An account of reason & faith in relation to the mysteries of Christianity / by John Norris.
         Norris, John, 1657-1711.
      
       
         
           1697
        
      
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             An account of reason & faith in relation to the mysteries of Christianity / by John Norris.
             Norris, John, 1657-1711.
          
           [14], 346, [1] p.
           
             Printed for S. Manship ...,
             London :
             1697.
          
           
             First edition.
             Written in reply to John Toland's Christianity not mysterious.
             Reproduction of original in Bristol Public Library, Bristol, England.
          
        
      
    
     
       
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         eng
      
       
         
           Toland, John, 1670-1722. -- Christianity not mysterious.
           Deism -- Controversial literature.
           Christianity -- Philosophy.
           Faith and reason.
        
      
    
     
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           AN
           ACCOUNT
           OF
           
             Reason
             &
             Faith
          
           :
           In
           RELATION
           to
           the
           MYSTERIES
           OF
           CHRISTIANITY
           .
        
         
           By
           
             JOHN
             NORRIS
          
           ,
           M.
           A.
           Rector
           of
           Bemerton
           near
           Sarum
           .
        
         
           Holding
           Faith
           ,
           and
           a
           good
           Conscience
           ;
           which
           some
           having
           put
           away
           ,
           Concerning
           Faith
           have
           made
           Ship-wrack
           .
           
             1
             Tim.
             1.
             19.
             
          
        
         
           LONDON
           ,
           Printed
           for
           
             S.
             Manship
          
           ,
           at
           the
           Ship
           near
           the
           
             Royal
             Exchange
          
           in
           Cornhil
           ,
           1697.
           
        
      
       
         
         
         
           To
           the
           Right
           Honourable
           Henry
           Lord
           of
           Colerane
           .
        
         
           
             My
             Lord
             ,
          
        
         
           YOur
           Lordships
           Learning
           and
           Knowledge
           in
           Matters
           of
           Religion
           ,
           and
           Sincerity
           in
           the
           Belief
           and
           Profession
           of
           its
           Sacred
           Articles
           are
           both
           so
           well
           known
           ,
           that
           I
           cannot
           be
           supposed
           to
           Present
           this
           Book
           to
           your
           Lordship
           with
           a
           Design
           to
           instruct
           you
           in
           the
           Former
           ,
           or
           to
           Settle
           and
           Confirm
           you
           in
           the
           Latter
           .
           There
           are
           indeed
           but
           too
           many
           in
           the
           World
           to
           whom
           it
           may
           be
           necessary
           upon
           those
           Accounts
           ,
           but
           all
           that
           I
           intend
           in
           reference
           
           to
           your
           Lordship
           by
           it
           is
           only
           to
           express
           my
           Reverence
           and
           Respect
           for
           your
           great
           Worth
           and
           Goodness
           ,
           and
           my
           grateful
           Acknowledgments
           for
           that
           particular
           Share
           and
           Interest
           I
           have
           had
           in
           your
           Favours
           .
        
         
           Which
           give
           me
           further
           Occasion
           to
           hope
           that
           you
           will
           be
           as
           kind
           to
           the
           Book
           a●
           you
           have
           been
           to
           the
           Author
           ,
           and
           that
           as
           you
           were
           pleas'd
           to
           incourage
           the
           Undertaking
           ,
           so
           you
           will
           now
           favour
           the
           Performance
           ,
           which
           with
           all
           deference
           and
           Submission
           is
           humbly
           presented
           to
           your
           Lordship
           by
        
         
           
             My
             Lord
             ,
          
           
             Your
             Lordships
             most
             Obliged
             and
             very
             humble
             Servant
             ,
             
               J.
               Norris
            
             .
          
        
      
       
         
         
           THE
           PREFACE
           .
        
         
           COntroversies
           of
           Religion
           ,
           and
           particularly
           this
           ,
           have
           been
           managed
           of
           late
           with
           that
           Intemperance
           of
           Passion
           and
           Indecency
           of
           ,
           Language
           ,
           after
           such
           a
           Rude
           Bear-Garden
           way
           ,
           so
           much
           more
           like
           Duelling
           or
           Prizing
           than
           Disputing
           ,
           that
           the
           more
           good
           Natured
           and
           better
           Bred
           part
           of
           the
           World
           are
           grown
           almost
           Sick
           of
           them
           and
           Prejudic'd
           against
           them
           ,
           not
           being
           able
           to
           see
           Men
           Cut
           and
           Slash
           and
           draw
           Blood
           from
           one
           another
           after
           such
           an
           inhuman
           manner
           only
           to
           vent
           their
           own
           Spleen
           ,
           and
           make
           diversion
           for
           the
           Savage
           and
           brutalized
           Rabble
           ,
           without
           some
           troublesom
           resentments
           
           of
           Pity
           and
           Displacency
           .
           And
           truly
           't
           is
           hard
           for
           a
           Man
           to
           read
           some
           certain
           things
           of
           this
           Character
           without
           being
           disturb'd
           ,
           and
           growing
           out
           of
           humour
           upon
           't
           ,
           and
           being
           even
           out
           of
           Conceit
           with
           Mankind
           ,
           such
           an
           Idea
           do
           they
           raise
           of
           the
           Malignity
           of
           Human
           Nature
           ,
           and
           so
           do
           they
           ruffle
           an●
           Chagrine
           the
           Mind
           of
           the
           Reader
           :
           From
           which
           impressions
           he
           will
           hardly
           recover
           himself
           till
           he
           meets
           with
           some
           Book
           or
           other
           of
           a
           Contrary
           Spirit
           (
           whereof
           the
           Bishop
           of
           
           London-Derry's
           Excellent
           Discourse
           of
           the
           
             Inventions
             of
             Men
             in
             the
             Worship
             of
             God
          
           is
           a
           very
           eminent
           Instance
           )
           which
           may
           serve
           to
           recompose
           the
           One
           ,
           and
           give
           him
           a
           better
           Opinion
           of
           the
           Other
           .
        
         
           I
           have
           endeavour'd
           in
           the
           Management
           of
           the
           present
           Argument
           to
           use
           such
           Christian
           Temper
           and
           Moderation
           
           as
           becomes
           the
           Search
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           may
           argue
           a
           Mind
           Concern'd
           only
           for
           the
           finding
           it
           .
           For
           of
           all
           the
           ill-sorted
           things
           in
           Nature
           I
           think
           it
           the
           most
           improper
           and
           disagreeable
           ,
           to
           reason
           in
           a
           Passion
           ,
           especially
           when
           't
           is
           in
           defence
           of
           that
           Religion
           which
           neither
           needs
           at
           nor
           allows
           it
           .
           And
           therefore
           laying
           aside
           all
           Anger
           and
           Disaffection
           (
           which
           even
           for
           the
           advantage
           of
           well
           reasoning
           ought
           to
           be
           laid
           aside
           )
           I
           have
           set
           my Self
           to
           observe
           the
           Laws
           of
           Decency
           as
           well
           as
           those
           of
           good
           Discourse
           ,
           to
           Consider
           things
           as
           they
           really
           are
           in
           their
           own
           Natures
           ,
           to
           represent
           them
           as
           I
           find
           them
           with
           all
           Calmness
           and
           Sedateness
           ,
           to
           regard
           nothing
           but
           the
           pure
           Merits
           of
           the
           Cause
           ,
           and
           to
           treat
           that
           Party
           of
           Men
           I
           write
           against
           with
           that
           Candour
           and
           Respect
           as
           may
           the
           better
           dispose
           them
           to
           lend
           Attention
           to
           
           my
           Arguments
           ,
           Considering
           it
           as
           one
           of
           the
           Principal
           Rules
           of
           the
           Art
           of
           Perswasion
           to
           gain
           upon
           the
           Affections
           of
           Men
           in
           order
           to
           the
           Conviction
           of
           their
           Iudgments
           .
           And
           I
           do
           not
           know
           that
           I
           am
           guilty
           of
           any
           incivility
           towards
           the
           Men
           I
           deal
           with
           ,
           unless
           it
           be
           that
           of
           Contradicting
           them
           .
           Wherein
           as
           they
           are
           even
           with
           me
           ,
           so
           I
           hope
           they
           will
           not
           be
           less
           so
           in
           the
           other
           part
           ,
           but
           will
           treat
           me
           with
           the
           like
           return
           of
           Civility
           and
           good
           Temper
           ,
           in
           Case
           they
           shall
           think
           fit
           to
           make
           any
           .
        
         
           The
           Occasion
           of
           this
           undertaking
           was
           a
           Certain
           late
           Book
           call'd
           
             Christianity
             Not
             Mysterious
          
           ,
           one
           of
           the
           most
           Bold
           ,
           daring
           and
           irreverent
           pieces
           of
           Defiance
           to
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           that
           even
           this
           Licentious
           Age
           has
           produced
           ,
           and
           which
           has
           been
           supposed
           
           to
           have
           done
           great
           Battery
           and
           Execution
           upon
           them
           ,
           and
           to
           be
           indeed
           a
           very
           shrewd
           and
           notable
           Performance
           even
           by
           people
           of
           competent
           Sense
           and
           Learning
           ,
           not
           excluding
           the
           Author
           himself
           who
           to
           shew
           his
           good
           Opinion
           both
           of
           his
           Cause
           and
           of
           his
           Management
           of
           it
           ,
           has
           since
           publish'd
           a
           Second
           Edition
           of
           his
           Book
           ,
           with
           inlargements
           ,
           and
           with
           his
           Name
           .
           To
           which
           I
           thought
           once
           to
           have
           return'd
           a
           direct
           and
           Formal
           Answer
           by
           way
           of
           Solution
           of
           his
           Objections
           ,
           till
           upon
           further
           Consideration
           I
           judg'd
           it
           better
           to
           give
           an
           Absolute
           Account
           of
           the
           Positive
           Side
           of
           the
           Question
           ;
           and
           after
           having
           laid
           such
           grounds
           in
           it
           as
           might
           be
           made
           use
           of
           for
           the
           Confutation
           of
           his
           Book
           ,
           to
           make
           a
           short
           Application
           of
           them
           in
           a
           few
           Strictures
           upon
           it
           at
           the
           End
           of
           Mine
           .
           But
           after
           I
           had
           laid
           those
           
           Grounds
           in
           the
           Absolute
           part
           ,
           I
           found
           the
           Application
           of
           them
           was
           so
           easie
           to
           the
           Author's
           Objections
           ,
           that
           they
           might
           as
           well
           be
           made
           by
           my
           Reader
           ,
           who
           might
           with
           such
           readiness
           out
           of
           the
           Principles
           here
           establish'd
           form
           an
           Answer
           to
           all
           that
           deserves
           one
           in
           that
           Book
           ,
           that
           I
           thought
           there
           was
           no
           need
           of
           inlarging
           the
           Bulk
           of
           mine
           upon
           that
           account
           .
           Which
           accordingly
           tho'
           I
           do
           not
           call
           by
           the
           Name
           of
           an
           Answer
           to
           
             Christianity
             Not
             Mysterious
          
           ,
           I
           cannot
           but
           reckon
           to
           have
           all
           the
           Substance
           (
           though
           not
           the
           Formality
           )
           of
           a
           Reply
           to
           that
           Treatise
           ,
           it
           being
           much
           the
           same
           thing
           in
           effect
           either
           to
           unlock
           a
           door
           for
           a
           Man
           ,
           or
           to
           put
           into
           his
           hands
           a
           Key
           that
           will.
           
        
         
           I
           write
           neither
           for
           Favour
           nor
           for
           Preferment
           ,
           but
           only
           to
           serve
           the
           Cause
           of
           Christianity
           (
           for
           so
           I
           call
           
           that
           of
           its
           Mysteries
           )
           and
           the
           interest
           of
           that
           Church
           which
           is
           so
           great
           a
           Friend
           to
           it
           and
           Maintainer
           of
           it
           according
           to
           its
           purest
           and
           most
           Primitive
           State
           of
           Apostolical
           and
           Evangelic
           Perfection
           .
           Of
           whose
           Communion
           't
           is
           my
           Happiness
           to
           be
           a
           Member
           ,
           my
           Glory
           to
           be
           a
           Priest
           ,
           and
           that
           I
           had
           better
           Abilities
           to
           do
           her
           Service
           ,
           my
           highest
           Ambition
           .
           However
           such
           as
           they
           are
           I
           humbly
           devote
           and
           imploy
           them
           to
           that
           purpose
           ,
           as
           I
           do
           this
           and
           all
           other
           my
           Labours
           .
           I
           hope
           what
           I
           have
           written
           may
           do
           some
           Service
           to
           the
           Cause
           whose
           Defence
           it
           Undertakes
           ,
           and
           if
           it
           does
           ,
           I
           shall
           not
           much
           regard
           the
           resentments
           of
           any
           Designing
           or
           not
           so
           well
           affected
           Persons
           ,
           Great
           or
           Little
           ,
           whose
           displeasure
           it
           may
           provoke
           ,
           tho'
           I
           have
           taken
           all
           due
           Care
           not
           to
           give
           any
           body
           any
           reasonable
           Offence
           .
           
           And
           so
           I
           Commit
           the
           following
           Papers
           to
           the
           attentive
           Perusal
           of
           the
           Candid
           and
           Considerate
           Reader
           ,
           and
           to
           the
           Blessing
           of
           God.
           
        
      
       
         
         
           THE
           CONTENTS
           .
        
         
           
             Chapter
             I.
             
          
           
             OF
             Reason
             .
             Page
             18.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             II.
             
          
           
             Of
             Faith.
             p.
             53.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             III.
             
          
           
             The
             Distinction
             of
             things
             Contrary
             to
             Reason
             ,
             and
             above
             Reason
             ,
             Consider'd
             .
             p.
             100.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             IV.
             
          
           
             That
             Human
             Reason
             is
             not
             the
             Measure
             of
             Truth
             .
             p.
             137.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             V.
             
          
           
             That
             therefore
             a
             things
             being
             Incomprehensible
             by
             Reason
             ,
             is
             of
             it self
             no
             Concluding
             Argument
             of
             its
             not
             being
             true
             .
             p.
             230.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             VI.
             
          
           
             That
             if
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             a
             thing
             were
             an
             Argument
             of
             its
             not
             being
             True
             ,
             Human
             Reason
             would
             then
             be
             the
             Measure
             of
             Truth
             .
             p.
             243.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             VII
             .
          
           
             That
             therefore
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             a
             thing
             is
             no
             just
             
             Objection
             against
             the
             Belief
             of
             it
             .
             With
             an
             Account
             of
             the
             Cartesian
             Maxim
             ,
             that
             we
             are
             to
             Assent
             only
             to
             what
             is
             Clear
             and
             Evident
             .
             p.
             251.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             VIII
             .
          
           
             Wherein
             is
             shewn
             what
             is
             the
             true
             Vse
             of
             Reason
             in
             Believing
             .
             p.
             282.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             IX
             .
          
           
             An
             Application
             of
             the
             foregoing
             Considerations
             to
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             Christianity
             .
             p.
             294.
             
          
           
             Chapter
             X.
             
          
           
             The
             Conclusion
             of
             the
             Whole
             ,
             with
             an
             Address
             to
             the
             
               Socinians
               .
               p.
            
             307.
             
          
           
           
             Post-script
             .
             p.
             339.
             
          
        
      
    
     
       
         
         
           The
           Introduction
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           AMong
           the
           various
           Conjectures
           Men
           of
           a
           Prophetic
           Spirit
           have
           fall'n
           into
           Concerning
           the
           last
           events
           ,
           we
           have
           had
           *
           this
           Opinion
           not
           long
           since
           advanc'd
           for
           one
           ,
           that
           as
           God
           formerly
           by
           rejecting
           the
           Iews
           made
           way
           for
           the
           Gentiles
           ,
           so
           in
           the
           latter
           days
           he
           will
           in
           like
           manner
           by
           rejecting
           the
           Gentiles
           make
           way
           for
           the
           Iews
           to
           enter
           into
           the
           Christian
           Church
           .
           That
           the
           state
           of
           Christianity
           being
           become
           intirely
           Corrupt
           ,
           and
           all
           over
           Anti-christianiz'd
           ,
           the
           First
           of
           those
           Viols
           of
           the
           Divine
           Wrath
           that
           are
           to
           exterminate
           the
           Wicked
           ,
           and
           usher
           in
           the
           Terrours
           of
           the
           Great
           Day
           ,
           shall
           fall
           upon
           the
           Christian
           World
           ,
           that
           Christendom
           shall
           be
           utterly
           dissolv'd
           ,
           broken
           in
           pieces
           ,
           and
           destroy'd
           ,
           and
           that
           the
           Iews
           shall
           be
           replaced
           and
           re●establish'd
           upon
           its
           Ruins
           .
           And
           ,
           to
           render
           it
           Worthy
           of
           so
           Sore
           a
           Calamity
           ,
           that
           the
           generality
           of
           its
           Professors
           shall
           not
           only
           greatly
           depart
           from
           the
           Primitive
           Power
           of
           the
           Evangelic
           Spirit
           ,
           by
           Apostatizing
           from
           
           the
           Purity
           and
           Perfection
           of
           both
           Christian
           Faith
           and
           Life
           (
           which
           we
           have
           already
           seen
           come
           to
           pass
           )
           but
           shall
           even
           lay
           down
           their
           Holy
           Profession
           ,
           renounce
           their
           very
           Faith
           and
           Religion
           ,
           and
           turn
           Infidels
           .
           Upon
           the
           latter
           part
           of
           which
           Opinion
           those
           Words
           of
           our
           Saviour
           seem
           to
           cast
           a
           very
           suspicious
           Aspect
           ,
           
           
             VVhen
             the
             Son
             of
             Man
             cometh
             ,
             shall
             be
             find
             Faith
             upon
             the
             Earth
             ?
          
           As
           upon
           the
           Former
           do
           also
           those
           words
           of
           St.
           Paul
           ,
           
           
             Thou
             wilt
             say
             then
             ,
             The
             Branches
             were
             broken
             off
             ,
             that
             I
             might
             be
             graffed
             in
             .
             VVell
             ;
             because
             of
             unbelief
             they
             were
             broken
             off
             ,
             and
             thou
             standest
             by
             Faith.
             Be
             not
             high-minded
             ,
             but
             fear
             .
             For
             if
             God
             spared
             not
             the
             Natural
             Branches
             ,
             take
             heed
             lest
             he
             also
             spare
             not
             thee
             .
             Behold
             therefore
             the
             Goodness
             and
             Severity
             of
             God
             :
             On
             them
             which
             fell
             ,
             Severity
             ;
             but
             towards
             thee
             ,
             Goodness
             ,
             if
             thou
             continue
             in
             his
             Goodness
             .
             Otherwise
             thou
             also
             shalt
             be
             cut
             off
             :
          
           that
           is
           ,
           as
           a
           dead
           ,
           wither'd
           and
           unfruitful
           Branch
           ,
           as
           were
           the
           Iews
           for
           the
           same
           Reason
           before
           ,
           and
           as
           our
           Saviour
           tells
           us
           every
           unfruitful
           Branch
           shall
           be
           .
           
        
         
           2.
           
           And
           truly
           if
           one
           were
           to
           judge
           of
           these
           Mens
           Opinion
           by
           the
           present
           face
           and
           state
           of
           things
           ,
           one
           
           would
           be
           inclined
           to
           think
           it
           true
           ,
           and
           that
           they
           had
           the
           right
           Key
           of
           Prophecy
           in
           their
           hands
           .
           For
           sure
           by
           all
           Signs
           and
           Appearances
           ,
           the
           Course
           of
           the
           World
           seems
           to
           drive
           this
           way
           ;
           and
           if
           there
           be
           such
           a
           Fatal
           Revolution
           to
           come
           ,
           no
           doubt
           but
           that
           we
           are
           with
           large
           steps
           hastening
           to
           it
           .
           For
           how
           are
           the
           Vitals
           of
           Religion
           continually
           struck
           at
           ,
           the
           Foundations
           of
           it
           unsettled
           and
           undermined
           ,
           its
           venerable
           Articles
           disputed
           and
           ridiculed
           ,
           and
           by
           what
           a
           slender
           thread
           does
           Christianity
           hang
           !
           The
           great
           Complaint
           for
           a
           long
           while
           has
           been
           of
           the
           Decay
           of
           Christian
           Piety
           ,
           and
           the
           Universal
           Corruption
           of
           Manners
           .
           But
           now
           our
           Religion
           is
           corrupted
           as
           well
           as
           our
           Manners
           ,
           and
           we
           every
           day
           make
           shipwrack
           of
           our
           Faith
           as
           well
           as
           of
           a
           good
           Conscience
           .
           So
           that
           we
           have
           now
           fill'd
           our
           measure
           ,
           and
           are
           every
           way
           ripe
           for
           Destruction
           .
           Some
           deny
           all
           Reveal'd
           Religion
           ,
           and
           consequently
           the
           Christian
           ;
           others
           allowing
           the
           Divinity
           of
           the
           Religion
           deny
           that
           of
           its
           Author
           ,
           together
           with
           the
           Doctrines
           of
           the
           Trinity
           ,
           Incarnation
           and
           Satisfaction
           ;
           others
           again
           owning
           his
           Divinity
           
           deny
           the
           necessity
           of
           Believing
           it
           ;
           others
           again
           granting
           that
           ,
           and
           the
           other
           Points
           ,
           deny
           the
           necessity
           of
           his
           Satisfaction
           ,
           which
           is
           not
           only
           resolv'd
           into
           mere
           Prudential
           Reasons
           (
           as
           formerly
           )
           instead
           of
           being
           grounded
           upon
           the
           
             Essential
             Order
          
           and
           Iustice
           of
           God
           ,
           but
           is
           brought
           down
           so
           low
           of
           late
           as
           to
           be
           made
           an
           Accommodation
           and
           Condescension
           to
           ,
           and
           a
           gracious
           Compliance
           with
           the
           common
           Weaknesses
           and
           Prejudices
           of
           Mankind
           .
           Thus
           is
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           so
           mangled
           and
           dismember'd
           by
           some
           ,
           and
           so
           odly
           and
           insidiously
           represented
           by
           others
           ,
           that
           between
           them
           both
           the
           general
           Faith
           of
           the
           thing
           is
           indanger'd
           ,
           and
           a
           ready
           way
           prepared
           to
           Scepticism
           and
           Infidelity
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           Not
           that
           I
           think
           it
           ought
           to
           be
           any
           just
           matter
           of
           Scandal
           to
           any
           considering
           Christians
           ,
           or
           Prejudice
           to
           their
           Holy
           Religion
           to
           see
           so
           many
           Corruptions
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           Apostacies
           and
           Revoltings
           from
           it
           ;
           since
           this
           is
           no
           more
           than
           what
           the
           Holy
           Spirit
           of
           God
           has
           often
           forewarn'd
           us
           shall
           come
           to
           pass
           in
           the
           latter
           days
           ;
           wherein
           we
           are
           expresly
           told
           ,
           that
           perillous
           times
           shall
           come
           ,
           and
           
           that
           Men
           shall
           resist
           the
           Truth
           ,
           
           be
           proud
           and
           high-minded
           ,
           of
           corrupt
           minds
           ,
           and
           reprobate
           concerning
           the
           Faith.
           And
           moreover
           that
           they
           shall
           privily
           bring
           in
           damnable
           Heresies
           ,
           
           even
           denying
           the
           Lord
           that
           bought
           them
           .
           This
           therefore
           I
           say
           ought
           in
           reason
           to
           be
           no
           matter
           of
           scandal
           to
           any
           Christians
           .
           And
           so
           neither
           ought
           the
           poor
           ,
           humble
           ,
           suffering
           condition
           of
           Jesus
           Christ
           to
           have
           been
           any
           to
           the
           Iews
           ,
           since
           this
           also
           was
           plainly
           foretold
           of
           the
           Messias
           ,
           and
           made
           a
           notable
           part
           of
           his
           Character
           .
           And
           yet
           we
           find
           that
           the
           Cross
           of
           Christ
           was
           a
           stumbling-block
           to
           the
           Iews
           ,
           and
           so
           no
           doubt
           are
           the
           present
           sufferings
           ,
           I
           may
           say
           Crucifixion
           ,
           of
           his
           Religion
           to
           many
           Christians
           ;
           the
           generality
           of
           which
           measure
           the
           certainty
           of
           their
           Faith
           by
           the
           firmness
           and
           constancy
           of
           its
           Professors
           ,
           and
           are
           apt
           more
           to
           stagger
           and
           take
           offence
           at
           the
           untoward
           appearance
           of
           any
           Event
           ,
           than
           to
           be
           confirm'd
           in
           their
           belief
           from
           its
           agreement
           with
           Antient
           Prophecies
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           In
           the
           mean
           time
           what
           do
           those
           without
           think
           of
           us
           !
           Particularly
           the
           Heathens
           ,
           among
           whom
           no
           doubt
           
           there
           are
           some
           that
           neither
           want
           Intelligence
           nor
           Curiosity
           to
           acquaint
           themselves
           with
           the
           present
           state
           of
           Christendom
           .
           What
           a
           confirmation
           must
           it
           be
           to
           these
           Men
           in
           their
           Infidelity
           ,
           to
           see
           Christians
           grow
           weary
           of
           their
           own
           Religion
           ,
           and
           willing
           to
           part
           with
           those
           great
           and
           weighty
           Articles
           of
           it
           for
           which
           the
           holy
           Martyrs
           shed
           their
           Blood
           ,
           and
           which
           could
           not
           be
           extorted
           from
           them
           by
           all
           the
           might
           and
           power
           of
           their
           cruel
           Emperours
           .
           Can
           it
           be
           expected
           that
           these
           Men
           should
           embrace
           a
           Religion
           which
           they
           see
           thus
           continually
           deserted
           by
           its
           own
           Disciples
           !
           Or
           rather
           instead
           of
           converting
           themselves
           to
           Christianity
           will
           they
           not
           look
           every
           day
           when
           the
           Christians
           shall
           come
           over
           to
           them
           !
           For
           truly
           this
           seems
           to
           be
           the
           state
           of
           the
           Christian
           World
           at
           this
           time
           .
           We
           are
           posting
           as
           fast
           as
           we
           can
           into
           Heathenism
           ,
           and
           stand
           even
           upon
           the
           brink
           of
           Infidelity
           .
           The
           great
           Articles
           of
           our
           Religion
           are
           giving
           up
           every
           day
           ,
           and
           when
           Men
           have
           parted
           with
           these
           ,
           we
           are
           very
           much
           beholden
           to
           them
           if
           they
           retain
           any
           of
           the
           rest
           ,
           there
           being
           nothing
           in
           Christianity
           considerable
           enough
           ,
           
           when
           the
           great
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Trinity
           ,
           Incarnation
           &c.
           are
           taken
           away
           ,
           to
           make
           it
           appear
           an
           Institution
           worthy
           of
           God
           ,
           or
           to
           challenge
           the
           Assent
           of
           any
           thinking
           and
           considering●
           Man
           But
           why
           do
           I
           talk
           of
           running
           into
           Heathenism
           ?
           I
           am
           afraid
           we
           are
           tending
           further
           .
           For
           as
           from
           a
           Socinian
           't
           is
           easie
           to
           commence
           a
           Deist
           ;
           so
           he
           that
           is
           once
           a
           Deist
           is
           in
           a
           hopeful
           way
           to
           be
           an
           Atheist
           whenever
           he
           please
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           I
           do
           not
           speak
           these
           things
           out
           of
           a
           Spirit
           of
           Peevishness
           and
           Dissatisfaction
           ,
           as
           some
           who
           being
           full
           of
           a
           Querulous
           Splenetick
           Humour
           ,
           and
           knowing
           not
           how
           better
           to
           dispose
           of
           it
           to
           their
           ease
           ,
           give
           it
           vent
           upon
           the
           Times
           ,
           of
           which
           they
           are
           always
           complaining
           right
           or
           wring
           .
           No
           ,
           the
           deplorable
           and
           dangerous
           state
           of
           Christianity
           ,
           and
           the
           too
           visible
           growth
           of
           Socinianism
           and
           Deism
           among
           us
           extort
           these
           Reflections
           from
           me
           ,
           and
           have
           given
           me
           many
           a
           troublesome
           and
           uneasie
           Thought
           in
           my
           private
           Retirements
           .
           For
           my
           Satisfaction
           under
           which
           ,
           my
           best
           Salvo
           has
           been
           to
           consider
           that
           God
           governs
           the
           World
           ,
           and
           that
           Jesus
           Christ
           ,
           who
           is
           the
           Head
           of
           his
           
           Church
           ,
           will
           preserve
           it
           from
           all
           the
           Powers
           of
           Earth
           ,
           and
           even
           from
           the
           Gates
           of
           Hell.
           And
           that
           tho'
           now
           he
           seems
           to
           be
           asleep
           in
           this
           Sacred
           Vessel
           while
           the
           Tempest
           rages
           ,
           and
           the
           Waves
           beat
           against
           it
           ,
           and
           almost
           cover
           it
           ,
           yet
           't
           is
           to
           be
           hoped
           he
           will
           awake
           ,
           and
           rebuke
           the
           Winds
           and
           the
           Sea
           ,
           and
           make
           all
           calm
           and
           quiet
           again
           .
           However
           in
           the
           mean
           time
           't
           is
           fit
           the
           Mariners
           should
           work
           ,
           and
           neglect
           the
           use
           of
           no
           means
           that
           are
           necessary
           to
           the
           safety
           of
           their
           Ship
           ;
           some
           by
           Writing
           ,
           others
           by
           private
           Discourse
           ,
           and
           all
           by
           Prayers
           and
           a
           good
           Life
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           But
           now
           whereas
           all
           Rational
           Method
           of
           Cure
           is
           founded
           upon
           the
           knowledge
           of
           the
           Cause
           of
           the
           Distemper
           ,
           he
           that
           would
           contribute
           any
           thing
           to
           the
           stopping
           this
           Contagion
           of
           
             Religious
             Scepticism
          
           ,
           that
           now
           reigns
           among
           us
           ,
           ought
           in
           the
           first
           place
           to
           consider
           the
           Reason
           of
           it
           ,
           what
           it
           is
           that
           makes
           Men
           so
           disposed
           to
           waver
           in
           their
           Religion
           ,
           and
           so
           ready
           to
           part
           with
           the
           great
           Articles
           and
           Mysteries
           of
           it
           .
           Now
           to
           this
           purpose
           I
           call
           to
           mind
           a
           very
           considerable
           Observation
           of
           Descartes
           concerning
           Atheism
           ,
           which
           I
           take
           
           to
           be
           equally
           applicable
           to
           Infidelity
           ,
           
           particularly
           to
           this
           of
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Faith
           :
           The
           Observation
           is
           this
           ,
           
             That
             those
             things
             which
             are
             commonly
             alledged
             by
             Atheists
             to
             impugne
             the
             Existence
             of
             God
             ,
             do
             all
             turn
             upon
             this
             ,
             that
             either
             we
             attribute
             some
             Humane
             Affection
             to
             God
             ,
             or
             else
             arrogate
             so
             great
             force
             and
             penetration
             to
             our
             own
             minds
             as
             to
             go
             about
             to
             comprehend
             and
             determine
             what
             God
             can
             ,
             and
             ought
             to
             do
             .
             So
             that
             if
             we
             would
             but
             carry
             about
             us
             this
             Thought
             ,
             that
             our
             Minds
             are
             to
             be
             consider'd
             as
             Finite
             ,
             but
             God
             as
             Incomprehensible
             and
             Infinite
             ,
             there
             would
             be
             no
             further
             difficulty
             in
             and
             of
             their
             Objections
             .
          
           Thus
           that
           very
           Acute
           and
           Judicious
           Person
           concerning
           the
           Grounds
           of
           Atheism
           .
           And
           in
           like
           manner
           I
           think
           it
           may
           be
           said
           of
           Infidelity
           as
           to
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           Christianity
           ,
           That
           the
           great
           Reason
           why
           so
           many
           that
           call
           themselves
           Christians
           do
           so
           obstinately
           cavil
           at
           them
           and
           dispute
           them
           ,
           is
           ,
           that
           either
           they
           think
           too
           meanly
           of
           God
           ,
           or
           too
           highly
           of
           themselves
           ;
           that
           either
           they
           ascribe
           something
           Humane
           to
           his
           Nature
           ,
           or
           something
           
           Divine
           to
           their
           own
           ;
           that
           either
           they
           set
           too
           narrow
           limits
           to
           the
           Divine
           Power
           and
           Greatness
           ,
           or
           carry
           out
           too
           far
           those
           of
           their
           own
           understandings
           ;
           in
           one
           word
           ,
           that
           either
           they
           Humani●e
           God
           ,
           or
           Deify
           themselves
           and
           their
           own
           Rational
           Abilities
           .
        
         
           7.
           
           And
           they
           confess
           in
           effect
           as
           much
           themselves
           .
           For
           the
           Reason
           that
           these
           Men
           commonly
           give
           out
           and
           pretend
           for
           their
           not
           allowing
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           any
           room
           in
           their
           Creed
           ,
           is
           ,
           that
           they
           are
           above
           the
           reach
           of
           their
           Understandings
           .
           They
           cannot
           comprehend
           them
           ,
           or
           conceive
           how
           they
           can
           be
           ,
           and
           therefore
           will
           not
           believe
           them
           ;
           having
           fix'd
           it
           as
           a
           Law
           in
           the
           general
           to
           believe
           nothing
           but
           what
           they
           can
           comprehend
           .
           But
           now
           where
           does
           the
           Ground
           of
           this
           Consequence
           rest
           at
           last
           ,
           or
           upon
           what
           Principle
           does
           it
           ultimately
           depend
           ?
           How
           comes
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           Point
           of
           Faith
           to
           be
           a
           presumption
           against
           it
           ;
           why
           is
           its
           being
           above
           their
           Reason
           in
           Argument
           that
           it
           is
           not
           true
           ?
           Why
           I
           say
           ,
           but
           only
           because
           in
           the
           first
           place
           they
           attribute
           so
           much
           to
           their
           
           Reason
           (
           at
           least
           by
           a
           Confuse
           Sentiment
           )
           as
           to
           presume
           it
           to
           be
           the
           Measure
           and
           Standard
           of
           all
           Truth
           ,
           and
           that
           nothing
           that
           is
           True
           can
           really
           be
           above
           it
           .
           Here
           I
           say
           the
           stress
           of
           the
           matter
           will
           rest
           at
           last
           .
           For
           should
           the
           Argument
           of
           these
           Men
           be
           reduced
           to
           a
           Syllogistical
           Form
           ,
           it
           must
           necessarily
           proceed
           thus
           ,
           
             
               Whatever
               is
               above
               our
               Reason
               is
               not
               to
               be
               believ'd
               as
               true
               ;
            
             
               But
               the
               Reputed
               Mysteries
               of
               Christianity
               are
               above
               our
               Reason
               :
            
             
               Therefore
               the
               Reputed
               Mysteries
               of
               Christianity
               are
               not
               to
               be
               believ'd
               as
               true
               .
            
          
        
         
           Now
           the
           only
           contestable
           Proposition
           in
           this
           Syllogism
           is
           the
           Major
           ,
           which
           can
           be
           prov'd
           by
           no
           other
           Principle
           than
           this
           ,
           That
           our
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           all
           Truth
           ,
           and
           whose
           Proof
           must
           be
           in
           this
           Form
           ,
           
             
               Whatever
               is
               above
               the
               Measure
               of
               all
               Truth
               is
               not
               to
               be
               believ'd
               as
               true
               ;
            
             
               But
               our
               Reason
               is
               the
               Measure
               of
               all
               Truth
               :
            
             
               Therefore
               whatever
               is
               above
               our
               Reason
               is
               not
               to
               be
               believ'd
               as
               true
               .
            
          
        
         
         
           By
           this
           Analysis
           of
           their
           Argument
           into
           its
           Principle
           it
           is
           plain
           ,
           that
           this
           their
           Reason
           of
           disbelieving
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           ,
           
             viz.
             Because
             they
             are
             above
             their
             Reason
             ,
          
           does
           at
           last
           resolve
           into
           this
           ,
           
             That
             their
             Reason
             is
             the
             Measure
             of
             all
             Truth
             ,
          
           and
           that
           they
           can
           comprehend
           all
           things
           .
           For
           otherwise
           how
           should
           their
           not
           being
           able
           to
           comprehend
           a
           thing
           ,
           be
           an
           Argument
           that
           it
           is
           not
           true
           ?
           This
           I
           presume
           is
           a
           Principle
           our
           Adversaries
           would
           be
           loth
           to
           own
           ,
           and
           indeed
           with
           good
           Reason
           ,
           it
           being
           the
           most
           extravagantly
           absurd
           and
           self-arrowgating
           one
           that
           can
           possibly
           enter
           the
           Thought
           ,
           or
           proceed
           from
           the
           Mouth
           of
           a
           Man.
           And
           accordinly
           I
           do
           not
           know
           any
           Socinian
           that
           had
           the
           immodesty
           in
           terms
           openly
           to
           assert
           it
           .
           But
           this
           is
           what
           they
           must
           come
           to
           if
           they
           will
           speak
           out
           ,
           and
           what
           in
           the
           mean
           time
           they
           do
           vertually
           and
           implicitly
           say
           .
           So
           then
           their
           procedure
           in
           short
           seems
           to
           be
           this
           ,
           They
           first
           set
           their
           Reason
           above
           all
           things
           ,
           and
           then
           will
           believe
           nothing
           that
           is
           above
           their
           Reason
           .
           And
           if
           this
           be
           not
           in
           an
           unreasonable
           measure
           to
           
           exalt
           that
           Faculty
           ,
           to
           carry
           it
           beyond
           its
           due
           bounds
           ,
           nay
           to
           set
           it
           no
           bounds
           at
           all
           ,
           but
           strictly
           to
           make
           it
           Infinite
           ,
           and
           so
           to
           ascribe
           to
           it
           no
           less
           than
           a
           Divine
           Perfection
           ,
           I
           must
           profess
           my
           despair
           ever
           to
           know
           what
           is
           .
        
         
           8.
           
           To
           be
           the
           adequate
           Measure
           of
           all
           Truth
           ,
           so
           as
           to
           have
           no
           one
           Truth
           above
           the
           comprehension
           of
           it
           ,
           is
           as
           much
           as
           can
           be
           said
           of
           the
           Reason
           and
           Understanding
           of
           God
           himself
           .
           His
           Infinite
           Understanding
           is
           indeed
           truly
           and
           necessarily
           so
           ,
           and
           whatever
           is
           above
           his
           Reason
           is
           for
           that
           very
           reason
           most
           certainly
           not
           true
           .
           Because
           he
           essentially
           comprehending
           all
           that
           truly
           is
           ,
           it
           must
           necessarily
           follow
           that
           whatever
           he
           does
           not
           comprehend
           must
           be
           nothing
           .
           But
           to
           say
           the
           same
           of
           the
           Reason
           of
           a
           Man
           ,
           or
           of
           the
           Intelligence
           of
           the
           most
           illuminated
           Angel
           ,
           would
           be
           to
           confound
           all
           distinction
           between
           Finite
           and
           Infinite
           ,
           God
           and
           Creature
           ,
           and
           to
           advance
           the
           most
           absurd
           ,
           and
           withal
           the
           most
           impious
           and
           blaspemous
           Proposition
           imaginable
           .
           And
           yet
           this
           is
           the
           general
           Principle
           upon
           which
           the
           
           Body
           of
           Socinianism
           turns
           ,
           and
           by
           which
           it
           would
           be
           most
           directly
           and
           most
           compendiously
           confuted
           .
        
         
           9.
           
           I
           shall
           therefore
           take
           hold
           of
           it
           by
           this
           handle
           :
           And
           since
           that
           which
           is
           a
           Principle
           one
           way
           ,
           as
           we
           argue
           forwards
           from
           the
           Cause
           to
           the
           Effect
           ,
           may
           be
           considered
           as
           a
           Consequence
           another
           way
           ,
           as
           we
           argue
           backwards
           from
           the
           Effect
           to
           the
           Cause
           ;
           and
           since
           there
           are
           these
           two
           general
           ways
           of
           Reasoning
           ,
           I
           shall
           therefore
           proceed
           both
           these
           wayes
           in
           the
           management
           of
           the
           present
           Argument
           ,
           which
           accordingly
           shall
           turn
           chiefly
           upon
           this
           double
           Hinge
           .
           First
           ,
           I
           shall
           overturn
           their
           Principle
           (
           I
           call
           it
           theirs
           ,
           because
           't
           is
           what
           they
           must
           at
           last
           necessarily
           come
           to
           )
           by
           shewing
           that
           Humane
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           or
           that
           there
           may
           be
           some
           things
           True
           which
           are
           above
           the
           comprehension
           of
           Humane
           Reason
           ,
           and
           that
           therefore
           a
           things
           being
           above
           Reason
           is
           no
           concluding
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           True.
           Secondly
           ,
           I
           shall
           argue
           
             ab
             Absurdo
          
           ,
           by
           shewing
           that
           if
           a
           things
           being
           above
           Reason
           were
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           True
           ,
           
           then
           it
           will
           follow
           that
           Humane
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           all
           Truth
           ,
           which
           if
           I
           bring
           them
           to
           ,
           I
           shall
           think
           them
           reduced
           to
           a
           sufficient
           Absurdity
           .
           These
           I
           intend
           as
           the
           two
           great
           Pillars
           of
           this
           Work
           ,
           which
           like
           the
           sides
           of
           an
           Arch
           will
           strengthen
           and
           bear
           up
           one
           another
           ,
           that
           which
           is
           liable
           to
           exception
           in
           the
           former
           part
           being
           made
           out
           in
           the
           latter
           ,
           and
           that
           which
           is
           liable
           to
           exception
           in
           the
           latter
           being
           made
           out
           in
           the
           former
           .
           For
           if
           it
           be
           questioned
           in
           the
           First
           Part
           whether
           this
           be
           indeed
           their
           Principle
           ,
           
             That
             Humane
             Reason
             is
             the
             Measure
             of
             all
             Truth
             ,
          
           that
           will
           appear
           in
           the
           Second
           ,
           wherein
           it
           will
           be
           shewn
           to
           follow
           from
           their
           supposition
           .
           And
           if
           it
           be
           question'd
           in
           the
           Second
           Part
           ,
           whether
           this
           their
           Principle
           be
           absurd
           ,
           and
           so
           whether
           they
           are
           reduced
           to
           an
           Absurdity
           ,
           that
           will
           appear
           in
           the
           First
           ,
           wherein
           this
           Principle
           is
           shewn
           to
           be
           False
           .
        
         
           10.
           
           And
           when
           by
           this
           Method
           I
           have
           shewn
           in
           general
           both
           
             a
             Priori
          
           and
           
             a
             Posteriori
          
           ,
           that
           a
           things
           being
           above
           Humane
           Reason
           is
           of
           it self
           no
           sufficient
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           
           true
           ,
           I
           shall
           then
           make
           application
           of
           all
           to
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           ,
           which
           I
           shall
           shew
           may
           be
           true
           notwithstanding
           their
           being
           above
           Humane
           Reason
           ,
           and
           so
           that
           their
           being
           above
           it
           is
           no
           just
           ground
           to
           conclude
           them
           False
           ,
           and
           that
           therefore
           they
           ought
           to
           be
           believed
           notwithstanding
           their
           being
           above
           our
           Reason
           ,
           which
           in
           this
           case
           ought
           to
           be
           no
           prejudice
           to
           our
           Faith
           ,
           supposing
           them
           otherwise
           sufficiently
           revealed
           .
           Which
           whether
           they
           are
           or
           no
           I
           shall
           not
           discuss
           ,
           my
           design
           at
           present
           not
           being
           to
           enter
           into
           the
           detail
           of
           the
           Controversie
           ,
           to
           prove
           the
           particular
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Faith
           ,
           such
           as
           the
           Trinity
           ,
           Incarnation
           ,
           or
           the
           like
           ,
           but
           only
           to
           lay
           a
           general
           ground
           and
           foundation
           for
           the
           belief
           of
           those
           Articles
           ,
           and
           to
           destroy
           that
           upon
           which
           the
           Body
           of
           Socinianism
           stands
           .
           The
           Great
           and
           General
           Principle
           of
           which
           I
           take
           to
           be
           ,
           That
           nothing
           is
           to
           be
           believ'd
           as
           reveal'd
           by
           God
           ,
           that
           is
           above
           the
           comprehension
           of
           Humane
           Reason
           ;
           or
           ,
           That
           a
           Man
           is
           to
           believe
           nothing
           but
           what
           he
           can
           comprehend
           .
           Which
           Principle
           I
           
           hope
           by
           the
           help
           of
           God
           ,
           with
           the
           utmost
           Evidence
           and
           Demonstration
           to
           overthrow
           .
           And
           because
           in
           order
           to
           this
           I
           must
           first
           give
           a
           direct
           and
           profess'd
           Account
           of
           Reason
           and
           Faith
           ,
           besides
           what
           will
           be
           said
           Incidentally
           and
           Occasionally
           of
           them
           in
           the
           Course
           of
           the
           Treatise
           ,
           whose
           main
           design
           is
           so
           to
           adjust
           and
           accommodate
           the
           Natures
           and
           Properties
           of
           these
           two
           things
           together
           ,
           as
           to
           shew
           the
           Reasonableness
           of
           believing
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           ;
           thereupon
           it
           is
           that
           I
           intitle
           the
           whole
           ,
           
             An
             Account
             of
             Reason
             and
             Faith
             ,
             in
             relation
             to
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             Christianity
             .
          
           This
           is
           the
           Gross
           of
           what
           I
           design
           ,
           the
           Particulars
           of
           which
           will
           be
           more
           distinctly
           laid
           down
           and
           accounted
           for
           in
           the
           following
           Chapters
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           I.
           Of
           Reason
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           AMbiguity
           of
           Words
           being
           one
           great
           occasion
           of
           Confusion
           of
           Thoughts
           ;
           whoever
           will
           Discourse
           clearly
           and
           distinctly
           of
           any
           Subject
           ,
           must
           in
           the
           first
           place
           fix
           and
           settle
           the
           signification
           of
           his
           Terms
           ,
           in
           case
           they
           are
           Ambiguous
           ;
           that
           is
           ,
           if
           one
           and
           the
           same
           Term
           be
           applyed
           to
           different
           Ideas
           .
           In
           this
           case
           ,
           Definition
           of
           the
           Name
           is
           to
           go
           before
           the
           Definition
           of
           the
           Thing
           ;
           between
           which
           two
           I
           conceive
           the
           difference
           to
           be
           this
           ,
           That
           in
           a
           Nominal
           Definition
           the
           word
           is
           only
           determin'd
           to
           such
           a
           certain
           Idea
           ,
           whereas
           in
           a
           Real
           one
           ,
           the
           Idea
           it self
           is
           opened
           and
           explained
           by
           some
           other
           Ideas
           that
           are
           supposed
           to
           be
           contain'd
           and
           involv'd
           in
           it
           .
           Upon
           which
           account
           it
           is
           that
           Nominal
           Definitions
           are
           Arbitrary
           ,
           and
           therefore
           incontestable
           ,
           and
           therefore
           may
           
           be
           used
           as
           Principles
           in
           Discourse
           ,
           as
           they
           are
           in
           Geometry
           ;
           whereas
           Real
           Definitions
           are
           not
           Arbitrary
           ,
           but
           must
           be
           conform'd
           to
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           ,
           and
           so
           are
           not
           to
           be
           taken
           for
           Principles
           ,
           whose
           Truth
           is
           to
           be
           supposed
           ,
           but
           for
           disputable
           Propositions
           ,
           whose
           Truth
           is
           to
           be
           proved
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           Reason
           therefore
           being
           an
           ambiguous
           word
           ,
           and
           of
           various
           acceptation
           ,
           before
           I
           proceed
           to
           give
           an
           account
           of
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           it
           will
           be
           necessary
           that
           I
           define
           the
           Name
           ;
           which
           will
           also
           be
           the
           better
           defined
           ,
           if
           it
           be
           first
           distinguisht
           .
           Now
           all
           Distinction
           being
           a
           sort
           of
           Division
           ,
           in
           which
           ,
           according
           to
           the
           Rules
           of
           Logick
           ,
           the
           Distribution
           ought
           to
           be
           into
           the
           most
           general
           ,
           and
           most
           immediate
           Members
           ,
           I
           shall
           accordingly
           distinguish
           of
           the
           several
           meanings
           of
           this
           word
           ,
           Reason
           ,
           by
           the
           same
           measure
           as
           I
           would
           divide
           any
           whole
           into
           its
           parts
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           I
           consider
           therefore
           that
           the
           most
           general
           distribution
           of
           Reason
           is
           into
           that
           of
           the
           Object
           and
           that
           of
           the
           Subject
           ;
           or
           ,
           to
           word
           it
           more
           Intelligibly
           ,
           though
           perhaps
           not
           altogether
           so
           Scholastically
           ,
           into
           that
           
           of
           the
           Thing
           ,
           and
           that
           of
           the
           Understanding
           .
           Reason
           objective
           ,
           or
           of
           the
           Thing
           ,
           is
           again
           very
           various
           :
           Sometimes
           it
           is
           taken
           for
           Truth
           ,
           and
           that
           both
           for
           Truth
           of
           the
           Thing
           ,
           namely
           the
           Essential
           relations
           that
           are
           between
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           for
           Truth
           of
           the
           Proposition
           which
           is
           its
           conformity
           to
           those
           Ideal
           Relations
           .
           Thus
           it
           is
           taken
           the
           first
           way
           for
           the
           Ideal
           Relations
           themselves
           ,
           when
           we
           inquire
           whether
           the
           Reasons
           of
           Good
           and
           Evil
           are
           
             ab
             Eterno
          
           ,
           meaning
           by
           Reasons
           the
           Essential
           Relations
           or
           Differences
           .
           Thus
           again
           it
           is
           taken
           the
           second
           way
           ,
           for
           the
           agreement
           or
           conformity
           of
           a
           Proposition
           with
           those
           Essential
           Relations
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           ,
           
             This
             is
             Sense
             and
             Reason
          
           ;
           meaning
           that
           the
           Proposition
           is
           true
           ,
           and
           conformable
           to
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           .
           Sometimes
           again
           it
           is
           taken
           for
           the
           Medium
           ,
           Argument
           ,
           or
           Principle
           whereby
           as
           Truth
           is
           proved
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           ,
           
             Do
             you
             prove
             this
             by
             Reason
             or
             by
             Authority
             ?
          
           Sometimes
           again
           for
           the
           Rules
           and
           Measures
           of
           Reasoning
           ;
           as
           suppose
           I
           should
           say
           ,
           
             That
             Reason
             is
             the
             ●ittest
             Study
             for
             a
             Rational
             Creature
             ,
          
           I
           should
           be
           supposed
           
           to
           mean
           those
           Rules
           and
           Measures
           whereby
           we
           ought
           to
           reason
           ,
           and
           so
           to
           intend
           a
           commendation
           of
           Logick
           .
           Sometimes
           again
           it
           is
           taken
           for
           Moderation
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           ,
           
             There
             is
             Reason
             in
             all
             things
             .
          
           Sometimes
           for
           Right
           ,
           Equity
           or
           Justice
           ;
           the
           observation
           of
           which
           is
           commonly
           call'd
           .
           
             Doing
             a
             Man
             Reason
          
           .
           It
           is
           also
           taken
           for
           the
           End
           or
           Motive
           of
           an
           Action
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           ,
           
             For
             what
             Reason
             do
             you
             this
             or
             that
          
           ;
           in
           which
           sense
           it
           is
           used
           by
           the
           Poet
           ;
           
             —
             stat
             pro
             Ratione
             voluntas
             .
          
        
         
           4.
           
           Come
           we
           now
           to
           the
           Consideration
           of
           Reason
           ,
           as
           't
           is
           taken
           subjectively
           ,
           the
           other
           general
           part
           of
           its
           distinction
           ,
           in
           which
           also
           there
           is
           some
           variety
           of
           Acceptation
           .
           For
           it
           is
           sometimes
           taken
           for
           the
           Act
           ,
           sometimes
           for
           the
           Habit
           ,
           and
           sometimes
           for
           the
           Natural
           Power
           or
           Faculty
           of
           Reasoning
           .
           For
           the
           Act
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           of
           a
           Man
           asleep
           ,
           that
           
             he
             is
             deprived
             of
             his
             Reason
             .
          
           For
           the
           Habit
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           of
           a
           Man
           ,
           that
           
             he
             has
             lost
             his
             Reason
          
           ,
           when
           his
           Intellectuals
           are
           mightily
           
           disorder'd
           and
           impair'd
           by
           a
           Disease
           .
           For
           the
           Natural
           Power
           or
           Faculty
           of
           Reasoning
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           ▪
           
             That
             Man
             is
             a
             Creature
             indued
             with
             Reason
             .
          
           Which
           being
           a
           Proposition
           of
           Universal
           Truth
           ,
           and
           that
           proceeds
           of
           Man
           as
           Man
           ,
           must
           necessarily
           be
           verified
           of
           every
           Man
           ,
           and
           consequently
           must
           not
           be
           meant
           of
           the
           Act
           or
           Habit
           of
           Reason
           ,
           (
           for
           these
           are
           not
           at
           all
           times
           in
           every
           Man
           )
           but
           of
           the
           Natural
           Power
           or
           Faculty
           of
           it
           ,
           which
           is
           not
           lyable
           to
           be
           suspended
           as
           the
           Act
           ,
           nor
           lost
           as
           the
           Habit
           ,
           but
           is
           Essential
           to
           the
           Nature
           of
           Man
           ,
           that
           which
           constitutes
           him
           what
           he
           is
           ,
           and
           distinguishes
           him
           from
           other
           Creatures
           ,
           and
           consequently
           is
           inseparable
           from
           him
           ,
           whether
           asleep
           or
           awake
           ,
           whether
           sick
           or
           well
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           Reason
           thus
           consider'd
           as
           it
           stands
           for
           a
           Power
           or
           Faculty
           in
           Human
           Nature
           ,
           may
           be
           taken
           again
           either
           largely
           or
           strictly
           .
           Largely
           ,
           for
           the
           Power
           of
           Thinking
           or
           Perception
           in
           general
           ,
           whereby
           a
           Man
           is
           capable
           of
           knowing
           or
           understanding
           any
           Truth
           ,
           let
           it
           be
           by
           what
           means
           ,
           or
           in
           what
           order
           or
           method
           
           soever
           .
           Strictly
           ,
           for
           the
           same
           Power
           proceeding
           after
           a
           certain
           special
           manner
           ,
           and
           according
           to
           a
           peculiar
           order
           and
           method
           ,
           namely
           ,
           from
           the
           knowledge
           of
           one
           thing
           to
           that
           of
           another
           ,
           or
           to
           the
           knowledge
           of
           what
           is
           ,
           as
           yet
           ,
           obscure
           and
           unknown
           ,
           by
           the
           knowledge
           of
           what
           is
           more
           clear
           and
           better
           known
           ;
           concerning
           which
           a
           fuller
           account
           by
           and
           by
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           After
           having
           thus
           distinguisht
           ,
           with
           what
           exactness
           of
           order
           I
           could
           ,
           the
           several
           Acceptations
           of
           the
           word
           Reason
           ,
           I
           shall
           in
           the
           next
           place
           define
           in
           which
           of
           these
           Senses
           I
           now
           use
           it
           .
           By
           Reason
           then
           in
           this
           place
           ,
           I
           intend
           not
           Reason
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           but
           that
           of
           the
           Subject
           ;
           and
           that
           not
           as
           to
           the
           Act
           or
           Habit
           ,
           but
           as
           to
           the
           Natural
           Power
           or
           Faculty
           of
           Reasoning
           .
           And
           that
           again
           not
           as
           it
           is
           taken
           strictly
           ,
           as
           it
           uses
           a
           certain
           particular
           process
           in
           its
           operation
           ,
           but
           as
           it
           is
           taken
           more
           at
           large
           for
           the
           power
           of
           perceiving
           or
           knowing
           in
           general
           .
           According
           to
           which
           Sense
           Reason
           is
           here
           the
           same
           with
           Vnderstanding
           .
           And
           so
           it
           is
           often
           used
           ;
           as
           when
           we
           say
           ,
           
             The
             Reason
             of
             a
             Man
             teaches
             him
             this
             or
             that
          
           ;
           
           meaning
           his
           Understanding
           at
           large
           ,
           or
           the
           general
           Power
           whereby
           he
           understands
           .
           For
           if
           Science
           ,
           which
           strictly
           taken
           is
           that
           particular
           kind
           of
           Knowledge
           which
           is
           acquired
           by
           Demonstration
           ,
           be
           yet
           often
           used
           more
           largely
           for
           Knowledge
           in
           general
           ,
           why
           may
           not
           Reason
           ,
           the
           great
           Principle
           and
           Faculty
           of
           Science
           ,
           which
           strictly
           taken
           signifies
           a
           Power
           of
           Knowing
           by
           such
           a
           certain
           way
           and
           in
           such
           a
           certain
           manner
           of
           proceeding
           ,
           be
           taken
           as
           well
           in
           a
           greater
           latitude
           ,
           for
           the
           Power
           of
           Knowing
           or
           Understanding
           in
           general
           ?
        
         
           7.
           
           And
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           Subject
           and
           Question
           now
           under
           Consideration
           requires
           that
           it
           should
           be
           thus
           used
           here
           .
           For
           when
           't
           is
           inquired
           whether
           there
           be
           any
           thing
           in
           Religion
           above
           Reason
           ,
           the
           meaning
           certainly
           can
           be
           no
           other
           than
           whether
           there
           be
           any
           thing
           which
           surpasses
           the
           Power
           and
           Capacity
           of
           a
           Mans
           Understanding
           to
           comprehend
           or
           account
           for
           ?
           And
           he
           that
           says
           there
           is
           nothing
           in
           Religion
           above
           Reason
           ,
           is
           supposed
           to
           mean
           ,
           that
           there
           is
           nothing
           in
           it
           beyond
           the
           comprehension
           of
           a
           Mans
           Natural
           Understanding
           ,
           
           nothing
           but
           what
           he
           can
           profound
           and
           fathom
           .
           And
           so
           also
           he
           that
           says
           ,
           that
           there
           are
           Mysteries
           in
           Christianity
           ,
           or
           things
           above
           our
           Reason
           ,
           must
           be
           presumed
           to
           mean
           ,
           that
           there
           are
           Reveal'd
           Truths
           that
           so
           far
           exceed
           the
           measure
           of
           our
           Intellectual
           Faculties
           and
           are
           of
           a
           size
           so
           disproportionate
           to
           our
           Minds
           ,
           that
           with
           all
           the
           force
           and
           penetration
           of
           Spirit
           ,
           and
           the
           utmost
           application
           of
           Thought
           ,
           we
           cannot
           possibly
           comprehend
           them
           ,
           be
           our
           method
           of
           proceeding
           what
           it
           will.
           I
           do
           not
           intend
           by
           this
           to
           state
           the
           Question
           (
           which
           shall
           be
           done
           more
           fully
           in
           its
           due
           place
           )
           but
           only
           to
           give
           an
           account
           of
           one
           of
           its
           Terms
           ,
           and
           to
           shew
           that
           by
           Reason
           I
           both
           do
           and
           should
           here
           mean
           ,
           A
           Mans
           Natural
           Power
           of
           Knowing
           or
           Understanding
           in
           general
           .
           In
           which
           use
           of
           the
           word
           ,
           't
           is
           no
           〈◊〉
           Authority
           to
           me
           that
           the
           Excellent
           and
           most
           Accurate
           Author
           of
           
             L'
             Art
             de
             Penser
          
           ,
           defines
           Log●ck
           to
           be
           an
           Art
           of
           well
           conducting
           ones
           Reason
           in
           the
           knowledge
           of
           things
           :
           Where
           by
           Reason
           't
           is
           plain
           he
           must
           mean
           the
           same
           as
           Vnderstanding
           ,
        
         
         
           8.
           
           What
           this
           Power
           or
           Principle
           of
           Understanding
           is
           in
           its
           self
           ,
           or
           in
           its
           own
           Nature
           and
           Essence
           ,
           I
           do
           not
           pretend
           to
           know
           ,
           as
           not
           having
           any
           clear
           Idea
           of
           my
           own
           Soul
           ,
           and
           indeed
           as
           not
           knowing
           my self
           at
           all
           by
           Idea
           ,
           but
           only
           by
           a
           confuse
           Sentiment
           of
           internal
           Consciousness
           .
           And
           therefore
           I
           shall
           not
           go
           about
           to
           examine
           what
           it
           is
           .
           For
           the
           same
           reason
           also
           I
           shall
           not
           set
           my self
           to
           consider
           whether
           the
           Understanding
           be
           any
           Power
           or
           Faculty
           really
           distinct
           from
           the
           Soul
           ,
           or
           only
           the
           Soul
           it self
           acting
           after
           a
           certain
           manner
           ,
           this
           being
           almost
           as
           obscure
           as
           the
           other
           ;
           and
           I
           care
           not
           to
           employ
           either
           my
           own
           Thoughts
           ,
           or
           my
           Readers
           ,
           upon
           things
           whereof
           I
           have
           not
           any
           clear
           Conception
           .
           All
           that
           I
           shall
           therefore
           further
           treat
           of
           concerning
           the
           Understanding
           (
           for
           so
           I
           now
           call
           our
           Reason
           )
           shall
           be
           with
           respect
           to
           its
           Operations
           ,
           by
           which
           the
           Nature
           of
           it
           is
           best
           known
           ,
           and
           whereof
           we
           are
           not
           only
           Conscious
           by
           way
           of
           Sentiment
           ,
           but
           have
           also
           ,
           or
           at
           least
           by
           self-reflexion
           may
           have
           ,
           some
           Notion
           and
           Conception
           by
           way
           of
           Idea
           .
        
         
         
           9.
           
           Now
           these
           are
           ordinarily
           supposed
           to
           be
           three
           ,
           
             Apprehension
             ,
             Iudgment
          
           and
           Discourse
           :
           By
           Apprehension
           ,
           meaning
           the
           simple
           view
           or
           perception
           of
           a
           thing
           ;
           by
           Iudgment
           ,
           the
           joining
           or
           separating
           of
           Ideas
           by
           Affirmation
           or
           Negation
           ;
           by
           Discourse
           ,
           the
           collecting
           of
           one
           thing
           from
           another
           .
           And
           upon
           this
           threefold
           ground
           our
           Systems
           of
           Logick
           have
           for
           a
           great
           while
           proceeded
           with
           great
           Agreement
           .
           But
           as
           Authentick
           as
           Time
           and
           Consent
           have
           made
           this
           Division
           ,
           I
           cannot
           think
           it
           right
           ,
           when
           I
           compare
           it
           with
           what
           by
           self-reflexion
           I
           find
           to
           pass
           within
           my
           own
           Mind
           .
           For
           supposing
           it
           were
           true
           as
           to
           the
           matter
           of
           it
           ;
           that
           is
           ,
           I
           mean
           ,
           that
           Judgment
           and
           Discourse
           did
           really
           belong
           to
           the
           Understanding
           (
           which
           yet
           the
           Philosophers
           of
           the
           Carcesian
           way
           will
           by
           no
           means
           allow
           )
           yet
           the
           Form
           of
           it
           must
           needs
           be
           very
           unartificial
           and
           inaccurate
           .
           For
           Truth
           being
           the
           general
           Object
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           and
           there
           being
           nothing
           in
           Truth
           but
           Ideas
           and
           the
           Relation
           that
           is
           between
           them
           ,
           't
           is
           impossible
           there
           should
           be
           any
           more
           operations
           of
           the
           
           Understanding
           than
           Perception
           and
           Iudgment
           ;
           Perception
           as
           to
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           and
           Judgment
           as
           to
           their
           Relation
           .
           Which
           Judgment
           't
           is
           true
           may
           be
           either
           Immediate
           or
           Mediate
           ;
           Immediate
           when
           the
           Relations
           of
           Ideas
           are
           judg'd
           of
           by
           the
           very
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           or
           Mediate
           when
           they
           are
           judg'd
           of
           by
           the
           help
           and
           means
           of
           some
           other
           Idea
           ,
           but
           then
           all
           this
           is
           but
           Judgment
           still
           ,
           though
           in
           two
           different
           ways
           ,
           the
           difference
           between
           them
           being
           the
           same
           as
           between
           judging
           of
           a
           thing
           under
           the
           Formality
           of
           a
           Proposition
           ,
           and
           judging
           of
           the
           same
           thing
           under
           the
           Formality
           of
           a
           Conclusion
           .
           These
           indeed
           are
           different
           ways
           of
           judging
           ,
           but
           still
           they
           are
           both
           but
           Judgments
           ,
           and
           one
           as
           much
           as
           the
           other
           .
           So
           that
           in
           reality
           that
           which
           these
           Men
           call
           Discourse
           is
           but
           a
           species
           of
           Iudgment
           ;
           and
           if
           for
           that
           reason
           they
           will
           consider
           it
           as
           distinct
           from
           Judgment
           and
           make
           it
           a
           third
           Operation
           ,
           they
           might
           as
           well
           have
           put
           in
           the
           other
           species
           too
           (
           Judgment
           immediate
           )
           and
           so
           made
           a
           fourth
           .
           But
           then
           this
           is
           against
           the
           great
           Fundamental
           Law
           of
           Division
           which
           requires
           
           that
           one
           of
           the
           Members
           ought
           not
           to
           be
           so
           included
           in
           the
           other
           ,
           as
           that
           the
           other
           may
           be
           affirm'd
           of
           it
           .
           Which
           is
           plainly
           the
           Case
           here
           ,
           this
           being
           such
           a
           kind
           of
           Division
           ,
           as
           if
           one
           should
           divide
           a
           Living
           Creature
           into
           a
           Plant
           ,
           an
           Animal
           and
           a
           Man
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           Discourse
           is
           as
           much
           a
           Species
           of
           Judgment
           as
           Man
           is
           of
           Animal
           .
           And
           herein
           (
           though
           the
           matter
           be
           so
           clear
           that
           I
           need
           it
           not
           )
           yet
           I
           happen
           to
           have
           the
           Authority
           of
           a
           considerable
           Philosopher
           
           on
           my
           side
           ,
           Monsieur
           Derodon
           ,
           who
           in
           these
           few
           words
           expresses
           his
           Sense
           full
           and
           home
           to
           this
           purpose
           ;
           
             The
             third
             Operation
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
          
           says
           he
           ,
           
             is
             commonly
             call'd
             Discourse
             ,
             but
             is
             properly
             the
             Iudgment
             of
             the
             Consequent
             ,
             as
             inferr'd
             from
             the
             Iudgment
             of
             the
             Antecedent
             .
          
        
         
           10.
           
           By
           this
           it
           is
           evident
           ,
           that
           supposing
           the
           matter
           of
           this
           Division
           never
           so
           true
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           that
           Judgment
           and
           Discourse
           do
           appertain
           to
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           yet
           the
           Form
           of
           it
           is
           wrong
           ;
           Discourse
           ,
           which
           is
           here
           made
           a
           third
           member
           of
           the
           Division
           ,
           being
           contain'd
           under
           Judgment
           ,
           
           which
           is
           the
           second
           ,
           as
           the
           Species
           of
           it
           .
           But
           neither
           is
           the
           matter
           of
           it
           true
           .
           For
           Judgment
           and
           Discourse
           ,
           or
           to
           speak
           more
           accurately
           ,
           Iudgment
           ,
           whether
           immediate
           or
           mediate
           ,
           does
           indeed
           not
           belong
           to
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           but
           (
           as
           will
           by
           and
           by
           appear
           )
           to
           the
           Will.
           There
           is
           but
           one
           general
           Operation
           that
           belongs
           to
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           and
           that
           is
           Perception
           .
           For
           as
           I
           said
           before
           ,
           Truth
           being
           the
           general
           Object
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           and
           there
           being
           nothing
           in
           Truth
           but
           Ideas
           and
           their
           Relations
           ,
           all
           that
           the
           Understanding
           can
           here
           have
           to
           do
           will
           be
           only
           to
           perceive
           these
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           the
           several
           Relations
           that
           are
           between
           them
           .
           For
           when
           this
           is
           done
           ,
           then
           is
           a
           thing
           sufficiently
           understood
           ,
           to
           understand
           a
           thing
           being
           no
           more
           than
           to
           perceive
           its
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           how
           they
           stand
           related
           to
           one
           another
           .
           Here
           is
           the
           whole
           compass
           and
           full
           extent
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           and
           all
           that
           we
           can
           possibly
           conceive
           by
           it
           ;
           and
           he
           that
           perceives
           Ideas
           and
           their
           Relations
           understands
           as
           much
           of
           them
           as
           is
           to
           be
           understood
           .
           Whereby
           it
           is
           
           evident
           ,
           that
           Perception
           is
           the
           only
           operation
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           and
           that
           it
           can
           have
           no
           other
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           there
           is
           variety
           in
           this
           Perception
           ,
           it
           being
           either
           Simple
           or
           Complex
           ;
           Simple
           of
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           and
           Complex
           of
           their
           Relations
           ;
           which
           latter
           again
           is
           either
           Immediate
           or
           Mediate
           ,
           (
           as
           was
           said
           before
           of
           Iudgment
           )
           but
           still
           't
           is
           all
           but
           Perception
           ,
           though
           differently
           modified
           ;
           which
           therefore
           I
           conclude
           to
           be
           the
           only
           Operation
           that
           properly
           belongs
           to
           the
           Understanding
           .
        
         
           11.
           
           But
           now
           if
           all
           that
           of
           right
           belongs
           to
           the
           Understanding
           be
           Perception
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           most
           certain
           that
           Judgment
           cannot
           belong
           to
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           Judgment
           is
           not
           Perception
           .
           For
           we
           are
           said
           to
           judge
           as
           we
           perceive
           ,
           and
           some
           are
           so
           much
           in
           haste
           that
           they
           will
           judge
           before
           they
           perceive
           ,
           which
           plainly
           shews
           them
           to
           be
           two
           different
           things
           .
           And
           that
           they
           are
           so
           this
           one
           Argument
           well
           considered
           is
           a
           Demonstration
           ,
           that
           Judgment
           is
           a
           Fallible
           thing
           ,
           that
           may
           be
           true
           or
           false
           as
           it
           happens
           ;
           whereas
           Perception
           
           is
           always
           true
           ,
           it
           being
           a
           Contradiction
           that
           it
           should
           be
           otherwise
           :
           For
           what
           a
           Man
           does
           not
           truly
           perceive
           he
           does
           not
           perceive
           at
           all
           .
           I
           conclude
           therefore
           that
           Judgment
           is
           not
           Perception
           ;
           and
           since
           Perception
           is
           (
           as
           has
           been
           shewn
           )
           the
           only
           opera●ion
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           I
           conclude
           again
           that
           Judgment
           does
           not
           belong
           to
           the
           Understanding
           .
           It
           must
           therefore
           belong
           to
           the
           Will
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           proper
           seat
           both
           of
           Judgment
           and
           of
           Errour
           too
           .
           And
           it
           is
           nothing
           else
           but
           the
           Will
           's
           consenting
           to
           and
           acquiescing
           in
           the
           Representations
           that
           are
           made
           by
           the
           Understanding
           .
           Which
           agrees
           well
           with
           those
           weighty
           and
           very
           fruitful
           Maxims
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Will
             is
             the
             Subject
             and
             Principle
             of
             all
             Errour
             as
             well
             as
             Sin
             (
             which
             indeed
             ought
             to
             be
             voluntary
             to
             make
             it
             culpable
             )
             .
             That
             't
             is
             in
             our
             Power
             to
             avoid
             Errour
             by
             suspending
             our
             Judgment
             till
             the
             Evidence
             be
             clear
             ,
             though
             't
             is
             not
             in
             our
             Power
             to
             avoid
             Ignorance
             or
             Non-Perception
             of
             many
             things
             by
             reason
             of
             the
             limitedness
             of
             our
             Faculties
             .
             That
             the
             fault
             
             of
             those
             that
             err
             is
             ,
             that
             their
             Wills
             run
             before
             their
             Understandings
             ,
             that
             they
             judge
             and
             pronounce
             before
             they
             perceive
             ,
             or
             of
             things
             whereof
             they
             have
             really
             no
             Perception
             ,
             which
             indeed
             is
             a
             great
             fault
             ,
             and
             the
             cause
             of
             all
             our
             disorders
             .
             That
             we
             are
             accountable
             for
             our
             Judgments
             as
             well
             as
             for
             any
             of
             our
             other
             Actions
             .
             And
             lastly
             ,
             That
             God
             is
             not
             the
             Cause
             of
             any
             of
             our
             Errours
             ,
             which
             with
             respect
             to
             him
             are
             only
             Negations
             ,
             occasioned
             only
             by
             his
             not
             having
             given
             us
             larger
             Capacities
             ;
             but
             with
             respect
             to
             our selves
             are
             Privations
             ,
             proceeding
             from
             the
             ill
             use
             we
             make
             of
             those
             Natural
             Capacities
             he
             has
             indued
             us
             with
             .
          
           All
           which
           great
           and
           momentous
           Truths
           are
           grounded
           upon
           the
           very
           Principle
           now
           laid
           down
           ,
           (
           which
           by
           this
           may
           appear
           to
           be
           something
           more
           than
           a
           Curiosity
           )
           That
           Judgment
           however
           commonly
           ascribed
           to
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           does
           yet
           really
           belong
           to
           the
           Will
           ,
           and
           not
           to
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           whose
           operations
           are
           all
           terminated
           within
           the
           limits
           of
           Perception
           .
           So
           well
           do
           
           these
           things
           cohere
           together
           ,
           and
           so
           aptly
           does
           one
           Truth
           hang
           and
           depend
           upon
           another
           .
        
         
           12.
           
           But
           as
           right
           as
           I
           think
           this
           Account
           of
           the
           matter
           to
           be
           ,
           yet
           considering
           what
           an
           innovation
           it
           is
           from
           the
           Scholastic
           Measures
           ,
           and
           how
           like
           a
           Paradox
           it
           looks
           ,
           I
           think
           a
           little
           Countenance
           from
           Authority
           may
           do
           well
           to
           counterpoise
           the
           Prejudice
           of
           Singularity
           .
           And
           because
           this
           is
           a
           greater
           Innovation
           than
           the
           precedent
           one
           ,
           I
           shall
           back
           it
           with
           an
           Authority
           proportionably
           greater
           than
           what
           was
           used
           upon
           the
           other
           occasion
           .
           
