by the picket guards, as was all of their early work of construction, but a heavy mist along the water concealed them from view until their work upon the bridge was well advanced. as soon as the forms of the workmen could be discerned the skirmishers opened fire, which was speedily answered from the other side in efforts to draw the fire from the bridge-builders, but the confederates limited their attention to the builders till they were driven off, when they ceased firing. another effort to lay the bridge met a like result. then a third received the same stormy repulse, when it seemed that all the cannon within a mile of the town turned their concentrating fire of shot and shell upon the buildings of the devoted city, tearing, crushing, bursting, burning their walls with angry desperation that must have been gratifying to spirits deep down below. under the failures to lay the bridge, general hunt suggested that the pontoon-boats be filled with infantrymen, rushed across and landed on the other bank until a sufficient force was in position to protect the bridge-builders. barksdale had been notified before noon that the army was in position, and that he could withdraw his troops at any moment, but he preferred his little fight in fredericksburg. at four o'clock, when the landing was made by the boats, he thought the city safe against artillery practice, and was pleased to hold till night could cover his withdrawal. colonel norman j. hall, of the seventh michigan regiment, commanded the troops working for a foothold on the west bank. after the several attempts to have the bridge built, he accepted general hunt's proposition to load the boats and have the men push across. lieutenant-colonel baxter, commanding the regiment, volunteered to lead the party. captain weymouth, of the nineteenth massachusetts, proposed to support the move. under signal for artillery fire to cease, the command of lieutenant-colonel baxter pushed across. under the best fire the pickets could bring to bear only one man was killed and lieutenant-colonel baxter and several men were wounded. the party of seventy were rushed up the bank, gained position, captured some prisoners, and were soon reinforced. the enemy's fire over the west bank was so sweeping that barksdale could not reinforce at the point of landing. the nineteenth massachusetts was deployed to the right, and the seventh michigan to the left. the twenty-eighth massachusetts reinforced them. the twelfth and fifty-ninth new york and one hundred and twenty-seventh pennsylvania regiments joined the command in the city. colonel hall found that he must prepare for some fighting, and speedily, as night was coming on. he sent to the rear to ask for time to prepare and make his fight to suit him, but was hurried on by the division pushing forward to get across the bridge, with orders to secure the streets at all hazards. the seventh michigan and nineteenth massachusetts had been brought to a stand, when the twenty-eighth massachusetts was rushed forward in gallant style. colonel hall reported, "platoon after platoon were swept away, but the head of the column did not falter. ninety-seven officers and men were killed or wounded in the space of about fifty yards." the eastern part of the town was occupied, and at a late hour of the night the confederates retired. as barksdale's brigade withdrew, he was relieved at the sunken road by the eighteenth and twenty-fourth georgia regiments and cobb's georgia legion, general t. r. r. cobb in command. the third grand division had no severe work in laying the bridges below deep run, and were ready for co-operation some hours in advance of the right. the federals occupied the 12th in moving the right grand division into the city by the upper bridges, and the left grand division by the bridges below deep creek. one hundred and four guns crossed with the right, one hundred and twenty with the left. the centre grand division was held in reserve. two divisions of the third corps were sent to the lower bridges during the night to support the battle of the left, and were ordered over on the 13th. the plan of battle by the federal commander, in brief, was to drive the confederate right back into the highlands and follow that success by attacking the confederate left by his right grand division. the _beginning_ only of this plan was carried out. the left grand division having duly crossed the river at the lower bridges on the 12th,--the sixth corps and bayard's brigade of cavalry, then the first corps,--the sixth deployed two divisions, supported by the third, parallel to the old richmond road; the first formed at right angles to the sixth, its right on the left of the sixth, its left on the river, two divisions on the front line, one in support. the cavalry was sent out to reconnoitre. the entire field of the command was an open plain between the highlands and the river, traversed by the old richmond road, which had well-formed embankments and ditches on both sides. the federal troops of their left divisions were in full view of the heights (lee's hill) occupied by the confederates; those of the right were concealed by the buildings of fredericksburg and under the river banks, and their bridges were under the steep also. the two brigades on the right of the sixth corps were to the right of deep run; the others, of the first and sixth corps, on the left. the batteries of the corps were under authority of corps commanders. there were but few shots exchanged during the 12th, and these not of great damage. on the confederate side the first corps (longstreet's) was in position from taylor's hill across deep run bottom. the second corps was in mass about the wooded heights at hamilton's crossing. his cavalry and horse artillery were on his right in the massaponax valley. general r. ransom's division was posted in rear of the left of marye's hill; his twenty-fourth north carolina regiment was advanced to the left of cobb's line in the sunken road. his brigade under colonel cooke was deployed as sharp-shooters on the crest of the hill. he was especially charged with looking after the left of cobb's line. in front of this line and about six hundred yards from it was a canal, or large wet ditch, about four hundred yards out from the city limits. the crossings at the plank and telegraph roads had been bridged, and the bridges were ordered wrecked, but were only partially destroyed, the string-pieces being left in place. the corps in position, the confederate commander prepared to stand and receive battle. in concluding this account of the confronting armies on the eve of battle, let us glance at their relative strength as expressed in numbers. the army of the potomac, as reported by general burnside, had on december 10 an "aggregate present for duty" of 132,017[110] officers and men (not including cavalry). the army of northern virginia was reported by general lee on the same date to have had an aggregate of 69,391[111] (not including cavalry). chapter xxiii. battle of fredericksburg (continued). the battle-field veiled by a heavy fog--terrific fighting of the 13th of december--forlorn hope of the federals--general meade's division of franklin's command makes the first advance--general french leads against the confederate left--hancock follows--general cobb killed--the sunken road and stone wall below marye's hill--desperate advances and determined repulses--humphreys's heroic assault--the stone wall "a sheet of flame"--general jackson loses his opportunity to advance--the charge of meade's divisions compared with that of pickett, pettigrew, and trimble's columns at gettysburg--forty per cent. killed in charging lines here, and sixty per cent. at gettysburg--total losses--peace to be declared because gold had gone to 200--organization of the army of northern virginia. on the morning of the 13th of december the confronting armies, which were destined that day to clash in one of the bloodiest conflicts of the war, stood completely veiled from each other's sight by an impenetrable mist. the entire confederate army was now for the first time upon the field, for general jackson had during the night brought up his scattered divisions from down the river. before daylight i rode to view my line and troops from right to left. hood's division on the right was found on the alert, as was the enemy near that point. the voices of the union officers as they gave their commands were carried to us with almost startling clearness by the heavy fog that covered the field and surroundings. so heavy was this fog that nothing could be seen at a distance of ten or twelve rods, and yet so distinctly were the voices of the officers brought to us that they seemed quite near at hand, and general hood was looking for assaulting columns against his front. he was told that such move would put the enemy's column in a _cul-de-sac_, and therefore his position was in no danger of attack; that the attack would be aimed against jackson's front; that in case it broke through there he should swing around to his right and take the attacking forces in reverse; that pickett's division would be ordered to a corresponding move on his left, with the batteries of the two divisions in the plain off the left; that my front would be attacked, but it was safely posted, and not likely to need other than the troops on that ground. pickett's command was under arms, expecting orders. they were given instructions similar to those just mentioned for hood. the divisions of mclaws, ransom, and r. h. anderson were in readiness, as were all the batteries. but the fog, nothing abated, hung so heavy that not a sight for a cannon-shot was open till a late hour of the morning. the front of the second corps was occupied by a. p. hill's division, the brigades of archer, lane, and pender on the first line; those of thomas, gregg, and brockenbrough on the second. a third line was occupied by taliaferro's and early's divisions. d. h. hill's division was off to the rear of the right. lieutenant-colonel walker posted a fourteen-gun battery of the division artillery on a. p. hill's right, and two other field batteries on the plain on his left. stuart's horse artillery and cavalry were on the plain on the right, in the valley of the massaponax, supporting the second corps. about 7.45 in the morning general hardie, of burnside's staff, reported to general franklin that his orders would reach him in a few minutes by the hands of an aide-de-camp. hardie was ordered to remain near general franklin's head-quarters. at eight o'clock the order came, and at 8.30 meade's division moved towards the general direction of jackson's position. at ten o'clock the fog lifted and revealed meade's lines, six batteries on his left and four on his right, gibbon's division supporting the right and doubleday's covering the left. the order for the commander of the left grand division was to make the advance by at least one division. the divisions of the first corps were thought to fully meet the terms of the order. meade's lines advanced in handsome, solid ranks, leaving heavy reserves of the sixth corps and two divisions of the third that had been called over from the centre grand division. the fire of stuart's horse artillery against their left caused delay until some of the batteries of the left engaged and drove off the fire. after half an hour's delay the advance was resumed, the batteries thrown to the front to shell the field in search of the confederate batteries. the latter had been ordered, for the most part, to reserve their fire for infantry. after an hour's heavy artillery practice meade's march was resumed, and with great vigor, the batteries ploughing the way for the infantry columns. at the same time the fourteen-gun battery of a. p. hill's right and his left batteries replied with equal spirit and practice, though with unequal metal. the view of the battle of the enemy's left burst upon us at lee's hill, as the mist rolled away under the bright noonday sun. we noted the thin, pale smoke of infantry fire fading in the far away of their left, the heavy clouds rising from the batteries on both sides of the river, the bright armored ranks and banners, and our elevation seemed to draw them so close to us, on their right, that we thought to turn our best guns upon that part of the line, and general lee authorized the test of their range. only a few shots were sent when the troops that had been lying concealed in the streets of the city came flying out by both roads in swarms at double time and rushed towards us. every gun that we had in range opened upon the advancing columns and ploughed their ranks by a fire that would test the nerves of the bravest soldiers. but the battle of the federal left had the first opening, and calls for first notice. [illustration: the battle of fredericksburg, from the battery on lee's hill.] under a strong artillery combat meade marched forward, with gibbon's division in close support on his right, and doubleday's farther off on his left. the line encountered lane's brigade front in a steady, hard fight, and, developing against archer's left, broke through, forcing the brigades back, encountered thomas's and gregg's brigades, threw the latter into confusion, and killed general gregg. brockenbrough's and pender's brigades turned against the penetrating columns and were forced back. under skilful handling the brigades finally brought the battle to steady work, but meade's impetuous onward march was bravely made and pressed until three brigades of early's division were advanced and thrown into action, commanded by colonels atkinson, walker, and hoke. these, with the combined fire of hill's broken lines, forced meade back. two regiments of berry's brigade of the third corps came to the relief of meade and were driven back, when gibbon's division which followed was met, and after severe battle was repulsed. the confederates made a partial following of the success, beyond the railroad, and until they encountered the fire of the relieving divisions under birney and sickles and the reserve batteries. doubleday's division protected meade's left as jackson's right under taliaferro partially engaged against them; both encountered loss. hood got one of his brigades in in time to follow the troops as they retired towards their reserve line. at the first moment of the break on jackson's lines pickett rode to hood and urged that the opportunity anticipated was at hand, but hood failed to see it in time for effective work. about two p.m. the battle quieted into defensive practice of artillery and sharp-shooters. the opening against the confederate left, before referred to, was led by french's division of the second corps, about 10.30. the eighteenth and twenty-fourth georgia regiments, cobb's georgia legion, and the twenty-fourth north carolina regiment were in the sunken road, the salient point. on marye's hill, back and above, was the washington artillery, with nine guns, ransom's and cooke's north carolina brigade in open field, the guns under partial cover, pitted. other batteries on taylor's and lee's hills posted to this defence as many as twenty guns, holding under range by direct and cross fire the avenues of approach and the open field along cobb's front. french's division came in gallant style, but somewhat hurried. he gathered his ranks behind the swell of ground near the canal and moved to the assault. an intervening plank fence gave the troops some trouble in crossing under fire, so that his ranks were not firm after passing it to the attack. hancock, coming speedily with his division, was better organized and in time to take up the fight as french was obliged to retire. this advance was handsomely maintained, but the galling fire they encountered forced them to open fire. under this delay their ranks were cut up as rapidly as they had collected at the canal, and when within a hundred yards of the stone wall they were so thinned that they could do nothing but surrender, even if they could leap to the road-bed. but they turned, and the fire naturally slackened, as their hurried steps took them away to their partial cover. the troops behind the stone wall were reinforced during this engagement by two of cooke's regiments from the hill-top, ordered by general ransom, and general mclaws ordered part of kershaw's brigade in on their right. after hancock's engagement some minutes passed before arrangements were made for the next. howard's division had been feeling for a way to get by cobb's left, when he was called to the front attack, and ordered over the same ground. he arranged his forces with care, and advanced in desperate fight. under the severe fire of the confederates his troops were provoked to return fire, and during the delay thus caused his ranks were so speedily decimated that they in turn were obliged to return to cover. the confederate commander, general cobb, was killed. general kershaw, with the other regiments of his brigade, was ordered to the front. the washington artillery, exhausted of ammunition, was relieved by guns of alexander's battalion. the change of batteries seemed to give new hope to the assaulting forces. they cheered and put in their best practice of sharp-shooters and artillery. the greater part of alexander's loss occurred while galloping up to his position. general ransom advanced the other regiments of his brigade to the crest of the hill. at the suggestion of general lee the brigades of jenkins and kemper of pickett's division were called up and assigned, the former to general mclaws and the latter to general ransom. a supply of ammunition was sent down to the troops in the road in time to meet the next attack, by sturgis's division of the ninth corps, which made the usual brave fight, and encountered the same damaging results. getty's division of the ninth corps came to his support on the left, but did not engage fiercely, losing less than eight hundred men. carroll's brigade of whipple's division, third corps, came in on sturgis's left, but only to brace that part of the fight. as the troops hurried forward from the streets of the city for the telegraph road, they came at once under the fire of the long-range guns on lee's hill. the thirty-pound parrotts were particularly effective in having the range and dropping their shells in the midst of the columns as they dashed forward. frequently commands were broken up by this fire and that of other long-range guns, and sought shelter, as they thought, in the railroad cut, but that point was well marked, and the shots were dropped in, in enfilade fire, with precision, often making wide gaps in their ranks. the siege guns of stafford heights gave their especial attention to our heavy guns and put their shots over the parapets very often. one shell buried itself close under the parapet at general lee's side, as he sat among the officers of his staff, but it failed to explode. soon after this our big parrott gun burst into many fragments. it was closely surrounded by general lee and staff, officers of the first corps head-quarters, and officers and gunners of the battery, but the explosion caused no other damage than the loss of the gun. griffin's division was next ordered to attack, and made the usual desperate struggle. the confederates meanwhile had accumulated such force in the road that a single division, had it reached that point, would have found its equal in numbers, and of greater vigor, with ransom at the top of the hill prepared to rush down and join in the mêlée. at that hour we could have safely invited one division into our midst, if assured it was to be the last. the next attack was made by humphreys's division. its commander was a man of superior attainments and accomplishments in the walks of civil as well as military life. he measured justly the situation, and arranged his battle in the only order by which success could have been made possible, but he had only two brigades with which to take a position not assailable and held by more than three brigades of superior troops. his troops were new, so that he felt called to personal example as well as skilful handling. he ordered the attack with empty muskets, and led with his brigade commanders, but half-way up towards the goal his men stopped to load and open fire, which neither he nor his officers could prevent, so they were driven back. then he made a like effort with his other brigade, under special orders from generals burnside and hooker that the point must be carried before night,--and the dew was then falling. (just then our second big parrott gun went into fragments, but without damage to the men.) the troops that had been driven back from previous attacks joined in trying to persuade humphreys's men not to go forward. notwithstanding the discouraging surroundings, he led his men on, encountered the same terrific and death-dealing opposition, and his men retired in greater confusion, going beyond his control to the vicinity of the city before he could get them again in ranks. his account of the last effort is interesting: "the stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and flanks of the column. officers and men were falling rapidly, and the head of the column was at length brought to a stand when close up to the wall. up to this time not a shot had been fired by the column, but now some firing began. it lasted but a minute, when, in spite of all our efforts, the column turned and began to retire slowly. i attempted to rally the brigade behind the natural embankment so often mentioned, but the united efforts of general tyler, myself, our staff, and other officers could not arrest the retiring mass."[112] at that time there were three brigades behind the stone wall and one regiment of ransom's brigade. the ranks were four or five deep,--the rear files loading and passing their guns to the front ranks, so that the volleys by brigade were almost incessant pourings of solid sheets of lead. two brigades of sykes's division, first and second regulars, were sent to the front to guard the line. it was some time after nightfall, so that their line could only be distinguished by the blaze of their fire. some of the batteries and infantry engaged against their fire till night was well advanced. general jackson thought to advance against the enemy's left late in the afternoon, but found it so well posted and guarded that he concluded the venture would be too hazardous. he lost his opportunity, failing to follow close upon the repulse of meade's and gibbon's divisions. his command was massed and well in hand, with an open field for infantry and artillery. he had, including the divisions of hood and pickett,--ordered to work with him,--about fifty thousand men. franklin had, including troops of the centre grand division, about equal force. the charge of meade's division has been compared with that of pickett's, pettigrew's, and trimble's at gettysburg, giving credit of better conduct to the former. the circumstances do not justify the comparison. when the fog lifted over meade's advance he was within musket-range of a. p. hill's division, closely supported on his right by gibbon's, and guarded on his left by doubleday's division. on hill's right was a fourteen-gun battery, on his left eight guns. meade broke through hill's division, and with the support of gibbon forced his way till he encountered part of ewell's division, when he was forced back in some confusion. two fresh divisions of the third corps came to their relief, and there were as many as fifty thousand men at hand who could have been thrown into the fight. meade's march to meet his adversary was half a mile,--the troops of both sides fresh and vigorous. of the assaulting columns of pickett, pettigrew, and trimble, only four thousand seven hundred under pickett were fresh; the entire force of these divisions was only fifteen thousand strong. they had a mile to march over open field before reaching the enemy's line, strengthened by field-works and manned by thrice their numbers. the confederates at gettysburg had been fought to exhaustion of men and munitions. they lost about sixty per cent. of the assaulting forces,--meade about forty. the latter had fresh troops behind him, and more than two hundred guns to cover his rallying lines. the confederates had nothing behind them but field batteries almost exhausted of ammunition. that meade made a brave, good fight is beyond question, but he had superior numbers and appointments. at gettysburg the confederate assault was made against intrenched lines of artillery and infantry, where stood fifty thousand men. a series of braver, more desperate charges than those hurled against the troops in the sunken road was never known, and the piles and cross-piles of dead marked a field such as i never saw before or since. between 1.30 and 2.30 of the afternoon several orders and messages were sent by general burnside calling on general franklin to renew the battle of the left. before 2.30 he received from general burnside, through his aide-de-camp, captain goddard, this despatch: "tell general franklin, with my compliments, that i wish him to make a vigorous attack with his whole force. our right is hard pressed." under ordinary circumstances this would be regarded as a strong order, but franklin had gone far enough in his first battle to be convinced that an attack by his "whole force," the other end of the army "hard pressed," would be extremely hazardous. if undertaken and proved disastrous, he could have been made to shoulder the whole responsibility, for a "wish" implies discretion. it is not just to the subordinate to use such language if orders are intended to be imperative. men bred as soldiers have no fancy for orders that carry want of faith on their face. the losses at fredericksburg were as follows:[113] union army. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | captured | organization. | killed. | wounded. | or | total. | | | missing. | ------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|------- right grand division (sumner) | 523 | 4281 | 640 | 5,444 centre grand division (hooker)| 352 | 2501 | 502 | 3,355 left grand division (franklin)| 401 | 2761 | 625 | 3,787 engineers | 8 | 49 | 2 | 59 artillery reserve | .. | 8 | .. | 8 ------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|------- aggregate | 1284 | 9600 | 1769 | 12,653 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- confederate army. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | captured | organization. | killed. | wounded. | or | total. | | | missing. | ------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|------- first army corps (longstreet) | 251 | 1516 | 127 | 1894 second army corps (jackson) | 344 | 2545 | 526 | 3415 stuart's cavalry | .. | 13 | .. | 13 ------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|------- aggregate | 595 | 4074 | 653 | 5322 ----------------------------------------------------------------------during the night, before twelve o'clock, a despatch-bearer lost his way and was captured. he had on his person a memorandum of the purpose of general burnside for renewing the battle against marye's hill in the morning. the information was sent up to general head-quarters, and orders were sent general ransom to intrench his brigade along the crest of the hill. orders were sent other parts of the line to improve defences and prepare for the next day in ammunition, water, and rations, under conviction that the battle of next day, if made as ordered, would be the last of the army of the potomac. morning came and passed without serious demonstrations on the part of the enemy. orders were sent out, however, for renewed efforts to strengthen the position. colonel alexander found a point at which he could pit a gun in enfilade position to the swell of ground behind which the enemy assembled his forces before advancing to the charge, and lieutenant-colonel latrobe sunk a gun in similar position for fire across the field of their charges. we were so well prepared that we became anxious before the night of the 14th lest general burnside would not come again. in the night he drew back to the river, and during the night of the 15th recrossed and sent his troops to their camps. the stone wall was not thought before the battle a very important element. we assumed that the formidable advance would be made against the troops of mclaws's division at lee's hill, to turn the position at the sunken road, dislodge my force stationed there, then to occupy the sunken road, and afterwards ascend to the plateau upon which the marye mansion stands; that this would bring their forces under cross and direct fire of all of our batteries--shortand long-range guns--in such concentration as to beat them back in bad disorder. [illustration: osmun latrobe. chief of staff of the first corps, after the battle of the wilderness.] general hood's failure to meet his orders to make counter to the anticipated attack upon jackson was reported in the official accounts. as he was high in favor with the authorities, it did not seem prudent to attempt to push the matter, as called for under the ordinary usages of war. "_bis peccare in bello non licet._" general lee went down to richmond soon after the battle to propose active operations, and returned with information that gold had advanced to 200 in new york; that the war was over and peace would be announced in sixty days; that it was useless to harass the troops by winter service. as gold had gone well up on the southern side without bringing peace, it was difficult for soldiers to see the bearing that it could have on the other side; still, we had some trust and hope in the judgment of superiors. the forces available for battle at fredericksburg were: federal (according to general burnside's report), 116,683; confederate, 78,000. about fifty thousand of the union troops were put into battle, and less than twenty thousand of the confederates were engaged. the organization of the confederate army at this time was as follows: army of northern virginia. first corps, lieutenant-general james longstreet. mclaws's division, maj.-gen. lafayette mclaws:--_kershaw's brigade_, brig.-gen. joseph b. kershaw; 2d s. c., col. john d. kennedy; 3d s. c., col. james d. nance, lieut.-col. william d. rutherford, maj. robert c. maffett, capt. william w. hance, capt. john c. summer, capt. john k. g. nance; 7th s. c., lieut.-col. elbert bland; 8th s. c., capt. e. t. stackhouse; 5th s. c., col. w. d. desaussure; 3d s. c. battn., lieut.-col. w. g. rice. _barksdale's brigade_, brig.-gen. william barksdale; 13th miss., col. j. w. carter; 17th miss., col. john c. fiser; 18th miss., lieut.-col. w. h. luse; 21st miss., col. benjamin g. humphreys. _cobb's brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. t. r. r. cobb, (2) col. robert mcmillan; 16th ga., col. goode bryan; 18th ga., lieut.-col. s. z. ruff; 24th ga., col. robert mcmillan; cobb legion; phillips's legion, col. b. f. cook. _semmes's brigade_, brig.-gen. paul j. semmes; 10th, 50th, 51st, and 53d ga. _artillery_, col. h. c. cabell; manly's (n. c.) battery, read's (ga.) battery, richmond howitzers (1st), mccarthy's battery; troup (ga.) art. (carlton's battery). anderson's division, maj.-gen. richard h. anderson:--_wilcox's brigade_, brig.-gen. cadmus m. wilcox; 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 14th ala. _mahone's brigade_, brig.-gen. william mahone; 6th, 12th, 16th, 41st, and 61st va. _featherston's brigade_, brig.-gen. w. s. featherston; 12th, 16th, 19th, and 48th miss. (5 cos.). _wright's brigade_, brig.-gen. a. r. wright; 3d (col. edward j. walker), 22d, 48th (capt. m. r. hall), and 2d ga. battn. (capt. c. j. moffett). _perry's brigade_, brig.-gen. e. a. perry; 2d, 5th, and 8th fla., capt. david lang, capt. thomas r. love. _artillery_, donaldsonville (la.) art., capt. v. maurin; huger's (va.) battery, capt. frank huger; lewis's (va.) battery, capt. john w. lewis; norfolk (va.) light art. blues, lieut. william t. peet. pickett's division, maj.-gen. george e. pickett:--_garnett's brigade_, brig.-gen. richard b. garnett; 8th, 18th, 19th, 28th, and 56th va. _armistead's brigade_, brig.-gen. lewis a. armistead; 9th, 14th, 38th, 53d, and 57th va. _kemper's brigade_, brig.-gen. james l. kemper; 1st, 3d, 7th, 11th, and 24th va. _jenkins's brigade_, brig.-gen. m. jenkins; 1st (hagood's), 2d (rifles), 5th, and 6th s. c.; hampton legion; palmetto sharp-shooters. _corse's brigade_, brig.-gen. montgomery d. corse; 15th, 17th, 30th, and 32d va. _artillery_, dearing's (va.) battery, fauquier (va.) art. (stribling's battery), richmond (fayette) art. (macon's battery). hood's division, maj.-gen. john b. hood:--_law's brigade_, brig.-gen. e. m. law; 4th and 44th ala.; 6th and 54th n. c. (col. j. c. s. mcdowell); 57th n. c., col. a. c. goodwin. _robertson's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. b. robertson; 3d ark.; 1st, 4th, and 5th tex. _anderson's brigade_, brig.-gen. george t. anderson; 1st (regulars), 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th ga. _toombs's brigade_, col. h. l. benning; 2d, 15th, 17th, and 20th ga. _artillery_, german (s. c.) art. (bachman's battery), palmetto (s. c.) light art. (garden's battery), rowan (n. c.) art. (reilly's battery). ransom's division, brig.-gen. robert ransom, jr.:--_ransom's brigade_, brig.-gen. robert ransom, jr.; 24th, 25th (lieut.-col. samuel c. bryson), 35th, and 49th n. c.; branch's (va.) battery. _cooke's brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. j. r. cooke, (2) col. e. d. hall; 15th n. c.; 27th n. c., col. john a. gilmer, jr.; 46th n. c., col. e. d. hall; 48th n. c., lieut.-col. samuel h. walkup; cooper's (va.) battery. first corps artillery:[114]--_washington (la.) artillery_, col. j. b. walton; 1st co., capt. c. w. squires; 2d co., capt. j. b. richardson; 3d co., capt. m. b. miller; 4th co., capt. b. f. eshleman. _alexander's battalion_, lieut.-col. e. porter alexander; bedford (va.) art., capt. tyler c. jordan; eubank's (va.) battery, capt. j. l. eubank; madison light art. (la.), capt. geo. v. moody; parker's (va.) battery, capt. william w. parker; rhett's (s. c.) battery, capt. a. b. rhett; woolfolk's (va.) battery, capt. p. woolfolk, jr. second corps, lieutenant-general thomas j. jackson. d. h. hill's division, maj.-gen. daniel h. hill:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. r. e. rodes; 3d, 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th ala. _second (ripley's) brigade_, brig.-gen. george doles; 4th ga.; 44th ga., col. john b. estes; 1st and 3d n. c. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. a. h. colquitt; 13th ala.; 6th, 23d, 27th, and 28th ga. _fourth brigade_, brig.-gen. alfred iverson; 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23d n. c. _fifth (ramseur's) brigade_, col. bryan grimes; 2d, 4th, 14th, and 30th n. c. _artillery_, maj. h. p. jones; hardaway's (ala.) battery, jeff davis (ala.) art. (bondurant's battery), king william (va.) art. (carter's battery), morris (va.) art. (page's battery), orange (va.) art. (fry's battery). a. p. hill's division, maj.-gen. ambrose p. hill:--_first (field's) brigade_, col. j. m. brockenbrough; 40th, 47th (col. robert m. mayo), 55th, and 22d va. battn., lieut.-col. e. p. tayloe. _second brigade_, (1). brig.-gen. maxcy gregg, (2) col. d. h. hamilton; 1st s. c. (p. a.), col. d. h. hamilton; 1st s. c. rifles; 12th, 13th, and 14th s. c. (col. samuel mcgowan). _third brigade_, brig.-gen. e. l. thomas; 14th, 35th, 45th, and 49th ga. _fourth brigade_, brig.-gen. j. h. lane; 7th n. c., lieut.-col. j. l. hill; 18th n. c., col. thomas j. purdie; 28th n. c., col. s. d. lowe; 33d n. c., col. clark m. avery; 37th n. c., col. w. m. barbour. _fifth brigade_, brig.-gen. j. j. archer; 5th ala. battn., maj. a. s. van de graaff, capt. s. d. stewart; 19th ga., lieut.-col. a. j. hutchins; 1st tenn. (pro. army), col. peter turney, lieut.-col. n. j. george, capt. m. turney, capt. h. j. hawkins; 7th tenn., col. john f. goodner; 14th tenn., lieut.-col. j. w. lockert. _sixth brigade_, (1) brig.-gen. william d. pender, (2) col. a. m. scales; 13th n. c., col. a. m. scales; 16th n. c., col. john s. mcelroy; 22d n. c., maj. christopher c. cole; 34th and 38th n. c. _artillery_, lieut.-col. r. l. walker; branch (n. c.) art., lieut. j. r. potts; crenshaw (va.) batt., lieut. j. ellett; fredericksburg (va.) art., lieut. e. a. marye; johnson's (va.) battery, lieut. v. j. clutter; letcher (va.) art., capt, g. davidson; pee dee (s. c.) art., capt. d. g. mcintosh; purcell (va.) art., capt. w. j. pegram. ewell's division, brig.-gen. jubal a. early:--_lawton's brigade_, (1) col. e. n. atkinson, (2) col. c. a. evans; 13th ga., col. j. m. smith; 26th ga., capt. b. f. grace; 31st ga., col. c. a. evans; 38th ga., capt. william l. mcleod; 60th ga., col. w. h. stiles; 61st ga., col. j. h. lamar, maj. c. w. mcarthur. _trimble's brigade_, col. r. f. hoke; 15th ala.; 12th ga.; 21st ga., lieut.-col. thomas w. hooper; 21st n. c. and 1st n. c. battn. _early's brigade_, col. j. a. walker; 13th va., lieut.-col. j. b. terrill; 25th, 31st, 44th, 49th, 52d, and 58th va. _hays's (1st la.) brigade_, gen. harry t. hays; 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th la. _artillery_ capt. j. w. latimer; charlottesville (va.) art., capt. j. mcd. carrington; chesapeake (md.) art., lieut. john e. plater; courtney (va.) art., lieut. w. a. tanner; 1st md. batt., capt. william f. dement; la. guard art., capt. louis e. d'aquin; staunton (va.) art., lieut. asher w. garber. jackson's division, brig.-gen. william b. taliaferro:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. e. f. paxton; 2d va., capt. j. q. a. nadenbousch; 4th va., lieut.-col. r. d. gardner, maj. william terry; 5th va., lieut.-col. h. j. williams; 27th va., lieut.-col. j. k. edmondson; 33d va., col. edwin g. lee. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. j. r. jones; 21st, 42d, and 48th va.; 1st va. battn. _third (taliaferro's) brigade_, col. e. t. h. warren; 47th ala., capt. james m. campbell; 48th ala., capt. c. b. st. john; 10th va., capt. w. b. yancey; 23d va., capt. a. j. richardson; 37th va., col. t. v. williams. _fourth (starke's) brigade_, col. edmund pendleton; 1st la. (vols.), lieut.-col. m. nolan; 2d la., maj. m. a. grogan; 10th la., maj. john m. legett; 14th la., capt. h. m. verlander; 15th la., lieut.-col. mcg. goodwyn; coppens's (la.) battn. _artillery_, capt. j. b. brockenbrough; carpenter's (va.) battery, lieut. george mckendree; danville (va.) art., capt. g. w. wooding; hampden (va.) art., capt. w. h. caskie; lee (va.) art., lieut. c. w. statham; lusk's (va.) battery. reserve artillery,[115] brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton:--_brown's battalion_, col. j. thompson brown; brooke's (va.) battery, dance's battery, powhatan art., hupp's battery, salem art., poague's (va.) battery, rockbridge art., smith's battery, 3d howitzers; watson's battery, 2d howitzers. _cutts's (ga.) battalion_, lane's battery, patterson's battery, ross's battery, capt. h. m. ross. _nelson's battalion_, maj. william nelson; kirkpatrick's (va.) battery, amherst art.; massie's (va.) battery, fluvanna art.; milledge's (ga.) battery. _miscellaneous batteries_, ells's (ga.) battery; nelson's (va.) battery, hanover art., capt. g. w. nelson; breathed (va.) battery, j. breathed; chew's (va.) battery, r. p. chew; hart's (s. c.) battery, j. f. hart; henry's (va.) battery, m. w. henry; moorman's (va.) battery, m. n. moorman. cavalry,[116] maj.-gen. james e. b. stuart:--_first brigade_,[117] brig.-gen. wade hampton; 1st n. c., col. l. s. baker; 1st s. c., col. j. l. black; 2d s. c., col. m. c. butler; cobb (ga.) legion, lieut.-col. p. m. b. young; phillips's (ga.) legion, lieut.-col. william w. rich. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. fitzhugh lee; 1st va., col. james h. drake; 2d va., col. thomas t. munford; 3d va., col. t. h. owen; 4th va., col. william c. wickham; 5th va. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. w. h. f. lee; 2d n. c., col. s. williams; 9th va., col. r. l. t. beale; 10th va., col. j. lucius davis; 13th va., col. j. r. chambliss, jr.; 15th va., col. william b. ball. _fourth brigade_,[118] brig.-gen. w. e. jones; 6th va., col. john s. green; 7th va., col. r. h. dulany; 12th va., col. a. w. harman; 17th (va.) battn., lieut.-col. o. r. funsten; white's (va.) battn., maj. e. v. white. chapter xxiv. preparing for the spring of '63. burnside's abortive moves--the "mud march"--general hooker supersedes burnside--the confederates strengthen their position for the winter--longstreet ordered to petersburg--secretary of war seddon and the author talk of general grant and the confederate situation on the mississippi and in the west--longstreet makes a radical proposition for confederate concentration in tennessee, thus to compel grant to abandon vicksburg--the skilful use of interior lines the only way of equalizing the contest--battle of chancellorsville, lee's brilliant achievement--criticism--death of "stonewall" jackson--the resolve to march northward--the army reorganized in three corps--ewell and a. p. hill appointed lieutenant-generals. before we were fully settled in our winter quarters, and when just beginning to enjoy our camp theatricals, we heard that general burnside was looking for another crossing by the lower rappahannock. we were not greatly concerned about that, however, as we thought the quicksands along the flats, made especially protective by the winter rains, would so delay his march as to allow us ample time to prepare for him. but the washington authorities having received reports of it through some of the superior officers of the army of the potomac, the march was arrested by orders of the war department. another move was set on foot a few weeks later, at a time when general lee happened to be in richmond. the information was forwarded to him and the army ordered under arms, prepared to take the field. a few weeks before, general burnside had ordered material to be hauled to the point below, which he had chosen when preparing for his crossing that had been arrested by the war department. when we found that his army was in motion, general jackson insisted that the crossing would be made below, and proposed to march his corps down to meet it. he was told that the neck of land between the potomac and the rappahannock was so interlaced with wet-weather streams and ravines that the route leading below was not practicable at that season; that the quicksands on the flats of the west side were formidable obstacles to the march of an army; that the only possible route for crossing the river was by the fords of the highlands, and that he must hold his troops ready to move accordingly. he was not satisfied with the refusal to accept his construction of the enemy's purpose, and demurred against authority less than general lee's, but found that the order must be obeyed. not many hours after the report came, the noise of the army working through the mud was distinctly heard by my picket guards along the upper river. some of the guards called out derisively, offering help to get the batteries through the mud if they could only be assured that the army would cross. the bottomless roads and severe weather broke up the campaign, and the move back to camp was reported to me before the confederates marched from their camps. this effort, called by burnside's soldiers "the mud march," was followed by the assignment of general hooker to command of the army of the potomac. long and close study of the field from the potomac to the james river, and the experiences of former campaigns, made it clear that the army of the potomac had been drawn into a false position, and it became manifest that there were but two moves left open for its spring campaign,--first, by crossing the upper fords of the rappahannock; secondly, by detaching forces to the south side of the james, and by that route moving against richmond. to guard against the former i laid out lines for field-works and rifle-pits covering all approaches by the upper fords as far as the road leading from united states ford. from that point the line broke to the rear, crossing the plank road and extending back half a mile to command the road from chancellorsville to spottsylvania court-house. when the lines for these works were well marked, i was ordered, with the divisions of hood and pickett and dearing's and henry's artillery battalions, to the south side near petersburg, to be in position to meet the latter move, leaving the divisions of mclaws and r. h. anderson to finish the work on the lines of defence. after passing to the south side of james river, assigning the troops to points of observation near blackwater river, and establishing head-quarters at petersburg, i learned that there was a goodly supply of produce along the east coast of virginia and north carolina, inside the military lines of the federal forces. to collect and transport this to accessible points for the confederates, it was necessary to advance our divisions so as to cover the country, and to hold the federal forces in and about their fortified positions while our trains were at work. to that end i moved with the troops in virginia across the blackwater to close lines about the forts around suffolk, and ordered the troops along our line in north carolina to a like advance. the movements were executed without serious trouble, and the work was prosecuted up to the time of my recall by general lee. while lying near suffolk a couple of young men dressed as citizens entered my tent one night with letters from secretary of war seddon, recommending them as trustworthy and efficient scouts. they were sent off through the swamp to find their way to norfolk and southward to report of roads or routes for our troops in case we should wish to make a détour for the capture of suffolk. one of them, harrison, proved to be an active, intelligent, enterprising scout, and was retained in service. the accounts that we gained indicated that suffolk could be turned and captured with little loss, but as we had given it up the year before as untenable, and were liable to be called upon at any moment to give it up again, it appeared that the "cost of the whistle" would be too high. the only occurrence of serious moment while we had our forces about suffolk was the loss of captain stribling's battery, which had been inadvertently posted by the officer in charge of the artillery on a neck running out into a bend of the nansemond river. the federal gun-boats, seeing the opportunity, came into the river and took positions commanding the ground in rear of the battery so as to sweep the field against all succoring parties, while a direct attack was made upon the battery, resulting in its capture. about this time the soldiers on both sides had considerable amusement over a federal signal station that was inside our lines as we had laid them. the union troops had some time previously trimmed up a tall pine-tree and built near the top a platform for use as a signal station, and, coming upon this, to gratify his curiosity a confederate soldier climbed to the staging and seated himself for a leisurely view of the federal forces inside their works. an artillerist of the other side, after allowing sufficient time to satisfy a reasonable curiosity, trained one of his rifle guns upon the platform, and sent a shell screaming and bursting too near for the comfort of the "man up a tree." as he did not care to be seen in precipitate retreat, he thought to wait a little, but a second shot admonished him that hurry, if less graceful, might be more wise than deliberate retreat. acting under pressure of the situation, his legs, to the amusement of the men on both sides, soon brought him to safe cover. when night closed in over the belligerents this soldier went to work on a scheme by which he hoped to get even with the yankees. he carefully constructed and equipped a full-sized man, dressed in a new suit of improved "butternut"[119] dry-goods, and, in due form christening him "julius cæsar," took him to the platform, adjusted him to graceful position, and made him secure to the framework by strong cords. a little after sunrise "julius cæsar" was discovered by some of the federal battery officers, who prepared for the target,--so inviting to skilful practice. the new soldier sat under the hot fire with irritating indifference until the confederates, not able to restrain their hilarity, exposed the joke by calling for "three cheers for julius cæsar." the other side quickly recognized the situation, and good-naturedly added to ours their cheers for the old hero. about the 28th day of april the army of the potomac, under general hooker, took up its march for the fords of the upper rappahannock to cross against general lee at fredericksburg. at the same time general grant crossed the mississippi below vicksburg, marched against general pemberton's army in mississippi, and was driving it back upon its fortifications about vicksburg. when general hooker's movements were so developed as to make sure of his purpose, repeated calls came to me over the wires to pull away from suffolk and return to general lee with all speed. these came from general lee, and also from the richmond authorities. in reply i despatched that our trains were at the front along the coast collecting supplies; that they would be hurried to our rear, and as soon as safe we would march. the calls became so frequent and urgent, however, that i inquired if we should abandon our trains. to this no answer came; and i was left to the exercise of my own judgment. as soon as the trains were safely back, we drew off, marched back to the blackwater, and thence _en route_ for richmond and fredericksburg. before we reached the former place a telegram came announcing the great battle and victory of chancellorsville. passing through richmond, i called to report to secretary of war seddon, who referred to affairs in mississippi, stating that the department was trying to collect an army at jackson, under general joseph e. johnston, sufficient to push grant away from his circling lines about vicksburg. he spoke of the difficulty of feeding as well as collecting an army of that magnitude in mississippi, and asked my views. the union army under general rosecrans was then facing the confederate army under general bragg in tennessee, at murfreesboro' and shelbyville. i thought that general grant had better facilities for collecting supplies and reinforcements on his new lines, and suggested that the only prospect of relieving vicksburg that occurred to me was to send general johnston and his troops about jackson to reinforce general bragg's army; at the same time the two divisions of my command, then marching to join general lee, to the same point; that the commands moving on converging lines could have rapid transit and be thrown in overwhelming numbers on rosecrans before he could have help, break up his army, and march for cincinnati and the ohio river; that grant's was the only army that could be drawn to meet this move, and that the move must, therefore, relieve vicksburg. it was manifest before the war was accepted that the only way to equalize the contest was by skilful use of our interior lines, and this was so impressed by two years' experience that it seemed time to force it upon the richmond authorities. but foreign intervention was the ruling idea with the president, and he preferred that as the easiest solution of all problems. the only objection offered by the secretary was that grant was such an obstinate fellow that he could only be induced to quit vicksburg by terribly hard knocks. on the contrary, i claimed that _he was a soldier_, and would obey the calls of his government, but was not lightly to be driven from his purpose. my march was continued, and we joined general lee at fredericksburg, where i found him in sadness, notwithstanding that he was contemplating his great achievement and brilliant victory of chancellorsville, for he had met with great loss as well as great gains. the battle had cost heavily of his army, but his grief was over the severe wounding of his great lieutenant, general thomas jonathan jackson, the head of the second corps of the army of northern virginia; cut off, too, at a moment so much needed to finish his work in the battle so handsomely begun. with a brave heart, however, general lee was getting his ranks together, and putting them in condition for other useful work. at the time of the battle of chancellorsville the army of the potomac, according to its return of a few days before, consisted of officers and men actually available for line of battle, 113,838, with 404 pieces of artillery.[120] the return of casualties showed the enormous loss of 17,287. returns of the army of northern virginia for march, 1863, showed an effective aggregate of 59,681;[121] batteries in action, about 160 guns. to this may possibly be added one thousand of troops returning during april in time for the battle. the casualties reported by the medical director numbered 10,281, but reports of the commanders showed over 12,000, not including artillery or cavalry, or slightly wounded and missing, which would probably add another thousand. chancellorsville is usually accepted as general lee's most brilliant achievement, and, considered as an independent affair, it was certainly grand. as i had no part in its active conduct, it is only apropos to this writing to consider the plan of battle as projected some four months previous,--_i.e._, to stand behind our intrenched lines and await the return of my troops from suffolk. [illustration: strategic and southern railroad map, 1863. showing positions of forces in the field may 4th, 1863, when the concentration against rosecrans' army was first proposed.] under that plan general lee would have had time to strengthen and improve his trenches, while hooker was intrenching at chancellorsville. he could have held his army solid behind his lines, where his men would have done more work on the unfinished lines in a day than in months of idle camp life. general hooker had split his army in two, and was virtually in the condition which president lincoln afterwards so graphically described in his letter addressed to him june 5 following,--viz.: "i would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other." my impression was, and is, that general lee, standing under his trenches, would have been stronger against hooker than he was in december against burnside, and that he would have grown stronger every hour of delay, while hooker would have grown weaker in morale and in confidence of his plan and the confidence of his troops. he had interior lines for defence, while his adversary was divided by two crossings of the river, which made lee's sixty thousand for defence about equal to the one hundred and thirteen thousand under general hooker. by the time that the divisions of pickett and hood could have joined general lee, general hooker would have found that he must march to attack or make a retreat without battle. it seems probable that under the original plan the battle would have given fruits worthy of a general engagement. the confederates would then have had opportunity, and have been in condition to so follow hooker as to have compelled his retirement to washington, and that advantage might have drawn grant from vicksburg; whereas general lee was actually so crippled by his victory that he was a full month restoring his army to condition to take the field. in defensive warfare he was perfect. when the hunt was up, his combativeness was overruling. it was probably a mistake to draw mclaws away from his position at marye's hill, where he and ransom had successfully held against six or seven severe attacks of the burnside battle, with three brigades, two of his own and one of ransom's. general early was assigned to that position with five brigades. he was attacked by about one-fourth the number of mclaws's assailants, the position was carried, and early was driven off in confusion, losing, besides large numbers as prisoners, many pieces of artillery. his especial assignment was to defend the plank road against the enemy's march to attack general lee's rear. instead, he retreated by the telegraph road, leaving the plank road free for the enemy. after driving early off, the enemy marched by the plank road, and early marched back to his late position at marye's hill. so general lee was obliged to take mclaws and anderson from his battle at chancellorsville to drive back the force threatening his rear. the battle as pitched and as an independent affair was brilliant, and if the war was for glory could be called successful, but, besides putting the cause upon the hazard of a die, it was crippling in resources and of future progress, while the wait of a few days would have given time for concentration and opportunities against hooker more effective than we experienced with burnside at fredericksburg. this was one of the occasions where success was not a just criterion. after reporting to general lee, i offered the suggestions made to secretary seddon, in regard to the means that should be adopted for the relief of vicksburg. i thought that honor, interest, duty, and humanity called us to that service, and asked the aid of his counsels with the war department, and reinforcements from his army for the west, to that end. i suggested that general johnston, instead of trying to collect an army against general grant, should be sent to reinforce general bragg, then standing against the union forces under general rosecrans in middle tennessee; that at the same time he should send my divisions, just up from suffolk, to join johnston's reinforcements to bragg's army; that the combination once made should strike immediately in overwhelming force upon rosecrans, and march for the ohio river and cincinnati. he recognized the suggestion as of good combination, and giving strong assurance of success, but he was averse to having a part of his army so far beyond his reach. he reflected over the matter one or two days, and then fell upon the plan of invading the northern soil, and so threatening washington as to bring about the same hoped-for result. to that end he bent his energies. his plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer suggestions leading to a different course. all that i could ask was that the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics; that we should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position as we might find in his own country, so well adapted to that purpose,--which might assure us of a grand triumph. to this he readily assented as an important and material adjunct to his general plan. his confidence in making moves threatening washington and the invasion of maryland and pennsylvania grew out of the known anxiety of the washington authorities as to the safety of their capital and of quiet within the union lines. in the midst of his work of preparation came the announcement that general jackson's trouble had taken an unfortunate turn, that he was thought to be sinking, and not many hours after that the news came that he had gone to rest. but the full realization of all that this meant was delayed until, at the railroad station, the train that was to bear his remains to their final resting-place started upon its sad journey. then officers and soldiers gathered to do last honors to their dead comrade and chieftain seemed suddenly to realize that they were to see "stonewall" jackson no more forever, and fully to measure the great misfortune that had come upon them. and as we turned away, we seemed to face a future bereft of much of its hopefulness. general jackson's death suggested to general lee a reorganization of his army into three corps, and r. s. ewell and a. p. hill, appointed lieutenant-generals, were assigned to the second and third respectively. as the senior major-general of the army, and by reason of distinguished services and ability, general ewell was entitled to the command of the second corps, but there were other major-generals of rank next below ewell whose services were such as to give them claims next after ewell's, so that when they found themselves neglected there was no little discontent, and the fact that both the new lieutenant-generals were virginians made the trouble more grievous.[122] afterwards, when early, noted as the weakest general officer of the army of northern virginia, was appointed lieutenant-general over those who held higher rank than he, there was a more serious feeling of "too much virginia." longstreet and jackson had been assigned by general johnston. in our anxious hours and hopeful anticipations the little quarrel was soon lost sight of,--displaced by affairs of greater moment. reaction began to show the effect of general lee's strong hand and hard work. hope and confidence impaired by the failure of the maryland campaign were restored, and we prepared to abandon all uncomfortable thoughts with the graves of our fallen comrades. as soon as affairs took such shape as to assure me that the advance northward was inevitable, i sent a requisition down to richmond for gold coin for my scout harrison, gave him what he thought he would need to get along in washington, and sent him off with secret orders, telling him that i did not care to see him till he could bring information of importance,--that he should be the judge of that. he wanted to know where he would find us, and was told that the head-quarters of the first corps were large enough for any intelligent man to find. with these orders he left us, and after about three weeks was arrested in pennsylvania and brought under guard to my head-quarters. chapter xxv. invasion of pennsylvania. plan of the confederate march north--general lee hoped to draw troops from the south and develop important results north of the potomac--he wanted beauregard sent to support the movement--the authorities in richmond failed to comprehend--the value of the "interior lines" not appreciated--spirited cavalry fight at brandy station between stuart's and pleasonton's commands--engagement of ewell and milroy at winchester--the question of authority for the cavalry movements--lieutenant-colonel fremantle of the coldstream guards, british army, as a guest and observer--the confederate advance reaches pennsylvania soil--general lee issues orders for a march on harrisburg--municipal authorities of york and gettysburg surrender to general john b. gordon. the absorbing study now was the projected campaign into maryland and pennsylvania,--the invasion of the enemy's country. the plan of defensive tactics gave some hope of success, and, in fact, i assured general lee that the first corps would receive and defend the battle if he would guard its flanks, leaving his other corps to gather the fruits of success. the first corps was as solid as a rock--a great rock. it was not to be broken of good position by direct assault, and was steady enough to work and wait for its chosen battle. the valley of the shenandoah gave us firm, broad roads for the march north, curtained by the solid range of the blue ridge and south mountains. there were some federal troops occupying points in the valley of virginia, but not more than enough to give healthful employment to our leading columns as they advanced. the army as reorganized in three corps had three divisions of each corps, with four brigades to the division, except r. h. anderson's, pickett's, and rodes's, each of which had five. j. e. b. stuart's cavalry consisted of the brigades of wade hampton, fitzhugh lee, w. h. f. lee, beverly robertson, and w. e. jones. the cavalry of jenkins and imboden, operating in the valley and west virginia near our route, was to move, the former with ewell, the latter on his left. six batteries of horse artillery under major r. f. beckham were of stuart's command, and to each army corps were attached five battalions of artillery of four guns to a battery, and four batteries to a battalion, making of the whole artillery organization, including batteries of reserve and the thirty guns of horse artillery, two hundred and eighty-seven guns. in the three army corps there were thirty-nine brigades, proper, of infantry. in the army of the potomac were fifty-one brigades of infantry, eight brigades of cavalry, and three hundred and seventy guns of artillery. the artillery appointments were so superior that our officers sometimes felt humiliated when posted to unequal combat with their better metal and munitions. in small-arms also the union troops had the most improved styles. notwithstanding, we were prepared to march forward and cheerfully accept the gage, hoping to overbalance these advantages through the morale afforded by brave hearts and the strategic skill to throw the onus of battle upon the enemy. the plan of campaign as projected was by the march of the second corps through the valley of the shenandoah to drive off or capture the federal forces stationed along the valley, and continue the march to pennsylvania until further orders, meanwhile collecting supplies for the advance and for those who were to follow, jenkins's brigade of cavalry working with the advance, and imboden's on its left; the first corps and main force of cavalry to march near the east base of the blue ridge, threatening towards the rear line of the army of the potomac, and occupy the blue ridge, while the trains and other troops passed behind the mountains to follow the advance march. stuart's cavalry brigades were to observe between the first corps and the union army. when the third corps had passed behind the first, the latter and the cavalry were to withdraw and follow the general march. stuart, whose movements were to correspond to those of the first corps, was to follow its withdrawal and cross the potomac on our right flank at shepherdstown. the brigades of generals m. jenkins and m. d. corse of pickett's division, left in virginia near petersburg and hanover junction, were to follow and join their division, as will soon appear. general beauregard was to be called from his post, in the south, with such brigades as could be pulled away temporarily from their southern service, and thrown forward, with the two brigades of pickett's division (jenkins's and corse's) and such others as could be got together, along the orange and alexandria railroad in threatening attitude towards washington city, and he was to suddenly forward pickett's brigades through the valley to the division, and at his pleasure march on, or back towards richmond. as the season of fevers along the coast of the carolinas was approaching, general lee thought that active operations in the far south, especially along the seaboard, would be suspended, that his move northward might draw most of them towards him, and possibly troops operating in the southwest, the latter being really a prominent part of the object of his northern march. he thought that beauregard's appearance in northern virginia would increase the known anxiety of the washington authorities and cause them to draw troops from the south, when in the progress of events other similar movements might follow on both sides until important results could be developed north of the potomac. his early experience with the richmond authorities taught him to deal cautiously with them in disclosing his views, and to leave for them the privilege and credit of approving, step by step, his apparently hesitant policy, so that his plans were disclosed little at a time; and, finding them slow in approving them, still slower in advancing the brigades of pickett's division, and utterly oblivious of the effect of a grand swing north on our interior lines, he did not mention the part left open for beauregard until he had their approval of the march of the part of his command as he held it in hand. the part assigned for beauregard became the subject for correspondence between the authorities and the officers who knew nothing of the general ideas and plans. the latter failed to see any benefit to accrue by taking troops from their commands, and naturally offered objections to their going. the authorities, not comprehending the vast strength to be gathered by utilizing our interior lines, failed to bring about their execution, and the great possibility was not fully tested. in pursuance of the plan for the northern campaign our march was taken up on wednesday, the 3d of june, mclaws's division of the first corps marching on that date from fredericksburg, and hood's from near orange court-house on the 4th; rodes's division of the second corps followed, and on the 5th johnson's and early's of the second. pickett of the first, with three of his brigades, followed the course of hood's division. all were to assemble at culpeper court-house, near our cavalry head-quarters. the third corps, general a. p. hill, was left in observation of the enemy at fredericksburg. when general hooker discovered the thinning of our camps in rear of fredericksburg, he put a bridge across the rappahannock at deep run, crossed a considerable force of artillery and infantry, and constructed a line of rifle-pits along the river bank. at the report of these movements, general lee thought to delay the movements of the second corps, though he hurried those of the first to draw off the federals from action against hill, but holding the second ready to go back to him should there be need. hill made a similar demonstration against hooker, threatening on the river below, though not so far as to cross it, which caused the federals to draw their troops from the south side. the second corps was then hurried on to culpeper court-house. the first and second corps waited at the court-house to know if indications about fredericksburg were such as to warrant the onward march. general hooker, not convinced that general lee had left him, ordered his cavalry under general pleasonton, supported by two brigades of infantry, to cross the rappahannock in search of stuart's cavalry, and to secure information of the confederate plans. pleasonton's force, including infantry, was eleven thousand. he divided his command, sending one half by beverley's, the other by kelly's ford, to march on converging roads to brandy station, near fleetwood, the latter point the head-quarters of our cavalry chief, five miles west of rappahannock bridge. happily for the confederates, the cavalry brigades had been drawn together on the 8th for review by general lee, and rested that night not remote from cavalry head-quarters. on the 9th, pleasonton's columns made an unlooked-for advance and engaged the confederates, before notice could be sent to the columns at their camps. the march resulted in a very severe and strongly disputed cavalry fight, ending in heavy losses on both sides. general stuart called for infantry supports before the close of the conflict, but succeeded in recovering his position before the infantry reached him,--not, however, until some important despatches were taken by the enemy, which gave the information they were seeking. stuart reported 485 officers and men lost; pleasonton, 907, and three pieces of artillery. on the 10th, ewell took up his march for the valley by chester gap. now, general milroy had a division of nine thousand federals at winchester, and sought to hold it contrary to his orders to retire to the command at harper's ferry. he had a brigade on outpost at berryville under mcreynolds. general kelly had ten thousand men at harper's ferry, with a strong detachment of infantry and a battery at martinsburg, under colonel b. f. smith. upon entering the valley, general ewell detached rodes's division and jenkins's cavalry to cut off and capture the force at berryville, but mcreynolds withdrew in time to join the forces at winchester. this confederate column then marched for martinsburg, and got possession there on the 14th, the garrison marching out and joining the troops on maryland heights. the artillery trying to escape north towards williamsport was followed so closely that they lost some three or four guns. with his divisions under johnson and early, general ewell marched to winchester and attacked and carried the outworks of milroy's fortified position, when the latter, after calling a council, decided to retreat, leaving his artillery and wagon-trains. ewell had anticipated this, and sent a part of johnson's division, one brigade, to intercept him on the martinsburg road. the commands met about daylight, and there ensued a severe engagement, successful to the federals till reinforcements came to the confederates, when milroy's command was broken up, part of his troops escaping to harper's ferry and part getting over the potomac at hancock. the federals at harper's ferry abandoned their position in virginia, seeking shelter on the heights on the maryland side. on his march through the valley, general ewell took 4000 prisoners and small-arms, 25 cannon, 11 standards, 250 wagons, 400 horses, and large quantities of subsistence and quartermaster's stores, with a loss of 269 of all arms. he crossed the potomac on the 15th, occupying hagerstown and sharpsburg, on the maryland side, and sent the cavalry brigade, under jenkins, north towards chambersburg. by the plan of march from the valley of virginia the leading corps (second) was to divide and cross the potomac river at williamsport and shepherdstown, the column through williamsport to march through hagerstown and chambersburg towards harrisburg, collecting produce and supplies for the army, imboden's cavalry on its left flank. the eastern column was to march through sharpsburg, emmitsburg, and gettysburg towards the bridge over the susquehanna river at wrightsville, jenkins's cavalry brigade working with the two columns. the third corps, passing behind the blue ridge, was to cross at shepherdstown and follow the march of the eastern column. the first corps was to draw back from the blue ridge and cross the potomac at williamsport, to be followed by the cavalry, which was to cross at shepherdstown and ride severely towards baltimore, to force the enemy to eastern concentration. the object of the march of the eastern columns, besides opening a wide field for foraging, was to draw the enemy from the route of travel of the supply trains, and to press him off east to give opportunity for the western columns to file in between him and washington. the reconnoissance and cavalry fight made against stuart at fleetwood gave general hooker conclusive evidence of the march of the army of northern virginia, and he drew off from stafford heights on the 13th, and marched towards the orange and alexandria railroad and the potomac river. the first corps was ordered north along the east base of the blue ridge to guard our line of march and cover, in a measure, the confederate plans, stuart's cavalry to ride between the first corps and the union army. on the 19th the divisions of the first corps were posted along the blue ridge from ashby's gap on the right to snicker's gap on the left, mclaws at the former, hood at the latter, pickett's three brigades between the others. under the impression that the cavalry was to operate with the first corps, in the general plan, the commander was ordered to follow its withdrawal west of the blue ridge and cross the potomac on its right at shepherdstown, and make his ride towards baltimore. he claimed that general lee had given him authority to cross east of the blue ridge. after the first corps was in position on the blue ridge, and while the third was passing our rear down the valley, it seems that general lee so far modified the plan of march north as to authorize his cavalry chief to cross the potomac with part of his command east of the blue ridge, and to change the march of the third corps by hagerstown and chambersburg. the point at which the cavalry force should cross the river was not determined between the confederate commander and his chief of cavalry, there being doubt whether the crossing could better be made at point of rocks, between the union army and the blue ridge, or between that army and washington city. that question was left open, and i was ordered to choose between the two points named at the moment that my command took up its line of march. the first corps was withdrawn from the blue ridge on the 20th, forded the shenandoah, and camped on its left bank. on the 21st, pleasonton came, in full force, supported by infantry, against stuart's cavalry brigades. the severe part of the fight came from upperville, and succeeded in driving stuart back into ashby's gap. part of mclaws's division was sent back in time to support stuart, and in the morning mclaws ordered wofford's brigade down upon the plain, but pleasonton had withdrawn. the infantry was recalled after an exchange of a few shots at great range. connected with the cavalry raid and orders authorizing it are matters of more than usual interest. on the 22d the confederate commander sent unsealed instructions to his cavalry chief, through head-quarters of the first corps, to be forwarded, provided the cavalry could be spared from my front and could make the ride without disclosing our plans, expressing his preference for the ride through hopewell gap east of the union army. as previously stated, i was to decide at the last moment between the two points that had been named. as my front was changed to the rear for the march north, the cavalry could be of no service there. the extent of authority with me, therefore, was to decide whether the crossing should be made at the point of rocks or around through hopewell gap east of the union army. the crossing at point of rocks was not only hazardous, but more likely to indicate our plans than any move that could be made, leaving the ride through hopewell gap the only route for the raiding party. in my note to general stuart enclosing general lee's instructions was this item: "p.s.--i think your passage of the potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. you had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the route in rear of the enemy." this has been put in italics and published as evidence that the raid was made by my orders, as well as by general lee's. in the postscript three points are indicated: first, the move along my rear to the crossing at point of rocks. second, my preferred march on my flank to the shepherdstown crossing. third, the route indicated by general lee. [illustration: arthur lyon fremantle. lieutenant-colonel coldstream guards, her majesty's service.] all of which general stuart understood as well as i did. especially did he know that _my orders were that he should ride on the right of my column, as originally designed_, to the shepherdstown crossing. in the body of my note were orders that he should report to me of affairs along the cavalry line before leaving; that he should assign general hampton to command of the cavalry to be left with us, with orders to report at my head-quarters. these orders, emanating properly from the commander of the rear column of the army, should not have been questioned, but they were treated with contumely. he assigned general robertson to command the cavalry that was left on the mountain, without orders to report at my head-quarters; and though left there to guard passes of the blue ridge, he rode on a raid, so that when the cavalry was most needed it was far away from the army. the raid and the absence of the cavalry at the critical moment were severely criticised through the army and the country. if general stuart could have claimed authority of my orders for his action, he could not have failed to do so in his official account. he offered no such excuse, but claimed to act under the orders of his chief, and reported that general lee gave consent to his application for leave to make the march. so our plans, adopted after deep study, were suddenly given over to gratify the youthful cavalryman's wish for a nomadic ride. about this time we entertained a distinguished visitor. an officer of the british service, lieutenant-colonel arthur j. l. fremantle, of the coldstream guards, brought letters from the secretary of war to general lee and myself. he was seeking opportunity to observe the campaign as a non-combatant; he travelled with us, divided his time between general head-quarters and head-quarters of the first corps, cheerfully adapted his tastes to the rough ways of confederate soldiers, and proved to be an interesting companion. to avoid the blockade he came to the confederacy through mexico. he gave a graphic account of his experience in texas and travel after crossing the rio grande to the interior in a two-horse hack. the drivers of his conveyance were mr. sargeant and judge hyde, two characters whom i had met years before while in army service on the texas frontier. they called their team grant and sherman, and enjoyed their glorious rides down the smooth slopes of the prairie roads, as they rattled their heels upon the box of the hack and plied their team, grant and sherman, with whips and oaths. but the great novelty to him was the position of the judge. in england there are few judges comparatively, and those of high estate. to find an american judge playing assistant to a hack-driver was refreshing, and colonel fremantle thoroughly enjoyed it. i now have the pleasure to salute our genial war-time visitor as governor at malta and lieutenant-general sir arthur james lyon fremantle, k.c.m., g.c.b., and to offer congratulations to her most noble majesty upon her worthy subject. on the 23d of june the divisions of the third corps passed on towards the potomac, followed by those of the first, the former crossing at shepherdstown, the latter at williamsport. the corps came together at hagerstown, in maryland, continued their march till the 27th, and rested two days at chambersburg, in pennsylvania. the cavalry under general imboden, ordered on general ewell's left, was due as far north as mcconnellsburg, but had halted at hancock. on the 28th, general lee issued orders for the march upon harrisburg. general ewell had marched his main column through chambersburg to carlisle. his column, intending to move east of the mountains through emmitsburg and gettysburg, had marched parallel to the main column as far as greenwood, when orders were renewed for it to march east through gettysburg. general early, commanding, ordered gordon's brigade and a detachment of cavalry through gettysburg; but his other troops marched north through mummasburg. the failure of the imboden cavalry on his left caused general ewell to send general george h. steuart through mcconnellsburg as guard of that flank. steuart's command rejoined him at carlisle. as general ewell marched he sent us three thousand head of beef cattle and information of five thousand barrels of flour. he halted at carlisle on the 27th. the municipal authorities of gettysburg and york surrendered to general gordon, who took some prisoners of the state militia, and marched to the bridge over the susquehanna at wrightsville, where he had other prisoners, but the bridge was burned before him. his brigade returned to the vicinity of york, where the division had marched and bivouacked on the night of the 28th. chapter xxvi. gettysburg--first day. information of federal force and positions brought by the scout harrison--general lee declines to credit it--general longstreet suggests a change of direction in conformance with the revelation--general meade had succeeded hooker in command five days before battle--positions on the eve of the first day--confederate cavalry "not in sight"--"the eyes of the army" sadly needed--a description of the famous battle-field--generals ewell and a. p. hill engage the federals--death of general john f. reynolds--the fight on seminary ridge--general hancock in federal command on the field--concerning the absent cavalry and information given by the scout--conditions at the close of the first day's fight. the eve of the great battle was crowded with events. movements for the concentration of the two vast armies went on in mighty force, but with a silence in strong contrast to the swift-coming commotion of their shock in conflict. it was the pent quiet of the gathering storm whose bursting was to shake the continent and suddenly command the startled attention of the world. after due preparation for our march of the 29th, all hands turned in early for a good night's rest. my mind had hardly turned away from the cares and labors of the day, when i was aroused by some one beating on the pole of my tent. it proved to be assistant inspector-general fairfax. a young man had been arrested by our outlying pickets under suspicious circumstances. he was looking for general longstreet's head-quarters, but his comfortable apparel and well-to-do, though travel-stained, appearance caused doubt in the minds of the guards of his being a genuine confederate who could be trusted about head-quarters. so he was sent up under a file of men to be identified. he proved to be harrison, the valued scout. he had walked through the lines of the union army during the night of the 27th and the 28th, secured a mount at dark of the latter day to get in as soon as possible, and brought information of the location of two corps of federals at night of the 27th, and approximate positions of others. general hooker had crossed the potomac on the 25th and 26th of june. on the 27th he had posted two army corps at frederick, and the scout reported another near them, and two others near south mountain, as he escaped their lines a little after dark of the 28th. he was sent under care of colonel fairfax to make report of his information at general head-quarters. general lee declined, however, to see him, though he asked colonel fairfax as to the information that he brought, and, on hearing it, expressed want of faith in reports of scouts, in which fairfax generally agreed, but suggested that in this case the information was so near general longstreet's ideas of the probable movements of the enemy that he gave credit to it. i also sent up a note suggesting a change of direction of the head of our column east. this i thought to be the first and necessary step towards bringing the two armies to such concentration east as would enable us to find a way to draw the enemy into battle, in keeping with the general plan of campaign, and at the same time draw him off from the travel of our trains. [illustration: harrison. the confederate scout who brought to general lee the first news of meade's assignment to command, and the positions of the corps of the army of the potomac.] there were seven corps of the army of the potomac afield. we were informed on the 28th of the approximate positions of five of them,--three near frederick and two near the base of south mountain. the others, of which we had no definite information, we now know were the sixth (sedgwick's), south of frederick and east of the monocacy, and the twelfth, towards harper's ferry. on the 26th, general hooker thought to use the twelfth corps and the garrison of harper's ferry to strike the line of our communication, but general halleck forbade the use of the troops of that post, when general hooker asked to be relieved of the responsibility of command, and was succeeded by general meade on the night of the 27th. if general hooker had been granted the authority for which he applied, he would have struck our trains, exposed from chambersburg to the potomac without a cavalryman to ride and report the trouble. general stuart was riding around hooker's army, general robertson was in virginia, general imboden at hancock, and jenkins's cavalry was at our front with general ewell. by the report of the scout we found that the march of ewell's east wing had failed of execution and of the effect designed, and that heavy columns of the enemy were hovering along the east base of the mountain. to remove this pressure towards our rear, general lee concluded to make a more serious demonstration and force the enemy to look eastward. with this view he changed direction of the proposed march north, by counter-orders on the night of the 28th, calling concentration east of the mountains at cashtown, and his troops began their march under the last orders on the 29th. it seems that general hill misconstrued the orders of the day, or was confused by the change of orders, and was under the impression that he was to march by york and cross the susquehanna towards philadelphia or harrisburg. he ordered his leading division under heth to cashtown, however, and followed with pender's division on the 30th, leaving orders for the division of r. h. anderson to follow on the 1st. the purpose of general lee's march east was only preliminary,--a concentration about cashtown. general ewell was ready to march for harrisburg on the 29th, when orders reached him of the intended concentration at cashtown. he was at carlisle with rodes's and e. johnson's divisions and the reserve artillery; his other division under early was at york. on the 30th, rodes was at heidlersburg, early near by, and johnson, with the reserve artillery, near green village. pettigrew's brigade of heth's division, advancing towards gettysburg on the 30th, encountered buford's cavalry and returned to cashtown. on the 29th, general meade wired general halleck,- "if lee is moving for baltimore, i expect to get between his main army and that place. if he is crossing the susquehanna, i shall rely upon general couch, with his force, holding him, until i can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which i shall endeavor to do.... my endeavor will be, in my movements, to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some portion of lee's army in detail."[123] as the change of orders made gettysburg prominent as the point of impact, the positions of the commands relative thereto and their distances therefrom are items of importance in considering the culmination of events. positions of army of northern virginia, night of june 30. general lee's head-quarters, greenwood. first corps, chambersburg, twenty-four miles to gettysburg; part at greenwood, sixteen miles. second corps and jenkins's cavalry, heidlersburg, ten miles; part near green village, twenty-three miles (johnson's division and trains). third corps, near greenwood, sixteen miles, and cashtown, eight miles. stuart's cavalry, circling between york and carlisle, out of sight. robertson's cavalry, in virginia, beyond reach. imboden's cavalry, at hancock, out of sight. the confederates not intending to precipitate battle. positions of army of the potomac. general meade's head-quarters, taneytown, fourteen miles. general hunt, artillery reserve, taneytown. first corps, marsh run, six miles. second corps, uniontown, twenty-two miles. third corps, bridgeport, twelve miles. fifth corps, union mills, fifteen miles. sixth corps, manchester, twenty-two miles. eleventh corps, emmitsburg, twelve miles. twelfth corps, littletown, nine miles. kilpatrick's cavalry, hanover, thirteen miles. gregg's cavalry, manchester, twenty-two miles. buford's cavalry, gettysburg. it should be borne in mind that the field of contention was south and east of gettysburg, so that the union troops were from two to four miles nearer their formation for battle than were the confederates, who had to march from two to four miles _beyond the town_. referring to the map, it may be seen that the confederate corps had two routes by which to march for concentration,--viz., from heidlersburg to cashtown, part of the second corps; on the road from chambersburg, the first, third, and part of the second corps (with all of the trains of the latter), with but a single track, the chambersburg-gettysburg turnpike. some of their distances were greater than any of the columns of the enemy, while the army of the potomac had almost as many routes of march as commands, and was marching from day to day anticipating a general engagement, which they were especially cautioned on the 30th was imminent. general hill decided to go beyond cashtown on the 1st to ascertain as to the enemy reported at gettysburg. he gave notice of his intentions to general ewell, and sent back to the commanding general to have anderson's division sent forward. he was at cashtown with heth's and pender's divisions and their batteries; his reserve artillery with anderson's division at fayetteville. the armies on the night of june 30 stood thus: the confederate: first corps, two divisions at greenwood (except one brigade detached under orders from head-quarters at new guilford); pickett's three brigades at chambersburg, left under orders from head-quarters to guard trains; the second corps, two divisions near heidlersburg, one near and north of chambersburg; the third corps at cashtown and fayetteville; cavalry not in sight or hearing, except jenkins's brigade and a small detachment. the union army: the first corps on marsh run, the second at uniontown, the third at bridgeport, the fifth at union mills, the sixth at manchester, the eleventh at emmitsburg, the twelfth at littlestown, fitzpatrick's cavalry at hanover, buford's at gettysburg (except one brigade, detached, guarding his trains). general meade's head-quarters and reserve artillery were at taneytown. his army, including cavalry, in hand. general lee's orders called his troops on converging lines towards cashtown, but he found that part of his infantry must be left at chambersburg to await the imboden cavalry, not up, and one of hood's brigades must be detached on his right at new guilford to guard on that side in place of robertson's cavalry (in virginia). so that as he advanced towards his adversary, the eyes and ears of his army were turned afar off, looking towards the homes of non-combatants. it is bootless to this writing to restate whence came this mishap. there is no doubt it greatly disturbed general lee's mind, and he would have called a halt under ordinary circumstances, but his orders did not contemplate immediate movements beyond cashtown. in that he felt safe, depending upon his cavalry coming up in time to meet him there. he was in his usual cheerful spirits on the morning of the 1st, and called me to ride with him. my column was not well stretched on the road before it encountered the division of e. johnson (second corps) cutting in on our front, with all of ewell's reserve and supply trains. he ordered the first corps halted, and directed that johnson's division and train should pass on to its corps, the first to wait. during the wait i dismounted to give hero a little respite. (the irish groom had christened my favorite horse "_haro_.") after a little time general lee proposed that we should ride on, and soon we heard reports of cannon. the fire seemed to be beyond cashtown, and as it increased he left me and rode faster for the front. the brigades of gamble and devin of buford's cavalry were the force that met pettigrew's brigade on the afternoon of the 30th, when the latter retired to the post of the divisions at cashtown. from gettysburg roads diverge to the passes of the mountains, the borders of the potomac and susquehanna, and the cities of baltimore and washington; so that it was something of a strategic point. from the west side two broad roads run, one northwest to chambersburg _via_ cashtown, the other southwest through fairfield to hagerstown. they cross an elevated ridge, a mile out north, and south of the lutheran seminary, known to the confederates as seminary ridge, covered by open forests. at the northward, about two miles from the town, the ridge divides, a lesser ridge putting out west, and presently taking a parallel course with the greater. this was known as mcpherson's ridge, and was about five hundred yards from the first, where the road crosses it. nearly parallel with the chambersburg pike and about two hundred yards distant was the cut of an unfinished railroad. willoughby's run flows south in a course nearly parallel to and west of the ridge, and is bordered by timbered lands. north of gettysburg the grounds are open and in fair fields. directly south of it a bold ridge rises with rough and steep slopes. the prominent point of the south ridge is cemetery hill, and east of this is culp's hill, from which the ridge turns sharply south half a mile, and drops off into low grounds. it was well wooded and its eastern ascent steep. east of it and flowing south is rock creek. from cemetery hill the ground is elevated, the ridge sloping south to the cropping out of little round top, devil's den, and the bolder round top, the latter about three miles south of the town. cemetery hill is nearly parallel to seminary ridge, and is more elevated. at five o'clock on the morning of july 1, general a. p. hill marched towards gettysburg with the divisions of heth and pender, and the battalions of artillery under pegram and mcintosh, heth's division and pegram's artillery in advance. r. h. anderson's division, with the reserve artillery left at fayetteville, was ordered to march and halt at cashtown. about ten o'clock heth encountered buford's cavalry. archer's brigade, leading, engaged, and davis's brigade came up on his left with part of pegram's artillery. the cavalry was forced back till it passed willoughby's run. on the 30th of june, general john f. reynolds had been directed to resume command of the right wing of the union army,--first, third, and eleventh corps. he was advised that day of the threatening movements of the confederates on the cashtown and mummasburg roads. at the same time the indications from general meade's head-quarters pointed to pipe creek as the probable line in case of battle. reynolds, however, prepared to support buford's line of cavalry, and marched at eight o'clock on the 1st of july with wadsworth's division and hall's battery, leaving the other divisions of doubleday and robinson with the artillery to follow under general doubleday, who became commander of the corps upon the assignment of reynolds to command of the wing. as reynolds approached gettysburg, in hearing of the cavalry fight, he turned the head of his column to the left and marched through the fields towards the engagement. as the cavalry skirmish line retired and passed willoughby's run, he approached with his reinforcements, brigadier-general cutter in advance, and was put in on the north of the cashtown road, followed by hall's battery. brigadier-general meredith following, his brigade was put into line on the left. as fast as the troops got into line they became severely engaged. doubleday, in advance of the divisions under him, put meredith's brigade in formidable position on a strip of woodland on the left. as the confederate left advanced through the railroad cut they came upon hall's battery, and were about to get it, when it was saved by speedy withdrawal, which caused the union right to retire, while archer's brigade of the confederate right, in pushing to the front, came in open space before meredith's brigade, which in turn made a gallant advance, drove archer back, followed across the run, and captured general archer and one thousand of his men. the other two brigades of pender's division, pettigrew's and brockenbrough's, were put in on the right of archer's men. during the severe engagement on his right the advance of the confederate infantry got in so close along the railroad cut that general reynolds, in efforts to extricate his right, was shot, when the right, still under severe pressure, was forced to retire towards seminary ridge. hall's battery, severely crippled, succeeded in getting away as the right retired. doubleday's other divisions came up about the moment general reynolds was killed. the second (robinson's) and third (rowley's) divisions deployed on the right and left. cooper's battery of four three-inch guns followed the left division. at the same time hill reinforced by his division under pender, thomas's brigade on his left, lane, scales, and perrin to the right. these restored the confederate right, overlapping the federal left; at the same time thomas's brigade made successful battle on the left, pushing off wadsworth's right and hall's battery, when the two brigades of the second division (robinson's) were sent to their support, but were, in turn, forced back towards seminary ridge. the confederate sharp-shooters cut down the horses of one of hall's guns and forced him to drop it. hill advanced pegram's and mcintosh's artillery to mcpherson's ridge, forcing the entire union line back to seminary ridge. general doubleday, anticipating such contingency, had ordered trenches made about seminary ridge, and sent his three other batteries under colonel wainwright to that point. he formed his line along the ridge and occupied the trenches by part of his infantry. at this period ewell's divisions under rodes approached against doubleday's right. general howard, upon his first approach to the battle, marched the eleventh corps to cemetery hill, and there posted it until called upon by general doubleday for assistance. to meet the call he ordered his divisions under generals barlow and schurz to doubleday's right, to occupy a prominent point at the north end of seminary ridge, reserving his division under steinwehr and part of his artillery on cemetery hill. as the divisions of the eleventh corps approached the confederate left, rodes's division of ewell's corps advanced. the federals then stood across the cashtown road, their left in advance of the seminary, their right thrown or standing more to the rear. rodes was in season to sweep the field of approach to the high point intended to be occupied by the divisions sent by howard, and came in good position to enfilade robinson's division of the first corps. as rodes approached he was threatened by buford's cavalry, but, finding cover under woodland, he made advance by three brigades in line till he came to the point of view which gave him command of that end of the field in elevated position, and in plunging fire down robinson's line and in advance of the divisions sent by general howard to occupy that point. while posting his infantry, rodes ordered carter's battery of artillery into action against robinson's lines stretched out and engaged against hill's corps. at that moment the divisions of the eleventh corps were not in full front of rodes, so that his fire upon robinson's line was something of a surprise, as well as most discomfiting. the divisions and artillery of the eleventh came to the front, however, almost simultaneously with robinson's necessitated change of right front rearward towards rodes. these changes and dispositions gave hill opportunity to press on by his front, when doubleday was obliged to call for help, and schurz called for support on his right. coster's brigade was sent from steinwehr's reserve, and buford's cavalry was ordered to brace as far as practicable the centre of the first corps, and another battery was sent to schurz's division. at 2.45 another call for help by the first corps was received, and general schurz was asked to answer it if he could by a regiment or more. calls were sent to hurry slocum's (twelfth) corps, some miles away, but then ewell was swinging his division under early into line nearer to gettysburg, gordon's brigade and jones's battery coming in in good time to make strong rodes's left, and hill's corps had overlapped the left of the first corps, so that general howard found himself forced to command a steady, orderly retreat to cemetery hill. the confederates pushed rapidly on, particularly the fresher troops of ewell, cleared the field, and followed on through the streets of gettysburg at four o'clock. the retreat began and continued in good order till they passed gettysburg, when the ranks became so scattered that the final march was little better than "_sauve qui peut_." as the troops retreated through gettysburg, general hancock rode upon the field, and under special assignment assumed command at three o'clock. as the retreating troops arrived, wadsworth's division on the right, the eleventh corps across the baltimore pike, the balance of the first under doubleday on the left of the eleventh, general howard and others assisted in forming the new line. the total effectives of the first and eleventh corps, according to the consolidated moving report of june 30, was 19,982. from the latest returns of general lee's army, an average estimate of his four divisions gave his total as 25,252. part of the reserve division of the eleventh corps was not engaged, but buford had two brigades of cavalry, and so the foregoing may be a fair estimate of the forces engaged, less the reserve on cemetery hill. at cashtown, general lee found that general hill had halted his division under r. h. anderson and his reserve artillery. he had general anderson called, who subsequently wrote me of the interview as follows: "about twelve o'clock i received a message notifying me that general lee desired to see me. i found general lee intently listening to the fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and depressed. at length he said, more to himself than to me, 'i cannot think what has become of stuart. i ought to have heard from him long before now. he may have met with disaster, but i hope not. in the absence of reports from him, i am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. it may be the whole federal army, or it may be only a detachment. if it is the whole federal force, we must fight a battle here. if we do not gain a victory, those defiles and gorges which we passed this morning will shelter us from disaster.'" he ordered anderson forward, and rode on to seminary ridge in time to view the closing operations of the engagement. the union troops were in disorder, climbing cemetery heights, the confederates following through the streets of gettysburg. two other divisions of confederates were up soon after, e. johnson's of the second and r. h. anderson's of the third corps. after a long wait i left orders for the troops to follow the trains of the second corps, and rode to find general lee. his head-quarters were on seminary ridge at the crossing of the cashtown road. anderson's division was then filed off along the ridge, resting. johnson's had marched to report to the corps commander. dismounting and passing the usual salutation, i drew my glasses and made a studied view of the position upon which the enemy was rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land surrounding. general lee was engaged at the moment. he had announced beforehand that he would not make aggressive battle in the enemy's country. after the survey and in consideration of his plans,--noting movements of detachments of the enemy on the emmitsburg road, the relative positions for manoeuvre, the lofty perch of the enemy, the rocky slopes from it, all marking the position clearly defensive,--i said, "we could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. all that we have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital." this, when said, was thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as my own. i was not a little surprised, therefore, at his impatience, as, striking the air with his closed hand, he said, "if he is there to-morrow i will attack him." in his official account, general lee reported,- "it had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked. but coming unexpectedly upon the whole federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous." when he rode away from me in the forenoon he made no mention of his absent cavalry, nor did he indicate that it was not within call. so i was at a loss to understand his nervous condition, and supported the suggestion so far as to say, "if he is there to-morrow it will be because he wants you to attack," and queried, "if that height has become the objective, why not take it at once? we have forty thousand men, less the casualties of the day; he cannot have more than twenty thousand." then it was that i heard of the wanderings of the cavalry and the cause of his uneven temper. so vexed was he at the halt of the imboden cavalry at hancock, _in the opening of the campaign_, that he was losing sight of pickett's brigades as a known quantity for battle. his manner suggested to me that a little reflection would be better than further discussion, and right soon he suggested to the commander of the second corps to take cemetery hill if he thought it practicable, but the subordinate did not care to take upon himself a fight that his chief would not venture to order.