instructions: this is a multi volume index file the index has links to all volumes. follow these instructions if you would like to have your own copy of this index and all the volumes of the pg freethinkers, on your hard disk. doing so will allow this index to be used with all the many links to the volumes and chapters when you are not connected to the internet: 3. go to your download directory and double-click on the downloaded file (41450-h.zip), and move the directory 41450-h to this or any other directory you would like. then double-click on 41450-h; you will see several directories: you may rename the directory named files to any name you wish, such as freethinkers. you may move this file to any directory on your computer. 4. in the newly named directory containing all the ebooks in this set you will find a file named index; this may be moved toany directory on your computer. this index file or its shorcut allows you to open all of the off-line files, chapters and illustrations in this set now on your hard disk. the name of the shortcut may of course be renamed as you wish, for example: freethinkers index. when using the index or any of the files you may use the back button to return from any link. 5. this archive of project gutenberg ebooks in the files directory (see instruction #3) also includes, in addition to the usual html files for your computer, two sets of mobile viewer files for kindles, nooks and others which use .mobi or .epub formats. there is no index for these as after you download them to your mobile viewer it will automatially list the new title names in the usual place. the directories are named: "epub" and "mobi". double click on the directory which applies to your mobile viewer and move all the enclosed files to your device using the same connection technique you are familiar with when you have downloaded any commercial ebooks from your computer. comic bible sketches reprinted from "the freethinker" by g. w. foote part i. london: progressive publishing company 28 stonecutter street, e.c. 1885. introduction. english literature has its comic histories, its comic grammars, its comic geographies, and its comic law-books, and carlyle once prophesied that it would some day boast its comic bible. tough as the fine old sage of chelsea was, he predicted this monstrosity with something of the horror a barbarian might feel at the thought of some irreverent fellow deliberately laughing at the tribal fetish. but what shocked our latter-day prophet so greatly in mere anticipation has partially come to pass. "la bible amusante" has had an extensive sale in france, and the infectious irreverence has extended itself to england. notwithstanding that mr. g. r. sims, when he saw the first numbers of that abominable publication, piously turned up the whites of his eyes, and declared his opinion that no english freethinker, however extreme, would think of reproducing or imitating them, there were found persons so utterly abandoned as not to scruple at this unparalleled profanity. several of the french drawings were copied with more or less fidelity in the _freethinker_, a scandalous print, as the christians love to describe it, which has been prosecuted twice for blasphemy, and whose editor, proprietor and publisher, have been punished respectively with twelve, nine and three months' imprisonment like common felons, all for the glory and honor of god, for the satisfaction of his dear son, and for the vindication of the holy spirit. in many cases the french originals could not be reproduced in england, owing to their gallic flavor. a parisian artist, disporting himself among those highly moral histories in the bible which our youths and maidens discover with unerring instinct, was not a spectacle which one could dare to exhibit before the pious and chaste british public; any more than an english poet could follow the lead of evariste parny in his "guerre des dieux" and "les amours de la bible." but many others were free from this objection, and a selection of them served as a basis for the freethinker artist to work on. a few were copied pretty closely; some were elaborated and adapted to our national taste; while others furnished a central suggestion, which was treated in an independent manner. by-and-bye, as the insular diffidence wore off, and the minds of the freethinker staff played freely on the subject, a new departure was taken; novel ideas were worked out, and holy writ was ransacked for fresh comicalities. dullards prophesied a speedy exhaustion of bible topics, but they did not know how inexhaustible it is in absurdities. properly read, it is the most comical book in the world; and one might say of it, as enobarbus says of cleopatra, that age cannot wither it, nor custom stale; it's infinite variety. the following comic bible sketches, which will be succeeded in due course by others, comprise all those worth preserving that appeared in the freethinker before its editor, proprietor and publisher were imprisoned, including the drawings they were prosecuted for by that pious guinea: pig, sir henry tyler, who had his dirty fingers severely rapped by lord coleridge, after spending several hundred pounds of somebody's money in an unsuccessful blasphemy prosecution, in order to patch up his threadbare reputation, and perhaps also with a faint hope of cheating the almighty into reserving him a front-seat ticket for the dress-circle in heaven. the french comic bible prints under each illustration a few crisp lines of satiric narrative. this plan has its advantages; it allows, for instance, the writer's pen to curvet as well as the artist's pencil. but it is after all less effective than the plan we have adopted. we merely give each picture a comprehensive and striking title, and print beneath it the bible text which is illustrated. by this means the satire is greatly heightened. not even the sentences of a voltaire could so illuminate and emphasise the grotesqueness of each topic as this juxtaposition of the solemnly absurd scripture with the gaily absurd illustration. the same spirit has animated us in designing the pictures. our object has been to take the bible text always as our basis, to include no feature which is contradicted by it, and to introduce as many comicalities and anachronisms as possible consistently with this rule. we are therefore able to defy criticism. bibliolators may vituperate us, persecute us, or imprison us, but they cannot refute us.. we can safely challenge them to prove that a single incident happened otherwise than we have depicted it. we can candidly say to them--"the thing must have happened in some way, as to which the divine word is silent; this is our view,--what is yours?" and we humbly submit that our speculations are as valid as our neighbors'. nothing but the insanest bigotry in favor of their own conjectures could lead them to quarrel with us for expounding ours. if they can shame us with explicit disproofs from holy writ, let them do so; but what right have they to set up their carnal imaginings and uninspired theories as the ultimate criteria of truth? those who object to any employment of satire on "sacred" subjects should not go beyond the preface of this book. it is not for them, nor are they for it; and they are warned in the hall of what they must expect in the various chambers. but if they neglect the warning they should take the responsibility. it will be simply indecent if they turn round afterwards and assail us with unmerited abuse. for the sake of those who proceed in a spirit of impartial candor and honest inquiry, we beg to offer a little further explanation. we honestly admit that our purpose is to discredit the bible as the infallible word of god. believing as we do, with voltaire, that despotism can never be abolished without destroying the dogmas on which it rests, and that the bible is the grand source and sanction of them all, we are profoundly anxious to expose its pretentions. the educated classes already see through them, and the upper classes credit them just as little, although they dare not openly profess a scepticism which would imperil their privileges. but the multitude are still left to the manipulation of priests, credulous victims of the black army everywhere arrayed against freedom and progress. it is to liberate these from thraldom that we labor, sacrifice and suffer. without being indifferent to what the world calls success, we acknowledge the sovereignty of loftier aims. compared with the advancement of freethought everything else is to us of trivial moment. it may interest, and perhaps surprise, some to learn that for the famous christmas number of the freethinker which was successfully prosecuted, the editor received absolutely nothing for his work except twelve months' imprisonment, while the then registered proprietor, who suffered nine months of the same fate, actually shared with him a pecuniary loss of five pounds. we are really in deadly earnest, like all the greater soldiers of freedom who preceded us; and we employ our smaller resources of satire, as such giants as lucian, rabelais, erasmus, voltaire and heine used theirs, for ends that reach far forward into the mighty future, and affect the welfare of unimagined generations of mankind. now the masses do not read learned disquisitions; they have no leisure to make themselves adequately acquainted with the history of the bible documents; nor can they study comparative religion, trace out the analogies between christianity and older faiths, and realise how all the elaborate developments of doctrine and ritual in modern creeds have sprung from a few simple beliefs and practices of savage superstition. but they are conversant with one or two cardinal ideas of science, and they know the principles which underlie our daily life. what is called common sense (the logic of common experience) is their philosophy, and whoever seeks to move them must appeal to them through that. strange as it may appear, it is that very common sense which the clergy dread far more than all the disclosures of learning and all the revelations of science; the reason being, that learning and science are the privilege of a few, while common sense is the possession of all, and affects the very foundations of spiritual and political tyranny. ridicule is a most potent form of common-sense logic. what is the _reductio ad absurdum_ but an appeal to admitted truths against plausible falsehoods? reducing a thing to an absurdity is simply showing its inconsistency with what is common to both sides in a dispute; and it frequently means the exposure of a gross contradiction to the principles of sanity. laughter, too, as hobbes pointed out, has always an element of pride or contempt; being invariably accompanied by a feeling of superiority to its object. whoever laughs at an absurdity is above it. he looks down on it from a loftier altitude than argument can reach. the man who laughs is safe. he can never more be in danger, unless he suffers fatty degeneration of the heart or fattier degeneration of the head. priestcraft nourishes hope in the scientific laboratory, and feels only faint misgivings in academic halls; but it pales and withers at the smile of scepticism, and hears in a low laugh the note of the trump of doom. ridicule can never injure truth. what it hurts must be false. laugh at the multiplication-table as much as you please, and twice two will still make four. pictorial ridicule has the immense advantage of visualising absurdities. lazy minds, or those accustomed to regard a subject with the reverence of prejudice, read without realising. but the picture supplies the deficiency of their imagination, translates words into things, and enables them to see what had else been only a vague sound. christians read the bible without realising its wonders, allowing themselves to be cheated with words. mr. herbert spencer has remarked that the image of the almighty hand launching worlds into space is very fine until you try to form a mental picture of it, when it is found to be utterly irrealisable. in the same way, the creation story is passable until you image the lord making a clay man and blowing up his nose; or the story of samson until you picture him slaying file after file of well-armed soldiers with the jaw-bone of a costermonger's pony. let it be observed that these comic bible sketches ridicule nothing but miracles. mr. mathew arnold has said that the bible miracles are only fairy tales (very poor ones, by the way) and their reign is doomed. we only seek to hasten their deposition. whatever the bible contains of truth, goodness and beauty, we prize as well as its blindest devotees. but this valuable deposit of antiquity would be more useful if cleared of the rubbish of superstition. it is not the good, but the evil parts of the bible, that are supported by its supernaturalism. why should civilised englishmen go walking about in hebrew old-clothes? let us heed carlyle's stern monition:--"the jew old-clothes having now grown fairly pestilential, a poisonous incumbrance in the path of of men, burn them up with revolutionary fire." a word in conclusion. the editor of the "manchester examiner," writing over the well-known signature of "verax," recently published a long article, censuring the policy of aggressive freethought, and declaring that to laugh at the absurdities of the bible was to insult the human race. we might as well, he said, laugh at our poor ancestors, the ancient britons, for all their mistakes and follies. well, when the ancient jews are not only dead, but buried like the ancient britons; when their mistakes and follies are no longer palmed off on unsuspecting children, and imposed on grown-up men and women, as divine immortal truths; we will cease ridiculing them, and devote our attention to worthier objects. what, would "verax" say if an ancient briton, dressed in a full suit of war-paint, were to walk through the manchester