           
             It
             may
             be
             well
             concluded
             from
             what
             has
             been
             said
          
           (
           says
           a
           Modern
           Writer
           ,
           and
           whom
           I
           think
           I
           may
           venture
           to
           call
           a
           Philosopher
           )
           
             that
             the
             Vnderstanding
             never
             judges
             ,
             since
             it
             only
             perceives
             ,
             or
             since
             Iudgments
             and
             even
             Reasonings
             ,
             with
             respect
             to
             the
             Vnderstanding
             ,
             are
             only
             pure
             Perceptions
             .
             That
             't
             is
             the
             Will
             alone
             which
             truly
             judges
             in
             acquiescing
             in
             that
             which
             the
             Vnderstanding
             represents
             to
             it
             ,
             and
             in
             voluntarily
             reposing
             it self
             therein
             .
             And
             that
             also
             't
             is
             that
             alone
             which
             leads
             us
             into
             Errour
             .
          
           Again
           ;
           
             I
             say
             then
             that
             there
             is
             no
             
             other
             difference
             on
             the
             part
             of
             the
             Vnderstanding
             between
             a
             simple
             Perception
             ,
             Iudgment
             and
             Discourse
             ,
             but
             that
             the
             Vnderstanding
             perceives
             a
             simple
             thing
             without
             any
             relation
             to
             any
             thing
             whatsoever
             ,
             by
             a
             simple
             Perception
             .
             That
             it
             perceives
             the
             Relations
             between
             two
             or
             more
             things
             in
             Iudgment
             .
             And
             that
             in
             fine
             ,
             it
             perceives
             the
             Relations
             that
             are
             between
             the
             Relations
             of
             things
             in
             Discourse
             .
             So
             that
             all
             the
             Operations
             of
             the
             Vnderstanding
             are
             no
             other
             than
             pure
             Perceptions
             .
          
           All
           which
           he
           further
           explains
           and
           confirms
           by
           an
           Illustration
           taken
           from
           Numbers
           ,
           with
           some
           other
           very
           considerable
           Reflections
           upon
           it
           ;
           which
           for
           brevity's
           sake
           I
           leave
           the
           curious
           Reader
           to
           consult
           in
           order
           to
           his
           better
           satisfaction
           .
        
         
           13.
           
           To
           this
           Account
           of
           this
           most
           excellent
           Person
           I
           fully
           agree
           as
           to
           the
           substance
           and
           matter
           of
           it
           ,
           only
           would
           by
           his
           leave
           make
           some
           little
           Alteration
           in
           the
           Form
           of
           it
           ;
           concerning
           which
           he
           had
           no
           occasion
           to
           be
           sollicitous
           ,
           as
           not
           designing
           a
           formal
           and
           exact
           division
           of
           the
           Operations
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ;
           but
           only
           to
           shew
           that
           they
           were
           all
           no
           
           other
           than
           pure
           Perceptions
           .
           And
           so
           far
           his
           representation
           of
           the
           Matter
           is
           right
           ,
           and
           so
           ,
           I
           suppose
           ,
           will
           the
           Form
           of
           it
           be
           too
           if
           it
           run
           thus
           .
           The
           only
           operation
           of
           the
           Understanding
           is
           Perception
           :
           Which
           Perception
           is
           either
           Simple
           or
           Complex
           .
           Simple
           of
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           and
           Complex
           of
           their
           Relations
           .
           Which
           Complex
           Perception
           is
           again
           twofold
           ,
           Immediate
           or
           Mediate
           .
           Immediate
           when
           the
           Relations
           of
           Ideas
           are
           perceiv'd
           by
           the
           perception
           and
           collation
           of
           the
           very
           Ideas
           themselves
           whose
           Relations
           they
           are
           ;
           Mediate
           when
           those
           Relations
           are
           perceiv'd
           by
           the
           help
           or
           mediation
           of
           some
           third
           Idea
           ,
           made
           use
           of
           as
           a
           common
           measure
           of
           comparing
           those
           Ideas
           which
           could
           not
           be
           so
           collated
           together
           as
           to
           have
           their
           Relations
           perceiv'd
           by
           themselves
           .
           And
           in
           this
           ,
           I
           think
           ,
           we
           have
           a
           right
           Account
           of
           the
           Operations
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           both
           as
           to
           Matter
           and
           Form
           ;
           the
           knowledge
           of
           which
           ,
           considering
           how
           much
           Spirit
           is
           above
           Body
           ,
           though
           it
           were
           only
           a
           piece
           of
           Speculation
           and
           Curiosity
           ,
           I
           should
           think
           of
           greater
           worth
           and
           
           consideration
           than
           that
           of
           the
           Properties
           of
           Lines
           and
           Figures
           ,
           or
           any
           of
           the
           Phenomena's
           of
           Nature
           .
        
         
           14.
           
           This
           Complex
           Perception
           ,
           or
           the
           Perception
           of
           the
           Relations
           that
           are
           between
           Ideas
           ,
           I
           take
           to
           be
           the
           same
           with
           what
           we
           commonly
           call
           Knowledge
           :
           Which
           is
           usually
           defined
           by
           an
           
             evident
             Assent
          
           ,
           but
           I
           think
           not
           rightly
           .
           For
           an
           evident
           Assent
           is
           the
           same
           as
           an
           Assent
           upon
           Evidence
           ;
           that
           is
           ,
           an
           Assent
           to
           an
           evident
           thing
           ,
           or
           to
           a
           thing
           whereof
           we
           have
           an
           evident
           Perception
           .
           But
           now
           Perception
           and
           Assent
           are
           two
           things
           ,
           (
           the
           former
           being
           the
           ground
           of
           the
           latter
           )
           and
           't
           is
           in
           the
           Perception
           ,
           not
           in
           the
           Assent
           ,
           that
           Knowledge
           properly
           consists
           .
           For
           Knowledge
           is
           most
           certainly
           an
           Act
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ;
           and
           it
           was
           shewn
           before
           ,
           that
           the
           only
           Operation
           of
           that
           is
           Perception
           .
           As
           for
           Assent
           ,
           that
           will
           be
           found
           to
           belong
           to
           another
           Principle
           .
           For
           Assent
           is
           no
           other
           than
           an
           
             Affirmative
             Iudgment
          
           ;
           (
           for
           then
           a
           Man
           is
           said
           to
           assent
           to
           a
           thing
           when
           he
           judges
           it
           to
           be
           so
           or
           so
           ,
           and
           then
           to
           dissent
           when
           he
           judges
           it
           not
           to
           be
           so
           )
           ;
           and
           Judgment
           ,
           
           as
           was
           shewn
           before
           ,
           belongs
           to
           the
           Will.
           Nor
           is
           it
           any
           thing
           to
           the
           contrary
           that
           we
           necessarily
           assent
           to
           whatsoever
           we
           clearly
           perceive
           .
           This
           neither
           proves
           Assent
           and
           Perception
           to
           be
           one
           and
           the
           same
           ,
           nor
           that
           Assent
           does
           not
           belong
           to
           the
           Will
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           the
           Will
           necessarily
           follows
           ,
           and
           cannot
           possibly
           resist
           the
           clear
           Light
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ;
           which
           is
           a
           great
           Truth
           ,
           but
           no
           Objection
           .
           Assent
           therefore
           is
           always
           voluntary
           ,
           tho'
           not
           always
           free
           ;
           and
           whether
           voluntary
           or
           free
           is
           a
           plain
           Act
           of
           the
           Will
           imbracing
           and
           acquiescing
           in
           what
           is
           represented
           to
           it
           by
           the
           Understanding
           .
           And
           therefore
           though
           we
           do
           always
           assent
           to
           what
           we
           evidently
           perceive
           ,
           yet
           Knowledge
           does
           not
           consist
           in
           the
           Assent
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           Perception
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           ground
           of
           that
           Assent
           .
        
         
           15.
           
           For
           ,
           to
           push
           the
           matter
           a
           little
           further
           ,
           though
           Assent
           necessarily
           follows
           upon
           clear
           Perception
           ,
           and
           cannot
           be
           separated
           from
           it
           ,
           yet
           sure
           we
           may
           use
           Abstraction
           here
           ,
           and
           consider
           Perception
           without
           considering
           Assent
           ,
           the
           Idea
           of
           the
           one
           
           not
           including
           the
           Idea
           of
           the
           other
           .
           But
           now
           I
           would
           fain
           know
           whether
           he
           that
           clearly
           perceives
           the
           Relations
           of
           things
           one
           to
           another
           ,
           may
           not
           be
           truly
           said
           to
           understand
           or
           know
           those
           things
           ?
           Or
           whether
           there
           be
           any
           thing
           further
           requisite
           to
           the
           understanding
           or
           knowledge
           of
           a
           thing
           after
           a
           full
           and
           clear
           perception
           of
           it
           ?
           If
           not
           ,
           (
           as
           I
           think
           no
           Man
           that
           considers
           what
           he
           speaks
           will
           say
           that
           there
           is
           )
           then
           Knowledge
           is
           supposed
           to
           be
           in
           its
           compleat
           and
           perfect
           act
           of
           being
           by
           Perception
           alone
           ,
           and
           that
           before
           any
           Assent
           be
           given
           ;
           which
           Assent
           therefore
           cannot
           go
           to
           the
           making
           up
           of
           its
           Nature
           ,
           since
           it
           was
           supposed
           to
           be
           compleat
           without
           it
           .
           To
           which
           I
           add
           ,
           That
           let
           our
           Assent
           be
           join'd
           with
           never
           so
           much
           Evidence
           ,
           still
           we
           are
           said
           to
           assent
           because
           we
           know
           ,
           and
           to
           what
           we
           know
           .
           So
           that
           our
           Knowledge
           is
           here
           presupposed
           to
           our
           Assent
           ,
           and
           consequently
           is
           in
           order
           of
           Nature
           at
           least
           before
           it
           ,
           and
           therefore
           cannot
           consist
           in
           it
           .
           I
           conclude
           therefore
           that
           Knowledge
           is
           not
           
             evident
             Assent
          
           ,
           but
           Perception
           ,
           particularly
           that
           Perception
           
           which
           I
           call
           Complex
           ,
           the
           perception
           of
           the
           Relations
           that
           are
           between
           Ideas
           ,
           whether
           as
           to
           Agreement
           or
           Disagreement
           .
           Which
           ,
           I
           think
           ,
           till
           we
           can
           meet
           with
           a
           better
           ,
           may
           serve
           for
           a
           tolerable
           Definition
           of
           Knowledge
           .
        
         
           16.
           
           But
           now
           whereas
           this
           Complex
           Perception
           (
           as
           was
           noted
           above
           )
           is
           either
           Immediate
           or
           Mediate
           ;
           hence
           it
           is
           that
           our
           Knowledge
           also
           admits
           of
           the
           same
           division
           ,
           being
           either
           Immediate
           or
           Mediate
           ,
           or
           if
           you
           please
           ,
           Intuitive
           or
           Demonstrative
           .
           Between
           which
           two
           the
           difference
           usually
           made
           is
           ,
           that
           in
           Intuitive
           Knowledge
           we
           have
           an
           intire
           and
           simultaneous
           view
           of
           things
           ,
           and
           see
           all
           at
           once
           ;
           whereas
           in
           Demonstrative
           Knowledge
           our
           prospect
           opens
           by
           degrees
           and
           we
           proceed
           step
           by
           step
           ,
           advancing
           from
           the
           knowledge
           of
           one
           thing
           to
           that
           of
           another
           .
           This
           account
           indeed
           is
           true
           ,
           but
           not
           explicit
           enough
           to
           make
           it
           clear
           :
           For
           't
           is
           Characterising
           from
           the
           effect
           only
           ,
           and
           does
           not
           explain
           how
           our
           view
           in
           Intuitive
           Knowledge
           comes
           to
           be
           so
           intire
           ,
           and
           in
           Demonstrative
           so
           gradual
           
           and
           progressive
           .
           This
           therefore
           must
           be
           deduced
           higher
           ,
           and
           explained
           by
           a
           more
           distinct
           Principle
           .
           And
           I
           think
           we
           shall
           distinguish
           them
           more
           clearly
           and
           exactly
           by
           saying
           ,
           That
           Intuitive
           Knowledge
           is
           when
           we
           perceive
           the
           agreement
           or
           disagreement
           of
           one
           Idea
           with
           another
           immediately
           and
           by
           themselves
           ,
           without
           the
           mediation
           or
           intervention
           of
           any
           other
           Idea
           .
           Demonstrative
           ,
           when
           this
           agreement
           or
           disagreement
           is
           perceiv'd
           not
           immediately
           ,
           by
           comparing
           the
           Ideas
           with
           themselves
           ,
           but
           mediately
           ,
           by
           comparing
           them
           with
           a
           third
           ;
           that
           is
           ,
           when
           we
           perceive
           them
           to
           agree
           or
           disagree
           with
           themselves
           ,
           as
           we
           find
           them
           to
           do
           so
           with
           some
           third
           Idea
           ,
           which
           we
           are
           oftentimes
           forced
           to
           make
           use
           of
           as
           a
           common
           measure
           ,
           because
           we
           cannot
           always
           ,
           by
           reason
           of
           the
           narrowness
           of
           our
           Faculties
           ,
           so
           collate
           and
           confront
           our
           other
           Ideas
           together
           ,
           as
           to
           see
           whether
           they
           agree
           or
           no
           by
           their
           mere
           comparison
           .
        
         
           17.
           
           This
           Demonstrative
           Knowledge
           is
           what
           in
           the
           Schools
           is
           call'd
           Science
           ,
           concerning
           which
           great
           stir
           
           is
           made
           ,
           and
           variety
           of
           Definitions
           given
           ,
           but
           which
           by
           the
           measures
           already
           laid
           down
           ,
           appears
           to
           be
           nothing
           else
           but
           a
           Mediate
           Perception
           ,
           or
           the
           perception
           of
           the
           Relations
           of
           Ideas
           by
           the
           mediation
           of
           some
           other
           Idea
           .
           This
           other
           Idea
           is
           what
           we
           usually
           call
           a
           Medium
           or
           Proof
           ,
           because
           it
           is
           the
           common
           measure
           whereby
           our
           Ideas
           are
           compared
           ,
           and
           the
           Relations
           between
           them
           perceiv'd
           .
           And
           't
           is
           the
           form
           and
           process
           of
           the
           Understanding
           using
           this
           middle
           Idea
           as
           a
           measure
           whereby
           to
           perceive
           the
           agreement
           or
           disagreement
           of
           the
           others
           ,
           according
           as
           they
           agree
           or
           disagree
           with
           this
           ,
           that
           I
           would
           call
           Reasoning
           ,
           which
           is
           not
           the
           very
           same
           with
           Science
           ,
           but
           the
           way
           and
           method
           to
           it
           .
           For
           we
           are
           said
           to
           reason
           in
           order
           to
           know
           ,
           and
           Science
           is
           the
           effect
           of
           Demonstration
           ,
           according
           to
           that
           known
           saying
           in
           Logic
           ,
           
             Demonstratio
             est
             Syllogismus
             scientiam
             pariens
          
           .
        
         
           18.
           
           If
           this
           Account
           of
           Reasoning
           be
           not
           clear
           enough
           to
           make
           it
           intelligible
           in
           it self
           ,
           or
           to
           distinguish
           it
           from
           Science
           ,
           I
           would
           further
           explain
           it
           thus
           ,
           by
           saying
           that
           Reasoning
           
           (
           as
           I
           here
           consider
           it
           with
           respect
           to
           the
           Understanding
           )
           is
           nothing
           else
           but
           the
           successive
           Perception
           of
           each
           of
           the
           extream
           Ideas
           with
           the
           middle
           one
           ,
           in
           order
           to
           perceive
           the
           union
           that
           is
           between
           them
           by
           the
           union
           that
           they
           have
           with
           the
           middle
           Idea
           .
           As
           for
           Example
           :
           I
           am
           to
           perceive
           that
           Space
           is
           Body
           ;
           and
           not
           being
           able
           to
           perceive
           this
           by
           the
           immediate
           inspection
           of
           these
           two
           Ideas
           ,
           I
           call
           in
           a
           third
           to
           my
           assistance
           ,
           and
           proceed
           to
           the
           perception
           of
           it
           thus
           :
           Whatever
           is
           extended
           is
           Body
           ;
           Space
           is
           extended
           ,
           therefore
           Space
           is
           Body
           .
           Here
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           I
           perceive
           the
           union
           of
           the
           two
           extream
           Ideas
           Space
           and
           Body
           ,
           by
           the
           successive
           Perception
           of
           the
           union
           that
           each
           of
           them
           have
           with
           the
           middle
           Idea
           ,
           extended
           .
           Now
           the
           very
           Perception
           it self
           of
           the
           union
           of
           the
           two
           extream
           Ideas
           ,
           Space
           and
           Body
           ,
           by
           the
           mediation
           of
           the
           third
           and
           middle
           one
           ,
           is
           what
           I
           would
           call
           Science
           :
           For
           't
           is
           in
           the
           Formality
           of
           this
           Mediate
           Perception
           that
           I
           am
           said
           to
           know
           that
           Space
           is
           Body
           .
           But
           the
           successive
           Perception
           that
           I
           have
           of
           the
           union
           
           of
           each
           of
           these
           two
           extream
           Ideas
           with
           the
           middle
           Idea
           in
           order
           to
           perceive
           the
           union
           they
           have
           among
           themselves
           ,
           is
           what
           I
           would
           call
           Reasoning
           .
           Which
           certainly
           cannot
           be
           the
           very
           Perception
           of
           the
           conclusion
           it self
           (
           for
           that
           would
           confound
           it
           with
           Science
           )
           and
           ●et
           must
           be
           Perception
           too
           ,
           (
           or
           else
           it
           would
           not
           belong
           to
           the
           Understanding
           )
           and
           therefore
           can
           be
           no
           other
           than
           this
           successive
           Perception
           that
           I
           speak
           of
           .
           Whereby
           it
           may
           appear
           that
           the
           Reasoning
           here
           specified
           is
           not
           only
           distinct
           from
           Science
           ,
           but
           also
           from
           that
           Reasoning
           which
           consists
           in
           illative
           Affirmations
           and
           Negations
           ,
           and
           so
           is
           a
           Species
           of
           Judgment
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           belongs
           to
           the
           Will
           ,
           not
           to
           the
           Understanding
           ;
           as
           was
           both
           remark'd
           and
           accounted
           for
           before
           .
        
         
           19.
           
           Those
           things
           which
           are
           known
           or
           perceiv'd
           by
           Intuitive
           Knowledge
           we
           call
           Principles
           ,
           and
           those
           things
           which
           are
           perceiv'd
           by
           Demonstrative
           Knowledge
           we
           call
           Conclusions
           :
           Which
           though
           equally
           certain
           (
           because
           the
           Objects
           of
           Knowledge
           )
           are
           yet
           not
           so
           clear
           as
           Principles
           ,
           
           which
           serve
           indeed
           to
           the
           demonstration
           of
           other
           things
           ,
           but
           need
           none
           themselves
           ,
           as
           being
           visible
           by
           their
           own
           Light
           ,
           and
           sometimes
           are
           so
           evident
           that
           they
           are
           not
           so
           much
           as
           capable
           of
           any
           ,
           but
           are
           strictly
           indemonstrable
           ,
           there
           being
           nothing
           more
           clear
           than
           themselves
           whereby
           they
           may
           receive
           further
           Evidence
           .
           We
           say
           of
           such
           Propositions
           ,
           
             That
             they
             are
             as
             clear
             as
             the
             Light
          
           ;
           and
           there
           is
           more
           aptness
           in
           the
           comparison
           than
           all
           that
           use
           it
           ,
           I
           believe
           ,
           are
           aware
           of
           .
           For
           Light
           is
           seen
           immediately
           and
           by
           it self
           ,
           and
           not
           by
           the
           mediation
           of
           any
           thing
           else
           ;
           whereas
           all
           other
           things
           are
           seen
           by
           Light.
           The
           Light
           that
           is
           thus
           seen
           by
           it self
           answers
           to
           Principles
           ,
           and
           those
           other
           things
           which
           are
           seen
           by
           Light
           answer
           to
           Conclusions
           .
           And
           the
           resemblance
           holds
           as
           well
           on
           the
           part
           of
           the
           Act
           as
           of
           the
           Object
           :
           For
           the
           first
           of
           these
           ways
           of
           seeing
           answers
           to
           Intuition
           ,
           and
           the
           last
           to
           Demonstration
           .
           So
           surprising
           is
           the
           agreement
           between
           Vision
           and
           Knowledge
           ,
           and
           so
           strange
           and
           wonderful
           the
           proportion
           in
           this
           as
           well
           as
           in
           some
           other
           things
           between
           the
           
           Sensible
           and
           the
           Intellectual
           World.
           
        
         
           20.
           
           Intuition
           is
           by
           far
           the
           most
           perfect
           and
           excellent
           way
           of
           Knowledge
           ,
           as
           being
           more
           clear
           ,
           more
           simple
           ,
           and
           more
           intire
           .
           More
           clear
           ,
           for
           here
           we
           have
           all
           Light
           without
           any
           mixture
           of
           Darkness
           ,
           whereas
           in
           the
           other
           there
           is
           one
           dark
           side
           .
           More
           simple
           ,
           for
           here
           the
           Mind
           perceives
           the
           Truth
           by
           one
           single
           View
           ,
           whereas
           in
           the
           other
           it
           is
           fain
           to
           multiply
           its
           Perception
           .
           More
           intire
           ,
           for
           here
           again
           we
           have
           the
           prospect
           lying
           altogether
           before
           us
           in
           its
           full
           and
           whole
           extent
           ,
           whereas
           in
           the
           other
           it
           opens
           gradually
           and
           successively
           ,
           the
           Light
           stealing
           in
           upon
           us
           more
           and
           more
           as
           we
           go
           further
           and
           further
           ,
           as
           it
           does
           upon
           .
           Men
           that
           travel
           toward
           the
           East
           .
           To
           which
           may
           be
           further
           added
           ,
           that
           Intuitive
           Knowledge
           supposes
           and
           proceeds
           from
           perfection
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           whose
           Perceptive
           Faculty
           is
           hereby
           argued
           to
           be
           very
           bright
           and
           clear
           .
           For
           it
           must
           be
           a
           very
           clear
           Perception
           to
           perceive
           the
           Relations
           of
           Ideas
           by
           the
           very
           Ideas
           themselves
           .
           Whereas
           Demonstrative
           Knowledge
           ,
           and
           the
           necesslty
           of
           
           Reasoning
           in
           order
           to
           it
           ,
           is
           founded
           upon
           the
           narrowness
           of
           our
           Intellectual
           Capacities
           ,
           which
           not
           being
           able
           to
           perceive
           the
           Truth
           or
           Falshood
           of
           a
           Proposition
           by
           the
           single
           collation
           of
           the
           two
           Ideas
           that
           compose
           it
           ,
           are
           fain
           to
           make
           use
           of
           a
           third
           as
           a
           common
           measure
           between
           them
           ;
           and
           so
           from
           the
           consideration
           of
           something
           more
           clear
           and
           better
           known
           ,
           to
           proceed
           in
           the
           search
           of
           what
           is
           more
           obscure
           and
           less
           known
           .
           Accordingly
           we
           attribute
           the
           way
           of
           Intuition
           to
           the
           most
           Perfect
           Beings
           ,
           God
           and
           Angels
           .
           Though
           as
           to
           Angels
           ,
           I
           make
           no
           great
           doubt
           but
           that
           in
           the
           Consideration
           of
           very
           compounded
           Questions
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           include
           a
           multiplicity
           of
           Relations
           they
           are
           fain
           to
           use
           Reasoning
           as
           well
           as
           we
           (
           as
           in
           the
           more
           simple
           ones
           we
           use
           Intuition
           as
           well
           as
           they
           )
           though
           perhaps
           after
           a
           much
           more
           perfect
           manner
           ,
           and
           by
           such
           compendious
           and
           facilitating
           Rules
           as
           we
           know
           nothing
           of
           .
           And
           as
           they
           may
           be
           supposed
           when
           they
           do
           reason
           ,
           to
           reason
           better
           and
           more
           expeditely
           than
           we
           ,
           so
           with
           equal
           probability
           it
           may
           be
           presumed
           ,
           considering
           the
           
           great
           disproportion
           of
           Natures
           and
           States
           between
           us
           ,
           that
           they
           use
           Intuition
           in
           very
           many
           things
           wherein
           we
           are
           forc'd
           to
           have
           recourse
           to
           Reasoning
           .
        
         
           21.
           
           Hereafter
           indeed
           when
           ,
           as
           the
           Scripture
           tells
           us
           ,
           all
           that
           is
           imperfect
           about
           us
           shall
           be
           done
           away
           ,
           and
           we
           shall
           be
           
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
          
           ,
           not
           only
           like
           but
           equal
           to
           the
           Angels
           ,
           we
           shall
           be
           able
           to
           see
           (
           't
           is
           to
           be
           hoped
           )
           by
           Intuition
           too
           ;
           and
           that
           many
           things
           which
           we
           here
           not
           only
           were
           ignorant
           of
           ,
           but
           thought
           impossible
           ;
           things
           that
           were
           not
           only
           above
           our
           Reason
           ,
           but
           ,
           as
           we
           thought
           ,
           contrary
           to
           it
           .
           We
           shall
           not
           only
           be
           able
           to
           reason
           better
           than
           we
           do
           now
           ,
           but
           shall
           in
           most
           things
           not
           stand
           in
           need
           of
           any
           Reasoning
           at
           all
           ,
           but
           shall
           with
           one
           simple
           View
           glance
           over
           and
           through
           the
           Relations
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           so
           have
           an
           intire
           prospect
           of
           the
           fair
           Field
           of
           Truth
           .
           But
           at
           present
           we
           must
           travel
           it
           over
           ,
           and
           that
           with
           many
           a
           weary
           step
           ,
           there
           being
           but
           very
           few
           things
           that
           we
           know
           by
           Intuition
           ,
           no
           more
           than
           just
           to
           give
           us
           a
           taste
           of
           the
           great
           Priviledge
           of
           Heaven
           ;
           and
           to
           incourage
           
           both
           our
           Desires
           and
           our
           Hopes
           of
           that
           perfect
           State
           ,
           when
           we
           shall
           be
           so
           far
           from
           needing
           any
           Logic
           to
           direct
           us
           in
           our
           reasoning
           ,
           that
           we
           shall
           have
           (
           in
           comparison
           )
           but
           little
           need
           or
           use
           even
           of
           Reason
           it self
           .
           But
           in
           this
           present
           state
           of
           our
           Nonage
           and
           Infirmity
           our
           Necessity
           of
           it
           is
           very
           great
           .
           For
           our
           Intuition
           is
           so
           short-sighted
           ,
           and
           reaches
           so
           very
           little
           a
           way
           ,
           that
           ,
           as
           ,
           if
           we
           knew
           no
           more
           than
           what
           we
           can
           by
           this
           Means
           attain
           to
           ,
           the
           Compass
           of
           our
           Knowledge
           would
           be
           so
           very
           Scanty
           that
           we
           should
           not
           have
           near
           light
           enough
           to
           direct
           us
           in
           our
           journey
           through
           the
           World.
           So
           if
           we
           would
           Know
           more
           ,
           and
           see
           to
           a
           further
           distance
           from
           us
           ,
           we
           must
           assist
           our
           Feeble
           Eye
           by
           the
           Advantage
           of
           a
           Glass
           .
           Now
           Reason
           is
           this
           Glass
           ,
           Naturally
           indeed
           a
           very
           good
           Prospective
           ,
           but
           which
           Logic
           ,
           and
           especially
           Algebra
           ,
           has
           improved
           into
           a
           Telescope
           .
           But
           yet
           still
           't
           is
           but
           an
           Artificial
           way
           of
           seeing
           ,
           and
           all
           Art
           supposes
           and
           argues
           a
           Defect
           in
           Nature
           .
           And
           though
           it
           be
           a
           great
           help
           ,
           yet
           we
           know
           't
           is
           no
           very
           great
           Commendation
           
           to
           a
           man's
           eye-sight
           to
           see
           with
           Spectacles
           .
        
         
           22.
           
           And
           why
           then
           are
           we
           Proud
           ?
           And
           why
           proud
           of
           that
           which
           should
           rather
           deject
           us
           ,
           and
           make
           us
           Humble
           ,
           of
           our
           Imperfections
           and
           our
           Defects
           ?
           Our
           Natural
           Reason
           is
           a
           Mark
           of
           our
           Limitation
           as
           Creatures
           ,
           and
           our
           Artificial
           one
           of
           our
           Infirmity
           as
           Men
           ,
           and
           both
           together
           give
           us
           but
           little
           Light
           ,
           and
           help
           us
           to
           see
           but
           a
           very
           little
           way
           off
           ,
           and
           that
           after
           the
           most
           imperfect
           and
           defective
           Manner
           ,
           such
           as
           upbraids
           our
           Ignorance
           at
           the
           very
           same
           time
           that
           it
           increases
           our
           Knowledge
           ,
           our
           Reason
           not
           so
           much
           inlightning
           ,
           as
           betraying
           the
           Darkness
           of
           our
           Understandings
           .
           Some
           few
           things
           indeed
           we
           know
           as
           Angels
           do
           ,
           by
           Intuition
           (
           or
           else
           we
           could
           not
           so
           much
           as
           reason
           like
           Men
           )
           but
           still
           the
           main
           Fund
           of
           our
           Knowledge
           lies
           in
           the
           Rational
           and
           Demonstrative
           kind
           ,
           and
           we
           are
           fain
           to
           use
           Clues
           and
           Chains
           to
           Conduct
           our
           Thoughts
           through
           the
           infinite
           Mazes
           and
           Labyrinths
           of
           Truth
           ,
           to
           proceed
           in
           a
           Train
           from
           one
           thing
           to
           another
           ,
           to
           walk
           step
           by
           step
           ,
           and
           
           feel
           out
           our
           way
           with
           wariness
           and
           Caution
           like
           Men
           that
           go
           in
           the
           Dark
           .
           And
           such
           indeed
           is
           our
           state
           in
           this
           Body
           and
           in
           this
           World.
           'T
           is
           now
           a
           kind
           of
           Night
           with
           us
           ,
           as
           having
           for
           the
           Most
           part
           only
           the
           Lesser
           Light
           ,
           Reason
           ,
           for
           our
           Difection
           .
           As
           for
           the
           Greater
           ,
           Int●ition
           ,
           we
           have
           little
           more
           of
           that
           than
           of
           the
           refracted
           Beams
           of
           the
           Sun
           a
           little
           before
           its
           rising
           ,
           and
           after
           its
           setting
           ,
           enough
           to
           make
           a
           Twilight
           ,
           a
           Mixture
           of
           Light
           and
           Darkness
           ,
           but
           such
           a
           Mixture
           as
           is
           very
           unequal
           ,
           Darkness
           making
           the
           far
           greater
           part
           of
           the
           Composition
           .
           And
           is
           not
           this
           Consideration
           sufficient
           (
           if
           there
           were
           nothing
           else
           )
           to
           take
           down
           our
           Pride
           ,
           and
           inspire
           us
           with
           a
           Sentiment
           of
           the
           profoundest
           Humility
           and
           Self-dejection
           .
           If
           not
           ,
           let
           us
           Consider
           that
           even
           this
           Lesser
           Light
           that
           is
           to
           govern
           our
           present
           Night
           and
           Darkness
           ,
           does
           oftentimes
           fail
           us
           ,
           and
           suffer
           an
           Eclipse
           .
           Let
           us
           Consider
           that
           we
           have
           a
           darker
           side
           yet
           ,
           and
           are
           subject
           to
           a
           Much
           lower
           Dispensation
           .
           There
           being
           many
           things
           ,
           and
           those
           of
           the
           
           highest
           Nature
           ,
           and
           greatest
           importance
           ,
           wherein
           our
           Reason
           is
           utterly
           at
           a
           loss
           ,
           and
           cannot
           help
           us
           out
           ,
           and
           with
           respect
           to
           which
           being
           destitute
           of
           Sight
           ,
           we
           must
           be
           Content
           to
           walk
           altogether
           by
           Faith.
           Concerning
           which
           in
           the
           following
           Chapter
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           II.
           Of
           Faith.
           
        
         
           1.
           
           FAith
           is
           a
           Term
           of
           great
           Ambiguity
           as
           well
           as
           Reason
           ,
           but
           not
           to
           insist
           upon
           the
           several
           Acceptations
           of
           it
           as
           it
           is
           used
           either
           in
           Divine
           or
           in
           Humane
           Writings
           ,
           I
           shall
           only
           define
           in
           what
           sense
           I
           here
           take
           it
           ,
           and
           then
           proceed
           to
           such
           Considerations
           upon
           it
           as
           may
           serve
           to
           lay
           open
           its
           Nature
           so
           far
           as
           is
           requisite
           to
           the
           Present
           Design
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           I
           do
           not
           take
           Faith
           here
           for
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           ,
           but
           for
           the
           Act
           or
           Habit
           of
           Faith
           ,
           and
           that
           not
           Ethically
           consider'd
           ,
           as
           it
           denotes
           the
           Moral
           Vertues
           of
           Veracity
           ,
           Fidelity
           ,
           Honesty
           and
           the
           like
           ,
           but
           Logically
           ,
           as
           it
           signifies
           a
           certain
           Assent
           ,
           Judgement
           or
           Perswasion
           of
           the
           Mind
           ,
           particularly
           that
           which
           is
           founded
           upon
           Testimony
           or
           Authority
           .
           So
           that
           the
           Generical
           and
           Common
           Part
           of
           Faith
           is
           Assent
           ,
           wherein
           it
           
           agrees
           with
           some
           other
           Acts
           of
           the
           Mind
           ,
           and
           the
           more
           special
           and
           peculiar
           part
           that
           limits
           and
           Contracts
           the
           General
           ,
           and
           whereby
           the
           whole
           is
           differenc'd
           and
           distinguish'd
           ,
           is
           the
           Motive
           and
           ground
           of
           this
           Assent
           .
           'T
           is
           it
           seems
           an
           Assent
           grounded
           not
           upon
           the
           internal
           Reason
           and
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           but
           upon
           the
           bare
           Testimony
           and
           Authority
           of
           the
           Speaker
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           For
           I
           consider
           that
           there
           are
           two
           general
           grounds
           of
           Assent
           ,
           Reason
           and
           Authority
           .
           That
           is
           ,
           we
           assent
           to
           a
           thing
           either
           because
           we
           have
           some
           Perception
           or
           Knowledge
           of
           it
           our selves
           ,
           or
           because
           its
           Truth
           is
           declared
           to
           us
           by
           another
           upon
           whose
           Knowledge
           and
           Veracity
           we
           think
           we
           may
           safely
           depend
           .
           If
           the
           Reason
           or
           evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           be
           imperfect
           and
           incomplete
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           if
           we
           perceive
           only
           in
           part
           ,
           then
           we
           yeild
           a
           partial
           and
           imperfect
           Assent
           ,
           mix'd
           with
           some
           Fear
           or
           Suspicion
           of
           the
           Contrary
           ,
           which
           is
           what
           we
           call
           Opinion
           .
           But
           if
           the
           Evidence
           be
           full
           and
           perfect
           ,
           then
           we
           yield
           a
           firm
           and
           most
           assured
           Assent
           ,
           which
           is
           generally
           distinguish'd
           from
           the
           other
           
           by
           the
           Name
           of
           Knowledge
           ,
           which
           according
           to
           the
           common
           Notion
           and
           Definition
           of
           it
           is
           an
           
             Evident
             Assent
          
           .
           But
           it
           was
           shewn
           before
           that
           Knowledge
           does
           not
           Formally
           Consist
           in
           the
           Assent
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           Perception
           which
           is
           the
           Ground
           of
           the
           Assent
           .
           And
           indeed
           how
           is
           it
           possible
           it
           should
           consist
           in
           any
           thing
           else
           ?
           For
           (
           to
           give
           yet
           a
           further
           Confirmation
           to
           what
           has
           been
           already
           offer'd
           upon
           this
           Occasion
           )
           let
           Assent
           be
           never
           so
           evident
           ,
           the
           evidence
           lies
           in
           the
           Perception
           ,
           not
           in
           the
           Assent
           ,
           which
           of
           it self
           is
           a
           blind
           dark
           Act
           of
           the
           Mind
           ,
           and
           can
           be
           said
           no
           otherwise
           to
           be
           Evident
           ,
           than
           as
           't
           is
           an
           Assent
           to
           an
           Evident
           thing
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           to
           what
           we
           perceive
           .
           But
           now
           Perception
           and
           Assent
           are
           not
           only
           two
           things
           ,
           but
           such
           as
           belong
           also
           to
           two
           different
           and
           distinct
           Faculties
           ,
           and
           therefore
           can
           never
           joyn
           together
           to
           make
           up
           Knowledge
           ,
           which
           is
           an
           Act
           only
           of
           one
           .
           And
           indeed
           to
           speak
           the
           truth
           ,
           
             Evident
             Assent
          
           (
           as
           't
           is
           here
           applied
           )
           seems
           to
           me
           a
           mere
           jumble
           of
           Words
           confusely
           uniting
           together
           in
           one
           Idea
           Operations
           that
           belong
           to
           distinct
           Faculties
           ,
           one
           belonging
           
           to
           the
           Will
           and
           the
           other
           to
           the
           Understanding
           .
           And
           how
           the
           result
           of
           this
           heterogeneous
           Composition
           should
           be
           Knowledge
           ,
           I
           must
           confess
           to
           be
           indeed
           a
           Mystery
           above
           my
           Comprehension
           .
           And
           besides
           ,
           after
           all
           ,
           an
           Evident
           Assent
           when
           resolv'd
           into
           more
           words
           will
           amount
           to
           the
           same
           as
           an
           Assent
           to
           what
           we
           know
           ,
           and
           would
           it
           not
           be
           a
           Notable
           Definition
           of
           Knowledge
           ,
           to
           say
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           
             an
             Assent
             to
             what
             we
             know
             ?
          
        
         
           4.
           
           If
           then
           Knowledge
           be
           not
           an
           
             Evident
             Assent
          
           ,
           and
           indeed
           as
           to
           the
           Formality
           of
           it
           has
           nothing
           of
           Assent
           in
           it
           ,
           as
           consisting
           purely
           and
           wholely
           in
           Perception
           ,
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           this
           Assent
           to
           an
           evident
           thing
           ought
           not
           to
           be
           call'd
           Knowledge
           .
           For
           't
           is
           necessary
           that
           the
           several
           Species
           of
           Assent
           should
           all
           have
           the
           general
           Nature
           of
           Assent
           in
           them
           ,
           and
           consequently
           this
           being
           a
           certain
           Species
           of
           Assent
           must
           partake
           of
           the
           nature
           of
           Assent
           in
           general
           ,
           which
           it
           cannot
           do
           if
           it
           be
           Knowledge
           ,
           for
           that
           were
           to
           pass
           over
           into
           another
           Kind
           ,
           Knowledge
           not
           being
           Assent
           ,
           but
           Perception
           .
           'T
           is
           therefore
           most
           clear
           and
           evident
           that
           our
           Common
           Systemes
           have
           here
           also
           
           gone
           upon
           a
           wrong
           ground
           ,
           and
           that
           Knowledge
           ought
           not
           to
           be
           put
           into
           the
           Number
           of
           the
           Three
           Assents
           (
           which
           are
           usually
           reckon'd
           to
           be
           
             Faith
             ,
             Opinion
          
           and
           Science
           )
           since
           the
           Assent
           whose
           ground
           is
           full
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           which
           is
           the
           only
           one
           that
           may
           pretend
           and
           is
           commonly
           presumed
           to
           be
           Knowledge
           ,
           is
           most
           apparently
           not
           so
           ,
           as
           differing
           from
           it
           no
           less
           than
           in
           the
           whole
           kind
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           If
           then
           it
           be
           demanded
           by
           what
           Name
           I
           would
           distinguish
           this
           Second
           Assent
           to
           a
           thing
           when
           the
           Evidence
           is
           full
           and
           complete
           from
           the
           former
           wherein
           the
           Evidence
           is
           supposed
           not
           to
           be
           so
           perfect
           ,
           I
           answer
           that
           indeed
           (
           so
           little
           have
           these
           things
           been
           Consider'd
           as
           they
           ought
           )
           there
           is
           no
           proper
           Name
           ,
           that
           I
           know
           of
           ,
           for
           it
           .
           When
           we
           assent
           to
           a
           thing
           of
           incomplete
           Evidence
           we
           call
           it
           Opinion
           ,
           and
           when
           we
           assent
           to
           a
           thing
           whose
           Evidence
           is
           complete
           this
           has
           been
           usually
           call'd
           Knowledge
           ,
           but
           certainly
           with
           the
           utmost
           impropriety
           ,
           knowledge
           ,
           as
           appears
           ,
           being
           quite
           another
           thing
           .
           But
           by
           what
           name
           to
           call
           it
           ,
           or
           how
           to
           distinguish
           it
           ,
           I
           pro●ess
           I
           know
           
           not
           .
           Not
           for
           want
           of
           real
           difference
           and
           distinction
           in
           the
           thing
           (
           for
           my
           Thought
           of
           it
           is
           very
           distinct
           )
           but
           merely
           because
           we
           want
           a
           word
           for
           it
           .
           As
           we
           do
           in
           like
           manner
           for
           Assent
           upon
           Reason
           in
           general
           to
           distinguish
           it
           from
           Assent
           upon
           Authority
           in
           general
           .
           For
           as
           Assent
           upon
           Authority
           in
           general
           Abstracting
           from
           Humane
           or
           Divine
           is
           call'd
           Faith
           ,
           so
           also
           Assent
           upon
           Reason
           in
           general
           abstracting
           from
           complete
           or
           incomplete
           should
           be
           call'd
           somewhat
           ,
           if
           one
           could
           tell
           what
           ,
           as
           every
           generical
           Idea
           ought
           to
           be
           distinguish'd
           by
           a
           generical
           Name
           .
           But
           since
           our
           Language
           affords
           not
           any
           one
           word
           that
           will
           serve
           to
           either
           of
           these
           purposes
           we
           must
           be
           content
           with
           the
           De●initio
           instead
           of
           the
           Definitum
           ,
           and
           express
           the
           things
           at
           large
           ,
           by
           saying
           Assent
           upon
           Reason
           or
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           Assent
           upon
           such
           Evidence
           as
           is
           full
           and
           complete
           ,
           which
           is
           sufficient
           to
           distinguish
           it
           from
           Assent
           upon
           evidence
           incomplete
           ,
           though
           we
           have
           no
           one
           proper
           word
           for
           this
           as
           we
           have
           for
           the
           other
           ,
           which
           is
           fitly
           call'd
           Opinion
           ,
           whereby
           we
           denote
           the
           imperfection
           
           both
           of
           the
           Evidence
           and
           of
           the
           Assent
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           But
           now
           if
           the
           Assent
           he
           not
           grounded
           upon
           any
           internal
           Reason
           or
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           at
           all
           ,
           but
           only
           upon
           Testimony
           or
           Authority
           ,
           then
           we
           call
           it
           Faith.
           Which
           appears
           to
           be
           an
           Assent
           of
           a
           quite
           different
           Nature
           from
           the
           other
           two
           .
           For
           they
           both
           agree
           in
           the
           general
           Nature
           of
           Assent
           upon
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           differ
           only
           as
           the
           Evidence
           differs
           ,
           and
           that
           is
           gradually
           ,
           as
           complete
           differs
           from
           incomplet●
           .
           But
           Faith
           differs
           from
           them
           both
           in
           the
           whole
           Kind
           ,
           as
           having
           no
           Evidence
           at
           all
           ,
           but
           only
           Authority
           for
           its
           Ground
           .
           And
           thus
           we
           have
           here
           a
           Threefold
           Assent
           ,
           (
           though
           not
           such
           as
           is
           taught
           us
           in
           the
           Schools
           )
           the
           Account
           of
           which
           in
           short
           proceeds
           thus
           .
           All
           Assent
           in
           general
           is
           either
           upon
           Reason
           or
           Authority
           .
           If
           the
           Reason
           be
           incomplete
           then
           't
           is
           Opinion
           .
           If
           complete
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           another
           kind
           of
           Assent
           for
           which
           as
           yet
           there
           wants
           a
           Name
           ,
           as
           also
           there
           does
           for
           Assent
           upon
           Reason
           in
           General
           .
           But
           if
           the
           Assent
           be
           upon
           Authority
           only
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           Faith.
           
        
         
         
           7.
           
           Now
           this
           Authority
           may
           be
           either
           of
           God
           or
           of
           Man.
           If
           the
           Authority
           whereupon
           our
           Assent
           is
           grounded
           be
           of
           Man
           ,
           then
           the
           Assent
           that
           is
           so
           grounded
           is
           Human
           Faith.
           If
           of
           God
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           Divine
           Faith.
           Between
           which
           two
           there
           is
           this
           in
           Common
           ,
           that
           they
           both
           proceed
           not
           upon
           the
           internal
           Light
           and
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           but
           upon
           Authority
           ,
           and
           so
           agree
           in
           the
           general
           Nature
           of
           〈◊〉
           ▪
           only
           as
           the
           Authority
           differ
           〈…〉
           Faith
           also
           varies
           ,
           and
           Human
           Authority
           differing
           from
           Divine
           just
           as
           much
           as
           Fallible
           differs
           from
           Infallible
           ▪
           the
           same
           in
           proportion
           will
           also
           〈…〉
           between
           Human
           and
           Divine
           ●aith
           .
           That
           is
           ,
           the
           former
           will
           always
           be
           a
           Fallible
           ,
           and
           the
           latter
           an
           Infallible
           Assent
           .
        
         
           8.
           
           
             Human
             Faith
          
           (
           though
           sometimes
           as
           actually
           undeceiv'd
           as
           Divine
           )
           is
           yet
           always
           liable
           to
           Error
           and
           Deception
           ,
           and
           so
           doubtful
           ,
           hazardous
           and
           uncertain
           even
           when
           actually
           true
           ,
           like
           a
           Conclusion
           drawn
           from
           uncertain
           Premisses
           ;
           in
           which
           respect
           it
           resembles
           Opinion
           ,
           and
           that
           so
           much
           that
           some
           have
           confounded
           
           it
           with
           it
           ,
           though
           I
           think
           illogically
           enough
           ,
           since
           though
           there
           be
           a
           like
           uncertainty
           in
           both
           Assents
           ,
           yet
           they
           differ
           extremely
           in
           their
           Formal
           Motives
           ,
           one
           being
           grounded
           upon
           Reason
           ,
           and
           the
           other
           upon
           Authority
           .
           And
           the
           Distinction
           of
           these
           Assents
           is
           not
           taken
           from
           the
           degree
           of
           Certainty
           wherein
           they
           agree
           ,
           but
           from
           the
           Quality
           of
           the
           Motive
           wherein
           they
           differ
           .
           However
           tho'
           this
           makes
           a
           great
           difference
           in
           Notion
           ,
           it
           makes
           None
           in
           the
           Affairs
           of
           Civil
           Life
           ,
           and
           the
           Faith
           of
           him
           that
           believes
           the
           Testimony
           of
           a
           Man
           will
           as
           to
           all
           real
           intents
           and
           purposes
           go
           for
           no
           more
           than
           his
           Opinion
           .
           And
           that
           because
           though
           different
           Assents
           as
           to
           the
           Formality
           of
           their
           Motives
           ,
           they
           are
           yet
           Much
           at
           one
           rate
           for
           Certainty
           ,
           being
           both
           Fallible
           in
           their
           Grounds
           ,
           and
           so
           subject
           to
           Error
           and
           Deception
           .
        
         
           9.
           
           But
           the
           Case
           is
           quite
           otherwise
           as
           to
           
             Divine
             Faith
          
           whose
           Foundation
           stands
           too
           sure
           not
           only
           to
           be
           overturn'd
           ,
           but
           even
           so
           much
           as
           shaken
           .
           This
           Faith
           is
           strictly
           and
           Absolutely
           infallible
           ,
           not
           subject
           to
           the
           least
           Error
           ,
           or
           Possibility
           of
           Erring
           ,
           
           as
           having
           the
           very
           
             Ground
             and
             Pillar
             of
             Truth
          
           it self
           ,
           the
           Omniscience
           and
           Veracity
           of
           God
           for
           its
           Security
           ,
           than
           which
           there
           neither
           Needs
           ,
           nor
           Can
           be
           Greater
           .
           'T
           is
           Most
           Certain
           that
           God
           is
           both
           Actively
           and
           Passively
           Infallible
           ,
           his
           Omniscience
           will
           not
           suffer
           him
           to
           be
           deceiv'd
           himself
           ,
           and
           his
           infinite
           Veracity
           and
           Truth
           will
           not
           suffer
           him
           to
           deceive
           us
           .
           And
           therefore
           he
           that
           builds
           his
           Faith
           upon
           his
           Authority
           ,
           goes
           upon
           the
           Most
           sure
           Grounds
           ,
           and
           cannot
           possibly
           Err
           in
           his
           Assent
           .
           And
           as
           he
           is
           secure
           from
           Error
           ,
           so
           he
           is
           also
           from
           all
           just
           reason
           of
           Scruple
           or
           Fear
           ,
           and
           leaning
           upon
           a
           firm
           and
           indefectible
           Support
           ,
           may
           stay
           and
           repose
           himself
           upon
           it
           with
           full
           Acquiescence
           .
           So
           that
           there
           is
           all
           the
           Certainty
           that
           can
           be
           in
           this
           Faith
           ,
           both
           Objective
           and
           Subjective
           ,
           that
           of
           the
           Thing
           ,
           and
           that
           of
           the
           Person
           .
           The
           thing
           assented
           to
           is
           most
           undoubtedly
           true
           in
           it self
           ,
           and
           he
           that
           assents
           to
           it
           may
           be
           most
           firmly
           assured
           and
           perswaded
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           in
           his
           own
           Mind
           ,
           and
           among
           all
           Temptations
           to
           Doubt
           and
           Distrust
           
           may
           with
           great
           Triumph
           and
           Confidence
           say
           with
           the
           Apostle
           ,
           
           
             I
             know
             whom
             I
             have
             believ'd
             .
          
        
         
           10.
           
           It
           was
           observ'd
           a
           little
           before
           of
           
             Humane
             Faith
          
           that
           it
           resembles
           Opinion
           ,
           in
           as
           much
           as
           they
           are
           both
           dubious
           and
           uncertain
           Assents
           ,
           as
           proceeding
           upon
           grounds
           of
           like
           uncertainty
           ,
           though
           otherwise
           of
           different
           Natures
           .
           Now
           as
           this
           Faith
           resembles
           Opinion
           ,
           so
           in
           like
           manner
           it
           may
           be
           observ'd
           of
           Divine
           Faith
           that
           it
           resembles
           Science
           ,
           or
           rather
           that
           Second
           Assent
           (
           for
           so
           I
           am
           forc'd
           to
           call
           it
           for
           want
           of
           a
           better
           Name
           )
           which
           we
           lately
           discours'd
           of
           ,
           and
           plac'd
           between
           Opinion
           and
           Faith.
           The
           Comparison
           here
           bears
           the
           same
           proportion
           as
           to
           Certainty
           ,
           as
           it
           did
           in
           the
           other
           Case
           as
           to
           uncertainty
           .
           Divine
           Faith
           has
           all
           the
           Certainty
           that
           is
           possible
           ,
           and
           therefore
           to
           be
           sure
           as
           much
           as
           Science
           or
           that
           Second
           Assent
           can
           have
           .
           There
           is
           as
           much
           Certainty
           in
           the
           thing
           assented
           to
           ,
           and
           there
           may
           be
           as
           much
           Assurance
           and
           firmness
           of
           Perswasion
           in
           the
           Assent
           it self
           ,
           or
           in
           other
           words
           what
           a
           man
           believes
           upon
           the
           Authority
           of
           God
           is
           in
           it self
           as
           certain
           as
           
           what
           he
           knows
           ,
           and
           he
           may
           also
           be
           as
           Certain
           of
           it
           .
           For
           he
           that
           assents
           to
           a
           thing
           upon
           full
           evidence
           can
           but
           assent
           fully
           and
           perfectly
           without
           suspense
           or
           hesitation
           ,
           and
           so
           also
           can
           he
           that
           assents
           to
           a
           thing
           upon
           Divine
           Authority
           only
           .
           His
           Ground
           is
           every
           whit
           as
           Firm
           and
           Sure
           as
           the
           others
           ,
           and
           why
           then
           should
           the
           Measure
           of
           his
           Assurance
           be
           less
           ?
           It
           cannot
           possibly
           be
           if
           he
           Knows
           and
           Considers
           upon
           what
           Ground
           he
           stands
           .
           So
           that
           thus
           far
           ,
           both
           in
           regard
           of
           the
           Certainty
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           and
           the
           Firmness
           of
           the
           Perswasion
           ,
           Divine
           Faith
           may
           be
           justly
           placed
           upon
           a
           level
           with
           the
           Most
           Evident
           Assent
           whatever
           .
        
         
           11.
           
           Nor
           I
           suppose
           will
           this
           be
           thought
           an
           undue
           Elevation
           of
           Divine
           Faith.
           On
           the
           Contrary
           I
           expect
           to
           be
           Complain'd
           of
           for
           setting
           the
           Dignity
           of
           it
           at
           too
           low
           a
           Pitch
           by
           those
           who
           say
           that
           Divine
           Faith
           is
           Firmer
           than
           Science
           .
           But
           't
           is
           for
           want
           of
           the
           Latter
           that
           these
           Men
           so
           excessively
           ex●ol
           the
           Former
           .
           I
           call
           it
           excessively
           ,
           because
           't
           is
           what
           strictly
           and
           exactly
           speaking
           cannot
           be
           .
           For
           what
           I
           Perceive
           or
           Know
           
           is
           even
           by
           that
           very
           supposition
           unquestionably
           true
           ,
           (
           or
           else
           I
           cannot
           be
           said
           to
           Know
           it
           )
           and
           what
           I
           believe
           upon
           the
           highest
           Authority
           can
           be
           no
           more
           .
           To
           say
           therefore
           that
           Faith
           is
           Firmer
           than
           Science
           ,
           is
           like
           saying
           that
           one
           streight
           Line
           is
           streighter
           than
           another
           .
           But
           perhaps
           their
           Meaning
           only
           is
           ,
           that
           't
           is
           safer
           relying
           upon
           the
           Aut●ority
           of
           God
           than
           upon
           our
           own
           Rational
           Faculties
           ,
           which
           indeed
           is
           right
           ,
           and
           I
           heartily
           wish
           all
           Men
           were
           convinc'd
           of
           it
           .
           For
           though
           what
           I
           do
           actually
           and
           really
           Know
           be
           to
           the
           full
           as
           true
           and
           certain
           as
           what
           I
           Believe
           ,
           and
           I
           can
           no
           more
           be
           out
           in
           one
           than
           in
           the
           other
           ,
           yet
           it
           is
           More
           Certain
           in
           the
           general
           that
           God
           cannot
           deceive
           me
           ,
           than
           that
           my
           Reason
           cannot
           be
           deceiv'd
           .
           Not
           that
           what
           I
           assent
           to
           by
           Divine
           Faith
           can
           have
           a
           greater
           Objective
           Certainty
           than
           what
           I
           clearly
           and
           distinctly
           Perceive
           or
           Know
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           there
           is
           a
           Possibility
           ,
           not
           to
           say
           Danger
           ,
           of
           my
           taking
           that
           for
           a
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Perception
           which
           ●ndeed
           is
           Not
           so
           ,
           and
           so
           though
           I
           
           cannot
           be
           deceiv'd
           in
           what
           I
           do
           truly
           know
           ,
           yet
           I
           may
           be
           deceiv'd
           in
           thinking
           that
           I
           know
           when
           I
           do
           not
           .
           So
           that
           Divine
           Faith
           though
           not
           more
           Certain
           than
           Knowledge
           it self
           ,
           is
           yet
           of
           greater
           Certainty
           than
           our
           
             Knowing
             Faculties
          
           ,
           and
           generally
           speaking
           the
           Believer
           goes
           upon
           surer
           grounds
           than
           the
           Man
           of
           Reason
           and
           Demonstration
           .
           Because
           his
           Reason
           may
           possibly
           lead
           him
           into
           Error
           ,
           whereas
           the
           Other
           's
           Authority
           cannot
           .
           And
           when
           they
           are
           both
           in
           the
           right
           ,
           yet
           still
           there
           will
           be
           this
           difference
           between
           them
           ,
           that
           his
           Reason
           is
           only
           
             not
             Deceiv'd
          
           ,
           whereas
           the
           Other
           's
           Faith
           is
           Infallible
           .
        
         
           12.
           
           And
           thus
           far
           we
           have
           taken
           a
           view
           of
           the
           more
           bright
           and
           perfect
           side
           of
           Divine
           Faith
           ,
           I
           mean
           that
           of
           its
           Firmness
           and
           Certainty
           ,
           in
           respect
           of
           which
           it
           stands
           upon
           a
           just
           level
           with
           Science
           .
           But
           it
           has
           also
           a
           more
           dark
           side
           ,
           in
           which
           respect
           it
           comes
           short
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           must
           give
           it
           the
           Precedency
           .
           And
           I
           think
           it
           may
           be
           very
           properly
           call'd
           a
           Dark
           side
           ,
           because
           it
           consists
           in
           Darkness
           
           and
           Obscurity
           ,
           and
           which
           is
           still
           so
           much
           the
           darker
           ,
           because
           't
           is
           so
           peculiar
           to
           Faith
           ,
           and
           makes
           so
           great
           a
           part
           of
           its
           Character
           ,
           being
           the
           Main
           Difference
           that
           distinguishes
           it
           from
           Science
           ,
           or
           that
           Second
           Assent
           before
           spoken
           of
           .
           For
           as
           to
           Firmness
           and
           Certainty
           ,
           therein
           they
           agree
           .
           For
           Faith
           may
           be
           Firm
           ,
           because
           he
           that
           believes
           in
           God
           may
           be
           supposed
           not
           in
           the
           least
           to
           hesitate
           or
           doubt
           of
           the
           truth
           of
           what
           he
           reveals
           .
           And
           't
           is
           also
           certain
           ,
           because
           it
           relies
           upon
           the
           most
           certain
           Foundation
           ,
           the
           Testimony
           of
           God
           ,
           who
           is
           Infallible
           himself
           ,
           and
           cannot
           deceive
           .
           And
           hitherto
           they
           run
           parallel
           one
           to
           the
           other
           .
           But
           here
           begins
           both
           the
           difference
           and
           the
           disproportion
           ,
           that
           there
           is
           Clearness
           and
           Evidence
           on
           the
           side
           of
           Science
           ,
           and
           that
           Second
           Assent
           ,
           whereas
           there
           is
           none
           on
           the
           side
           of
           Faith
           ,
           which
           walks
           indeed
           upon
           firm
           Ground
           ,
           but
           altogether
           in
           the
           dark
           .
           For
           he
           that
           Believes
           does
           not
           give
           his
           Assent
           because
           either
           by
           Sense
           or
           Reason
           he
           perceives
           the
           Object
           of
           his
           Faith
           to
           be
           thus
           or
           thus
           ,
           but
           merely
           because
           he
           has
           the
           
           Word
           and
           Authority
           of
           God
           for
           it
           .
           Which
           though
           it
           be
           sufficient
           to
           found
           a
           Firm
           and
           Certain
           ,
           is
           yet
           however
           not
           enough
           to
           beget
           a
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           Assent
           .
           So
           that
           the
           great
           and
           distinguishing
           Character
           of
           Science
           and
           the
           Second
           Assent
           ,
           is
           Light
           and
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           that
           of
           Faith
           inevidence
           and
           Obscurity
           ,
           which
           accordingly
           is
           commonly
           said
           to
           be
           an
           
             inevident
             Assent
          
           .
           But
           how
           and
           in
           what
           sense
           it
           is
           so
           seems
           not
           commonly
           to
           be
           so
           well
           understood
           ,
           and
           for
           the
           Consequence
           of
           what
           depends
           upon
           the
           right
           stating
           of
           it
           ,
           deserves
           to
           be
           explain'd
           with
           all
           possible
           exactness
           .
        
         
           13.
           
           In
           order
           to
           which
           we
           are
           carefully
           to
           distinguish
           between
           the
           thing
           believ'd
           ,
           and
           the
           Reason
           or
           Motive
           that
           induces
           us
           ,
           to
           believe
           it
           ;
           even
           as
           in
           Knowledge
           we
           distinguish
           between
           the
           thing
           Known
           ,
           and
           the
           Argument
           or
           Medium
           by
           which
           it
           is
           Known
           ,
           the
           Scitum
           and
           the
           
             Formalis
             ratio
             Sciendi
          
           .
           The
           thing
           Believ'd
           I
           would
           call
           the
           Matter
           or
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           ,
           and
           the
           Motive
           that
           induces
           me
           to
           believe
           it
           I
           would
           call
           the
           Formal
           Reason
           
           of
           Faith.
           Aquinas
           I
           know
           calls
           them
           both
           Objects
           ,
           
           and
           then
           after
           distinguishes
           them
           by
           calling
           the
           Former
           the
           Material
           Object
           ,
           and
           the
           latter
           the
           Formal
           Object
           of
           Faith.
           Accordingly
           he
           says
           that
           
             the
             Formal
             Object
             of
             Faith
             is
             the
             First
             Truth
             ,
          
           meaning
           (
           as
           he
           afterward
           explains
           himself
           )
           that
           Faith
           relies
           upon
           the
           Truth
           of
           God
           as
           its
           Medium
           ,
           or
           Argument
           .
           Which
           Medium
           I
           chuse
           rather
           to
           call
           (
           and
           I
           think
           more
           intelligibly
           )
           the
           formal
           Reason
           ,
           than
           the
           formal
           Object
           of
           Faith.
           Since
           the
           Term
           (
           Object
           )
           seems
           more
           properly
           to
           design
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           ,
           or
           the
           thing
           Believ'd
           ,
           and
           is
           hardly
           applicable
           to
           the
           Motive
           or
           Reason
           of
           Believing
           .
           However
           since
           we
           both
           mean
           one
           and
           the
           same
           thing
           ,
           there
           need
           be
           no
           debate
           upon
           the
           different
           manner
           of
           expressing
           it
           ,
           especially
           since
           if
           any
           one
           think
           his
           Term
           more
           intelligible
           and
           expressive
           of
           the
           Notion
           intended
           by
           it
           ,
           or
           has
           any
           reverence
           for
           it
           upon
           any
           other
           Consideration
           ,
           he
           is
           at
           liberty
           to
           substitute
           it
           in
           the
           room
           of
           the
           other
           .
        
         
         
           14.
           
           This
           necessary
           Distinction
           being
           premised
           ,
           't
           is
           in
           the
           first
           place
           to
           be
           well
           heeded
           that
           when
           Faith
           is
           said
           to
           be
           an
           obscure
           and
           inevident
           Assent
           ,
           this
           Obscurity
           or
           inevidence
           is
           not
           to
           be
           applied
           to
           the
           formal
           Reason
           or
           Motive
           of
           Faith
           ,
           but
           only
           to
           the
           Matter
           or
           Object
           of
           it
           .
           I
           say
           not
           to
           the
           formal
           Reason
           of
           it
           .
           For
           as
           there
           may
           be
           in
           general
           a
           clear
           Reason
           why
           a
           Man
           should
           believe
           an
           Obscure
           thing
           ,
           so
           't
           is
           most
           Certain
           that
           the
           formal
           Reason
           for
           which
           we
           assent
           to
           the
           things
           of
           Faith
           is
           very
           clear
           .
           For
           this
           formal
           Reason
           is
           no
           other
           than
           the
           Authority
           of
           God
           ,
           Or
           rather
           ,
           since
           this
           includes
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           Revealer
           as
           well
           as
           the
           Revelation
           it self
           (
           for
           otherwise
           of
           what
           Authority
           would
           be
           the
           Revelation
           :
           )
           I
           would
           chuse
           to
           say
           that
           the
           Truth
           and
           Revelation
           of
           God
           do
           jointly
           make
           up
           the
           formal
           Reason
           of
           Divine
           Faith
           ,
           which
           accordingly
           proceeds
           upon
           this
           double
           Principle
           ,
           1.
           
           That
           whatever
           God
           reveals
           is
           true
           ,
           2.
           
           That
           this
           or
           that
           thing
           in
           particular
           is
           reveal'd
           by
           God.
           For
           Faith
           has
           its
           Reasons
           as
           well
           as
           
           Science
           (
           though
           of
           another
           Nature
           )
           and
           its
           Reasons
           are
           these
           two
           ,
           as
           will
           more
           distinctly
           ,
           appear
           by
           disposing
           the
           Process
           of
           Faith
           into
           a
           Syllogistical
           Form
           ,
           which
           will
           be
           this
           .
        
         
           
             Whatever
             is
             reveal'd
             by
             God
             is
             true
             ,
          
           
             This
             is
             Reveal'd
             by
             God
             ,
          
           
             Therefore
             this
             is
             true
             .
          
        
         
           The
           Conclusion
           of
           this
           Syllogism
           contains
           both
           the
           Matter
           and
           the
           Act
           of
           Faith
           ,
           as
           it
           is
           an
           Assent
           to
           such
           a
           thing
           upon
           such
           a
           ground
           ,
           which
           is
           implied
           by
           the
           Illative
           Particle
           ,
           Therefore
           .
           The
           two
           other
           Propositions
           contain
           the
           Ground
           it self
           or
           the
           formal
           Reason
           of
           Faith
           ,
           which
           you
           see
           consists
           of
           the
           double
           Principle
           before-mention'd
           .
           Now
           't
           is
           most
           apparent
           that
           these
           two
           Principles
           are
           both
           of
           them
           sufficiently
           clear
           ,
           or
           at
           least
           may
           be
           so
           .
           'T
           is
           clear
           in
           the
           first
           place
           that
           whatever
           is
           reveal'd
           by
           God
           is
           true
           .
           This
           is
           either
           self-evident
           ,
           or
           may
           be
           proved
           from
           the
           Idea
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           so
           has
           either
           the
           Light
           of
           a
           Principle
           ,
           or
           of
           a
           Conclusion
           ,
           either
           an
           immediate
           
           or
           a
           Mediate
           Evidence
           .
           And
           it
           may
           be
           also
           clear
           (
           and
           to
           be
           sure
           is
           so
           whenever
           our
           Faith
           is
           well-grounded
           )
           that
           such
           a
           thing
           in
           Particular
           is
           reveal'd
           by
           God.
           And
           in
           both
           these
           respects
           it
           is
           true
           (
           what
           is
           commonly
           said
           )
           that
           
             Faith
             is
             the
             Highest
             Reason
          
           .
           For
           you
           see
           it
           is
           perfectly
           reasonable
           in
           its
           Fund
           and
           Principle
           ,
           and
           does
           at
           last
           resolve
           ,
           as
           much
           as
           any
           Mathematical
           Conclusion
           ,
           into
           a
           rational
           ground
           of
           unquestionable
           Light
           and
           Evidence
           .
           With
           this
           only
           difference
           that
           a
           Conclusion
           in
           Geometry
           is
           founded
           upon
           a
           Ground
           taken
           from
           within
           ,
           from
           the
           intrinsic
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           whereas
           our
           Conclusion
           of
           Faith
           proceeds
           upon
           a
           ground
           taken
           from
           
             without
             ,
             viz.
          
           from
           the
           Authority
           of
           God
           ,
           but
           such
           as
           however
           in
           Light
           and
           Evidence
           is
           no
           way
           inferiour
           to
           the
           other
           .
        
         
           15.
           
           This
           by
           the
           way
           may
           serve
           to
           shew
           the
           vanity
           and
           impertinence
           of
           those
           who
           when
           they
           are
           to
           prove
           that
           there
           is
           nothing
           in
           Christianity
           above
           Reason
           ,
           run
           out
           into
           a
           Popular
           Ve●●
           of
           Harangue
           about
           the
           Reasonables
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           
           and
           its
           great
           Accommodation
           to
           Human
           Nature
           ,
           crying
           out
           with
           repeated
           importunity
           that
           Man
           is
           a
           Reasonable
           Creature
           ,
           Christianity
           a
           reasonable
           Service
           ,
           and
           Faith
           a
           Rational
           Act
           ,
           nay
           even
           the
           
             Highest
             Reason
          
           ,
           and
           the
           like
           .
           As
           if
           we
           were
           for
           a
           Blind
           and
           unaccountable
           Faith
           ,
           and
           denied
           the
           use
           of
           Reason
           in
           Religion
           ,
           or
           that
           Faith
           was
           founded
           upon
           Reason
           .
           Or
           as
           if
           because
           there
           is
           a
           Reason
           from
           without
           for
           Believing
           ,
           therefore
           the
           thing
           Believ'd
           might
           not
           from
           within
           ,
           and
           as
           to
           the
           inward
           Matter
           of
           it
           be
           above
           Reason
           ,
           so
           as
           not
           to
           be
           comprehended
           or
           accounted
           for
           by
           it
           .
           But
           this
           will
           cross
           my
           way
           again
           in
           another
           place
           ,
           
           and
           therefore
           I
           shall
           not
           anticipate
           here
           what
           further
           Considerations
           I
           may
           have
           occasion
           to
           bestow
           upon
           it
           there
           .
        
         
           16.
           
           To
           return
           therefore
           ,
           I
           say
           that
           this
           Obscurity
           and
           inevidence
           that
           is
           in
           Faith
           ,
           and
           upon
           whose
           account
           it
           is
           commonly
           said
           to
           be
           an
           inevident
           Assent
           ,
           does
           not
           belong
           to
           its
           formal
           Reason
           (
           which
           you
           see
           may
           be
           clear
           enough
           ,
           as
           clear
           as
           any
           Principle
           of
           Natural
           Science
           )
           but
           
           only
           to
           the
           Matter
           or
           Object
           of
           it
           .
           That
           is
           ,
           in
           other
           words
           the
           inevidence
           does
           not
           lie
           in
           the
           Reason
           of
           Believing
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           Believ'd
           .
           Not
           that
           the
           matter
           of
           Faith
           again
           is
           wholy
           and
           all
           over
           without
           Evidence
           (
           for
           then
           there
           would
           be
           no
           reason
           to
           believe
           it
           )
           but
           only
           that
           it
           has
           no
           evidence
           from
           within
           ,
           and
           from
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           it self
           ,
           as
           was
           remarqu'd
           before
           .
           Not
           that
           this
           again
           is
           so
           to
           be
           understood
           neither
           as
           if
           the
           Proposition
           to
           be
           believ'd
           were
           not
           so
           much
           as
           simply
           intelligible
           as
           to
           the
           very
           litteral
           sense
           and
           direct
           signification
           of
           its
           Terms
           .
           No
           ,
           we
           are
           no
           more
           to
           believe
           we
           Know
           not
           what
           ,
           than
           to
           believe
           we
           Know
           not
           why
           ,
           and
           whatever
           Darkness
           there
           may
           be
           in
           Faith
           ,
           it
           is
           still
           so
           much
           a
           Luminous
           Assent
           ,
           and
           an
           Act
           of
           Reason
           ,
           as
           to
           require
           that
           we
           understand
           the
           simple
           Meaning
           of
           the
           Proposition
           we
           are
           to
           believe
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           the
           Grounds
           of
           Credibility
           upon
           which
           it
           Challenges
           our
           Assent
           .
           For
           the
           general
           Object
           of
           Faith
           is
           Truth
           ,
           and
           Truth
           is
           the
           relation
           of
           Connexion
           between
           Ideas
           ,
           I
           say
           Ideas
           ,
           
           for
           Truth
           does
           not
           lie
           in
           Sounds
           or
           Words
           but
           in
           Things
           .
           Therefore
           to
           believe
           such
           a
           Thing
           to
           be
           True
           is
           the
           same
           as
           to
           believe
           that
           there
           is
           a
           Connexion
           between
           such
           Ideas
           .
           But
           then
           a
           Man
           must
           know
           what
           those
           Ideas
           are
           ,
           or
           else
           how
           can
           he
           believe
           they
           are
           connected
           .
           Therefore
           he
           must
           understand
           something
           more
           than
           the
           Terms
           themselves
           ,
           he
           must
           also
           have
           the
           Ideas
           of
           those
           Terms
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           same
           as
           to
           under
           stand
           the
           Meaning
           and
           Signification
           of
           them
           .
           And
           indeed
           he
           that
           has
           no
           Idea
           or
           Conception
           of
           what
           he
           believes
           ,
           believes
           he
           knows
           not
           what
           ,
           and
           he
           that
           believes
           he
           knows
           not
           what
           cannot
           be
           properly
           said
           to
           believe
           any
           thing
           .
           In
           all
           Faith
           therefore
           the
           Proposition
           Must
           be
           simply
           intelligible
           ,
           and
           though
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           be
           to
           be
           Believ'd
           ,
           yet
           the
           Meaning
           of
           it
           must
           be
           understood
           .
        
         
           17.
           
           For
           we
           are
           again
           Carefully
           to
           distinguish
           between
           the
           Meaning
           of
           a
           Proposition
           ,
           and
           the
           Truth
           of
           a
           Proposition
           .
           The
           meaning
           of
           a
           Proposition
           is
           only
           the
           Determination
           of
           the
           Ideas
           that
           are
           signified
           by
           such
           Terms
           ;
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           is
           the
           
           Union
           or
           Connexion
           that
           is
           between
           those
           Ideas
           .
           Now
           though
           a
           Man
           does
           not
           see
           the
           Connexion
           that
           is
           between
           the
           Ideas
           of
           that
           Proposition
           he
           is
           said
           to
           Believe
           ,
           yet
           he
           must
           in
           some
           measure
           perceive
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           because
           in
           believing
           the
           Proposition
           he
           is
           supposed
           to
           believe
           that
           such
           Ideas
           are
           so
           related
           and
           Connected
           together
           .
           When
           therefore
           't
           is
           said
           that
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           is
           inevident
           as
           to
           the
           intrinsic
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           the
           inevidence
           must
           not
           be
           thought
           to
           lie
           in
           the
           Ideas
           whereof
           the
           Proposition
           to
           be
           Believ'd
           Consists
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           Connexion
           of
           those
           Ideas
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           not
           in
           the
           Meaning
           of
           the
           Proposition
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           ,
           which
           is
           properly
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           ,
           as
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           are
           of
           Perception
           .
           Which
           again
           by
           the
           way
           may
           serve
           to
           discover
           another
           Instance
           of
           Impertinency
           in
           the
           Reasoning
           of
           those
           ,
           who
           when
           they
           are
           Maintaining
           that
           there
           can
           be
           no
           Article
           of
           Faith
           above
           Reason
           ,
           divert
           into
           pompous
           Flourishes
           and
           Declamations
           about
           the
           Intelligibility
           of
           the
           Objects
           of
           Faith
           ,
           and
           the
           utter
           impossibility
           
           of
           Believing
           what
           is
           not
           intelligible
           .
           As
           if
           we
           denied
           the
           simple
           intelligibility
           of
           the
           Proposition
           ,
           or
           would
           have
           Men
           believe
           they
           know
           not
           what
           (
           which
           certainly
           would
           be
           a
           strange
           degree
           of
           Implicit
           Faith
           ,
           and
           more
           Nonsensical
           than
           that
           of
           the
           Collier
           )
           or
           ,
           as
           if
           that
           Proposition
           which
           is
           clear
           enough
           as
           to
           its
           simple
           Meaning
           might
           not
           be
           inevident
           ,
           and
           so
           above
           Reason
           ,
           as
           to
           its
           Truth
           ,
           or
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           as
           if
           Clearness
           of
           Ideas
           might
           not
           consist
           with
           Obscurity
           of
           their
           Connexion
           .
        
