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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES
AND PREPARATIONS FOR A CATASTROPHIC
CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE:
FINDINGS AND ACTIONS TAKEN


PREPARED BY
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
FROM ANALYSES CARRIED OUT BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ad hoc COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF
CONSEQUENCES AND PREPARATIONS FOR
A MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE



[Illustration: fema symbol
federal emergency
management agency]

Washington, D.C. 20472
November 1980




TABLE OF CONTENTS


                                                             Page

CHAPTER:

  I. Executive Summary of Findings, Issues, and Actions         1

 II. Geologic Earthquake Scenarios                             15

III. Assessment of Losses for Selected Potential
     California Earthquakes                                    21

 IV. An Assessment of the Current State of Readiness
     Capability of Federal, State, and Local
     Governments for Earthquake Response                       27

  V. An Assessment of the Social Impacts                       35


ANNEX:

    1. Copies of Correspondence Between President
       Carter and Governor Brown                               37

    2. Current California and Federal Earthquake
       Response Planning                                       43

    3. California Assembly Bill No. 2202                       53


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                                               57




CHAPTER I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS


A. BACKGROUND

After viewing the destruction wrought by the eruption of Mt. St.
Helens in Washington State in May 1980, President Carter became
concerned about the impacts of a similar event of low probability but
high damage potential, namely a catastrophic earthquake in California,
and the state of readiness to cope with the impacts of such an event.

As a result of the President's concern, an _ad hoc_ committee of the
National Security Council was formed to conduct a government review of
the consequences of, and preparation for such an event. In addition to
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Committee included
representatives from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the
United States Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, and the
National Communications System, at the Federal level; State of
California agencies and California local governments at the State and
local levels; and consultants from the private sector. During the
summer of 1980, the participants in this review prepared working papers
on relevant issues and problem areas for the consideration of the _ad
hoc_ committee. Pertinent facts, conclusions and recommendations were
reviewed with the Governor of the State of California. The President
reviewed the _ad hoc_ committee's findings and approved the
recommendations for Federal action. This report summarizes the results
of the assessment and notes these actions.

A number of Federal legislative and administrative actions have been
taken to bring about, in the near future, an increased capability to
respond to such an event. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977
(P.L. 95-124) authorizes a coordinated and structured program to
identify earthquake risks and prepare to lessen or mitigate their
impacts by a variety of means. The coordination of this program, the
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), is the
responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
which is charged with focusing Federal efforts to respond to
emergencies of all types and lessen their impacts before they occur.
The NEHRP has six high-priority thrusts:

      » Overall coordination of Federal departments and agencies'
        programs

      » Maintenance of a comprehensive program of research and
        development for earthquake prediction and hazards
        mitigation

      » Leadership and support of the Federal Interagency
        Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction as it develops
        seismic design and construction standards for use in
        Federal projects

      » Development of response plans and assistance to State and
        local governments in the preparation of their plans

      » Analysis of the ability of financial institutions to
        perform their functions after a creditable prediction of
        an earthquake as well as after an event, together with an
        exploration of the feasibility of using these institutions
        to foster hazard reduction

      » An examination of the appropriate role of insurance in
        mitigating the impacts of earthquakes.

More recently, a cooperative Federal, State, local, and private-sector
effort was initiated to prepare for responding to a credible
large-magnitude earthquake, or its prediction, in Southern California.


B. SUMMARY

The review provided the overall assessment that the Nation is
essentially unprepared for the catastrophic earthquake (with a
probability greater than 50 percent) that must be expected in
California in the next three decades. While current response plans and
preparedness measures may be adequate for moderate earthquakes,
Federal, State, and local officials agree that preparations are
woefully inadequate to cope with the damage and casualties from a
catastrophic earthquake, and with the disruptions in communications,
social fabric, and governmental structure that may follow. Because of
the large concentration of population and industry, the impacts of
such an earthquake would surpass those of any natural disaster thus
far experienced by the Nation. Indeed, the United States has not
suffered any disaster of this magnitude on its own territory since the
Civil War.

The basis for this overall assessment is summarized below and
discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this report.


C. LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE EARTHQUAKES

Earth scientists unanimously agree on the inevitability of major
earthquakes in California. The gradual movement of the Pacific Plate
relative to the North American Plate leads to the inexorable
concentration of strain along the San Andreas and related fault
systems. While some of this strain is released by moderate and smaller
earthquakes and by slippage without earthquakes, geologic studies
indicate that the vast bulk of the strain is released through the
occurrence of major earthquakes--that is, earthquakes with Richter
magnitudes of 7.0 and larger and capable of widespread damage in a
developed region. Along the Southern San Andreas fault, some 30 miles
from Los Angeles, for example, geologists can demonstrate that at
least eight major earthquakes have occurred in the past 1,200 years
with an average spacing in time of 140 years, plus or minus 30 years.
The last such event occurred in 1857. Based on these statistics and
other geophysical observations, geologists estimate that the
probability for the recurrence of a similar earthquake is currently as
large as 2 to 5 percent per year and greater than 50 percent in the
next 30 years. Geologic evidence also indicates other faults capable
of generating major earthquakes in other locations near urban centers
in California, including San Francisco-Oakland, the immediate Los
Angeles region, and San Diego. Seven potential events have been
postulated for purposes of this review and are discussed in chapter
II. The current estimated probability for a major earthquake in these
other locations is smaller, but significant. The aggregate probability
for a catastrophic earthquake in the whole of California in the next
three decades is well in excess of 50 percent.


D. CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE

Casualties and property damage estimates for four of the most likely
catastrophic earthquakes in California were prepared to form a basis
for emergency preparedness and response. Chapter III gives details on
these estimates. Deaths and injuries would occur principally because
of the failure of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory,
and unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the adoption of
earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some
modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late
1960's but not adequately designed or erected to meet the current
understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject
to failure. Strong ground shaking, which is the primary cause of
damage during earthquakes, often extends over vast areas. For example,
in an earthquake similar to that which occurred in 1857, strong ground
shaking (above the threshold for causing damage) would extend in a
broad strip along the Southern San Andreas fault, about 250 miles long
and 100 miles wide, and include almost all of the Los Angeles-San
Bernardino metropolitan area, and all of Ventura, Santa Barbara, San
Luis Obispo, and Kern counties.

For the most probable catastrophic earthquake--a Richter magnitude 8+
earthquake similar to that of 1857, which occurred along the Southern
San Andreas fault--estimates of fatalities range from about 3,000, if
the earthquake were to occur at 2:30 a.m. when the population is
relatively safe at home, to more than 13,000, if the earthquake were to
occur at 4:30 p.m. on a weekday, when much of the population is either
in office buildings or on the streets. Injuries serious enough to
require hospitalization under normal circumstances are estimated to be
about four times as great as fatalities. For the less likely prospect
of a Richter magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault in
the immediate Los Angeles area, fatalities are estimated to be about
4,000 to 23,000, at the same respective times. Such an earthquake,
despite its smaller magnitude, would be more destructive because of its
relative proximity to the most heavily developed regions; however, the
probability of this event is estimated to be only about 0.1 percent per
year. Smaller magnitude--and consequently less damaging--earthquakes
are anticipated with greater frequency on a number of fault systems in
California.

In either of these earthquakes, casualties could surpass the previous
single greatest loss of life in the United States due to a natural
disaster, which was about 6,000 persons killed when a hurricane and
storm surge struck the Galveston area of the Texas coast in 1900. The
highest loss of life due to earthquakes in the United States occurred
in San Francisco in 1906, when 700 people were killed. By way of
comparison (in spite of the vast differences in building design and
practices and socioeconomic systems) the devastating 1976 Tangshan
earthquake in China caused fatalities ranging from the official
Chinese Government figure of 242,000 to unofficial estimates as high
as 700,000. Fortunately, building practices in the United States
preclude such a massive loss of life.

Property losses are expected to be higher than in any past earthquake
in the United States. For example, San Francisco in 1906, and
Anchorage in 1964, were both much less developed than today when they
were hit by earthquakes. And the San Fernando earthquake in 1971, was
only a moderate shock that struck on the fringe of a large urban area.
Each of these three earthquakes caused damage estimated at about $0.5
billion in the then current dollars. Estimates of property damage for
the most probable catastrophic earthquake on the Southern San Andreas
(Richter magnitude 8+) and for the less probable but more damaging one
(Richter magnitude 7.5) on the Newport-Inglewood fault, are about $15
billion and $70 billion respectively. By comparison, tropical storm
Agnes caused the largest economic loss due to a natural disaster in
the United States to date but it amounted to only $3.5 billion (in
1972 dollars).

It should be noted, however, that substantial uncertainty exists in
casualty and property damage estimates because they are based on
experience with only moderate earthquakes in the United States (such
as the 1971 San Fernando earthquake) and experience in other countries
where buildings are generally less resistant to damage. The
uncertainty is so large that the estimated impacts could be off by a
factor of two or three, either too high or too low. Even if these
lowest estimates prevail, however, the assessment about preparedness
and the capability to respond to the disasters discussed in this
report would be substantially unchanged.

Assuming a catastrophic earthquake, a variety of secondary problems
could also be expected. Search and rescue operations--requiring heavy
equipment to move debris--would be needed to free people trapped in
collapsed buildings. It is likely that injuries, particularly those
immediately after the event, could overwhelm medical capabilities,
necessitating a system of allocating medical resources to those who
could be helped the most. Numerous local fires must be expected;
nevertheless, a conflagration such as that which followed the Tokyo
earthquake of 1923, or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, is
improbable, unless a "Santa Ana type" wind pattern is in effect. Since
the near failure of a dam in the San Fernando, California, earthquake
of 1971 (which was a moderate event), substantial progress has been
made in California to reduce the hazard from dams, in some cases
through reconstruction. For planning purposes, however, experts
believe that the failure of at least one dam should be anticipated
during a catastrophic earthquake in either the Los Angeles or San
Francisco regions.

Experience in past earthquakes, particularly the 1971 San Fernando
earthquake, has demonstrated the potential vulnerability of commercial
telephone service to earthquakes, including the possibility of damage
to switching facilities from ground shaking and rupture of underground
cables that cross faults. This is especially serious because
immediately following earthquakes, public demand for telephone
services increases drastically. This increased demand overloads the
capability of the system, even if it had not been damaged, and
therefore management action to reduce the availability of service to
non-priority users and to accommodate emergency calls is mandatory.
Radio-based communication systems, particularly those not requiring
commercial power, are relatively safe from damage, although some must
be anticipated. The redundancy of existing communication systems,
including those designed for emergency use, means that some capability
for communicating with the affected region from the outside would
almost surely exist. Restoration of service by the commercial carriers
should begin within 24 to 72 hours as a result of maintenance and
management actions; however, total restoration of service would take
significantly longer.