streets, boasting himself the pink of fashion, and insulting peaceable citizens who refused to patronise his tailor? would he not write a racy article on the absurd phenomenon, and ask why the police tolerated such a nuisance? in like manner we publish our comic bible sketches, and summon the police of thought to remove those ancient jews who still infest our mental thoroughfares. april, 1885. g. w. foote nature and the gods from "the atheistic platform", twelve lectures by arthur b. moss london: freethought publishing company 63, fleet street, e.c. 1884 nature and the gods ladies and gentlemen,--no word has played a more important part in the discussion of scientific and philosophical questions than the word nature. everyone thinks he knows the meaning of it. yet how few have used it to express the same idea; indeed it has been employed to convey such a variety of impressions that john stuart mill asserts that it has been the "fruitful source" of the propagation of "false taste, false philosophy, false morality, and even bad law." now, i propose in this lecture that we start with some clear ideas concerning the meaning of such words, upon the right understanding of which the whole force of my arguments depends. what, then, is meant by the word nature? when used by a materialist it has two important meanings. in its large and philosophical sense it means, as mr. mill says: "the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which produce them, including not only all that happens, but all that is capable of happening--the unused capabilities of matter being as much a part of the idea of nature as those which take effect." but the word nature is often used, and rightly used, to distinguish the "natural" from the "artificial" object--that is, to indicate the difference between a thing produced spontaneously by nature, from a thing wrought by the skill and labor of man. but it must not be supposed that the artificial object forms no part of nature. all art belongs to nature. art simply means the adaptation, the moulding into certain forms of the things of nature, and therefore the artistic productions of man are included in the comprehensive sense of the term nature which i just now used. now in nature there is a permanent and a changeable-element, but man only takes cognisance of the changeable or phenomenal element; of the substratum underlying phenomena he knows and can know nothing whatever; that is, man does not know what matter and force are in themselves in the abstract, he only knows them in the concrete, as they affect him through the medium of his senses. now i allege that nearly all the mistakes of theology have arisen from the ignorance of man in regard to nature and her mode of operation. let us consider for a moment a few facts in reference to man. of course i don't want to take you back to his origin. but suppose we go back no further than a few thousand years, we shall find that man lived in holes in the earth; that he moved about in fear and trembling; that not only did he fight against his fellow creatures, but that he went in constant fear of animals who sought him as their prey. under these circumstances he looked to nature for assistance. he felt how unspeakably helpless he was, and he cried aloud for help. sometimes he imagined that he received what in his agony he had yearned for. then it was that he thought that nature was most kind. perhaps he wanted food to eat and had tried in vain to procure it. but presently a poor beast comes across his path, and he slays it and satisfies his hunger. or perhaps he himself is in danger. a ferocious animal is in pursuit of him and he sees no means of escape, but presently comes in view a narrow stream of water which he can swim across, but which his pursuer cannot. when he is again secure he utters a deep sigh of relief. in time he makes rapid strides of progress. he learns to keep himself warm while the animals about him are perishing with cold; he learns to make weapons wherewith to destroy his enemies; but his greatest triumph of all is when he has learned how to communicate his thoughts to his fellows. up to now it would be pretty safe to say that man was destitute of all ideas concerning the existence of god or gods. but he advances one stage further, and his thoughts begin to take something like definite shape. he forms for himself a theory as to the cause of the events happening about him. and now the reign of the gods begins. man is still a naked savage; as voltaire truly says: "man had only his bare skin, which continually exposed to the sun, rain and hail, became chapped, tanned, and spotted. the male in our continent was disfigured by spare hairs on his body, which rendered him frightful without covering him. his face was hidden by these hairs. his skin became a rough soil which bore a forest of stalks, the roots of which tended upwards and the branches of which grew downwards. it was in this state that this animal ventured to paint god, when in course of time he learnt the art of description." ("philosophical dictionary," vol. ii., page 182). naturally enough man's first objects of worship were fetishes--gods of wood, stone, trees, fire, water. by-and-bye, however, he came to worship living beings; in fact, any animal that he thought was superior in any way to himself was converted into an object of worship. but none of these gods were of any assistance to him in promoting his advancement in the world. and neither did he receive any assistance from the spontaneous action of nature. in fact he advanced in the road of civilisation only in proportion as he offered ceaseless war against the hurtful forces of nature, using one force to counteract the destructive character of another. think what the earth must have been without a solitary house upon it, without a man who yet knew how to till the soil! must it not have been a howling wilderness fit only for savage beasts and brutal barbarians? in course of time, however, man made great strides. he began to live in communities, which afterwards grew, into nations. he betook himself also to the art of agriculture, and supplied himself and his fellows with good, nutritious food. and with this growth of man the gods underwent a similar transition. now instead of bowing down before fetishes, man transferred his worship to gods and goddesses who were supposed to dwell somewhere in the sky. and these gods were of a very peculiar kind. each of them had a separate department to himself and performed only a certain class of actions. one made the sun to shine and the trees to grow; one had a kind of dynamite factory to himself, and manufactured lightning and thunder; another was a god of love; another secretary for war; another perpetual president of the celestial peace society. some had several heads; some had only one eye or one arm; some had wings, while others appeared like giants, and hurled thunderbolts at the heads of unoffending people. but these gods were of no more service to man than those that preceded them. if man advanced it was by his own effort, by virtue of using his intelligence, by strife, warfare, and by suffering. neither nature nor the gods taught man to be truthful, honest, just, nor even to be clean. no god came to tell him that he must not lie, nor steal, nor murder.. all virtues are acquired, all are the result of education. and it was only after coming together and being criticised by one another; men being criticised by women who no doubt taught them that when they came a-wooing they would have a very slight chance if they were not clean and respectable; living in societies and being governed by the wisest among their fellows, who were able to judge as to what kind of actions produced the most beneficial results, that laws against theft, adultery, and murder, and other evil actions, were established. from polytheism, or belief in many gods, the next great step was to monotheism, or belief in one god. this was an important transition, and meant the clearing from the heavens of many fictitious deities. but though the monotheist believed only in one god, that did not prevent others from believing in an entirely different deity. the ancient jew worshipped jahveh, but that did not prevent the baalites from having a god of their own, to whom they could appeal in the hour of need. and just let me here observe that the early monotheist always worshipped an anthropomorphic or man-like deity. and he worshipped such a god because man was the highest being of whom he had any conception. his god was always the counterpart of himself and reflected all the characteristics of his own nature. was he brutal and licentious? so was his god. was he in favor of aggressive wars? so was his god. was he a petty tyrant, in favor of slavery? so was his god. was he a polygamist? so was his god. was he ignorant of the facts of life? so was his god. was he revengeful and relentless? so was his god. and in whatever book we find a deity described as a malevolent or fiendish wretch depend upon it, by whatever name that book may be known, and by whomsoever it may be reverenced, it was written by one who possessed in his own person precisely the same characteristics as those he depicted in the character of his deity. the jewish god, jahveh, it must be understood, was not a spiritual being, although it is sometimes pretended that he was. no. he was a purely material being. true he lived somewhere up above, but he made very frequent visits to the earth. once he walked in the garden of eden "in the cool of day," or "his voice" did for him (gen. iii., 8). once he stood upon a mountain, whither moses, aaron, nadab and abihu had gone to hold a consultation with him (ex. xxiv., 10). once he talked with moses "face to face" (ex. xxxiii., 11). and not only was jahveh a material being, but on the whole he was not a very formidable deity. in point of truth he was a very little fellow. and by way of diversion he was sometimes drawn about in a small box, or ark, two feet long and three feet wide (sam. vi., 6, 7). as evidence that even among professional christians to-day jahveh is not looked upon as a very stalwart fellow, mr. edward gibson, in the house of commons, a short time ago said that if mr. bradlaugh were admitted into that assembly the effect of it would be that god would be "thrown out of the window." and if you want to find a man with "small ideas" on general matters it is only necessary to know the kind of god he worships to be able to determine the intellectual width and depth of such a man's mind. why is this? because all ideas of god were born in the fertile imaginations of men, and a man's idea of god is invariably the exact measurement of himself, morally and intellectually. it may be urged by some theists that man is indebted to jahveh for his existence, and that he owes his moral and intellectual advancement to the fact that this deity, through the medium of moses and the other inspired writers, laid down certain commandments for his guidance in life. when it is remembered, however, that if man is indebted in any way to jahveh for his existence, he owes him only the exact equivalent of the benefits he has received, i think it will be seen that on the whole man's indebtedness to this deity is very small indeed. was adam indebted to jahveh for the imperfect nature which compelled him to commit the so-called sin which imperilled the future destiny of human race? were all the "miserable sinners"--the descendants of the first pair--indebted to jahveh for their "corrupt" natures? if yes, what kind of god was man indebted to? to a god who once drowned the whole of mankind except one family? to a god who said that he was a jealous being who "visited the sins of the father upon the children unto a third and fourth generation." (ex. xx., 5)? to a god who sanctioned slavery (lev. xxv., 44, 45) and injustice of all kinds? to a god who said "thou shalt not suffer a witch to live" (ex. xxii., 18), and gave instructions for men to kill the blasphemers among their fellows (lev. xxiv., 16)? to a god who told moses to go against the midianites and slay every man among them, preserving only the virgins among the women to satisfy the lustful natures of a brutal horde of soldiers (numbers xxxi., 7--18)? to a god to whom, as shelley says, the only acceptable offerings were "the steam of slaughter, the dissonance of groans, and the flames of a desolate land" (dialogue between "eusebes and theosophus," prose writings, page 300)? i deny that man has ever been in any way indebted to such a god, and i say moreover that such a deity never had any real existence, except in the base imaginations of ignorant and brutal men. but the next stage was from the material to the spiritual god. many ages must have elapsed before this more elevating though equally absurd belief became to be accepted, even by a small minority of mankind. but the time eventually did come--a time which happily is now rapidly passing away--when intellectual men believed that the proposition of the existence of god could be demonstrated to all rational minds. some said that god's existence was self-evident to every intelligent mind; others that nature and men could not have come by "chance"; that they must have had a cause; some said that the harmony existing in the universe proved god's existence; others that everybody except fools "felt in their hearts" that there was a god. but these imaginary proofs did not always convince. at last there came forth philosophers who said that there was a mode of reasoning, the adoption of which "leads irresistibly up to the belief in god," and that that mode was called the mode _à priori_. another school said that the _à priori_, or reasoning from cause to effect, was an altogether fallacious method, and that the only satisfactory mode of establishing god's existence was the _à posteriori_, or reasoning from effect to cause. another school said that taken singly neither of these