         
           18.
           
           But
           then
           it
           must
           be
           observ'd
           again
           that
           when
           we
           say
           that
           the
           Inevidence
           that
           is
           in
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           respects
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           Proposition
           not
           the
           Meaning
           of
           it
           ,
           or
           the
           Connexion
           of
           the
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           not
           the
           very
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           this
           is
           not
           so
           to
           be
           understood
           neither
           as
           if
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           even
           thus
           consider'd
           ,
           were
           Absolutely
           ,
           and
           in
           its
           self
           necessarily
           inevident
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           could
           not
           possibly
           be
           known
           without
           altering
           its
           Nature
           ,
           and
           ceasing
           to
           be
           any
           longer
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith.
           I
           know
           the
           contrary
           Supposition
           has
           
           prevail'd
           in
           some
           Schools
           ,
           where
           it
           passes
           almost
           for
           Principle
           and
           Maxim
           that
           Knowledge
           and
           Faith
           are
           mutually
           Exclusive
           of
           each
           other
           ,
           that
           the
           same
           thing
           cannot
           be
           at
           once
           the
           Object
           of
           both
           ,
           and
           that
           therefore
           if
           a
           thing
           be
           believ'd
           it
           cannot
           be
           known
           ,
           and
           if
           known
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           believ'd
           .
           St.
           Austin
           was
           of
           this
           Opinion
           ,
           and
           has
           in
           many
           places
           declared
           his
           mind
           to
           this
           purpose
           ,
           particularly
           in
           his
           XL
           Treatise
           of
           his
           Exposition
           upon
           St.
           
           Iohn's
           Gospel
           .
           
           And
           his
           Authority
           has
           recommended
           it
           (
           as
           it
           did
           most
           other
           things
           )
           to
           several
           of
           the
           Schoolmen
           ,
           particularly
           Aquinas
           ,
           whence
           it
           has
           been
           transmitted
           down
           among
           many
           Modern
           Writers
           of
           the
           Systematical
           way
           ,
           both
           Philosophers
           and
           Divines
           .
           But
           we
           must
           follow
           Reason
           before
           Authority
           ,
           and
           whoever
           can
           be
           prevail'd
           with
           to
           lay
           the
           latter
           quite
           aside
           ,
           and
           to
           use
           the
           other
           as
           he
           ought
           ,
           will
           I
           believe
           clearly
           perceive
           that
           nothing
           hinders
           but
           that
           the
           same
           Proposition
           may
           be
           at
           once
           the
           Object
           of
           both
           Faith
           and
           Science
           ,
           or
           that
           the
           Same
           thing
           may
           be
           at
           the
           same
           time
           both
           Known
           and
           Believ'd
           ,
           
           provided
           it
           be
           by
           different
           Mediums
           ,
           according
           to
           the
           diversity
           of
           the
           respective
           Acts.
           
        
         
           19.
           
           For
           ,
           not
           to
           enter
           into
           the
           wrangle
           and
           Dust
           of
           the
           Schools
           upon
           this
           Occasion
           ,
           it
           may
           be
           sufficient
           to
           consider
           that
           there
           is
           no
           manner
           of
           Opposition
           between
           Faith
           and
           Knowledge
           ,
           or
           the
           Most
           evident
           Assent
           as
           to
           the
           Essence
           of
           the
           Proposition
           (
           that
           being
           not
           supposed
           to
           be
           denied
           in
           the
           one
           which
           is
           Affirm'd
           in
           the
           other
           ,
           or
           the
           contrary
           )
           but
           only
           as
           to
           the
           Medium
           of
           the
           Act.
           And
           that
           't
           is
           not
           the
           Absolute
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           Believ'd
           ,
           but
           the
           Quality
           of
           the
           Motive
           that
           specifies
           Faith
           ,
           and
           distinguishes
           it
           from
           other
           Assents
           .
           So
           that
           't
           is
           no
           matter
           what
           the
           Absolute
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           be
           in
           it self
           ,
           whether
           it
           be
           evident
           or
           not
           evident
           ,
           Knowable
           or
           not
           Knowable
           ,
           provided
           it
           be
           assented
           to
           upon
           the
           proper
           Medium
           and
           Motive
           of
           Faith
           ,
           that
           is
           upon
           Authority
           ,
           without
           any
           respect
           had
           to
           the
           Natural
           evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           though
           otherwise
           never
           so
           evident
           in
           its
           own
           Absolute
           Nature
           ,
           so
           as
           to
           be
           the
           Object
           of
           Science
           (
           though
           
           upon
           a
           different
           Medium
           )
           at
           the
           same
           time
           .
           For
           as
           I
           said
           before
           ,
           't
           is
           not
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           but
           the
           Quality
           of
           the
           Medium
           that
           specifies
           Faith
           ,
           and
           tho'
           the
           same
           thing
           cannot
           have
           two
           Natures
           ,
           or
           be
           in
           it self
           at
           once
           evident
           and
           not
           evident
           ,
           yet
           why
           may
           it
           not
           sustain
           two
           different
           Relations
           ,
           or
           be
           consider'd
           in
           two
           different
           Mediums
           ,
           so
           as
           to
           be
           said
           to
           be
           known
           when
           perceiv'd
           by
           its
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           to
           be
           believ'd
           when
           assented
           to
           upon
           Authority
           ?
           Which
           certainly
           may
           be
           done
           as
           fully
           ,
           and
           with
           as
           little
           regard
           to
           its
           evidence
           ,
           as
           if
           there
           were
           no
           evidence
           in
           the
           thing
           at
           all
           .
           So
           that
           the
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           does
           not
           hinder
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           ,
           supposing
           the
           Belief
           not
           to
           proceed
           upon
           that
           Evidence
           ,
           but
           upon
           its
           own
           proper
           Medium
           ,
           Authority
           .
        
         
           20.
           
           But
           to
           use
           a
           way
           of
           Arguing
           less
           Abstract
           ,
           though
           it
           may
           be
           with
           some
           more
           pressing
           and
           convincing
           .
           Suppose
           God
           should
           reveal
           to
           me
           a
           Geometrical
           Truth
           ,
           as
           that
           two
           Triangles
           having
           the
           same
           Base
           ,
           and
           being
           within
           the
           same
           Parallels
           ,
           are
           equal
           ,
           and
           I
           who
           at
           first
           receiv'd
           
           it
           upon
           his
           bare
           Authority
           should
           come
           afterwards
           to
           be
           able
           to
           demonstrate
           it
           my self
           upon
           the
           known
           Principles
           of
           Art
           ,
           who
           that
           well
           considers
           the
           Natures
           of
           these
           things
           would
           say
           that
           my
           Science
           evac●●ted
           my
           Faith
           ,
           and
           that
           I
           ceas'd
           to
           be
           a
           Believer
           assoon
           as
           I
           became
           a
           Mathematician
           ?
           For
           though
           I
           am
           now
           supposed
           to
           Know
           what
           before
           I
           only
           Believ'd
           ,
           yet
           why
           should
           this
           Knowledge
           destroy
           my
           Faith
           ,
           since
           I
           may
           still
           have
           as
           much
           regard
           for
           the
           Authority
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           as
           little
           to
           the
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           as
           I
           had
           before
           the
           Demonstration
           ,
           and
           would
           still
           be
           ready
           to
           assent
           to
           it
           though
           there
           were
           no
           evidence
           to
           be
           produced
           for
           it
           ,
           only
           upon
           the
           Ground
           of
           Divine
           Authority
           .
           And
           ,
           to
           use
           another
           Sensible
           though
           not
           so
           Artificial
           way
           of
           arguing
           ,
           I
           would
           fain
           know
           whether
           any
           one
           of
           those
           who
           are
           of
           the
           Contrary
           Sentiment
           would
           refuse
           a
           Demonstrative
           Account
           of
           a
           Reveal'd
           Truth
           ,
           suppose
           the
           Creation
           of
           the
           World
           ,
           merely
           for
           fear
           of
           injuring
           or
           destroying
           his
           Faith
           ,
           which
           yet
           he
           were
           bound
           in
           Conscience
           to
           do
           ,
           if
           Knowledge
           and
           
           Faith
           were
           so
           exclusive
           of
           each
           other
           ,
           and
           inevidence
           and
           Obscurity
           were
           so
           absolutely
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           Faith
           as
           some
           pretend
           .
           For
           then
           it
           would
           not
           be
           lawful
           to
           acquire
           the
           Natural
           Knowledge
           of
           any
           reveal'd
           Truth
           ,
           because
           't
           is
           unlawful
           to
           destroy
           one's
           Faith
           ,
           and
           every
           Believer
           would
           have
           just
           reason
           to
           fear
           all
           further
           Light
           and
           Information
           about
           what
           he
           believes
           ,
           which
           yet
           I
           think
           would
           be
           acknowledg'd
           by
           all
           an
           extravagant
           Scruple
           ,
           such
           as
           can
           hardly
           enter
           ,
           much
           less
           stay
           long
           in
           any
           Considering
           head
           ;
           And
           is
           withal
           Contrary
           to
           a
           plain
           Exhortation
           of
           the
           Apostle
           ,
           who
           bids
           us
           add
           to
           our
           Faith
           Knowledge
           
           .
        
         
           21.
           
           When
           therefore
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           ,
           as
           it
           is
           taken
           for
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           Proposition
           Believ'd
           ,
           is
           charged
           with
           Obscurity
           ,
           and
           Faith
           it self
           upon
           that
           account
           is
           said
           (
           as
           it
           commonly
           is
           )
           to
           be
           of
           inevident
           things
           ,
           the
           Meaning
           ought
           not
           to
           be
           of
           an
           Absolute
           ,
           but
           of
           a
           Relative
           inevidence
           .
           Not
           that
           what
           is
           Believ'd
           is
           so
           all
           over
           dark
           and
           obscure
           that
           it
           cannot
           (
           while
           Believ'd
           )
           absolutely
           be
           known
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           it
           
           cannot
           under
           that
           Formality
           ,
           and
           so
           far
           as
           it
           is
           Believ'd
           ,
           being
           necessarily
           in
           that
           respect
           inevident
           ,
           how
           bright
           or
           clear
           soever
           it
           may
           be
           in
           other
           respects
           .
           That
           is
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           though
           the
           thing
           Believ'd
           absolutely
           consider'd
           may
           be
           Evident
           ,
           yet
           it
           is
           not
           so
           as
           Believ'd
           ,
           or
           in
           relation
           to
           Faith
           ,
           because
           that
           has
           no
           regard
           to
           the
           Evidence
           how
           bright
           soever
           it
           may
           shine
           ,
           but
           proceeds
           wholy
           upon
           another
           Argument
           ,
           between
           which
           and
           the
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           there
           is
           not
           the
           least
           Affinity
           or
           Communication
           .
           The
           short
           is
           ,
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           simply
           and
           absolutely
           speaking
           may
           admit
           of
           Evidence
           ,
           but
           then
           though
           it
           be
           never
           so
           evident
           and
           demonstrable
           in
           it self
           ,
           yet
           as
           Believ'd
           it
           is
           always
           Obscure
           ,
           Faith
           having
           no
           regard
           to
           the
           proper
           light
           and
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           but
           only
           to
           the
           Testimony
           of
           the
           Revealer
           ,
           whose
           bare
           Authority
           is
           the
           only
           Motive
           that
           determines
           her
           Assent
           ,
           and
           the
           only
           Ground
           upon
           which
           she
           lays
           the
           whole
           weight
           of
           it
           ,
           though
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           thing
           in
           it self
           absolutely
           Consider'd
           ,
           may
           also
           stand
           
           upon
           other
           Foundations
           ,
           be
           rationally
           accounted
           for
           by
           Arguments
           from
           within
           ,
           and
           so
           be
           seen
           by
           its
           own
           Light.
           But
           let
           the
           Light
           shine
           never
           so
           bright
           upon
           the
           Object
           from
           other
           sides
           ,
           Faith
           lets
           in
           none
           ,
           nor
           has
           any
           regard
           to
           that
           which
           she
           finds
           there
           ,
           but
           connives
           at
           it
           ,
           and
           walks
           (
           as
           I
           may
           say
           )
           with
           her
           eyes
           shut
           ,
           contenting
           her self
           with
           the
           certainty
           of
           Revelation
           ,
           and
           leaving
           to
           Science
           (
           if
           there
           be
           any
           )
           the
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           .
           So
           that
           the
           Object
           is
           always
           dark
           to
           her
           ,
           how
           clear
           and
           bright
           soever
           it
           may
           be
           in
           it self
           ,
           or
           appear
           ,
           when
           absolutely
           consider'd
           ,
           to
           a
           Philosophic
           Eye
           .
           In
           which
           respect
           it
           falls
           very
           short
           of
           the
           Perfection
           of
           Science
           ,
           though
           in
           respect
           of
           Firmness
           and
           Certainty
           it
           be
           equal
           to
           it
           ,
           as
           was
           said
           before
           .
           All
           which
           is
           briefly
           couch'd
           in
           that
           excellent
           Account
           of
           Faith
           given
           by
           the
           Author
           to
           the
           Hebrews
           ,
           
           when
           he
           says
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           the
           
             Substance
             of
             things
             hoped
             for
             ,
             and
             the
             Argument
             of
             things
             not
             seen
             .
          
           Where
           by
           Substance
           and
           Argument
           he
           equals
           it
           with
           Science
           in
           regard
           of
           the
           Firmness
           and
           Certainty
           of
           the
           Assent
           ,
           but
           by
           
           saying
           that
           't
           is
           
             of
             things
             not
             seen
          
           he
           makes
           it
           vail
           and
           stoop
           to
           it
           in
           point
           of
           Evidence
           ,
           in
           which
           respect
           indeed
           Faith
           ,
           as
           Firm
           and
           as
           Certain
           as
           it
           is
           ,
           is
           as
           much
           inferiour
           to
           Science
           ,
           as
           Darkness
           is
           to
           Light.
           
        
         
           22.
           
           To
           gather
           up
           then
           what
           has
           been
           here
           discours'd
           at
           large
           concerning
           the
           inevidence
           of
           Faith
           into
           one
           view
           .
           When
           we
           say
           that
           Faith
           is
           an
           inevident
           Assent
           we
           are
           not
           to
           understand
           this
           inevidence
           of
           the
           formal
           Reason
           of
           Faith
           ,
           but
           of
           the
           Matter
           of
           it
           .
           And
           when
           we
           say
           that
           the
           Matter
           of
           it
           is
           inevident
           ,
           we
           should
           not
           intend
           by
           it
           that
           it
           is
           wholy
           and
           all
           over
           without
           Evidence
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           it
           has
           none
           from
           within
           or
           from
           the
           intrinsic
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           .
           And
           when
           we
           say
           that
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           is
           inevident
           from
           within
           ,
           this
           again
           is
           not
           to
           be
           intended
           of
           the
           simple
           Meaning
           of
           the
           Proposition
           ,
           but
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           .
           And
           when
           we
           say
           that
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           is
           inevident
           ,
           this
           again
           lastly
           is
           not
           to
           be
           understood
           ,
           as
           if
           it
           were
           always
           and
           necessarily
           so
           in
           its
           own
           Absolute
           Nature
           ,
           but
           only
           so
           far
           forth
           as
           it
           is
           Believ'd
           ,
           or
           
           as
           't
           is
           consider'd
           under
           the
           formality
           of
           an
           Object
           of
           Faith.
           Or
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           the
           inevidence
           of
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           in
           respect
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           Article
           is
           not
           an
           Absolute
           but
           a
           Relative
           inevidence
           .
           Not
           that
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           is
           Never
           Absolutely
           and
           in
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           inevident
           (
           for
           it
           may
           be
           so
           too
           as
           will
           be
           seen
           afterwards
           )
           but
           only
           that
           it
           is
           not
           necessarily
           so
           ,
           there
           being
           no
           reason
           from
           the
           Nature
           of
           Faith
           that
           requires
           it
           should
           ,
           which
           may
           consist
           with
           Evidence
           ,
           though
           it
           proceeds
           not
           upon
           it
           ,
           and
           has
           no
           regard
           to
           it
           as
           a
           Motive
           .
           So
           then
           the
           formal
           Reason
           of
           Faith
           is
           always
           Clear
           ,
           the
           Matter
           of
           it
           Absolutely
           consider'd
           may
           be
           clear
           or
           not
           clear
           ,
           as
           it
           happens
           ,
           according
           as
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           is
           ,
           but
           as
           Believ'd
           ,
           or
           as
           Consider'd
           under
           the
           formality
           of
           being
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           so
           it
           is
           always
           inevident
           and
           Obscure
           ,
           as
           being
           not
           supposed
           to
           be
           assented
           to
           for
           the
           sake
           of
           its
           Evidence
           (
           even
           when
           it
           has
           any
           )
           but
           wholy
           upon
           another
           Account
           ,
           already
           sufficiently
           represented
           .
        
         
         
           23.
           
           And
           thus
           having
           struck
           some
           Light
           into
           the
           Darkness
           of
           Faith
           ,
           by
           stating
           and
           explaining
           with
           what
           exactness
           I
           could
           in
           what
           Sense
           it
           is
           an
           
             inevident
             Assent
          
           ,
           I
           cannot
           forbear
           Observing
           by
           the
           way
           (
           though
           a
           little
           of
           the
           soonest
           )
           of
           what
           Service
           this
           Account
           may
           be
           towards
           the
           grand
           Question
           of
           Believing
           things
           above
           Reason
           .
           For
           if
           Faith
           be
           an
           inevident
           Assent
           so
           far
           at
           least
           as
           not
           to
           respect
           the
           Evidence
           of
           its
           Object
           ,
           why
           may
           not
           a
           thing
           be
           believ'd
           though
           it
           be
           above
           Reason
           ?
           For
           what
           though
           it
           be
           above
           Reason
           ,
           is
           it
           therefore
           above
           Faith
           ?
           Has
           Faith
           any
           regard
           to
           Evidence
           ?
           Or
           is
           it
           determin'd
           by
           any
           Rational
           Motive
           ,
           I
           mean
           that
           is
           taken
           from
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           Object
           ?
           Even
           when
           a
           thing
           is
           evident
           ,
           Faith
           is
           not
           supposed
           to
           assent
           to
           it
           because
           of
           its
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           why
           then
           may
           not
           a
           thing
           be
           believ'd
           though
           it
           be
           not
           evident
           ?
           Some
           Contend
           that
           Faith
           and
           Evidence
           cannot
           possibly
           consist
           together
           ,
           and
           according
           to
           them
           Not
           only
           what
           is
           inevident
           may
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           but
           whatever
           is
           believ'd
           must
           be
           inevident
           .
           But
           this
           I
           look
           
           upon
           ,
           and
           have
           already
           shewn
           to
           be
           a
           Mistake
           .
           And
           't
           is
           a
           Mistake
           in
           the
           Extremity
           too
           .
           For
           I
           take
           it
           to
           be
           every
           whit
           as
           much
           an
           Extreme
           to
           say
           that
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           is
           always
           inevident
           ,
           as
           to
           say
           that
           it
           is
           always
           evident
           .
           However
           ,
           it
           is
           always
           inevident
           
             so
             far
             as
             Believ'd
          
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           Middle
           Point
           between
           the
           two
           extremes
           .
           The
           Nature
           of
           Faith
           requires
           at
           least
           this
           Relative
           inevidence
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           whatever
           it
           be
           in
           its
           own
           Nature
           ,
           and
           we
           need
           no
           More
           .
           For
           if
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           be
           alwayes
           inevident
           so
           far
           as
           Believ'd
           ,
           then
           will
           it
           not
           follow
           that
           it
           May
           be
           believ'd
           though
           inevident
           ?
           For
           my
           part
           I
           see
           nothing
           that
           should
           hinder
           this
           Consequence
           ,
           if
           the
           Principle
           it
           proceeds
           upon
           be
           right
           .
           The
           Principle
           is
           (
           and
           a
           very
           moderate
           one
           sure
           ,
           the
           generality
           of
           Writers
           straining
           the
           Matter
           a
           great
           deal
           higher
           )
           that
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           is
           inevident
           as
           far
           as
           Believ'd
           .
           The
           Consequence
           is
           ,
           that
           therefore
           a
           thing
           may
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           though
           inevident
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           one
           of
           these
           is
           an
           Absolute
           ,
           and
           the
           other
           only
           a
           Relative
           inevidence
           .
           But
           this
           signifies
           
           Nothing
           to
           the
           Argument
           .
           For
           why
           may
           not
           a
           thing
           really
           and
           in
           it self
           inevident
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           when
           even
           that
           which
           is
           Evident
           is
           Consider'd
           by
           Faith
           as
           inevident
           ?
           Why
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           all
           one
           (
           as
           to
           Faith
           )
           as
           if
           it
           were
           so
           indeed
           ;
           For
           what
           does
           the
           Evidence
           signify
           ,
           or
           what
           real
           alteration
           does
           it
           make
           ,
           if
           Faith
           has
           no
           regard
           to
           it
           ,
           nor
           Consideration
           of
           it
           ?
           And
           what
           should
           hinder
           then
           but
           that
           a
           thing
           really
           inevident
           may
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           especially
           if
           reveal'd
           by
           God
           himself
           ,
           and
           concerning
           himself
           .
           The
           short
           is
           ,
           Faith
           as
           Faith
           has
           no
           regard
           to
           Evidence
           (
           I
           mean
           that
           of
           the
           thing
           )
           and
           Faith
           as
           Divine
           has
           no
           need
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           therefore
           why
           an
           inevident
           thing
           may
           not
           be
           believ'd
           is
           what
           I
           do
           not
           understand
           ,
           and
           would
           be
           glad
           to
           Learn
           .
        
         
           24.
           
           But
           to
           return
           (
           for
           I
           look
           upon
           this
           as
           too
           much
           a
           digression
           from
           the
           present
           ,
           and
           too
           much
           a
           Prevention
           of
           what
           is
           to
           follow
           to
           be
           further
           pursued
           )
           after
           having
           thus
           discours'd
           of
           the
           Nature
           of
           Faith
           in
           General
           ,
           and
           the
           double
           Distribution
           of
           it
           into
           Humane
           and
           Divine
           ,
           with
           proper
           Considerations
           upon
           each
           of
           them
           ,
           
           it
           remains
           that
           it
           be
           now
           further
           consider'd
           that
           each
           of
           these
           may
           be
           either
           Explicit
           or
           Implicit
           .
           Then
           we
           are
           said
           to
           believe
           Explicitly
           ,
           when
           we
           believe
           determinately
           such
           or
           such
           a
           thing
           in
           particular
           ,
           distinctly
           knowing
           what
           that
           Particular
           thing
           is
           .
           And
           then
           Implicitly
           ,
           when
           we
           believe
           indeterminately
           and
           at
           large
           whatever
           is
           proposed
           to
           us
           by
           such
           an
           Authority
           ,
           not
           knowing
           what
           in
           particular
           is
           proposed
           ,
           or
           what
           it
           is
           we
           Believe
           .
           Which
           though
           it
           seems
           to
           carry
           the
           Appearance
           of
           an
           Assent
           too
           blind
           and
           hood-winkt
           to
           be
           the
           act
           of
           a
           Reasonable
           Creature
           ,
           may
           yet
           in
           its
           proper
           place
           become
           him
           as
           much
           as
           the
           other
           ,
           and
           indeed
           is
           every
           whit
           as
           rational
           an
           Assent
           in
           its
           Ground
           and
           Principle
           .
           For
           all
           Explicit
           Faith
           is
           founded
           upon
           Implicit
           ,
           and
           has
           Implicit
           Faith
           in
           it
           .
        
         
           25.
           
           To
           understand
           both
           this
           and
           the
           Nature
           of
           Implicit
           Faith
           the
           better
           we
           are
           to
           Consider
           (
           what
           has
           been
           already
           intimated
           )
           that
           Faith
           proceeds
           upon
           Premisses
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           Science
           ,
           and
           is
           the
           Conclusion
           of
           a
           Syllogism
           .
           And
           I
           further
           Note
           
           (
           what
           perhaps
           may
           not
           be
           unworthy
           the
           Observation
           of
           the
           Curious
           )
           that
           the
           Major
           Proposition
           in
           Faith
           Explicit
           is
           the
           Conclusion
           in
           Faith
           Implicit
           ,
           as
           may
           be
           seen
           in
           the
           Syllogism
           before
           set
           down
           .
           
             
               Whatever
               is
               reveal'd
               by
               God
               is
               true
               ,
            
             
               This
               is
               Reveal'd
               by
               God
               ,
            
             
               Therefore
               this
               is
               true
               .
            
          
           The
           Major
           Proposition
           here
           (
           whatever
           is
           reveal'd
           by
           God
           is
           true
           )
           is
           the
           Conclusion
           of
           Implicit
           Faith
           ,
           whose
           act
           is
           as
           much
           to
           believe
           to
           be
           true
           whatever
           God
           reveals
           ,
           as
           the
           act
           of
           Explicit
           Faith
           is
           to
           believe
           that
           this
           or
           that
           in
           particular
           is
           so
           .
           So
           that
           Explicit
           Faith
           proceeds
           upon
           Implicit
           ,
           borrows
           from
           it
           its
           Conclusion
           for
           its
           Principle
           ,
           and
           begins
           where
           the
           other
           leaves
           off
           .
           Just
           as
           in
           the
           Subalternation
           of
           Sciences
           ,
           that
           which
           is
           a
           Conclusion
           in
           one
           is
           a
           Principle
           in
           the
           other
           ,
           so
           't
           is
           here
           in
           the
           Subalternation
           of
           these
           two
           Faiths
           ,
           whereof
           that
           which
           is
           Explicit
           may
           be
           said
           to
           be
           Subalternated
           to
           that
           which
           is
           Implicit
           .
           Let
           not
           any
           therefore
           vilify
           or
           disparage
           Implicit
           
           Faith
           as
           a
           blind
           and
           irrational
           Assent
           ,
           since
           it
           lays
           a
           ground
           for
           Explicit
           ,
           which
           serves
           it self
           of
           it
           ,
           using
           its
           Conclusion
           as
           a
           Principle
           ,
           even
           as
           what
           is
           a
           Conclusion
           in
           Geometry
           is
           a
           Principle
           in
           Perspective
           .
           And
           as
           Geometry
           is
           therefore
           accounted
           the
           Superiour
           Science
           ,
           so
           ought
           implicit
           Faith
           to
           be
           reckon'd
           as
           the
           Superiour
           Faith
           ,
           upon
           whose
           Conclusion
           the
           other
           proceeds
           ,
           and
           which
           it self
           proceeds
           thus
           ,
           
             
               Whatever
               is
               reveal'd
               by
               him
               that
               is
               Infallible
               is
               true
               ,
            
             
               God
               is
               Infallible
               ,
            
             
               Therefore
               whatever
               is
               reveal'd
               by
               God
               is
               true
               .
            
          
           Here
           besides
           that
           't
           is
           plain
           to
           be
           seen
           that
           the
           Conclusion
           of
           this
           last
           Syllogism
           is
           the
           Principle
           of
           the
           precedent
           One
           ,
           and
           that
           Explicit
           Faith
           supposes
           what
           is
           proved
           in
           Implicit
           ,
           it
           may
           be
           further
           noted
           that
           Implicit
           Faith
           (
           as
           being
           the
           highest
           degree
           of
           Faith
           )
           is
           due
           only
           to
           the
           highest
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           to
           an
           Infallible
           Authority
           ,
           the
           reason
           why
           whatever
           is
           reveal'd
           
           by
           God
           is
           here
           Concluded
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           being
           ,
           because
           he
           is
           infallible
           .
           Infallibility
           then
           is
           the
           proper
           ground
           of
           Implicit
           Faith
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           the
           Church
           of
           Rome
           assuming
           to
           her self
           the
           Character
           of
           Infallible
           ,
           does
           upon
           that
           Supposition
           rightly
           require
           it
           .
           I
           say
           upon
           that
           supposition
           ,
           for
           she
           is
           right
           enough
           in
           her
           Consequence
           ,
           supposing
           her
           Principle
           to
           be
           true
           .
           But
           the
           truth
           of
           it
           is
           ,
           that
           is
           Most
           Extravagant
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           carries
           in
           it
           such
           matchless
           Arrogance
           and
           Presumption
           as
           befits
           only
           him
           
             who
             as
             God
             sitteth
             in
             the
             temple
             of
             God
             ,
          
           
           
             shewing
             himself
             that
             he
             is
             God.
          
           For
           God
           only
           is
           Infallible
           ,
           and
           therefore
           he
           only
           has
           right
           to
           require
           Implicit
           Faith.
           And
           to
           him
           indeed
           it
           is
           due
           from
           every
           one
           of
           his
           Creatures
           in
           the
           highest
           Measure
           imaginable
           ,
           as
           is
           also
           
             Implicit
             Obedience
          
           upon
           the
           same
           Ground
           .
           Of
           both
           which
           we
           have
           a
           signal
           Example
           in
           Abraham
           ,
           
           who
           when
           he
           was
           call'd
           by
           God
           to
           go
           out
           into
           a
           place
           which
           he
           should
           after
           receive
           for
           an
           Inheritance
           ,
           is
           said
           
             by
             Faith
             to
             have
             Obey'd
             ,
             and
             to
             
             have
             gone
             out
             ,
             not
             knowing
             whither
             he
             went.
             
          
        
         
           26.
           
           But
           now
           what
           can
           be
           more
           dark
           and
           inevident
           than
           this
           Implicit
           Faith
           ?
           It
           s
           Formal
           Reason
           indeed
           is
           sufficiently
           clear
           ,
           and
           it
           resolves
           at
           last
           into
           a
           Ground
           highly
           Rational
           ,
           and
           so
           may
           be
           said
           in
           that
           respect
           to
           be
           the
           highest
           Reason
           .
           For
           certainly
           nothing
           can
           be
           more
           Reasonable
           than
           to
           believe
           whatever
           God
           (
           who
           is
           Infallible
           )
           reveals
           .
           There
           is
           therefore
           no
           Darkness
           on
           this
           Side
           .
           Nay
           even
           the
           Light
           it self
           does
           not
           shine
           more
           Clear.
           But
           as
           for
           the
           Matter
           of
           it
           (
           if
           I
           may
           call
           it
           so
           where
           nothing
           distinctly
           is
           believ'd
           )
           that
           is
           sure
           as
           dark
           and
           obscure
           as
           can
           well
           be
           conceiv'd
           ,
           so
           dark
           as
           even
           to
           be
           Invisible
           .
           For
           a
           Man
           to
           believe
           at
           large
           without
           any
           restriction
           or
           limitation
           whatever
           God
           shall
           propose
           to
           him
           ,
           let
           it
           be
           what
           it
           will
           ,
           not
           Knowing
           what
           that
           is
           (
           like
           
           Abraham's
           going
           ,
           
             not
             knowing
             whither
             he
             went
          
           )
           is
           such
           a
           dark
           and
           obscure
           act
           of
           Faith
           as
           has
           nothing
           clear
           in
           it
           but
           the
           Humility
           and
           Devotion
           of
           him
           who
           
           so
           believes
           .
           This
           is
           a
           Faith
           Worthy
           of
           God
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           peculiar
           to
           him
           ,
           and
           't
           is
           the
           great
           inevidence
           and
           obscurity
           of
           it
           that
           makes
           it
           so
           .
           For
           so
           far
           is
           the
           Matter
           of
           it
           from
           having
           any
           Evidence
           in
           it
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           not
           so
           much
           as
           Evident
           what
           the
           Matter
           of
           it
           is
           .
           Here
           then
           is
           the
           very
           Blackness
           of
           Darkness
           ,
           and
           he
           that
           has
           this
           infolded
           Faith
           (
           as
           every
           true
           Believer
           has
           )
           and
           can
           thus
           trust
           God
           in
           the
           Dark
           ,
           where
           he
           sees
           nothing
           but
           only
           the
           general
           Reason
           of
           his
           so
           doing
           ,
           is
           not
           likely
           in
           any
           of
           the
           more
           explicit
           instances
           of
           it
           to
           plead
           the
           inevidence
           of
           the
           Article
           to
           excuse
           his
           Infidelity
           ,
           or
           to
           deny
           his
           Faith
           to
           an
           otherwise
           sufficiently
           clear
           Revelation
           ,
           merely
           because
           it
           is
           above
           his
           shallow
           Reason
           .
        
         
           27.
           
           Upon
           what
           has
           been
           hitherto
           discours'd
           it
           will
           not
           be
           difficult
           to
           give
           in
           few
           words
           a
           Satisfactory
           Resolution
           of
           a
           Celebrated
           Question
           which
           among
           the
           Schoolmen
           has
           made
           a
           great
           many
           ,
           and
           that
           is
           ,
           whether
           Faith
           belongs
           to
           the
           Vnderstanding
           or
           to
           the
           Will
           :
           It
           is
           
           plain
           by
           the
           Measures
           already
           laid
           down
           that
           it
           belongs
           to
           the
           Latter
           .
           For
           Faith
           (
           as
           all
           acknowledge
           )
           is
           an
           Assent
           ,
           and
           Assent
           is
           a
           Species
           of
           Judgement
           ,
           and
           Judgement
           (
           as
           has
           been
           shewn
           already
           )
           is
           an
           act
           of
           the
           Will
           ,
           not
           of
           the
           Understanding
           ,
           whose
           only
           Operation
           is
           Perception
           ,
           and
           consequently
           Faith
           is
           an
           act
           of
           the
           Will
           consenting
           to
           ,
           imbracing
           ,
           acquiescing
           and
           reposing
           it self
           in
           what
           the
           Understanding
           represents
           as
           proposed
           and
           reveal'd
           by
           God.
           And
           indeed
           unless
           Judgment
           and
           consequently
           Faith
           did
           belong
           to
           the
           Will
           as
           their
           proper
           and
           immediate
           Principle
           ,
           't
           is
           impossible
           to
           Conceive
           how
           a
           Man
           should
           be
           blame-worthy
           for
           any
           of
           his
           Opinions
           ,
           or
           how
           he
           should
           stand
           accountable
           either
           for
           Error
           on
           the
           one
           hand
           ,
           or
           for
           Infidelity
           and
           Heresy
           on
           the
           other
           .
           For
           if
           Faith
           be
           an
           act
           of
           the
           Understanding
           then
           since
           the
           only
           Operation
           of
           the
           Understanding
           is
           Perception
           ,
           the
           greatest
           Fault
           of
           an
           Infidel
           or
           a
           Heretic
           will
           be
           Non-Perception
           ,
           which
           indeed
           is
           not
           
           Error
           but
           Ignorance
           ,
           whereas
           Infidelity
           and
           Heresie
           are
           always
           supposed
           to
           include
           Error
           ,
           and
           to
           be
           also
           the
           worst
           of
           Errors
           .
           And
           this
           Non-perception
           is
           only
           a
           Negation
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           resolves
           into
           want
           of
           Parts
           ,
           which
           is
           not
           a
           Moral
           but
           a
           Natural
           defect
           ,
           whereas
           Infidelity
           and
           Heresie
           (
           as
           indeed
           all
           that
           is
           Faulty
           )
           are
           understood
           to
           be
           Privations
           ,
           and
           Defects
           of
           a
           Moral
           Nature
           .
           But
           then
           to
           make
           them
           so
           they
           must
           be
           voluntary
           (
           nothing
           being
           faulty
           but
           what
           is
           so
           )
           that
           is
           again
           they
           must
           be
           Wilful
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           they
           must
           be
           acts
           of
           the
           Will
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           Faith
           which
           is
           the
           Habit
           whereof
           those
           Sins
           are
           Privations
           ,
           must
           also
           belong
           to
           the
           same
           Principle
           ,
           or
           else
           in
           short
           there
           would
           be
           neither
           Vertue
           in
           having
           it
           ,
           nor
           Vice
           in
           being
           without
           it
           .
           And
           accordingly
           our
           Saviour
           in
           upbraiding
           the
           Iews
           with
           Infidelity
           does
           all
           along
           not
           only
           by
           Confequence
           ,
           but
           directly
           and
           expresly
           ,
           Charge
           it
           upon
           their
           Wills
           :
           
           
             Ye
             will
             not
             come
             to
             me
             ,
             that
             ye
             may
             have
             Life
             .
          
        
         
         
           28.
           
           And
           thus
           I
           have
           gone
           thorough
           what
           I
           intended
           ,
           and
           what
           indeed
           is
           of
           greatest
           Consideration
           ,
           upon
           this
           Subject
           of
           Faith.
           In
           the
           account
           of
           which
           if
           I
           differ
           from
           any
           Authors
           of
           the
           better
           Character
           that
           have
           either
           professedly
           or
           occasionally
           written
           upon
           it
           ,
           particularly
           Baronius
           and
           Dr.
           Pearson
           ,
           't
           is
           not
           that
           I
           love
           to
           lay
           aside
           great
           Authorities
           ,
           or
           affect
           to
           be
           by
           my self
           ,
           but
           because
           I
           follow
           the
           best
           Light
           of
           my
           Understanding
           ,
           write
           with
           Freedom
           and
           Ingenuity
           what
           I
           think
           ,
           and
           endeavour
           to
           represent
           things
           as
           they
           are
           ,
           without
           having
           regard
           to
           Authority
           any
           further
           than
           I
           think
           it
           joyn'd
           with
           Truth
           and
           Reason
           .
           Which
           shall
           also
           be
           my
           Rule
           in
           what
           remains
           of
           this
           Treatise
           .
           In
           the
           Mean
           time
           what
           has
           been
           hitherto
           discours'd
           concerning
           Reason
           and
           Faith
           may
           serve
           as
           a
           good
           Preparation
           in
           order
           to
           an
           Account
           of
           the
           Great
           Question
           Concerning
           the
           Belief
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           .
           But
           before
           we
           enter
           upon
           
           any
           thing
           of
           that
           Nature
           ,
           't
           is
           fit
           the
           Distinction
           of
           Above
           Reason
           ,
           and
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           be
           Consider'd
           and
           rightly
           Stated
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           task
           allotted
           for
           the
           next
           Chapter
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           III.
           The
           Distinction
           of
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           and
           above
           Reason
           ,
           Consider'd
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           THere
           are
           some
           Distinctions
           in
           the
           World
           that
           are
           without
           a
           Difference
           ,
           though
           Difference
           be
           the
           Ground
           of
           all
           Distinction
           ,
           and
           this
           by
           some
           is
           pretended
           to
           be
           of
           that
           Number
           ,
           who
           will
           have
           the
           Parts
           of
           it
           to
           be
           Coincident
           ,
           and
           that
           
             Contrary
             to
             Reason
          
           and
           
             above
             Reason
          
           signifie
           in
           reality
           alike
           ,
           and
           are
           but
           different
           Expressions
           for
           one
           and
           the
           same
           thing
           .
           And
           though
           they
           may
           be
           reasonably
           suspected
           to
           do
           this
           to
           serve
           the
           interest
           of
           a
           Cause
           for
           whose
           advantage
           it
           would
           be
           to
           have
           this
           Distinction
           taken
           away
           ,
           yet
           they
           have
           the
           Confidence
           to
           Charge
           the
           same
           upon
           those
           that
           hold
           it
           ,
           pretending
           that
           it
           is
           only
           a
           dextrous
           Shift
           and
           Evasion
           invented
           
           by
           Subtile
           Men
           as
           an
           Expedient
           to
           relieve
           the
           Distress
           of
           a
           desperate
           Argument
           ,
           when
           there
           is
           nothing
           else
           to
           be
           said
           for
           it
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           Which
           of
           these
           is
           the
           Evasion
           ,
           either
           the
           denying
           or
           the
           allowing
           this
           Distinction
           ,
           will
           best
           appear
           by
           the
           Examination
           of
           it
           ,
           which
           ,
           besides
           its
           Serviceableness
           to
           our
           Clearer
           proceeding
           in
           what
           we
           are
           now
           upon
           ,
           I
           am
           the
           rather
           induced
           to
           undertake
           ,
           because
           (
           as
           Mr.
           Boyle
           Observes
           in
           a
           little
           Treatise
           upon
           this
           Subject
           )
           
             there
             are
             divers
             that
             employ
             this
             Distinction
             ,
             few
             that
             have
             attempted
             to
             explain
             it
             ,
             and
             none
             that
             has
             taken
             care
             to
             justifie
             it
             .
          
           Indeed
           He
           himself
           is
           the
           only
           Person
           that
           I
           know
           of
           that
           has
           written
           professedly
           about
           it
           (
           and
           I
           cannot
           but
           wonder
           that
           a
           thing
           of
           such
           Curiosity
           and
           Importance
           should
           be
           so
           little
           Consider'd
           )
           though
           I
           think
           he
           has
           not
           gone
           to
           the
           Bottom
           of
           the
           Subject
           ,
           nor
           is
           sufficiently
           clear
           even
           as
           far
           as
           he
           goes
           .
           However
           because
           he
           has
           some
           Considerable
           Observations
           upon
           it
           (
           as
           indeed
           his
           Thoughts
           are
           generally
           very
           good
           )
           and
           there
           is
           no
           reason
           why
           we
           
           should
           refuse
           any
           additional
           Light
           in
           so
           dark
           and
           untrodden
           a
           way
           ,
           I
           shall
           for
           the
           further
           advantage
           and
           illustration
           of
           the
           Matter
           first
           draw
           up
           into
           a
           short
           view
           what
           that
           Excellent
           Person
           has
           Meditated
           concerning
           it
           ,
           with
           such
           Occasional
           Remarques
           as
           I
           shall
           think
           necessary
           ,
           and
           then
           proceed
           to
           state
           the
           thing
           according
           to
           my
           own
           Conceptions
           ,
           hoping
           that
           between
           us
           both
           it
           will
           be
           sufficiently
           clear'd
           ,
           and
           that
           nothing
           of
           any
           Consequence
           will
           be
           overlook'd
           that
           belongs
           to
           the
           Consideration
           of
           this
           so
           little
           consider'd
           ,
           and
           almost
           Virgin
           Subject
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           To
           give
           you
           then
           in
           the
           first
           place
           the
           Sum
           of
           Mr.
           
           Boyle's
           Account
           ,
           He
           proposes
           in
           general
           two
           things
           .
           1.
           
           To
           declare
           in
           what
           sense
           the
           Distinction
           is
           to
           be
           understood
           .
           2.
           
           To
           prove
           that
           it
           is
           not
           an
           Arbitrary
           or
           illusory
           Distinction
           ,
           but
           grounded
           upon
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           .
           As
           to
           the
           first
           he
           tells
           you
           that
           by
           things
           
             Above
             Reason
          
           he
           Conceives
           such
           Notions
           and
           Propositions
           as
           Mere
           Reason
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           unassisted
           by
           Revelation
           would
           never
           
           have
           discover'd
           to
           us
           ,
           whether
           those
           things
           be
           to
           our
           Finite
           Capacities
           clearly
           comprehensible
           or
           not
           .
           And
           that
           by
           things
           
             Contrary
             to
             Reason
          
           he
           understands
           such
           Conceptions
           and
           Propositions
           as
           are
           not
           only
           undiscoverable
           by
           mere
           Reason
           ,
           but
           such
           as
           when
           we
           do
           understand
           them
           do
           evidently
           appear
           repugnant
           to
           some
           Principle
           ,
           or
           to
           some
           Conclusion
           of
           right
           Reason
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           Now
           before
           I
           go
           any
           further
           I
           would
           here
           by
           this
           great
           Man's
           leave
           ,
           and
           with
           due
           deference
           to
           his
           high
           Character
           ,
           remarque
           ,
           that
           though
           things
           undiscoverable
           by
           mere
           Reason
           without
           Revelation
           may
           in
           a
           Certain
           sense
           be
           said
           to
           be
           
             above
             Reason
          
           ,
           in
           as
           much
           as
           they
           surpass
           the
           Natural
           ability
           of
           the
           Understanding
           to
           make
           the
           first
           Discovery
           of
           them
           ,
           yet
           this
           is
           not
           what
           Divines
           mean
           by
           
             Above
             Reason
          
           as
           they
           use
           the
           Phrase
           in
           this
           Distinction
           ,
           opposing
           it
           to
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           .
           For
           this
           Distinction
           was
           intended
           against
           the
           Socinians
           ,
           who
           generally
           reject
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           Faith
           as
           contrary
           to
           Sense
           and
           Reason
           ,
           to
           which
           we
           reply
           that
           they
           
           are
           not
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           but
           only
           Above
           it
           .
           They
           cry
           out
           that
           this
           is
           no
           Distinction
           ,
           but
           a
           mere
           Shift
           and
           Evasion
           ,
           pretending
           that
           the
           I
           arts
           of
           it
           fall
           in
           together
           ,
           and
           that
           what
           is
           above
           Reason
           is
           also
           contrary
           to
           it
           ,
           and
           therefore
           not
           to
           be
           believ'd
           .
           Now
           't
           is
           most
           plain
           that
           both
           they
           that
           use
           this
           Distinction
           ,
           and
           they
           against
           whom
           it
           is
           used
           do
           not
           .
           Mean
           by
           
             things
             Above
             Reason
          
           such
           as
           are
           beyond
           the
           first
           invention
           or
           Discovery
           of
           it
           .
           For
           besides
           that
           to
           mean
           that
           our
           Mysteries
           are
           only
           undiscoverable
           when
           we
           say
           they
           are
           above
           Reason
           ,
           would
           be
           too
           little
           a
           thing
           to
           oppose
           to
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           it
           is
           also
           too
           little
           a
           thing
           to
           intend
           by
           Mystery
           ,
           since
           though
           the
           undiscoverableness
           of
           them
           by
           Reason
           might
           be
           a
           sufficient
           ground
           of
           their
           being
           so
           call'd
           before
           their
           Revelation
           ,
           it
           can
           be
           none
           now
           after
           they
           are
           reveal'd
           .
           And
           therefore
           if
           we
           say
           of
           these
           Mysteries
           now
           that
           they
           are
           above
           Reason
           ,
           we
           cannot
           be
           presumed
           to
           intend
           it
           in
           respect
           of
           their
           undiscoverableness
           .
           And
           't
           is
           as
           plain
           that
           that
           our
           Adversaries
           do
           not
           so
           understand
           
           us
           .
           For
           they
           deny
           that
           things
           above
           Reason
           are
           to
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           (
           according
           to
           them
           )
           above
           Reason
           and
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           are
           all
           one
           .
           But
           now
           no
           Socinian
           that
           understands
           his
           own
           Principle
           would
           deny
           the
           Credibility
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           ,
           as
           that
           signifies
           only
           undiscoverable
           by
           Reason
           alone
           ,
           much
           less
           would
           he
           say
           that
           what
           is
           above
           Reason
           (
           in
           that
           Sense
           )
           is
           also
           contrary
           to
           it
           .
           No
           ,
           without
           doubt
           they
           will
           in
           this
           sense
           both
           allow
           us
           the
           Distinction
           ,
           and
           the
           Mysteries
           (
           if
           they
           may
           be
           so
           call'd
           )
           that
           are
           built
           upon
           it
           .
           But
           then
           this
           plainly
           shews
           that
           they
           do
           not
           understand
           it
           in
           this
           Sense
           ,
           any
           more
           than
           we
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           Instead
           therefore
           of
           saying
           undiscoverable
           ,
           he
           should
           have
           said
           incomprehensible
           by
           Reason
           .
           Into
           which
           he
           slips
           unawares
           in
           the
           account
           of
           the
           other
           part
           of
           the
           Distinction
           ,
           
             things
             Contrary
             to
             Reason
          
           ,
           by
           saying
           that
           they
           are
           such
           as
           when
           we
           do
           understand
           them
           do
           appear
           repugnant
           ,
           &c.
           which
           plainly
           implies
           that
           the
           former
           things
           that
           were
           said
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           are
           such
           as
           we
           do
           
           not
           understand
           ,
           even
           when
           discover'd
           ,
           and
           not
           such
           as
           we
           are
           not
           able
           only
           to
           Discover
           ,
           since
           otherwise
           there
           will
           be
           no
           Antithesis
           in
           the
           Second
           part
           ,
           in
           which
           there
           is
           nothing
           amiss
           except
           those
           words
           
             as
             are
             not
             only
             undiscoverable
          
           ,
           which
           in
           my
           judgment
           ought
           to
           be
           expung'd
           as
           the
           Production
           of
           the
           first
           Mistake
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           Mr.
           Boyle
           proceeds
           to
           illustrate
           his
           Explanation
           of
           this
           Distinction
           by
           a
           Comparison
           drawn
           from
           Sight
           .
           He
           supposes
           a
           Man
           to
           be
           askt
           by
           a
           Diver
           what
           he
           could
           see
           in
           a
           deep
           Sea.
           To
           which
           the
           Man
           is
           supposed
           to
           reply
           that
           he
           could
           see
           into
           a
           Sea-green
           Liquor
           to
           the
           depth
           of
           some
           yards
           and
           no
           further
           .
           So
           that
           if
           further
           ask't
           if
           he
           could
           see
           what
           lies
           at
           the
           Bottom
           of
           the
           Sea
           ,
           his
           Answer
           no
           doubt
           would
           be
           in
           the
           Negative
           .
           But
           then
           if
           the
           Diver
           should
           let
           himself
           down
           to
           the
           Bottom
           and
           bring
           up
           thence
           and
           shew
           him
           Oysters
           or
           Muscles
           with
           Pearls
           in
           them
           ,
           he
           would
           easily
           acknowledge
           both
           that
           they
           lay
           beyond
           the
           reach
           of
           his
           Sight
           ,
           and
           that
           the
           Pearls
           were
           Genuin
           and
           Good.
           But
           
           if
           the
           Diver
           should
           further
           pretend
           that
           each
           of
           these
           Pearls
           was
           bigger
           than
           the
           Shells
           they
           were
           contain'd
           in
           ,
           this
           would
           be
           thought
           not
           only
           undiscernible
           by
           the
           Eyes
           ,
           but
           contrary
           to
           their
           Informations
           ,
           and
           to
           admit
           this
           would
           argue
           the
           Sight
           not
           only
           to
           be
           imperfect
           ,
           but
           false
           and
           delusory
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           'tis
           presum'd
           that
           this
           he
           would
           not
           admit
           .
        
         
           7.
           
           Now
           I
           not
           only
           allow
           this
           Comparison
           ,
           but
           even
           admire
           it
           for
           the
           singular
           Aptness
           and
           Pertinency
           of
           it
           to
           illustrate
           ,
           even
           to
           the
           Sense
           ,
           the
           difference
           between
           things
           above
           and
           things
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           only
           I
           think
           it
           seems
           to
           proceed
           upon
           the
           supposition
           that
           by
           things
           above
           Reason
           are
           meant
           such
           only
           as
           are
           incomprehensible
           by
           it
           ,
           which
           certainly
           would
           make
           the
           Comparison
           much
           more
           Apposite
           and
           Exact
           .
           Whereof
           he
           himself
           appears
           sensible
           at
           the
           end
           of
           it
           ,
           where
           offering
           to
           consider
           the
           Matter
           more
           distinctly
           ,
           he
           tells
           you
           that
           the
           things
           above
           Reason
           are
           not
           all
           of
           one
           sort
           ,
           but
           may
           be
           distinguish'd
           into
           two
           kinds
           sufficiently
           differing
           from
           each
           other
           .
           
           which
           he
           makes
           to
           be
           these
           ,
           that
           there
           are
           some
           things
           that
           Reason
           by
           its
           own
           Light
           cannot
           Discover
           .
           And
           others
           ,
           that
           ,
           when
           proposed
           it
           cannot
           Comprehend
           .
           This
           indeed
           is
           true
           ,
           but
           then
           he
           should
           have
           said
           so
           sooner
           ,
           and
           have
           told
           us
           withal
           that
           by
           things
           above
           Reason
           (
           as
           the
           Phrase
           is
           used
           in
           this
           Distinction
           )
           he
           meant
           the
           Latter
           Sort
           only
           ,
           the
           Former
           not
           being
           to
           the
           Purpose
           .
        
         
           8.
           
           However
           he
           proceeds
           upon
           that
           part
           First
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           to
           shew
           that
           there
           are
           divers
           Truths
           in
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           that
           Reason
           left
           to
           it self
           would
           never
           have
           been
           able
           to
           find
           out
           .
           Of
           which
           he
           gives
           several
           Instances
           ,
           which
           as
           not
           being
           to
           the
           Point
           ,
           I
           pass
           over
           ,
           and
           come
           to
           his
           other
           Consideration
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           ,
           meaning
           such
           as
           when
           proposed
           do
           surpass
           our
           Comprehension
           ,
           and
           that
           (
           as
           he
           well
           observes
           )
           upon
           one
           or
           other
           of
           these
           three
           Accounts
           ,
           either
           as
           not
           clearly
           Conceivable
           by
           our
           understanding
           ,
           such
           as
           the
           Infiniteness
           of
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           ,
           or
           as
           inexplicable
           by
           us
           ,
           such
           as
           the
           Manner
           how
           God
           can
           
           Create
           a
           Rational
           Soul
           ,
           or
           how
           this
           being
           an
           Immaterial
           Substance
           can
           act
           upon
           a
           Human
           Body
           ,
           or
           be
           acted
           upon
           by
           it
           ,
           &c.
           
           Or
           else
           lastly
           as
           Asymmetrical
           or
           unsociable
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           such
           ,
           as
           we
           see
           not
           how
           to
           reconcile
           with
           other
           things
           evidently
           and
           confessedly
           true
           ,
           whereof
           he
           gives
           an
           instance
           in
           the
           Case
           of
           Prescience
           and
           Contingency
           .
        
         
           9.
           
           He
           further
           observes
           (
           and
           I
           think
           rightly
           )
           that
           there
           may
           be
           difference
           of
           degree
           in
           things
           above
           Reason
           ,
           as
           to
           their
           Abstruseness
           .
           That
           some
           things
           appear
           to
           surpass
           our
           understandings
           immediately
           ,
           even
           before
           attentively
           lookt
           into
           .
           And
           other
           things
           only
           when
           a
           narrow
           inspection
           is
           made
           into
           them
           ,
           being
           intelligible
           enough
           in
           the
           〈◊〉
           ▪
           and
           as
           imploy'd
           in
           common
           Discourse
           .
           Whereof
           he
           gives
           instances
           in
           
             Place
             ,
             Time
          
           ,
           and
           Motion
           .
           And
           he
           makes
           use
           of
           this
           Observation
           to
           solve
           a
           Difficulty
           wherein
           it
           is
           pretended
           that
           we
           cannot
           profess
           to
           believe
           things
           which
           we
           acknowledge
           to
           be
           above
           our
           Reason
           ,
           without
           discovering
           that
           we
           do
           not
           well
           consider
           what
           we
           say
           ,
           and
           that
           we
           
           then
           talk
           like
           Parrots
           .
           To
           which
           the
           substance
           of
           his
           Answer
           is
           ,
           that
           we
           may
           talk
           of
           those
           things
           according
           to
           that
           Notion
           of
           them
           which
           is
           more
           Obvious
           and
           Superficial
           ,
           though
           not
           according
           to
           that
           which
           is
           Philosophical
           and
           Accurate
           .
        
         
           10.
           
           After
           this
           Explanation
           of
           what
           is
           meant
           by
           Above
           Reason
           and
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           he
           comes
           in
           the
           Second
           place
           to
           justify
           the
           Distinction
           by
           shewing
           that
           it
           is
           grounded
           upon
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           .
           And
           that
           he
           does
           by
           shewing
           that
           there
           is
           no
           Necessity
           that
           things
           above
           Reason
           should
           be
           also
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           .
           This
           he
           shews
           first
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           in
           the
           first
           Sense
           ,
           viz.
           those
           that
           are
           undiscoverable
           by
           Reason
           alone
           ,
           but
           this
           being
           not
           the
           sense
           of
           Above
           Reason
           as
           it
           is
           used
           in
           this
           Distinction
           ,
           and
           since
           things
           according
           to
           this
           sense
           above
           Reason
           are
           not
           affirm'd
           by
           our
           Adversaries
           to
           be
           contrary
           to
           it
           ,
           I
           pass
           over
           all
           that
           he
           says
           upon
           this
           part
           ,
           and
           strike
           in
           with
           him
           again
           where
           he
           shews
           the
           same
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           in
           the
           Second
           sense
           .
           I
           cannot
           meet
           with
           any
           
           thing
           directly
           under
           that
           Head
           ,
           but
           only
           a
           few
           Passages
           here
           and
           there
           scatter'd
           up
           and
           down
           .
           As
           when
           he
           says
           of
           Galileo
           ,
           that
           when
           he
           first
           made
           his
           Discoveries
           with
           the
           Telescope
           and
           said
           that
           there
           were
           Planets
           that
           mov'd
           about
           Iupiter
           ,
           He
           said
           something
           that
           other
           Astronomers
           could
           not
           discern
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           but
           nothing
           that
           they
           could
           prove
           to
           be
           false
           .
           And
           again
           when
           he
           says
           that
           for
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           is
           Extrinsecal
           and
           Accidental
           to
           its
           being
           true
           or
           false
           .
           Because
           to
           be
           above
           our
           Reason
           is
           not
           an
           Absolute
           thing
           ,
           but
           a
           Respective
           One
           ,
           importing
           a
           Relation
           to
           the
           Measure
           of
           Knowledge
           that
           belongs
           to
           Human
           understanding
           .
           And
           therefore
           it
           may
           not
           be
           above
           Reason
           in
           reference
           to
           a
           more
           inlightned
           Intellect
           &c.
           which
           indeed
           is
           rightly
           and
           very
           judiciously
           remarqu'd
           in
           it self
           ,
           and
           no
           less
           pertinently
           to
           the
           present
           business
           .
           And
           again
           when
           he
           says
           that
           there
           are
           some
           things
           true
           which
           yet
           are
           liable
           to
           Objections
           not
           directly
           answerable
           ,
           and
           so
           above
           Reason
           .
           He
           instances
           in
           the
           Controversie
           of
           the
           
           Divisibility
           of
           Quantity
           ,
           where
           each
           side
           of
           the
           Contradiction
           is
           press'd
           with
           unanswerable
           Objections
           ,
           and
           yet
           as
           parts
           of
           a
           Contradiction
           ,
           one
           of
           them
           must
           necessarily
           be
           true
           .
           And
           yet
           take
           which
           you
           will
           you
           run
           into
           invincible
           Difficulties
           .
           Which
           indeed
           well
           concludes
           that
           a
           thing
           that
           is
           above
           Reason
           may
           yet
           be
           true
           ,
           and
           if
           true
           then
           not
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           what
           is
           so
           should
           be
           true
           .
           Which
           one
           Consideration
           is
           indeed
           enough
           to
           justifie
           the
           Distinction
           beyond
           all
           exception
           .
        
         
           11.
           
           Mr.
           Boyle
           has
           yet
           a
           further
           Observation
           concerning
           this
           Distinction
           too
           Considerable
           to
           be
           pass'd
           over
           ,
           and
           that
           is
           ,
           that
           he
           looks
           upon
           it
           to
           be
           of
           Importance
           not
           only
           to
           the
           defence
           of
           some
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           ,
           but
           even
           of
           some
           important
           Articles
           of
           Natural
           Theology
           ,
           in
           which
           (
           as
           he
           shews
           by
           several
           Instances
           )
           there
           are
           many
           Doctrins
           which
           must
           be
           acknowledg●d
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           and
           yet
           whose
           Modus
           is
           not
           explainable
           .
        
         
         
           12.
           
           After
           this
           he
           Considers
           an
           Objection
           wherein
           it
           is
           pretended
           that
           the
           granting
           this
           Distinction
           would
           be
           of
           bad
           Consequence
           ,
           as
           affording
           shelter
           to
           any
           unintelligible
           stuff
           that
           a
           bold
           Enthusiast
           may
           obtrude
           under
           the
           venerable
           Title
           of
           a
           Mystery
           ,
           that
           is
           above
           Reason
           .
           To
           which
           he
           answers
           very
           judiciously
           ,
           that
           he
           does
           not
           deny
           but
           that
           the
           Distinction
           is
           liable
           to
           be
           ill
           imploy'd
           ,
           but
           that
           this
           is
           no
           other
           than
           what
           is
           common
           to
           it
           with
           divers
           other
           Distinctions
           ,
           which
           are
           without
           Scruple
           Admitted
           because
           useful
           ,
           and
           not
           rejected
           because
           they
           have
           not
           the
           Priviledge
           that
           they
           can
           never
           be
           Misapplied
           .
           And
           that
           therefore
           both
           in
           reference
           to
           those
           other
           Distinctions
           ,
           and
           that
           he
           had
           been
           treating
           of
           ,
           it
           becomes
           Men
           to
           stand
           upon
           their
           Guard
           ,
           and
           strictly
           examine
           how
           far
           the
           Doctrine
           proposed
           as
           a
           Mystery
           ,
           is
           intitled
           to
           the
           benefit
           of
           this
           Distinction
           .
           Which
           if
           it
           should
           be
           employ'd
           to
           justifie
           any
           thing
           ,
           that
           ,
           though
           styl'd
           a
           Mystery
           ,
           is
           but
           a
           pretended
           one
           ,
           the
           Errour
           (
           as
           he
           well
           observes
           in
           the
           Close
           of
           all
           )
           will
           lye
           ,
           Not
           
           in
           the
           Groundlesness
           of
           the
           Distinction
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           Erroneousness
           of
           the
           Application
           .
        
         
           13.
           
           In
           this
           you
           have
           the
           Sum
           and
           Substance
           ,
           as
           briefly
           and
           as
           clearly
           as
           I
           could
           represent
           it
           ,
           of
           Mr.
           
           Boyle's
           Thoughts
           concerning
           things
           above
           Reason
           and
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           which
           ,
           like
           all
           his
           ,
           are
           great
           and
           strong
           ,
           and
           (
           allowing
           only
           for
           those
           inaccuracies
           taken
           Notice
           of
           )
           just
           and
           true
           .
           And
           now
           though
           what
           this
           Excellent
           Person
           has
           offer'd
           may
           serve
           to
           let
           in
           a
           great
           deal
           of
           Light
           into
           the
           Distinction
           ,
           yet
           since
           a
           thing
           of
           such
           Consequence
           if
           true
           ,
           and
           so
           much
           Contested
           whether
           true
           or
           no
           ,
           can
           never
           be
           made
           too
           Clear
           ,
           and
           sometimes
           a
           different
           ,
           though
           not
           better
           ,
           Representation
           of
           a
           thing
           may
           contribute
           to
           its
           further
           Illustration
           ,
           every
           Reader
           having
           his
           particular
           
             Point
             of
             View
          
           ,
           so
           as
           that
           the
           very
           ●ame
           Notion
           or
           Truth
           that
           does
           not
           Meet
           with
           him
           in
           one
           Posture
           ,
           may
           shine
           full
           in
           his
           Face
           and
           strike
           him
           with
           success
           in
           another
           ,
           I
           shall
           therefore
           under
           the
           Shelter
           of
           Mr.
           
           Boyle's
           Authority
           ,
           and
           by
           the
           advantage
           of
           his
           Light
           ,
           
           venture
           to
           set
           down
           my
           own
           Thoughts
           concerning
           this
           weighty
           Point
           ,
           applying
           my self
           chiefly
           to
           that
           part
           of
           it
           ,
           wherein
           I
           think
           the
           other
           Account
           Most
           defective
           .
        
         
           14.
           
           And
           first
           though
           it
           should
           be
           true
           that
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           is
           to
           be
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           and
           to
           be
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           is
           to
           appear
           repugnant
           to
           some
           Principle
           or
           Conclusion
           of
           Right
           Reason
           ,
           yet
           I
           do
           not
           think
           this
           of
           it self
           sufficient
           either
           to
           Clear
           or
           to
           Justifie
           the
           Distinction
           ,
           since
           it
           may
           be
           both
           again
           demanded
           what
           it
           is
           to
           be
           incomprehensible
           ,
           and
           what
           repugnant
           ,
           and
           again
           disputed
           whether
           incomprehensible
           and
           repugnant
           be
           not
           the
           same
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           whether
           that
           which
           is
           above
           Reason
           be
           not
           also
           Contrary
           to
           it
           .
           And
           then
           we
           are
           but
           where
           we
           were
           before
           .
           This
           Account
           of
           the
           Matter
           is
           then
           too
           Gross
           and
           General
           to
           be
           rested
           in
           ,
           and
           we
           must
           be
           therefore
           more
           minute
           and
           particular
           in
           our
           Explanation
           of
           it
           ,
           if
           we
           would
           be
           more
           Clear.
           
        
         
           15.
           
           However
           since
           Generals
           are
           to
           go
           before
           ,
           and
           do
           also
           prepare
           the
           way
           for
           Particulars
           ,
           I
           shall
           first
           propose
           
           the
           general
           Idea
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           and
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           and
           then
           particularize
           upon
           that
           Idea
           ,
           by
           opening
           and
           unfolding
           more
           distinctly
           and
           explicitly
           what
           is
           contain'd
           in
           it
           ,
           and
           by
           so
           comparing
           and
           collating
           together
           the
           two
           parts
           of
           the
           Notion
           as
           to
           shew
           the
           real
           Difference
           that
           is
           between
           them
           .
           So
           that
           I
           shall
           make
           but
           one
           work
           of
           the
           Explanatory
           and
           Iustificatory
           parts
           ,
           supposing
           that
           there
           needs
           no
           more
           to
           the
           Justification
           of
           the
           Distinction
           ,
           than
           only
           to
           have
           the
           Members
           of
           it
           well
           explain'd
           .
           For
           if
           the
           Idea
           of
           Above
           Reason
           be
           distinct
           from
           the
           Idea
           of
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           (
           as
           the
           Explanation
           of
           them
           will
           shew
           that
           it
           is
           )
           then
           the
           Distinction
           proceeds
           upon
           a
           real
           Difference
           ,
           is
           grounded
           upon
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           ,
           and
           has
           all
           that
           is
           necessary
           to
           a
           true
           and
           good
           Distinction
           .
        
         
           16.
           
           By
           things
           above
           Reason
           then
           (
           as
           the
           Expression
           is
           used
           in
           this
           Distinction
           )
           I
           conceive
           to
           be
           Meant
           ,
           Not
           such
           as
           Reason
           of
           it self
           cannot
           Discover
           ,
           but
           such
           as
           when
           proposed
           it
           cannot
           Comprehend
           .
           And
           by
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           I
           conceive
           
           such
           as
           it
           can
           and
           does
           actually
           comprehend
           ,
           and
           that
           to
           be
           absolutely
           Impossible
           .
           Or
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           a
           thing
           is
           then
           above
           Reason
           when
           we
           do
           not
           comprehend
           how
           it
           can
           be
           ,
           and
           then
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           when
           we
           do
           positively
           comprehend
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           .
           Thus
           in
           the
           General
           .
        
         
           17.
           
           But
           to
           be
           a
           little
           more
           Particular
           ,
           we
           are
           to
           Consider
           upon
           the
           first
           Part
           ,
           that
           when
           we
           speak
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           ,
           the
           word
           Reason
           here
           (
           as
           was
           shewn
           in
           the
           first
           Chapter
           )
           signifies
           the
           same
           as
           Vnderstanding
           ,
           and
           there
           being
           but
           one
           only
           Operation
           of
           that
           ,
           namely
           Perception
           ,
           by
           Comprehend
           here
           must
           be
           meant
           the
           same
           as
           by
           Perceive
           .
           So
           that
           when
           we
           say
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           that
           they
           are
           such
           as
           Reason
           cannot
           Comprehend
           ,
           't
           is
           the
           same
           as
           to
           say
           they
           are
           such
           as
           the
           Understanding
           cannot
           Perceive
           .
           But
           then
           when
           we
           say
           ,
           
             Cannot
             Perceive
          
           ,
           't
           is
           to
           be
           carefully
           noted
           that
           this
           is
           not
           to
           be
           understood
           of
           the
           literal
           and
           Grammatical
           Meaning
           of
           the
           Proposition
           ,
           as
           if
           the
           thing
           said
           to
           be
           
             Above
             Reason
          
           were
           perfectly
           unintelligible
           ,
           but
           only
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           ,
           
           as
           was
           observ'd
           before
           concerning
           Faith.
           And
           then
           again
           when
           we
           say
           that
           Above
           Reason
           is
           when
           we
           do
           not
           Comprehend
           or
           Perceive
           the
           Truth
           of
           a
           thing
           ,
           this
           must
           not
           be
           meant
           of
           not
           Comprehending
           the
           Truth
           in
           its
           whole
           Latitude
           and
           Extent
           ,
           so
           that
           as
           many
           Truths
           should
           be
           said
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           as
           we
           cannot
           thus
           thorougly
           comprehend
           and
           pursue
           throughout
           all
           their
           Consequences
           and
           Relations
           to
           other
           Truths
           (
           for
           then
           almost
           every
           thing
           would
           be
           Above
           Reason
           )
           but
           only
           of
           not
           comprehending
           the
           Union
           or
           Connexion
           of
           those
           immediate
           Ideas
           of
           which
           the
           Proposition
           supposed
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           consists
           .
           And
           which
           is
           therefore
           said
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           not
           because
           the
           simple
           and
           direct
           Meaning
           of
           its
           Terms
           is
           unintelligible
           ,
           or
           because
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           is
           not
           comprehensible
           in
           its
           remotest
           and
           utmost
           Extent
           ,
           but
           purely
           because
           the
           Connexion
           of
           its
           Ideas
           ,
           or
           the
           manner
           of
           it
           ,
           is
           not
           discernible
           ,
           and
           that
           partly
           for
           want
           of
           sufficient
           clearness
           of
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           so
           as
           to
           be
           able
           to
           perceive
           their
           Union
           Intuitively
           ,
           and
           partly
           for
           want
           
           of
           a
           due
           and
           proper
           Medium
           whereby
           to
           compare
           them
           ,
           so
           as
           to
           discern
           their
           Union
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Science
           and
           Demonstration
           .
        
         
           18.
           
           'T
           is
           also
           to
           be
           Observ'd
           upon
           the
           Second
           part
           of
           the
           Explanation
           ,
           that
           I
           chuse
           rather
           to
           say
           that
           things
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           are
           such
           as
           we
           Perceive
           to
           be
           Impossible
           ,
           than
           such
           as
           
             appear
             contrary
             to
             some
             Principle
             ,
             or
             some
             Conclusion
             of
             Right
             Reason
             .
          
           This
           being
           the
           more
           General
           and
           Absolute
           Idea
           ,
           whereof
           the
           two
           other
           are
           but
           Instances
           and
           Specifications
           .
           For
           then
           is
           a
           thing
           said
           to
           be
           Impossible
           when
           its
           Ideas
           cannot
           stand
           together
           or
           be
           united
           .
           Which
           may
           be
           either
           because
           of
           the
           immediate
           Opposition
           and
           Inconsistency
           of
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           with
           themsel●●s
           so
           as
           Mutually
           to
           Exclude
           each
           other
           (
           as
           in
           a
           Contradiction
           )
           or
           because
           of
           their
           inconsistency
           with
           some
           other
           Truth
           ,
           with
           which
           it
           cannot
           Comport
           .
           Or
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           either
           because
           one
           of
           the
           Ideas
           cannot
           consist
           with
           the
           other
           ,
           by
           reason
           of
           the
           immediate
           opposition
           that
           is
           between
           them
           ,
           or
           because
           the
           Union
           of
           both
           is
           inconsistent
           with
           some
           
           Truth
           or
           other
           ,
           which
           therefore
           will
           not
           suffer
           them
           to
           be
           United
           .
           Which
           Truth
           will
           be
           indeed
           either
           a
           Principle
           or
           a
           Conclusion
           of
           right
           Reason
           .
           And
           then
           we
           are
           said
           to
           Perceive
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           Impossible
           when
           we
           perceive
           that
           its
           Ideas
           cannot
           stand
           together
           ,
           and
           that
           either
           immediately
           by
           the
           very
           inconsistency
           of
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           or
           mediately
           by
           the
           Repugnance
           that
           they
           carry
           to
           some
           other
           Truth
           ,
           whether
           Principle
           or
           Conclusion
           .
           Which
           Repugnance
           I
           take
           to
           consist
           in
           this
           ,
           that
           the
           supposed
           Principle
           or
           Conclusion
           cannot
           stand
           with
           the
           Union
           of
           such
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           that
           therefore
           if
           such
           a
           Principle
           or
           such
           a
           Conclusion
           be
           true
           (
           as
           is
           supposed
           )
           then
           such
           Ideas
           are
           not
           United
           ,
           and
           indeed
           are
           as
           uncapable
           of
           Union
           ,
           that
           is
           as
           impossible
           ,
           as
           if
           there
           were
           an
           immediate
           inconsistency
           between
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           .
           So
           that
           for
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           is
           ,
           in
           short
           ,
           for
           the
           Understanding
           to
           perceive
           the
           Absolute
           impossibility
           of
           it
           ,
           or
           that
           its
           Ideas
           cannot
           stand
           together
           ,
           which
           it
           does
           either
           Immediately
           by
           perceiving
           the
           direct
           inconsistency
           of
           
           those
           Ideas
           ,
           or
           Mediately
           by
           perceiving
           their
           inconsistency
           with
           some
           evident
           and
           incontestable
           Truth
           or
           other
           ,
           whether
           Principle
           or
           Conclusion
           .
           For
           the
           way
           and
           method
           is
           the
           same
           in
           knowing
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           False
           or
           impossible
           as
           in
           knowing
           it
           to
           be
           True
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           as
           the
           Process
           of
           the
           Understanding
           is
           either
           Immediate
           or
           Mediate
           in
           the
           latter
           ,
           so
           is
           it
           also
           in
           the
           Former
           .
           But
           though
           there
           are
           these
           different
           ways
           of
           perceiving
           the
           impossiblity
           of
           a
           thing
           ,
           't
           is
           in
           the
           General
           Perception
           of
           its
           Impossibility
           and
           not
           in
           the
           several
           ways
           of
           it
           that
           its
           contrariety
           to
           Reason
           must
           be
           made
           Formally
           to
           consist
           ;
           Even
           as
           it
           was
           shewn
           before
           of
           Knowledge
           ,
           which
           is
           made
           to
           consist
           in
           the
           Perception
           of
           the
           Relation
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           not
           in
           this
           or
           that
           determinate
           manner
           of
           perceiving
           it
           ,
           which
           indeed
           serve
           afterwards
           to
           distinguish
           Knowledge
           into
           its
           kinds
           (
           as
           suppose
           Intuitive
           and
           Demonstrative
           )
           but
           do
           not
           enter
           into
           its
           First
           and
           General
           Idea
           .
           For
           which
           Consideration
           I
           think
           the
           Perception
           of
           a
           things
           impossibility
           does
           better
           express
           its
           Contrariety
           
           to
           Reason
           than
           the
           Repugnance
           it
           appears
           to
           have
           to
           some
           Principle
           or
           Conclusion
           of
           it
           ,
           that
           being
           only
           (
           as
           I
           said
           before
           )
           an
           instance
           and
           specification
           (
           and
           but
           one
           single
           one
           too
           )
           of
           its
           Impossibility
           .
        