[124] the following circular orders were sent the commanders of columns of the first corps: "head-quarters first army corps, "near gettysburg, july 1, 5.30 p.m. "colonel,--the commanding general desires you to come on to-night as fast as you can without distressing your men and animals. hill and ewell have sharply engaged the enemy, and you will be needed for to-morrow's battle. let us know where you will stop to-night. "respectfully, "g. m. sorrel, "_a. a. general_. "colonel walton, "_chief of artillery_." at 12.15 of the afternoon of the 1st, general halleck sent a cipher despatch to general meade approving his tactics, but asking, as to his strategy, "are you not too far east, and may not lee attempt to turn your left and cut you off from frederick?" in this connection may be noted the plan that general meade had mapped in his own mind and given to some of his generals for battle to be formed behind pipe creek, a position that would have met the views of general halleck, as well as his own, covering washington and baltimore under close lines that could not be turned. at gettysburg the confederates had comparatively an open field. reports coming in to head-quarters about six o'clock that the enemy was in some force off our right towards fairfield, general lee ordered general anderson to put one of his brigades out on the right as picket-guard. wilcox's brigade and boss's battery were marched and posted near black horse tavern. nothing coming from the _centre troops_ about cemetery hill, general lee ordered the second corps, _after night, from his left to his right_, for work in that direction, but general ewell rode over and reported that another point--culp's hill--had been found on his left, which had commanding elevation over cemetery hill, from which the troops on the latter could be dislodged, by artillery, and was under the impression that his troops were in possession there. that was accredited as reported and approved, and the corps commander returned, and ordered the hill occupied if it had not been done. but the officer in charge had waited for specific orders, and when they were received he had made another reconnoissance. it was then twelve o'clock. by the reconnoissance it was found that the enemy was there, and it was thought that this should be reported, and further orders waited. general ewell's troops and trains passed the junction of the roads at four o'clock. the train was fourteen miles long. it was followed by the troops of the first corps that had been waiting all day. after night the washington artillery and mclaws's division camped at marsh run, four miles from gettysburg. here is hood's account of his march: "while lying in camp near chambersburg information was received that hill and ewell were about to come into contact with the enemy near gettysburg. my troops, together with mclaws's division, were at once put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which we reached after a hard march at or before sunrise on july 2. so imperative had been our orders to hasten forward with all possible speed that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about two hours during the night from the 1st to the 2d of july." when i left general lee, about seven o'clock in the evening, he had formed no plans beyond that of seizing culp's hill as his point from which to engage, nor given any orders for the next day, though his desperate mood was painfully evident, and gave rise to serious apprehensions. he had heard nothing of the movements of the enemy since his crossing the potomac, except the report of the scout. his own force on the field was the second corps, rodes's, early's, and e. johnson's divisions from right to left through the streets of gettysburg around towards culp's hill; on rodes's right, pender's division of the third; on seminary ridge, r. h. anderson's division of the third (except wilcox's brigade at black horse tavern); behind seminary ridge, heth's division of the third; on the march between cashtown and greenwood, the first corps. chapter xxvii. gettysburg--second day. the confederate commander reviews the field and decides on plan of battle--positions on the morning of july 2--night march of the federal sixth corps--it was excelled by law's brigade of confederates--the battle was opened after mid-day--general hood appeals for permission to turn the federal left--failure to make the flanking movement by the confederate right was a serious mistake--hood, in his usual gallant style, led his troops forward among the rocks--desperate charges against an earnest adversary--hood wounded--general law succeeds him in command of the division--"little round top" an important point--"the citadel of the field"--it was a fight of seventeen thousand confederates against twice their number--quiet along the lines of other confederate commands--"a man on the left who didn't care to make the battle win"--evidence against the alleged order for "battle at sunrise"--the "order" to ewell was discretionary--lee had lost his balance. the stars were shining brightly on the morning of the 2d when i reported at general lee's head-quarters and asked for orders. after a time generals mclaws and hood, with their staffs, rode up, and at sunrise their commands filed off the road to the right and rested. the washington artillery was with them, and about nine o'clock, after an all-night march, alexander's batteries were up as far as willoughby's run, where he parked and fed, and rode to head-quarters to report. as indicated by these movements, general lee was not ready with his plans. he had not heard from his cavalry, nor of the movements of the enemy further than the information from a despatch captured during the night, that the fifth corps was in camp about five miles from gettysburg, and the twelfth corps was reported near culp's hill. as soon as it was light enough to see, however, the enemy was found in position on his formidable heights awaiting us. [illustration: battle of gettysburg. july 2nd, 1863.] the result of efforts during the night and early morning to secure culp's hill had not been reported, and general lee sent colonel venable of his staff to confer with the commander of the second corps as to opportunity to make the battle by his left. he was still in doubt whether it would be better to move to his far-off right. about nine o'clock he rode to his left to be assured of the position there, and of the general temper of affairs in that quarter. after viewing the field, he held conference with the corps and division commanders. they preferred to accept his judgment and orders, except general early, who claimed to have learned of the topographical features of the country during his march towards york, and recommended the right of the line as the point at which strong battle should be made. about ten o'clock general lee returned to his head-quarters, but his engineer who had been sent to reconnoitre on his right had not come back. to be at hand for orders, i remained with the troops at his head-quarters. the infantry had arms stacked; the artillery was at rest. the enemy occupied the commanding heights of the city cemetery, from which point, in irregular grade, the ridge slopes southward two miles and a half to a bold outcropping height of three hundred feet called little round top, and farther south half a mile ends in the greater elevation called round top. the former is covered from base to top by formidable boulders. from the cemetery to little round top was the long main front of general meade's position. at the cemetery his line turned to the northeast and east and southeast in an elliptical curve, with his right on culp's hill. at an early hour of the 2d the union army was posted: the twelfth corps at culp's hill, extending its left to wadsworth's division of the first; on wadsworth's left the eleventh corps; on the left of the eleventh the other troops of the first; on their left the second, and left of that to little round top the third corps; the fifth corps stood in reserve across the bend from the right of the twelfth to the left of the second corps. thus there was formed a field of tremendous power upon a convex curve, which gave the benefit of rapid concentration at any point or points. the natural defences had been improved during the night and early morning. the sixth corps was marching from manchester, twenty-two miles from gettysburg. its first order, received near manchester before night of the 1st, was to march for taneytown, but after passing the baltimore pike the orders were changed, directing a prompt march to gettysburg. the march has been variously estimated from thirty to thirty-five miles, but the distance from manchester _via_ taneytown to gettysburg is only twenty-nine miles, and as the ground for which the corps marched was three miles east of gettysburg, the march would have been only twenty-six miles _via_ taneytown; as the corps marched back and took the baltimore pike, some distance must have been saved. it was on the field at three o'clock of the afternoon,--the union cavalry under general pleasonton in reach. the confederate left was covering the north and east curve of the enemy's line, johnson's division near culp's hill, early's and rodes's extending the line to the right through gettysburg; pender's division on the right of rodes's; the other divisions of the third corps resting on seminary ridge, with mclaws's division and hood's three brigades near general head-quarters; pickett's brigades and law's of hood's division at chambersburg and new guilford, twenty-two and twenty-four miles away. law had received orders to join his division, and was on the march. the cavalry was not yet heard from. the line so extended and twisted about the rough ground that concentration at any point was not possible. it was some little time after general lee's return from his ride to the left before he received the reports of the reconnoissance ordered from his centre to his right. his mind, previously settled to the purpose to fight where the enemy stood, now accepted the explicit plan of making the opening on his right, and to have the engagement general. he ordered the commander of the third corps to extend the centre by anderson's division, mclaws's and hood's divisions to extend the deployment to his right. heth's division of the third was drawn nearer the front, and notice of his plans was sent the commander of the second corps. at the intimation that the battle would be opened on the right by part of the first corps, colonel alexander was asked to act as director of artillery, and sent to view the field in time to assign the batteries as they were up. it was eleven o'clock when general lee's order was issued, but he had ordered law's brigade to its division, and a wait of thirty minutes was necessary for it to get up. law had received his orders at three in the morning, and had marched twenty-three miles. the battle-ground was still five miles off by the route of march, but law completed his march of twenty-eight miles in eleven hours,--the best marching done in either army to reach the field of gettysburg. the battle was to be opened on the right by two divisions of the first corps, supported on their left by four of the brigades of anderson's division; the opening to be promptly followed on lee's left by the second corps, and continued to real attack if the opportunity occurred; the third (centre) corps to move to severe threatening and take advantage of opportunity to attack; the movements of the second and third corps to be prompt, and in close, severe co-operation, so as to prevent concentration against the battle of the right. the little cavalry that was with the army was kept on the extreme left. not so much as one trooper was sent us. general lee ordered his reconnoitring officer to lead the troops of the first corps and conduct them by a route concealed from view of the enemy. as i was relieved for the time from the march, i rode near the middle of the line. general lee rode with me a mile or more. general anderson marched by a route nearer the enemy's line, and was discovered by general sickles, who commanded the third corps, the left of the union line. a little uncomfortable at his retired position, and seeing that the battle was forming against him, general sickles thought to put the third maine regiment and the berdan sharp-shooters on outpost in a bold woodland cover, to develop somewhat of the approaching battle, and presently threw his corps forward as far as the peach orchard, half a mile forward of the position assigned to it in the general line. the tenth alabama regiment was sent against the outpost guard, and, reinforced by the eleventh regiment, drove it back, and anderson's division found its place in proper line. general birney's account of the affair at the outpost puts it at twelve o'clock, and the signal accounts, the only papers dated on the field, reported,- "the enemy's skirmishers advancing from the west one mile from here--11.45." and presently,- "the rebels are in force; our skirmishers give way--12.55." there is no room for doubt of the accuracy of these reports, which go to show that it was one o'clock in the afternoon when the third corps, upon which the first corps was to form, was in position. under the conduct of the reconnoitring officer, our march seemed slow,--there were some halts and countermarches. to save time, i ordered the rear division to double on the front, and we were near the affair of anderson's regiments with the outpost guard of sickles. anderson's division deployed,--wilcox's, perry's, wright's, posey's, and mahone's brigades from right to left. general hood was ordered to send his select scouts in advance, to go through the woodlands and act as vedettes, in the absence of cavalry, and give information of the enemy, if there. the double line marched up the slope and deployed,--mclaws on the right of anderson, hood's division on his right, mclaws near the crest of the plateau in front of the peach orchard, hood spreading and enveloping sickles's left. the former was readily adjusted to ground from which to advance or defend. hood's front was very rugged, with no field for artillery, and very rough for advance of infantry. as soon as he passed the emmitsburg road, he sent to report of the great advantage of moving on by his right around to the enemy's rear. his scouting parties had reported that there was nothing between them and the enemy's trains. he was told that the move to the right had been proposed the day before and rejected; that general lee's orders were to guide my left by the emmitsburg road. in our immediate front were the divisions of the third corps under generals humphreys and birney, from right to left, with orders for supports of the flanks by divisions of the second and fifth corps. the ground on the left of birney's division was so broken and obstructed by boulders that his left was dropped off to the rear, forming a broken line. in rear of the enemy, and between his lines and little round top, was a very rough elevation of eighty feet formed by upheavals that left open passage deep down devil's den. smith's battery was on birney's left, winslow's between the right and next brigade. other batteries in position were clark's, ames's, randolph's, seeley's, and turnbull's. as mclaws's division came up on line, barksdale's brigade was in front of a battery about six hundred yards off. he appealed for permission to charge and capture it, but was told to wait. on his right was kershaw's brigade, the brigades of semmes and wofford on the second line. hood's division was in two lines,--law's and robertson's brigades in front, g. t. anderson's and benning's in the second line. the batteries were with the divisions,--four to the division. one of g. t. anderson's regiments was put on picket down the emmitsburg road. general hood appealed again and again for the move to the right, but, to give more confidence to his attack, he was reminded that the move to the right had been carefully considered by our chief and rejected in favor of his present orders. the opportunity for our right was in the air. general halleck saw it from washington. general meade saw and was apprehensive of it. even general pendleton refers to it in favorable mention in his official report. failing to adopt it, general lee should have gone with us to his right. he had seen and carefully examined the left of his line, and only gave us a guide to show the way to the right, leaving the battle to be adjusted to formidable and difficult grounds without his assistance. if he had been with us, general hood's messengers could have been referred to general head-quarters, but to delay and send messengers five miles in favor of a move that he had rejected would have been contumacious. the opportunity was with the confederates from the assembling on cemetery hill. it was inviting of their preconceived plans. it was the object of and excuse for the invasion as a substitute for more direct efforts for the relief of vicksburg. confederate writers and talkers claim that general meade could have escaped without making aggressive battle, but that is equivalent to confession of the inertia that failed to grasp the opportunity. beaten in the battle of the 1st, dislodged of position, and outgeneralled, the union army would have felt the want of spirit and confidence important to aggressive battle; but the call was in the hands of the confederates, and these circumstances would have made their work more facile, while the union commander would have felt the call to save his capital most imperative. even as events passed it was thought helpful to the union side to give out the report that general mcclellan was at hand and would command the army. four of the brigades of anderson's division were ordered to advance in echelon in support of my left. at three o'clock the artillery was ordered to open practice. general meade was then with general sickles discussing the feasibility of withdrawing his corps to the position to which it was originally assigned, but the opening admonished him that it was too late. he had just sent a cipher telegram to inform general halleck, commander-in-chief, that in the event of his having no opportunity to attack, and should he find the confederates moving to interpose between him and washington, he would fall back on his supplies at westminster.[125] but my right division was then nearer to westminster, and our scouting parties of infantry were within rifle range of the road leading to that point and to washington. so it would have been convenient, after holding our threatening attitude till night, to march across his line at dark, in time to draw other troops to close connection before the next morning. prompt to the order the combat opened, followed by artillery of the other corps, and our artillerists measured up to the better metal of the enemy by vigilant work. hood's lines were not yet ready. after a little practice by the artillery, he was properly adjusted and ordered to bear down upon the enemy's left, but he was not prompt, and the order was repeated before he would strike down.[126] in his usual gallant style he led his troops through the rocky fastnesses against the strong lines of his earnest adversary, and encountered battle that called for all of his power and skill. the enemy was tenacious of his strong ground; his skilfully-handled batteries swept through the passes between the rocks; the more deadly fire of infantry concentrated as our men bore upon the angle of the enemy's line and stemmed the fiercest onset, until it became necessary to shorten their work by a desperate charge. this pressing struggle and the cross-fire of our batteries broke in the salient angle, but the thickening fire, as the angle was pressed back, hurt hood's left and held him in steady fight. his right brigade was drawn towards round top by the heavy fire pouring from that quarter, benning's brigade was pressed to the thickening line at the angle, and g. t. anderson's was put in support of the battle growing against hood's right. i rode to mclaws, found him ready for his opportunity, and barksdale chafing in his wait for the order to seize the battery in his front. kershaw's brigade of his right first advanced and struck near the angle of the enemy's line where his forces were gathering strength. after additional caution to hold his ranks closed, mclaws ordered barksdale in. with glorious bearing he sprang to his work, overriding obstacles and dangers. without a pause to deliver a shot, he had the battery. kershaw, joined by semmes's brigade, responded, and hood's men, feeling the impulsion of relief, resumed their bold fight, and presently the enemy's line was broken through its length. but his well-seasoned troops knew how to utilize the advantage of their grounds and put back their dreadful fires from rocks, depressions, and stone fences, as they went for shelter about little round top. that point had not been occupied by the enemy, nor marked as an important feature of the field. the broken ranks sought shelter under its rocks and defiles as birds fly to cover. general hood fell seriously hurt, and general law succeeded to command of the division, but the well-seasoned troops were not in need of a close guiding hand. the battle was on, and they knew how to press its hottest contention. general warren, chief engineer of the federal army, was sent at the critical moment to little round top, and found that it was the citadel of the field. he called for troops to occupy it. the fifth corps (sykes's) was hurried to him, and general hancock sent him caldwell's division of the second corps. at the brick house, away from his right, general sickles had a detachment that had been reinforced by general hancock. this fire drew anderson's brigade of direction (wilcox) a little off from support of barksdale's left. general humphreys, seeing the opportunity, rallied such of his troops as he could, and, reinforced by hays's division (willard's brigade) of hancock's corps, came against barksdale's flank, but the latter moved bravely on, the guiding spirit of the battle. wright's georgia and perry's florida brigades were drawn in behind wilcox and thrown against humphreys, pushing him off and breaking him up. the fighting had by this time become tremendous, and brave men and officers were stricken by hundreds. posey and wilcox dislodged the forces about the brick house. general sickles was desperately wounded! general willard was dead! general semmes, of mclaws's division, was mortally wounded! our left relieved, the brigades of anderson's division moved on with barksdale's, passed the swale, and moved up the slope. caldwell's division, and presently those of ayres and barnes of the fifth corps, met and held our strongest battle. while thus engaged, general sykes succeeded in putting vincent's and weed's brigades and hazlett's battery on the summit of little round top, but presently we overreached caldwell's division, broke it off, and pushed it from the field. of his brigade commanders, zook was killed, and brooke and cross were wounded, the latter mortally. general hancock reported sixty per cent. of his men lost. on our side, barksdale was down dying, and g. t. anderson wounded. we had carried devil's den, were at the round tops and the wheat-field, but ayres's division of regulars and barnes's division were holding us in equal battle. the struggle throughout the field seemed at its tension. the brigades of r. h. anderson's division could hold off other troops of hancock's, but were not strong enough to step to the enemy's lines. when caldwell's division was pushed away, ayres's flank and the gorge at little round top were only covered by a sharp line of picket men behind the boulders. if we could drive in the sharp-shooters and strike ayres's flank to advantage, we could dislodge his and barnes's divisions, occupy the gorge behind sykes's brigades on round top, force them to retreat, and lift our desperate fighters to the summit. i had one brigade--wofford's--that had not been engaged in the hottest battle. to urge the troops to their reserve power in the precious moments, i rode with wofford. the rugged field, the rough plunge of artillery fire, and the piercing musket-shots delayed somewhat the march, but alexander dashed up with his batteries and gave new spirit to the worn infantry ranks. by a fortunate strike upon ayres's flank we broke his line and pushed him and barnes so closely that they were obliged to use most strenuous efforts to get away without losing in prisoners as well as their killed and wounded. we gained the wheat-field, and were so close upon the gorge that our artillery could no longer venture their fire into it. we were on little round top grappling for the crowning point. the brigade commanders there, vincent and weed, were killed, also the battery commander, hazlett, and others, but their troops were holding to their work as firmly as the mighty boulders that helped them. general meade thought that the confederate army was working on my part of the field. he led some regiments of the twelfth corps and posted them against us, called a division of newton's corps (first) from beyond hancock's, and sent crawford's division, the last of the fifth corps, splitting through the gorge, forming solid lines, in places behind stone fences, and making steady battle, as veterans fresh in action know so well how to make. while meade's lines were growing my men were dropping; we had no others to call to their aid, and the weight against us was too heavy to carry. the extreme left of our lines was only about a mile from us across the enemy's concentric position, which brought us within hearing of that battle, if engaged, and near enough to feel its swell, but nothing was heard or felt but the clear ring of the enemy's fresh metal as he came against us. no other part of our army had engaged! my seventeen thousand against the army of the potomac! the sun was down, and with it went down the severe battle. i ordered recall of the troops to the line of plum run and devil's den, leaving picket lines near the foot of the round tops. my loss was about six thousand, meade's between twelve and fourteen thousand; but his loss in general and field officers was frightful. when general humphreys, who succeeded to barksdale's brigade, was called back to the new line, he thought there was some mistake in the orders, and only withdrew as far as a captured battery, and when the order was repeated, retired under protest. general stuart came down from carlisle with his column of cavalry late in the afternoon of the 2d. as he approached he met a cavalry force of the enemy moving towards the confederate left rear, and was successful in arresting it. he was posted with jenkins's three thousand cavalry[127] on the confederate left. notwithstanding the supreme order of the day for general battle, and the reinforcement of the cavalry on our left, the second and third corps remained idle during all of the severe battle of the confederate right, except the artillery, and the part of that on the extreme left was only in practice long enough to feel the superior metal of the enemy, when it retired, leaving a battery of four guns in position. general early failed to even form his division in battle order, leaving a brigade in position remote from the line, and sending, later, another to be near stuart's cavalry. the latter returned, however, before night. at eight o'clock in the evening the division on our extreme left, e. johnson's, advanced. the brigades were j. m. jones's, nicholls's, steuart's, and walker's. walker's was detached, as they moved, to look for a detachment of the enemy reported threatening the far away left. when the three brigades crossed rock creek it was night. the enemy's line to be assaulted was occupied by greene's brigade of the twelfth corps. it was reinforced by three regiments of wadsworth's division and three from the eleventh corps. after brave attack and defence, part of the line was carried, when the fight, after a severe fusillade between the infantry lines, quieted, and walker's brigade returned to the division. part of the enemy's trenches, east of the point attacked (across a swale), vacated when the corps moved over to the left, general johnson failed to occupy. before this, general rodes discovered that the enemy, in front of his division, was drawing off his artillery and infantry to my battle of the right, and suggested to general early that the moment had come for the divisions to attack, and drew his forces from entanglements about the streets to be ready. after e. johnson's fight on our extreme left, general early ordered two brigades under general harry t. hays to attack. hays had with his louisiana brigade hoke's north carolina brigade under colonel avery. he made as gallant a fight as was ever made. mounting to the top of the hill, he captured a battery, and pushed on in brave order, taking some prisoners and colors, until he discovered that his two brigades were advancing in a night affair against a grand army, when he found that he was fortunate in having night to cover his weakness, and withdrew. the gallant colonel avery, mortally wounded and dying, wrote on a slip of paper, "_tell father that i died with my face to the enemy_." when rodes was prepared, hays had retired, and the former did not see that it was part of the order for general engagement to put his division in night attack that could not be supported. [illustration: second day's battle, gettysburg] thus the general engagement of the day was dwarfed into the battle of the right at three o'clock, that on the left at eight by a single division, and that nearer the centre at nine o'clock by two brigades. there was a man on the left of the line who did not care to make the battle win. he knew where it was, had viewed it from its earliest formation, had orders for his part in it, but so withheld part of his command from it as to make co-operative concert of action impracticable. he had a pruriency for the honors of the field of mars, was eloquent, before the fires of the bivouac and his chief, of the glory of war's gory shield; but when its envied laurels were dipping to the grasp, when the heavy field called for bloody work, he found the placid horizon, far and away beyond the cavalry, more lovely and inviting. he wanted command of the second corps, and, succeeding to it, held the honored position until general lee found, at last, that he must dismiss him from field service. general lee ordered johnson's division of his left, occupying part of the enemy's trenches about culp's hill, to be reinforced during the night of the 2d by two brigades of rodes's division and one of early's division. why the other brigades of those divisions were not sent does not appear, but it does appear that there was a place for them on johnson's left, in the trenches that were vacated by the federal twelfth corps when called over to reinforce the battle of meade's left. culp's hill bore the same relations to the enemy's right as little round top did to his left. general fitzhugh lee quotes evidence from general meade that had culp's hill been occupied, in force, by confederates, it would have compelled the withdrawal of the federal troops.[128] general meade, after the battle of his left, ordered the divisions of his twelfth corps back to their trenches, to recover the parts occupied by the confederate left. it was night when the first division approached. general ruger, commanding, thought to feel his way through the dark by a line of skirmishers. he found the east end of his trenches, across the swale, unoccupied, and took possession. pressing his adventure, he found the main line of his works occupied by the confederates in force, and disposed his command to wait for daylight. the second division came during the night, when general williams, commanding the corps, posted it on the left of the first, and the division commanders ordered batteries in proper positions. during the night, general meade held a council, which decided to fight it out. so it began to look as if the vicissitudes of the day had so worked as to call general meade from defensive to aggressive battle for culp's hill. but the confederates failed to see the opportunity and force the issue as it was presented. in general meade's evidence before the committee on the conduct of the war, he puts his losses of the first and second days at twenty thousand, and assigns two-thirds of these to the battle of the 2d. as the fighting against the three brigades of our left after night, and two brigades, later in the night, from our centre, could not have been very severe, i claim that his loss in the battle of his left was from twelve to fourteen thousand. as events of the battle of the 2d passed, it seems fair to claim that with pickett's brigades present at the moment of wofford's advance for the gorge at little round top, we could have had it before crawford was there. under ordinary circumstances this account of the second day, made from the records, would be complete and conclusive; but the battle of gettysburg, which may be called the epitome of the war, has been the subject of many contentions of words. knights of the quill have consumed many of their peaceful hours in publishing, through books, periodicals, and newspapers, their plans for the battle, endeavoring to forestall the records and to find a scapegoat, and their representations may be given, though they do not deserve it, a word of reply. general w. n. pendleton led off when making a lecturing tour through the south for a memorial church for general lee. he claims that he made a reconnoissance on the afternoon of the 1st of july, and that upon his reporting it, general lee ordered general longstreet to attack at sunrise the next day. he did not venture to charge that the second and third corps, that were on the field and had had a good night's rest, were part of the command ordered for the early battle, for the commanders, both virginians, and not under the political ban, could have brought confusing evidence against him; nor did he intend to put general lee in the anomalous position, inferentially, of ordering part of the first corps--that should march through the night and all night--to make the battle alone. the point of battle was east of the emmitsburg road; to find it, it was necessary to cross that road, but general sickles was moving part of his corps over the road during that afternoon, and rested there the latter part of the day and during the night. so, to make the reconnoissance, general pendleton passed the union troops in confederate uniform--he was military in his dress--and found the point of battle. giving him credit, for the moment, for this delicate work and the mythical order, let us find the end to which it would lead. the only troops that could come under the order were mclaws's division, part of hood's, and the artillery,--about ten thousand men. these, after a hurried all-night's march, reached general lee's head-quarters about sunrise of the 2d, and by continued forced march could have reached the point of battle, about five miles away, by seven o'clock, where they would have encountered a division of the third corps (birney's); presently the second and fifth corps under hancock and sykes; then the first, eleventh, and twelfth under newton, howard, and slocum; then the balance of the third coming in on our rear along the emmitsburg road,--making sixty thousand men and more. there was reason to be proud of the prowess of the troops of the first corps, but to credit a part of it with success under the circumstances was not reasonable. that the confederate second corps did not have orders for the alleged sunrise battle is evidenced by the report of its commander, who, accounting for his work about culp's hill during the night of the 1st and morning of the 2d, reported of the morning, "it was now daylight, and too late," meaning that it was too late for him to attack and carry that hill, as general lee had authorized and expected him to do during the night before. if he had been ordered to take part in the sunrise battle, he would have been in the nick of time. that the third corps was not to be in it is evidenced by the position of the greater part of it on seminary ridge until near noon of the 2d. so general lee must have ordered a position carried, at sunrise, by ten thousand men, after it had gathered strength all night,--a position that he would not assault on the afternoon of the 1st with forty thousand men, lest they should encounter "overwhelming numbers."[129] as the other corps, after receiving their orders for the afternoon battle of the 2d, failed to engage until after nightfall, it is not probable that they would have found the sunrise battle without orders. general pendleton's official report is in conflict with his memorial lecture. in the former he makes no reference to the sunrise-battle order, but mentions a route by which the left of the enemy could be turned. letters from the active members of general lee's staff and from his military secretary, general a. l. long, show that the sunrise battle was not ordered, and a letter from colonel fairfax shows that the claim that it was so ordered was set up after general lee's death.[130] in a published account, general long mentions my suggestion on the afternoon of the 1st for the turning march around the enemy's left, which he says, after consideration, was rejected.[131] colonel taylor claims that the attack by the confederate right should have been sooner, and should have met the enemy back on his first or original line, and before little round top was occupied. but little round top was not occupied in force until after my battle opened, and general sickles's advance to his forward lines was made in consequence of the confederate threatening, and would have been sooner or later according as that threatening was made. he calls the message of general lee to general ewell on the afternoon of the 1st an order. general lee says,- "the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. general ewell was thereupon instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable." it is the custom of military service to accept instructions of a commander as orders, but when they are coupled with conditions that transfer the responsibility of battle and defeat to the subordinate, they are not orders, and general ewell was justifiable in not making attack that his commander would not order, and the censure of his failure is unjust and _very ungenerous_. the virginia writers have been so eager in their search for a flaw in the conduct of the battle of the first corps that they overlook the only point into which they could have thrust their pens. at the opening of the fight, general meade was with general sickles discussing the feasibility of moving the third corps back to the line originally assigned for it, but the discussion was cut short by the opening of the confederate battle. if that opening had been delayed thirty or forty minutes the corps would have been drawn back to the general line, and my first deployment would have enveloped little round top and carried it before it could have been strongly manned, and general meade would have drawn off to his line selected behind pipe creek. the point should have been that the battle was opened too soon. another point from which they seek comfort is that sedgwick's corps (sixth) was not up until a late hour of the 2d, and would not have been on the field for an earlier battle. but sedgwick was not engaged in the late battle, and could have been back at manchester, so far as the afternoon battle was concerned. and they harp a little on the delay of thirty minutes for law's brigade to join its division. but general lee called for the two divisions, and had called for law's brigade to join his division. it was therefore his order for the division that delayed the march. to have gone without it would have justified censure. as we were not strong enough for the work with that brigade, it is not probable that we could have accomplished more without it. colonel taylor says that general lee urged that the march of my troops should be hastened, and was chafed at their non-appearance. not one word did he utter to me of their march until he gave his orders at eleven o'clock for the move to his right. orders for the troops to hasten their march of the 1st were sent without even a suggestion from him, but upon his announcement that he intended to fight the next day, if the enemy was there.[132] that he was excited and off his balance was evident on the afternoon of the 1st, and he labored under that oppression until enough blood was shed to appease him. chapter xxviii. gettysburg--third day. the stroke of arms that shook the continent--longstreet opposed the attack as planned and made--the confederate column of assault--it was weak in numbers but strong in spirit--tremendous artillery combat begins the day's fighting--charge of generals pickett, trimble, and pettigrew--armistead falls by the side of the federal guns--the federal cavalry charge of general farnsworth--the commander falls with five mortal wounds--could the assaulting column have been safely augmented from longstreet's right?--testimony as to that point--where rested the responsibility for disaster?--criticism of the battle as a whole--cemetery hill stronger than marye's hill at fredericksburg--controverted points--casualties of the three days' fight--organization of the forces engaged. general lee has reported of arrangements for the day,- "the general plan was unchanged. longstreet, reinforced by pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and general ewell was ordered to attack the enemy's right at the same time. the latter during the night reinforced general johnson with two brigades from rodes's and one from early's division."[133] this is disingenuous. he did not give or send me orders for the morning of the third day, nor did he reinforce me by pickett's brigades for morning attack. as his head-quarters were about four miles from the command, i did not ride over, but sent, to report the work of the second day. in the absence of orders, i had scouting parties out during the night in search of a way by which we might strike the enemy's left, and push it down towards his centre. i found a way that gave some promise of results, and was about to move the command, when he rode over after sunrise and gave his orders. his plan was to assault the enemy's left centre by a column to be composed of mclaws's and hood's divisions reinforced by pickett's brigades.[134] i thought that it would not do; that the point had been fully tested the day before, by more men, when all were fresh; that the enemy was there looking for us, as we heard him during the night putting up his defences; that the divisions of mclaws and hood were holding a mile along the right of my line against twenty thousand men, who would follow their withdrawal, strike the flank of the assaulting column, crush it, and get on our rear towards the potomac river; that thirty thousand men was the minimum of force necessary for the work; that even such force would need close co-operation on other parts of the line; that the column as he proposed to organize it would have only about thirteen thousand men (the divisions having lost a third of their numbers the day before); that the column would have to march a mile under concentrating battery fire, and a thousand yards under long-range musketry; that the conditions were different from those in the days of napoleon, when field batteries had a range of six hundred yards and musketry about sixty yards. he said the distance was not more than fourteen hundred yards. general meade's estimate was a mile or a mile and a half (captain long, the guide of the field of gettysburg in 1888, stated that it was a trifle over a mile). he then concluded that the divisions of mclaws and hood could remain on the defensive line; that he would reinforce by divisions of the third corps and pickett's brigades, and stated the point to which the march should be directed. i asked the strength of the column. he stated fifteen thousand. opinion was then expressed that the fifteen thousand men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle; but he was impatient of listening, and tired of talking, and nothing was left but to proceed. general alexander was ordered to arrange the batteries of the front of the first and third corps, those of the second were supposed to be in position; colonel walton was ordered to see that the batteries of the first were supplied with ammunition, and to prepare to give the signal-guns for the opening combat. the infantry of the third corps to be assigned were heth's and pettigrew's divisions and wilcox's brigade. at the time of the conversation and arrangement of the assault by the confederate right, artillery fire was heard on our extreme left. it seems that general lee had sent orders to general ewell to renew his battle in the morning, which was intended, and directed, as a co-operation of the attack he intended to order on his right, but general ruger, anticipating, opened his batteries against ewell at daylight. the union divisions--ruger's and gary's--were on broken lines, open towards the trenches held by the confederates, so that assault by our line would expose the force to fire from the enemy's other line. ruger had occupied the trenches left vacant on his right, and gary reached to his left under greene, who held his line against the attack of the day before. it seems that the confederates failed to bring artillery up to their trenches, and must make their fight with infantry, while on the union side there were some fifteen or twenty guns playing, and many more at hand if needed. as the union batteries opened, johnson advanced and assaulted the enemy's works on his right towards the centre and the adjacent front of the new line, and held to that attack with resolution, putting in fresh troops to help it from time to time. ruger put two regiments forward to feel the way towards johnson's left. they got into hot engagement and were repulsed; johnson tried to follow, but was in turn forced back. he renewed his main attack again, but unsuccessfully, and finally drew back to the trenches. ruger threw a regiment forward from his left which gained the stone wall; his division was then advanced, and it recovered the entire line of trenches. while this contention was in progress the troops ordered for the column of assault were marching and finding positions under the crest of the ridge, where they could be covered during the artillery combat. alexander put a battery of nine guns under the ridge and out of the enemy's fire to be used with the assaulting column. general lee said that the attack of his right was not made as early as expected,--which he should not have said. he knew that i did not believe that success was possible; that care and time should be taken to give the troops the benefit of positions and the grounds; and he should have put an officer in charge who had more confidence in his plan. two-thirds of the troops were of other commands, and there was no reason for putting the assaulting forces under my charge. he had confidence in general early, who advised in favor of that end of the line for battle. knowing my want of confidence, he should have given the benefit of his presence and his assistance in getting the troops up, posting them, and arranging the batteries; but he gave no orders or suggestions after his early designation of the point for which the column should march. fitzhugh lee claims evidence that general lee did not even appear on that part of the field while the troops were being assigned to position. as the commands reported, pickett was assigned on the right, kemper's and garnett's brigades to be supported by armistead's; wilcox's brigade of the third corps in echelon and guarding pickett's right; pettigrew's division on pickett's left, supported by the brigades of scales and lane, under command of general trimble. the brigades of pettigrew's division were archer's, pettigrew's, brockenbrough's, and davis's. (general archer having been taken prisoner on the 1st, his brigade was under command of colonel fry; general scales being wounded on the same day, his brigade was commanded by colonel lowrance.) the ridge upon which the commands were formed was not parallel to that upon which the enemy stood, but bending west towards our left, while the enemy's line bore northwest towards his right, so that the left of the assaulting column formed some little distance farther from the enemy's line than the right. to put the troops under the best cover during the artillery combat they were thus posted for the march, but directed to spread their steps as soon as the march opened the field, and to gain places of correct alignment. [illustration: e. p. alexander. brigadier-general and chief of artillery, first corps.] meanwhile, the enemy's artillery on his extreme right was in practice more or less active, but its meaning was not known or reported, and the sharp-shooters of the command on the right had a lively fusillade about eleven o'clock, in which some of the artillery took part. the order was that the right was to make the signal of battle. general lee reported that his left attacked before due notice to wait for the opening could be given, which was a mistake, inasmuch as the attack on his left was begun by the federals, which called his left to their work. general meade was not apprehensive of that part of the field, and only used the two divisions of the twelfth corps, shaler's brigade of the sixth, and six regiments of the first and eleventh corps in recovering the trenches of his right, holding the other six corps for the battle of his centre and left. he knew by the confederate troops on his right just where the strong battle was to be. the director of artillery was asked to select a position on his line from which he could note the effect of his practice, and to advise general pickett when the enemy's fire was so disturbed as to call for the assault. general pickett's was the division of direction, and he was ordered to have a staff-officer or courier with the artillery director to bear notice of the moment to advance. the little affair between the skirmish lines quieted in a short time, and also the noise on our extreme left. the quiet filing of one or two of our batteries into position emphasized the profound silence that prevailed during our wait for final orders. strong battle was in the air, and the veterans of both sides swelled their breasts to gather nerve and strength to meet it. division commanders were asked to go to the crest of the ridge and take a careful view of the field, and to have their officers there to tell their men of it, and to prepare them for the sight that was to burst upon them as they mounted the crest. just then a squadron of union cavalry rode through detachments of infantry posted at intervals in rear of my right division. it was called a charge, but was probably a reconnoissance. colonel black had reported with a hundred of the first south carolina cavalry, not all mounted, and a battery of horse artillery, and was put across the emmitsburg road, supported by infantry, in front of merritt's brigade of cavalry. when satisfied that the work of preparation was all that it could be with the means at hand, i wrote colonel walton, of the washington artillery,- "head-quarters, july 3, 1863. "colonel,--let the batteries open. order great care and precision in firing. when the batteries at the peach orchard cannot be used against the point we intend to attack, let them open on the enemy's on the rocky hill. "most respectfully, "james longstreet, "_lieutenant-general, commanding_." at the same time a note to alexander directed that pickett should not be called until the artillery practice indicated fair opportunity. then i rode to a woodland hard by, to lie down and study for some new thought that might aid the assaulting column. in a few minutes report came from alexander that he would only be able to judge of the effect of his fire by the return of that of the enemy, as his infantry was not exposed to view, and the smoke of the batteries would soon cover the field. he asked, if there was an alternative, that it be carefully considered before the batteries opened, as there was not enough artillery ammunition for this and another trial if this should not prove favorable. he was informed that there was no alternative; that i could find no way out of it; that general lee had considered and would listen to nothing else; that orders had gone for the guns to give signal for the batteries; that he should call the troops at the first opportunity or lull in the enemy's fire. the signal-guns broke the silence, the blaze of the second gun mingling in the smoke of the first, and salvoes rolled to the left and repeated themselves, the enemy's fine metal spreading its fire to the converging lines, ploughing the trembling ground, plunging through the line of batteries, and clouding the heavy air. the two or three hundred guns seemed proud of their undivided honors and organized confusion. the confederates had the benefit of converging fire into the enemy's massed position, but the superior metal of the enemy neutralized the advantage of position. the brave and steady work progressed. before this the confederates of the left were driven from their captured trenches, and hope of their effective co-operation with the battle of the right was lost, but no notice of it was sent to the right of the battle. they made some further demonstrations, but they were of little effect. merritt's brigade of cavalry was in rear of my right, threatening on the emmitsburg road. farnsworth's brigade took position between merritt's and close on my right rear. infantry regiments and batteries were broken off from my front line and posted to guard on that flank and rear. not informed of the failure of the confederates on the left and the loss of their vantage-ground, we looked with confidence for them to follow the orders of battle. general pickett rode to confer with alexander, then to the ground upon which i was resting, where he was soon handed a slip of paper. after reading it he handed it to me. it read: "if you are coming at all, come at once, or i cannot give you proper support, but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all. at least eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery itself. "alexander." pickett said, "general, shall i advance?" the effort to speak the order failed, and i could only indicate it by an affirmative bow. he accepted the duty with seeming confidence of success, leaped on his horse, and rode gayly to his command. i mounted and spurred for alexander's post. he reported that the batteries he had reserved for the charge with the infantry had been spirited away by general lee's chief of artillery; that the ammunition of the batteries of position was so reduced that he could not use them in proper support of the infantry. he was ordered to stop the march at once and fill up his ammunition-chests. but, alas! there was no more ammunition to be had. the order was imperative. the confederate commander had fixed his heart upon the work. just then a number of the enemy's batteries hitched up and hauled off, which gave a glimpse of unexpected hope. encouraging messages were sent for the columns to hurry on,--and they were then on elastic springing step. the officers saluted as they passed, their stern smiles expressing confidence. general pickett, a graceful horseman, sat lightly in the saddle, his brown locks flowing quite over his shoulders. pettigrew's division spread their steps and quickly rectified the alignment, and the grand march moved bravely on. as soon as the leading columns opened the way, the supports sprang to their alignments. general trimble mounted, adjusting his seat and reins with an air and grace as if setting out on a pleasant afternoon ride. when aligned to their places solid march was made down the slope and past our batteries of position. [illustration: george e. pickett] confederate batteries put their fire over the heads of the men as they moved down the slope, and continued to draw the fire of the enemy until the smoke lifted and drifted to the rear, when every gun was turned upon the infantry columns. the batteries that had been drawn off were replaced by others that were fresh. soldiers and officers began to fall, some to rise no more, others to find their way to the hospital tents. single files were cut here and there, then the gaps increased, and an occasional shot tore wider openings, but, closing the gaps as quickly as made, the march moved on. the divisions of mclaws and hood were ordered to move to closer lines for the enemy on their front, to spring to the charge as soon as the breach at the centre could be made. the enemy's right overreached my left and gave serious trouble. brockenbrough's brigade went down and davis's in impetuous charge. the general order required further assistance from the third corps if needed, but no support appeared. general lee and the corps commander were there, but failed to order help. colonel latrobe was sent to general trimble to have his men fill the line of the broken brigades, and bravely they repaired the damage. the enemy moved out against the supporting brigade in pickett's rear. colonel sorrel was sent to have that move guarded, and pickett was drawn back to that contention. mclaws was ordered to press his left forward, but the direct fire of infantry and cross-fire of artillery was telling fearfully on the front. colonel fremantle ran up to offer congratulations on the apparent success, but the big gaps in the ranks grew until the lines were reduced to half their length. i called his attention to the broken, struggling ranks. trimble mended the battle of the left in handsome style, but on the right the massing of the enemy grew stronger and stronger. brigadier garnett was killed, kemper and trimble were desperately wounded; generals hancock and gibbon were wounded. general lane succeeded trimble, and with pettigrew held the battle of the left in steady ranks. pickett's lines being nearer, the impact was heaviest upon them. most of the field officers were killed or wounded. colonel whittle, of armistead's brigade, who had been shot through the right leg at williamsburg and lost his left arm at malvern hill, was shot through the right arm, then brought down by a shot through his left leg. general armistead, of the second line, spread his steps to supply the places of fallen comrades. his colors cut down, with a volley against the bristling line of bayonets, he put his cap on his sword to guide the storm. the enemy's massing, enveloping numbers held the struggle until the noble armistead fell beside the wheels of the enemy's battery. pettigrew was wounded, but held his command. general pickett, finding the battle broken, while the enemy was still reinforcing, called the troops off. there was no indication of panic. the broken files marched back in steady step. the effort was nobly made, and failed from blows that could not be fended. some of the files were cut off from retreat by fire that swept the field in their rear. officers of my staff, sent forward with orders, came back with their saddles and bridles in their arms. latrobe's horse was twice shot. looking confidently for advance of the enemy through our open field, i rode to the line of batteries, resolved to hold it until the last gun was lost. as i rode, the shells screaming over my head and ploughing the ground under my horse, an involuntary appeal went up that one of them might take me from scenes of such awful responsibility; but the storm to be met left no time to think of one's self. the battery officers were prepared to meet the crisis,--no move had been made for leaving the field. my old acquaintance of sharpsburg experience, captain miller, was walking up and down behind his guns, smoking his pipe, directing his fire over the heads of our men as fast as they were inside of the danger-line; the other officers equally firm and ready to defend to the last. a body of skirmishers put out from the enemy's lines and advanced some distance, but the batteries opened severe fire and drove it back. our men passed the batteries in quiet walk, and would rally, i knew, when they reached the ridge from which they started. general lee was soon with us, and with staff-officers and others assisted in encouraging the men and getting them together. as the attack failed, general kilpatrick put his cavalry brigade under general farnsworth on the charge through the infantry detachment in rear of my right division. the regiments of g. t. anderson's brigade had been posted at points in rear as guards against cavalry, and the first texas, fourth and fifteenth alabama, and bachman's and reilly's batteries were looking for that adventure. farnsworth had a rough ride over rocks and stone fences, but bore on in spite of all, cutting and slashing when he could get at the skirmishers or detachments. he made a gallant ride along the rear of our right, but was obliged to come under the infantry and artillery fire at several points. he fell, pierced, it is said, by five mortal wounds. calls for him to surrender were made, but the cavalry were not riding for that. the command lost heavily, but claimed captives equal to their loss. kilpatrick's mistake was in not putting farnsworth in on merritt's left, where he would have had an open ride, and made more trouble than was ever made by a cavalry brigade. had the ride been followed by prompt advance of the enemy's infantry in line beyond our right and pushed with vigor, they could have reached our line of retreat. general meade ordered his left, but delay in getting the orders and preparing to get through the rough grounds consumed time, and the move was abandoned. the fifth and sixth corps were in convenient position, and would have had good ground for marching after getting out of the rocky fastnesses of round top. as we had no cavalry on our right, the union cavalry was held on their right to observe the confederates under stuart, except kilpatrick's division (and custer's brigade of that division was retained on their right). a little while after the repulse of our infantry column, stuart's cavalry advanced and was met by gregg's, and made one of the severest and most stubborn fights of cavalry on record. general wade hampton was severely wounded. the union forces held the field. when affairs had quieted a little, and apprehension of immediate counter-attack had passed, orders were sent the divisions of mclaws and hood to draw back and occupy the lines from which they had advanced to engage the battle of the second. orders sent benning's brigade by the division staff were not understood, and benning, under the impression that he was to relieve part of mclaws's division, which he thought was to be sent on other service, ordered the fifteenth georgia regiment to occupy that position. when he received the second order he sent for his detached regiment. meanwhile, the enemy was feeling the way to his front, and before colonel dubose received his second order, the enemy was on his front and had passed his right and left flanks. the moment he received the final order, colonel dubose made a running fight and escaped with something more than half his men. in regard to this, as to other battles in which the first corps was concerned, the knights of peaceful later days have been busy in search of points on which to lay charges or make innuendoes of want of conduct of that corps. general early has been a picturesque figure in the combination, ready to champion any reports that could throw a shadow over its record, but the charge most pleasing to him was that of _treason_ on the part of its commander. the subject was lasting, piquant, and so consoling that one is almost inclined to envy the comfort it gave him in his latter days. colonel taylor and members of the staff claim that general lee ordered that the divisions of mclaws and hood should be a part of the assaulting column. of this general lee says,- "general longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hill on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked from reverse as they advanced. his operations had been embarrassed the day previously from the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of hood and mclaws. he was therefore reinforced by heth's division and two brigades of pender's, to the command of which major-general trimble was assigned. general hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of the command, to afford general longstreet further assistance if required, and to avail himself of any success that might be gained." colonel taylor says,- "as our extreme right was comparatively safe, being well posted, and not at all threatened, one of the divisions of hood and mclaws, and a greater part of the other, could be moved out of the lines and be made to take part in the attack." on this point i offer the evidence of general warren before the committee of investigation: "general meade had so arranged his troops on our left during the third day that nearly one-half of our army was in reserve in that position. it was a good, sheltered position, and a convenient one from which to reinforce other points of the line, and when the repulse of the enemy took place on that day, general meade intended to move forward all the forces he could get in hand and assault the enemy in line. he ordered the advance of the fifth corps, but it was carried so slowly that it did not amount to much, if anything." general hancock's evidence on that point is: "general meade told me before the fight that if the enemy attacked me, he intended to put the fifth and sixth corps on the enemy's flank." from which it is evident that the withdrawal of the divisions of my right, to be put in the column of assault, would have been followed by those corps swinging around and enveloping the assaulting columns and gaining lee's line of retreat. colonel venable thinks it a mistake to have put heth's division in the assaulting column. he says,- "they were terribly mistaken about heth's division in this planning. it had not recuperated, having suffered more than was reported on the first day." but to accept for the moment colonel taylor's premises, the two divisions referred to would have swelled the columns of assault to twenty-three thousand men. we were alone in the battle as on the day before. the enemy had seventy-five thousand men on strong ground, with well-constructed defences. the confederates would have had to march a mile through the blaze of direct and cross fire and break up an army of seventy-five thousand well-seasoned troops, well defended by field-works! a rough sketch of the positions of the forces about my right and rear will help to show if it "was comparatively safe, and not at all threatened." [illustration: gettysburg, pa. july 3rd, 1863] general gibbon's testimony in regard to the assaulting columns of the 3d: "i was wounded about the time i suppose the enemy's second line got into our batteries,--probably a little before that. as described to me afterwards, the result, i think, will carry out my idea in regard to it, because the enemy broke through, forced back my weakest brigade under general webb, got into our batteries, and the men were so close that the officers on each side were using their pistols on each other, and the men frequently clubbed their muskets, and the clothes of men on both sides were burned by the powder of exploding cartridges. an officer of my staff, lieutenant haskell, had been sent by me, just previously to the attack, to general meade with a message that the enemy were coming. he got back on the top of the hill hunting for me, and was there when this brigade was forced back, and, without waiting orders from me, he rode off to the left and ordered all the troops of the division there to the right. as they came up helter-skelter, everybody for himself, with their officers among them, they commenced firing upon these rebels as they were coming into our lines." had the column been augmented by the divisions of my right, it is probable that its brave men would have penetrated far enough to reach johnson's island as prisoners; hardly possible that it could have returned to general lee by any other route. when engaged collecting the broken files after the repulse, general lee said to an officer who was assisting, "it is all my fault." a letter from colonel w. m. owen assures me that general lee repeated this remark at a roadside fire of the washington artillery on the 5th of july. a letter from general lee during the winter of 1863-64 repeated it in substance. and here is what colonel t. j. goree, of texas, has to say upon the subject: "i was present, however, just after pickett's repulse, when general lee so magnanimously took all the blame of the disaster upon himself. another important circumstance, which i distinctly remember, was in the winter of 1863-64, when you sent me from east tennessee to orange court-house with some despatches to general lee. upon my arrival there, general lee asked me into his tent, where he was alone, with two or three northern papers on the table. he remarked that he had just been reading the northern reports of the battle of gettysburg; that he had become satisfied from reading those reports _that if he had permitted you to carry out your plan, instead of making the attack on cemetery hill, he would have been successful_." further testimony to this effect comes from another source: "in east tennessee, during the winter of 1863-64, you called me into your quarters, and asked me to read a letter just received from general lee in which he used the following words: 'oh, general, _had i but followed your advice, instead of pursuing the course that i did, how different all would have been_!' you wished me to bear this language in mind as your correspondence might be lost. "erasmus taylor. "orange county, va." a contributor to _blackwood's magazine_ reported,- "but lee's inaction after fredericksburg was, as we have called it, an unhappy or negative blunder. undoubtedly the greatest positive blunder of which he was ever guilty was the unnecessary onslaught which he gratuitously made against the strong position into which, by accident, general meade fell back at gettysburg. we have good reason for saying that during the five years of calm reflection which general lee passed at lexington, after the conclusion of the american war, his maladroit manipulation of the confederate army during the gettysburg campaign was to him a matter of ceaseless self reproach. "'if,' said he, on many occasions, 'i had taken general longstreet's advice on the eve of the second day of the battle of gettysburg, and filed off the left corps of my army behind the right corps, in the direction of washington and baltimore, along the emmitsburg road, the confederates would to-day be a free people.'"[135] it should be stated that kindest relations were maintained between general lee and myself until interrupted by politics in 1867. it is difficult to reconcile these facts with the reports put out after his death by members of his family and of his staff, and _post-bellum_ champions, that indicate his later efforts to find points by which to so work up public opinion as to shift the disaster to my shoulders. some of the statements of the members of the staff have been referred to. general fitzhugh lee claims evidence that general lee said that he would have gained the battle if he had had general jackson with him. but he had jackson in the sharpsburg campaign, which was more blundering than that of gettysburg.[136] in another account fitzhugh lee wrote of general lee,- "he told the father of the writer, his brother, that he was controlled too far by the great confidence he felt in the fighting qualities of his people, and by assurances of most of his higher officers." no assurances were made from officers of the first corps, but rather objections. the only assurances that have come to light, to be identified, are those of general early, who advised the battle, but _from the other end of the line from his command_, which should have given warning that it did not come from the heart of a true soldier. and this is the epitome of the confederate battle. the army when it set out on the campaign was all that could be desired, (except that the arms were not all of the most approved pattern), but it was despoiled of two of its finest brigades, jenkins's and corse's of pickett's division, and was fought out by detail. the greatest number engaged at any one time was on the first day, when twenty-six thousand engaged twenty thousand of the first and part of the eleventh corps. on the afternoon of the second day about seventeen thousand were engaged on the right, and at night about seven thousand on the left; then later at night about three thousand near the centre. on the third day about twelve thousand were engaged at daylight and until near noon, and in the afternoon fifteen thousand,--all of the work of the second and third days against an army of seventy thousand and more of veteran troops in strong position defended by field-works. general lee was on the field from about three o'clock of the afternoon of the first day. every order given the troops of the first corps on that field up to its march on the forenoon of the 2d was issued in his presence. if the movements were not satisfactory in time and speed of moving, it was his power, duty, and privilege to apply the remedy, but it was not a part of a commander's duty or privilege to witness things that did not suit him, fail to apply the remedy, and go off and grumble with his staff-officers about it. in their efforts to show culpable delay in the movements of the first corps on the 2d, some of the virginia writers endeavor to show that general lee did not even give me a guide to lead the way to the field from which his battle was to be opened. he certainly failed to go and look at it, and assist in selecting the ground and preparing for action. fitzhugh lee says of the second day, "longstreet was attacking the marye's hill of the position."[137] at fredericksburg, general burnside attacked at marye's hill in six or more successive assaults with some twenty or thirty thousand against three brigades under mclaws and ransom and the artillery; he had about four hundred yards to march from his covered ways about fredericksburg to marye's hill. when his last attack was repulsed in the evening, he arranged and gave his orders for the attack to be renewed in the morning, giving notice that he would lead it with the ninth corps, but upon reports of his officers abandoned it. general lee's assaulting columns of fifteen or twenty thousand had a march of a mile to attack double their numbers, better defended than were the three brigades of confederates at marye's hill that drove back burnside. the enemy on cemetery hill was in stronger position than the confederates at marye's hill. fitzhugh lee writes in the volume already quoted,- "over the splendid scene of human courage and human sacrifice at gettysburg there arises in the south an apparition, like banquo's ghost at macbeth's banquet, which says the battle was lost to the confederates because some one blundered." call them banquo, but their name is legion. weird spirits keep midnight watch about the great boulders, while unknown comrades stalk in ghostly ranks through the black fastnesses of devil's den, wailing the lament, "some one blundered at gettysburg! woe is me, whose duty was to die!" fitzhugh lee makes his plans, orders, and movements to suit his purpose, and claims that they would have given gettysburg to the confederates, but he is not likely to convince any one outside of his coterie that over the heights of gettysburg was to be found honor for the south. general meade said that the suggestion to work towards his line of communication was sound "military sense." that utterance has been approved by subsequent fair judgment, and it is that potent fact that draws the spiteful fire of latter-day knights. forty thousand men, unsupported as we were, could not have carried the position at gettysburg. the enemy was there. officers and men knew their advantage, and were resolved to stay until the hills came down over them. it is simply out of the question for a lesser force to march over broad, open fields and carry a fortified front occupied by a greater force of seasoned troops. referring to the proposed move around the union left to cut the line of communication, a parallel in the franco-german war is appropriate. when the manoeuvres of the campaign had pushed marshal macmahon's army back to the road between paris and metz, the latter fortified and occupied by the army under marshal bazaine, macmahon hesitated between paris and metz, and was manoeuvred out of position to a point north of the line. von moltke seized the opportunity and took position on the line, which gave him shorter routes east and west. so that macmahon, to reach either point, must pass the german forces under von moltke. he made a brave effort to reach metz, and von moltke, to maintain his advantage, was called to skilful manoeuvre and several gallant affairs, but succeeded in holding his advantage that must call macmahon to general engagement or surrender. out-generalled, and with a demoralized army, he thought the latter his proper alternative. the relative conditions of the armies were similar. the union army, beaten at fredericksburg and chancellorsville, and drawn from its aggressive campaign to defensive work in pennsylvania, had met disaster in its battle of the 1st. if it had been outgeneralled, and dislodged of position without further attack, it would have been in poor condition to come in aggressive battle against its adversary in well-chosen defensive grounds. again, in our own war, when the union army carried the confederate works west of petersburg on the 2d of april, 1865, general meade got his army together and was about to march east to finish his work by the capture of petersburg. general grant objected,--that the confederates would retreat during the night; at petersburg he would be behind them; in his then position he would be alongside of them, and have an even start, with better prospect to strike across their march and force them to general battle or surrender; and he ordered arrangements for the march west at daylight. even napoleon bonaparte, the first in the science and greatest in the execution of the art of war, finally lost grasp of his grandest thought: "in war men are nothing; a man is everything."[138] the confederate chief at gettysburg looked something like napoleon at waterloo. fitzhugh lee quotes evidence of governor carroll, of maryland, that general lee said, "longstreet is the hardest man to move in my army." it does not look like generalship to lose a battle and a cause and then lay the responsibility upon others. he held command and was supported by his government. if his army did not suit him, his word could have changed it in a minute. if he failed to apply the remedy, it was his fault. some claim that his only fault as a general was his tender, generous heart. but a heart in the right place looks more to the cause intrusted to its care than for hidden ways by which to shift its responsibility to the shoulders of those whose lives hang upon his word. when he set out on his first campaign (chickahominy) with the army, the key of the campaign was intrusted to general jackson, who named the hour for the opening and failed to meet his own appointment. at the time he appointed, a. p. hill's, d. h. hill's, and longstreet's commands were in position waiting. about eight hours after his time he was up, but deliberately marched past the engagement and went into camp, a mile or more behind the hot battle. he remained in his camp next morning, and permitted the enemy, dislodged of his position of the day before, to march by him to a strong position at gaines's mill. when his column reached that position, his leading division (d. h. hill's) engaged the enemy's right without orders. he called the division off and put his command in position to intercept the enemy's retreat towards the pamunkey, from which he was afterwards called to his part in the general engagement. the next day he had the cavalry and part of his infantry in search of the enemy's next move. at my head-quarters were two clever young engineers who were sent to find what the enemy was about. they were the first to report the enemy's retreat towards james river. orders were given for jackson to follow on the direct line of retreat, also magruder and huger. my command was ordered around through the outskirts of richmond by the darbytown road to interpose between mcclellan's army and the james river, about twenty miles; the other troops marching by routes of about nine miles. we were in position on the evening of the 29th of june, and stood in front of the enemy all of the 30th, fighting a severe battle in the afternoon. magruder and huger got up after night, and jackson on the morning of the 1st. after the battle of the 1st, jackson, magruder, and huger were ordered in direct pursuit along the route of retreat, my command by the longer route of nance's store. jackson's column and mine met on the evening of the 3d near westover, the enemy's new position. at the second manassas my command relieved the pressure against jackson. he called on me for relief by a route that would have taken an hour or an hour and a half. a way was found by which he was relieved in about thirty minutes. when relieved, he left the battle on my hands. i was at sharpsburg all day; jackson only about two and a half hours. at fredericksburg, anticipating the move against him, half of my command was ordered to swing off from my right and join in his battle. but general lee's assertion seems to refer to the operations at gettysburg, after jackson had found his happy home. let us see how far this assertion is supported by events. general lee reported,- "the advance of the enemy to the latter place (gettysburg) was unknown, and, the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops." when, on the forenoon of the 2d, he decided upon his plan, the second corps was deployed in the immediate front of the enemy's line on our left, except two brigades sent off by general early. one division of the third was close on the right of the second, all within thirty minutes' march of the enemy's lines. two divisions of the third corps and two of the first were on seminary ridge. when the order was announced the divisions on seminary ridge had to find their positions and deploy to the right. by the route ordered for the march it was five or six miles to the point at which the battle was to be opened. the troops of the third had a shorter route. the march of the first was made in time for prompt deployment on the right of the third. we were left to our own resources in finding ground upon which to organize for battle. the enemy had changed position somewhat after the march was ordered, but as we were not informed of his position before the march, we could not know of the change. the confederate commander did not care to ride near us, to give information of a change, to assist in preparing for attack, nor to inquire if new and better combinations might be made. four brigades of the right of the third corps were assigned as part of my command. the engagement was to be general. my artillery combat was opened at three p.m., followed in half an hour by the infantry, and i made progressive battle until sundown. a division of the second corps attacked on our left at nightfall, and later two brigades. other parts of the second and third corps did not move to the battle. on the 3d i was ordered to organize the column of assault, the other corps to co-operate and assist the battle. there was an affair on the confederate left before the assaulting columns were organized, brought on by attack of the enemy. the assaulting force marched at one p.m. its work has been described, but it is important to note that neither of the other corps took part in the battle while the southern chief stood in view of the attack and near the rear of those corps. so it looks as if the commander of the first corps was easier to move than any one in his army, rather than harder, and his chief left him to fight the battles alone. after the retreat, and when resting on the south banks of the rapidan, reading of the progress of the march of general rosecrans's army towards georgia, it seemed sinful to lie there idle while our comrades in the west were so in need of assistance, and i wrote the secretary of war suggesting that a detachment should be sent west from the idle army. general lee objected, but the suggestion was ordered to be executed. in this instance the subordinate was easier to move than his chief, though the interests of the cause depended largely on the movement of the latter. [illustration: william blake. volunteered in the eighteenth mississippi at the age of sixteen. lost a leg at gettysburg.] the forces engaged at gettysburg were: confederate.--according to the latest official accounts, the army of northern virginia, on the 31st of may, numbered 74,468. the detachments that joined numbered 6400, making 80,868. deducting the detachments left in virginia,--jenkins's brigade, pickett's division, 2300; corse's brigade, pickett's division, 1700; detachments from second corps and of cavalry, 1300, in all 5300,--leaves the actual aggregate 75,568. union.--according to the reports of the 30th of june, and making allowance for detachments that joined in the interim in time to take part in the battle, the grand aggregate was 100,000[139] officers and men. the confederates lost many men after the battle, and before they recrossed the potomac, from the toils of the march and the continuous and severe harassment of the enemy's cavalry, which followed closely and in great force. the casualties were: confederate.[140] first corps 7,539 second corps 5,937 third corps 6,735 cavalry 1,426 ----- aggregate 21,637 union.[141] first corps 6,059 second corps 4,369 third corps 4,211 fifth corps 2,187 sixth corps 242 eleventh corps 3,801 twelfth corps 1,082 cavalry 1,094 staff 4 ----- aggregate 23,049 the organization of the contending armies at gettysburg was as follows: army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee, commanding. first army corps, lieutenant-general james longstreet. mclaws's division, maj.-gen. lafayette mclaws:--_kershaw's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. b. kershaw; 2d s. c., col. j. d. kennedy, lieut.-col. f. gaillard; 3d s. c., maj. r. c. maffett, col. j. d. nance; 7th s. c., col. d. wyatt aiken; 8th s. c., col. j. w. henagan; 15th s. c., col. w. d. de saussure, maj. william m. gist; 3d s. c. battn., lieut.-col. w. g. rice. _barksdale's brigade_, brig.-gen. william barksdale, col. b. g. humphreys; 13th miss., col. j. w. carter; 17th miss., col. w. d. holder, lieut.-col. john c. fiser; 18th miss., col. t. m. griffin, lieut.-col. w. h. luse; 21st miss., col. b. g. humphreys. _semmes's brigade_,[142] brig.-gen. p. j. semmes, col. goode bryan; 10th ga., col. john b. weems; 50th ga., col. w. r. manning; 51st ga., col. e. ball; 53d ga., col. james p. simms. _wofford's brigade_, brig.-gen. w. t. wofford; 16th ga., col. goode bryan; 18th ga., lieut.-col. s. z. ruff; 24th ga., col. robert mcmillan; cobb's (ga.) legion, lieut.-col. luther j. glenn; phillips (ga.) legion, lieut.-col. e. s. barclay. _artillery_, col. h. c. cabell; 1st n. c. art., batt. a, capt. b. c. manly; pulaski (ga.) art., capt. j. c. fraser, lieut. w. j. furlong; 1st richmond howitzers, capt. e. s. mccarthy; troup (ga.) art., capt. h. h. carlton, lieut. c. w. motes. pickett's division, maj.-gen. george e. pickett:--_garnett's brigade_, brig.-gen. r. b. garnett, maj. c. s. peyton; 8th va., col. eppa hunton; 18th va., lieut.-col. h. a. carrington; 19th va., col. henry gantt, lieut.-col. john t. ellis; 28th va., col. r. c. allen, lieut.-col. william watts; 56th va., col. w. d. stuart, lieut.-col. p. p. slaughter. _kemper's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. l. kemper, col. joseph mayo, jr.; 1st va., col. lewis b. williams, lieut.-col. f. g. skinner; 3d va., col. joseph mayo, jr., lieut.-col. a. d. callcote; 7th va., col. w. t. patton, lieut.-col. c. c. flowerree; 11th va., maj. kirkwood otey; 24th va., col. william r. terry. _armistead's brigade_, brig.-gen. l. a. armistead, col. w. r. aylett; 9th va., maj. john c. owens; 14th va., col. james g. hodges, lieut.-col. william white; 38th va., col. e. c. edmonds, lieut.-col. p. b. whittle; 53d va., col. w. r. aylett; 57th va., col. john bowie magruder. _artillery_, maj. james dearing; fauquier (va.) art., capt. r. m. stribling; hampden (va.) art., capt. w. h. caskie; richmond fayette art., capt. m. c. macon; virginia batt., capt. joseph g. blount. hood's division, maj.-gen. john b. hood, brig.-gen. e. m. law:--_law's brigade_, brig.-gen. e. m. law, col. james l. sheffield; 4th ala., lieut.-col. l. h. scruggs; 15th ala., col. william c. oates, capt. b. a. hill; 44th ala., col. william f. perry; 47th ala., col. james w. jackson, lieut.-col. m. j. bulger, maj. j. m. campbell; 48th ala., col. james l. sheffield, capt. t. j. eubanks. _robertson's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. b. robertson; 3d ark., col. van h. manning, lieut.-col. r. s. taylor; 1st tex., lieut.-col. p. a. work; 4th tex., col. j. c. g. key, maj. j. p. bane; 5th tex., col. r. m. powell, lieut.-col. k. bryan, maj. j. c. rogers. _anderson's brigade_, brig.-gen. george t. anderson, lieut.-col. william luffman; 7th ga., col. w. w. white; 8th ga., col. john r. towers; 9th ga., lieut.-col. john c. mounger, maj. w. m. jones, capt. george hillyer; 11th ga., col. f. h. little, lieut.-col. william luffman, maj. henry d. mcdaniel, capt. william h. mitchell; 59th ga., col. jack brown, capt. m. g. bass. _benning's brigade_, brig.-gen. henry l. benning; 2d ga., lieut.-col. william t. harris, maj. w. s. shepherd; 15th ga., col. d. m. dubose; 17th ga., col. w. c. hodges; 20th ga., col. john a. jones, lieut.