modes of reasoning established the existence of deity, but that both taken together "formed a perfect chain" of reasoning that was quite conclusive on the point. neither of these schools, however, showed how two bad arguments could possibly make one good one. but let me just briefly examine these arguments put forward so confidently by leading theists. the first method--_à priori_--invariably takes the form of an attempt to establish what is called a "great first cause." when it is said that there must be a "first cause" to account for the existence of nature, such language, to say the least, shows a total misapprehension of the meaning of the word "cause," as used by scientific men. "first cause," as applied to nature as a whole, remembering the definition i have given, is an absurdity. cause and effect apply only to phenomena. each effect is a cause of some subsequent effect, and each cause is an effect of some antecedent cause. the phenomena of the universe form a complete chain of causes and effects, and in an infinite regression there can be no first cause. let me explain what i mean more fully. for instance, here is a chain; suppose it is to form a perfect circle, every link in which is perfect; now if you were to go round and round this chain from now to doomsday you would never come to the first link. it is the same in nature. you can go back, and back, and back through successive causes and effects, but you will never come to a "first cause"; you will not be able to say "here is the end of nature, and here the beginning of something else." there is no brick wall to mark the boundary line of nature. you cannot "look through nature up to nature's god,"--the poet pope notwithstanding--for nature seems endless, and you can neither penetrate her heights nor fathom her depths. and i have one other word to say in reference to this _à priori_ method, before finally disposing of it. it is this, that it is an altogether unscientific method. man knows nothing whatever of cause except in the sense' that in the immediate antecedent of an effect. man's experience is of effects; these he takes cognisance of; of these he has some knowledge, but of cause, except as a means to an end, he has none. but this brings me to the second mode of reasoning in proof of god's existence, the _à posteriori_ and this has one advantage in its favor, and that is, that it is a scientific method. it reasons from known effects up to the supposed causes of them. now this generally assumes the form, no matter under what guise, of the famous "design argument." dr. paley stated it many years ago, and it has not been much improved since his day. it is generally stated in this way: "the world exhibits marks of design; that design must have had a designer; that designer must be a person; that person is god." a number of illustrations are then brought forward to support this contention. for instance, it is argued that when a man observes a watch or a telescope, or any article that has been made to answer a certain purpose, and the mechanism of which is so adjusted as to effect the desired object, it is said that from the marks of design or contrivance observed in the mechanism, he infers that these articles are the products of some human designer. and so it is said that when we look around the world and see how beautifully things are designed, the eye to see, the ear to hear; how admirably things are adapted the one to the other, are we not justified by similar reasoning in concluding that these are the productions of an almighty and infinite designer? briefly stated that is the argument. now let me examine it. and in the first place it will be observed that it is assumed that there is a great resemblance between the works of nature and the artistic works of man. but is this really a fact? man simply moulds natural objects into certain forms; they are then called artificial objects. we know that man designs watches and telescopes; it is a fact within our experience. but there is not the slightest similarity between the process of manufacture and the natural process of growth; so that when we see various objects of nature, we do hot conclude, however harmoniously the parts may work together, that they were designed. we know a manufactured article from a natural object, we could not mistake the one for the other. but let us suppose that we did not know that men made watches; it is very probable that we should then think that a watch was not made at all, but that it was a natural object. take an illustration. suppose that i were to lay a watch upon the earth somewhere in south africa; suppose that in a short time a savage wandering near the spot where the watch was deposited should observe it, should take it into his hand and handle it--i am assuming that the savage had never seen a watch before, and was not aware that men designed and constructed watches--think you that he would for a moment notice that it exhibited marks of design? no, i think he would be more likely to come to the opinion that it was alive. the design argument therefore is purely an argument drawn from experience. but what experience has man of god? speaking for myself i can say that i have absolutely no experience of him at all, and i am not acquainted with anybody who has. man does not know god as a designer or constructor; he neither knows of his capabilities, nor his existence; and he therefore cannot reasonably say that god is the designer of anything. the human eye is very often adduced by the theist as an illustration of design. now nobody can deny that the eye is a delicate, complicated, and beautiful structure; nobody could fail to see and acknowledge with feelings of admiration the wonderful adjustment and harmonious working of its various parts; and all would readily acknowledge how admirably it is fitted to perform its functions. but yet to acknowledge all this is not to admit that the eye is designed. to point to the combinations and conditions which produce this result, without showing that these conditions were designed, is to beg the whole question. and it must be distinctly understood that the _onus probandi_ as the lawyers say, lies with the affirmer of the design argument and not with him who does not see evidence in it sufficient to command belief. to show that a thing is capable of effecting a certain result does not prove that it was designed for that purpose. for example. i hold this glass in my hand; i now release my hold from it and it instantly falls to the ground; that does not surely prove either that i was designed to hold up that glass, or that the glass was designed to fall on withdrawing my grasp from it. at most it only proves that i am capable of holding it, and that when i release it, it is impelled by the law of gravitation to fall towards the earth. but there is another view of this question i wish to present to you. from this argument it is not quite clear that there is only one supreme god of the universe. admittedly this is an argument based upon experience. what does experience teach us in respect to a person? simply this. that a person must have an organisation, and a person with an organisation must be a limited being. has god an organisation? if he has not, he cannot be intelligent, cannot perceive, recollect, judge; and if he has, then an organisation implies contrivance, and contrivance implies a contriver, and this again instead of leading up to one god, leads to an innumerable tribe of deities each mightier and more complicated than the other. if the theist retorts that a person need not have an organisation, the atheist at once replies that neither need the designer of nature be a person. but these are not the only objections to be used against the design argument. the _à priori_ theologians have some very potent arguments to advance. mr. william gillespie has discovered twenty-four defects of _à posteriori_ arguments, and i think he has conclusively shown that all the attributes claimed for deity are impeached by this method. in my humble opinion the design argument has grown out of the arrogance and conceit of man, who imagines that the earth and all the things existing upon it were treated especially for his benefit. suppose that i admit that there is design in nature, the theist has then to account for some awkward and many horrible designs. how will he get over the fact that nature is one vast battle-field on which all life is engaged in warfare? what goodness will he see in the design that gives the strong and cunning the advantage over the weak and simple? what beneficence will he detect in the fact that all animals "prey" upon one another? and that man is not exempt from the struggle? famine destroys thousands; earthquakes desolate a land; and what tongue can tell the anguish and pain endured by the very poor in all great countries of the earth? think of the "ills to which flesh is heir." think of the diseases from which so many thousands suffer. think how many endure agony from cancer or tumor, how many have within their bodies parasites which locate themselves in the liver, the muscles, and the intestines, causing great agony and sometimes death. think how many are born blind and how many become sightless on account of disease. think of the deaf and the dumb, and of the poor idiots who pass a dreary and useless existence in asylums. then think of the accidents to which all men are liable. think of the many who are killed or injured on railways every year. think of men and boys who injure or destroy their limbs in machinery during the performance of their daily work. think of the thousands who find a premature and watery grave. in one of our london workhouses i saw recently a young man who had met with a dreadful accident; who had had his hand frightfully lacerated by a circular saw, which will prevent him from ever working again. think of his suffering. think of the misery his wife and children will have to bear on account of it. it almost makes one shed bitter tears to think of it; and yet we are to be told, we who are striving to alleviate suffering and mitigate the evils which afflict our fellow creatures, we are to be told that an infinitely wise and good god designs these things. oh the blasphemy of it! surely an infinite fiend could not do worse; and if i thought that nature were intelligent, that nature knew of the suffering she inflicted on all kinds of living beings and had the power to prevent it, but would not, i would curse nature even though the curse involved for me a sudden and painful death. but nature heareth not man's protests or appeals--she is blind to his sufferings and deaf to his prayers. oh, but it's said: "see what harmony there is in the universe:" _per se_ there is neither harmony nor chaos in nature; we call that harmony which pleasantly affects us, and that chaos which does the reverse. some theist may say: "suppose that i grant that i cannot prove that god exists, what then? you cannot prove your own existence, and yet you believe that you exist." i am well aware that i cannot prove my own existence; i don't want to prove it; it's a fact, and it stands for itself--to me it is not a matter of belief, it is a matter of certainty. i know that i exist. cannot god make the evidence of his existence as clear as my own is to me? if he cannot, what becomes of his power? and if he will not, what of his goodness? and it must be remembered that there are thousands of intelligent atheists in the world to-day. now, either god does not wish man to believe in him, or if he does he lacks the power to produce conviction. o theist--you who profess to be conversant with the ways of the almighty--explain to me, now, how it is that in proportion as men cultivate their minds and reason on theological questions that the tendency is for them to disbelieve even in the ethereal deity of modern theism. and it will not do in the nineteenth century to put jesus forward as a god. he was no god. he possessed many good qualities, no doubt, as a man--but not one attribute which is claimed for god. he was neither all-wise, nor all-good, nor all-powerful, and he was only a finite being. and how can it be pretended by sensible persons that a finite man living on the earth, born of a woman, and dying like any other ordinary being, could possibly be the infinite god of the universe? is it not absurd? i cannot believe it, and anybody with brains that devotes a moment's thought to the matter, must acknowledge either that it is incomprehensible, or that it is monstrously absurd. in this country we are not asked to believe in any of the "foreign gods"--the gods of ancient greece or rome--the gods of china, india, or egypt, etc.