         
           19.
           
           So
           Now
           we
           are
           arrived
           to
           a
           Clear
           and
           Distinct
           Conception
           of
           things
           Above
           Reason
           and
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           .
           A
           thing
           is
           then
           above
           Reason
           when
           we
           do
           not
           Perceive
           or
           Comprehend
           how
           it
           can
           be
           .
           And
           then
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           when
           we
           do
           Perceive
           that
           it
           Cannot
           be
           ,
           or
           is
           Impossible
           .
           As
           to
           give
           a
           plain
           and
           sensible
           Instance
           of
           each
           of
           these
           .
           That
           the
           sides
           of
           an
           Hyperbola
           should
           be
           always
           approaching
           to
           each
           other
           and
           yet
           never
           meet
           ,
           though
           continued
           to
           infinity
           ;
           is
           a
           Proposition
           of
           unquestion'd
           Certainty
           in
           Geometry
           ,
           and
           yet
           such
           as
           passes
           the
           Reason
           of
           a
           Man
           to
           Comprehend
           how
           it
           can
           be
           ,
           and
           therefore
           may
           properly
           be
           said
           to
           be
           one
           of
           those
           things
           that
           are
           above
           Reason
           .
           But
           now
           that
           a
           Triangle
           should
           have
           Parallel
           Sides
           ,
           is
           not
           only
           above
           Reason
           ,
           but
           directly
           Contrary
           to
           it
           .
           
           For
           here
           the
           Understanding
           is
           not
           only
           at
           a
           loss
           to
           Comprehend
           how
           it
           may
           be
           ,
           but
           does
           positively
           and
           evidently
           perceive
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           ,
           it
           being
           utterly
           impossible
           that
           a
           Figure
           of
           Three
           Lines
           should
           have
           its
           sides
           Parallel
           to
           each
           other
           .
        
         
           20.
           
           Now
           though
           by
           this
           Explanation
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           and
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           the
           Difference
           between
           them
           is
           already
           obvious
           even
           to
           the
           eye
           ,
           and
           stares
           a
           Man
           in
           the
           very
           Face
           ,
           like
           things
           of
           great
           inequality
           whose
           Disproportion
           appears
           at
           View
           ,
           without
           Measuring
           them
           ,
           yet
           for
           further
           Satisfaction
           's
           sake
           ,
           and
           to
           make
           the
           matter
           as
           plain
           as
           any
           thing
           in
           Nature
           to
           all
           but
           those
           who
           either
           have
           not
           ,
           or
           will
           not
           use
           their
           Understandings
           ,
           let
           us
           a
           little
           Compare
           these
           Ideas
           together
           ,
           thereby
           the
           better
           to
           illustrate
           their
           Difference
           .
        
         
           21.
           
           It
           is
           most
           Evident
           that
           the
           Idea
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           and
           the
           Idea
           of
           things
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           are
           two
           really
           distinct
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           that
           One
           is
           Not
           the
           Other
           .
           This
           immediately
           appears
           from
           the
           very
           direct
           View
           of
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           .
           
           For
           what
           can
           be
           More
           plain
           than
           that
           Not
           to
           Comprehend
           how
           a
           thing
           may
           be
           ,
           and
           to
           Comprehend
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           ,
           are
           two
           different
           things
           ?
           And
           what
           better
           way
           have
           we
           to
           know
           the
           Distinction
           of
           things
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           the
           Idea
           of
           one
           is
           not
           the
           Idea
           of
           another
           ?
           But
           then
           besides
           ,
           the
           Ideas
           of
           these
           things
           are
           not
           only
           Formally
           different
           from
           each
           other
           ,
           but
           have
           also
           different
           Properties
           and
           Characters
           belonging
           to
           them
           ,
           and
           such
           too
           as
           are
           exclusive
           of
           each
           other
           ,
           and
           which
           therefore
           do
           manifestly
           shew
           the
           Ideas
           to
           which
           they
           belong
           to
           be
           distinct
           .
           For
           ,
           for
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           implies
           only
           a
           Negation
           ,
           the
           Not
           Comprehending
           how
           a
           thing
           can
           be
           ,
           but
           for
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           implies
           the
           Position
           of
           an
           Intellectual
           act
           ,
           the
           Comprehending
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           .
           Again
           ,
           in
           things
           above
           Reason
           the
           Proposition
           is
           supposed
           not
           to
           be
           understood
           ,
           whereas
           in
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           it
           is
           supposed
           to
           be
           well
           understood
           ,
           and
           that
           to
           be
           false
           and
           impossible
           .
           Again
           ,
           in
           things
           above
           Reason
           the
           Mind
           determines
           nothing
           concerning
           
           the
           Object
           proposed
           ,
           whether
           it
           be
           true
           or
           whether
           it
           be
           false
           ,
           whether
           it
           be
           Possible
           ,
           or
           whether
           it
           be
           Impossible
           .
           All
           that
           she
           determines
           is
           concerning
           her
           own
           Act
           ,
           that
           she
           does
           not
           Comprehend
           how
           it
           can
           be
           .
           But
           whether
           it
           be
           or
           not
           ,
           that
           she
           does
           not
           affirm
           ,
           but
           holds
           herself
           in
           a
           perfect
           Suspence
           .
           But
           now
           in
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           the
           Mind
           is
           every
           whit
           as
           positive
           and
           decisive
           ,
           and
           does
           determine
           as
           boldly
           and
           freely
           as
           in
           those
           things
           that
           are
           most
           according
           to
           it
           .
           Whereby
           it
           plainly
           appears
           that
           to
           be
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           is
           something
           more
           than
           to
           be
           above
           it
           ,
           and
           that
           the
           Mind
           proceeds
           a
           great
           deal
           further
           in
           the
           former
           than
           in
           the
           latter
           ,
           the
           Language
           of
           the
           Soul
           in
           things
           above
           Reason
           being
           only
           ,
           
             How
             can
             these
             things
             be
          
           !
           But
           in
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           she
           is
           Positive
           and
           Dogmatical
           ,
           roundly
           pronouncing
           ,
           
             This
             cannot
             be
          
           .
           So
           that
           unless
           there
           be
           no
           difference
           between
           a
           Negation
           and
           a
           Positive
           Act
           ,
           between
           the
           Ignorance
           or
           Non-Perception
           of
           a
           thing
           ,
           and
           the
           knowing
           it
           to
           be
           False
           ,
           between
           Suspension
           and
           a
           peremptory
           
           Determination
           ,
           between
           a
           greater
           and
           a
           less
           ,
           't
           is
           most
           undeniably
           evident
           that
           the
           Parts
           of
           this
           Distinction
           are
           not
           only
           really
           but
           widely
           different
           ,
           and
           that
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           is
           one
           thing
           ,
           and
           to
           be
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           is
           another
           .
        
         
           22.
           
           If
           it
           be
           pretended
           (
           as
           some
           perhaps
           may
           be
           likely
           to
           Object
           )
           that
           to
           be
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           implies
           a
           Negation
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           ,
           because
           it
           is
           there
           supposed
           to
           be
           Comprehended
           that
           the
           thing
           is
           False
           and
           cannot
           be
           ,
           and
           that
           therefore
           they
           agree
           in
           one
           of
           the
           Main
           instances
           of
           their
           Difference
           ,
           to
           this
           the
           Answer
           is
           Clear
           and
           Full.
           I
           grant
           there
           is
           a
           Negation
           in
           one
           as
           well
           as
           the
           other
           ,
           but
           then
           I
           distinguish
           of
           Negation
           .
           There
           is
           a
           Negation
           of
           the
           Act
           ,
           and
           a
           Negation
           of
           the
           Object
           .
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           does
           indeed
           imply
           a
           Negation
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           it
           implies
           a
           Separation
           and
           dis-union
           of
           certain
           Ideas
           ,
           as
           inconsistent
           and
           incompatible
           one
           with
           another
           .
           But
           it
           does
           not
           imply
           a
           Negation
           of
           the
           Act
           ,
           but
           the
           quite
           Contrary
           ,
           because
           the
           understanding
           is
           here
           
           supposed
           positively
           to
           comprehend
           the
           thing
           ,
           and
           withal
           the
           Impossibility
           of
           it
           ,
           which
           is
           not
           done
           in
           things
           Above
           Reason
           ,
           wherein
           the
           Negation
           is
           that
           of
           the
           Act.
           So
           that
           this
           first
           and
           great
           difference
           between
           them
           stands
           firm
           and
           good
           .
        
         
           23.
           
           And
           now
           having
           thus
           far
           justified
           the
           reality
           of
           this
           distinction
           of
           things
           Above
           Reason
           and
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           both
           by
           the
           Explanation
           and
           Collation
           of
           the
           Parts
           of
           it
           ,
           which
           thereby
           appear
           to
           consist
           of
           Ideas
           as
           different
           as
           can
           well
           be
           conceiv'd
           ,
           I
           might
           further
           proceed
           to
           do
           the
           same
           by
           producing
           some
           Instances
           of
           things
           confessedly
           Above
           Reason
           that
           are
           also
           notwithstanding
           as
           confessedly
           True.
           For
           if
           any
           one
           thing
           that
           is
           Above
           Reason
           be
           yet
           found
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           this
           plainly
           demonstrates
           the
           thing
           in
           Question
           (
           if
           there
           can
           be
           yet
           any
           Question
           about
           it
           )
           most
           evidently
           shewing
           that
           what
           is
           Above
           Reason
           is
           not
           as
           such
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           what
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           should
           be
           true
           ,
           whatever
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           being
           also
           as
           Contrary
           to
           Truth
           .
           
           I
           might
           also
           further
           alledge
           that
           to
           be
           Above
           Reason
           does
           equally
           abstract
           from
           True
           and
           False
           (
           which
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           does
           not
           )
           and
           that
           not
           only
           because
           ,
           as
           I
           observed
           before
           ,
           it
           determines
           nothing
           concerning
           its
           Object
           ,
           but
           also
           because
           't
           is
           a
           thing
           not
           of
           an
           Absolute
           ,
           but
           of
           a
           Relative
           Importance
           ,
           as
           being
           an
           extrinsecal
           Denomination
           taken
           not
           from
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           Object
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           ,
           but
           only
           as
           it
           is
           to
           us
           ,
           and
           in
           relation
           to
           our
           not
           only
           Finite
           ,
           but
           very
           Limited
           Capacities
           .
           For
           to
           be
           Above
           Reason
           is
           not
           to
           be
           Above
           Reason
           in
           general
           or
           all
           Reason
           ,
           so
           as
           to
           be
           absolutely
           incomprehensible
           ,
           but
           only
           Human
           Reason
           .
           But
           then
           that
           which
           is
           Above
           the
           Reason
           of
           a
           Man
           may
           not
           be
           Above
           the
           Reason
           of
           an
           Angel
           (
           as
           indeed
           what
           is
           Above
           the
           Reason
           of
           one
           Man
           may
           not
           transcend
           that
           of
           another
           )
           and
           what
           is
           above
           the
           Reason
           of
           an
           Angel
           may
           yet
           be
           perfectly
           comprehended
           by
           God
           ,
           the
           Supream
           and
           Soveraign
           Reason
           .
           So
           that
           to
           be
           Above
           Reason
           here
           is
           of
           a
           respective
           signification
           ,
           such
           as
           does
           not
           express
           the
           quality
           of
           the
           Object
           
           as
           it
           is
           in
           its
           own
           Nature
           ,
           but
           only
           as
           it
           is
           in
           reference
           to
           such
           a
           particular
           Faculty
           ,
           whereas
           to
           be
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           is
           not
           a
           Relative
           but
           an
           Absolute
           thing
           ,
           and
           whatever
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           is
           Contrary
           to
           all
           Reason
           ,
           and
           so
           consequently
           to
           Truth
           .
           I
           say
           I
           might
           further
           insist
           on
           these
           and
           some
           other
           Considerations
           ,
           but
           being
           partly
           prevented
           here
           by
           Mr.
           Boyle
           (
           whose
           Account
           I
           would
           have
           used
           to
           supply
           the
           defects
           of
           Mine
           ,
           as
           Mine
           is
           intended
           to
           supply
           some
           of
           his
           )
           and
           having
           so
           abundantly
           clear'd
           the
           difference
           of
           these
           things
           already
           ,
           I
           shall
           not
           so
           far
           distrust
           either
           the
           Strength
           of
           the
           Argument
           ,
           or
           that
           of
           my
           Reader
           's
           Understanding
           ,
           as
           to
           prosecute
           this
           Matter
           any
           further
           than
           only
           to
           shape
           an
           Answer
           out
           of
           what
           has
           been
           laid
           down
           ,
           to
           an
           Objection
           which
           I
           meet
           with
           in
           a
           Modern
           Writer
           against
           
             Monsieur
             Iurieu
          
           ,
           and
           which
           ,
           to
           do
           it
           the
           utmost
           Justice
           ,
           I
           will
           set
           down
           in
           his
           own
           words
           .
        
         
           24.
           
           I
           have
           Consider'd
           
             (
             says
             he
          
           )
           the
           Distinction
           which
           they
           use
           between
           being
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           
           and
           being
           above
           Reason
           .
           'T
           is
           agreed
           that
           't
           is
           not
           
           possible
           to
           believe
           what
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           .
           But
           't
           is
           said
           that
           we
           can
           well
           believe
           what
           is
           above
           Reason
           .
           This
           Distinction
           seems
           to
           me
           of
           no
           use
           ,
           or
           else
           I
           do
           not
           comprehend
           it
           .
           For
           if
           by
           being
           above
           Reason
           it
           be
           meant
           that
           we
           do
           not
           comprehend
           a
           Truth
           in
           its
           whole
           Extent
           ,
           though
           what
           we
           conceive
           of
           it
           be
           clear
           and
           certain
           ,
           I
           own
           that
           in
           this
           sense
           one
           ought
           to
           believe
           what
           is
           above
           Reason
           .
           But
           if
           by
           being
           above
           Reason
           be
           meant
           a
           Doctrine
           ,
           wherein
           we
           see
           nothing
           Clear
           ,
           a
           Doctrine
           which
           our
           Reason
           loses
           the
           sight
           of
           on
           all
           its
           sides
           ,
           I
           mean
           that
           all
           the
           Propositions
           which
           may
           be
           extracted
           from
           it
           appear
           incomprehensible
           ,
           such
           a
           one
           as
           this
           for
           example
           ,
           that
           the
           three
           Divine
           Persons
           make
           but
           one
           God
           ,
           &c.
           
           It
           seems
           that
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           in
           this
           sense
           ,
           is
           the
           same
           as
           to
           be
           intirely
           inaccessible
           to
           Reason
           ,
           which
           differs
           nothing
           ,
           but
           in
           words
           ,
           from
           being
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           .
        
         
           25.
           
           I
           suppose
           whoever
           has
           duely
           consider'd
           and
           well
           comprehended
           the
           Tenour
           of
           the
           foregoing
           Discourse
           ,
           can
           neither
           be
           insensible
           of
           the
           Deficiency
           of
           this
           Allegation
           ,
           nor
           be
           long
           at
           a
           loss
           what
           Answer
           
           to
           return
           to
           it
           .
           But
           to
           spare
           my
           Reader
           this
           Trouble
           ,
           My
           Reply
           is
           ,
           that
           this
           Author's
           Argument
           proceeds
           upon
           a
           wrong
           Supposition
           .
           He
           supposes
           here
           that
           to
           be
           
             Above
             Reason
          
           must
           be
           either
           the
           Not
           Comprehending
           a
           thing
           in
           its
           whole
           Latitude
           and
           extent
           ,
           or
           the
           Comprehending
           Nothing
           at
           all
           of
           it
           .
           Whereas
           I
           have
           shewn
           before
           that
           't
           is
           neither
           of
           them
           ;
           That
           we
           do
           not
           mean
           by
           Above
           Reason
           what
           is
           all
           over
           unintelligible
           ,
           even
           as
           to
           the
           very
           Meaning
           of
           the
           Proposition
           ,
           nor
           what
           is
           not
           to
           be
           Comprehended
           in
           its
           utmost
           extent
           ,
           but
           only
           what
           is
           incomprehensible
           to
           us
           as
           to
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           or
           the
           Manner
           of
           it
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           if
           the
           Proposition
           were
           perfectly
           unintelligible
           ,
           so
           that
           (
           as
           he
           says
           )
           
             we
             could
             see
             nothing
             clear
             in
             it
             ,
          
           even
           as
           to
           the
           very
           Sense
           and
           Meaning
           of
           it
           ,
           we
           could
           no
           more
           believe
           it
           than
           what
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           though
           even
           then
           it
           would
           not
           (
           as
           this
           Author
           confusely
           enough
           pretends
           )
           be
           the
           same
           with
           it
           ,
           because
           what
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           is
           supposed
           to
           be
           well
           understood
           .
           But
           't
           is
           much
           otherwise
           
           if
           it
           be
           incomprehensible
           only
           as
           to
           the
           Truth
           or
           Manner
           of
           the
           thing
           .
           This
           as
           I
           shall
           shew
           hereafter
           may
           very
           well
           be
           Beleiv'd
           ,
           though
           what
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           cannot
           ,
           and
           what
           is
           utterly
           unintelligible
           cannot
           .
           And
           I
           have
           sufficiently
           shewn
           already
           that
           what
           is
           thus
           only
           inaccessible
           to
           Reason
           differs
           ,
           a
           little
           more
           than
           in
           words
           ,
           from
           being
           contrary
           to
           it
           .
        
         
           26.
           
           And
           now
           if
           Humane
           Nature
           were
           not
           a
           very
           unaccountable
           thing
           ,
           I
           should
           stand
           greatly
           amazed
           at
           either
           the
           Natural
           or
           wilful
           Blindness
           of
           those
           who
           are
           for
           confounding
           things
           so
           vastly
           different
           as
           the
           parts
           of
           this
           Distinction
           ,
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           and
           contrary
           to
           it
           ,
           most
           apparently
           are
           .
           There
           are
           indeed
           some
           things
           which
           we
           are
           ordinarily
           taught
           to
           distinguish
           ,
           and
           yet
           when
           strictly
           examin'd
           and
           compared
           ,
           will
           be
           found
           to
           have
           no
           real
           ground
           of
           Distinction
           in
           them
           .
           And
           't
           is
           every
           whit
           as
           great
           (
           and
           almost
           as
           Common
           )
           a
           Fault
           to
           distinguish
           things
           that
           do
           not
           differ
           ,
           as
           to
           confound
           those
           that
           do
           .
           And
           there
           are
           
           also
           other
           things
           of
           such
           near
           Resemblance
           and
           Cognation
           to
           each
           other
           that
           there
           needs
           a
           great
           deal
           of
           Art
           ,
           Subtlety
           and
           nice
           Inspection
           to
           discern
           their
           Difference
           .
           So
           Fine
           and
           Minute
           and
           almost
           imperceptible
           are
           the
           Lines
           that
           terminate
           their
           Natures
           ,
           and
           divide
           them
           from
           one
           another
           .
           But
           the
           Ideas
           of
           these
           things
           are
           as
           different
           as
           those
           of
           a
           Man
           and
           a
           Tree
           ,
           a
           Triangle
           and
           a
           Square
           ,
           so
           that
           a
           Man
           must
           wink
           hard
           not
           to
           perceive
           it
           ,
           or
           be
           very
           insincere
           not
           to
           acknowledge
           it
           .
           And
           I
           cannot
           imagine
           why
           those
           especially
           who
           are
           known
           to
           serve
           themselves
           upon
           occasion
           of
           Distinctions
           which
           have
           no
           other
           Foundation
           than
           the
           mere
           Will
           and
           Pleasure
           (
           unless
           you
           will
           say
           Interest
           )
           of
           those
           that
           use
           them
           ,
           should
           yet
           reject
           such
           a
           Solid
           and
           well-grounded
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           well
           Authorized
           ,
           one
           as
           this
           ,
           but
           only
           because
           it
           is
           not
           for
           their
           turn
           ,
           and
           ,
           if
           admitted
           ,
           would
           like
           a
           Bomb
           thrown
           into
           their
           Garrison
           ,
           blow
           up
           and
           lay
           wast
           their
           Main
           Strength
           ,
           and
           force
           them
           to
           desert
           and
           give
           
           up
           a
           Cause
           which
           they
           are
           (
           now
           especially
           )
           most
           Zealously
           Fond
           of
           ,
           and
           seem
           resolv'd
           even
           
             against
             Reason
          
           to
           Maintain
           .
        
         
           27.
           
           For
           I
           must
           further
           remarqu●
           (
           and
           't
           is
           an
           Observation
           not
           lightly
           to
           be
           pass'd
           over
           )
           that
           if
           this
           One
           Distinction
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           ,
           and
           things
           contrary
           to
           Reason
           be
           once
           admitted
           ,
           or
           shewn
           to
           be
           real
           ,
           Solid
           and
           well-grounded
           ,
           the
           main
           part
           of
           the
           Socinian
           Controversie
           is
           immediately
           ,
           or
           at
           least
           in
           the
           very
           next
           Consequence
           ,
           at
           an
           end
           .
           For
           the
           Reason
           why
           they
           will
           not
           believe
           things
           above
           Reason
           is
           because
           (
           as
           they
           pretend
           )
           Above
           Reason
           differs
           nothing
           in
           reality
           from
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           and
           so
           those
           things
           that
           are
           above
           Reason
           are
           also
           as
           much
           contrary
           to
           it
           as
           above
           it
           ,
           and
           what
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           is
           on
           both
           sides
           acknowledg'd
           impossible
           to
           be
           believ'd
           .
           Well
           ,
           but
           then
           if
           it
           be
           made
           appear
           (
           as
           I
           think
           by
           this
           time
           is
           sufficiently
           done
           )
           that
           these
           two
           are
           quite
           different
           things
           ,
           and
           that
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           same
           as
           to
           be
           contrary
           to
           it
           ,
           
           then
           even
           by
           their
           own
           Confession
           there
           can
           be
           no
           pretence
           why
           what
           is
           above
           Reason
           may
           not
           be
           Believ'd
           .
           Which
           I
           take
           to
           be
           the
           true
           inducement
           that
           makes
           these
           Men
           stand
           out
           so
           fiercely
           and
           obstinately
           against
           this
           Distinction
           (
           for
           they
           are
           aware
           what
           mischief
           it
           will
           do
           'em
           )
           as
           it
           is
           also
           the
           reason
           why
           I
           have
           bestow'd
           so
           much
           care
           and
           pains
           to
           clear
           and
           justifie
           it
           .
        
         
           28.
           
           And
           thus
           having
           given
           an
           Account
           of
           these
           great
           and
           Fundamental
           things
           ,
           what
           Reason
           is
           ,
           what
           Faith
           is
           ,
           and
           what
           it
           is
           to
           be
           Above
           ,
           and
           what
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           we
           have
           now
           prepared
           the
           way
           to
           the
           more
           full
           and
           direct
           Consideration
           of
           the
           Belief
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           ,
           the
           true
           state
           of
           which
           Question
           by
           what
           has
           been
           hitherto
           discours'd
           appears
           to
           be
           this
           ,
           Whether
           we
           may
           not
           Assent
           upon
           the
           Authority
           of
           Divine
           Revelation
           to
           such
           things
           as
           our
           Understanding
           or
           Reason
           cannot
           perceive
           or
           Comprehend
           as
           to
           the
           Truth
           or
           Manner
           of
           them
           .
           Or
           ,
           whether
           our
           not
           being
           able
           thus
           to
           Comprehend
           them
           ,
           be
           a
           
           sufficient
           Reason
           why
           we
           should
           not
           believe
           them
           .
           For
           the
           Resolution
           of
           which
           we
           have
           already
           laid
           the
           Grounds
           ,
           and
           shall
           now
           proceed
           more
           directly
           to
           build
           upon
           them
           in
           the
           following
           Chapter
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           IV.
           That
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           WE
           have
           gain'd
           a
           most
           wonderful
           Point
           in
           the
           foregoing
           Chapter
           ,
           by
           proving
           the
           Distinction
           between
           things
           Above
           and
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           of
           it self
           alone
           is
           sufficient
           Not
           only
           immediately
           to
           decide
           ,
           but
           even
           forever
           to
           Silence
           the
           Controversie
           between
           us
           and
           our
           Socinian
           Adversaries
           concerning
           the
           Belief
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           .
           For
           the
           only
           Objection
           that
           is
           or
           can
           possibly
           be
           pretended
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           being
           the
           supposed
           Contrariety
           of
           the
           same
           things
           to
           Reason
           ,
           if
           it
           be
           shewn
           that
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           involves
           no
           such
           Contrariety
           ,
           then
           the
           Objection
           against
           the
           belief
           of
           such
           things
           is
           fairly
           and
           wholly
           removed
           ,
           
           and
           consequently
           there
           remains
           no
           Reason
           why
           they
           may
           not
           be
           Believ'd
           .
           So
           that
           I
           cannot
           but
           look
           upon
           the
           Substance
           of
           my
           Work
           as
           most
           effectually
           done
           already
           ,
           and
           those
           of
           our
           Adversaries
           that
           have
           any
           reasonable
           Measure
           of
           Penetration
           and
           Sincerity
           must
           needs
           be
           sensible
           of
           it
           .
           And
           I
           dare
           appeal
           even
           to
           their
           own
           Consciences
           whether
           they
           are
           not
           .
           However
           considering
           the
           importunity
           of
           those
           I
           have
           to
           deal
           with
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           the
           weight
           of
           the
           Cause
           it self
           ,
           I
           shall
           endeavour
           the
           further
           establishment
           of
           it
           upon
           some
           other
           Considerations
           ,
           whereby
           I
           shall
           also
           give
           further
           Confirmation
           ,
           and
           so
           repay
           what
           I
           am
           endebted
           to
           the
           Point
           contended
           for
           in
           the
           preceding
           Chapter
           ,
           since
           we
           may
           as
           well
           argue
           backwards
           from
           the
           Believableness
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           to
           their
           not
           Contrariety
           ,
           as
           forwards
           from
           their
           not
           Contrariety
           to
           their
           Believableness
           ,
           the
           Consequence
           being
           full
           as
           good
           ,
           thus
           ,
           
             Above
             Reason
             Believable
             ,
             therefore
             not
             Contrary
             ,
          
           as
           thus
           ,
           
             Above
             Reason
             not
             Contrary
             ,
             therefore
             Believable
             .
          
           Now
           in
           order
           to
           the
           
           fuller
           Conviction
           and
           demonstration
           of
           the
           Believableness
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           I
           set
           out
           upon
           this
           Ground
           ,
           that
           
             Humane
             Reason
             is
             not
             the
             Measure
             of
             Truth
             .
          
        
         
           2.
           
           'T
           is
           agreed
           among
           the
           Masters
           of
           Reason
           that
           as
           all
           Proof
           ought
           to
           be
           only
           of
           such
           things
           as
           need
           it
           ,
           so
           there
           are
           Propositions
           so
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           of
           themselves
           that
           they
           have
           no
           need
           of
           being
           demonstrated
           ,
           and
           that
           there
           are
           some
           again
           that
           are
           not
           capable
           of
           Demonstration
           ,
           the
           Fulness
           and
           immediateness
           of
           their
           Evidence
           rendring
           them
           strictly
           indemonstrable
           .
           And
           it
           has
           been
           charged
           by
           one
           of
           the
           most
           Considerable
           of
           them
           as
           a
           Fault
           in
           the
           Method
           of
           the
           Geometricians
           that
           they
           set
           themselves
           to
           prove
           things
           that
           have
           no
           need
           of
           Proof
           ,
           
           whereof
           he
           gives
           an
           Instance
           in
           Euclid
           ,
           who
           goes
           formally
           to
           work
           to
           prove
           that
           two
           sides
           of
           a
           Triangle
           taken
           together
           are
           greater
           than
           one
           ,
           although
           this
           be
           most
           Evident
           even
           from
           the
           Notion
           only
           of
           a
           Right
           Line
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           shortest
           that
           can
           possibly
           be
           between
           two
           Points
           ,
           and
           the
           Natural
           Measure
           of
           Distance
           
           from
           one
           Point
           to
           another
           ,
           which
           it
           could
           not
           be
           if
           it
           were
           not
           also
           the
           shortest
           of
           all
           Lines
           that
           can
           be
           drawn
           from
           Point
           to
           Point
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           Now
           though
           I
           cannot
           say
           that
           the
           Proposition
           of
           this
           Chapter
           is
           so
           Evident
           of
           it self
           as
           not
           to
           be
           capable
           of
           Demonstration
           ,
           yet
           I
           must
           Confess
           I
           cannot
           but
           think
           it
           of
           the
           Number
           of
           those
           that
           do
           not
           need
           any
           ,
           that
           is
           I
           mean
           ,
           to
           those
           who
           will
           but
           take
           the
           Pains
           to
           consider
           it
           with
           Attention
           ,
           and
           are
           withal
           so
           sincere
           as
           to
           say
           ingenuously
           what
           they
           inwardly
           think
           .
           For
           to
           unattentive
           or
           Captious
           Persons
           nothing
           is
           plain
           (
           since
           there
           is
           Nothing
           but
           what
           some
           will
           contradict
           ,
           and
           there
           are
           those
           who
           profess
           to
           doubt
           of
           every
           thing
           )
           and
           even
           the
           Sun
           it self
           can't
           make
           a
           Man
           see
           ,
           if
           either
           he
           want
           eyes
           ,
           or
           will
           shut
           '
           em
           .
           I
           cannot
           therefore
           say
           that
           to
           such
           men
           either
           this
           or
           any
           other
           Proposition
           is
           plain
           ,
           but
           I
           would
           venture
           to
           be
           tried
           by
           any
           competent
           and
           indifferent
           Considerer
           whether
           this
           be
           not
           indeed
           a
           very
           plain
           and
           certain
           Proposition
           ,
           as
           plain
           as
           most
           of
           those
           which
           pass
           for
           Principles
           
           and
           Maximes
           in
           Discourse
           ,
           that
           
             Human
             Reason
             is
             not
             the
             Measure
             of
             Truth
             .
          
           And
           accordingly
           I
           should
           justly
           fear
           incurring
           the
           same
           Censure
           that
           is
           charged
           upon
           the
           Geometricians
           ,
           of
           going
           to
           prove
           what
           is
           evident
           ,
           were
           there
           not
           something
           peculiar
           in
           the
           present
           Case
           that
           makes
           it
           very
           different
           from
           theirs
           .
           For
           they
           dealing
           in
           Matters
           of
           an
           Abstract
           and
           indifferent
           Nature
           ,
           and
           such
           wherein
           the
           Lusts
           and
           Passions
           of
           men
           are
           altogether
           uninteressed
           ,
           have
           no
           real
           need
           to
           prove
           evident
           things
           ,
           because
           for
           that
           very
           reason
           their
           Evidence
           is
           never
           Contested
           ;
           whereas
           the
           Point
           I
           have
           now
           in
           hand
           being
           of
           a
           Moral
           Concernment
           and
           such
           as
           incounters
           the
           Partialities
           and
           false
           Biasses
           of
           Humane
           Nature
           ,
           particularly
           that
           great
           and
           governing
           one
           of
           Self-Love
           ,
           though
           it
           should
           be
           of
           equal
           evidence
           with
           some
           of
           their
           Maxims
           ,
           will
           yet
           not
           be
           equally
           secure
           from
           Opposition
           ,
           and
           pass
           alike
           uncontested
           .
           And
           so
           there
           may
           be
           need
           of
           proving
           it
           ,
           if
           not
           to
           do
           any
           necessary
           Service
           to
           the
           Proposition
           it self
           ,
           yet
           to
           satisfie
           the
           
           importunity
           of
           the
           Men
           I
           argue
           with
           .
           Which
           indeed
           is
           the
           present
           Case
           ,
           since
           (
           as
           was
           intimated
           in
           the
           Beginning
           )
           the
           Sentiment
           of
           these
           Men
           concerning
           the
           disbelief
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           resolves
           at
           last
           into
           this
           Principle
           ,
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
           Which
           therefore
           both
           for
           their
           Satisfaction
           and
           Refutation
           must
           be
           shewn
           to
           be
           False
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           Now
           when
           I
           say
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           my
           meaning
           is
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           not
           that
           Common
           Standard
           whereby
           Truth
           in
           the
           General
           is
           to
           be
           Measured
           ,
           so
           that
           of
           every
           thing
           it
           may
           be
           safely
           Concluded
           that
           it
           is
           either
           true
           or
           not
           true
           according
           as
           it
           accords
           with
           this
           Measure
           ,
           as
           't
           is
           comprehensible
           or
           not
           Comprehensible
           by
           Human
           Reason
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           there
           is
           a
           certain
           Sense
           in
           which
           Human
           Reason
           sometimes
           is
           ,
           and
           may
           be
           truely
           said
           to
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           in
           as
           much
           as
           whatever
           the
           Understanding
           does
           clearly
           and
           distinctly
           Perceive
           may
           be
           concluded
           as
           most
           certainly
           true
           ,
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           a
           thing
           should
           be
           otherwise
           
           than
           as
           we
           clearly
           perceive
           it
           to
           be
           ,
           without
           supposing
           our
           Perceptive
           Faculties
           to
           be
           in
           themselves
           Naturally
           False
           ,
           and
           without
           supposing
           it
           also
           necessary
           that
           we
           should
           fall
           into
           Errour
           even
           in
           the
           right
           use
           of
           these
           Faculties
           (
           it
           being
           impossible
           to
           conceive
           a
           More
           right
           use
           of
           them
           than
           to
           Assent
           only
           to
           what
           we
           clearly
           Perceive
           )
           which
           are
           not
           only
           in
           themselves
           manifest
           Absurdities
           ,
           but
           such
           also
           as
           would
           necessarily
           infer
           the
           Authour
           of
           our
           Natures
           to
           be
           also
           the
           Authour
           of
           our
           Errours
           and
           Deceptions
           .
           It
           must
           therefore
           be
           admitted
           by
           all
           what
           the
           Philosophers
           of
           the
           Cartesian
           way
           so
           earnestly
           stand
           and
           Contend
           for
           ,
           that
           Clearness
           of
           Perception
           is
           the
           great
           Rule
           and
           Criterion
           of
           Truth
           ,
           so
           far
           that
           whatever
           we
           do
           clearly
           and
           distinctly
           perceive
           to
           be
           true
           is
           really
           in
           it self
           True.
           But
           then
           this
           is
           only
           to
           be
           a
           Partial
           and
           inadequate
           Rule
           ,
           and
           in
           some
           certain
           limited
           respect
           only
           ,
           not
           absolutely
           and
           in
           general
           .
           For
           though
           I
           grant
           that
           whatever
           we
           clearly
           perceive
           is
           true
           ,
           yet
           I
           deny
           that
           it
           follows
           likewise
           Backwards
           ,
           that
           
           whatever
           is
           true
           we
           do
           also
           clearly
           Perceive
           ,
           and
           so
           consequently
           that
           whatever
           we
           do
           not
           clearly
           Perceive
           is
           therefore
           not
           True.
           By
           which
           it
           is
           plain
           that
           this
           Cartesian
           Maxim
           must
           be
           very
           much
           abused
           to
           prove
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Common
           and
           General
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           I
           dare
           say
           the
           Great
           Authors
           of
           it
           never
           intended
           it
           to
           that
           purpose
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           Reason
           or
           Understanding
           in
           general
           may
           be
           safely
           said
           ,
           and
           must
           necessarily
           be
           allow'd
           to
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
           For
           Truth
           in
           general
           carries
           a
           necessary
           Relation
           to
           understanding
           in
           general
           ,
           as
           fully
           adequate
           and
           commensurate
           to
           it
           .
           So
           that
           all
           Truth
           is
           simply
           and
           absolutely
           intelligible
           ,
           the
           greatest
           and
           sublimest
           Truths
           as
           much
           as
           the
           least
           and
           meanest
           ,
           those
           which
           the
           Angels
           study
           and
           desire
           to
           look
           into
           ,
           as
           much
           as
           those
           which
           employ
           the
           narrow
           Thoughts
           of
           the
           poorest
           Rustic
           .
           The
           Former
           are
           in
           themselves
           as
           intelligible
           as
           the
           latter
           ,
           and
           if
           not
           actually
           so
           well
           understood
           't
           is
           not
           because
           of
           any
           incapacity
           in
           the
           Objects
           ,
           but
           by
           reason
           of
           the
           Disproportion
           of
           the
           Faculties
           
           that
           are
           Conversant
           about
           them
           .
           But
           this
           disproportion
           must
           not
           be
           Universal
           ,
           nor
           extend
           throughout
           the
           whole
           Order
           of
           Being
           .
           For
           what
           is
           intelligible
           must
           be
           so
           to
           some
           Understanding
           (
           since
           what
           no
           Understanding
           can
           Comprehend
           is
           the
           same
           as
           not
           to
           be
           intelligible
           )
           and
           consequently
           there
           must
           be
           an
           Understanding
           that
           Comprehends
           all
           that
           is
           truly
           intelligible
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           all
           Truth
           .
           And
           accordingly
           it
           may
           be
           truly
           said
           of
           this
           All-Comprehensive
           Understanding
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           so
           that
           whatever
           this
           perfect
           Understanding
           does
           not
           understand
           is
           not
           intelligible
           ,
           and
           if
           not
           intelligible
           ,
           then
           also
           not
           True.
           Besides
           that
           it
           might
           be
           further
           Consider'd
           (
           were
           this
           a
           proper
           place
           for
           so
           Abstract
           and
           Metaphysical
           a
           Speculation
           )
           that
           Truth
           it Self
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           real
           Nature
           and
           Essence
           of
           it
           ,
           is
           one
           and
           the
           same
           with
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           as
           they
           are
           related
           to
           one
           another
           ,
           and
           does
           therefore
           exist
           Originally
           and
           intirely
           in
           the
           Mind
           of
           God
           ,
           who
           is
           Substantial
           Truth
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           does
           Comprehend
           all
           Truth
           ,
           
           and
           so
           consequently
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           it
           .
           And
           because
           this
           All-comprehensive
           Understanding
           is
           contain'd
           within
           the
           Extent
           of
           Reason
           or
           Understanding
           in
           General
           ,
           therefore
           it
           may
           be
           truly
           said
           also
           of
           Reason
           or
           Understanding
           in
           General
           that
           it
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           it
           being
           most
           certain
           that
           what
           is
           above
           all
           Reason
           ,
           or
           what
           no
           Reason
           whatsoever
           can
           Comprehend
           is
           as
           much
           above
           Truth
           too
           ,
           and
           cannot
           possibly
           be
           true
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           But
           though
           it
           be
           thus
           necessary
           to
           allow
           this
           of
           Reason
           in
           General
           ,
           the
           same
           cannot
           be
           allow'd
           of
           Human
           Reason
           .
           For
           whatever
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           must
           be
           fully
           adequate
           and
           Commensurate
           to
           Truth
           .
           That
           's
           Certain
           .
           And
           therefore
           if
           Human
           Reason
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           it
           must
           have
           the
           same
           compass
           and
           extent
           with
           Truth
           ,
           and
           possess
           it
           whole
           and
           intire
           ,
           if
           not
           Essentially
           and
           Substantially
           as
           God
           does
           ,
           yet
           at
           least
           Noetically
           and
           by
           way
           of
           Theory
           ,
           so
           as
           to
           be
           able
           thoroughly
           to
           Perceive
           and
           Comprehend
           all
           Truth
           .
           But
           now
           that
           this
           Qualification
           cannot
           
           possibly
           agree
           to
           Human
           Reason
           (
           though
           it
           be
           somewhat
           unreasonable
           that
           I
           should
           be
           put
           to
           prove
           such
           a
           Proposition
           as
           this
           )
           I
           hope
           fully
           to
           demonstrate
           upon
           a
           Double
           Consideration
           ,
           one
           taken
           from
           the
           Nature
           of
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           and
           the
           other
           from
           the
           Nature
           of
           Truth
           .
        
         
           7.
           
           And
           first
           to
           begin
           with
           Truth
           .
           This
           ,
           as
           the
           Most
           thinking
           and
           Metaphysical
           Persons
           Conceive
           of
           it
           ,
           is
           supposed
           to
           consist
           in
           the
           Relations
           of
           equality
           or
           inequality
           ,
           or
           Agreement
           or
           Disagreement
           .
           Now
           we
           are
           to
           Consider
           that
           these
           Relations
           may
           be
           of
           Three
           Sorts
           ,
           either
           such
           as
           are
           between
           Created
           Beings
           ,
           or
           such
           as
           are
           between
           Intelligible
           Ideas
           ,
           or
           such
           as
           are
           between
           Created
           Beings
           and
           their
           Ideas
           .
           And
           we
           are
           also
           to
           Consider
           that
           there
           are
           two
           General
           Sorts
           of
           Truths
           extremely
           different
           one
           from
           another
           ,
           and
           therefore
           carefully
           to
           be
           distinguish'd
           .
           Those
           that
           regard
           only
           the
           Abstract
           Natures
           of
           things
           ,
           and
           their
           immutable
           Essences
           ,
           independently
           on
           their
           actual
           Existence
           .
           And
           others
           again
           
           that
           do
           regard
           things
           that
           do
           actually
           Exist
           .
           The
           former
           of
           these
           Constitute
           that
           Order
           of
           Truths
           which
           we
           call
           Necessary
           ,
           the
           latter
           that
           which
           we
           call
           Contingent
           .
           And
           this
           double
           order
           of
           Truths
           results
           from
           that
           threefold
           Relation
           before-mention'd
           .
           From
           the
           first
           and
           third
           Relations
           arise
           Contingent
           Truths
           ,
           which
           are
           nothing
           else
           but
           the
           Relations
           of
           agreement
           of
           disagreement
           that
           are
           either
           between
           Created
           Beings
           themselves
           ,
           or
           between
           Created
           Beings
           and
           their
           Ideas
           .
           And
           these
           I
           call
           Contingent
           Truths
           in
           opposition
           to
           those
           that
           are
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           ,
           partly
           because
           these
           Relations
           could
           not
           begin
           to
           exist
           before
           those
           Beings
           were
           produced
           (
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           there
           should
           be
           Relations
           between
           things
           that
           are
           not
           )
           and
           partly
           because
           these
           Relations
           might
           not
           have
           existed
           ,
           because
           those
           Beings
           might
           not
           have
           been
           produced
           .
           And
           as
           Contingent
           Truths
           arise
           from
           the
           first
           and
           third
           ,
           so
           from
           the
           second
           and
           middle
           Relations
           result
           those
           Truths
           which
           are
           Necessary
           ,
           Eternal
           ,
           and
           Immutable
           ,
           
           and
           which
           I
           understand
           to
           be
           nothing
           else
           but
           the
           Relations
           of
           Agreement
           or
           Disagreement
           that
           are
           between
           Ideas
           .
        
         
           8.
           
           I
           go
           here
           upon
           the
           common
           and
           allow'd
           Distinction
           between
           Necessary
           and
           Contingent
           Truths
           ,
           and
           upon
           the
           as
           much
           allow'd
           Supposition
           that
           there
           is
           such
           an
           Order
           of
           Truths
           as
           are
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           ,
           which
           therefore
           I
           take
           for
           granted
           as
           a
           Principle
           ,
           not
           to
           decline
           the
           trouble
           of
           proving
           it
           ,
           but
           because
           it
           is
           a
           Confess'd
           as
           well
           as
           Evident
           thing
           ,
           and
           I
           care
           not
           for
           proving
           any
           more
           evident
           things
           than
           I
           needs
           must
           .
           And
           that
           these
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Truths
           are
           in
           this
           precisely
           distinguish'd
           from
           those
           that
           are
           Contingent
           ,
           
             that
             they
             are
             the
             Relations
             that
             are
             between
             Ideas
             ,
          
           I
           think
           is
           plain
           from
           the
           very
           Notion
           and
           Nature
           of
           them
           ,
           because
           they
           are
           supposed
           to
           be
           such
           Truths
           as
           regard
           the
           Abstract
           Natures
           and
           Essences
           of
           things
           as
           they
           are
           in
           Idea
           ,
           and
           not
           as
           they
           have
           an
           actual
           Existence
           
             in
             rerum
             Naturâ
          
           ,
           since
           then
           they
           would
           not
           be
           necessary
           ,
           but
           Contingent
           Truths
           ,
           
           
           
           
           
           which
           would
           be
           contrary
           to
           the
           Supposition
           .
           And
           Because
           these
           Necessary
           Truths
           are
           the
           most
           considerable
           and
           principal
           sort
           of
           Truths
           ,
           as
           being
           the
           Ground
           and
           Foundation
           of
           all
           Science
           ,
           and
           the
           true
           and
           proper
           Objects
           of
           our
           Theory
           and
           Contemplation
           ,
           and
           because
           for
           the
           same
           Reason
           whenever
           we
           speak
           of
           Truth
           Absolutely
           and
           in
           General
           we
           are
           presumed
           to
           mean
           necessary
           and
           immutable
           Truth
           ,
           hence
           it
           is
           that
           Truth
           is
           commonly
           said
           by
           Metaphysical
           Writers
           to
           consist
           in
           the
           Relations
           that
           are
           between
           Ideas
           ,
           though
           indeed
           this
           be
           strictly
           true
           only
           of
           Necessary
           Truth
           .
           But
           it
           is
           sufficient
           to
           the
           present
           purpose
           that
           it
           is
           true
           of
           this
           .
           And
           so
           much
           I
           suppose
           will
           readily
           be
           granted
           me
           at
           least
           ,
           that
           the
           general
           Nature
           and
           Reason
           of
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Truths
           consists
           in
           the
           Relations
           that
           are
           between
           Ideas
           .
        
         
           9.
           
           I
           further
           add
           that
           these
           Ideas
           must
           be
           the
           same
           with
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           that
           exactly
           speaking
           all
           Ideas
           are
           Divine
           Ideas
           ,
           even
           those
           which
           we
           use
           to
           call
           our
           own
           ,
           it
           being
           most
           Certain
           
           (
           as
           might
           easily
           and
           with
           the
           greatest
           Evidence
           be
           shewn
           )
           that
           the
           immediate
           Objects
           of
           our
           Understandings
           are
           no
           other
           than
           the
           Ideas
           of
           the
           Divine
           Intellect
           ,
           in
           which
           we
           see
           and
           contemplate
           all
           things
           .
           But
           not
           to
           enter
           into
           this
           sublime
           Speculation
           at
           present
           ,
           it
           will
           be
           sufficient
           to
           consider
           that
           unless
           the
           Ideas
           whose
           Relations
           Constitute
           those
           Truths
           which
           are
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           be
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           ,
           it
           will
           be
           impossible
           that
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Truths
           should
           be
           what
           we
           suppose
           they
           are
           ,
           that
           is
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           .
           For
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Truths
           must
           be
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Relations
           ,
           and
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           Relations
           should
           be
           more
           Necessary
           or
           Eternal
           than
           the
           Subjects
           from
           which
           they
           result
           ,
           unless
           these
           Ideas
           the
           Subjects
           of
           these
           Relations
           be
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           ,
           how
           can
           their
           Relations
           be
           so
           ?
           'T
           is
           plain
           therefore
           that
           these
           Ideas
           must
           be
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           .
           But
           now
           I
           pray
           what
           Ideas
           are
           so
           but
           the
           Divine
           ?
           What
           is
           there
           in
           the
           whole
           Compass
           of
           Being
           that
           is
           Necessary
           ,
           
           Eternal
           and
           Immutable
           but
           God
           and
           his
           Divine
           Perfections
           ?
           As
           therefore
           we
           say
           that
           these
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Truths
           are
           Relations
           between
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           not
           such
           as
           are
           between
           either
           Created
           Entities
           themselves
           ,
           or
           between
           them
           and
           their
           Ideas
           ,
           because
           then
           they
           would
           be
           of
           the
           Order
           of
           Contingent
           ,
           not
           of
           Necessary
           Truths
           ,
           For
           the
           same
           reason
           we
           must
           say
           that
           they
           are
           the
           Relations
           that
           are
           between
           the
           
             Divine
             Ideas
          
           ,
           those
           only
           being
           sufficiently
           steddy
           and
           Permanent
           Subjects
           to
           sustain
           such
           Stable
           and
           Immutable
           Relations
           .
           And
           indeed
           were
           it
           not
           for
           those
           Representative
           Perfections
           of
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           which
           we
           call
           Ideas
           ,
           there
           would
           be
           no
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Essences
           to
           support
           these
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Relations
           ,
           and
           then
           there
           could
           be
           no
           such
           Relations
           ,
           and
           if
           no
           such
           Relations
           ,
           then
           there
           could
           be
           no
           Necessary
           Truths
           ,
           and
           is
           no
           Necessary
           Truths
           then
           no
           Science
           Which
           by
           the
           way
           would
           most
           Convineingly
           prove
           to
           any
           Capable
           and
           Attentive
           Understanding
           the
           absolute
           Necessity
           and
           Certainty
           
           of
           a
           God
           ,
           as
           the
           most
           inmost
           Ground
           and
           Central
           Support
           of
           the
           whole
           Intellectual
           World.
           
        
         
           10.
           
           Well
           then
           it
           can
           no
           longer
           be
           doubted
           but
           that
           these
           Necessary
           and
           Eternal
           Truths
           are
           the
           Relations
           that
           are
           between
           the
           
             Divine
             Ideas
          
           .
           But
           now
           as
           these
           Ideas
           are
           Infinite
           as
           being
           the
           Essential
           Perfections
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           really
           identify'd
           with
           his
           Divine
           Nature
           and
           Substance
           ,
           so
           it
           must
           necessarily
           follow
           that
           the
           Relations
           that
           result
           from
           them
           ,
           and
           subsist
           between
           them
           must
           also
           be
           Infinite
           .
           And
           then
           since
           these
           Truths
           do
           essentially
           Consist
           in
           ,
           and
           in
           their
           Reason
           and
           Formality
           are
           no
           other
           than
           these
           Ideal
           Relations
           ,
           it
           no
           less
           evidently
           follows
           that
           Truth
           also
           must
           be
           Infinite
           too
           .
        
         
           11.
           
           Which
           also
           will
           be
           necessary
           to
           Conclude
           upon
           another
           Account
           .
           For
           I
           confider
           again
           that
           since
           Relations
           do
           not
           in
           reality
           differ
           as
           distinct
           Entities
           from
           their
           Subjects
           and
           Terms
           (
           as
           the
           Relations
           of
           two
           Circles
           supposed
           to
           be
           equal
           to
           each
           other
           do
           not
           really
           differ
           from
           the
           Circles
           themselves
           so
           related
           )
           these
           
           Ideal
           Relations
           must
           in
           the
           reality
           of
           the
           thing
           be
           one
           and
           the
           same
           with
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           themselves
           ,
           and
           consequently
           with
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           with
           which
           these
           Ideas
           are
           identified
           .
           And
           accordingly
           Truth
           which
           is
           the
           same
           with
           these
           Ideal
           Relations
           must
           also
           as
           to
           the
           real
           Essence
           and
           Substance
           of
           it
           be
           one
           and
           the
           same
           with
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           .
        
         
           12.
           
           And
           that
           indeed
           it
           is
           so
           may
           be
           further
           ,
           and
           somewhat
           more
           directly
           ,
           demonstrated
           thus
           .
           That
           God
           is
           the
           Cause
           of
           whatever
           is
           besides
           himself
           ,
           or
           ,
           that
           whatever
           is
           ,
           is
           either
           God
           or
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           is
           a
           clear
           and
           acknowledg'd
           Principle
           .
           Necessary
           Truth
           then
           is
           either
           God
           or
           the
           Effect
           of
           God.
           But
           it
           is
           not
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           therefore
           it
           can
           be
           no
           other
           than
           God
           himself
           .
           Now
           that
           it
           is
           not
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           ,
           the
           many
           gross
           Absurdities
           which
           that
           supposition
           draws
           after
           it
           I
           think
           will
           oblige
           him
           that
           Considers
           them
           to
           acknowledge
           .
           For
           First
           ,
           if
           Necessary
           Truth
           be
           the
           effect
           of
           God
           either
           it
           would
           not
           be
           necessary
           ,
           which
           is
           against
           
           the
           Supposition
           ;
           or
           if
           it
           be
           ,
           then
           as
           being
           a
           necessary
           Effect
           it
           must
           have
           a
           necessary
           Cause
           ,
           that
           is
           a
           Cause
           necessarily
           determin'd
           to
           act
           ,
           and
           so
           God
           would
           be
           a
           necessary
           Agent
           ,
           even
           
             ad
             extra
          
           .
           He
           would
           also
           be
           an
           unintelligent
           Agent
           .
           The
           Consequence
           is
           not
           to
           be
           avoided
           .
           For
           if
           Truth
           be
           the
           effect
           of
           God
           then
           antecedently
           to
           the
           effecting
           of
           it
           ,
           there
           was
           no
           Truth
           ,
           and
           consequently
           no
           Knowledge
           ,
           because
           there
           could
           be
           nothing
           known
           ;
           and
           so
           God
           in
           the
           production
           of
           Truth
           (
           if
           indeed
           he
           did
           produce
           it
           )
           must
           be
           supposed
           to
           act
           altogether
           in
           the
           dark
           ,
           and
           without
           any
           Intelligence
           .
           Again
           ,
           if
           Truth
           be
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           ,
           then
           the
           Perfection
           of
           the
           Divine
           Understanding
           must
           be
           supposed
           to
           depend
           upon
           something
           that
           is
           not
           God
           ,
           nay
           upon
           something
           created
           by
           God
           ,
           whereas
           God
           is
           the
           true
           perfective
           Object
           of
           all
           his
           Creatures
           ,
           and
           is
           himself
           completely
           Happy
           in
           the
           sole
           Contemplation
           of
           himself
           .
           '
           T●will
           follow
           again
           that
           God
           has
           constituted
           an
           Order
           of
           Realities
           which
           he
           has
           not
           ●ower
           to
           abolish
           ;
           that
           he
           has
           made
           some
           things
           which
           he
           cannot
           
           unmake
           again
           .
           And
           lastly
           to
           add
           no
           more
           ,
           If
           Truth
           be
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           then
           it
           cannot
           be
           God
           ,
           (
           because
           God
           cannot
           produce
           what
           is
           Himself
           )
           and
           if
           it
           be
           not
           God
           ,
           then
           by
           the
           Supposition
           there
           will
           be
           something
           Necessary
           ,
           Immutable
           ,
           Eternal
           and
           Independent
           ,
           &c.
           that
           is
           not
           God.
           Which
           last
           Consequence
           as
           it
           contradicts
           the
           Common
           and
           Natural
           Sentiment
           of
           Mankind
           ,
           so
           it
           struck
           so
           hard
           against
           a
           certain
           very
           Thoughtful
           and
           Metaphysical
           Head
           ,
           
           that
           he
           could
           not
           forbear
           urging
           this
           as
           One
           Argument
           against
           the
           very
           Being
           of
           Necessary
           Truth
           ;
           because
           then
           (
           as
           he
           pretends
           )
           there
           would
           be
           something
           Necessary
           besides
           God
           ,
           not
           considering
           that
           this
           Necessary
           Truth
           is
           really
           one
           and
           the
           same
           with
           the
           Divine
           Substance
           .
           Which
           one
           Consideration
           puts
           by
           the
           whole
           force
           of
           his
           Argument
           against
           the
           Being
           of
           Necessary
           Truth
           ,
           though
           however
           it
           be
           sufficiently
           conclusive
           of
           the
           Point
           we
           now
           contend
           for
           ,
           that
           this
           Truth
           is
           not
           the
           Effect
           of
           God.
           For
           if
           it
           were
           then
           his
           Allegation
           would
           take
           place
           ;
           that
           is
           ,
           there
           would
           indeed
           
           be
           something
           Necessary
           besides
           God
           ,
           which
           though
           it
           does
           not
           follow
           from
           the
           Supposition
           of
           the
           Being
           of
           Necessary
           Truth
           ,
           is
           yet
           plainly
           inseparable
           from
           the
           other
           Supposition
           ,
           that
           of
           its
           being
           the
           Effect
           of
           God.
           For
           then
           the
           very
           next
           Consequence
           is
           ,
           that
           there
           would
           be
           something
           Necessary
           besides
           God
           ,
           which
           no
           Religious
           ,
           nor
           indeed
           Rational
           Ear
           can
           bear
           .
           'T
           is
           plain
           therefore
           that
           Truth
           is
           not
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           ;
           and
           since
           it
           is
           not
           ,
           it
           remains
           by
           vertue
           of
           the
           premised
           Disjunction
           that
           it
           can
           be
           no
           other
           than
           the
           very
           Substance
           and
           Essence
           of
           the
           Deity
           .
        
         
           13.
           
           And
           to
           this
           purpose
           I
           further
           consider
           ,
           That
           the
           whole
           Perfection
           of
           the
           Mind
           does
           consist
           in
           its
           union
           with
           God
           ,
           who
           is
           her
           only
           true
           Good.
           This
           seems
           to
           me
           a
           Proposition
           of
           a
           very
           shining
           Evidence
           .
           For
           the
           good
           of
           the
           Mind
           must
           of
           necessity
           be
           something
           Spiritual
           ,
           otherwise
           it
           would
           be
           of
           a
           Nature
           inferiour
           to
           herself
           ,
           and
           so
           not
           capable
           of
           being
           her
           Perfection
           .
           But
           neither
           is
           that
           enough
           Whatever
           is
           the
           good
           of
           the
           Mind
           must
           not
           
           be
           only
           of
           a
           like
           Nature
           with
           the
           Mind
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           of
           a
           Spiritual
           ,
           but
           of
           a
           superiour
           Nature
           too
           .
           It
           must
           be
           something
           above
           the
           Mind
           that
           can
           be
           its
           Perfection
           ,
           and
           that
           can
           act
           upon
           it
           ,
           and
           inlighten
           it
           ,
           and
           affect
           it
           with
           pleasing
           Sensations
           ,
           otherwise
           how
           can
           it
           be
           able
           to
           add
           any
           thing
           to
           its
           better
           Being
           or
           Perfection
           ?
           And
           in
           order
           to
           all
           this
           it
           must
           also
           be
           intimately
           present
           to
           it
           ,
           and
           united
           with
           it
           ,
           otherwise
           how
           can
           it
           so
           act
           upon
           it
           ?
           But
           now
           God
           is
           the
           only
           Spiritual
           Being
           whom
           we
           can
           possibly
           conceive
           thus
           qualified
           to
           be
           the
           good
           or
           perfective
           Object
           of
           our
           Minds
           .
           Whence
           it
           follows
           that
           he
           only
           is
           so
           ,
           and
           that
           we
           cannot
           become
           either
           more
           Perfect
           or
           more
           Happy
           in
           any
           Kind
           or
           Degree
           but
           by
           our
           Union
           with
           ,
           and
           Possession
           of
           God.
           And
           hence
           it
           further
           follows
           ,
           that
           Truth
           could
           not
           be
           any
           Perfection
           of
           our
           Understandings
           if
           it
           were
           not
           the
           same
           with
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           (
           since
           that
           is
           our
           only
           perfective
           and
           beatifying
           Object
           )
           and
           that
           therefore
           since
           it
           really
           is
           perfective
           of
           our
           Understandings
           ,
           and
           that
           in
           the
           very
           highest
           measure
           
           (
           the
           Understanding
           being
           then
           most
           Perfect
           when
           it
           has
           the
           clearest
           and
           the
           largest
           view
           of
           Truth
           )
           it
           can
           be
           no
           other
           than
           the
           very
           Essence
           of
           that
           Infinite
           Mind
           who
           is
           the
           only
           true
           Good
           and
           Objective
           Perfection
           of
           all
           Spirits
           .
        
         
           14.
           
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           makes
           all
           Truth
           ,
           even
           that
           which
           is
           Eternal
           to
           have
           been
           positively
           instituted
           and
           establish'd
           by
           God
           ,
           to
           depend
           upon
           him
           as
           the
           
             Summus
             Legislator
          
           ,
           to
           be
           the
           effect
           of
           his
           Will
           and
           Pleasure
           ,
           and
           by
           Consequence
           to
           be
           Absolutely
           and
           Originally
           Arbitrary
           and
           Contingent
           .
           So
           that
           according
           to
           him
           2
           and
           2
           might
           not
           have
           been
           4
           ,
           or
           3
           Angles
           of
           a
           Triangle
           might
           not
           have
           been
           equal
           to
           2
           Right
           ones
           if
           God
           had
           pleas'd
           so
           to
           Order
           it
           .
           But
           this
           Notion
           of
           this
           Great
           Man
           does
           so
           rudely
           Shock
           the
           Natural
           Sense
           of
           Mankind
           that
           it
           cannot
           find
           Admission
           even
           where
           the
           rest
           of
           his
           Philosophy
           does
           ,
           but
           is
           generally
           exploded
           notwithstanding
           the
           eminency
           of
           its
           Author
           ,
           and
           that
           even
           by
           one
           of
           his
           greatest
           Admirers
           ,
           
           and
           (
           as
           I
           think
           )
           by
           far
           the
           Most
           Considerable
           of
           his
           Disciples
           .
           
           And
           truly
           I
           think
           this
           Opinion
           is
           treated
           no
           worse
           than
           it
           deserves
           ,
           since
           besides
           the
           Absurdities
           already
           Mention'd
           ,
           it
           shakes
           the
           Foundations
           of
           Science
           ,
           yea
           and
           of
           Morality
           too
           ,
           by
           supposing
           the
           Natures
           not
           only
           of
           Metaphysical
           and
           Mathematical
           Truth
           ,
           but
           even
           of
           Moral
           Good
           and
           Evil
           to
           be
           of
           a
           Positive
           and
           Arbitrary
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           of
           a
           Contingent
           Ordination
           .
           It
           is
           therefore
           deservedly
           as
           well
           as
           generally
           rejected
           ,
           but
           then
           let
           those
           that
           reject
           it
           have
           a
           Care
           that
           they
           fall
           not
           into
           a
           worse
           Absurdity
           .
           As
           they
           would
           not
           suppose
           Truth
           to
           be
           of
           a
           Positive
           and
           Alterable
           Nature
           and
           that
           the
           Relations
           of
           Ideas
           might
           have
           been
           otherwise
           than
           they
           are
           ,
           so
           let
           them
           have
           a
           Care
           how
           they
           make
           any
           thing
           Necessary
           and
           Immutable
           that
           is
           Not
           God.
           Let
           them
           be
           Consistent
           with
           themselves
           ,
           and
           as
           they
           justly
           reject
           the
           Opinion
           that
           makes
           Truth
           the
           Effect
           of
           God's
           Free
           and
           Arbitrarious
           Constitution
           ,
           and
           consequently
           of
           a
           Mutable
           and
           Variable
           Nature
           ,
           so
           let
           them
           own
           and
           Confess
           (
           as
           they
           are
           Obliged
           to
           do
           )
           that
           
           it
           is
           no
           other
           than
           God
           himself
           .
           For
           there
           is
           no
           other
           way
           of
           avoiding
           Des
           Cartes's
           Absurdity
           .
           For
           if
           Truth
           be
           not
           God
           then
           't
           is
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           if
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           then
           since
           the
           Constitutions
           of
           God
           are
           Free
           and
           Arbitrary
           ,
           the
           Natures
           and
           Relations
           of
           things
           might
           have
           been
           quite
           otherwise
           than
           they
           are
           ,
           the
           whole
           Science
           of
           Geometry
           might
           be
           transposed
           ,
           a
           Circle
           might
           have
           the
           Properties
           of
           a
           Square
           ,
           and
           a
           Square
           the
           Properties
           of
           a
           Circle
           ,
           2
           and
           2
           might
           not
           have
           been
           4
           ,
           or
           what
           else
           you
           will
           instance
           in
           .
           And
           so
           in
           Morality
           too
           (
           which
           is
           of
           far
           worse
           Consequence
           )
           there
           might
           have
           been
           the
           like
           transposition
           ,
           what
           is
           Vertue
           might
           have
           been
           Vice
           ,
           and
           what
           is
           Vice
           might
           have
           been
           Vertue
           .
           These
           are
           the
           Natural
           Consequences
           of
           Truth
           's
           being
           the
           Effect
           of
           Divine
           Constitution
           ,
           and
           they
           are
           intolerable
           ones
           too
           ,
           and
           therefore
           the
           Principle
           from
           which
           they
           flow
           is
           by
           the
           general
           Current
           of
           Writers
           well
           denied
           .
           But
           then
           unless
           they
           proceed
           ,
           and
           acknowledge
           Truth
           to
           be
           one
           with
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           they
           cannot
           help
           
           relapsing
           into
           the
           same
           or
           worse
           Absurdities
           .
           For
           whoever
           says
           that
           Truth
           is
           not
           God
           must
           say
           that
           it
           is
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           whoever
           says
           that
           ,
           must
           either
           say
           that
           't
           is
           Arbitrary
           and
           Contingent
           ,
           or
           if
           he
           says
           it
           is
           Necessary
           and
           Immutable
           ,
           he
           must
           allow
           of
           something
           Necessary
           and
           Immutable
           that
           is
           not
           God.
           But
           now
           it
           being
           most
           Evident
           that
           there
           is
           nothing
           Necessary
           that
           is
           not
           God
           ,
           if
           Truth
           be
           not
           God
           then
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           Necessary
           (
           which
           presently
           runs
           us
           into
           the
           Cartesian
           Absurdity
           of
           the
           Arbitrary
           Position
           of
           Truth
           )
           or
           if
           it
           be
           Necessary
           then
           't
           is
           as
           plain
           that
           it
           must
           be
           God.
           The
           short
           is
           ,
           Truth
           is
           either
           God
           or
           the
           Effect
           of
           God.
           If
           it
           be
           not
           God
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           as
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           says
           .
           But
           if
           not
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           (
           as
           the
           Consequent
           Absurdities
           from
           that
           Principle
           demonstrate
           ,
           and
           as
           is
           generally
           granted
           )
           then
           't
           is
           God
           himself
           as
           we
           say
           .
           It
           must
           be
           one
           or
           the
           other
           ,
           there
           is
           no
           Medium
           .
           To
           say
           that
           Truth
           is
           God
           ,
           or
           to
           say
           that
           't
           is
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           are
           each
           of
           them
           Consistent
           Propositions
           ,
           
           though
           from
           the
           gross
           Absurdities
           of
           the
           Latter
           the
           Former
           only
           appears
           to
           be
           the
           right
           ,
           but
           to
           deny
           that
           't
           is
           the
           effect
           of
           God
           and
           yet
           not
           to
           say
           that
           it
           is
           God
           ,
           that
           is
           to
           affirm
           that
           't
           is
           neither
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           nor
           yet
           God
           ,
           is
           all
           over
           unmaintainable
           and
           inconsistent
           .
           If
           it
           be
           not
           the
           Effect
           of
           God
           (
           as
           is
           both
           generally
           and
           justly
           acknowledg'd
           )
           then
           it
           must
           of
           Necessity
           be
           God
           ,
           since
           whatever
           is
           ,
           is
           either
           God
           or
           the
           Effect
           of
           God.
           
        
         
           15.
           
           And
           indeed
           if
           Truth
           be
           not
           God
           how
           comes
           it
           to
           be
           Cloath'd
           with
           the
           Glorious
           Ensigns
           of
           his
           Majesty
           ,
           to
           wear
           the
           Characters
           of
           his
           Divinity
           ,
           and
           to
           have
           so
           many
           of
           his
           peculiar
           and
           incommunicable
           Attributes
           ?
           How
           comes
           it
           to
           be
           Necessary
           ,
           Immutable
           ,
           Eternal
           ,
           Self-existent
           ,
           Increated
           ,
           Immense
           ,
           Omni-present
           and
           Independent
           ,
           and
           that
           not
           only
           upon
           the
           Conceptions
           of
           any
           Minds
           whether
           Human
           or
           Angelical
           ,
           but
           even
           all
           things
           whatsoever
           ,
           which
           might
           never
           have
           been
           made
           ,
           or
           might
           now
           be
           annihilated
           without
           any
           Prejudice
           to
           the
           being
           of
           Truth
           ,
           which
           does
           not
           
           respect
           the
           natural
           and
           actual
           Existencies
           but
           only
           the
           Abstract
           Essences
           of
           things
           .
           For
           were
           there
           no
           such
           thing
           as
           any
           real
           Circle
           or
           Triangle
           in
           Nature
           it
           would
           still
           be
           never
           the
           less
           true
           that
           their
           Abstract
           Essences
           would
           be
           determinate
           and
           invariable
           ,
           and
           that
           such
           and
           such
           distinct
           Properties
           would
           belong
           to
           them
           .
           Which
           by
           the
           way
           plainly
           Convinces
           that
           Truth
           is
           none
           of
           the
           Effects
           ,
           Works
           ,
           or
           Creatures
           of
           God
           ,
           since
           it
           did
           exist
           before
           them
           ,
           does
           not
           now
           depend
           on
           them
           ,
           and
           would
           remain
           the
           self-same
           Immutable
           thing
           without
           them
           .
           But
           then
           I
           demand
           whence
           has
           it
           this
           Self-subsistence
           and
           Independency
           of
           Being
           ?
           Whence
           again
           has
           it
           its
           fix'd
           and
           unalterable
           Nature
           ,
           such
           as
           we
           can
           neither
           add
           any
           thing
           to
           ,
           nor
           diminish
           ought
           from
           ?
           How
           is
           it
           that
           it
           is
           Present
           in
           all
           Places
           ,
           and
           to
           all
           Minds
           ,
           so
           as
           to
           be
           Contemplated
           by
           them
           all
           at
           the
           same
           time
           ,
           and
           after
           the
           same
           Manner
           ?
           How
           comes
           it
           to
           pass
           that
           we
           cannot
           so
           much
           as
           dis-imagine
           it
           ,
           or
           by
           way
           of
           Fiction
           and
           Supposition
           remove
           it
           out
           of
           Being
           ;
           but
           
           it
           still
           returns
           upon
           us
           with
           a
           strong
           and
           invincible
           Spring
           ,
           since
           even
           the
           very
           Supposition
           that
           there
           is
           no
           Truth
           carries
           a
           Formal
           Proposition
           in
           it
           whose
           Ideas
           have
           a
           certain
           Habitude
           to
           each
           other
           ,
           and
           so
           Contradicts
           it self
           .
           Besides
           how
           comes
           it
           to
           be
           a
           Perfection
           of
           the
           Divine
           Understanding
           ?
           Is
           any
           thing
           a
           Perfection
           to
           God
           but
           himself
           ?
           How
           comes
           it
           also
           to
           be
           the
           Rule
           and
           Measure
           of
           his
           Will
           ,
           which
           can
           be
           determin'd
           by
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           just
           Reasonable
           and
           True
           ?
           Can
           any
           thing
           be
           a
           Rule
           to
           God
           that
           is
           not
           himself
           ?
           Does
           he
           Consult
           or
           Follow
           any
           thing
           but
           what
           is
           One
           with
           his
           own
           Divine
           Nature
           and
           Essence
           ?
           And
           yet
           God
           consults
           and
           follows
           Truth
           ,
           and
           cannot
           act
           but
           according
           to
           its
           Immutable
           Laws
           and
           Measures
           .
           It
           is
           not
           therefore
           really
           distinguish'd
           from
           him
           ,
           but
           Coeternal
           and
           Consubstantial
           with
           him
           ,
           and
           so
           in
           Consulting
           Truth
           he
           Consults
           his
           own
           Essence
           *
           ,
           even
           the
           Divine
           
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
          
           ,
           the
           Eternal
           and
           Increated
           
           Wisdom
           ,
           the
           true
           intelligible
           Light
           ,
           in
           whom
           are
           all
           the
           Ideas
           and
           Essences
           of
           things
           ,
           the
           Fulness
           of
           Being
           and
           Truth
           ,
           who
           in
           the
           Beginning
           was
           with
           God
           ,
           and
           was
           God
           ,
           who
           is
           Eternally
           Contemplated
           by
           him
           with
           Infinite
           Joy
           and
           Complacency
           ,
           and
           who
           said
           of
           himself
           Incarnate
           ,
           
             I
             am
             the
             Way
             ,
             the
             Truth
             ,
             and
             the
             Life
             .
          
           I
           would
           fain
           know
           how
           all
           these
           incommunicable
           Attributes
           of
           God
           should
           agree
           to
           Truth
           if
           it
           be
           any
           thing
           less
           than
           a
           Divine
           Nature
           .
           Particularly
           I
           demand
           ,
           whence
           has
           it
           that
           unshakeable
           Firmness
           and
           Stability
           ,
           that
           invincible
           Permanency
           and
           Sted●astness
           ,
           that
           Necessity
           of
           Existence
           ,
           that
           utter
           repugnance
           to
           Not
           Being
           ,
           but
           only
           because
           it
           is
           really
           Coessential
           and
           Consubstantial
           with
           him
           whose
           Name
           is
           Iehovah
           ,
           and
           who
           is
           Being
           it self
           ,
           to
           whom
           it
           is
           Essential
           to
           Exist
           ,
           or
           rather
           ,
           whose
           very
           Essence
           is
           Existence
           .
        