While numerous agencies have the capability for emergency
communication within themselves, non-telephonic communication among
entities and agencies in the affected area is minimal. This is true
for Federal, State, and local agencies. This weakness has been pointed
out repeatedly by earthquake response exercises, and the problem is
raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level
of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the
operational integration of communications systems and networks among
the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies.

Because of their network-like character, most systems for
transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a
whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local
damage. These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly
in the first several days after the event, but would resume service
over a few weeks to months. The principal difficulty would be the
greatly increased need for these systems in the first few days after
the event, when lifesaving activities would be paramount.

Portions of the San Francisco Bay Area and of the Los Angeles Area
contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for
guided missiles and space vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts,
electronic computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific
vulnerability to the postulated earthquakes was not analyzed. In the
event of major damage, however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated
somewhat by such measures as the use of underutilized capacity located
elsewhere, substitution of capacity from other industries, imports,
use of other products, and drawing-down of inventories.

Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in
the United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated
with best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of
individuals as well as governmental and other institutions. Popular
assumptions of post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and
the need for martial law, the breakdown of government institutions,
and the requirement for the quick assertion of outside leadership and
control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however,
indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. On the
contrary, the impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of
solidarity and cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the
perception remains among emergency response officials that there will
be an increased need for law enforcement following the event.

Another major unknown involves whether a medium or short-term warning
of the event would be possible and how such a warning could be
utilized most effectively. The technology for earthquake prediction is
in an early stage of development and, therefore it is problematical
that researchers will succeed in issuing a short-term warning before a
catastrophic earthquake, should the event occur in the next few
years. Yet as research progresses, scientifically-based,
intermediate-term warnings are possible, but subject to a high degree
of uncertainty. Consequently, response preparations must be made for
both an earthquake without warning, and one with a short-or
intermediate-term warning, possibly with a significant level of
uncertainty.


E. CAPABILITY FOR RESPONSE

Planning for response to a large-scale disaster is a complicated
process encompassing many variables such as population densities and
distribution characteristics; land-use patterns and construction
techniques; geographical configurations; vulnerability of
transportation; communications and other lifeline systems; complex
response operations; long-term physical, social, and economic recovery
policies. These factors, together with the realization that an
earthquake has the potential for being the greatest single-event
catastrophe in California, make it incumbent upon the State to
maintain as high a level of emergency readiness as is practicable, and
to provide guidance and assistance to local jurisdictions desiring to
plan and prepare for such events. Annex 2 reviews the general nature
of preparedness planning and the basic characteristics of California
and Federal Government plans.

Federal, State, and local emergency response capabilities are judged
to be adequate for moderate earthquakes--those that are most likely to
occur frequently in California and cause property damage in the range
of $1 billion. Such an event, however, would severely tax existing
resources and provide a major test of management relationships among
different governmental levels. Federal, State, and local officials,
however, are quick to point out serious shortcomings in their ability
to respond to a catastrophic earthquake. An analysis of the
preparedness posture of 60 local governments, 34 California State
organizations, and 17 Federal agencies, carried out by the California
Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA, indicates that response
to such an earthquake would become disorganized and largely
ineffective. Many governmental units have generalized earthquake
response plans, some have tailored earthquake plans, and several plans
are regularly exercised. The coordination of these plans among
jurisdictions, agencies, and levels of government, however, is
inadequate. In addition, the potential for prediction is not
incorporated; long-term recovery issues are not considered; and
communications problems are significant, as discussed above. Overall,
Federal preparedness is deficient at this time. Early reaction to a
catastrophic event would likely be characterized by delays,
ineffective response, and ineffectively coordinated delivery of
support.

FEMA Region IX (San Francisco) has drafted an Earthquake Response Plan
for the San Francisco Bay area. Annex 2 gives an overview of this
draft plan. This is a site-specific plan for response to potential
catastrophic earthquake occurrences. The emergency response portion
relies upon a decentralized approach which provides for Federal
disaster support activities to be assigned to selected Federal
agencies by mission assignment letters. No specific plans have been
prepared in this detail for other seismic risk areas, although it is
expected that the Bay Area plan could be easily adapted to other
areas. The Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation
are developing detailed earthquake plans that would ensure a
well-organized and adequate response to mission assignments for a
major earthquake. The plans of other agencies need further
development.

Very significant capabilities to assist in emergency response exist
within the California National Guard, California Highway Patrol, the
Departments of Health Services and Transportation, and the U.S.
Department of Defense. Capabilities exist for such lifesaving
activities as _aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue, emergency
medical services, emergency construction and repair, communications,
and emergency housing and food_. Current estimates by both Federal and
State officials, however, indicate that at least 6 to 8 hours would be
required before personnel and equipment can be mobilized and begin
initial deployment to the affected area. During the period before the
arrival of significant outside assistance critical to the saving of
lives (especially of those trapped in collapsed buildings), the public
would be forced to rely largely upon its own resources for search and
rescue, first aid, and general lifesaving actions. The current level
of public preparation for this critical phase of response can be
described as only minimal. Much of the current state of preparedness
arises from past programs aimed at a wide spectrum of emergencies,
particularly civil defense against nuclear attack. New or strengthened
programs are needed to enhance public preparedness.

FEMA has recently entered into a cooperative effort with California
State and local governments to prepare an integrated prototype
preparedness plan to respond to a catastrophic earthquake in Southern
California or to a prediction of such an event. The plan's completion,
in late 1981, promises to improve substantially the state of readiness
to respond to the prediction and the occurrence of an earthquake in
that area and to provide a model which could be applied to other
earthquake-prone regions of California and the rest of the country.


F. FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS

The _ad hoc_ committee responsible for this review developed several
significant findings related to the implications of major earthquakes
in California and our capabilities to respond to them. It then
identified major relevant issues raised by these findings and caused a
number of actions to be taken. A brief discussion of the results of
its review follows.


1. Leadership

=Finding=: _Effective leadership at all governmental levels is the
single most important factor needed to improve this Nation's
preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake in California._ The problem
of emergency preparedness is severely complicated because
responsibilities for preparation and response cut across normal lines
of authority. Further complication arises from the large areal extent
of the impacts expected from a major earthquake, affecting literally
dozens of government entities. The emergency services coordinator at
any level of government is effective only to the extent he or she is
backed by the political leadership at that level. This is especially
true when preparedness activities must be done, for the most part,
within existing resources. City and county officials must increasingly
accept their share of the responsibility for preparedness, but
commitment by State or Federal leaders is also essential. The general
tendency among elected officials and the public is to ignore the
existing hazard problem. Experience, however, teaches that effective
response mechanisms must be in place before the disaster; they cannot
be developed in the time of crisis. Overcoming this apathy and
developing the organizational arrangements among Federal, State, and
local government and volunteer agencies--together with the private
sector and the general public will require, above all, leadership.

      =Issue=: The leadership role of the Federal Government in
      preparing for a catastrophic earthquake in California and
      how this leadership role is to be exerted require
      clarification.

        =Action=: The President has communicated with the
        Governor of California to indicate the results of this
        review, to express concern about the need for cooperative
        leadership to prepare for the event, and to offer to
        increase the Federal effort with the State of California
        and local governments in the cooperative undertaking to
        prepare for a catastrophic earthquake. He stressed that
        the Federal role is to supplement the effort and
        resources of the State, and that commitment of
        significant Federal resources would be contingent upon
        the application of significant State resources. In his
        response to the President's communications, the Governor
        of California underscored the State's readiness to
        participate in this cooperative effort and announced his
        signing into law a measure that would provide substantial
        State resources (see annex 1). A summary of the new law
        (A.B. 2202) is contained in annex 3.


2. Management of Preparedness and Response Activities

=Finding=: _Preparedness must be developed as a partnership between
Federal, State, and local governments with improvements needed at all
levels_, as none have the resources or authorities to solve the
problem alone.

      =Issue=: Since the Nation faces a very probable earthquake
      in California sometime during the next 30 years, FEMA
      should provide the necessary leadership, management, and
      coordination required to strengthen planning and
      preparedness within the Federal Government, as delegated
      under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of
      1977 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. In this effort,
      FEMA requires the support and assistance of numerous other
      Federal agencies.

        =Actions=: FEMA is taking steps to:

        » Strengthen significantly its management, research,
          application, and coordination functions, as delegated
          under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
          and Disaster Relief Act.

        » Lead other agencies in the development of a
          comprehensive preparedness strategy detailing specific
          objectives and assignments, and periodically monitor
          accomplishments in meeting assigned responsibilities.

        Departments and agencies with appropriate capabilities
        will provide needed support to FEMA in strengthening
        Federal preparedness and hazard mitigation programs.

      =Issue=: A major deficiency that has been identified is the
      potential for delay following a catastrophic earthquake in
      processing a request for a Presidential declaration of a
      major disaster, and the subsequent initiation of full-scale
      Federal support for lifesaving actions. The first few hours
      are critical in saving the lives of people trapped in
      collapsed buildings; consequently, this is when Federal
      support is needed most. Decisions on post-event recovery
      aspects of Federal assistance can be deferred until
      lifesaving operations are underway and sufficient
      information about damage is in hand.

        =Action=: FEMA will develop and negotiate, before the
        event, an agreement with the State of California which
        will enable the President to declare a major disaster and
        initiate full-scale Federal support for lifesaving and
        humanitarian action within minutes of a catastrophic
        earthquake. The agreement will defer resolution of issues
        relating to longer-term restoration and recovery and
        similar questions with large budgetary implications until
        adequate damage estimates are available. The Executive
        Branch will thus be able to arrive at an informed
        decision.

      =Issue=: Significant improvements in the Federal, State,
      and local capability for coordination of operational
      response to a catastrophic earthquake are needed.

        =Actions=: FEMA and other appropriate Federal agencies will
        increase their efforts, in a partnership with appropriate
        State and local agencies and volunteer and private-sector
        organizations, to:

        » Complete development and agreement on fully integrated
          earthquake response plans for both the San Francisco
          and Los Angeles regions, including provision for
          predicted as well as unpredicted earthquakes, building
          upon the existing draft plan for San Francisco.

        » Establish a small FEMA staff in California dedicated to
          the coordination of earthquake preparedness planning and
          implementation.

        » Develop improved mechanisms for the coordination of
          medical and mortuary activities following a catastrophic
          earthquake.

        » Identify and document the critical requirements for
          emergency communications--particularly non-telephonic
          communications--among Federal, State, and local
          agencies. Shortfalls between critical requirements and
          current capabilities, as well as remedial actions or
          recommended solutions for each will be identified in
          accordance with the "National Plan for Communications
          Support in Emergencies and Major Disasters." This
          review will include consideration of using existing
          satellite communications or a dedicated system, should
          it be found necessary.