--and we need not now discuss as to how far these deities have influenced human conduct for good or for ill. england, as a civilised country, is not very old. and civilisation has always meant a banishment of the gods. while men considered how to please the gods, they neglected in a great measure the work of the world. as plato said: "the gods only help those who help themselves." well they are just the persons who do not want help; and i shall never worship any god who leaves the helpless and the unfortunate to perish. if god only "helps those who help themselves," he might as well leave the helping alone, because even as we find the world to-day, the whole of life seems to be based on the principle that, "unto him that hath shall be given, and he shall have in abundance, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have." the man who has a strong constitution may struggle successfully in the world; the man with great affluence may win an easy victory over his fellows; the man who has plenty of "influential friends" has good prospects; but the poor, the weakly, the ignorant, what hope have they--they have to suffer and toil, and toil and suffer from the cradle to the tomb. how is it, then, you may ask, if man has received no assistance from without, either from nature or the gods, that he has achieved such splendid results in the world? the answer is simple enough. the great struggle for life--the desire to get food, clothing, habitation, comfort--these have been the motives which have urged men on. the desire to get food caused men to till the soil, and, as the demand increased, the methods of cultivation improved; with improved taste came improved raiment and dwellings for the rich; plain dress and decent habitation for the poor. men having given up the worship of nature, began to study her; they found that by diligent investigation, and the application of their augmented knowledge, they were able to beautify the world, and render their lives happy. then we began to have great scientific discoveries. navigation, steam-power, telegraphy, electricity; by a knowledge of the use of these powers man has been able to conquer the destructive character of many natural forces, and to transfer a world of misery into a home of comparative comfort. and i say that the world is indebted far more to those who built houses, made clothes, navigated ships, made machinery, wrote books, than to all the gods and their clerical representatives the world has ever known. belief in god never helped a man to supersede the sailing vessel by the steamship, the old coach by the railroad, the scythe by the reaping machine, nor the fastest locomotion by the telegraph wires. man's necessities allured him on to all these achievements. one stephenson is worth a thousand priests--one edison of more value to the world than all the gods ever pictured by the imagination. and we must not forget the men who freed the human intellect from the fetters of a degrading superstition. we must not forget what the world owes to our brunos, our spinozas, our voltaires, our paines, our priestleys; for these, by teaching men to rely on their reason, have opened out channels of thought that were previously closed, and mines of intellectual and material wealth that have since yielded great results. and so it must now be said that man is master of nature, and he finds that she is just as good as a servant as she was bad as a master. but the earth is not yet a paradise. theology is not yet entirely banished; the debris of the decayed beliefs still cumber our path and impede our progress. there is even now much that remains to be done. plenty of labor to be performed. ignorance, poverty, and crime and misery still exist and exert their evil influence in the world. the philanthropist and the reformer have still their work to do. the ignorant have yet to be instructed, the hungry have yet to be fed, the homeless have yet to be provided for. and i have come to the opinion after years of experience, that ignorance is the real cause of all the misery and suffering in the world; that that man is truly wise who sees that it is against his own interest to do a paltry act, to perform an evil deed. all actions carry with them their consequences, and you can no more escape the effects of your evil deeds than you can evade the law of gravitation, or elude the grim monster death when the dread hour arrives. no. if you would be happy you must act virtuously--act as you would desire all others to do to promote your happiness. say to yourselves: "if every one were to act as i am doing, would the world be benefited?" and if you come to the opinion that the world would not be improved by such conduct, depend upon it your actions are not good. remember that once you perform a deed in nature it is irrevocable; and if it is bad repentance is worse than useless. all actions either have an evil or a good result. every deed leaves its indelible impress on the book of nature, from which no leaves can be torn and nothing can be expunged. and remember, too, that the man who makes his fellow-creatures happy cannot displease a god who is good; and a god who is not good is neither deserving of admiration nor service. an infinite and all-powerful god cannot need the assistance of man; but man needs the assistance of his brothers and sisters to diffuse the glorious light of knowledge through the world; needs assistance to alleviate suffering, to remove injustice, and secure the possibility of freedom and happiness for all. therefore i urge you to abate not your enthusiasm, but work bravely on; and when the evening of your life approaches, with wife by your side and your children playing joyously about you, with many friends to cheer and thank you--then will you know that your life's labor has not been in vain. humanity's gain from unbelief by charles bradlaugh [reprinted from the "north american review" of march, 1889.] london freethought publishing company, 1889. humanity's gain from unbelief. as an unbeliever, i ask leave to plead that humanity has been real gainer from scepticism, and that the gradual and growing rejection of christianity--like the rejection of the faiths which preceded it--has in fact added, and will add, to man's happiness and well being. i maintain that in physics science is the outcome of scepticism, and that general progress is impossible without scepticism on matters of religion. i mean by religion every form of belief which accepts or asserts the supernatural. i write as a monist, and use the word "nature" as meaning all phenomena, every phænomenon, all that is necessary for the happening of any and every phænomenon. every religion is constantly changing, and at any given time is the measure of the civilisation attained by what guizot described as the _juste milieu_ of those who profess it. each religion is slowly but certainly modified in its dogma and practice by the gradual development of the peoples amongst whom it is professed. each discovery destroys in whole or part some theretofore cherished belief. no religion is suddenly rejected by any people; it is rather gradually out-grown. none see a religion die; dead religions are like dead languages and obsolete customs; the decay is long and--like the glacier march--is only perceptible to the careful watcher by comparisons extending over long periods. a superseded religion may often be traced in the festivals, ceremonies, and dogmas of the religion which has replaced it. traces of obsolete religions may often be found in popular customs, in old wives' stories, and in children's tales. it is necessary, in order that my plea should be understood, that i should explain what i mean by christianity; and in the very attempt at this explanation there will, i think, be found strong illustration of the value of unbelief. christianity in practice may be gathered from its more ancient forms, represented by the roman catholic and the greek churches, or from the various churches which have grown up in the last few centuries. each of these churches calls itself christian. some of them deny the right of the others to use the word christian. some christian churches treat, or have treated, other christian churches as heretics or unbelievers. the roman catholics and the protestants in great britain and ireland have in turn been terribly cruel one to the other; and the ferocious laws of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enacted by the english protestants against english and irish papists, are a disgrace to civilisation. these penal laws, enduring longest in ireland, still bear fruit in much of the political mischief and agrarian crime of to-day. it is only the tolerant indifference of scepticism that, one after the other, has repealed most of the laws directed by the established christian church against papists and dissenters, and also against jews and heretics. church of england clergymen have in the past gone to great lengths in denouncing nonconformity; and even in the present day an effective sample of such denunciatory bigotry may be found in a sort of orthodox catechism written by the rev. f. a. gace, of great barling, essex, the popularity of which is vouched by the fact that it has gone through ten editions. this catechism for little children teaches that "dissent is a great sin", and that dissenters "worship god according to their own evil and corrupt imaginations, and not according to his revealed will, and therefore their worship is idolatrous". church of england christians and dissenting christians, when fraternising amongst themselves, often publicly draw the line at unitarians, and positively deny that these have any sort of right to call themselves christians. in the first half of the seventeenth century quakers were flogged and imprisoned in england as blasphemers; and the early christian settlers in new england, escaping from the persecution of old world christians, showed scant mercy to the followers of fox and penn. it is customary, in controversy, for those advocating the claims of christianity, to include all good done by men in nominally christian countries as if such good were the result of christianity, while they contend that the evil which exists prevails in spite of christianity. i shall try to make out that the ameliorating march of the last few centuries has been initiated by the heretics of each age, though i quite concede that the men and women denounced and persecuted as infidels by the pious of one century, are frequently claimed as saints by the pious of a later generation. what then is christianity? as a system or scheme of doctrine, christianity may, i submit, not unfairly be gathered from the old and new testaments. it is true that some christians to-day desire to escape from submission to portions, at any rate, of the old testament; but this very tendency seems to me to be part of the result of the beneficial heresy for which i am pleading. man's humanity has revolted against old testament barbarism; and therefore he has attempted to disassociate the old testament from christianity. unless old and new testaments are accepted as god's revelation to man, christianity has no higher claim than any other of the world's many religions, if no such claim can be made out for it apart from the bible. and though it is quite true that some who deem themselves christians put the old testament completely in the background, this is, i allege, because they are out-growing their christianity. without the doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of jesus, christianity, as a religion, is naught; but unless the story of adam's fall is accepted, the redemption from the consequences of that fall cannot be believed. both in great britain and in the united states the old and new testaments are forced on the people as part of christianity; for it is blasphemy at common law to deny the scriptures of the old and new testaments to be of divine authority; and such denial is punishable with fine and imprisonment, or even worse. the rejection of christianity intended throughout this paper, is therefore the rejection of the old and new testaments as being of divine revelation. it is the rejection alike of the authorised teachings of the church of rome and of the church of england, as these may be found in the bible, the creeds, the encyclicals, the prayer book, the canons and homilies of either or both of these churches. it is the rejection of the christianity of luther, of calvin, and of wesley. a ground frequently taken by christian theologians is that the progress and civilisation of the world are due to christianity; and the discussion is complicated by the fact that many eminent servants of humanity have been nominal christians, of one or other of the sects. my allegation will be that the special services rendered to human progress by these exceptional men, have not been in consequence of their adhesion to christianity, but in spite of it; and that the specific points of advantage to human kind have been in ratio of their direct opposition to precise biblical enactments. a. s. farrar says (1) that christianity "asserts authority over religious belief in virtue of being a supernatural communication from god, and claims the right to control human thought in virtue of possessing sacred books, which are at once the record and the instrument of the communication, written by men endowed with supernatural inspiration". 