-col. j. d. waddell. _artillery_, maj. m. w. henry; branch (n. c.) art., capt. a. c. latham; german (s. c.) art., capt. william k. bachman; palmetto (s. c.) light art., capt. hugh r. garden; rowan (n. c.) art., capt. james reilly. artillery reserve, col. j. b. walton:--_alexander's battalion_, col. e. p. alexander; ashland (va.) art., capt. p. woolfolk, jr., lieut. james woolfolk; bedford (va.) art., capt. t. c. jordan; brooks (s. c.) art., lieut. s. c. gilbert; madison (la.) light art., capt. george v. moody; va. batt., capt. w. w. parker; va. batt., capt. o. b. taylor. _washington (la.) artillery_, maj. b. f. eshleman; first co., capt. c. w. squires; second co., capt. j. b. richardson; third co., capt. m. b. miller; fourth co., capt. joe norcom, lieut. h. a. battles. second army corps, lieutenant-general richard s. ewell. _escort_, randolph's company virginia cavalry, capt. william f. randolph. early's division, maj.-gen. jubal a. early:--_hays's brigade_, brig.-gen. harry t. hays; 5th la., maj. alexander hart, capt. t. h. biscoe; 6th la., lieut.-col. joseph hanlon; 7th la., col. d. b. penn; 8th la., col. t. d. lewis, lieut.-col. a. de blanc, maj. g. a. lester; 9th la., col. leroy a. stafford. _smith's brigade_, brig.-gen. william smith; 31st va., col. john s. hoffman; 49th va., lieut.-col. j. catlett gibson; 52d va., lieut.-col. james h. skinner. _hoke's brigade_, col. isaac e. avery, col. a. c. godwin; 6th n. c., maj. s. mcd. tate; 21st n. c., col. w. w. kirkland; 57th n. c., col. a. c. godwin. _gordon's brigade_, brig.-gen. j. b. gordon; 13th ga., col. james m. smith; 26th ga., col. e. n. atkinson; 31st ga., col. clement a. evans; 38th ga., capt. william l. mcleod; 60th ga., capt. w. b. jones; 61st ga., col. john h. lamar. _artillery_, lieut.-col. h. p. jones; charlottesville (va.) art., capt. james mcd. carrington; courtney (va.) art., capt. w. a. tanner; louisiana guard art., capt. c. a. green; staunton (va.) art., capt. a. w. garber. johnson's division, maj.-gen. edward johnson:--_steuart's brigade_, brig.-gen. george h. steuart; 1st md. battn. inf., lieut.-col. j. r. herbert, maj. w. w. goldsborough, capt. j. p. crane; 1st n. c., lieut.-col. h. a. brown; 3d n. c., maj. w. m. parsley; 10th va., col. e. t. h. warren; 23d va., lieut.-col. s. t. walton; 37th va., maj. h. c. wood. _stonewall brigade_, brig.-gen. james a. walker; 2d va., col. j. q. a. nadenbousch; 4th va., maj. william terry; 5th va., col. j. h. s. funk; 27th va., lieut.-col. d. m. shriver; 33d va., capt. j. b. golladay. _nicholls's brigade_,[143] col. j. m. williams; 1st la., capt. e. d. willett; 2d la., lieut.-col. r. e. burke; 10th la., maj. t. n. powell; 14th la., lieut.-col. david zable; 15th la., maj. andrew brady. _jones's brigade_, brig.-gen. john m. jones, lieut.-col. r. h. dungan; 21st va., capt. w. p. moseley; 25th va., col. j. c. higginbotham, lieut.-col. j. a. robinson; 42d va., lieut.-col. r. w. withers, capt. s. h. saunders; 44th va., maj. n. cobb, capt. t. r. buckner; 48th va., lieut.-col. r. h. dungan, maj. oscar white; 50th va., lieut.-col. l. h. n. salyer. _artillery_, maj. j. w. latimer, capt. c. i. raine; 1st md. batt., capt william f. dement; alleghany (va.) art., capt. j. c. carpenter; chesapeake (md.) art., capt. william d. brown; lee (va.) batt., capt. c. i. raine, lieut. william w. hardwicke. rodes's division, maj.-gen. r. e. rodes:--_daniel's brigade_, brig.-gen. junius daniel; 32d n. c., col. e. c. brabble; 43d n. c., col. t. s. kenan, lieut.-col. w. g. lewis; 45th n. c., lieut.-col. s. h. boyd, maj. john r. winston, capt. a. h. gallaway, capt. j. a. hopkins; 53d n. c., col. w. a. owens; 2d n. c. battn., lieut.-col. h. l. andrews, capt. van brown. _doles's brigade_, brig.-gen. george doles; 4th ga., lieut.-col. d. r. e. winn, maj. w. h. willis; 12th ga., col. edward willis; 21st ga., col. john t. mercer; 44th ga., col. s. p. lumpkin, maj. w. h. peebles. _iverson's brigade_, brig.-gen. alfred iverson; 5th n. c.,[144] capt. speight b. west, capt. benjamin robinson; 12th n. c., lieut.-col. w. s. davis; 20th n. c.,[145] lieut.-col. nelson slough, capt. lewis t. hicks; 23d n. c.,[146] col. d. h. christie, capt. william h. johnston. _ramseur's brigade_, brig.-gen. s. d. ramseur; 2d n. c., maj. d. w. hurtt, capt. james t. scales; 4th n. c., col. bryan grimes; 14th n. c., col. r. tyler bennett, maj. joseph h. lambeth; 30th n. c., col. francis m. parker, maj. w. w. sillers. _o'neal's brigade_, col. e. a. o'neal; 3d ala., col. c. a. battle; 5th ala., col. j. m. hall; 6th ala., col. j. n. lightfoot, capt. m. l. bowie; 12th ala., col. s. b. pickens; 26th ala., lieut.-col. john c. goodgame. _artillery_, lieut.-col. thomas h. carter; jeff davis (ala.) art., capt. w. j. reese; king william (va.) art., capt. w. p. carter; morris (va.) art., capt. r. c. m. page; orange (va.) art., capt. c. w. fry. _artillery reserve_, col. j. thompson brown; 1st va. art., capt. willis j. dance; 2d richmond (va.) howitzers, capt. david watson; 3d richmond (va.) howitzers, capt. b. h. smith, jr.; powhatan (va.) art., lieut. john m. cunningham; rockbridge (va.) art., capt. a. graham; salem (va.) art., lieut. c. b. griffin; nelson's battn., lieut.-col. william nelson; amherst (va.) art., capt. t. j. kirkpatrick; fluvanna (va.) art., capt. j. l. massie; ga. batt., capt. john milledge, jr. third army corps, lieutenant-general ambrose p. hill. anderson's division, maj.-gen. r. h. anderson:--_wilcox's brigade_, brig.-gen. cadmus m. wilcox; 8th ala., lieut.-col. hilary a. herbert; 9th ala., capt. j. h. king; 10th ala., col. william h. forney, lieut.-col. james e. shelley; 11th ala., col. j. c. c. sanders, lieut.-col. george e. tayloe; 14th ala., col. l. pinckard, lieut.-col. james a. broome. _mahone's brigade_, brig.-gen. william mahone; 6th va., col. george t. rogers; 12th va., col. d. a. weisiger; 16th va., col. joseph h. ham; 41st va., col. william a. parham; 61st va., col. v. d. groner. _wright's brigade_, brig.-gen. a. r. wright, col. william gibson; 3d ga., col. e. j. walker; 22d ga., col. joseph wasden, capt. b. c. mccurry; 48th ga., col. william gibson, capt. m. r. hall; 2d ga. battn., maj. george w. ross, capt. charles j. moffett. _perry's brigade_, col. david lang; 2d fla., maj. w. r. moore; 5th fla., capt. r. n. gardner; 8th fla., col. david lang. _posey's brigade_, brig.-gen. carnot posey; 12th miss., col. w. h. taylor; 16th miss., col. samuel e. baker; 19th miss., col. n. h. harris; 48th miss., col. joseph m. jayne. _artillery_ (_sumter battalion_), maj. john lane; co. a, capt. hugh m. ross; co. b, capt. george m. patterson; co. c, capt. john t. wingfield. heth's division, maj.-gen. henry heth, brig.-gen. j. j. pettigrew:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. j. j. pettigrew, col. j. k. marshall; 11th n. c., col. collett leventhorpe; 26th n. c., col. henry k. burgwyn, jr., capt. h. c. albright; 47th n. c., col. g. h. faribault; 52d n. c., col. j. k. marshall, lieut.-col. marcus a. parks. _second brigade_, col. j. m. brockenbrough; 40th va., capt. t. e. betts, capt. r. b. davis; 47th va., col. robert m. mayo; 55th va., col. w. s. christian; 22d va. battn., maj. john s. bowles. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. james j. archer, col. b. d. fry, lieut.-col. s. g. shepard; 13th ala., col. b. d. fry; 5th ala. battn., maj. a. s. van de graaff; 1st tenn. (provisional army), maj. felix g. buchanan; 7th tenn., lieut.-col. s. g. shepard; 14th tenn., capt. b. l. phillips. _fourth brigade_, brig.-gen. joseph r. davis; 2d miss., col. j. m. stone; 11th miss., col. f. m. green; 42d miss., col. h. r. miller; 55th n. c., col. j. k. connally. _artillery_, lieut.-col. john j. garnett; donaldsonville (la.) art., capt. v. maurin; huger (va.) art., capt. joseph d. moore; lewis (va.) art., capt. john w. lewis; norfolk light art. blues, capt. c. r. grandy. pender's division, maj.-gen. william d. pender, maj.-gen. i. r. trimble, brig.-gen. james h. lane:--_first brigade_, col. abner perrin; 1st s. c. (provisional army), maj. c. w. mccreary; 1st s. c. rifles, capt. william m. hadden; 12th s. c., col. john l. miller; 13th s. c., lieut.-col. b. t. brockman; 14th s. c., lieut.-col. joseph n. brown. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. james h. lane, col. c. m. avery; 7th n. c., capt. j. mcleod turner, capt. james g. harris; 18th n. c., col. john d. barry; 28th n. c., col. s. d. lowe, lieut.-col. w. h. a. speer; 33d n. c., col. c. m. avery; 37th n. c., col. w. m. barbour. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. edward l. thomas; 14th, 35th, 45th, and 49th ga., col. s. t. player. _fourth brigade_, brig.-gen. a. m. scales, lieut.-col. g. t. gordon, col. w. lee j. lowrance; 13th n. c., col. j. h. hyman, lieut.-col. h. a. rogers; 16th n. c., capt. l. w. stowe; 22d n. c., col. james conner; 34th n. c., col. william lee j. lowrance, lieut.-col. g. t. gordon; 38th n. c., col. w. j. hoke, lieut.-col. john ashford. _artillery_, maj. william t. poague; albemarle (va.) art., capt. james w. wyatt; charlotte (n. c.) art., capt. joseph graham; madison (miss.) light art., capt. george ward; virginia batt., capt. j. v. brooke. artillery reserve, col. r. lindsay walker:--_mcintosh's battalion_, maj. d. g. mcintosh; danville (va.) art., capt. r. s. rice; hardaway (ala.) art., capt. w. b. hurt; 2d rockbridge (va.) art., lieut. samuel wallace; virginia batt., capt. m. johnson. _pegram's battalion_, maj. w. j. pegram, capt. e. b. brunson; crenshaw (va.) batt.; fredericksburg (va.) art., capt. e. a. marye; letcher (va.) art., capt. t. a. brander; pee dee (s. c.) art., lieut. william e. zimmerman; purcell (va.) art., capt. joseph mcgraw. cavalry. stuart's division, maj.-gen. j. e. b. stuart:--_hampton's brigade_, brig.-gen. wade hampton, col. l. s. baker; 1st n. c., col. l. s. baker; 1st and 2d s. c.; cobb's (ga.) legion, jeff. davis legion, phillips (ga.) legion. _robertson's brigade_, brig.-gen. beverly h. robertson;[147] 4th n. c., col. d. d. ferebee; 5th n. c. _fitzhugh lee's brigade_, brig.-gen. fitzhugh lee; 1st md. battn.,[148] maj. harry gilmor, maj. ridgely brown; 1st va., col. james h. drake; 2d va., col. t. t. munford; 3d va., col. thomas h. owen; 4th va., col. william c. wickham; 5th va., col. t. l. rosser. _jenkins's brigade_, brig.-gen. a. g. jenkins, col. m. j. ferguson; 14th, 16th, and 17th va.; 34th va. battn., lieut.-col. v. a. witcher; 36th va. battn.; jackson's (va.) batt., capt. thomas e. jackson. _jones's brigade_, brig.-gen. william e. jones; 6th va., maj. c. e. flournoy; 7th va., lieut.-col. thomas marshall; 11th va., col. l. l. lomax. _w. h. f. lee's brigade_, col. j. r. chambliss, jr.; 2d n. c.; 9th va., col. r. l. t. beale; 10th va., col. j. lucius davis; 13th va. _stuart's horse artillery_, maj. r. f. beckham; breathed's (va.) batt., capt. james breathed; chew's (va.) batt., capt. r. p. chew; griffin's (md.) batt., capt. w. h. griffin; hart's (s. c.) batt., capt. j. f. hart; mcgregor's (va.) batt., capt. w. m. mcgregor; moorman's (va.) batt., capt. m. n. moorman. imboden's command,[149] brig.-gen. j. d. imboden; 18th va. cav., col. george w. imboden; 62d va. inf. (mounted), col. george h. smith; virginia partisan rangers, capt. john h. mcneill; virginia batt., capt. j. h. mcclanahan. artillery,[150] brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton. army of the potomac, major-general george g. meade, u. s. army, commanding. general head-quarters:--_command of the provost-marshal-general_, brig.-general marsena r. patrick; 93d n. y.,[151] col. john s. crocker; 8th u. s. (8 cos.),[151] capt. edwin w. h. reed; 2d pa. cav., col. r. butler price; 6th pa. cav., cos. e and i, capt. james starr; regular cav. (detachments from 1st, 2d, 5th, and 6th regiments). signal corps, capt. lemuel b. norton. guards and orderlies, oneida (n. y.) cav., capt. daniel p. mann. artillery,[152] brig.-gen. henry j. hunt. engineer brigade,[153] brig.-gen. henry w. benham:--15th n. y. (3 cos.), maj. walter l. cassin; 50th n. y., col. william h. pettes; u. s. battn., capt. george h. mendell. first army corps,[154] major-general abner doubleday, major-general john newton. _general head-quarters_, 1st me. cav., co. l, capt. constantine taylor. first division, brig.-gen. james s. wadsworth:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. solomon meredith, col. william w. robinson; 19th ind., col. samuel j. williams; 24th mich., col. henry a. morrow, capt. albert m. edwards; 2d wis., col. lucius fairchild, maj. john mansfield, capt. george h. otis; 6th wis., lieut.-col. rufus r. dawes; 7th wis., col. william w. robinson, maj. mark finnicum. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. lysander cutler; 7th ind., col. ira g. grover; 76th n. y., maj. andrew j. grover, capt. john e. cook; 84th n. y. (14th militia), col. edward b. fowler; 95th n. y., col. george h. biddle, maj. edward pye; 147th n. y., lieut.-col. francis c. miller, maj. george harney; 56th pa. (9 cos.), col. j. william hofmann. second division, brig.-gen. john c. robinson:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. gabriel r. paul, col. samuel h. leonard, col. adrian r. root, col. richard coulter, col. peter lyle; 16th me., col. charles w. tilden, maj. archibald d. leavitt; 13th mass., col. samuel h. leonard, lieut.-col. n. walter batchelder; 94th n. y., col. adrian r. root, maj. samuel a. moffett; 104th n. y., col. gilbert g. prey; 107th pa., lieut.-col. james macthomson, capt. emanuel d. roath. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. henry baxter; 12th mass., col. james l. bates, lieut.-col. david allen, jr.; 83d n. y. (9th militia), lieut.-col. joseph a. moesch; 97th n. y., col. charles wheelock, maj. charles northrup; 11th pa.,[155] col. richard coulter, capt. benjamin f. haines, capt. john v. overmyer; 88th pa., maj. benezet f. foust, capt. henry whiteside; 90th pa., col. peter lyle, maj. alfred j. sellers. third division, brig.-gen. thomas a. rowley, maj.-gen. abner doubleday:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. thomas a. rowley, col. chapman biddle; 80th n. y. (20th militia), col. theodore b. gates; 121st pa., maj. alexander biddle, col. chapman biddle; 142d pa., col. robert p. cummins, lieut.-col. a. b. mccalmont; 151st pa., lieut.-col. george f. mcfarland, capt. walter l. owens, col. harrison allen. _second brigade_, col. roy stone, col. langhorne wister, col. edmund l. dana; 143d pa., col. edmund l. dana, lieut.-col. john d. musser; 149th pa., lieut.-col. walton dwight, capt. james glenn; 150th pa., col. langhorne wister, lieut.-col. h. s. huidekoper, capt. cornelius c. widdis. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. george j. stannard, col. francis v. randall; 12th vt.,[156] col. asa p. blunt; 13th vt., col. francis v. randall, maj. joseph j. boynton, lieut.-col. william d. munson; 14th vt., col. william t. nichols; 15th vt.,[156] col. redfield proctor; 16th vt., col. wheelock g. veazey. _artillery brigade_, col. charles s. wainwright; me. light, 2d batt. b, capt. james a. hall; me. light, 5th batt. e, capt. greenleaf t. stevens, lieut. edward n. whittier; 1st n. y. light, batt. l,[157] capt. gilbert h. reynolds, lieut. george breck; 1st pa. light, batt. b, capt. james h. cooper; 4th u. s., batt. b, lieut. james stewart. second army corps,[158] major-general winfield s. hancock, brigadier-general john gibbon. _general head-quarters_, 6th n. y. cav., cos. d and k, capt. riley johnson. first division, brig.-gen. john c. caldwell:--_first brigade_, col. edward e. cross, col. h. boyd mckeen; 5th n. h., lieut.-col. charles e. hapgood; 61st n. y., lieut.-col. k. oscar broady; 81st pa., col. h. boyd mckeen, lieut.-col. amos stroh; 148th pa., lieut.-col. robert mcfarlane. _second brigade_, col. patrick kelly; 28th mass., col. r. byrnes; 63d n. y. (2 cos.), lieut.-col. richard c. bentley, capt. thomas touhy; 69th n. y. (2 cos.), capt. richard moroney, lieut. james j. smith; 88th n. y. (2 cos.), capt. denis f. burke; 116th pa. (4 cos.), maj. st. clair a. mulholland. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. samuel k. zook, lieut.-col. john fraser; 52d n. y., lieut.-col. c. g. freudenberg, capt. william scherrer; 57th n. y., lieut.-col. alford b. chapman; 66th n. y., col. orlando h. morris, lieut.-col. john s. hammell, maj. peter nelson; 140th pa., col. richard p. roberts, lieut.-col. john fraser. _fourth brigade_, col. john r. brooke; 27th conn. (2 cos.), lieut.-col. henry c. merwin, maj. james h. coburn; 2d del., col. william p. baily, capt. charles h. christman; 64th n. y., col. daniel g. bingham, maj. leman w. bradley; 53d pa., lieut.-col. richards mcmichael; 145th pa. (7 cos.), col. hiram l. brown, capt. john w. reynolds, capt. moses w. oliver. second division, brig.-gen. john gibbon, brig.-gen. william harrow:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. william harrow, col. francis e. heath; 19th me., col. francis e. heath, lieut.-col. henry w. cunningham; 15th mass., col. george h. ward, lieut.-col. george c. joslin; 1st minn.,[159] col. william colvill, jr., capt. nathan s. messick, capt. henry c. coates; 82d n. y. (2d militia), lieut.-col. james huston, capt. john darrow. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. alexander s. webb; 69th pa., col. dennis o'kane, capt. william davis; 71st pa., col. richard penn smith; 72d pa., col. dewitt c. baxter, lieut.-col. theodore hesser; 106th pa., lieut.-col. william l. curry. _third brigade_, col. norman j. hall; 19th mass., col. arthur f. devereux; 20th mass., col. paul j. revere, lieut.-col. george n. macy, capt. henry l. abbott; 7th mich., lieut.-col. amos e. steele, jr., maj. sylvanus w. curtis; 42d n. y., col. james e. mallon; 59th n. y. (4 cos.), lieut.-col. max a. thoman, capt. william mcfadden. _unattached_, mass. sharp-shooters, 1st co., capt. william plumer, lieut. emerson l. bicknall. third division, brig.-gen. alexander hays:--_first brigade_, col. samuel s. carroll; 14th ind., col. john coons; 4th ohio, lieut.-col. leonard w. carpenter; 8th ohio, lieut.-col. franklin sawyer; 7th w. va., lieut.-col. jonathan h. lockwood. _second brigade_, col. thomas a. smyth, lieut.-col. francis e. pierce; 14th conn., maj. theodore g. ellis; 1st del., lieut.-col. edward p. harris, capt. thomas p. hizar, lieut. william smith, lieut. john t. dent; 12th n. j., maj. john t. hill; 10th n. y. (battn.), maj. george f. hopper; 108th n. y., lieut.-col. francis e. pierce. _third brigade_, col. george l. willard, col. eliakim sherrill, lieut.-col. james m. bull; 39th n. y. (4 cos.), maj. hugo hildebrandt; 111th n. y., col. clinton d. mcdougall, lieut.-col. isaac m. lusk, capt. aaron p. seeley; 125th n. y., lieut.-col. levin crandell; 126th n. y., col. eliakim sherrill, lieut.-col. james m. bull. _artillery brigade_, capt. john g. hazard; 1st n. y. light, batt. b,[160] lieut. albert s. sheldon, capt. james mckay rorty, lieut. robert e. rogers; 1st r. i. light, batt. a, capt. william a. arnold; 1st r. i. light, batt. b, lieut. t. fred. brown, lieut. walter s. perrin; 1st u. s., batt. i, lieut. george a. woodruff, lieut. tully mccrea; 4th u. s., batt. a, lieut. alonzo h. cushing, sergt. frederick fuger. third army corps, major-general daniel e. sickles, major-general david b. birney. first division, maj.-gen. david b. birney, brig.-gen. j. h. hobart ward:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. charles k. graham, col. andrew h. tippin; 57th pa. (8 cos.), col. peter sides, capt. alanson h. nelson; 63d pa., maj. john a. danks; 68th pa., col. andrew h. tippin, capt. milton s. davis(?), 105th pa., col. calvin a. craig; 114th pa., lieut.-col. frederick f. cavada, capt. edward r. bowen; 141st pa., col. henry j. madill. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. j. h. hobart ward, col. hiram berdan; 20th ind., col. john wheeler, lieut.-col. william c. l. taylor; 3d me., col. moses b. lakeman; 4th me., col. elijah walker, capt. edwin libby; 86th n. y., lieut.-col. benjamin l. higgins; 124th n. y., col. a. van horne ellis, lieut.-col. francis m. cummins; 99th pa., maj. john w. moore; 1st u. s. sharp-shooters, col. hiram berdan, lieut.-col. caspar trepp; 2d u. s. sharp-shooters (8 cos.), maj. homer r. stoughton. _third brigade_, col. p. regis de trobriand; 17th me., lieut.-col. charles b. merrill; 3d mich., col. byron r. pierce, lieut.-col. edwin s. pierce; 5th mich., lieut.-col. john pulford; 40th n. y., col. thomas w. egan; 110th pa. (6 cos.), lieut.-col. david m. jones, maj. isaac rogers. second division, brig.-gen. andrew a. humphreys:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. joseph b. carr; 1st mass., lieut.-col. clark b. baldwin; 11th mass., lieut.-col. porter d. tripp; 16th mass., lieut.-col. waldo merriam, capt. matthew donovan; 12th mass., capt. john f. langley; 11th n. j., col. robert mcallister, capt. luther martin, lieut. john schoonover, capt. william h. lloyd, capt. samuel t. sleeper; 26th pa., maj. robert l. bodine; 84th pa.,[161] lieut.-col. milton opp. _second brigade_, col. william r. brewster; 70th n. y., col. j. egbert farnum; 71st n. y., col. henry l. potter; 72d n. y., col. john s. austin, lieut.-col. john leonard; 73d n. y., maj. michael w. burns; 74th n. y., lieut.-col. thomas holt; 120th n. y., lieut.-col. cornelius d. westbrook, maj. john r. tappen. _third brigade_, col. george c. burling; 2d n. h., col. edward l. bailey; 5th n. j., col. william j. sewell, capt. thomas c. godfrey, capt. henry h. woolsey; 6th n. j., lieut.-col. stephen r. gilkyson; 7th n. j., col. louis r. francine, maj. frederick cooper; 8th n. j., col. john ramsey, capt, john g. langston; 115th pa., maj. john p. dunne. _artillery brigade_, capt. george e. randolph, capt. a. judson clark; n. j. light, 2d batt., capt. a. judson clark, lieut. robert sims; 1st n. y. light, batt. d, capt. george b. winslow; n. y. light, 4th batt., capt. james e. smith; 1st r. i. light, batt. e, lieut. john k. bucklyn, lieut. benjamin freeborn; 4th u. s., batt. k, lieut. francis w. seeley, lieut. robert james. fifth army corps, major-general george sykes. _general head-quarters_, 12th n. y. inf., cos. d and e, capt, henry w. rider; 17th pa. cav., cos. d and h, capt. william thompson. first division, brig.-gen. james barnes:--_first brigade_, col. william s. tilton; 18th mass., col. joseph hayes; 22d mass., lieut.-col. thomas sherwin, jr.; 1st mich., col. ira c. abbott, lieut.-col. william a. throop; 118th pa., lieut.-col. james gwyn. _second brigade_, col. jacob b. sweitzer; 9th mass., col. patrick r. guiney; 32d mass., col. g. l. prescott; 4th mich., col. harrison h. jeffords, lieut.-col. george w. lumbard; 62d pa., lieut.-col. james c. hull. _third brigade_, col. strong vincent, col. james c. rice; 20th me., col. joshua l. chamberlain; 16th mich., col. norval e. welch; 44th n. y., col. james c. rice, lieut.-col. freeman conner; 83d pa., capt. orpheus s. woodward. second division, brig.-gen. romeyn b. ayres:--_first brigade_, col. hannibal day; 3d u. s. (6 cos.), capt. henry w. freedley, capt. richard g. lay; 4th u. s. (4 cos.), capt. julius w. adams, jr.; 6th u. s. (5 cos.), capt. levi c. bootes; 12th u. s. (8 cos.), capt. thomas s. dunn; 14th u. s. (8 cos.), maj. grotius r. giddings. _second brigade_, col. sidney burbank; 2d u. s. (6 cos.), maj. arthur t. lee, capt. samuel a. mckee; 7th u. s. (4 cos.), capt. david p. hancock; 10th u. s. (3 cos.), capt. william clinton; 11th u. s. (6 cos.), maj. de lancey floyd-jones; 17th u. s. (7 cos.), lieut.-col. j. durell greene. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. stephen h. weed, col. kenner garrard; 140th n. y., col. patrick h. o'rorke, lieut.-col. louis ernst; 146th n. y., col. kenner garrard, lieut.-col. david t. jenkins; 91st pa., lieut.-col. joseph h. sinex; 155th pa., lieut.-col. john h. cain. third division,[162] brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford:--_first brigade_, col. william mccandless; 1st pa. reserves (9 cos.), col. william c. talley; 2d pa. reserves, lieut.-col. george a. woodward; 6th pa. reserves, lieut.-col. wellington h. ent; 13th pa. reserves, col. charles f. taylor, maj. william r. hartshorne. _third brigade_, col. joseph w. fisher; 5th pa. reserves, lieut.-col. george dare; 9th pa. reserves, lieut.-col. james mck. snodgrass; 10th pa. reserves, col. adoniram j. warner; 11th pa. reserves, col. samuel m. jackson; 12th pa, reserves (9 cos.), col. martin d. hardin. _artillery brigade_, capt. augustus p. martin; mass. light, 3d batt. c, lieut. aaron f. walcott; 1st n. y. light, batt. c, capt. almont barnes; 1st ohio light, batt. l, capt, frank c. gibbs; 5th u. s., batt. d, lieut. charles e. hazlett, lieut. benjamin f. rittenhouse; 5th u. s., batt. i, lieut. malbone f. watson, lieut. charles c. macconnell. sixth army corps, major-general john sedgwick. _general head-quarters_, 1st n. j. cav., co. l, 1st pa. cav., co. h, capt. william s. craft. first division, brig.-gen. horatio g. wright:--_provost guard_, 4th n. j. (3 cos.), capt. william r. maxwell. _first brigade_, brig.-gen. a. t. a. torbert; 1st n. j., lieut.-col. william henry, jr.; 2d n. j., lieut.-col. charles wiebecke; 3d n. j., col. edward l. campbell; 15th n. j., col. william h. penrose. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. joseph j. bartlett;[163] 5th me., col. clark s. edwards; 121st n. y., col. emory upton; 95th pa., lieut.-col. edward carroll; 96th pa., maj. william h. lessig. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. david a. russell; 6th me., col. hiram burnham; 49th pa. (4 cos.), lieut.-col. thomas m. hulings; 119th pa., col. peter c. ellmaker; 5th wis., col. thomas s. allen. second division,[164] brig.-gen. albion p. howe:--_second brigade_, col. lewis a. grant; 2d vt., col. james h. walbridge; 3d vt., col. thomas o. seaver; 4th vt., col. charles b. stoughton; 5th vt., lieut.-col. john r. lewis; 6th vt., col. elisha l. barney. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. thomas h. neill; 7th me. (6 cos.), lieut.-col. selden connor; 33d n. y. (detachment), capt. henry j. gifford; 43d n. y., lieut.-col. john wilson; 49th n. y., col. daniel d. bidwell; 77th n. y., lieut.-col. winsor b. french; 61st pa., lieut.-col. george f. smith. third division, maj.-gen. john newton,[165] brig.-gen. frank wheaton:--first brigade, brig.-gen. alexander shaler; 65th n. y., col. joseph e. hamblin; 67th n. y., col. nelson cross; 122d n. y., col. silas titus; 23d pa., lieut.-col. john f. glenn; 82d pa., col. isaac c. bassett. _second brigade_, col. henry l. eustis; 7th mass., lieut.-col. franklin p. harlow; tenth mass., lieut.-col. joseph b. parsons; 37th mass., col. oliver edwards; 2d r. i., col. horatio rogers, jr. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. frank wheaton, col. david j. nevin; 62d n. y., col. david j. nevin, lieut.-col. theodore b. hamilton; 93d pa., maj. john i. nevin; 98th pa., maj. john b. kohler; 102d pa.,[166] col. john w. patterson; 139th pa., col. frederick h. collier, lieut.-col. william h. moody. _artillery brigade_, col. charles h. tompkins; mass. light, 1st batt. (a), capt. william h. mccartney; n. y. light, 1st batt., capt. andrew cowan; n. y. light, 3d batt., capt. william a. harn; 1st r. i. light, batt. c, capt. richard waterman; 1st r. i. light, batt. g, capt. george w. adams; 2d u. s., batt. d, lieut. edward b. williston; 2d u. s., batt. g, lieut. john h. butler; 5th u. s., batt. f, lieut. leonard martin. eleventh army corps,[167] major-general oliver o. howard. _general head-quarters_, 1st ind. cav., cos. i and k, capt. abram sharra; 8th n. y. inf. (1 co.), lieut. herman foerster. first division, brig.-gen. francis c. barlow, brig.-gen. adelbert ames:--_first brigade_, col. leopold von gilsa; 41st n. y. (9 cos.), lieut.-col. detleo von einsiedel; 54th n. y., maj. stephen kovacs, lieut. ernst poth(?); 68th n. y., col. gotthilf bourry; 153d pa., maj. john f. frueauff. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. adelbert ames, col. andrew l. harris; 17th conn., lieut.-col. douglas fowler, maj. allen g. brady; 25th ohio, lieut.-col. jeremiah williams; capt. nathaniel j. manning, lieut. william maloney, lieut. israel white; 75th ohio, col. andrew l. harris, capt. george b. fox; 107th ohio, col. seraphim meyer, capt. john m. lutz. second division, brig.-gen. adolph von steinwehr:--_first brigade_, col. charles r. coster; 134th n. y., lieut.-col. allan h. jackson; 154th n. y., lieut.-col. d. b. allen; 27th pa., lieut.-col. lorenz cantador; 73d pa., capt. d. f. kelley. _second brigade_, col. orland smith; 33d mass., col. adin b. underwood; 136th n. y., col. james wood, jr.; 55th ohio, col. charles b. gambee; 73d ohio, lieut.-col. richard long. third division, maj.-gen. carl schurz:--_first brigade_, brig.-gen. alex. schimmelfennig, col. george von amsberg; 82d ill., lieut.-col. edward s. salomon; 45th n. y., col. george von amsberg; lieut.-col. adolphus dobke; 157th n. y., col. philip p. brown, jr.; 61st ohio, col. stephen j. mcgroarty; 74th pa., col. adolph von hartung; lieut.-col. alexander von mitzel, capt. gustav schleiter, capt. henry krauseneck. _second brigade_, col. w. krzyzanowski; 58th n. y., lieut.-col. august otto, capt. emil koenig; 119th n. y., col. john t. lockman, lieut.-col. edward f. lloyd; 82d ohio, col. james s. robinson, lieut.-col. david thomson; 75th pa., col. francis mahler, maj. august ledig; 26th wis., lieut.-col. hans boebel, capt. john w. fuchs. _artillery brigade_, maj. thomas w. osborn; 1st n. y. light, batt. i, capt. michael wiedrich; n. y. light, 13th batt., lieut. william wheeler; 1st ohio light, batt. i., capt, hubert dilger; 1st ohio light, batt. k, capt. lewis heckman; 4th u. s., batt. g., lieut. bayard wilkeson, lieut. eugene a. bancroft. twelfth army corps, major-general henry w. slocum,[168] brigadier-general alpheus s. williams. _provost guard_, 10th me. (4 cos.), capt. john d. beardsley. first division, brig.-gen. alpheus s. williams, brig.-gen. thomas h. ruger:--_first brigade_, col. archibald l. mcdougall; 5th conn., col. w. w. packer; 20th conn., lieut.-col. william b. wooster; 3d md., col. jos. m. sudsburg; 123d n. y., lieut.-col. james c. rogers, capt. adolphus h. tanner; 145th n. y., col. e. l. price; 46th pa., col. james l. selfridge. _second brigade_,[169] brig.-gen. henry h. lockwood; 1st md., potomac home brigade, col. william p. maulsby; 1st md., eastern shore, col. james wallace; 150th n. y., col. john h. ketcham. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. thomas h. ruger, col. silas colgrove; 27th ind., col. silas colgrove, lieut.-col. john r. fesler; 2d mass., lieut. col. charles r. mudge, maj. charles f. morse; 13th n. j., col. ezra a. carman; 107th n. y., col. nirom m. crane; 3d wis., col. william hawley. second division, brig.-gen. john w. geary:--_first brigade_, col. charles candy; 5th ohio, col. john h. patrick; 7th ohio, col. william r. creighton; 29th ohio, capt. wilbur f. stevens, capt. edward hayes; 66th ohio, lieut.-col. eugene powell; 28th pa., capt. john flynn; 147th pa. (8 cos.), lieut.-col. ario pardee, jr. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. thomas l. kane, col. george a. cobham, jr.; 29th pa., col. william rickards, jr.; 109th pa., capt. f. l. gimber; 111th pa., lieut.-col. thomas m. walker, col. george a. cobham, jr. _third brigade_, brig.-gen. george s. greene; 60th n. y., col. abel godard; 78th n. y., lieut.-col. herbert von hammerstein; 102d n. y., col. james c. lane, capt. lewis r. stegman; 137th n. y., col. david ireland; 149th n. y., col. henry a. barnum, lieut.-col. charles b. randall. _artillery brigade_, lieut. edward d. muhlenberg; 1st n. y. light, batt. m, lieut. charles e. winegar; pa. light, batt. e, lieut. charles a. atwell; 4th u. s., batt. f, lieut. sylvanus t. rugg; 5th u. s., batt. k, lieut. david h. kinzie. cavalry corps, major-general alfred pleasonton. first division, brig.-gen. john buford:--_first brigade_, col. william gamble; 8th ill., maj. john l. beveridge; 12th ill. (4 cos.), 3d ind. (6 cos.), col. george h. chapman; 8th n. y., lieut.-col. william l. markell. _second brigade_, col. thomas c. devin; 6th n. y., maj. william e. beardsley; 9th n. y., col. william sackett; 17th pa., col. j. h. kellogg; 3d w. va. (2 cos.), capt. seymour b. conger. _reserve brigade_, brig.-gen. wesley merritt; 6th pa., maj. james h. haseltine; 1st u. s., capt. richard s. c. lord; 2d u. s., capt. t. f. rodenbough; 5th u. s., capt. julius w. mason; 6th u. s., maj. samuel h. starr, lieut. louis h. carpenter, lieut. nicholas nolan, capt. ira w. claflin. second division, brig.-gen. david mcm. gregg:--_head-quarters guard_, 1st ohio, co. a, capt. noah jones. _first brigade_, col. john b. mcintosh; 1st md. (11 cos.), lieut.-col. james m. deems; purnell (md.) legion, co. a, capt. robert e. duvall; 1st mass.,[170] lieut.-col. greely s. curtis; 1st n. j., maj. m. h. beaumont; 1st pa., col. john p. taylor, 3d pa., lieut.-col. e. s. jones; 3d pa. heavy art., section batt. h,[171] capt. w. d. rank. _second brigade_,[172] col. pennock huey; 2d n. y., lieut.-col. otto harhaus; 4th n. y., lieut.-col. augustus pruyn; 6th ohio (10 cos.), maj. william stedman; 8th pa., capt. william a. corrie. _third brigade_, col. j. irvin gregg; 1st me. (10 cos.), lieut.-col. charles h. smith; 10th n. y., maj. m. henry avery; 4th pa., lieut.-col. william e. doster; 16th pa., lieut.-col. john k. robison. third division, brig.-gen. judson kilpatrick:--_head-quarters guard_, 1st ohio, co. c, capt. samuel n. stanford. _first brigade_, brig.-gen. elon j. farnsworth, col. nathaniel p. richmond; 5th n. y., maj. john hammond; 18th pa., lieut.-col. william p. brinton; 1st vt., lieut.-col. addison w. preston; 1st w. va. (10 cos.), col. nathaniel p. richmond, maj. charles e. capehart. _second brigade_, brig.-gen. george a. custer; 1st mich., col. george h. town; 5th mich., col. russell a. alger; 6th mich., col. george gray; 7th mich. (10 cos.), col. william d. mann. horse artillery:--_first brigade_, capt. james m. robertson; 9th mich. batt., capt. jabez j. daniels; 6th n. y. batt., capt. joseph w. martin; 2d u. s., batts. b and l, lieut. edward heaton; 2d u. s., batt. m, lieut. a. c. m. pennington, jr.; 4th u. s., batt. e, lieut. samuel s. elder. _second brigade_, capt. john c. tidball; 1st u. s., batts. e and g, capt. alanson m. randol; 1st u. s., batt. k, capt. william m. graham; 2d u. s., batt. a, lieut. john h. calef; 3d u. s., batt. c., lieut. william d. fuller.[173] artillery reserve, brig.-gen. robert o. tyler, capt. james m. robertson. _head-quarters guard_, 32d mass. inf., co. c, capt. josiah c. fuller. _first regular brigade_, capt. dunbar r. ransom; 1st u. s., batt. h, lieut. chandler p. eakin, lieut. philip d. mason; 3d u. s., batts. f and k, lieut. john g. turnbull; 4th u. s., batt. c, lieut. evan thomas; 5th u. s., batt. c, lieut. gulian v. weir. _first volunteer brigade_, lieut.-col. freeman mcgilvery; mass. light, 5th batt. (e),[174] capt. charles a. phillips; mass. light, 9th batt., capt. john bigelow, lieut. richard s. milton; n. y. light, 15th batt., capt. patrick hart; pa. light, batts. c and f, capt. james thompson. _second volunteer brigade_, capt. elijah d. taft; 1st conn. heavy, batt. b,[175] capt. albert f. brooker; 1st conn. heavy, batt. m,[175] capt. franklin a. pratt; conn. light, 2d batt., capt. john w. sterling; n. y. light, 5th batt., capt. elijah d. taft. _third volunteer brigade_, capt. james f. huntington; n. h. light, 1st batt., capt. frederick m. edgell; 1st ohio light, batt. h, lieut. george w. norton; 1st pa. light, batts. f and g, capt. r. bruce ricketts; w. va. light, batt. c, capt. wallace hill. _fourth volunteer brigade_, capt. robert h. fitzhugh; me. light, 6th batt. (f), lieut. edwin b. dow; md. light, batt. a, capt. james h. rigby; n. j. light, 1st batt., lieut. augustus n. parsons; 1st n. y. light, batt. g, capt. nelson ames; 1st n. y. light, batt. k,[176] capt. robert h. fitzhugh. _train guard_, 4th n. j. inf. (7 cos.), maj. charles ewing. pennsylvania volunteers and militia. _called into service during the gettysburg campaign._[177] _emergency militia._--ind. co. cav. (murray troop), capt. frank a. murray; ind. co. cav. (first philadelphia city troop), capt. samuel j. randall; ind. co. cav. (luzerne rangers), capt. henry h. brown; ind. co. cav. (wissahickon cav.), capt. samuel w. comly; ind. co. cav. (continental troop), capt. alban h. myers; ind. co. cav. (curtin horse guards), capt. john w. jones; ind. batt., capt. e. spencer miller; ind. batt., capt. henry d. landis; 20th inf., col. william b. thomas; 26th inf., col. william w. jennings; 27th inf., col. jacob g. frick; 28th inf., col. james chamberlin; 29th inf., col. joseph w. hawley; 30th inf., col. william n. monies; 31st inf., col. john newkumet; 33d inf. (blue reserves), col. william w. taylor; ind. battn. inf., lieut.-col. robert litzinger; ind. co. inf., capt. john spear; ind. co. inf., capt. william b. mann; ind. co. inf., capt. james b. german. _ninety-days' militia._--1st battn. cav., lieut.-col. richard f. mason; ind. co. cav., capt. james m. bell; ind. co. cav., capt. william b. dick; ind. co. cav. (dana troop), capt. r. w. hammell; ind. batt., capt. joseph m. knap; ind. batt., capt. benoni frishmuth; ind. batt., capt. w. c. ermentrout; ind. batt. (2d keystone batt.), capt. edward fitzki; ind. batt. (chester co. art.), capt. george r. guss; 32d inf. (gray reserves), col. charles s. smith; 34th inf., col. charles albright; 35th inf., col. henry b. mckean; 36th inf., col. henry c. alleman; 37th inf., col. john trout; 38th inf., col. melchior h. horn; 39th inf., col. james nagle; 40th inf. (1st coal regt.), col. alfred day; 41st inf., col. edward r. mayer; 42d inf., col. charles h. hunter; 43d inf., col. william w. stott; 44th inf. (merchants' regt.), col. enos woodward; 45th inf., col. james t. clancy; 46th inf., col. john j. lawrence; 47th inf., col. james p. wickersham; 48th inf., col. john b. embich; 49th inf. (2d corn exchange), col. alexander murphy; 50th inf., col. emlen franklin; 51st inf. (2d coal regt.), col. oliver hopkinson; 52d inf. (2d union league), col. william a. gray; 53d inf., col. henry royer; 54th inf., col. thomas f. gallagher; 55th inf., col. robert b. mccomb; 56th inf., col. samuel b. dick; 57th inf., col. james r. porter; 58th inf., col. george h. bemus; 59th inf. (3d union league), col. george p. mclean; 60th inf., col. william f. small; ind. battn. inf., lieut.-col. john mckeage; ind. co. inf., capt. joseph k. helmbold; ind. co. inf., capt. horace a. beale; ind. co. inf., capt. benjamin t. green; ind. co. inf., capt. david mitchel; ind. co. inf., capt. osborn e. stephens; ind. co. inf., capt. william f. rich. _six months' volunteers._--20th cav., col. john e. wynkoop; 21st cav., col. william h. boyd; 22d cav. (battn.), maj. b. mortimer morrow; 1st battn. cav., lieut.-col. richard c. dale; ind. batt. (park batt.), capt. horatio k. tyler; ind. batt., capt. w. h. woodward; ind. batt., capt. robert j. nevin; 1st battn. inf., lieut.-col. joseph f. ramsey; 2d battn. inf., lieut.-col. john c. lininger; 3d battn. inf., lieut.-col. t. ellwood zell; ind. co. inf., capt. samuel t. griffith; ind. co. inf., capt. william m. schrock. chapter xxix. the wave rolls back. confederates retreat from gettysburg--the federals pursue--crossing the potomac under difficulties--kilpatrick's cavalry dash on pettigrew's command--general lee thought to rest his army in the valley of virginia, but meade followed too fast--engagements that harassed the retreat--general lee wished to be relieved of command, but president davis would not consent to the appointment of joseph e. johnston or general beauregard. the armies rested on the "fourth,"--one under the bright laurels secured by the brave work of the day before, but in profound sorrow over the silent forms of the host of comrades who had fallen during those three fateful days, whose blood bathed the thirsty fields of gettysburg, made classic by the most stupendous clash of conflict of that long and sanguinary war; while gentle rain came to mellow the sod that marked the honored rest of friend and foe; the other, with broken spirits, turned from fallen comrades to find safety away from the fields that had been so promising of ennobling fruits. the enemy had cast his lines on grounds too strong for lead and steel, and, exhausted alike of aggressive force and means of protracted defence, there was nothing left for the vanquished but to march for distant homeward lines. the cavalry left on the blue ridge joined the confederate left late on the afternoon of the 3d. orders for retreat were issued before noon of the 4th, and trains of wounded and other impedimenta were put in motion by the chambersburg and fairfield routes, the army to march after night by the latter,--the second corps as rear-guard, the first to follow the third and push on to secure the crossings of the potomac at williamsport and falling waters. it was daylight of the 5th when the road was open for the march of the first, and a later hour of the morning before the second could follow. pursuit was made by the enemy, led by cavalry and the sixth corps, and the rear-guard had to deploy near fairfield to check it. rain was helping us. before the enemy could get through the mud and push his batteries over the boggy fields, our trains had reached the mountain gorge, and the rear-guard was on the march following. direct pursuit of the solid ranks was changed to march down the east of the mountains, but the firmer broad road gave the confederates easier march. kilpatrick got his cavalry in on the wagon-trains and destroyed a number, but did not delay the march of the column. on this retreat the army, already crippled of its pride, was met by the dispiriting news of another defeat at vicksburg, which meant that the mississippi was free to the federals from its source to the gulf. diverting incidents occurred, but we were in poor mood for them. as we approached hagerstown, two grotesque figures stepped into the road about a hundred yards in front of us,--one a negro of six feet and a hundred and eighty pounds, the other a white man of about five feet seven. the negro was dressed in full uniform of the union infantry, the white man in travel-stained butternut dry-goods. the negro had a musket on his shoulder. riding up to them, it was observed that the musket was at the cock-notch. the negro was reminded that it was unsoldier-like to have the gun at a cock, but said that he wanted to be ready to save and deliver his prisoner to the guard; it was his proudest capture during the march, and he wanted credit for it. the man was a recruit lately from abroad, and did not seem to care whether or not he was with his comrades. however, there were doubts if he understood a word that was said. the uniform was a tight fit, and the shoes were evidently painful, but the black man said that he could exchange them. he was probably the only man of the army who had a proud story to take home. the union cavalry came severely upon our left flank at hagerstown, forcing stuart to call for infantry support. parts of semmes's and g. t. anderson's brigades were sent, crossed the antietam, and had uncomfortable experience with the horse artillery near funkstown. they had dire complaints to make of the way cavalrymen put them in columns of fours against batteries, when they could have advanced more rapidly and effectively in line of battle and saved half of their men lost. halting for rest near falling waters, a sudden alarm was brought down the road by a cavalryman riding at speed, who reported all of the enemy's cavalry on a sweeping ride against us. the troops were thrown together to wait, but the cavalry charge proved to be a carriage-load of lady refugees. some of the cavalry did get over upon the trains parked at williamsport, but there were many wounded near there who could handle their muskets, many infantry up from winchester, and some of imboden's cavalry, besides some batteries who held the ground, and stuart eventually got up, when the enemy drew off. on the 6th and 7th the commands were up, and deployed their lines from falling waters to cover the bridge and ford at williamsport. but the river was full, past fording at williamsport, and a raiding party from harper's ferry had partially destroyed the bridge at falling waters. infantry trenches were made along the lines, batteries were put in position, and we were ready in a day or two to receive our successful adversary. he found some mud along his route, and was not up until the 12th, when he appeared and spread his lines along the confederate front, but positions were changed,--he had the longer outer curve, while the confederates were on the concentrating inner lines. he made his field-works and other arrangements, had some reinforcements since his battle, and was well organized. on the forenoon of the 13th, general lee sent for me, and announced that the river was fordable and the bridge repaired, that the trains would be started at once, and the troops would follow when night could conceal the move. the first and third corps were to cross by the bridge, the second by the ford. as the lines were comfortable, the roads heavy, it occurred to me that the hurried move during a single night would be troublesome; suggestion was offered that the trains and wounded should move over during the night, and give us easy march the next night, but the waters on the other side were high, and only enough mills running to supply food from day to day, and the weather treacherous, so the general thought it better to hurry on. the march by the williamsport crossing over the firm, broad turnpike was made without trouble. the route to the bridge was over a new road; at the ends of the bridge were green willow poles to prevent the wheels cutting through the mud, but the soil underneath was wet and soggy under the long season of rain, and before night rain again began to fall. general lee, worn by the strain of the past two weeks, asked me to remain at the bridge and look to the work of the night. and such a night is seldom experienced even in the rough life of the soldier. the rain fell in showers, sometimes in blinding sheets, during the entire night; the wagons cut deep in the mud during the early hours, and began to "stall" going down the hill, and one or two of the batteries were "stalled" before they reached the bridge. the best standing points were ankle-deep in mud, and the roads half-way to the knee, puddling and getting worse. we could only keep three or four torches alight, and those were dimmed at times when heavy rains came. then, to crown our troubles, a load of the wounded came down, missed the end of the bridge, and plunged the wagon into the raging torrent. right at the end of the bridge the water was three feet deep, and the current swift and surging. it did not seem possible that a man could be saved, but every one who could get through the mud and water rushed to their relief, and providence was there to bring tears of joy to the sufferers. the wagon was righted and on the bridge and rolled off to virginia's banks. the ground under the poles became so puddled before daylight that they would bend under the wheels and feet of the animals until they could bend no farther, and then would occasionally slip to one side far enough to spring up and catch a horse's foot and throw him broadside in the puddled mud. under the trials and vexations every one was exhausted of patience, the general and staff were ready for a family quarrel as the only relief for their pent-up trouble, when daylight came, and with it general lee to relieve and give us opportunity for a little repose. the division of the third corps under general pettigrew formed the rear of the infantry line, which was to be covered by fitzhugh lee's cavalry. but the cavalry brigadier rode off and crossed the river, leaving, it is said, a squadron for the duty, and the squadron followed the example of the brigadier. the consequence was that when kilpatrick's cavalry rode up it was taken to be the confederates ordered for their rear-guard. instead of friends, however, general pettigrew found a foe. he was surprised by a dashing cavalry charge, was wounded, and died after a few days. some artillery, three standards (of the virginia infantry), and a large number of prisoners were taken. general meade claimed two thousand. general lee thought to occupy the gaps of the blue ridge by his cavalry, and rest his army in the valley of virginia, in threatening lines against washington city, but found the shenandoah river full and past fording, and before the tide began to recede general meade crossed the potomac east of the blue ridge and began to occupy the gaps, which called for a southern march of the confederates. on the 19th my command was ordered to millwood to secure, if possible, ashby's gap, but as the enemy's cavalry was on the opposite bank, and the waters were too high for us to get over, we marched on to manassas, then for chester gap. as high up as front royal the river was found past fording, but part of a pontoon bridge was at hand. general corse, who had joined us, hurried and succeeded in getting his brigade over in time to occupy chester gap, and putting his regiment under colonel arthur herbert in the west end of manassas gap. the balance of pickett's men crossed by putting the arms and ammunition in the boats, the men swimming, and sent reinforcements to general corse and colonel herbert, when the enemy's cavalry withdrew. one bridge was laid and spliced, and the march southward was resumed. [illustration: retreat from gettysburg. accident during the night-crossing of the potomac on a pontoon bridge.] the next day another demonstration was made by the enemy's cavalry at manassas gap, but hood's division was there and mclaws's was at the chester gap, where another heavy body of cavalry approached. an effort was made to get behind the latter by hidden lines of march, but the plan of catching cavalry with infantry was not successful, though general wofford thought for a time that his trap was well laid. the march was continued, and the head of the column reached culpeper court-house on the 24th. benning's brigade, left on guard at gaines's cross-roads till the third corps could relieve him, was attacked by a strong cavalry force. on the approach of the third corps he thought to organize, with general a. p. hill, another plan to entrap the cavalry in a thick wood, but the riders found little difficulty in getting away. general ewell was detained a little, and found, upon approaching front royal, that general wright's brigade, left there to hold the gaps for him, was engaged in skirmishing with the enemy's infantry. he reinforced the brigade, held the enemy back, then changed his march west, crossed the blue ridge at thornton's gap, and ordered early's division, that was not yet up, through the valley by strasburg. he reached madison court-house on the 29th. general meade got his army together near warrenton on the 31st of july, and ordered a detachment of artillery, cavalry, and infantry across the rappahannock at kelly's ford and the railroad bridge. the command drove our cavalry back till it was reinforced by infantry, when the enemy was pushed back beyond brandy station. general ewell was called down from madison court-house, behind the rapidan, and the first and third corps were marched into position behind the river on the 3d of august, leaving the cavalry at culpeper court-house. general lee suffered during the campaign from his old trouble, sciatica, and as soon as he found rest for his army applied to the authorities for a change of commanders. the president refused, pleading that he had no one to take his place. at the time he had two generals of his own choosing who were not in authority adequate to their rank,--joseph e. johnston, the foremost soldier of the south, who had commanded the army from its organization until he was wounded at seven pines, and g. t. beauregard, the hero of sumter and the first bull run, well equipped and qualified for high command. but the president was jealous of johnston, and nourished prejudice against beauregard. chapter xxx. longstreet moves to georgia. the author reverts to the perils and opportunities in the west--proposes to the secretary of war to reinforce against rosecrans from the army of northern virginia--makes plan known to general lee--the move finally effected--difficulties of transportation--a roundabout route--general longstreet narrowly escapes capture when seeking bragg's head-quarters--general bragg assigns longstreet to command of the left--instructions for the battle of chickamauga--the armies in position--federals in command of generals rosecrans, crittenden, mccook, and george h. thomas. while the army was lying idle on the south bank of the rapidan my mind reverted to affairs in the west, and especially to the progressive work of the union army in tennessee towards the northern borders of georgia. other armies of the south were, apparently, spectators, viewing those tremendous threatenings without thought of turning minds or forces to arrest the march of rosecrans. to me the emergency seemed so grave that i decided to write the honorable secretary of war (excusing the informality under the privilege given in his request in may) expressing my opinion of affairs in that military zone. i said that the successful march of general rosecrans's army through georgia would virtually be the finishing stroke of the war; that in the fall of vicksburg and the free flow of the mississippi river the lungs of the confederacy were lost; that the impending march would cut through the heart of the south, and leave but little time for the dissolution; that to my mind the remedy was to order the army of northern virginia to defensive work, and send detachments to reinforce the army in tennessee; to call detachments of other commands to the same service, and strike a crushing blow against general rosecrans before he could receive reinforcing help; that our interior lines gave the opportunity, and it was only by the skilful use of them that we could reasonably hope to equalize our power to that of the better-equipped adversary; that the subject had not been mentioned to my commander, because like all others he was opposed to having important detachments of his army so far beyond his reach; that all must realize that our affairs were languishing, and that the only hope of reviving the waning cause was through the advantage of interior lines. a few days after the letter was despatched the subject happened up while discussing affairs with general lee, when i felt warranted in expressing my views and relieving my mind of the serious apprehensions that haunted me. he inquired if i was willing to go west and take charge there. to that i consented, provided the change could be so arranged as to give me an opportunity, by careful handling of the troops before accepting battle, to gain their confidence; providing, at the same time, that means could be arranged for further aggressive march in case of success. at that time the railway passing our camps on the rapidan through virginia and east tennessee to chattanooga was open and in good working order. general bragg's army was near chattanooga, general buckner's in east tennessee, near knoxville, general samuel jones's army, or parts of an army, in southwest virginia. there was but one railway,--from cincinnati _via_ louisville and nashville to chattanooga. on that road general rosecrans was marching against general bragg. on the direct route to east tennessee over the cumberland mountains general burnside was moving into east tennessee against general buckner's forces. a few days after the conversation with general lee, he was called down to richmond. in the course of a week he wrote, viz.: "[confidential.] "richmond, august 31, 1863. "lieutenant-general j. longstreet, "_head-quarters army of northern virginia_: "general,--i have wished for several days past to return to the army, but have been detained by the president. he will not listen to my proposition to leave to-morrow. i hope you will use every exertion to prepare the army for offensive operations, and improve the condition of our men and animals. i can see nothing better to be done than to endeavor to bring general meade out and use our efforts to crush his army while in its present condition. * * * * * "very respectfully and truly yours, "r. e. lee, "_general_." reply. "head-quarters, september 2, 1863. "general r. e. lee, "_commanding_: "general,--your letter of the 31st is received. i have expressed to generals ewell and hill your wishes, and am doing all that can be done to be well prepared with my own command. our greatest difficulty will be in preparing our animals. i do not see that we can reasonably hope to accomplish much by offensive operations, unless you are strong enough to cross the potomac. if we advance to meet the enemy on this side he will in all probability go into one of his many fortified positions. these we cannot afford to attack. "i know but little of the condition of our affairs in the west, but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in tennessee. if we could hold the defensive here with two corps and send the other to operate in tennessee with that army, i think that we could accomplish more than by an advance from here. * * * * * "i remain, general, very respectfully, "your obedient servant, "james longstreet, "_lieutenant-general_." general lee next wrote to inquire as to the time necessary for the movement of my corps into tennessee. as there were but two divisions, mclaws's and hood's, and alexander's batteries, two days was supposed to be ample time. the transportation was ordered by the quartermaster's department at richmond, and the divisions were made ready to board the trains as soon as they could reach us. the success of the plan was thought from the first to depend upon its prompt and vigorous execution, and it was under those conditions that general lee agreed to reinforce the army in tennessee, together with the assurance that vigorous pursuit, even to the ohio river, should follow success. the onward march was repeatedly urged, not only in return for the use of part of the army, but to relieve general lee of apprehension from the army in front of him; but it was not until the 9th of september that the first train came to orange court-house to start with its load of troops. meanwhile, general buckner had left his post in east tennessee and marched south to draw nearer the army under general bragg about chattanooga, leaving nothing of his command in east tennessee except two thousand men at cumberland gap, under general frazer, partially fortified. general burnside had crossed the mountains, and was not only in east tennessee, but on that very day general frazer surrendered to him his command at cumberland gap without a fight. these facts were known to the richmond authorities at the time of our movements, but not to general lee or myself until the move was so far advanced as to prevent recall. so that we were obliged to make the circuit through the carolinas to augusta, georgia, and up by the railroad, thence through atlanta to dalton and ringgold. it was the only route of transit left us. there were two routes between richmond and augusta, one _via_ wilmington, the other through charlotte, north carolina, but only a single track from augusta to chattanooga. the gauges of the roads were not uniform, nor did the roads connect at the cities (except by drays and other such conveyances). the roads had not been heavily worked before the war, so that their rolling stock was light and limited. instead of two days of moving, it was not until the 25th that our artillery joined us near chattanooga. hood's division was first shipped, and three brigades, or the greater part of three, were landed at the railroad station, and joined general bragg's army on the 18th and 19th of september, but that army had been manoeuvred and flanked out of chattanooga, buckner's out of east tennessee, and both were together down below the borders of georgia. as i left general lee's tent, after bidding him good-by, he walked out with me to my horse. as my foot was in the stirrup he said again, "now, general, you must beat those people out in the west." withdrawing my foot to respectful position i promised, "if i live; but i would not give a single man of my command for a fruitless victory." he promised again that it should be so; said that arrangements had been made that any success that we had would be followed; that orders to that effect had been given; that transportation was also ordered to be prepared, and the orders would be repeated. while the troops were in transit, jenkins's south carolina brigade was transferred to hood's division, so that we had two south carolina and four georgia brigades of the two divisions, which gave us some little trouble in keeping our men on the cars passing by their homes. the people crowded every station to give us their all in most acceptable rations, and to cheer us with wishes for a happy issue. the train upon which i rode reached catoosa about two o'clock of the afternoon of the 19th of september. that upon which our horses were came up at four o'clock. only part of the staff of the corps was with me, and general alexander was with his batteries far away in south carolina. as soon as our horses could be saddled we started, lieutenant-colonels sorrel and manning and myself, to find the head-quarters of the commanding general. we were told to follow the main road, and did so, though there were many men coming into that road from our right bearing the wounded of the day's battle; the firing was still heard off to the right, and wagons were going and coming, indicating our nearness to the field. nothing else occurring to suggest a change of the directions given us, we followed the main road. it was a bright moonlight night, and the woodlands on the sides of the broad highway were quite open, so that we could see and be seen. after a time we were challenged by an outlying guard, "who comes there?" we answered, "friends." the answer was not altogether satisfying to the guard, and after a very short parley we asked what troops they were, when the answer gave the number of the brigade and of the division. as southern brigades were called for their commanders more than by their numbers, we concluded that these friends were the enemy. there were, too, some suspicious obstructions across the road in front of us, and altogether the situation did not look inviting. the moon was so bright that it did not seem prudent to turn and ride back under the fire that we knew would be opened on us, so i said, loudly, so that the guard could hear, "let us ride down a little way to find a better crossing." riding a few rods brought us under cover and protection of large trees, sufficiently shading our retreat to enable us to ride quietly to the rear and take the road over which we had seen so many men and vehicles passing while on our first ride. we reached general bragg's head-quarters at eleven o'clock, reported, and received orders, which he had previously given other commanders, for attack early in the morning. our bivouac was made near the general head-quarters, and we rode at daylight to find the troops. hood's brigades that had arrived before us had been at work with the left of the army, which was assigned as my command. lieutenant-general polk was commanding the right wing. two brigades of mclaws's division, kershaw's and humphreys's, came in the afternoon, and marched during the night and across the chickamauga river. the army had forced its way across the chickamauga under severe skirmishes, little less than a battle, during the greater part of the 19th, and some of the commands had been engaged on the 18th working on the same plan. the written order giving the plan was issued on the 18th. in general terms, it was to cross the chickamauga, strike the enemy's left, and roll it back on his right by a wheel to the left so as to come in between the enemy and chattanooga. the work had been so persistent and assiduous during part of the 18th and all of the 19th, that general rosecrans came to understand the plan as well as his adversary, and to arrange accordingly. with my instructions for the 20th the commanding general gave me a map showing prominent topographical features of the grounds from the chickamauga river to mission ridge, and beyond to the lookout mountain range. at early dawn i found the left wing. it was composed of buckner's corps (stewart's and preston's divisions), a new division under general bushrod r. johnson, the division of general t. c. hindman, and three of hood's brigades. buckner's corps had been cut in two. his division on the right of the left wing was under general stewart, while preston's division, on the extreme left, on the bank of the chickamauga, was assigned, by the order for battle, as the pivot upon which the battle should wheel. the commands stood: stewart's, johnson's, hindman's, and preston's divisions; hood's brigades in rear of johnson's line. general buckner reported his artillery as amounting to about thirty guns. three batteries were reported, of four guns each, with hindman's division, johnson's and hood's commands being without artillery. the brigades of kershaw and humphreys were ordered, with hood's, to be used as a column of assault, by brigades, at a hundred paces interval. as the battle was ordered for daylight, it seemed too late to draw buckner's divisions into reciprocal relations, and we had yet to find the right wing. as it was not in touch or sight, general stewart was ordered to find it. he marched about half a mile to his right and found that he was nearly half a mile in advance of the right wing. his move made place for hood's column, which was called to the line, and general stewart broke his right to rear to guard that flank until the right wing could get to the front. the divisions were formed in two lines, two brigades on the front line, others of the second line in support, except hood's five brigades in column. general mclaws and two of his brigades, two of hood's, and alexander's artillery were on the rails, speeding for the battle as fast as steam could carry them, but failed to reach it. when organized for battle the left wing stood about three hundred yards east of the lafayette-chattanooga dirt road. as the battle was ordered for wheel to the left on preston's division as pivot, his (trigg's) brigade was echeloned on the left of hindman's division. the purpose of the commander in ordering the wheel on the left as pivot was to push in, from the start, between the enemy and his new base at chattanooga. no chief of artillery for the command reported, and a brief search failed to find one. the field, so far as it could be surveyed, however, was not a field, proper, but a heavy woodland, not adapted to the practice of artillery. the hour of battle was at hand, but the right wing was not yet organized. some of the troops were without rations, their wagons, having lost the lines of march through the woodlands, failing to reach them until after daylight, when they were further delayed cooking their food. the right wing was formed of d. h. hill's corps, breckenridge's and cleburne's divisions, w. h. t. walker's corps of walker's and liddell's divisions, cheatham's division of polk's corps, artillery battalions of majors melancthon smith, t. r. hotchkiss, and r. e. groves, and batteries of lieutenant r. t. beauregard, captain e. p. howell, captain w. h. fowler, and lieutenant shannon. as it formed it stood with d. h. hill's corps on the right, breckenridge's and cleburne's divisions from right to left, cheatham's division on the left of cleburne's rear, and walker's reserve corps behind hill's corps; but when arranged for battle it was about half a mile in rear of the line upon which the left wing was established. the confederate commander rode early in the morning to hear the opening of the battle. as the sounds failed to reach him, he became anxious, sent orders of inquiry for the cause of delay, and repeated his orders for attack, and finally rode to his right wing and gave peremptory orders. marching through the woods to line up on the left wing, the left of the right wing was found to overlap my division on the right, yet our extreme right was found to overreach the left of the enemy's field-works by two brigades, and reconnoissance found the road between the enemy and chattanooga open and free of obstructions or troops to defend it. on the right of breckenridge's division was armstrong's division of cavalry dismounted, and beyond his right was forrest's other division of cavalry, pegram's. some miles off from our left was wheeler's division of cavalry, under wharton and martin. the union army from left to right was: first the fourteenth corps, general george h. thomas commanding, four divisions,--baird's division on the left, then reynolds's and brannan's, the latter retired to position of reserve, and negley's. (the last named had been left, on the night of the 19th, on guard near the glen house, but was ordered early on the 20th to join general thomas, and one of the brigades did move promptly under the order; the other brigades (two) failed to receive the order.) then the twentieth corps, three divisions,--jefferson c. davis's, r. w. johnson's, and p. h. sheridan's,--on the right, general a. mcd. mccook commanding the corps. next was the twenty-first corps, three divisions,--t. j. wood's, j. m. palmer's, and h. p. van cleve's,--general t. l. crittenden commanding the corps. it was in position on the east slope of mission ridge, ordered to be prepared to support the corps of the right or left, or both; one of its brigades had been left to occupy chattanooga. wilder's mounted infantry, on the right of the twentieth corps, was ordered to report to the commander of that corps for the day's work. a reserve corps under general gordon granger was off the left of the union army to cover the gap in mission ridge at rossville and the road from the union left to that gap. minty's cavalry was with this corps, and posted at mission mills. general granger had steedman's division of two brigades and a brigade under colonel d. mccook. general r. b. mitchell, commanding union cavalry, was on their right at crawfish springs, with orders to hold the crossings of the chickamauga against the confederate cavalry. it seems that parts of the twentieth and twenty-first corps, johnson's and van cleve's divisions, were under general thomas in the fight of his left on the 19th, and remained with him on the 20th. the purpose of the posting of the union army was to hold open its routes for chattanooga by the rossville and dry valley roads. as before stated, the confederate commander's design was to push in between the union army and chattanooga, recover his lost ground, and cut the enemy's line of supplies. the commanders of the armies were on the field early on the 20th. the failure of the opening of the confederates at daylight gave opportunity for a reconnoissance by light of day, by which it was learned that the road from the union left was open, not guarded nor under close observation; but the commander ordered direct assault under the original plan,--his back to the river, the union army backing on mission ridge. the chickamauga river, rising from the mountains south, flows in its general course a little east of north to conflux with the tennessee river. the ridge runs nearly parallel with the river, and opens up a valley a mile wide. it is a bold outcropping of limestone about one hundred feet above the valley, with occasional passes, or gaps, that are strong points of guard for defence. four miles northwest from the union left was the gap at rossville, called for the old cherokee chief. on its right was the pass of the dry valley road, and immediately in its rear was the mcfarland gap. the line of the lafayette road lies about parallel with the ridge to within a mile of the union left, when it bends westward and leads to the rossville gap. the dry valley road crosses the chickamauga at glass's mills, courses along the east slope of the ridge, crosses it, and joins on the west the road that crosses at the mcfarland gap. the union left was east of the chattanooga-rossville road, but crossed the road to the west and formed in broken front. the left and right of thomas's line was retired or broken to the rear. the union commander rode over his lines on the afternoon of the 19th and ordered his front covered by such field-works as could be constructed during the night. general thomas covered his lines by log and rail obstructions. the corps of rosecrans's right formed two lines of rail defences for infantry. the batteries had the ascending slopes of the ridge for positions, and their field was more favorable otherwise for artillery practice than was that of the confederates advancing from the valley and more densely timbered forests. they had two hundred and forty-six guns. the records do not give satisfactory accounts of the number of confederate guns, but they probably numbered not less than two hundred. chapter xxxi. battle of chickamauga. tactical features--the battle opened by direct attack on the federals in the early morning of september 20--repeated and determined front assaults--brigadiers helm killed and adams wounded--the union commands lay behind defences--hood's brigades surged through the forest against the covered infantry and artillery--hood wounded--longstreet suggests a plan for progressive action--halting tactics at high tide of success--the confederate left fought a separate battle--general thomas retreats--first confederate victory in the west, and one of the bloodiest battles of the war--forces engaged--losses. satisfied that the opening of the battle was to be the attack against his left, the union commander ordered negley's division out from its position near the glen house to report to general thomas and assist in meeting the attack, but only beattie's brigade was in time for that service, the other brigades waiting to be relieved from their positions in line. meanwhile, baird's left had been extended by dodge's brigade of johnson's division of the twentieth corps. before the confederate commander engaged his battle he found the road between the enemy's left and chattanooga open, which gave him opportunity to interpose or force the enemy from his works to open battle to save his line. but he preferred his plan of direct attack as the armies stood, and opened his battle by attack of the right wing at 9.30 a.m. of the 20th. he was there, and put the corps under lieutenant-general d. h. hill to the work. breckenridge's and cleburne's divisions, breckenridge on the right, overreached the enemy's left by two brigades, stovall's and adams's, but the other brigade, helm's, was marched through the wood into front assault of the enemy behind his field-works. this brigade made desperate repeated and gallant battle until the commander, benjamin h. helm, one of the most promising brigadiers, was killed, when its aggressive work was suspended. the other brigades crossed the chattanooga road, changed front, and bore down against the enemy's left. this gave them favorable ground and position. they made resolute attack against baird's left, threatening his rear, but he had troops at hand to meet them. they had a four-gun battery of slocum's of the washington artillery,[178] and encountered dodge's brigade and parts of willick's, berry's, and stanley's, and superior artillery. in the severe contention general adams fell seriously hurt, and the brigades were eventually forced back to and across the road, leaving general adams on the field. a separate attack was then made by cleburne's division, the brigades of polk and wood assaulting the breastworks held by the divisions of johnson and palmer. these brigades, after severe fight, were repulsed, and their positions were covered by deshler's brigade. general deshler received a mortal wound from a fragment of shell, leaving the brigade in the hands of the gallant colonel roger q. mills (our afterwards distinguished statesman). general thomas called repeatedly for reinforcements, and received assurances that they were coming, even to include the army if necessary to hold the left. johnson's brigade of cheatham's division was ordered to support the brigade under colonel mills, and the reserve corps under general w. h. t. walker (gist's and liddell's divisions) was ordered into the breckenridge battle, gist's brigade against the left angle of the breastworks, and walthall's to the place of cleburne's division. the other brigade of gist's division supported the battle of his own brigade, and general liddell was ordered with govan's brigade to advance, passing beyond the enemy's left to the chattanooga road, and wheel to the left against his left rear. the troops, without exception, made a brave, desperate fight, but were unsuccessful, and forced to suspend aggressive work. [illustration: battle of chickamauga. sept. 19th and 20th, 1863] as the grand wheel to the left did not progress, i sent, at eleven o'clock, to say to general bragg that my column of attack could probably break the enemy's line if he cared to have it go in. before answer came, general stewart, commanding my right division, received a message from general bragg to go in and attack by his division, and reported that the confederate commander had sent similar orders to all division commanders. he advanced, and by his severe battle caused the union reserve division under general brannan to be drawn to the support of that front, and this attack, with that of the divisions of our right against those of baird, johnson, palmer, and reynolds, so disturbed general thomas that other reinforcements were called to support his defence. general stewart was in hot engagement before word reached me that the battle had been put in the hands of division commanders; but my orders reached general hood in time to hold him and commanders on his left before he received notice from the commanding general, and the brigades of kershaw and humphreys were ordered nearer the rear of his column. the divisions of b. r. johnson and hindman were ordered to follow in close echelon on hood's left. buckner's pivoting division under preston was left to the position to which the confederate chief had assigned it. in our immediate front were the parts of the twentieth and twenty-first corps in two lines covered by rail defences and well-posted batteries. at the early surging of his lines through the forest, general hood came under the fire of this formidable array of artillery and infantry, and found his lines staggering under their galling missiles, and fast losing strength as the fire thickened. his leading brigade was decimated, but his others pushed to the front to take and pursue the assault. the divisions of b. r. johnson and hindman were pressed hard on hood's left, and the brigades of kershaw and humphreys closed to his support, when a bold push gave us the first line of the enemy and a large number of his guns; but general hood was fearfully wounded, supposed to be fatally; general benning, of his "rock brigade," lost his horse, and thought general hood was killed. he cut a horse loose from a captured gun, mounted, and using part of a rope trace as his riding whip, rode to meet me and report disaster. he had lost his hat in the mêlée, and the brigade disappeared under the steady crushing fire so quickly that he was a little surprised. he reported, "general hood killed, my horse killed, my brigade torn to pieces, and i haven't a man left." i asked if he didn't think he could find one man. the question or the manner seemed to quiet somewhat his apprehensions and brought affirmative answer, when he was told to collect his men and join us at the front; that we had broken and carried the first line; that johnson's division, on his left, was then in the breach and pushing on, with hindman on his left, spreading battle to the enemy's limits; that stewart's division would hold it on our right, and the brigades of kershaw and humphreys then on the quick step would be with us in a minute and help restore the battle to good organization. just then these two brigades burst through the brush in cheerful, gallant march, and brought him back to his usual courageous, hopeful confidence. as we approached a second line, johnson's division happened to strike it while in the act of changing position of some of the troops, charged upon and carried it, capturing some artillery, hood's and hindman's troops pressing in close connection. this attack forced the parts of the twentieth and twenty-first corps from that part of the field, back over missionary ridge, in disordered retreat, and part of negley's division of the fourteenth corps by the same impulsion. as our right wing had failed of the progress anticipated, and had become fixed by the firm holding of the enemy's left, we could find no practicable field for our work except by a change of the order of battle from wheel to the left, to a swing to the right on my division under general stewart. the fire of the enemy off my right readily drew hood's brigades to that bearing. johnson's and hindman's divisions were called to a similar move, and buckner's pivotal division under general preston, but general buckner objected to having his left "in the air." presently a discouraging account came from general hindman, that in the progress of his battle his left and rear had been struck by a formidable force of cavalry; that manigault's brigade was forced back in disorder, and his other brigades exposed on their open left could not be handled. i wrote him a note commending the brave work of his division, and encouraging renewed efforts; urged him to have his brigades in hand, and bring them around to close connection on johnson's left. on the most open parts of the confederate side of the field one's vision could not reach farther than the length of a brigade. trigg's brigade was ordered to the relief of manigault's, which had been forced back to the lafayette road, and the balance of preston's division was ordered to follow, if necessary, to support that part of the field, and our cavalry far away from my left was called to clean it up and pursue the retreating columns. it seems that wilder's brigade of mounted infantry had struck manigault's left and put it back in disorder, and a brigade, or part of a brigade, of cavalry coming against the rear, increased the confusion and drove it back to the lafayette road, when trigg's brigade advanced to its relief. the two put the attacking forces back until they found it necessary to retire beyond the ridge and cover the withdrawal of trains left exposed by the retreat of troops of the twentieth and twenty-first corps. general hindman gathered his forces and marched for the left of johnson's division, and preston's brigade under general trigg was returned to the point of its first holding. our front, cleared of opposing forces, was soon changed forward, and formed at right angle to its first line to seek the enemy's line standing against our right wing. calls were repeated for the cavalry to ride in pursuit of the retreating forces, and guard the gaps of the ridge behind the enemy standing in front of our right wing. in the new position of the left wing its extreme left encountered the enemy rallying in strong position that was heavily manned by field batteries. at the same time my left was approaching the line of fire of one of our batteries of the right wing. general johnson thought that he had the key of the battle near snodgrass hill. it was a key, but a rough one. he was ordered to reorganize his own brigades and those of hindman's division for renewed work; to advance a line of skirmishers, and give time to the troops for refreshment, while i rode along the line to observe the enemy and find relations with our right wing. it was after one o'clock, and the hot and dry and dusty day made work fatiguing. my lunch was called up and ordered spread at some convenient point while i rode with general buckner and the staffs to view the changed conditions of the battle. i could see but little of the enemy's line, and only knew of it by the occasional exchange of fire between the lines of skirmishers, until we approached the angle of the lines. i passed the right of our skirmishers, and, thinking i had passed the enemy's, rode forward to be accurately assured, when i suddenly found myself under near fire of his sharp-shooters concealed behind the trees and under the brush. i saw enough, however, to mark the ground line of his field-works as they were spread along the front of the right wing, and found that i was very fortunate in having the forest to cover the ride back until out of reach of their fire. in the absence of a chief of artillery, general buckner was asked to establish a twelve-gun battery on my right to enfilade the enemy's works and line standing before our right wing, and then i rode away to enjoy my spread of nassau bacon and georgia sweet potatoes. we were not accustomed to potatoes of any kind in virginia, and thought we had a luxury, but it was very dry, as the river was a mile and more from us, and other liquids were over the border. then, before we had half finished, our pleasures were interrupted by a fragment of shell that came tearing through the woods, passed through a book in the hands of a courier who sat on his horse hard by reading, and struck down our chief of ordnance, colonel p. t. manning, gasping, as was supposed, in the struggles of death. friends sprang forward to look for the wound and to give some aid and relief. in his hurry to enjoy and finish his lunch he had just taken a large bite of sweet potato, which seemed to be suffocating him. i suggested that it would be well to first relieve him of the potato and give him a chance to breathe. this done, he revived, his breath came freer, and he was soon on his feet ready to be conveyed to the hospital. in a few days he was again on duty. [illustration: r. j. moses. chief of subsistence department, first corps, army of northern virginia.] after caring for and sending him off, and before we were through with our lunch, general bragg sent for me. he was some little distance in rear of our new position. the change of the order of battle was explained, and the necessity under which it came to be made. we had taken some thirty or more field-pieces and a large number of small-arms, and thought that we had cut off and put to disorder the twentieth and twenty-first corps that had retreated through the pass of the ridge by the dry valley road. he was informed of orders given general johnson for my left, and general buckner for a battery on the right. i then offered as suggestion of the way to finish our work that he abandon the plan for battle by our right wing, or hold it to defence, draw off a force from that front that had rested since the left wing took up the battle, join them with the left wing, move swiftly down the dry valley road, pursue the retreating forces, occupy the gaps of the ridge behind the enemy standing before our right, and call that force to its own relief. he was disturbed by the failure of his plan and the severe repulse of his right wing, and was little prepared to hear suggestions from subordinates for other moves or progressive work. his words, as i recall them, were: "there is not a man in the right wing who has any fight in him." from accounts of his former operations i was prepared for halting work, but this, when the battle was at its tide and in partial success, was a little surprising. his humor, however, was such that his subordinate was at a loss for a reopening of the discussion. he did not wait, nor did he express approval or disapproval of the operations of the left wing, but rode for his head-quarters at reed's bridge. there was nothing for the left wing to do but work along as best it could. the right wing ceased its active battle as the left forced the enemy's right centre, and the account of the commanding general was such as to give little hope of his active use of it in supporting us. after his lunch, general johnson was ordered to make ready his own and hindman's brigades, to see that those of hood's were in just connection with his right, and await the opening of our battery. preston's division was pulled away from its mooring on the river bank to reinforce our worn battle.[179] the battery not opening as promptly as expected, general johnson was finally ordered into _strong_, _steady_ battle. he pushed through part of the woodland, drove back an array of artillery and the supporting infantry, and gained other elevated ground. the sound of battle in his rear, its fire drawing nearer, had attracted the attention of general granger of the reserve corps, and warned him that it was the opportunity for his command. he marched, without orders, towards the noise, and passed by the front of forrest's cavalry and the front of our right wing, but no report of his march was sent us. day was on the wane. night was advancing. the sun dipped to the palisades of lookout mountain, when lieutenant-colonel claiborne reported that the cavalry was not riding in response to my calls. he was asked to repeat the order _in writing_, and despatched as follows: "battle-field, september 20, 1863, 5.09 p.m. "general wheeler: "lieutenant-general longstreet orders you to proceed down the road towards the enemy's right, and with your artillery endeavor to enfilade his line, with celerity. "by order of lieutenant-general longstreet. "thomas claiborne, "_lieutenant-colonel cavalry_." then our foot-scouts reported that there was nothing on the road taken by the enemy's retreating columns but squads of footmen. another written order for the cavalry was despatched at 5.30.[180] general preston reinforced us by his brigade under gracie, pushed beyond our battle, and gained a height and intervening dell before snodgrass hill, but the enemy's reserve was on the hill, and full of fight, even to the aggressive. we were pushed back through the valley and up the slope, until general preston succeeded in getting his brigade under trigg to the support. our battery got up at last under major williams and opened its destructive fire from eleven guns, which presently convinced general thomas that his position was no longer tenable. he drew reynolds's division from its trenches near the angle, for assignment as rear-guard. lieutenant-colonel sorrel, of the staff, reported this move, and was sent with orders to general stewart to strike down against the enemy's moving forces. it seems that at the same time liddell's division of the extreme right of our right wing was ordered against the march of the reserves. stewart got into part of reynolds's line and took several hundred prisoners. meanwhile, reynolds was used in meeting the attack and driving back the division of general liddell. that accomplished, he was ordered to position to cover the retreat. as no reports came to the left from the commanding general or from the right wing, the repulse of liddell's division was thought to indicate the strong holding of the enemy along his intrenched front line, and i thought that we should wait to finish the battle on the morrow. the direct road to chattanooga was practically closed. mcfarland gap, the only _débouché_, was supposed to be occupied by the cavalry. another blind road was at the base of the mountain on its east side. during the artillery practice the fire of some of the guns of our battery was turned to the contest at snodgrass hill, which disturbed part of our infantry fiercely struggling for that ground, and they complained, but the fire was effective. as the woods were full of the enemy, a shot would find a mark. the intrenched line was crumbling faster than we supposed, and their reserve was engaged in hot defensive battle to hold secure the gap while yet there were two hours of daylight. had the four brigades of cheatham's division that had not been in action gone in at the same time as liddell's division, it is hardly possible that the confederate commander could have failed to find the enemy's empty lines along the front of his right wing, and called both wings into a grand final sweep of the field to the capture of thomas's command; but he was not present, and the condition of affairs was embarrassing to the subordinate commanders. [illustration: battle of chickamauga. confederates flanking the union forces.] a reconnoissance made just before the first strokes of the morning engagement discovered an open way around the enemy's left by turning his intrenched line in reverse, which general hill thought to utilize by change of tactics, but general bragg present, and advised of the opportunity, preferred his tactics, and urged prompt execution. at the later hour when liddell's division was passed beyond the enemy's intrenchments to strike at his reinforcing march under general granger, the subordinate of the right wing could not see how he was to be justified in using a greater force in that direction, affairs of the wing being similar to those of the opening, while the relations of the right and left were in reverse of tactical orders; but a vigilant chief present and caring for the weaker part of his battle, advised that the enemy was on his last legs, with his reserves could well have sprung the right wing into the opening beyond his right, securing crushing results. earlier in the afternoon he did send an order for renewed efforts of the right wing under his plan of parallel assault, but the troops had tested the lines in their first battle, and were not in condition for a third effort, at parallel battle. the contention by our left wing was maintained as a separate and independent battle. the last of my reserve, trigg's brigade, gave us new strength, and preston gained snodgrass hill. the trampled ground and bushy woods were left to those who were too much worn to escape the rapid strides of the heroic confederates. the left wing swept forward, and the right sprang to the broad chattanooga highway. like magic the union army had melted away in our presence. a few hundred prisoners were picked up by both wings as they met, to burst their throats in loud huzzas. the army of tennessee knew how to enjoy its first grand victory. the dews of twilight hung heavy about the trees as if to hold down the voice of victory; but the two lines nearing as they advanced joined their continuous shouts in increasing volume, not as the burstings from the cannon's mouth, but in a tremendous swell of heroic harmony that seemed almost to lift from their roots the great trees of the forest. before greetings and congratulations upon the success had passed it was night, and the mild beams of the quartering moon were more suggestive of venus than of mars. the haversacks and ammunition supplies were ordered replenished, and the confederate army made its bivouac on the ground it had gained in the first pronounced victory in the west, and one of the most stubbornly contested battles of the war. our cavalry had failed to close mcfarland gap, and through that general thomas made his march for the stand at rossville gap. it has been stated that this retreat was made under the orders of the union commander. general thomas did, in fact, receive a message from his chief a little after four o'clock, saying that he was riding to chattanooga to view the position there; that he, general thomas, was left in command of all of the organized forces, and should seek strong and threatening position at rossville, and send the other men back to chattanooga to be reorganized. this was a suggestion more than an order, given under the conviction that the confederates, having the dry valley road, would pass the ridge to the west side, cut general thomas off, and strike his rear at pleasure. the order to command of the troops in action, and the conditions referring to duties at chattanooga, carried inferential discretion. that general thomas so construed it was evidenced by his decision to hold "until nightfall if possible." but directly, under the practice of our enfilading battery, he became convinced that it was not possible, changed his purpose, and at 5.30 gave orders for his commanders to prepare to retire, and called reynolds's division from its trenches to be posted as rear-guard to cover the retreat. general granger was then engaged in severe contention against my left at snodgrass hill. his march along the front of our cavalry and right wing suggested the advance of liddell's division to the chattanooga road to try to check it. the withdrawal of reynolds's division was in season to aid in driving liddell's division back to its former ground. reynolds was posted on eminent ground as rear-guard, and organized retreat followed. it was not until after sunset that rosecrans's _order_ for retreat was issued, as appears from the letter written from rossville by general james a. garfield, chief of staff, dated 8.40, three hours and more after the move was taken up, viz.: "your order to retire to this place was received a little after sunset and communicated to generals thomas and granger. the troops are now moving back, and will be here in good shape and strong position before morning."