        » Cooperatively conduct practice response exercises with
          State and local officials that will prepare officials
          and the public for conditions that might be encountered
          in a catastrophic earthquake and that would reveal
          deficiencies in planning.

      =Issue=: Improving the current inadequate preparedness of
      the public for a catastrophic earthquake requires a
      substantial increase in public information and public
      awareness. Although public information is primarily a
      State, local, and private-sector responsibility, the
      Federal Government has a role as well. Because citizens
      will have no choice but to rely largely upon their own
      resources in the first several hours immediately following
      a catastrophic earthquake, it is important that certain
      basic knowledge about lifesaving measures be very widely
      disseminated.

        =Action=: FEMA will stimulate and work with the State of
        California and other appropriate groups to develop and
        publicize earthquake awareness, hazard mitigation
        techniques, specific post-earthquake actions to be taken,
        including first aid, and other pertinent information.

      =Issue=: The possibility of a credible,
      scientifically-based prediction of a catastrophic
      earthquake poses serious challenges to government and our
      society. The current level of scientific understanding of
      earthquake prediction and the available resources are such
      that present instrumentation efforts are directed toward
      research rather than maintaining extensive monitoring
      networks for real-time prediction. The transition from
      research to fully operational capability will require
      additional scientific understanding as well as resources.
      Earthquake predictions are possible, perhaps likely,
      however, from the current research effort. Even with a
      significant level of uncertainty, any scientifically
      credible prediction that indicates a catastrophic
      earthquake is expected within about 1 year or less, will
      require very difficult and consequential decisions on the
      part of elected officials at all levels of government.
      Decisions may include such possibilities as the
      mobilization of National Guard and U.S. Department of
      Defense resources prior to the event, the imposition of
      special procedures or drills at potentially hazardous
      facilities, such as nuclear reactors or dams, the
      condemnation or evacuation of particularly unsafe buildings
      with the subsequent need for temporary housing, and the
      provisions of special protection of fragile inventories. If
      the prediction is correct and appropriate actions are
      taken, thousands of lives can be saved and significant
      economic losses can be avoided. The costs of responding to
      a prediction may be substantial, however, and the
      commitment of resources undoubtedly will have to be made in
      the face of considerable uncertainty and even reluctance.
      Indeed, the possibility of an inaccurate prediction must be
      faced squarely.

        =Actions=: FEMA, in conjunction with other appropriate
        Federal agencies, State and local governments, and
        volunteer and private-sector organizations, will increase
        its actions to develop procedures for responding to a
        credible, scientific earthquake prediction, including:

        » Identification of constructive and prudent actions to
          be taken

        » Analysis of the costs and benefits of various
          alternative actions

        » Identification of roles and responsibilities in deciding
          which actions should be implemented and by whom

        » Criteria for evaluating circumstances when the provision
          of Federal assistance would be appropriate

        The U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the
        Interior will:

        » Maintain a sound and well-balanced program of research
          in earthquake prediction and hazard assessment based
          upon a carefully considered strategic plan

        » Work with State and local officials and FEMA to develop
          improved mechanisms for the transmission of earthquake
          predictions and related information, and to plan for the
          utilization of the capability for earthquake prediction


3. Resources

=Finding=: While leadership and management are essential ingredients to
achieve an adequate earthquake preparedness posture, _the availability
of adequate staffing and resources at all levels of government
determines the efficacy of agency programs and initiatives_. In many
agencies, earthquake preparedness has been accorded a low priority in
their programs. This is a manifestation of a more general problem of
minimal agency resource allocation to emergency preparedness. The
results of the actions that have been indicated will be limited unless
additional resources are made available.

      =Issue=: Additional resources should be provided as
      necessary to accelerate the earthquake hazard mitigation
      and preparedness activities under the National Earthquake
      Hazards Reduction Program.

        =Action=: FEMA has reassessed its priorities and is
        allocating resources to increase the staffing, funding,
        and management attention and direction for earthquake
        hazards mitigation, including preparations for a
        catastrophic earthquake in California. This includes an
        increase of staff resources in FEMA Region IX for
        Federal, State, and local coordination of planning,
        preparedness, and mitigation. Resource needs that cannot
        be fully met by the reassessment and reallocation for
        Fiscal Year 1981 should be identified and justified along
        with needs for Fiscal Year 1982 in the course of the
        budget submissions for Fiscal Year 1982. To facilitate an
        adequate and balanced response by other Federal agencies,
        FEMA will provide timely guidance to other agencies on
        specific priorities for this effort in relation to other
        major preparedness goals. The Office of Management and
        Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy
        will work together to develop a cross-agency ranking of
        budgetary resources for earthquake preparedness for
        Fiscal Year 1982.




CHAPTER II

GEOLOGIC EARTHQUAKE SCENARIOS


A. MAJOR EVENTS

For purposes of assessing the consequences of a major California
earthquake, scenarios for seven large earthquakes were developed. The
scenarios depict expectable earthquakes that could severely impact on
the major population centers of California. In each case they are
representative of only one possible magnitude of earthquake that could
occur on the indicated fault system. On each fault system there is a
greater probability of one or more damaging earthquakes of somewhat
smaller magnitude than the postulated event. The postulated
earthquakes are listed in the following table.


TABLE 1

MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKES

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Current
                                               Annual        Likelihood
                                               Probability   of
                                               of            Occurrence
                                 Richter       Occurrence    in Next
Region            Fault System   Magnitude[1]  (Percent)     20-30 Years
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Los Angeles-      Southern
San Bernardino    San Andreas    8.3             2-5           High

San Francisco     Northern
Bay Area          San Andreas    8.3             1             Moderate

San Francisco
Bay Area          Hayward        7.4             1             Moderate

Los Angeles       Newport-                                     Moderate
                  Inglewood      7.5             0.1           -Low

San Diego         Rose Canyon    7.0             0.01          Low

Riverside                                                      Moderate-
San Bernardino    Cucamonga      6.8             0.1           Low

Los Angeles       Santa Monica   6.7             0.01          Low
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   [1] This is the estimated largest magnitude earthquake expected
   at a reasonable level of probability. The main shock can be
   expected to be followed by large aftershocks over a period of
   weeks or longer. Each large aftershock would be capable of
   producing additional significant damage and hampering disaster
   assistance operations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

These earthquake scenarios represent the largest magnitude events
estimated on the basis of a variety of geologic assumptions. The
appropriateness of these assumptions depends on the intent of the
analysis and the state of geologic knowledge. Therefore, the resulting
estimates may not be appropriate for other purposes, such as the
development of seismic design criteria for a specific site. The
development of such criteria commonly requires detailed analyses of
the site and its immediate geologic environment beyond the scope of
this report. Consequently, detailed site analyses may require
modification of the conclusions reached in this report, particularly
fault systems other than the San Andreas and Hayward faults.


B. GEOLOGIC EVIDENCE

Some of the possible earthquakes listed are repeat occurrences of
historical events, others are not, but geologic evidence indicates
that earthquakes occurred on these faults before settlement of the
region. Based on available data, the postulated earthquake magnitudes
would be the largest events that could be expected at a reasonable
level of probability. They represent a selection of events useful for
planning purposes, but are by no means the only such events likely to
occur either on these or other fault systems.

The historic record of seismicity in California is too short to
determine confidently how often large earthquakes reoccur. Information
on past earthquakes must be gleaned from the geologic record and
therefore, presents a picture of past seismicity that is incomplete
and not yet fully deciphered. Current knowledge about the recurrence
of large earthquakes on specific faults is rudimentary. The
probabilities of occurrence shown above are order-of-magnitude
estimates and subject to considerable uncertainty, especially for the
less probable events.


C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

Following are brief descriptions of postulated events. Figure 1 gives
their geographic location.


   1. Los Angeles-San Bernardino/Southern San Andreas Fault
      (Magnitude 8.3)

      For the past several thousand years, great earthquakes have been
occurring over a 300 km length of the San Andreas fault approximately
every 100 to 200 years, 140 years on the average. The last such event
took place in 1857. The probability of occurrence of this earthquake
is estimated to be currently as large as 2 to 5 percent per year and
greater than 50 percent in the next 30 years. The fault skirts the
edge of the Los Angeles-San Bernardino metropolitan region, thus most
of the urbanized area lies further than 20 miles from the source of
strong shaking. Because of the distance, shaking would be more
hazardous for large structures than for one- to two-story houses. The
long duration of shaking could trigger numerous slides on steep
slopes and cause liquefaction in isolated areas.


   2. San Francisco Bay Area/Northern San Andreas Fault
      (Magnitude 8.3)

      A repeat occurrence of the 1906 earthquake, in which the San
Andreas fault broke over 400 km of its length, would cause severe
damage to structures throughout the Bay Area and adjacent regions. The
extensive urban development on lowlands and landfill around San
Francisco Bay would be especially hard hit and liquefaction in many of
these areas would intensify the damage to structures erected on them.


   3. San Francisco Bay Area/Hayward Fault (Magnitude 7.4)

      The last large events to occur on this fault were in 1836 and
1868. Should a major earthquake occur, severe ground shaking and
liquefaction is expected to cause damage throughout the entire
circum-bay area nearly as severe as that resulting from a 1906-type
earthquake on the San Andreas fault. This earthquake would be of
particular concern because of the many dams located along or near the
fault.


   4. Los Angeles/Newport-Inglewood Fault (Magnitude 7.5)

      This earthquake would be a serious threat to the nearby,
densely-populated areas of Los Angeles. Shaking would cause extensive
structural damage throughout the Los Angeles Basin and liquefaction
near the coast would add still more destruction.


   5. San Diego Area/Rose Canyon Fault (Magnitude 7.0)

      This fault--a segment of an active zone of faults extending from
the Newport-Inglewood fault to Northern Mexico--would present the
greatest earthquake risk to the San Diego area. Severe damage due to
shaking and liquefaction could be expected in the coastal areas.
Because of unstable sea-bed sediments in the offshore area, local
tsunamis (tidal waves) are possible.


   6. Los Angeles/Santa Monica Fault (Magnitude 6.7 and 7.0) and
      Riverside/San Bernardino/Cucamonga Fault (Magnitude 6.8)

      These faults are part of a system of east-west tending faults
bordering the northern edge of the Los Angeles basin. This fault
system caused the 1971 San Fernando earthquake and is geologically
similar to the system that generated the large 1952 Kern County
earthquake. Although smaller in magnitude than the earthquakes
previously described, these postulated events are potentially quite
dangerous because of their vicinity to high population densities in
Southern California.


D. EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS

Detailed maps were prepared for each event showing qualitative
estimates of ground shaking intensity resulting from each earthquake.
These estimates are indicative of the general severity of damage to
ordinary structures. Empirical formulae providing quantitative
estimates of peak ground motion at various distances from the
postulated earthquakes were developed for use in the effects of
severe ground shaking on individual structures or critical
facilities. No estimates were made of localized effects, such as
ground failures related to liquefaction (the complete failure or loss
of strength, of a saturated soil due to shaking), landslides, and
fault rupture. These effects can be far more destructive than ground
shaking alone.