1 farrar's "critical history of freethought". unbelievers refuse to submit to the asserted authority, and deny this claim of control over human thought: they allege that every effort at freethinking must provoke sturdier thought. take one clear gain to humanity consequent on unbelief, i.e. in the abolition of slavery in some countries, in the abolition of the slave trade in most civilised countries, and in the tendency to its total abolition. i am unaware of any religion in the world which in the past forbade slavery. the professors of christianity for ages supported it; the old testament repeatedly sanctioned it by special laws; the new testament has no repealing declaration. though we are at the close of the nineteenth century of the christian era, it is only during the past three-quarters of a century that the battle for freedom has been gradually won. it is scarcely a quarter of a century since the famous emancipation amendment was carried to the united states constitution. and it is impossible for any well-informed christian to deny that the abolition movement in north america was most steadily and bitterly opposed by the religious bodies in the various states. henry wilson, in his "rise and fall of the slave power in america"; samuel j. may, in his "recollections of the anti-slavery conflict"; and j. greenleaf whittier, in his poems, alike are witnesses that the bible and pulpit, the church and its great influence, were used against abolition and in favor of the slaveowner. i know that christians in the present day often declare that christianity had a large share in bringing about the abolition of slavery, and this because men professing christianity were abolitionists. i plead that these so-called christian abolitionists were men and women whose humanity, recognising freedom for all, was in this in direct conflict with christianity. it is not yet fifty years since the european christian powers jointly agreed to abolish the slave trade. what of the effect of christianity on these powers in the centuries which had preceded? the heretic condorcet pleaded powerfully for freedom whilst christian france was still slave-holding. for many centuries christian spain and christian portugal held slaves. porto rico freedom is not of long date; and cuban emancipation is even yet newer. it was a christian king, charles 5th, and a christian friar, who founded in spanish america the slave trade between the old world and the new. for some 1800 years, almost, christians kept slaves, bought slaves, sold slaves, bred slaves, stole slaves. pious bristol and godly liverpool less than 100 years ago openly grew rich on the traffic. daring the ninth century week christians sold slaves to the saracens. in the eleventh century prostitutes were publicly sold as slaves in rome, and the profit went to the church. it is said that william wilberforce, the abolitionist, was a christian. but at any rate his christianity was strongly diluted with unbelief. as an abolitionist he did not believe leviticus xxv, 44-6; he must have rejected exodus xxi, 2-6; he could not have accepted the many permissions and injunctions by the bible deity to his chosen people to capture and hold slaves. in the house of commons on 18th february, 1796, wilberforce reminded that christian assembly that infidel and anarchic france had given liberty to the africans, whilst christian and monarchic england was "obstinately continuing a system of cruelty and injustice". wilberforce, whilst advocating the abolition of slavery, found the whole influence of the english court, and the great weight of the episcopal bench, against him. george iii, a most christian king, regarded abolition theories with abhorrence, and the christian house of lords was utterly opposed to granting freedom to the slave. when christian missionaries some sixty-two years ago preached to demerara negroes under the rule of christian england, they were treated by christian judges, holding commission from christian england, as criminals for so preaching. a christian commissioned officer, member of the established church of england, signed the auction notices for the sale of slaves as late as the year 1824. in the evidence before a christian court-martial, a missionary is charged with having tended to make the negroes dissatisfied with their condition as slaves, and with having promoted discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the slaves against their lawful masters. for this the christian judges sentenced the demerara abolitionist missionary to be hanged by the neck till he was dead. the judges belonged to the established church; the missionary was a methodist. in this the church of england christians in demerara were no worse than christians of other sects: their roman catholic christian brethren in st. domingo fiercely attacked the jesuits as criminals because they treated negroes as though they were men and women, in encouraging "two slaves to separate their interest and safety from that of the gang", whilst orthodox christians let them couple promiscuously and breed for the benefit of their owners like any other of their plantation cattle. in 1823 the _royal gazette_ (christian) of demerara said: "we shall not suffer you to enlighten our slaves, who are by law our property, till you can demonstrate that when they are made religious and knowing they will continue to be our slaves." when william lloyd garrison, the pure-minded and most earnest abolitionist, delivered his first anti-slavery address in boston, massachusetts, the only building he could obtain, in which to speak, was the infidel hall owned by abner kneeland, the "infidel" editor of the _boston investigatory_ who had been sent to gaol for blasphemy. every christian sect had in turn refused mr. lloyd garrison the use of the buildings they severally controlled. lloyd garrison told me himself how honored deacons of a christian church joined in an actual attempt to hang him. when abolition was advocated in the united states in 1790, the representative from south carolina was able to plead that the southern clergy "did not condemn either slavery or the slave trade"; and mr. jackson, the representative from georgia, pleaded that "from genesis to revelation" the current was favorable to slavery. elias hicks, the brave abolitionist quaker, was denounced as an atheist, and less than twenty years ago a hicksite quaker was expelled from one of the southern american legislatures, because of the reputed irreligion of these abolitionist "friends". when the fugitive slave law was under discussion in north america, large numbers of clergymen of nearly every denomination were found ready to defend this infamous law. samuel james may, the famous abolitionist, was driven from the pulpit as irreligious, solely because of his attacks on slaveholding. northern clergymen tried to induce "silver tongued" wendell philips to abandon his advocacy of abolition. southern pulpits rang with praises for the murderous attack on charles sumner. the slayers of elijah lovejoy were highly reputed christian men. guizot, notwithstanding that he tries to claim that the church exerted its influence to restrain slavery, says ("european civilisation", vol. i., p. 110): "it has often been repeated that the abolition of slavery among modern people is entirely due to christians. that, i think, is saying too much. slavery existed for a long period in the heart of christian society, without its being particularly astonished or irritated. a multitude of causes, and a great development in other ideas and principles of civilisation, were necessary for the abolition of this iniquity of all iniquities." and my contention is that this "development in other ideas and principles of civilisation" was long retarded by governments in which the christian church was dominant. the men who advocated liberty were imprisoned, racked, and burned, so long as the church was strong enough to be merciless. the rev. francis minton, hector of middlewich, in his recent earnest volume (1) on the struggles of labor, admits that "a few centuries ago slavery was acknowledged throughout christendom to have the divine sanction.... 1 "capital and wages", p. 19. neither the exact cause, nor the precise time of the decline of the belief in the righteousness of slavery can be defined. it was doubtless due to a combination of causes, one probably being as indirect as the recognition of the greater economy of free labor. with the decline of the belief the abolition of slavery took place." the institution of slavery was actually existent in christian scotland in the 17th century, where the white coal workers and salt workers of east lothian were chattels, as were their negro brethren in the southern states thirty years since; they "went to those who succeeded to the property of the works, and they could be sold, bartered, or pawned". (1) "there is", says j. m. robertson, "no trace that the protestant clergy of scotland ever raised a voice against the slavery which grew up before their eyes. and it was not until 1799, after republican and irreligious france had set the example, that it was legally abolished." 1 "perversion of scotland," p. 197. 2 "capital and wages ", pp. 15, 16. take further the gain to humanity consequent on the unbelief, or rather disbelief, in witchcraft and wizardry. apart from the brutality by christians towards those suspected of witchcraft, the hindrance to scientific initiative or experiment was incalculably great so long as belief in magic obtained. the inventions of the past two centuries, and especially those of the 18th century, might have benefitted mankind much earlier and much more largely, but for the foolish belief in witchcraft and the shocking ferocity exhibited against those suspected of necromancy. after quoting a large number of cases of trial and punishment for witchcraft from official records in scotland, j. m. robertson says: "the people seem to have passed from cruelty to cruelty precisely as they became more and more fanatical, more and more devoted to their church, till after many generations the slow spread of human science began to counteract the ravages of superstition, the clergy resisting reason and humanity to the last". the rev. mr. minton concedes that it is "the advance of knowledge which has rendered the idea of satanic agency through the medium of witchcraft grotesquely ridiculous". he admits that "for more than 1500 years the belief in witchcraft was universal in christendom", and that "the public mind was saturated with the idea of satanic agency in the economy of nature". he adds: "if we ask why the world now rejects what was once so unquestioningly believed, we can only reply that advancing knowledge has gradually undermined the belief". in a letter recently sent to the _pall mall gazette_ against modern spiritualism, professor huxley declares, "... that the older form of the same fundamental delusion--the belief in possession and in witchcraft--gave rise in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries to persecutions by christians of innocent men, women, and children, more extensive, more cruel, and more murderous than any to which the christians of the first three centuries were subjected by the authorities of pagan rome." and professor huxley adds: "no one deserves much blame for being deceived in these matters. we are all intellectually handicapped in youth by the incessant repetition of the stories about possession and witchcraft in both the old and the new testaments. the majority of us are taught nothing which will help us to observe accurately and to interpret observations with due caution." the english statute book under elizabeth and under james was disfigured by enactments against witchcraft passed under pressure from the christian churches, which acts have only been repealed in consequence of the disbelief in the christian precept, "thou shaft not suffer a witch to live". the statute 1 james i, c. 12, condemned to death "all persons invoking any evil spirits, or consulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feeding, or rewarding any evil spirit", or generally practising any "infernal arts". this was not repealed until the eighteenth century was far advanced. edison's phonograph would 280 years ago have insured martyrdom for its inventor; the utilisation of electric force to transmit messages around the world would have been clearly the practice of an infernal art. at least we may plead that unbelief has healed the bleeding feet of science, and made the road free for her upward march. is it not also fair to urge the gain to humanity which has been apparent in the wiser treatment of the insane, consequent on the unbelief in the christian doctrine that these unfortunates were examples either of demoniacal possession or of special visitation of deity? for centuries under christianity mental disease was most ignorantly treated. exorcism, shackles, and the whip were the penalties rather than the curatives for mental maladies. from the heretical departure of pinel at the close of the last century to the position of maudsley to-day, every step illustrates the march of unbelief. take the gain to humanity in the unbelief not yet complete, but now largely preponderant, in the dogma that sickness, pestilence, and famine were manifestations of divine anger, the results of which could neither be avoided nor prevented. the christian churches have done little or nothing to dispel this superstition. the official and authorised prayers of the principal denominations, even to-day, reaffirm it. modern study of the laws of health, experiments in sanitary improvements, more careful applications of medical knowledge, have proved more efficacious in preventing or diminishing plagues and pestilence than have the intervention of the priest or the practice of prayer. those in england who hold the old faith that prayer will suffice to cure disease are to-day termed "peculiar people", and are occasionally indicted for manslaughter when their sick children die, because the parents have trusted to god instead of appealing to the resources of science. it is certainly a clear gain to astronomical science that the church which tried to compel galileo to unsay the truth has been overborne by the growing unbelief of the age, even though our little children are yet taught that joshua made the sun and moon stand still, and that for hezekiah the sun-dial reversed its record. as buckle, arguing for the morality of scepticism, says (1): 1 "history of civilisation", vol. i, p. 345. "as long as men refer the movements of the comets to the immediate finger of god, and as long as they believe that an eclipse is one of the modes by which the deity expresses his anger, they will never be guilty of the blasphemous presumption of attempting to predict such supernatural appearances. before they could dare to investigate the causes of these mysterious phænomena, it is necessary that they should believe, or at all events that they should suspect, that the phænomena themselves were capable of being explained by the human mind." as in astronomy so in geology, the gain of knowledge to humanity has been almost solely in measure of the rejection of the christian theory. a century since it was almost universally held that the world was created 6,000 years ago, or at any rate, that by the sin of the first man, adam, death commenced about that period. ethnology and anthropology have only been possible in so far as, adopting the regretful words of sir w. jones, "intelligent and virtuous persons are inclined to doubt the authenticity of the accounts delivered by moses concerning the primitive world". surely it is clear gain to humanity that unbelief has sprung up against the divine