[181] so events and the evidence seem conclusive that it was our artillery practice that made the confusion of chickamauga forests unbearable, and enforced retreat before rosecrans order was issued. the union army and reserve had been fought, and by united efforts we held the position at snodgrass hill, which covered mcfarland gap and the retreat. there were yet five brigades of confederates that had not been in active battle. the confederate commander was not present, and his next in rank thought night pursuit without authority a heavy, unprofitable labor, while a flank move, after a night's rest, seemed promising of more important results. the confederate chief did not even know of his victory until the morning of the 21st, when, upon riding to his extreme right, he found his commander at that point seeking the enemy in his immediate front, and commended the officer upon his vigilance,--twelve hours after the retreat of the enemy's forces. the forces engaged and their respective casualties follow: general bragg's returns of the 20th of august--the last of record--reported his aggregate of all arms 43,866 reinforced from j. e. johnston's army in august 9,000 reinforced from j. e. johnston's army in september (gregg and mcnair) 2,500 reinforced from general lee's army, september 18 and 19 (a large estimate) 5,000 ----- total 60,366 losses on the 18th and 19th 1,124 ----- aggregate for battle on the 20th 59,242 general rosecrans's return of september 20, 1863, showed: aggregate of infantry, equipped 46,561 aggregate of cavalry, equipped 10,114 aggregate of artillery, equipped 4,192 ----- total 60,867 ----- confederate losses (estimated; returns imperfect) 17,800 union losses by returns (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) 16,550 the exceeding heaviness of these losses will be better understood, and the desperate and bloody character of the chickamauga battle more fully appreciated, upon a little analysis. the battle, viewed from the stand-point of the union losses, was the fifth greatest of the war, gettysburg, spottsylvania, the wilderness, and chancellorsville alone exceeding it, but each of these battles were of much longer time. viewed by comparison of confederate losses, chickamauga occupies similar place--fifth--in the scale of magnitude among the battles of the war. but the sanguinary nature of the contention is best illustrated by a simple suggestion of proportions. official reports show that on both sides the casualties--killed, wounded, and missing--embraced the enormous proportion of thirty-three per cent. of the troops actually engaged. on the union side there were over a score of regiments in which the losses in this single fight exceeded 49.4 per cent., which was the heaviest loss sustained by a german regiment at any time during the franco-german war. the "charge of the light brigade" at balaklava has been made famous in song and history, yet there were thirty union regiments that each lost ten per cent. more men at chickamauga, and many confederate regiments whose mortality exceeded this. longstreet's command in less than two hours lost nearly forty-four per cent. of its strength, and of the troops opposed to a portion of their splendid assaults, steedman's and brannan's commands lost respectively forty-nine and thirty-eight in less than four hours, and single regiments a far heavier percentage. of the confederate regiments sustaining the heaviest percentages of loss (in killed, wounded, and missing,--the last a scarcely appreciable fraction) the leading ones were: regiment. per cent. tenth tennessee 68.0 fifth georgia 61.1 second tennessee 60.2 fifteenth and thirty-seventh tennessee 59.9 sixteenth alabama 58.6 sixth and ninth tennessee 57.9 eighteenth alabama 56.3 twenty-second alabama 55.2 twenty-third tennessee 54.1 twenty-ninth mississippi 52.7 fifty-eighth alabama 51.7 thirty-seventh georgia 50.1 sixty-third tennessee 49.7 forty-first alabama 48.6 thirty-second tennessee 48.3 twentieth tennessee 48.0 first arkansas 45.1 ninth kentucky 44.3 these are only a few of the cases in which it was possible to compute percentages of casualties, the number of effectives taken into battle not having been mentioned, but they serve to illustrate the sanguinary severity of the fight and the heroism of the troops. chapter xxxii. failure to follow success. longstreet differs with general bragg as to movements of pursuit--the confederates on lookout mountain--federals gain comfortable positions around it--superior officers of bragg's command call for his removal--bragg seeks scapegoats--president davis visits the army--tests the temper of the officers towards bragg--he offers the command to longstreet--he declines--his reasons--general bragg ignores signal-service reports and is surprised--general joe hooker's advance--night attack beyond lookout mountain--colonel bratton's clever work--review of the western movement and combination--it should have been effected in may instead of september--inference as to results had the first proposition been promptly acted upon. about sunrise of the next morning, general bragg rode to my bivouac, when report was made to him of orders of the night before, to replenish supplies and prepare to take up pursuit at daylight. he asked my views of the next step to be taken, explaining that there were some defensive works about chattanooga to cover the enemy in that position. i knew nothing of the country except of its general geographical features, but the hunt was up and on the go, when any move towards his rear was safe, and a speedy one encouraging of great results. i suggested that we cross the tennessee river north of chattanooga and march against the line of the enemy's rear; that if, after so threatening as to throw general rosecrans to full retreat, we found it inconvenient to pursue him, we turn back with part of the army and capture or disperse the union army in east tennessee under general burnside. he stated that he would follow that course, ordered the right wing to march,[182] and the left wing to follow as soon as the way was clear,--the left to care for the dead and wounded during the wait. as it was night when the rear of the right wing stretched out on the road, my march was not taken up until the morning of the 22d. general mclaws joined me on the 21st with his other brigades, and general jenkins joined hood's division. afterwards g. t. anderson's brigade joined the latter. when our march reached general bragg's head-quarters and reported on the 22d, he gave me orders to direct a division from the line of march to follow the enemy towards chattanooga. when asked if he had abandoned the course upon which his march was ordered, he said the people would be greatly gratified to know that his army was marching through the streets of chattanooga with bands of music and salutations of the soldiers. i thought, and did not fail to say, that it would give them greater pleasure to know that he had passed the tennessee river, turned the enemy out of chattanooga in eager flight, to save his rearward lines, whilst we marched hammering against the broken flanks of his columns. but the cavalry had reported that the enemy was in hurried and confused retreat, his trains crossing the river and passing over the nose of lookout mountain in disorder. the praise of the inhabitants of a city so recently abandoned to the enemy, and a parade through its streets with bands of music and flaunting banners, were more alluring to a spirit eager for applause than was the tedious march for fruition of our heavy labors. general rosecrans prepared, no doubt, to continue his retreat, anticipating our march towards his rear, but finding that we preferred to lay our lines in front of him, concluded that it would be more comfortable to rest at chattanooga, reinforce, repair damages, and come to meet us when ready for a new trial. [illustration: confederates around chattanooga 1863] when general bragg found that the enemy had changed his mind, and was not inclined to continue his rearward march, he stretched his army in a semicircle of six miles along the southeast front of chattanooga, from the base of lookout mountain on his left, to his right resting on the tennessee river, and ordered alexander's batteries to the top of the mountain, my command, mclaws's, hood's, and walker's divisions, occupying the left of his line of investment. his plan was to shell the enemy from his works by field batteries, but the works grew stronger from day to day on all sides of the city. our infantry was posted along the line, as supports for the batteries, with orders not to assault unless especially ordered. the northern point of lookout mountain, upon which alexander's batteries were posted, abuts upon the tennessee river. the city lies east of the abutment and nestles close under it. the base of the mountain has a steep, rugged grade of five hundred feet above the plateau, and from its height the mountain crops out into palisades of seven hundred feet. general alexander managed to drop an occasional shell or shot about the enemy's lines by lifting the trails of his guns, but the fire of other batteries was not effective. at the end of a week's practice the confederate commander found the enemy getting more comfortable in his works, and thought to break him up by a grand cavalry raid. on the 30th he ordered general wheeler to organize a force of his effective mounts, cross the river, and ride against the railway and such depots and supply-trains as he could reach. the cavalry destroyed some wagon-trains and supplies, and gave the enemy more trouble than the artillery practice, yet failed to convince him that it was time to abandon his position, but, on the contrary, satisfied him that he was safe from further serious trouble. at that time the shortest line of the enemy's haul of provisions from the depot at stevenson was along the road on the north bank of the river. the confederate chief conceived, as our cavalry ride had failed of effect, that a line of sharp-shooters along the river on our side could break up that line of travel, and ordered, on the 8th of october, a detail from my command for that purpose. as the line was over the mountain about seven miles beyond support, by a rugged road not practicable for artillery, i ordered a brigade of infantry detailed to go over and protect the sharp-shooters from surprise or capture. the detail fell upon law's brigade. the line for this practice extended from the east side of lookout creek some ten miles down the river. the effect of the fire was about like that of the cavalry raid. it simply put the enemy on shorter rations until he could open another route for his trains. but more to be deplored than these novel modes of investment was the condition of the confederate army. after moving from virginia to try to relieve our comrades of the army of tennessee, we thought that we had cause to complain that the fruits of our labor had been lost, but it soon became manifest that the superior officers of that army themselves felt as much aggrieved as we at the halting policy of their chief, and were calling in letters and petitions for his removal. a number of them came to have me write the president for them. as he had not called for my opinion on military affairs since the johnston conference of 1862, i could not take that liberty, but promised to write to the secretary of war and to general lee, who i thought could excuse me under the strained condition of affairs. about the same time they framed and forwarded to the president a petition praying for relief.[183] it was written by general d. h. hill (as he informed me since the war). while the superior officers were asking for relief, the confederate commander was busy looking along his lines for victims. lieutenant-general polk was put under charges for failing to open the battle of the 20th at daylight; major-general hindman was relieved under charges for conduct before the battle, when his conduct of the battle with other commanders would have relieved him of any previous misconduct, according to the customs of war, and pursuit of others was getting warm. on the union side the washington authorities thought vindication important, and major-generals mccook and crittenden, of the twentieth and twenty-first corps, were relieved and went before a court of inquiry; also one of the generals of division of the fourteenth corps. the president came to us on the 9th of october and called the commanders of the army to meet him at general bragg's office. after some talk, in the presence of general bragg, he made known the object of the call, and asked the generals, in turn, their opinion of their commanding officer, beginning with myself. it seemed rather a stretch of authority, even with a president, and i gave an evasive answer and made an effort to turn the channel of thought, but he would not be satisfied, and got back to his question. the condition of the army was briefly referred to, and the failure to make an effort to get the fruits of our success, when the opinion was given, in substance, that our commander could be of greater service elsewhere than at the head of the army of tennessee. major-general buckner was called, and gave opinion somewhat similar. so did major-general cheatham, who was then commanding the corps recently commanded by lieutenant-general polk, and general d. h. hill, who was called last, agreed with emphasis to the views expressed by others. the next morning the president called me to private conference, and had an all day talk. he thought to assign me to command, but the time had passed for handling that army as an independent force. regarding this question, as considered in virginia, it was understood that the assignment would be made at once, and in time for opportunity to handle the army sufficiently to gain the confidence of the officers and soldiers before offering or accepting battle. the action was not taken, a battle had been made and won, the army was then seriously entangled in a _quasi_ siege, the officers and soldiers were disappointed, and disaffected in _morale_. general grant was moving his army to reinforce against us, and an important part of the union army of virginia was moving to the same purpose. in my judgment our last opportunity was lost when we failed to follow the success at chickamauga, and capture or disperse the union army, and it could not be just to the service or myself to call me to a position of such responsibility. the army was part of general joseph e. johnston's department, and could only be used in strong organization by him in combining its operations with his other forces in alabama and mississippi. i said that under him i could cheerfully work in any position.[184] the suggestion of that name only served to increase his displeasure, and his severe rebuke. i recognized the authority of his high position, but called to his mind that neither his words nor his manner were so impressive as the dissolving scenes that foreshadowed the dreadful end. he referred to his worry and troubles with politicians and non-combatants. in that connection, i suggested that all that the people asked for was success; with that the talk of politicians would be as spiders' webs before him. and when restored to his usual gracious calm i asked to have my resignation accepted, to make place for some one who could better meet his ideas of the important service. he objected that my troops would not be satisfied with the change. i suggested a leave of absence, as winter was near, when i would go to the trans-mississippi department, and after the troops were accustomed to their new commander, send in my written resignation, from texas, but he was not minded to accept that solution of the premises. finally, i asked his aid in putting the divisions that were with me in more efficient working order, by assigning a major-general to command hood's division. he had been so seriously crippled that he could not be in condition to take the field again even if he recovered, and a commander for the division was essential to its proper service. as he had no one, or failed to name any one, for the place, i suggested the promotion of the senior brigadier then in command of it, general m. jenkins, who was a bright, gallant, and efficient officer of more than two years' experience in active warfare, loved by his troops, and all acquaintances as well. he had been transferred, recently, by the war department to the division, upon application of general hood, and in consequence there was some feeling of rivalry between him and brigadier-general law, the next in rank, who had served with the division since its organization, and had commanded it at gettysburg after general hood was wounded, and after his taking off in the battle of chickamauga. the president referred to the services of general law with the division, but failed to indicate a preference. i thought it unwise and not military to choose a junior for assignment to command over his senior officers, and prejudicial to the _esprit de corps_ and _morale_ of any army, except under most eminent services, and in this instance where service, high military character, and equipment were on the side of the senior it was more objectionable, but consented that it would be better to have general law promoted, and the feeling of rivalry put at rest; general jenkins's heart was in the service, and could submit to anything that seemed best for its interests; but the president was pleased to remain negative, and failed to assign a commander. the interview was exciting, at times warm, but continued until lookout mountain lifted above the sun to excuse my taking leave. the president walked as far as the gate, gave his hand in his usual warm grasp, and dismissed me with his gracious smile; but a bitter look lurking about its margin, and the ground-swell, admonished me that clouds were gathering about head-quarters of the first corps even faster than those that told the doom of the southern cause. a day or two after this interview the president called the commanders to meet him again at general bragg's head-quarters. he expressed desire to have the army pulled away from the lines around chattanooga and put to active work in the field, and called for suggestions and plans by which that could be done, directing his appeal, apparently, to me as first to reply. i suggested a change of base to rome, georgia, a march of the army to the railway bridge of the tennessee river at bridgeport, and the crossing of the river as an easy move,--one that would cut the enemy's rearward line, interrupt his supply train, put us between his army at chattanooga and the reinforcements moving to join him, and force him to precipitate battle or retreat. general bragg proposed that we march up and cross the river and swing around towards the enemy's rear and force him out by that means. no other plans were offered, nor did other officers express preference for either of the plans that were submitted. maps were called for and demonstrations given of the two plans, when the president ordered the move to be made by the change of base to rome, and in a day or two took leave of us. he had brought general pemberton with him to assign to the corps left by general polk, but changed his mind. general d. h. hill was relieved of duty; after a time general buckner took a leave of absence, and general hardee relieved general cheatham of command of the corps left to him by general polk. about this time general lee wrote me, alluding to the presence of the president, the questions under consideration, my proposition for him to leave the army in virginia in other hands and come west to grander, more important fields, to his purpose in sending me west to be assigned to command them, and expressing anticipation of my return to virginia.[185] the president left the army more despondent than he found it. general pemberton's misfortune at vicksburg gave rise to severe prejudice of the people and the army, and when the troops heard of the purpose of the president to assign him to command of polk's corps, parts of the army were so near to mutiny that he concluded to call general hardee to that command. a few days after he left us a severe season of rain set in, and our commander used the muddy roads to excuse his failure to execute the campaign that the president had ordered. late on the 20th of september and during the 21st, general rosecrans reported his condition deplorable, and expressed doubt of his holding at chattanooga, and called to general burnside in east tennessee, to whom he looked for aid; but finding only feeble efforts to follow our success he recovered hope, prepared defensive works, and was looking to renewal of his aggressive work when he was relieved. from accounts made public since the war it appears that his animals were so reduced from want of forage at the time of the october rains that general rosecrans could not move his artillery over the muddy roads, which suggests mention that the campaign ordered by the president for the change of base could have forced him from his works in his crippled condition, and given us comfortable operations between him and his reinforcements coming from virginia and mississippi. in his official account, general bragg said that the road on the south side was left under my command, which is misleading. my command--three divisions--was on his line of investment, east of the city and of the mountain; the road was west of the mountain from six to twenty miles from the command. we were in support of his batteries, to be ready for action at the moment his artillery practice called for it. we held nearly as much of his line as the other eight divisions. none of the commanders had authority to move a man from the lines until the 8th of october, when he gave orders for posting the sharp-shooters west of the mountain. the exposure of this detachment was so serious that i took the liberty to send a brigade as a rallying force for it, and the exposure of these led me to inquire as to the assistance they could have from our cavalry force operating on the line from the mountain to bridgeport, some eight or ten miles behind them. the cavalry was not found as watchful as the eyes of an army should be, and i reported them to the general, but he thought otherwise, assured me that his reports were regular, daily and sometimes oftener. nevertheless, prudence suggested more careful guard, and i ordered captain manning, who brought from virginia part of my signal force, to establish a station in observation of bridgeport and open its communication with my head-quarters. general bragg denied all reports sent him of the enemy from my signal party, treated them with contempt, then reported that the road was under my command. his report is remarkable in that he failed to notice the conduct of his officers, except of the killed and wounded and one division commander whom he found at daylight of the 21st advancing his line of skirmishers in careful search of the enemy who had retreated at early twilight the evening before under shouts from the confederate army that made the heavy wood reverberate with resounding shouts of victory. that officer he commended as the "ever vigilant." he gave due credit to his brave soldiers for their gallant execution of his orders to charge and continue to charge against the enemy's strongholds, as he knew that they would under his orders until their efforts were successful, but the conduct of the battle in all of its phases discredits this claim. when the right wing of his army stepped into the lafayette-rossville road the enemy's forces were in full retreat through mcfarland gap, and all fighting and charging had ceased, except the parting blows of preston's division with granger's reserve corps. a peculiar feature of the battle was the early ride of both commanders from the field, leaving the battle to their troops. general rosecrans was generous enough to acknowledge that he left his battle in other hands. general bragg claimed everything for himself, failing to mention that other hands were there. while general rosecrans was opening a route beyond reach of our sharp-shooters, his chief engineer, general w. f. smith, was busy upon a plan for opening the line of railway on the south side, and his first step was to break up the line of sharp-shooters. on the 19th he made a survey of the river below chattanooga. on the same day general rosecrans was superseded in command by general george h. thomas. a day or two after that my signal party reported some stir about the enemy's camps near bridgeport, and the cavalry reported a working force at nicojack cave. the cavalry was put under my orders for a reconnoissance, and i was ordered to send a brigade of infantry scouting for the working party. nothing was found at the cave or by the reconnoissance, and the cavalry objected to my authority. on the 25th orders came to me to hold the mountain by a brigade of infantry. after ordering the brigade, i reported a division necessary to make possession secure, suggesting that the enemy's best move was from bridgeport and along the mountain crest; that we should assume that he would be wise enough to adopt it, unless we prepared against it. but our commander was disturbed by suggestions from subordinates, and thought them presumptuous when they ventured to report of the probable movements of the enemy. on the night of the 27th of october, general smith moved to the execution of his plan against our line of sharp-shooters. he put fifty pontoon-boats and two flat-boats in the river at chattanooga, the former to take twenty-five men each, the latter from forty to seventy-five,--the boats to float quietly down the river eight miles to brown's ferry, cross and land the troops. at the same time a sufficient force was to march by the highway to the same point, to be in readiness for the boats to carry them over to their comrades. the sharp-shooters had been posted for the sole purpose of breaking up the haul along the other bank, and not with a view of defending the line, nor was it defensible, while the enemy had every convenience for making a forced crossing and lodgement. the vigilant foe knew his opportunity, and only waited for its timely execution. it is needless to say that general smith had little trouble in establishing his point. he manned his boats, floated them down to the crossing, landed his men, and soon had the boats cross back for his other men, pushed them over, and put them at work intrenching the strong ground selected for their holding. by daylight he was comfortably intrenched, and had his artillery on the other side in position to sweep along the front. the confederate commander did not think well enough of his line when he had it to prepare to hold it, but when he found that the enemy proposed to use it, he thought to order his infantry down to recover the ground just demonstrated as indefensible, and ordered me to meet him on the mountain next morning to learn his plans and receive his instructions for the work. that afternoon the signal party reported the enemy advancing from bridgeport in force,--artillery and infantry. this despatch was forwarded to head-quarters, but was discredited. it was repeated about dark, and again forwarded and denied. on the morning of the 28th i reported as ordered. the general complained of my party sending up false alarms. the only answer that i could make was that they had been about two years in that service, and had not made such mistakes before. while laying his plans, sitting on the point of lookout rock, the enemy threw some shells at us, and succeeded in bursting one about two hundred feet below us. that angered the general a little, and he ordered alexander to drop some of his shells about their heads. as this little practice went on, a despatch messenger came bursting through the brushwood, asking for general longstreet, and reported the enemy marching from bridgeport along the base of the mountain,--artillery and infantry. general bragg denied the report, and rebuked the soldier for sensational alarms, but the soldier said, "general, if you will ride to a point on the west side of the mountain i will show them to you." we rode and saw the eleventh and twelfth corps under general hooker, from the army of the potomac, marching quietly along the valley towards brown's ferry. the general was surprised. so was i. but my surprise was that he did not march along the mountain top, instead of the valley. it could have been occupied with as little loss as he afterwards had and less danger. he had marched by our line of cavalry without their knowing, and general bragg had but a brigade of infantry to meet him if he had chosen to march down along the top of the mountain, and that was posted twenty miles from support. my estimate of the force was five thousand. general bragg thought it not so strong, and appearance from the elevation seemed to justify his estimate. presently the rear-guard came in sight and made its bivouac immediately in front of the point upon which we stood. the latter force was estimated at fifteen hundred, and halted about three miles in rear of the main body. a plan was laid to capture the rear-guard by night attack. he proposed to send me mclaws's and jenkins's divisions for the work, and ordered that it should be done in time for the divisions to withdraw to the point of the mountain before daylight, left me to arrange details for attack, and rode to give orders for the divisions, but changed his mind without giving me notice, and only ordered jenkins's division. after marching his command, general jenkins rode to the top of the mountain and reported. the route over which the enemy had marched was along the western base of a series of lesser heights, offering strong points for our troops to find positions of defence between his main force and his rear-guard. after giving instructions to general jenkins, he was asked to explain the plan of operations to general mclaws in case the latter was not in time to view the position from the mountain before night. a point had been selected and ordered to be held by one of jenkins's brigades supported by mclaws's division, while general jenkins was to use his other brigades against the rear-guard, which rested in the edge of a woodland of fair field of approach. the point at which law's brigade rested after being forced from its guard of the line of sharp-shooters was near the northern base of the mountain about a mile east of the route of the enemy's line of march. as general law's detached service had given him opportunity to learn something of the country, his brigade was chosen as the brigade of position between the parts of the enemy's forces. general law was to move first, get into position by crossing the bridge over lookout creek, to be followed by jenkins's other brigades, when mclaws's division was to advance to position in support of law's brigade. i waited on the mountain, the only point from which the operations could be seen, until near midnight, when, seeing no indications of the movements, i rode to the point that had been assigned for their assembly, found the officers in wait discussing the movements, and, upon inquiry, learned that mclaws's division had not been ordered. under the impression that the other division commander understood that the move had miscarried, i rode back to my head-quarters, failing to give countermanding orders. the gallant jenkins, however, decided that the plan should not be abandoned, and went to work in its execution by his single division. to quiet the apprehensions of general law he gave him robertson's brigade to be posted with his own, and benning's brigade as their support, and ordered his own brigade under colonel bratton to move cautiously against the rear-guard, and make the attack if the opportunity was encouraging. as soon as colonel bratton engaged, the alarm spread, the enemy hastened to the relief of his rear, encountered the troops posted to receive them, and made swift, severe battle. general law claimed that he drove off their fight, and, under the impression that colonel bratton had finished his work and recrossed the bridge, withdrew his command, leaving colonel bratton at the tide of his engagement. general jenkins and colonel bratton were left to their own cool and gallant skill to extricate the brigade from the swoop of numbers accumulating against them, and, with the assistance of brave benning's rock brigade, brought the command safely over, benning's brigade crossing as bratton reached the bridge. the conduct of bratton's forces was one of the cleverest pieces of work of the war, and the skill of its handling softened the blow that took so many of our gallant officers and soldiers. colonel bratton made clever disposition of his regiments, and handled them well. he met gallant resistance, and in one instance had part of his command forced back, but renewed the attack, making his line stronger, and forced the enemy into crowded ranks and had him under converging circular fire, with fair prospects, when recalled under orders to hasten to the bridge. so urgent was the order that he left the dead and some of the wounded on the field. general law lost of his own brigade (aggregate) 43 general robertson (1 wounded and 8 missing) 9 colonel bratton lost (aggregate) 356 -- confederate loss 408 union loss (aggregate) 420 it was an oversight of mine not to give definite orders for the troops to return to their camps before leaving them. general jenkins was ordered to inquire into the conduct of the brigades of position, and reported evidence that general law had said that he did not care to win general jenkins's spurs as a major-general. he was ordered to prepare charges, but presently when we were ordered into active campaign in east tennessee he asked to have the matter put off to more convenient time. we may pause here to reflect upon the result of the combination against rosecrans's army in september, after our lines of transit were seriously disturbed, and after the severe losses in pennsylvania, mississippi, and tennessee; and to consider in contrast the probable result of the combination if effected in the early days of may, when it was first proposed (see strategic map). at that time general grant was marching to lay siege upon vicksburg. the campaign in virginia had been settled, for the time, by the battle of chancellorsville. our railways were open and free from virginia through east tennessee, georgia, alabama, to central mississippi. the armies of rosecrans and bragg were standing near murfreesboro' and shelbyville, tennessee. the richmond authorities were trying to collect a force at jackson, mississippi, to drive grant's army from the siege. two divisions of the first corps of the army of northern virginia were marching from suffolk to join general lee at fredericksburg. under these circumstances, positions, and conditions, i proposed to secretary seddon, and afterwards to general lee, as the only means of relief for vicksburg, that johnston should be ordered with his troops to join bragg's army; that the divisions marching for fredericksburg should be ordered to meet johnston's, the transit over converging lines would give speedy combination, and johnston should be ordered to strike rosecrans in overwhelming numbers and march on to the ohio river. as the combination of september and battle of chickamauga drew general grant's army from its work in mississippi to protect the line through tennessee and kentucky, and two federal corps from the army of the potomac, the inference is fair that the earlier, more powerful combination would have opened ways for grand results for the south, saved the eight thousand lost in defending the march for vicksburg, the thirty-one thousand surrendered there, port hudson and its garrison of six thousand, and the splendid army of northern virginia the twenty thousand lost at gettysburg. and who can say that with these sixty-five thousand soldiers saved, and in the ranks, the southern cause would not have been on a grand ascending grade with its bayonets and batteries bristling on the banks of the ohio river on the 4th day of july, 1863! the elections of 1862 were not in support of the emancipation proclamation. with the mississippi river still closed, and the southern army along the banks of the ohio, the elections of 1864 would have been still more pronounced against the federal policy, and a new administration could have found a solution of the political imbroglio. "blood is thicker than water." chapter xxxiii. the east tennessee campaign. general bragg's infatuation--general grant in command of the federal forces--longstreet ordered into east tennessee--his plans for the campaign--poorly supported by his superior--foraging for daily rations--general burnside's forces--advance upon knoxville--affairs at lenoir's and campbell's stations--engagement near knoxville an artillery combat--reprehensible conduct of officers--allegement that one was actuated by jealousy--federals retire behind their works--laying the confederate lines about knoxville. about the 1st of november it was rumored about camp that i was to be ordered into east tennessee against general burnside's army. at the moment it seemed impossible that our commander, after rejecting a proposition for a similar move made just after his battle, when flushed with victory and the enemy discomfited, could now think of sending an important detachment so far, when he knew that, in addition to the reinforcements that had joined the union army, another strong column was marching from memphis under general sherman, and must reach chattanooga in fifteen or twenty days. but on second thoughts it occurred to me that it might, after all, be in keeping with his peculiarities, and then it occurred to me that there are many ways to compass a measure when the spirit leads. so i set to work to try to help his plans in case the report proved true. after a little reflection it seemed feasible that by withdrawing his army from its lines about chattanooga to strong concentration behind the chickamauga river, and recalling his detachment in east tennessee (the latter to give the impression of a westward move), and at the moment of concentration sending a strong force for swift march against general burnside,--strong enough to crush him,--and returning to chattanooga before the army under general sherman could reach there (or, if he thought better, let the detachment strike into kentucky against the enemy's communications), something worth while could be effected. presently i was called, with lieutenant-general hardee and major-general breckenridge, the other corps commanders, to learn his plans and receive his orders. he announced his purpose in general terms to send me into east tennessee, then paused as if inviting the opinions of others, when i stated that the move could be made, but it would be hazardous to make a detachment strong enough for rapid work while his army was spread along a semicircle of six miles, with the enemy concentrated at the centre, whence he could move in two or three threatening columns, to hold his line to its extension, and give his real attack such power that it must break through by its weight. then i suggested the operations herein just mentioned. he ordered the move to be made by my two divisions, alexander's and leydon's artillery, and wheeler's cavalry and horse artillery. we had the promise of a force, estimated from three to five thousand, that was to come from southwest virginia and meet us, but that command was to start from a point two hundred miles from our starting, march south as we marched north, and meet us at knoxville. general bragg estimated general burnside's force south of knoxville at fifteen thousand. i repeated the warning that the move as ordered was not such as to give assurances of rapid work, saying that my march and campaign against the enemy's well-guarded positions must be made with care, and that would consume so much time that general grant's army would be up, when he would organize attack that must break through the line before i could return to him. his sardonic smile seemed to say that i knew little of his army or of himself in assuming such a possibility. so confident was he of his position that i ventured to ask that my column should be increased to twenty thousand infantry and artillery, but he intimated that further talk was out of order. general grant had in the mean time joined the army and assumed command on the 22d of october, and it was known that general sherman was marching to join him. on the 20th of october general burnside reported by letter[186] to general grant an army of twenty-two thousand three hundred men, with ninety-odd guns, but his returns for november show a force of twenty-five thousand two hundred and ninety and over one hundred guns. eight thousand of his men were on service north of knoxville and about cumberland gap. to march, and capture or disperse this formidable force, fortified at points, i had mclaws's and hood's divisions of infantry, colonel alexander's and major leydon's artillery, and four brigades of general wheeler's cavalry. kershaw's, humphreys's, wofford's, and bryan's brigades constituted mclaws's division. hood's division, which was commanded during the campaign by brigadier-general m. jenkins, was made up of jenkins's, anderson's, benning's, law's, and robertson's brigades. general wheeler's cavalry was organized into two divisions of two brigades each,--general john t. morgan's alabama and colonel cruse's georgia brigades, under major-general w. t. martin; colonels g. g. dibbrell's tennessee and thomas harrison's texas brigades, under brigadier-general frank armstrong. this made about fifteen thousand men, after deducting camp guards and foraging parties. the remote contingent that was to come from southwest virginia was an unknown quantity, not to be considered until it could report for service. as soon as the conference at head-quarters adjourned orders were issued for alexander's artillery to be withdrawn from lookout mountain, and general mclaws was ordered to withdraw his division from the general line after night. both commands were ordered to tyner's station to take the cars for sweetwater on the 4th. control of the trains was under general bragg's quartermaster, who had orders for the cars to be ready to transport the troops on their arrival, but the trains were not ready until the 5th. the brigades arrived at sweetwater on the 6th, 7th, and 8th. alexander's batteries were shipped as soon as cars were ready. to expedite matters, his horses and wagons were ordered forward by the dirt road; the batteries found cars, the last battery getting to sweetwater on the 10th. jenkins's division and leydon's batteries were drawn from the lines on the 5th and ordered to meet the cars at the tunnel through missionary ridge. they reached the station in due season, but the cars were not there. after waiting some days, the battery horses and horses of mounted officers were ordered by the wagon road. tired of the wait, i advised the troops to march along the road and find the cars where they might have the good fortune to meet them, the officers, whose horses had been sent forward, marching with the soldiers. general bragg heard of the delay and its cause, but began to urge the importance of more rapid movements. his effort to make his paper record at my expense was not pleasing, but i tried to endure it with patience. he knew that trains and conductors were under his exclusive control, but _he wanted papers that would throw the responsibility of delay upon other shoulders_. on the 8th and 9th the infantry marched as far as cleveland, about thirty miles, where the train-masters gave notice that the trains could meet them, but it was not until the 12th that the last of the brigades reached sweetwater. while waiting for transportation, i wrote some of my friends to excuse my failure to stop and say good-by. the letter written to general buckner was returned to me some months after, endorsed by him as having important bearing upon events as they transpired,--viz.: "wednesday, november 5, 1863. "my dear general,--i start to-day for tyner's station, and expect to get transportation to-morrow for sweetwater. the weather is so bad, and i find myself so much occupied, that i shall not be able to see you to say good-by. "when i heard the report around camp that i was to go into east tennessee, i set to work at once to try and plan the means for making the move with security and the hope of great results. as every other move had been proposed to the general and rejected or put off until time had made them inconvenient, i came to the conclusion, as soon as the report reached me, that it was to be the fate of our army to wait until all good opportunities had passed, and then, in desperation, seize upon the least favorable movement. "as no one had proposed this east tennessee campaign to the general, i thought it possible that we might accomplish something by encouraging his own move, and proposed the following plan,--viz.: to withdraw from our present lines and our forces in east tennessee (the latter to be done in order to give the impression to the enemy that we were retiring from east tennessee and concentrating near him for battle or for some other movement) and place our army in a strong concentrated position behind chickamauga river. the moment the army was together, to make a detachment of twenty thousand to move rapidly against burnside and destroy him; and by continued rapid movements to threaten the enemy's rear and his communications to the extent that might be necessary to draw him out from his present position. this, at best, is but a tedious process, but i thought it gave promise of some results, and was, therefore, better than being here destroying ourselves. the move, as i proposed it, would have left this army in a strong position and safe, and would have made sure the capture of burnside,--that is, the army could spare twenty thousand, if it were in the position that i proposed, better than it can spare twelve, occupying the lines that it now does. twenty thousand men, well handled, could surely have captured burnside and his forces. under present arrangements, however, the lines are to be held as they now are and the detachment is to be of twelve thousand. we thus expose both to failure, and really take no chance to ourselves of great results. the only notice my plan received was a remark that general hardee was pleased to make, 'i don't think that that is a bad idea of longstreet's.' i undertook to explain the danger of having such a long line under fire of the enemy's batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our midst, and within twenty minutes' march of any portion of our line. but i was assured that he would not disturb us. i repeated my ideas, but they did not even receive notice. it was not till i had repeated them, however, that general hardee noticed me. have you any maps that you can give or lend me? i shall need everything of the kind. do you know any reliable people, living near and east of knoxville, from whom i might get information of the condition, strength, etc., of the enemy? i have written in such hurry and confusion of packing and striking camp (in the rain and on the head of an empty flour barrel) that i doubt if i have made myself understood. i remain "sincerely your friend, "j. longstreet, "_lieutenant-general_. "to major-general s. b. buckner, "_commanding division_." three months thereafter general buckner returned the letter with the following: (endorsement.) "morristown, tenn., february 1, 1864. "general,--it seems to me, after reading this letter again, that its predictions are so full a vindication of your judgment of the movements then ordered, that it should remain in your possession, with a view that at some future day it may serve to 'vindicate the truth of history.' i place it at your disposal with that view. "truly your friend, "s. b. buckner, "_major-general_. "to lieutenant-general j. longstreet." i asked at general head-quarters for maps and information of the country through which i was to operate, for a quartermaster and commissary of subsistence who knew of the resources of the country, and for an engineer officer who had served with general buckner when in command of that department. neither of the staff-officers was sent, nor a map, except one of the topographical outlines of the country between the hiawassee and tennessee rivers, which was much in rear of the field of our proposed operations. general buckner was good enough to send me a plot of the roads and streams between loudon and knoxville. we were again disappointed at sweetwater. we were started from chattanooga on short rations, but comforted by the assurance that produce was abundant at that point, and so it proved to be; but general stevenson, commanding the outpost, reported his orders from the commanding general were to ship all of his supplies to his army, and to retire with his own command and join him upon our arrival. in this connection it should be borne in mind that we were recently from virginia,--coming at the heated season,--where we left most of our clothing and blankets and all of our wagon transportation; and by this time, too, it was understood through the command that the richmond authorities were holding thunder-clouds over the head of the commander, and that general bragg was disposed to make them more portentous by his pressing calls for urgency. thus we found ourselves in a strange country, not as much as a day's rations on hand, with hardly enough land transportation for ordinary camp equipage, the enemy in front to be captured, and our friends in rear putting in their paper bullets. this sounds more like romance than war, but i appeal to the records for the facts, including reports of my chiefs of quartermaster and subsistence departments and general alexander's account of the condition of some of the battery horses and ammunition. our foraging parties were lively, and we lost but a day and part of another in gathering in rations for a start. anticipating proper land transportation, plans were laid for march across the little tennessee above its confluence with the greater river, through marysville to the heights above knoxville on the east bank, by forced march. this would have brought the city close under fire of our field batteries and forced the enemy into open grounds. a guide had been secured who claimed to be familiar with the country, and was useful in laying our plans. but when our pontoon bridge came up it was without a train for hauling. so our plan must be changed. fortunately, we found a point in a bend of the river near the railroad at which we could force a crossing. at dark the cars were rolled up to that point by hand, and we learned that the little tennessee river above us was fordable for cavalry. general wheeler had been ordered to have vedettes along the river from loudon to some distance below kingston, where a considerable body of union troops occupied the north bank. he was ordered with his other troops to prepare for orders to cross the little tennessee at its fords, ride to marysville, capture the enemy's cavalry outpost at that point, ride up the east side of the river to knoxville, and seize the heights overlooking the city; or, finding that not feasible, to endeavor to so threaten as to hold the enemy's forces there to their works, while we marched against the troops of the west side; but when he found his service on that side ceased to be effective or co-operative with our movements, to cross the river and join the main column. as just now explained, the failure of wagons for our pontoon bridge forced us to cross at loudon, and to make direct march upon knoxville by that route. weary of the continual calls of general bragg for hurried movements, it seemed well to make cause for him to assign another commander or to move him to discontinue his work at a paper record; so i wired to remind him that he assured me before sending me away that he was safe in his position, and that he was told before my leaving that the command was not strong enough to excuse any but a careful, proper campaign; that he had since been informed that all delays of our movements were due to his inefficient staff corps, and that we were dependent upon foraging for our daily rations for men and animals. it began to look more like a campaign against longstreet than against burnside. as general burnside's orders were to hold knoxville, he decided to act on the defensive. leaving the troops in the northern district of his department in observation of that field, he withdrew his division on the south side of tennessee river as we marched for loudon, took up his pontoon bridge, and broke up the railroad bridge. orders were issued on the 12th for the general move of my cavalry by marysville, the infantry and artillery along the railroad route. pains were taken to have the bridge equipments carried by hand to the river, and skirmishing parties put in the boats and drifted to the opposite bank. the troops in rear were marched during the night to the vicinity of loudon and held in readiness in case the enemy came to oppose our crossing. the bridge was laid under the supervision of general alexander and major clark, our chief engineer, at huff's ferry, without serious resistance. a few miles east of loudon the holston[187] and little tennessee rivers come together, making the tennessee river, which flows from the confluence west to kingston, where it resumes its general flow southwest. the holston rises in the mountains north and flows south to the junction. the little tennessee rises in the mountains east and flows west to the junction. the railroad crosses the main river at loudon, thirty miles from knoxville, and runs about parallel to the holston river, and near its west bank. west of the railroad and parallel is a broken spur of the clinch mountain range, with occasional gaps or passes for vehicles, and some other blind wagon-roads and cattle-trails. west of this spur, and near its base, is the main wagon-road to knoxville, as far as campbell station, about seventeen miles, where it joins the kingston road, passes a gap, and unites with the wagon-road that runs with the railroad east of the mountain spur at campbell station. south of this gap, about eleven miles, is another pass at lenoir's mill, and three miles south of that another pass, not used. a detail of sharp-shooters under captain foster, of jenkins's brigade, manned the first boats and made a successful lodging, after an exchange of a few shots with the enemy's picket-guard on the north bank. they intended to surprise and capture the picket and thus secure quick and quiet passage, but in that they were not successful. the north bank was secured, however, without loss, and troops were passed rapidly over to hold it, putting out a good skirmish line in advance of the bridge-head. as we advanced towards loudon, the part of general white's union division that had been on the opposite bank of the river was withdrawn to lenoir's station. during the 13th and 14th the command was engaged in making substantial fastenings for the bridge and constructing its defences. general vaughn's regiments and a battery of major leydon's (with broken-down horses) were assigned to guard the bridge. on the afternoon of the 14th the enemy appeared on our front in strong force, drove our skirmish line back, and seemed prepared to give battle. as we were then waiting the return of our foraging wagons, we could only prepare to receive him. some of the provisions looked for came in during the night, and we advanced on the 15th, finding that the enemy had retired. the force that came back to meet us on the 15th was part of white's division (chapin's brigade) sent by general burnside, and general potter, commanding the ninth corps, sent general ferrero with his division. the move was intended probably to delay our march. it was chapin's brigade that made the advance against our skirmishers, and it probably suffered some in the affair. we lost not a single man. general wheeler crossed the little tennessee river at motley's ford at nightfall on the 13th, and marched to cut off the force at marysville. he came upon the command, only one regiment, the eleventh kentucky cavalry, that was advised in time to prepare for him. he attacked as soon as they came under fire, dispersed them into small parties that made good their escape, except one hundred and fifty taken by dibbrell's brigade. colonel wolford brought up the balance of his brigade and made strong efforts to support his broken regiment, but was eventually forced back, and was followed by the eighth, and eleventh texas and third arkansas cavalry and general john t. morgan's brigade. the next day he encountered sanders's division of cavalry and a battery, and, after a clean cavalry engagement of skilful manoeuvres on both sides, succeeded in reaching the vicinity of the city of knoxville, but found it too well guarded to admit of any very advantageous work. on the 15th our advance was cautiously made by hood's division and alexander's artillery leading; mclaws's division and leydon's artillery following. all along the route of the railroad the valley between the mountain and the river is so narrow and rough that a few thousand men can find many points at which they can make successful stands against great odds. our course was taken to turn all of those points by marching up the road on the west side of the mountain. a few miles out from our bridge we encountered a skirmishing party near the lower gap of the mountain, which, when pressed back, passed through the gap. general jenkins continued his march--leaving a guard at the gap till it could be relieved by general mclaws--to lenoir's station. the enemy was looking for us to follow through the lower gaps and attack his strong front, and was a little surprised to find us close on his right flank. he was well guarded there, however, against precipitate battle by the mountain range and narrow pass and the heavy, muddy roads through which our men and animals had to pull. arrangements were made for a good day's work from early morning. our guide promised to lead part of our men through a blind route during the night by which we could cut off the enemy's retreat, so that they would be securely hemmed in. generals jenkins and mclaws came up during the night. the former was ordered to advance part of his command to eligible points at midnight and hold them ready for use at daylight. the guide was sent with a brigade to the point which was to intercept the enemy's retreat. mclaws was held on the road, ready for use east or west of the ridge. jenkins was ordered to have parties out during the night to watch that the enemy did not move, and report. as no report came from them, all things were thought to be properly adjusted, when we advanced before daylight. in feeling our way through the weird gray of the morning, stumps seen on the roadside were taken to be sharp-shooters, but we were surprised that no one shot at us, when, behold! before it was yet quite light, we came upon a park of eighty wagons, well loaded with food, camp equipage, and ammunition, with the ground well strewn with spades, picks, and axes.[188] the animals had been taken from the wagons to double their teams through the mud. general potter had sent the division under general hartranft back to the campbell station pass to occupy the junction of his line of retreat with the kingston road and the road upon which we were marching, and was well on the march with the balance of the ninth corps, ferrero's division and his cavalry, before we knew that there was an opening by which he could escape. our guide, who promised to post the brigade so as to command the road in rear of the enemy, so far missed his route as to lead the brigade out of hearing of the enemy's march during the night. hart's cavalry brigade that was left in observation near kingston had been called up, and with mclaws's division advanced on the roads to campbell station, while general jenkins followed the direct line of retreat on double time, and right royally did his skirmishers move. he brought the rear to an occasional stand, but only leaving enough to require him to form line for advance, when the enemy again sped away on their rearward march at double time. general jenkins made the march before noon, but the enemy had passed the gap and the junction of the roads, and was well posted in battle array in rear of them. general mclaws was not up. he was not ordered on double time, as it was thought to first bring the enemy to bay on the east road, when some of his infantry could be called over the mountain on the enemy's flank. general ferrero, who covered the retreat, reported that it was necessary to attach from sixteen to twenty animals to a piece to make the haul through the mud. the retreat was very cleverly conducted, and was in time to cover the roads into campbell's station, forming into line of battle to meet us. jenkins's division, being in advance, was deployed on the right with alexander's battalion. as soon as the line was organized the batteries opened practice in deliberate, well-timed combat, but general alexander had the sympathy of his audience. his shells often exploded before they reached the game, and at times as they passed from the muzzles of his guns, and no remedy could be applied that improved their fire. as general mclaws came up his division was put upon our left with the other batteries, and hart's brigade of cavalry was assigned in that part to observe the enemy's, farther off. it was not yet past meridian. we had ample time to make a battle with confident hope of success, by direct advance and the pressing in on the enemy's right by mclaws's left, but our severe travel and labor after leaving virginia were not to find an opportunity to make a simply successful battle. as the rear of the enemy was open and could be covered, success would have been a simple victory, and the enemy could have escaped to his trenches at knoxville, leaving us crippled and delayed: whereas as he stood he was ours. how we failed to make good our claim we shall presently see. mclaws was ordered to use one of his brigades well out on his left as a diversion threatening the enemy's right, and to use hart's cavalry for the same purpose, while general jenkins was ordered to send two of his brigades through a well-covered way off our right to march out well past the enemy's left and strike down against that flank and rear. general law, being his officer next in rank, was ordered in charge of his own and anderson's brigades. general jenkins rode with the command, and put it in such position that the left of this line would strike the left of the enemy's, thus throwing the weight of the two brigades past the enemy's rear. i rode near the brigades, to see that there could be no mismove or misconception of orders. after adjusting the line of the brigades, and giving their march the points of direction, general jenkins rode to his brigades on the front to handle them in direct attack. i remained near the front of the flanking brigades for complete assurance of the adjustment of their march, and waited until they were so near that it was necessary to ride at speed, close under the enemy's line, to reach our main front, to time its advance with the flanking move. the ride was made alone, as less likely to draw the enemy's fire, the staff riding around. as i approached the front, the men sprang forward without orders to open the charge, but were called to await the appearance of the flanking move of our right. but general law had so changed direction as to bring his entire force in front instead of in the rear of the enemy's left. this gave him opportunity to change position to strong ground in rear, which made other movements necessary in view of the objective of the battle. there was yet time for successful battle, but it would have been a fruitless victory. before other combinations suited to our purpose could be made it was night, and the enemy was away on his march to the fortified grounds about knoxville. the demonstration of our left under general mclaws was successful in drawing the enemy's attention, and in causing him to change front of part of his command to meet the threatening. in his official account general jenkins reported,- "in a few minutes, greatly to my surprise, i received a message from general law that in advancing his brigades he had obliqued so much to the left as to have gotten out of its line of attack. this careless and inexcusable movement lost us the few moments in which success from this point could be attained."[189] apropos of this the following memorandum of a staff-officer is interesting and informative: "i know at the time it was currently reported that general law said he might have made the attack successfully, but that jenkins would have reaped the credit of it, and hence he delayed until the enemy got out of the way." this has been called a battle, by the other side, but it was only an artillery combat, little, very little, musket ammunition being burnt. the next day the enemy was safely behind his works about knoxville, except his cavalry under general sanders and his horse artillery left to delay our march. mclaws's division reached the suburbs of the city a little after noon, and was deployed from near the mouth of third creek as his right, the enemy holding a line of dismounted cavalry skirmishers about a thousand yards in advance of his line of works. alexander's artillery was disposed near mclaws's deployment. jenkins got up before night and was ordered to deploy on mclaws's left as far as the tazewell road, preceded by hart's cavalry, which was to extend the line north to the holston river. general wheeler came up later and was assigned to line with colonel hart. the city stands on the right bank of the holston river, on a plateau about one and a half miles in width and extending some miles down south. at knoxville the plateau is one hundred and twenty feet above the river, and there are little streams called first, second, and third creeks, from the upper to the lower suburbs of the city,--first creek between the city and east knoxville, or temperance hill; second creek between the city and college hill; third creek below and outside the enemy's lines of defence. the plateau slopes down to the valley through which the railway passes, and west of the valley it rises to the usual elevation. the confederates were posted on the second plateau, with their batteries of position. the line of the enemy's works, starting at its lower point on the west bank of the river, was just above the mouth of second creek, lying at right angles to the river. it ran to a fort constructed by the confederates, when occupied by them years before, called fort loudon, above the kingston road, and about a thousand yards in front of the college. east from that point it was about parallel with the river, reaching to temperance hill, to mabry's hill, and to the holston, below the glass-works. an interior line extended from temperance hill to flint hill on the east, and another on the west, between the outer line and second creek. dams were built across first and second creeks, flooding and forming formidable wet ditches over extensive parts of the line. abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and wire entanglements were placed where thought to be advantageous for the defenders. the heights on the northeast across the river are much more elevated than the plateaux of the city side, and command all points of the west bank. these were defended at some points by earthworks well manned. from the lower point of the enemy's line the confederates extended to his right at the river, conforming to his defensive lines. the part of our line occupied by the cavalry was a mere watch-guard. our move was hurried, and our transportation so limited that we had only a few tools in the hands of small pioneer parties, and our wagons were so engaged in collecting daily rations that we found it necessary to send our cavalry down to lenoir's for the tools captured there for use in making rifle-pits for our sharp-shooters. when general burnside rode to the front to meet us at lenoir's he left general parke in command at knoxville, and he and captain poe, of the engineers, gave attention to his partially-constructed works. upon laying our lines about knoxville, the enemy's forces in the northeast of his department were withdrawn towards cumberland gap, but we had no information of the troops ordered to meet us from southwest virginia. chapter xxxiv. besieging knoxville. closing on the enemy's lines--a gallant dash--the federal positions--fort loudon, later called fort sanders--assault of the fort carefully planned--general mclaws advises delay--the order reiterated and emphasized--gallant effort by the brigades of generals wofford, humphreys, and bryan at the appointed time--a recall ordered, because carrying the works was reported impossible--general longstreet is ordered by the president to general bragg's relief--losses during the assault and the campaign. the enemy's line of sharp-shooters and fort sanders stood in our direct line of advance,--the fort manned by the heaviest and best field guns. benjamin's battery, an old familiar acquaintance who had given us many hard knocks in our eastern service, opened upon us as soon as we were in its reach. it was not until night of the 17th that our line was well established, and then only so as to enclose the enemy's front, leaving the country across the river to be covered when the troops from virginia should join us. when general mclaws advanced on the morning of the 18th he found the enemy's line of skirmishers--cavalry dismounted--behind a line of heavy rail defences. general alexander was ordered to knock the rails about them and drive them out, and was partially successful, but the enemy got back before our infantry could reach them, so we had to carry the line by assault. part of our line drove up in fine style, and was measurably successful, but other parts, smarting under the stiff musket fire, hesitated and lay down under such slight shelter as they could find, but close under fire,--so close that to remain inactive would endanger repulse. captain winthrop, of alexander's staff, appreciating the crisis, dashed forward on his horse and led the halting lines successfully over the works. in his gallant ride he received a very severe hurt. neither our numbers nor our condition were such as to warrant further aggressive action at the moment, nor, in fact, until the column from virginia joined us. our sharp-shooters were advanced from night to night and pitted before daylight, each line being held by new forces as the advance was made. the first line occupied was a little inside of the rail piles. it seemed probable, upon first examination of the line along the northwest, that we might break through, and preparations were made for that effort, but, upon closer investigation, it was found to be too hazardous, and that the better plan was to await the approach of the other forces. when within six hundred yards of the enemy's works, our lines well pitted, it seemed safe to establish a battery on an elevated plateau on the east (or south) side of the river. some of our troops were sent over in flat-boats, and the reconnoissance revealed an excellent point commanding the city and the enemy's lines of works, though parts of his lines were beyond our range. some of our best guns were put in position, and our captured pontoon bridges down at lenoir's were sent for, to be hauled up along the river, but impassable rapids were found, and we were obliged to take part of our supply-train to haul them. they were brought up, and communication between the detachment and main force was made easy. the brigades of law and robertson were left on the east (or south) side as guard for that battery. the union forces were posted from left to right,--the ninth corps, general r. d. potter commanding. general ferrero's division extended from the river to second creek; general hartranft's along part of the line between second and first creeks; chapin's and reilly's brigades over temperance hill to near bell's house, and the brigades of hoskins and casement to the river. the interior line was held by regiments of loyal tennesseeans recently recruited. the positions on the south (or east) side of the river were occupied by cameron's brigade of hascall's division and shackelford's cavalry (dismounted), reilly's brigade in reserve,--two sections of wilder's battery and konkle's battery of four three-inch rifle guns. [illustration: approaches and defenses of knoxville, e. tennessee. showing the positions occupied by the united states and confederate forces during the siege] the batteries of the enemy's front before the city were romer's four three-inch rifles at the university, benjamin's four twenty-pound parrotts and beecher's six twelve-pound napoleons (at the fort), gittings's four ten-pound parrotts, fifteenth indiana battery of six rifle guns (three-inch), james's (indiana) battery of six rifle guns, henshaw's battery of two (james's) rifle guns and four six-pounders, shields's battery of six twelve-pound napoleons, and one section of wilder's three-inch rifle guns, extending the line from the fort to the river on the north. in his official account, general burnside reported "about twelve thousand effective men, exclusive of the recruits and loyal tennesseeans." he had fifty-one guns of position, including eight on the southeast side. fort loudon, afterwards called for the gallant sanders, who fell defending it, was a bastion earthwork, built upon an irregular quadrilateral. the sides were, south front, one hundred and fourteen yards; west front, ninety-five yards; north front, one hundred and twenty-five yards; east front, eighty-five yards. the eastern front was open, intended to be closed by a stockade. the south front was about half finished; the western front finished, except cutting the embrasures, and the north front nearly finished. the bastion attacked was the only one that was finished. the ditch was twelve feet wide, and generally seven to eight feet deep. from the fort the ground sloped in a heavy grade, from which the trees had been cut and used as abatis, and wire net-work was stretched between the stumps. general burnside reported,- "many citizens and persons who had been driven in by the enemy volunteered to work on the trenches and did good service, while those who were not inclined from disloyalty to volunteer were pressed into service. the negroes were particularly efficient in their labors during the siege. on the 20th of november our line was in such condition as to inspire the entire command with confidence." general poe reported,- "the citizens of the town and all contrabands within reach were pressed into service and relieved the almost exhausted soldiers, who had no rest for more than a hundred hours. many of the citizens were confederates and worked with a very poor grace, which blistered hands did not tend to improve." on the 22d, general mclaws thought his advance near enough the works to warrant assault. he was ordered to it with assaulting columns supported by the division. general jenkins was also ordered up, and general wheeler was ordered to push his troops and his horse artillery forward as mclaws's attack opened, so that the entire line would engage and hold to steady work till all the works were carried. after consulting his officers, general mclaws reported that they preferred to have daylight for their work. on the 23d reports came of a large force of the enemy at kingston advancing. general wheeler was sent with his main force of cavalry to look after them. he engaged the enemy on the 24th, and after a skirmish withdrew. soon afterwards, receiving orders from general bragg to join him, leaving his cavalry under command of major-general martin, he rode to find his commander. general martin brought the brigades back and resumed position on our left. colonel hart, who was left at kingston with his brigade, reported that there were but three regiments of cavalry and a field battery, that engaged general wheeler on the 24th. on the night of the 24th the enemy made a sortie against a point of general wofford's line which broke through, but was speedily driven back with a loss of some prisoners and a number of killed and wounded. general wofford's loss was five wounded, two mortally. our cavalry, except a brigade left at kingston, resumed its position on the left of our line on the 26th. on the 23d a telegram came from general bragg to say that the enemy had moved out and attacked his troops at chattanooga. later in the day he announced the enemy still in front of him, but not engaging his forces. on the 25th i had a telegram from general bushrod r. johnson at loudon, who was marching with two brigades to reinforce us, saying that the enemy was throwing his cavalry forward towards charleston. this, in connection with the advance of the enemy towards general bragg, reported by his despatch of the 23d, i took to be an effort to prevent reinforcements coming to us, or to cut in and delay their march. that night general leadbetter, chief engineer of general bragg's army, reported at head-quarters with orders from general bragg that we should attack at knoxville, and very promptly. i asked him to make the reconnoissance and designate the assailable points. at the same time he was asked to consider that the troops from virginia were on the march and would join us in eight or ten days, when our investment could be made complete; that the enemy was then on half rations, and would be obliged to surrender in two weeks; also whether we should assault fortifications and have the chance of repulse, rather than wait for a surrender. from his first reconnoissance he pronounced fort sanders the assailable point, but, after riding around the lines with general jenkins and general alexander, he pronounced in favor of assault from our left at mabry's hill. on the 27th, after more thorough reconnoissance in company with my officers, he came back to his conclusion in favor of assault at fort sanders. i agreed with him that the field at mabry's hill was too wide, and the march under fire too long, to warrant attack at that point. he admitted that the true policy was to wait and reduce the place by complete investment, but claimed that the crisis was on, the time imperative, and that the assault must be tried. meanwhile, rumors reached us, through the telegraph operator, of a battle at chattanooga, but nothing official, though outside indications were corroborative. in the afternoon colonel giltner, of the command from virginia, reported with his cavalry, and next day (28th) general w. e. jones, of that command, reported with his cavalry. the brigades from chattanooga under general b. r. johnson were at hand, but not yet up. the artillery and infantry coming from virginia were five or six days' march from us; but general leadbetter was impatient. general mclaws was ordered to double his force of sharp-shooters and their reserve, advance during the night and occupy the line of the enemy's pickets, and arrange for assault. the artillery was to open on the fort as soon as the weather cleared the view. after ten minutes' practice the assaulting column was to march, but the practice was to hold until the near approach of the storming party to the fort. the assault was to be made by three of mclaws's brigades, his fourth, advancing on his right, to carry the line of works in its front as soon as the fort was taken. three brigades of jenkins's division were to follow in echelon on the left of mclaws's column, g. t. anderson's, of his right, leading at two hundred yards' interval from mclaws's, anderson to assault the line in his front, and upon entering to wheel to his left and sweep up that line, followed by jenkins's and benning's brigades; but, in case of delay in mclaws's assault, anderson was to wheel to his right and take the fort through its rear opening, leaving the brigades of jenkins and benning to follow the other move to their left. the ditch and parapets about the fort were objects of careful observation from the moment of placing our lines, and opinions coincided with those of reconnoitring officers that the former could be passed without ladders. general alexander and i made frequent examinations of them within four hundred yards. after careful conference, general mclaws ordered,- "_first._ wofford's georgia and humphreys's mississippi brigades to make the assault, the first on the left, the second on the right, this latter followed closely by three regiments of bryan's brigade; the sixteenth georgia regiment to lead the first and the thirteenth mississippi the second assaulting column. "_second._ the brigades to be formed for the attack in columns of regiments. "_third._ the assault to be made with fixed bayonets, and without firing a gun. "_fourth._ should be made against the northwest angle of fort loudon or sanders. "_fifth._ the men should be urged to the work with a determination to succeed, and should rush to it without hallooing. "_sixth._ the sharp-shooters to keep up a continuous fire into the embrasures of the enemy's works and along the fort, so as to prevent the use of the cannon, and distract, if not prevent, the fire of all arms." general b. r. johnson was in time to follow the main attack by general mclaws with his own and gracie's brigades (two thousand six hundred and twenty-five effectives). the order was given for the 28th, but the weather became so heavy and murky as to hide the fort from view of our artillery, so operations were put off until the 29th. on the 28th reports were brought of an advance of union troops from the direction of cumberland gap. the cavalry under general w. e. jones was sent to arrest their march pending operations ordered for the 29th, and he was authorized to call the artillery and infantry marching from virginia to his assistance if the force proved formidable. after arranging his command, general mclaws wrote me as follows: "head-quarters division, "november 28, 1863. "general,--it seems to be a conceded fact that there has been a serious engagement between general bragg's forces and those of the enemy; with what result is not known so far as i have heard. general bragg may have maintained his position, may have repulsed the enemy, or may have been driven back. if the enemy has been beaten at chattanooga, do we not gain by delay at this point? if we have been defeated at chattanooga, do we not risk our entire force by an assault here? if we have been defeated at chattanooga, our communications must be made with virginia. we cannot combine again with general bragg, even if we should be successful in our assault on knoxville. if we should be defeated or unsuccessful here, and at the same time general bragg should have been forced to retire, would we be in condition to force our way to the army in virginia? i present these considerations, and with the force they have on my mind i beg leave to say that i think we had better delay the assault until we hear the result of the battle of chattanooga. the enemy may have cut our communication to prevent this army reinforcing general bragg, as well as for the opposite reason,--viz., to prevent general bragg from reinforcing us, and the attack at chattanooga favors the first proposition.[190] "very respectfully, "l. mclaws, "_major-general_." in reply i wrote,- "head-quarters, november 28, 1863. "major-general mclaws: "general,--your letter is received. i am not at all confident that general bragg has had a serious battle at chattanooga, but there is a report that he has, and that he has fallen back to tunnel hill. under this report i am entirely convinced that our only safety is in making the assault upon the enemy's position to-morrow at daylight, and it is the more important that i should have the entire support and co-operation of the officers in this connection; and i do hope and trust that i may have your entire support and all the force you may be possessed of in the execution of my views. it is a great mistake to suppose that there is any safety for us in going to virginia if general bragg has been defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors, and with his army destroyed our own had better be, for we will be not only destroyed, but disgraced. there is neither safety nor honor in any other course than the one i have chosen and ordered. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "james longstreet, "_lieutenant-general commanding_. "p.s.--the assault must be made at the time appointed, and must be made with a determination which will insure success." after writing the letter it occurred to me to show it to general leadbetter, who was stopping at our head-quarters, when he suggested the postscript which was added. the assault was made by the brigades of generals wofford, humphreys, and bryan at the appointed time and in admirable style. the orders were, that not a musket should be discharged except by the sharp-shooters, who should be vigilant and pick off every head that might appear above the parapets until the fort was carried. the troops marched steadily and formed regularly along the outside of the works around the ditch. i rode after them with the brigades under general b. r. johnson until within five hundred yards of the fort, whence we could see our advance through the gray of the morning. a few men were coming back wounded. major goggin, of general mclaws's staff, who had been at the fort, rode back, met me, and reported that it would be useless for us to go on; that the enemy had so surrounded the fort with net-work of wire that it was impossible for the men to get in without axes, and that there was not an axe in the command. without a second thought i ordered the recall, and ordered general johnson to march his brigades back to their camps. he begged to be allowed to go on, but, giving full faith to the report, i forbade him. i had known major goggin many years. he was a classmate at west point, and had served with us in the field in practical experience, so that i had confidence in his judgment. recall was promptly sent general jenkins and his advance brigade under general anderson, but the latter, seeing the delay at the fort, changed his direction outside the enemy's works and marched along their front to the ditch, and was there some little time before he received the order. in his march and countermarch in front of the enemy's line he lost four killed and thirty-three wounded. as a diversion in favor of the assaulting columns, our troops on the south side were ordered to a simultaneous attack, and to get in on that side if the opportunity occurred. they were reinforced by russell's brigade of morgan's division of cavalry, and harrison's brigade of armstrong's division, dismounted, general morgan commanding. this demonstration had the effect anticipated in detaining troops to hold on that side that were intended as reserve for the fort. just after the troops were ordered back it occurred to me that there must be some mistake about the wire net-work, for some of our men had been seen mounting and passing over the parapets, but it was too late to reorganize and renew the attack, and i conceived that some of the regimental pioneers should have been at hand prepared to cut the wires, but all had been armed to help swell our ranks. since reading the accounts of general poe, the engineer in charge of the works, i am convinced that the wires were far from being the serious obstacle reported, and that we could have gone in without the use of axes; and from other accounts it appears that most of the troops had retired from the fort, leaving about a hundred and fifty infantry with benjamin's battery. our muskets from the outside of the parapet could have kept the infantry down, and the artillery practice, except the few hand-grenades, prepared at the time by the artillerists. johnson's brigades would have been at the ditch with me in ten minutes, when we would have passed over the works. hence it seems conclusive that the failure was due to the order of recall. it is not a part of my nature to listen to reports that always come when stunning blows are felt, but confidence in the conduct of the war was broken, and with it the tone and spirit for battle further impaired by the efforts of those in authority to damage, if not prevent, the success of work ordered in their own vital interest: a poor excuse for want of golden equipoise in one who presumes to hold the lives of his soldiers, but better than to look for ways to shift the responsibility of a wavering spirit that sometimes comes unawares. [illustration: the assault on fort sanders, knoxville.] after the repulse, general burnside was so considerate as to offer a "flag of truce" for time to remove our killed and wounded about his lines. about half an hour after the repulse, and while yet on the slope leading up to the fort, major branch, of major-general ransom's staff, came with a telegram from the president informing me that general bragg had been forced back by superior numbers, and ordering me to proceed to co-operate with his army. orders were issued at once for our trains to move south, and preparations were begun for a move of the troops after nightfall. in the afternoon word came from general wheeler, authorized by general bragg, that i should join him, if practicable, at ringgold. but our first step was to be relieved of the threatening from the direction of cumberland gap. general martin was sent to reinforce general jones, with orders to hurry his operations, and return in time to cover anticipated movements. his brigades which had done their clever work on the south side were withdrawn to go with him. when he came up with jones, the latter was severely engaged, but it was then night, too late for other operations. their arrangements were made during the night and battle renewed at early dawn and severely contested, the union troops giving from point to point until they crossed the ford at walker's and were beyond further threatening. they lost some fifty killed and wounded and one company captured at colonel graham's camp. generals martin and jones joined us in good season after their affair of the morning. their loss was slight, but not detailed in separate reports. confederate loss in the assault 822 union loss in the assault 673 confederate losses during the campaign 1296 union losses during the campaign 1481 chapter xxxv. cut off from east and west. impracticability of joining general bragg--wintering in east tennessee--general longstreet given discretionary authority over the department by president davis--short rations--minor movements of hide-and-seek in the mountains--longstreet's position was of strategic importance--that fact fully appreciated by president lincoln, secretary stanton, and generals halleck and grant--"drive longstreet out of east tennessee and keep him out"--generals robertson and mclaws--the charges against them and action taken--honorable mention for courage and endurance--the army finally fares sumptuously on the fat lands of the french broad. as general wheeler's note indicated doubt of the feasibility of the move towards general bragg, it occurred to me that our better course was to hold our lines about knoxville, and in that way cause general grant to send to its relief, and thus so reduce his force as to stop, for a time, pursuit of general bragg. under this impression, i ordered our trains back, and continued to hold our lines. the superior officers were called together and advised of affairs, and asked for suggestions. the impression seemed to be that it would not be prudent to undertake to join general bragg. at the same time reports came from him to inform me that he had retired as far as dalton, and that i must depend upon my own resources. we were cut off from communication with the army at dalton, except by an impracticable mountain route, and the railway to the north was broken up by the removal of bridges and rails for a distance of a hundred miles and more. deciding to remain at knoxville, i called on general ransom to join us with his main force, to aid in reinvesting it, or to hold it while we could march against a succoring force if the numbers should warrant. on the 1st of december, colonel giltner, commanding one of general ransom's cavalry brigades, reported that he had orders to join general ransom with his brigade. on the same day a courier going from general grant to general burnside was captured, bearing an autograph letter for the latter, stating that three columns were advancing for his relief,--one by the south side under general sherman, one by decherd under general elliott, the third by cumberland gap under general foster. when general leadbetter left us on the 29th of november, he was asked to look after affairs at loudon, and to order general vaughn to destroy such property as he could not haul off, and retire through the mountains to general bragg's army. finding that general vaughn had not been moved, he was ordered on the 1st of december to cross the river to our side with everything that he could move, and to be ready to destroy property that he must leave, and march to join us as soon as the pressure from general sherman's force became serious. at the same time an order came from general bragg that his cavalry be ordered back to his army. as i had relieved the pressure against him in his critical emergency, and affairs were getting a little complicated about my position, i felt warranted in retaining the cavalry for the time. reports coming at the same time of reinforcements for the enemy at kingston, pressing towards general vaughn at loudon, he was ordered to join us. as he had no horses for the battery, he tumbled it from the bridge into the middle of the tennessee river, burned the bridge, and marched. under the circumstances there seemed but one move left for us,--to march around knoxville to the north side, up the holston, and try to find the column reported to be marching down from cumberland gap, the mountain ranges and valleys of that part of the state offering beautiful fields for the manoeuvre of small armies. the order was issued december 2. trains were put in motion on the 3d, and ordered up the railroad route under escort of law's and robertson's brigades and one of alexander's batteries. on the night of the 4th the troops were marched from the southwest to the north side of the city, and took up the march along the west bank of the holston. general martin, with his own and general w. e. jones's cavalry, was left to guard the rear of our march and pick up weak men or stragglers. he was ordered to cross part of his cavalry to the east bank at strawberry plains and march up on that side, and general w. e. jones to follow on our rear with his and the balance of martin's corps. as we were not disturbed, we reached blain's cross-roads on the afternoon of the 5th, where we met general ransom with his infantry and the balance of his artillery. on the 6th we marched to rutledge, halting two days to get food and look for the succoring column by cumberland gap, which failed to appear. however, it was time for us to be looking for better fields of food for men and animals, who had not had comfortable rations for weeks. it seemed, too, that general bragg's call for his cavalry could not be longer left in abeyance. to get away from convenient march of the enemy we went up the river as far as rogersville, where we might hope to forage under reduced cavalry force. we marched on the 8th, ordering our cavalry, except giltner's brigade, across the holston near bean's station, general ransom's command to cover our march, general bragg's cavalry to go by an eastern route through the mountains to georgia. we halted at rogersville on the 9th, where we were encouraged to hope for full rations for a few days, at least; but to be sure of accumulating a few days' extra supply (the mills being only able to grind a full day's rations for us), every man and animal was put on short rations until we could get as much as three days' supply on hand. on the 7th of december the union army, under major-general john g. parke, took the field along the rear of our march, and reached rutledge on the 9th, the enemy's cavalry advancing as far as bean's station. the object was supposed to be the securing of the forage and subsistence stores of the country; but of these movements we were not fully advised until the 11th. on the 10th of december, general morgan's brigade of cavalry was attacked at russellville while engaged in foraging, but got force enough, and in time, to drive the enemy away. on the 10th a telegram from the president gave me discretionary authority over the movements of the troops of the department, and i ordered the recall of general martin, and put his command between us and the enemy. on the 12th we had information that general sherman had taken up his march for return to general grant's army with the greater part of his troops. at the same time we had information of the force that had followed our march as far as rutledge and blain's cross-roads, under general parke, who had posted a large part of the force of artillery, cavalry, and infantry at bean's station, a point between the clinch mountain and the holston river. the mountain there is very rugged, and was reported to be inaccessible, except at very rough passes. the valley between it and the river is about two miles wide, at some places less. i thought to cut off the advance force at bean's station by putting our main cavalry force east of the river, the other part west of the mountain (except giltner's), so as to close the mountain pass on the west, and bar the enemy's retreat by my cavalry in his rear,--which was to cross the holston behind him,--then by marching the main column down the valley to capture this advance part of the command. my column, though complaining a little of short rations and very muddy roads, made its march in good season. so also did jones on the west of the mountain, and martin on the other side of the holston; but the latter encountered a brigade at may's ford, which delayed him and gave time for the enemy to change to a position some four miles to his rear. as we approached the position in front of the gap, giltner's cavalry in advance, general b. r. johnson met and engaged the enemy in a severe fight, but forced him back steadily. as we were looking for large capture more than fight, delay was unfortunate. i called kershaw's brigade up to force contention till we could close the west end of the gap. the movements were nicely executed by johnson and kershaw, but general martin had not succeeded in gaining his position, so the rear was not closed, and the enemy retired. at night i thought the army was in position to get the benefit of the small force cut off at the gap, as some reward for our very hard work. we received reports from general jones, west of the mountain, that he was in position at his end of the gap, and had captured several wagon-loads of good things. as his orders included the capture of the train, he had failed of full comprehension of them, and after nightfall had withdrawn to comfortable watering-places to enjoy his large catch of sugar and coffee, and other things seldom seen in confederate camps in those days. thus the troops at the gap got out during the night, some running over the huge rocks and heavy wood tangles along the crest, by torch-light, to their comrades, some going west by easier ways. so when i sent up in the morning, looking for their doleful surrender, my men found only empty camp-kettles, mess-pans, tents, and a few abandoned guns, and twelve prisoners, while the yankees were, no doubt, sitting around their camp-fires enjoying the joke with the comrades they had rejoined. during our march and wait at rogersville, general foster passed down to knoxville by a more southern route and relieved general burnside of command of the department on the 12th. general jenkins was ordered to follow down the valley to the new position of the enemy. his brigades under generals law and robertson had been detached guarding trains. general law, commanding them, had been ordered to report to the division commander on the 13th, but at night of the 14th he was eight miles behind. orders were sent him to join the division at the earliest practicable moment on the 15th. he reported to the division commander between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. if he started at the hour he should have marched, six a.m. at the latest, he was about eight hours making as many miles. meanwhile, the enemy had been reinforced by a considerable body of infantry, and later it appeared that he was advancing to offer battle. general mclaws was ordered to reinforce our front by a brigade. he sent word that his men had not yet received their bread rations. he sent kershaw's brigade, however, that had captured rations the day before, but then it was night, and the appearance of general martin's cavalry on or near the enemy's flank caused a change of his plans. during the night he retreated, and we occupied his trenches. i could have precipitated an affair of some moment, both at this point and at bean's station gap, but my purpose was, when i fought, to fight for all that was on the field. the time was then for full and glorious victory; a fruitless one we did not want. the enemy retired to blain's cross-roads, where general foster, after reinforcing by the fourth corps, decided to accept battle. he reported his force as twenty-six thousand, and credited the confederates with equal numbers, but twenty thousand would have been an overestimate for us. he assigned the true cause of our failure to follow up and find him: "general longstreet, however, did not attack, in consequence, probably, of the very inclement weather, which then set in with such severity as to paralyze for a time the efforts of both armies." and now the weather grew very heavy, and the roads, already bad, became soft and impracticable for trains and artillery. the men were brave, steady, patient. occasionally they called pretty loudly for _parched corn_, but always in a bright, merry mood. there was never a time when we did not have enough of corn, and plenty of wood with which to keep us warm and parch our corn. at this distance it seems almost incredible that we got along as we did, but all were then so healthy and strong that we did not feel severely our really great hardships. our serious trouble was in the matter of clothing and shoes. as winter had broken upon us in good earnest, it seemed necessary for us to give up the game of war for the time, seek some good place for shelter, and repair railroads and bridges, to open our way back towards richmond. general bragg had been relieved from command of the army at dalton by lieutenant-general w. j. hardee, who declined, however, the part of permanent commander, to which, after a time, general joseph e. johnston was assigned. on his return from knoxville, general sherman proposed to general grant to strike at general hardee and gain rome and the line of the oostenaula. he wrote,- "of course we must fight if hardee gives us battle, but he will not. longstreet is off and cannot do harm for a month. lee, in virginia, is occupied, and hardee is alone." but general halleck was much concerned about the confederate army in east tennessee, the only strategic field then held by southern troops. it was inconveniently near kentucky and the ohio river, and president lincoln and his war secretary were as anxious as halleck on account of its politico-strategic bearing. general halleck impressed his views upon general grant, and despatched general foster that it was of first importance to "drive longstreet out of east tennessee and keep him out." general grant ordered, "drive longstreet to the farthest point east that you can." and he reported to the authorities,- "if longstreet is not driven out of the valley entirely and the road destroyed east of abingdon, i do not think it unlikely that the last great battle of the war will be fought in east tennessee. reports of deserters and citizens show the army of bragg to be too much demoralized and reduced by desertions to do anything this winter. i will get everything in order here in a few days and go to nashville and louisville, and, if there is still a chance of doing anything against longstreet, to the scene of operations there. i am deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond saltville this winter, so as to be able to select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having the enemy dictate it to me." referring to his orders, general foster reported his plan to intrench a line of infantry along bull's gap and mulberry gap, and have his cavalry ready for the ride against saltville, but the confederates turned upon him, and he despatched general grant on the 11th,- "longstreet has taken the offensive against general parke, who has fallen back to blain's cross-roads, where granger is now concentrating his corps. i intend to fight them if longstreet comes." the failure to follow has been explained. the summing up of the plans laid for general hardee and saltville is brief. hardee was not disturbed. the ride towards saltville, made about the last of the month, was followed by general w. e. jones and came to grief, as will be elsewhere explained. upon relinquishing command of his army, general bragg was called to richmond as commander-in-chief near the president. before general hood was so seriously hurt at the battle of chickamauga, he made repeated complaints of want of conduct on the part of brigadier-general j. b. robertson. after the _fiasco_ in lookout valley on the night of the 28th of october, i reported to general bragg of the representations made by general hood, and of want of conduct on the part of general robertson in that night attack, when general bragg ordered me to ask for a board of officers to examine into the merits of the case. the board was ordered, and general robertson was relieved from duty by orders from general bragg's head-quarters, "while the proceedings and actions of the examining board in his case were pending." on the 8th, without notice to my head-quarters, general bragg ordered, "brigadier-general robertson will rejoin his command until the board can renew its session."