[Illustration: Figure 1. Geographic Locations of Selected Regional
Events]




CHAPTER III

ASSESSMENT OF LOSSES FOR SELECTED POTENTIAL CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKES


A. INTRODUCTION

As part of a program that FEMA and its predecessor agencies have had
underway for a number of years, property loss and casualty estimates
were prepared in 1972 and 1973 for a number of potential maximum
credible earthquakes that could impact on the San Francisco and the
Los Angeles areas--North San Andreas (Richter magnitude 8.3), Hayward
(Richter magnitude 7.4), South San Andreas (Richter magnitude 8.3),
and Newport-Inglewood (Richter magnitude 7.5). These estimates have
now been updated as part of the current assessment.

Estimates of property loss and casualties are based on the expected
type and distribution of damage for each postulated earthquake as
determined by the size and location of the earthquake and the
distribution and character of the buildings and structures within the
affected area. Methodologies for estimates of this type are
approximate at best. Consequently, the figures shown below may vary
upward or downward by as much as a factor of two or three. This degree
of uncertainty does not affect the validity of the conclusions of this
report, however, since there are greater uncertainties in all other
aspects of emergency response planning.


B. PROPERTY LOSS ESTIMATES

The property loss estimates were obtained by first estimating the
total replacement dollar value of buildings and their contents,
multiplying them by percentage loss factors (inferred from the
anticipated strength of shaking in each county), and then summing to
obtain the aggregate loss. Included in the estimates are private as
well as Federal, State, and local government buildings, insured and
uninsured. Excluded from consideration is the replacement value of
transportation and communication facilities, dams, utility
installations, and special purpose structures (e.g., convention
centers and sports arenas). Also excluded is the potential damage
resulting from a major dam failure or the indirect dollar losses due
to such factors as higher unemployment, lower tax revenue, reduced
productivity, and stoppage of industrial production. Experience
indicates that indirect losses could be approximately equal to the
dollar amounts lost in buildings and their contents. The property loss
estimates for four postulated earthquakes on the faults listed below
are as follows.


TABLE 2

ESTIMATES OF PROPERTY LOSSES FOR REPRESENTATIVE EARTHQUAKES[1]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Loss to          Loss of
                            Building         Contents         Total Loss
Fault                   ($ in Billions)  ($ in Billions)  ($ in Billions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Northern San Andreas          25               13               38
Hayward                       29               15               44
Newport-Inglewood             45               24               69
Southern San Andreas          11                6               17
----------
   [1] Uncertain by a possible factor of two to three.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------


C. CASUALTY ESTIMATES

Deaths and injuries in these earthquakes principally would occur from
failures of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory, and
unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the institution of
earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some
modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late
1960's, but not adequately designed or constructed to meet the current
understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject
to failure. Consequently, the number of fatalities will be strongly
influenced by the number of persons within high-occupancy buildings,
capable of collapsing, or by failure of other critical facilities such
as dams. Additional imponderables are the degree of saturation of the
ground at the time of the event and the possibility of weather
conditions conducive to the spread of fire. A conflagration such as
occurred in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, is not considered
likely to occur in any of the analyzed events, however, because of
improvements in fire resistance of construction and firefighting
techniques. Nonetheless, numerous smaller fires must be anticipated in
any of the analyzed events and a "Santa Ana type" wind could cause
serious problems.

An additional element of uncertainty in estimating casualties from
earthquake stems from not knowing where most of the population will be
at the time of the earthquake. In the early morning (i.e., 2:30 a.m.)
most people are at home, by far the safest environment during a
seismic emergency. At 2:00 in the afternoon, on the other hand, the
majority of people are at their places of employment and therefore
vulnerable to collapse of office buildings. Around 4:30 p.m. many more
people are in the streets and thus subject to injury due to falling
debris or failures of transportation systems. Consequently, depending
on the time of day, wide variations in the number of casualties can be
expected.

Following are estimates of dead and injured (requiring
hospitalization) for each of the four representative faults and for
the three time periods just discussed.

TABLE 3

ESTIMATES OF CASUALTIES[1]

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fault                      Time         Dead     Hospitalized[2]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Northern San Andreas     2:30 a.m.      3,000      12,000
                         2:00 p.m.     10,000      37,000
                         4:30 p.m.     11,000      44,000

Hayward                  2:30 a.m.      3,000      13,000
                         2:00 p.m.      8,000      30,000
                         4:30 p.m.      7,000      27,000

Southern San Andreas     2:30 a.m.     3,000       12,000
                         2:00 p.m.     12,000      50,000
                         4:30 p.m.     14,000      55,000

Newport-Inglewood        2:30 a.m.      4,000      18,000
                         2:00 p.m.     21,000      83,000
                         4:30 p.m.     23,000      91,000
----------
   [1] Uncertain by a possible factor of two to three.

   [2] Injuries not requiring hospitalization are estimated to be
   from 15 to 30 times the number of deaths.
-------------------------------------------------------------------


D. OVERVIEW OF OTHER TYPES OF DAMAGE

For this assessment, estimates of damage to substantial numbers of
different type facilities essential to the immediate response
capability were updated. Earthquakes associated with the same four
major fault systems identified earlier in this chapter were used as a
basis for these estimates. The types of facilities analyzed included
_hospitals_, _medical supply storages_, _blood banks_, and _custodial
care homes_, together with their essential services and personnel
resources. Although newer hospitals in California are being built
according to substantially improved seismic safety standards and
practices, older hospital facilities can be expected to be poorly
resistant to earthquakes.

Among residential buildings, single family homes are expected to
suffer structural damage and loss of contents. Damage to multifamily
dwellings--particularly older buildings--would, in all likelihood, be
more extensive. Analysis of expected damage indicates that temporary
housing for as many as 200,000 families might be needed--a requirement
calling for careful planning and exceptional management skills.

Schools are judged to be among the safest facilities exposed to the
earthquakes. Since passage of the Field Act in 1933, after the Long
Beach earthquake, school buildings in California have been
continuously improved to withstand seismic hazards.

As a result of continuing and substantial upgrading of design and
construction practices in the past 10 years, dams and reservoirs can
be expected to show an improved performance in an earthquake.
Nonetheless, on a contingency basis, one dam failure might be assumed
for each planning effort.

Realizing the fact that 84 key communications facilities, earth
stations, Department of Defense voice and data switches, commercial
transoceanic cable heads, Federal Telecommunications System switches,
and major direct distance dial switches are located within 55 miles of
either Los Angeles or San Francisco, damage must be expected to occur.
With this realization, priorities have been assigned to all critical
circuits transiting the key facilities, based on established criteria
of criticality of service continuity. _National warning systems
circuitry, command and control circuits, and circuits supporting
diplomatic negotiations_ (of which a high concentration exists in
California) are examples of those circuits carrying high-restoration
priority.

In the civil sector there would be 24 to 72 hours of minimal
communications, with a possible blackout of telephonic communications
in the area immediately following an earthquake. The commercial
carriers would institute network control procedures to regain control
of the situation as fast as possible.

The impact on transportation facilities in any of the four
hypothesized earthquakes could be massive. Since the magnitude and
severity is unprecedented in recent years, conclusions regarding
losses must be accepted as tentative. As in the case of hospitals,
however, the lessons learned in earthquakes during the past 10 years
are being incorporated in the design and construction of new
facilities.

In general, all major transportation modes would be
affected--_highways_, _streets_, _overpasses and bridges_, _mass
transit systems_, _railroads_, _airports_, _pipelines_, and _ocean
terminals_, although major variances in losses are expected among the
modes. From a purely structural standpoint, the more rigid or elevated
systems (such as railroads and pipelines) which cross major faults on
an east-west axis would incur the heaviest damage, with initial losses
approaching 100 percent. Other major systems (such as highways,
airports, and pile-supported piers at water terminals) have better
survivability characteristics and therefore would fare much better,
with damage generally in the moderate range of 15 to 30 percent. These
transportation facility loss estimates are stated in terms of
immediate post-quake effects. They do not reflect the impact of
priority emergency recovery efforts and expedient alternatives that
are available, some within hours, to aid in restoration of
transportation capacity. In addition, transportation systems generally
have an inherently significant degree of redundancy and flexibility.
Consequently, an unquantified but significant movement capability in
all transport modes is expected to survive. Finally, these loss
estimates do not take into account the question of availability of
essential supporting resources, particularly petroleum fuels,
electricity, and communications. In the initial response phase, these
could prove to be the most limiting factors in the capability of the
transportation system.

Business and industry would be affected by damage to office buildings,
plants, and other support facilities. Although the 1971 San Fernando
earthquake occurred on the margin of a largely suburban area,
industrial facilities incurred significant damage. For example,
several buildings of the kind commonly used for light industry or
warehouses suffered from collapsed roofs or walls. Generally, building
codes do not apply to special industrial facilities, and the ability
of these structures to resist earthquake shaking will depend largely
on the foresight of the design engineer. For example, a major
electrical power switching yard and a water filtration plant were
seriously damaged in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake.

About 10 percent of the population and industrial resources of the
Nation are located in California. Over 85 percent of these resources
(or about 8.5 percent of the Nation's total) are located in the 21
California counties that are subject to the possibility of damage from
a major earthquake. Much of the aerospace and electronics industry is
centered in California. For example, about 56 percent of the guided
missiles and space vehicles, 40 percent of the semiconductors, 25
percent of the electronic computer equipment, and approximately 21
percent of the optical instruments and lenses manufactured in the
Nation are manufactured in these 21 counties. The probability that all
these counties would be affected by one earthquake is extremely
remote; yet the significant concentration of key industries remains a
concern. For example, about 25 percent of the Nation's semiconductors
are manufactured in Santa Clara County, an area along the Northern San
Andres fault that suffered very heavy damage in the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake. Estimates of damage to these industrial facilities and the
resulting loss of production have not been made. Similarly, the
resulting impact of possible damage to national production has not
been adequately analyzed.

Federally regulated financial institutions were generically analyzed
to determine their ability to continue to promote essential services
in the event of a major earthquake like those that have been
postulated for this assessment. The conclusion reached thus far is
that large-magnitude earthquakes pose no significant or unanticipated
problems of solvency and liquidity for such institutions. The Federal
Reserve System and other regulatory entities have procedures in place
that are designed--and have been tested--specifically to provide for
the continued operation of financial institutions immediately
following an earthquake or other emergency.