right of kings, that men no longer believe that the monarch is "god's anointed" or that "the powers that be are ordained of god". in the struggles for political freedom the weight of the church was mostly thrown on the side of the tyrant. the homilies of the church of england declare that "even the wicked rulers have their power and authority from god ", and that "such subjects as are disobedient or rebellious against their princes disobey god and procure their own damnation". it can scarcely be necessary to argue to the citizens of the united states of america that the origin of their liberties was in the rejection of faith in the divine right of george iii. will any one, save the most bigoted, contend that it is not certain gain to humanity to spread unbelief in the terrible doctrine that eternal torment is the probable fate of the great majority of the human family? is it not gain to have diminished the faith that it was the duty of the wretched and the miserable to be content with the lot in life which providence had awarded them? if it stood alone it would be almost sufficient to plead as justification for heresy the approach towards equality and liberty for the utterance of all opinions achieved because of growing unbelief. at one period in christendom each government acted as though only one religious faith could be true, and as though the holding, or at any rate the making known, any other opinion was a criminal act deserving punishment. under the one word "infidel", even as late as lord coke, were classed together all who were not christians, even though they were mahommedans, brahmins, or jews. all who did not accept the christian faith were sweepingly denounced as infidels and therefore _hors de la loi_. one hundred and forty-five years since, the attorney-general, pleading in our highest court, said (1): "what is the definition of an infidel? why, one who does not believe in the christian religion. then a jew is an infidel." and english history for several centuries prior to the commonwealth shows how habitually and most atrociously christian kings, christian courts, and christian churches, persecuted and harassed these infidel jews. there was a time in england when jews were such infidels that they were not even allowed to be sworn as witnesses. in 1740 a legacy left for establishing an assembly for the reading of the jewish scriptures was held to be void (2) because it was "for the propagation of the jewish law in contradiction to the christian religion ". it is only in very modern times that municipal rights have been accorded in england to jews. it is barely thirty years since they have been allowed to sit in parliament. in 1851, the late mr. newdegate in debate (3) objected "that they should have sitting in that house an individual who regarded our redeemer as an impostor". lord chief justice raymond has shown (4) how it was that christian intolerance was gradually broken down. "a jew may sue at this day, but heretofore he could not; for then they were looked upon as enemies, but now commerce has taught the world more humanity." lord coke treated the infidel as one who in law had no right of any kind, with whom no contract need be kept, to whom no debt was payable. the plea of alien infidel as answer to a claim was actually pleaded in court as late as 1737. (5) in a solemn judgment, lord coke says (6): "all infidels are in law _perpetui inimici_; for between them, as with the devils whose subjects they be, and the christian, there is perpetual hostility". twenty years ago the law of england required the writer of any periodical publication or pamphlet under sixpence in price to give sureties for £800 against the publication of blasphemy. i was the last person prosecuted in 1868 for non-compliance with that law, which was repealed by mr. gladstone in 1869. up till the 23rd december, 1888, an infidel in scotland was only allowed to enforce any legal claim in court on condition that, if challenged, he denied his infidelity. if he lied and said he was a christian, he was accepted, despite his lying. if he told the truth and said he was an unbeliever, then he was practically an outlaw, incompetent to give evidence for himself or for any other. fortunately all this was changed by the royal assent to the oaths act on 24th december. has not humanity clearly gained a little in this struggle through unbelief? 1 omychund v. barker, 1 atkyns 29. 2 d'costa. d'pays, amb. 228. 3 hansard cxvi. 381. 4 lord raymond's reports 282, wells v. williams. 5 ramkissenseat v. barker, 1 atkyns 61. 6 coke's reports, calvin's ease. for more than a century and a-half the roman catholic had in practice harsher measure dealt out to him by the english protestant christian, than was even during that period the fate of the jew or the unbeliever. if the roman catholic would not take the oath of abnegation, which to a sincere romanist was impossible, he was in effect an outlaw, and the "jury packing" so much complained of to-day in ireland is one of the habit survivals of the old bad time when roman catholics were thus by law excluded from the jury box. the _scotsman_ of january 5th, 1889, notes that in 1860 the rev. dr. robert lee, of greyfriars, gave a course of sunday evening lectures on biblical criticism, in which he showed the absurdity and untenableness of regarding every word in the bible as inspired; and it adds: "we well remember the awful indignation such opinions inspired, and it is refreshing to contrast them with the calmness with which they are now received. not only from the pulpits of the city, but from the press (misnamed religious) were his doctrines denounced. and one eminent u.p. minister went the length of publicly praying for him, and for the students under his care. it speaks volumes for the progress made since then, when we think in all probability dr. charteris, dr. lee's successor in the chair, differs in his teaching from the confession of faith much more widely than dr. lee ever did, and yet he is considered supremely orthodox, whereas the stigma of heresy was attached to the other all his life." and this change and gain to humanity is due to the gradual progress of unbelief, alike inside and outside the churches. take from differing churches two recent illustrations: the late principal dr. lindsay alexander, a strict calvinist, in his important work on "biblical theology", claims that "all the statements of scripture are alike to be deferred to as presenting to us the mind of god ". yet the rev. dr. of divinity also says: "we find in their writings [i.e., in the writings of the sacred authors] statements which no ingenuity can reconcile with what modern research has shown to be the scientific truths--i.e., we find in them statements which modern science proves to be erroneous." at the last southwell diocesan church of england conference at derby, the bishop of the diocese presiding, the rev. j. g. richardson said of the old testament that "it was no longer honest or even safe to deny that this noble literature, rich in all the elements of moral or spiritual grandeur, given--so the church had always taught, and would always teach--under the inspiration of almighty god, was sometimes mistaken in its science, was sometimes inaccurate in its history, and sometimes only relative and accommodatory in its morality. it assumed theories of the physical world which science had abandoned and could never resume; it contained passages of narrative which devout and temperate men pronounced discredited, both by external and internal evidence; it praised, or justified, or approved, or condoned, or tolerated, conduct which the teaching of christ and the conscience of the christian alike condemned." or, as i should urge, the gain to humanity by unbelief is that "the teaching of christ" has been modified, enlarged, widened, and humanised, and that "the conscience of the christian" is in quantity and quality made fitter for human progress by the ever increasing additions of knowledge of these later and more heretical days. ludicrous aspects of christianity: a response to the challenge of the bishop of manchester. by austin holyoak the bishop of manchester, in a speech delivered by him in oldham in august, 1870, is reported to have said that "he could defy anyone to try to caricature the work, the character, or the person of the lord jesus christ." he no doubt felt confident in throwing out such a challenge, as the attempt would be considered so atrociously impious that few men could be found with courage enough to incur the odium of such an act. we confess that we have not the temerity to wound the sensitiveness of the devoutly religious. what may be deemed of the nature of caricature in the following remarks the reader is requested to regard as merely the spontaneous utterance of one who is keenly alive to the ludicrous, and who is not awed by the belief that the bible is an infallible volume. we find the new testament, when read without the deceptive spectacles of _faith_ as amusing, as extravagant, and as contradictory in many places as most books. a system of religion, to be a moral guide to men, should be perfect in all its parts. it should not consist of a few precepts which might be followed under certain circumstances, the rest being made up of impossibilities and contradictions; but should be so comprehensive as to embrace all orders of men under all circumstances. and a divine exemplar to mankind, if such a being can be imagined, should possess every human virtue in perfection, and be absolutely without fault. we are told daily and hourly that jesus christ possesses these transcendent qualities, and is worthy of the homage and admiration of the world. we ask where this divine image is to be found, and are referred to the four gospels in the new testament. all that is there written was written by inspiration of god, and god therefore is the painter of the lineaments of his own son. we will take it as such, and see what aspect jesus presents when viewed in the light we are able to bring to bear upon his portrait. we shall follow a somewhat different plan to that adopted by m. rénan. that great french writer has evidently gone to his task with the intention or anticipation of finding an almost perfect man, and he ends by believing he really sees one in jesus. we have taken up the gospels with the desire of finding what is actually there; and as it appears to us, so we will present it to the reader. we know that some will view the sayings and actions in a different light; but that is inevitable. no two persons ever see in the painted portrait of a friend or relative, precisely the same expression; yet they may be equally honest. now we claim to be regarded as truthful in the following portraiture, though jesus appears to us a very different man to what he appeared to m. renan. some may say we are flippant, but that we cannot help, though we may regret it. we must express ourselves in our own way, and we most be excused if we laugh at what seems ludicrous or absurd. we may be accused of a want of reverence, but we cannot feel reverence for what does not excite that feeling in us. these pages are not critical--they do not pretend to be learned--they do not seek to explain away anything on the score of "forgeries" or "interpolations." they are based upon the supposition that the _four_ gospels are each and collectively true, and without contradiction. no attempt is made to reconcile contradictions by rejecting all that does not harmonise. the churches do not do so--they cling to all within the two covers of the "sacred book," and of course take the responsibility. nothing will be here set down that jesus did not utter; no meaning will be put upon his words that they will not legitimately bear; we have judged of him as we find him in the general actions of his life. a devout believer will exclaim, with uplifted hands and eyes--"oh, this is blasphemy; it is revolting to the moral sense; christ was the son of god, and therefore perfect. he could not be what you have represented him to be, or people long ago would have ceased to worship him. he is the one sublime character whose image fills the world, and before whom millions bow the head in reverent humility." just so; that is where the delusion arises. men have been taught that they must not think--that they must not doubt--that they must not examine the grounds of their faith--they must _believe_, and that the sin of unbelief is everlasting perdition. a halo of sanctity is thrown around this distorted image--there is a sacred mystery, a "holy of holies" into which common sense must not enter; and so devotees fall down at the threshold and worship, where they should stand erect in reliance on their own reason and judgment, and examine fearlessly for themselves into those doctrines on a belief in which their everlasting salvation is said to depend. jesus, the son of mary, but not the son of joseph, mary's husband, was, according to his biographers, an illegitimate child--at least, his birth seems to have been brought about in a most illegitimate way. one matthew, who pretends to know a great deal about this child, even before it was born, wishes his readers to infer that jesus was descended in a direct line from that worthy man and favourite of god, king david, through exactly twenty-eight generations; that is, down to joseph, who was not the father of jesus at all. he was the son of the holy ghost, but who or what that was no man knows, and no one has been able to comprehend unto this day. another biographer named luke, more sensible than matthew, like a modern welshman traces jesus's descent direct from adam, who, being the first man, _was_ probably a very distant relative of his. this extraordinary child jesus, who in his own language was simply joshua, came into the world to fulfil no end of prophecies. he was to be called jesus, that he might save his people from their sins. but he did not do it, as the jews