[191] on the 18th of december the division commander preferred "charges and specifications" against brigadier-general robertson, in which he accused him of calling the commanders of his texas regiments to him and saying there were but "three days' rations on hand, and god knows where more are to come from; that he had no confidence in the campaign; that whether we whipped the enemy in the immediate battle or not, we would be compelled to retreat, the enemy being believed by citizens and others to be moving around us, and that we were in danger of losing a considerable part of our army; that our men were in no condition for campaigning; that general longstreet had promised shoes, but how could they be furnished? that we only had communication with richmond, and could only get a mail from there in three weeks; that he was opposed to the movement; would require written orders, and would obey under protest." general robertson was ordered to bristol to await the action of the richmond authorities, who were asked for a court-martial to try the case. on the 17th the following orders concerning general mclaws were issued: "head-quarters near bean's station, "december 17, 1863. "special orders no. 27. "major-general l. mclaws is relieved from further duty with this army, and will proceed to augusta, georgia, from which place he will report by letter to the adjutantand inspector-general. he will turn over the command of the division to the senior brigadier present. "by command of lieutenant-general longstreet. moxley sorrel, "_lieutenant-colonel and assistant adjutant-general_. "major-general mclaws, "_confederate states army_." on the same day he wrote,- "_camp on bean's station gap road_, "december 17, 1863. "lieutenant-colonel sorrel, "_assistant adjutant-general_: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of special orders no. 27, from your head-quarters, of this date, relieving me from further duty with this army. if there is no impropriety in making inquiry, and i cannot imagine there is, i respectfully request to be informed of the particular reason for the order. "very respectfully, "l. mclaws, "_major-general_." in reply the following was sent: "head-quarters near bean's station, "december 17, 1863. "major-general mclaws, "_confederate states army_: "general,--i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, asking for the particular reason for the issue of the order relieving you from duty with this army. in reply i am directed to say that throughout the campaign on which we are engaged you have exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts and plans which the commanding general has thought proper to adopt, and he is apprehensive that this feeling will extend more or less to the troops under your command. under these circumstances the commanding general has felt that the interest of the public service would be advanced by your separation from him, and as he could not himself leave, he decided upon the issue of the order which you have received. "i have the honor to be, general, with great respect, "g. moxley sorrel, "_lieutenant-colonel and assistant adjutant-general_." [illustration: g. m. sorrel. chief of staff, first corps; promoted to brigadier-general, 1864.] on the 19th, general law handed in his resignation at head-quarters, and asked leave of absence on it. this was cheerfully granted. then he asked the privilege of taking the resignation with him to the adjutant-general at richmond. this was a very unusual request, but the favor he was doing the service gave him some claim to unusual consideration, and his request was granted. the law disaffection was having effect, or seemed to be, among some of the officers, but most of them and all of the soldiers were true and brave, even through all of the hardships of the severest winter of the four years of war. marching and fighting had been almost daily occupation from the middle of january, 1863, when we left fredericksburg to move down to suffolk, virginia, until the 16th of december, when we found bleak winter again breaking upon us, away from our friends, and dependent upon our own efforts for food and clothing. it is difficult for a soldier to find words that can express his high appreciation of conduct in officers and men who endured so bravely the severe trials they were called to encounter. orders were given to cross the holston river and march for the railroad, only a few miles away. before quitting the fields of our arduous labors mention should be made of general bushrod r. johnson's clever march of sixteen miles, through deep mud, to bean's station on the 13th, when he and general kershaw attacked and pushed the enemy back from his front at the gap before he could get out of it. honorable mention is also due general jenkins for his equally clever pursuit of the enemy at lenoir's station; brigadier-general humphreys and bryan for their conduct at the storming assault; colonel ruff, who led wofford's brigade, and died in the ditch; colonel mcelroy, of the thirteenth mississippi regiment, and colonel thomas, of the sixteenth georgia, who also died in the ditch; lieutenant cumming, adjutant of the sixteenth georgia regiment, who overcame all obstacles, crowned the parapet with ten or a dozen men, and, entering the fort through one of the embrasures, was taken prisoner; and colonel fiser, of the eighteenth mississippi, who lost an arm while on the parapet. not the least of the gallant acts of the campaign was the dash of captain winthrop, who led our once halting lines over the rail defences at knoxville. the transfer of the army to the east bank of the river was executed by diligent work and the use of such flat-boats and other means of crossing as we could collect and construct. we were over by the 20th, and before christmas were in our camps along the railroad, near morristown. blankets and clothes were very scarce, shoes more so, but all knew how to enjoy the beautiful country in which we found ourselves. the french broad river and the holston are confluent at knoxville. the country between and beyond them contains as fine farming lands and has as delightful a climate as can be found. stock and grain were on all farms. wheat and oats had been hidden away by our union friends, but the fields were full of maize, still standing. the country about the french broad had hardly been touched by the hands of foragers. our wagons immediately on entering the fields were loaded to overflowing. pumpkins were on the ground in places like apples under a tree. cattle, sheep, and swine, poultry, vegetables, maple-sugar, honey, were all abundant for immediate wants of the troops. when the enemy found we had moved to the east bank, his cavalry followed to that side. they were almost as much in want of the beautiful foraging lands as we, but we were in advance of them, and left little for them. with all the plenitude of provisions and many things which seemed at the time luxuries, we were not quite happy. tattered blankets, garments, and shoes (the latter going--many gone) opened ways, on all sides, for piercing winter blasts. there were some hand-looms in the country from which we occasionally picked up a piece of cloth, and here and there we received other comforts, some from kind and some from unwilling hands, which nevertheless could spare them. for shoes we were obliged to resort to the raw hides of beef cattle as temporary protection from the frozen ground. then we began to find soldiers who could tan the hides of our beeves, some who could make shoes, some who could make shoe-pegs, some who could make shoe-lasts, so that it came about that the hides passed rapidly from the beeves to the feet of the soldiers in the form of comfortable shoes. then came the opening of the railroad, and lo and behold! a shipment of three thousand shoes from general lawton, quartermaster-general! thus the most urgent needs were supplied, and the soldier's life seemed passably pleasant,--that is, in the infantry and artillery. our cavalry were looking at the enemy all of this while, and the enemy was looking at them, both frequently burning powder between their lines. general sturgis had been assigned to the cavalry of the other side to relieve general shackelford, and he seemed to think that the dead of winter was the time for cavalry work; and our general martin's orders were to have the enemy under his eye at all hours. both were vigilant, active, and persevering. about the 20th of december a raid was made by general averill from west virginia upon a supply depot of general sam jones's department, at salem, which was partially successful, when general grant, under the impression that the stores were for troops of east tennessee, wired general foster, december 25, "this will give you great advantage," and general foster despatched general parke, commanding his troops in the field, december 26, "longstreet will feel a little timid now, and will bear a little pushing." under the fierce operations of general sturgis's cavalry against general martin's during the latter days of december, general w. e. jones's cavalry was on guard for my right and rear towards cumberland gap. while sturgis busied himself against our front and left, a raiding party rode from cumberland gap against the outposts of our far-off right, under colonel pridemore. as w. e. jones was too far to support martin's cavalry, he was called to closer threatenings against cumberland gap, that he might thus draw some of sturgis's cavalry from our front to strengthen the forces at the gap. upon receipt of orders, general jones crossed clinch river in time to find the warm trail of the raiders who were following pridemore. he sent around to advise him of his ride in pursuit of his pursuers, and ordered pridemore, upon hearing his guns, to turn and join in the attack upon them. the very cold season and severe march through the mountain fastnesses stretched jones's line so that he was in poor condition for immediate attack when he found the enemy's camp at daylight on the 3d of january; but he found a surprise: not even a picket guard out in their rear. he dashed in with his leading forces and got the enemy's battery, but the enemy quickly rallied and made battle, which recovered the artillery, and got into strong position about some farm-houses and defended with desperate resolution. finding the position too strong, jones thought to so engage as to make the enemy use his battery until his ammunition was exhausted, and then put in all of his forces in assault. towards night the enemy found himself reduced to desperate straits and tried to secure cover of the mountains, but as quick as he got away from the farm-houses jones put all of his forces in, capturing three pieces of artillery, three hundred and eighty prisoners, and twenty-seven wagons and teams of the sixteenth illinois cavalry and twenty-second ohio light artillery. a number of the men got away through the mountains. chapter xxxvi. strategic importance of the field. longstreet again considers relief from service--general grant at knoxville--shoeless soldiers leave bloody trails on frozen roads--a confederate advance--affair at dandridge--federals retreat--succession of small engagements--general grant urges general foster's army to the offensive--general foster relieved--general schofield in command of federals--general grant's orders--general halleck's estimate of east tennessee as a strategic field--affair of cavalry--advance towards knoxville--longstreet's command called back to defensive for want of cavalry. during the last few days of the year 1863 the cold of the severest winter of the war came on, and constantly increased until the thermometer approached zero, and on new year's dropped below, hanging near that figure for about two weeks. the severe season gave rest to every one. even the cavalry had a little quiet, but it was cold comfort, for their orders were to keep the enemy in sight. the season seemed an appropriate one for making another effort to be relieved from service,--that service in which the authorities would not support my plans or labors,--for now during the lull in war they would have ample time to assign some one to whom they could give their confidence and aid. but this did not suit them, and the course of affairs prejudicial to order and discipline was continued. it was difficult under the circumstances to find apology for remaining in service. the president asked congress to provide for another general officer when he had five on his rolls,--one of whom was not in command appropriate to his rank,--and appointed lieutenant-general smith, of the trans-mississippi department, of lower rank than mine, to hold rank above me. a soldier's honor is his all, and of that they would rob him and degrade him in the eyes of his troops. the occasion seemed to demand resignation, but that would have been unsoldierly conduct. dispassionate judgment suggested, as the proper rounding of the soldier's life, to stay and go down with faithful comrades of long and arduous service. on the other side of the picture affairs were bright and encouraging. the disaffected were away, and with them disappeared their influence. the little army was bright and cheerful and ready for any work to which it could be called. general grant made his visit to knoxville about new year's, and remained until the 7th. he found general foster in the condition of the confederates,--not properly supplied with clothing, especially in want of shoes. so he authorized a wait for the clothing, then in transit and looked for in a week; and that little delay was a great lift for the confederates. we were not timid, but were beginning to think ourselves comfortable and happy, and were expectant of even better condition. we were receiving a hundred pairs of shoes a day of our own make, the hand-looms of the farmers were giving help towards clothing our men, promises from richmond were encouraging, and we were prepared to enjoy rest that we had not known for a twelvemonth. the medical inspector of the cis-mississippi district came to see us, and after careful inspection told us that the army was in better health and better heart than the other armies of the district. before leaving general foster, general grant ordered him on the receipt of the clothing to advance and drive us "at least beyond bull's gap and red bridge." and to prepare for that advance he ordered the ninth and twenty-third corps to mossy creek, the fourth corps to strawberry plains, and the cavalry to dandridge. the union army--equipped--marched on the 14th and 15th of january. the confederate departments were not so prompt in filling our requisitions, but we had hopes. the bitter freeze of two weeks had made the rough angles of mud as firm and sharp as so many freshly-quarried rocks, and the poorly protected feet of our soldiers sometimes left bloody marks along the roads. general sturgis rode in advance of the army, and occupied dandridge by elliott's, wolford's, and garrard's divisions of cavalry and mott's brigade of infantry. the fourth and twenty-third corps followed the cavalry, leaving the ninth corps to guard at strawberry plains. general martin gave us prompt notice that the march was at dandridge, and in force. the move was construed as a flanking proceeding, but it was more convenient to adopt the short march and meet it at dandridge than to leave our shoe factory and winter huts and take up the tedious rearward move. the army was ordered under arms, the cavalry was ordered concentrated in front of general sturgis, and the divisions of jenkins and b. r. johnson and alexander's batteries were marched to join general martin. mclaws's division under general wofford, and ransom's under general carr, with such batteries as they could haul, were assigned to positions on the morristown (strawberry plains) road, to strike forward or reinforce at dandridge as plans developed. the men without shoes were ordered to remain as camp guards, but many preferred to march with their comrades. i rode in advance to be assured that our cavalry had not mistaken a strong cavalry move for one by the enemy. we found general martin on the bull's gap road sharply engaged with the enemy, both sides on strong defensive grounds and using their horse batteries, but no infantry was in sight. general martin was ordered to push on, gain the opposing plateau, and force the enemy to show his infantry. he found the enemy in strong fight, but got the plateau, when the enemy deployed in stronger force; but his infantry did not appear. when asked to take the next hill, he thought it could not be done without infantry, but my idea was to save the infantry the trying march, if possible, and to that end it was necessary to push with the cavalry. he was called to send me a detachment of his troopers, and about six hundred came,--harrison's brigade, as i remember. we rode away from the enemy's left, concealing our march under traverse of an elevated woodland, while general martin engaged their front attention. at a secluded spot, a little beyond the enemy's left, the men dismounted, leaving their animals under guards, moved under cover to good position, deployed into single line, and marched for the second plateau. part of the march was over a small opening, near a farm-house. the exposure brought us under fire of some sharp-shooters, but we hadn't time to stop and shoot. as our line marched, a chicken, dazed by the formidable appearance, crouched in the grass until it was kicked up, when it flew and tried to clear the line, but one of the troopers jumped up, knocked it down with the end of his gun, stooped, picked it up, put it in his haversack, and marched on without losing his place or step and without looking to his right or left, as though it was as proper and as much an every-day part of the exercise of war as shooting at the enemy. presently we got up the hill, and general martin advanced his mounts to meet us. we lost but two men,--wounded,--an officer and a soldier. the officer was at my side, and, hearing the thud of the blow, i turned and asked if he was much hurt. he said it was only a flesh-wound, and remained with his command until night. from that point we saw enough to tell that a formidable part of the army was before us, and orders were sent for the command to speed their march as much as they could without severe trial. when general martin made his bold advance general sturgis thought to ride around by a considerable détour and strike at his rear, but in his ride was surprised to encounter our marching columns of infantry, and still more surprised when he saw a thousand muskets levelled and sending whistling bullets about his men, and our batteries preparing something worse for him. his troopers got back faster than they came. in trying by a rapid ride to find position for handling his men he lost a number of his staff, captured, and narrowly escaped himself. it was near night when the command got up skirmishers from the advance division, reinforced the cavalry, and pushed the enemy back nearer the town. dandridge is on the right bank of the french broad river, about thirty miles from knoxville. its topographical features are bold and inviting of military work. its other striking characteristic is the interesting character of its citizens. the confederates--a unit in heart and spirit--were prepared to do their share towards making an effective battle, and our plans were so laid. at the time ordered for his advance, general foster was suffering from an old wound, and general parke became commander of the troops in the field. the latter delayed at strawberry plains in arranging that part of his command, and general sheridan, marching with the advance, became commander, until superseded by the corps commander, general gordon granger. our plans were laid before the army was all up. our skirmish line was made stronger and relieved the cavalry of their dismounted service. a narrow unused road, practicable for artillery, was found, that opened a way for us to reach the enemy's rearward line of march. sharp-shooters were organized and ordered forward by it, to be followed by our infantry columns. it was thought better to move the infantry alone, as the ringing of the iron axles of the guns might give notice of our purpose; the artillery to be called as our sharp-shooters approached the junction of the roads. the head of the turning force encountered a picket-guard, some of whom escaped without firing, but speedily gave notice of our feeling towards their rear. general granger decided to retire, and was in time to leave our cross-road behind him, his rear-guard passing the point of intersection before my advance party reached it about midnight. the weather moderated before night, and after dark a mild, gentle rain began to fall. when i rode into dandridge in the gray of the morning the ground was thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of a horse. when the cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. the mud and want of a bridge to cross the holston made pursuit by our heavy columns useless. the cavalry was ordered on, and the troops at morristown, on the strawberry plains road, were ordered to try that route, but the latter proved to be too heavy for progress with artillery. while yet on the streets of dandridge, giving directions for such pursuit as we could make, a lady came out upon the sidewalk and invited us into her parlors. when the orders for pursuit were given, i dismounted, and with some members of my staff walked in. after the compliments of the season were passed, we were asked to be seated, and she told us something of general granger during the night before. she had never heard a person swear about another as general granger did about me. some of the officers proposed to stop and make a battle, but general granger swore and said it "was no use to stop and fight longstreet. you can't whip him. it don't make any difference whether he has one man or a hundred thousand." presently she brought out a flask that general granger had forgotten, and thought that i should have it. it had about two refreshing inches left in it. though not left with compliments, it was accepted. although the weather had moderated, it was very wet and nasty, and as we had taken our coffee at three o'clock, it was resolved to call it noon and divide the spoils. colonel fairfax, who knew how to enjoy good things, thought the occasion called for a sentiment, and offered, "general granger--may his shadow never grow less." the cavalry found the road and its side-ways so cut up that their pursuit was reduced to labored walk. the previous hard service and exposure had so reduced the animals that they were not in trim for real effective cavalry service. they found some crippled battery forges and a little of other plunder, but the enemy passed the holston and broke his bridges behind him. our army returned to their huts and winter homes. part of our cavalry was ordered to the south side of the french broad, and general martin was ordered to press close on the enemy's rear with the balance of his force. general armstrong followed the line of retreat, and by the use of flat-boats passed his cavalry over the holston and rode to the vicinity of knoxville. he caught up with some stragglers, equipments, ammunition, and remains of some caissons, and at last made a grand haul of a herd of eight hundred beef cattle and thirty-one wagons. upon getting his cavalry back to knoxville, general foster crossed them over the bridge at the city below the french broad to foraging grounds about louisville, and called his dandridge march a foraging excursion, saying that he was building a bridge to cross to the south side when we bore down against him. but the strategy of his tedious march by our front to find a crossing point at dandridge and build a bridge in our presence, when he could have crossed to the south side of the french broad by his bridge at knoxville and reached those foraging grounds unmolested, was not like napoleon. he claimed that he recovered two hundred of the lost herd of beef cattle. in that our reports do not agree. it is possible that his officers may have confounded that adventure with another. my explanation of the discrepancy--from memory--is that another of our parties undertook to get in a herd of swine, with which there was a smaller herd of beef cattle; that all of the latter herd were recovered, and the reports of the two adventures were confounded. on the 14th, general vance came down from the mountains of north carolina on a raid towards sevierville. he captured a number of wagons, but was promptly pursued by the enemy, his prize recovered, and he and a number of his staff were taken prisoners, with the loss of a hundred or more horses and equipments. they were not a part of my command, and failed to give us notice of their ride. the first intimation we had of them was of their unfortunate adventure. on the 21st orders came from richmond to send corse's brigade back to petersburg, in virginia. it was so ordered, and hodges's brigade was ordered to us from the department of west virginia, in place of corse's. to seek some of the fruits of our advantage at dandridge, the roads being a little firmer, our leading division, under general jenkins, was ordered on the 21st to prepare to march towards strawberry plains, and the richmond authorities were asked to send us a pontoon bridge, tools of construction, and to hurry forward such shoes as they could send. on the 24th, as the official records show, general grant sent word to general halleck of our return towards knoxville, that he had ordered general foster to give battle, if necessary, and that he would send general thomas with additional troops to insure that we would be driven from the state. he also directed general thomas to go in person and take command, and said, "i want longstreet routed and pursued beyond the limits of the state of tennessee." and he ordered general foster to put his cavalry on a raid from cumberland gap to cut in upon our rear. on the 26th we were advised of the advance of the enemy's cavalry up the south side of the french broad to some of the fords above dandridge. general martin was ordered to cross in force below it, get in rear of the enemy, and endeavor to put him to confusion. he crossed with morgan's division, and called armstrong's to follow, but the enemy, finding opportunity to put his force against the division, advanced and made a severe battle on the 27th, which became desperate as developed until, in their successive gallant charges, our ranks were broken to confusion, when the enemy made a dash and got two of our guns and two hundred prisoners, driving us towards the river. general armstrong crossed pending these operations and received the enemy's attack on the 28th. general b. r. johnson's infantry division had been ordered near dandridge, and crossed while armstrong's command held the enemy. the latter was caught in battle from which there was no escape but to fight it out. johnson's infantry crossed in time to march towards the enemy's rear before he could dislodge armstrong. i rode a little in advance of johnson's command. the enemy, advised of the approach of infantry, made his final charge and retired south towards marysville. in his last effort one of his most reckless troopers rode in upon head-quarters, but colonel fairfax put spurs into his horse, dashed up against him, had his pistol at his head, and called "surrender" before the man could level his gun. the trooper was agreeably surprised to find it no worse. the enemy's move to marysville left us in possession of the foraging grounds. on the 30th, general grant urged general foster's army to the offensive, and called for the cavalry raid through the powell river valley and cumberland gap towards our rear, and general foster called on general thomas for a force of ten thousand infantry and working details to repair the railroad and bridges between knoxville and chattanooga. general thomas was willing to respond to the call for troops, but asked timely notice so that he could call sherman's forces from mississippi to replace those to be sent and make a co-operative move against general johnston at dalton. at the same time general foster called for a pontoon bridge to make his crossing of the holston at strawberry plains, which was ordered. general sturgis could not approve the ride through powell river valley, and expressed preference for a route through the mountains of north carolina towards asheville, to find our rear. general grant had suggested raids from both these points on the 24th of january, but general foster decided against the raid from cumberland gap, explaining that general jones was at little war gap to intercept a column that might ride from that point. he found, too, upon counting his effectives for the raid, that he could only mount fifteen hundred men, and that our guards at weak points had been doubled. our railroad was in working order on the 26th of january, and the part of the pontoon bridge ordered for us was on the road. general jenkins was ordered with the leading division down towards strawberry plains to collect such material as he could, and be prepared to throw the bridge across the holston as soon as it was up and ready for us. notice was given general a. e. jackson of indications of raids; to captain osborn, commanding scouts; to general wharton; to rucker's cavalry legion and jones's cavalry; and general vaughn was ordered to collect his command at rogersville, to be prepared to threaten cumberland gap if the forces there should be reduced. due notice was sent our outlying parties and scouts to be on the watch for the reported raiding parties, and the guards of bridges in our rear were reinforced. on the 6th of february, general grant reported from nashville,- "major-general h. w. halleck, "_general-in-chief_: "i am making every effort to get supplies to knoxville for the support of a large force--large enough to drive longstreet out. the enemy have evidently fallen back with most of their force from general thomas's front, some going to mobile. has there been any movement in that direction by our troops? "u. s. grant, "_major-general, commanding_." "major-general thomas: "reports of scouts make it evident that joe johnston has removed most of his force from your front, two divisions going to longstreet. longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the east. this makes it evident the enemy intends to secure east tennessee if they can, and i intend to drive them out or get whipped this month. for this purpose you will have to detach at least ten thousand men besides stanley's division (more will be better). i can partly relieve the vacuum at chattanooga by troops from logan's command. it will not be necessary to take artillery or wagons to knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery horses should be taken to use on artillery there. six mules to each two hundred men should also be taken, if you have them to spare. let me know how soon you can start. "grant, "_major-general_." on the 9th, major-general j. m. schofield arrived at knoxville, and assumed command of the army of the ohio. general grant reported on the 11th,- "major-general h. w. halleck, "_general-in-chief_: "i expect to get off from chattanooga by monday next a force to drive longstreet out of east tennessee. it has been impossible heretofore to subsist the troops necessary for this work. "u. s. grant, "_major-general_." "major-general j. m. schofield, "_knoxville, tenn._: "i deem it of the utmost importance to drive longstreet out immediately, so as to furlough the balance of our veterans, and to prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, instead of permitting the enemy to dictate it for us. thomas is ordered to start ten thousand men, besides the remainder of granger's corps, at once. he will take no artillery, but will take his artillery horses, and three mules to one hundred men. he will probably start next monday. "u. s. grant, "_major-general_." general schofield ordered preparations for the eastern raid continued, but to await further orders of execution, and reported that its execution would require all of his effective mounts, break his animals down, and leave him without cavalry. general grant wired these several despatches from nashville on february 12: "major-general thomas: "conversation with major-general foster has undecided me as to the propriety of the contemplated move against longstreet. schofield telegraphs the same views. i will take the matter into consideration during the day, after further talk with foster, and give you the conclusion arrived at. if decided that you do not go i will instruct schofield to let granger send off his veterans at once. "should you not be required to go into east tennessee, could you not make a formidable reconnoissance towards dalton, and, if successful in driving the enemy out, occupy that place and complete the railroad up to it this winter? "grant, "_major-general_." "major-general thomas: "logan's troops started yesterday morning. if i decide not to make the move at present into east tennessee, i will send them back, unless you require them to aid in advance on dalton. (see my telegram of this morning.) "grant, "_major-general_." "major-general j. m. schofield: "no movement will be made against longstreet at present. give your men and animals all the rest you can preparatory to early operations in the spring. furlough all the veterans you deem it prudent to let go. "u. s. grant, "_major-general_." "major-general j. m. schofield, "_knoxville, tenn._: "you need not attempt the raid with the cavalry you now have. if that in kentucky can recruit up it may do hereafter to send it on such an expedition. i have asked so often for a co-operative movement from the troops in west virginia that i hardly expect to see anything to help us from there. general halleck says they have not got men enough. crook, however, has gone there, and may undertake to strike the road about new river. "u. s. grant, "_major-general_." "major-general halleck, "_general-in-chief, washington_: "general,--i have got general thomas ready to move a force of about fourteen thousand infantry into east tennessee to aid the force there in expelling longstreet from the state. he would have started on monday night if i had not revoked the order. my reasons for doing this are these: general foster, who is now here (or left this morning), says that our possession of the portion of east tennessee is perfectly secure against all danger. the condition of the people within the rebel lines cannot be improved now after losing all they had. longstreet, where he is, makes more secure other parts of our possessions. our men, from scanty clothing and short rations, are not in good condition for an advance. there are but very few animals in east tennessee in condition to move artillery or other stores. if we move against longstreet with an overwhelming force he will simply fall back towards virginia until he can be reinforced or take up an impregnable position. the country being exhausted, all our supplies will have to be carried from knoxville the whole distance advanced. we would be obliged to advance rapidly and return soon whether the object of the expedition was accomplished or not. longstreet could return with impunity on the heels of our returning column, at least as far down the valley as he can supply himself from the road in his rear. schofield telegraphs to the same effect. all these seem to be good reasons for abandoning the movement, and i have therefore suspended it. now that our men are ready for an advance, however, i have directed it to be made on dalton, and hope to get possession of that place and hold it as a step towards a spring campaign. our troops in east tennessee are now clothed; rations are also accumulating. when foster left most of the troops had ten days' supplies, with five hundred barrels of flour and forty days' meat in store, and the quantity increasing daily. "i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "u. s. grant, "_major-general_." later despatches from general grant and commander-in-chief halleck were as follows: "nashville, tenn., february 13, 1864. "major-general h. w. halleck, "_general-in-chief_: "despatches just received from general schofield and conversation with general foster, who is now here, have determined me against moving immediately against longstreet. i will write more fully. no danger whatever to be apprehended in east tennessee. "u. s. grant, "_major-general_." "knoxville, february 15, 1864, 6.30 p.m. "major-general thomas: "in consequence of longstreet's movement in this direction i have ordered one division of granger's corps to this place. i think stanley should move up as far as athens and sweet water so as to protect the railroad. longstreet has not advanced farther than strawberry plains. no further news from him to-day. "j. m. schofield, "_major-general_." "[confidential.] "washington, d. c., february 17, 1864. "major-general grant, "_nashville, tenn._: "general,--your letter of the 12th instant is just received. i fully concur with you in regard to the present condition of affairs in east tennessee. it certainly is very much to be regretted that the fatal mistake of general burnside has permitted longstreet's army to winter in tennessee. it is due to yourself that a full report of this matter should be placed on file, so that the responsibility may rest where it properly belongs. "h. w. halleck, "_general-in-chief_." the raids ordered north and south of us were now given over. general thomas made his advance towards dalton, and retired, unsuccessful. general halleck was right in his estimate of east tennessee as a strategic field essential to the union service, the gate-way to kentucky, to the union line of communication, and the ohio river; but general grant found it so far from his lines of active operations that it could not be worked without interrupting plans of campaigns for the summer, and giving his adversary opportunity to dictate the work of the year. he thought it better to depend upon the conservative spirit that controlled at the south, to draw the army in east tennessee off to meet threatenings in virginia and georgia, when he was prepared for them. on the 10th of february, general jenkins was ordered with his division at strawberry plains to use the pontoon and flat-boats in bridging the holston river. other columns were ordered to approximate concentration, including wharton's brigade from bull's gap, and hodges's brigade coming from the department of west virginia. rucker's cavalry was ordered to blain's cross-roads on the west bank, and outlying forces were advised of the advance. general jenkins was ordered to put some of the cavalry over to be in observation towards knoxville, and a brigade of infantry as supporting force; batteries on the hither bank to cover the troops and the bridge in case the enemy was disposed to dispute our crossing, and await my arrival and further orders. the army being ready for the crossing and move for knoxville, inquiry was made of general johnston as to the condition of affairs with the enemy at chattanooga. in answer he said,- "our scouts report that troops have been sent from chattanooga to loudon. they could not learn the number." on the 17th i asked the richmond authorities for ten thousand additional men, and general lee, approving our work, asked to have pickett's division sent, and other detachments to make up the number. on the 19th i was informed from general johnston's head-quarters that "eight trains loaded with troops went up from chattanooga on the night of the 17th." a telegram came on the 19th from richmond to say that the additional troops called for could not be sent, and on the same day a telegram from the president ordered me to send general martin with his cavalry to general johnston. in reply i reported that the order depriving me of the cavalry would force me to abandon the move, then in progress, against knoxville, and draw the troops back towards bristol. then came other despatches from general johnston that the enemy was still drawing forces from chattanooga, but no authority came from richmond authorizing me to retain the cavalry, so we were obliged to draw back to fields that could be guarded by smaller commands. referring to the proposed advance, general grant said, "longstreet cannot afford to place his force between knoxville and the tennessee." it was not so intended, but to put the army alongside of knoxville to hold the enemy to his intrenched lines, while the troops asked for would be employed in breaking the railroad and bridges between that point and chattanooga. it was thought that the army at chattanooga could not afford sufficient detachments to drive me from that work without exposing that position to danger from general johnston at dalton, but upon inquiry of general johnston if he could avail himself of such opportunity, he replied that he was ordered to reinforce general polk, who was operating in mississippi in front of general sherman. instead of reinforcing general polk, the latter should have been ordered to general johnston. that would have drawn general sherman to general thomas, but polk, having interior lines of transit, could have been in time for johnston to strike and break up the road and bridge behind thomas before sherman could reach him. the break could have forced thomas to care for his own position, and the want of the bridge behind him might have forced him to abandon it, in search of safe communication with his supplies. but the authorities could not be induced to abandon the policy of placing detachments to defend points to which the enemy chose to call us. we had troops enough in tennessee, georgia, alabama, and mississippi, if allowed to use them in co-operative combination, to break the entire front of the federal forces and force them back into kentucky before the opening of the spring campaign, when we might have found opportunity to "dictate" their campaign. the enemy was in no condition for backward move at the time of my advance upon knoxville, so simultaneous advance of our many columns could have given him serious trouble, if not confusion. the order for the return of martin's cavalry to georgia, and the notice that other troops could not be sent me, called for the withdrawal of the command east, where we could find safer lines of defence and good foraging. the order to retire was issued, and the march was taken up on the 22d of february, jenkins's division and the cavalry to cover the march. he was ordered to reship the pontoon-boats, destroy trestlings, flat-boats, the railroad bridge, and march in advance of the cavalry. he inquired if he should cut the wires and crossings of small streams, but was ordered to leave them undisturbed, as the enemy would not be so likely to trouble us when he found we were disposed to be accommodating. the march was not seriously disturbed. the enemy's cavalry, reduced by severe winter service, was in poor condition to follow, and the roads we left behind us were too heavy for artillery. a good position was found behind bull's gap, and the army was deployed to comfortable camps from the holston river on the right to the nolachucky on the left. the prime object of the second advance upon knoxville was to show the strategic strength of the field, and persuade the authorities that an army of twenty thousand in that zone could be of greater service than double that force on the enemy's front or elsewhere, but they could not or would not hear of plans that proposed to take them from the settled policy of meeting the enemy where he was prepared for us. chapter xxxvii. last days in tennessee. longstreet's army at bull's gap--u. s. grant made lieutenant-general--richmond authorities awake to the gravity of the situation--longstreet's proposition for campaign--approved by general lee--richmond authorities fail to adopt it--general bragg's plan--a memorable and unpleasant council at the capital--orders from president davis--the case of general law--longstreet ordered to the army of northern virginia--resolutions of thanks from confederate congress. it would be difficult to find a country more inviting in agriculture and horticulture than east tennessee, and its mineral resources are as interesting, but for those whose mission was strategic, its geographical and topographical features were more striking. our position at bull's gap was covered by a spur of the mountains which shoots out from the south side of the holston river towards the north bend of the nolachucky, opening gaps that could be improved by the pick and shovel until the line became unassailable. in a few days our line was strong enough, and we looked for the enemy to come and try our metal, until we learned that he was as badly crippled of the cavalry arm as we. general martin was ordered with his division to general johnston in georgia, and colonel gary with his legion was ordered to south carolina to be mounted for cavalry service. the armies under general lee in virginia and general johnston in georgia were in defensive positions, with little prospect of striking by their right or left flanks in search of a way to break their bounds, and the army in east tennessee had been called back to the defensive for want of cavalry, but the latter still covered gate-ways through the mountains that offered routes to kentucky for strategic manoeuvres. the trans-mississippi department was an open field of vast opportunities, but was lying fallow. an officer of the union service had worked his way during three years of severe field service from obscure position with a regiment, to command of armies, and had borne his banners in triumph through battle and siege, over the prejudice of higher officers, until president lincoln's good judgment told him that grant was the man for the times. congress provided the place, and the president sent his commission as lieutenant-general to the united states senate, where it was promptly confirmed, and the lieutenant-general was presently assigned as commander over half a million of men, to the surprise of many, more than all to the bureau general-in-chief. he was soon at work arranging his combination for the campaign of the coming year. he was a west point boy, and we had been together during three years of academic service, then two years in the united states fourth regiment of infantry, and later in worth's division in mexico. forced to extremities, the richmond authorities began to realize the importance of finding a way out of our pent-up borders before the union commander could complete his extensive arrangements to press on with his columns. they called upon general lee, general johnston, and myself for plans or suggestions that could anticipate the movements of the enemy, disconcert his plans, and move him to new combinations. in front of general lee and on his right and left the country had been so often foraged by both union and confederate armies that it was denuded of supplies. besides, a forced advance of lee's army could only put the enemy back a few miles to his works about washington. general johnston's opportunities were no better, and in addition to other difficulties, he was working under the avowed displeasure of the authorities, more trying than his trouble with the enemy. i was under the impression that we could collect an army of twenty thousand men in south carolina by stripping our forts and positions of all men not essential for defence; that that army could be quietly moved north by rail through greenville to the borders of north carolina, and promptly marched by abingdon, virginia, through the mountain passes, while my command covered the move by its position in east tennessee. that army passing the mountains, my command could drop off by the left to its rear and follow into kentucky,--the whole to march against the enemy's only line of railway from louisville, and force him to loose his hold against general johnston's front, and give the latter opportunity to advance his army and call all of his troops in alabama and mississippi to like advance, the grand junction of all of the columns to be made on or near the ohio river,--general beauregard to command the leading column, with orders not to make or accept battle until the grand junction was made. that general johnston should have like orders against battle until he became satisfied of fruitful issues. the supplies and transportation for beauregard to be collected at the head of the railroad, in advance of the movement of troops, under the ostensible purpose of hauling for my command. the arrangements perfected, the commander of the leading column to put his troops on the rail at or near charleston and march with them as they arrived at the head of the road. with this proposition i went to virginia and submitted it to general lee. he approved, and asked me to take it to the richmond authorities. i objected that the mere fact of its coming from me would be enough to cause its rejection, and asked, if he approved, that he would take it and submit it as his own. he took me with him to richmond, but went alone next morning to see the president. he met, besides the president, the secretary of war and general bragg. conference was held during the forenoon, but was not conclusive. in the afternoon he called me with him for further deliberation. at the opening of the afternoon council it appeared that general bragg had offered a plan for early spring campaign, and that it had received the approval of the president,--viz.: "general johnston to march his army through the mountains of georgia and east tennessee to the head-waters of little tennessee river; my command to march through the mountains east of knoxville to join general johnston. the commands united, to march west, cross the river into middle tennessee, and march for the enemy's line of supplies about nashville." when asked an opinion of this, i inquired as to general johnston's attitude towards it, and was told that he objected; that he thought the sparsely-settled country of the mountains through which he would move could not supply his army; that he would consume all that he could haul before turning westward for the middle country, and would be forced to active foraging from his first step between the two armies of the enemy. general lee inquired if general johnston had maturely considered the matter. i thought that he had, and that the objections of the officer who was to conduct the campaign were, of themselves, reasons for overruling it; but its advocates were not ready to accept a summary disposal of their plans, and it began to transpire that the president had serious objections to general beauregard as a commander for the field. but general lee called us back to business by asking if there was anything more to be added than general johnston's objections. i called attention to general bragg's official account of the battle of chickamauga, in which he reported that a similar move had been proposed for him through middle tennessee towards the enemy's line of communication at nashville early on the morning after the battle; that he rejected it, reported it "visionary"; said that it would leave his rear open to the enemy, and alluded to the country through which the march was proposed as "affording no subsistence to men or animals." this at harvest season, too! the enemy demoralized by the late battle, and the confederates in the vigor of success! now, after a winter of foraging by the union armies, the country could not be so plethoric of supplies as to support us, while an active army was on each flank, better prepared to dispute our march. general lee wore his beard full, but neatly trimmed. he pulled at it nervously, and more vigorously as time and silence grew, until at last his suppressed emotion was conquered. the profound quiet of a minute or more seemed an hour. when he spoke, it was of other matters, but the air was troubled by his efforts to surrender hopeful anticipations to the caprice of empirics. he rose to take leave of the august presence, gave his hand to the president, and bowed himself out of the council chamber. his assistant went through the same forms, and no one approached the door to offer parting courtesy. i had seen the general under severe trial before, especially on his pennsylvania campaign when he found the cavalry under general imboden had halted for rest at hancock, at the opening of an aggressive movement. my similar experience with the president in the all-day talk, on missionary ridge, six months before, had better prepared me for the ordeal, and i drew some comfort from the reflection that others had their trials. general lee took the next train for his army on the rapidan, and i that by the direct route to my command by the southside railway. when ordered from virginia in september my wife remained in petersburg with her good friend mrs. dunn. on the 20th of october following a son was born, and christened robert lee. after continuous field service since the 1st of july, 1861, i thought to avail myself of the privilege as department commander to take a two days' leave of absence to see the precious woman and her infant boy. while there it occurred to me to write to the president, and try to soften the asperities of the richmond council; also to find a way to overcome the objections to general beauregard. i suggested, too, that general lee be sent to join us, and have command in kentucky. in reply the president sent a rebuke of my delay. on my return to head-quarters at greenville the other division of general johnston's cavalry was ordered to him through the mountains. just then a severe snow-storm came upon us and blocked all roads. meanwhile, the enemy had mended his ways, secured munitions, and thought to march out from mossy creek as far as morristown. orders were given for a march to meet him, but we found ourselves in need of forage, so we rested in position, and presently learned that the enemy had retired towards his works. our reduced cavalry force made necessary a change of position behind the holston river, where a small force could at least observe our flanks, and give notice of threatenings on either side. a letter from the president under date of the 25th ordered that we be prepared to march to meet general johnston for the campaign through middle tennessee. he was informed that we were ready, only needing supplies for the march and his orders; that i had cared for the bridges in that direction, so that there was no reason with us for delay. on the 7th of april i was ordered, with the part of my command that had originally served with the army of northern virginia, back to service with general lee on the rapidan. the move was made as soon as cars could be had to haul the troops, halting under orders at charlottesville to meet a grand flanking move then anticipated. on the 22d we were ordered down as far as mechanicsville, five miles west of gordonsville, watching there for a lesser flank move. on the 29th, general lee came out and reviewed the command. referring to the general officers who had been put under charges while in east tennessee, general robertson had been sentenced to suspension, and an excellent officer, general gregg, had been sent to report, and was assigned to the texas brigade. in the case of general mclaws, the court-martial ordered official reprimand, but the president disapproved the proceedings, passing reprimand upon the court and the commanding general, and ordered the officer to be restored to duty, which was very gratifying to me, who could have taken several reprimands to relieve a personal friend of embarrassing position. general mclaws was a classmate, and had been a warm personal friend from childhood. i had no desire to put charges against him, and should have failed to do so even under the directions of the authorities. i am happy to say that our personal relations are as close and interesting as they have ever been, and that his heart was big enough to separate official duties and personal relations. charges had been preferred against brigadier-general e. m. law for surreptitiously disposing of an official communication to the war department that had been intrusted to his care, in which was enclosed his pretended resignation from the confederate army. the president refused to entertain the charges, and ordered the officer released from arrest and restored to his command. of the paper that was improperly disposed of, general cooper, adjutant and inspector-general of the army, reported,- "the resignation within referred to never came to the office. it appears from inquiry at the war department that it was presented by a friend of general law, unofficially, to the secretary of war, and never came through the regular channels as an official paper."[192] general lee wrote to the department of the charges,- "i examined the charges against general law and find them of a very grave character. i think it due to general law, as well as to the interest of the service, that they should be investigated and his innocence or guilt should be declared by a court-martial. there have been instances of officers obtaining indulgences on not true grounds, which i think discreditable and prejudicial to military discipline, and should be stopped."[193] the indorsement of general cooper shows that the paper was fraudulently handled. the letter of general lee shows the offence a high crime and misdemeanor. general lee wrote to inform me that the authorities at richmond had ordered general law to be restored to duty with his command. the limit of endurance had thus been reached and passed. i ordered the rearrest of general law upon his appearance within the limits of the command. to hold me at the head of the command while encouraging mutinous conduct in its ranks was beyond all laws and customs of war, and i wrote general lee that my orders were out to have general law again put under arrest, and that the case should be brought before a military tribunal, or i must be relieved of duty in the confederate states service. the authorities then thought to find their way by transferring me to another command, but on that point general lee became impatient, and inclined to serious thought and action. the commander of the army was involved as well as the commander of the first corps, and both or neither must be relieved. the authorities halted, and that was the last that i heard of general law until his newspaper articles began to appear, years after the surrender. the following vote of thanks given by the congress at this juncture affords a remarkable commentary upon the conduct of the authorities, as well as constituting a compliment most heartily appreciated by the recipients: "thanks of the confederate congress to lieutenant-general james longstreet and his command.[194] "no. 42.--joint resolutions of thanks to lieutenant-general longstreet and the officers and men of his command. "_resolved by the congress of the confederate states of america_, that the thanks of congress are due, and hereby cordially tendered, to lieutenant-general james longstreet and the officers and men of his command, for their patriotic services and brilliant achievements in the present war, sharing as they have the arduous fatigues and privations of many campaigns in virginia, maryland, pennsylvania, georgia, and tennessee, and participating in nearly every great battle fought in those states, the commanding general ever displaying great ability, skill, and prudence in command, and the officers and men the most heroic bravery, fortitude, and energy, in every duty they have been called upon to perform. "_resolved_, that the president be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolution to lieutenant-general longstreet for publication to his command. "approved february 17, 1864." chapter xxxviii. battle of the wilderness. campaign of 1864--general grant in the field--strength of the armies--their positions--description of the wilderness--the battle opened--a brisk day's fighting--longstreet's command faces hancock's on the morning of the second day--an effective flank movement--general wadsworth mortally wounded--general jenkins falls under fire of friends, and longstreet is seriously wounded--carried from the field on a litter--tribute to general jenkins--criticism and controversy. after reporting the return of my command to service with the army of northern virginia, i took the earliest opportunity to suggest that the preliminaries of the campaign should be carefully confined to strategic manoeuvre until we could show better generalship. that accomplished, i argued, the enemy's forces would lose confidence in the superiority of their leader's skill and prowess; that both armies were composed of intelligent, experienced veterans, who were as quick to discover the better handling of their ranks as trained generals; that by such successful manoeuvres the confederates would gain confidence and power as the enemy began to lose prestige; that then we could begin to look for a favorable opportunity to call the enemy to aggressive work, while immediate aggression from us against his greater numbers must make our labors heavy and more or less doubtful; that we should first show that the power of battle is in generalship more than in the number of soldiers, which, properly illustrated, would make the weaker numbers of the contention the stronger force. in this connection i refer to the policy of _attrition_ which became a prominent feature during part of the campaign, and showed that the enemy put his faith in numbers more than in superior skill and generalship. general grant made his head-quarters near the army of the potomac, in culpeper county, virginia, commanded by major-general george g. meade. it had been organized into three corps, second, fifth, and sixth, commanded respectively by major-general w. s. hancock, major-general g. k. warren, and major-general john sedgwick, all in cantonment near culpeper court-house. the ninth corps was a distinct body reorganized under major-general a. e. burnside, and posted in co-operative position near the railroad bridge over the rappahannock river. the aggregate of the two commands was about one hundred and thirty thousand men, classified as follows: army of the potomac: infantry present for duty, equipped (aggregate) 73,390 cavalry (aggregate) 12,424 artillery and engineers 2,764 quartermaster's, subsistence, and medical departments, extra-duty men, and engineer brigade 19,183 ninth corps, present for duty, equipped 19,486 ------ total 127,247 but deducting extra-duty men, claimed as non-combatants 19,183 ------ leaves 108,064 these figures are from major-general a. a. humphreys, chief of staff of the army of the potomac. but general badeau, in his "military history of u. s. grant," p. 94, gives as the exact numbers put into battle (after deducting a division of colored troops, not then used for battle service) the following: army of the potomac 97,273 ninth corps 22,708 ------ total 119,981 from which he deducts the division of colored troops 3,095 ------ leaving 116,886 the army of northern virginia stood on the west side of rapidan river, mine run on its right, extending north, the left division, r. h. anderson's, looking towards madison court-house; the second and third corps, commanded by lieutenant-generals r. s. ewell and a. p. hill; two divisions and alexander's artillery of longstreet's (first) corps being held at mechanicsville. colonel taylor, chief of staff with the army of northern virginia, gives the strength of the army at the opening of the campaign, from the returns of april 20, the latest up to date, as follows:[195] second corps 17,093 third corps 22,199 unattached commands, maryland line, etc. 1,125 "a liberal estimate," as he calls it, of my command 10,000 ----- total 50,417 cavalry 8,727 artillery corps 4,854 ----- making a total of 63,998 but general badeau objects, on authority of a letter from general bragg to general joseph e. johnston, stating that i had fourteen thousand men in my command. if general bragg's letter referred to my command in east tennessee it was accurate enough. but buckner's division of that command, the cavalry, and other detachments were left in east tennessee. general badeau claims, besides, six thousand furloughed men and conscripts as joining the army between the 20th of april and the 4th of may. of this there is no official record, and it is more than probable that new cases of sick and furloughed men of that interval were as many at least as the fragmentary parties that joined us. general humphreys reported me as having fifteen thousand men. if he intended those figures as the strength of the first corps, he is accurate enough, but pickett's division of that corps was not with it, nor did it return to the army of northern virginia until late in the campaign. so i find no good reason for changing the figures of colonel taylor, except so far as to add johnson's brigade of rodes's division, which is reported to have joined the second corps on the 6th of may,--estimated at 1500, which, added to 63,998, would make the total 65,498. but general ewell's official account of numbers on the morning of the 6th of may puts his force at 15,500, which is better authority than colonel taylor's from the return of april 20, or general badeau's computation. to these figures should be added johnson's brigade, that reported later of the day, estimated by general badeau at 1500, which makes the aggregate of the second corps 17,000, and brings that of the army of northern virginia back to 65,405. however, the numerical strength of armies should not be considered as of exclusive bearing upon the merits of the campaign. the commanders had chosen their battle after mature deliberation. they knew of each other's numbers and resources before they laid their plans, and they had even known each other personally for more than twenty years. each had the undivided support and confidence of his government and his army, and it was time now to leave the past and give attention to the future. general lee had acquired fame as a strategist in his two years' service in the army of northern virginia, and general grant, by his three years' service in the west, had come to be known as an all-round soldier, seldom if ever surpassed; but the biggest part of him was his heart. they were equally pugnacious and plucky,--grant the more deliberate. six months before the opening of the impending campaign, in november, 1863, general meade, essaying a blow at the army of northern virginia, crossed the rapidan below general lee's right, and deployed along the south side of mine run, but found lee's line so strong and so improved by field-works that he felt constrained to withdraw without making battle. as the purpose of this writing is to convey ideas of personal observations and experience, it will be confined, as far as practicable, to campaigns or parts of them with which i was directly or indirectly connected. so, when participants and partisans have passed away, i shall have contributed my share towards putting the historian in possession of evidence which he can weigh with that of other actors in the great drama. at midnight of the 3d of may, 1864, the army of the potomac took its line of march for the lower crossings of the rapidan river at germania and ely's fords, the fifth and sixth corps for the former, the second for the latter, wilson's division of cavalry leading the first, gregg's the second column. the cavalry was to secure the crossings and lay bridges for the columns as they came up. wilson's cavalry crossed at germania ford, drove off the confederate outpost, and began the construction of a bridge at daylight. gregg also was successful, and the bridges were ready when the solid columns came. warren's (fifth corps) crossed after wilson's cavalry, marching westward as far as wilderness tavern. sedgwick's corps followed and pitched camp near the crossing. hancock's corps followed gregg's cavalry, and made camp at chancellorsville. generals grant and meade went over after warren's column and established head-quarters near the crossing. general grant despatched for burnside's corps to come and join him by night march. sheridan was expected to engage stuart's cavalry at hamilton's crossing near fredericksburg. general grant had no fixed plan of campaign beyond the general idea to avoid the strong defensive line occupied by general lee behind mine run, and find a way to draw him out to open battle. the wilderness is a forest land of about fifteen miles square, lying between and equidistant from orange court-house and fredericksburg. it is broken occasionally by small farms and abandoned clearings, and two roads,--the orange plank road and the turnpike, which are cut at right angles by the germania road,--in general course nearly parallel, open ways through it between fredericksburg and the court-house. the germania ford road joins the brock road, the strategic line of the military zone, and crosses the turnpike at wilderness tavern and the plank road about two miles south of that point. though the march was set on foot at midnight it was soon made known to general lee, and its full purport was revealed by noon of the 4th, and orders were sent the different commanders for their march to meet the enemy,--the second corps (ewell's), consisting of rodes's, johnson's, and early's divisions, by the orange turnpike; the third (a. p. hill's)--r. h. anderson's, heth's, and wilcox's divisions--by the orange plank road. general lee's signals were interpreted and sent to general grant, who so far modified his plans as to prepare for immediate battle. the commands of the first corps, field's and kershaw's divisions and alexander's batteries, were stationed, field's north of gordonsville, where he had been posted on the 1st of may in anticipation of a move around our left, the other commands near mechanicsville. we were ordered forward by the plank road to parker's store; the order was received after one o'clock, and sent out for information of the commanders, who were ordered to prepare and march. but i asked for and received authority to march by a shorter route that would at the same time relieve the plank road of pressure of troops and trains (for we had been crowded off the road once before by putting too many troops upon a single track). by the same despatch i asked and subsequently obtained leave to go on to the brock road, where we could look for and hope to intercept the enemy's march, and cause him to develop plans before he could get out of the wilderness. we marched at four o'clock by the lawyer's road. our chief quartermaster, colonel taylor, whose home was between orange court-house and the wilderness, had been ordered to secure the services of the most competent guide to be found. we halted at brock's bridge for rest, and there colonel taylor brought up our guide, james robinson, who had been for several years the sheriff of the county, and whose whole life had been spent in the wilderness. the march was resumed, and continued with swinging step, with occasional rests, until we reached richard's shops, at five p.m. of the 5th. there we overtook rosser's cavalry, engaged in severe encounter with part of sheridan's. the enemy abandoned the contest and rode away, leaving his dead with some of ours on the field. [illustration: battle of the wilderness, va. may 5th, 6th and 7th, 1864.] the distance of march was twenty-eight miles. soon after my arrival at the shops, colonel venable, of general head-quarters staff, came with orders for a change of direction of the column through the wood to unite with the troops of the third corps on the plank road. the rear of my column closed up at dark, and orders were sent to prepare to resume march at twelve o'clock. the accounts we had of the day's work were favorable to the confederates; but the change of direction of our march was not reassuring. in accordance with the general plan of turning the confederate right without touching our intrenched line along mine run, the army of the potomac had been put in motion early on the 5th, the second corps towards shady grove church by the todd's tavern road, the fifth by the dirt road towards parker's store on the plank road, the sixth on the right, to follow the fifth as movements developed. general warren moved with three divisions, leaving griffin's on the turnpike. presently, after taking up his march towards parker's store, the confederates were discovered on the plank road, and general meade ordered the corps made ready for battle. the sixth, except getty's division, was ordered to make connection on the right of the fifth by wood roads, and prepare for the battle. getty's division was ordered to the plank road at the brock road crossing, to hold that point at all hazards until the second corps could join it, the latter being recalled from todd's tavern for that holding and developments there indicated. at noon general warren was prepared on the turnpike and attacked with griffin's and wadsworth's divisions. general lee's orders were against a general engagement until his forces were in hand, but the troops had met and action could not wait. warren's attack had some success, as by his orders general ewell felt called upon to delay battle, but a sudden dash of the enemy broke into disorder his brigade under j. m. jones, also battle's brigade; but other of his troops joined them, recovered his ground, drove off the attacking forces, taking two guns, and called warren's corps to better concentration. the sixth was to be with warren, but was delayed by the narrow, tangled roads till night. general ewell prepared for the next day by intrenching his front. meanwhile, general hill had pushed the divisions under heth and wilcox along the plank road until they were near the brock road crossing, occupied by getty's division of the sixth corps. general getty was in time to drive back a few of our men who had reached the brock road in observation, and hancock's corps joined him at two p.m., fronting his divisions--birney's, mott's, gibbon's, and barlow's--along the brock road, on the left of getty's. his artillery was massed on his left, near barlow, except a battery nearer the plank road, and one section at the crossing. he ordered his line intrenched. as soon as he found his troops in hand at the cross-roads, general meade ordered them into action. getty's division, supported by the second corps, was to drive hill back, occupy parker's store, and connect with warren's line. he afterwards learned of the repulse of warren on the turnpike, but repeated his orders for the advance on the plank road. at 4.15 getty's division advanced, and met the divisions of heth and wilcox a few hundred yards in advance of their trenches. in the fierce engagement that followed, birney's and mott's divisions were engaged on getty's left, and later the brigades of carroll and owen, of gibbon's division. wadsworth's division and baxter's brigade of the fifth corps were put in to aid getty's right. the combination forced heth and wilcox back about half a mile, when the battle rested for the night. hancock reinforced his front by webb's brigade of gibbon's division, and was diligently employed at his lines during the night putting up field-works. about eleven o'clock in the night the guide reported from general lee to conduct my command through the wood across to the plank road, and at one o'clock the march was resumed. the road was overgrown by the bushes, except the side-tracks made by the draft animals and the ruts of wheels which marked occasional lines in its course. after a time the wood became less dense, and the unused road was more difficult to follow, and presently the guide found that there was no road under him; but no time was lost, as, by ordering the lines of the divisions doubled, they were ready when the trail was found, and the march continued in double line. at daylight we entered the plank road, and filed down towards the field of strife of the afternoon of the 5th and daylight of the 6th. r. h. anderson's division of the third corps, marching on the plank road, had rested at verdierville during the night, and was called to the front in the morning. the divisions of heth and wilcox rested during the night of the 5th where the battle of that day ceased, but did not prepare ammunition nor strengthen their lines for defence, because informed that they were to be relieved from the front. both the division commanders claim that they were to be relieved, and that they were ordered not to intrench or replenish supplies. so it seems that they were all night within hearing of the voices of hancock's men, not even reorganizing their lines so as to offer a front of battle! general heth has stated that he proposed to arrange for battle, but was ordered to give his men rest. while hancock was sending men to his advanced line during the night and intrenching there and on his second line, the confederates were all night idle. hancock advanced and struck the divisions before sunrise, just as my command reported to general lee. my line was formed on the right and left of the plank road, kershaw on the right, field on the left. as the line deployed, the divisions of heth and wilcox came back upon us in disorder, more and more confused as their steps hurried under hancock's musketry. as my ranks formed the men broke files to give free passage for their comrades to the rear. the advancing fire was getting brisk, but not a shot was fired in return by my troops until the divisions were ready. three of field's brigades, the texas, alabama, and benning's georgia, were formed in line on the left of the road, and three of kershaw's on the right. general lee, appalled at the condition of affairs, thought to lead the texas brigade alone into desperate charge, before my lines were well formed. the ordeal was trying, but the steady troops, seeing him off his balance, refused to follow, begged him to retire, and presently colonel venable, of his staff, reported to me general lee's efforts to lead the brigade, and suggested that i should try to call him from it. i asked that he would say, with my compliments, that his line would be recovered in an hour if he would permit me to handle the troops, but if my services were not needed, i would like to ride to some place of safety, as it was not quite comfortable where we were. as full lines of battle could not be handled through the thick wood, i ordered the advance of the six brigades by heavy skirmish lines, to be followed by stronger supporting lines. hancock's lines, thinned by their push through the wood, and somewhat by the fire of the disordered divisions, weaker than my line of fresh and more lively skirmishers, were checked by our first steady, rolling fire, and after a brisk fusillade were pushed back to their intrenched line, when the fight became steady and very firm, occasionally swinging parts of my line back and compelling the reserves to move forward and recover it. general lee sent general m. l. smith, of the engineers, to report to me. he was ordered through the wood on my right to the unfinished railroad to find a way around the left of the enemy's line, while we engaged his front. r. h. anderson's division of the third corps came up about eight o'clock and was ordered to report to me. hancock's early advance was under a general order including the army of the potomac. the ninth corps that had been called up reported to general grant, and was ordered in between the plank and turnpike roads. at eight o'clock hancock was reinforced by stevenson's division of the ninth, and wadsworth of the fifth was put under his orders. at nine o'clock he attacked with wadsworth's, birney's, stevenson's, and mott's divisions, and the brigades of webb, carroll, and owen, of gibbon's division, making as formidable battle as could be organized in the wood, but the tangle thinned his lines and our fire held him in desperate engagement. two divisions of the ninth corps, at the same time marching for parker's store, were encountered between the plank and turnpike roads by our second corps (ewell's). under this combination the forces struggled an hour at the extreme tension of skill and valor. about ten o'clock general smith returned and reported favorably of his reconnoissance: that the heavy woodland concealed the route of the proposed flank march, and that there was no force of the enemy in observation. hancock's left on the brock road was in strong, well-guarded position, but there was room along its front for our troops to march near the unfinished railroad beyond view of that left on the brock road. general smith was then asked to take a small party and pass beyond the brock road and find a way for turning the extreme union left on that road. there were two brigades of field's division and one of kershaw's not on the line of battle, but on flank march as supports, and r. h. anderson's division of the third corps. colonel sorrel, chief of staff, was ordered to conduct three brigades, g. t. anderson's of field's, mahone's of r. h. anderson's, and wofford's of kershaw's division, by the route recommended by general smith, have them faced to the left, and marched down against hancock's left. davis's brigade of the third corps also got into this command. as soon as the troops struck hancock his line began to break, first slowly, then rapidly. somehow, as they retreated, a fire was accidentally started in the dry leaves, and began to spread as the confederates advanced. mahone's brigade approached the burning leaves and part of it broke off a little to get around, but the twelfth virginia was not obstructed by the blaze and moved directly on. at the plank road colonel sorrel rode back to join us. all of the enemy's battle on the right of the plank road was broken up, and general field was fighting severely with his three brigades on the left against wadsworth and stevenson, pushing them a little. the twelfth virginia regiment got to the plank road some little time before the other regiments of the brigade, and, viewing the contention on the farther side between field's and wadsworth's divisions, dashed across and struck the left of wadsworth's line. this relieved field a little, and, under this concentrating push and fire, wadsworth fell mortally wounded. in a little while followed the general break of the union battle. the break of his left had relieved kershaw's troops, and he was waiting for the time to advance, and jenkins's brigade that had been held in reserve and that part of r. h. anderson's division not in use were ready and anxious for opportunity to engage, and followed as our battle line pushed forward. general smith then came and reported a way across the brock road that would turn hancock's extreme left. he was asked to conduct the flanking brigades and handle them as the ranking officer. he was a splendid tactician as well as skilful engineer, and gallant withal. he started, and, not to lose time or distance, moved by inversion, wofford's left leading, wofford's favorite manoeuvre. as wofford's left stepped out, the other troops moved down the plank road, jenkins's brigade by the road, kershaw's division alongside. i rode at the head of the column, jenkins, kershaw, and the staff with me. after discussing the dispositions of their troops for reopening battle, jenkins rode closer to offer congratulations, saying, "i am happy; i have felt despair of the cause for some months, but am relieved, and feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the rapidan before night." little did he or i think these sanguine words were the last he would utter. when wadsworth fell the union battle broke up in hasty retreat. field's brigades closed to fresh ranks, the flanking brigades drew into line near the plank road, and with them the other regiments of mahone's brigade; but the twelfth regiment, some distance in advance of the others, had crossed the road to strike at wadsworth's left before the other regiments were in sight, and was returning to find its place in line. the order for the flanking brigades to resume march by their left had not moved those brigades of the right. as the twelfth regiment marched back to find its place on the other side of the plank road, it was mistaken, in the wood, for an advance of the enemy, and fire was opened on it from the other regiments of the brigade. the men threw themselves to the ground to let the fire pass. just then our party of officers was up and rode under the fire. general jenkins had not finished the expressions of joyful congratulations which i have quoted when he fell mortally wounded. captain doby and the orderly, bowen, of kershaw's staff, were killed. general kershaw turned to quiet the troops, when jenkins's brigade with levelled guns were in the act of returning the fire of the supposed enemy concealed in the wood, but as kershaw's clear voice called out "_f-r-i-e-n-d-s!_" the arms were recovered, without a shot in return, and the men threw themselves down upon their faces. at the moment that jenkins fell i received a severe shock from a minie ball passing through my throat and right shoulder. the blow lifted me from the saddle, and my right arm dropped to my side, but i settled back to my seat, and started to ride on, when in a minute the flow of blood admonished me that my work for the day was done. as i turned to ride back, members of the staff, seeing me about to fall, dismounted and lifted me to the ground. orders were given general field, the senior officer present, to push on before the enemy could have time to rally. the two lines marching along the plank road, southward, in pursuit, and the flanking brigades to move in the other direction, were, for the moment, a little perplexing, as he was not accurately advised of the combinations, but he grasped the situation. before he was prepared, however, general r. h. anderson came into command as senior, and then general lee came up. the plans, orders, and opportunity were explained to him, but the woods concealed everything except the lines of troops alongside the road. general lee did not care to handle the troops in broken lines, and ordered formation in a general line for parallel battle. the change in the forest tangle consumed several hours of precious time, and gave general hancock time to collect his men into battle order, post his heavy reinforcements, and improve his intrenchments. [illustration: the wounding of general longstreet at the wilderness, may 6, 1864.] after several hours of work our new line was finally adjusted and ordered forward. it approached the enemy's stronghold (in ranks a little thinned by the march through the wood and the enemy's fire), made desperate and repeated charges, and jenkins's gallant brigade mounted their breastworks, but the solid ranks behind them threw it off, with the lines that essayed to give it support, and the whole were forced back from their fight. thus the battle, lost and won three times during the day, wore itself out. general ewell found opportunity before night to push some of his brigades around the enemy's right, and did clever work in taking a number of prisoners,--generals seymour and shaler among them,--but it was too late in the day to follow his work with a strong fight. he handled his troops with skill and care, putting defensive works before them whenever they halted. like attention by general hancock may be noted; while in marked contrast was the conduct of the third corps after their affair on the afternoon of the 5th. the commanders of the leading divisions of the third had proposed to prepare their troops for the next day, but were ordered to give their men rest,[196] and told that they were to be relieved and withdrawn from the battle. not even a line of battle was formed, so that they were in disorder when they were struck in the morning, and speedily fell into confusion. my command, less than ten thousand, had found the battle on the plank road in retreat, little less than a panic. in a few hours we changed defeat to victory, the broken divisions of the third corps rallying in their rear. as my litter was borne to the rear my hat was placed over my face, and soldiers by the road-side said, "he is dead, and they are telling us he is only wounded." hearing this repeated from time to time, i raised my hat with my left hand, when the burst of voices and the flying of hats in the air eased my pains somewhat. but micah jenkins, who fell by the same fire, was no more. he was one of the most estimable characters of the army. his taste and talent were for military service. he was intelligent, quick, untiring, attentive, zealous in discharge of duty, truly faithful to official obligations, abreast with the foremost in battle, and withal a humble, noble christian. in a moment of highest earthly hope he was transported to serenest heavenly joy; to that life beyond that knows no bugle call, beat of drum, or clash of steel. may his beautiful spirit, through the mercy of god, rest in peace! amen! "_l'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace._" an americanism which seems an appropriate substitute is, _a level head, a level head, always a level head_. with patience to wait ten minutes to see my flanking brigades stretched out on their march to retrieve my _aplomb_, we could have found a good battle against hancock's strong left, while we broke over his confused front. fearing another change of plan, i hurried on to execute before it could be ordered. there were twenty-two thousand men in the third corps. it is not claiming too much, therefore, to say that that corps, carefully prepared during the night of the 5th, could have held hancock's battle on the morning of the 6th until my attack of his left could have relieved them. under that plan events support the claim that the third corps, intrenched in their advanced position, with fresh supplies and orders to hold their ground, could have received and held against hancock's early battle until my command could have come in on his left rear and completed our strongly organized battle by which we could have carried the wilderness, even down and into the classic rapidan. general field says in his account of the day,- "i was at longstreet's side in a moment, and in answer to my anxious inquiry as to his condition, he replied that he would be looked after by others, and directed me to take command of the corps and push ahead. though at this moment he could not have known the extent or character of his wounds (that they were severe was apparent), he seemed to forget himself in the absorbing interest of the movement he was making. "had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, i have always believed that grant would have been driven across the rapidan before night; but general lee was present, and ordered that our line, which was nearly a right angle (my division being the base, and kershaw's and the other flanking force the perpendicular), should first be straightened out. the difficulty of manoeuvring through the brush made this a tedious operation, so that when we did advance with large reinforcements from ewell's corps placed under my orders, the enemy was found awaiting us behind new breastworks, thoroughly prepared." colonel fairfax says,- "on reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse and propped against a tree. you blew the bloody foam from your mouth and said, 'tell general field to take command, and move forward with the whole force and gain the brock road,' but hours were lost."[197] a northern historian says,- "it seemed, indeed, that irretrievable disaster was upon us; but in the very torrent and tempest of the attack it suddenly ceased and all was still. what could cause this surcease of effort at the very height of success was then wholly unknown to us."