CHAPTER IV

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF READINESS CAPABILITY OF FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE


A. INTRODUCTION

An earthquake of catastrophic magnitude, with or without credible
warning, happens suddenly. The potential for disaster, however, does
not occur suddenly. The degree of preparedness and commitment to
comprehensive planning and mitigation programs for the inevitable
event will largely determine the degree of hardship to be experienced
through loss of life, human suffering, property destruction, and the
other related economic, social, and psychological aspects of
disruption to day-to-day community activities. The impacts can be
reduced substantially from current expected levels through the
development and implementation of improved and more widely practiced
earthquake hazards reduction measures. These include _coordinated
emergency preparedness plans and procedures_, _earthquake prediction
and warning systems_, _improved construction techniques_, and
_effective public education and information programs_.

The State of California Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA
conducted an analysis of the readiness capability for potential
catastrophic earthquakes in California at the Federal, State, and
local government levels. The planning of 22 counties and 38 cities, of
34 State agencies, and of 17 Federal organizations were reviewed with
the following objectives: (a) identify opportunities for improvement;
(b) provide a basis for making decisions that would strengthen program
direction and planning efforts; and (c) specify resource needs and
potential legislative initiatives. Annex 2 summarizes current Federal
and California earthquake planning.

The environment in which preparedness planning in California occurs is
characterized by the following observations of public expectations and
attitudes:

        » There is widespread public support for government
          action.

        » Most people have some ideas as to what government should
          be doing.

        » There is understanding of the need for hazard reduction
          as well as emergency response planning.

        » People are willing, in the abstract, to have government
          funds spent for hazard mitigation.

        » The public is not very satisfied with what government
          officials have done.

        » Public officials perceive that current preparedness
          plans and response are inadequate at best.

As discussed below, the review indicates that all is not well in
earthquake plans and preparedness. Current plans and preparedness are
judged to be adequate for the "moderate" earthquakes most likely to
occur frequently in California. By moderate it is meant an event
causing property damage on the order of $1 to $2 billion. Such an
event, however, will severely tax existing resources and provide a
major test of management relationship among different governmental
jurisdictions and levels. For a catastrophic earthquake, current plans
and preparedness are clearly inadequate, leading to a high likelihood
that Federal, State, and local response activities would become
disorganized and largely fail to perform effectively for an extended
period of time.


B. STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE

Although there are widely differing approaches, local emergency
planning in California generally consists of a basic plan and a series
of contingency plans. The basic plan establishes the authority, sets
forth references, addresses hazard vulnerability, states the planning
assumptions, establishes an emergency services organization, assigns
tasks, formulates a mutual aid system, and directs the development of
specific support annexes. For those hazards identified in the basic
plan, a separate contingency plan is then developed to address the
unique nature of the hazardous event. The contingency plan contains
service support plans for each of the functional operations, including
detailed standard operating procedures. The planning efforts of local
jurisdictions are coordinated with adjacent jurisdictions and the
California OES for consistency.

A plan is not considered complete without the support annexes which
make the plan operational. The survey undertaken for this assessment
disclosed that approximately 93 percent of the jurisdictions examined
have existing, basic plans; 50 percent have completed annexes; 28
percent of the basic plans addressed an earthquake hazard
vulnerability; 35 percent have planned for earthquake contingency; and
only 1 percent (one city) has a plan to respond to an earthquake
prediction.

At the State level, the California OES, as an integral part of the
Governor's Office, functions as his immediate staff and coordinating
organization in carrying out the State's emergency responsibilities.
Specific emergency assignments have been made to 34 State agencies by
the OES Director through a series of Administrative Orders. During
emergencies the activities of these agencies and departments are
coordinated by the California OES.

The State OES is also responsible for maintaining and updating the
California Emergency Plan (CEP) and associated readiness plans. As in
the case of local plans, the basic document is supported by
operational annexes as listed below:

    CONTINGENCY                       MUTUAL AID

    Earthquake                        Fire and Rescue
    Earthquake Prediction             Law Enforcement
    Oil Spill                         Medical
    Nuclear Blackmail                 Utilities
    Reactor Accident                  Military Support
    Radioactive Material Incident
    Flood


    SUPPORTING SYSTEMS                EMERGENCY RESOURCES
                                      MANAGEMENT

    Warning                           Construction and Housing
    Emergency Broadcast System        Economic Stabilization
    Emergency Public Information      Food
    Intelligence Operations           Health
    Radiological Defense              Industrial Production
                                      Manpower
                                      Petroleum
                                      Telecommunications
                                      Transportation
                                      Utilities

Based on this planning concept, the review assessed quantitatively the
preparedness activities of the 34 State agencies that have
preparedness responsibilities in accordance with the CEP. The
quantitative data are listed in the following table.


TABLE 4

QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES

-----------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Number of   Percent of
  Preparedness Element               Agencies    34 Agencies
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Existence of Plan                       22            65
Conduct of Exercises                    27            79
Public Education Activities             10            29
Public Information Activities            9            26
Operational Capability                  32            94
-----------------------------------------------------------------

The quality of the plans, activities, and operational capabilities
were then evaluated on a scale of 1 (expected to fail/inadequate) to 5
(expected to succeed well/adequate). The qualitative results are shown
below.


TABLE 5

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES

----------------------------------------------------------
  Preparedness Element        Capability Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
  Planning                           2.67
  Exercises                          2.64
  Public Education                   1.44
  Public Information                 1.50
  Operational Capability             2.91
----------------------------------------------------------

It should be emphasized that these ratings apply to the State's
_present_ level of planning and preparedness for response to a major
destructive earthquake (magnitude 8), not a moderate (San
Fernando-type) event.


C. FEDERAL RESPONSE

At the Federal level the principal capability to respond to a
catastrophic earthquake in California resides in FEMA, the agency
responsible by law to coordinate Federal activities in all
emergencies. FEMA has developed a basic plan for supplemental Federal
assistance for a major earthquake in the San Francisco Bay area. This
plan, however, covers only the emergency phase of response (first few
days of efforts to save lives and protect property). In addition, FEMA
is participating in a broader effort concentrating in Southern
California. This cooperative effort is getting under way with State
and local governments, other Federal departments, voluntary agencies,
practicing professions, business and commercial interests, labor,
educators, and researchers. It is expected to develop an effective
program to respond to an earthquake or a credible earthquake
prediction in that part of the State. The emphasis is being placed on
_public safety, reduction of property damage, self-help on the part of
individuals, socioeconomic impacts, improved response and long-range
recovery planning, mitigation activities, and public participation for
both the post-prediction and immediate post-earthquake periods_. This
pilot effort is expected to be usable in other highly seismic areas of
California as well as in other States.

In the event of a catastrophic earthquake, a substantial number of
Federal agencies would provide support to and be coordinated by FEMA.
Illustrative are the following:


   1. Department of Defense (DOD)

      Initially, local military commanders may provide necessary
support to save lives, alleviate suffering, or mitigate property
damage. Normally, additional DOD resources would not be committed
until a presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster.
When this occurs, the Secretary of the Army is DOD Executive Agent for
military support. The Commander, Sixth U.S. Army, at the Presidio, San
Francisco, has been further delegated authority to coordinate disaster
relief operations in the western portion of the United States.
Extensive planning and coordination have taken place between the Sixth
U.S. Army and FEMA Region IX. DOD emergency functions include: _damage
survey_, _search and rescue_, _emergency medical care_,
_identification and disposition of dead_, _emergency debris
clearance_, _emergency roads and bridge construction_, _airfield
repair_, and _identification and demolition of unsafe structures_.
Specific units have been identified to respond to an earthquake in any
of the major population centers of California. For example, at this
time the following units would be prepared for commitment within 8
hours after a disaster is declared by the President:

        » Six medical units with a 1,320 bed capacity

        » Seven helicopter units with 90 utility helicopters and
          36 medium helicopters

        » One Infantry brigade of 1,500 personnel

        » Two engineer units with 78 pieces of heavy equipment

        » Two transportation units with 124 cargo trucks and
          trailers

These as well as additional DOD assets could be made available,
contingent on defense priorities.


   2. The National Communication System

      This Agency's plan, the "National Plan for Communications Support
in Emergencies and Major Disasters," provides for planning and using
national telecommunications assets and resources during presidentially
declared emergencies and major disasters. The plan, which has been
exercised repeatedly in past disasters, provides the management
structure and the communications staff to support FEMA. Restoration
priorities have been assigned to all critical circuits.


   3. Department of Transportation (DOT)

      DOT has established an Office of Emergency Transportation. This
office has developed and maintains comprehensive emergency plans and
procedural manuals for natural disasters and other civil crises. It
constantly monitors the civil transportation system for indications of
potential adverse impacts from all hazards. It conducts scheduled
periodic training and readiness exercises for DOT emergency personnel
and maintains quick response cells and emergency operating facilities
at DOT headquarters and in the field to provide an immediate reaction
capability. The system has been activated several times in the recent
past (e.g., Three Mile Island, 1979 Energy/Fuel Crisis, Independent
Truckers' Strike, and the Mt. St. Helens eruption).


D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVING RESPONSE CAPABILITY

Earthquake prediction has not been incorporated into existing plans.
Response to predictions in the current environment, if given, would be
_ad hoc_. The State of California has only a rudimentary plan and the
Federal Government none. The City of Los Angeles has examined the
problem extensively, but only considers its own jurisdiction and has
not produced an actionable plan. Current planning for the recovery
period is incomplete, uncoordinated, and not functional. State and
local governments have done little to plan for the recovery period
when, following the emergency lifesaving phase, efforts and resources
are concentrated on restoring the functioning of the community. They
presume that the Federal Government will "step in" after a
presidential declaration. The Federal Government has an untested draft
plan for the San Francisco area that is not fully coordinated with the
State plans. Current Federal plans are geared to the provision of
assistance on the order of a few hundred million dollars. Thus, there
is little confidence that they would function under the requirements
for tens-of-billions-of-dollars and concomitant service demands.

Both Federal and State agencies need to commit the financial resources
and assignment of personnel to maintain and enhance earthquake plans
and preparedness. Earthquake preparedness, although responding to high
damage expectation, is still based upon a relatively low probability
occurrence. When it is in competition with pressing social needs for a
portion of limited resources, social needs tend to prevail at all
levels of government. Without a clear commitment, future development
of earthquake preparedness, as in the past, is problematic and its
implementation is in considerable doubt. The Federal earthquake
preparedness effort needs to focus on a high state of readiness.

History in the area of natural hazard mitigation suggests that
assignment of responsibility, even by the President, when not followed
by leadership and regular oversight over the allocation of financial
resources, seldom leads to programs which can be expected to function.
The same weakness is evidenced at the State and local government
levels with few exceptions. The stresses likely to occur in emergency
response programs after a catastrophic earthquake will be such that
effective response will require a cooperative, integrated effort among
different jurisdictions and levels of government.