         
           16.
           
           But
           now
           from
           this
           Coessentiality
           and
           Consubstantiality
           of
           Truth
           with
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           (
           a
           Noble
           and
           Sublime
           Theory
           ,
           but
           which
           I
           
           do
           but
           lightly
           touch
           over
           ,
           having
           not
           room
           here
           to
           pursue
           it
           at
           large
           )
           it
           evidently
           and
           necessarily
           follows
           again
           that
           Truth
           is
           Infinite
           .
           There
           cannot
           be
           a
           more
           immediate
           ,
           nor
           a
           more
           necessary
           ,
           nor
           a
           more
           inseparable
           Connexion
           between
           any
           two
           things
           than
           between
           this
           Consequence
           and
           that
           Principle
           .
           And
           indeed
           if
           Truth
           were
           not
           Infinite
           how
           can
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           God
           be
           so
           ?
           Not
           sure
           as
           Concretely
           and
           Objectively
           Consider'd
           ,
           for
           that
           manifestly
           implies
           the
           Infinity
           of
           its
           Object
           .
           And
           what
           is
           the
           Object
           of
           the
           Divine
           ,
           or
           of
           any
           other
           Understanding
           ,
           but
           Truth
           ?
           And
           should
           Knowledge
           here
           be
           taken
           for
           the
           Power
           or
           Faculty
           of
           Knowing
           ,
           to
           what
           purpose
           is
           an
           Infinite
           Power
           of
           Knowing
           unless
           there
           be
           an
           Infinite
           to
           be
           Known
           ?
           And
           would
           not
           such
           a
           Power
           be
           uneasie
           and
           afflictive
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           useless
           ,
           to
           him
           that
           had
           it
           ,
           unless
           the
           Object
           be
           supposed
           to
           carry
           due
           Proportion
           to
           it
           :
           For
           if
           it
           be
           so
           uneasie
           a
           Reflexion
           to
           some
           of
           us
           to
           have
           such
           short
           and
           narrow
           Faculties
           when
           the
           Compass
           of
           Truth
           has
           so
           large
           
           and
           spatious
           an
           extent
           ,
           to
           be
           able
           to
           know
           so
           little
           when
           there
           is
           so
           much
           to
           be
           known
           ,
           how
           much
           more
           troublesom
           and
           painful
           would
           it
           be
           to
           the
           Supreme
           Intelligence
           to
           have
           an
           Infinite
           Understanding
           when
           all
           that
           is
           intelligible
           is
           but
           Finite
           ?
           Would
           not
           that
           Infinity
           of
           his
           Capacity
           serve
           to
           vex
           and
           disquiet
           him
           more
           than
           the
           Narrowness
           of
           ours
           does
           us
           ,
           the
           difference
           being
           as
           much
           as
           between
           having
           a
           great
           Stomach
           and
           but
           little
           Meat
           ,
           and
           a
           little
           Stomach
           when
           there
           is
           a
           great
           deal
           of
           Meat
           ,
           whereof
           which
           is
           the
           greatest
           Punishment
           is
           Obvious
           to
           imagine
           .
           And
           we
           may
           judge
           of
           this
           in
           some
           measure
           by
           our selves
           .
           We
           have
           in
           us
           a
           Capacity
           boundless
           and
           unlimited
           .
           For
           tho'
           our
           Understandings
           be
           Finite
           ,
           our
           Wills
           know
           no
           Measure
           ,
           and
           are
           in
           a
           manner
           Infinite
           .
           As
           God
           has
           made
           us
           capable
           of
           enjoying
           an
           Infinite
           Good
           ,
           so
           Nothing
           less
           than
           that
           can
           satisfie
           our
           Desires
           .
           For
           we
           desire
           Good
           as
           Good
           ,
           and
           consequently
           all
           possible
           Good.
           Now
           we
           find
           this
           to
           be
           a
           great
           Pain
           to
           us
           at
           present
           to
           desire
           an
           Infinite
           Good
           when
           all
           that
           we
           can
           enjoy
           
           here
           is
           Finite
           .
           The
           greatest
           part
           of
           the
           Uneasiness
           ,
           the
           Melancholy
           ,
           the
           Disconsolateness
           ,
           the
           Aridity
           that
           accompanies
           Human
           Life
           will
           be
           found
           ,
           if
           traced
           to
           the
           Original
           ,
           to
           proceed
           from
           hence
           ,
           viz.
           from
           the
           little
           proportion
           that
           is
           between
           our
           Capacities
           and
           our
           Gratifications
           ,
           between
           what
           is
           desired
           and
           what
           is
           enjoy'd
           .
           And
           this
           Desire
           of
           an
           Infinite
           Good
           will
           be
           a
           far
           greater
           Punishment
           to
           us
           Hereafter
           when
           the
           Activity
           of
           our
           Faculties
           shall
           be
           more
           invigorated
           and
           inlarg'd
           ,
           if
           we
           have
           not
           then
           an
           Infinite
           Good
           to
           enjoy
           .
           ●Twill
           be
           at
           least
           the
           worst
           ingredient
           of
           Hell
           and
           Damnation
           ,
           if
           not
           all
           that
           is
           to
           be
           understood
           by
           it
           .
           And
           yet
           we
           are
           still
           to
           Consider
           that
           our
           Will
           is
           In●●nite
           only
           
             Ex
             parte
             Objecti
          
           ,
           because
           it
           desires
           an
           Infinite
           Good
           ,
           and
           not
           
             Ex
             parte
             Actûs
          
           because
           it
           desires
           it
           infinitely
           or
           with
           an
           unlimited
           Force
           and
           Activity
           .
           For
           't
           is
           impossible
           that
           a
           Finite
           Nature
           should
           have
           any
           Power
           or
           Force
           in
           it
           that
           is
           strictly
           infinite
           ,
           or
           that
           any
           such
           Act
           or
           Operation
           should
           proceed
           from
           it
           .
           But
           then
           what
           would
           
           the
           Affliction
           be
           if
           the
           Act
           were
           Infinite
           as
           well
           as
           the
           Object
           ,
           and
           we
           were
           to
           aspire
           after
           an
           Infinite
           Good
           with
           an
           Infinite
           Desire
           !
           What
           Conception
           can
           Frame
           a
           just
           Idea
           of
           the
           Misery
           of
           such
           a
           State
           !
           And
           can
           it
           be
           much
           less
           for
           an
           Infinite
           Intelligence
           to
           have
           only
           a
           Finite
           Intelligible
           for
           its
           Object
           ?
           But
           there
           is
           Nothing
           Painful
           or
           Afflictive
           in
           the
           Condition
           of
           the
           Supremely
           and
           Completely
           Blessed
           .
           And
           therefore
           we
           must
           Conclude
           that
           as
           the
           Infinite
           Will
           of
           God
           has
           a
           Good
           fully
           Commensurate
           and
           Adequate
           to
           its
           unlimited
           Activity
           ,
           whereon
           it
           may
           Center
           and
           Repose
           its
           Weight
           ,
           so
           the
           Infinite
           Understanding
           of
           God
           has
           also
           an
           Infinite
           Intelligible
           for
           its
           Object
           .
           And
           since
           the
           Formal
           Object
           of
           Understanding
           in
           General
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           of
           the
           Divine
           ,
           is
           Truth
           (
           as
           that
           of
           the
           Will
           is
           Good
           )
           hence
           it
           follows
           again
           that
           Truth
           must
           needs
           be
           of
           an
           Infinite
           Nature
           .
        
         
           17.
           
           And
           do
           we
           not
           find
           it
           so
           when
           we
           Convert
           our selves
           to
           it
           by
           Study
           and
           Meditation
           ?
           When
           we
           apply
           our
           Minds
           to
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           set
           our
           
           selves
           to
           muse
           and
           think
           ,
           do
           we
           not
           find
           that
           we
           launch
           forth
           into
           a
           vast
           intelligible
           Sea
           ,
           that
           has
           neither
           Bottom
           nor
           Shore
           ?
           And
           the
           more
           we
           think
           and
           the
           more
           we
           Meditate
           are
           we
           not
           still
           more
           and
           more
           convinc'd
           of
           this
           ,
           and
           do
           we
           not
           discover
           the
           further
           we
           go
           in
           our
           Intellectual
           Progress
           ,
           that
           there
           still
           lies
           more
           and
           more
           beyond
           us
           ,
           so
           that
           the
           more
           we
           advance
           in
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           Truth
           the
           more
           we
           inlarge
           Our
           Idea
           of
           it
           ,
           as
           the
           greatest
           Travellers
           think
           most
           Magnificently
           of
           the
           World
           ?
           Do
           we
           not
           find
           as
           in
           a
           Spatious
           Campaigne
           ,
           so
           in
           the
           immense
           Field
           of
           Truth
           ,
           that
           our
           Eye
           wearies
           ,
           and
           our
           Sight
           loses
           it self
           in
           the
           boundless
           Prospect
           ,
           and
           that
           besides
           the
           clear
           view
           which
           we
           have
           of
           a
           few
           things
           at
           a
           little
           distance
           from
           us
           ,
           there
           lie
           all
           round
           us
           vast
           Tracts
           unmeasurably
           diffused
           ,
           whereof
           we
           have
           only
           Confuse
           and
           indistinct
           Images
           ,
           like
           the
           Faint
           Blew
           of
           the
           far
           distant
           Hills
           ?
           Are
           not
           the
           Relations
           and
           Combinations
           of
           things
           with
           one
           another
           Infinite
           ,
           and
           should
           but
           one
           link
           in
           this
           Endless
           Chain
           be
           alter'd
           would
           not
           innumerable
           
           Alterations
           ensue
           upon
           it
           ?
           Should
           but
           One
           Proposition
           that
           is
           False
           be
           supposed
           True
           ,
           or
           One
           that
           is
           True
           be
           supposed
           False
           ,
           what
           Understanding
           but
           the
           Divine
           could
           go
           on
           with
           the
           Train
           of
           New
           Consequences
           that
           would
           result
           from
           such
           a
           Supposition
           ?
           I
           say
           New
           Consequences
           ,
           For
           we
           are
           to
           consider
           that
           besides
           the
           
             Absolute
             Systeme
          
           of
           Truth
           which
           contains
           the
           Relations
           of
           Ideas
           with
           their
           settled
           Coherencies
           and
           Dependencies
           one
           upon
           another
           according
           as
           they
           really
           stand
           in
           their
           Natural
           Order
           ,
           there
           is
           a
           Secondary
           Systeme
           of
           Truth
           which
           I
           may
           call
           Hypothetical
           ,
           that
           results
           from
           any
           supposed
           Change
           made
           in
           the
           Absolute
           Systeme
           ,
           whence
           will
           still
           arise
           new
           and
           new
           Consequences
           even
           to
           Infinity
           .
           But
           not
           to
           consider
           Hypothetical
           Truth
           ,
           can
           the
           Bounds
           of
           that
           which
           is
           Absolute
           be
           ever
           fix'd
           ,
           or
           its
           Stock
           ever
           Exhausted
           ?
           Does
           it
           not
           after
           all
           the
           Study
           that
           has
           been
           employ'd
           about
           it
           ,
           and
           the
           Numberless
           Number
           of
           Volumns
           that
           have
           been
           written
           upon
           it
           furnish
           perpetual
           matter
           for
           our
           Contemplation
           ,
           and
           is
           it
           not
           a
           
           Subject
           for
           everlasting
           Thoughts
           and
           Considerations
           ?
           Has
           it
           not
           been
           the
           great
           Research
           of
           the
           Thoughtful
           and
           Inquisitive
           for
           many
           Ages
           ,
           and
           yet
           does
           not
           every
           Age
           refine
           upon
           its
           Predecessour
           ,
           and
           produce
           New
           Discoveries
           ?
           Are
           not
           the
           Sciences
           continually
           improved
           ,
           and
           yet
           are
           there
           not
           still
           Depths
           in
           every
           Science
           which
           no
           Line
           of
           Thought
           can
           ever
           Fathom
           ?
           What
           a
           vast
           Fecundity
           is
           there
           in
           some
           plain
           simple
           Propositions
           ,
           nay
           who
           can
           number
           the
           Conclusions
           that
           may
           be
           drawn
           from
           any
           one
           Principle
           !
           Take
           the
           most
           simple
           Figure
           in
           Geometry
           ,
           and
           where
           is
           the
           Mathematician
           who
           after
           a
           Thousand
           Years
           Study
           can
           reckon
           up
           all
           the
           Properties
           that
           may
           be
           affirm'd
           of
           it
           ,
           both
           as
           Absolutely
           Consider'd
           ,
           and
           as
           it
           stands
           in
           relation
           to
           other
           Figures
           ?
           And
           what
           then
           shall
           we
           think
           of
           the
           whole
           Science
           in
           all
           its
           Branches
           and
           Dependencies
           ,
           Particularly
           of
           Algebra
           ,
           the
           Main
           Ocean
           of
           this
           Bottomless
           Sea
           ?
           And
           what
           shall
           we
           say
           of
           Metaphysick's
           ,
           another
           unmeasurable
           Abysse
           ,
           and
           what
           of
           the
           endless
           Circle
           of
           Truth
           ,
           if
           not
           the
           
           same
           which
           one
           of
           
           Iob's
           Friends
           says
           of
           God
           ,
           
           
             Canst
             thou
             by
             searching
             ●ind
             out
          
           Truth
           ,
           
             Canst
             thou
             find
             her
             out
             unto
             Perfection
             ?
             It
             is
             as
             high
             as
             Heaven
             ,
             what
             canst
             thou
             do
             ?
             deeper
             than
             Hell
             ,
             what
             canst
             thou
             know
             ?
             The
             Measure
             thereof
             is
             longer
             than
             the
             Earth
             ,
             and
             broader
             than
             the
             Sea.
          
           And
           that
           because
           they
           after
           all
           are
           Finite
           ,
           whereas
           this
           is
           truly
           and
           strictly
           Infinite
           .
           Which
           by
           the
           way
           sufficiently
           proves
           a
           God
           ,
           and
           that
           this
           God
           is
           Truth
           ,
           whose
           Eternal
           and
           Glorious
           Majesty
           be
           Blessed
           for
           Ever
           .
        
         
           18.
           
           But
           then
           let
           us
           Consider
           ,
           if
           Truth
           be
           indeed
           (
           as
           you
           see
           )
           of
           an
           Infinite
           Nature
           ,
           then
           to
           prove
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           fully
           adequate
           to
           it
           ,
           does
           not
           intirely
           possess
           it
           ,
           nor
           all
           over
           and
           wholly
           comprehend
           it
           ,
           and
           consequently
           cannot
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           it
           ,
           there
           will
           be
           no
           need
           of
           laying
           open
           the
           great
           Weakness
           and
           Deficiency
           of
           our
           Understanding
           :
           I
           need
           not
           represent
           the
           Imperfection
           of
           its
           Light
           ,
           nor
           the
           Shortness
           of
           its
           Views
           ,
           nor
           the
           Slenderness
           of
           its
           Attainments
           ,
           nor
           the
           very
           Narrow
           Extent
           of
           its
           Knowledge
           ,
           
           nor
           the
           very
           little
           Progress
           it
           is
           able
           to
           make
           in
           the
           Contemplation
           and
           Comprehension
           of
           Truth
           ;
           That
           there
           are
           a
           great
           many
           things
           whereof
           we
           have
           no
           Ideas
           (
           for
           which
           we
           need
           go
           no
           further
           for
           an
           Instance
           than
           our
           own
           Souls
           )
           and
           that
           even
           where
           we
           have
           Ideas
           of
           things
           we
           cannot
           always
           discern
           the
           Relations
           and
           Connexions
           that
           are
           between
           them
           ,
           and
           that
           either
           for
           want
           of
           sufficient
           Clearness
           in
           the
           Ideas
           themselves
           to
           have
           their
           Relations
           perceived
           immediately
           without
           comparing
           them
           with
           other
           mediate
           Ideas
           ,
           or
           else
           for
           want
           of
           such
           due
           and
           proper
           Mediums
           wherewith
           to
           compare
           them
           ,
           and
           that
           therefore
           the
           extent
           of
           our
           Knowledge
           is
           not
           only
           vastly
           exceeded
           by
           the
           Natures
           of
           things
           ,
           but
           also
           very
           Considerably
           even
           by
           our
           own
           Ideas
           ,
           there
           being
           many
           things
           whereof
           we
           have
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           sometimes
           very
           clear
           ones
           too
           ,
           and
           yet
           which
           we
           know
           no
           more
           how
           to
           reason
           upon
           or
           discourse
           of
           intelligibly
           ,
           or
           with
           any
           Certainty
           ,
           than
           we
           do
           of
           those
           things
           whereof
           we
           have
           no
           Ideas
           at
           all
           ,
           being
           ,
           for
           Example
           ,
           
           no
           more
           able
           to
           tell
           what
           proportion
           such
           a
           Circle
           bears
           to
           such
           a
           Square
           though
           we
           have
           clear
           Ideas
           of
           both
           ,
           than
           we
           are
           to
           tell
           what
           proportion
           there
           is
           between
           Angels
           and
           our
           own
           Souls
           ,
           things
           whereof
           we
           have
           no
           Ideas
           .
           A
           very
           remarkable
           Instance
           of
           the
           Shortness
           and
           Contractedness
           of
           our
           Understandings
           ,
           which
           it
           seems
           are
           not
           only
           destitute
           of
           the
           Ideas
           of
           many
           things
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           of
           the
           knowledge
           of
           them
           (
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           the
           extent
           of
           our
           knowledge
           should
           exceed
           that
           of
           our
           Ideas
           )
           but
           are
           also
           Blind
           to
           those
           very
           Ideas
           which
           they
           have
           ,
           and
           cannot
           see
           even
           when
           they
           have
           the
           advantage
           of
           the
           Light.
           But
           I
           say
           I
           need
           not
           present
           my
           Reader
           with
           a
           Night-piece
           of
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           describe
           great
           Blindness
           and
           gross
           Darkness
           ,
           how
           ignorant
           she
           is
           when
           she
           does
           not
           adventure
           to
           judge
           ,
           and
           how
           Erroneous
           when
           she
           does
           ,
           stumbling
           and
           falling
           (
           as
           is
           usual
           in
           the
           dark
           )
           out
           of
           one
           mistake
           into
           another
           ,
           out
           of
           one
           Errour
           into
           another
           ,
           either
           by
           im●racing
           false
           Principles
           ,
           or
           by
           drawing
           wrong
           
           Conclusions
           from
           true
           ones
           ,
           so
           that
           Ignorance
           seems
           her
           safest
           Retreat
           ,
           and
           to
           suspend
           her
           best
           Wisdom
           ;
           These
           I
           say
           and
           such
           other
           of
           our
           intellectual
           Infirmities
           I
           need
           not
           insist
           upon
           or
           make
           any
           advantage
           of
           ,
           it
           being
           sufficient
           to
           conclude
           the
           Point
           in
           hand
           that
           Human
           Reason
           in
           its
           largest
           Capacity
           and
           Extent
           and
           with
           all
           the
           advantages
           of
           both
           Nature
           and
           Artificial
           improvement
           is
           after
           all
           but
           a
           Finite
           thing
           (
           and
           that
           to
           be
           sure
           the
           most
           Zealous
           of
           its
           Votaries
           and
           Advocates
           must
           confess
           that
           it
           is
           )
           since
           't
           is
           impossible
           that
           what
           has
           Bounds
           should
           be
           able
           totally
           and
           adequately
           to
           Comprehend
           what
           has
           None
           ,
           or
           that
           Finite
           should
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Infinite
           .
        
         
           19.
           
           I
           know
           but
           of
           one
           thing
           that
           can
           with
           any
           Pertinency
           be
           replied
           to
           this
           Argument
           ,
           and
           that
           is
           ,
           that
           though
           Human
           Reason
           (
           as
           Finite
           )
           be
           not
           able
           to
           comprehend
           all
           Truth
           (
           as
           being
           Infinite
           )
           yet
           however
           there
           may
           perhaps
           be
           no
           one
           Truth
           in
           Particular
           but
           what
           ,
           when
           presented
           to
           it
           ,
           may
           be
           comprehended
           by
           it
           ,
           and
           so
           Human
           Reason
           may
           be
           rightly
           said
           to
           
           be
           Adequate
           and
           Commensurate
           to
           Truth
           as
           Distributively
           ,
           though
           not
           as
           Collectively
           consider'd
           .
           But
           to
           this
           I
           have
           several
           things
           to
           return
           .
           First
           of
           all
           I
           say
           that
           such
           is
           the
           reciprocal
           dependence
           and
           concatenation
           of
           Truth
           that
           the
           want
           of
           a
           thorough
           and
           intire
           Comprehension
           of
           all
           Truth
           in
           its
           widest
           and
           most
           diffused
           Extent
           must
           needs
           very
           much
           Eclipse
           the
           view
           and
           darken
           the
           Perception
           of
           any
           one
           Solitary
           Truth
           in
           particular
           ,
           so
           that
           however
           we
           may
           have
           some
           tolerable
           Perception
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           we
           may
           call
           Clear
           in
           Comparison
           of
           some
           other
           Truths
           which
           we
           do
           not
           see
           so
           clearly
           ,
           yet
           it
           cannot
           be
           near
           so
           clear
           and
           Distinct
           a
           Perception
           ,
           as
           that
           Infinite
           Being
           has
           of
           it
           who
           sees
           not
           only
           the
           Truth
           it self
           ,
           but
           also
           the
           Manifold
           Relation
           ,
           Connexion
           ,
           and
           Combination
           that
           it
           has
           with
           all
           other
           Truths
           .
           The
           difference
           between
           these
           two
           ways
           of
           Perception
           being
           of
           a
           like
           Nature
           with
           that
           which
           is
           between
           seeing
           a
           Proposition
           as
           it
           stands
           singly
           by
           it self
           ,
           and
           seeing
           the
           same
           Proposition
           with
           all
           its
           Relations
           and
           
           Dependencies
           ,
           and
           in
           conjunction
           with
           the
           whole
           Context
           and
           Coherence
           of
           the
           Discourse
           whereof
           it
           is
           a
           Part.
           I
           say
           again
           Secondly
           ,
           that
           though
           we
           may
           have
           a
           competent
           Perception
           of
           some
           plain
           and
           simple
           Truths
           without
           pursuing
           them
           thorough
           all
           the
           Relations
           and
           Dependencies
           that
           they
           have
           with
           other
           Truths
           (
           since
           otherwise
           ,
           as
           I
           have
           hinted
           already
           ,
           we
           should
           be
           able
           to
           understand
           nothing
           ,
           and
           every
           thing
           would
           be
           above
           Reason
           )
           yet
           however
           we
           do
           not
           know
           but
           that
           there
           may
           be
           some
           Truths
           of
           such
           a
           Nature
           as
           not
           to
           be
           understood
           without
           the
           adequate
           Comprehension
           of
           those
           Relations
           and
           Dependencies
           ;
           which
           since
           we
           have
           not
           ,
           we
           do
           not
           nor
           can
           ever
           know
           but
           that
           there
           may
           be
           some
           Truths
           that
           are
           so
           above
           us
           as
           to
           be
           out
           of
           our
           Reach
           ,
           and
           to
           lie
           beyond
           all
           possibility
           of
           Comprehension
           ,
           and
           consequently
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           adequate
           and
           commensurate
           to
           Truth
           even
           Distributively
           consider'd
           .
           I
           say
           we
           do
           not
           know
           ,
           and
           't
           is
           impossible
           we
           should
           ever
           know
           but
           that
           thus
           it
           may
           be
           .
           For
           how
           should
           we
           be
           
           able
           to
           know
           it
           ,
           or
           upon
           what
           shall
           we
           ground
           this
           our
           Knowledge
           ?
           It
           must
           be
           either
           upon
           the
           Natural
           Force
           and
           Penetration
           of
           our
           Understandings
           ,
           or
           upon
           our
           Actual
           Views
           and
           Perceptions
           ,
           or
           upon
           the
           Nature
           of
           Truth
           it self
           .
           As
           for
           the
           Capacity
           of
           our
           Understandings
           though
           we
           do
           not
           know
           the
           precise
           and
           exact
           Bounds
           and
           Limits
           of
           it
           ,
           yet
           we
           know
           in
           the
           general
           that
           it
           is
           Finite
           ,
           and
           has
           its
           fix'd
           and
           determinate
           Measure
           ,
           which
           it
           would
           strive
           in
           vain
           to
           exceed
           .
           As
           for
           the
           Nature
           of
           Truth
           ,
           that
           we
           both
           experiment
           ,
           and
           from
           the
           foregoing
           Considerations
           must
           of
           necessity
           conclude
           to
           be
           Infinite
           .
           And
           what
           Ground
           of
           Assurance
           can
           we
           have
           from
           either
           or
           both
           of
           these
           ,
           which
           are
           apt
           rather
           to
           lay
           a
           Foundation
           of
           Diffidence
           and
           Distrust
           ?
           And
           then
           as
           for
           our
           actual
           Views
           and
           Perceptions
           ,
           though
           we
           should
           suppose
           them
           to
           have
           been
           hitherto
           never
           so
           clear
           and
           distinct
           ,
           never
           so
           numerous
           and
           extensive
           ,
           and
           never
           so
           fortunate
           and
           successful
           ,
           so
           that
           our
           Victorious
           Understandings
           never
           yet
           met
           with
           a
           Baffle
           ,
           nor
           sounded
           a
           
           retreat
           from
           a
           too
           difficult
           and
           impregnable
           Theory
           ,
           suppose
           in
           one
           word
           ,
           that
           we
           never
           yet
           applied
           our
           minds
           to
           the
           consideration
           of
           any
           one
           Truth
           but
           what
           we
           fully
           comprehended
           and
           were
           perfect
           Masters
           of
           (
           which
           yet
           he
           must
           be
           a
           very
           Presumptuous
           ,
           or
           a
           very
           little
           experienc'd
           Thinker
           that
           shall
           affirm
           of
           himself
           )
           how
           notwithstanding
           do
           we
           know
           ,
           considering
           the
           Finiteness
           of
           our
           Intellect
           ,
           and
           the
           Infiniteness
           of
           Truth
           ,
           but
           that
           there
           may
           be
           Other
           Truths
           of
           a
           Nature
           so
           far
           above
           us
           ,
           and
           so
           disproportionate
           to
           us
           ,
           as
           not
           possibly
           to
           be
           Comprehended
           by
           us
           .
           For
           we
           cannot
           argue
           here
           from
           the
           past
           Successes
           and
           Atchievements
           of
           our
           Understandings
           to
           the
           Future
           ,
           or
           because
           there
           has
           been
           nothing
           hitherto
           proposed
           to
           us
           but
           what
           we
           Comprehended
           ,
           that
           therefore
           there
           can
           be
           nothing
           proposed
           but
           what
           we
           can
           Comprehend
           .
           If
           we
           conclude
           thus
           ,
           we
           forget
           the
           vast
           disproportion
           between
           Truth
           and
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           that
           the
           one
           is
           Finite
           and
           the
           other
           Infinite
           ,
           the
           due
           and
           attentive
           Consideration
           of
           which
           would
           convince
           us
           that
           tho'
           
           we
           have
           thought
           never
           so
           much
           ,
           and
           never
           so
           well
           ,
           and
           comprehended
           never
           so
           many
           Truths
           ,
           yet
           for
           ought
           we
           know
           there
           may
           be
           Truths
           which
           our
           intellectual
           Sight
           though
           aided
           with
           all
           the
           advantages
           of
           Art
           ,
           that
           may
           help
           the
           Mind
           as
           much
           as
           a
           Telescope
           does
           the
           Eye
           ,
           can
           yet
           never
           penetrate
           ,
           and
           which
           (
           by
           the
           way
           )
           it
           may
           be
           Worthy
           of
           God
           to
           reveal
           to
           us
           if
           't
           were
           only
           to
           Check
           and
           Controle
           the
           daring
           Progress
           of
           our
           Understanding
           ,
           to
           make
           us
           understand
           our
           Measure
           and
           remember
           that
           we
           are
           but
           Men
           ,
           to
           be
           sensible
           of
           the
           defects
           of
           that
           part
           upon
           which
           we
           most
           value
           our selves
           and
           despite
           others
           ,
           and
           that
           even
           the
           Light
           that
           is
           in
           us
           is
           but
           Darkness
           .
           Whether
           there
           be
           any
           such
           Truths
           I
           do
           not
           now
           say
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           upon
           the
           Supposition
           of
           the
           Infinity
           of
           Truth
           't
           is
           impossible
           for
           us
           to
           be
           sure
           but
           that
           there
           may
           be
           such
           ,
           which
           is
           enough
           to
           hinder
           Our
           Reason
           from
           being
           (
           at
           least
           as
           to
           us
           )
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           since
           if
           it
           be
           so
           't
           is
           more
           than
           we
           know
           ,
           or
           can
           possibly
           be
           assured
           of
           ,
           which
           makes
           it
           all
           one
           (
           
             to
             us
          
           )
           as
           if
           it
           were
           not
           .
           For
           we
           
           cannot
           make
           use
           of
           it
           as
           a
           Measure
           ,
           or
           draw
           any
           Consequence
           from
           it
           to
           the
           Falsehood
           ,
           Impossibility
           ,
           or
           Incredibility
           of
           things
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           since
           for
           ought
           we
           know
           or
           can
           know
           to
           the
           Contrary
           ,
           there
           may
           be
           Truths
           which
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           .
        
         
           20.
           
           But
           then
           I
           say
           further
           Thirdly
           ,
           that
           the
           Infinite
           Nature
           of
           Truth
           will
           Oblige
           us
           to
           acknowledge
           that
           there
           actually
           are
           and
           must
           be
           such
           .
           For
           if
           Truth
           be
           Infinite
           then
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           it
           in
           its
           full
           and
           intire
           Extent
           ,
           and
           so
           much
           the
           very
           Objection
           supposes
           .
           But
           then
           I
           say
           that
           as
           the
           want
           of
           a
           perfect
           Comprehension
           of
           all
           Truth
           does
           very
           much
           shade
           and
           darken
           the
           perception
           of
           any
           one
           single
           Truth
           in
           particular
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           of
           the
           mutual
           connexion
           and
           dependence
           of
           things
           one
           upon
           another
           (
           as
           was
           before
           observ'd
           )
           so
           it
           must
           needs
           quite
           Eclipse
           and
           totally
           Abscond
           some
           Truths
           from
           our
           View
           .
           For
           there
           are
           some
           Truths
           so
           very
           Complex
           and
           Abstruse
           ,
           and
           that
           lie
           so
           deep
           ,
           and
           ,
           as
           I
           may
           say
           ,
           so
           far
           within
           the
           Bowels
           of
           the
           Intellectual
           
           Systeme
           ,
           that
           include
           such
           a
           Multitude
           of
           Relations
           ,
           depend
           upon
           so
           many
           Suppositions
           ,
           are
           the
           Conclusions
           of
           so
           many
           Premisses
           ,
           presuppose
           and
           require
           the
           knowledge
           of
           so
           many
           things
           (
           of
           some
           of
           which
           it
           may
           be
           we
           have
           not
           so
           much
           as
           the
           simple
           Ideas
           )
           have
           such
           a
           Train
           of
           Principles
           Planted
           and
           Intrench'd
           as
           a
           Guard
           before
           'em
           ,
           and
           draw
           such
           an
           immense
           Retinue
           of
           Consequences
           after
           them
           ,
           and
           are
           every
           way
           so
           mingled
           ,
           involv'd
           and
           combined
           with
           other
           Truths
           that
           they
           cannot
           possibly
           be
           understood
           without
           an
           intire
           and
           all-comprehensive
           view
           of
           the
           whole
           Rational
           Systeme
           .
           Instances
           of
           such
           Truths
           abound
           in
           every
           Science
           .
           But
           there
           is
           nothing
           that
           may
           furnish
           us
           with
           so
           sensible
           and
           palpable
           an
           Illustration
           of
           this
           Matter
           as
           th●
           Order
           and
           Measure
           of
           
             Divine
             Providence
          
           .
           We
           are
           all
           fully
           assured
           from
           the
           very
           Notion
           and
           Idea
           of
           God
           as
           involving
           all
           possible
           Excellency
           and
           Perfection
           in
           it
           ,
           that
           he
           is
           a
           Being
           infinitely
           Wise
           ,
           Good
           ,
           Just
           and
           Holy
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           that
           his
           whole
           Conduct
           in
           the
           Government
           
           of
           the
           World
           must
           necessarily
           carry
           the
           Character
           of
           all
           these
           Attributes
           ,
           and
           that
           he
           cannot
           possibly
           do
           any
           thing
           contrary
           or
           repugnant
           to
           any
           of
           them
           any
           more
           than
           he
           can
           deny
           himself
           ,
           or
           depart
           from
           the
           Essential
           Perfections
           of
           his
           Infinite
           Nature
           .
           And
           upon
           this
           Consideration
           is
           founded
           the
           best
           Argument
           we
           have
           for
           Submission
           and
           Resignation
           to
           the
           Will
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           Acquiescence
           in
           his
           Providential
           Dispensations
           .
           Thus
           far
           then
           we
           are
           all
           satisfied
           and
           agreed
           .
           And
           yet
           it
           cannot
           be
           denied
           when
           we
           come
           to
           Particulars
           ,
           but
           that
           there
           are
           Phenomena
           in
           the
           Moral
           as
           well
           as
           in
           the
           Natural
           World
           which
           are
           utterly
           insolvible
           ,
           and
           that
           a
           great
           many
           of
           these
           Dispensations
           of
           Providence
           are
           accompanied
           with
           desperate
           and
           invincible
           Difficulties
           ,
           such
           as
           have
           at
           once
           exercised
           and
           puzzled
           the
           thoughts
           of
           the
           most
           inquisitive
           in
           all
           Ages
           ,
           and
           still
           remain
           Obstinate
           and
           Unmoveable
           Objections
           not
           only
           to
           the
           Atheists
           and
           Libertines
           ,
           but
           even
           to
           the
           most
           sober
           and
           intelligent
           of
           both
           Philosophers
           and
           Divines
           ,
           Men
           
           of
           the
           greatest
           Light
           and
           Piety
           ,
           those
           who
           best
           understand
           ,
           and
           do
           most
           reverence
           and
           adore
           the
           ways
           of
           God.
           And
           adore
           them
           after
           all
           they
           must
           ,
           for
           so
           intricate
           and
           intangling
           are
           the
           Difficulties
           ,
           or
           (
           by
           the
           leave
           of
           some
           )
           I
           would
           say
           Mysteries
           of
           Providence
           ,
           especially
           in
           those
           dark
           Scenes
           of
           it
           that
           relate
           to
           the
           Divine
           Concourse
           and
           Cooperation
           with
           the
           Will
           of
           Man
           ,
           the
           Ordination
           of
           his
           Final
           State
           ,
           the
           Order
           and
           Distribution
           of
           Grace
           ,
           the
           Permission
           ,
           Direction
           and
           Nice
           Conduct
           of
           Sin
           ,
           &c.
           that
           the
           Capacity
           of
           our
           Understanding
           will
           not
           serve
           us
           to
           give
           a
           clear
           and
           unobnoxious
           account
           of
           them
           .
           Indeed
           the
           diligent
           and
           curious
           Wit
           of
           Man
           has
           gone
           a
           great
           way
           in
           this
           as
           well
           as
           in
           Other
           Matters
           ,
           and
           several
           Systemes
           and
           Hypotheses
           have
           been
           invented
           about
           these
           things
           by
           Contemplative
           Spirits
           ,
           among
           whom
           the
           two
           very
           particular
           Authors
           of
           the
           Treatise
           of
           Nature
           and
           Grace
           ,
           and
           of
           
             L'Oeconomie
             Divine
          
           have
           I
           think
           gone
           the
           furthest
           of
           any
           .
           But
           though
           some
           of
           these
           Accounts
           bid
           fairer
           for
           reception
           
           than
           others
           ,
           by
           striking
           some
           glimmering
           Light
           into
           these
           Abstrusities
           ,
           yet
           still
           they
           all
           agree
           in
           this
           ,
           that
           they
           leave
           a
           great
           deal
           more
           in
           the
           Dark
           ,
           and
           labour
           with
           Difficulties
           even
           where
           they
           do
           Explain
           :
           So
           that
           after
           all
           they
           discover
           nothing
           so
           much
           as
           their
           own
           Shortness
           and
           Deficiency
           .
           In
           the
           mean
           while
           we
           know
           and
           are
           most
           certain
           in
           the
           General
           ,
           that
           all
           is
           right
           and
           as
           it
           should
           be
           in
           the
           Conduct
           of
           God
           towards
           his
           Creatures
           ,
           and
           that
           he
           cannot
           make
           one
           false
           Step
           in
           the
           Government
           of
           the
           World.
           So
           much
           we
           understand
           without
           Systemes
           ,
           and
           truly
           not
           much
           more
           with
           them
           .
           For
           as
           for
           the
           Particular
           Scenes
           of
           Providence
           we
           know
           not
           what
           to
           make
           of
           them
           ;
           and
           when
           we
           have
           consider'd
           the
           Dispensations
           of
           God
           as
           much
           as
           we
           can
           or
           dare
           ,
           we
           find
           our selves
           after
           all
           obliged
           to
           confess
           ,
           that
           though
           
             Righteousness
             and
             Iudgment
             are
             the
             Habitation
             of
             his
             Seat
             ,
          
           
           
             yet
             Clouds
             and
             Darkness
             are
             round
             about
             him
             .
          
        
         
           21.
           
           But
           now
           how
           comes
           it
           to
           be
           so
           Dark
           and
           Cloudy
           ?
           How
           come
           we
           to
           be
           so
           little
           able
           to
           see
           the
           particular
           
           Wisdom
           ,
           Goodness
           ,
           Justice
           and
           Holiness
           of
           those
           ways
           of
           God
           ,
           which
           in
           the
           general
           we
           are
           convinc'd
           to
           be
           so
           Wise
           ,
           Good
           ,
           Just
           and
           Holy
           ?
           Why
           can
           we
           not
           enter
           into
           the
           Detail
           of
           Providence
           ?
           Why
           even
           because
           we
           do
           not
           see
           it
           throughout
           ,
           and
           have
           not
           a
           Comprehension
           of
           its
           Universal
           Systeme
           .
           For
           the
           Passages
           of
           Providence
           〈◊〉
           of
           such
           a
           Relative
           and
           Complicated
           Nature
           ,
           there
           is
           such
           a
           kind
           of
           
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
          
           or
           
             mutual
             in-being
          
           or
           indwelling
           in
           them
           ,
           (
           if
           I
           may
           transfer
           an
           Expression
           hither
           ,
           commonly
           applyed
           to
           a
           higher
           Mystery
           )
           they
           are
           so
           interwoven
           with
           ,
           and
           have
           so
           common
           a
           dependance
           upon
           one
           another
           ,
           that
           without
           a
           Comprehensive
           View
           of
           the
           whole
           Drama
           ,
           we
           can
           hardly
           make
           any
           thing
           of
           any
           one
           Particular
           Scene
           .
           Indeed
           if
           we
           could
           have
           such
           a
           View
           as
           that
           ,
           a
           View
           that
           went
           round
           and
           through
           ,
           and
           grasp'd
           the
           whole
           Area
           of
           that
           immense
           Circle
           ,
           we
           should
           quickly
           see
           the
           Regularity
           of
           the
           most
           uneven
           and
           odd-figured
           Parts
           ,
           and
           how
           wonderfully
           they
           conspired
           (
           like
           the
           Flats
           and
           Sharps
           
           of
           Musick
           )
           to
           the
           Order
           and
           Harmony
           of
           that
           excellent
           and
           surprizing
           Beauty
           that
           results
           from
           them
           .
           But
           being
           not
           able
           to
           reach
           this
           ,
           we
           are
           not
           competent
           Judges
           of
           the
           rest
           ,
           (
           which
           by
           the
           way
           should
           repress
           our
           forwardness
           to
           fit
           in
           Judgment
           upon
           things
           so
           far
           above
           the
           Cognizance
           of
           our
           Court
           )
           ;
           and
           though
           we
           know
           the
           Measures
           of
           God
           to
           be
           all
           Wise
           ,
           Good
           ,
           Just
           and
           Holy
           ,
           yet
           this
           is
           only
           an
           implicit
           Knowledge
           ,
           founded
           upon
           an
           External
           Evidence
           only
           (
           much
           after
           the
           same
           manner
           as
           it
           is
           in
           Faith
           )
           even
           the
           general
           Conception
           we
           have
           of
           the
           Divine
           Perfection
           ,
           without
           any
           clear
           and
           immediate
           discernment
           of
           the
           Internal
           Connexion
           that
           is
           between
           the
           things
           themselves
           .
           We
           believe
           't
           is
           all
           well
           and
           right
           because
           the
           Infinitely
           Wise
           God
           sits
           at
           the
           Helm
           ;
           but
           then
           again
           ,
           because
           he
           is
           so
           Infinitely
           Wise
           we
           cannot
           found
           the
           Depths
           of
           his
           Wisdom
           ,
           (
           as
           indeed
           it
           would
           be
           very
           strange
           if
           an
           Infinitely
           Wise
           Agent
           should
           not
           be
           able
           to
           do
           things
           Wisely
           ,
           and
           yet
           beyond
           our
           Understanding
           )
           nor
           reconcile
           all
           his
           particular
           proceedings
           
           to
           the
           Laws
           of
           Reason
           and
           Equity
           ;
           but
           the
           more
           we
           study
           about
           these
           things
           the
           more
           we
           are
           at
           a
           loss
           ,
           the
           further
           we
           wade
           into
           this
           Sea
           the
           deeper
           we
           find
           it
           ,
           till
           at
           last
           we
           find
           our selves
           obliged
           to
           cry
           out
           with
           the
           most
           inspired
           Apostle
           ,
           
             O
             the
             Depth
             of
             the
             Riches
             both
             of
             the
             Wisdom
             and
             Knowledge
             of
             God
             ,
          
           
           
             how
             unsearchable
             are
             his
             Iudgments
             ,
             and
             his
             Ways
             past
             finding
             out
             !
          
           And
           all
           for
           want
           of
           an
           Intire
           and
           Comprehensive
           View
           of
           them
           .
           For
           if
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           some
           very
           Compounded
           Truths
           be
           impossible
           without
           the
           Clear
           Perception
           of
           the
           Simple
           Principles
           upon
           which
           they
           depend
           ;
           and
           a
           Man
           would
           to
           no
           purpose
           beat
           his
           Brains
           about
           the
           Consideration
           of
           
             Conical
             Sections
          
           ,
           till
           he
           has
           first
           well
           possessed
           himself
           of
           Ordinary
           Geometry
           ;
           how
           much
           less
           then
           (
           may
           we
           conclude
           )
           are
           the
           Intricate
           and
           very
           Complicated
           Events
           of
           Divine
           Providence
           to
           be
           unravel'd
           without
           a
           Collected
           and
           Simultaneous
           Idea
           of
           the
           Universal
           Systeme
           whereof
           they
           are
           parts
           ,
           to
           which
           they
           relate
           ,
           and
           from
           their
           Concentricity
           with
           which
           they
           receive
           all
           
           their
           Order
           and
           Beauty
           ,
           but
           which
           is
           in
           a
           manner
           lost
           to
           us
           for
           want
           of
           Compass
           enough
           in
           our
           Prospect
           .
           By
           which
           single
           Instance
           it
           appears
           (
           among
           many
           others
           that
           might
           have
           been
           given
           )
           how
           the
           Incapacity
           of
           Comprehending
           Truth
           in
           its
           whole
           Extent
           may
           disable
           us
           from
           Comprehending
           many
           Particular
           Truths
           ;
           and
           consequently
           ,
           that
           the
           same
           Infinity
           of
           Truth
           which
           hinders
           us
           from
           Comprehending
           it
           according
           to
           that
           Extent
           ,
           must
           also
           hinder
           us
           as
           much
           from
           being
           able
           to
           comprehend
           every
           Particular
           Truth
           .
           So
           then
           there
           will
           be
           Particular
           Truths
           which
           are
           Incomprehensible
           by
           us
           ,
           and
           consequently
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           Commensurate
           to
           all
           Truth
           ,
           not
           only
           as
           Collectively
           ,
           but
           even
           as
           Distributively
           Consider'd
           .
           And
           therefore
           not
           as
           Distributively
           ,
           because
           not
           as
           Collectively
           .
        
         
           22.
           
           But
           then
           to
           raise
           our
           Speculation
           a
           little
           higher
           ,
           I
           consider
           yet
           further
           ,
           that
           the
           Infinity
           of
           Truth
           is
           not
           only
           an
           Infinity
           of
           Extent
           ,
           but
           also
           an
           Infinity
           of
           Nature
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           that
           the
           Compass
           of
           Truth
           is
           not
           only
           Boundless
           and
           illimited
           ,
           and
           
           that
           it
           has
           in
           it
           an
           inexhaustible
           Spring
           ,
           which
           like
           the
           Source
           of
           Light
           ,
           is
           never
           to
           be
           drawn
           dry
           by
           the
           most
           thirsty
           draught
           of
           the
           whole
           Intellectual
           World
           ,
           but
           also
           that
           there
           are
           Particular
           Truths
           of
           a
           Nature
           truely
           infinite
           ,
           and
           by
           consequence
           incomprehensible
           to
           any
           Understanding
           that
           is
           not
           so
           .
           For
           we
           are
           here
           to
           recollect
           ,
           what
           has
           been
           already
           shewn
           ,
           that
           Truth
           is
           Consubstantial
           and
           Coessential
           with
           God
           and
           with
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           .
           Now
           though
           these
           Ideas
           are
           all
           equally
           of
           the
           Essence
           and
           Nature
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           so
           far
           equally
           Divine
           (
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           there
           should
           be
           any
           thing
           in
           God
           that
           is
           not
           God
           )
           yet
           there
           is
           this
           general
           and
           very
           remarkable
           Difference
           between
           them
           ,
           that
           some
           of
           these
           Divine
           Ideas
           are
           Absolute
           ,
           and
           some
           Relative
           .
           That
           is
           ,
           some
           are
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           Simply
           and
           Absolutely
           as
           He
           is
           in
           Himself
           ,
           without
           any
           Relation
           to
           any
           thing
           out
           of
           Himself
           .
           And
           others
           again
           are
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           consider'd
           purely
           in
           Relation
           to
           things
           without
           Him
           either
           in
           Act
           or
           in
           Possibility
           ,
           and
           only
           so
           far
           forth
           
           as
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           is
           representative
           of
           Creatures
           .
           Or
           if
           you
           will
           ,
           thus
           :
           We
           may
           consider
           a
           twofold
           Being
           in
           Ideas
           ,
           
             Esse
             Reale
          
           ,
           and
           
             Esse
             Ideale
          
           or
           Repraesentativum
           .
           Some
           Ideas
           are
           Divine
           ,
           not
           only
           according
           to
           their
           
             Esse
             Reale
          
           (
           for
           so
           they
           are
           all
           )
           but
           also
           according
           to
           their
           
             Esse
             Repraesentativum
          
           ,
           as
           representing
           God
           to
           the
           Mind
           that
           Contemplates
           them
           .
           Others
           again
           are
           Divine
           only
           according
           to
           their
           
             Esse
             Reale
          
           ,
           being
           indeed
           of
           the
           Substance
           of
           God
           ,
           but
           not
           representing
           him
           ,
           but
           his
           Creatures
           ,
           and
           so
           are
           Divine
           in
           the
           same
           sense
           as
           the
           Idea
           of
           a
           Body
           is
           Spiritual
           ,
           
             viz.
             Essentially
          
           only
           ,
           not
           Representatively
           .
           Which
           Diversity
           indeed
           resolves
           into
           the
           former
           ,
           because
           they
           are
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           ,
           not
           as
           it
           is
           absolutely
           in
           itself
           ,
           but
           only
           as
           it
           is
           representative
           of
           Creatures
           ,
           according
           to
           such
           a
           certain
           Modality
           and
           Limitation
           of
           Perfection
           .
           And
           accordingly
           though
           they
           are
           truly
           
             Divine
             Ideas
          
           as
           well
           as
           the
           other
           ,
           yet
           they
           are
           not
           said
           to
           be
           
             Ideas
             of
             God
          
           ,
           as
           not
           representing
           him
           ,
           but
           his
           Creatures
           .
           The
           short
           is
           ,
           The
           Essence
           of
           God
           may
           be
           consider'd
           
           either
           as
           it
           is
           absolutely
           in
           it self
           according
           to
           its
           Infinite
           Simplicity
           ,
           or
           as
           it
           is
           in
           relation
           to
           ,
           and
           representative
           of
           things
           without
           ,
           either
           of
           an
           Actual
           ,
           or
           of
           a
           Possible
           Existence
           .
           And
           so
           the
           Ideas
           or
           Essential
           Perfections
           of
           God
           are
           of
           two
           sorts
           :
           Either
           such
           as
           are
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           consider'd
           in
           the
           first
           sense
           ,
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           ,
           or
           else
           such
           as
           are
           of
           the
           same
           Divine
           Essence
           only
           in
           the
           second
           sense
           ,
           as
           far
           forth
           as
           that
           Essence
           is
           representative
           of
           things
           out
           of
           it self
           ;
           upon
           which
           by
           the
           way
           ,
           I
           suppose
           ,
           must
           be
           grounded
           (
           if
           we
           will
           resolve
           things
           into
           their
           last
           Principle
           )
           the
           common
           distinction
           of
           the
           Attributes
           of
           God
           into
           Communicable
           and
           Incommunicable
           .
           The
           Incommunicable
           Attributes
           of
           God
           being
           those
           Perfections
           that
           are
           of
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           Simply
           and
           Absolutely
           consider'd
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           ;
           and
           the
           Communicable
           those
           that
           belong
           to
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           Relatively
           consider'd
           ,
           and
           as
           representative
           of
           Creatures
           ,
           to
           whom
           accordingly
           they
           are
           in
           their
           Measure
           truly
           applicable
           ;
           whereas
           the
           former
           are
           not
           ,
           but
           are
           peculiar
           to
           
           God
           alone
           ;
           which
           sufficiently
           shews
           the
           difference
           between
           this
           double
           order
           of
           Divine
           Ideas
           .
           But
           to
           make
           it
           yet
           more
           intelligible
           by
           an
           Instance
           .
           The
           Idea
           of
           the
           Divine
           Immensity
           ,
           or
           that
           Perfection
           in
           God
           which
           we
           call
           his
           Immensity
           ,
           is
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           according
           to
           the
           first
           sense
           ,
           as
           it
           is
           simply
           and
           absolutely
           in
           it self
           ;
           being
           no
           other
           than
           the
           Substance
           of
           God
           as
           it
           is
           universally
           diffused
           ,
           intirely
           present
           in
           ,
           and
           filling
           all
           places
           without
           being
           circumscribed
           by
           any
           ,
           yet
           without
           any
           Local
           Extension
           .
           But
           now
           the
           Idea
           of
           Extension
           ,
           or
           that
           Perfection
           in
           God
           which
           vertually
           ,
           eminently
           ,
           and
           
             modo
             intelligibili
          
           ,
           answers
           to
           Extension
           (
           and
           is
           therefore
           frequently
           called
           by
           Mr.
           
             Malebranch
             ,
             L'
             ètendue
             intelligibl●
          
           )
           is
           of
           the
           Substance
           of
           God
           ,
           not
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           simply
           and
           absolutely
           ,
           but
           only
           as
           far
           forth
           as
           it
           is
           representative
           of
           Matter
           ,
           or
           Body
           ,
           and
           imitable
           or
           participable
           by
           it
           ,
           according
           to
           those
           Limitations
           and
           Imperfections
           which
           belong
           to
           that
           kind
           of
           Being
           ,
           and
           which
           are
           represented
           by
           this
           its
           Idea
           .
           I
           know
           not
           whether
           I
           express
           my self
           to
           
           the
           Conception
           of
           every
           Reader
           ,
           but
           I
           am
           sufficiently
           Clear
           and
           Intelligible
           to
           my self
           ;
           and
           whoever
           is
           not
           much
           wanting
           either
           in
           Metaphysics
           ,
           or
           in
           Attention
           ,
           cannot
           I
           think
           well
           miss
           my
           Meaning
           .
        
         
           23
           Now
           the
           use
           that
           I
           make
           of
           this
           Speculation
           to
           the
           present
           purpose
           is
           this
           :
           Those
           Ideas
           which
           are
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           only
           as
           that
           Divine
           Essence
           ,
           according
           to
           some
           certain
           Limitations
           and
           inadequate
           Considerations
           of
           it
           ,
           is
           representative
           of
           Creatures
           ,
           must
           be
           consider'd
           by
           us
           as
           of
           a
           Finite
           Nature
           .
           Because
           however
           truly
           Divine
           and
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           ,
           yet
           not
           as
           it
           is
           absolutely
           and
           simply
           in
           it self
           ,
           but
           only
           as
           it
           is
           in
           relation
           to
           Creatures
           ;
           that
           is
           ,
           as
           partially
           and
           inadequately
           consider'd
           ,
           according
           to
           certain
           Abstractions
           and
           Limitations
           of
           Entity
           and
           Perfection
           ,
           such
           as
           the
           things
           whereof
           they
           are
           Ideas
           do
           require
           .
           And
           accordingly
           such
           Ideas
           are
           ordinarily
           said
           ,
           not
           to
           be
           the
           Ideas
           of
           God
           who
           is
           Infinite
           (
           for
           they
           do
           not
           represent
           him
           ,
           though
           Essential
           to
           him
           )
           but
           to
           be
           the
           Ideas
           of
           Creatures
           ,
           who
           are
           Finite
           .
           They
           are
           
           indeed
           
             Divine
             Ideas
          
           ,
           because
           Essential
           to
           God
           ;
           but
           they
           are
           not
           
             Ideas
             of
             God
          
           ,
           because
           they
           are
           of
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           only
           as
           it
           relates
           to
           Creatures
           ,
           and
           is
           representative
           of
           them
           .
           Of
           Creatures
           therefore
           they
           are
           the
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           God
           in
           seeing
           them
           is
           not
           properly
           said
           to
           see
           himself
           ,
           (
           though
           they
           are
           of
           himself
           )
           but
           to
           see
           Creatures
           ;
           because
           though
           they
           are
           of
           his
           Divine
           Essence
           ,
           yet
           't
           is
           only
           according
           to
           such
           Precisions
           ,
           Limitations
           and
           Inadequations
           of
           it
           as
           to
           be
           expressive
           and
           representative
           of
           their
           Finite
           Perfections
           .
           As
           therefore
           the
           Realities
           which
           these
           Ideas
           represent
           are
           Finite
           ,
           so
           these
           Ideas
           must
           be
           conceiv'd
           by
           us
           as
           Finite
           too
           ;
           it
           being
           impossible
           that
           Infinite
           consider'd
           as
           Infinite
           ,
           should
           be
           representative
           of
           what
           is
           Finite
           .
           And
           as
           these
           Ideas
           are
           Finite
           ,
           so
           are
           they
           also
           by
           Consequence
           so
           Proportionate
           ,
           and
           of
           a
           Measure
           so
           adjusted
           to
           Finite
           Understandings
           ,
           as
           to
           be
           Intelligible
           by
           them
           ,
           and
           within
           the
           Possibility
           of
           their
           Comprehension
           ;
           which
           must
           also
           in
           like
           manner
           be
           concluded
           of
           all
           those
           Truths
           which
           are
           Consubstantial
           to
           
           them
           .
           And
           accordingly
           the
           Experiment
           answers
           the
           Theory
           .
           We
           find
           that
           not
           only
           contingent
           Truths
           that
           regard
           only
           the
           Actualities
           and
           Existencies
           of
           Things
           ,
           such
           as
           matters
           of
           Fact
           ,
           Human
           Events
           ,
           &c.
           but
           even
           a
           great
           many
           of
           those
           which
           are
           Ideal
           and
           Necessary
           ,
           and
           concern
           only
           the
           Abstract
           Reasons
           and
           Essences
           of
           Things
           independently
           on
           their
           Actual
           Existence
           ,
           are
           Comprehensible
           by
           us
           ,
           as
           in
           Metaphysics
           and
           Geometry
           ,
           in
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           which
           Sciences
           we
           meet
           with
           a
           great
           many
           things
           which
           we
           well
           understand
           ,
           and
           whereof
           we
           have
           Clear
           Ideas
           and
           Conceptions
           .
        
         
           24.
           
           But
           now
           it
           is
           not
           thus
           with
           the
           Ideas
           of
           the
           first
           Order
           ,
           nor
           with
           their
           Truths
           ,
           Though
           those
           Divine
           Ideas
           which
           appertain
           to
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           only
           as
           representative
           of
           Creatures
           ,
           be
           both
           Finite
           and
           Comprehensible
           by
           limited
           Understandings
           ,
           (
           which
           indeed
           otherwise
           would
           not
           be
           capable
           of
           any
           Science
           )
           yet
           these
           Absolute
           Ideas
           which
           I
           now
           speak
           of
           ,
           are
           neither
           Finite
           nor
           Comprehensible
           .
           For
           
           these
           Ideas
           are
           of
           the
           very
           Essence
           and
           Substance
           of
           God
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           purely
           and
           separately
           consider'd
           according
           to
           its
           simple
           and
           absolute
           Nature
           ,
           and
           not
           as
           it
           is
           in
           relation
           to
           Creatures
           ,
           or
           as
           representative
           of
           any
           Reality
           out
           of
           it self
           .
           And
           accordingly
           God
           in
           contemplating
           these
           Ideas
           of
           his
           may
           be
           truly
           and
           strictly
           said
           to
           contemplate
           himself
           ;
           and
           we
           also
           in
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           them
           do
           as
           really
           contemplate
           God
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           they
           are
           of
           his
           Divine
           Essence
           simply
           and
           absolutely
           consider'd
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           ,
           and
           not
           as
           it
           is
           in
           reference
           to
           any
           thing
           besides
           ,
           or
           out
           of
           it self
           .
           These
           Ideas
           therefore
           are
           strictly
           Infinite
           (
           because
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           ,
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           simply
           and
           absolutely
           consider'd
           is
           so
           )
           and
           consequently
           Incomprehensible
           by
           any
           Finite
           ,
           and
           consequently
           by
           Human
           Understanding
           .
           God
           only
           can
           Comprehend
           these
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           he
           only
           can
           Comprehend
           himself
           .
           Human
           Reason
           indeed
           has
           Light
           enough
           to
           discover
           that
           there
           are
           such
           Ideas
           and
           Perfections
           in
           God
           ,
           and
           is
           withal
           able
           to
           discern
           enough
           of
           them
           to
           
           raise
           her
           greatest
           Wonder
           and
           Devotion
           ,
           and
           to
           make
           her
           despise
           all
           other
           Intelligible
           Objects
           in
           comparison
           of
           these
           
             Infinite
             Grandeurs
          
           ;
           and
           the
           Angelic
           Spirits
           that
           wait
           about
           the
           Throne
           of
           his
           Majesty
           ,
           and
           stand
           in
           a
           better
           Light
           ,
           are
           able
           to
           see
           yet
           more
           of
           them
           ;
           but
           neither
           the
           one
           nor
           the
           other
           can
           Comprehend
           them
           fully
           any
           more
           than
           they
           can
           God
           himself
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           they
           are
           God.
           So
           that
           though
           the
           other
           Ideas
           are
           Finite
           and
           Comprehensible
           ,
           these
           are
           truly
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           .
           And
           of
           this
           we
           have
           sufficient
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Instances
           above
           proposed
           of
           each
           .
           The
           Idea
           of
           Extension
           is
           very
           Clear
           and
           Intelligible
           to
           our
           Minds
           ,
           as
           Finite
           and
           as
           Narrowly
           bounded
           as
           they
           are
           .
           We
           have
           a
           very
           distinct
           View
           of
           it
           ,
           we
           Perceive
           it
           ,
           we
           Comprehend
           it
           .
           Among
           all
           Intelligible
           Objects
           there
           is
           none
           that
           is
           more
           clear
           ,
           nor
           whereof
           we
           have
           a
           more
           adequate
           and
           exact
           Notion
           .
           And
           upon
           this
           is
           founded
           all
           that
           peculiar
           Clearness
           ,
           Evidence
           and
           Certainty
           that
           is
           in
           the
           Geometric
           Sciences
           ,
           which
           alone
           have
           the
           happiness
           to
           
           be
           free
           from
           Disputes
           ,
           and
           without
           Contestation
           to
           find
           that
           Truth
           which
           the
           others
           seek
           after
           ,
           and
           that
           for
           no
           other
           Reason
           but
           because
           we
           have
           so
           clear
           and
           distinct
           a
           Notion
           of
           its
           general
           Subject
           ,
           Extension
           .
           But
           now
           as
           to
           the
           *
           
             Divine
             Immensity
          
           ,
           so
           far
           are
           we
           from
           having
           a
           Clear
           Conception
           of
           that
           ,
           that
           no
           sooner
           do
           we
           set
           our selves
           to
           contemplate
           this
           vast
           Idea
           ,
           but
           we
           enter
           into
           Clouds
           and
           Darkness
           ,
           or
           rather
           into
           such
           an
           over-shining
           and
           insupportable
           Light
           as
           dazzles
           and
           blinds
           our
           Eyes
           ,
           yea
           hurts
           and
           pains
           them
           ,
           till
           they
           can
           no
           longer
           indure
           to
           gaze
           ,
           but
           are
           forc'd
           to
           refresh
           themselves
           either
           by
           letting
           down
           their
           wearied
           Lids
           (
           suspense
           of
           Thought
           )
           or
           by
           turning
           their
           view
           upon
           less
           glorious
           Objects
           .
           In
           the
           Meditation
           of
           the
           other
           Idea
           we
           are
           like
           Men
           that
           wade
           in
           a
           River
           where
           we
           both
           see
           and
           feel
           the
           Bottom
           ,
           and
           go
           on
           for
           a
           pretty
           way
           together
           smoothly
           and
           without
           much
           difficulty
           ,
           only
           now
           and
           then
           
           meeting
           with
           an
           intangling
           Weed
           that
           lets
           and
           incumbers
           our
           progress
           .
           But
           in
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           the
           Infinite
           Idea
           of
           the
           Divine
           Immensity
           we
           are
           like
           men
           that
           commit
           themselves
           to
           the
           Main
           Sea
           ,
           at
           the
           very
           first
           Plunge
           out
           of
           our
           depth
           ,
           and
           ready
           to
           be
           overwhelm'd
           ,
           swallow'd
           up
           and
           lost
           in
           an
           Abyss
           that
           knows
           no
           bottom
           .
        
         
           25.
           
           I
           use
           a
           little
           Figure
           and
           Imagery
           here
           the
           better
           to
           impress
           this
           upon
           the
           Imagination
           of
           those
           who
           are
           not
           so
           well
           habituated
           to
           the
           Conception
           of
           things
           by
           
             Pure
             Intellection
          
           ,
           but
           the
           thing
           it self
           needs
           none
           of
           the
           advantages
           of
           the
           Metaphorical
           way
           ,
           being
           strictly
           and
           severely
           true
           .
           And
           by
           these
           two
           Instances
           it
           may
           appear
           what
           a
           vast
           difference
           there
           is
           between
           these
           two
           sorts
           of
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           ,
           the
           Absolute
           and
           the
           Relative
           ,
           those
           that
           are
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           as
           in
           himself
           ,
           and
           those
           that
           are
           of
           the
           same
           Divine
           Essence
           as
           it
           is
           in
           relation
           to
           Creatures
           .
           The
           First
           ,
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           the
           Second
           ,
           Finite
           and
           Comprehensible
           .
           For
           you
           see
           here
           the
           Idea
           of
           Extension
           is
           
           clear
           and
           distinct
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           we
           can
           fully
           and
           adequately
           Conceive
           ,
           but
           the
           Idea
           of
           the
           Divine
           Immensity
           ,
           has
           nothing
           clear
           and
           distinct
           in
           it
           ,
           but
           is
           all
           over
           Darkness
           and
           Obscurity
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           quite
           astonishes
           and
           confounds
           us
           with
           a
           Thousand
           difficulties
           upon
           the
           first
           application
           of
           our
           Thoughts
           to
           it
           ,
           as
           indeed
           do
           all
           the
           Absolute
           Attributes
           and
           Perfections
           of
           God
           ,
           which
           are
           all
           equally
           Infinite
           ,
           and
           equally
           incomprehensible
           to
           Finite
           Spirits
           ,
           however
           they
           may
           be
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           that
           which
           in
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           is
           representative
           of
           ,
           and
           carries
           a
           Relation
           to
           those
           Realities
           which
           either
           actually
           do
           ,
           or
           possibly
           may
           exist
           out
           of
           it
           .
           And
           in
           this
           I
           say
           no
           more
           (
           setting
           aside
           only
           the
           Rationale
           of
           the
           thing
           )
           than
           those
           who
           tell
           us
           that
           the
           Incommunicable
           Attributes
           of
           God
           are
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           .
           They
           are
           so
           .
           But
           what
           is
           it
           that
           makes
           them
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           ?
           Even
           the
           same
           that
           makes
           them
           
             Incommunicable
             ,
             viz.
          
           their
           being
           of
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           according
           to
           its
           Absolute
           Simplicity
           ,
           
           and
           not
           as
           it
           is
           in
           Relation
           to
           Creatures
           .
           For
           't
           is
           most
           evident
           that
           the
           Essence
           of
           God
           as
           it
           is
           simply
           and
           Absolutely
           in
           it self
           is
           every
           way
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           and
           therefore
           all
           those
           Ideas
           and
           Perfections
           of
           his
           which
           are
           in
           this
           Absolute
           Sense
           Essential
           to
           him
           must
           be
           also
           of
           an
           alike
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           Nature
           .
           Which
           by
           the
           way
           may
           serve
           to
           Silence
           the
           presumptuous
           Cavils
           of
           those
           who
           draw
           Objections
           against
           the
           Existence
           of
           God
           from
           the
           incomprehensibility
           of
           his
           Attributes
           ,
           since
           if
           there
           be
           a
           God
           he
           must
           have
           incomprehensible
           Attributes
           ,
           which
           unless
           we
           ascribe
           to
           him
           we
           do
           not
           think
           either
           rightly
           or
           worthily
           of
           him
           .
        
         
           26.
           
           But
           to
           resume
           our
           Point
           ,
           we
           see
           then
           here
           what
           a
           large
           Field
           is
           now
           open'd
           to
           our
           Prospect
           of
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           Truths
           ,
           even
           of
           a
           Compass
           as
           large
           as
           the
           Absolute
           Ideas
           and
           Perfections
           of
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           .
           For
           though
           all
           Created
           things
           are
           of
           a
           Finite
           Nature
           ,
           and
           though
           even
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           that
           represent
           them
           ,
           as
           far
           as
           
           representative
           of
           them
           ,
           must
           fall
           under
           the
           same
           limited
           Consideration
           ,
           yet
           those
           Absolute
           Ideas
           and
           Perfections
           of
           God
           that
           have
           no
           such
           external
           Reference
           ,
           but
           are
           of
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           as
           it
           is
           in
           its
           pure
           ,
           simple
           ,
           abstracted
           Self
           ,
           must
           necessarily
           partake
           of
           the
           Divine
           Infinity
           ,
           and
           be
           as
           unbounded
           as
           God
           himself
           .
           And
           since
           Truth
           (
           as
           was
           before
           observ'd
           )
           is
           Coessential
           and
           Consubstantial
           with
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           ,
           I
           further
           Conclude
           ,
           that
           though
           those
           Truths
           which
           regard
           the
           Actualities
           and
           Existencies
           of
           things
           ,
           or
           if
           you
           please
           ,
           things
           that
           do
           actually
           exist
           ,
           be
           Finite
           ,
           because
           the
           things
           themselves
           are
           so
           ,
           and
           though
           even
           those
           that
           regard
           the
           Divine
           Ideas
           themselves
           are
           also
           Finite
           supposing
           the
           Ideas
           to
           be
           of
           the
           inferiour
           Order
           ,
           such
           as
           are
           of
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           only
           as
           it
           is
           representative
           of
           ,
           and
           in
           relation
           to
           Creatures
           ,
           yet
           those
           Truths
           which
           respect
           those
           Divine
           Ideas
           of
           the
           Superiour
           Order
           ,
           that
           are
           of
           the
           Absolute
           Essence
           of
           God
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           purely
           and
           simply
           Consider'd
           ,
           and
           so
           are
           not
           only
           Essentially
           ,
           but
           
           even
           Representatively
           Divine
           ,
           as
           truly
           representing
           God
           ,
           and
           being
           in
           a
           strict
           and
           proper
           sense
           his
           Ideas
           ,
           I
           say
           the
           Truths
           of
           this
           Order
           and
           Character
           must
           necessarily
           be
           of
           a
           Nature
           far
           exalted
           above
           all
           Creatures
           ,
           yea
           above
           all
           other
           Ideal
           Truths
           ,
           even
           as
           far
           as
           what
           is
           of
           the
           Simple
           and
           Absolute
           Essence
           of
           God
           transcends
           that
           which
           in
           the
           same
           Essence
           is
           only
           Relative
           to
           things
           without
           ,
           and
           can
           therefore
           be
           no
           less
           than
           Infinite
           .
           We
           have
           here
           then
           an
           Order
           of
           Infinite
           Truths
           ,
           even
           allthose
           which
           regard
           the
           Absolute
           Ideas
           and
           Perfections
           of
           God.
           These
           Divine
           Ideas
           and
           Perfections
           are
           all
           Infinite
           ,
           as
           that
           Glorious
           Essence
           whose
           Ideas
           they
           are
           and
           whom
           they
           represent
           ,
           and
           so
           also
           are
           the
           Sublime
           Truths
           which
           result
           from
           them
           .
           They
           are
           of
           a
           Nature
           strictly
           Infinite
           ,
           and
           if
           Infinite
           then
           by
           Consequence
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           I
           mean
           to
           all
           understandings
           that
           are
           not
           so
           .
           For
           as
           Nothing
           Finite
           has
           Reality
           enough
           to
           represent
           Infinite
           ,
           so
           neither
           can
           any
           thing
           Finite
           have
           Capacity
           enough
           to
           Comprehend
           it
           .
           For
           as
           the
           actual
           knowledge
           of
           any
           intelligent
           Being
           can
           
           never
           exceed
           its
           intellectual
           Power
           ,
           so
           neither
           can
           its
           Power
           exceed
           the
           measure
           of
           its
           Essence
           .
           A
           Finite
           Being
           therefore
           must
           have
           a
           Finite
           Understanding
           ,
           and
           a
           Finite
           Understanding
           must
           have
           a
           Finite
           Perception
           .
           Since
           then
           our
           Understandings
           are
           Finite
           ,
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           our
           Perception
           of
           Infinite
           must
           also
           be
           Finite
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           that
           
             Objective
             Reality
          
           which
           we
           contemplate
           when
           we
           think
           upon
           Infinite
           has
           no
           Limits
           ,
           and
           so
           we
           may
           be
           said
           in
           some
           respect
           to
           have
           an
           
             Infinite
             Thought
          
           ,
           as
           far
           as
           the
           Operation
           of
           the
           Mind
           may
           be
           denominated
           from
           the
           quality
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           but
           yet
           still
           we
           think
           according
           to
           the
           Measure
           of
           our
           Nature
           ,
           and
           our
           Perception
           of
           Infinite
           can
           be
           no
           more
           at
           the
           most
           than
           Finite
           .
           But
           now
           a
           Finite
           Perception
           bears
           no
           proportion
           to
           an
           Infinite
           Intelligible
           ,
           besides
           that
           to
           perceive
           such
           an
           Object
           after
           a
           Finite
           manner
           is
           not
           to
           perceive
           it
           as
           it
           is
           ,
           but
           only
           Partially
           and
           inadequately
           .
           But
           now
           a
           Partial
           and
           inadequate
           Perception
           of
           a
           thing
           can
           never
           be
           said
           to
           be
           a
           Comprehension
           of
           that
           
           thing
           ,
           even
           though
           the
           thing
           be
           Finite
           ,
           much
           less
           then
           when
           it
           is
           Infinite
           .
           Whereby
           it
           plainly
           appears
           that
           if
           there
           be
           an
           Order
           of
           Infinite
           Truths
           the
           same
           will
           also
           be
           Incomprehensible
           Ones
           ,
           and
           since
           again
           as
           I
           have
           shewn
           there
           is
           an
           Order
           of
           such
           Truths
           ,
           even
           all
           those
           that
           regard
           the
           Absolute
           Ideas
           and
           Perfections
           of
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           ,
           it
           clearly
           follows
           that
           there
           is
           an
           Order
           of
           Incomprehensible
           Truths
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           even
           Distributively
           consider'd
           ,
           since
           there
           are
           Particular
           Truths
           which
           it
           cannot
           Comprehend
           ;
           which
           was
           the
           thing
           to
           be
           proved
           .
        
         
           27.
           