[198] some years after the affair on the plank road, general hancock said to me,- "you rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours before i could reorganize for battle." he explained that reinforcements crowding up through the wood, the retreating troops, and confusion caused by mixing in with wagon-trains and horses, made a troublesome tangle, but it was unravelled and his troops at rest when the final attack was made. he had sixty thousand men in hand. bad as was being shot by some of our own troops in the battle of the wilderness,--that was an honest mistake, one of the accidents of war,--being shot at, since the war, by many officers, was worse. fitzhugh lee wrote of me in the southern historical society papers, vol. v., no. 4, april, 1878, saying, among other things, "he lost his way and reached the wilderness twenty-four hours behind time." now, from mechanicsville to parker's store by our line of march was thirty-four miles,--by the plank road, thirty-five; from parker's store to the battle, three miles. from the time of our march to going into battle was thirty-six hours, including all of two nights. deducting twenty-four hours alleged as lost leaves twelve hours, including all night of the 4th, for the march of thirty-seven miles! his logic and method of injury remind one of the french teacher who, when out of patience with the boys, used to say, "i will give you zero and mark you absent." another report started by fitzhugh lee as coming from his cousin, g. w. c. lee, was that general lee said that he "sent an officer to longstreet to stay with and show him the roads." this, like all other reported sayings of general lee in regard to me, was not published until after general lee's death. when it was first published i wrote general g. w. c. lee for the name of the officer sent. he referred me to the members of general lee's staff. not one of them knew of the circumstance or the officer, but referred me to general lee's engineers. after long search i found the engineers and applied for information, but not one of them knew anything of the alleged fact. i had the letters published as an advertisement for the officer who was claimed as my guide. no response came. i inquired of the members of the staff, first corps; not one had seen or heard of such a person. the quartermaster, colonel taylor, who was ordered to secure a competent guide at the first moment of receipt of orders to march, reported of the matter thus: "meadow farm, orange court-house, "july 1, 1879. "general james longstreet: "dear general,--your favor of the 30th ultimo is this moment to hand, and i reply at once. i think general fitzhugh lee entirely in error as to any engineer or other officer being sent to guide you in the spring of 1864 from your camp near gordonsville to the wilderness. i well remember your sending for me, and directing me to procure a guide for you, which i did after some difficulty in the person of mr. james robinson, the then sheriff of the county. i saw no such person, nor can i think that any such was at any time at our quarters before we broke camp. "sincerely yours, "erasmus taylor." these efforts to secure one witness in support of the allegation, or rather to prove a negation, were all that occurred to me at the time, and now i can think of but one more chance, which is for fitzhugh lee to offer a liberal reward. it is not probable that he would fail to find a false witness who could answer for a time to support the false charges. it may be added that the accounts of the march by other officers agree with mine, as already given. i present here a letter from general alexander and an extract from one written me by colonel venable. the former says,- "augusta, ga., june 12, 1879. "my dear general,--absence prevented an earlier response to your favor of the 5th. my recollection of the events is as follows: my command, the artillery, got orders to move about noon on may 4, 1864, being in camp near mechanicsville, some four or five miles west of gordonsville. we marched about four p.m., and with only short rests all night and all next day till about five p.m., when we halted to rest and bivouac at a point which i cannot remember; but our cavalry had had a skirmish there with the enemy's cavalry just before our arrival, and i remember seeing some killed and wounded of each side. your whole corps, hood's and mclaws's, and the artillery, i think, was concentrated at that point, and my recollection is that we had orders to move on during the night, or before daylight the next morning, to get on the enemy's left flank on the brock road. "but whatever the orders were, i remember distinctly that during the night news of the fight on the plank road came, and with it a change of orders, and that we marched at one a.m., or earlier, and turned to the left and struck the plank road at parker's store, and pushed rapidly down it to where the battle had already begun. i remember, too, that the march was so hurried that at one point, the head of the leading division (i forget which it was, however) having lost a little distance by taking the wrong road, the rear division was not allowed to halt, but pushed right on, so that it got abreast of the leading division, and the two came down the road side by side, filling the whole road and crowding the retreating men of the divisions which were being driven back into the woods on each side. "these are facts as i recollect them, and while i don't know what your orders were, i remember that there was a change in them during the night, according to my understanding, and that the change was as promptly and vigorously and successfully carried out as time and distance could possibly permit. there was certainly _no loss of time_ from the moment we received orders to the moment we went under fire in the wilderness, as the distance covered will show. "very truly yours, "e. p. alexander. "general longstreet." colonel venable writes,- "july 25, 1879. "dear general,--... well, the morning came. the enemy attacked wilcox and heth before your arrival. disaster seemed imminent. i was sent to meet you and hasten your march. i met your two divisions within less than half a mile of the battle-field coming up in parallel columns very rapidly (i was going to say in double-quick) on the plank road, side by side, and that they came in grandly, forming line of battle, kershaw on the right and field on the left, restoring the battle. it was superb, and my heart beats quicker to think about it even at this distance of time.... "yours, very truly, "charles s. venable. "general longstreet." chapter xxxix. again in front of richmond. longstreet absent on leave, nursing his wounds--hears of the death of cavalry leader j. e. b. stuart--returns to virginia--assigned to command on the north side of james river--affair on the williamsburg road--lee's apprehension of grant's march into richmond--closing scenes of the campaign of 1864 about the confederate capital--general benjamin f. butler's move against fort fisher--remote effects on the situation in virginia. from the wilderness i was taken to the meadow farm home of my friend erasmus taylor, and carefully nursed by his charming wife until put on board of a train for lynchburg and taken to my good kinswoman, mrs. caroline garland, who had lost her only son and child, general samuel garland, killed two years before at south mountain. from her hospitable home, when strong enough for a ride in the fresh air, i was taken to the home of a cherished friend, colonel john d. alexander, at campbell court-house. but a raiding party rode through the village early one morning, which suggested a change, and i was taken to my kinsfolk, the sibleys, at augusta, georgia, and after a time to other good friends, the harts and daniels, at and near union point, on the georgia railroad. before i was strong enough to sit more than a few minutes news came of the change of commanders in the army of georgia,--the superseding of general joseph e. johnston by assignment of general j. b. hood, and i was asked to take command of the corps left vacant by assignment of general hood. answer was made that when able for duty i would be prepared to obey orders. later came sadder news from virginia announcing the fall of our cavalier j. e. b. stuart. the most famous american rider fell mortally wounded on the 18th of may, 1864, near yellow tavern, in a cavalry engagement with general sheridan, just then budding into fame. stuart, endowed by nature with the gifts that go to make a perfect cavalryman, improved and cultivated through years of active warfare, experience, and discipline, was the embodiment of all that goes to make up the ideal soldierly character,--the bold, dashing dragoon. his death was possibly a greater loss to the confederate army even than that of the swift-moving general "stonewall" jackson. through all the vicissitudes of war he held his troopers beside him peerless in prowess and discipline. after his fall their decline came swifter than their up-building had been accomplished by his magic hand. [illustration: erasmus taylor. chief-quartermaster first corps, army of northern virginia.] in society he was gay, bright, and genial, abstemious to a degree. in idle hours of week-days he was fond of his banjo-player, sweeny, but he was devout withal, and to him the grandest, sweetest music was "rock of ages." to this day that sublime air never fails to bring before my mind's vision his noble figure. may his great spirit rest near "the rock of ages" always! amen! about the 1st of october i was strong enough to ride horseback, and after a little practice, and having become weary of idle hours, took leave of wife and children, and travelled back to richmond to find our great commander and his noble followers. the general seemed worn by past labor, besides suffering at seasons from severe sciatica, while his work was accumulating and his troubles multiplying to proportions that should have employed half a dozen able men. the military staff of his head-quarters was made up of excellent, intelligent, active, zealous young men, more than anxious to anticipate his wants and to meet their official obligations, and it is a source of gratification to write that they were efficient, affectionate, admirable, and polite. but facts will not justify like commendation of the purveying department. complaints had been made early in the war and continued of our inefficient subsistence department at richmond. the diminishing resources of the country called for exceptionally earnest, methodical, business faculties in these departments, especially that of subsistence, but, unfortunately, as our resources became more circumscribed, the officers, instead of putting forth stronger efforts in their business, seemed to lose the energy of their former service, and general lee found himself called upon to feed as well as fight his army. although anxious to assist in his severe trials, and relieve him of part of his work, i feared that he might think a cripple an additional incumbrance, and wrote the chief of staff,- "randolph's house, "near richmond, va., october 18, 1864. "colonel w. h. taylor, "_assistant adjutant-general_: "sir,--i have not reported formally for duty, because i doubted the propriety of being assigned, in my crippled condition, to position now filled by officers of vigorous health. if i can be of service in any position, i prefer to go to duty. if there is nothing to which i can be assigned on this side of the mississippi river, without displacing an efficient officer, i will cheerfully accept service in the trans mississippi department. "the doctors give me little reason to hope to recover the use of my arm even within a year; hence my desire to be assigned for duty, or to have an extended leave of absence. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "j. longstreet, "_lieutenant-general_." an order came assigning me to command on the north side of james river and drury's bluff, and pickett's division on the south side, along bermuda hundred front as far as swift creek. on the north side were the local defence troops under lieutenant-general ewell, and hoke's and field's divisions and gary's brigade of one thousand cavalry. there had been severe fighting on that side a few days previous, in an attack of the federals upon fort harrison of our line, which resulted in the capture of the fort; then a more desperate fight of the confederates to recover it, which was not successful. the loss of fort harrison broke our line off a little near the river, and caused a new line to be taken from that point to our left, where it joined the line occupied in 1862, when general mcclellan was against us. the line of the north side extended from chapin's bluff on the james river, by fort gilmer, across north of white oak swamp to the vicinity of the chickahominy at new bridge. hoke's and field's divisions occupied the line from fort gilmer, covering charles city road on the left, and gary's cavalry had a strong picket force on the nine miles road, with vedettes, to guard and patrol the west side of the swamp and the south side of the chickahominy. the crossings of the swamp were heavily obstructed by fallen timber. the batteries at chapin's and drury's bluffs were manned by officers of the navy and sailors, and other organized artillery and infantry, and the local defence contingent lined out towards fort gilmer. my men had become experts in fortifying, so that parapets and dams along the front grew apace. our officers during their experience in east tennessee had become skilled as foragers, and soon began to find in nooks and corners of northern virginia food and forage which relieved general lee of the trouble of supplying the men on the north side, and my troops were beginning to feel comfortable. but there were more serious embarrassments on the south side, and desertions were becoming more numerous from day to day. towards the latter part of october, general grant conceived a plan by which he proposed to extend and advance his left, so as to get the southside railroad and connect this new point with his line of intrenchments. at the same time he thought to have general butler on his extreme right break through the lines on the north side into richmond. for his left attack he ordered the second corps, under hancock, to be supported by parts of the fifth and ninth corps. general lee had his third corps (a. p. hill's), heth's and wilcox's divisions and mahone's in reserve. hancock's advance was met by mahone's division, and the entire march of the different commands was arrested after a severe rencounter, in which mahone got a number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery,--the latter not brought off, as the enemy held the bridge. according to the reports of the adjutant-general's office the federal losses were 1284. the confederate losses were not accurately accounted for, but the federal accounts claimed two hundred prisoners taken at one time, and other losses equal to their own. i was informed of troops crossing the bridge to the north side on the 25th, and that the crossings continued at intervals till after the night of the 26th. the plan of operations contemplated that general butler should have "twenty thousand men north of the james where longstreet was now in command."[199] these were parts of the tenth and eighteenth corps, commanded by generals terry and weitzel. general terry was to make a fierce demonstration against our front along the darby and charles city roads with the tenth, while general weitzel was to march the eighteenth across white oak swamp and get in the unoccupied lines on the williamsburg road, or between that and gary's cavalry on the nine miles road. early on the 27th, general terry moved out with the tenth corps and made demonstration for formidable attack, putting his infantry in sharp practice along the outer edge of our abatis, and his artillery in practice near the roads. our sharp-shooters opened in reply from behind their breastworks and held a lively rattle of musketry for quite a time. the delay in making more serious work told me that some other was the point of danger, which must mean the unoccupied lines beyond white oak swamp. field was ordered to pull his division out of the works and march for the williamsburg road, hoke to cover the line of field by extending and doubling his sharp-shooters. [illustration: charles w. field. major-general commanding division of first corps.] when the head of general field's column got to the williamsburg road the enemy's skirmishers were deployed and half-way across the field approaching our line. just behind the trenches was a growth of pines which concealed our troops until a line of sharp-shooters stepped into the works. their fire surprised the enemy somewhat, as they had seen nothing but part of gary's cavalry, and their skirmish line gave up the field for their heavy infantry. the open in front of the breastworks was about six hundred yards wide and twelve hundred in length, extending from the york river railroad on the north to a ditch draining towards the head of white oak swamp on the south. about midway of the field is a slight depression or swale of five or six feet depth. quickly following the repulse of the skirmish line, and just as field had adjusted the infantry and artillery to their trenches, came the eighteenth corps bursting into the open and deploying on both sides of the road in solid ranks. they were at once in fair canister range, and soon under the terrific fire of a solid line of infantry,--infantry so experienced that they were not likely to throw as much as one bullet without well-directed aim. at the first fire they began to drop, and they fell more rapidly until they reached the swale, when the entire line dropped to the ground. they had just enough cover there for their bodies as they spread themselves closely to the ground, but not enough to permit them to load or rise to deliver fire without exposing their persons to our fire. to attempt to retreat would have been as disastrous as to advance; so they were entrapped. general gary reported that the field of the nine miles road was clear, and was ordered to come in on the flank of the entrapped infantry and order surrender; but before he was there another report reached him of a formidable force advancing against his squadron on the nine miles road. he was sent on a gallop to meet this. meanwhile, the troops hiding under the swell of ground found ways to drop off on their right under the railroad cut, and many others got away down the dry ditch on their left, until captain lyle, of the fifth south carolina regiment, got a force out on the flank and secured the surrender of the remainder. he picked up about six hundred prisoners. general gary's guard on the nine miles road held an open work by a section of artillery and a squadron of cavalry. the advance against it was so well executed, and our cavalry so interested in the operations on the williamsburg road, that the guard was taken by surprise and pushed away from its post by the first attack, losing its field-works and a piece of artillery. gary soon made amends for the careless watch by dismounting his brigade and marching in line of battle at right angles to the line of the enemy, striking him in flank, recovering the lost cannon, and driving him back the way he came. under cover of the night the federals returned to their fortified lines, where they were as strong as were the lines held by the confederates in their front. the confederates lost: field's division, 45; gary's cavalry, 8; artillery, 11; total, 64. federal "losses, killed, wounded, and missing, 1103."[200] general grant sent orders to have the positions gained by his left held and intrenched, but they were abandoned because they were weak in the too extended line. after the loss of fort harrison, general lee became more anxious for his line on the north side, and rode out to witness the operations on that front, under the threatening of butler's forces; and as our cavalry had made no report of the enemy crossing the swamp, he was not quite satisfied to have the troops moved over to the williamsburg road, but did not order them retained. his idea was that the north side was the easier route of grant's triumphal march into richmond, and that sooner or later he would make his effort there in great force. these were the closing scenes between the armies about richmond and petersburg for the year 1864. the defeat of general early in the valley of virginia on the 19th of october concluded active work in that quarter. most of sheridan's infantry was sent back to the army of the potomac, and the greater part of early's to the army of northern virginia. kershaw's division of the first corps had been left with general early for his battle of the 19th of october. in his account of the battle, general early alludes to its outcome and finality as a causeless panic started by the break of his left division under general gordon, followed by kershaw's and other troops. it is sufficient for this writing to say that the general called the rout "thorough and disgraceful, mortifying beyond measure: we had within our grasp a great and glorious victory, and lost it by the uncontrollable propensity of our men for plunder."[201] kershaw's division was restored to duty with the first corps in november. late in december i was informed of a move of the enemy's land and naval forces against fort fisher in wilmington harbor. the information was despatched to general lee at petersburg, and brought a midnight order for me to send hoke's division to wilmington. hoke was relieved and on the move before daylight. general bragg was relieved of duty at richmond and ordered to wilmington. general butler was in command of the land forces and admiral porter of the navy. between them, or under the direction of one or the other, was the steamer "louisiana," freighted with about two hundred and fifty tons of gunpowder intended to blow up fort fisher. but its only tangible effect was to relieve the commander of the land forces from further service in the field. in georgia, general hood led his army off from the front of general sherman at atlanta, and marched west and north, and the latter took up his line of march south for savannah on the 16th of november. these moves brought sherman's army into remote bearing upon our army at richmond, and as a matter of course it began to receive more careful attention from general lee. in order to better guard our position on the north side, i ordered, in addition to the timber obstructions over white oak swamp, the roads leading around towards our left to be broken up by subsoil ploughs, so as to make greater delay of any movements in that direction during the winter rains, and wrote to ask general lee if he could not order the roads upon which general grant would probably march against the southside railroad broken in the same way; also suggesting that the roads in georgia upon which general sherman was marching could be obstructed in this and other ways so as to delay and annoy his march, with the possibility that it might eventually be broken up. the pickets along our lines were in more or less practice shooting at each other from their rifle-pits until i ordered it stopped on the north end of the line, as an annoyance, and not a legitimate part of war to carry on the shooting of sentinels on guard duty. the example was soon followed by the army on our front, so that the men on the picket lines became friendly, and afterwards came to mutual agreements to give the other side notice, in case of battle, in time for the pickets to get to their pits before the batteries could open on them. before the winter was half gone the pickets established quite a bartering trade, giving tobacco for sugar and coffee. our foraging parties of the north side were fortunate in collecting supplies, and at times were in condition to aid our comrades of the south side. but the officers found that they could only get a small portion of the produce by impressment or tax in kind. they were ordered to locate all supplies that they could not collect. the chief of staff of the first corps, colonel sorrel, was appointed brigadier-general, and relieved of his duties by colonel osman latrobe. the army of tennessee, under general hood, pursuing its march northward late in november and early in december, came upon the federal forces under general schofield at franklin, and general thomas at nashville, tennessee, where desperate battles were fought, until hood's army was reduced to skeleton commands and forced to retreat. and thus with sherman's progressive movements in the extreme south, our own ill success in virginia, and an apparent general strengthening of the federal cause, the year 1864 drew to a close with little of happy omen for the confederacy. chapter xl. talk of peace. second federal move against fort fisher and wilmington harbor--confederate disaffection--act of congress appointing a supreme commander of the armies--montgomery blair's peace conference--longstreet has a meeting with general ord, commander of the army of the james--military convention proposed--correspondence between general grant and general lee--longstreet's suggestions for measures in the critical juncture near the close of the war. the second expedition against wilmington was sent in january, 1865, general terry commanding the land and rear-admiral porter the naval forces. after very desperate work the fort and outworks were carried, the commander, general whiting, being mortally and colonel lamb severely wounded. all points of the harbor were captured by the enemy, the confederates losing, besides most of the armaments of the forts, about two thousand five hundred officers and men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. general terry's loss was about five hundred. a remarkable success,--the storming of a position fortified during months and years of labor and by most approved engineering.[202] as the first months of 1865 passed, the confederate congress realized the extreme tension of affairs, and provided, among other expedients, for the enrollment of negroes as confederate soldiers. other measures for giving confidence and strength to the cause were adopted. on the 21st of january the confederate president was informed of disaffection in the virginia legislature, and, what was more significant, in the confederate congress, where a resolution expressive of want of confidence in the chief executive was under informal consideration, and would undoubtedly pass by a large vote if introduced. at this critical juncture it seems that a compromise was effected. it was agreed that congress should enact a law providing a supreme commander of the confederate armies, this law to be approved by the president, who should then call general lee to the exercise of the functions of that office. the intention was to invest him with dictatorial power. during the early days of february, hon. montgomery blair visited richmond upon a mission of peace, and brought about a meeting at hampton roads between president lincoln and secretary seward and the confederate vice-president, alexander h. stephens, and the hon. r. m. t. hunter and judge j. a. campbell. president lincoln was firm for the surrender of the confederate armies and the abolition of slavery, which the confederate president did not care to consider. about the 15th of february, major-general j. c. breckenridge was appointed secretary of war, and brigadier-general f. m. st. john was appointed commissary-general of subsistence. general ord, commanding the army of the james, sent me a note on the 20th of february to say that the bartering between our troops on the picket lines was irregular; that he would be pleased to meet me and arrange to put a stop to such intimate intercourse. as a soldier he knew his orders would stop the business; it was evident, therefore, that there was other matter he would introduce when the meeting could be had. i wrote in reply, appointing a time and place between our lines. we met the next day, and presently he asked for a side interview. when he spoke of the purpose of the meeting, i mentioned a simple manner of correcting the matter, which he accepted without objection or amendment. then he spoke of affairs military and political. referring to the recent conference of the confederates with president lincoln at hampton roads, he said that the politicians of the north were afraid to touch the question of peace, and there was no way to open the subject except through officers of the armies. on his side they thought the war had gone on long enough; that we should come together as former comrades and friends and talk a little. he suggested that the work as belligerents should be suspended; that general grant and general lee should meet and have a talk; that my wife, who was an old acquaintance and friend of mrs. grant in their girlhood days, should go into the union lines and visit mrs. grant with as many confederate officers as might choose to be with her. then mrs. grant would return the call under escort of union officers and visit richmond; that while general lee and general grant were arranging for better feeling between the armies, they could be aided by intercourse between the ladies and officers until terms honorable to both sides could be found. i told general ord that i was not authorized to speak on the subject, but could report upon it to general lee and the confederate authorities, and would give notice in case a reply could be made. general lee was called over to richmond, and we met at night at the president's mansion. secretary-of-war breckenridge was there. the report was made, several hours were passed in discussing the matter, and finally it was agreed that favorable report should be made as soon as another meeting could be arranged with general ord. secretary breckenridge expressed especial approval of the part assigned for the ladies. as we separated, i suggested to general lee that he should name some irrelevant matter as the occasion of his call for the interview with general grant, and that once they were together they could talk as they pleased. a telegram was sent my wife that night at lynchburg calling her to richmond, and the next day a note was sent general ord asking him to appoint a time for another meeting. the meeting was appointed for the day following, and the result of the conference was reported. general ord asked to have general lee write general grant for an interview, stating that general grant was prepared to receive the letter, and thought that a way could be found for a military convention, while old friends of the military service could get together and seek out ways to stop the flow of blood. he indicated a desire on the part of president lincoln to devise some means or excuse for paying for the liberated slaves, which might be arranged as a condition and part of the terms of the convention, and relieve the matter of political bearing; but those details were in the form of remote probabilities to be discussed when the parties became advanced in their search for ways of settlement. on the 1st of march i wrote general lee giving a report of the second interview, and on the 2d he wrote general grant as follows: "head-quarters confederate states armies, "march 2, 1865. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant, "_commanding united states armies_: "general,--lieutenant-general longstreet has informed me that, in a recent conversation between himself and major-general ord as to the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy difficulties by means of a military convention, general ord states that if i desired to have an interview with you on the subject you would not decline, provided i had authority to act. sincerely desiring to leave nothing untried which may put an end to the calamities of war, i propose to meet you at such convenient time and place as you may designate, with the hope that upon an interchange of views it may be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a convention of the kind mentioned. in such event i am authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed interview may render necessary or advisable. should you accede to this proposition, i would suggest that, if agreeable to you, we meet at the place selected by generals ord and longstreet for their interview, at eleven a.m. on monday next. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "r. e. lee, "_general_." the letter was sent to me open, with instructions to read, seal, and forward. i rode into richmond to ask that some other business should be named as the cause of the call for the interview, but he was not disposed to approach his purpose by diplomacy, and ordered the letter to be delivered. he sent another letter, however: "head-quarters confederate states armies, "march 2, 1865. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant, "_commanding united states armies_: "general,--lieutenant-general longstreet has informed me that in an interview with major-general ord, that officer expressed some apprehension lest the general terms used by you with reference to the exchange of political prisoners should be construed to include those charged with capital offences. "general ord further stated that you did not intend to embrace that class of cases in the agreement to exchange. i regret to learn that such is your interpretation, as i had hoped that by exchanging those held under charges by each party it would be possible to diminish, to some extent, the sufferings of both without detriment to their interests. should you see proper to assent to the interview proposed in my letter of this date, i hope it may be found practicable to arrive at a more satisfactory understanding on this subject. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "r. e. lee, "_general_." to which general grant replied,- "city point, virginia, "march 4, 1865. "general r. e. lee, "_commanding confederate states armies_: "your two letters of the 2d instant were received yesterday. in regard to any apprehended misunderstanding in reference to the exchange of political prisoners, i think there need be none. general ord and general longstreet have probably misunderstood what i said to the former on the subject, or i may have failed to make myself understood possibly. a few days before the interview between generals longstreet and ord i had received a despatch from general hoffman, commissary-general of prisoners, stating in substance that all prisoners of war who were or had been in close confinement or irons, whether under charges or sentence, had been ordered to city point for exchange. i forwarded the substance of that despatch to lieutenant-colonel mulford, assistant agent of exchange, and presumed it probable that he had communicated it to colonel robert ould. a day or two after, an officer who was neither a prisoner of war nor a political prisoner, was executed, after a fair and impartial trial, and in accordance with the laws of war and the usage of civilized nations. it was in explanation of this class of cases i told general ord to speak to general longstreet. reference to my letter of february 16 will show my understanding on the subject of releasing political or citizen prisoners. "in regard to meeting you on the 6th instant, i would state that i have no authority to accede to your proposition for a conference on the subject proposed. such authority is vested in the president of the united states alone. general ord could only have meant that i would not refuse an interview on any subject on which i have a right to act, which, of course, would be such as are purely of a military character, and on the subject of exchanges which has been intrusted to me. (signed) "u. s. grant, "_lieutenant-general_." under the impression that general lee would construe the act of congress in its broad sense and proceed to handle the confederate armies and affairs under his own good judgment, i wrote, begging that he would call general joseph e. johnston back to service and command, and presently suggested and then wrote that i was credibly informed that there was plenty of produce in the country which the farmers would cheerfully deliver at richmond or petersburg if liberal prices _in gold_ could be paid them; that the authority given to impress bread and meat stuffs should be applied as including gold; that right or wrong the emergency called for it, and that i would undertake to secure the gold upon his authority. i suggested that as grant's combinations were looking to concentration against the army of northern virginia and richmond, we should use the railways for collecting and drawing detachments from southern points, calling cavalry by the dirt roads, while the farmers were bringing their produce by private conveyance. furthermore, i cited the fact that there were eight or ten thousand non-combatants in richmond who could be put in my trenches as conscripts, and officered by the officers of the department on duty there, and twelve hundred in lynchburg that could be made similarly available; and argued that using them in the trenches would enable him to draw the first corps out for a movable force to meet flanking efforts of his adversary, and keep open his lines of communication. in that way, i continued, he could collect a hundred thousand men at richmond, with a good supply of rations, while general grant was drawing his two hundred thousand together to attack us; that when concentrated grant would find himself obliged to give speedy battle, as he could not long supply his large force; that our interior lines would enable us to repel and break up the attack and relieve richmond. the times were heavy of events, executive authority intended to be suspended, and it seemed possible that the use of a little gold would so manifest its power as to induce our people to let cotton and tobacco go for foreign exchange which might put us on a gold basis for a twelvemonth. this was the expedient that offered light and hope for the future, and the times called either for heroic methods or the giving over of the forms of war. general lee agreed that the provisions were in the country and would be delivered for gold, but did not think the gold could be found. he made his orders assuming command of the armies, but instead of exercising authority on a scale commensurate with the views of congress and the call of the crisis, applied to the richmond authorities for instructions under the new assignment, and wrote that he would call general johnston to command if he could be ordered to report to him for duty. general johnston was so ordered, and was assigned to command of such fragments of troops as he could collect in the carolinas. general wade hampton was relieved of duty as chief of cavalry in the army of northern virginia and ordered to join general johnston. after collecting such detachments as he could gather, general johnston threw them from time to time along the flank of sherman's march from georgia for virginia, and had some spirited affairs with that army, which was gathering strength along the seaboard as it marched. chapter xli. battle of five forks. various affairs of the closing campaign--the massing of grant's forces--sortie against fort steadman--captured but quickly retaken--general grant's move around the confederate right--general lee anticipates with aggressive work--sheridan makes battle with his whole force at five forks--desperate situation of the confederates--disparity of numbers--splendid stand and battle of generals pickett and ransom--colonel pegram mortally wounded--w. h. f. lee, the "noble son of a noble sire"--corse's division--pickett's generalship--casualties. meanwhile general grant was drawing forces from the north and west to further strengthen his already overwhelming combinations against richmond. general schofield was called from tennessee to north carolina to guard and join on, if necessary, the flank of sherman's column. the cavalry and infantry of the valley of virginia were brought down to the union army about richmond and petersburg,--the latter by transports. general sheridan marched his cavalry, ten thousand strong, from the valley to ride across james river, through lynchburg, to join the northward march of sherman's column. his divisions were under generals custer and devens; general wesley merritt was his chief of cavalry. he was to destroy railroads, canals, bridges, and other works of value as he marched. at staunton he decided to take in the balance of general early's command near his route at waynesboro'. he found that command posted behind field-works, but the line did not cover the left of the position near the river. after some preliminary dashes, general custer found his way around general early's left, and, with part of the cavalry dismounted, made a bold, simultaneous charge on the front and flank, breaking up the line and capturing most of the troops. some of the union commanders claimed that the confederates cheered them as they surrendered. this, however, the confederates deny. the affair is mentioned in the diary of major j. hoskiss, the engineer of the confederate army of the valley, in not more creditable terms than general early gave of his battle of cedar run. pickett's division, fitzhugh lee's cavalry, and other detachments were sent to lynchburg to defend against sheridan's ride; but the high waters of james river and other obstacles turned sheridan from his southern course to a sweep down the north side. generals pickett and fitzhugh lee were recalled and ordered to the north side to join me at richmond for a march to intercept sheridan's forces. general pickett reported on the 13th, and we marched for hanover on the 14th. i made requisition for a pontoon bridge, and was delayed a day waiting for it and for the cavalry. the bridge was not sent. as we marched towards the pamunkey river, general sheridan heard of the move and crossed to the north bank with his main force, leaving a brigade to watch our march, but presently drew the brigade after him. general rosser reported to me with five hundred cavalry, one of the remnants of general early's army not captured, and was ordered across the pamunkey river to follow sheridan's ride. our artillery and infantry were delayed part of a day and night building a bridge from the timbers of an old barn that stood near the bank of the river, and part of the command crossed early in the morning to find a cold cavalry trail, growing colder. as the prospect of overhauling the march was not encouraging, we retraced our steps, returning to richmond on the 18th, where pickett's men rested until the 24th. as sherman's army drew towards richmond, general grant gave up the thought of taking the city by attack of his strong columns on the north side, lest he should leave open the way of escape of the confederate army, and give time for it to combine with johnston's forces before he could overhaul it. he found, too, that the "attrition" policy could not be made effective, even with his superior numbers, unless he could so manoeuvre as to call his adversary from his fortified grounds to make the work of attrition mutual. on the 14th of march he gave instructions of preparation for a general move by his left, and on the 24th gave definite orders for the move to be made on the 29th. on the 24th, general lee gave consent to the making of a sortie from his line at hare's hill, in front of petersburg, against fort steadman of the enemy's works. the distance between the lines at that point was one hundred and fifty yards, the distance between the picket lines fifty yards. union officers had given out that deserters from the confederate army were permitted to march into the union lines with their arms. under the circumstances it was conceived to be practicable to gain fort steadman by surprise, and the confederate chief was led to believe that there were other forts to the rear of steadman that could be carried and held until general grant could be forced to make a longer line to reach our southern communications, and give us time to find dry roads for our march away, or for reinforcements to join us. it was a hazardous adventure at best, but his brave heart usually went with a proposition for a bold fight. the second corps, under major-general gordon, was assigned for the sortie, to be reinforced by other troops to be called. pickett's division of the first corps, that had been resting on the north side since the 18th, was called to report to general lee at petersburg, without intimation of the service proposed, but all calls and orders of the times were looked upon as urgent. the quartermaster was despatched to richmond to have the transportation at the station as soon as the troops could reach the depot, and the division was ordered to march in anticipation of due preparation for their transit. but the quartermaster found that the railroad company could furnish transportation for three brigades only. general lee was informed of the fact, and i suggested that his only way to be assured of the service of a division was to draw mahone's from bermuda hundred and have pickett's march to replace it. he preferred part of pickett's division,--finding it could not be used as a division, as pickett, the ranking officer, would be called to command the work during the early morning, for which he had no opportunity to prepare. general lee collected about eighteen thousand men near the sallying field, ordered men selected to cut away the fraise and abatis for the storming column that should advance with empty guns (to avoid premature alarms), and ordered a squadron of cavalry ready to dash across the lines to cut the wires about general grant's lines. the army of the potomac, general meade commanding, was posted,--the ninth corps on the right from james river to fort howard, including fort steadman, general parke commanding; next, on parke's left, was the sixth corps, under general wright; then general humphreys with the second corps, general warren with the fifth; general sheridan's cavalry, armed with repeating rifles, on the extreme left; general ord, commanding the army of the james, on the north side, generals gibbon and weitzel commanding corps,--all officers of the highest attainments and veterans in service. the armies of the potomac and the james and sheridan's cavalry, constituting general grant's immediate command, numbered one hundred and eleven thousand soldiers.[203] colonel w. h. taylor, chief of staff with general lee, reports, "lee had at that time only thirty-nine thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven available muskets for the defence of richmond and petersburg."[204] the stormers advanced before daylight, gained quiet possession of the enemy's picket line, carried his works between batteries 9 and 10, moved to the right and left, captured fort steadman and its garrison, and turned the guns there and at battery 10 against the enemy. but the alarm spread and the enemy was afield, feeling his way towards the assailants, for it was not yet light enough to see and direct his artillery fire over his own men. batteries 11 and 12 were taken, and guides sent to conduct the confederate columns to forts reported to be in rear of steadman were in search, but there were no forts there. redoubts constructed on the main line had commanding positions over fort steadman, and a sweeping fire along its lines, in anticipation of a surprise attack, but their fire was withheld for daylight to direct it. light broke and the fire opened. general parke called his field artillery under tidball into practice from high ground over the confederates, put the divisions of hartranft and wilcox against the confederate flanks, and held them back near the troops crowding in along the breach, and called for a division from the second corps. the confederate columns were strong enough to repel the attack of two divisions,--were put there for that purpose,--but so far from breaking up and pushing back the ninety thousand men in front of them, they were not so handled as to check two divisions long enough for the forces to get back to their lines. the artillery fire not only tore the confederate ranks, but crossed fire in their rear, cutting off reinforcements and retreat. our side was without artillery, except captured guns, which were handled by infantry. as the sortie was noised along the line, general humphreys and general wright advanced the second and sixth corps against the confederate lines along their fields to learn if troops had been drawn from their fronts to join the attack. batteries 11 and 12 were recovered before eight o'clock, and general parke ordered hartranft's division to regain fort steadman and battery 10, which was done with slight loss before nine o'clock. many confederates got back to their lines in disordered flight, but 1949 prisoners and nine stands of colors were taken by the ninth corps. the aggregate of union losses was reported as 2107. confederate losses are not reported in detail or in numbers. general meade's estimate of our loss was 5000. general humphreys captured the intrenched picket line in front of him, but found the confederate works in front well manned. general wright got well in on the front of his line to favorable position, from which he assaulted and carried the confederate works on the 2d of april. corse's and terry's brigades of pickett's division remained in wait under arms until a late hour of the 25th, but were not called to take part in the sortie.[205] the result calls for little comment upon the adventure. for an army of forty thousand veterans, without field batteries, to dislodge from their well-chosen and strongly-fortified lines an army of ninety thousand well-armed and thoroughly-appointed veterans was impossible. pursuant to previous orders, general grant started on his move around the confederate right on the 27th. general ord was called to the south side with fourteen thousand men of the army of the james, leaving general weitzel with twenty thousand on the north side.[206] in front of that force we had ten thousand men of field's and kershaw's divisions and g. w. c. lee's division of local defence troops (not including gary's cavalry, the sailors and marines) holding the forts at drury's and chapin's farms. general grant's orders were that his troops at all points should be ready to receive orders for assault. duly informed of the enemy's movements, and understanding his purpose, general lee marched to his right on the 29th. fitzhugh lee's cavalry was called in advance to march for five forks. general lee marched with fifteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry (including fitzhugh lee's division), and a quota of artillery, along the white oak road to his right. the purpose of the enemy was to overreach the fortified grounds and call the confederates to field work, and general lee thought to anticipate him by aggressive work as soon as he was in the open field, and ordered battle for the 31st. general pickett, with three brigades of his division, two of b. r. johnson's division (ransom's and wallace's), with the cavalry, was ordered to engage sheridan's cavalry at five forks, while general lee attacked, with mcgowan's, gracie's, hunton's, and wise's brigades, the fifth army corps, that was between pickett and our line of fortifications. the opening of this part of the battle was in favor of the confederates. general lee drove back the advance division of the fifth corps to the next, and pushed the two back to concentration upon the third, where that part of the battle rested. general pickett made his part of the battle by putting w. h. f. lee's and rosser's divisions of cavalry on his right, and following that leading by his infantry and artillery, leaving fitzhugh lee's cavalry division, under general t. t. mumford, along the right front of sheridan's cavalry. he pressed his separate battle by his right advance until night, forcing sheridan back to dinwiddie court-house, where the latter reported to general grant that the force in front of him was too strong, and asked for reinforcements. pickett prepared to follow his success by early morning battle and rested for the night, but miles's division of the second corps was put against the other end of the battle, and the fifth corps rallied and advanced against the brigades that were with general lee. they were forced back to the white oak road, then into their fortified lines, leaving an interval of five miles behind pickett's left. responding to general sheridan's call, general grant ordered the fifth corps, under general warren, fifteen thousand[207] strong, and mackenzie's cavalry division (sixteen hundred). the design was that the fifth corps should come in on pickett's left rear and cut off his retreat, but heavy rains of the 30th and morning of the 31st had so flooded the streams and roads that the night march was slow and fatiguing, and pickett receiving notice during the night of the projected move against his rear, changed his orders for battle, and directed the troops withdrawn for five forks before daylight. his retrograde was made in time to escape the fifth corps, and was followed by sheridan's cavalry, but no serious effort was made to delay his movements. he made his march of five miles to five forks, put his troops in order of battle by nine o'clock of the morning of the 1st of april, and ordered his well-chosen line examined and put under construction of field-works. corse's, terry's, and steuart's brigades of pickett's division, and ransom's and wallace's brigades of b. r. johnson's division, were posted from right to left. of pegram's artillery, three guns were planted at the forks, and three more near his right; w. h. f. lee's division of cavalry on his right; fitzhugh lee's division on his left,--general t. t. mumford commanding the latter; rosser's division in rear guarding trains. general fitzhugh lee was chief of cavalry. as soon as the infantry line was formed, the troops set to work intrenching the position. the line of battle was parallel to and lay along the white oak road, the left broken smartly to the rear, the retired end in traverse and flanking defence. the extreme right of the infantry line was also refused, but not so much. four miles east from pickett's left was the right of the fortified lines of general lee's army. on the right and outside of those lines was a detachment of cavalry under general roberts. the division of fitzhugh lee's cavalry was ordered to cover the ground between roberts's cavalry and pickett's left by a line of vedettes, and his division was posted on that part of the field. w. h. f. lee's cavalry held strong guard on the right, and had the benefit of some swamp lands. his lines formed and field-works under construction, general pickett rode to the rear for his noon lunch, and was soon followed by the cavalry chief. sheridan's cavalry followed close on pickett's march, but did not attempt to seriously delay it. he made a dash about ten o'clock to measure the strength of the works under construction, and found them too strong to warrant fierce adventure. delayed by the heavy roads and flooding streams, the fifth corps was not in position until four o'clock in the afternoon. general sheridan planned for battle to have general merritt display the cavalry divisions of custer and devens against the confederate front and right, to convey the impression that that was the field from which his battle would be made, while he drew up and massed the fifth corps at the other end of the field for the real fight. the corps was arranged, crawford's division in column on the right, ayres's on crawford's left, griffin's division in support, mackenzie's cavalry division on the right of the infantry column, at the white oak road. the fifth corps was to wheel in close connection and assault against the face of the return of confederate works, while the cavalry divisions in front were to assail on that line and the right of the works. the march and wheel of the fifth corps were made in tactical order, and the lines advanced in courageous charge, but staggered and halted under the destructive infantry fire. the charge was repeated, but held in check until crawford's division found a way under cover of a woodland beyond the confederate works, and marched to that advantage. ransom drew his brigade from the intrenched line to meet that march, but it was one brigade against three--and those supported by part of griffin's division. ransom's horse was killed, falling on him; his adjutant-general, captain gee, was killed, and the brigade was forced back. this formidable move by open field to pickett's rear made his position untenable. feeling this, the veteran soldiers of the left brigades realized that their battle was irretrievable. those who could find escape from that end of the works fell back in broken ranks, while many others, finding the enemy closing in on their rear, thought it more soldierly to surrender to ayres's brave assaulting columns, and not a few were the captives of crawford's division. it was not until that period that general pickett knew, by the noise of battle, that it was on. he rode through the fire to his command, but his cavalry chief, riding later, was cut off from the field and failed to take part in the action. when pickett got to the forks, colonel pegram, of the artillery, had been mortally wounded, the battery commander was killed, and many of the cannoneers killed or wounded. he found an artillery sergeant and enough men to man one gun, and used it with effect until the axle broke. the brigades of steuart and terry changed front and received the rolling battle. the cavalry assailants of the front and right had no decided success, but the infantry columns pressing their march, the confederate brigades were pushed back to their extreme right, where in turn corse's brigade changed front to receive the march, leaving w. h. f. lee's cavalry to look to his right. the union cavalry essayed to charge the confederate remnants to dismay, but the noble son of the noble sire seized opportunity to charge against the head of this threatening column before it could pass the swamp lands, drove back its head until corse's brigade got back to cover of woodland, and night came to cover the disastrous field.[208] the remnants of the command were collected as soon and as well as they could be in the dead of night and marched towards exeter mills, where pickett proposed to cross the appomattox and return to the army, but early movements of the next morning changed the face of the military zodiac. the position was not of general pickett's choosing, but of his orders, and from his orders he assumed that he would be reinforced. his execution was all that a skilful commander could apply. he reported as to his position and the movements of the enemy threatening to cut his command from the army, but no force came to guard his right. the reinforcements joined him after night, when his battle had been lost and his command disorganized. the cavalry of his left was in neglect in failing to report the advance of the enemy, but that was not for want of proper orders from his head-quarters. though taken by surprise, there was no panic in any part of the command; brigade after brigade changed front to the left and received the overwhelming battle as it rolled on, until crushed back to the next, before it could deploy out to aid the front,--or flank attack,--until the last right brigade of the brave corse changed and stood alone on the left of w. h. f. lee's cavalry, fronting at right angle against the enemy's cavalry columns. it is not claiming too much for that grand division to say that, aided by the brigades of ransom and wallace, they could not have been dislodged from their intrenched position by parallel battle even by the great odds against them. as it was, ayres's division staggered under the pelting blows that it met, and crawford's drifted off from the blows against it, until it thus found the key of the battle away beyond the confederate limits. in generalship pickett was not a bit below the "gay rider." his defensive battle was better organized, and it is possible that he would have gained the day if his cavalry had been diligent in giving information of the movements of the enemy.[209] [illustration: five forks] the losses are not found in separate reports. both sides suffered severely, pickett losing two thousand. he had nine thousand men of all arms. his adversary had twenty-six thousand. reinforcements of hunton's brigade, and lieutenant-general r. h. anderson with the other brigades of b. r. johnson, were sent him too late, and a telegram came for me at richmond to march a division to petersburg to report to general lee. the hour at which the telegram was received was not noted. as the operations at five forks were not decisive until after five o'clock, the telegram may have been received about seven p.m. field's division was ordered to the railway station, and the quartermaster was sent in advance to have the cars ready to move it. to give the troops the benefit of our limited transportation i rode with the staff by the dirt road. chapter xlii. petersburg. the fierce concerted assault by the federals--death of a. p. hill--general lee announces to richmond authorities that he must retreat--reception of the news by president davis at church service--federals take forts gregg and whitworth--the retreat harassed by continuous fighting--longstreet saves high bridge, a vital point--ewell and others compelled to surrender--general mahone's account of interesting scenes--magnitude of the disaster--"is the army dissolving?"--general reed mortally wounded--panic occurs, but order is restored--general gregg and part of his cavalry command captured by rosser and mumford. the darkness of night still covered us when we crossed over james river by the pontoon bridge, but before long land and water batteries lifted their bombs over their lazy curves, screaming shells came through the freighted night to light our ride, and signal sky-rockets gave momentary illumination. our noble beasts peered through the loaded air and sniffed the coming battle; night-birds fluttered from their startled cover, and the solid pounding upon mahone's defensive walls drove the foxes from their lairs. if tears and prayers could have put out the light it would not have passed petersburg,--but it passed by twenty miles. a hundred guns and more added their lightning and thunder to the storm of war that carried consternation to thousands of long-apprehensive people. the cause was lost, but the end was not yet. the noble army of northern virginia, once, twice conqueror of empire, must bite the dust before its formidable adversary. the impulse was to stop and guard mahone, but some of his men had been called to assist in guarding elsewhere, which, with our imperative orders, admonished us that he must be left to his fate, and weitzel's fire upon the lines we had just left told of his orders to be prepared for the grand enveloping charge. but the order for weitzel's part in the general charge was afterwards suspended until enough troops could be sent to assure success. had general grant known that field's division was withdrawn during the night, weitzel's assault would have gone in the general move of the morning of the 2d, and richmond, with the confederate authorities, would have been taken before noon. as morning approached the combat was heavier. the rolling thunder of the heavy metal reverberated along the line, and its bursting blaze spread afar to light the doom of the army once so proud to meet the foe,--matchless army of northern virginia! general grant had ordered assault for four o'clock, but it was near five before there was light enough for the men to see their way across the line and over the works. our night-ride was beyond range of the enemy's batteries. crossing the appomattox, we rode through the streets of petersburg for general lee's head-quarters, some miles farther west. as no part of the command had reached the station when we passed, orders were left for the detachments to march as soon as they landed. before the first rays of morning we found general head-quarters. some members of the staff were up and dressed, but the general was yet on his couch. when told of my presence, he called me to a seat at his bedside, and gave orders for our march to support the broken forces about five forks. he had no censure for any one, but mentioned the great numbers of the enemy and the superior repeating rifles of his cavalry. he was ill, suffering from the rheumatic ailment that he had been afflicted with for years, but keener trouble of mind made him in a measure superior to the shooting pains of his disease. from the line gained by the sixth corps on the 25th it was a run of but two or three minutes across to the confederate works. at 4.45, general wright advanced as the signal for general assault. general lee was not through with his instructions for our march when a staff-officer came in and reported that the lines in front of his head-quarters were broken. drawing his wrapper about him, he walked with me to the front door and saw, as far as the eye could cover the field, a line of skirmishers in quiet march towards us. it was hardly light enough to distinguish the blue from the gray. general wright drove in our picket line, and in desperate charges crowned the confederate works. general gibbon followed the move with his divisions of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth corps, one of his brigades (harris's) carrying part of the confederate works. the troops, weary of their all-night watch and early battle, halted to close their ranks and wait for the skirmish line to open up the field. general lee appealed to have me interpose and stop the march, but not a man of my command was there, nor had we notice that any of them had reached the station at petersburg. all staff-officers mounted and rode to find the parts of heth's and wilcox's divisions that had been forced from their lines. the display of officers riding in many directions seemed to admonish the skirmishers to delay under cover of an intervening swale. the alarm reached general a. p. hill, of the third corps, who rode off to find his troops, but instead came suddenly upon the enemy's skirmishers in their concealment. he wheeled and made a dash to escape, but the federal fire had deadly effect, the gallant general fell, and the southern service lost a sword made bright by brave work upon many heavy fields. general humphreys, of the second, followed the move of the sixth corps, and general parke assaulted on the bermuda hundred front and at petersburg. he had partial success at the former, but was repulsed when he met mahone's strong line. at petersburg he had more success, capturing twelve guns. general sheridan, reinforced by miles's division, was ordered to follow up his work on the right bank. the reinforcements sent under lieutenant-general anderson joined general pickett at night of the 1st, and the combined forces succeeded in getting out of the way of the union infantry, and they gave the cavalry a severe trial a little before night at amazon creek, where the pursuit rested; but the union forces made some important captures of artillery and prisoners. the divisions of heth and wilcox moved to the right and left to collect their broken files. general wright wheeled to the right and massed the sixth corps for its march to petersburg, and was joined by general gibbon. not venturing to hope, i looked towards petersburg and saw general benning, with his rock brigade, winding in rapid march around the near hill. he had but six hundred of his men. i asked for two hundred, and led them off to the canal on our right, which was a weak point, threatened by a small body of skirmishers, and ordered the balance of his troops deployed as skirmishers in front of the enemy's main force. i rode then to benning's line of skirmishers, and at the middle point turned and rode at a walk to the top of the hill, took out my glasses, and had a careful view of the enemy's formidable masses. i thought i recognized general gibbon, and raised my hat, but he was busy and did not see me. there were two forts at our line of works,--gregg and whitworth. general grant rode over the captured works and ordered the forts taken. upon withdrawing my glasses i looked to the right and left, and saw benning's four hundred standing in even line with me, viewing the masses preparing for their march to meet us. during a few moments of quiet, general lee despatched to richmond of affairs at petersburg, and to advise that our troops must abandon their lines and march in retreat as soon as night could cover the move. it was eleven o'clock of the morning when the despatch reached richmond. it was the sabbath-day. the city was at profound worship. the president was at st. paul's church. my wife was there (rest her spirit!) and heard the pastor, mr. minnegerode, read, "_the lord is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before him_." the full congregation rose, and the air whispered silence. the solemnity was broken as a swift despatch-bearer entered the portals and walked with quiet but rapid steps up the aisle to the chancel. he handed the president a sealed envelope. after reading, the president took his hat and walked with dignity down the aisle. service was resumed, but presently came another messenger for some of the ladies, then another, and still another, and in a few moments the congregation, followed by the minister, giving up the sacred service, passed out and to their homes to prepare, in silent resignation, for whatever was to come. the tragic scenes of the south side, in a different way, were as impressive as these. general gibbon prepared his divisions under foster and turner for assault upon forts gregg and whitworth, and when the sixth corps lined up with him, he ordered the divisions to their work. as they advanced the other brigades of field's division came up, were aligned before the enemy's heavy massing forces, and ordered to intrench. general foster found his work at fort gregg called for all the force and skill that he could apply. he made desperate assault, but was checked, and charged again and again, even to the bayonet, before he could mount the parapets and claim the fort. it had been manned by part of harris's brigade (twelfth mississippi regiment, under captain j. h. duncan, three hundred men of mahone's division). fifty-five dead were found in the fort; two hundred and fifty, including wounded, were prisoners. general turner attacked at fort whitworth, and had easier work. general wilcox, thinking it a useless sacrifice to try to hold it, ordered his troops withdrawn, and many got out in time to escape the heavy assault, but many were taken prisoners. general gibbon lost ten officers and one hundred and twelve men killed, twenty-seven officers and five hundred and sixty-five men wounded; two pieces of artillery and several colors were captured. it was my time next. general meade called miles's division back to the second corps, and prepared to march down upon petersburg, but general grant thought that the work might prove hazardous of delay to his plans for the next day; that general lee was obliged to pull away from his lines during the night to find escape, and standing as he was he would have the start, while at petersburg he would be behind him. he therefore ordered all things in readiness for his march westward at early light of the next morning. after a. p. hill fell his staff and corps were assigned as part of my command. heth's and wilcox's divisions were much broken by the losses of the day. mahone had repulsed the attack made upon his position, and had his division in good order and spirits, except the regiment of harris's brigade that was at fort gregg. general lee's order for retreat was out in time to have the troops take up the march as soon as night came. the troops at petersburg were to cross the appomattox at the bridge there, mahone's division to march to chesterfield court-house and cover the march of the troops from the north side. general ewell, commanding on the north side, was to cross his divisions, one at the lower bridge, the other at richmond. lieutenant-general anderson and major-general pickett, with the cavalry, were to march up the south bank of the appomattox. field's division and parts of heth's and wilcox's crossed the river soon after dark, and were followed by the second corps, which wrecked the bridge behind it. g. w. c. lee's division, including the garrison at chapin's bluff, crossed the james at the lower bridge, breaking it when they had passed. the sailors and marines at drury's bluff, on the south side, failed to receive orders, but, under advice from general mahone, got off in good season and marched through chesterfield court-house to join g. w. c. lee's division in its after-march. general kershaw crossed at richmond. as the division came over the bridge the structure was fired (supposedly by an incendiary), and kershaw had to go through the flames at double-quick time. ewell's command was united near manchester and pursued its march. general mahone marched on his line just mentioned. after a tramp of sixteen miles through mud, my column halted for a short rest, and marched to goode's bridge on the 3d. field's and wilcox's divisions were put across the appomattox to guard against threatening moves of cavalry. in the forenoon of the 4th, mahone's division crossed,--also a part of heth's that had been cut off, and had marched up on the south side,--and our march was continued to amelia court-house, the enemy's cavalry constantly threatening our left flank. at the court-house the cavalry was more demonstrative and seemed ready to offer battle. field, heth, wilcox, and the artillery were put in position and looked for opportunity to strike the head of the enemy's column and delay his march. but it proved to be only the purpose of the cavalry to delay our march while the enemy was passing his heavier column by us to jetersville. orders had been sent for provisions to meet us at the court-house, but they were not there, so we lost the greater part of a day gathering supplies from the farmers. our purpose had been to march through burkeville to join our forces to those of general j. e. johnston in north carolina, but at jetersville, on the 5th, we found the enemy square across the route in force and intrenching, where our cavalry under general w. h. f. lee engaged him. general field put out a strong line of skirmishers to support the cavalry. field's, heth's, and wilcox's divisions and artillery were prepared for action and awaited orders. general meade was in front of us with the second and fifth corps and sheridan's cavalry, but his sixth corps was not up. general fitzhugh lee had been sent by the painesville road with the balance of his cavalry to guard the trains raided by detachments of the enemy, which latter made some important captures. general lee was with us at jetersville, and, after careful reconnoissance, thought the enemy's position too strong to warrant aggressive battle. he sent for some of the farmers to get more definite information of the country and the strength of the position in front of us, but they knew nothing beyond the roads and by-roads from place to place. general meade, finding that his sixth corps could not join him till a late hour, decided to wait till next morning for his attack. general ord rested his column for the night at burkeville. the enemy was quiet at jetersville, except for a light exchange of cavalry fire. no orders came, the afternoon was passing, further delay seemed perilous. i drew the command off and filed to the right to cross flat creek to march for farmville. the other infantry and trains and artillery followed and kept the march until a late hour, halting for a short rest before daylight. early on the 6th, general meade advanced for battle, and, not finding us at jetersville, started towards amelia court-house to look for us, but general humphreys, of his second corps, learned that our rear-guard was on the north side of flat creek on the westward march. general griffin, of the fifth corps, also had information of troops in march west, and general meade, therefore, changed direction to pursue with his second and sixth corps, putting the fifth on the painesville road. general sheridan despatched general ord that we had broken away from him and were marching direct for burkeville. the latter prepared to receive us, but soon learned that we had taken another route. he had previously detached two regiments of infantry (five hundred men), under colonel washburn, with orders to make rapid march and burn high bridge. to this force he afterwards sent eighty cavalrymen, under brigadier-general theodore reed, of his staff, who conducted the column, and put his command in march to follow by the road through rice's station. after repairing the bridge at flat creek, general humphreys marched in hot pursuit of our rear-guard, followed by the sixth corps, merritt's and crook's cavalry moving on the left of our column as we marched. general humphreys, in his account of the pursuit, says,- "a sharp and running fight commenced at once with gordon's corps which was continued over a distance of fourteen miles, during which several partially-intrenched positions were carried."[210] my column marched before daylight on the 6th. the design from the night we left petersburg was that its service should be to head off and prevent the enemy's infantry columns passing us and standing across our march. at sailor's creek the road "forks,"--one road to the high bridge crossing of appomattox river, the other by rice's station to farmville. we had information of ord's column moving towards rice's station, and i was ordered to that point to meet it, the other columns to follow the trains over the bridge. at rice's station the command was prepared for action,--field's division across the road of ord's march, wilcox on field's right; both ordered to intrench, artillery in battery. heth's division was put in support of wilcox, mahone to support field. just then i learned that ord's detachment of bridge-burners had passed out of sight when the head of my command arrived. i had no cavalry, and the head of ord's command was approaching in sight; but directly general rosser reported with his division of cavalry. he was ordered to follow after the bridge-burners and capture or destroy the detachment, _if it took the last man of his command to do it_. general ord came on and drove in my line of skirmishers, but i rode to meet them, marched them back to the line, with orders to hold it till _called in_. ord's force proved to be the head of his column, and he was not prepared to press for general engagement. general t. t. mumford reported with his cavalry and was ordered to follow rosser, with similar directions. gary's cavalry came and reported to me. high bridge was a vital point, for over it the trains were to pass, and i was under the impression that general lee was there, passing with the rest of his army, but hearing our troops engaged at rice's station, he had ridden to us and was waiting near mahone's division. ord's command was not up till near night, and he only engaged with desultory fire of skirmishers and occasional exchange of battery practice, arranging to make his attack the next morning. general ewell's column was up when we left amelia court-house, and followed anderson's by amelia springs, where he was detained some little time defending trains threatened by cavalry; at the same time our rear-guard was near him, followed by the enemy. near deatonville crook's cavalry got in on our trains and caused delay of several hours to anderson's march. crook was joined by part of merritt's cavalry and repeated the attack on the trains, but ewell was up in time to aid in repelling the attack, and the march was resumed, the enemy's cavalry moving on their left flank. anderson crossed sailor's creek, closely followed by ewell. the route by which they were to march was by high bridge, but they were on strange ground, without maps, or instructions, or commander. in the absence of orders anderson thought to march for the noise of battle, at rice's station. they had no artillery or cavalry. the chief of cavalry was there, but his troopers were elsewhere, and he rode away, advising the force to follow him. the rear-guard came up rapidly and essayed to deploy for defence, but the close pursuit of humphreys's corps forced its continued march for high bridge, letting the pursuit in upon ewell's rear. as anderson marched he found merritt's cavalry square across his route. humphreys was close upon ewell, but the former awaited battle for the arrival of the sixth corps. there was yet a way of escape from the closing clutches of the enemy by filing to their right and marching to the rear of the command at rice's station; but they were true soldiers, and decided to fight, even to sacrifice their commands if necessary, to break or delay the pursuit until the trains and rear-guard could find safety beyond high bridge. ewell deployed his divisions, kershaw's on the right, g. w. c. lee's on the left. their plan was, that anderson should attack and open the way while ewell defended the rear. as anderson attacked, wright's corps was up, humphreys had matured his plans, and the attack of anderson hastened that of the enemy upon the confederate rear. anderson had some success, and ewell received the assaults with resolute coolness, and at one moment pushed his fight to aggressive return, but the enemy, finding that there was no artillery with the confederates, dashed their batteries into closer range, putting in artillery and infantry fire, front and flanks, until the confederate rear was crushed to fragments. general ewell surrendered; so also did general g. w. c. lee with his division. general kershaw advised such of his men as could to make their escape, and surrendered with his division. general anderson got away with the greater part of b. r. johnson's division, and pickett with six hundred men. generals corse and hunton and others of pickett's men were captured. about two hundred of kershaw's division got away. general r. s. ewell and general r. h. anderson are barely known in the retreat, but their stand and fight on that trying march were among the most soldier-like of the many noble deeds of the war. while waiting near my rear, general lee received information, through colonel venable, of his staff, as to the disaster at sailor's creek. he drew mahone's division away, and took it back to find the field. general mahone writes of the scenes that he witnessed as follows: "as we were moving up in line of battle, general lee riding with me and remonstrating about the severity of my note in respect to colonel marshall's interference with my division the night before, up rode colonel venable, of general lee's staff, and wanted to know if he, general lee, had received his message. general lee replied 'no,' when colonel venable informed him that the enemy had captured the wagon-trains at sailor's creek. general lee exclaimed, 'where is anderson? where is ewell? it is strange i can't hear from them.' then turning to me, he said, 'general mahone, i have no other troops, will you take your division to sailor's creek?' and i promptly gave the order by the left flank, and off we were for sailor's creek, where the disaster had occurred. general lee rode with me, colonel venable a little in the rear. on reaching the south crest of the high ground at the crossing of the river road overlooking sailor's creek, the disaster which had overtaken our army was in full view, and the scene beggars description,--hurrying teamsters with their teams and dangling traces (no wagons), retreating infantry without guns, many without hats, a harmless mob, with the massive columns of the enemy moving orderly on. at this spectacle general lee straightened himself in his saddle, and, looking more the soldier than ever, exclaimed, as if talking to himself, 'my god! has the army dissolved?' as quickly as i could control my own voice i replied, 'no, general, here are troops ready to do their duty;' when, in a mellowed voice, he replied, 'yes, general, there are some true men left. will you please keep those people back?' as i was placing my division in position to 'keep those people back,' the retiring herd just referred to had crowded around general lee while he sat on his horse with a confederate battle-flag in his hand. i rode up and requested him to give me the flag, which he did. "it was near dusk, and he wanted to know of me how to get away. i replied, 'let general longstreet move by the river road to farmville, and cross the river there, and i will go through the woods to the high bridge (railroad bridge) and cross there.' to this he assented. i asked him then, after crossing at the high bridge, what i should do, and his reply was, to exercise my judgment. i wanted to know what should be done with the bridge after crossing it. he said, 'set fire to it,' and i replied that the destruction of a span would as well retard the enemy as the destruction of the whole half mile of bridge, and asked him to call up colonel talcott, of the engineers' regiment, and personally direct him in the matter, which he did." general mahone withdrew at eleven o'clock at night through the wood, found the bridge, had the fragments of commands over before daylight, and crossed high bridge. the parties called to fire the bridge failed to appear. he sent a brigade back to do the work, and had a sharp skirmish in checking the enemy long enough to start the fire, after which he withdrew as far as cumberland church and deployed for battle, poague's artillery on his right. general rosser got up with the detachment sent to burn the bridge, and attacked. general reed, seeing his approach, found a defensive position, and arranged the command to receive battle. general mumford got up and deployed his troopers, dismounted, on rosser's left. nothing daunted, general reed received the attack, and in gallant fight made one or two counter-charges with his small cavalry force, but ere long he was mortally wounded, as was colonel washburn. most of his cavalry officers and many of his infantry were killed or wounded, and the rest surrendered. reed's fight was as gallant and skilful as a soldier could make, and its noise in rear of sailor's creek may have served to increase the confusion there. the result shows the work of these remnants of confederate veterans as skilful and worthy of their old chief who fell at yellow tavern. i heard nothing of the affair at sailor's creek, nor from general lee, until next morning. our work at rice's station was not very serious, but was continued until night, when we marched and crossed the appomattox at farmville without loss, some of rosser's and mumford's cavalry following. we crossed early in the morning and received two days' rations,--the first regular issue since we left richmond,--halted our wagons, made fires, got out cooking utensils, and were just ready to prepare a good breakfast. we had not heard of the disasters on the other route and the hasty retreat, and were looking for a little quiet to prepare breakfast, when general lee rode up and said that the bridges had been fired before his cavalry crossed, that part of that command was cut off and lost, and that the troops should hurry on to position at cumberland church. i reminded him that there were fords over which his cavalry could cross, and that they knew of or would surely find them. everything except the food was ordered back to the wagons and dumped in. meanwhile, the alarm had spread, and our teamsters, frightened by reports of cavalry trouble and approaching fire of artillery, joined in the panic, put whips to their teams as quick as the camp-kettles were tumbled over the tail-boards of the wagons, and rushed through the woods to find a road somewhere in front of them. the command was ordered under arms and put in quick march, but general lee urged double-quick. our cavalry was then engaged near farmville, and presently came a reckless charge of gregg's troopers towards parts of rosser's and mumford's commands. heth's division of infantry was sent to support them. as the balance of the command marched, general lee took the head of the column and led it on the double-quick. i thought it better to let them pass me, and, to quiet their apprehensions a little, rode at a walk. general mahone received the attack of part of the enemy's second corps, like gregg's cavalry making reckless attack. the enemy seemed to think they had another sailor's creek affair, and part of their attack got in as far as poague's battery, but mahone recovered it, and then drove off an attack against his front. general gregg and a considerable part of his command were captured by rosser and mumford. at cumberland church the command deployed on the right of poague's battery, but mahone reported a move by part of miles's division to turn his left which might dislodge him. g. t. anderson's brigade of field's division was sent with orders to get around the threatening force and break it up. mahone so directed them through a woodland that they succeeded in over-reaching the threatened march, and took in some three hundred prisoners,[211] the last of our trouble for the day. general lee stopped at a cottage near my line, where i joined him after night; the trains and other parts of his army had moved on towards appomattox court-house. chapter xliii. appomattox. some of general lee's officers say to him that "further resistance is hopeless"--longstreet does not approve--general grant calls for surrender--"not yet"--the confederate chieftain asks terms--his response to his officers as represented by general pendleton--correspondence of generals lee and grant--morning of april 9--general lee rides to meet the federal commander, while longstreet forms the last line of battle--longstreet endeavors to recall his chief, hearing of a break where the confederate troops could pass--custer demands surrender of longstreet--reminded of irregularity, and that he was "in the enemy's lines"--meeting with general grant--capitulation--last scenes. the beginning of the end was now at hand,--not perhaps necessarily, but, at least, as the sequence of cause and effect actually followed. "an event occurred on the 7th," says general long, "which must not be omitted from the narrative. perceiving the difficulties that surrounded the army, and believing its extrication hopeless, a number of the principal officers, from a feeling of affection and sympathy for the commander-in-chief, and with a wish to lighten his responsibility and soften the pain of defeat, volunteered to inform him that, in their opinion, the struggle had reached a point where further resistance was hopeless, and that the contest should be terminated and negotiations opened for a surrender of the army. the delivery of this opinion was confided to general pendleton, who, both by his character and devotion to general lee, was well qualified for such an office. the names of longstreet and some others, who did not coincide in the opinion of their associates, did not appear in the list presented by pendleton."[212] a little after nightfall a flag of truce appeared under torchlight in front of mahone's line bearing a note to general lee: "head-quarters armies of the united states, "5 p.m., april 7, 1865. "general r. e. lee, "_commanding confederate states army_: "general,--the results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate army known as the army of northern virginia. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "u. s. grant, "_lieutenant-general, commanding armies of the united states_." i was sitting at his side when the note was delivered. he read it and handed it to me without referring to its contents. after reading it i gave it back, saying, "_not yet_." general lee wrote in reply,- "april 7, 1865. "general,--i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, "_general_. "lieutenant-general grant, "_commanding armies of the united states_." i was not informed of the contents of the return note, but thought, from the orders of the night, it did not mean surrender. general lee ordered my command from forwardto rear-guard, and his cavalry in rear of the march. the road was clear at eleven o'clock, and we marched at twelve. the enemy left us to a quiet day's march on the 8th, nothing disturbing the rear-guard, and our left flank being but little annoyed, but our animals were worn and reduced in strength by the heavy haul through rain and mud during the march from petersburg, and the troops of our broken columns were troubled and faint of heart. we passed abandoned wagons in flames, and limbers and caissons of artillery burning sometimes in the middle of the road. one of my battery commanders reported his horses too weak to haul his guns. he was ordered to bury the guns and cover their burial-places with old leaves and brushwood. many weary soldiers were picked up, and many came to the column from the woodlands, some with, many without, arms,--all asking for food. general grant renewed efforts on the 8th to find a way to strike across the head of our march by his cavalry and the army of the james, pursuing our rear-guard with the second and sixth corps of the army of the potomac. in the forenoon, general pendleton came to me and reported the proceedings of the self-constituted council of war of the night before, and stated that he had been requested to make the report and ask to have me bear it to general lee, in the name of the members of the council. much surprised, i turned and asked if he did not know that the articles of war provided that officers or soldiers who asked commanding officers to surrender should be shot, and said,- "if general lee doesn't know when to surrender until i tell him, he will never know." it seems that general pendleton then went to general lee and made the report. general long's account of the interview, as reported by pendleton, is as follows: "general lee was lying on the ground. no others heard the conversation between him and myself. he received my communication with the reply, 'oh, no, i trust that it has not come to that,' and added, 'general, we have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms. the enemy do not fight with spirit, while our boys still do. besides, if i were to say a word to the federal commander, he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as to make it the condition of demanding an unconditional surrender, a proposal to which i will never listen.... i have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination for our subjugation, make good, in the long run, our independence, unless foreign powers should, directly or indirectly, assist us.... but such considerations really make with me no difference. we had, i was satisfied, sacred principles to maintain, and rights to defend, for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if we perished in the endeavor.' "such were, as nearly as i can recall them, the exact words of general lee on that most critical occasion. you see in them the soul of the man. where his conscience dictated and his judgment decided, there his heart was."[213] the delicate affection that prompted the knights of later days to offer to relieve our grand commander of his official obligations and take upon themselves responsibility to disarm us and turn us over to the enemy is somewhat pathetic, but when to it are applied the stern rules of a soldier's duty upon a field of emergency, when the commander most needs steady hands and brave hearts, their proceeding would not stand the test of a military tribunal. the interesting part of the interview is that in it our great leader left a sufficient testimonial of his regard as a legacy to the soldiers of his column of the right. though commanders of other columns were in mutinous conduct towards him, he had confidence that we were firm and steady in waiting to execute his last command. during the day general grant wrote general lee in reply to his note of the 7th inquiring as to terms of surrender,- "april 8, 1865. "general r. e. lee, "_commanding confederate states army_: "general,--your note of last evening in reply to mine of the same date, asking the conditions on which i will accept surrender of the army of northern virginia, is just received. in reply i would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon,--namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will be received. "u. s. grant, "_lieutenant-general_." in reply, general lee wrote,- "april 8, 1865. "general,--i received at a late hour your note of to-day. in mine of yesterday i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the army of northern virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the confederate states forces under my command and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. to-morrow on the old stage road to richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies. "r. e. lee, "_general_." the enemy's movements of the day were impressive of his desire to get by our left flank and make a strong stand across the route of our head of column. at prospect station, general sheridan was informed of four trains of cars at appomattox station loaded with provisions for general lee's army. he gave notice to merritt's and crook's cavalry, and rode twenty-eight miles in time for custer's division to pass the station, cut off the trains, and drive back the guard advancing to protect them. he helped himself to the provisions, and captured besides twenty-five pieces of artillery and a wagon and hospital train. at night general lee made his head-quarters near the rear-guard, and spread his couch about a hundred feet from the saddle and blanket that were my pillow and spread for the night. if he had a more comfortable bed than mine i do not know, but i think not. he sent for his cavalry commander, and gave orders for him to transfer his troopers from the rear to the advanced guard, and called general gordon, commanding in front, for report and orders. the advance was then at appomattox court-house, wallace's brigade resting in the village. his orders were to march at one o'clock in the morning, the trains and advanced forces to push through the village in time for my column to stand and prepare to defend at that point in case of close pursuit. general gordon reported, as i remember, less than two thousand men. (general fitzhugh lee puts it at sixteen hundred, but he may have overlooked wallace's brigade, which joined the advance on that day.) my column was about as it was when it marched from petersburg. parts of ewell's, anderson's, and pickett's commands not captured on the march were near us, and reported to me, except wallace's brigade. on the 9th the rear-guard marched as ordered, but soon came upon standing trains of wagons in the road and still in park alongside. the command was halted, deployed into position, and ordered to intrench against the pursuing army. it was five o'clock when the advance commands moved,--four hours after the time ordered. to these general long's batteries of thirty guns were attached. they met sheridan's cavalry advancing across their route. the column was deployed, the cavalry on the right of the artillery and infantry, as they advanced to clear the way. they reported some success, capturing two pieces of artillery, when general ord's column came up. he had, besides his army of the james, the fifth army corps. these commands, with the cavalry, pushed the confederates back a little, while the two corps of the army of the potomac were advancing against my rear-guard. of the early hours of this, the last day of active existence of the army of northern virginia, colonel venable, of general lee's staff, wrote thus: "at three o'clock on the morning of that fatal day, general lee rode forward, still hoping that he might break through the countless hordes of the enemy, who hemmed us in. halting a short distance in rear of our vanguard, he sent me on to general gordon to ask him if he could break through the enemy. i found general gordon and general fitz lee on their front line in the dim light of the morning, arranging our attack. gordon's reply to the message (i give the expressive phrase of the gallant georgian) was this: 'tell general lee i have fought my corps to a frazzle, and i fear i can do nothing unless i am heavily supported by longstreet's corps.' "when i bore the message back to general lee, he said, 'then there is nothing left me but to go and see general grant, and i would rather die a thousand deaths.' "convulsed with passionate grief, many were the wild words which we spoke as we stood around him. said one, 'oh, general, what will history say of the surrender of the army in the field?' "he replied, 'yes, i know they will say hard things of us; they will not understand how we are overwhelmed by numbers. but that is not the question, colonel; the question is, "is it right to surrender this army?" if it is right, then i will take all the responsibility!'"