Experience in other areas of planning and preparedness, particularly
for civil defense, indicates that damage to existing programs occurs
when the Federal Government raises expectations of the public and of
other levels of government and then fails to follow through with
implementation and funding. It is better to maintain the _status quo_
with minor changes at the margin than to announce substantial program
initiatives and not meet their requirements.




CHAPTER V

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL IMPACTS


Often, it is assumed that disasters leave masses of the population in
the impacted areas dazed and helpless and unable to cope with the new
conditions, or that those not so immobilized panic or display
antisocial behavior. Another common assumption is that local
communities and organizations are rendered ineffective to handle the
many problems, leading to further disorganization, loss of morale, and
requiring the quick assertion of "strong" outside leadership and
control.

Practical experience and field studies of disasters indicate that
these assumptions are not necessarily correct. The widespread sharing
of danger, loss, and deprivation produces an intimate cooperativeness
among the survivors, which overcomes social isolation and provides a
channel for very close communication and expression and a major source
of physical and emotional support and reassurance. This capacity seems
to account for the resiliency of personality and social organization
in dealing with threat and danger. It is also at the base of the
ability of social life to regenerate.

In addition, a good case can be made in that community systems
experiencing impact may be more efficient and rational than they are
in "normal" circumstances. Normal (pre-disaster) community life
traditionally operates at a low level of effectiveness and efficiency.
Activities are directed toward a very diffuse set of goals, just as
human resources within the community are inadequately utilized. Upon
disaster impact, certain community goals--care for victims and the
restoration of essential services--develop a high priority while
others are ignored or held in abeyance. Thus, the entire range of
community resources, even taking into account "losses," can be
allocated to the accomplishment of the more critical goals. Also,
human resources are better utilized. Many women, older persons,
younger persons, and members of minorities now become "productive;"
the "labor" market after impact is open to those underutilized
resources. In effect, then, disasters create the conditions for the
more efficient utilization of material resources and the more
effective mobilization of human resources.

To accomplish this, certain modifications have to occur in the normal
community structure, since the usual decision-making structures are
designed for a different range and type of problem. Outsiders see this
restructuring process as disorganized, chaotic, and creating the
necessity for the imposition of some strong outside authority. On the
contrary, this restructuring process is functional and adaptive. Its
consequences are seen in communities and societies that rebound
dramatically from the disruption and destruction to levels of
integration, productivity, and growth capacity far beyond the
pre-disaster state.

In summary, the picture drawn points to the capacity of individuals
and institutions to deal with difficult problems created by disaster
impact. It also points to the adaptive capacity of social organization
within communities to deal with unique and dramatic problems. These
findings are not an argument against planning nor against "outside"
assistance, but they should condition both the nature of planning and
the direction of assistance.




ANNEX 1

LETTERS OF CORRESPONDENCE




THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


  September 19, 1980

  To Governor Jerry Brown

As you know, following my trip to view the destructive impacts of the
volcanic eruption of Mt. St. Helens in the State of Washington, I
directed that an assessment be undertaken of the consequences and
state of preparedness for a major earthquake in California. This
review, chaired by my Science and Technology Advisor, Frank Press, is
now complete. We are grateful for the assistance provided by your
staff and the other State, and local officials in this effort.

Although current response plans are generally adequate for moderate
earthquakes, Federal, State, and local officials agree that additional
preparation is required to cope with a major earthquake. Prudence
requires, therefore, that we take steps to improve our preparedness.

While the primary responsibility for preparedness rests with the State
of California, its local governments and its people, the magnitude of
human suffering and loss of life that might occur and the importance
of California to the rest of the Nation require increased Federal
attention to this important issue. Accordingly, I have directed that
the Federal government increase its work with you to supplement your
efforts. The Federal efforts will be led by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and include the Department of Defense and other
Departments and agencies as appropriate.

As a Nation, we must reduce the adverse impacts of a catastrophic
earthquake to the extent humanly possible by increasing our
preparedness for this potential eventuality.

  Sincerely,

  [signed] Jimmy Carter

  The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
  Governor of California
  Sacramento, California 95814


  September 26, 1980

  The Honorable Jimmy Carter
  The President
  The White House
  Washington, D.C. 20500

  Dear Mr. President:

Let me take this opportunity to review our conversations over the last
few months regarding increased seismic activity in California.

When we met in Oakland on July 4 I raised the issue of seismic
hazards. I was concerned then with the steady increase in seismic
activity in California since 1978. Sharing my concern, you directed
that the National Security Council join with my staff and certain
local experts to conduct a quick study on the potential for a great
earthquake in California.

As you know, significant theoretical and public policy research had
already been completed by our Seismic Safety Commission, State
Geologist, Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council and the Office of
Emergency Services. Together with the U.S. Geological Survey and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), they had clearly been
keeping abreast of the state of the art of earthquake prediction.
Indeed, combined state and federal efforts, founded on major
theoretical advances in American, Russian and Chinese seismic and
geological theory since the early 1970s, had shifted the language of
earthquake prediction in California from "if" to "when"!

In light of my personal interest in this subject, I have signed into
law Assemblyman Frank Vicencia's AB 2202, a jointly funded
state-federal project to design a comprehensive earthquake
prediction-response plan. It is the state's intention to prepare a
plan for the greater Los Angeles area as quickly as feasible. In my
view, such a fullscale prediction-response program had become possible
only after the research findings of both physical and policy
scientists during the past five years. It is my conviction that such a
plan is now timely--neither too early nor too late.

In this context, your recognition of this issue in our conversation of
September 22 in Los Angeles was a welcome personal reinforcement of
our state and local efforts. I am also grateful for the September 3
briefing in Sacramento by Mr. John Macy, Director of FEMA, regarding
the latest U.S. Geological Survey interpretations of anomalies around
California's system of geological faults. As soon as we have received
the final FEMA report on the details of those anomalies, I will ask
the state geologist to evaluate the report, confer with colleagues in
the Geological Survey and have all state and local officials fully
briefed.

At that time, I would be grateful for an early opportunity to meet
with you and explore next steps. I am confident that a heightened
state of awareness among my fellow Californians will so deploy the
resources of the state, plus available federal supplementary
assistance, as to minimize the loss of life and property in the event
of a great earthquake.

  Sincerely,

  /s/

  Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
  Governor




ANNEX 2

CURRENT CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLANNING


A. NATURE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING

An emergency, as used in this report, is defined as an unexpected,
sudden or out-of-the-ordinary event or series of events adversely
affecting lives and property which, because of its magnitude, cannot
be handled by normal governmental processes. Emergency response
planning is the process that addresses preparedness for and response
to an emergency.

Emergency response planning is an evolutionary, ongoing process and is
prerequisite to all other emergency readiness activities. It is a
comprehensive process that identifies the potential hazardous events,
and the vulnerability to such hazards, estimates expected losses, and
assesses impacts of such events. The development of written plans is
followed by placement of capabilities to implement the response plan
and by the conduct of periodic tests and exercises. The most difficult
task in the development of an emergency plan is to anticipate as many
of the problems and complications resulting from a given disaster
situation as possible and to provide a basis for response to those not
anticipated.

The objective of emergency planning is to create the capacity for
government to:

        » Save the maximum number of lives in the event of an
          emergency

        » Minimize injuries and protect property

        » Preserve the functions of civil government

        » Maintain and support economic and social activities
          essential for response and the eventual long-term
          recovery from the disaster

Emergency planning is a logical and necessary pre-emergency activity
for governmental (and other organizational) entities likely to be
affected by a disaster's occurrence. To be successful, such planning
must be accomplished within the framework of the day-to-day
governmental structure and activity but at the same time provide for
response to the extraordinary circumstances and requirements inherent
in disaster situations.

Emergency plans include the preparation of guidelines, policy
directives, and procedures to be utilized in preparing for and
conducting disaster operations, training, and test exercises. They
should also contain clear statements of authorities, responsibilities,
organizational relationships, and operating procedures necessary for
the accomplishment of disaster response and recovery activities.
Further, they should address the four elements of mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery (immediate and long-term).

Once plans are established they must be periodically updated as
conditions change. Updating may become necessary for a number of
reasons: increased scientific, technical, and managerial knowledge;
feedback from evaluation of exercises; better understanding of
vulnerability; shifts in population and economic activities;
construction of new critical facilities; and changes in personnel,
organization, and legislation.

Emergency planning is a shared responsibility at all levels--in this
case from the Federal through the State and local jurisdictional
levels. It should include business, industry, research and scientific
institutions, practicing professions, and the individuals. By
involving all functions of government, the planning process enhances
the capability for implementing the plans through the realistic
consideration of available capabilities and elimination of conflicts
and inconsistencies of roles and task assignments.

Further, by being a part of the planning decision-making process and
having identified the needs and areas of consideration, individuals,
organizations, and officials responsible for emergency operations are
better able to relate to the expected impact and the operational
environment. The written plans also serve valuable purposes for
training and familiarization of new organizations, individuals, and
public officials. Experience has shown repeatedly that when emergency
operations are conducted in accordance with existing plans, reaction
time is reduced and coordination improved, with fewer casualties, less
property damage, and a higher surviving socioeconomic capability to
undertake recovery. Other benefits that accrue from planning include
the enhancement of hazard awareness.


B. CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY PLANNING RESPONSE

The State of California emergency response planning is a series of
related documents, each of which serve a specific purpose. (See
figures 1 and 2.)

The basic plan of a jurisdiction (item (1) in figures 1 and 2) is the
foundation of this planning process. It is an essential administrative
(rather than operational) document, and as such it:

        » Provides the basis (including legal authority) for and
          the objectives of emergency planning and operations

        » Outlines contingencies (emergency situations) to be
          planned and prepared for and establishes the general
          principles and policies (concepts of operations) to be
          applied to each

        » Describes the emergency organization in terms of who is
          responsible for what actions

        » Defines interjurisdictional and interservice
          relationships and the direction and control structure to
          make assignments and resolve conflicts

        » Contains or refers to information of common interest
          about supporting facilities, such as the Emergency
          Operations Center and warning and communications systems

        » Provides the planning basis for other supporting
          documents which are more operationally oriented

The basic plan is supported by a Direction and Control annex and by
functional annexes (see (2) and (3) respectively in figures 1 and 2).
The Direction and Control annex details how overall responses to an
emergency will be managed and coordinated. Functional annexes (for
both staff and services) are designed to address the extraordinary
requirements created by emergencies. They identify the specific needs,
the organizational resources available to meet those needs, and the
scheme or "concept of operations" for their application. It should be
noted that, because of unique requirements, annexes often do not
reflect normal departmental structure. An annex becomes a departmental
plan only when an agency represents the sole resource for meeting the
stated need and when satisfying that need is the only task assigned to
that agency by the basic plan.