           And
           of
           all
           this
           we
           may
           have
           a
           plain
           and
           visible
           illustration
           in
           the
           foremention'd
           Instance
           of
           the
           
             Divine
             Immensity
          
           .
           This
           is
           an
           Idea
           or
           Perfection
           of
           God
           that
           is
           truely
           Insinite
           ,
           as
           being
           of
           his
           Divine
           Essence
           as
           it
           is
           Absolutely
           in
           it self
           ,
           and
           not
           as
           in
           Order
           to
           ,
           or
           representative
           of
           Creatures
           ;
           And
           as
           Infinite
           't
           is
           also
           Incomprehensible
           by
           any
           but
           God
           himself
           .
           Accordingly
           the
           Complex
           Truth
           that
           regards
           this
           Absolute
           
           Idea
           of
           God
           is
           also
           Infinite
           ,
           and
           as
           such
           Incomprehensible
           .
           As
           appears
           in
           this
           Proposition
           ,
           
             God
             is
             Immense
          
           ;
           which
           is
           an
           Infinite
           and
           Incomprehensible
           Truth
           .
           We
           find
           it
           is
           so
           a
           Posteriori
           by
           casting
           the
           view
           of
           our
           Understandings
           upon
           it
           .
           And
           we
           find
           it
           must
           be
           so
           
             a
             Priori
          
           by
           reasoning
           upon
           the
           Principles
           already
           laid
           down
           and
           establish'd
           .
           And
           to
           prevent
           all
           vain
           cavilling
           in
           this
           matter
           I
           further
           add
           ,
           that
           though
           we
           could
           suppose
           the
           Truths
           that
           result
           from
           Infinite
           Ideas
           not
           to
           be
           Infinite
           (
           which
           yet
           we
           cannot
           by
           reason
           of
           their
           real
           Identity
           and
           Coessentiality
           with
           those
           Ideas
           )
           yet
           however
           they
           must
           upon
           another
           account
           be
           incomprehensible
           ,
           even
           upon
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           those
           Ideas
           .
           For
           if
           the
           Ideas
           whereof
           a
           Truth
           consists
           be
           incomprehensible
           ,
           as
           they
           must
           be
           if
           they
           are
           Infinite
           ,
           that
           alone
           would
           be
           enough
           to
           hinder
           us
           from
           being
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           such
           a
           Truth
           ,
           it
           being
           impossible
           we
           should
           thoroughly
           understand
           the
           Relations
           or
           Habitudes
           between
           those
           Ideas
           whose
           Simple
           Natures
           (
           the
           Foundation
           of
           those
           Habitudes
           )
           
           we
           do
           not
           Comprehend
           .
           For
           if
           in
           Finite
           things
           the
           not
           having
           a
           clear
           and
           adequate
           Idea
           of
           a
           thing
           makes
           us
           unable
           to
           judge
           of
           the
           Truth
           or
           Falshood
           of
           many
           Propositions
           concerning
           that
           thing
           (
           whereof
           there
           are
           a
           multitude
           of
           Instances
           in
           Morality
           ,
           especially
           in
           Questions
           relating
           to
           the
           Soul
           of
           Man
           ,
           which
           must
           for
           ever
           lie
           undetermin'd
           merely
           for
           want
           of
           our
           having
           a
           clear
           Idea
           of
           that
           Noble
           Essence
           )
           much
           more
           then
           in
           things
           Infinite
           will
           the
           not
           having
           a
           Comprehension
           of
           the
           Ideas
           incapacitate
           us
           from
           Comprehending
           the
           Truths
           that
           Result
           from
           them
           ,
           which
           will
           therefore
           be
           as
           incomprehensible
           as
           if
           they
           were
           (
           what
           indeed
           they
           are
           )
           in
           themselves
           Infinite
           .
        
         
           28.
           
           I
           have
           hitherto
           shewn
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           Truth
           by
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           and
           consequently
           that
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           from
           the
           joynt
           Consideration
           of
           each
           .
           Only
           with
           this
           difference
           .
           I
           have
           consider'd
           and
           represented
           Truth
           Absolutely
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           ,
           according
           to
           its
           own
           Infinite
           and
           unmeasurable
           Nature
           .
           But
           
           as
           for
           Human
           Reason
           I
           have
           consider'd
           that
           only
           as
           Finite
           ,
           as
           supposing
           that
           sufficient
           to
           my
           present
           Purpose
           ,
           and
           that
           there
           was
           no
           need
           of
           placing
           it
           in
           any
           other
           Light.
           For
           after
           it
           hath
           been
           shewn
           that
           Truth
           is
           Infinite
           ,
           to
           prove
           that
           Human
           Reason
           cannot
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           it
           ,
           it
           is
           certainly
           enough
           to
           Consider
           it
           as
           a
           Bounded
           Power
           ,
           without
           representing
           how
           very
           strait
           and
           narrow
           its
           Bounds
           are
           ,
           since
           whatever
           is
           Finite
           can
           never
           measurer
           Infinite
           .
           But
           then
           it
           so
           ,
           what
           if
           we
           add
           the
           other
           Consideration
           to
           it
           ?
           If
           the
           bare
           Finiteness
           of
           Human
           Understanding
           (
           a
           defect
           common
           to
           it
           with
           all
           Created
           Intelligencies
           )
           renders
           it
           uncapable
           of
           Comprehending
           Truth
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           of
           being
           the
           Measure
           of
           it
           ,
           how
           much
           more
           then
           does
           the
           littleness
           and
           narrowness
           of
           its
           Bounds
           contribute
           to
           heighten
           that
           incapacity
           ?
           If
           the
           having
           any
           limits
           does
           so
           unqualifie
           it
           for
           the
           adequate
           Comprehension
           of
           Truth
           ,
           how
           then
           does
           the
           having
           so
           very
           short
           and
           strait
           ones
           ?
           Strait
           indeed
           by
           Natural
           and
           Original
           Constitution
           ,
           but
           much
           more
           
           yet
           retrench'd
           by
           Sin
           ,
           and
           by
           all
           those
           Passions
           ,
           Prejudices
           ,
           deordinate
           Affections
           and
           Evil
           Customs
           which
           are
           the
           Effects
           and
           Consequences
           of
           Sin
           ,
           and
           which
           have
           now
           so
           darken'd
           our
           Minds
           ,
           and
           drawn
           such
           a
           gross
           Film
           over
           our
           Intellectual
           Sight
           that
           we
           can
           hardly
           distinguish
           Day
           from
           Night
           ,
           Clearness
           from
           Obscurity
           ,
           Truth
           from
           Falshood
           ,
           and
           are
           able
           to
           see
           but
           so
           very
           little
           a
           way
           into
           the
           Works
           of
           God
           (
           much
           less
           into
           the
           Nature
           of
           God
           himself
           )
           that
           we
           need
           nothing
           else
           to
           depress
           and
           humble
           our
           Pride
           and
           Vanity
           than
           that
           very
           Knowledge
           of
           ours
           which
           puffs
           us
           up
           .
           So
           very
           narrow
           in
           its
           Compass
           and
           Extent
           ,
           so
           very
           Shallow
           and
           Superficial
           in
           its
           Depth
           ,
           so
           very
           Confuse
           and
           Obscure
           in
           its
           Light
           ,
           so
           very
           uncertain
           and
           conjectural
           in
           its
           Ground
           ,
           and
           so
           every
           way
           defective
           and
           imprerfect
           is
           it
           .
           But
           how
           then
           can
           we
           found
           the
           Depth
           of
           Truth
           with
           so
           short
           a
           Line
           ?
           A
           Bottomless
           Depth
           with
           (
           I
           will
           not
           say
           a
           Finite
           ,
           but
           )
           so
           very
           scanty
           a
           Measuer
           ?
           And
           what
           an
           extravagant
           Folly
           and
           Weakness
           ,
           not
           to
           say
           Pride
           and
           
           Vanity
           is
           it
           to
           fancy
           that
           we
           can
           ?
           It
           would
           be
           a
           Vain
           Presumption
           in
           an
           Angel
           ,
           but
           sure
           the
           very
           Madness
           and
           Distraction
           of
           Impudence
           in
           Man
           ,
           who
           may
           with
           less
           defiance
           to
           Sence
           and
           Reason
           think
           to
           grasp
           the
           Ocean
           within
           the
           hollow
           of
           his
           hand
           ,
           than
           to
           Comprehend
           and
           Measure
           Truth
           ,
           Infinite
           Boundless
           Truth
           ,
           not
           only
           with
           Finite
           ,
           but
           so
           very
           limited
           Capacities
           .
        
         
           29.
           
           But
           suppose
           Truth
           were
           not
           (
           what
           we
           have
           shewn
           it
           to
           be
           )
           Infinite
           ,
           but
           had
           Bounds
           as
           well
           as
           our
           Reason
           ,
           yet
           unless
           it
           had
           the
           Same
           ,
           our
           Reason
           cannot
           be
           Commensurate
           to
           it
           ,
           or
           the
           Measure
           of
           it
           .
           But
           does
           the
           supposition
           of
           its
           having
           Limits
           infer
           that
           it
           has
           the
           same
           ?
           No
           ,
           For
           though
           Finite
           ,
           its
           Bounds
           may
           possibly
           be
           extended
           further
           than
           those
           of
           our
           Understandings
           ,
           and
           how
           can
           we
           be
           sure
           that
           they
           are
           not
           ?
           We
           cannot
           then
           even
           upon
           this
           supposition
           be
           sure
           that
           our
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           therefore
           it
           is
           all
           one
           as
           to
           us
           (
           as
           I
           said
           before
           )
           as
           if
           it
           were
           not
           so
           ,
           forasmuch
           as
           we
           cannot
           use
           it
           as
           a
           Measure
           by
           drawing
           
           any
           Consequences
           from
           it
           concerning
           the
           Falshood
           or
           impossibility
           of
           things
           upon
           the
           account
           of
           our
           inability
           to
           Comprehend
           them
           ,
           since
           for
           ought
           we
           know
           the
           Limits
           of
           Truth
           though
           we
           should
           suppose
           it
           Finite
           ,
           may
           yet
           exceed
           ,
           and
           that
           very
           greatly
           too
           ,
           those
           of
           our
           Rational
           Faculties
           .
           And
           Considering
           both
           the
           Natural
           and
           the
           Superaccessory
           defects
           of
           them
           it
           is
           very
           reasonable
           to
           think
           that
           they
           do
           .
        
         
           30.
           
           Some
           Essences
           perhaps
           there
           may
           be
           (
           though
           even
           this
           again
           is
           more
           than
           we
           know
           )
           that
           sit
           so
           high
           in
           the
           Intellectual
           Form
           as
           to
           be
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           all
           that
           is
           Finite
           ,
           so
           that
           the
           only
           reason
           why
           they
           have
           not
           an
           adequate
           Comprehension
           of
           Truth
           at
           large
           is
           because
           it
           is
           indeed
           Infinite
           .
           But
           there
           is
           no
           Necessity
           ,
           nor
           so
           much
           as
           Probability
           that
           Human
           Reason
           should
           be
           of
           so
           rais'd
           an
           Order
           that
           nothing
           but
           Infinity
           should
           transcend
           its
           Comprehension
           .
           And
           it
           must
           be
           a
           strange
           Composition
           of
           Pride
           and
           Self-love
           that
           can
           make
           us
           fancy
           that
           it
           is
           ;
           something
           like
           that
           ,
           only
           much
           more
           extravagant
           ,
           which
           
           possesses
           the
           disturb'd
           Heads
           of
           some
           in
           Bedlam
           ,
           and
           makes
           them
           Conceit
           themselves
           Kings
           and
           Emperours
           in
           the
           midst
           of
           their
           
             Irons
             ,
             Rags
          
           ,
           and
           Straw
           .
           What
           though
           Truth
           were
           Finite
           ,
           and
           some
           Understandings
           too
           that
           are
           so
           were
           able
           to
           measure
           it
           ,
           why
           must
           this
           needs
           be
           concluded
           of
           Human
           Understanding
           ?
           If
           a
           Finite
           Being
           were
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           Truth
           ,
           why
           must
           Man
           be
           that
           Being
           ?
           The
           Scripture
           tells
           us
           he
           is
           made
           lower
           than
           the
           Angels
           ,
           and
           how
           many
           Orders
           and
           Degrees
           there
           may
           be
           among
           them
           we
           know
           not
           ,
           nor
           indeed
           how
           many
           Ranks
           of
           Spiritual
           Beings
           there
           may
           be
           in
           the
           Universe
           whose
           Understandings
           go
           beyond
           ours
           .
           For
           who
           can
           define
           the
           Out-flowings
           of
           the
           Divine
           Fecundity
           ,
           or
           Number
           the
           Rounds
           of
           the
           Intellectual
           Scale
           ?
           In
           the
           mean
           while
           though
           man
           knows
           not
           how
           many
           Orders
           of
           Intelligent
           Creatures
           there
           are
           above
           him
           ,
           yet
           't
           is
           with
           great
           Reason
           and
           Consent
           presumed
           that
           there
           are
           none
           below
           him
           ,
           so
           that
           he
           is
           placed
           even
           by
           his
           own
           Confession
           in
           the
           lowest
           Form
           of
           the
           Intellectual
           Order
           .
           
           And
           why
           then
           may
           not
           his
           Understanding
           (
           as
           much
           as
           he
           values
           himself
           upon
           it
           )
           be
           of
           so
           Shallow
           a
           Depth
           ,
           and
           so
           low
           a
           Size
           that
           even
           Finite
           Objects
           may
           be
           disproportionate
           to
           him
           ?
           Especially
           since
           we
           find
           him
           so
           often
           puzzl'd
           and
           gravell'd
           in
           Natural
           things
           ,
           as
           also
           in
           those
           Ideal
           Truths
           that
           have
           relation
           to
           the
           Natural
           and
           Ectypal
           World
           ,
           such
           as
           Philosophical
           and
           Mathematical
           Problems
           .
           Or
           if
           the
           Reason
           of
           any
           Creature
           could
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           why
           should
           he
           be
           that
           Creature
           ,
           who
           is
           seated
           in
           the
           very
           Confines
           of
           the
           Material
           and
           Immaterial
           World
           ,
           and
           is
           as
           it
           were
           the
           Common-Point
           where
           Matter
           ends
           and
           Spirit
           begins
           ,
           who
           brings
           up
           the
           rear
           of
           the
           Intellectual
           kind
           ,
           and
           is
           both
           the
           youngest
           and
           the
           
             least
             indow'd
          
           among
           the
           Sons
           of
           God.
           
        
         
           31.
           
           These
           Considerations
           sufficiently
           shew
           that
           there
           is
           no
           Necessity
           ,
           nor
           so
           much
           as
           Probability
           ,
           that
           Human
           Reason
           should
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           even
           upon
           the
           Supposition
           of
           its
           being
           Finite
           .
           Which
           indeed
           is
           enough
           of
           it self
           to
           carry
           
           the
           Point
           Contended
           for
           as
           far
           as
           the
           Design
           of
           the
           present
           Argument
           is
           Concern'd
           .
           For
           if
           it
           be
           not
           necessary
           that
           Human
           Reason
           should
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           then
           it
           is
           Possible
           that
           it
           may
           not
           be
           ,
           and
           if
           it
           is
           Possible
           that
           it
           may
           not
           ,
           then
           we
           can
           be
           never
           Sure
           that
           it
           is
           ,
           and
           if
           we
           cannot
           be
           Sure
           that
           it
           is
           ,
           then
           we
           cannot
           Use
           it
           as
           a
           Measure
           ,
           which
           (
           as
           I
           have
           remarqu'd
           already
           and
           for
           the
           Moment
           of
           it
           do
           here
           reinculcate
           )
           makes
           it
           the
           same
           to
           all
           intents
           and
           purposes
           as
           if
           it
           were
           not
           such
           at
           all
           .
           But
           yet
           to
           carry
           our
           Plea
           a
           little
           highter
           I
           further
           Contend
           that
           as
           the
           foregoing
           Considerations
           suffice
           to
           shew
           that
           Human
           Reason
           may
           not
           ,
           so
           there
           is
           One
           behind
           that
           very
           positively
           Demonstrates
           that
           it
           Cannot
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           even
           tho'
           we
           should
           allow
           it
           to
           be
           of
           a
           Finite
           and
           bounded
           Nature
           as
           well
           as
           our
           own
           understandings
           .
        
         
           32.
           
           As
           there
           are
           many
           things
           whereof
           our
           Ideas
           are
           very
           Confuse
           and
           Obscure
           ,
           so
           't
           is
           most
           〈◊〉
           that
           there
           are
           some
           things
           〈◊〉
           we
           have
           no
           Ideas
           at
           all
           ,
           it
           〈◊〉
           not
           pleas'd
           the
           Eternal
           and
           〈◊〉
           
           Intelligence
           to
           Exhibit
           that
           in
           Himself
           which
           is
           Representative
           of
           those
           things
           to
           our
           Understandings
           .
           But
           now
           besides
           the
           Difficultys
           and
           disadvantages
           we
           shall
           always
           ly
           under
           in
           the
           Comprehension
           of
           things
           from
           the
           Confuseness
           and
           Obscurity
           of
           our
           Ideas
           ,
           which
           of
           it Self
           will
           many
           times
           render
           those
           things
           ,
           and
           also
           whatever
           nearly
           relates
           to
           those
           things
           incomprehensible
           by
           us
           ,
           and
           besides
           that
           our
           not
           having
           any
           Ideas
           of
           Certain
           things
           ,
           is
           an
           invincible
           Bar
           to
           all
           Knowledge
           and
           Comprehension
           of
           those
           things
           (
           unless
           we
           could
           be
           supposed
           to
           be
           able
           to
           see
           without
           Light
           )
           't
           is
           also
           further
           Considerable
           that
           possibly
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           that
           Truth
           which
           we
           set
           our Selves
           to
           Comprehend
           ,
           and
           whereof
           we
           have
           the
           Ideas
           ,
           may
           depend
           upon
           the
           truth
           of
           another
           thing
           whereof
           we
           have
           no
           Idea
           .
           If
           it
           should
           be
           so
           tho
           Truth
           in
           general
           be
           never
           so
           Finite
           ,
           or
           the
           Particular
           Truth
           we
           would
           Contemplate
           be
           never
           so
           Finite
           ,
           't
           is
           plain
           we
           shall
           be
           no
           more
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           it
           than
           if
           it
           were
           Infinite
           .
           Now
           I
           say
           that
           't
           is
           not
           only
           Possible
           that
           
           this
           may
           be
           the
           Case
           (
           which
           yet
           of
           it Self
           as
           I
           have
           again
           and
           again
           Noted
           is
           sufficient
           to
           debar
           us
           from
           using
           our
           Reason
           as
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           )
           but
           there
           are
           also
           some
           Instances
           wherein
           it
           appears
           actually
           to
           be
           so
           .
           We
           know
           well
           enough
           what
           we
           mean
           by
           Liberty
           and
           Contingency
           ,
           and
           are
           withal
           well
           assured
           that
           we
           are
           Free
           Agents
           .
           We
           have
           also
           a
           Sufficient
           Notion
           of
           Prescience
           ,
           and
           are
           also
           no
           less
           assured
           of
           the
           Reality
           of
           it
           ,
           And
           because
           both
           these
           are
           true
           ,
           and
           there
           can
           be
           no
           real
           repugnance
           between
           one
           Truth
           and
           another
           we
           are
           also
           by
           Consequence
           assured
           that
           there
           is
           a
           good
           Harmony
           and
           Agreement
           between
           them
           ,
           and
           that
           they
           are
           Consistent
           with
           each
           other
           .
           But
           now
           how
           to
           adjust
           their
           apparent
           Opposition
           ,
           or
           reconcile
           those
           Instances
           of
           seeming
           Contradiction
           and
           inconsistency
           wherewith
           they
           press
           us
           ,
           this
           we
           neither
           Know
           nor
           are
           able
           with
           all
           our
           Meditation
           to
           Comprehend
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           we
           have
           not
           an
           Idea
           of
           the
           Human
           Soul
           ,
           without
           which
           there
           is
           no
           possibility
           of
           Comprehending
           how
           its
           Free
           Workings
           
           may
           be
           the
           Objects
           of
           Prescience
           ,
           tho
           our
           Ideas
           of
           Prescience
           and
           Liberty
           were
           never
           so
           Clear.
           Or
           if
           this
           Instance
           shall
           not
           be
           thought
           so
           proper
           because
           the
           Men
           with
           whom
           our
           present
           Concern
           lies
           are
           pleas'd
           to
           disown
           the
           Doctrine
           of
           Prescience
           ,
           let
           me
           desire
           them
           to
           Consider
           whether
           there
           be
           not
           many
           other
           Difficulties
           concerning
           Human
           Liberty
           ,
           besides
           that
           taken
           from
           ,
           Prescience
           ,
           which
           they
           are
           no
           more
           able
           to
           get
           over
           then
           they
           are
           that
           .
           And
           that
           for
           the
           very
           same
           Reason
           ,
           even
           because
           they
           ahve
           not
           an
           Idea
           of
           the
           Soul
           ,
           upon
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           which
           the
           Solution
           of
           those
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           some
           other
           Difficulties
           in
           Morality
           ,
           does
           Necessarily
           depend
           .
           Or
           if
           they
           please
           let
           them
           take
           an
           Instance
           of
           a
           Physical
           Nature
           .
           We
           know
           well
           enough
           what
           it
           is
           to
           be
           in
           a
           Place
           ,
           and
           we
           know
           also
           as
           well
           what
           it
           is
           to
           be
           Coextended
           to
           a
           Place
           .
           But
           now
           how
           Being
           in
           a
           Place
           may
           be
           without
           Coextension
           to
           a
           Place
           ,
           this
           is
           what
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           (
           tho
           as
           to
           the
           thing
           it Self
           ,
           upon
           other
           Considerations
           constrain'd
           to
           grant
           it
           )
           and
           that
           because
           we
           are
           
           ignorant
           of
           the
           general
           Nature
           of
           Spirit
           ,
           upon
           the
           clear
           Conception
           of
           which
           the
           Comprehension
           of
           the
           other
           does
           so
           depend
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           had
           without
           it
           .
           And
           indeed
           we
           may
           concluded
           in
           general
           that
           when
           ever
           we
           have
           clear
           Ideas
           of
           things
           ,
           and
           yet
           are
           not
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           the
           Truth
           of
           them
           ,
           't
           is
           because
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           those
           things
           depends
           upon
           the
           Truth
           of
           something
           else
           whereof
           we
           have
           either
           no
           Idea
           ,
           or
           not
           such
           as
           is
           sufficiently
           Clear.
           Which
           must
           be
           the
           true
           Reason
           of
           the
           hitherto
           presumed
           impossibility
           of
           finding
           out
           the
           exact
           Proportion
           between
           a
           Circle
           and
           a
           Square
           .
           Why
           ,
           Circle
           and
           Square
           are
           very
           Intelligible
           things
           ,
           and
           how
           come
           we
           then
           not
           to
           be
           able
           to
           determin
           the
           precise
           and
           just
           Proportion
           that
           is
           between
           them
           :
           It
           cannot
           be
           from
           any
           Obscurity
           in
           the
           things
           themselves
           ,
           much
           less
           from
           our
           want
           of
           having
           Ideas
           of
           them
           ,
           for
           we
           have
           as
           clear
           and
           exact
           Ideas
           of
           these
           Figures
           as
           we
           can
           have
           of
           any
           thing
           in
           the
           World.
           It
           must
           be
           therefore
           because
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           their
           Proportion
           depends
           upon
           the
           Knowledge
           
           of
           some
           other
           thing
           whereof
           the
           Idea
           fails
           us
           ,
           which
           till
           we
           are
           posses'd
           of
           we
           shall
           in
           vain
           endeavour
           to
           discover
           the
           other
           .
           Whereby
           it
           plainly
           appears
           that
           we
           are
           not
           only
           uncapable
           of
           Comprehending
           those
           Truths
           that
           relate
           to
           things
           whereof
           we
           have
           no
           Ideas
           ,
           but
           that
           even
           where
           we
           have
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           those
           very
           Clear
           ones
           too
           we
           may
           be
           as
           far
           from
           Comprehending
           a
           Truth
           as
           if
           we
           had
           none
           merely
           upon
           the
           account
           of
           the
           Dependence
           which
           that
           Truth
           has
           upon
           some
           other
           thing
           whereof
           we
           have
           not
           ,
           at
           least
           a
           just
           ,
           Idea
           .
           Which
           single
           Consideration
           is
           enough
           for
           ever
           to
           spoil
           
             Human
             Reason
          
           for
           setting
           up
           for
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           even
           upon
           the
           Supposition
           of
           its
           being
           Finit
           .
           So
           very
           False
           is
           that
           arrogant
           Assertion
           of
           a
           Modern
           Philosopher
           ,
           
           .
           
             Quaecunque
             existunt
             humanae
             Menti
             pervestigabilia
             ,
             praeterquam
             In●initum
             .
          
           Whatever
           is
           may
           be
           thoroughly
           Comprehended
           by
           the
           Mind
           of
           Man
           ,
           except
           Infinite
           .
           And
           again
           .
           
             Vnum
             duntaxat
             est
             quod
             omnem
             mentis
             nostrae
             vim
             longissime
             excedit
             ,
             ipsâque
             suâ
             Naturâ
             ,
             ut
             in
             se
             est
             ,
             ab
             eâ
             Cognosci
             nequit
             ,
          
           In●initum
           puta
           .
           
           There
           is
           but
           one
           only
           thing
           that
           far
           exceeds
           the
           Force
           and
           reach
           of
           our
           Mind
           ,
           and
           that
           cannot
           of
           its
           own
           very
           Nature
           be
           known
           by
           it
           as
           it
           is
           in
           it self
           ,
           namely
           Infinite
           .
           What
           but
           One
           thing
           excepted
           from
           the
           Verge
           ,
           and
           placed
           beyond
           the
           reach
           of
           Human
           Knowledge
           ?
           'T
           is
           well
           that
           One
           thing
           is
           a
           pretty
           large
           one
           ,
           but
           sure
           the
           Authour
           was
           ignorant
           of
           something
           else
           ,
           that
           is
           Himself
           ,
           or
           else
           he
           could
           never
           have
           advanc'd
           such
           a
           Crude
           and
           ill-consider'd
           a
           Proposition
           .
        
         
           33.
           
           And
           thus
           I
           have
           shewn
           at
           large
           in
           a
           rational
           way
           by
           arguing
           
             a
             Priori
          
           ,
           and
           from
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           ,
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           that
           even
           upon
           the
           most
           Liberal
           Supposition
           of
           its
           being
           Finite
           ;
           And
           if
           it
           be
           not
           so
           supposing
           Truth
           to
           be
           Finite
           ,
           much
           less
           is
           it
           supposing
           it
           (
           what
           it
           has
           been
           prov'd
           to
           be
           )
           of
           an
           Infinite
           Nature
           .
           If
           upon
           the
           Former
           Supposition
           it
           exceeds
           the
           Proportion
           of
           our
           Reason
           ,
           certainly
           upon
           the
           latter
           there
           will
           be
           no
           Proportion
           between
           them
           .
           But
           whether
           our
           Reason
           bears
           no
           Proportion
           
           to
           Truth
           ,
           or
           whether
           it
           be
           only
           Disproportionate
           to
           it
           ,
           either
           way
           it
           follows
           that
           it
           cannot
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           it
           ,
           which
           I
           cannot
           but
           now
           look
           upon
           as
           a
           Proposition
           sufficiently
           demonstrated
           .
           And
           in
           all
           this
           I
           contend
           for
           no
           more
           than
           what
           is
           implied
           in
           that
           Common
           and
           universally
           approv'd
           Maxim
           even
           among
           those
           of
           the
           
             Rational
             way
          
           ,
           that
           we
           ought
           not
           to
           deny
           what
           is
           Evident
           for
           the
           sake
           of
           what
           is
           Obscure
           ,
           or
           depart
           from
           a
           Truth
           which
           we
           see
           a
           Necessity
           to
           admit
           because
           of
           some
           Difficulties
           attending
           it
           which
           we
           cannot
           solve
           ;
           which
           they
           say
           is
           an
           Argument
           only
           of
           our
           Ignorance
           ,
           and
           not
           of
           the
           Falshood
           of
           the
           thing
           .
           This
           indeed
           is
           a
           true
           Rule
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           must
           be
           allow'd
           to
           hold
           good
           in
           all
           our
           Reasonings
           ,
           let
           the
           Matter
           of
           them
           be
           what
           it
           will.
           Only
           I
           wish
           that
           the
           Implication
           of
           the
           Rule
           were
           as
           much
           minded
           ,
           as
           the
           Rule
           it self
           is
           generally
           receiv'd
           .
           For
           it
           plainly
           implies
           that
           there
           are
           some
           things
           which
           though
           plain
           and
           certain
           as
           to
           their
           Existence
           ,
           are
           yet
           incomprehensible
           
           and
           inexplicable
           as
           to
           their
           Manner
           .
           But
           then
           as
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           Manner
           should
           not
           make
           us
           reject
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           thing
           when
           otherwise
           Evident
           ,
           so
           neither
           should
           the
           Evidence
           we
           have
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           thing
           make
           us
           disown
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           Manner
           ,
           since
           it
           is
           so
           far
           from
           being
           against
           the
           Nature
           of
           Truth
           that
           it
           should
           be
           incomprehensible
           ,
           that
           you
           see
           we
           have
           discover'd
           even
           from
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           its
           Nature
           that
           there
           are
           incomprehensible
           Truths
           .
           Of
           which
           I
           might
           now
           subjoyn
           some
           particular
           Examples
           ,
           but
           that
           I
           should
           fall
           very
           deep
           into
           a
           
             Common
             Place
          
           ,
           being
           herein
           prevented
           by
           many
           other
           Writers
           ,
           particularly
           by
           the
           admirable
           one
           of
           
             L'
             Art
             de
             Penser
          
           ,
           to
           the
           First
           Chapter
           of
           whose
           Fourth
           Book
           I
           refer
           my
           Reader
           ;
           where
           he
           shews
           by
           several
           ,
           and
           some
           of
           them
           uncommon
           Instances
           that
           there
           are
           things
           which
           the
           Mind
           of
           Man
           is
           not
           capable
           of
           Comprehending
           .
           After
           which
           he
           Concludes
           with
           a
           very
           grave
           and
           useful
           Reflection
           ,
           which
           for
           the
           great
           advantage
           and
           Pertinency
           
           of
           it
           to
           the
           present
           Affair
           ,
           though
           I
           refer
           my
           Reader
           to
           the
           rest
           of
           the
           Chapter
           ,
           I
           shall
           here
           set
           down
           .
           
             The
             Pro●it
          
           (
           says
           he
           )
           
             that
             one
             may
             draw
             from
             these
             Speculations
             is
             not
             barely
             to
             acquire
             the
             knowledge
             of
             them
             ,
             which
             of
             it self
             is
             barren
             enough
             ,
             but
             it
             is
             to
             learn
             to
             know
             the
             Bounds
             of
             our
             understanding
             ,
             and
             to
             force
             it
             to
             confess
             that
             there
             are
             things
             which
             it
             cannot
             Comprehend
             .
             And
             therefore
             it
             is
             good
             to
             fatigue
             the
             mind
             with
             these
             kind
             of
             Subtilties
             ,
             the
             better
             to
             tame
             its
             Presumption
             ,
             and
             abate
             its
             confidence
             and
             daringness
             in
             opposing
             its
             Feeble
             Lights
             against
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             Religion
             ,
             under
             the
             Pretence
             that
             it
             cannot
             comprehend
             them
             .
             For
             since
             all
             the
             Force
             of
             Human
             Vnderstanding
             is
             constrain'd
             to
             yield
             to
             the
             least
             Atom
             of
             Matter
             ,
             and
             to
             own
             that
             it
             sees
             Clearly
             that
             it
             is
             infinitely
             divisible
             without
             being
             able
             to
             Comprehend
             how
             this
             may
             be
             .
             Is
             it
             not
             apparently
             to
             transgress
             against
             Reason
             to
             refuse
             to
             believe
             the
             wonderful
             effects
             of
             the
             Divine
             Onnipotence
             ,
             Merely
             for
             this
             Reason
             ,
             that
             our
             Vnderstanding
             cannot
             Comprehend
             them
             ?
          
           Yes
           without
           
           doubt
           it
           is
           ,
           as
           will
           better
           appear
           in
           the
           sequel
           of
           this
           Discourse
           .
           In
           the
           mean
           while
           before
           I
           take
           leave
           of
           the
           Subject
           of
           this
           Chapter
           ,
           I
           have
           a
           double
           Remarque
           to
           make
           upon
           it
           .
        
         
           34.
           
           The
           First
           is
           ,
           that
           since
           Truth
           in
           its
           full
           extent
           is
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           we
           should
           not
           vainly
           go
           about
           to
           Comprehend
           it
           ,
           but
           be
           contented
           to
           be
           ignorant
           in
           many
           things
           .
           And
           since
           there
           are
           some
           special
           Truths
           in
           particular
           that
           are
           incomprehensible
           we
           should
           not
           apply
           our
           Thoughts
           to
           the
           Comprehension
           of
           all
           things
           at
           a
           Venture
           ,
           as
           some
           who
           are
           for
           understanding
           every
           thing
           ,
           but
           sit
           down
           first
           and
           Consider
           whether
           they
           are
           proportionate
           to
           our
           Capacities
           or
           No
           ,
           and
           ,
           as
           far
           as
           we
           can
           learn
           to
           distinguish
           what
           Truths
           may
           ,
           and
           what
           may
           not
           be
           Comprehended
           by
           us
           ,
           that
           so
           we
           may
           not
           lose
           that
           Time
           and
           Pains
           in
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           them
           ,
           which
           might
           be
           profitably
           imploy'd
           in
           the
           Consideration
           of
           other
           things
           ,
           better
           suted
           to
           our
           
           Capacity
           .
           As
           a
           great
           many
           do
           ,
           who
           busie
           themselves
           all
           their
           Lives
           long
           about
           such
           things
           which
           if
           they
           should
           study
           to
           Eternity
           they
           would
           not
           Comprehend
           ,
           and
           that
           indeed
           because
           they
           require
           an
           Infinite
           Capacity
           to
           Comprehend
           them
           .
           Whereas
           the
           shortest
           Compendium
           of
           Study
           ,
           and
           the
           best
           way
           to
           abridge
           the
           Sciences
           is
           to
           study
           only
           what
           we
           can
           Master
           ,
           and
           what
           is
           within
           the
           Sphere
           of
           our
           Faculties
           ,
           and
           never
           so
           much
           as
           to
           apply
           our selves
           to
           what
           we
           can
           never
           Comprehend
           .
        
         
           35.
           
           The
           other
           Remarque
           is
           that
           the
           Conclusion
           prov'd
           in
           this
           Chapter
           does
           very
           much
           Fortifie
           and
           Confirm
           that
           which
           was
           undertaken
           to
           be
           made
           out
           in
           the
           last
           Concerning
           the
           Distinction
           of
           Things
           Above
           ,
           and
           Things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           .
           For
           if
           there
           are
           Truths
           which
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           ,
           then
           it
           seems
           what
           is
           above
           our
           Comprehension
           may
           yet
           be
           True
           ,
           and
           if
           True
           then
           to
           be
           sure
           not
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           
           since
           whatever
           is
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           is
           no
           less
           Contrary
           to
           Truth
           ,
           which
           though
           sometimes
           above
           Reason
           is
           yet
           never
           Contrary
           to
           it
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           V.
           That
           therefore
           a
           things
           being
           Incomprehensible
           by
           Reason
           is
           of
           it self
           no
           Concluding
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           True.
           
        
         
           1.
           
           AS
           there
           is
           nothing
           in
           Man
           that
           deserves
           his
           Consideration
           so
           Much
           ,
           and
           Few
           things
           without
           him
           that
           deserve
           it
           More
           than
           that
           part
           of
           him
           wherein
           he
           resembles
           his
           Maker
           ,
           so
           there
           is
           Nothing
           more
           worthy
           of
           his
           Consideration
           in
           that
           part
           ,
           or
           that
           is
           at
           least
           more
           necessary
           to
           be
           Consider'd
           by
           him
           ,
           than
           the
           Defects
           of
           it
           ,
           without
           a
           due
           regard
           to
           which
           it
           would
           not
           be
           very
           safe
           for
           him
           to
           dwell
           much
           upon
           the
           Consideration
           of
           the
           other
           ,
           as
           being
           apt
           to
           seduce
           him
           into
           ●
           ride
           and
           Vanity
           ,
           to
           blow
           him
           up
           with
           Self-Conceit
           ,
           
           and
           so
           by
           an
           imaginary
           Greatness
           to
           spoil
           and
           corrupt
           that
           which
           is
           Genuine
           and
           Natural
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           Now
           the
           Defects
           of
           our
           Intellectual
           part
           Consider'd
           in
           their
           general
           Heads
           are
           I
           suppose
           
             Sin
             ,
             Ignorance
          
           ,
           and
           Errour
           .
           And
           though
           Sin
           in
           it self
           must
           be
           allow'd
           to
           be
           of
           a
           worse
           Nature
           and
           Consequence
           than
           either
           Ignorance
           or
           Errour
           (
           however
           some
           may
           fancy
           it
           a
           greater
           Reproach
           to
           'em
           to
           have
           their
           Intellectuals
           question'd
           than
           their
           Morals
           )
           and
           so
           upon
           that
           score
           may
           require
           more
           of
           our
           Consideration
           ,
           yet
           upon
           another
           account
           the
           Defects
           of
           the
           Understanding
           seem
           to
           need
           it
           more
           than
           those
           of
           the
           Will
           ,
           since
           we
           are
           not
           only
           apt
           to
           be
           more
           proud
           of
           our
           Intellectuals
           than
           of
           our
           Morals
           ,
           but
           also
           to
           Conceit
           our selves
           more
           Free
           and
           Secure
           from
           Errour
           than
           we
           are
           from
           Sin
           ,
           though
           Sin
           in
           the
           very
           Nature
           and
           Principle
           of
           it
           implies
           and
           supposes
           Errour
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           Pride
           the
           presumed
           Sin
           of
           the
           Angels
           is
           also
           the
           most
           Natural
           and
           Hereditary
           one
           of
           Man
           ,
           his
           dominant
           
           and
           most
           cleaving
           Corruption
           ,
           the
           Vice
           as
           I
           may
           call
           it
           of
           his
           Planet
           and
           Complexion
           .
           And
           that
           which
           we
           are
           most
           apt
           to
           be
           proud
           of
           is
           our
           Vnderstandings
           ,
           the
           only
           Faculty
           in
           us
           whose
           limits
           we
           forget
           .
           In
           other
           things
           we
           are
           Sensible
           not
           only
           of
           the
           general
           Bounds
           of
           our
           Nature
           ,
           but
           also
           of
           the
           particular
           narrowness
           of
           them
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           do
           not
           attempt
           any
           thing
           very
           much
           beyond
           our
           Measure
           ,
           but
           contain
           our Selves
           pretty
           reasonably
           within
           Our
           Line
           ,
           at
           least
           are
           not
           such
           Fools
           as
           to
           apply
           our
           Strength
           to
           Move
           the
           Earth
           out
           of
           its
           place
           ,
           or
           to
           set
           our
           Mouths
           to
           drink
           up
           the
           Sea
           ,
           or
           to
           try
           with
           our
           Eyes
           to
           look
           into
           the
           Regions
           beyond
           the
           Stars
           .
           But
           there
           is
           hardly
           any
           Distance
           but
           to
           which
           we
           fancy
           our
           Intellectual
           Sight
           will
           reach
           ,
           scarce
           any
           Object
           too
           bright
           ,
           too
           large
           ,
           or
           too
           far
           remov'd
           for
           it
           .
           Strange
           that
           when
           we
           Consider
           that
           in
           us
           which
           makes
           us
           Men
           ,
           we
           should
           forget
           that
           we
           are
           so
           .
           And
           yet
           thus
           it
           is
           ;
           when
           we
           look
           upon
           our
           Understandings
           't
           is
           with
           such
           a
           Magnifying
           Glass
           that
           it
           appears
           in
           a
           manner
           boundless
           
           and
           unlimited
           to
           us
           ,
           and
           we
           are
           dazzled
           with
           our
           own
           Light.
           
        
         
           4.
           
           Not
           that
           it
           is
           to
           be
           presumed
           that
           there
           are
           any
           who
           upon
           a
           deliberate
           Consideration
           of
           the
           Matter
           have
           this
           Form'd
           and
           express
           Thought
           that
           their
           Understandings
           are
           Infinite
           Human
           Nature
           seems
           hardly
           capable
           of
           such
           Excess
           .
           But
           only
           as
           the
           Psalmist
           says
           in
           another
           Case
           of
           some
           Worldly
           Men
           ,
           that
           their
           
             Inward
             Thought
             is
             that
             their
             houses
             shall
             continue
             for
             ever
             ,
          
           
           Not
           meaning
           that
           any
           could
           be
           so
           grossely
           absurd
           as
           positively
           and
           explicitly
           to
           Conceive
           that
           their
           Houses
           any
           more
           than
           their
           own
           Bodies
           ,
           should
           last
           always
           ,
           and
           never
           decay
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           they
           had
           such
           a
           kind
           of
           a
           wandring
           and
           Confuse
           Imagination
           secretly
           lurking
           in
           their
           Minds
           ,
           and
           loosely
           hovering
           about
           them
           ;
           so
           in
           like
           manner
           there
           are
           a
           sort
           of
           People
           who
           are
           Parturient
           and
           teeming
           with
           a
           kind
           of
           Confuse
           and
           unform'd
           Imagination
           tho'
           perhaps
           they
           never
           bring
           it
           to
           an
           express
           and
           distinct
           Thought
           ,
           that
           their
           Understandings
           have
           no
           bounds
           or
           limits
           belonging
           to
           them
           ,
           tho'
           they
           cannot
           
           deny
           but
           that
           they
           have
           ,
           if
           directly
           put
           to
           the
           Question
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           Accordingly
           you
           shall
           find
           those
           whose
           Conduct
           betrays
           this
           inward
           Sentiment
           ,
           who
           venture
           at
           all
           in
           their
           Studies
           ,
           stick
           at
           nothing
           ,
           but
           will
           undertake
           to
           give
           a
           Reason
           for
           every
           thing
           ,
           and
           positively
           decide
           whatever
           Comes
           in
           their
           way
           without
           Suspense
           or
           Reserve
           ,
           imagining
           (
           confusely
           at
           least
           )
           they
           have
           a
           Comprehension
           of
           all
           things
           ,
           and
           that
           there
           is
           nothing
           too
           hard
           or
           knotty
           for
           them
           ,
           nothing
           but
           what
           they
           either
           actually
           do
           ,
           or
           are
           capable
           of
           Comprehending
           ,
           if
           they
           once
           set
           themselves
           to
           it
           .
           And
           from
           hence
           they
           roundly
           Conclude
           that
           whatever
           they
           are
           not
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           is
           not
           true
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           deny
           their
           Belief
           to
           whatever
           transcends
           their
           Comprehension
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           Now
           I
           confess
           there
           is
           no
           fault
           to
           be
           found
           with
           the
           Consequence
           of
           these
           Men
           ,
           nor
           with
           their
           Practice
           as
           it
           relates
           to
           that
           Consequence
           ,
           which
           are
           both
           (
           as
           far
           as
           I
           can
           see
           )
           exceeding
           right
           if
           their
           Principle
           be
           once
           admitted
           :
           For
           if
           indeed
           it
           be
           really
           so
           that
           Human
           
           Reason
           is
           adequate
           and
           Commensurate
           to
           Truth
           ,
           so
           that
           there
           is
           no
           Truth
           but
           what
           it
           is
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           ,
           then
           it
           will
           certainly
           follow
           that
           whatever
           it
           cannot
           Comprehend
           is
           not
           True
           ,
           and
           there
           will
           need
           no
           other
           ,
           nor
           better
           Argument
           of
           the
           falshood
           of
           any
           thing
           than
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           it
           .
           For
           their
           Reasoning
           resolves
           into
           this
           Form.
           
        
         
           
             Whatever
             is
             true
             we
             can
             Comprehend
             .
          
           
             This
             we
             do
             not
             Comprehend
             ,
          
           
             Therefore
             this
             is
             not
             true
             .
          
        
         
           Or
           thus
           ,
           
             
               If
               whatever
               is
               true
               we
               can
               Comprehend
               ,
               then
               what
               we
               cannot
               Comprehend
               is
               not
               true
               ,
            
             
               But
               whatever
               is
               true
               we
               can
               Comprehend
               ,
               Ergo
               &c.
               
            
          
           Where
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           if
           the
           Major
           of
           the
           First
           ,
           or
           the
           Minor
           of
           the
           Second
           Syllogisin
           (
           wherein
           the
           Principle
           of
           these
           Men
           is
           Contain'd
           )
           be
           allow'd
           ,
           there
           will
           be
           no
           avoiding
           
           the
           Conclusions
           of
           them
           .
           So
           that
           if
           we
           admit
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           Comprehensive
           of
           all
           Truth
           we
           are
           not
           Consistent
           with
           our Selves
           if
           we
           do
           not
           also
           grant
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           a
           just
           Warrant
           to
           Conclude
           it
           not
           True.
           
        
         
           7.
           
           But
           then
           on
           the
           other
           side
           if
           this
           Mighty
           Principle
           upon
           which
           such
           a
           Weight
           is
           laid
           ,
           and
           such
           great
           things
           built
           be
           false
           ,
           if
           Human
           Reason
           be
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           (
           as
           I
           think
           is
           with
           great
           Evidence
           Demonstrated
           in
           the
           last
           Chapter
           )
           then
           is
           not
           the
           Consequence
           as
           good
           this
           way
           ,
           that
           therefore
           a
           thing
           's
           being
           Incomprehensible
           by
           Reason
           is
           no
           Concluding
           Argument
           of
           it
           's
           not
           being
           True
           ?
           For
           how
           are
           we
           inconsistent
           with
           our Selves
           ,
           if
           granting
           Human
           Reason
           to
           be
           Commensurate
           to
           Truth
           we
           deny
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           argues
           it
           not
           to
           be
           True
           ,
           but
           only
           because
           in
           denying
           that
           we
           Contradict
           our
           Principle
           ;
           or
           ,
           which
           is
           all
           one
           ,
           Suppose
           the
           Contradictory
           Proposition
           to
           it
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           viz.
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           Commensurate
           to
           Truth
           .
           But
           now
           if
           in
           saying
           that
           
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           does
           not
           argue
           it
           not
           to
           be
           true
           we
           in
           the
           Consequence
           of
           what
           we
           affirm
           Suppose
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           as
           plain
           that
           the
           Supposition
           of
           Reason's
           not
           being
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           will
           also
           Oblige
           us
           to
           say
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           of
           it
           's
           not
           being
           True.
           Whereby
           it
           is
           plain
           that
           the
           Consequence
           is
           every
           whit
           as
           good
           thus
           ,
           
             Human
             Reason
             is
             not
             the
             Measure
             of
             Truth
             ,
             therefore
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             a
             thing
             is
             no
             Argument
             that
             it
             is
             not
             True
             ;
             as
             thus
             ,
             Human
             Reason
             is
             the
             Measure
             of
             Truth
             ,
             therefore
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             a
             thing
             is
             an
             Argument
             that
             it
             is
             not
             True.
          
           The
           only
           Reason
           why
           he
           that
           denies
           this
           latter
           Consequence
           upon
           the
           Supposition
           or
           Concession
           of
           this
           latter
           Principle
           is
           inconsistent
           with
           himself
           ,
           being
           this
           ,
           because
           in
           denying
           the
           latter
           Consequence
           he
           Supposes
           the
           Former
           Principle
           ,
           which
           Principle
           therefore
           must
           as
           much
           inter
           the
           Consequence
           that
           Supposed
           it
           ,
           viz.
           That
           a
           things
           being
           Incomprehensible
           by
           Reason
           
           is
           no
           Warrant
           to
           Conclude
           that
           it
           is
           not
           true
           .
        
         
           8.
           
           And
           because
           this
           Principle
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           has
           been
           already
           proved
           at
           large
           ,
           I
           look
           upon
           the
           grounds
           of
           this
           Consequence
           as
           already
           laid
           ,
           and
           therefore
           to
           shew
           the
           Connexion
           that
           is
           between
           the
           one
           and
           the
           other
           (
           besides
           what
           I
           have
           even
           now
           said
           to
           that
           purpose
           )
           need
           only
           add
           this
           further
           Remarque
           .
           That
           since
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           or
           since
           there
           are
           Incomprehensible
           Truths
           ,
           then
           it
           seems
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           and
           the
           Truth
           of
           a
           thing
           may
           Consist
           together
           ;
           or
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           the
           same
           thing
           may
           be
           at
           once
           True
           and
           Incomprehensible
           .
           But
           now
           there
           cannot
           be
           in
           the
           whole
           Compass
           of
           Reasoning
           a
           more
           certain
           ,
           or
           more
           evident
           Maxim
           than
           this
           ,
           That
           that
           which
           is
           when
           a
           thing
           is
           ,
           or
           would
           be
           supposing
           it
           were
           ,
           is
           no
           Argument
           that
           it
           is
           not
           .
           As
           for
           Instance
           ,
           Suppose
           it
           should
           be
           Objected
           against
           the
           Copernican
           Hypothesis
           of
           the
           Motion
           of
           the
           Earth
           that
           it
           is
           repugnant
           to
           
           Sense
           ,
           since
           we
           see
           the
           Sun
           and
           the
           Stars
           Rise
           and
           Set
           ,
           and
           Move
           round
           about
           us
           .
           It
           is
           thought
           a
           sufficient
           Answer
           to
           this
           to
           say
           ,
           That
           supposing
           the
           Earth
           and
           not
           the
           Sun
           did
           really
           Move
           these
           Appearances
           would
           yet
           be
           the
           same
           as
           they
           are
           now
           ,
           since
           Sailing
           ,
           
           as
           we
           do
           ,
           between
           the
           Sun
           and
           the
           Stars
           (
           as
           a
           late
           Writer
           expresses
           it
           )
           not
           the
           Ship
           in
           which
           we
           are
           ,
           but
           the
           Bodies
           which
           surround
           us
           would
           seem
           to
           Move
           .
           And
           't
           is
           most
           Certain
           that
           if
           supposing
           the
           Earth
           did
           )
           really
           Move
           the
           Motion
           would
           yet
           seem
           to
           be
           in
           the
           Sun
           and
           Stars
           ;
           then
           the
           seeming
           Motion
           of
           those
           Bodies
           is
           no
           Argument
           that
           the
           Earth
           does
           not
           Move
           .
        
         
           9.
           
           Why
           just
           so
           it
           is
           in
           the
           present
           Case
           ,
           when
           't
           is
           Objected
           against
           the
           Truth
           of
           a
           thing
           that
           't
           is
           Incomprehensible
           by
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           't
           is
           a
           sufficient
           Answer
           to
           say
           that
           this
           argues
           nothing
           ,
           since
           if
           the
           thing
           were
           true
           it
           might
           yet
           be
           Incomprehensible
           .
           And
           't
           is
           most
           certain
           that
           if
           supposing
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           True
           it
           might
           yet
           be
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           then
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           
           thing
           is
           no
           good
           Objection
           against
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           .
           And
           therefore
           since
           we
           have
           proved
           that
           there
           are
           Incomprehensible
           Truths
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           that
           the
           Truth
           of
           a
           thing
           and
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           same
           thing
           may
           Consist
           together
           ,
           we
           may
           now
           with
           all
           Rational
           assurance
           Conclude
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           that
           it
           is
           not
           True
           ,
           any
           more
           than
           the
           seeming
           Motion
           of
           the
           Sun
           is
           an
           Argument
           against
           the
           real
           one
           of
           the
           Earth
           ,
           since
           the
           Former
           would
           be
           even
           Supposing
           the
           Truth
           of
           the
           Latter
           .
           And
           both
           by
           Vertue
           of
           this
           most
           Evident
           and
           incontestable
           Principle
           ,
           That
           what
           may
           Consist
           with
           the
           Truth
           of
           any
           thing
           ,
           can
           be
           no
           good
           Argument
           that
           it
           is
           not
           True.
           
        
         
           10.
           
           And
           indeed
           when
           it
           shall
           be
           Consider'd
           how
           many
           things
           surpass
           our
           Conception
           when
           we
           are
           Children
           which
           yet
           we
           are
           able
           well
           to
           Comprehend
           when
           we
           are
           Men
           ,
           how
           many
           things
           again
           are
           beyond
           the
           Ken
           of
           Ignorant
           and
           Illiterate
           Men
           which
           yet
           are
           very
           Intelligible
           and
           Shine
           forth
           with
           full
           
           Light
           to
           the
           Men
           of
           Art
           and
           Learning
           ,
           and
           how
           many
           things
           again
           even
           among
           the
           Learned
           are
           now
           discover'd
           and
           well
           understood
           by
           the
           help
           of
           Algebra
           which
           were
           Mysteries
           to
           former
           Ages
           ,
           and
           are
           still
           beyond
           even
           the
           Imagination
           of
           those
           who
           have
           not
           that
           Noble
           and
           Wonderful
           
             Key
             of
             Knowledge
          
           .
           When
           again
           it
           shall
           be
           further
           Consider'd
           how
           many
           of
           those
           things
           which
           we
           cannot
           even
           with
           the
           Assistance
           of
           that
           Commanding
           Key
           unlock
           in
           this
           state
           of
           Mortality
           ,
           we
           may
           yet
           have
           a
           clear
           view
           of
           in
           that
           of
           Separation
           ,
           when
           deliver'd
           from
           the
           Burthen
           of
           our
           Flesh
           ,
           and
           that
           many
           of
           those
           things
           which
           are
           too
           high
           for
           us
           then
           may
           yet
           be
           of
           a
           level
           with
           the
           Understanding
           of
           Angels
           ,
           and
           that
           what
           is
           above
           their
           Capacity
           may
           yet
           be
           most
           clearly
           and
           distinctly
           perceiv'd
           by
           the
           Infinitely
           penetrating
           and
           All-Comprehensive
           Intellect
           of
           God
           ,
           I
           say
           he
           that
           shall
           but
           seriously
           enter
           into
           this
           single
           Reflection
           must
           needs
           discover
           himself
           much
           wanting
           in
           that
           Stock
           of
           Sense
           and
           Reason
           he
           
           pretends
           to
           ,
           if
           he
           still
           continue
           to
           Measure
           the
           Possibilities
           of
           things
           by
           their
           Proportionableness
           to
           his
           Understanding
           ,
           or
           Conclude
           any
           thing
           False
           or
           Impossible
           ,
           when
           he
           has
           no
           better
           Reason
           for
           it
           but
           only
           because
           he
           cannot
           Comprehend
           it
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           VI.
           That
           if
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           were
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           true
           ,
           Human
           Reason
           would
           then
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           AS
           there
           is
           Nothing
           more
           Common
           than
           for
           people
           to
           hold
           Certain
           Principles
           that
           have
           an
           inseparable
           Connexion
           with
           very
           bad
           Consequences
           ,
           and
           yet
           not
           professedly
           to
           hold
           those
           Consequences
           ,
           because
           either
           they
           do
           not
           attend
           to
           them
           ,
           or
           are
           not
           sensible
           that
           they
           do
           indeed
           follow
           from
           such
           Principles
           ,
           whereof
           we
           have
           two
           very
           pregnant
           Instances
           in
           the
           Maintainers
           of
           the
           Predestinarian
           and
           Soli●idian
           Systemes
           ,
           so
           on
           the
           other
           hand
           ,
           and
           for
           the
           same
           Reason
           there
           are
           those
           who
           take
           up
           ,
           and
           with
           great
           Fixedness
           adhere
           to
           certain
           Consequences
           without
           Professedly
           
           holding
           those
           Principles
           from
           which
           they
           truly
           flow
           ,
           and
           to
           which
           (
           if
           traced
           to
           the
           Head
           )
           they
           will
           infallibly
           lead
           them
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           Of
           this
           we
           have
           a
           very
           particular
           Instance
           (
           where
           I
           confess
           one
           would
           not
           expect
           to
           find
           it
           )
           in
           those
           of
           the
           Socinian
           Perswasion
           .
           The
           Reason
           these
           Men
           of
           Reason
           give
           why
           they
           will
           not
           believe
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Faith
           ,
           is
           because
           they
           are
           above
           their
           Reason
           ,
           they
           cannot
           Comprehend
           them
           .
           Whereby
           they
           plainly
           imply
           ,
           that
           they
           will
           believe
           Nothing
           but
           what
           they
           can
           Comprehend
           ,
           or
           that
           Nothing
           is
           to
           be
           believ'd
           that
           is
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           which
           is
           also
           a
           common
           Maxim
           among
           them
           ,
           who
           accordingly
           make
           Above
           Reason
           and
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           to
           be
           one
           and
           the
           same
           thing
           .
           And
           whereas
           't
           is
           only
           the
           untruth
           of
           a
           thing
           that
           can
           make
           it
           unfit
           to
           be
           the
           Object
           of
           Faith
           ,
           in
           saying
           they
           will
           not
           believe
           what
           they
           cannot
           Comprehend
           ,
           they
           do
           as
           good
           as
           say
           that
           what
           they
           cannot
           Comprehend
           is
           not
           True
           ,
           and
           so
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           a
           just
           
           warrant
           to
           conclude
           it
           False
           .
           And
           all
           this
           they
           own
           and
           expresly
           declare
           ,
           if
           not
           in
           these
           very
           terms
           ,
           yet
           at
           least
           in
           such
           as
           are
           equivalent
           to
           them
           as
           is
           too
           Notorious
           and
           well
           known
           to
           need
           any
           Citations
           for
           the
           proof
           of
           it
           .
           But
           now
           though
           they
           do
           thus
           profess●dly
           own
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           by
           Reason
           is
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           true
           ,
           yet
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           or
           that
           all
           Truth
           is
           Comprehensible
           by
           it
           ,
           are
           (
           as
           I
           take
           it
           )
           Propositions
           which
           they
           do
           not
           openly
           and
           professedly
           avow
           .
           For
           as
           I
           noted
           in
           the
           Introduction
           't
           is
           such
           an
           Odious
           and
           Arrogant
           Assertion
           that
           they
           cannot
           with
           any
           Face
           of
           Modesty
           or
           common
           Decency
           make
           a
           plain
           and
           direct
           Profession
           of
           it
           ,
           though
           at
           the
           same
           time
           't
           is
           most
           Certain
           ,
           that
           this
           is
           the
           true
           Principle
           of
           that
           Consequence
           which
           they
           do
           professedly
           hold
           ,
           viz.
           
             that
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             a
             thing
             argues
             it
             not
             to
             be
             true
             ,
          
           and
           that
           this
           Consequence
           does
           as
           necessarily
           lead
           back
           to
           that
           Principle
           .
        
         
         
           3.
           
           For
           as
           if
           Human
           Reason
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           it
           follows
           in
           the
           descendintg
           line
           as
           a
           direct
           Consequence
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           argues
           it
           not
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           so
           it
           follows
           as
           well
           Backwards
           
             &
             per
             viam
             ascensûs
          
           ,
           that
           if
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           argues
           it
           not
           to
           be
           True
           ,
           then
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
           Since
           if
           it
           were
           not
           ,
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           (
           as
           is
           shewn
           in
           the
           Preceding
           Chapter
           )
           would
           then
           not
           argue
           it
           not
           to
           be
           True.
           If
           therefore
           it
           does
           ,
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
           Which
           Principle
           whoever
           disowns
           ought
           also
           to
           renounce
           the
           other
           Proposition
           ,
           viz.
           
             That
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             a
             thing
             is
             an
             Argument
             of
             its
             untruth
             ,
          
           which
           if
           yet
           he
           will
           imbrace
           notwithstanding
           ,
           't
           is
           plain
           he
           holds
           the
           Consequence
           without
           its
           Principle
           ,
           and
           has
           indeed
           no
           Reason
           for
           what
           he
           Affirms
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           For
           as
           he
           who
           granting
           Human
           Reason
           to
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           denies
           yet
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           an
           Argument
           of
           
           its
           not
           being
           true
           is
           therefore
           inconsistent
           with
           himself
           ,
           because
           in
           so
           doing
           he
           supposes
           the
           Contradictory
           to
           what
           he
           had
           before
           granted
           ,
           viz.
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
           So
           he
           that
           Affirms
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           True
           ,
           and
           yet
           denies
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           is
           also
           as
           inconsistent
           with
           himself
           ,
           because
           in
           so
           doing
           the
           supposes
           the
           Contradictory
           to
           his
           own
           Assertion
           ,
           and
           does
           in
           effect
           say
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           not
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           True
           ,
           as
           most
           Certainly
           it
           would
           not
           be
           in
           case
           Human
           Reason
           be
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           as
           the
           foregoing
           Chapter
           has
           sufficiently
           shewn
           .
           The
           short
           is
           ,
           if
           the
           Not
           being
           of
           A
           proves
           that
           C
           is
           not
           ,
           then
           the
           being
           of
           C
           proves
           that
           A
           is
           ,
           since
           if
           it
           were
           not
           ,
           according
           to
           the
           First
           Supposition
           C
           could
           not
           be
           .
           And
           so
           here
           if
           Reason's
           not
           being
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           proves
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           not
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           True
           ,
           
           then
           if
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           be
           an
           Argument
           of
           it
           's
           not
           being
           True
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           since
           if
           it
           were
           not
           then
           according
           to
           the
           first
           Supposition
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           would
           not
           be
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           True.
           
        
         
           5.
           
           For
           how
           I
           pray
           comes
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           to
           conclude
           the
           untruth
           of
           it
           ?
           I
           cannot
           Comprehend
           such
           a
           thing
           ,
           therefore
           it
           is
           not
           True
           ,
           where
           's
           the
           Consequence
           ?
           By
           what
           Logic
           does
           this
           Latter
           Proposition
           follow
           from
           the
           Former
           ?
           why
           we
           have
           here
           the
           Minor
           Proposition
           and
           the
           Conclusion
           ,
           and
           to
           make
           a
           Complete
           Argument
           of
           it
           we
           must
           add
           another
           ,
           thus
           ;
           If
           it
           were
           true
           I
           should
           Comprehend
           it
           ,
           but
           I
           do
           not
           Comprehend
           it
           ,
           therefore
           it
           is
           not
           true
           .
           Whereby
           it
           appears
           to
           the
           eye
           that
           my
           not
           being
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           otherwise
           an
           Argument
           of
           the
           ●●truth
           of
           it
           ,
           than
           as
           it
           is
           first
           pre●●pposed
           that
           if
           it
           were
           true
           I
           should
           〈◊〉
           ●ble
           to
           Comprehend
           it
           .
           Which
           again
           resolving
           into
           this
           Absolute
           ●●●●osition
           ,
           that
           I
           am
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           
           all
           Truth
           ,
           it
           plainly
           follows
           that
           if
           my
           inability
           to
           Comprehend
           a
           thing
           be
           an
           Argument
           that
           it
           is
           not
           true
           ,
           then
           I
           am
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           all
           Truth
           ,
           and
           that
           my
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           and
           Final
           Standard
           of
           it
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           I
           Conclude
           therefore
           that
           if
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           were
           an
           Argument
           of
           it
           's
           not
           being
           true
           then
           Human
           Reason
           will
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           that
           they
           that
           hold
           the
           Former
           ought
           also
           if
           they
           will
           be
           Consistent
           with
           themselves
           to
           admit
           the
           Latter
           .
           But
           because
           this
           is
           a
           False
           Principle
           ,
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           therefore
           ,
           I
           Conclude
           again
           that
           the
           Consequence
           that
           Resolves
           into
           this
           Principle
           is
           also
           False
           ,
           since
           we
           may
           as
           well
           Conclude
           a
           Consequence
           to
           be
           False
           because
           it
           leads
           back
           to
           a
           False
           Principle
           ,
           as
           a
           Principle
           to
           be
           False
           because
           it
           is
           productive
           of
           a
           bad
           Consequence
           .
           Which
           still
           further
           Confirms
           and
           Establishes
           the
           Conclusion
           of
           the
           last
           Chapter
           ,
           
             viz.
             That
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             a
             thing
             is
             no
             Argument
             of
             its
             untruth
             ,
          
           which
           you
           
           see
           is
           now
           proved
           both
           Backwards
           and
           Forwards
           ,
           and
           so
           made
           impregnable
           on
           all
           sides
           .
           We
           have
           proved
           it
           Forwards
           by
           shewing
           the
           Falseness
           of
           that
           Principle
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           by
           thence
           arguing
           the
           said
           Conclusion
           ;
           and
           we
           have
           also
           proved
           it
           Backwards
           by
           shewing
           that
           the
           Contrary
           Supposition
           Resolves
           into
           that
           False
           and
           already
           Confused
           Principle
           .
           And
           I
           do
           not
           see
           how
           any
           Conclusion
           can
           be
           better
           proved
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           VII
           .
           That
           therefore
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           just
           Objection
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           .
           With
           an
           Account
           of
           the
           Cartesian
           Maxim
           ,
           that
           we
           are
           to
           Assent
           only
           to
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           T
           Is
           a
           Wonderful
           thing
           to
           Consider
           the
           Caprice
           of
           Human
           Nature
           ,
           by
           what
           unaccountable
           Springs
           it's
           Movements
           are
           ordered
           ,
           and
           how
           odly
           and
           unsteddily
           Men
           act
           and
           manage
           themselves
           even
           in
           the
           same
           Circumstances
           ,
           and
           in
           Relation
           to
           the
           same
           Objects
           .
           Sometimes
           the
           Obscurity
           and
           Mysteriousness
           of
           a
           thing
           shall
           be
           a
           Motive
           of
           Credibility
           ,
           and
           recommend
           it
           the
           rather
           to
           their
           Belief
           .
           Thus
           you
           shall
           have
           a
           great
           many
           reject
           that
           Philosophy
           as
           idle
           and
           Chimerical
           which
           undertakes
           to
           explain
           the
           Effects
           of
           Nature
           by
           insensible
           
           Particles
           ,
           their
           different
           Bigness
           ,
           Figure
           ,
           Contexture
           ,
           Local
           Motion
           ,
           Rest
           ,
           &c.
           
           Merely
           because
           this
           is
           a
           plain
           Simple
           and
           Intelligible
           Account
           ,
           such
           as
           they
           can
           easily
           and
           well
           Conceive
           .
           The
           very
           easiness
           and
           clearness
           wherewith
           they
           Conceive
           these
           Principles
           is
           Made
           an
           Objection
           against
           them
           (
           though
           indeed
           it
           be
           a
           good
           Presumption
           for
           them
           )
           and
           for
           that
           very
           Reason
           they
           will
           not
           believe
           them
           to
           be
           the
           true
           Principles
           of
           Nature
           ,
           whose
           Effects
           they
           fancy
           must
           be
           Resovled
           into
           Causes
           more
           hidden
           and
           Abstruse
           .
           And
           accordingly
           they
           find
           in
           themselves
           a
           greater
           inclination
           to
           lend
           attention
           to
           those
           that
           shall
           undertake
           the
           Solution
           of
           them
           by
           the
           real
           Chimeras
           of
           Substantial
           Forms
           ,
           Qualities
           ,
           Sympathys
           ,
           Antipathys
           ,
           &c.
           or
           that
           shall
           go
           to
           account
           for
           them
           by
           the
           yet
           more
           Obscure
           Principles
           of
           the
           Chymists
           ,
           striking
           and
           filling
           their
           Ears
           with
           those
           great
           but
           empty
           Sounds
           ,
           
             Archeus
             ,
             Seminal
             Spirit
             ,
             Astral
             Beings
             ,
             Gas
             ,
             Blas
             ,
          
           &c.
           which
           they
           receive
           with
           great
           satisfaction
           not
           for
           their
           Scientific
           Light
           (
           for
           they
           are
           dark
           as
           may
           be
           ,
           mere
           Philosophic
           
           Cant
           )
           but
           only
           because
           they
           are
           Mysterious
           and
           Abstruse
           ,
           and
           therefore
           they
           fancy
           there
           must
           be
           somewhat
           more
           than
           Ordinary
           in
           them
           ,
           tho
           they
           know
           not
           ,
           nor
           ,
           it
           may
           be
           ,
           never
           Consider'd
           ,
           what
           .
           And
           herein
           ,
           as
           in
           some
           other
           Instances
           ,
           
             Men
             love
             Darkness
             better
             than
             Light.
             
          
        
         
           2.
           
           But
           then
           at
           another
           time
           you
           shall
           have
           them
           inquiring
           after
           Truth
           as
           Diogenes
           did
           after
           an
           Honest
           Man
           ,
           with
           a
           Candle
           in
           their
           hands
           ,
           and
           not
           caring
           to
           go
           a
           step
           any
           further
           than
           they
           can
           see
           their
           way
           .
           Now
           upon
           a
           sudden
           they
           are
           all
           for
           Clear
           and
           distinct
           Ideas
           ,
           Full
           and
           adequate
           Perceptions
           ,
           Demonstrative
           Proofs
           and
           Arguments
           ,
           and
           nothing
           will
           serve
           or
           Content
           them
           but
           Light
           and
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           they
           will
           believe
           nothing
           but
           what
           they
           can
           Comprehend
           .
           Strange
           diversity
           of
           Conduct
           !
           Who
           would
           think
           two
           such
           vastly
           distant
           extreams
           should
           meet
           together
           ,
           I
           will
           not
           say
           in
           the
           same
           Man
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           same
           Human
           Nature
           ,
           and
           that
           the
           very
           same
           Creature
           (
           and
           such
           a
           One
           as
           Stiles
           it self
           Rational
           too
           )
           should
           proceed
           by
           such
           uncertain
           Measures
           ,
           
           and
           act
           so
           inconsistently
           with
           it Self
           ;
           sometimes
           embracing
           a
           thing
           for
           the
           sake
           of
           it's
           Obscurity
           ,
           and
           sometimes
           again
           in
           another
           Fit
           making
           that
           alone
           an
           Invincible
           Objection
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           But
           it
           is
           plain
           by
           the
           foregoing
           Measures
           that
           it
           is
           not
           .
           For
           since
           Truth
           is
           the
           general
           Object
           of
           Faith
           ,
           't
           is
           evident
           that
           nothing
           can
           argue
           a
           thing
           to
           be
           absolutely
           incredible
           ,
           or
           not
           reasonable
           to
           be
           beleiv'd
           ,
           but
           that
           which
           at
           the
           same
           time
           argues
           it
           not
           to
           be
           True.
           For
           if
           true
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           still
           within
           the
           Compass
           of
           the
           general
           Object
           of
           Faith.
           But
           now
           we
           have
           shewn
           already
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           of
           it
           's
           not
           being
           true
           ,
           whence
           it
           clearly
           and
           closely
           follows
           that
           't
           is
           no
           Argument
           neither
           against
           it's
           Credibility
           .
           And
           if
           so
           ,
           then
           we
           may
           believe
           it
           Notwithstanding
           it's
           Incomprehensibility
           ,
           because
           we
           may
           believe
           whatever
           is
           not
           Absolutely
           incredible
           .
           So
           that
           there
           is
           no
           Necessity
           that
           we
           should
           discard
           every
           thing
           we
           cannot
           Conceive
           as
           unworthy
           of
           a
           Rational
           Belief
           ,
           or
           that
           what
           is
           Above
           
           our
           Reason
           should
           be
           therefore
           above
           our
           Faith
           too
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           It
           is
           true
           indeed
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           in
           it Self
           no
           proper
           and
           direct
           Argument
           why
           it
           should
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           and
           he
           would
           be
           thought
           to
           give
           but
           an
           ordinary
           account
           of
           his
           Faith
           ,
           who
           being
           ask●d
           why
           he
           believ'd
           ,
           such
           an
           Incomprehensible
           thing
           ,
           should
           answer
           
             because
             it
             is
             Incomprehensible
          
           .
           which
           at
           best
           could
           pass
           only
           for
           a
           Religious
           Flourish
           ,
           much
           such
           another
           as
           ,
           
             Credo
             quia
             impossibile
          
           .
           And
           that
           because
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           not
           directly
           and
           
             per
             se
          
           a
           Criterion
           of
           Truth
           (
           whether
           it
           may
           be
           
             per
             Accidens
          
           ,
           may
           be
           Consider'd
           afterwards
           )
           whose
           Natural
           and
           genuin
           Character
           is
           not
           Obsecurity
           ,
           but
           Light
           and
           Evidence
           .
           Not
           that
           nothing
           is
           True
           but
           what
           has
           this
           Character
           (
           for
           we
           have
           already
           shewn
           the
           Contrary
           in
           proving
           Incomprehensible
           Truths
           )
           but
           that
           as
           whatever
           we
           clearly
           perceive
           is
           True
           ,
           so
           our
           Clear
           perceiving
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           the
           only
           sign
           from
           the
           Intrinsic
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           it Self
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           .
           Incomprehensibility
           
           therefore
           is
           none
           ,
           but
           as
           such
           abstracts
           from
           true
           and
           not
           true
           ,
           and
           is
           equally
           Common
           to
           both
           .
           But
           now
           that
           which
           may
           Consist
           with
           a
           thing
           supposing
           it
           false
           ,
           can
           no
           more
           prove
           it
           True
           ,
           than
           that
           which
           may
           Consist
           with
           a
           thing
           supposing
           it
           True
           ,
           can
           prove
           it
           false
           ,
           according
           to
           the
           Tenour
           of
           the
           Fifth
           Chapter
           .
           The
           Incomprehensibility
           therefore
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           proper
           Argument
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           no
           Reason
           of
           it Self
           ,
           why
           it
           should
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           it
           abstracts
           as
           such
           from
           True
           and
           False
           ,
           and
           is
           too
           Common
           to
           Both
           to
           prove
           either
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           And
           because
           it
           is
           so
           ,
           it
           is
           also
           further
           granted
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           not
           only
           in
           it Self
           no
           proper
           Reason
           why
           it
           should
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           but
           has
           also
           so
           far
           the
           Nature
           of
           a
           Disswasive
           from
           believing
           ,
           as
           to
           be
           a
           Caution
           against
           a
           too
           hasty
           Belief
           ,
           till
           there
           appear
           some
           other
           Motive
           from
           without
           either
           from
           Reason
           or
           Authority
           that
           shall
           determin
           the
           Assent
           .
           In
           the
           mean
           while
           it
           advises
           to
           Suspend
           .
           For
           the
           
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           being
           as
           such
           No
           Reason
           why
           a
           Man
           should
           believe
           it
           ,
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           if
           he
           did
           believe
           it
           Consider'd
           only
           as
           in
           that
           State
           he
           would
           believe
           it
           .
           without
           Reason
           .
           That
           therefore
           is
           a
           Reason
           why
           he
           should
           suspend
           ,
           a
           Negation
           of
           Reason
           being
           enough
           to
           with-hold
           ones
           Assent
           ,
           though
           to
           give
           it
           one
           had
           need
           have
           a
           positive
           Reason
           .
           When
           therefore
           a
           thing
           appears
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           that
           indeed
           is
           sufficient
           Reason
           to
           suspend
           our
           Belief
           ,
           till
           some
           prevailing
           Consideration
           from
           without
           shall
           over-rule
           that
           Suspension
           ,
           by
           requiring
           our
           Assent
           .
           But
           when
           it
           does
           so
           ,
           then
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           ought
           to
           be
           No
           Argument
           to
           the
           Contrary
           ,
           and
           it
           would
           be
           every
           whit
           as
           absurd
           to
           reject
           a
           thing
           now
           because
           of
           its
           Incomprehensibility
           ,
           as
           to
           believe
           it
           before
           for
           that
           Reason
           .
           And
           that
           because
           as
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           reason
           for
           Believing
           it
           ,
           so
           it
           is
           no
           Absolute
           Reason
           against
           it
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           If
           it
           were
           so
           it
           would
           be
           in
           Natural
           things
           ,
           the
           objects
           of
           Human
           and
           Philosophic
           Science
           ,
           such
           as
           
           belong
           properly
           and
           immediately
           to
           the
           Province
           and
           Jurisdiction
           of
           Reason
           .
           Here
           ,
           if
           any
           where
           ,
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           would
           forbid
           all
           Assent
           to
           it
           .
           And
           so
           it
           is
           supposed
           to
           do
           by
           some
           who
           though
           far
           from
           denying
           the
           Belief
           of
           Incomprehensible
           things
           in
           Religion
           ,
           will
           yet
           tell
           you
           that
           in
           Physical
           Contemplations
           ,
           Clearness
           and
           Evidence
           is
           to
           lead
           the
           way
           ,
           and
           we
           are
           to
           proceed
           with
           our
           Light
           before
           us
           ,
           assenting
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           we
           well
           Comprehend
           .
           In
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           indeed
           they
           will
           allow
           that
           Reason
           is
           to
           be
           submitted
           to
           Revelation
           ,
           and
           that
           we
           are
           to
           believe
           many
           things
           which
           pass
           our
           Comprehension
           ;
           but
           in
           Matters
           of
           pure
           Reason
           they
           will
           have
           us
           go
           no
           further
           than
           Reason
           can
           carry
           us
           .
           Which
           indeed
           is
           right
           enough
           it
           their
           Meaning
           be
           that
           we
           are
           to
           Assent
           to
           Nothing
           but
           what
           upon
           the
           whole
           Matter
           all
           things
           Consider'd
           from
           without
           as
           well
           as
           from
           within
           ,
           we
           have
           reason
           to
           believe
           true
           ,
           and
           that
           we
           are
           never
           to
           proceed
           to
           judge
           or
           determin
           without
           some
           Evidence
           or
           other
           ,
           but
           then
           this
           will
           equally
           hold
           
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           too
           ,
           which
           is
           too
           rational
           an
           Assent
           to
           be
           given
           at
           a
           Venture
           ,
           and
           we
           know
           not
           why
           ,
           and
           whose
           
             Formal
             Reason
          
           (
           as
           has
           been
           already
           discours'd
           )
           is
           always
           Clear.
           But
           if
           their
           Meaning
           be
           that
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           we
           must
           Assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           has
           an
           internal
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           what
           in
           its
           self
           ,
           and
           by
           its
           own
           Lights
           is
           Comprehensible
           by
           us
           (
           as
           they
           seem
           to
           mean
           ,
           or
           else
           their
           distinction
           of
           the
           Case
           of
           Reason
           and
           the
           Case
           of
           Revelation
           is
           here
           impertinent
           )
           then
           I
           conceive
           that
           they
           set
           too
           narrow
           limits
           to
           our
           Assent
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           when
           they
           allow
           it
           to
           be
           given
           only
           to
           things
           which
           in
           this
           sense
           are
           Evident
           to
           us
           .
           For
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           there
           are
           many
           things
           in
           Nature
           which
           we
           fee
           are
           True
           ,
           and
           must
           be
           True
           ,
           and
           so
           not
           only
           may
           ,
           but
           cannot
           help
           Assenting
           to
           them
           ,
           though
           at
           the
           same
           time
           we
           are
           not
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           how
           they
           are
           ,
           or
           can
           possibly
           be
           .
        