have had amongst them since his time as great criminals as ever existed before. he was also to be named emmanuel, "which, being interpreted, is god with us." but he never was called emmanuel, so the second prophecy was fulfilled! he was born in a house in the first instance, and a star was seen to walk before certain wise men and direct them where he was. in the second instance he was born in a manger, in the stable of an inn where certain shepherds found mary, and joseph, and the babe lying. these were not wise men from the east, but poor ignorant shepherds from the neighbouring fields, and they were not led by a star, but had seen an angel of the lord by night, who terrified them very much, and departed without telling them in which particular manger the saviour was to be found. the angel appeared amid loud sounds of "glory to god in the highest, and on earth peace, and good-will towards men." if those glad tidings of great joy _were_ heard then, they have never been heard since, for the advent of this child was the signal for war, and strife, and bloodshed among mankind, which have desolated every land where the christian name has been spoken. after their fright was over, the shepherds consulted together, and resolved to go into bethlehem, to look for "this thing which had come to pass." they alighted upon joseph and his family all lying in a manger, much to the surprise of mary, who evidently did not comprehend what the excitement was about, for we are told that "mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart." so after all, who knows that they found the right babe at last? if such evidence as is here given were adduced in a court of law to prove the identity of a lost heir to an estate, it would never be allowed to go even to trial, but the grand jury would ignore the bill at once. however, as jesus was declared the rightful heir, we must accept that fact, and proceed to examine how far he administered the great estate to which he was born. joseph was a very drowsy man, who had to be continually warned and roused by angels as to what he should do and the dangers which threatened him. being made wide awake to the fact that herod sought to kill the child, he suddenly fled into egypt with his family, and there remained till the death of herod, that another prophecy might be fulfilled, "out of egypt have i called my son." but he did not go into egypt, but was taken back to nazareth at eight days old, and there remained till he was a man. so the third prophecy was fulfilled! jesus is familiarly known by the name of the "meek and lowly," but this is a title which scarcely seems warranted by the narratives. from his youth upwards he gave signs of the possession of an imperious disposition and a vituperative tongue, and he on several occasions manifested a want of filial affection. his parents went to jerusalem every year to the feast of the passover, and at the age of twelve jesus was taken. when the parents returned, the boy remained behind unknown to them, and they had got a day's journey on their way home before they missed him. they retraced their steps to jerusalem in much trouble, and at last, after three days' search, found the truant comfortably seated in the temple in the midst of the doctors, holding a learned argument with them. when his mother saw him she asked him why he had caused them so much sorrow. instead of showing any penitence, he pertly answered, "how is it that ye sought me? wist ye not that i must be about my father's business?" and mary, though she knew he was the son of the holy ghost, had not the slightest idea what he meant. when he "began to be about thirty years of age," he met with john baptist, a strange sort of anchorite, who used to dress in camelshair and eat locusts and wild honey. from this cynic jesus learnt much, especially the habit of calling names. when people presented themselves to john to be baptised, he greeted them in this loving way--"o generation of vipers, who hath warned _you_ to flee from the wrath to come?" jesus was baptised, and afterwards retailed much that john had said, especially his abusive phrases. at this ceremony of immersion the heavens opened to jesus, and the spirit of god descended like a dove and alighted upon him. this spirit assumes as many shapes as satan himself, and altogether appears to be a very curious bird of passage. this baptism was not a happy thing to jesus, for immediately afterwards he was led up of the spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil, and he had to fast forty days and forty nights, and afterwards, we are gravely told, "he was an hungered," which is not a remarkable fact, seeing that he was a young man of very good appetite. we shall see, as we get farther on, that his love of eating and drinking was manifested on many carious occasions. the old and new testaments teem with accounts of feasts and carouses by the chosen of the lord, and the lord himself, to such a degree, that christianity has not inaptly been termed the religion of gourmands. jesus frequently manifests great readiness and smartness in reply, which is either an answer to the question addressed to him, or a very clever evasion of it. when the devil had got jesus, he said to him, "if thou be the son of god, command that these stones be made bread." the devil evidently thought that to make something to eat would be the greatest temptation he could offer him. but jesus evaded the task by saying, "it is written that man shall not live by bread alone." the devil tried again, and took him to the pinnacle of a temple, and asked him to cast himself down, saying--"for it is written he shall give his angels charge concerning thee." jesus said unto him, "it is written again, thou shalt not tempt the lord thy god." the devil tried a third time, and took him up into an exceeding high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of this world, and the _glory_ of them, and promised him all if he would fall down and worship him. how could jesus see from one spot all the kingdoms of the world? as no one looking straight before him can see round a globe; but if it was done by supernatural power, why take the trouble to go to the top of an exceeding high mountain? the _flat_ country would have been a more suitable spot. he also saw the _glory_ of them, which must have puzzled him greatly, for what is the glory of one place, is sometimes the shame of another, jesus said, "get thee hence, satan: for it is written, thou shalt worship the lord thy god, and him only shalt thou serve." the devil deemed this conclusive, and thereupon took his departure. after john the baptist was cast into prison, jesus went to reside in capernaum, and there commenced to preach from john's text--"repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." at the outset of his public career he was a copyist, and he remained so to the end of his life. he simply repeated other men's sayings, or elaborated the traditions and prophecies which were so prevalent among the jews of his day. this kingdom of heaven did not mean something in another world somewhere in the clouds, but simply a new order of things here, and that more especially among the jews. at times, it must be confessed, it is difficult to understand what it meant if not an improved mental state, and not a material kingdom at all. jesus belonged to the working class, and his followers were of the lower orders, and he constantly preached against riches, which was very popular. his followers now appreciate his sublime example so much, that they get rich as fast as they can, especially the successors of the apostles, who are content if they can only get princely incomes, and a palace wherein to lay their heads! jesus wanted followers, so he walked out by the sea of galilee, and saw peter and andrew casting their nets. if they had been only fishing for small fry, he could not have more contemptuously addressed them. "and he said unto them, follow me, and i will make you fishers of men. and they straightway left their nets and followed him." a curious phenomenon strikes one here. peter and andrew have never seen jesus before; he does not tell them who he is; he explains no principles to them by which to enlist their sympathies and awaken conviction--he merely says, "follow me, and i will make you fishers of men," and in prospect of that delightful occupation they abandon their home and calling to accompany a stranger on a doubtful mission, whatever fish may have come to their net afterwards, they certainly could never have caught two greater flat-fish than themselves. a more striking instance of blind following is not to be found upon record. peter afterwards became the greatest fanatic of all the disciples, and caused his master some trouble through his excess of zeal. and this is the man to whom are entrusted the keys of heaven. no wonder the ignorant fanatics find a ready admission, whilst sensible people are excluded. and he too is the great predecessor of the pope of rome, the head of a church which preaches the efficacy of saints' relics, the liquefaction of blood, and the truth of winking virgins. fanaticism was at the foundation, and delusion and ignorance very naturally result. others followed jesus, forsaking their nets and their parents, and they went about all galilee, jesus preaching and curing all sorts of disease and sickness--and curious indeed were some of his cures, such as are not mentioned in any modern pharmacopoeia. having vanquished great satan himself on three occasions, the minor devils had no chance with him, and woe betide all who came before him inhabiting human beings. all these cures were performed that a prophecy might be fulfilled, "which was spoken by esaias the prophet, saying-, himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses." but then he did nothing of the kind. and so that prophecy was fulfilled! to cure a disease is not to take it upon ourselves; if it were, the royal college of surgeons would soon become an institution of the past. you might love your neighbour as yourself, but to be expected to have the measles tor him, would cool the warmest friendship. one style of cure jesus had which may have been very efficacious, but it certainly was not delicate. once a deaf man, who had an impediment in his speech, was brought to him to be healed. jesus took him aside from the multitude, and put his fingers into his ears, and spat and touched his tongue. and a blind man was brought to him, whom he took by the hand and led out of the town; and when he had spit on his eyes, and put his hands on him, asked him if he saw aught and the man was restored to sight this kind of lubrication could scarcely be deemed pleasant. neither do we find an incentive to cleanliness in this, for we are told, "as he spake, a certain pharisee besought him to dine with him; and he went in, and sat down to meat and when the pharisee saw it, he mar-yelled that he had not first washed before dinner. and the lord said onto him, now do ye pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter; but your inward part is full of ravening wickedness. ye fools, did not he that made that which is _without_, make that which it _within_ also?" this may be very true, but it is also very dirty; and though it may satisfy the son of god, would not be an excuse for any man who wished to be considered decent. the fame of jesus spread rapidly, and great multitudes flocked to hear him. one day he went up into a mountain, and addressed the people, but his discourse was of rather an extravagant description. as we understand matters in these days, what is the amount of truth contained in the following sentences?-"blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. "blessed art they that mourn: for they shall be comforted. "blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. "blessed an the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. "blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see god. "blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of god. "blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. "blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake." this kingdom of heaven is past all comprehension. the poor in spirit have it, and the persecuted for righteousness' sake have it; and if these are the penalties to be paid for its possession, it is not worth the winning. then is it possible or proper for any one to act in this way:--"if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out; if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off?" who in his senses would think of doing so? who would stand by and allow others to do it? and who lives according to this christian principle, and who follows this precept:--"resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also?" in the first place, it is grossly immoral _not_ to resist evil; and in the second, all the world repudiates the doctrine of non-resistance under such circumstances. if any one smites us on the right cheek, do we not quickly turn and hit him on the left? it is a natural instinct, and to act otherwise is cowardice. do the proceedings of our law courts furnish many instances of the adoption of this recommendation:--"and if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also?" one half humanity would very soon be stripped by the other half. "and whoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away." no one with any spirit or power of resistance would think of submitting to the _compulsion_ of walking a mile with a person, much less of going two in the company of one whose society might be a nuisance. and if we are to give to every one that asketh, what are our vagrancy laws but a flagrant violation of christianity? the injunction is here given without the slightest qualification, and is an encouragement to mendicancy the world over. there are one or two precepts specially binding on christians of the present day! this, for instance, is