The second major portion of the California State planning structure
consists of specific contingency plans (see (4) in figures 1 and 2).
One such plan is prepared for each extraordinary emergency or
disaster, likely to occur, detailing the probable effects of the
emergency on the jurisdiction and the actions to be taken in
offsetting these effects. It is also called a "response plan" since it
describes the operations to be undertaken to deal with catastrophic
situations. Contingency plans include service support plans and
checklists (see (5) and (6) respectively in figures 1 and 2). Each
involved element of the emergency organization details its response
actions in Service Support Plans and itemizes functions appropriate to
the specific contingency. The contingency plans, service support
plans, and related checklists and standard operating procedures
constitute the "operational" portions of the overall emergency plan.
They address internal procedures to accomplish stated objectives and
document, in advance, the specific organizational elements that will
respond to each type of disaster or "need," with identification of
procedures and resources.

The third major part of California's overall State plan is a
compendium of information and resources needed to cope with
emergencies (see (7) in figures 1 and 2). This includes references
describing the control structure (Emergency Operations Center
locations, communications, key facilities, personnel lists, and
equipment source listings).


C. FEDERAL EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLANNING

Most Federal agencies operating within the State have a generic
emergency response plan that establishes their internal procedures for
responding to disasters. Certain agencies such as the Corps of
Engineers and the Federal Highway Administration, which provide
services and support that are used on a regular and fairly extensive
basis in disaster, tend to have more highly developed disaster
response plans. Some of them even have rather basic earthquake
response segments included in their basic plans. Thus, for moderate
earthquakes these plans are relatively effective and the Federal
response can be expected to be at least adequate. Few Federal
agencies, however, have developed any specific plan that is adequate
to respond to the demands of a catastrophic event causing property
damage exceeding the $2 billion range. Of 24 Federal agencies whose
earthquake planning status were recently evaluated by FEMA Region IX,
only the Sixth U.S. Army was determined to have developed a
comprehensive capability that is in acceptable detail, has been
exercised, and appears to be operationally adequate and reliable.
Other Federal agencies are now beginning to perceive the need to
improve their planning and response capability following the expected
event, and are gradually responding to this need.

Providing impetus to this expanded planning activity has been the
emergence of the FEMA Region IX Earthquake Response Plan for the San
Francisco Bay Area. This is a site-specific FEMA plan based on a 1974
draft that provided for a full range of Federal assistance during the
emergency lifesaving phase following the earthquake. Although this
plan never proceeded beyond the draft stage (because of evolving FEMA
disaster field operations policy), it served as the basic guide for
the development of the Sixth U.S. Army Plan, and has remained a core
document for identifying expected Federal agency activities for
earthquake recovery in the San Francisco Bay area. In 1979, the
emergency response portion of the 1974 FEMA Region IX draft was
restructured. The conduct of the post-event response program was
shifted from being a centrally directed FEMA activity under the
operational control of the Regional Director to a decentralized
operation which provides for functional disaster support activities to
be assigned by the Regional Director to certain Federal agencies by
Mission Assignment Letters. Table 1 indicates functional task
assignment areas. Those with the designation "Emergency Support
Function (ESF)," have been assigned to other Federal agencies. Table 2
reviews the principal and support agency assignments for each of the
ESF functions.

On the basis of these anticipated mission assignments, the tasked
Federal agencies participated in the development of operational
annexes in the 1979 version of the San Francisco Earthquake Response
Plan. Upon completion of the annexes, all agencies were then required
to develop the necessary agency support plans and standard operating
procedures for accomplishing the mission assignment tasks.
Additionally, those Federal agencies designated in the plan as
principal agencies were tasked with the responsibility of organizing
and coordinating the activities of Federal agencies designated as
support.

The rationale for this approach was to identify the various functional
areas of disaster response for which a Federal activity could
reasonably be expected to maintain after the occurrence of the event.
With the functional areas identified, the range of Federal agency
talent was evaluated and Federal response capabilities matched to
expected functional demands. By the development of a matrix (figure
2), a total of 16 functional response areas (such as transportation,
mass care, and debris removal) were identified, and 20 Federal
agencies, plus volunteer organizations such as the American National
Red Cross, were designated as having appropriate disaster response
capabilities. Subsequently, all agencies were rated on their
capability for functioning in a principal or a support capacity. These
agencies were then provided specific FEMA Region IX Mission
Assignments or tasking statements which, when triggered by a
Presidential disaster declaration, provide the legal basis for
delivering the authorized assistance in response to State and local
government needs.

The end result of this approach has been to create a much more
effective and reliable capability to respond to the needs of an
earthquake disaster by those Federal agencies from which a significant
response would be required.

          +----------+
          |Basic Plan|                  .
          |   (1)    |                  .
          +----------+                  .
           |     |  |                   .
           |     |  |                   .        +-----------------+
           |     |  +----------------------------|Contingency Plans|
           |     |                      .        |      (4)        |
           |     |                      .        +-----------------+
           |     | Administrative       .   Operational  |
           |   +-------------+          .                |
           |   |Direction and|          .                |
           |   |Control Annex|          .                |
           |   |     (2)     |          .                |
           |   +-------------+          .                |
    +------+------+                     .                |
    |             |                     .                |
+-------+     +-------+                 .    +-----------------------+
| Staff |     |Service|                 .    | Service Support Plans |
|Annexes|     |Annexes|----------------------|          (5)          |
|  (3)  |     |  (3)  |                 .    |  Response Checklists  |
+-------+     +-------+                 .    |   and SOP's (6)       |
                                        .    +-----------------------+
                                        .                |
                                        .                |
                                        .                |
                                              +--------------------+
                                              |Resources Compendium|
                                              |         (7)        |
                                              +--------------------+

[Illustration: =Figure 1: Emergency Plans
(Description of and Relationship Between Plan Components)=]


+-------------------------+           +-------------------------+
| BASIC PLAN (1)          |           |                         |
|                         |-+         |                         |-+
|  Authorities            | |         |   RESOURCES MANUAL(S)   | |
|   Policies              | |-+       |           (7)           | |-+
|    Responsibilities     | | |       |                         | | |
|     System Interfaces   | | |-+     |                         | | |-+
|                         | | | |     |                         | | | |
+-------------------------+ | | |-+   +-------------------------+ | | |-+
 |Direction and Control (2) | | | |    |Communication Capabilities| | | |
 +--------------------------+ | | |-+  +--------------------------+ | | |-+
  |Public Safety (3)          | | | |   |Law Enforcement/Fire       | | | |
  +---------------------------+ | | |   +---------------------------+ | | |
   |People Care (3)             | | |    |Medical-Health/Welfare      | | |
   +----------------------------+ | |    +----------------------------+ | |
    |System Restoration (3)       | |     |Engineering/Utilities        | |
    +-----------------------------+ |     +-----------------------------+ |
     |Resource Management (3)       |      |Transportation, etc.          |
     +------------------------------+      +------------------------------+



     +----------------+           +----------------+
     |                |           |                |
     |                |           |                |
     | EARTHQUAKE     |-+         |     FLOOD      |-+
     | Response Plan  | |         |  Response Plan | |
     |     (4)        | |         |       (4)      | |
     |                | |         |                | |
     |                | |-+       |                | |-+
     +----------------+ | |       +----------------+ | |
      |                 | |        |                 | |
      | D & C Checklist | |        | D & C Checklist | |
      +-----------------+ |        +-----------------+ |
        |Svcs. Sup.       |          |Svcs. Sup.       |
        |  Plans (5)      |          |  Plans (5)      |
        |Checklists &     |          |Checklists &     |
        |  SOP's (6)      |          |  SOP's (6)      |
        +-----------------+          +-----------------+


     +----------------+          +----------------+
     |                |          | WAR            |
     |                |-+        |                |-+
     |      WAR       | |        |                | |
     |  Response Plan | |        |  Response Plan | |
     |       (4)      | |        |     (4)        | |
     |    In-Place    | |        | Crisis         | |
     |   Protection   | |-+      |  Relocation    | |-+
     +----------------+ | |      +----------------+ | |
      |                 | |       |                 | |
      | D & C Checklist | |       | D & C Checklist | |
      +-----------------+ |       +-----------------+ |
        |Svcs. Sup.       |         | Svcs. Sup.      |
        |  Plans (5)      |         |   Plans (5)     |
        |Checklists &     |         | Checklists &    |
        |  SOP's (6)      |         |   SOP's (6)     |
        +-----------------+         +-----------------+

[Illustration: =Figure 2: Emergency Planning Format
(A Partial Illustration of the Component Parts of a Jurisdictional
Emergency Plan)=]


TABLE 1

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IX EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE AND
ASSISTANCE TASKS

(San Francisco Bay Area)


ANNEXES TO BASIC PLAN

                    Disaster Field Activities
                     Disaster Field Location
                       Mission Assignments
               Emergency Transportation (ESF-1)[1]
                      Communication (ESF-2)
                Emergency Debris Clearance (ESF-3)
                      Fire Fighting (ESF-4)
         Emergency Roads, Airfields, and Bridges (ESF-5)
                   Emergency Demolition (ESF-6)
            Administrative Logistical Support (ESF-7)
                  Emergency Medical Care (ESF-8)
                    Search and Rescue (ESF-9)
           Identification and Disposal of Dead (ESF-10)
              Warnings of Risks and Hazards (ESF-11)
           Emergency Distribution of Medicine (ESF-12)
             Emergency Distribution of Food (ESF-13)
      Emergency Distribution of Consumable Supplies (ESF-14)
              Emergency Shelter & Mass Care (ESF-15)
                  Damage Reconnaissance (ESF-16)
                       Isoseismal Analysis
                       Authorities Referral
                          Administration

   [1] Emergency Support Functions (ESF) are cross-referenced by
   number in table 2.