         
           7.
           
           Not
           that
           our
           Assent
           is
           then
           Blind
           and
           wholly
           without
           Evidence
           ,
           (
           for
           then
           we
           might
           as
           well
           Assent
           to
           the
           contrary
           as
           to
           what
           we
           do
           ,
           and
           
           would
           do
           better
           not
           to
           Assent
           at
           all
           )
           but
           only
           that
           it
           has
           none
           from
           within
           ,
           and
           from
           the
           intrinsic
           Nature
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           but
           only
           from
           some
           External
           Consideration
           ,
           much
           after
           the
           same
           manner
           as
           it
           is
           in
           ●atch
           .
           In
           both
           which
           there
           may
           be
           a
           Clear
           Reason
           ,
           why
           we
           should
           Assent
           to
           an
           Obscure
           thing
           .
           But
           then
           as
           the
           internal
           Obscurity
           does
           not
           destroy
           the
           External
           Evidence
           ,
           so
           neither
           does
           the
           External
           Evidence
           strike
           any
           Light
           into
           the
           internal
           Obscurity
           ;
           or
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           as
           the
           Reason
           for
           Assenting
           is
           never
           the
           less
           Clear
           because
           the
           Matter
           assented
           to
           is
           Obscure
           ,
           so
           neither
           is
           the
           Matter
           assented
           to
           ever
           the
           less
           Obscure
           because
           the
           Reason
           for
           assen●ing
           to
           it
           is
           Clear.
           And
           yet
           notwithstanding
           this
           internal
           Obscurity
           of
           the
           Matter
           we
           assent
           to
           it
           because
           of
           the
           prevailing
           Light
           of
           the
           External
           Evidence
           .
           And
           this
           we
           do
           ,
           not
           only
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           (
           according
           to
           the
           Restriction
           of
           some
           )
           but
           in
           the
           things
           of
           Nature
           and
           Reason
           too
           ,
           where
           we
           are
           oftentimes
           forced
           by
           the
           pressing
           urgency
           of
           certain
           External
           and
           Collateral
           Considerations
           
           to
           assent
           to
           things
           internally
           obscure
           and
           whose
           very
           possibility
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           ,
           as
           is
           plain
           in
           the
           great
           Question
           of
           the
           Divisibility
           of
           Quantity
           ,
           and
           other
           Instances
           ,
           whereof
           every
           Thinking
           Man's
           Obse●●ation
           cannot
           but
           have
           already
           furnish'd
           him
           with
           variety
           .
           The
           Incomprehensibility
           then
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           non
           just
           Objection
           against
           our
           Assent
           to
           it
           even
           in
           Matters
           of
           a
           Rational
           Nature
           ,
           much
           less
           then
           is
           it
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           For
           if
           not
           in
           Matters
           that
           belong
           to
           the
           Court
           of
           Reason
           ,
           and
           where
           she
           sits
           as
           Judge
           ,
           then
           much
           less
           in
           things
           that
           are
           not
           of
           her
           proper
           Jurisdiction
           ,
           and
           if
           notwithstanding
           the
           internal
           inevidence
           of
           an
           Object
           we
           think
           fit
           to
           assent
           to
           it
           upon
           Rational
           Considerations
           ,
           much
           more
           may
           we
           ,
           and
           ought
           we
           upon
           the
           Authority
           of
           the
           Infallible
           God.
           
        
         
           8.
           
           Indeed
           if
           whatsoever
           is
           Above
           our
           Reason
           were
           also
           (
           as
           some
           pretend
           )
           as
           Contrary
           to
           it
           ,
           and
           there
           were
           nothing
           true
           but
           what
           was
           also
           Comprehensible
           ,
           and
           so
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           were
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           true
           ,
           
           then
           I
           con●ess
           we
           could
           not
           as
           Rational
           Creatures
           assent
           to
           an
           incomprehensible
           Proposition
           upon
           any
           Consideration
           whatsoever
           ,
           No
           not
           even
           that
           of
           Divine
           Authority
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           there
           could
           then
           be
           no
           such
           Authority
           for
           Incomprehensible
           things
           .
           But
           if
           there
           were
           ,
           't
           is
           impossible
           we
           should
           regard
           it
           ,
           because
           we
           could
           not
           have
           greater
           assurance
           either
           of
           the
           Existence
           or
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           ,
           than
           we
           have
           already
           (
           upon
           this
           Supposition
           )
           that
           the
           things
           reveal'd
           are
           not
           true
           .
           But
           now
           if
           this
           Supposition
           be
           no
           more
           than
           a
           Supposition
           ,
           if
           to
           be
           above
           Reason
           does
           not
           involve
           any
           Contrariety
           to
           it
           ,
           if
           there
           are
           incomprehensible
           Truths
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           o●
           it
           s
           not
           being
           true
           (
           all
           which
           has
           been
           already
           proved
           )
           then
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           what
           is
           an
           incomprehensible
           may
           yet
           be
           a
           Believable
           Object
           (
           because
           within
           the
           Possibility
           of
           Truth
           )
           and
           then
           to
           render
           it
           actually
           believ'd
           there
           needs
           only
           some
           External
           Evidence
           either
           from
           Reason
           or
           Authority
           .
           For
           what
           should
           hinder
           our
           Assent
           to
           an
           
           Incomprehensible
           thing
           when
           we
           have
           plain
           Evidence
           from
           without
           for
           it
           ,
           and
           its
           own
           internal
           Obscurity
           is
           no
           Argument
           against
           it
           !
           'T
           is
           plain
           therefore
           that
           we
           ought
           to
           give
           our
           Assent
           .
           And
           since
           we
           do
           so
           oftentimes
           upon
           a
           Ground
           of
           Reason
           ,
           much
           more
           ought
           we
           upon
           that
           more
           Firm
           and
           Immoveable
           ground
           of
           Revelation
           .
           The
           short
           is
           ,
           whatever
           is
           no
           Objection
           against
           the
           Truth
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           none
           against
           the
           Credibility
           of
           it
           ,
           since
           Truth
           is
           the
           General
           Object
           of
           Faith
           (
           unless
           you
           will
           say
           that
           a
           thing
           is
           unfit
           to
           be
           believ'd
           upon
           any
           other
           account
           besides
           want
           of
           Truth
           )
           and
           therefore
           since
           we
           have
           already
           shewn
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           against
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           ,
           it
           visibly
           follows
           that
           it
           is
           no
           Argument
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           neither
           .
           Therefore
           an
           Incomprehensible
           thing
           may
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           he
           that
           refuses
           to
           believe
           any
           thing
           is
           bound
           to
           give
           a
           better
           Reason
           for
           it
           than
           because
           it
           is
           Incomprehensible
           .
        
         
         
           9.
           
           If
           it
           be
           said
           that
           this
           is
           reason
           enough
           ,
           because
           Faith
           is
           a
           Rational
           Act
           ,
           and
           therefore
           what
           is
           above
           the
           Comprehension
           of
           Reason
           is
           as
           much
           above
           a
           Rational
           Belief
           ,
           to
           this
           ,
           besides
           what
           I
           have
           already
           remarqu'd
           upon
           this
           Occasion
           in
           the
           Chapter
           of
           Faith
           ,
           
           I
           here
           further
           reply
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           true
           indeed
           and
           on
           both
           sides
           agreed
           that
           Faith
           is
           a
           Rational
           Act
           ,
           but
           in
           what
           Sense
           is
           the
           Question
           .
           There
           are
           two
           very
           different
           Senses
           according
           to
           which
           it
           may
           be
           said
           to
           be
           so
           either
           in
           regard
           of
           the
           Clearness
           of
           its
           Formal
           Reason
           ,
           or
           in
           regard
           of
           the
           Clearness
           of
           its
           Object
           .
           Either
           because
           it
           is
           founded
           upon
           an
           External
           Evidence
           ,
           or
           Argument
           for
           believing
           ,
           or
           because
           it
           proceeds
           upon
           an
           Internal
           Evidence
           ,
           that
           appears
           in
           the
           very
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           Believ'd
           .
           I●
           Faith
           be
           said
           to
           be
           a
           Rational
           Act
           in
           the
           latter
           Sense
           ,
           the
           Assertion
           is
           then
           False
           ,
           for
           so
           (
           that
           ●s
           in
           respect
           of
           the
           Object
           )
           we
           have
           sh●wn
           it
           to
           be
           an
           inevident
           Assent
           .
           But
           i●
           〈◊〉
           be
           said
           to
           be
           a
           Rational
           Act
           in
           the
           former
           Sense
           ,
           then
           indeed
           it
           is
           true
           ,
           but
           nothing
           to
           the
           purpose
           ,
           
           since
           nothing
           hinders
           but
           that
           this
           External
           Evidence
           may
           well
           consist
           with
           an
           Internal
           Inevidence
           ,
           or
           in
           other
           words
           ,
           that
           the
           Clearness
           of
           the
           Reason
           for
           Believing
           may
           stand
           with
           the
           Obscurity
           of
           the
           Object
           Believ'd
           .
           And
           therefore
           though
           Faith
           be
           a
           Rational
           Act
           yet
           it
           does
           not
           hence
           ●ollow
           that
           what
           is
           Above
           Reason
           is
           also
           above
           Faith
           and
           cannot
           rationally
           be
           believ'd
           ,
           because
           the
           Act
           of
           Faith
           is
           said
           to
           be
           Rational
           ,
           Not
           in
           respect
           of
           the
           Evidence
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           but
           only
           that
           of
           its
           Formal
           Reason
           or
           Motive
           .
           And
           therefore
           though
           there
           be
           no
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Object
           ,
           yet
           it
           is
           not
           thereby
           render'd
           uncapable
           of
           being
           the
           Matter
           of
           Faith
           ,
           because
           the
           Evidence
           which
           Faith
           as
           a
           Rational
           Act
           supposes
           ,
           is
           wholly
           of
           another
           kind
           .
           There
           seems
           indeed
           a
           kind
           of
           opposition
           as
           to
           the
           Sound
           between
           Faith's
           being
           an
           Act
           of
           Reason
           ,
           and
           the
           believing
           what
           is
           Above
           Reason
           .
           And
           this
           it
           may
           be
           is
           that
           which
           imposes
           upon
           the
           Minds
           ,
           or
           the
           Ears
           shall
           I
           say
           ,
           of
           them
           that
           urge
           it
           as
           an
           Objection
           .
           I
           cannot
           imagine
           what
           else
           should
           ,
           for
           I
           'm
           sure
           there
           is
           no
           
           Contradiction
           in
           the
           Sense
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Act
           and
           not
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Act
           are
           Contradictories
           ,
           because
           
             ad
             Idem
          
           ,
           and
           so
           are
           Not
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Object
           and
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Object
           ,
           for
           the
           same
           reason
           .
           But
           there
           is
           no
           Contradiction
           between
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Act
           and
           No
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Object
           ,
           and
           therefore
           these
           may
           stand
           together
           ,
           though
           the
           other
           cannot
        
         
           10.
           
           But
           to
           lay
           open
           the
           Fallacy
           of
           this
           great
           and
           very
           popular
           Objection
           yet
           a
           little
           more
           to
           the
           Eye
           (
           though
           it
           must
           be
           a
           very
           blind
           one
           that
           does
           not
           see
           it
           already
           )
           I
           will
           put
           it
           into
           Form
           ,
           and
           give
           it
           a
           Formal
           Answer
           .
           
             
               If
               Faith
               be
               a
               Rational
               Act
               ,
               then
               what
               is
               Above
               Reason
               cannot
               rationally
               be
               Believ'd
               .
            
             
               But
               Faith
               is
               a
               Rational
               Act
               ,
               Ergo.
               
            
          
           For
           Answer
           to
           this
           I
           distinguish
           .
           If
           by
           Rational
           Act
           be
           meant
           an
           Act
           founded
           upon
           Internal
           Evidence
           ,
           or
           the
           Evidence
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           then
           I
           deny
           the
           Minor
           ,
           Faith
           is
           not
           so
           a
           Rational
           Act.
           But
           if
           by
           Rational
           
           Act
           be
           meant
           an
           Act
           founded
           upon
           External
           Evidence
           or
           the
           Evidence
           of
           its
           Formal
           Reason
           or
           Motive
           ,
           then
           indeed
           I
           grant
           the
           Minor
           ,
           but
           deny
           the
           Consequence
           ,
           which
           is
           none
           at
           all
           ,
           for
           it
           does
           not
           at
           all
           follow
           because
           Faith
           is
           a
           Rational
           Act
           ,
           meaning
           by
           it
           that
           it
           proceeds
           upon
           External
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           that
           there
           is
           a
           clear
           Reason
           for
           Believing
           ,
           that
           therefore
           the
           thing
           Believ●d
           may
           not
           from
           within
           and
           in
           its
           own
           Nature
           be
           altogether
           inevident
           and
           so
           above
           the
           Comprehension
           of
           Reason
           .
           For
           though
           Evidence
           be
           Contradictory
           to
           Not
           Evidence
           in
           the
           ●ame
           ,
           yet
           Evidence
           in
           the
           Act
           is
           no
           way
           Contradictory
           to
           inevidence
           in
           the
           Object
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           does
           not
           at
           all
           exclude
           it
           .
           They
           may
           therefore
           both
           stand
           together
           ,
           and
           Consequently
           what
           is
           above
           Reason
           may
           be
           believ'd
           for
           any
           thing
           that
           this
           Celebrated
           Objection
           from
           Faith's
           being
           a
           Rational
           Act
           makes
           to
           the
           Contrary
           ;
           which
           truly
           is
           so
           gross
           and
           palpable
           a
           Sophism
           ,
           that
           I
           cannot
           but
           wonder
           how
           it
           could
           ever
           impose
           upon
           so
           many
           Learned
           Men
           as
           it
           has
           done
           ,
           and
           some
           of
           
           them
           very
           acute
           and
           nice
           Considerers
           of
           things
           .
           But
           I
           hope
           the
           Fallaciousness
           of
           it
           is
           by
           this
           so
           plainly
           and
           fully
           detected
           ,
           that
           I
           shall
           not
           think
           those
           Heads
           worth
           much
           informing
           that
           shall
           be
           further
           imposed
           on
           by
           it
           .
        
         
           11.
           
           But
           what
           then
           shall
           we
           say
           to
           that
           Great
           and
           Fundamental
           Maxim
           so
           pressingly
           inculcated
           by
           
             Des
             Castes
          
           and
           his
           Followers
           ,
           and
           not
           disallow'd
           of
           by
           others
           ,
           that
           
             we
             are
             to
             assent
             to
             not●ing
             but
             what
             is
             Clear
             and
             Evident
             ?
          
           If
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           how
           then
           to
           what
           is
           Obscure
           and
           Inevident
           ?
           Or
           if
           to
           what
           is
           Obscure
           and
           Inevident
           ,
           how
           then
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ?
           Do
           not
           these
           seem
           flat
           Contradictions
           one
           to
           the
           other
           ,
           and
           how
           then
           shall
           we
           adjust
           the
           Matter
           between
           them
           ?
           It
           must
           be
           either
           by
           denying
           that
           Cartesian
           Maxim
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           or
           by
           shewing
           that
           though
           it
           be
           true
           it
           does
           not
           Contradict
           the
           Assertion
           here
           maintain'd
           ,
           but
           is
           Consistent
           with
           it
           .
           The
           First
           way
           I
           shall
           not
           take
           .
           I
           allow
           the
           Maxim
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           and
           not
           only
           so
           ,
           but
           to
           be
           withal
           of
           the
           
           greatest
           importance
           of
           any
           that
           can
           be
           given
           for
           the
           direction
           of
           the
           Mind
           of
           Man
           in
           order
           to
           the
           avoiding
           of
           Errour
           .
           The
           only
           Remedy
           and
           Caution
           against
           which
           is
           never
           to
           let
           our
           Judgments
           prevent
           our
           Conceptions
           ,
           or
           to
           Assent
           to
           any
           thing
           that
           we
           have
           only
           a
           Confuse
           Notion
           of
           ,
           and
           where
           we
           see
           only
           by
           halves
           and
           with
           an
           imperfect
           Light
           ,
           or
           perhaps
           do
           not
           see
           at
           all
           ,
           but
           to
           have
           a
           Clear
           Understanding
           of
           the
           Matter
           before
           we
           adventure
           to
           judge
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           to
           Maintain
           an
           Evidence
           in
           all
           our
           Reasonings
           .
           Which
           accordingly
           is
           made
           by
           M.
           Malebranche
           the
           First
           of
           those
           Rules
           which
           in
           his
           Treatise
           of
           Method
           he
           lays
           down
           to
           be
           observ'd
           in
           the
           inquiry
           after
           Truth
           .
           And
           indeed
           to
           do
           otherwise
           is
           to
           make
           a
           wrong
           use
           of
           our
           Intellectual
           Powers
           ,
           particularly
           of
           that
           Liberty
           we
           have
           to
           suspend
           Judgment
           till
           the
           fulness
           of
           Evidence
           requires
           it
           ,
           and
           the
           want
           of
           Observing
           this
           Rule
           is
           also
           the
           Occasion
           of
           most
           of
           our
           Errours
           and
           Wrong
           Assents
           ,
           
           as
           the
           same
           Excellent
           Person
           shews
           it
           to
           have
           
           been
           in
           particular
           to
           the
           Authors
           of
           the
           Scholastic
           Philosophy
           .
        
         
           12.
           
           I
           shall
           not
           therefore
           go
           about
           to
           salve
           my
           own
           Assertion
           by
           denying
           Des
           Cartes's
           Maxim
           ,
           but
           rather
           by
           shewing
           that
           according
           to
           the
           true
           Sense
           and
           intendment
           of
           it
           ,
           it
           does
           not
           Contradict
           it
           .
           But
           first
           we
           must
           see
           what
           the
           true
           Sense
           of
           it
           is
           ,
           or
           rather
           in
           what
           Sense
           it
           is
           true
           ,
           though
           this
           may
           be
           without
           much
           difficulty
           Collected
           by
           any
           attentive
           Reader
           from
           what
           has
           been
           already
           said
           in
           several
           places
           of
           this
           Chapter
           ,
           wherein
           I
           have
           in
           great
           Measure
           prevented
           this
           Objection
           .
           But
           to
           Consider
           it
           more
           directly
           ;
           To
           verifie
           this
           Maxim
           that
           we
           are
           to
           Assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           the
           usual
           way
           has
           been
           to
           distinguish
           between
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           ,
           and
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           .
           In
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           ,
           say
           they
           ,
           we
           are
           to
           believe
           many
           things
           which
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           .
           And
           here
           then
           it
           seems
           this
           Rule
           must
           be
           laid
           aside
           .
           But
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           we
           must
           Assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           .
           And
           here
           then
           it
           seems
           it
           holds
           .
           Accordingly
           when
           
           't
           is
           Objected
           against
           certain
           Articles
           of
           Faith
           that
           they
           are
           not
           to
           be
           comprehended
           by
           Reason
           ,
           't
           is
           usual
           to
           reply
           that
           these
           things
           do
           not
           belong
           to
           Reason
           &c.
           implying
           that
           if
           they
           did
           ,
           then
           indeed
           the
           Objection
           would
           be
           good
           ,
           and
           the
           incomprehensibility
           of
           such
           things
           would
           be
           an
           Argument
           against
           assenting
           to
           them
           ,
           which
           implies
           again
           that
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           we
           must
           not
           Assent
           to
           any
           thing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           though
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           we
           may
           .
           But
           we
           have
           remarqu'd
           already
           that
           even
           in
           Matters
           of
           Pure
           Reason
           we
           are
           forc'd
           to
           Assent
           to
           many
           things
           which
           we
           cannot
           comprehend
           ,
           and
           that
           even
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           we
           do
           in
           a
           Certain
           Sense
           Assent
           upon
           Clear
           Evidence
           .
           This
           Distinction
           therefore
           will
           not
           do
           .
        
         
           13.
           
           In
           stead
           therefore
           of
           distinguishing
           between
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           and
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           ,
           I
           think
           it
           will
           be
           better
           to
           distinguish
           of
           Evidence
           .
           We
           are
           to
           Assent
           to
           Nothing
           save
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           says
           our
           Maxim.
           Very
           Good.
           Now
           if
           by
           Evidence
           here
           be
           meant
           internal
           Evidence
           ,
           and
           the
           Sense
           be
           that
           
           are
           to
           assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           in
           its
           own
           Nature
           ,
           and
           by
           a
           Light
           intrinsic
           to
           it
           ,
           is
           Evident
           ,
           then
           the
           Maxim
           is
           False
           ;
           and
           that
           not
           only
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           ,
           but
           also
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           too
           ,
           wherein
           we
           find
           our selves
           often
           Constrain'd
           to
           assent
           to
           things
           that
           have
           not
           this
           internal
           Evidence
           ,
           but
           are
           (
           as
           to
           what
           respects
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           things
           themselves
           )
           altogether
           Obscure
           and
           Incomprehensible
           .
           But
           if
           by
           Evidence
           here
           be
           Meant
           Evidence
           at
           large
           ,
           abstracting
           from
           Internal
           or
           External
           ,
           and
           the
           Sense
           be
           that
           we
           are
           to
           assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           has
           some
           Evidence
           or
           other
           ,
           either
           Internal
           or
           External
           ,
           or
           what
           is
           some
           way
           or
           other
           evident
           to
           us
           ,
           and
           what
           we
           see
           plainly
           to
           be
           true
           by
           a
           Light
           shining
           from
           within
           or
           from
           without
           ,
           in
           short
           ,
           what
           we
           have
           one
           way
           or
           other
           sufficient
           ground
           or
           Reason
           to
           assent
           to
           ,
           then
           the
           Maxim
           is
           undoubtedly
           true
           ,
           and
           will
           hold
           Universally
           ,
           not
           only
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           ,
           but
           also
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           too
           ,
           which
           (
           as
           was
           shewn
           in
           the
           Chapter
           of
           Faith
           )
           is
           the
           Conclusion
           of
           a
           Syllogism
           ,
           and
           so
           a
           Rational
           
           Act
           ,
           and
           proceedt
           upon
           as
           Much
           ,
           though
           not
           the
           Same
           kind
           of
           Evidence
           ,
           as
           any
           other
           Conclusion
           does
           ,
           And
           that
           even
           in
           the
           Belief
           of
           Incomprehensible
           things
           ,
           which
           it
           would
           be
           absurd
           ,
           nay
           impossible
           to
           believe
           ,
           if
           there
           were
           no
           Reason
           to
           believe
           things
           above
           Reason
           .
           According
           to
           a
           saying
           ,
           as
           I
           take
           it
           of
           St.
           Austin
           ,
           in
           one
           of
           his
           Letters
           to
           this
           purpose
           ,
           
             That
             we
             could
             not
             bring
             our selves
             to
             believe
             what
             is
             Above
             our
             Reason
             ,
             if
             Reason
             it self
             did
             not
             perswade
             us
             that
             there
             are
             things
             which
             we
             should
             do
             well
             to
             believe
             ,
             although
             we
             are
             not
             capable
             of
             Comprehending
             them
             .
          
           So
           then
           in
           ●hort
           ,
           if
           this
           Maxim
           that
           we
           are
           to
           assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Evident
           ,
           be
           understood
           of
           Internal
           Evidence
           ,
           then
           't
           is
           False
           ,
           not
           only
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           but
           also
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           ,
           wherein
           things
           intrinsecally
           inevident
           are
           assented
           to
           .
           But
           if
           it
           be
           understood
           of
           Evidence
           at
           large
           then
           ●tis
           true
           ,
           not
           only
           in
           Matters
           of
           Reason
           ,
           but
           also
           in
           Matters
           of
           Faith
           ,
           which
           (
           as
           has
           been
           often
           noted
           )
           is
           reasonable
           in
           its
           Fund
           and
           Principle
           ,
           and
           whose
           Evidence
           
           must
           be
           Clear
           ,
           though
           its
           Object
           may
           be
           Obscure
           .
        
         
           14.
           
           In
           this
           large
           therefore
           and
           indefinite
           Sense
           of
           the
           Word
           Evidence
           the
           Maxim
           is
           to
           be
           understood
           .
           We
           are
           to
           assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           we
           ought
           to
           make
           use
           of
           our
           liberty
           of
           Suspension
           so
           far
           as
           not
           to
           give
           our
           Assent
           to
           any
           thing
           but
           what
           all
           things
           Consider'd
           and
           upon
           the
           whole
           appears
           Evident
           to
           us
           ,
           what
           by
           some
           Light
           or
           other
           we
           see
           and
           plainly
           perceive
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           and
           what
           in
           one
           word
           we
           find
           sufficient
           Reason
           either
           from
           within
           or
           from
           without
           to
           Assent
           to
           .
           According
           to
           that
           well
           known
           Sentence
           wherewith
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           Concludes
           his
           wonderful
           System
           ,
           
             Nihilque
             ab
             ullo
             Credi
             velim
             ,
             nisi
             quod
             ipsi
             Evidens
             &
             invicta
             ratio
             persuadebit
             .
          
           I
           would
           have
           nothing
           believ'd
           by
           any
           one
           but
           what
           by
           evident
           and
           irresistible
           reason
           he
           shall
           be
           Convinc'd
           of
           .
           And
           certainly
           he
           would
           be
           very
           unreasonable
           that
           should
           desire
           more
           .
           For
           to
           assent
           without
           Evidence
           of
           one
           sort
           or
           other
           that
           the
           thing
           assented
           to
           is
           
           true
           ,
           is
           to
           assent
           without
           a
           why
           or
           wherefore
           ,
           and
           to
           assent
           so
           is
           to
           assent
           without
           Reason
           ,
           which
           again
           is
           to
           assent
           not
           as
           a
           Rational
           Creature
           ;
           and
           as
           Man
           ought
           not
           ,
           so
           to
           be
           sure
           God
           cannot
           require
           such
           an
           Assent
           .
           To
           assent
           therefore
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           upon
           some
           Consideration
           or
           other
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           to
           us
           ,
           and
           what
           we
           have
           good
           reason
           to
           imbrace
           ,
           as
           true
           ,
           is
           certainly
           a
           Maxim
           of
           unquestionable
           Truth
           ,
           and
           of
           universal
           Extent
           ,
           that
           holds
           in
           all
           Matters
           whatsoever
           ,
           whether
           of
           Reason
           or
           of
           Faith
           ,
           in
           the
           former
           of
           which
           an
           Assent
           without
           Evidence
           would
           be
           the
           Act
           ,
           and
           in
           the
           latter
           the
           Sacrifice
           of
           a
           Fool.
           
        
         
           15.
           
           And
           that
           this
           is
           the
           true
           Sense
           wherein
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           intended
           his
           Maxim
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           the
           true
           Sense
           of
           the
           Maxim
           it self
           ,
           is
           plain
           from
           the
           Occasion
           of
           it
           which
           as
           all
           know
           who
           are
           not
           utter
           Strangers
           to
           ,
           or
           very
           Negligent
           Readers
           of
           his
           Books
           ,
           was
           the
           bringing
           in
           and
           obtruding
           so
           many
           things
           in
           the
           Vulgar
           Philosophy
           whereof
           the
           Introducers
           of
           them
           had
           such
           Confuse
           Notions
           
           and
           of
           whose
           reality
           and
           Existence
           they
           had
           no
           Firm
           and
           Solid
           Reasons
           to
           assure
           them
           ,
           such
           as
           Substantial
           Forms
           ,
           really
           inhering
           Accidents
           and
           Qualities
           and
           the
           like
           ,
           which
           served
           rather
           to
           darken
           than
           clear
           up
           the
           Science
           of
           Nature
           ,
           and
           were
           the
           Occasions
           of
           a
           thousand
           Errours
           in
           the
           Superstructures
           that
           were
           rais'd
           upon
           those
           Imaginary
           and
           Chimerical
           Principles
           .
           In
           Opposition
           to
           ,
           and
           as
           a
           Remedy
           for
           which
           ,
           he
           lays
           down
           this
           Fundamental
           Maxim
           ,
           to
           be
           Carefully
           observ'd
           by
           all
           the
           Disciples
           of
           Truth
           in
           their
           whole
           Intellectual
           Progress
           ,
           never
           to
           assent
           to
           any
           thing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           to
           nothing
           but
           of
           Whose
           Truth
           and
           Reality
           they
           are
           fully
           assured
           ,
           and
           have
           sufficient
           Reason
           to
           assent
           to
           .
           This
           is
           the
           true
           Sense
           of
           the
           Maxim
           ,
           this
           is
           the
           Sense
           of
           its
           Author
           ,
           and
           in
           this
           Sense
           it
           is
           undeniably
           true
           .
           And
           that
           without
           any
           prejudice
           to
           our
           present
           Conclusion
           ,
           with
           which
           (
           as
           thus
           explain'd
           )
           it
           is
           very
           Consistent
           .
           For
           't
           is
           now
           very
           easie
           to
           discern
           that
           we
           may
           believe
           an
           Incomprehensible
           thing
           ,
           and
           yet
           at
           the
           same
           
           time
           according
           to
           this
           Cartesian
           Maxim
           assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           because
           the
           Evidence
           of
           Faith
           is
           External
           ,
           and
           that
           there
           may
           be
           an
           External
           Evidence
           to
           assent
           to
           a
           thing
           Internally
           Inevident
           is
           no
           Contradiction
           .
        
         
           16.
           
           Which
           by
           the
           way
           may
           serve
           to
           discover
           as
           well
           the
           Injustice
           as
           the
           Impertinence
           ,
           1.
           
           Of
           those
           who
           make
           use
           of
           this
           Maxim
           as
           an
           Objection
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           .
           2.
           
           Of
           those
           who
           take
           occasion
           from
           hence
           to
           traduce
           the
           Cartesian
           Philosophy
           as
           favourable
           to
           ,
           and
           looking
           with
           a
           very
           propitious
           Aspect
           upon
           Sociniani●●
           ,
           and
           indeed
           as
           little
           better
           than
           an
           Introduction
           to
           it
           ,
           only
           because
           it
           talks
           so
           much
           of
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Ideas
           and
           Conceptions
           ,
           and
           of
           assenting
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           .
           But
           Most
           of
           all
           3dly
           .
           Of
           those
           who
           proceed
           even
           to
           traduce
           the
           Author
           himself
           as
           a
           secret
           Friend
           to
           the
           Cause
           ,
           and
           no
           better
           than
           a
           Socinian
           in
           Disguise
           .
           It
           would
           have
           been
           indeed
           a
           Considerable
           Glory
           and
           Advantage
           to
           that
           ,
           (
           or
           any
           other
           Interest
           )
           to
           have
           had
           so
           great
           
           a
           Master
           of
           Reason
           a
           Friend
           to
           it
           .
           But
           he
           Certainly
           was
           not
           ,
           if
           with
           his
           Words
           he
           has
           transmitted
           to
           us
           his
           real
           Thoughts
           ,
           which
           would
           be
           great
           uncharity
           to
           question
           ,
           and
           ,
           with
           a
           witness
           ,
           to
           
             Assent
             to
             what
             is
             not
             Evident
             .
          
        
         
           17.
           
           He
           was
           indeed
           a
           great
           Master
           in
           the
           Rational
           way
           ,
           but
           no
           Magnifier
           or
           Exalter
           of
           Human
           Reason
           .
           So
           far
           from
           that
           ,
           that
           he
           seems
           to
           have
           had
           the
           most
           inward
           and
           feeling
           Sense
           of
           its
           Infirmities
           and
           Defects
           ,
           and
           the
           best
           to
           have
           understood
           what
           a
           poor
           little
           thing
           't
           is
           to
           be
           a
           Man
           ,
           of
           any
           one
           in
           the
           World.
           As
           may
           be
           abundantly
           Collected
           from
           several
           passages
           in
           his
           Writings
           (
           besides
           that
           the
           whole
           vein
           of
           them
           runs
           that
           way
           )
           particularly
           those
           two
           final
           Sentences
           wherewith
           he
           shuts
           up
           his
           Principles
           and
           his
           
             Metaphysics
             ,
             At
             Nihilominus
             memor
             meaetenuitatis
             ,
             nihil
             affirmo
          
           &c.
           and
           ,
           
             Naturae
             nostrae
             infirmitas
             est
             agnoscenda
          
           .
           Which
           plainly
           shew
           what
           a
           low
           debasing
           Sense
           he
           had
           both
           of
           Himself
           and
           of
           Human
           Nature
           in
           general
           ,
           as
           ●tis
           Natural
           for
           every
           man
           to
           have
           more
           and
           more
           ,
           the
           wiser
           
           he
           grows
           ,
           and
           the
           further
           he
           advances
           in
           Knowledge
           ,
           which
           when
           all
           's
           done
           (
           provided
           you
           take
           a
           good
           Dose
           of
           it
           )
           is
           the
           best
           Cure
           of
           Pride
           and
           Vanity
           .
        
         
           18.
           
           And
           as
           he
           had
           thus
           slender
           an
           Opinion
           both
           of
           Human
           Reason
           and
           his
           Own
           ,
           so
           he
           appears
           to
           have
           had
           also
           at
           the
           same
           such
           an
           high-raised
           and
           elevated
           Sense
           of
           the
           immense
           Grandeur
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           of
           the
           Magnificence
           of
           his
           Works
           ,
           and
           how
           inscrutable
           the
           Profundities
           of
           both
           are
           to
           such
           Finite
           and
           Contracted
           Minds
           as
           ours
           ,
           as
           can
           scarce
           any
           where
           be
           parallel'd
           .
           Two
           Characters
           certainly
           of
           Spirit
           ,
           that
           are
           none
           of
           the
           aptest
           to
           dispose
           a
           Man
           to
           Socinianism
           .
           But
           not
           to
           dwell
           any
           longer
           upon
           Rational
           Presumptions
           ,
           there
           is
           a
           certain
           plain
           and
           deciding
           place
           in
           the
           Writings
           of
           this
           Great
           Man
           (
           which
           one
           would
           think
           had
           escaped
           the
           Eyes
           of
           some
           )
           that
           is
           enough
           forever
           to
           silence
           the
           Calumny
           of
           his
           being
           even
           in
           the
           least
           Socinianiz'd
           ,
           and
           to
           shame
           those
           that
           have
           so
           little
           Conscience
           or
           Judgment
           as
           to
           
           stain
           his
           Memory
           with
           it
           .
           For
           who
           can
           suspect
           him
           in
           the
           least
           infected
           with
           that
           Head-seizing
           Disease
           ,
           which
           is
           now
           become
           so
           Popular
           and
           Epidemic
           ,
           when
           he
           shall
           hear
           him
           still
           Purging
           and
           Apologizing
           for
           himself
           in
           these
           Vindicatory
           words
           ,
           
           
             Credenda
             esse
             Omnia
             quae
             a
             Deo
             revelata
             sunt
             ,
             quamvis
             Captum
             Nostrum
             Excedant
             .
          
           And
           again
           ,
           
             Ita
             si
             soriè
             nobis
             Deus
             de
             seipso
             ,
             vel
             aliis
             aliquid
             revelet
             ,
             quod
             Naturales
             ingenii
             Nostri
             vires
             excedat
             ,
             qualia
             jam
             sunt
             Mysteria
             Incarnationis
             &
             Trinitatis
             ,
             non
             recasabimus
             illa
             Credere
             ,
             quamvis
             non
             Clare
             intelligamus
             .
             Nec
             ullo
             modo
             mirabimur
             multa
             esse
             ,
             tum
             in
             immensâ
             ejus
             Naturâ
             ,
             tum
             etiam
             in
             r●
             bus
             ab
             ●o
             Creatis
             ,
             quae
             Captum
             Nostrum
             excedant
             .
          
           Now
           how
           glad
           should
           I
           be
           to
           see
           all
           the
           Socinians
           in
           Christendom
           Subscribe
           to
           this
           Form
           of
           Words
           ,
           and
           is
           it
           not
           strange
           then
           that
           he
           whose
           Originally
           they
           are
           should
           be
           suspected
           of
           Socinianism
           ,
           and
           that
           his
           Philosophy
           too
           should
           be
           thought
           to
           lead
           to
           it
           .
           But
           the
           Truth
           is
           ,
           the
           Cartesian
           Philosophy
           leads
           just
           as
           much
           to
           Socinianism
           ,
           as
           
           Philosophy
           in
           general
           does
           to
           Atheism
           ,
           and
           I
           will
           venture
           to
           say
           ,
           and
           be
           bound
           to
           make
           it
           good
           ,
           that
           as
           no
           good
           Philosopher
           can
           be
           an
           Atheis●
           ,
           so
           no
           good
           Cartesian
           can
           be
           a
           Socinian
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           VIII
           .
           Wherein
           is
           shewn
           what
           is
           the
           true
           Use
           of
           Reason
           in
           Believing
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           REason
           being
           the
           great
           Character
           and
           Principle
           of
           Man
           ,
           that
           makes
           him
           like
           to
           the
           Angels
           above
           him
           ,
           and
           distinguishes
           him
           from
           the
           Beasts
           that
           are
           below
           him
           ,
           and
           which
           therefore
           only
           are
           below
           him
           for
           want
           of
           the
           Rational
           Power
           (
           being
           many
           of
           them
           in
           regard
           of
           their
           Bodily
           Endowments
           upon
           a
           level
           with
           him
           ,
           and
           some
           beyond
           him
           )
           't
           is
           but
           Just
           and
           Natural
           it
           should
           appear
           in
           all
           that
           he
           does
           ,
           and
           pre●ide
           and
           govern
           in
           all
           his
           Actions
           .
           For
           as
           the
           Conduct
           of
           the
           Infinitely
           Wise
           and
           All-knowing
           God
           does
           always
           carry
           in
           it
           the
           Characters
           of
           his
           Essential
           and
           Consubstantial
           Reason
           ,
           even
           of
           him
           who
           is
           the
           Wisdom
           of
           the
           Father
           ,
           the
           
           true
           intelligible
           Light
           ,
           so
           should
           also
           the
           Conduct
           of
           Man
           express
           in
           Proportion
           the
           Signatures
           of
           his
           Reason
           ,
           and
           though
           he
           cannot
           act
           by
           such
           exact
           and
           unerring
           Measures
           as
           his
           Glorious
           Maker
           ,
           nor
           yet
           with
           all
           that
           Perfection
           of
           Wisdom
           that
           even
           some
           Created
           Intelligences
           express
           ,
           yet
           at
           least
           he
           should
           act
           like
           Himself
           ,
           and
           not
           by
           doing
           any
           thing
           absurd
           or
           unaccountable
           deny
           his
           Reasonable
           Nature
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           This
           has
           serv'd
           for
           a
           Principle
           to
           some
           Scholastic
           and
           Moral
           Writers
           whereon
           to
           build
           a
           very
           high
           ,
           and
           (
           as
           some
           think
           )
           very
           Severe
           Conclusion
           ,
           viz.
           that
           there
           is
           no
           individual
           Action
           of
           Man
           purely
           indifferent
           .
           Which
           I
           suppose
           may
           be
           true
           enough
           of
           those
           Actions
           of
           his
           which
           are
           properly
           Humane
           ,
           I
           mean
           that
           are
           done
           deliberately
           ,
           with
           fore-thought
           and
           Consideration
           ,
           every
           one
           of
           which
           must
           ,
           as
           far
           as
           I
           can
           see
           ,
           be
           either
           good
           or
           Bad
           according
           to
           the
           Circumstances
           wherewith
           they
           are
           Cloath'd
           ,
           however
           specifically
           Consider'd
           in
           
           relation
           to
           their
           Objects
           only
           ,
           and
           as
           abstracted
           from
           those
           Circumstances
           ,
           some
           of
           them
           may
           be
           Indifferent
           .
           And
           certainly
           we
           cannot
           suppose
           any
           Action
           of
           a
           more
           Neutral
           and
           adiaphorous
           Nature
           than
           an
           
             unprofitable
             Word
          
           ,
           and
           yet
           of
           such
           He
           that
           is
           to
           be
           our
           Judge
           tells
           us
           we
           shall
           render
           an
           Account
           in
           the
           Day
           of
           Judgment
           .
           Which
           plainly
           shews
           that
           there
           is
           no
           such
           thing
           as
           Indifferency
           in
           the
           Actions
           of
           Man
           as
           Individually
           and
           Concretely
           Consider'd
           ,
           but
           that
           all
           of
           them
           are
           either
           good
           or
           bad
           according
           as
           the
           Principle
           ,
           Manner
           ,
           End
           ,
           and
           other
           Circumstances
           are
           that
           attend
           the
           doing
           of
           them
           .
           And
           that
           because
           Man
           being
           a
           Rational
           Creature
           the
           Order
           of
           Reason
           is
           due
           at
           least
           to
           all
           his
           deliberate
           Actions
           ,
           which
           accordingly
           ought
           to
           carry
           the
           Characters
           of
           a
           Rational
           Nature
           in
           them
           ,
           the
           want
           of
           which
           will
           be
           enough
           to
           render
           any
           of
           them
           evil
           and
           imperfect
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           But
           then
           if
           Reason
           ought
           to
           pre●ide
           and
           direct
           in
           all
           the
           deliberate
           Actions
           of
           Man
           much
           more
           ought
           
           it
           in
           things
           of
           the
           greatest
           Moment
           and
           Consequence
           ,
           wherein
           his
           Interest
           and
           Welfare
           is
           more
           nearly
           Concern'd
           ,
           and
           which
           accordingly
           require
           his
           greatest
           Consideration
           ,
           and
           the
           use
           of
           the
           best
           Light
           that
           he
           has
           .
           And
           because
           there
           cannot
           be
           a
           thing
           of
           greater
           Consequence
           and
           Concernment
           to
           him
           than
           Religion
           ,
           upon
           which
           both
           his
           Present
           and
           his
           Future
           ,
           his
           Temporal
           and
           his
           Eternal
           Happiness
           does
           intirely
           depend
           ,
           hence
           it
           follows
           that
           the
           Principal
           Use
           he
           ought
           to
           make
           of
           his
           Rational
           Faculty
           is
           in
           Religion
           ,
           that
           here
           if
           any
           where
           he
           ought
           to
           Think
           ,
           Consider
           ,
           Advise
           ,
           Deliberate
           ,
           Reason
           and
           Argue
           ,
           Consult
           both
           his
           own
           Light
           and
           that
           of
           others
           ,
           neglect
           no
           advantage
           that
           may
           be
           had
           from
           Nature
           or
           Art
           ,
           from
           Books
           or
           Men
           ,
           from
           the
           Living
           or
           the
           Dead
           ,
           but
           imploy
           all
           possible
           Means
           for
           his
           direction
           and
           Information
           ,
           
           and
           not
           be
           as
           the
           
             Horse
             and
             Mule
             which
             have
             no
             Vnderstanding
             .
          
           For
           't
           was
           for
           this
           great
           End
           and
           Purpose
           that
           his
           Reason
           was
           given
           him
           ,
           and
           this
           is
           the
           best
           Use
           
           he
           can
           make
           of
           it
           .
           As
           for
           the
           Study
           of
           Nature
           ,
           that
           turns
           to
           too
           little
           an
           Account
           ,
           and
           as
           for
           the
           Affairs
           of
           Civil
           Life
           they
           in
           themselves
           and
           without
           relation
           to
           another
           World
           ,
           are
           too
           little
           and
           inconsiderable
           for
           us
           to
           suppose
           that
           our
           Reason
           was
           given
           us
           for
           the
           Management
           of
           them
           .
           Religion
           only
           bears
           proportion
           to
           so
           Noble
           a
           Faculty
           ,
           is
           most
           worthy
           of
           its
           Application
           ,
           and
           can
           also
           best
           reward
           the
           due
           Exercise
           and
           Use
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           't
           is
           upon
           Religion
           that
           it
           will
           be
           best
           bestow'd
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           Nor
           is
           there
           any
           thing
           in
           Religion
           that
           may
           justly
           fear
           to
           be
           brought
           before
           the
           Bar
           of
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           or
           to
           undergo
           the
           Test
           of
           its
           severest
           Discussion
           .
           The
           Heathen
           Religion
           indeed
           Might
           ,
           for
           which
           Cause
           those
           that
           drew
           its
           Picture
           cast
           a
           Shade
           upon
           a
           great
           part
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           would
           not
           Venture
           to
           expose
           it
           to
           Common
           View
           .
           And
           the
           too
           much
           Heathenized
           Religion
           of
           some
           Christians
           may
           also
           very
           deservedly
           retire
           behind
           the
           Curtain
           ,
           and
           decline
           coming
           to
           the
           
           Light
           ,
           for
           fear
           the
           Absurdities
           and
           Monstrous
           Inconsistencies
           of
           it
           should
           be
           laid
           open
           .
           But
           certainly
           there
           is
           not
           any
           thing
           ,
           neither
           Doctrine
           nor
           Precept
           in
           that
           true
           Religion
           that
           is
           reveal'd
           by
           God
           ,
           in
           Evangelical
           Christianity
           ,
           that
           need
           fly
           the
           Light
           of
           Reason
           ,
           or
           refuse
           to
           be
           tried
           by
           it
           .
           Christian
           Religion
           is
           all
           over
           a
           
             Reasonable
             Service
          
           ,
           and
           the
           Author
           of
           it
           is
           too
           reasonable
           a
           Master
           to
           impose
           any
           other
           ,
           or
           to
           require
           (
           as
           his
           Vicar
           does
           )
           that
           Men
           should
           follow
           him
           blindfold
           ,
           and
           pull
           out
           their
           eyes
           to
           become
           his
           Disciples
           .
           No
           ,
           he
           that
           Miraculously
           gave
           Sight
           to
           so
           many
           has
           no
           need
           of
           ,
           nor
           pleasure
           in
           the
           Blind
           ,
           nor
           has
           his
           Divine
           Religion
           any
           occasion
           for
           such
           Judges
           or
           Professors
           .
           For
           it
           is
           the
           Religion
           of
           the
           Eternal
           and
           uncreated
           Wisdom
           ,
           the
           Divine
           Word
           ,
           the
           true
           Light
           of
           the
           World
           ,
           and
           the
           Universal
           Reason
           of
           all
           Spirits
           ,
           and
           't
           is
           impossible
           that
           he
           should
           reveal
           any
           thing
           that
           Contradicts
           the
           Measures
           of
           sound
           Discourse
           ,
           or
           the
           immutable
           Laws
           of
           Truth
           ,
           as
           indeed
           it
           is
           that
           any
           Divine
           Revelation
           
           should
           be
           truly
           Opposite
           to
           Right
           Reason
           (
           hower
           it
           may
           sometimes
           be
           Above
           it
           )
           or
           that
           any
           thing
           should
           be
           Theologically
           true
           ,
           which
           is
           Philosophically
           False
           ,
           as
           some
           with
           great
           profoundness
           are
           pleas'd
           to
           distinguish
           .
           For
           the
           Light
           of
           Reason
           is
           as
           truly
           from
           God
           as
           the
           Light
           of
           Revelation
           is
           ,
           and
           therefore
           though
           the
           latter
           of
           these
           Lights
           may
           exceed
           and
           out-shine
           the
           former
           ,
           it
           can
           never
           be
           Contrary
           to
           it
           .
           God
           as
           the
           Soveraign
           Truth
           cannot
           reveal
           any
           thing
           against
           Reason
           ,
           and
           as
           the
           Soveraign
           Goodness
           he
           cannot
           require
           us
           to
           believe
           any
           such
           thing
           .
           Nay
           to
           descend
           some
           degrees
           below
           this
           ,
           he
           cannot
           require
           us
           to
           believe
           ,
           not
           only
           what
           is
           against
           Reason
           ,
           but
           even
           what
           is
           without
           it
           .
           For
           to
           believe
           any
           thing
           without
           Reason
           is
           an
           unreasonable
           Act
           ,
           and
           't
           is
           impossible
           that
           God
           should
           ever
           require
           an
           unreasonable
           act
           ,
           especially
           from
           a
           Reasonable
           Creature
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           We
           therefore
           not
           only
           acknowledge
           the
           use
           of
           Reason
           in
           Religion
           ,
           but
           also
           that
           't
           is
           in
           Religion
           
           that
           't
           is
           chiefly
           to
           be
           used
           ;
           so
           far
           are
           we
           from
           denying
           the
           Use
           of
           it
           there
           .
           And
           it
           is
           a
           little
           unfairly
           done
           of
           our
           Adversaries
           so
           much
           to
           insinuate
           the
           Contrary
           as
           they
           do
           .
           For
           I
           cannot
           take
           it
           for
           less
           than
           such
           an
           Insinuation
           ,
           when
           they
           are
           arguing
           with
           us
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           the
           Christian
           Mysteries
           to
           run
           out
           as
           they
           usually
           do
           into
           Harangues
           and
           Flourishes
           (
           whereof
           ,
           by
           the
           way
           ,
           I
           know
           none
           more
           guilty
           than
           the
           Author
           of
           
             Christianity
             not
             Mysterious
          
           )
           about
           the
           Reasonableness
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           ,
           and
           the
           Rational
           Nature
           of
           Faith
           ,
           what
           a
           Reasonable
           Act
           the
           One
           is
           ,
           and
           what
           a
           Reasonable
           Service
           the
           Other
           is
           ,
           &c.
           as
           if
           we
           were
           against
           the
           Use
           of
           Reason
           in
           Religion
           ,
           or
           were
           for
           a
           Blind
           ,
           Groundless
           ,
           and
           Unaccountable
           Faith
           ,
           or
           if
           because
           we
           hold
           the
           Belief
           of
           things
           above
           Reason
           ,
           therefore
           we
           are
           for
           having
           no
           Reason
           for
           our
           Belief
           .
           This
           I
           say
           is
           an
           unfair
           Insinuation
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           argues
           some
           want
           either
           of
           Judgment
           or
           Sincerity
           (
           I
           don't
           
           know
           which
           )
           in
           those
           that
           suggest
           it
           .
           For
           they
           seem
           plainly
           by
           running
           so
           much
           upon
           this
           Vein
           to
           imply
           as
           if
           it
           were
           part
           of
           the
           Question
           between
           us
           ,
           whether
           there
           be
           any
           Use
           of
           Reason
           in
           Religion
           ,
           or
           whether
           Faith
           is
           to
           be
           Founded
           upon
           Reason
           or
           No.
           But
           Now
           this
           is
           no
           part
           of
           the
           Controversie
           that
           lies
           between
           us
           ,
           we
           acknowledge
           the
           Use
           of
           Reason
           in
           Religion
           as
           well
           as
           they
           ,
           and
           are
           as
           little
           for
           a
           Senseless
           and
           Irrational
           Faith
           as
           they
           can
           be
           .
           This
           therefore
           being
           Common
           to
           us
           both
           is
           no
           part
           of
           the
           Question
           ,
           and
           they
           do
           ill
           to
           insinuate
           that
           it
           is
           by
           so
           many
           Popular
           Declamatory
           Strains
           upon
           the
           Reasonableness
           of
           Religion
           ,
           and
           in
           particular
           of
           Faith
           ,
           whereas
           they
           do
           ,
           or
           should
           know
           ,
           that
           the
           thing
           in
           Question
           between
           us
           is
           not
           whether
           there
           be
           any
           Use
           of
           Reason
           to
           be
           made
           in
           Believing
           ,
           but
           only
           what
           it
           is
           ,
           or
           wherein
           the
           true
           Use
           of
           it
           does
           Consist
           .
        
         
         
           6.
           
           Now
           this
           we
           may
           determine
           in
           a
           few
           words
           ,
           having
           already
           laid
           the
           grounds
           of
           it
           .
           For
           since
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Concluding
           Argument
           against
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           ,
           nor
           Consequently
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           (
           as
           is
           shewn
           in
           the
           three
           foregoing
           Chapters
           )
           it
           is
           plain
           that
           the
           proper
           Office
           and
           Business
           of
           a
           Believers
           Reason
           is
           to
           Examin
           and
           Inquire
           ▪
           Not
           whether
           the
           thing
           proposed
           be
           Comprehensible
           or
           not
           ,
           but
           only
           whether
           it
           be
           Reveal'd
           by
           God
           or
           No
           ,
           since
           if
           it
           be
           ,
           the
           Incomprehensibleness
           of
           it
           will
           be
           no
           Objection
           against
           it
           .
           That
           therefore
           ought
           to
           be
           no
           part
           of
           its
           Questistion
           or
           Deliberation
           ,
           because
           indeed
           it
           is
           not
           to
           the
           purpose
           to
           Consider
           whether
           such
           a
           thing
           be
           ,
           when
           if
           it
           were
           it
           would
           be
           no
           just
           Objection
           .
           The
           only
           Considerable
           thing
           then
           here
           is
           whether
           such
           a
           Proposition
           be
           indeed
           from
           God
           ,
           and
           has
           him
           for
           its
           Author
           or
           no.
           And
           here
           Reason
           is
           to
           clear
           her
           Eyes
           ,
           put
           the
           Matter
           in
           the
           best
           Light
           ,
           call
           in
           all
           the
           Assistance
           
           that
           may
           be
           had
           both
           from
           the
           Heart
           and
           the
           Head
           ,
           and
           determine
           of
           the
           thing
           with
           all
           the
           Judgement
           ,
           and
           all
           the
           Sincerity
           that
           she
           can
           .
           But
           as
           to
           the
           Comprehensibility
           or
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           Article
           ,
           this
           is
           quite
           besides
           the
           Question
           ,
           and
           ought
           therefore
           to
           be
           no
           part
           of
           her
           scruting
           or
           debate
           ,
           since
           if
           it
           were
           never
           so
           much
           above
           her
           Comprehension
           it
           would
           be
           never
           the
           less
           proper
           Object
           for
           her
           Belief
           .
        
         
           7.
           
           The
           Sum
           is
           ,
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           ,
           therefore
           in
           the
           believing
           of
           a
           thing
           ,
           the
           proper
           work
           of
           my
           Reason
           is
           not
           to
           Consider
           whether
           it
           be
           incomprehensible
           .
           But
           when
           a
           thing
           is
           proposed
           to
           me
           as
           from
           God
           ,
           all
           that
           my
           Reason
           has
           to
           do
           in
           this
           Case
           is
           Seriously
           ,
           Soberly
           ,
           Diligently
           ,
           Impartially
           ,
           and
           (
           I
           add
           )
           Humbly
           to
           Examine
           whether
           it
           comes
           with
           the
           true
           Credentials
           of
           his
           Authority
           ,
           and
           has
           him
           for
           its
           real
           Author
           or
           no.
           This
           is
           all
           that
           Reason
           has
           to
           do
           in
           this
           Matter
           ,
           and
           when
           
           she
           has
           done
           this
           ,
           she
           is
           to
           rise
           from
           the
           Seat
           of
           Judgement
           ,
           and
           resign
           it
           to
           Faith
           ,
           which
           either
           gives
           or
           refuses
           her
           Assent
           ,
           Not
           as
           the
           thing
           proposed
           is
           Comprehensible
           or
           not
           Comprehensible
           ,
           but
           as
           't
           is
           either
           Reveal●d
           or
           not
           Reveal'd
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           IX
           .
           An
           Application
           of
           the
           foregoing
           Considerations
           to
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           Christianity
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           HAving
           thus
           raised
           the
           Shell
           of
           our
           Building
           to
           its
           due
           ●itch
           ,
           we
           have
           now
           only
           to
           Roof
           it
           by
           making
           a
           Short
           Application
           of
           the
           Principles
           laid
           down
           and
           set●led
           in
           the
           Former
           Chapters
           to
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           ,
           against
           the
           Truth
           and
           Belief
           of
           which
           it
           plainly
           appears
           from
           the
           Preceding
           Considerations
           that
           there
           lies
           now
           no
           Reasonable
           Objection
           .
           For
           if
           Human
           Reason
           be
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           and
           if
           therefore
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           ●hing
           to
           Human
           Reason
           be
           no
           Argument
           of
           its
           〈◊〉
           being
           True
           ,
           nor
           Consequently
           against
           its
           being
           Believ'd
           ,
           and
           if
           the
           only
           Use
           and
           Imployment
           
           of
           Reason
           in
           Believing
           be
           to
           Consider
           ,
           not
           the
           Internal
           Evidence
           of
           the
           thing
           ,
           whether
           the
           Article
           be
           Comprehensible
           or
           no
           ,
           but
           whether
           it
           be
           truly
           reveal'd
           by
           God
           ,
           I
           say
           if
           these
           things
           are
           so
           ,
           as
           we
           have
           abundantly
           prov'd
           them
           to
           be
           ,
           then
           from
           these
           Premises
           the
           Clear
           and
           undeniable
           Consequence
           is
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           Christian
           Mysteries
           is
           no
           just
           reason
           why
           they
           should
           not
           be
           Believ'd
           ,
           and
           so
           tha●
           we
           may
           Believe
           them
           though
           we
           should
           suppose
           them
           (
           what
           yet
           some
           deny
           )
           to
           be
           Incomprehensible
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           
             Nay
             so
             far
             is
             the
             Incomprehensible
             Sublimity
             of
             these
             Mysteries
             from
             being
             a
             sufficient
             Objection
             against
             the
             Belief
             of
             them
             ,
             that
             Accidentally
             and
             indirectly
             it
             may
             be
             improved
             into
             a
             Considerable
             Argument
             for
             them
             ,
             and
             such
             as
             may
             serve
             to
             recommend
             them
             to
             our
             Faith
             ,
             inasmuch
             as
             it
             is
             a
             very
             strong
             Presumption
             that
             they
             are
             of
             no
             Human
             Origin
             ,
             but
             have
             God
             for
             their
             Authour
             ,
             it
             being
             reasonable
             to
             suppose
             that
             what
             does
             so
             very
             much
             transcend
             the
             Capacity
             
             of
             Man
             to
             Comprehend
             ,
             does
             no
             less
             exceed
             his
             Ability
             to
             invent
             .
             And
             accordingly
             the
             Incomprehensibility
             of
             our
             Mysteries
             for
             which
             some
             will
             have
             them
             to
             be
             false
             ,
             is
             made
             use
             of
             by
             a
             very
             Rational
             Authour
             as
             an
             Argument
             of
             their
             Truth
             .
             And
             it
             may
             be
             worth
             while
             to
             let
             the
             Reader
             see
             how
             he
             Manages
             it
             in
             relation
             to
             One
             of
             the
             Most
             Sublime
             of
             them
             .
          
           
           The
           more
           Obscure
           are
           our
           Mysteries
           .
           Strange
           Paradox
           !
           the
           more
           Credible
           they
           now
           appear
           to
           me
           .
           Yes
           ,
           I
           find
           even
           in
           the
           Obscurity
           of
           our
           Mysteries
           ,
           receiv'd
           as
           they
           are
           by
           so
           many
           different
           Nations
           ,
           an
           invincible
           Proof
           of
           their
           Truth
           .
           How
           ,
           for
           instance
           ,
           shall
           we
           accord
           the
           Vnity
           with
           the
           Trinity
           ,
           the
           Society
           of
           three
           different
           Persons
           in
           the
           perfect
           Simplicity
           of
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           ?
           This
           without
           doubt
           is
           Incomprehensibl●
           ,
           but
           not
           Incredible
           .
           It
           is
           indeed
           above
           us
           ,
           but
           let
           us
           Consider
           a
           little
           and
           we
           shall
           believe
           it
           ,
           at
           least
           if
           we
           w●ll
           be
           of
           the
           same
           Religion
           with
           the
           Apostles
           .
           For
           supposing
           they
           had
           not
           known
           this
           ineffable
           Mystery
           ,
           or
           that
           they
           had
           not
           taught
           it
           to
           their
           Successours
           ,
           I
           maintain
           that
           it
           is
           not
           
           Possible
           that
           a
           Sentiment
           so
           extraordinary
           should
           find
           in
           the
           Minds
           of
           Men
           such
           an
           Vniversal
           Belief
           as
           is
           given
           to
           it
           in
           the
           whole
           Church
           ,
           and
           among
           so
           many
           different
           Nations
           .
           The
           More
           this
           Adorable
           Mystery
           appears
           Monstrous
           (
           suffer
           the
           Expression
           of
           the
           Enemies
           of
           our
           Faith
           )
           the
           More
           it
           Shocks
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           the
           More
           the
           Imagination
           Mutinies
           against
           it
           ,
           the
           more
           Obscure
           ,
           Incomprehensib●●
           and
           Impenetrable
           it
           is
           ,
           the
           less
           Credible
           is
           it
           that
           it
           should
           Naturally
           insi●●ate
           it self
           into
           the
           Minds
           and
           〈◊〉
           of
           all
           Christians
           of
           so
           many
           and
           so
           distant
           Countries
           .
           Never
           do
           the
           same
           Errours
           spread
           universally
           ,
           especially
           such
           sort
           of
           Errours
           which
           so
           strangely
           offend
           the
           Imagination
           ,
           which
           have
           nothing
           sensible
           in
           them
           ,
           and
           which
           seem
           to
           Contradict
           the
           most
           Simple
           and
           Common
           Notions
           .
           If
           Iesus
           ●hrist
           did
           not
           Watch
           over
           his
           Church
           ,
           the
           Number
           of
           the
           〈…〉
           would
           quickly
           exceed
           that
           of
           〈◊〉
           ●●●hodox
           Christians
           ▪
           For
           〈…〉
           in
           the
           Sentimen●
           〈…〉
           that
           does
           not
           〈…〉
           the
           Mind
           .
           And
           〈…〉
           that
           〈…〉
           to
           our
           Vnderstandings
           
           may
           establish
           themselves
           in
           time
           .
           But
           that
           a
           Truth
           so
           Sublime
           ,
           so
           far
           removed
           from
           Sense
           ,
           so
           Cross
           to
           Human
           Reason
           ,
           so
           Contrary
           in
           short
           to
           all
           Nature
           as
           is
           this
           great
           Mystery
           of
           our
           Faith
           ,
           that
           a
           Truth
           I
           say
           of
           this
           Character
           should
           spread
           it self
           Vniversally
           ,
           and
           Triumph
           over
           all
           Nations
           where
           the
           Apostles
           had
           Preach'd
           the
           Gospel
           ,
           supposing
           that
           these
           First
           Preachers
           of
           our
           Faith
           had
           neither
           known
           any
           thing
           ,
           nor
           ●aid
           any
           thing
           of
           this
           Mystery
           ,
           this
           Certainly
           is
           what
           cannot
           be
           Conceiv'd
           by
           any
           one
           that
           has
           never
           so
           little
           knowledge
           of
           Human
           Nature
           .
           That
           there
           should
           be
           Heretics
           that
           should
           oppose
           a
           Doctrine
           so
           Sublime
           is
           nothing
           strange
           ,
           nor
           am
           I
           surprized
           at
           it
           .
           On
           the
           Contrary
           I
           should
           be
           very
           much
           if
           never
           any
           body
           had
           opposed
           it
           .
           This
           Truth
           wanted
           but
           little
           of
           being
           quite
           oppress'd
           .
           'T
           is
           very
           possible
           .
           For
           't
           will
           be
           always
           reckon'd
           a
           Commendable
           Vndertaking
           to
           attaque
           that
           which
           seems
           to
           Clash
           with
           Reason
           .
           But
           that
           at
           length
           the
           Mystery
           of
           the
           Trinity
           should
           prevail
           ,
           and
           should
           establish
           it self
           Vniversally
           wherever
           the
           Religion
           of
           Iesus
           Christ
           was
           receiv'd
           ,
           without
           
           its
           being
           known
           and
           taught
           by
           the
           Apostles
           ,
           without
           an
           Authority
           and
           a
           Force
           Divine
           ,
           there
           needs
           methinks
           but
           an
           Ordinary
           Measure
           of
           good
           Sense
           to
           acknowledge
           that
           nothing
           in
           the
           World
           is
           less
           Probable
           .
           For
           it
           is
           not
           in
           the
           least
           likely
           that
           a
           Doctrine
           so
           Divine
           ,
           so
           above
           Reason
           ,
           so
           remov'd
           from
           whatever
           may
           strike
           the
           Imagination
           and
           the
           Senses
           ,
           should
           Naturally
           Come
           into
           the
           Thought
           of
           Man.
           
        
         
           3.
           
           You
           see
           here
           how
           this
           Excellent
           Person
           strikes
           Light
           out
           of
           Darkness
           ,
           by
           improving
           even
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           Christian
           Mysteries
           into
           an
           Argument
           for
           the
           Truth
           and
           Credibility
           of
           them
           ,
           and
           so
           turning
           the
           Artillery
           of
           our
           Adversaries
           against
           themselves
           .
           This
           indeed
           is
           a
           bold
           Atchievement
           ,
           an●
           as
           Fortunate
           a
           one
           too
           ,
           for
           I
           think
           there
           is
           a
           great
           deal
           of
           Force
           and
           Weight
           in
           his
           Reasoning
           .
           But
           I
           need
           not
           push
           the
           Matter
           so
           far
           ,
           nor
           follow
           so
           home
           into
           the
           Enemies
           Camp
           ,
           as
           to
           plant
           their
           own
           Cannon
           against
           them
           .
           'T
           is
           sufficient
           to
           the
           design
           of
           the
           present
           undertaking
           ,
           and
           as
           much
           as
           I
           am
           
           led
           to
           by
           the
           Principles
           before
           Establish'd
           ,
           to
           Conclude
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           Christian
           Mysteries
           is
           no
           Argument
           against
           them
           .
           This
           therefore
           I
           insist
           upon
           ,
           and
           (
           if
           my
           Reason
           mightily
           deceive
           me
           not
           )
           dare
           ingage
           finally
           to
           stand
           to
           .
           For
           if
           (
           as
           it
           has
           been
           shewn
           )
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           in
           general
           be
           no
           Conclusive
           Argument
           against
           either
           the
           Truth
           or
           the
           Credibility
           of
           it
           ,
           then
           since
           Negative
           Propositions
           do
           separate
           the
           Attribut
           from
           the
           Subject
           according
           to
           all
           the
           Extent
           which
           the
           Subject
           has
           in
           the
           Proposition
           ,
           what
           Consequence
           can
           be
           more
           Clear
           than
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           our
           Mysteries
           is
           no
           Argument
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           them
           ?
           I
           Conclude
           therefore
           that
           it
           is
           None
           ,
           and
           that
           they
           ought
           never
           the
           less
           to
           be
           believ'd
           for
           their
           being
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           supposing
           them
           otherwise
           sufficiently
           Reveal'd
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           Whether
           they
           are
           so
           or
           no
           is
           besides
           my
           Undertaking
           at
           present
           to
           examin
           ,
           nor
           need
           I
           ingage
           my
           Pen
           in
           this
           Question
           ,
           since
           the
           Affirmative
           side
           of
           it
           is
           so
           Obvious
           
           to
           every
           Eye
           that
           can
           but
           read
           the
           Bible
           ,
           and
           has
           been
           withal
           so
           abundantly
           and
           convincingly
           made
           good
           by
           those
           abler
           hands
           which
           have
           gone
           into
           the
           Detail
           of
           the
           Controversie
           ,
           and
           undertaken
           the
           particular
           defence
           of
           the
           Christian
           Mysteries
           .
           This
           part
           of
           the
           Argument
           therefore
           being
           so
           well
           discharged
           already
           ,
           I
           shall
           Concern
           my self
           no
           further
           with
           it
           than
           only
           in
           Consequence
           and
           Pursuance
           of
           the
           Former
           Principles
           to
           bestow
           upon
           it
           this
           one
           single
           Necessary
           Remarque
           ,
           viz.
           That
           as
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           the
           Christian
           Mysteries
           is
           no
           just
           Objection
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           them
           supposing
           them
           otherwise
           sufficiently
           Reveal'd
           ,
           so
           neither
           is
           it
           a
           just
           Objection
           against
           their
           being
           so
           Reveal'd
           ,
           supposing
           the
           plain
           ,
           obvious
           and
           literal
           Construction
           of
           the
           Words
           does
           naturally
           and
           directly
           lead
           to
           such
           a
           Sense
           .
           And
           that
           it
           does
           so
           is
           not
           I
           think
           offer'd
           to
           be
           denied
           ,
           and
           the
           thing
           it self
           is
           plain
           enough
           to
           extort
           an
           acknowledgement
           ,
           but
           then
           't
           is
           pretended
           that
           there
           is
           a
           Necessity
           of
           having
           recourse
           to
           a
           different
           Construction
           ,
           
           and
           to
           understand
           the
           words
           in
           another
           Sense
           ,
           because
           of
           the
           unconceivableness
           and
           incomprehensibleness
           of
           that
           which
           their
           proper
           and
           Grammatical
           Scheme
           does
           Exhibit
           .
           But
           by
           the
           Tenour
           of
           this
           whole
           Discourse
           it
           evidently
           appears
           that
           there
           is
           no
           such
           Necessity
           ,
           since
           to
           admit
           an
           incomprehensible
           Sense
           has
           nothing
           absurd
           or
           inconvenient
           in
           it
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           of
           the
           Untruth
           of
           it
           .
           From
           whence
           it
           plainly
           follows
           that
           't
           is
           no
           more
           an
           Objection
           against
           its
           being
           Reveal'd
           than
           't
           is
           an
           Objection
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           supposing
           it
           were
           Reveal'd
           ,
           there
           being
           nothing
           but
           the
           untruth
           of
           a
           thing
           that
           can
           be
           a
           reasonable
           Obstruction
           against
           either
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           We
           are
           therefore
           to
           take
           the
           Words
           of
           Scripture
           according
           to
           their
           proper
           and
           most
           Natural
           Sense
           ,
           and
           not
           seek
           out
           for
           Forc'd
           and
           Strain'd
           Interpretations
           upon
           the
           account
           of
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           that
           which
           is
           apparently
           Genuin
           and
           Natural
           .
           And
           if
           the
           Revelation
           be
           otherwise
           plain
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           
           we
           would
           accept
           of
           in
           another
           Case
           ,
           and
           about
           matters
           which
           we
           can
           well
           Comprehend
           ,
           we
           ought
           not
           to
           think
           it
           the
           less
           so
           because
           the
           Sense
           of
           it
           so
           understood
           is
           such
           as
           we
           cannot
           reconcile
           to
           our
           Apprehensions
           and
           Conceptions
           of
           things
           .
           For
           notwithstanding
           that
           it
           may
           be
           true
           ,
           since
           by
           this
           time
           we
           may
           be
           sufficiently
           satisfied
           that
           there
           are
           many
           Incomprehensible
           Truths
           .
           The
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           therefore
           no
           Argument
           against
           its
           being
           Reveal'd
           ,
           any
           more
           than
           't
           is
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           supposing
           it
           were
           .
           Which
           opens
           an
           immediate
           Entrance
           to
           the
           Christians
           Mysteries
           ,
           which
           I
           doubt
           not
           would
           be
           thought
           sufficiently
           Reveal'd
           were
           it
           not
           for
           the
           incomprehensibility
           of
           them
           ,
           the
           only
           Objection
           that
           can
           be
           pretended
           against
           their
           Revelation
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           I
           have
           hitherto
           argued
           upon
           the
           Supposition
           that
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           Christianity
           (
           those
           Doctrines
           I
           mean
           that
           are
           so
           call'd
           )
           are
           above
           Reason
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           do
           transcend
           our
           Comprehension
           ,
           and
           have
           shewn
           that
           even
           upon
           that
           Supposition
           
           there
           is
           no
           reasonable
           Objection
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           them
           ,
           that
           they
           are
           never
           the
           less
           Believable
           for
           their
           being
           Incomprehensible
           .
           But
           what
           if
           I
           should
           recall
           this
           Concession
           ,
           and
           put
           our
           Adversaries
           to
           the
           proof
           that
           they
           are
           indeed
           above
           Human
           Reason
           and
           Comprehension
           .
           They
           cannot
           be
           ignorant
           that
           there
           are
           those
           that
           Contend
           they
           are
           not
           ,
           and
           with
           great
           shew
           of
           reason
           offer
           to
           prove
           it
           ,
           by
           endeavouring
           to
           render
           a
           Conceivable
           and
           Intelligible
           Account
           of
           them
           .
           If
           these
           Men
           should
           be
           in
           the
           right
           (
           which
           I
           do
           not
           think
           necessary
           at
           present
           to
           inquire
           into
           )
           it
           would
           be
           a
           further
           Advantage
           to
           our
           Cause
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           though
           I
           do
           not
           now
           insist
           upon
           it
           ,
           I
           need
           not
           lose
           the
           Benefit
           of
           .
           But
           if
           it
           should
           prove
           that
           they
           are
           not
           in
           the
           right
           ,
           the
           Cause
           of
           our
           Christian
           Mysteries
           is
           not
           much
           Concern'd
           in
           the
           loss
           of
           that
           Pillar
           ,
           but
           can
           support
           it self
           well
           enough
           without
           it
           ,
           as
           having
           another
           that
           is
           sufficient
           to
           bear
           its
           weight
           ,
           since
           though
           we
           should
           suppose
           these
           Sacred
           Doctrines
           to
           be
           never
           so
           Incomprehensible
           to
           our
           Reason
           ,
           it
           does
           
           by
           no
           Consequence
           follow
           (
           as
           from
           the
           Argument
           of
           this
           whole
           Discourse
           is
           apparent
           )
           that
           therefore
           they
           may
           not
           be
           due
           Objects
           of
           our
           Faith.
           