[214] presently general lee called to have me ride forward to him. he was dressed in a suit of new uniform, sword and sash, a handsomely embroidered belt, boots, and a pair of gold spurs. at first approach his compact figure appeared as a man in the flush vigor of forty summers, but as i drew near, the handsome apparel and brave bearing failed to conceal his profound depression. he stood near the embers of some burned rails, received me with graceful salutation, and spoke at once of affairs in front and the loss of his subsistence stores. he remarked that the advanced columns stood against a very formidable force, which he could not break through, while general meade was at my rear ready to call for all the work that the rear-guard could do, and, closing with the expression that it was not possible for him to get along, requested my view. i asked if the bloody sacrifice of his army could in any way help the cause in other quarters. he thought not. then, i said, your situation speaks for itself. [illustration: alexander arranges the last line of battle deployed in the army of northern virginia, at appomattox.] he called up general mahone, and made to him a similar statement of affairs. the early morning was raw and damp. general mahone was chilled standing in wait without fire. he pushed up the embers and said to the general he did not want him to think he was scared, he was only chilled. general mahone sometimes liked to talk a little on questions of moment, and asked several questions. my attention was called to messages from the troops for a time, so that i failed to hear all of the conversation, but i heard enough of it to know that general mahone thought it time to see general grant. appeal was made to me to affirm that judgment, and it was promptly approved. general grant had been riding with his column in our rear during the correspondence of the 7th and 8th. so general lee, upon mounting traveller, his favorite horse, rode to our rear to meet him, leaving his advanced forces engaged in a lively skirmish. he did not think to send them notice of his intended ride, nor did he authorize me to call a truce. he passed my rear under flag, but general grant's orders were that his correspondence with general lee should not interrupt or delay the operations of any of his forces. our advance troops were in action, and general humphreys was up with the second corps of the army of the potomac, preparing for action against our rear-guard. the situation was embarrassing. it was plain enough that i should attack the second corps before others could be up and prepare for action, though our truce forbade. it could not prevail, however, to call me to quiet while the enemy in plain view was preparing for attack, so we continued at our work constructing our best line of defence, and when strong enough i ordered parts of the rear-guard forward to support the advanced forces, and directed general alexander to establish them with part of his batteries in the best position for support or rallying line in case the front lines were forced back. that was the last line of battle formed in the army of northern virginia. while this formation was proceeding, report came from our front that a break had been found through which we could force passage. i called for a swift courier, but not one could be found. colonel j. c. haskell had a blooded mare that had been carefully led from petersburg. appreciating the signs of the times, he had ordered her saddled, intending a desperate ride to escape impending humiliation, but, learning my need of a swift courier he came and offered his services and his mare. he was asked to take the information just brought in to general lee, and as he mounted was told to kill his mare but bring general lee back. he rode like the wind. general lee had passed out and dismounted beyond a turn of the road, and was not seen until the gallant rider had dashed by him. the steed swept onward some distance before the rider could pull up. as colonel haskell rode back, general lee walked to meet him, exclaiming, "you have ruined your beautiful mare! why did you do so?" the swift despatch was too late. general lee's note to general grant asking an interview had gone beyond recall. as my troops marched to form the last line a message came from general lee saying he had not thought to give notice of the intended ride to meet general grant, and asked to have me send his message to that effect to general gordon, and it was duly sent by captain sims, of the third corps staff, serving at my head-quarters since the fall of a. p. hill. after delivering the message, captain sims, through some informality, was sent to call the truce. the firing ceased. general custer rode to captain sims to know his authority, and, upon finding that he was of my staff, asked to be conducted to my head-quarters, and down they came in fast gallop, general custer's flaxen locks flowing over his shoulders, and in brusk, excited manner, he said,-"in the name of general sheridan i demand the unconditional surrender of this army." he was reminded that i was not the commander of the army, that he was within the lines of the enemy without authority, addressing a superior officer, and in disrespect to general grant as well as myself; that if i was the commander of the army i would not receive the message of general sheridan. he then became more moderate, saying it would be a pity to have more blood upon that field. then i suggested that the truce be respected, and said,-"as you are now more reasonable, i will say that general lee has gone to meet general grant, and it is for them to determine the future of the armies." he was satisfied, and rode back to his command. general grant rode away from the army of the potomac on the morning of the 9th to join his troops near appomattox court-house, so general lee's note was sent around to him. when advised of the change, general lee rode back to his front to await there the answer to his note. while waiting, general lee expressed apprehension that his refusal to meet general grant's first proposition might cause him to demand harsh terms. i assured him that i knew general grant well enough to say that the terms would be such as he would demand under similar circumstances, but he yet had doubts. the conversation continued in broken sentences until the bearer of the return despatch approached. as he still seemed apprehensive of humiliating demands, i suggested that in that event he should break off the interview and tell general grant to do his worst. the thought of another round seemed to brace him, and he rode with colonel marshall, of his staff, to meet the union commander. the status of affairs spread through the advance troops of the army, but the work of preparation on my rear line was continued. general field inquired of a passing officer, "what's up?" but, seeing arrangements going on for attack in our rear, he continued his work of preparation to receive it. general grant was found prepared to offer as liberal terms as general lee could expect, and, to obviate a collision between his army of the rear with ours, ordered an officer sent to give notice of the truce. a ride around the lines would consume time, and he asked to have the officer conducted through our lines. colonel fairfax was sent with him. when they reached our rear line it was still at work on the trenches. the officer expressed surprise at the work of preparation, as not proper under truce. colonel fairfax ordered the work discontinued, and claimed that a truce between belligerents can only be recognized by mutual consent. as the object of the ride was to make the first announcement of properly authorized truce, the work of preparation between the lines was no violation of the usages of war, particularly when it was borne in mind that the orders of general grant were that the correspondence should not delay or interrupt military operations. as general lee rode back to his army the officers and soldiers of his troops about the front lines assembled in promiscuous crowds of all arms and grades in anxious wait for their loved commander. from force of habit a burst of salutations greeted him, but quieted as suddenly as they arose. the road was packed by standing troops as he approached, the men with hats off, heads and hearts bowed down. as he passed they raised their heads and looked upon him with swimming eyes. those who could find voice said good-by, those who could not speak, and were near, passed their hands gently over the sides of traveller. he rode with his hat off, and had sufficient control to fix his eyes on a line between the ears of traveller and look neither to right nor left until he reached a large white-oak tree, where he dismounted to make his last head-quarters, and finally talked a little. the shock was most severe upon field's division. seasoned by four years of battle triumphant, the veterans in that body stood at appomattox when the sun rose on the 9th day of april, 1865, as invincible of valor as on the morning of the 31st of august, 1862, after breaking up the union lines of the second field of manassas. they had learned little of the disasters about petersburg, less of that at sailor's creek, and surrender had not had time to enter their minds until it was announced accomplished! the reported opportunity to break through the enemy's lines proved a mistake. general mumford, suspecting surrender from the sudden quiet of the front, made a dashing ride, and passed the enemy's lines with his division of cavalry, and that caused the impression that we would be able to march on. soon after general lee's return ride his chief of ordnance reported a large amount of united states currency in his possession. in doubt as to the proper disposition of the funds, general lee sent the officer to ask my opinion. as it was not known or included in the conditions of capitulation, and was due (and ten times more) to the faithful troops, i suggested a _pro rata_ distribution of it. the officer afterwards brought three hundred dollars as my part. i took one hundred, and asked to have the balance distributed among field's division,--the troops most distant from their homes. the commissioners appointed to formulate details of the capitulation were assigned a room in the mclean residence. the way to it led through the room occupied as general grant's head-quarters. as i was passing through the room, as one of the commissioners, general grant looked up, recognized me, rose, and with his old-time cheerful greeting gave me his hand, and after passing a few remarks offered a cigar, which was gratefully received. the first step under capitulation was to deliver to the union army some fifteen hundred prisoners, taken since we left petersburg, not all of them by my infantry, rosser's and mumford's cavalry having taken more than half of them. besides these i delivered to general grant all of the confederate soldiers left under my care by general lee, except about two hundred lost in the affairs about petersburg, amelia court-house, jetersville, rice's station, and cumberland church. none were reported killed except the gallant officers brigadier-general dearing, of rosser's cavalry, colonel bostan, of mumford's cavalry, and major thompson, of stuart's horse artillery, in the desperate and gallant fight to which they were ordered against the bridge-burning party. general grant's artillery prepared to fire a salute in honor of the surrender, but he ordered it stopped. as the world continues to look at and study the grand combinations and strategy of general grant, the higher will be his award as a great soldier. confederates should be foremost in crediting him with all that his admirers so justly claim, and ask at the same time that his great adversary be measured by the same high standards. on the 12th of april the army of northern virginia marched to the field in front of appomattox court-house, and by divisions and parts of divisions deployed into line, stacked their arms, folded their colors, and walked empty-handed to find their distant, blighted homes. there were "surrendered and paroled" on the last day of our military history over twenty-eight thousand officers and men,--viz.: general lee and staff 15 longstreet's corps[215] 14,833 gordon's corps[216] 7,200 ewell's corps 287 cavalry corps 1,786 artillery 2,586 detachments 1,649 ----- total 28,356 in glancing backward over the period of the war, and the tremendous and terrible events with which it was fraught, the reflection irresistibly arises, that it might perhaps have been avoided and without dishonor. the flag and the fame of the nation could have suffered no reproach had general scott's advice, before the outbreak, been followed,--"wayward sisters, depart in peace." the southern states would have found their way back to the union without war far earlier than they did by war. the reclaiming bonds would then have been those only of love, and the theory of government formulated by george washington would have experienced no fracture. but the inflexible fiat of fate seemingly went forth for war; and so for four long years the history of this great nation was written in the blood of its strong men. chapter xliv. post-bellum pendant. old friends and their kindness--general grant--his characteristic letter of introduction to president johnson--in business in new orleans--political unfriendliness--cause of criticism of military career--appointed surveyor of customs--the old nurse. some weeks after the surrender the newspapers announced that i was to visit washington city. my old company commander, bradford p. alden, who had resigned from the army some years before the war, came down from new york to meet me. not finding me, he wrote to tell me of his trip, that he was anxious about me, lest i might be in need of assistance; that in that event i should draw on him for such amount of money as i wanted. when ready to return his favor he was not in the country, and it was only through a mutual friend, general alvord, that his address in europe was found and the amount returned. a more noble, lovable character never descended from the people of plymouth rock. about the 1st of november, 1865, business of personal nature called me to washington. i stopped at the metropolitan hotel. upon seeing the arrival in the morning papers, general w. a. nichols, of the united states army, called and insisted that my visit should be with him and his family. the request was declined with the suggestion that the war-feeling was too warm for an officer of the army to entertain a prominent confederate, but he insisted and urged that his good wife would not be satisfied unless the visit was made. so it was settled, and i became his guest. he was on duty at the time as assistant adjutant-general at the war department. as i was stopping with an officer of the army, the usages of military life required that i should call upon the commanding general. the next morning i walked with general nichols to make an official call on general grant. he recognized us as we entered his office, rose and walked to meet us. after the usual brief call, we rose to take leave, when he asked to have us call on his family during the evening. most of those whom we met during the evening were old-time personal friends, especially the father-in-law, mr. dent. when leaving, after a pleasant evening, general grant walked with us to the gate and asked if i cared to have my pardon. i pleaded not guilty of an offence that required pardon. he said that he meant amnesty,--that he wished to know if i cared to have it. i told him that i intended to live in the country, and would prefer to have the privileges of citizenship. he told me to call at his office at noon next day; that in the mean time he would see the secretary of war and the president in regard to the matter. the next day he gave me a letter to the president, and said that he had seen him and thought the matter was arranged; that i should first see the secretary of war, then the president. his strong and characteristic letter to the president was as follows: "head-quarters armies of the united states, "washington, d. c., november 7, 1865. "his excellency a. johnson, "_president_: "knowing that general longstreet, late of the army which was in rebellion against the authority of the united states, is in the city, and presuming that he intends asking executive clemency before leaving, i beg to say a word in his favor. "general longstreet comes under the third, fifth, and eighth exceptions made in your proclamation of the 29th of may, 1865. i believe i can safely say that there is nowhere among the exceptions a more honorable class of men than those embraced in the fifth and eighth of these, nor a class that will more faithfully observe any obligation which they may take upon themselves. general longstreet, in my opinion, stands high among this class. i have known him well for more than twenty-six years, first as a cadet at west point and afterwards as an officer of the army. for five years from my graduation we served together, a portion of the time in the same regiment. i speak of him, therefore, from actual personal acquaintance. "in the late rebellion, i think, not one single charge was ever brought against general longstreet for persecution of prisoners of war or of persons for their political opinions. if such charges were ever made, i never heard them. i have no hesitation, therefore, in recommending general longstreet to your excellency for pardon. i will further state that my opinion of him is such that i shall feel it as a personal favor to myself if this pardon is granted. "very respectfully, your obedient servant, "u. s. grant, "_lieutenant-general_." supported by this generous endorsement, i called on the secretary of war, who referred me to the president. after a lengthy interview the president asked to have the matter put off until next day, when i should call at noon. the next day he was still unprepared to make decision, but, after a long, pleasant talk, he said,-"there are three persons of the south who can never receive amnesty: mr. davis, general lee, and yourself. you have given the union cause too much trouble." i replied, "you know, mr. president, that those who are forgiven most love the most." "yes," he said, "you have very high authority for that, but you can't have amnesty." during a subsequent session of congress, general pope sent in a list of names from georgia for whom he asked relief from their political disabilities. general grant, after approving it, made request to one of his friends in congress to have my name put on the list, and i was extended relief soon after it was given to general r. e. lee. in january, 1866, i engaged in business in new orleans with the owen brothers,--william, miller, and edward, old soldiers of the washington artillery,--as cotton factors, and speedily found fair prosperity. before the year was out i was asked to take position in an insurance company, but declined, and repeated applications were refused under plea of limited business experience, but, under promise of ample and competent assistance, i accepted the place with a salary of five thousand dollars, and my affairs were more than prosperous until i was asked an opinion upon the political crisis of 1867. as the whole animus of the latter-day adverse criticisms upon, and uncritical assertions in regard to, the commander of the first corps of the army of northern virginia had its origin in this matter of politics, a brief review of the circumstances is in order. as will be readily recalled by my older readers (while for the younger it is a matter of history), president johnson, after the war, adopted a reconstruction policy of his own, and some of the states were reorganized under it with democratic governors and legislatures, and all would have followed. but congress, being largely republican, was not satisfied, and enacted that the states could not be accepted unless they provided in their new constitutions for _negro suffrage_. in case they would not, the state governments should be removed and the states placed in the hands of general officers of the army as military governors, who should see that the states were reorganized and restored to the union under the laws. under the severe ordeal one of the city papers of new orleans called upon the generals of confederate service to advise the people of the course that they should pursue,--naming the officers. i thought it better policy to hold the states, as they were organized, under the president's policy, shape their constitutions as directed by congress, and have the states not yet reorganized follow the same course. my letter upon the subject was as follows: "new orleans, la., june 3, 1867. "j. m. g. parker, esq.: "dear sir,--your esteemed favor of the 15th ultimo was duly received. "i was much pleased to have the opportunity to hear senator wilson, and was agreeably surprised to meet such fairness and frankness from a politician whom i had been taught to believe harsh in his feelings towards the people of the south. "i have considered your suggestion to wisely unite in efforts to restore louisiana to her former position in the union 'through the party now in power.' my letter of the 6th of april, to which you refer, clearly indicates a desire for practical reconstruction and reconciliation. there is only one route left open, which practical men cannot fail to see. "the serious difficulty arises from want of that wisdom so important for the great work in hand. still, i will be happy to work in any harness that promises relief to our discomfited people and harmony to the nation, whether bearing the mantle of mr. davis or mr. sumner. "it is fair to assume that the strongest laws are those established by the sword. the ideas that divided political parties before the war--upon the rights of the states--were thoroughly discussed by our wisest statesmen, and eventually appealed to the arbitrament of the sword. the decision was in favor of the north, so that her construction becomes the law, and should be so accepted. "the military bill and amendments are the only peace-offerings they have for us, and should be accepted as the starting-point for future issues. "like others of the south not previously connected with politics, i naturally acquiesced in the ways of democracy, but, so far as i can judge, there is nothing tangible in them, beyond the issues that were put to test in the war and there lost. as there is nothing left to take hold of except prejudice, which cannot be worked for good for any one, it seems proper and right that we should seek some standing which may encourage hope for the future. "if i appreciate the issues of democracy at this moment, they are the enfranchisement of the negro and the rights of congress in the premises, but the acts have been passed, are parts of the laws of the land, and no power but congress can remove them. "besides, if we now accept the doctrine that the states only can legislate on suffrage, we will fix the negro vote upon us, for he is now a suffragan, and his vote, with the vote that will go with him, will hold to his rights, while, by recognizing the acts of congress, we may, after a fair trial, if negro suffrage proves a mistake, appeal and have congress correct the error. it will accord better with wise policy to insist that the negro shall vote in the northern as well as the southern states. "if every one will meet the crisis with proper appreciation of our condition and obligations, the sun will rise to-morrow on a happy people. our fields will again begin to yield their increase, our railways and waters will teem with abundant commerce, our towns and cities will resound with the tumult of trade, and we will be reinvigorated by the blessings of almighty god. "very respectfully yours, "james longstreet." i might have added that not less forceful than the grounds i gave were the obligations under which we were placed by the terms of our paroles,--"to respect the laws of congress,"--but the letter was enough. the afternoon of the day upon which my letter was published the paper that had called for advice published a column of editorial calling me traitor! deserter of my friends! and accusing me of joining the enemy! but did not publish a line of the letter upon which it based the charges! other papers of the democracy took up the garbled representation of this journal and spread it broadcast, not even giving the letter upon which they based their evil attacks upon me. up to that time the first corps, in all of its parts, in all of its history, was above reproach. i was in successful business in new orleans as cotton factor, with a salary from an insurance company of five thousand dollars per year. the day after the announcement old comrades passed me on the streets without speaking. business began to grow dull. general hood (the only one of my old comrades who occasionally visited me) thought that he could save the insurance business, and in a few weeks i found myself at leisure. two years after that period, on march 4, 1869, general grant was inaugurated president of the united states, and in the bigness of his generous heart called me to washington. before i found opportunity to see him he sent my name to the senate for confirmation as surveyor of customs at new orleans. i was duly confirmed, and held the office until 1873, when i resigned. since that time i have lived in new orleans, louisiana, and in gainesville, georgia, surrounded by a few of my old friends, and in occasional appreciative touch with others, south and north. of all the people alive i still know and meet, probably no one carries me farther back in recollections of my long life than does my "old nurse." most of the family servants were discharged after the war at macon, mississippi, where some of them still reside, among them this old man, daniel, who still claims the family name, but at times uses another. he calls promptly when i visit macon and looks for "something to remember you by." during my last visit he seemed more concerned for me than usual, and on one of his calls asked,-"marse jim, do you belong to any church?" "oh, yes," i said, "i try to be a good christian." he laughed loud and long, and said,-"something must have scared you mighty bad, to change you so from what you was when i had to care for you." in a recent letter he sent a message to say that he is getting to be a little feeble. blessings on his brave heart! [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] appendix. letters of general robert e. lee and general longstreet. i. _lee to anderson on conduct of the first corps._ august 26, 1864. lieutenant-general r. h. anderson, _commanding longstreet's corps_: general,--i take great pleasure in presenting to you my congratulations upon the conduct of the men of your corps. i believe that they will carry anything they are put against. we tried very hard to stop pickett's men from capturing the breastworks of the enemy, but could not do it. i hope his loss has been small. i am, with respect, your obedient servant, r. e. lee, _general_. ii. _lee to longstreet congratulating him on his convalescence and anticipating return._ camp petersburg, august 29, 1864. general j. longstreet: my dear general,--i received yesterday your letter of the 23d, and am much gratified at your improvement. you will soon be as well as ever, and we shall all be rejoiced at your return. you must not, however, become impatient at the gradual progress you must necessarily make, but be content with the steady advance you are making to health and strength. your progress will be the more certain and your recovery more confirmed. do not let sherman capture you, and i will endeavor to hold grant till you come. i am glad to hear such good accounts of my little namesake. good lungs are a great blessing, and nothing expands them better than a full, hearty yell. i hope mrs. longstreet is well, and that she is enjoying the good peaches and melons of georgia. we have but little enjoyment here. our enemy is very cautious, and he has become so proficient in intrenching that he seems to march with a system already prepared. he threatens dreadful things every day, but, thank god, he has not expunged us yet. all your army friends inquire for you anxiously, and will be delighted to hear of your improvement. we shall not object to your chirography, so you must practise it often, and let me hear of your progress and well-doing. please present my kindest regards to mrs. longstreet, and love to my namesake. the gentlemen of my staff are very grateful for your remembrance, and unite with me in sincere wishes for your welfare and happiness. i am sure the rest of this army would join did they know of the opportunity. with great regard, very truly yours, r. e. lee. iii. _longstreet to lee._ head-quarters army corps, november 24, 1864. general r. e. lee, _commanding_: general,--from the report of scouts received yesterday, it seems that the tenth corps is still on this side, or if it went over to the south side, has returned. the information, too, seems to indicate the arrival of the sixth corps from the valley. under these circumstances it will be necessary for me to force the enemy to develop the extent of his move on this side before taking any more of my troops to the south side. this i shall do, of course, as rapidly as possible. i am going to have the roads leading from white oak swamp to the williamsburg road well broken up with subsoil ploughs. i think that the enemy will then have to build a corduroy there as he moves. he surely will, if i can have a good gentle rain after the roads are thoroughly ploughed. can't you apply this idea to advantage on your side on the roads that general grant will be obliged to travel if he goes to burkeville? i don't know, however, but that it would be better for us to go to burkeville and block the roads behind him. if the roads that general sherman must travel to get to charleston or savannah can be thoroughly ploughed and the trees felled over them, i think that general sherman will not be able to get to his destination in fifty days, as the northern papers expect; and it is not thought to be possible that he can collect more than fifty days' rations before reaching the coast. if the parties are properly organized, i think that they might destroy or injure all of the roads so as to break down general sherman's animals, and result in the capture of most of his forces. i remain, very respectfully, yours most obediently, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. iv. _longstreet to lee on impressment of gold and measures for final campaign._ [confidential.] head-quarters, february 14, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding_: general,--recent developments of the enemy's designs seem to indicate an early concentration of his armies against richmond. this, of course, would involve a like concentration on our part, or the abandonment of our capital. the latter emergency would, i think, be almost fatal,--probably quite so, after our recent reverses. to concentrate here in time to meet the movements of the enemy we will be obliged to use the little of our southern railroad that is left us in transporting our troops, so that we cannot haul provisions over that route. i fear, therefore, that we will not be able to feed our troops unless we adopt extraordinary efforts and measures. i think that there is enough of the necessaries of life left in virginia and north carolina to help us through our troubles if we can only reach them. impressing officers, however, nor collectors of taxes in kind, nor any other plan heretofore employed, is likely to get those supplies in time or in quantities to meet our necessities. the citizens will not give their supplies up and permit their families and servants to suffer for the necessaries of life without some strong inducement. for each one may naturally think that the little that he would supply by denying himself and family would go but little way where so much is needed. he does not want confederate money, for his meat and bread will buy him clothes, etc., for his family more readily and in larger quantities than the money that the government would pay. the only thing that will insure our rations and national existence is _gold_. send out the gold through virginia and north carolina and pay liberal prices, and my conviction is that we shall have no more distress for want of food. the winter is about over, and the families can and will subsist on molasses, bread, and vegetables for the balance of the year if they can get gold for their supplies. there is a great deal of meat and bread inside the enemy's lines that our people would bring us for gold; but they won't go to that trouble for confederate money. they can keep gold so much safer than they can meat and bread, and it is always food and clothing. if the government has not the gold, it must impress it, or if there is no law for the impressment, the gold must be taken without the law. necessity does not know or wait for law. if we stop to make laws in order that we may reach the gold it will disappear the day that the law is mentioned in congress. to secure it no one should suspect that we are after it until we knock at the doors of the vaults that contain it, and we must then have guards to be sure that it is not made away with. it seems to my mind that our prospects will be brighter than they have been if we can only get food for our men; and i think that the plan that i have proposed will secure the food. there seem to be many reasons for the opinion that the enemy deems our capital essential to him. to get the capital he will concentrate here everything that he has, and we will be better able to fight him when we shall have concentrated than when we are in detachments. the army of the mississippi will get new life and spirits as soon as it finds itself alongside of this, and we will feel more comfortable ourselves to know that all are under one eye and one head that is able to handle them. i remain, most respectfully and truly, your obedient servant, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. v. _lee to longstreet on plans for campaign._ [confidential.] head-quarters confederate states armies, february 22, 1865. lieutenant-general j. longstreet, _commanding, etc._: general,--your letter of the 14th instant is received. it arrived during my absence in richmond, and has not been overlooked. i agree with you entirely in believing that if we had gold we could get sufficient supplies for our army, but the great difficulty is to obtain the gold. it is not in the coffers of the government or the banks, but is principally hoarded by individuals throughout the country, and is inaccessible to us. i hope, under the reorganization of the commissary department, if we can maintain possession of our communications, that the army will be better supplied than heretofore, and that we can accumulate some provisions ahead. as regards the concentration of our troops near the capital, the effect would be to produce a like concentration of the enemy, and an increase of our difficulties in obtaining food and forage. but this, whether for good or evil, is now being accomplished by the enemy, who seems to be forcing generals beauregard and bragg in this direction. if sherman marches his army to richmond, as general beauregard reports it is his intention to do, and general schofield is able to unite with him, we shall have to abandon our position on the james river, as lamentable as it is on every account. the want of supplies alone would force us to withdraw when the enemy reaches the roanoke. our line is so long, extending nearly from the chickahominy to the nottoway, and the enemy is so close upon us, that if we are obliged to withdraw we cannot concentrate all our troops nearer than some point on the line of railroad between richmond and danville. should a necessity, therefore, arise, i propose to concentrate at or near burkeville. the route for the troops north of james river would have to be through richmond, on the road to amelia court-house, the cavalry passing up the north branch of the river, and crossing at some point above richmond. pickett's division would take the route through chesterfield court-house, crossing the appomattox at goode's bridge. with the army concentrated at or near burkeville, our communications north and south would be by that railroad, and west by the southside railroad. we might also seize the opportunity of striking at grant, should he pursue us rapidly, or at sherman, before they could unite. i wish you to consider this subject, and give me your views. i desire you also to make every preparation to take the field at a moment's notice, and to accumulate all the supplies you can. general grant seems to be preparing to move out by his left flank. he is accumulating near hatcher's run depots of supplies, and apparently concentrating a strong force in that quarter. yesterday and to-day trains have passed from his right to his left loaded with troops, which may be the body of eight thousand which you report having left signal hill yesterday. i cannot tell whether it is his intention to maintain his position until his other columns approach nearer, or to anticipate any movement by us which he might suppose would then become necessary. i wish you would watch closely his movements on the north side of the river, and try and ascertain whether he is diminishing his force. if he makes the move which appearances now indicate, he may draw out his whole force, abandoning his lines of defence, or hold them partially and move with the remainder of his troops. i should like very much to confer with you on these subjects, but i fear it will be impossible for me to go north of james river, and i do not know that it will be convenient for you to come here. very respectfully, your obedient servant, r. e. lee, _general_. p.s.--can you not return pickett's brigade to him in order that i may withdraw grimes's brigade from his line, its division having been ordered to our right? r. e. l. vi. _longstreet to lee on impressment of men._ [confidential.] head-quarters, february 23, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding, etc._: general,--your letter of yesterday is received. i think you did not understand my letter of the 14th instant. my effort was to express conviction that sherman's move was aimed at richmond, and that grant's concentration here would force us to do the same thing; and, that we might be able to do so, it was necessary that we should have gold, by impressment, to purchase our produce supplies. i think that it is not too late yet. we can surely get the gold by sending impressing officers with guards to the vaults in which it is stored. i understand that there are twelve hundred men in lynchburg already organized, and that we may get eight or ten thousand men in richmond by taking everybody who is able to bear arms. the staff-officers about richmond would be nearly enough to officer this force. if such a force can be raised and put in my lines, it can hold them, i think, and my corps can move down to the relief of beauregard, or it may be moved over to our right, and hold grant in check, so that sherman will be obliged to unite with him or seek a base at new-berne or at wilmington. this would give beauregard and bragg time to unite their forces to meet sherman and schofield here or wherever they may appear. we shall lose more men by a move than by a battle. it is true that we may be compelled to move after the battle, but i think not. if we fight sherman as i suggest, we shall surely drive him to the water for fresh supplies, even if we are not otherwise successful. then we may have time to concentrate as soon as grant, and reopen the line of communication with the south. the local and other troops that we may get from richmond and lynchburg will have tolerably comfortable huts, and there will be enough old soldiers amongst them to teach them picket duty. there are also some cavalrymen who can aid them. i should think that grant, if he moves, can only make a partial move, similar to his last, and that would not injure us very materially. in preparing to take the field, in view of the abandonment of richmond, is it your desire to keep our wagons about our camps that we may move at once? our wagons are out all the time gathering supplies, and at times some distance; so that a very sudden move would leave them behind. shall we continue to send them or keep them with us?... your obedient servant, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. vii. _lee to longstreet._ head-quarters, february 25, 1865. general,--i have received your letters of the 23d and 24th insts. i fear i did not entirely comprehend your views expressed in your letter of the 14th. i think, however, my reply meets your supposition, in the event of concentration by the enemy. i shall in that case unite all the forces possible. i think you are misinformed as to the number of men in lynchburg. at my last call upon general colston, commissary there, he said he had not one hundred men, and they were unarmed. i am very glad to hear that general ewell can get force enough from richmond to man the lines north of james river. i know him to be a brave old soldier, ready to attempt anything, but i do not know where he will find the men. please see him and get a definite statement, for if that can be done it will lighten our labor considerably. you cannot afford to keep your wagons by you. they will have to be kept collecting provisions, forage, etc., or you will starve. i am making great efforts to gather supplies, and send you some documents which will show what the commissary-general is doing in addition to the operations of the officers of his department. it will be a grievous thing to be obliged to abandon our position, and i hope the necessity will never arise, but it would be more grievous to lose our army. i am fully alive to the benefits of procuring gold, but fear it cannot be obtained in the way you suggest; still, i will try. i am much gratified by the earnestness and zeal you display in our operations; and were our whole population animated by the same spirit, we should be invincible. the last reports from s. c. indicated that sherman was turning eastward. it may be to reach the pedee in search of supplies. very respectfully, your obedient servant, r. e. lee, _general_. general longstreet, _commanding, etc._ viii. _longstreet to lee on impressment of gold._ head-quarters first corps, february 26, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding_: general,--i have just heard from general ewell indirectly that he can raise force enough at richmond to hold the lines on this side, so that my corps may be withdrawn temporarily to your right, that is, if you can put a part of the second corps in place of pickett's division. this arrangement will give you force enough to meet any move that the enemy may make upon your right. if he makes no move, then you can, when the proper moment arrives, detach a force to the aid of general beauregard, and if the enemy should then press you, you can abandon petersburg and hold your line here, and take up the line of the appomattox. but i think that the enemy will be forced to move a force south the moment that he finds that you are reinforcing against sherman, else he will encounter the risk of losing sherman as well as richmond. there is some hazard in the plan, but nothing can be accomplished in war without risk. the other important question is provisions. we are doing tolerably well by hauling from the country and paying market prices in confederate money. if you would give us gold i have reason to believe that we could get an abundant supply for four months, and by that time we ought to be able to reopen our communication with the south. the gold is here, and we should take it. we have been impressing food and all of the necessaries of life from women and children, and have been the means of driving thousands from their homes in destitute conditions. should we hesitate, then, about putting a few who have made immense fortunes at our expense to a little inconvenience by impressing their gold? it is necessary for us, and i do not think that we should let our capital fall into the enemy's hands for fear of injuring the feelings or interests of a few individuals. we have expended too much of blood and treasure in holding it for the last four years to allow it to go now by default. i think that it may be saved. if it can, we should not leave any possible contingency untried. i think, however, that the enemy's positions are so well selected and fortified that we must either wait for an opportunity to draw him off from here or await his attack. for even a successful assault would cripple us so much that we could get no advantage commensurate with our loss. i remain with great respect, and truly, your obedient servant, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. ix. _longstreet to lee on his "peace" interview with general ord._ head-quarters first army corps, march 1, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding_: general,--i had another interview with major-general ord yesterday, and expressed the opinions that were spoken of in our interview at the president's mansion on sabbath last. he acceded promptly to my proposition that the war must cease if we are to go to work to try to make peace, and to the proposal for a military convention. i further claimed that we could not go into convention upon any more favorable basis than an earnest desire to arrange plans for peace that should be equally honorable for both parties. to this also i understood him to give his unqualified consent. he says that general grant has the authority to meet you if you have authority to appoint a military convention, and proposed that you should indicate your desire to meet general grant, if you felt authorized to do so. as he made this proposition before mine, to the effect that general grant should express his desire to meet you, and as the interview between general ord and myself had been brought on at the request of general ord, i did not feel that i could well do otherwise than promise to write to you of the disposition on their part to have the interview. if you think it worth your time to invite general grant to an interview, it might be upon some other as the ostensible grounds, and this matter might be brought up incidentally. i presume that general grant's first proposition will be to go into convention upon the basis of reconstruction; but if i have not misunderstood general ord's conversation, general grant will agree to take the matter up without requiring any principle as a basis further than the general principle of desiring to make peace upon terms that are equally honorable for both sides. i would suggest that the interview take place on this side, and at the place of meeting between general ord and myself; because there are several little points upon which you should be posted before the interview, and i do not see that i can well do that by writing. besides, as "the ice has already been broken" on this side, your interview would be relieved in a measure of the formality incident to such occasions. if it should be on this side, i hope that you will give me two or three days' notice. general stevens is of the opinion that one thousand negro laborers on this line during this month will so strengthen our position that we will be able to spare a division, and i am satisfied that we can do so if we can have the work completed, and can get the aid that general ewell promises us. i remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. x. _longstreet to lee on exchange of political prisoners._ head-quarters first army corps, march 1, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding_: general,--i neglected to mention in my letter just finished that general ord expressed some apprehension for general grant lest there might be some misunderstanding in regard to the exchange of political prisoners. the terms were general for the exchange of this class of prisoners, but were not intended by him, he says, to include such as were under charges for capital offences. general grant desired that you should be advised of this construction of the terms. i remain, respectfully, your most obedient servant, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. xi. _lee to longstreet on interview with general grant._ head-quarters, march 2, 1865. general,--i have received to-day your letter of the 1st instant, and concluded to propose an interview to general grant. as you desired to have two or three days' notice, i have appointed monday next, 6th instant, at eleven a.m., at the point suggested by you. will you send my letter to general grant, and arrange with general ord for the interview? if you will ride in to my quarters on saturday next, 4th instant, by ten a.m., in richmond, i shall be happy to see you, when you can enlighten me on the points you referred to in your letter. i hope some good may result from the interview. very truly yours, r. e. lee, _general_. general j. longstreet, _commanding, etc._: p.s.--seal the letter to general grant before transmitting. r. e. l. xii. _longstreet to lee urging use of gold._ head-quarters first army corps, march 7, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding_: general,--i received a letter yesterday from a friend in the interior of north carolina assuring me that there are large quantities of provisions in the state; that many have two and three years' supply on hand, and that gold will bring anything that we need to our armies. the gold is in the country, and most of it is lying idle. let us take it at once and save richmond, and end the war. if we hold richmond and keep our cotton, the war cannot last more than a year longer. if we give up richmond we shall never be recognized by foreign powers until the government of the united states sees fit to recognize us. if we hold richmond and let the enemy have our cotton, it seems to me that we shall furnish him the means to carry on the war against us. it looks to me as though the enemy had found that our policy of destroying the cotton rather than let it fall into their hands would break them down, and that it has forced them to the policy of sending on here to make a contract to feed and clothe our armies in order that they may get the means of carrying on the war of subjugation. if we will keep our cotton and use our gold our work will be comparatively easy. i remain, respectfully, your obedient servant, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. xiii. _longstreet to lee on guarding the danville railroad._ head-quarters first army corps, march 20, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding_: general,--i presume that the enemy's next move will be to raid against the danville railroad, and think that it would be well if we begin at once to make our arrangements to meet it. in order that we may get the troops that may be necessary to meet such a move, would suggest that we collect all the dismounted men of generals fitz lee, rosser, and lomax, and put them behind our strongest lines, and draw out a corps of infantry and hold it in readiness for the raid. general w. h. f. lee's dismounts might also be used behind our works to great advantage. with a cavalry force of two or three thousand men to hold the enemy in check, i think that our infantry may be able to overtake the raiding column. if we can get a large cavalry force i think that we would surely be able to destroy the raiding force. i remain your obedient servant, j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. xiv. _longstreet to assistant adjutant-general taylor on suppression of desertion._ head-quarters first army corps, march 25, 1865. lieutenant-colonel w. h. taylor, _assistant adjutant-general_: the impression prevails amongst the georgia troops of this command that persons at home having authority to raise local organizations are writing and sending messages to the men in the ranks here, offering inducements to them to quit our ranks and go home and join the home organizations. the large and increasing number of desertions, particularly amongst the georgia troops, induces me to believe that some such outside influence must be operating upon our men. nearly all of the parties of deserters seem to go home, and it must be under the influence of some promise, such as being received in the local forces. i would suggest, therefore, the publication of a general order warning all officers or persons authorized to raise local organizations against receiving such deserters or in any way harboring them, and cautioning all such parties that they shall be punished for such crimes under the twenty-second and twenty-third articles of war. it may be well to publish the articles in the order, and to send the order south to be published in all the southern papers. if the order is published, i would suggest that copies be sent to the southern papers by special messenger or by parties going south who will take pains to have it published, otherwise i fear it may miscarry or be delayed by our irregular mails. another growing evil seems to trouble us now in the shape of applications to raise negro companies, regiments, brigades, etc. the desire for promotion seems to have taken possession of our army, and it seems that nearly all the officers and men think that they could gain a grade or more if allowed to go home. i presume that many may try to go merely because they get furloughs. i would suggest, therefore, that some regulation be published upon this subject, and it seems to me that it should require the companies to be mustered in as non-commissioned officers and privates by the enrolling officers, and that all of the officers (general, field, and company) shall be selected from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates on duty with the armies of the confederacy. if these matters are not speedily taken hold of by a firm hand, i fear that we shall be seriously damaged by them. i remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, (signed) j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. xv. _longstreet to lee on sheridan's operations._ head-quarters first army corps, march 28, 1865. general r. e. lee, _commanding, etc._: your telegram asking if we can spare general pickett's division as a supporting force to our cavalry is received. i suggested that it should be sent on that service because i was apprehensive that our railroad would be in danger of being broken up behind us, leaving us without supplies sufficient to hold richmond until our communications south could be re-established, or in case sheridan went to n. c., his mounted force would be too formidable for that of general johnston's, and that general johnston would be in great danger if we shall not reinforce him. i do not think that we can well spare the division. but i think that we would choose a lesser risk by sparing it in case sheridan's cavalry makes either of these moves contemplated than we would by holding him here to await the result of these operations. the enemy seems now to count upon taking richmond by raiding upon our lines of communication, and not by attacking our lines of work. i think, therefore, we should endeavor to put a force in the field that can contend against that of the enemy. if grant sends off his cavalry, he can hardly intend to make any general move of his main army until its return. in every aspect of affairs, so far as i am advised, i think that the greater danger is from keeping too close within our trenches. if we can remain where we are independently of the railroad, and if general johnston would be safe with such a force as sheridan's operating against him, in addition to sherman's, we had better keep the division here. you know much more about all those points than i do, and are much better able to decide upon them. my supply train is in from northern neck, and starts back to-morrow for other provisions. if there is any impropriety in sending it back, please telegraph me as soon as you receive this, that i may recall it. we have about one hundred thousand pounds of meat near dublin and eighteen thousand at new boston. the c. s. complains that the railroad agents will not ship the meat unless it is boxed. this cannot always be done. if you can in any way aid us in this matter, we shall do very well for some time to come. i remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, (signed) j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. xvi. _longstreet to adjutant-general taylor on policy towards new organizations._ head-quarters first army corps, march 30, 1865. lieutenant-colonel w. h. taylor, _assistant adjutant-general_: your letter expressing the views of the commander-in-chief in reference to the policy to be pursued in raising negro troops is received. i am apprehensive that we shall have applications and evidence enough to take from us more men than we can well spare at this critical moment in our affairs. it seems to me that any person who has the influence to raise a company or a regiment by going home could do so as well by letters to his friends at home. if i am right in this opinion, an order announcing that the officers of the companies and regiments of colored troops would be appointed from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates _on duty_ with our armies would have the effect of bringing back more absentees than we should lose by making the appointments. if we may judge of our future success in getting up new organizations by the past, we may rely upon it that many will furnish the necessary evidence, and go home and there remain for eight and ten and twelve months. i think it would be well to publish a general order, explaining more clearly the policy indicated in your letter, in order that a better general understanding may exist amongst the parties who may desire to furnish evidence of their ability to get up new organizations. otherwise i may adopt rules which would not be as favorable to the officers and men of this command as those of other commands. i remain very respectfully, your obedient servant, (signed) j. longstreet, _lieutenant-general_. xvii. _lee to longstreet on proposed publication of a history of virginia campaigns._ lexington, va., january 19, 1866. general j. longstreet: my dear general,--upon my return from richmond, where i have been for a week on business connected with washington college, i found your letter of the 26th ultimo. i regret very much that you never received my first letter, as you might then, perhaps, have given me the information i desired, with more ease to yourself and with more expedition than now. i did not know how to address it, but sent it to a friend in richmond, who gave it to one of our officers going south, who transferred it to another, etc., and after travelling many weary miles, has been recently returned to me. i start it again in pursuit of you, though you did not tell me how to address you. i have almost forgotten what it contained, but i hope it will inform you of my purpose in writing a history of the campaigns in virginia, and of the object that i have in view, so that you may give me all the information in your power. i shall be in no hurry in publishing, and will not do so until i feel satisfied that i have got the true story, as my only object is to disseminate the truth. i am very sorry to hear that your records were destroyed too; but i hope sorrel and latrobe will be able to supply you with all you require. i wish to relate the acts of all the corps of the army of northern virginia wherever they did duty, and do not wish to omit so important a one as yours. i will therefore wait as long as i can. i shall be very glad to receive anything you may give to mr. washington mclean, as i know you recommend no one but those who deserve your good opinion. i am delighted to hear that your arm is still improving, and hope it will soon be restored. you are, however, becoming so accomplished with your left hand as not to need it. you must remember me very kindly to mrs. longstreet and all your children. i have not had an opportunity yet to return the compliment she paid me. i had, while in richmond, a great many inquiries after you, and learned that you intended commencing business in new orleans. if you become as good a merchant as you were a soldier, i shall be content. no one will then excel you, and no one can wish you more success and more happiness than i. my interest and affection for you will never cease, and my prayers are always offered for your prosperity. i am most truly yours, r. e. lee. xviii. _lee to longstreet--congratulations._ lexington, va., january 26, 1866. longstreet, owen & co., _new orleans_: gentlemen,--i am much obliged to you for your business card, and the pleasure it has afforded me to know that you have entered into partnership. i know you will do your work well, and please myself, therefore, with the prospect of your great success. i wrote to your senior a few days since, at macon, mississippi, and hope he will receive my letter. i do not consider my partnership with him yet dissolved, and shall not let go him during life. wishing you all happiness and prosperity, i am, with great affection, your obedient servant, r. e. lee. xix. _lee to longstreet, suggesting the preparation of his memoirs._ lexington, va., march 9, 1866. general j. longstreet: my dear general,--your son garland handed me a few days since your letter of the 15th of january, with the copies of your reports of operations in east tennessee, wilderness, virginia, and of some of my official letters to you. i hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around suffolk and richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to collect. can you not occupy your leisure time in preparing your memoirs of the war? every officer whose position and character would give weight to his statements ought to do so. it is the only way in which we may hope that fragments of truth will reach posterity. mrs. longstreet will act as your amanuensis. i am very sorry that your arm improves so slowly. i trust it will be eventually restored to you. you must present my kindest regards to mrs. longstreet. i hope your home in new orleans will be happy; that your life, which is dear to me, may be long and prosperous. most truly yours, r. e. lee. xx. _longstreet to lee on battle of gaines's mill._ new orleans, la., march 20, 1866. general r. e. lee, _lexington, va._: my dear general,--your favor of the 9th instant is received. the papers or copies sent by garland contain everything that i have or can get in the shape of your letters and orders. i shall be able to give you an account of movements, etc., connected with the suffolk campaign and the siege of richmond when i can get our diaries,--that is, sorrel's, latrobe's, and my own. but i fear that i shall not be able to do so in time to meet your desires. i shall send all that i can gather together to your house as soon as i can. i have sometimes thought that i would make the effort to write at some future time, but begin to despair of my arm. it is too much labor to write with my left hand, and it gives me inconvenience, indeed pain, to keep my right hand in the constrained position necessary in writing. our business affairs occupy my days from nine till four p.m., so i am glad to give my arm rest after that time. mrs. longstreet would be rather a poor amanuensis in the evening, my only spare time, as her two little boys, lee and jim, occupy most of her time. she is trying to get a picture of lee to send you. i delivered your message that you "regretted that you had not been able to return the compliment." to go back to history and the war. there is one portion of our records as written that i should like corrected,--the battle of gaines's mill. your report of that battle does not recognize the fact that the line in my front, that is, the enemy's line, was broken by the troops that were under my orders and handling. a part of jackson's command, being astray, reported to me just as i was moving my column of attack forward,--whiting's division,--and i put it in my column of attack, as stated in my report. i think that you must have overlooked my report on this point, and have been guided by jackson's. jackson knew nothing of the matter of my having his troops, i suppose, and merely made his report from riding over the ground after the battle. i presume that he was not within one mile of the division when i put it in, and had no idea of its whereabouts. general whiting reported to me that he had lost his way, and did not know where to find general jackson, and offered his troops if i had use for them. i was then moving to assault, and put whiting in a little behind pickett's brigade. the commands made the assault together, and broke the enemy's line. anderson's brigade followed and secured it, the assaulting columns being somewhat broken in making the charge. just after breaking his lines the enemy made a severe attack, and would have recovered his position, i think, but for the timely support of anderson's and kemper's brigades at this point. another fact should not be lost sight of in this connection. a. p. hill had made several formidable attacks at the same point, and had fought manfully against it for several hours, and though not entirely successful, he must have made a decided impression, and have injured the enemy as much as he was himself injured, and thus weakened the enemy's lines so as to enable us to break them. it is quite common to give those credit only who show results, but it frequently happens, as in this case, that there are others who merit as much who are not known by results,--that is, who are not seen by others than those on the ground. if you can come across my son when you have an idle moment, i hope that you will give him a few words of kindly advice and encouragement. he is taught to look up to you as superior to others. mrs. longstreet joins me in affectionate salutations. i remain very truly yours, j. longstreet. xxi. _lee to longstreet--situation and prospects._ lexington, va., may 25, 1866. general j. longstreet: my dear general,--i was very glad to receive your letter of the 18th, but you told me so little of yourself that i presume you intend writing to me again shortly. but what you did say was very satisfactory, and i am much pleased to know that your prospects in a commercial point of view are good and progressive. i hope they may regularly and surely advance. i feel much obliged by your kind proposition as regards myself. for the present i must remain where i am. when i see that i have done all the good that i can accomplish for washington college i may find it necessary to do something that will enable me to procure a competence for my family. i will then turn my hand to whatever may offer. for myself i want nothing but my food and clothes. i send in compliance with your request a number of autographs, enough, i should think, to last for all time; but if they will be of any service to you i will send more. mr. lowe has not yet reached lexington. it will give me pleasure to see him when he does, as he comes from you. as you did not mention your arm, i hope that is improving too. you must never omit to mention it, mrs. longstreet, and your children when you write. i see garland very often in my walks, but very rarely at my house.... all unite in kindest regards to yourself and family. most truly yours, r. e. lee. index. a. adams, general, wounded at chickamauga, 446. alden, bradford r., at jefferson barracks, 17; friendliness of, to longstreet, 632. alexander, general e. p., at fredericksburg, 311, 316; at gettysburg, 389, 390, 391; notifies pickett to advance, 392; goes to tennessee with longstreet, 437; on lookout mountain, 463; at campbell's station, 493; at knoxville, 497; at mechanicsville (1864), 553; letter of, to longstreet, on affairs at wilderness, 570, 571. amazon creek, engagement at, 606. amusement of soldiers, 325, 326. anderson, general g. b., at seven pines, 94; at south mountain, 222; mortally wounded at sharpsburg, 249. anderson, general g. t., at sharpsburg, 242, 247; wounded at gettysburg, 372; brigade of, receives farnsworth's cavalry charge, 395; in retreat from gettysburg, 428; joins hood's division in tennessee, 462; in assault of fort sanders, 502, 503, 505, 506; at wilderness, 562; captures prisoners at farmville, 617. anderson, lieutenant-general r. h., at williamsburg, 72, 75, 76; at seven pines, 94; at sharpsburg, 247, 249; report of interview with general lee at gettysburg, 357; in fight at little round top, 372; in command of left division on rapidan (1864), 553; division of, in the wilderness, 559, 562; succeeds longstreet, wounded, 565; at five forks, 602; in engagement at amazon creek, 606; makes attack at rice's station, 613; letter to, from general lee, 639. antietam, battle of. _see_ sharpsburg. appendix, 639. appomattox, surrender at, officers urge negotiations for surrender, 618; general grant asks surrender, 619; general lee replies, asking terms, 619; interview of general pendleton with general lee, 620, 621; general grant states terms for surrender, 622; general lee proposes meeting with general grant, 622; sheridan's decisive action, 622; general lee gives orders for march to appomattox court-house, 623; an account of last scenes of activity, 624; general lee confers with longstreet and mahone, 624, 625; general lee rides to meet general grant, 625; longstreet endeavors to recall lee, 626; general custer's demand of surrender from longstreet, 627; truce ordered, 628; sympathy of soldiers for general lee, 629; generals grant and longstreet meet, 630; details of capitulation arranged, 630; number of troops surrendered and paroled, 631. archer, general, at shepherdstown, 264; at fredericksburg, 309; captured at gettysburg, 354, 389. arista, general, in command of mexican forces, 22. armies. _see_ confederate, federal, army of the potomac, army of northern virginia. armistead, general, at malvern hill, 143; killed beside federal battery in pickett's charge (gettysburg), 394. armstrong, general, at chickamauga, 441; makes great capture of cattle, 530; in sharp engagement on the french broad, 532. army corps. _see_ corps. army of northern virginia, losses of, in maryland campaign, 266, 267; condition of, on entering maryland, 284; reorganized in october, 1862, 290; strength of, at fredericksburg, 305; strength and organization of, at fredericksburg, 317 _et seq._; divided into three corps, 332; in readiness for gettysburg campaign, 334; organization of, in gettysburg, 410; in retreat from gettysburg, 426 _et seq._; strength of, in 1864, 552-554; capitulation of, at appomattox, 631. army of observation, 18. army of occupation, 19. army of the potomac, organization of, in maryland campaign, 209, 271; strength of, at antietam, 265; losses of, at antietam, 266; reorganized by general burnside, 292; strength of, at fredericksburg, 305; in false position at fredericksburg, 323; before gettysburg, 335; meade succeeds hooker in command of, 348; organization of, at gettysburg, 415; strength of, in 1864, 552; crosses the rapidan, 555; posting of, at five forks, 593. army of the tennessee, first victory of the, 456; longstreet offered command of, 466; hardee offered command of, 466 (note). army of virginia organized, 153; strength of, 153, 157. "attrition," policy of, 551. averill, general, makes raid from west virginia into east tennessee, 521, 522. avery, colonel, death of, at gettysburg, 375. ayres, general, at five forks, 598, 599, 601. b. badeau, general, quoted on strength of army of potomac in 1864, 552, 553. baird, general, at chickamauga, 441. baker, e. d., 61. ball's bluff, engagement at, 61. banks, general n. p., in command of second corps, army of virginia, 153; his battle against jackson at slaughter mountain, 157. barksdale, general, at fredericksburg, 301, 303; takes battery at gettysburg, 370; guiding spirit of the battle, 371; mortally wounded, 372. barlow, general, at antietam, 250; fall of, 252, 266; at gettysburg, 355. baxter, colonel, crosses the river at fredericksburg under fire, 303. beauregard, general g. t., at west point, 16; at manassas, 33, 35; instructions to commanders, 36; order for battle, 44; order miscarries, 46; in charge of left, 49; brave charge by, 50; ordered west, 64; proposal to bring, into gettysburg campaign, 336; prejudice against, of davis, 432, 545; longstreet writes president davis in favor of, 547. beauregard, lieutenant r. t., at chickamauga, 441. beaver dam creek. _see_ mechanicsville. bee, general bernard e., at manassas, 46, 48; gives name of "stonewall" to jackson, 49. benning, general, at gettysburg, 370, 396; in retreat from gettysburg, 431; at chickamauga, 448; at petersburg, 606. bermuda hundred, pickett's division assigned to, 574; assault on, by parke (petersburg), 605. berry, general, at fredericksburg, 309. birney, general, at fredericksburg, 309; at gettysburg, account of affair at peach orchard, 366; at wilderness, 559. blackburn's ford, engagement at, 38. _see_ manassas, first. blair, hon. montgomery, peace mission of, 583. bonham, general m. s., at manassas, 52. bostan, colonel, killed, 630. boteler's ford, 264. _see_ shepherdstown. bowen, orderly, killed at wilderness, 564. bragg, general braxton, at west point, 17; threatening near chattanooga, 434, 436; longstreet at head-quarters of, 438; plan of, for chickamauga, 439; gives orders to longstreet's division commanders, 447; disturbed by plan of battle, 452; absence of, from field, 455, 457; order for retreat, 456, 457; did not know result of chickamauga until next day, 458; receives report of battle from longstreet, 461; refuses to pursue the enemy, 462, 463; officers call for removal of, 464; puts generals polk and hindman under charges, 465; inquiry in regard to, by president davis, 465; on affairs subsequent to chickamauga, 471; criticism upon, 472; ignores signal service reports and is surprised, 474, 475; plans to capture hooker's rear-guard by night attack, 475; orders longstreet into east tennessee, 481; urges longstreet to make rapid movement, 483; orders speedy attack of knoxville by longstreet, 501; orders longstreet to co-operation with his army after defeat at chattanooga, 507; relieved of command by general hardee, 515; called to richmond as commander-in-chief, 516; suggestions of, before authorities at richmond, 545; action of, after chickamauga criticised by longstreet before authorities at richmond, 546; ordered to wilmington, 580; comment on, by confederate newspaper, 582 (note). branch, general l. o'b., report of, on march to mechanicsville, 123. brandy station, cavalry engagement at, between stuart and pleasonton, 338. brannan, general, at chickamauga, 442. bratton, colonel, in attack on hooker's rear-guard near lookout mountain, 476, 477. breckenridge, major-general j. c., at chickamauga, 441; in assault, 445, 446; appointed secretary of war, 583, 584. bristoe station, engagement at between ewell and hooker, 170. brockenbrough, general, at fredericksburg, 307; at gettysburg, 354. bryan, general, in assault on fort sanders, 505, 520. buckner, general simon, at chickamauga, 439; gives opinion adverse to bragg, 465; letter to, from longstreet, 484, 485. buford, general, at gettysburg, 351, 352, 353. bull run. _see_ manassas. bull's gap, longstreet's army at, 542. burnside, general a. e., ordered to fredericksburg to aid pope, 159; begins work at "burnside's bridge," 244; continuance of, 254, 256, 257, 258; mcclellan's orders to, for taking bridge, 258; effects crossing, 260; battle concentrates against, 261; his advance arrested, 262; assigned to command army of the potomac, 291; reorganizes army in three "grand divisions," 292; submits plan to president lincoln, 292; plan of, for crossing rappahannock at fredericksburg, 301; plan of, for battle, 304; orders that marye's hill must be carried before night, 312; orders of, to franklin criticised, 315; memorandum of, for renewal of attack on marye's hill, captured, 316; abortive moves by, 322 _et seq._; in east tennessee, 434, 436, 480, 481; has army of twenty-five thousand men north of knoxville, 482; acts on defensive at knoxville, 488; sends troops to little tennessee river, 490; report of, on condition at knoxville, 499, 500; relieved of command at knoxville by general foster, 514; in command of ninth corps in virginia, 552. burnside's bridge. _see_ burnside, general a. e., and sharpsburg. butler, general benjamin f., in front of richmond, 575, 576; move on fort fisher, 580. c. campaign in far south, consideration of, 540. campaign of 1864, 551 _et seq._ campbell, judge j. a., 583. campbell's station, engagement at, 492, 494. cannon-shots, remarkable, 254, 255. capitulation. _see_ appomattox, surrender at. carr, general, at dandridge, 526. cashtown, lee calls for concentration at, 348. chambersburg, confederates at, 351. chancellorsville, losses at, 327; criticism upon, 329, 330. chantilly, battle of, 193; killing of kearny and stevens at, 194. charles city cross-roads. _see_ frayser's farm. chattanooga, federal army at, 462 _et seq._ cheatham, general, at chickamauga, 441; gives opinion adverse to general bragg, 465. chester gap, longstreet's command at, in retreat from gettysburg, 431. chickahominy river, mcclellan advances to, 82 (_see_ seven pines); fighting along the, in summer of 1862, 120 _et seq._; mcclellan changes base from, to james river, 132. chickamauga, battle of (_see_ westward movement), longstreet arrives at bragg's head-quarters, 438; plan for, 439; confederate purpose to push between enemy and his base at chattanooga, 440; confederate positions, 440, 441; union positions, 441, 442; general bragg orders direct assault, 443, 445; battle opened by advance of general d. h. hill's corps, 445; general helm killed, 446; attack by cleburne, 446; longstreet's troops assault, 447; wounding of general hood, 448; federals driven back, 448, 449; change in plan by longstreet, 450; right wing ceases active battle, 452; contention by left wing as independent battle, 455; the union army melts away, 455, 456; rejoicings of confederates, 456; general thomas marches for rossville gap, 456; retreat was made before issue of rosecrans's order, 457; confederates hold snodgrass hill, 457; losses, 458; heavy losses by regiments, 459; longstreet urges pursuit of the federals, 461 _et seq._; absence of both commanders from the field, 472; action of bragg after close of, referred to at richmond by longstreet, 546. cleburne, general, at chickamauga, 441, 446. cobb, general, attacked by franklin at crampton's pass, 229, 230; at fredericksburg, 303; killing of, 311. colgrove, colonel silas, finds lee's "lost order," 213. confederate army, organization and strength of, at manassas (first), 57; strength of, at sharpsburg, 265, 266; losses of, at sharpsburg, 266; condition of, on entering maryland, 284; reorganized, 290; strength of, at fredericksburg, 305; numbers and organization of, at fredericksburg, 317 _et seq._; divided into three corps, 332; ready for gettysburg campaign, 334; organization of, at gettysburg, 410; in retreat from gettysburg, 426 _et seq._; strength and losses of, at chickamauga, 458; losses of, at knoxville, 508; strength of, 1864, 552; capitulation of, 630. confederate flag. _see_ flag. confederate soldier, tributes to, 200, 288; amusement of, 325. congress, confederate, tenders vote of thanks to general longstreet, 550; expresses want of confidence in president davis, 583; passes law for appointment of commander-in-chief, 583. cooke, colonel, at sharpsburg, 250, 267. corps, army, two provisional, organized by mcclellan on chickahominy, 82; first (confederate), losses of, at sharpsburg, 266; first (confederate), firmness of, 334; second (confederate), leading on march into pennsylvania, 340; first (confederate), on march into pennsylvania, 341; third (confederate), march of, to gettysburg, 344; first (confederate), at gettysburg, 397 _et seq._; vote of thanks to first (confederate), in congress, 550; ninth (federal), under burnside, 552; general lee on services of first (confederate), 639. corpus christi, army concentrates at, 19. corse, general, at five forks, 595, 600, 601; captured, 614. couch, general d. n., at seven pines, 95, 98; at harper's ferry, 229, 232. councils of war, at richmond, april, 1862, 66; johnston's, before seven pines, 85, 86; by general g. w. smith, at seven pines, 107; of lee and his officers, june, 1862, 121; in spring of 1864, at richmond, 543-595. cox, general j. d., with pleasonton, opens battle of south mountain, 221, 223; at burnside's bridge in command of ninth corps, 258. crampton's pass, description of, 206; general franklin ordered to, by mcclellan, 217; hampton's cavalry at, 229; franklin and cobb have engagement at, 229, 230. crittenden, general t. l., at chickamauga, 442; goes before court of inquiry, 465. crook, general, at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259; attacks confederate trains, 612. cross, colonel, at antietam, 266. cullen, j. s. d., letter of, to general longstreet on second day at gettysburg, 383 (note). cumberland church, engagement at, 615. cumberland gap, engagement at, 513. cumming, lieutenant, bravery of, at fort sanders, 520. curtin, andrew g., governor of pennsylvania, letter of, to general mcclellan, 282. custer, general, at gettysburg, 396; defeats and captures most of early's command at waynesboro', 590; at five forks, 598; division of, at appomattox, 622; demands and is refused surrender of longstreet, 627. d. dandridge, affair at, 528 _et seq._ danville railroad, longstreet on guarding of, 650. davis, lieutenant-colonel h., escapes with command from harper's ferry, 231. davis, jefferson, president, in council, april, 1862, 66; high opinion of mcclellan, 66; on battle-field (frayser's farm), 134; letter to, from general lee, relative to peace proposition, 204; prejudice of, against johnston and beauregard, 432; visits army of tennessee and makes inquiry as to general bragg, 465; proffers command to longstreet, 466; urges promotion of general law, 467; holds second conference with commanders at bragg's head-quarters, 468; favors longstreet's suggestion for change of base to rome, georgia, 469; leaves army more despondent than he found it, 470; orders longstreet to march to bragg's relief, 507; gives longstreet discretionary authority over troops in the department, 511; orders longstreet to send martin's cavalry to johnston, 539; in council with generals lee, longstreet, and bragg, 545, 546; want of confidence in, expressed by congress, 583; receives news of defeat at petersburg in church at richmond, 607. davis, general jefferson c., at chickamauga, 442. dearing, general, killed, 630. dent, frederick, home of, 18. dent, miss julia, meets lieutenant grant, 18. dent, marshall, maternal grandfather of author, 13. dent, mary ann, mother of author, 14. desertion, longstreet on suppression of, 651. deshler, general, mortally wounded at chickamauga, 446. devens, general, 590, 598. doby, captain, killed at wilderness, 564. doubleday, general abner, in engagement against jackson at groveton, 176, 177; at antietam, 241; at fredericksburg, 309; in command of a corps at gettysburg, 353, 355. douglas, colonel, killed at sharpsburg, 243. dranesville, engagement at, 62. duncan, captain j. h., defends fort gregg (petersburg), 607. duryea, colonel, charge of, at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259. e. early, general jubal a., at manassas, 39; at williamsburg, 78; at sharpsburg, 242, 245; appointment of, as lieutenant-general, 332; on march to gettysburg, 344; in battle, 374, 375; charges of, against longstreet and first corps, 397; comment on, 402; defeat in the valley, 579; command of, captured by custer at waynesboro', 590. east tennessee campaign, longstreet ordered to, 480, 481; organization of confederate command for, 482; move to sweetwater, 483; transportation under bragg's quartermaster, 483; letter of general longstreet to general buckner on delays, etc., 484, 485; buckner's endorsement, 485; on short rations, 486; orders to general wheeler, 487; "looked like campaign against longstreet instead of burnside," 488; description of country, 488, 489; engagement on the little tennessee river, 490; engagement at campbell's station, 492-495; federals behind their works at knoxville, 495; gallant assault on fort loudon repulsed, 497; longstreet reinforced by general bushrod r. johnson, 501; mclaws's orders to his command for assault of fort sanders, 503; mclaws urges delay because of report of bragg's defeat, 504; reply to, by longstreet, 504; the assault made, 505, 506; troops recalled on a misconception, 506, 507; bragg orders longstreet to co-operate with his army after defeat at chattanooga, 507; losses at knoxville, 508; longstreet finds it impracticable to join bragg, 509; columns advancing for relief of burnside, 510; longstreet marches up the holston valley, 511; he is followed by general parke, 512; engagement at cumberland gap, 513; want of clothing and shoes, 515, 521; presence of longstreet causes concern to federal authorities and general grant, 515, 516; charges against general robertson, 517; general mclaws ordered relieved from duty, 518; general law resigns under privilege, 519; honorable mention of officers, 520; the army revels in plenty on the french broad, 520, 521; brilliant achievement of general w. e. jones at cumberland gap, 522, 523; strategic importance of the field, 524, 538; foster advances against longstreet, 525; union army makes stand at dandridge, 526; affair at, 528 _et seq._; longstreet drinks to health of granger, 529; general foster calls dandridge's expedition "a foraging excursion," 530; general grant orders foster to offensive against longstreet, 532; despatches on longstreet from general grant to generals halleck, thomas, and schofield, 535-538; longstreet asks for ten thousand additional troops, 539; longstreet's purpose towards close of campaign, 539; withdrawal eastward of longstreet's command, 540; authorities would not support campaign, 541; longstreet and his original command from virginia rejoins general lee on the rapidan, 547; vote of thanks to general longstreet and first corps by confederate congress, 550. edwards's ferry. _see_ ball's bluff. elections of 1862, 1864, 479. elzey, general, arrives at manassas, 49; succeeds kirby smith, 50. emancipation proclamation, issue of, made practicable by victory at antietam, 288, 289; elections of 1862 not in support of, 479. ewell, general r. s., at west point, 17; engagement of, with hooker, at bristoe station, 170; loses a leg at groveton, 177; appointed to command of second corps on death of jackson, 332; engages milroy at winchester, 339; march of, to gettysburg, 344; captures beeves and flour, 345; in fight on cemetery hill, 355, 356; attacked by ruger, 387; in retreat from gettysburg, 431, 432; in command of second corps on rapidan (1864), 553; becomes engaged in wilderness, 558, 562; takes several officers prisoners, 565; in retreat from petersburg, 612, 613; brave stand and final surrender of, 614. f. fairfax, colonel, at sharpsburg, 250; takes scout to longstreet, 345; letter from, to general longstreet on interview with general lee, "sunrise order," etc., 380, 381 (note); drinks with longstreet to health of gordon granger, 530; captures a trooper on the french broad, 532; on delay at wilderness after wounding of longstreet, 567. fair oaks. _see_ seven pines. falling waters, confederates at, in retreat from gettysburg, 428, 429. farmville, panic of confederate teamsters at, 616; engagement at, 616, 617. farnsworth, general, charge of, at gettysburg, 395; killed, 395. federal army, organization and strength of, at manassas (first) 57, 58; strength and losses of, at antietam, 265, 266; reorganized by burnside, 292; strength of, at fredericksburg, 305; in false position, 323; before gettysburg, 335; meade succeeds hooker in command of, 348; organization of, at gettysburg, 415; strength and losses of, at chickamauga, 458; losses of, at knoxville, 508; strength of, in 1864, 552; how posted at five forks, 593. ferrero, general, at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259; in east tennessee campaign, 490; covers retreat, 492. field, general, at wilderness, 562-564; gives account of battle, 567; before richmond, 577; division of, withdrawn, 604; division of, at appomattox, 629. fiser, colonel, wounded in assault on fort sanders, 520. fisher, fort, move against, 580. fitzhugh, captain, captured and loses despatch, 160. five forks, battle of, general grant's move around the confederate right, 595; general lee endeavors to anticipate, 596; opening of, favorable to confederates, 596; general grant orders fifth corps into battle, 597; sheridan's strategic plan, 598; the battle irretrievable for confederates, 599; pickett's battle, 599-602; losses, 601, 602; general lee on, 604. flag, confederate, origin of, 56. "foot cavalry" of virginia, 146. forrest, general, at chickamauga, 441. foster, general john g., reaches knoxville and relieves burnside of command at, 513, 514; at blain's cross-roads, 514; assigns true cause for longstreet's failure to follow, 515; plans to intrench at bull's gap, 516; army of, advances against longstreet, occupying dandridge, 526; suffering from an old wound, gives command to general parke, 528; calls dandridge expedition a "foraging excursion," 530; urged to offensive by general grant, 531, 532; assaults fort gregg (petersburg), 607. fowler, captain w. h., at chickamauga, 441. franklin, william b., given command of sixth corps, 82; encounters jackson at white oak swamp, 133; arrives at centreville to reinforce pope, 190; ordered by mcclellan to crampton's pass, 217; engages general cobb of mclaws's command, 229, 230, 232; report by, 257; placed in command of left grand division army of the potomac, 292; arrives before fredericksburg, 297; troops of, enter fredericksburg, 304; orders to, by burnside, criticised, 315. frayser's farm, battle at, longstreet encounters main force of mcclellan's army at, 133; president davis has narrow escape on the field, 134; jenkins captures randol's battery, precipitating battle, 135; heintzelman's report of fight, 135; mccall's report, 136; general holmes's account, 137; general kearny's account, 137; capture of general mccall, 138, 139. frederick, md., confederates in, 201, 202, 205; mcclellan's army at, 213. _see_ maryland campaign. fredericksburg, battle and campaign of, burnside's plans for, submitted to president lincoln, 292; union army on march to, 293; general sumner calls on civil authorities for surrender of town, 293; reply of the mayor, 294-296; citizens of, move beyond danger, 296; description of field of, 297-299; signal for battle, 301; plans of federals for crossing the river, 301, 302; work of general hunt and colonel hall, 302; federals occupy eastern part of town, 303; sumner's and franklin's troops occupy city, 304; plan of federal commander, 304; strength of the armies, 305; mist veils the confronting armies, 306; confederate positions, 307; general meade's advance, 308; the opening against the confederate left, 309; killing of general cobb, 311; destructive work of artillery, 311; desperate charges by griffin and humphreys, 312; before the stone wall on marye's hill, 313; comparison of charges by federals with those of pickett, pettigrew, and trimble at gettysburg, 314; criticism of orders to franklin, 315; losses in battle, 315, 316; burnside plans to renew attack, 316; strength of armies in battle, 317; organization of confederate army, 317 _et seq._ fremantle, lieutenant-colonel, of the coldstream guards, as guest of lee and longstreet, 343; congratulations of, to longstreet on pickett's charge, 394. french, general william h., at fredericksburg, 309, 310. g. gaines's mill, battle at, the hills attack fitz-john porter, 126; longstreet's reserve engages, 127; anderson, pickett, and hood's charges, 129; letter of longstreet upon, to general lee, 656. garfield, general james a., communication of, on rosecrans's order to retreat from chickamauga, 457. garland, general samuel, at seven pines, 94; killed at south mountain, 221; allusion to, 223. garnett, r. b., at west point, 16, 17; killed in pickett's charge (gettysburg), 394. gary, general, in affair on williamsburg road, 578. gee, captain, killed at five forks, 599. generalship, power of battle in, rather than in numbers, 551. getty, general, in opening of battle of wilderness, 558; advance of, 559. gettysburg, battle and campaign of, first mentioned, 331, 334; confederate plan of campaign, 335, 336; hooker discovers federal withdrawal from fredericksburg, 337; cavalry engagement in rear of the march, 338; confusion in regard to cavalry orders, 342; municipal authorities of gettysburg and york surrender to general john b. gordon, 345; longstreet suggests change in direction of march, 347; federal corps' locations, 347, 348; general george g. meade succeeds hooker in command of federals, 348; positions of armies june 30, 349, 350; confederate cavalry not at hand, 351; description of field, 352 _et seq._; preliminary fighting, 353, 354; the battle opens, 354; general john f. reynolds killed, 354; fight on cemetery hill, 355, 356; federals retreat through town, 356; howard forms new lines, 357; forces engaged (on first day), 357; lee had not intended to deliver general battle, 358; lee seriously affected by absence of cavalry, 359; commands of longstreet's corps hurried forward, 359; second day's battle, 362; front of meade's position, 363; march of sixth corps (federal), 364; position of confederates, 364; lee settles on attack by his right, 365; advance of first corps (confederate), 366; time of reaching position, 366; hood reports advantage of move to the right, 367; renews appeal, 368; opportunity for confederate right seen by halleck in washington, 368; barksdale of mclaws's opens the fight and takes battery, 370; little round top the citadel of the field, 371; fight at the hill and brick church, 371; many officers killed or wounded, 371, 372; longstreet with wofford's brigade on little round top, 372; meade reinforces against longstreet, 373; losses of longstreet and meade on second day, 373; late arrival of cavalry, 373; federals draw artillery from their right against longstreet's battle, 374; "man on the left who did not care to make battle win," 375; general pendleton on the order for "battle at sunrise," 377 _et seq._; refutation of, 378-384; losses on second day, 376, 377; third day's battle, 385 _et seq._; lee's plans, 386; ruger opens against ewell, 387; longstreet did not approve attack as made, 388, but he prepared carefully for the assault, 389, 390; confederates on the left driven from their trenches, 391; longstreet assents to pickett's advance, 392; pickett's, trimble's, and pettigrew's charge, 394; farnsworth's cavalry charge, 395; the confederate first corps, 397; lee's acknowledgment of fault, 400; epitome of battle, 402; cemetery hill and marye's hill compared, 403; impossibility of taking cemetery hill, 404; forces engaged and losses in battle, 409; organization of confederate army, 410 _et seq._; organization of federal army, 415 _et seq._; confederate retreat, 426. gibbon, general, in engagement with jackson at groveton, 176; at south mountain, 224; at antietam, 241, 266; at fredericksburg, 309; wounded in front of pickett's charge (gettysburg), 394; on assaulting columns, on the 3d, at gettysburg, 399; at the wilderness, 558, 559; at petersburg, 606-608. gist, general, at chickamauga, 446. glendale. _see_ frayser's farm. goggin, major, reports taking of fort sanders impossible, 505, 506. gold, price of, reaches 200, 317; longstreet advocates impressment of, 588, 641, 646, 649. gordon, general john b., authorities of gettysburg and york surrender to, 345; corps of, assigned for sortie against fort steadman, 592; at appomattox, 623, 624. goree, colonel t. j., 47; on repulse of pickett at gettysburg, 400. "grand divisions," army of the potomac organized in, 292. granger, general gordon, covers gap in mission ridge at chickamauga, 442; in severe contention against longstreet's left, 457; in command of federals at dandridge, 528; on longstreet, 529. grant, general ulysses s., at west point, 17; joins fourth regiment in missouri as lieutenant, 18; takes part in theatricals, 20; operations of, at vicksburg, 478; assumes command of armies in tennessee, 482; orders longstreet driven out of east tennessee, 516; visits knoxville, 525; wants longstreet driven from tennessee, 531; urges general foster to the offensive, 532; despatches of, to generals halleck, thomas, and schofield, on plans to drive longstreet from tennessee, 534-536; finds longstreet too far from his line of operations to properly engage against, 538; assigned as commander-in-chief, 543; with army of the potomac, 552; had no general plan for campaign (may, 1864), 555; prepares for immediate battle (wilderness), 556; orders ninth corps into battle, 561; plan of, for left attack in front of richmond, 575, 576; letters to, from general lee, on military peace convention, 585, 586; draws from east and west to strengthen combination against, 590 _et seq._ (_see_ five forks, battle of); gives up attack of richmond by north side of james, 591; gives orders for grand move by his left, 592; number of troops in command of, 593; movement by left begun, 595; purpose of the latter, 596; orders concerted assault at petersburg, 604; rides over captured works, 606; asks surrender of general lee, 619; letter to, from general lee, asking terms for surrender, 619; renews efforts to strike across head of confederate march, 620; writes general lee as to terms of surrender, 621, 622; letter to, from general lee, proposing meeting, 622; arranges details of capitulation, 630; tribute to, 630; gives general longstreet letter to president johnson, 633; inaugurated president, 638; appoints longstreet surveyor of customs at new orleans, 638; general lee on interview with, 649. grant, mrs. ulysses s., proposed meeting of, with mrs. longstreet to bring about peace, 584. grapevine bridge. _see_ mechanicsville. greene, general george s., at gettysburg, 374. gregg, fort (petersburg), 606, 607. gregg, general d. mcm., at gettysburg, stubborn fight of, 396. gregg, general maxcy, killed at fredericksburg, 309; captured with part of command by rosser and mumford, 617. griffin, general, attack of, at fredericksburg, 312. groves, major r. e., at chickamauga, 441. groveton, engagement at, between jackson and pope's troops, 175. _see_ manassas, second. gunboats, mcclellan's facetious remark concerning, 151. h. hagerstown, confederates at, on retreat from gettysburg, 427, 428. hall, colonel norman j., in command of troops attempting to cross river at fredericksburg, 302; report of, 303. halleck, general henry wager, at west point, 17; assumes command as general-in-chief of federal armies, 153; thinks the capital in peril, 214; letter to, on affairs in maryland, 214-216; meade communicates purpose to, 349; suggests to meade that lee may turn his left, 360; sees opportunity for confederate right at gettysburg, 368; concern of, over longstreet's presence in east tennessee, 515, 516; despatch to, from general grant, on longstreet, 534-536; despatch of, to general grant, 537; right in estimate of strategic importance of longstreet's presence in tennessee, 538. hampton roads conference, 583. hampton, wade, at manassas, 48; wounded at seven pines, 98; at crampton's gap, 229; wounded at gettysburg, 396; ordered to join johnston in the carolinas, 589. hancock, winfield scott, takes two redoubts at williamsburg, 77; christened "the superb," 80; takes command of richardson's brigade at antietam, 251; makes well-organized advance at fredericksburg, 310; assumes federal command under special assignment on field of gettysburg (first day), 356; wounded in pickett's charge, 394; on meade's intentions on third day at gettysburg, 398; in command of second corps, army of the potomac, 552; intrenches at night along front in wilderness, 558; advance of, in morning, 560; movement against left of, by longstreet, 562; on longstreet's advance, 568. hardee, general, commissioned lieutenant-general, 290; offered and declines command of army of tennessee, 466; succeeds cheatham in command of corps, 469. hardie, general, at fredericksburg, 307. harper's ferry, capture of, proposed by lee, 201; plan for movement against, 202; description of, 207; situation at, 228; mclaws at, 231; colonel davis escapes from, 231; colonel miles' commandant of, mortally wounded, 232; surrendered by general white, 232; holding of, not of strategic value, 286; let alone in gettysburg campaign, 287; abandoned by federals, 339. harrison, fort, captured by federals, 575. harrison, scout, employed by longstreet, 324; sent out with secret orders, 333; makes report, 346. harrison's landing, mcclellan's army at, 145. hartranft, general, at campbell station, 492, 520; at fort steadman, 594, 595. haskell, colonel j. c., rides to recall general lee from