TABLE 2

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS


KEY:
 a: Emergency Transportation
 b: Emergency Communications
 c: Emergency Debris Clearance
 d: Fire Fighting
 e: Emerg. Roads, Air Fields & Bridges
 f: Emergency Demolition
 g: Logistical Support
 h: Emergency Medical Care
 i: Search and Rescue
 j: Identif. & Disposal of Dead
 k: Warnings of Risks & Hazards
 l: Emergency Dist. of Medicine
 m: Emergency Dist. of Food
 n: Emergency Dist. of Consum. Supplies
 o: Emerg. Shelter, Feed, & Mass Care
 p: Damage Reconnaissance
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|ESF           | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 12| 13| 14| 15| 16|
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|ANNEX         |(D)|(E)|(F)|(G)|(H)|(I)|(J)|(K)|(L)|(M)|(N)|(O)|(P)|(Q)|(R)|(S)|
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| FEDERAL      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| AGENCIES     | a | b | c | d | e | f | g | h | i | j | k | l | m | n | o | p |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOT - FAA     | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOT - FHWA    | S |   |   |   | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOT - FRA     | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOT - RETCO-9 | P |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOT - UMTA    | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOT - USCC    | S | S |   | S |   | S |   |   | S |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOD - 6th USA | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | P | P | P |   | S | S | S | S | P |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOD - COE     |   | S | P | S | P | P |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|ICC           | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S | S |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DA - USFS     |   | S |   | P | S |   |   |   | S |   |   |   |   |   | S | S |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DA - FNS      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | P |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOC - MARAD   | S |   |   |   |   | S |   | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|NCS           |   | P |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|AYRC          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |   |   |   | S |   |   | P |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|Volunteer     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Agencies     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |   |
| (Various)    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|HEW           |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |   |   |   |   | P |   |   | S |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|US ATTY       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|DOL - OSHA    |   |   | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|USPS          | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|FBI           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |   |   |   |   |   |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|VA            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | S |   | S |   | S | S |   | S |   |
+--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|GSA           | S | S |   |   |   | S | P |   |   |   |   | S |   | P |   |   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
P - Principal Agencies
S - Support Agencies




ANNEX 3

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 2202


The Governor of California signed into law Assembly Bill 2202 on
September 25, 1980, which, among others, provides for State
participation in a joint Federal, State, and local program to prepare
a comprehensive program for responding to a major earthquake
prediction. This action was initiated in January 1980 through the
actions of the Assembly Committee on Government Organization, Frank
Vicencia, Chairman. Inclusions of specific funds for preparedness was
included following a subcommittee on Emergency Planning and Disaster
Relief hearing on possible earthquake prediction on April 22, 1980.
The text of the Law follows:

                 Assembly Bill No. 2202

                 CHAPTER 1046

            An act to amend Section 8897 of, to amend and
          renumber Section 8898 of, and to add Section
          8895.1 to, the Government Code, relating to the
          Seismic Safety Commission, making an appropriation
          therefor, and declaring the urgency thereof, to
          take effect immediately.

          [Approved by Governor September 25, 1980. Filed
          with Secretary of State September 26, 1980.]


                 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

            AB 2202, Vicencia. Seismic Safety Commission.

            The Seismic Safety Commission Act, which will
          self-repeal, effective January 1, 1986,
          establishes the Seismic Safety Commission, and
          confers upon it various powers and duties relating
          to earthquake hazard reduction. The California
          Emergency Services Act confers various related
          powers and duties upon the Governor, the Director
          and the Department of Emergency Services, and the
          California Emergency Council.

            This bill would amend the Seismic Safety
          Commission Act by: changing the basic subject of
          the powers and duties of the commission to
          earthquake hazard mitigation and making certain
          corresponding changes in its powers and duties;
          including within commission responsibilities,
          scheduling on its agenda as required, a report on
          disaster mitigation issues from the Office of
          Emergency Services and defining, for such
          purposes, "disaster" as all natural hazards which
          could have an impact on public safety; and
          authorizing the commission to exercise various
          specified powers in relation to other disasters,
          as so defined, in connection with issues or items
          reported or discussed with the Office of Emergency
          Services at any commission meeting.

            This bill would also require the commission to
          initiate, as specified, a comprehensive program to
          prepare the state for responding to a major
          earthquake prediction, as specified.

            This bill would appropriate $750,000 for the
          purposes of this act.

            This act would take effect immediately as an
          urgency statute.

            Appropriation: yes.


          _The people of the State of California do enact
          as follows:_

            SECTION 1. Section 8895.1 is added to the
          Government Code, to read:

            8895.1. The commission shall initiate, with the
          assistance and participation of other state,
          federal, and local government agencies, a
          comprehensive program to prepare the state for
          responding to a major earthquake prediction. The
          program should be implemented in order to result
          in specific tools or products to be used by
          governments in responding to an earthquake
          prediction, such as educational materials for
          citizens. This program may be implemented on a
          prototypical basis in one area of the state
          affected by earthquake predictions, provided that
          it is useful for application in other areas of the
          state upon its completion.

            SEC. 2. Section 8897 of the Government Code is
          amended to read:

            8897. The commission is responsible for all of
          the following in connection with earthquake hazard
          mitigation:

            (a) Setting goals and priorities in the public
          and private sectors.

            (b) Requesting appropriate state agencies to
          devise criteria to promote earthquake and disaster
          safety.

            (c) Scheduling a report on disaster mitigation
          issues from the Office of Emergency Services, on
          the commission agenda as required. For the
          purposes of this subdivision, the term disaster
          refers to all natural hazards which could have
          impact on public safety.

            (d) Recommending program changes to state
          agencies, local agencies, and the private sector
          where such changes would improve earthquake
          hazards and reduction.

            (e) Reviewing the recovery and reconstruction
          efforts after damaging earthquakes.

            (f) Gathering, analyzing, and disseminating
          information.

            (g) Encouraging research.

            (h) Sponsoring training to help improve the
          competence of specialized enforcement and other
          technical personnel.

            (i) Helping to coordinate the earthquake safety
          activities of government at all levels.

            (j) Establishing and maintaining necessary
          working relationships with any boards,
          commissions, departments, and agencies, or other
          public or private organizations.

            SEC. 3. Section 8898 of the Government Code is
          amended and renumbered to read:

            8897.1. To implement the foregoing
          responsibilities, the commission may do any of the
          following:

            (a) Review state budgets and review grant
          proposals, other than those grant proposals
          submitted by institutions of postsecondary
          education to the federal government, for
          earthquake related activities and to advise the
          Governor and Legislature thereon.

            (b) Review legislative proposals, related to
          earthquake safety to advise the Governor and
          Legislature concerning such proposals, and to
          propose needed legislation.

            (c) Recommend the addition, deletion, or
          changing of state agency standards when, in the
          commission's view, the existing situation creates
          undue hazards or when new developments would
          promote earthquake hazard mitigation, and conduct
          public hearings as deemed necessary on the
          subjects.

            (d) In the conduct of any hearing,
          investigation, inquiry, or study which is ordered
          or undertaken in any part of the state, to
          administer oaths and issue subpoenas for the
          attendance of witnesses and the production of
          papers, records, reports, books, maps, accounts,
          documents, and testimony.

            (e) In addition, the commission may perform any
          of the functions contained in subdivisions (a) to
          (d), inclusive, in relation to other disasters, as
          defined in subdivision (c) of Section 8897, in
          connection with issues or items reported or
          discussed with the Office of Emergency Services at
          any commission meeting.

            SEC. 4. The sum of seven hundred fifty thousand
          dollars ($750,000) is hereby appropriated from the
          General Fund to the Seismic Safety Commission for
          carrying out the provisions of Section 8895.1 of
          the Government Code as added by this act,
          contingent upon receipt of matching federal funds.

            SEC. 5. This act is an urgency statute necessary
          for the immediate preservation of the public
          peace, health, or safety within the meaning of
          Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into
          immediate effect. The facts constituting such
          necessity are:

            In order to protect the public safety against
          earthquakes, including the imminent possibility of
          major earthquake predictions being made within the
          next 12 months, it is necessary that this act take
          effect immediately.




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


=National Security Council Ad Hoc Committee on Assessment of
Consequences and Preparation for a Major California Earthquake=

_Dr. Frank Press_, Chairperson, President's Science Advisor
_Clifton Alexander, Jr._, Secretary of the Army
    _Roderick Renick_, Department of Defense
_Cecil Andres_, Secretary of the Department of Interior
    _H.W. Menard_, Department of Interior (USGS)
_W. Bowman Cutter_, Executive Associate Director for Budget, Office of
      Management and Budget
_Lynn Daft_, Associate Director for Domestic Policy Staff, White House
_Peter Hamilton_, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department
      of Defense
_Ted Hodkowski_, Intergovernmental Assistant to the President, White
      House
_John W. Macy, Jr._, Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
    _Richard Green_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
    _Frank Camm_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_William Odom_, Military Assistant, National Security Council, White
      House
_Robert P. Pirie, Jr._, Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve
      Affairs and Logistics, Department of Defense


=Working Group Members=

_Philip Smith_, Chairperson, Office of Science and Technology Policy
_Clarence G. Collins_, Department of Transportation
_Richard DiConti_, National Communications System
_Joseph Mullinix_, Office of Management and Budget
_Chris Shoemaker_, National Security Council
_Charles C. Thiel_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_Stephen Travis_, Domestic Policy Staff
_Robert L. Wesson_, Office of Science and Technology Policy

=Selected Contributors=

_Richard E. Adams_, State of California, OES Region V
_James Alexander_, State of California, OES Region I
_William Anderson_, National Science Foundation
_Ralph Archuleta_, United States Geological Survey
_Roger D. Borcherdt_, United States Geological Survey
_Robert D. Brown, Jr._, United States Geological Survey
_James Brown_, George Washington University
_Richard J. Buzka_, United States Geological Survey
_Maria D. Castain_, United States Geological Survey
_Lloyd Cluff_, Woodward-Clyde Consultants
_John Crawford_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_Alex Cunningham_, State of California, OES
_Donna Darling_, State of California, OES Region II
_Gardner Davis_, State of California, OES Region VI
_Henry Degenkolb_, H.J. Degenkolb & Associates
_Joseph Domingues_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
_Russell Dynes_, American Sociological Association
_Raymond R. Eis_, United States Geological Survey
_Susan Elkins_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
_Jack F. Evernden_, United States Geological Survey
_Charles Fritz_, National Academy of Sciences
_Thomas E. Fumal_, United States Geological Survey
_James T. Haigwood_, State of California, OES Region I
_Jane Victoria Hindmarsh_, State of California, OES
_Connie E. Hooper_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_William B. Joyner_, United States Geological Survey
_Harry King_, State of California, OES Region II
_Henry Lagorio_, University of California
_Richard P. Liechti_, United States Geological Survey
_Terry Meade_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
_Ugo Morelli_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_William Myers_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_Robert A. Page_, United States Geological Survey
_Daniel J. Ponti_, United States Geological Survey
_H. Roger Pulley_, State of California, OES
_F. Joseph Russo_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_Louis Schwalb_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_Wanda H. Seiders_, United States Geological Survey
_Paul A. Spudich_, United States Geological Survey
_Frank Steindl_, Oklahoma State University
_Karl Steinbrugge_, Private Consultant
_Christopher Stephens_, United States Geological Survey
_Robert Stevens_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
_John Sucich_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_Hurst Sutton_, Private Consultant
_Richard Traub_, State of California, OES Region I
_Monica L. Turner_, United States Geological Survey
_Robert E. Wallace_, United States Geological Survey
_Kay M. Walz_, United States Geological Survey
_William W. Ward_, State of California, OES Region II
_Robert R. Wilson_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
_Robert P. Yerkes_, United States Geological Survey
_Mark D. Zoback_, United States Geological Survey


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