        
         
           7.
           
           Should
           any
           one
           now
           be
           so
           fond
           of
           Objection
           as
           to
           draw
           one
           against
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           Christianity
           from
           the
           use
           of
           the
           Word
           Mystery
           in
           Scripture
           ,
           which
           knows
           no
           other
           Mysteries
           but
           such
           as
           before
           the
           Revelation
           of
           them
           were
           undiscover'd
           ,
           not
           Considering
           whether
           they
           were
           in
           themselves
           Conceivable
           or
           no
           ,
           I
           must
           tell
           him
           that
           I
           do
           not
           know
           that
           ever
           I
           met
           in
           any
           Controversie
           with
           a
           less
           pertinent
           Objection
           ,
           as
           much
           as
           it
           is
           made
           of
           by
           a
           late
           Bold
           Writer
           ,
           
           who
           heaps
           together
           a
           great
           many
           Texts
           to
           shew
           the
           signification
           of
           the
           Word
           Mystery
           in
           the
           New
           Testament
           ,
           that
           it
           signifies
           not
           things
           in
           themselves
           inconceivable
           ,
           but
           only
           such
           as
           were
           not
           known
           before
           they
           were
           Reveal'd
           .
           Well
           ,
           be
           it
           so
           as
           this
           Gentleman
           pretends
           (
           though
           I
           believe
           upon
           Examination
           it
           would
           appear
           otherwise
           )
           yet
           what
           is
           this
           to
           the
           purpose
           ?
           For
           do
           we
           Dispute
           about
           Names
           or
           Things
           ?
           
           The
           Question
           is
           not
           whether
           the
           Scripture
           expresses
           inconceivable
           things
           by
           the
           Name
           of
           Mysteries
           ,
           but
           whether
           there
           be
           not
           things
           in
           Scripture
           above
           our
           Conception
           (
           call
           them
           by
           what
           Name
           you
           will
           )
           and
           if
           there
           be
           ,
           whether
           their
           being
           so
           above
           our
           Conception
           be
           an
           Argument
           why
           they
           should
           not
           be
           Believ'd
           .
           Now
           to
           these
           inconceivable
           things
           it
           has
           been
           the
           Common
           Use
           of
           Church-Writers
           to
           apply
           the
           Name
           of
           Mysteries
           ,
           which
           ,
           if
           the
           thing
           be
           granted
           ,
           he
           must
           be
           a
           great
           Lover
           of
           Cavil
           and
           Wrangle
           that
           will
           Contend
           about
           it
           .
           But
           the
           Learned
           Bishop
           of
           Worcester
           has
           already
           prevented
           me
           in
           the
           Consideration
           of
           this
           Objection
           ,
           
           for
           which
           reason
           ,
           together
           with
           the
           Frivolousness
           of
           it
           ,
           I
           shall
           pursue
           it
           no
           further
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           CHAP.
           X.
           The
           Conclusion
           of
           the
           whole
           ,
           with
           an
           Address
           to
           the
           Socinians
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           AND
           thus
           I
           have
           led
           my
           Reader
           through
           a
           long
           Course
           of
           Various
           Reasoning
           ,
           and
           perhaps
           as
           far
           as
           he
           is
           willing
           to
           follow
           me
           ,
           though
           I
           hope
           his
           Journey
           has
           not
           been
           without
           some
           Pleasure
           that
           may
           deceive
           ,
           and
           some
           Profit
           that
           may
           in
           part
           reward
           the
           Labour
           of
           it
           .
           I
           have
           shewn
           him
           what
           Reason
           is
           ,
           and
           what
           Faith
           is
           ,
           that
           so
           he
           may
           see
           from
           the
           Absolute
           Natures
           of
           each
           what
           Habitude
           and
           Relation
           they
           have
           to
           one
           another
           ,
           and
           how
           the
           Darkness
           and
           Obscurity
           of
           the
           Latter
           may
           Consist
           with
           the
           Light
           and
           Evidence
           of
           the
           Former
           .
           I
           have
           also
           Consider'd
           the
           Distinction
           of
           things
           Above
           Reason
           and
           things
           Contrary
           to
           Reason
           ,
           and
           shewn
           it
           to
           be
           real
           and
           well-grounded
           ,
           and
           to
           have
           all
           that
           is
           requisite
           to
           a
           good
           Distinction
           .
           
           And
           for
           the
           further
           Confirmation
           of
           it
           ,
           I
           have
           also
           shewn
           that
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
           From
           which
           Great
           Principle
           (
           which
           I
           was
           the
           more
           willing
           to
           discourse
           at
           large
           and
           thoroughly
           to
           settle
           and
           establish
           because
           of
           its
           Moment
           and
           Consequence
           to
           the
           Concern
           in
           hand
           )
           I
           have
           deduced
           that
           weighty
           Inference
           ,
           that
           therefore
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Concluding
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           true
           ,
           which
           Consequence
           for
           the
           greater
           Security
           of
           it
           ,
           because
           it
           is
           so
           Considerable
           in
           the
           present
           Controversie
           ,
           I
           have
           also
           proved
           Backwards
           ,
           by
           shewing
           that
           if
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           were
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           true
           ,
           then
           Human
           Reason
           (
           contrary
           to
           what
           was
           before
           demonstrated
           )
           would
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           .
           Whence
           I
           infer
           again
           
             ex
             Absurdo
          
           ,
           that
           therefore
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           true
           .
           From
           this
           last
           Consequence
           I
           infer
           another
           of
           no
           less
           Moment
           and
           Consideration
           ,
           viz.
           That
           therefore
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           neither
           ,
           where
           also
           I
           Consider
           that
           seemingly
           Opposite
           Maxim
           of
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           ,
           that
           we
           are
           to
           Assent
           to
           nothing
           but
           what
           is
           Clear
           and
           Evident
           ,
           and
           reconcile
           it
           to
           the
           other
           Position
           .
           Whence
           my
           next
           step
           was
           to
           state
           the
           true
           use
           of
           Reason
           in
           Believing
           ,
           which
           I
           shew'd
           to
           Consist
           not
           in
           examining
           the
           Credibility
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           but
           in
           taking
           account
           of
           the
           Certainty
           of
           the
           Revelation
           ,
           which
           when
           once
           resolv'd
           of
           we
           are
           no
           longer
           to
           Dispute
           ,
           but
           Believe
           .
           In
           fine
           ,
           I
           have
           made
           an
           Application
           of
           these
           Considerations
           to
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Faith
           ,
           by
           shewing
           that
           they
           are
           never
           the
           less
           to
           be
           Believ'd
           for
           being
           Mysteries
           ,
           supposing●
           them
           otherwise
           sufficiently
           Reveal'd
           ,
           against
           which
           also
           I
           have
           shewn
           their
           Incomprehensibility
           to
           be
           no
           Objection
           .
           So
           that
           every
           way
           the
           Great
           Argument
           against
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           the
           Christian
           Faith
           taken
           from
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           them
           vanishes
           and
           sinks
           into
           nothing
           .
           In
           all
           which
           I
           think
           I
           have
           effectually
           overthrown
           the
           General
           and
           Fundamental
           Ground
           of
           Socinianism
           ,
           
           and
           truely
           in
           great
           Measure
           that
           of
           Deism
           too
           ,
           whose
           best
           Argument
           against
           Reveal'd
           Religion
           in
           general
           ,
           is
           ,
           because
           the
           Christian
           ,
           upon
           all
           Accounts
           the
           most
           preferable
           of
           those
           that
           pretend
           to
           be
           Reveal'd
           ,
           Contains
           so
           many
           things
           in
           it
           which
           transcend
           the
           Comprehension
           of
           Human
           Understanding
           .
           But
           whether
           this
           Best
           Argument
           be
           really
           a
           good
           one
           or
           no
           ,
           the
           whole
           Procedure
           of
           this
           Discourse
           may
           sufficiently
           shew
           ,
           and
           whoever
           knows
           how
           to
           distinguish
           Sophistry
           from
           good
           Reasoning
           ,
           may
           easily
           judge
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           And
           now
           you
           Gentlemen
           for
           whose
           sakes
           I
           have
           been
           at
           the
           pains
           to
           write
           this
           Treatise
           ,
           give
           me
           leave
           in
           a
           few
           words
           to
           Address
           my self
           a
           little
           more
           particularly
           to
           you
           ,
           and
           to
           Expostulate
           with
           you
           .
           Whether
           it
           be
           the
           good
           opinion
           you
           have
           of
           your
           Cause
           ,
           or
           the
           present
           Opportunity
           you
           have
           to
           appear
           in
           the
           behalf
           of
           it
           that
           invites
           you
           so
           freely
           to
           Come
           abroad
           as
           you
           have
           done
           of
           late
           ,
           you
           have
           certainly
           (
           to
           give
           your
           Courage
           its
           due
           )
           taken
           a
           very
           rational
           and
           Polite
           Age
           for
           it
           ,
           and
           I
           hope
           the
           Wise
           Conduct
           of
           
           Providence
           may
           turn
           this
           juncture
           to
           the
           Advantage
           of
           the
           Truth
           ,
           and
           that
           the
           Light
           to
           which
           you
           have
           adventur'd
           to
           expose
           your
           Novel
           Opinions
           may
           serve
           to
           make
           you
           see
           their
           Absurdities
           ,
           if
           you
           do
           not
           too
           Obstinately
           shut
           your
           Eyes
           against
           it
           .
           Some
           of
           you
           are
           Considerable
           Masters
           of
           Reason
           (
           otherwise
           truly
           I
           should
           not
           think
           it
           worth
           while
           to
           argue
           with
           you
           )
           and
           you
           all
           profess
           great
           Devotion
           to
           it
           (
           I
           wish
           you
           do
           not
           make
           it
           an
           Idol
           )
           and
           to
           be
           very
           Zealous
           and
           Affectionate
           Disciples
           of
           it
           .
           Reason
           is
           the
           great
           Measure
           by
           which
           you
           pretend
           to
           go
           ,
           and
           the
           Judge
           to
           whom
           in
           all
           things
           you
           appeal
           .
           Now
           I
           accept
           of
           your
           Measure
           ,
           and
           do
           not
           refuse
           to
           be
           tried
           in
           the
           Court
           of
           your
           own
           Chusing
           .
           Accordingly
           you
           see
           I
           have
           dealt
           with
           you
           all
           along
           upon
           the
           Ground
           of
           Logic
           ,
           and
           in
           a
           Rational
           way
           ,
           being
           very
           Confident
           that
           Reason
           alone
           will
           discover
           to
           you
           your
           undue
           Elevations
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           the
           Errours
           you
           have
           been
           misled
           into
           by
           that
           Occasion
           ,
           if
           you
           do
           but
           Consult
           even
           this
           Oracle
           of
           yours
           
           as
           you
           ought
           ,
           and
           make
           a
           right
           use
           of
           its
           Sacred
           Light.
           
        
         
           3.
           
           But
           I
           am
           afraid
           you
           do
           not
           .
           Instead
           of
           imploying
           your
           Reason
           in
           the
           first
           place
           to
           examin
           the
           Certainty
           of
           the
           Revelation
           ,
           whether
           such
           a
           thing
           be
           truly
           Reveal'd
           ,
           and
           if
           so
           ,
           to
           believe
           it
           notwithstanding
           its
           being
           incomprehensible
           ,
           your
           Method
           is
           to
           begin
           with
           the
           Quality
           of
           the
           Object
           ,
           to
           Consider
           whether
           it
           be
           Comprehensible
           or
           no
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           to
           proceed
           in
           your
           Belief
           or
           Disbelief
           of
           its
           being
           Reveal'd
           .
           'T
           is
           true
           indeed
           you
           are
           not
           so
           gross
           as
           to
           argue
           thus
           ,
           this
           is
           Comprehensible
           therefore
           't
           is
           Reveal'd
           .
           But
           you
           cannot
           deny
           but
           that
           you
           argue
           thus
           ,
           this
           is
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           therefore
           't
           is
           not
           Reveal'd
           ,
           proceeding
           upon
           this
           general
           Principle
           that
           though
           whatever
           is
           Comprehensible
           is
           not
           therefore
           presently
           Reveal'd
           ,
           yet
           whatever
           is
           Reveal'd
           must
           be
           Comprehensible
           .
           But
           now
           judge
           you
           whether
           this
           be
           not
           to
           make
           your
           Reason
           the
           Rule
           and
           Measure
           of
           Divine
           Revelation
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           that
           God
           can
           reveal
           nothing
           to
           you
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           ,
           or
           ,
           that
           
           you
           are
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           all
           that
           God
           can
           possibly
           Reveal
           (
           for
           otherwise
           how
           is
           your
           not
           being
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           any
           thing
           an
           Argument
           of
           its
           not
           being
           Reveal●d
           )
           I
           say
           Consider
           whether
           this
           be
           not
           to
           set
           up
           your
           Reason
           as
           the
           Rule
           of
           Revelation
           ,
           and
           Consider
           again
           whether
           this
           does
           not
           resolve
           either
           into
           a
           very
           low
           Opinion
           you
           have
           of
           God
           and
           his
           Infinite
           Perfections
           ,
           or
           an
           extravagantly
           high
           one
           you
           have
           of
           your selves
           and
           your
           own
           Rational
           indowments
           .
        
         
           4.
           
           And
           yet
           as
           if
           this
           were
           not
           Presumption
           enough
           ,
           do
           you
           not
           also
           make
           your
           Reason
           the
           Rule
           of
           Faith
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           of
           Revelation
           ?
           To
           be
           the
           Rule
           of
           Faith
           is
           a
           very
           Great
           thing
           ,
           and
           yet
           so
           far
           't
           is
           plain
           that
           you
           make
           your
           Reason
           the
           Rule
           of
           Faith
           that
           you
           will
           allow
           nothing
           to
           be
           believ'd
           but
           whose
           Bottom
           you
           can
           Sound
           by
           that
           Line
           ,
           this
           being
           an
           avow'd
           Principle
           with
           you
           that
           you
           are
           to
           believe
           nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           .
           But
           hold
           a
           little
           ,
           before
           your
           Reason
           can
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Faith
           ,
           must
           it
           not
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ?
           And
           I
           
           pray
           Consider
           seriously
           ,
           and
           tell
           me
           truly
           ,
           do
           you
           verily
           think
           in
           your
           Consciences
           that
           your
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ?
           Do
           you
           think
           your
           Rational
           Faculties
           proportion'd
           to
           every
           intelligible
           Object
           ,
           and
           that
           you
           are
           able
           to
           Comprehend
           all
           the
           things
           that
           are
           ,
           and
           that
           there
           is
           nothing
           in
           the
           whole
           extent
           of
           Science
           too
           high
           ,
           too
           difficult
           ,
           or
           too
           abstruse
           for
           you
           ,
           no
           one
           part
           of
           this
           vast
           Intellectual
           Sea
           but
           what
           you
           can
           wade
           through
           ?
           If
           you
           say
           yes
           ,
           besides
           the
           Blasphemous
           Presumptions
           and
           Luciferian
           Arrogance
           of
           the
           Assertion
           ,
           and
           how
           little
           it
           falls
           on
           this
           side
           of
           
             Similis
             ero
             Altissimo
          
           ,
           which
           banish'd
           the
           vain-glorious
           Angel
           from
           the
           Court
           of
           Heaven
           ,
           because
           nothing
           less
           would
           Content
           his
           Aspiring
           Ambition
           than
           to
           be
           as
           God
           there
           (
           though
           by
           the
           way
           there
           is
           more
           Sense
           and
           Congruity
           of
           Reason
           in
           pretending
           to
           be
           a
           God
           in
           Heaven
           ,
           than
           to
           be
           a
           God
           upon
           Earth
           )
           I
           say
           besides
           this
           ,
           I
           would
           put
           it
           to
           your
           more
           sober
           thought
           to
           Consider
           whether
           it
           be
           not
           every
           whit
           as
           great
           an
           Extremity
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Rational
           Speculation
           to
           Dogmatize
           
           so
           far
           as
           to
           pretend
           to
           Comprehend
           every
           thing
           ,
           as
           to
           say
           with
           the
           Sceptics
           and
           Pyrrhonians
           that
           we
           know
           nothing
           :
           The
           latter
           of
           which
           however
           in
           regard
           of
           its
           Moral
           Consequences
           may
           be
           more
           innocently
           and
           safely
           affirm'd
           than
           the
           Former
           ,
           since
           in
           that
           we
           only
           humbly
           degrade
           our selves
           ,
           and
           are
           Content
           to
           sink
           down
           into
           the
           Level
           of
           Brutes
           ,
           whereas
           in
           this
           we
           aspire
           to
           what
           is
           infinitely
           above
           us
           ,
           and
           advance
           our selves
           into
           the
           Seat
           of
           God.
           And
           you
           know
           an
           Excess
           of
           Self-dejection
           is
           of
           the
           two
           the
           more
           tolerable
           Extreme
           .
           But
           if
           you
           say
           that
           your
           Reason
           is
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           (
           as
           upon
           this
           ,
           and
           the
           other
           Considerations
           there
           lies
           a
           Necessity
           upon
           you
           to
           Confess
           )
           how
           then
           I
           pray
           comes
           it
           to
           be
           the
           Measure
           of
           your
           Faith
           ,
           and
           how
           come
           you
           to
           lay
           down
           this
           for
           a
           Maxim
           that
           you
           will
           believe
           Nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           ?
           Why
           ,
           if
           your
           Reason
           be
           not
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           (
           and
           you
           your selves
           Care
           not
           ,
           and
           I
           believe
           are
           asham'd
           in
           terms
           to
           say
           that
           it
           is
           )
           then
           do
           you
           not
           evidently
           discern
           that
           there
           is
           no
           Consequence
           from
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           
           of
           a
           thing
           to
           the
           incredibility
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           that
           you
           have
           no
           reason
           to
           deny
           your
           Belief
           to
           a
           thing
           as
           true
           merely
           upon
           the
           account
           of
           its
           incomprehensibility
           .
           And
           do
           you
           not
           then
           plainly
           see
           that
           your
           great
           Maxim
           falls
           to
           the
           ground
           ,
           that
           you
           are
           to
           believe
           nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           ?
           But
           if
           yet
           notwithstanding
           this
           you
           will
           still
           adhere
           to
           your
           beloved
           Maxim
           ,
           and
           resolve
           to
           believe
           Nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           adjust
           and
           clear
           up
           to
           your
           Reason
           ,
           then
           I
           pray
           Consider
           whether
           this
           will
           not
           necessarily
           lead
           you
           back
           to
           that
           Absurd
           ,
           and
           withal
           Odious
           and
           Invidious
           Principle
           ,
           and
           which
           therefore
           you
           your selves
           care
           not
           to
           own
           ,
           viz.
           
             That
             your
             Reason
             is
             the
             Measure
             of
             Truth
             .
          
        
         
           5.
           
           But
           why
           do
           you
           not
           care
           to
           own
           it
           ?
           Do
           you
           not
           see
           at
           the
           first
           cast
           of
           your
           Eye
           that
           you
           are
           unavoidably
           driven
           upon
           it
           by
           your
           profess'd
           Maxim
           ?
           Or
           if
           you
           do
           not
           think
           fit
           to
           own
           it
           (
           as
           indeed
           it
           is
           a
           good
           handsom
           Morsel
           to
           swallow
           )
           why
           do
           you
           not
           then
           renounce
           that
           Maxim
           of
           yours
           which
           is
           the
           immediate
           
           Consequence
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           necessarily
           resolves
           into
           it
           ?
           Why
           will
           you
           whose
           Pretensions
           are
           so
           high
           to
           Reason
           act
           so
           directly
           against
           the
           Laws
           of
           it
           ,
           as
           to
           own
           that
           implicitly
           and
           by
           Consequence
           which
           neither
           your
           Head
           nor
           your
           Heart
           will
           serve
           you
           to
           acknowledge
           in
           broad
           and
           express
           Terms
           ?
           Be
           a
           little
           more
           Consistent
           with
           your
           own
           Sentiments
           at
           least
           ,
           if
           not
           with
           Truth
           ,
           and
           be
           not
           your selves
           a
           Mystery
           ,
           while
           you
           pretend
           not
           to
           believe
           any
           .
           If
           you
           do
           not
           care
           to
           own
           the
           Principle
           ,
           then
           deny
           the
           Consequence
           ,
           or
           if
           you
           will
           not
           let
           go
           the
           Consequence
           ,
           then
           stand
           by
           and
           own
           the
           Principle
           .
           Either
           speak
           out
           boldly
           and
           roundly
           that
           your
           Reason
           is
           the
           Measure
           of
           Truth
           ,
           or
           if
           you
           think
           that
           too
           gross
           a
           defiance
           to
           Sense
           ,
           Experience
           ,
           Religion
           and
           Reason
           too
           to
           be
           professedly
           maintain'd
           ,
           then
           be
           so
           ingenuous
           to
           us
           ,
           and
           so
           Consistent
           with
           your selves
           as
           to
           renounce
           your
           Maxim
           of
           Believing
           Nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           ,
           since
           you
           cannot
           hold
           it
           but
           with
           that
           Absurd
           Principle
           ;
           And
           which
           is
           therefore
           a
           Certain
           Argument
           
           that
           you
           ought
           not
           to
           hold
           it
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           And
           are
           you
           sure
           that
           you
           always
           do
           ,
           I
           mean
           so
           as
           to
           act
           by
           it
           ,
           that
           you
           hold
           it
           
             in
             Hypothesi
          
           as
           well
           as
           
             in
             Thesi
          
           ?
           Do
           you
           never
           assent
           to
           any
           thing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           ?
           Are
           there
           not
           many
           things
           in
           the
           Sciences
           which
           you
           find
           a
           pressing
           Necessity
           to
           Subscribe
           to
           ,
           though
           at
           the
           same
           time
           you
           cannot
           conceive
           their
           Modus
           ,
           or
           account
           for
           their
           Possibility
           ?
           But
           you
           'l
           say
           perhaps
           these
           are
           things
           of
           a
           Physical
           and
           Philosophical
           Consideration
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           have
           no
           relation
           to
           Religion
           .
           True
           ,
           they
           are
           so
           ,
           but
           then
           besides
           that
           this
           visibly
           betrays
           the
           weakness
           of
           your
           ground
           ,
           since
           if
           the
           incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           were
           a
           good
           Argument
           against
           assenting
           to
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           ,
           it
           would
           be
           so
           throughout
           ,
           in
           the
           things
           of
           Nature
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           in
           the
           things
           of
           Religion
           ,
           I
           would
           here
           further
           demand
           of
           you
           why
           you
           are
           so
           particularly
           shy
           of
           admitting
           incomprehensible
           things
           in
           Religion
           ,
           why
           is
           it
           there
           only
           that
           you
           seem
           so
           stiffly
           and
           zealously
           to
           adhere
           to
           your
           Maxim
           of
           Believing
           
           nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           ?
           Since
           there
           are
           so
           many
           inconceivable
           things
           ,
           or
           if
           you
           please
           ,
           Mysteries
           ,
           in
           the
           Works
           of
           Nature
           and
           of
           Providence
           ,
           why
           not
           in
           Religion
           ?
           Nay
           where
           should
           one
           expect
           to
           find
           Mysteries
           if
           not
           there
           ,
           where
           all
           the
           things
           that
           are
           Reveal'd
           are
           Reveal'd
           by
           God
           himself
           ,
           and
           many
           of
           them
           concerning
           Himself
           and
           his
           own
           Infinite
           Perfections
           ?
           And
           what
           deference
           do
           we
           pay
           to
           God
           more
           than
           Man
           ,
           if
           either
           we
           suppose
           that
           he
           cannot
           reveal
           Truths
           to
           us
           which
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           ,
           or
           if
           we
           will
           not
           believe
           them
           if
           he
           does
           ?
           Nay
           may
           it
           not
           be
           rather
           said
           that
           we
           do
           not
           pay
           him
           so
           much
           ,
           since
           we
           think
           it
           adviseable
           to
           receive
           many
           things
           from
           our
           Tutours
           and
           Masters
           upon
           their
           Authority
           only
           though
           we
           do
           not
           Comprehend
           them
           our selves
           ,
           and
           justifie
           our
           doing
           so
           by
           that
           well
           known
           and
           in
           many
           Cases
           very
           reasonable
           Maxim
           ,
           
             Discentem
             oportet
             Credere
          
           .
           But
           as
           there
           is
           no
           Authority
           like
           the
           Divine
           ,
           so
           if
           that
           Motto
           become
           any
           School
           ,
           't
           is
           that
           of
           Christ.
           
        
         
         
           7.
           
           Now
           't
           is
           in
           this
           School
           that
           you
           profess
           to
           be
           Scholars
           ,
           and
           why
           then
           will
           you
           be
           such
           Opiniative
           and
           uncompliant
           Disciples
           as
           to
           refuse
           to
           receive
           the
           Sublime
           Lectures
           read
           to
           you
           by
           your
           Divine
           and
           Infallible
           Master
           ,
           merely
           because
           they
           are
           too
           high
           for
           you
           ,
           and
           you
           cannot
           Conceive
           them
           ,
           when
           at
           the
           same
           time
           any
           one
           of
           your
           that
           is
           not
           a
           Mathematician
           (
           pardon
           the
           Supposition
           )
           would
           I
           doubt
           not
           take
           it
           upon
           the
           word
           of
           him
           that
           is
           so
           that
           
             the
             Diameter
             of
             a
             Square
             is
             incommensurable
             to
             the
             Side
             ,
          
           though
           he
           did
           not
           know
           how
           to
           demonstrate
           ,
           or
           so
           much
           as
           Conceive
           it
           himself
           .
           Since
           then
           you
           would
           express
           such
           implicit
           regard
           to
           the
           Authority
           of
           a
           fallible
           ,
           though
           Learned
           ,
           Man
           ,
           shall
           not
           the
           Divine
           weigh
           infinitely
           heavier
           with
           you
           ,
           and
           since
           you
           would
           not
           stick
           to
           assent
           to
           things
           above
           your
           Conception
           in
           Human
           and
           Natural
           Sciences
           ,
           why
           are
           you
           so
           violently
           set
           against
           Mysteries
           in
           Religion
           ,
           whereof
           God
           is
           not
           only
           the
           Authour
           ,
           but
           in
           great
           Measure
           the
           Object
           too
           .
        
         
         
           8.
           
           You
           know
           very
           well
           that
           in
           the
           great
           Problem
           of
           the
           Divisibility
           of
           Quantity
           there
           are
           Incomprehensibilities
           on
           both
           sides
           ,
           it
           being
           inconceivable
           that
           Quantity
           should
           ,
           and
           it
           being
           also
           inconceivable
           that
           it
           should
           not
           be
           divided
           infinitely
           .
           And
           yet
           you
           know
           again
           that
           as
           being
           parts
           of
           a
           Contradiction
           one
           of
           them
           must
           necessarily
           be
           true
           .
           Possibly
           you
           may
           not
           be
           able
           with
           the
           utmost
           Certainty
           and
           without
           all
           hesitation
           to
           determine
           which
           that
           is
           ,
           but
           however
           you
           know
           in
           the
           general
           that
           One
           of
           them
           ,
           indeterminately
           ,
           must
           be
           true
           (
           which
           by
           the
           way
           is
           enough
           to
           Convince
           you
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           no
           Argument
           against
           the
           truth
           of
           it
           )
           and
           you
           must
           also
           further
           grant
           that
           God
           whose
           Understanding
           is
           infinite
           does
           precisely
           and
           determinately
           know
           which
           of
           them
           is
           so
           .
           Now
           suppose
           God
           should
           Reveal
           this
           ,
           and
           make
           it
           an
           Article
           of
           Faith.
           'T
           is
           not
           indeed
           likely
           that
           he
           will
           ,
           it
           being
           so
           much
           beneath
           the
           Majesty
           ,
           and
           besides
           the
           End
           and
           Intention
           of
           Revelation
           ,
           whose
           great
           Design
           is
           the
           
           direction
           of
           our
           Life
           and
           Manners
           ,
           and
           not
           the
           improvement
           of
           our
           Speculation
           .
           But
           suppose
           I
           say
           he
           should
           ,
           would
           you
           not
           believe
           it
           ?
           If
           not
           ,
           then
           you
           must
           suppose
           either
           that
           there
           is
           no
           Necessity
           that
           either
           of
           the
           two
           parts
           (
           which
           yet
           are
           Contradictory
           )
           should
           be
           true
           ,
           or
           that
           though
           one
           of
           them
           be
           true
           yet
           that
           God
           does
           not
           known
           which
           is
           so
           ,
           or
           that
           though
           he
           does
           know
           which
           is
           so
           ,
           yet
           he
           does
           not
           deal
           faithfully
           in
           revealing
           that
           which
           is
           the
           Right
           ,
           all
           which
           are
           extravagant
           Suppositions
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           Men
           of
           your
           Sense
           and
           Reason
           can
           never
           allow
           .
           But
           then
           if
           you
           say
           (
           as
           you
           must
           )
           that
           you
           would
           believe
           it
           ,
           then
           I
           pray
           what
           becomes
           of
           your
           Maxim
           of
           believing
           nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           ,
           and
           why
           do
           you
           so
           stiffly
           plead
           the
           incomprehensibility
           of
           an
           Article
           of
           Faith
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           why
           must
           there
           be
           no
           Mysteries
           in
           Religion
           ?
           I
           say
           in
           Religion
           ,
           where
           if
           any
           where
           our
           Reason
           might
           expect
           to
           find
           things
           above
           its
           Measure
           ,
           unreachable
           Heights
           ,
           and
           unfathomable
           Depths
           ,
           and
           where
           God
           
           is
           not
           only
           the
           Revealer
           (
           as
           in
           the
           Case
           now
           supposed
           )
           but
           also
           the
           
             Object
             Reveal'd
          
           .
           For
           is
           it
           not
           reasonable
           to
           suppose
           that
           there
           are
           things
           more
           incomprehensible
           in
           God
           than
           in
           Nature
           ,
           and
           if
           you
           would
           receive
           an
           Incomprehensible
           Revelation
           of
           his
           concerning
           his
           Works
           ,
           how
           much
           rather
           ought
           you
           to
           admit
           the
           same
           concerning
           Himself
           ?
        
         
           9.
           
           And
           this
           gives
           me
           occasion
           to
           say
           something
           to
           you
           concerning
           the
           Doctrine
           of
           the
           
             Holy
             Trinity
          
           .
           This
           great
           Article
           of
           the
           Christian
           Faith
           you
           have
           a
           particular
           Prejudice
           against
           and
           will
           not
           believe
           ,
           and
           that
           because
           it
           so
           utterly
           transcends
           the
           Force
           of
           Reason
           to
           Conceive
           how
           the
           same
           undivided
           and
           Numerically
           One
           Simple
           Essence
           of
           God
           should
           be
           Communicated
           to
           Three
           really
           distinct
           Persons
           ,
           so
           as
           that
           there
           should
           be
           both
           a
           Unity
           in
           Trinity
           ,
           and
           a
           Trinity
           in
           Unity
           .
           This
           however
           ,
           as
           inconceivable
           as
           it
           seems
           ,
           some
           will
           not
           yield
           to
           be
           so
           far
           Above
           Reason
           but
           that
           a
           Rational
           and
           Intelligible
           Account
           may
           be
           given
           of
           it
           ,
           which
           accordingly
           
           they
           have
           essay'd
           to
           do
           by
           several
           Hypotheses
           .
           But
           I
           decline
           at
           present
           all
           advantage
           that
           may
           be
           had
           from
           them
           ,
           or
           any
           other
           that
           may
           be
           invented
           to
           render
           this
           an
           intelligible
           Article
           .
           You
           know
           I
           Reason
           all
           along
           upon
           the
           Contrary
           Supposition
           ,
           that
           those
           Articles
           of
           the
           Christian
           Faith
           which
           we
           call
           Mysteries
           are
           really
           incomprehensible
           ,
           and
           only
           go
           to
           invalidate
           the
           Consequence
           that
           is
           drawn
           from
           thence
           in
           prejudice
           of
           their
           Belief
           .
           Well
           then
           for
           once
           we
           will
           give
           you
           what
           you
           stand
           for
           ,
           that
           the
           Doctrine
           of
           the
           Trinity
           is
           indeed
           utterly
           above
           Reason
           .
           You
           have
           our
           leave
           to
           suppose
           it
           as
           incomprehensible
           as
           you
           please
           .
           But
           then
           you
           are
           to
           Consider
           (
           besides
           what
           has
           hitherto
           been
           discours'd
           concerning
           the
           Nullity
           of
           the
           Consequence
           from
           the
           incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           to
           its
           incredibility
           )
           that
           this
           is
           a
           Revelation
           of
           God
           concerning
           Himself
           ,
           and
           do
           you
           pretend
           to
           Comprehend
           the
           Nature
           and
           Essence
           of
           God
           ?
           If
           you
           do
           ,
           then
           your
           Understanding
           is
           as
           infinite
           as
           the
           Divine
           .
           But
           if
           you
           do
           not
           ,
           then
           the
           
           incomprehensibility
           of
           this
           Mysterious
           Article
           ought
           to
           be
           no
           Objection
           with
           you
           against
           the
           Belief
           of
           it
           ,
           since
           if
           it
           be
           ,
           you
           must
           be
           driven
           to
           say
           that
           you
           Comprehend
           the
           Nature
           of
           God
           ,
           which
           I
           hope
           you
           have
           too
           much
           Religion
           as
           well
           as
           Reason
           to
           affirm
           .
        
         
           10.
           
           And
           indeed
           if
           we
           meet
           with
           so
           many
           insuperable
           Difficulties
           in
           the
           Search
           of
           Nature
           ,
           much
           more
           may
           we
           in
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           its
           Author
           ,
           if
           the
           Works
           of
           God
           do
           so
           puzzle
           and
           baffle
           our
           Understandings
           ,
           much
           more
           may
           they
           Confess
           their
           Deficiency
           when
           God
           himself
           is
           their
           Object
           ,
           and
           if
           we
           are
           not
           able
           to
           explain
           Creation
           ,
           or
           give
           an
           Account
           how
           the
           Material
           World
           issued
           in
           time
           from
           the
           great
           Fountain
           of
           Being
           ,
           much
           less
           may
           we
           be
           supposed
           able
           to
           explain
           the
           Eternal
           and
           ineffable
           Generation
           of
           his
           Divine
           and
           Consubstantial
           World.
           But
           what
           then
           ,
           shall
           we
           not
           Believe
           it
           ?
           Or
           rather
           shall
           we
           not
           say
           upon
           this
           Occasion
           with
           the
           Pious
           and
           Ingenious
           Mr.
           Wesley
           ,
           
           
             
             
               Ineffable
               the
               way
               ,
               for
               who
               Th'
               Almighty
               to
               perfection
               ever
               knew
               ?
            
             
               But
               He
               himself
               has
               said
               it
               ,
               and
               it
               must
               be
               true
               .
            
          
           Nay
           to
           go
           lower
           yet
           ,
           if
           there
           be
           so
           many
           things
           relating
           to
           Extension
           ,
           Motion
           and
           Figure
           (
           of
           all
           which
           we
           have
           Clear
           Ideas
           )
           which
           we
           cannot
           Comprehend
           ,
           and
           there
           result
           from
           them
           Propositions
           which
           we
           know
           not
           what
           to
           make
           of
           ,
           with
           how
           much
           greater
           reason
           may
           we
           expect
           to
           find
           what
           we
           cannot
           Understand
           in
           the
           Nature
           of
           an
           Infinite
           Being
           ,
           whereof
           we
           have
           no
           adequate
           Idea
           .
           And
           indeed
           we
           meet
           with
           so
           many
           Incomprehensibles
           in
           the
           School
           of
           Nature
           that
           one
           would
           think
           we
           should
           be
           too
           much
           familiarized
           to
           'em
           to
           think
           them
           strange
           in
           that
           of
           Religion
           ,
           and
           God
           seems
           on
           purpose
           to
           exercise
           and
           discipline
           our
           Understandings
           with
           what
           is
           above
           them
           in
           Natural
           things
           ,
           that
           so
           we
           might
           be
           the
           less
           surprized
           to
           find
           what
           passes
           our
           Conception
           in
           his
           own
           
           Infinite
           Essence
           .
           Here
           then
           at
           least
           you
           may
           Confess
           your
           Ignorance
           ,
           and
           that
           without
           any
           reproach
           to
           your
           Understandings
           ,
           which
           were
           indeed
           intended
           for
           the
           Contemplation
           ,
           but
           not
           for
           the
           Comprehension
           of
           an
           Infinite
           Object
           .
           You
           need
           not
           therefore
           here
           be
           backward
           to
           own
           that
           you
           meet
           with
           what
           you
           cannot
           Comprehend
           (
           it
           would
           indeed
           be
           a
           Mistery
           if
           you
           should
           not
           )
           nor
           think
           it
           any
           disgrace
           to
           have
           your
           Eyes
           dazzl'd
           with
           that
           Light
           at
           the
           insupportable
           Glory
           of
           which
           even
           the
           Seraphin
           Veil
           and
           Cover
           theirs
           .
        
         
           11.
           
           You
           may
           perceive
           by
           this
           that
           your
           Denial
           of
           the
           Doctrine
           of
           the
           Trinity
           because
           of
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           it
           proceeds
           upon
           no
           good
           Consequence
           ,
           but
           you
           are
           also
           further
           desired
           to
           Consider
           the
           very
           Bad
           one
           that
           it
           Naturally
           leads
           to
           .
           You
           refuse
           to
           receive
           this
           Article
           because
           you
           cannot
           Comprehend
           it
           ,
           but
           besides
           that
           your
           Reason
           for
           this
           your
           refusal
           is
           not
           good
           unless
           you
           could
           be
           supposed
           to
           Comprehend
           every
           thing
           ,
           even
           
             the
             Deep
             things
             of
             God.
          
           Pray
           Consider
           what
           
           the
           Consequence
           will
           be
           if
           you
           pursue
           your
           Principle
           to
           the
           utmost
           ,
           and
           Conduct
           your selves
           intirely
           by
           its
           Measures
           .
           Will
           it
           not
           inevitably
           lead
           you
           to
           the
           denial
           of
           all
           Religion
           ?
           This
           perhaps
           may
           startle
           you
           ,
           but
           think
           again
           .
           Will
           not
           this
           necessarily
           lead
           you
           to
           the
           denial
           of
           God
           the
           Foundation
           of
           all
           Religion
           ?
           For
           if
           you
           will
           not
           believe
           the
           Trinal
           Distinction
           of
           Persons
           in
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           because
           you
           cannot
           conceive
           how
           such
           a
           thing
           can
           be
           ,
           then
           may
           you
           not
           for
           the
           same
           reason
           refuse
           as
           well
           to
           believe
           the
           Divine
           Essence
           it self
           ,
           some
           of
           whose
           incommunicable
           Attributes
           ,
           such
           as
           his
           
             Self
             Existence
             ,
             Eternity
             ,
             Immensity
             ,
          
           &c.
           are
           as
           Incomprehensible
           as
           any
           thing
           in
           the
           Notion
           of
           the
           Trinity
           can
           be
           .
           So
           that
           if
           you
           will
           but
           follow
           your
           Measure
           from
           the
           denial
           of
           Three
           you
           may
           be
           quickly
           brought
           to
           deny
           even
           One.
           So
           directly
           does
           your
           Principle
           of
           Believing
           nothing
           but
           what
           you
           can
           Comprehend
           lead
           to
           Atheism
           ,
           and
           that
           with
           such
           swift
           and
           wide
           strides
           ,
           that
           were
           it
           not
           for
           the
           assistance
           of
           the
           same
           expedient
           ,
           
           your
           Friends
           the
           Deists
           would
           hardly
           be
           able
           to
           follow
           you
           .
        
         
           12.
           
           And
           now
           Sirs
           what
           do
           you
           think
           of
           your
           Principle
           ?
           Is
           it
           not
           a
           goodly
           one
           ,
           and
           richly
           worth
           all
           the
           Passion
           and
           Zeal
           you
           have
           express'd
           for
           it
           ?
           You
           know
           very
           well
           that
           
             M.
             Abbadie
          
           in
           his
           Excellent
           Treatise
           of
           the
           Divinity
           of
           Christ
           has
           shewn
           you
           that
           upon
           one
           of
           your
           grounds
           (
           viz.
           the
           denial
           of
           that
           Article
           )
           the
           Mahumetan
           Religion
           is
           preferable
           to
           the
           Christian
           ,
           and
           indeed
           that
           you
           are
           Obliged
           by
           it
           to
           renounce
           Christianity
           and
           turn
           Mahumetans
           .
           This
           truly
           was
           a
           home-thrust
           .
           But
           yet
           you
           see
           the
           Consequence
           of
           your
           general
           Principle
           reaches
           further
           ,
           as
           leading
           your
           not
           only
           out
           of
           Christianity
           ,
           but
           out
           of
           all
           Religion
           whether
           Natural
           or
           Reveal'd
           ,
           even
           beyond
           Deism
           ,
           even
           into
           Atheism
           it self
           .
           If
           it
           does
           not
           actually
           lead
           you
           thither
           the
           fault
           is
           not
           in
           the
           Principle
           ,
           whose
           Connexion
           with
           that
           Consequence
           is
           natural
           enough
           ,
           but
           't
           is
           because
           you
           are
           not
           so
           Consistent
           with
           your selves
           as
           to
           follow
           it
           .
           And
           indeed
           't
           is
           a
           great
           Happiness
           that
           you
           do
           
           not
           ,
           (
           since
           if
           you
           were
           here
           better
           Logicians
           you
           would
           be
           worse
           Men
           )
           though
           it
           would
           be
           a
           much
           greater
           ,
           if
           for
           the
           danger
           of
           being
           more
           Consistent
           with
           it
           you
           would
           be
           perswaded
           to
           lay
           it
           down
           .
        
         
           13.
           
           And
           that
           you
           may
           be
           so
           be
           pleased
           further
           to
           Consider
           ,
           that
           though
           this
           Principle
           of
           yours
           does
           not
           eventually
           carry
           you
           as
           far
           as
           Atheism
           ,
           because
           perhaps
           the
           Horridness
           of
           the
           Conclusion
           may
           be
           a
           Counterweight
           against
           the
           Force
           of
           the
           Premises
           (
           though
           you
           see
           it
           Naturally
           tends
           that
           way
           )
           yet
           there
           is
           very
           great
           danger
           of
           its
           leading
           you
           Effectually
           into
           Deism
           ,
           that
           not
           being
           not
           accounted
           now-a-days
           such
           a
           very
           frightful
           thing
           .
           For
           as
           long
           as
           you
           hold
           that
           what
           is
           above
           Human
           Reason
           is
           not
           to
           be
           Believ'd
           ,
           and
           upon
           that
           Account
           reject
           the
           Christian
           Mysteries
           ,
           because
           they
           are
           above
           Reason
           ,
           you
           lie
           at
           the
           Mercy
           of
           that
           Argument
           that
           shall
           prove
           to
           you
           that
           these
           Mysteries
           are
           indeed
           Reveal'd
           ,
           and
           that
           the
           Genuin
           and
           Natural
           Sense
           of
           the
           Sacred
           Text
           declares
           for
           them
           .
           For
           if
           you
           once
           come
           to
           be
           convinc'd
           of
           that
           ,
           
           you
           will
           then
           be
           Obliged
           in
           Consequence
           of
           your
           Principle
           to
           renounce
           that
           Religion
           which
           reveals
           such
           incredible
           things
           ,
           that
           is
           the
           Christian
           ,
           which
           will
           be
           a
           shrew'd
           (
           indeed
           an
           invincible
           )
           Temptation
           to
           you
           to
           throw
           up
           all
           Reveal'd
           Religion
           ,
           and
           so
           to
           turn
           perfect
           Deists
           .
           And
           I
           pray
           God
           it
           may
           not
           have
           that
           Effect
           upon
           you
           .
        
         
           14.
           
           But
           as
           to
           the
           parting
           with
           Christianity
           that
           you
           will
           be
           further
           tempted
           to
           do
           upon
           another
           account
           .
           For
           when
           you
           have
           by
           your
           Principle
           stript
           it
           ,
           or
           I
           may
           say
           rather
           unbowell'd
           it
           of
           its
           great
           and
           adorable
           Mysteries
           ,
           it
           will
           appear
           such
           a
           poor
           ,
           lank
           ,
           slender
           thing
           to
           you
           that
           you
           will
           hardly
           think
           it
           Considerable
           enough
           to
           be
           reveal'd
           as
           a
           New
           and
           more
           perfect
           ,
           Institution
           by
           God
           ,
           or
           to
           be
           receiv'd
           as
           such
           by
           thinking
           and
           Considering
           Men.
           For
           what
           will
           such
           find
           so
           considerable
           in
           Christianity
           (
           especially
           as
           a
           new
           Institution
           )
           what
           so
           visibly
           peculiar
           and
           assuredly
           distinguishing
           ,
           what
           that
           may
           infallibly
           set
           it
           above
           an
           Humane
           Institution
           ,
           if
           it
           be
           once
           robb'd
           of
           its
           Mysteries
           ?
           They
           may
           indeed
           think
           
           it
           a
           good
           plain
           piece
           of
           Morals
           ,
           and
           such
           as
           exceeds
           any
           other
           of
           a
           known
           Humane
           Composure
           ,
           but
           how
           are
           they
           sure
           but
           that
           the
           Invention
           of
           Man
           may
           be
           able
           to
           rise
           so
           high
           ,
           as
           to
           Compose
           such
           a
           System
           as
           this
           ,
           if
           you
           set
           aside
           its
           Mysteries
           ?
           Which
           therefore
           I
           cannot
           but
           look
           upon
           of
           all
           the
           things
           that
           are
           intrinsic
           to
           it
           (
           for
           I
           do
           not
           here
           Consider
           Miracles
           )
           as
           the
           greatest
           Characters
           of
           its
           Divinity
           .
           And
           some
           perhaps
           would
           be
           apt
           to
           think
           them
           such
           as
           without
           which
           it
           would
           hardly
           be
           thought
           worthy
           of
           reception
           (
           especially
           as
           a
           New
           Institution
           )
           even
           with
           the
           help
           of
           Miracles
           ,
           which
           Men
           are
           always
           ready
           ,
           and
           not
           without
           reason
           ,
           to
           suspect
           ,
           when
           the
           Matters
           for
           whose
           sake
           they
           are
           wrought
           bear
           not
           sufficient
           Proportion
           to
           them
           .
           Which
           they
           would
           also
           perhaps
           be
           inclined
           to
           think
           to
           be
           the
           present
           Case
           .
           For
           what
           (
           would
           they
           say
           )
           is
           there
           in
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           that
           deserves
           so
           great
           ado
           ,
           what
           that
           should
           ingage
           an
           Omnipotent
           Arm
           to
           introduce
           it
           into
           the
           World
           ,
           by
           such
           mighty
           Signs
           and
           Wonders
           ,
           
           if
           there
           be
           indeed
           nothing
           Wonderful
           in
           it
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           if
           you
           take
           away
           its
           Mysteries
           .
           What
           cannot
           a
           good
           System
           of
           Morality
           (
           especially
           if
           only
           a
           Second
           ,
           and
           a
           little
           more
           Correct
           Edition
           of
           a
           Former
           )
           be
           Communicated
           to
           the
           World
           without
           Alarming
           Heaven
           and
           Earth
           ,
           and
           giving
           disturbance
           to
           the
           Course
           of
           Nature
           ?
           And
           if
           Christianity
           be
           no
           More
           ,
           what
           Proportion
           (
           say
           they
           )
           will
           it
           bear
           to
           its
           Miraculous
           Introduction
           ?
           And
           what
           will
           it
           be
           found
           to
           have
           so
           very
           Considerable
           as
           either
           to
           deserve
           or
           justifie
           such
           an
           Apparatus
           ?
           It
           must
           indeed
           be
           allow'd
           by
           all
           to
           be
           a
           good
           wholsom
           Institution
           for
           the
           Direction
           of
           Manners
           ,
           but
           what
           is
           there
           so
           very
           Great
           and
           Admirable
           in
           it
           ,
           what
           that
           either
           deserves
           or
           answers
           to
           so
           many
           Types
           and
           Figures
           and
           Prophetical
           Predictions
           ,
           what
           that
           so
           Copiously
           sets
           forth
           the
           Manifold
           Wisdom
           of
           God
           ,
           and
           the
           Glory
           of
           his
           Attributes
           ,
           and
           the
           Nothingness
           of
           the
           Creature
           ,
           and
           where
           are
           those
           
             Deep
             things
             of
             God
          
           ,
           that
           Eye
           hath
           not
           seen
           nor
           Ear
           heard
           ,
           nor
           have
           
           enter'd
           into
           the
           Heart
           of
           Man
           (
           a
           place
           which
           the
           Apostle
           applies
           out
           of
           the
           Prophet
           Isaiah
           to
           the
           Revelations
           of
           the
           Gospel
           )
           where
           I
           say
           are
           those
           profound
           things
           which
           the
           Spirit
           of
           God
           only
           that
           
             Searches
             all
             things
          
           could
           reveal
           ,
           
           and
           which
           even
           now
           they
           are
           Reveal'd
           
             the
             Angels
             desire
             to
             look
             into
             .
          
           
           You
           'l
           hardly
           find
           any
           thing
           of
           so
           rais'd
           a
           Character
           in
           Christianity
           if
           you
           devest
           it
           of
           its
           Mysteries
           ,
           which
           therefore
           may
           justly
           be
           reckon'd
           as
           the
           Main
           Pillars
           of
           it
           ,
           without
           which
           it
           will
           have
           much
           ado
           to
           support
           it self
           .
           So
           that
           in
           short
           
             Christianity
             Not
             Mysterious
          
           (
           how
           fond
           soever
           a
           Certain
           Author
           is
           of
           such
           a
           Religion
           )
           will
           make
           but
           a
           very
           little
           Figure
           in
           Proportion
           to
           its
           Pomp
           and
           External
           Splendor
           ,
           and
           indeed
           will
           almost
           dwindle
           down
           into
           Nothing
           .
        
         
           15.
           
           It
           may
           indeed
           even
           without
           the
           Mysteries
           make
           a
           shift
           to
           subsist
           as
           a
           mere
           System
           of
           Precepts
           ,
           and
           Rule
           of
           Life
           ,
           though
           even
           thus
           Consider'd
           it
           will
           be
           greatly
           impair'd
           and
           suffer
           much
           disadvantage
           
           (
           as
           wanting
           those
           Convincing
           Demonstrations
           of
           God's
           hatred
           of
           Sin
           ,
           and
           of
           his
           Love
           towards
           Mankind
           ,
           and
           withal
           those
           indearing
           and
           perswasive
           Arguments
           for
           their
           returns
           of
           Love
           ,
           Gratitude
           and
           Obedience
           towards
           him
           ,
           which
           can
           only
           be
           deriv'd
           from
           the
           Redemption
           of
           the
           World
           by
           the
           Death
           and
           Satisfaction
           of
           its
           Divine
           Undertaker
           )
           but
           as
           a
           Covenant
           of
           Grace
           establish'd
           betwixt
           God
           and
           his
           Offending
           and
           Estranged
           Creature
           it
           cannot
           possibly
           stand
           ,
           but
           must
           fall
           to
           the
           ground
           .
           So
           that
           though
           the
           Moral
           or
           Legal
           part
           (
           as
           I
           may
           call
           it
           )
           of
           Christianity
           may
           at
           a
           hard
           rate
           Continue
           after
           the
           downfall
           of
           its
           Mysteries
           ,
           yet
           its
           Federal
           part
           ,
           and
           all
           that
           is
           properly
           Gospel
           in
           it
           must
           needs
           be
           involv'd
           in
           the
           Ruin
           and
           Fall
           with
           them
           ,
           that
           being
           all
           built
           upon
           the
           Satisfaction
           of
           Christ
           ,
           as
           that
           again
           upon
           his
           Divinity
           ,
           which
           is
           therefore
           the
           very
           Foundation
           of
           the
           Christian
           Religion
           ,
           as
           
             M.
             Abbadie
          
           has
           by
           Variety
           of
           Demonstration
           proved
           it
           to
           be
           .
           If
           then
           you
           would
           
           have
           that
           Divine
           Institution
           stand
           ,
           and
           if
           you
           would
           stand
           fast
           in
           it
           (
           both
           which
           I
           am
           willing
           to
           suppose
           )
           have
           a
           care
           how
           you
           remove
           its
           Mysteries
           ,
           Considering
           how
           Fundamental
           they
           are
           to
           the
           Building
           ,
           and
           how
           great
           a
           share
           of
           its
           Sacred
           Weight
           rests
           upon
           them
           .
           But
           endeavour
           rather
           to
           remove
           your
           own
           Prejudices
           ,
           to
           Mortifie
           your
           Understandings
           ,
           to
           study
           Humility
           ,
           and
           to
           restrain
           the
           too
           free
           Sallies
           of
           your
           too
           curious
           and
           over
           venturous
           Reason
           by
           still
           and
           silent
           Reflections
           upon
           God's
           Infinite
           Greatness
           ,
           and
           your
           own
           almost
           as
           great
           Infirmities
           ,
           by
           which
           one
           Thought
           well
           pursued
           you
           will
           (
           by
           the
           Grace
           of
           God
           )
           come
           to
           a
           better
           Understanding
           of
           your selves
           than
           to
           reject
           any
           of
           his
           plain
           Revelations
           merely
           because
           you
           cannot
           Conceive
           them
           ,
           and
           so
           leaving
           Light
           and
           Vision
           to
           the
           other
           Life
           ,
           will
           be
           Content
           with
           other
           good
           Christians
           humbly
           to
           Believe
           and
           Adore
           in
           this
           .
        
         
         
           16.
           
           Gentlemen
           ,
           I
           beseech
           you
           seriously
           to
           Consider
           what
           with
           Christian
           Charity
           and
           all
           due
           Civil
           Respect
           I
           have
           here
           laid
           before
           you
           ,
           and
           if
           upon
           Consideration
           of
           it
           you
           find
           any
           weight
           in
           it
           ,
           to
           let
           it
           have
           its
           full
           Force
           and
           Effect
           upon
           you
           .
           Which
           if
           you
           do
           I
           hope
           it
           may
           serve
           by
           the
           Blessing
           of
           God
           (
           to
           whom
           for
           that
           end
           I
           humbly
           devote
           this
           Labour
           )
           to
           Convince
           you
           ,
           or
           at
           least
           to
           put
           you
           upon
           such
           better
           Considerations
           of
           your
           own
           as
           May.
           For
           I
           pretend
           not
           here
           to
           have
           said
           all
           ,
           but
           to
           have
           left
           many
           things
           to
           the
           inlargement
           and
           improvement
           of
           your
           own
           Meditation
           ,
           Considering
           the
           impropriety
           of
           doing
           otherwise
           to
           Persons
           of
           your
           Parts
           and
           Learning
           ,
           which
           I
           pray
           God
           to
           Sanctifie
           and
           Increase
           to
           you
           .
           Whereby
           you
           may
           perceive
           that
           I
           am
           not
           against
           your
           making
           use
           of
           your
           Reason
           .
           No
           ,
           I
           would
           only
           have
           you
           reason
           rightly
           ,
           and
           that
           you
           may
           do
           so
           would
           have
           you
           by
           all
           Human
           Methods
           to
           improve
           and
           Cultivate
           your
           Reason
           as
           much
           as
           you
           can
           ,
           being
           well
           perswaded
           that
           as
           a
           half-view
           of
           things
           
           makes
           men
           Opiniative
           ,
           Disputatious
           and
           Dogmatical
           ,
           so
           a
           Clear
           and
           thorough
           Light
           makes
           them
           Humble
           and
           distrustful
           of
           themselves
           ,
           and
           that
           the
           more
           Cultivated
           and
           Improved
           any
           Man's
           Natural
           Reason
           is
           ,
           the
           easier
           it
           will
           be
           for
           him
           to
           Captivate
           it
           to
           the
           
             Obedience
             of
             Faith.
          
           
        
      
    
     
       
         
         
           POST-SCRIPT
           .
        
         
           SInce
           the
           Committing
           of
           these
           Papers
           to
           the
           Press
           I
           have
           had
           the
           pleasure
           to
           peruse
           Mr.
           
           Whiston's
           New
           Theory
           of
           the
           Earth
           ,
           for
           which
           extraordinary
           and
           truly
           great
           Performance
           I
           return
           him
           all
           due
           Thanks
           ,
           and
           am
           very
           glad
           to
           see
           so
           great
           a
           Master
           of
           Reason
           and
           Philosophy
           express
           so
           awful
           and
           reverential
           a
           regard
           to
           Religion
           in
           general
           ,
           and
           in
           particular
           to
           the
           Sacred
           Mysteries
           of
           it
           ,
           against
           which
           both
           Human
           Reason
           and
           Natural
           Philosophy
           have
           been
           of
           late
           so
           abusively
           and
           profanely
           imploy'd
           .
           How
           far
           this
           Ingenious
           and
           Learned
           Author
           makes
           good
           his
           great
           undertaking
           ,
           or
           whether
           this
           or
           the
           
           Former
           Theorist
           be
           most
           likely
           to
           be
           in
           the
           right
           .
           I
           shall
           not
           take
           upon
           me
           to
           examin
           .
           I
           only
           make
           this
           Observation
           from
           both
           their
           wonderful
           Attempts
           that
           whether
           they
           are
           in
           the
           right
           or
           no
           ,
           as
           to
           their
           respective
           Accounts
           of
           things
           ,
           yet
           they
           have
           at
           least
           gone
           so
           far
           and
           offer'd
           so
           fairly
           towards
           a
           true
           Explanation
           of
           them
           ,
           as
           to
           Convince
           any
           Competent
           and
           indifferent
           Reader
           that
           the
           Mosaiek
           Records
           concerning
           the
           greater
           Phenomena
           of
           Creation
           and
           Providence
           are
           not
           really
           of
           so
           desperate
           a
           Nature
           as
           they
           were
           once
           presumed
           to
           be
           ,
           but
           are
           in
           themselves
           Capable
           of
           ,
           and
           may
           perhaps
           in
           time
           actually
           have
           (
           if
           they
           have
           not
           already
           )
           a
           true
           natural
           Solution
           .
           As
           for
           Instance
           ,
           a
           Universal
           Flood
           without
           a
           Miracle
           ,
           or
           that
           the
           World
           should
           be
           wholly
           Drown'd
           in
           a
           Natural
           way
           ,
           or
           according
           to
           the
           Laws
           of
           Motion
           already
           settled
           ,
           and
           by
           a
           Train
           of
           Causes
           already
           laid
           in
           Nature
           ,
           has
           been
           hitherto
           thought
           an
           Incomprehensible
           ,
           and
           accordingly
           an
           Impossible
           thing
           .
           But
           
           now
           if
           these
           two
           Mighty
           
           Genius's
           who
           have
           undertaken
           to
           give
           a
           Natural
           Account
           of
           this
           stupendous
           Revolution
           have
           neither
           of
           them
           pitch'd
           upon
           the
           very
           precise
           way
           and
           Manner
           whereby
           it
           was
           brought
           to
           pass
           ,
           yet
           I
           think
           it
           cannot
           be
           denied
           but
           that
           they
           have
           said
           enough
           between
           them
           to
           Convince
           that
           the
           thing
           was
           naturally
           Possible
           ,
           and
           that
           a
           true
           Natural
           Account
           may
           be
           given
           of
           it
           ,
           though
           they
           should
           be
           supposed
           not
           to
           have
           hit
           directly
           upon
           that
           which
           is
           so
           .
           That
           is
           ,
           I
           mean
           ,
           they
           have
           represented
           it
           at
           least
           as
           a
           Conceivable
           thing
           ,
           whether
           they
           themselves
           have
           had
           the
           good
           fortune
           to
           Conceive
           of
           it
           exactly
           as
           it
           was
           or
           no.
           Upon
           which
           it
           is
           very
           Natural
           and
           no
           less
           pertinent
           to
           the
           Concern
           in
           hand
           to
           make
           this
           further
           Reflexion
           ,
           that
           we
           should
           not
           be
           Overhasty
           to
           pronounce
           any
           thing
           (
           even
           of
           a
           Physical
           ,
           much
           less
           of
           a
           Religious
           Nature
           )
           to
           be
           Impossible
           ,
           only
           because
           it
           appears
           to
           us
           to
           be
           Incomprehensible
           .
           For
           besides
           that
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           is
           (
           as
           this
           
           whole
           Discourse
           shews
           )
           no
           certain
           Argument
           of
           its
           Impossibility
           ,
           and
           that
           what
           appears
           incomprehensible
           to
           our
           Understandings
           may
           at
           the
           same
           time
           be
           well
           Comprehended
           by
           those
           of
           Angels
           ,
           not
           to
           say
           of
           wiser
           Men
           ,
           perhaps
           that
           which
           appears
           to
           us
           at
           present
           to
           be
           above
           all
           Comprehension
           may
           in
           process
           of
           time
           and
           upon
           further
           Reflexion
           and
           Experience
           so
           brighten
           and
           clear
           up
           to
           our
           Minds
           ,
           as
           to
           be
           Comprehended
           ,
           or
           at
           least
           to
           be
           thought
           of
           a
           Comprehensible
           and
           Possible
           Nature
           even
           by
           our
           more
           improved
           selves
           .
           For
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           as
           such
           being
           no
           Absolute
           Affection
           or
           Intrinsic
           Denomination
           of
           the
           thing
           it self
           from
           its
           own
           Nature
           ,
           but
           only
           such
           as
           affects
           it
           from
           without
           and
           in
           relation
           to
           the
           present
           Capacity
           of
           our
           Understandings
           ,
           there
           needs
           no
           alteration
           in
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           thing
           to
           make
           that
           Comprehensible
           ,
           which
           was
           before
           incomprehensible
           ,
           a
           Change
           in
           our
           Understandings
           is
           sufficient
           ,
           upon
           whose
           greater
           improvement
           alone
           an
           incomprehensible
           may
           become
           a
           
           Comprehensible
           Object
           .
           So
           that
           besides
           the
           Nullity
           of
           the
           Consequence
           from
           the
           Incomprehensibility
           of
           a
           thing
           to
           its
           Impossibility
           ,
           even
           the
           Principle
           it self
           from
           which
           that
           Consequence
           is
           pretended
           to
           be
           drawn
           may
           be
           remov'd
           ,
           by
           the
           present
           Comprehension
           of
           what
           pass'd
           before
           with
           us
           for
           an
           incomprehensible
           Proposition
           .
           Upon
           both
           which
           Considerations
           we
           are
           admonish'd
           to
           be
           very
           Cautious
           how
           we
           Conclude
           any
           thing
           in
           Nature
           ,
           much
           more
           in
           Scripture
           ,
           to
           be
           impossible
           ,
           because
           to
           us
           incomprehensible
           .
           And
           't
           is
           the
           very
           use
           Mr.
           Whiston
           himself
           makes
           of
           the
           latter
           of
           them
           in
           the
           Conclusion
           of
           his
           excellent
           Work
           ,
           from
           which
           I
           think
           it
           worth
           while
           to
           transcribe
           a
           Passage
           both
           for
           the
           Advantage
           of
           the
           present
           Argument
           ,
           and
           the
           greater
           Conviction
           of
           the
           Reader
           ,
           to
           whom
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           to
           my self
           ,
           it
           must
           be
           no
           little
           Satisfaction
           to
           see
           the
           Sentiments
           of
           so
           great
           an
           Author
           concur
           with
           mine
           .
        
         
           The
           Measure
           of
           our
           present
           knowledge
           (
           
             says
             he
          
           )
           
           ought
           not
           to
           be
           esteem'd
           
           the
           
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
             〈◊〉
          
           or
           Test
           of
           Truth
           (
           
             the
             very
             Proposition
             almost
             in
             Terms
             of
             my
             Fourth
             Chapter
          
           )
           or
           to
           be
           opposed
           to
           the
           Accounts
           receiv'd
           from
           profane
           Antiquity
           ,
           much
           less
           to
           the
           inspired
           writings
           .
           For
           notwithstanding
           that
           several
           particulars
           relating
           to
           the
           eldest
           Condition
           of
           the
           VVorld
           and
           its
           great
           Catastrophe's
           ,
           examine'd
           and
           compared
           with
           so
           much
           Philosophy
           as
           was
           till
           lately
           known
           ,
           were
           plainly
           unaccountable
           ,
           and
           ,
           naturally
           speaking
           ,
           impossible
           ;
           yet
           we
           see
           now
           Nature
           is
           more
           fully
           ,
           more
           certainly
           ,
           and
           more
           substantially
           understood
           ,
           that
           the
           same
           things
           approve
           themselves
           to
           be
           plain
           ,
           easie
           ,
           and
           rational
           .
           'T
           is
           therefore
           Folly
           in
           the
           highest
           degree
           to
           reject
           the
           Truth
           or
           Divine
           Authority
           of
           the
           Holy
           Scriptures
           because
           we
           cannot
           give
           our
           Minds
           particular
           satisfaction
           as
           to
           the
           Manner
           ,
           may
           or
           even
           possibility
           of
           some
           things
           therein
           asserted
           .
           Since
           we
           have
           seen
           so
           many
           of
           those
           things
           ,
           which
           seem'd
           the
           most
           incredible
           in
           the
           whole
           Bible
           ,
           and
           gave
           the
           greatest
           Scruple
           and
           Scandal
           to
           Philosophic
           Minds
           ,
           so
           fully
           and
           particularly
           attested
           ,
           and
           next
           to
           demonstrated
           from
           Certain
           Principles
           
           of
           Astronomy
           and
           natural
           Knowledge
           ;
           't
           is
           but
           reasonable
           to
           expect
           in
           due
           time
           a
           like
           Solution
           of
           the
           other
           Difficulties
           .
           'T
           is
           but
           just
           sure
           to
           depend
           upon
           the
           Veracity
           of
           those
           Holy
           VVriters
           in
           other
           Assertions
           ,
           whose
           Fidelity
           is
           so
           intirely
           establish'd
           in
           these
           hitherto
           equally
           unaccountable
           ones
           .
           The
           obvious
           ,
           plain
           ,
           or
           literal
           Sense
           of
           the
           Sacred
           Scriptures
           ought
           not
           without
           great
           reason
           to
           be
           eluded
           or
           laid
           aside
           :
           Several
           of
           those
           very
           places
           which
           seem'd
           very
           much
           to
           require
           the
           same
           hitherto
           ,
           appearing
           now
           to
           the
           Minutest
           Circumstances
           ,
           true
           and
           rational
           ,
           according
           to
           the
           strictest
           and
           most
           literal
           Interpretation
           of
           them
           .
           VVe
           may
           be
           under
           an
           Obligation
           to
           believe
           such
           things
           on
           the
           Authority
           of
           the
           Holy
           Scriptures
           as
           are
           properly
           Mysteries
           ▪
           that
           is
           ,
           though
           not
           really
           Contradictory
           ,
           yet
           plainly
           unaccountable
           to
           our
           (
           present
           degree
           of
           )
           Knowledge
           and
           Reason
           .
           Thus
           the
           Sacred
           Histories
           of
           the
           Original
           Constitution
           ,
           and
           great
           Catastrophe's
           of
           the
           VVorld
           have
           been
           in
           the
           past
           Ages
           the
           Objects
           of
           the
           Faith
           of
           Iews
           and
           Christians
           ,
           though
           the
           Divine
           Providence
           had
           not
           afforded
           so
           much
           light
           as
           
           that
           they
           could
           otherwise
           Satisfie
           themselves
           in
           the
           Credibility
           of
           them
           ,
           till
           the
           new
           improvements
           in
           Philosophy
           .
           And
           this
           is
           but
           just
           and
           Reasonable
           .
           For
           sure
           the
           Ignorance
           or
           Incapacity
           of
           the
           Creature
           does
           by
           no
           Means
           afford
           sufficient
           ground
           for
           Incredulity
           ,
           or
           justifie
           Men
           in
           their
           rejecting
           Divine
           Revelation
           ,
           and
           impeaching
           the
           Veracity
           or
           Providence
           of
           the
           Creator
           .
           
             With
             which
             weighty
             ,
             and
             to
             the
             present
             purpose
             very
             pertinent
             words
             of
             this
             worthy
             Author
             I
             Seal
             up
             my
             own
             ,
             and
             leave
             them
             both
             to
             the
             Consideration
             of
             the
             Reader
             .
          
        
         
           FINIS
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           Corrections
           .
        
         
           PAge
           176.
           line
           22.
           after
           describe
           read
           its
           .
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           Perfections
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           are
           as
           .
           p.
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           1.
           r.
           proceeds
           .
           p.
           287.
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           12.
           for
           
             as
             his
             Vicar
             does
          
           ,
           r.
           whatever
           his
           Vicar
           may
           do
           .
           p.
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           l.
           23.
           after
           or
           ,
           r.
           as
           .
           p.
           292.
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           Scrutiny
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         Notes, typically marginal, from the original text
         
           Notes for div A52412-e850
           
             *
             
               See
               Mrs.
            
             Bourignon
             
               's
               Works
               at
               large
               ▪
               particularly
            
             Vol.
             7.
             
             Part
             2d
             .
             pag.
             193.
             
             
               As
               also
               Mr.
            
             Poiret
             
               's
               Oeconomic
               Divine
            
             Vol.
             5.
             p.
             338.
             
          
           
             Luk.
             18.
             8.
             
          
           
             Rom.
             11.
             19
             ,
             20
             ,
             21
             ,
             22.
             
          
           
             Ioh.
             15.
             2.
             
          
           
             2
             Tim.
             3.
             
          
           
             2
             Pet.
             2.
             
          
           
             
               In
               the
               Preface
               to
               his
            
             Metaphysical
             Meditat.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e1770
           
             Philoso
             .
             contract
             .
             p.
             242.
             
          
           
             Recherche
             
               de
               la
               Veritè
            
             .
             Liv.
             1.
             p.
             10.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e3300
           
             2
             Tim.
             1.
             12.
             
          
           
             22
             ●
             .
             Q.
             1.
             
             Art.
             1.
             
          
           
             Chap.
             7.
             
             Artic.
             9.
             
          
           
             Tom.
             9.
             p.
             107.
             
          
           
             2
             Pet.
             5.
             
          
           
             Heb.
             11.
             1.
             
          
           
             2
             Thes.
             2.
             4.
             
          
           
             Heb.
             11.
             8.
             
          
           
             Joh.
             〈◊〉
             40.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e5250
           
             Avis
             Stir
             le
             Table●●
             du
             Socinianisme
             .
             Traité
             1.
             pag.
             14
             ▪
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e6500
           
             L'
             Art
             de
             Penser
             .
             p.
             432.
             
          
           
             Cogit
             .
             Rational
             .
             de
             Deo
             ,
             p.
             296.
             
          
           
             Mr.
             Malebranche
             .
          
           
             *
             Veritas
             immortalis
             est
             ,
             veritas
             incommutabilis
             est
             ,
             veritas
             illud
             verbum
             est
             de
             quo
             dicitur
             
               in
               principio
               erat
               verbum
               ,
               &
               verbum
               erat
               apud
               Deum
               &
               Deus
               erat
               verbum
               .
            
             S.
             Austin
             in
             Psal.
             123.
             
          
           
             Iob
             11.
             7.
             
          
           
             Psal.
             97.
             2.
             
          
           
             Rom.
             11.
             33.
             
          
           
             *
             
               I
               the
               rather
               Instance
               in
               the
            
             Divine
             Immensity
             ,
             
               because
               the
               D●vout
               Psalmist
               does
               herein
               parti●ularize
               his
               Ignorance
               ,
               making
               it
               the
               Subject
               of
               his
               Astonishment
               rather
               than
               his
               Curiosity
               .
            
             Such
             Knowledge
             is
             too
             wonderful
             for
             me
             ,
             it
             is
             high
             ,
             I
             cannot
             attain
             unto
             it
             ,
             Psal.
             139.
             
          
           
             ●erardi
             de
             Vries
             Prasessoris
             V●tra●
             〈◊〉
             ,
             exercitationes
             rationales
             de
             Deo
             ,
             Divinisque
             Perfectoinibus
             Pag.
             248.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e8960
           
             Psal.
             4.
             
          
           
             Le
             Clerks
             Physics
             .
             Pag.
             14.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e9630
           
             〈…〉
             
          
           
             Recherche
             de
             la
             Verité
             .
             
               Tom.
               2.
               p.
            
             165.
             
          
           
             〈…〉
             .
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e10660
           
             Psal.
             32.
             10.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e11050
           
             〈…〉
             .
          
           
             Christianity
             not
             My●ter
             ▪
             p.
             90.
             
          
           
             Serm.
             of
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             the
             Christian
             Faith.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e11270
           
             Life
             of
             Christ
             ,
             p.
             184.
             
          
           
             1
             Cor.
             2.
             9
             ,
             10.
             
          
           
             1
             Pet.
             1.
             12.
             
          
        
         
           Notes for div A52412-e12430
           
             p.
             379.