meeting general grant at appomattox, 626. hatton, general, killed at seven pines, 98. hayes, rutherford b., wounded at south mountain, 223. hays, general h. t., at gettysburg, 374. hazlett, captain, battery of, on little round top, 371; killed, 372. heintzelman, general, in command of left wing on chickahominy, 84; report of, on frayser's farm fight, 135. helm, general benjamin h., killed at chickamauga, 446. heth, general, at wilderness, 556, 558, 560; on failure to intrench, 565; at petersburg, 605, 609; at farmville, 617. hill, lieutenant-general a. p., promoted major-general, 85; at mechanicsville, 123 _et seq._; at gaines's mill, 126; intercepts orders of general pope, 172; at harper's ferry, 231; arrives from harper's ferry in time to assist at sharpsburg, 261; makes strong battle against burnside, 262; at shepherdstown, 264; tactical moves by, at antietam, 266; appointed to command of third corps, 332; marches towards gettysburg, 350, 353; in fight, 355, 356; in retreat from gettysburg, 431; in command of third corps on rapidan (1864), 553; death of, at petersburg, 605. hill, general d. h., at williamsburg, 74; asks permission to attack hancock's redoubts, 77; the movement made with heavy loss, 78; humor of, 113; letter to longstreet denying proposed abandonment of richmond when lee took command, 115, 116; in conference with lee on attacking mcclellan, 121; at mechanicsville, 124; at gaines's mill, 126; at south mountain, 221, 222, 224; explains to general lee the situation at south mountain, 227; at sharpsburg, 241, 242, 251, 253; horse shot under, by a cannon-ball, 254; "like a game-cock" at sharpsburg, 266; record of, 332 (note); at chickamauga, in right wing, 441; opens battle by front assault, 445; urges change of tactics, 455; writes petition for relief from bragg, 465; gives president davis opinion adverse to bragg, 466; relieved of duty, 469. hindman, general t. c., in left wing at chickamauga, 439; advance of, 448; relieved under charges by bragg, 465. hoke, general, in front of richmond, 574, 575; in affair on williamsburg road, 577; sent to wilmington, 580. holmes, general, on fight at frayser's farm, 137; commissioned lieutenant-general, 290. hood, general j. b., at gaines's mill, 128, 129; report on fight at frayser's farm, 137; advance of, at turkey bridge, 139; at second manassas, 188, 189; at south mountain, 222; at sharpsburg, 242, 266; at fredericksburg, 306, 317; march of, from chambersburg to gettysburg, 361; reports on advantage of move to the right (gettysburg, second day), 367; renews appeal, 368; seriously wounded, 370; division of, in third day's fight (gettysburg), 393, 396; in retreat from gettysburg, 431; division of, starts for tennessee, 437; arrival at chickamauga, 439; brigades of, in left wing, 439, 440; leads advance, 447; wounding of, 448; successor for, considered, 467; division of, in engagement on little tennessee, 490; supersedes johnston in command of army of georgia, 572; army of, reduced to a skeleton, 581. hooker, general joseph, at williamsburg, 73, 75; at frayser's farm, 138; engagement of, with ewell at bristoe station, 170; at south mountain, 223; at antietam, 241; heavy loss in troops of, 243; wounding of, 245; given command of centre grand division, army of the potomac, under burnside, 292; arrives at hartwood, near fredericksburg, 297; marches for fords of the upper rappahannock, 326; at chancellorsville, 328, 329; discovers abandonment of fredericksburg by confederates, 337; succeeded by meade, 348; in tennessee, 474. hoskiss, major j., on capture of early's command, 591. hotchkiss, major t. r., at chickamauga, 441. howard, general o. o., at fredericksburg, 310; approach to gettysburg, 355; retreats to cemetery hill, 356; forms new lines after retreat, 357. howell, captain e. p., at chickamauga, 441. huger, general, johnston's orders to, for seven pines, 89. humphreys, major-general a. a., desperate attack by, at fredericksburg, 312; account by, of fight before the stone wall, 313; at gettysburg, 367, 373; at chickamauga, 440; spirited advance of, 448; in assault of fort sanders, 505; honorably mentioned, 520; as chief of staff gives strength of army of the potomac, 1864, 552; quoted on affair on williamsburg road, 578; at fort steadman, 595; at petersburg, 606; in pursuit of confederates, 611; in engagement at rice's station, 614. hunt, general, at fredericksburg, 302. hunter, colonel david, wounded at manassas, 46. hunter, hon. r. m. t., 583. hunton, general, capture of, 614. i. imboden's cavalry, halt of, at hancock vexes general lee, 359. impressment of gold, urged by longstreet, 588, 641, 646; of men, urged by longstreet, 644. j. jackson, lieutenant-general thomas jonathan, at manassas, 46; christened "stonewall," 49; order to, from general lee, june 11, 1862, for movement against mcclellan, 114; reinforced by lawton and whiting for that purpose, 115; in conference with lee and longstreet, june, 1862, 121; lateness of, at mechanicsville, 123; at gaines's mill, 126; encounters franklin at white oak swamp, 133; ordered to follow mcclellan's retreat from malvern hill, 146; fails to support magruder, 149, 150; engages with pope's forces at slaughter mountain, 156, 157; move of, on manassas junction, 167, 168; engages king's division at groveton, 175, 177; sustains attack at manassas, 180, 182; in heavy battle with fitz-john porter, 187; some characteristics of, 191, 192; hard pressed by stevens at chantilly, 193; comment on move of, to manassas junction, 197, 198; ordered by lee to move against harper's ferry, 202, 231, 232; leaves harper's ferry to rejoin lee, 233; arrives on field of sharpsburg, 236; division of, receives attack of hooker at sharpsburg, 241; withdraws, 242; ordered by general lee to turn federal right, 257; commissioned lieutenant-general, 290; called by lee towards fredericksburg, 299, 309; loses opportunity for advance, 313; severely wounded at chancellorsville, 328; death of, 332; comment on, at sharpsburg, 401 (note); comment on, in chickahominy campaign, 406; at second manassas, 407. james river, confederate troops on, in april, 1862, 67; mcclellan changes base to, from the chickahominy, 132; longstreet assigned to command north of, 574. jenkins, general micah, at seven pines, 95, 100; at frayser's farm, 135; at fredericksburg, 311; ordered to chambersburg with cavalry brigade, 340; brigade of, transferred to hood's division and goes to tennessee, 437; joins hood's division after battle of chickamauga, 462; longstreet urges appointment of, to command of hood's division, 467; engages in attack on hooker's rear-guard, 475-477; at lenoir's station, 491; at campbell's station, 494; before knoxville, 495; at dandridge, 526; ordered to strawberry plains, 531; ordered to bridge the holston river, 538; takes part in flank move, 563, and riding with longstreet expresses high hopes, 563; mortally wounded, 564; tribute to, 566. jetersville, confederates halted at, 610. johnson, general bushrod r., at chickamauga, 439; before snodgrass hill, 450; in assault on fort sanders, 505; severely engages federals at cumberland gap, 513; honorable mention of, for march to bean station, 519; in affair near dandridge, 532; at five forks, 596, 597; division of, mostly escapes in retreat from petersburg, 614. johnson, major-general edward, advance at gettysburg (evening of second day), 374, 387. johnson, president, letter to, from general grant on longstreet, 633, 634; reconstruction policy of, 635. johnson, general r. w., at chickamauga, 442. johnston, general joseph eggleston, position of, before manassas, 35, 41, 43; forces arrive at manassas, 44; on field, 49; called to richmond for council with war department, 65; at williamsburg, 79; compliment of, to longstreet, 80; prepares to attack mcclellan before mcdowell can reach him, 85; calls council before seven pines, 85, 86; orders to generals smith and huger, 89; orders troops to sleep on their lines, 100; wounded at close of seven pines, 100; high regard for, in army, 112; president davis jealous of, 432; plan for campaign of, suggested by general bragg, 545; superseded by hood, 572; longstreet asks for recall of, to service, 588; assigned to command in the carolinas, 589. jones, general d. r., at savage station, 132; at antietam, 260; overcome by the killing of his brother-in-law, colonel kingsbury, 262. jones, general j. m., at gettysburg, 374; in opening of wilderness, 558. jones, general j. r., wounded at sharpsburg, 243. jones, general samuel, raid against, at salem, by general averill, 521, 522. jones, general w. e., sent to arrest union advance at cumberland gap, 503; fights engagement at walker's ford, 508; brilliant achievement of, at cumberland gap, 522, 523. k. kearny, general philip, at williamsburg, 75; at seven pines, 96; report of, on battle, 99; report of, on fight at frayser's farm, 137; orders to, from pope, on eve of manassas (second), 178; opens against jackson's left at manassas, 182; at chantilly, 193; killed, 194. kemper, general, wounded in pickett's charge, 394. kershaw, general, at elk ridge, 208; at sharpsburg, 245; at gettysburg (opening of second day), 370; at chickamauga, 440; charge of, 448; at cumberland gap, 513; honorably mentioned, 519; in wilderness, 563, 564; with early in the valley, 579; crosses a fired bridge at richmond, 609; surrenders at rice's station, 614. keyes, general e. d., on battle of seven pines, 110. kilpatrick, general j., at gettysburg, 395, 396; follows confederate retreat, 427, 428, 430. kingsbury, colonel, killed at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259; killing of, overcomes general d. r. jones, his brother-in-law, 262. knoxville, siege of, description of town and federal works, 495; a gallant dash repulsed, 497; federal positions, 498, 499; fort loudon (or sanders) described, 499; mclaws ordered to assault fort, 500; general bushrod r. johnson marches to reinforce longstreet, 501; mclaws's orders to his command for assault of fort sanders, 503; mclaws urges delay because of bragg's reported defeat, 504; longstreet's answer thereto, 504, 505; the assault made, 505, 506; troops recalled under a misconception, 506, 507; bragg orders longstreet to co-operate with his army, 507; losses in, 508. l. lamb, colonel, wounded at fort fisher, 582. lane, general, at fredericksburg, 309; succeeds pickett in command of charge at gettysburg, 394. latane, captain, killed on stuart's raid, 118. latrobe, colonel, at fredericksburg, 316. law, general e. m., march of, to gettysburg, 365; succeeds to command of hood's division at gettysburg, 370; in chattanooga campaign, 464; claims of, for promotion, urged by president davis, 467; takes part in night attack on hooker's rear-guard, 476, 477; order for preferring charges against, 477; late report on federal retreat from lenoir's station, 491 (note); at campbell's station, 494; charge against, that he withheld attack improperly, 495; slow march of, 514; resigns under privilege, 519; action of president davis towards, 548; rearrest ordered by general longstreet, 549. lawton, general, ordered by lee to reinforce jackson, 115; wounded at sharpsburg, 243. leadbetter, general, makes reconnoissance at knoxville, 501; favors attack of fort sanders, 502; adds postscript to general longstreet's letter urging determined assault of fort sanders, 505. lee, general fitzhugh, left in command of cavalry by stuart, 160; failure to comply with instructions, 160; consequences of that failure, 196; attacked by pleasonton at south mountain, 229; on general r. e. lee at gettysburg, 401; on longstreet, 405; charges that longstreet lost his way in wilderness, 568, 569; recalled to join longstreet at richmond, 591; at five forks, 597, 598; in retreat from petersburg, 610. lee, general g. w. c., on longstreet at wilderness, 569; at five forks, 596; at rice's station, 613, 614. lee, general robert e., assigned to command at seven pines, 109; impression of, in the army, 112, 113; established in confidence, 114; plans simultaneous attack on front and rear of mcclellan, 115; adopts suggestion of longstreet making change in plans against mcclellan, 120; orders longstreet's reserve into action at gaines's mill, 127; at frayser's farm with president davis, 134; abandons his original plan at malvern hill, 144; campaign of, against mcclellan reviewed, 147 _et seq._; momentary facetiousness, 149; letter of, to general magruder, 150; original plan for pursuit of mcclellan, 152; enjoys increased esteem of his army, 158; plans of, for striking pope, 159; witnesses retreat of pope, 162; on field of manassas, 181, 182; decides to cross bull run and reach pope's rear, 186; joins longstreet on field and rides under fire, 189; injury to, in stampede, 192; letters of, to general pope on killing of kearny, 194; decides to enter maryland, 200; orders of, for maryland campaign, 203; address of, to people of maryland, 280; letter of, to jefferson davis, suggesting peace proposition, 204; celebrated "lost order" of, 203, 212, 213; receives information of federal advance at south mountain, 219; prefers stand at turner's pass, 220; orders withdrawal of troops from south mountain, 228; with longstreet and hill on field at sharpsburg, 254; orders flank move by jackson, 257; sends for brigades left at harper's ferry, 261; calls longstreet his old war-horse, 262; in contempt of federal army disperses forces, 284; description of, 285; reorganizes army of northern virginia, 290; on retirement of mcclellan, 291; advice of, to citizens of fredericksburg, 299; orders of, at opening of battle, 308; narrowly escapes death or injury from a shell, 312; goes to richmond, 317; orders longstreet to return from suffolk, 326; grief of, over loss of stonewall jackson, 328; his conduct of battle of chancellorsville, 329; falls on plan of northern invasion, 331; plans of, for gettysburg, 335, 336; caution of, in revealing plans to richmond authorities, 336, 337; orders of, to cavalry chief, 341; issues orders for march of army to harrisburg, 344; refuses to credit information of scout harrison, 347; changes direction of march, 348; order for concentration at cashtown, 348, 351; mind disturbed by absence of cavalry, 351; calls longstreet to ride with him towards gettysburg, 351; expresses regret at absence of cavalry, 357; on field of gettysburg at close of first day, 357; had not intended delivering general battle, 358; gives discretionary order for second corps to attack cemetery hill, 359; official report of, on first day's battle, 359 (note); settles on making the opening (second day) by his right, 365; alleged order of, to longstreet for battle at sunrise, 377 _et seq._; excitement of, 384; on battle of gettysburg, third day, 385; plans of, 386; claimed attack was not made early enough, 388; on the field with the right, 395; official report of, on longstreet's battle on the right, 397; acknowledges fault at gettysburg, 399, 400; comments upon, 400, 401; on field and responsible for gettysburg, 402, 405; review of campaigns of, 406; review of orders of, for gettysburg, 407 _et seq._; "harder to move than his lieutenant," 409; in the retreat from gettysburg, 429, 430; desires retirement, 432; longstreet mentions westward movement to, 434; goes to richmond, 434; letter from, to longstreet, 435; letter to, from longstreet, 435; parting with longstreet, 437; letter from, to longstreet, 469, 470 (note); favors sending pickett's division to longstreet, 539; longstreet's suggestion to, of plans for continuance of war, 544; goes to richmond to confer with authorities, 544; suppressed excitement of, in council with richmond authorities, 546; becomes impatient in longstreet-law affair, 549; compared with general grant, 554; gives orders against general engagement, 558; endeavors to lead a brigade in charge, 560; assumes command on field after longstreet is wounded, 565; delays advance, 565, 567; alleged saying of, concerning longstreet, 569; hard labors of, 573; becomes anxious about line on north side of the james, 579; hears from longstreet proposition of general ord for peace meeting, 584; letters of, to general grant on military peace convention, 585, 586; reply to, from general grant, 587; consents to sortie against fort steadman, 592; strength of, for defence of richmond, 593, 594; endeavors to anticipate grant's move around his right, 596; at petersburg, 604, 605; gives orders for retreat, 608; at jetersville, 610; realizes fulness of disaster at rice's station and sailor's creek, 614, 615; at farmville, 616; urged by officers to negotiate for surrender, 618; letter to, from general grant, asking surrender, 619; replies to, asking terms, 619; letter to, from general grant, stating terms of surrender, 621; writes general grant, proposing meeting, 622; gives orders for advance to appomattox court-house, 623; still hopes to break through the federal cordon, 624; confers with longstreet and mahone, 624, 625; rides to meet general grant, 625, 626, 628; sympathy for, of troops, 629; letter of, to general r. h. anderson, 639; letter of, to general longstreet, congratulating him on convalescence, 639; letter to, from longstreet, 640; letter to, from longstreet, on impressment of gold, 641; letter from, to longstreet, 642; letter to, from longstreet, on impressment of men, 644; letter from, to longstreet, 645; letter to, from longstreet, on impressment of gold, 646; letter to, from longstreet, on interview with general ord, 647; letter to, from longstreet, on exchange of prisoners, 648; letter of, to longstreet, on interview with general grant, 649; letter to, from longstreet, on use of gold, 649; letter to, from longstreet, on guarding danville railroad, 650; letter to, from longstreet, on sheridan's operations, 652; letter of, to longstreet, on proposed history, 654; letter of, to longstreet, suggesting preparation of memoirs, 656; letter to, from longstreet, on battle of gaines's mill, 656; letter of, to longstreet, on prospects, etc., 657. lee, lieutenant-colonel s. d., at sharpsburg, 243. lee, general w. h. f., at five forks, 596, 597, 598; in engagement at jetersville, 610. leesburg, confederate army at, on the way to maryland, 201. lenoir's station, federal retreat at, 491. letters. _see_ lee, longstreet, grant, etc. lewinsville, j. e. b. stuart disperses federals at, 60. liddell, general, at chickamauga, 441, 446. lincoln, president, telegrams from, on lee in maryland, 209; letter to, from mcclellan, on prospect in maryland, 214; issues emancipation proclamation, 288, 289; general burnside submits plans to, 292; humorous advice of, to hooker, 329; position in hampton roads conference, 583; desire attributed to, for devising means for payment of slaves, 585. long, general a. l., letter of, to general longstreet, on order for "battle at sunrise" (gettysburg), 380 (note); gives account of appeal of lee's officers for surrender, 618; on interview of generals lee and pendleton about surrender, 620. longstreet, lieutenant-general james, birth of, 13; appointed to west point, 15; assigned to duty as brevet lieutenant at jefferson barracks, missouri, 16; goes to louisiana, 18; to florida, 18; assigned lieutenant, 18; goes to corpus christi, 19; at palo alto, 25; at resaca de la palma, 27, 28; at outbreak of civil war, 29; leaves albuquerque, 30; arrives at richmond, 32; appointed brigadier-general, 33; reports to beauregard at manassas junction, 33; stays retreat at blackburn's ford, 39; advance of, at manassas, 44; orders batteries to fire on federal retreat, 52; criticism of, on mcdowell, 54; on tyler's reconnoissance, 55; on beauregard, 56; invited to dine with the enemy, 60; promoted major-general, 61; marches to culpeper court-house, 65; meets president davis and general lee in war council at richmond, 66; on mcclellan, 66; at williamsburg, 72, 74; opposes attack on hancock's redoubts, 77; estimates forces engaged at williamsburg, 79; johnston's testimonial to, 80; in command of right wing from james river to white oak swamp, 81; to strike against federal right at seven pines, 85; in council with johnston, 86; ordered to williamsburg road, 86; tactical handling there left to him, 88; complaint against, by general smith, 90; endeavors to harmonize with huger, 92; his battle on the williamsburg road, 96; plans for resuming battle of seven pines at daylight, 103; asks for reinforcements and a diversion, 108; makes appeal for ten thousand men to renew fight at seven pines, 109; meets general lee, 112; suggests to lee movement against mcclellan's right flank, 114; letter to, from d. h. hill, 115, 116; suggestion of, for method of attack on mcclellan adopted by lee, 120; in conference with lee and others, 121; at mechanicsville, 124; puts his reserve into action at gaines's mill, 127 _et seq._; encounters main force of mcclellan at frayser's farm, 133; on the field with president davis and general lee, 134; at malvern hill, 142, 145; review by, of campaign, 147; ordered to gordonsville with ten brigades, 158; proposes move against pope's right, 159; rides with lee to clarke's mountain, 161; orders arrest of toombs, 161, and release of, 166; reaches thoroughfare gap, _en route_ for manassas, 173; arrival on field of manassas, 180; makes reconnoissance and reports against attack, 182; right flank of, ordered attacked by porter, 184; orders batteries to attack porter, for jackson's relief, 187; arrives on field of chantilly, 194; objects to movement against harper's ferry, 201, 202; orders to, for maryland campaign, 203; march of, 206; expresses to general lee preference for concentration at antietam rather than at turner's pass, 219; at south mountain, 222; estimate of troops of, at south mountain, 226; position of, in the line, preparatory to battle of sharpsburg, 234; advance against his left by hooker, 236; troops of, enter fight, 242; sustains strong attack of general richardson, 249; ride of, with general lee and d. h. hill on field of sharpsburg, 254; orders mclaws and walker to prepare to assault, 256; called by general lee his "old war-horse," 262; criticism of, on maryland campaign, 279 _et seq._; commissioned lieutenant-general, 290; marches to culpeper court-house, 291; marches for fredericksburg, 293; on the heights, 293; position of troops of, at fredericksburg, 305; views his lines preparatory to battle, 306; differs with general jackson as to the enemy's purpose, 323; covers route to richmond, 323; ordered to south side of james river, 324; employs one harrison as scout, 324; ordered to rejoin lee, 326; criticism of, on battle of chancellorsville, 329, 330; proposes measures to general lee for relief of vicksburg, 331; urges that campaign in pennsylvania should be one of defensive tactics, 331; sends scout harrison out with secret orders, 333; takes up march for gettysburg, 337; directions to stuart for movement of cavalry, 342; orders treated with contumely, 343; entertains colonel fremantle, 343; harrison, the scout, reports to, 346; suggests, on information received, change of march eastward, 347; rides with general lee towards gettysburg, 351; proposes to general lee move around the federal left, 358; orders columns of first corps hurried forward for battle, 359; advances with command, 366; rides with wofford's brigade into fight at little round top, 372; losses of (on second day), 373, 376, 377; alleged order to, for "battle at sunrise," 377 _et seq._; letter to, from colonel taylor, 379; letter to, from colonel venable, 379; letter to, from general long, 380; letter to, from charles marshall, 380; letter to, from colonel fairfax, 380, 381; letter to, from j. s. d. cullen, 383, 384; losses of, on third day, 385 _et seq._; sends scouts to find way for striking the enemy's left, 385; interview with general lee, 386; did not believe in attack as made, 388; carefully prepares for making assault, 389, 390; not advised of failure of confederate left, 392; rides to batteries, 395; testimony to claims of, at gettysburg, 400; fitzhugh lee upon, 403; franco-german war affords parallel for suggestion of, for move around federal left, 404; refutation of the statement that he was "hard to move," 405 _et seq._; _résumé_ of action of, at gettysburg, 407 _et seq._; in the retreat from gettysburg, 429, 430; urges on secretary of war seddon a westward movement, 433, 434; mentions the matter to general lee, 434; letter to, from general lee, 435; letter from, to general lee, 435; transportation ordered for movement of, to tennessee, 436; route of, on westward movement, 436, 437; parting with lee, 437; reaches general bragg's head-quarters, 438; placed in command of general bragg's left wing, 439; orders to division commanders of, from general bragg, 447; orders hood's division to assault, 447; rides with general buckner and comes under fire of the enemy, 450; lunches on the field, 451; reports to general bragg on battle of chickamauga, and urges pursuit of enemy, 461; gives opinion to president davis against bragg, 465; declines assignment to command of army of tennessee, 466; offers resignation to president, who declines it, 467; urges appointment of general micah jenkins to command of hood's division, 467; suggests change of base to rome, georgia, 468; letter to, from general lee, 469, 470 (note); calls a signal force from virginia to tennessee, 471; defends position, 472, 473; arranges night attack on hooker's rear-guard, 475, 476; reviews effects and possibilities of western move, 478, 479; ordered on campaign in east tennessee, 480, 481; organization of command of, 482; letter of, to general buckner on east tennessee campaign, 484, 485; troops of, on short rations, 486; orders of, to general wheeler, 487; command of, in engagement on little tennessee, 490; orders mclaws to assault fort at knoxville, 500; reinforced by general bushrod r. johnson, 501; ordered by bragg to attack knoxville, 501; orders of, to mclaws for assault of fort sanders, 502; letter to, from mclaws, urging delay in attack on fort sanders, 504; answer of, thereto, 504; recalls troops and gives reasons for, 505-507; ordered by bragg to co-operate with his army after defeat at chattanooga, 507; finds conformance to order impracticable, 509; marches up the holston valley, 511; presence of, in east tennessee causes concern to lincoln, 515, and to grant, 516; orders relief of general mclaws, 518; makes honorable mention of officers, 520; renews effort to be relieved from service, 524; marches to dandridge, 526; enters dandridge and drinks to general gordon granger, 529; general grant gives orders that he be driven from tennessee, 531; foster ordered to offensive against, 532; despatches concerning, from general grant to generals halleck, thomas, and schofield, 535-537; orders concentration of forces, 538; asks for ten thousand additional troops, 539; purpose of, in latter part of campaign, 539; on campaign in the far south, 540; withdrawal of command eastward made necessary, 540; asked by richmond authorities for suggestions, 543; ideas of, on prosecution of the war, 544; goes to virginia and submits plans to general lee, 544; criticism of, on bragg before richmond authorities, 546; visits wife at petersburg, 546; returns to tennessee, 547; rejoins general lee on the rapidan, 547; receives vote of thanks in congress, 550; in command of first corps on the rapidan (1864), 553; takes short route of march to field of battle (wilderness), 556, 557, 559; troops of, form under fire, 560; repulses hancock, 561; makes flanking movement on hancock's left, 562; rides with flanking party, 563; severely wounded, 564; borne to the rear, 566; northern historian and general hancock on advance of, 568; fitzhugh lee upon, 568; letter to, from colonel taylor on controversy as to guide at wilderness, 569; letter to, from general alexander on same subject, 570, 571; letter to, from colonel venable on same, 571; absent on leave, 572; again at front, and meets general lee, 573; letter of, to colonel taylor, 574; assigned to command on north side of james river, 574; orders roads broken with ploughs, 580; puts stop to picket-firing, 581; meets general e. o. c. ord and hears proposition for peace convention, 583, 584; disclaims authority to speak on, 584; communicates proposition for meeting, to general lee, 584; advocates impressment of gold and men, 588; starts in pursuit of sheridan, 592; visits general lee at petersburg, 604; receives a. p. hill's corps as part of his command, 608; on retreat from richmond, 609; marches for farmville, pressed by the enemy, 610; saves high bridge, 612; crosses appomattox at farmville, 615; not among those of lee's officers who urged surrender, 618; says "not yet" in regard to surrender, 619; refuses to bear to general lee report of officers favoring surrender, 620; calls for interview with general lee, 624; endeavors to recall general lee from ride to general grant, 626; forms last line of battle, 626; refuses to surrender to general custer, 627; meets general grant, 630; formally surrenders command, 630, 631; visits washington, 632; calls on general grant, 633; receives letter to president johnson, 633; interview of, with the president, 634; is relieved from political disabilities, 634; engages in business in new orleans, 634, 635; favors holding states under the president's reconstruction policy, 635; letter of, on the subject to j. m. g. parker, esq., 636, 637; attacked by new orleans press, 637; appointed surveyor of customs, 638; tribute of, to his old nurse, 638; letter to, from general lee, congratulating on convalescence, 639; letter from, to general lee, 640; letter of, to general lee, on impressment of gold, 641; letter to, from general lee, on policy of campaign, 642; letter of, to general lee, on impressment of men, 644; letter to, from general lee, 645; letter of, to general lee, on impressment of gold, 646; letter of, to general lee, on "peace" interview with general ord, 647; letter of, to general lee, on exchange of political prisoners, 648; letter to, from general lee, on interview with general grant, 649; letter of, to general lee, urging use of gold, 649; letter of, to general lee, on guarding danville railroad, 650; letter of, to a. a. general taylor, on suppression of desertion, 651; letter of, to general lee, on sheridan's operations, 652; letter of, to general taylor, on policy towards new organizations, 653; letter to, from general lee, on proposed history, 654; letter of congratulation from general lee, 655; letter to, from general lee, suggesting preparation of memoirs, 655; letter of, to general lee, on battle of gaines's mill, 656; letter to, from general lee, on prospects, etc., 657. longstreet, mrs. james, proposed meeting with mrs. grant to bring about peace, 584; in church at richmond, hears news of defeat at petersburg, 607. longstreet, owen & co., letter to, from general lee, 655. longstreet, richard, settles in america, 13. longstreet, robert lee (son of general longstreet), birth of, 546. longstreet, william, applies steam to navigation, 1787, 14; letter to governor telfair, 14. lookout mountain, confederates upon, 463; attack near, on hooker's rear-guard, 476, 477. lost orders, lee's to stuart, captured by pope, 160, 196; lee's "general order no. 191," in maryland campaign, 203, 212, 282, 283. loudon, fort. _see_ sanders, fort. lubbock, colonel, 48. lyle, captain, in affair on williamsburg road, 578. m. mccall, general john a., joins army of potomac, 122; at mechanicsville, 124; at gaines's mill, 126; report of, on frayser's farm, 136; captured at close of battle (frayser's farm), 138; his tenacity of battle, 139. mcclellan, general george b., 61; called "the young napoleon," 63; delay in marching against johnston at centreville, 64; concentrates army on the james river, 65; president davis's high opinion of, 66; not on field of williamsburg until late in the day, 80; at white house, 82; organizes two provisional army corps, 82; orders troops withdrawn from mechanicsville, 125; orders change of base to james river, 132; main force of, encounters longstreet at frayser's farm, 133; masterly retreat of, 132-140, 151; strength of his position at malvern hill, 141; shows himself well equipped in science of war, 151; on a gunboat on the james, 151; reaches alexandria, 171; marches in slow pursuit of lee in maryland, 208; report of, on march, 209; receives lee's "lost order," 213; writes president lincoln of prospects in maryland, 214; writes general halleck on same, 214-216; "makes haste slowly" after receiving the "lost order," 216; orders for advance of commands, 217; prisoners claimed by, at south mountain, 225; army of, in position at antietam, 234; on field with hooker, 237; disapproves of attack by franklin, 257; orders burnside to take bridge over antietam, 258; neither plan nor execution of, strong at antietam, 267; letter to, from governor curtin, 282; slow march of, after lee in maryland, 282; his position at opening of maryland campaign, 284, 285; opinion of, against holding harper's ferry, 286; description of, 285; compared and contrasted with lee, 285; crosses the potomac, south of the blue ridge, 290; relieved from command, 291. mccook, general a. mcd., at chickamauga, 442; goes before court of inquiry, 465. mccook, colonel d., at chickamauga, 442. mcdowell, general irvin, at west point, 16; in the field, 35; at centreville, 37; plan for battle at manassas, 43; pushes battle by artillery arm, 49; gallant effort of, to recover lost power, 50; criticism of, 54, 56; in command of third corps, army of virginia, 153; march of, to manassas intercepted by jackson, 176, 177; at manassas, 190. mcelroy, colonel, death of, 520. mclaws, major-general l., at williamsburg, 70; at seven pines, 107, 108; march of, in maryland campaign, 207, 208; orders from, at crampton's pass, 230; at maryland heights, 231; arrives at sharpsburg, 244; brigades of, enter battle, 245, 247; losses of lee's army in, 266; at fredericksburg, 307 _et seq._; at gettysburg, 370, 393, 396, 397; in retreat from gettysburg, 431; brigades of, start with longstreet's command for tennessee, 437; two brigades of, arrive at chickamauga, 439; but commander and other brigades too late, 440; finally joins longstreet, 462; posts army in semicircle near chattanooga, 463; engages in attack on hooker's rear-guard, 476, 477; in engagement on little tennessee, 490; reaches knoxville, 495; advance of, 497; ordered to assault of fort, 500; again ordered to assault, 502; orders of, to command for assault, 503; letter of, to general longstreet, urging delay of assault, 504; letter to, from general longstreet, 504; makes assault, 505, 506; relief of, ordered by general longstreet, 518; inquires cause therefor, 518; is restored to duty, 548. magruder, fort, at williamsburg, 68; attack on, 73. magruder, general j. b., 66; reinforced by huger and early, 67; builds fortifications at williamsburg, 68; engages with sumner at allen's farm and savage station, 132. mahone, general william, in battle of wilderness, 562; arrests advance of hancock before richmond, 576; at petersburg, 606; describes general lee's reception of disaster in retreat to appomattox, 614, 615; fires high bridge, 615; at cumberland church, 615; at farmville, 617; in conference with general lee at appomattox, 625. malvern hill, battle of, 141; positions of troops on field of, 141, 142; confederates make poor use of artillery, 143; general lee abandons his original plan, 144; battle begun by advance of the confederate right, 144; confederates repulsed, 144; federals march to harrison's landing, 145; jackson ordered to follow retreat, 146; casualties, 151. manassas (or bull run), first battle of, field chosen by beauregard, 33; description of, 34; beauregard's plan of battle, 36; mcdowell's arrival, 35, 37; opening of battle, 38, 46; forces available, 41; mcdowell's advance driven back, 46; terry's and lubbock's reconnoissance, 45, 48; fight assumes large proportions, 48; jackson christened "stonewall," 49; beauregard in command on left, 49; kirby smith's forces arrive, 50; mcdowell makes effort to recover lost power, 50; flight of federals, 51; longstreet's order to fire on retreat countermanded by general bonham, 52; pursuit revoked, 53; losses, 53; criticism of mcdowell, 54, 56; tyler's reconnoissance, 55; confederate battle-flag, 56; organization of forces, 57, 58. manassas (or bull run), second battle of, making ready for, 163 _et seq._; strength of confronting armies, 169; advance of pope to, 170; jackson first on the field, 171; pope reaches the junction, 172; first passage of arms on field, 172; longstreet at thoroughfare gap, 173, 174; engagement at, 175, 176; jackson attacks king's division at groveton, 175, 176; pope's orders to porter, 178, 179; battle opened by federals against jackson's right, 180; positions of troops, 181; kearny opens against jackson's left, 182; longstreet reports against attack, 182; lee returns to first plan of battle, 183; confederate advance anticipated by federals, 184; pope on his orders to porter, 185; pope mistakenly thinks confederates retreating, 185, 186; porter ordered against jackson's front, 186; longstreet orders batteries against porter, 187; charge of longstreet's troops, 187; lee rides under fire, 189; action of united states regulars, 190; federals retreat, 190; jackson and stuart ordered in pursuit, 191; forces engaged, and losses, 195; retreat covered by sumner, 196; review of campaign, 196, 197. manassas junction, longstreet reports at, to beauregard, 33; raid on, by stuart and trimble, 167; engagement at, 169. manning, colonel p. t., wounded while lunching with longstreet on field of chickamauga, 451. mansfield, major-general joseph k. f., crosses the antietam preparatory to battle, 237; mortally wounded at antietam, 242. marshall, colonel, letter of, to general longstreet, on alleged order by general lee for battle "at sunrise," 380 (note). martin, major-general, 441; supersedes wheeler in command of confederate cavalry at knoxville, 500; operations against sturgis's cavalry, 522; in affair at dandridge, 526, 527; in affair near dandridge, 532; president davis orders cavalry of, sent to johnston, 539; leaves longstreet for georgia, 542. marye, captain, at manassas, 40. maryland campaign, the, 199 _et seq._ (_see_ harper's ferry, sharpsburg, etc.); review of, 279 _et seq._ mason, george t., killed on the rio grande, 23. matamoras, taylor's army at, 22. may, charles, heroism of, at resaca de la palma, 28. meade, general george g., at south mountain, 223-225; at antietam, 241; handsome advance of, at fredericksburg, 308, 309; succeeds hooker in command of the army of the potomac, 348; wires general halleck of plans, 349; suggestion to, by general halleck that lee may turn his left, 360; position of, on second day at gettysburg, 363; recognizes and fears move by confederate right, 368; holds council on night of second day, 376; not apprehensive of lee's left, 389; attempts to bring his left against longstreet's battle, 396; on suggestion of longstreet to work towards his line of communications, 404; concentrates army at warrenton, 432; before the battle of the wilderness, 552; orders his troops into action, 559; at petersburg, 608; follows retreat, 610, 611. mechanicsville, battle of, attack by a. p. hill, 123, 124; losses of first day, 124; mcclellan orders withdrawal, 125. memoirs of general longstreet, suggested by general lee, 655. merritt, general wesley, sheridan's chief of cavalry, 590, 598. mexican war, beginning of, 18; precipitated by movement to the rio grande, 21, 22; first hostilities, 23; palo alto, 25; resaca de la palma, 26. miles, colonel dixon h., mentioned by mcclellan, 215; mortally wounded at harper's ferry, 232; orders to, from general wool, 286. miles, general, at petersburg, 608. miller, captain, at gettysburg, 395. mills, colonel roger q., commands brigade at chickamauga, 446. milroy, general, fights severe engagement with ewell at winchester, 339. minnegerode, rev., pastor of church in richmond, 607. mitchell, general r. b., at chickamauga, 442. moore, colonel, killed at seven pines, 99. morgan, general john t., in engagement on little tennessee river, 490; in affair near dandridge, 532. "mud march," the, 323. mumford, general t. t., at five forks, 596, 597; ordered by longstreet against ord's bridge-burners, 612; at cumberland church, 615; captures part of gregg's cavalry, 617; at appomattox, 629. n. naglee, general, at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259. napoleon, quotation from, 405. negley, general, at chickamauga, 442. negroes, confederate congress provides for enrolment of, as soldiers, 582; suffrage of, 636. nichols, general w. a., at gettysburg, 374; extends hospitality to longstreet, 632, 633. north carolina, fifth regiment, slaughter in ranks of, at williamsburg, 78. nurse, the old, 638. o. ord, general e. o. c., 62; meets general longstreet, 583; proposes meeting of commanders in interest of peace, 584; called by general grant to south side of the james, 595; following confederate retreat from petersburg, 610; orders burning of high bridge, 611; at appomattox, 623, 624; interview with, described by longstreet, 647. orders, lost. _see_ lost orders. owen, edward, 635. owen, miller, 635. owen, william, 635. p. palmer, general j. m., at chickamauga, 442. palo alto, 24. parke, general john g., in command at knoxville, 496; takes the field along the rear of longstreet's march, 512; assumes command of federals in field on march to dandridge, 528; at fort steadman, 594, 595; at petersburg, 605, 606. parker, j. m. g., letter to, from general longstreet, 636, 637. patrick, general, at antietam, 266; carries sumner's demand for surrender of fredericksburg to civil authorities and general longstreet, 294; in attack, 309. patterson, robert, opposing johnston in the valley, 42, 53. peace, propositions for, by general lee, 204; to be secured because gold had gone up to 200, 317; talk of, 582; mission of hon. montgomery blair, 583; proposition of general ord to longstreet for meeting of commanders in interest of, 583, 584; proposed meeting of wives of generals grant and longstreet in interest of, 584; correspondence of generals lee and grant, 585, 586; general grant disclaims authority to act upon, 587; longstreet on interview with general ord, 547. pegram, colonel, at five forks, 597; mortally wounded, 599. pegram, general, at chickamauga, 441. pemberton, general, commissioned lieutenant-general, 290; with president davis before army of the tennessee, 469; troops threaten mutiny when they hear davis's purpose to assign him to command of polk's corps, 470. pender, general, at shepherdstown, 264; at fredericksburg, 307; at gettysburg, 354. pendleton, general, at shepherdstown, 264; saw opportunity for the right at gettysburg, 368; charges of, against first corps, 377; delivers to general lee opinion of officers favorable to surrender, 618; interview with general lee on proposition for surrender, 620, 621. peninsula, the, 68. peninsular campaign (_see_ chickahominy, seven pines, mechanicsville, gaines's mill, malvern hill, etc.), losses in, 151. pennsylvania, invasion of, 331, 334. _see_ gettysburg. perry, general, at gettysburg, 371. petersburg, battle of, confederates cross the james, 603; general grant's concerted assault, 604; general wright makes opening assault, 605; death of general a. p. hill, 605; general grant rides over captured works, 606; news of, received by president davis in church at richmond, 607; fierce assaults on fort gregg, 607; heavy losses at fort whitworth, 608; lee gives orders for retreat, 608; lee purposed to join johnston in north carolina, 610. pettigrew, general, wounded and captured at seven pines, 98; charge of, at gettysburg, compared with those of meade's divisions at fredericksburg, 314; at gettysburg, 352; position of, on third day (gettysburg), 388; famous charge, 393; wounding of, 394; attacked by kilpatrick in retreat from gettysburg, 430. pickett, general george e., at seven pines, 108; at gaines's mill, 127, 128; at opening of fredericksburg, 309; his charge at gettysburg compared with that of meade's division at fredericksburg, 314; position of, on third day, 388; alexander gives notice to, and longstreet affirms order for advance of, 392; general lee favors sending division of, to longstreet, in tennessee, 539; recalled, to join longstreet, 591; ordered to join lee at petersburg, 592; opens battle of five forks, 596, 597; rides under fire to his command, 599; position at five forks not of his choosing, 600; generalship of, 601; reinforced too late, 599, 602; in engagement at amazon creek, 606; escapes capture at rice's station, 614. pleasonton, general alfred, in maryland campaign, 209, 210; pushes confederate cavalry back from the maryland mountains, 216; opens battle of south mountain, 221; crosses bridge no. 2 (antietam), 252; in command of cavalry division under burnside's reorganization, 292; engages stuart's cavalry at brandy station, 338; drives stuart back to ashby's gap, 341. poe, captain, constructs federal earthworks at knoxville, 496; report on work by citizens and contrabands, 500. political prisoners, general lee upon exchange of, 586; general grant upon, 587; longstreet on exchange of, 648. polk, general leonidas (bishop), commissioned lieutenant-general, 290; in command of right wing at chickamauga, 439; put under charges by general bragg, 465. pope, major-general john, in command of army of virginia, 153; displays bold front as a diversion, 154; injudicious orders of, 154; "general orders no. 11," 155; his attitude towards non-combatants contrasted with scott's in mexico, 155, 156; engages with jackson at slaughter mountain, 157; increases strength of his army, 159; captures one of lee's orders and officers, 160; puts army in retreat across the rappahannock, 160; head-quarters of, raided by stuart, 165; forms plan to attack lee, 166; concentrates army of virginia at warrenton, 168; orders for advance and concentration at manassas, 171; reaches manassas junction, 172; orders to porter, 178, 179; orders for attack at manassas, 180; orders porter to attack longstreet's right, 184; his report upon, 185; mistakenly supposes confederates retreating, 185, 186; letter to, from general lee, on death of kearny, 194; criticism of, in manassas campaign, 197. porter, major-general fitz-john, in command of fifth corps, 82; at mechanicsville, 122; at gaines's mill, 126; at malvern hill, 141; ordered by pope to manassas, 171; march of, delayed, 171; pope's orders to, for manassas, 178; ordered to attack longstreet's right flank, 184; receives order too late, 185; ordered to attack jackson's front, 186; hard battle against, by jackson and longstreet, 187, 188; at antietam, 234; ordered ready to enter battle, 252. porter, theoderic, in theatricals on mexican frontier, 20; killed on the rio grande, 23. potomac, army of. _see_ army of the potomac. potter, general r. d., in east tennessee campaign, 490, 492. powell, william h., report of, on second manassas, 190. preston, general william, at chickamauga, 439, 450 (note); gains snodgrass hill, 455. provisional army corps, two organized by mcclellan, 82. r. rains, general, leaves percussion shells at williamsburg, 79. ransom, general, at fredericksburg, 309, 310, 313; at five forks, 596, 598; horse killed, 599. reed, general theodore, mortally wounded in engagement at cumberland church, 615. regulars, united states, at first manassas, 37, 51; at second manassas, 189, 190. reno, general jesse, division of, joins pope at culpeper, 159; captures signal station, 161; killed at south mountain, 223. resaca de la palma, 26-28. retreats, the great (mcclellan's), 132-152; from gettysburg, 426 _et seq._ reynolds, general john f., at mechanicsville, 126; ordered to attack at manassas (second), 180; in command of right wing of union army at gettysburg, 353; death of, 354. reynolds, general, at chickamauga, 441. rice's station, 611; engagement at, 613, 614. richardson, general i. b., at sharpsburg, 244, 247; brave advance of, against confederate centre, 248, 250; occupies piper house at antietam, 251; mortally wounded, 251. richardson, colonel john b., at second manassas, 188; at sharpsburg, 258, 269; at fredericksburg, 319; at gettysburg, 411. richmond, apprehended advance on, 64; practicable routes to, 64; d. h. hill's denial of reported proposed abandonment of, when lee assumed command, 115, 116; burnside's march for, 293; route to, covered by longstreet after fredericksburg battle, 323, 324; armies again in front of, 572 _et seq._ (_see_ richmond, campaign of, in 1864); news of petersburg received at, 607. "richmond authorities," forced to extremity, call for suggestions as to conduct of the war, 543; lee and longstreet confer with, 544. _see_ richmond, campaign against. richmond, campaign against, in 1864, fall of general j. e. b. stuart, 573; longstreet assigned to command north of the james, 574; confederate positions, 575; general grant conceives plan for left attack, 575, 576; mahone arrests advance of hancock, 576; affair on the williamsburg road, 576-578; closing scenes of (1864), 579; sherman's movements come into remote bearing upon affairs around the capital, 580; longstreet orders roads broken up with ploughs, 580; general grant strengthens combination against richmond, 590; general grant orders a grand move by his left, 592; general lee gives consent to sortie against fort steadman, 592; positions and strength of federal army, 593; general lee's strength, 593, 594; storming of fort steadman, 594; losses at fort steadman, 595; general grant begins movement around the confederate right, 595; general lee endeavors to anticipate the movement, 596 (_see_ five forks, battle of, petersburg, battle of, etc.); longstreet in retreat marches for farmville, 610; general meade's pursuit, 610, 611; movements of generals ord and longstreet, 611, 612; high bridge saved by longstreet, 612; engagement at rice's station, 613, 614; confederate disaster, 614; general lee's reception of the news described by general mahone, 614, 615; engagement at cumberland church, 615; panic among confederate teamsters at farmville, 615; engagement at farmville, 616, 617. _see_ appomattox, surrender at. ridgely, randolph, heroism of, at resaca de la palma, 27. ripley, general, wounded at sharpsburg, 243. robertson, general j. b., in engagement at lookout valley, 476, 477; charges and specifications against, 517; sentenced to suspension, 548. robinson, james, longstreet's guide in wilderness, 548. "rock brigade," at chickamauga, 448; at petersburg, 606. rodes, general r. e., takes federal redoubt and battery at seven pines, 94; at south mountain, 224; at sharpsburg, 247; at gettysburg, 355, 374. rosecrans, general w. s., threatening of, in georgia, 433; understood bragg's plan for chickamauga, 439; rides along union lines on eve of battle, 443; at chattanooga, 463; reports condition of army deplorable, 470; superseded in command by general george h. thomas, 472. rosser, colonel, on the rappahannock, 164, 218, 221; general, saves portion of early's command and reports to longstreet, 591; at five forks, 596; ordered by longstreet against ord's bridge-burners, 612; at cumberland church, 615; captures part of gregg's cavalry, 617. ruff, colonel, honorably mentioned, and death of, 520. ruger, general, opens against ewell (gettysburg, third day), 387, 388. s. sailor's creek, confederate disaster at, 613-615. st. john, brigadier-general f. m., appointed commissary-general of subsistence, 583. sanders, fort, assault on, by general mclaws, 505, 506. scales, general, wounded at gettysburg, 389. scammon, colonel, at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259. schofield, general j. m., despatch to, from general grant, on driving longstreet out of tennessee, 535, 536; despatch of, to general thomas, 537. schurz, general carl, at gettysburg, 355. scott, general winfield, 37; treatment of non-combatants in mexican war, 156; advice of, as to "wayward sisters," 631. scout harrison employed by longstreet, 324; reports to longstreet before gettysburg, 346. seddon, secretary of war, sends scouts to longstreet, 324; longstreet calls on, and makes proposition to, for western movement, 327, 409; western movement again urged on, by longstreet, 433, 434. sedgwick, general, division of, leads sumner's advance at sharpsburg, 244, 245; encounters heavy fire, 246; in command of sixth corps, 552. semmes, general, at gettysburg, 370; mortally wounded, 371. seven days' retreat, mcclellan's, 132, 152. seven pines (or fair oaks), battle of, 81; new line of defence, 81; mcclellan advances to the chickahominy, 82; preliminary affairs, 82; positions of the armies, 83, 84; johnston seeks to strike mcclellan before mcdowell can reach him, 85; johnston holds council, 85, 86; longstreet ordered to williamsburg road, 86; tactical handling there left to him, 88; terrific storm on eve of battle, 88; johnston's orders for generals smith and huger, 89; lack of harmony between longstreet, smith, and huger, 90, 92; hour of opening battle, 93; garland and the two andersons strongly engage, 94; rodes takes federal redoubt and battery, 94; longstreet's battle on the williamsburg road, 96; mcclellan orders sumner's corps to the fight, 97; sumner's reports quoted, 98; general smith beaten, 98; general johnston orders troops to sleep on their lines, 100; johnston wounded, 100; summary of forces and losses, 101, 102; longstreet plans for resuming battle at daylight, 103; the second day's battle, 105; general smith holds a council, 107; longstreet asks for reinforcements and a diversion, 108; pickett's brave stand, 108; losses, 110; criticism on general smith, 110, 111; the battle should not have been lost by the confederates, 110; keyes's corroboration, 110. seward, secretary, 583. seymour, general, taken prisoner at wilderness, 565. shaler, general, captured at wilderness, 565. shannon, lieutenant, at chickamauga, 441. sharpsburg (or antietam), battle of, preliminaries, 227 _et seq._; head of lee's army reaches the antietam, 233; union army on the field, 234; mcclellan makes reconnoissance, 234; description of the field, 235; hooker advances against longstreet, 236; jackson arrives from harper's ferry, 236; general mansfield crosses the antietam, 237; the bloodiest single day of the war, 239; comparison with other battles, 240; battle opens, 241; fall of general mansfield, 242; heavy losses in general walker's, hood's, and hill's commands, 243; federals in heavy columns cross the antietam, 244; sumner's advance, 245, 247; richardson's march against the confederate centre, 248; longstreet's battle on the hagerstown pike, 249; fall of g. b. anderson, 249; richardson mortally wounded, 251; attack against confederate centre reduced to defensive, 252; pleasonton crosses bridge no. 2, 252; his threatening demonstration checked, 253; d. h. hill's horse shot under him, 254; jackson ordered to turn federal right, 257; mcclellan's orders to burnside to take bridge, 258; charge of colonel duryea, 259; advance against longstreet's right, 260; arrival of general a. p. hill, 261; burnside's progress arrested, 262; meeting of lee and longstreet after close of battle, 262; lee withdraws across the potomac, 263 (_see_ shepherdstown); strength of armies, 265; losses, 266; mcclellan's plan and execution not strong, 267; confederate troops engaged in, 267; federal troops engaged in, 271; full significance of battle, 288; comments on stonewall jackson at, 401 (note). shepherdstown, lee's army crosses potomac at, 263; engagement at, 264, 265. sheridan, general p. h., at chickamauga, 442; in command of federals of foster's army on march to dandridge, 528; in fight at yellow tavern, 573; marches cavalry from the valley to join sherman, 590; in battle of five forks, 596, 597, 598; at petersburg, 606; at appomattox, 622; longstreet on operations of, 652. sherman, general william t., at west point, 17; advance of, at manassas, 48; marching on chattanooga, 480; proposes to strike hardee, 515; movements of, come into remote bearing upon matters around richmond, 580; progressive movements of, 581. sickles, general daniel, at fredericksburg, 309; in affair at the peach orchard (gettysburg), 366, 371; wounded, 371. sigel, general, in command of first corps, army of virginia, 153; ordered by pope to attack at manassas (second), 180. sims, captain, at appomattox, 627. slaughter mountain, battle at, 157. slaughter, m., mayor of fredericksburg, reply of, to general sumner's demand for surrender, 294-296. slocum, general henry w., at crampton's pass, 229; at gettysburg, 356. smith, general e. k., commissioned lieutenant-general, 290. smith, major-general g. w., reports for duty with army of northern virginia, 60; called to richmond for council with war department, 65; johnston's orders to, for seven pines, 89; complaint of, against longstreet, 90; beaten at seven pines, 98; command devolved upon, temporarily, after johnston was wounded, 100; standing of, 103; holds council, 107; criticism upon, 110, 111; resignation of, 111. smith, general kirby, arrives on field of manassas, 49; is wounded, 50. smith, general m. l., in wilderness, 561; makes reconnoissance and leads flanking force, 562, 563. smith, major melancthon, at chickamauga, 441. smith, general w. f., at crampton's pass, 229; opens line of railway on the tennessee, 472; move of, against confederate sharp-shooters, 473. soldiers, the confederate, tributes to, 200, 288; amusement of, 325. sorrel, lieutenant-colonel g. m., 47; goes with longstreet to chickamauga, 438; communicates to general mclaws order of relief from general longstreet, 518; leads divisions in flanking party in wilderness, 562; appointed brigadier, 581. south mountain, description of, 218; advance of union forces to, 219; battle of, opened by generals pleasonton and cox, 221; general garland killed, 221; federals in superior strength numerically, 222; general reno killed, 223; the strong battle against general rodes, 224; exhaustion of the troops, 225; losses, 225; lee orders withdrawal of troops from, 228. staff of general lee, 573. steadman, fort, sortie against, 592 _et seq._ steamboat invented by william longstreet, 14. steedman, general, at chickamauga, 442. stephens, hon. alex. h., 583. steuart, general george h., marches through mcconnellsburg and carlisle, 345; at gettysburg, 374; at five forks, 600. stevens, general i. i., at west point, 17; division of, joins pope on rappahannock, 161; at manassas (second), 182; killed at chantilly, 194; tribute to, 195. stewart, general, at chickamauga, 439; makes strong advance and assault, 447. strawberry plains. _see_ dandridge. stribling's battery, captured at suffolk, 325. stuart, general j. e. b., disperses federals at lewinsville, 60; at dranesville, 62; opposes hooker on the hampton and yorktown roads, 68, 69; at williamsburg, 75; reconnoissance by, around mcclellan's army, 116-119; cuts off stoneman's cavalry at savage station, 130; at erlington heights, 146; raids general pope's head-quarters, 165, 166; captures supplies, etc., at manassas junction, 167; cavalry of, in first passage of arms on field of manassas, 172; takes a map on the field, 183; in pursuit of pope's retreat, 193; at maryland heights, 229; rides around union army at sharpsburg and harper's ferry, 290; engages pleasonton's cavalry at brandy station, 338; orders to, from general lee, for march to pennsylvania, 340; driven by pleasonton back to ashby's gap, 341; directions to, from longstreet, for movements by cavalry, 342; late arrival of, at gettysburg, 373; stubborn fight of, on third day, 396; covering confederate retreat from gettysburg, 428; death of, at yellow tavern, 572, 573; character of, 573. sturgis, general, at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259; operations against martin's cavalry, 521, 522; occupies dandridge, 526; in affair at dandridge, 526; attempts to strike martin's rear, 527. suffolk, general longstreet's operations about, 324. sumner, general e. v., in command of right on chickahominy, 84; ordered by mcclellan into battle at seven pines, 97; reports of, 98; defeats magruder at savage station, 132; gallant covering of retreat from second manassas, 196; lee's "lost order" found in camp of, 213; advance of, at sharpsburg, 245; eagerness and bravery of, 247; in command of right grand division army of the potomac, 292; calls for surrender of fredericksburg, 293; troops of, enter fredericksburg, 304. "sunrise order" for battle at gettysburg, 377 _et seq._ surrender. _see_ appomattox, surrender at. sykes, general, in command of united states regulars at manassas, 51; at second manassas, 189; at fredericksburg, 313; corps of, at little round top, 371. t. taliaferro, general, wounded at groveton, 177; at fredericksburg, 309. taylor, colonel erasmus, on lee's acknowledgment of fault at gettysburg, 400; takes guide to longstreet in wilderness, 557; letter of, to longstreet, on controversy as to guide at wilderness, 569. taylor, general, mortally wounded at manassas junction, 170. taylor, assistant adjutant-general w. h., letter of, to general longstreet, on order for "battle at sunrise" (gettysburg), 379 (note); on supporting longstreet at gettysburg, 397; states strength of army of northern virginia (may, 1864), 553; letter to, from longstreet, 574; reports lee's strength for defence of richmond, 593, 594; letter to, from longstreet, 651; letter to, from longstreet, on policy towards new organizations, 653. taylor, general zachary, in command of "army of observation" in louisiana, 18; moves to the rio grande, 21; calls for volunteers, 23; at resaca de la palma, 27. tennessee, army of the. _see_ army of tennessee. tennessee campaign, 438 _et seq._ _see_ chickamauga, battle of, etc. tennessee, east, campaign of. _see_ east tennessee campaign. terry, colonel, 48, 596. terry, general, before richmond, 576; in second expedition against wilmington, 582; at five forks, 595, 597, 600. texas seeks annexation, 18. thomas, colonel, death of, 520. thomas, general george h., at west point, 17; commands four divisions of rosecrans's army at chickamauga, 441-443; calls for reinforcements, 446; supersedes general rosecrans in command, 472; called on by general foster for troops to aid in campaign against longstreet, 533; despatch from general grant to, on longstreet, 534-537; despatch to, from general schofield, 537. thompson, major, killed, 630. thoroughfare gap, longstreet's advance column at, 173; description of, 174. _see_ manassas, second. tidball's artillery at fort steadman, 594. toombs, general robert, on the chickahominy, 113; ordered under arrest by longstreet, 161; released, 166; at second manassas, 189; gallantly defends bridge against burnside, 257; forced to retire, 260. triggs, general, at chickamauga, 449. trimble, general, in engagement on rappahannock, 164; at manassas junction, 167; charge of, at gettysburg compared with that of meade's men at fredericksburg, 314; position of, at gettysburg, third day, 388; in the famous charge, 393; wounding of, 394. turner, general, at petersburg, 607; assaults fort whitworth, 608. tyler, general, reconnoissance of, at manassas, 38, 55. v. vance, general, captured by federals, 531. van cleve, general h. p., at chickamauga, 442. venable, colonel charles s., mentioned, 363, 379; letter of, to general longstreet on "battle at sunrise" order at gettysburg, 379 (note); on putting heth's division in assaulting columns, 398; takes order for change of direction to longstreet in wilderness, 557; letter of, to longstreet, on movement of latter to the wilderness, 571; gives account of last scenes and of general lee, 624. vincent, general, killed at little round top (gettysburg), 372. virginia "foot cavalry," 146. virginia, "too much," 332. w. wadsworth, general james s., at gettysburg, 374; mortally wounded at wilderness, 563. wagner, lieutenant, mortally wounded by remarkable cannon-shot, 255. walker, general j. g., at harper's ferry, 231; at sharpsburg, 242, 247. walker, general w. h. t., at chickamauga, 441, 446. walton, colonel, longstreet's order to, 390. war feeling in the south, 31. war, mexican. _see_ mexican war. war, the general status of, on confederate side, 543; suggestions for conduct of, by longstreet, 544. warren, major-general g. k., finds little round top the citadel of the field at gettysburg, 371; testimony as to third day at gettysburg, 398; in command of fifth corps (1864), 552; makes opening attack in wilderness, 558; at five forks, 597. washburn, colonel, mortally wounded, 615. washington artillery, the, at manassas, 37, 40, 41, 49; at second manassas, 181, 186; at sharpsburg, 233, 236, 243, 249, 250, 261, 267; at fredericksburg, 311; at gettysburg, 390 _et seq._ weed, general, killed on little round top (gettysburg), 372. weitzel, general, before richmond, 576, 595, 603, 604. west point, distinguished men at, 16, 17. westward movement, first proposed to secretary of war seddon by longstreet, 327, 409; reverted to by longstreet, 433, 434; transportation ordered for, 436; longstreet reaches general bragg's head-quarters, 438 (_see_ chickamauga, battle of, etc.); difference between time proposed for and actual making of, 478, 479. weymouth, captain, at fredericksburg, 303. wharton, general, 441. wheeler, general, makes cavalry raid on tennessee river, 463; longstreet's orders to, in east tennessee, 487, 488; in engagement on little tennessee river, 490; returns to general bragg, 500. white house, mcclellan establishes his permanent depot at, 82. _see_ seven pines. whiting, major, at manassas, 52; general, at seven pines, 105-107; desires to leave fair oaks, 113; reinforces jackson, 115; at gaines's mill, 127, 128; mortally wounded at fort fisher, 582. whittle, colonel, wounded at gettysburg, 394. whitworth, fort (petersburg), 606-608. wilcox, general, at burnside's bridge (antietam), 259; at gettysburg, 374; at wilderness, 556, 558, 560; at fort steadman, 594; at petersburg, 605, 606, 608. wilderness, the, battle of, general grant with army of the potomac, 552; strength of confronting armies, 552-554; army of the potomac crosses the rapidan, 555; general grant had no fixed plan beyond avoiding lee's defensive line, 555; wilderness described, 555, 556; march of longstreet's command, 556; receives a guide, 557; troops meet and action cannot wait, 558; attack by general warren, 558; confederates fail to intrench at night, 560; hancock's advance in the morning, 560; longstreet's troops form line under fire, 560, and repulse hancock's advance, 561; the ninth corps ordered in by general grant, 561; longstreet organizes flanking movement against hancock's left, 562, 563; general jenkins mortally and longstreet severely wounded, 564; general lee on the field in command, 565; value of a "level head," 566; the failure to intrench by third corps, 565-567; delay in advance after longstreet was disabled, 567; controversy as to longstreet's march and guide, 568, 571. willard, general, killed at gettysburg, 371. williamsburg, battle of, 72; advance of hooker, 73; longstreet orders early to support the left, 74; stuart's charge, 75; anderson's concentrated movement on, and capture of guns, 75; anderson driven back by hooker's reinforcements, 76; hancock takes two redoubts, 77; attack by d. h. hill and early, with great slaughter of the latter's troops because of blunder, 78; forces engaged, 79; casualties, 79; object of the battle, 79; hancock called "the superb," 80. williamsburg, engagement near, 68-70. williamsburg road, affair on (1864), 576-578. williamsport, confederates at, on retreat from gettysburg, 428, 429. wilmington, first move against, 580; second expedition against, 582. winchester, engagement at, between ewell and milroy, 339. winder, general, mortally wounded at slaughter mountain, 157. winthrop, captain, wounded at knoxville in leading assault, 497. wofford, general, longstreet rides with, to little round top, 372; in retreat from gettysburg, 431; in engagement on little tennessee river, 490; in assault on fort sanders, 502, 503, 505; at dandridge, 526; at wilderness, 562, 563. wood, general t. j., at chickamauga, 442, 446. woodhull, major alfred a., gives account of remarkable cannon-shot, 255. wool, general john e., orders to colonel miles, in command of harper's ferry, 286. worth, general, at corpus christi, 20. wright, general, at gettysburg, 371; makes assault at petersburg, 605. wrightsville, bridge at, burned, 345. y. yellow tavern, engagement at, between sheridan and stuart, 573. york, authorities of, surrender to general john b. gordon, 345. yorktown, confederates occupy, 67; intrenchments abandoned, 68. the end. footnotes: [1] brother of the rear-admiral. [2] he had a similar wound in the war of 1812. [3] rebellion record, vol. ii. p. 309. less two regiments and one cavalry troop. [4] general beauregard claims that he was not so strong, but estimates seem to warrant the number given. [5] in that attack the division commander, colonel david hunter, was wounded. [6] rebellion record, vol. ii. pp. 351, 387, 405, 426. [7] ibid., 328. [8] not engaged. [9] in reserve at centreville and not in battle proper. [10] rebellion record, vol. xi. part i. p. 521. [11] rebellion record, vol. xi. part i. p. 568. [12] ibid., p. 450. [13] smith's war papers. [14] rebellion record, vol. xi. part iii. p. 563. [15] rebellion record, vol. xi. part i. p. 938. [16] general berry thought that he got up as far as the casey camp, but mistook couch's opening for that of casey. [17] confederate war papers, g. w. smith. [18] rebellion record, vol. xi. part i. p. 763. [19] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 813. [20] previous returns give him 11,000, but one of his brigades was absent. [21] smith's war papers. [22] ibid. [23] ibid. [24] smith's war papers. [25] ibid. [26] letter from general mclaws. [27] rebellion record, vol. xii. part iii. p. 910. [28] of interest in this connection is a letter to the author from general d. h. hill: "fayetteville, ark., february 4, 1879. "general james longstreet: "my dear general,--i never heard of the proposed abandonment of richmond at the time general lee took command. i had charge of one of the four divisions with which the retreat from yorktown was effected, and was called several times into general lee's most important councils. i never heard any officer suggest such a course in these councils or in private conversations. "i feel sure that general johnston always intended to fight the invading force, and so far as i know no officer of rank entertained any other view. "i remember very well that some days before the council on the nine miles road (when yourself, a. p. hill, and myself were present) that you suggested the plan of attacking mcclellan's right flank, and that i expressed my preference for an attack on the other flank. this shows that there was no thought of retreat. "very truly yours, "d. h. hill." [29] official account, rebellion record, vol. xi. part i. p. 1036. [30] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 882. [31] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 38. [32] from memory i will say that this message from general lee was delivered by captain a. p. mason. [33] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 517. stuart. [34] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 627. d. h. hill. [35] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 100. heintzelman. [36] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 107. [37] ibid., pp. 162-164. [38] a name taken by the infantry from the valley district on account of their swift secret marches. [39] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 664. [40] rebellion record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 687. [41] rebellion record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 52. [42] rebellion record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 53. [43] his letter of august 14, 1862. [44] rebellion record, vol xii. part ii. p. 29. [45] rebellion record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 378. [46] rebellion record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 381. [47] ibid., pp. 74, 75. [48] ibid., p. 371. [49] rebellion record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 518. [50] ibid., p. 520. [51] rebellion record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 40. general pope. [52] battles and leaders of the civil war. [53] rebellion record. [54] rebellion record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 558. general lee's report. [55] "head-quarters army of northern virginia, "september 9, 1862. "special orders, no. 191. "the army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the hagerstown road. general jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route towards sharpsburg, cross the potomac at the most convenient point, and, by friday night, take possession of the baltimore and ohio railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from harper's ferry. "general longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army. "general mclaws, with his own division and that of general r. h. anderson, will follow general longstreet. on reaching middletown he will take the route to harper's ferry, and by friday morning possess himself of the maryland heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at harper's ferry and vicinity. "general walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the potomac at cheek's ford, ascend its right bank to lovettsville, take possession of loudoun heights, if practicable, by friday morning, key's ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the potomac on his right. he will, as far as practicable, co-operate with general mclaws and general jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. "general d. h. hill's division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. the reserve artillery, ordnance, supply-trains, etc., will precede general hill. "general stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of generals longstreet, jackson, and mclaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind. "the commands of generals jackson, mclaws, and walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at boonsborough or hagerstown. "each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments to procure wood, etc. "by command of general r. e. lee. "r. h. chilton, "_assistant adjutant-general_. "major-general d. h. hill, "_commanding division_." [56] rebellion record, vol. xix. part ii. p. 600. [57] rebellion record, vol. xix. part i. p. 41. mcclellan's official account. [58] record, vol. xix. part i. [59] rebellion record, vol. xix. part ii. p. 281. [60] rebellion record, vol. xix. part i. p. 48. [61] rebellion record, vol. xix. part i. p. 183. [62] rebellion record, vol. xix. part i. p. 961. [63] rebellion record, vol. xix. part i. p. 47. [64] some authorities say (including a small number of "captured or missing") 12,601. [65] report of committee, part i. p. 368. [66] of this shot, captain a. b. more, of richmond, virginia, wrote, under date of june 16, 1886,-"the howitzers have always been proud of that shot, and, thinking it would interest you, i write to say that it was fired by corporal holzburton, of the second company, richmond howitzers, from a ten-pound parrott." [67] rebellion record, vol. xix. part i. p. 377. [68] rebellion record, vol. i. part i. p. 63. [69] this includes eighty-five lost by s. d. lee's artillery, not regularly assigned as part of the corps. [70] surgeon lafayette guild, medical director of the army of northern virginia, in his official tabulated report, accounts for 10,291 only. [71] compiled from the official reports. [72] left at leesburg. [73] commanding brigade while general evans commanded provisional division. [74] attached to twenty-first north carolina regiment. [75] john r. johnson's and d'aquin's batteries were the only ones present with this division at sharpsburg. [76] braxton's, crenshaw's, mcintosh's, and pegram's batteries engaged at sharpsburg. [77] cutts's and jones's battalions also under d. h. hill's command at sharpsburg. [78] first virginia artillery. [79] with d. h. hill's division at sharpsburg. [80] left at leesburg. [81] compiled from the records of the adjutant-general's office. on september 14 the right wing of the army, consisting of the first and ninth corps, was commanded by major-general burnside; the centre, composed of the second and twelfth corps, by major-general sumner, and the left wing, comprising the sixth corps and couch's division (fourth corps), by major-general franklin. [82] designation changed from third corps, army of virginia, to first army corps, by general orders, no. 129, adjutant-general's office, september 12, 1862. [83] wounded september 17. [84] relieved september 14. [85] wounded september 14. [86] joined september 9, and detached september 13 as railroad guard. [87] wounded september 14. [88] detached at washington, d. c., since september 6. [89] wounded september 17. [90] wounded september 17. [91] assigned to the sixth corps as the third division, september 26, 1862. [92] joined september 17. [93] joined september 15. [94] this division was organized september 12, and reached the battle-field of antietam september 18. [95] assigned to first division, second army corps, september 17. [96] on the 16th and 17th, major general burnside exercised general command on the left, and brigadier-general cox was in immediate command of the corps. [97] killed september 14. [98] wounded september 17. [99] designation changed from second corps, army of virginia, to twelfth army corps, by general orders, no. 129, adjutant-general's office, september 12, 1862. [100] mortally wounded september 17. [101] wounded september 17. [102] no officers present; enlisted men of company attached to second massachusetts. [103] detached september 9. [104] detached september 13. [105] killed september 17. [106] detached at frederick, md. [107] rebellion record, vol. xix. part i. p. 520. [108] see organization of the army appended to account of the battle of fredericksburg. [109] rebellion record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 783. [110] rebellion record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 1121. [111] ibid., p. 1057. [112] rebellion record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 432. [113] vol. xxi. of the official records. [114] not assigned to divisions. [115] majors garnett, hamilton, and t. j. page, jr., are mentioned in the reports as commanding artillery battalions, but their composition is not stated. [116] organization of brigades as established november 10, 1862. on roster for december 16, 1862, hart's, breathed's, moorman's, and chew's batteries appear as attached, respectively, to the first, second, third, and fourth brigades. commanders are given as reported december 16, 1862. [117] detachment on raid to dumfries. [118] in the shenandoah valley. [119] the confederate dry-goods factories, for want of other dye-stuffs, had long before this resorted to the use of the butternut coloring. [120] rebellion record, vol. xxv. part ii. p. 320. [121] ibid., p. 696. [122] general d. h. hill was next in rank to general ewell. he was the hero of bethel, seven pines, south mountain, and the hardest fighter at sharpsburg. his record was as good as that of "stonewall" jackson, but, not being a virginian, he was not so well advertised. [123] report committee, vol. i p. 480. [124] from general lee's official report: "... it was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by general hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under general meade, was approaching gettysburg. without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. general ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. he decided to await johnson's division, which had marched from carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach gettysburg until a late hour...." [125] report of committee, vol. i. p. 488. [126] his account. [127] in his official report he puts jenkins's force at the opening campaign at three thousand eight hundred. [128] general lee, by fitzhugh lee (note), p. 299. [129] his official report. [130] following are the essential portions of the letters referred to, affording unquestionable and overwhelming testimony against the claim that general longstreet was ordered to give battle "at sunrise": "norfolk, va., april 28, 1875. "dear general,--... i can only say that i never before heard of the 'sunrise attack' you were to have made, as charged by general pendleton. if such an order was given you i never knew of it, or it has strangely escaped my memory. i think it more than probable that if general lee had had your troops available the evening previous to the day of which you speak, he would have ordered an early attack, but this does not touch the point at issue. i regard it as a great mistake on the part of those who, perhaps because of political differences, now undertake to criticise and attack your war record. such conduct is most ungenerous, and i am sure meets the disapprobation of all good confederates with whom i have had the pleasure of associating in the daily walks of life. "yours, very respectfully, "w. h. taylor." "university of virginia, may 11, 1875. "general james longstreet: "dear general,--... i did not know of any order for an attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can i believe any such order was issued by general lee. about sunrise on the 2d of july i was sent by general lee to general ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (colonel marshall had been sent with a similar order on the night of the 1st.) general ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. before he got through the examination of the enemy's position, general lee came himself to general ewell's lines. in sending the message to general ewell, general lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. i do not think that the errand on which i was sent by the commanding general is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army. "yours, very truly, "charles s. venable." "baltimore, md., may 7, 1875. "dear general,--... i have no personal recollection of the order to which you refer. it certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there anything in general lee's official report to show the attack on the 2d was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there was not proper concert of action on that day.... "respectfully, "charles marshall." "big island, bedford, va., may 31, 1875. "dear general,--... i do not recollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at gettysburg during the first three days of july, 1863.... "yours truly, "a. l. long." "freestone p. o., prince william county, va., "november 12, 1877. "my dear general longstreet,--... the winter after the death of general lee i was in lexington, visiting my sons at the v. m. i. general pendleton called to see me at the hotel. general custis lee was in my room when he came in. after general lee left, general pendleton asked me if general longstreet was not ordered to attack on the 2d of july at gettysburg at six o'clock in the morning, and did not attack until four o'clock in the evening. i told him it was not possible. when he left me i was under the impression i had convinced him of his mistaken idea. i told general pendleton that you and general lee were together the greater part of the day up to about three o'clock or later; that you separated at the mouth of a lane not long thereafter. you said to me, 'those troops will be in position by the time you get there; tell general hood to attack.' when i gave the order to general hood he was standing within a step or two of his line of battle. i asked him to please delay his attack until i could communicate to general longstreet that he can turn the enemy,--pointing to a gorge in the mountain, where we would be sheltered from his view and attack by his cavalry. general hood slapped me on the knee and said, 'i agree with you,--bring general longstreet to see for himself.' when i reported to you, your answer was, 'it is general lee's order; the time is up,--attack at once.' i lost no time in repeating the same to general hood, and remained with him to see the attack, which was made instantly. we had a beautiful view of the enemy's left from hood's position, which was close up to him. he gave way quickly. general hood charged, and i spurred to report to you; found you with hat in hand cheering on general mclaws's division.... "truly your friend, "john w. fairfax." [131] "four years with general lee." [132] upon the various matters of this momentous day, which have been subject of controversy, the following testimony from j. s. d. cullen is interesting and important: "richmond, va., may 18, 1875. "general james longstreet: "dear general,--... it was an astounding announcement to the survivors of the first army corps that the disaster and failure at gettysburg was alone and solely due to its commander, and that had he obeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief meade's army would have been beaten before its entire force had assembled, and its final discomfiture thereby made certain. it is a little strange that these charges were not made while general lee was alive to substantiate or disprove them, and that seven years or more were permitted to pass by in silence regarding them. you are fortunate in being able to call upon the adjutant-general and the two confidential officers of general lee's staff for their testimony in the case, and i do not think that you will have any reason to fear their evidence. they knew every order that was issued for that battle, when and where attacks were to be made, who were slow in attacking, and who did not make attacks that were expected to be made. i hope, for the sake of history and for your brave military record, that a quietus will at once be put on this subject. i distinctly remember the appearance in our head-quarters camp of the scout who brought from frederick the first account that general lee had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy; of the excitement at general lee's head-quarters among couriers, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all betokening some early movement of the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. that afternoon general lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his head-quarters, and said, 'to-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to harrisburg as we expected, but will go over to gettysburg and see what general meade is after.' orders had then been issued to the corps to move at sunrise on the morning of the next day, and promptly at that time the corps was put on the road. the troops moved slowly a short distance when they were stopped by ewell's wagon-trains and johnson's division turning into the road in front of them, making their way from some point north to cashtown or gettysburg. how many hours we were detained i am unable to say, but it must have been many, for i remember eating a lunch or dinner before moving again. being anxious to see you, i rode rapidly by the troops (who, as soon as they could get into the road, pushed hurriedly by us also), and overtook you about dark at the hill this side of gettysburg, about half a mile from the town. you had been at the front with general lee, and were returning to your camp, a mile or two back. i spoke very exultingly of the victory we were thought to have obtained that day, but was surprised to find that you did not take the same cheerful view of it that i did, and presently you remarked that it would have been better had we not fought than to have left undone what we did. you said that the enemy were left occupying a position that it would take the whole army to drive them from and then at a great sacrifice. we soon reached the camp, three miles, perhaps, from gettysburg, and found the column near by. orders were issued to be ready to march at 'daybreak,' or some earlier hour, next morning. about three o'clock in the morning, while the stars were shining, you left your head-quarters and rode to general lee's, where i found you sitting with him _after sunrise_ looking at the enemy on cemetery hill...." "i am yours, very truly, "j. s. d. cullen." [133] rebellion record. [134] "four years with general lee," w. h. taylor, page 103. [135] _eclectic magazine_, may, 1872. [136] at sharpsburg, general jackson left the field at seven o'clock in the morning and did not return until four o'clock in the afternoon, when he was ordered with his command and the cavalry to turn and strike down against the union right. he started to execute the order, then gave it up without even asking permission. he made a brave and gallant fight in the morning, losing 1601 officers and men. but d. h. hill was there from the first to the last gun, losing from his division 1872 officers and men. jackson had the greater part of two divisions. but hill was not a virginian, and it would not do to leave the field for refreshments. the figures include jackson's losses at harper's ferry and sharpsburg; hill's at south mountain and sharpsburg. [137] "general lee," by fitzhugh lee. marye's hill was the stronghold at fredericksburg. [138] _vide_ "the french under the first and last bonaparte;" the second corps of the army of northern virginia under stonewall jackson in 1862, in the valley of virginia, and j. a. early in 1864. [139] general meade's monthly return for june 30 shows 99,131 "present for duty, equipped." the comte de paris estimates the force actually on the field, including the sixth corps, which was in reserve, at 82,000. [140] rebellion record, vol. xxvii. [141] rebellion record, vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 187. [142] no reports on file for this brigade. bryan was in command july 7, and was probably semmes's immediate successor. the commanders of the tenth, fifty-first, and fifty-third georgia are given as reported for june 22 and july 31. manning reported in command of fiftieth georgia, june 22. no commander reported on return for july 31. [143] the regimental commanders are given as reported for june 14. [144] the four captains present (west, robinson, james m. taylor, thomas n. jordan) were reported as wounded july 1; robinson and taylor as having rejoined july 2, but it does not appear who commanded during robinson's absence. [145] lieutenant-colonel slough and major john s. brooks reported as wounded at four p.m., july 1. [146] colonel christie, lieutenant-colonel r. d. johnston, major c. c. blacknall, and the senior captain (abner d. pearce) reported as wounded early in the fight, july 1. [147] commanded his own and w. e. jones's brigade. [148] serving with ewell's corps. [149] mounted. [150] see battalions attached to corps and cavalry. [151] not engaged. [152] see artillery brigades attached to army corps and the reserves. [153] not engaged. with exception of the regular battalion, it was, july 1, and while at beaver dam creek, md., ordered to washington, d. c., where it arrived july 3. [154] major-general john f. reynolds, of this corps, was killed july 1, while in command of the left wing of the army; general doubleday commanded the corps july 1, and general newton, who was assigned to that command on the 1st, superseded him july 2. [155] transferred, in the afternoon of july 1, to the first brigade. [156] guarding trains, and not engaged in the battle. [157] battery e, first new york light artillery, attached. [158] after the death of general reynolds, general hancock was assigned to the command of all the troops on the field of battle, relieving general howard, who had succeeded general reynolds. general gibbon, of the second division, assumed command of the corps. these assignments terminated on the evening of july 1. similar changes in commanders occurred during the battle of the 2d, when general hancock was put in command of the third corps, in addition to that of his own. he was wounded on the 3d, and brigadier-general william hays was assigned to the command of the corps. [159] 2d company minnesota sharp-shooters attached. [160] transferred from artillery reserve, july 1; fourteenth new york battery attached. [161] guarding corps trains, and not engaged in the battle. [162] joined corps june 28. the second brigade left in the department of washington. [163] also in command of the third brigade, third division, on july 3. [164] no first brigade in division. [165] see foot-note 149, p. 415. [166] guarding wagon-train at westminster, and not engaged in the battle. [167] during the interval between the death of general reynolds and the arrival of general hancock, on the afternoon of july 1, all the troops on the field of battle were commanded by general howard, general schurz taking command of the eleventh corps, and general schimmelfennig of the third division. [168] exercised command of the right wing of the army during a part of the battle. [169] unassigned during progress of battle; afterwards attached to first division, as second brigade. [170] served with the sixth army corps, and on the right flank. [171] serving as light artillery. [172] at westminster, etc., and not engaged in the battle. [173] with huey's cavalry brigade, and not engaged in the battle. [174] tenth new york battery attached. [175] not engaged. [176] eleventh new york battery attached. [177] the emergency militia and the six months' volunteers were mustered into the united states service, and the ninety-days' militia into the state service. under act of congress approved april 12, 1866, the state was reimbursed by the united states for money expended in payment of the latter troops. [178] that company did not go with the battalion to virginia. [179] this was my first meeting with the genial, gallant, lovable william preston. [180] rebellion record. [181] rebellion record, vol. xxx. part i. p. 144. [182] in his official report of the battle, general bragg denies that his march of the 21st was for the crossing of the tennessee river; refers to the proposition as visionary, and says of the country, "affording no subsistence for men or animals."--rebellion record. [183] rebellion record. [184] later on he offered the command to lieutenant-general hardee, who declined it. [185] "camp rappahannock, october 26, 1863. "my dear general,--i have received your three letters, september 26, october 6, and october 11. the first was received just as i was about to make a move upon general meade, to prevent his detaching reinforcements to rosecrans. the second when i had gone as far as i thought i could advantageously go; and the third since my return to this place. i have read them all with interest and pleasure, but have not had time to reply till now. "i rejoice at your great victory deeply. it seemed to me to have been complete. i wish it could have been followed up by the destruction of the federal army. as regards your proposition as to myself, i wish that i could feel that it was prompted by other reasons than kind feelings to myself. i think that you could do better than i could. it was with that view i urged your going. the president, being on the ground, i hope will do all that can be done. he has to take a broad view of the whole ground, and must order as he deems best. i will cheerfully do anything in my power. "in addition to other infirmities, i have been suffering so much from rheumatism in my back that i could scarcely get about. the first two days of our march i had to be hauled in a wagon, and subsequently every motion of my horse, and indeed of my body, gave much pain. i am rather better now, though i still suffer. we could not come up with meade. we had to take circuitous and by-roads, while he had broad and passable routes on either side of the railroad. we struck his rear-guards three times,--the last at bristoe, where hill with his advance of two brigades fell too precipitately on one of his corps,--suffered a repulse and loss. he was finally driven beyond bull run. i saw he could easily get behind his intrenchments in front of alexandria. our men were dreadfully off for shoes, blankets, and clothes. one division alone had over a thousand barefooted men. we had failed to take any, and i fear had failed to manage as well as we might. the country was a perfect waste. a northeast storm broke upon us. there was neither shelter nor food for man or beast. i saw no real good i could accomplish by manoeuvring. the enemy had destroyed the bridge over the rappahannock and blown up one of the piers. the freshet after we left the rapidan carried away the railroad bridge over that river. i therefore withdrew to the rappahannock, destroying the railroad from cub run (this side manassas junction) to the rappahannock river. "we inflicted some punishment upon the enemy,--captured upward of two thousand four hundred prisoners. "but i missed you dreadfully, and your brave corps. your cheerful face and strong arms would have been invaluable. i hope you will soon return to me. i trust we may soon be together again. may god preserve you and all with you. "very truly yours, "r. e. lee. "general longstreet." [186] rebellion record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 680. [187] since those days the name of holston has been changed to the tennessee. [188] writing of these operations since the war, general e. m. law, in an article in the philadelphia _weekly press_ of july 18, 1888, said,-"during the night the sounds of retreat continued, and when daylight came the valley about lenoir presented the scene of an encampment deserted with ignominious haste." but he did not take the trouble to report the retreat until nearly twenty-five years after the war. had he done so at the proper time the work at campbell's station would have been in better season. [189] rebellion record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 526. [190] rebellion record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 491. [191] rebellion record. [192] rebellion record. [193] ibid. [194] rebellion record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 549. [195] "four years with general lee." [196] general heth's personal account. [197] letter to the writer. [198] decisive battles of the war, swinton, p. 378. [199] military history of u. s. grant. badeau. [200] virginia campaigns, 1864-65, by general a. a. humphreys, army of the potomac. [201] general early's official account. [202] one of our weeklies announced, upon learning that general bragg was ordered there, "we understand that general bragg is ordered to wilmington. good-by, wilmington!" [203] general badeau's "military history of u. s. grant." [204] four years with general lee. [205] diary of a member of corse's brigade. [206] estimated from returns. [207] estimated from general return for march. [208] this account is gathered from the evidence of officers of both sides, given before the warren court of inquiry, which vindicated warren and pickett, though the court was inclined to coquette with the lieutenant-general, who, at that late day, was in high authority. [209] he reported that he could have gained the day if the cavalry of his left had been as efficient as that of his right. [210] virginia campaigns. [211] general mahone claimed seven hundred in all. [212] memoirs of general lee, a. l. long. [213] memoirs of robert e. lee, a. l. long. [214] memoirs of robert e. lee, a. l. long. [215] including the parts of the third corps attached after the fall of a. p. hill, and about five thousand that reported on the 7th, 8th, and 9th in bands and squads from the columns broken up at sailor's creek. [216] including five thousand two hundred of fragments dispersed at petersburg and during the rearward march, that joined us in retreat. 