very much obeyed:--"and when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are; for they love to pray standing in the synagogues, _and in the corners of the streets_, that they may be seen of men." this, we know, is universally observed by the followers of jesus. it is obeyed by the ordained minister in his canonicals; the primitive in his whitewashed tabernacle; the methodist in his tub; the revivalists in their delirious and epileptic gatherings; the ranters in their camp meetings, and howling peregrinations through our country towns and villages; and above all, those highly gifted young men belonging to the town mission, who render the night hideous by their insane ravings at the corners of the streets and in the paths of public places. it is consoling to find the "salt of the earth" such consistent followers of their great master. it is because _they_ are the salt of the earth, that the world has got into such a precious pickle. bishops especially, and pluralists in particular, nurse in their hearts this saying: "lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth." no, poor men, they think too much about their heavenly father! a few thousand! a year are quite sufficient for them. and christian bankers and millionaires equally regard the injunction. this is a christian country, and we are a christian people, and our various provident and benefit societies and savings' banks tell how we esteem this command: "take no thought for the morrow, saying, what shall we eat? or, what shall we drink? or, wherewithal shall we be clothed?" we don't think of the morrow merely, but of years to come, and he who is the most careful in providing for the future, is most honoured amongst men. now all these impracticable and extravagant commands are taken from the much-vaunted sermon on the mount, and jesus said, whosoever heard them, and obeyed them, he would liken unto a _wise_ man; but whosoever obeyed them not, he would liken unto a foolish man. it may be an honour to be deemed foolish in such a case; but what shall we say of the professing christian, who considers himself so much superior to the freethinker, and who boasts of his principles being the checks which keep him moral, and says that if it had not been for his blessed saviour the world would have been lost? why, out of the mouth of jesus himself he is proved to be a hypocrite and foolish, for he does what is solemnly condemned, and leaves undone what is strictly enjoined. "and it came to pass, when jesus had ended these sayings, the people _were_ astonished at his doctrine." and can any rational inquirer be astonished at that? on reading over these gospels calmly, and seeing what are attributed to jesus as his sayings and doings, one is amazed at the credulity of the world in allowing such a stupendous delusion as the christian religion to be palmed upon it as something divine derived direct from deity. after this startling sermon, great multitudes followed jesus, and wherever he went he healed the sick and performed miracles, but he generally enjoined the convalescents not to mention to any one what he had done. the reason for this is not given, but if one may make a conjecture, it was either because he had really worked no cure at all, or else he was afraid of having too many demands made upon his time. we are told that when "jesus saw great multitudes about him, he gave commandment to depart unto the other side" of the water, that he might get away from them. before he departed, a disciple said unto him, "lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father. but jesus said unto him, follow me, and let the dead bury their dead." is this an instance of meekness? when on board the ship, a great storm came on, and the sailors were afraid of being wrecked. so they awoke jesus, telling him of their danger. he first chided them, and then scolded the winds and the waves, which at once subsided. when he was come to the other side, into the country of the gergesenes, he was met by two men possessed with devils, who asked him if he had come to torment them before their time? and singular to say, the devils also, from the _interior_, entered into conversation with jesus, asking as a favour, that if they were cast out, they might be allowed to go into a herd of swine which were feeding some distance off. why they should choose such an abode is not apparent; but having permission to go, they at once entered into possession, much to the astonishment of the poor porkies, who took fright and ran violently down a steep hill into the sea, and all, to the number of 2,000, perished in the waters. o unhappy pigs! o miserable devils! the son of man, whom you had never injured, worked your speedy destruction. "and, behold, the whole city came out to meet jesus; and when they saw him, they besought him that he would depart out of _their_ coasts." they had more desire to save their bacon than to see miracles worked at the expense of their pigs. jesus entered into a ship and came over to his own city, where a certain ruler came and worshipped him, saying that his daughter was dead, but making the request that she should be raised to life again. when jesus entered the ruler's house, he said, "give place, for the maid is not dead, but sleepeth." and they laughed him to scorn. but when the house was cleared he took the girl by the hand, and the maid arose. this was regarded as a miracle, but it could not be, because jesus said the girl only slept, and it is not possible that a perfect god could tell an untruth. after this jesus called together his twelve disciples, and gave them instructions what to do. he said:--"provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses, nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves; for the workman is worthy of his meat. and into whatsoever city or town ye shall enter, inquire who in it is worthy; and there abide till ye go hence. and when ye come into a house, salute it. and if the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it; but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you. and whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet. verily i say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for the land of sodom and gomorrha in the day of judgment than for that city." but it is doubtful if he meant the land of sodom and gomorrha, or tyre and sidon. however, though we may overlook this uncertainty, we cannot the fact, that a threat of destroying cities is held out if his disciples are not received and fed by people upon whom they have not the slightest claim. this advice would justify the order of 'mendicant friars in their lazy habit of living upon all who are willing to support them. he also added--"behold, i send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves." have not the jesuits carried out this advice? and then he gave utterance to this painful truth to which the blood-stained pages of history can testify:--"think not that i am come to send peace on earth: i came _not_ to send peace, but a sword. for i am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. and a man's foes shall be they of his own household. he that loveth father or mother more than, me, is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me." there has been no peace, and there can be none, in the world, so long as the contradictory and impossible doctrines of jesus of nazareth are taught as infallible truth. house has been divided against house, the father's hand lifted against the child, and the mother's loving tenderness turned to bitterest hate, because of differences of opinion upon christian dogmas. while jesus was making one of his incoherent speeches, somebody told him that his mother and brothers were without, desiring to speak with him. "but he answered and said unto him that told him, who is my mother? and who are my brethren? and he stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, behold my mother and my brethren." there is here manifested a want of natural affection unbecoming any man, and which justifies m. rénan in saying, notwithstanding his great reverence for jesus, that he was more loved than loving. there is scarcely a trace of affection throughout his life, from his childhood to his death. he was mystical and fanatical, like all who seek to set themselves up as inspired teachers. one day jesus sat by the sea-side and talked to the people in parables. he is answerable for the following:--"for whosoever hath to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; but whosoever hath _not_, from him shall be taken away even that he hath." he says immediately after, as a sort of apology, "therefore speak i to then in parables, because they seeing, see not; and hearing, they hear not, neither do they understand." it would be a miracle greater than that worked among the pigs, if anyone did understand. this sort of talk must have been indulged in for amusement--it could not have had any serious purport, or if it had, it is too profound to be understood. when jesus learnt the execution of john the baptist, he departed into a desert place, but the multitude heard of him, and followed him out of the cities. and when evening came, the disciples asked him to send the multitude away, that they might go into the villages and buy themselves victuals. we do not usually find villages in _desert_ places; but that was quite as possible in this case as what followed. jesus said they need not go, and told the disciples to give to the people to eat. they said, we have here but five loaves and two fishes. he said, bring them hither to me. and then looking up to heaven, he blessed and brake, and distributed to the multitude. now out of this very small commissariat, about five thousand men, besides women and children, ate and were filled, and left twelve baskets full of fragments at the end of the feast. all we can deplore is, that the age of miracles is past. if anyone could do this now, what a number of attached followers be would have, no matter what his speculative opinions might be. he might believe in the eternity of punishments; in three gods in one, or one in three; in election, predestination, or transmigration of souls--in short, in anything or nothing; if he could only feed his flock by casting his eyes up to heaven, he would soon empty all the churches and chapels in the kingdom. as rénan very powerfully points out, no miracle ever yet took place under scientific conditions; and till one of this description is wrought under such conditions, we must be allowed to suspend our judgment. we do not say it did not take place, but we don't believe it. it is true it does not say what kind of fishes the two were which served to fill five thousand men, _besides_ women and children, who probably ran the number up to eight thousand. perhaps the fishes were whales, as the whole story is so "very like a whale" that any suggested solution of the astounding tale is legitimate. this miracle was once discussed by a society in chicago, and the 'cute american intellect found a key to the mystery, for they _resolved_--"that the multitude must certainly have made their repast off _multiplication tables_!" after this stupendous feat, jesus constrained his disciples to get into the ship and go across the water, whilst he remained behind to get rid of his well fed friends. and when night came, the ship was tossed by the storm. and in the fourth watch jesus went unto them walking on the sea. when his disciples saw him they said he was a spirit, and cried out for fear. but jesus said, be of good cheer; it is i; be not afraid. then the enthusiastic peter said, lord, if it be thou, bid me come unto thee on the water. jesus said, come; to which peter responded by stepping out of the ship; but he could not float, and began to sink rapidly, and would have perished if his master had not put out his hand and saved him. if this system of aquatic locomotion could be instituted now, it would supersede all lifeboats. but we have little _faith_ in these days of scientific facts, and it requires an immense amount of that commodity to be able to attempt even what was said to have been accomplished by the founders of our national religion. jesus did not confine his creative abilities to the solid comforts of life, but exercised them upon the liquid luxuries of existence. being invited to a wedding, and there being no wine, his mother, with a woman's natural solicitude on such an occasion, said to him, "they have no wine. jesus saith unto her, woman, what have i to do with thee? mine hour is not yet come." now, what such a churlish answer had to do with the simple remark made by his mother, we leave to gentle christians to say. however, after a time he became more amiable; and, no doubt, reflecting upon the disappointment of those who had come to a marriage feast, and found nothing but water to drink, he took compassion on them, and turned the water into wine, to the extent of "six water pots, containing two or three firkins apiece." "this beginning of miracles did jesus in cana of galilee, and manifested forth his glory; and his disciples believed on him." well they might; and we fear that any man in these days who should do such things, would have many followers, in spite of all the preaching of all the teetotallers, who, strange to say, for the most part profess to be good christians, notwithstanding that christ, when he had the opportunity of rebuking wine bibbing, did not do so, but encouraged it by supplying the very beverage which teetotallers so vehemently condemn. when jesus came into the coasts of cæsarea philippi, he asked his disciples, saying, whom do men say that i the son of man am? he was anxious to know what people thought of him now that he was become so famous. "and they said, some say that thou art john the baptist; some, elias; and others, jeremias, or one of the prophets. he saith unto them, but whom say _ye_ that i am?" of course peter was ready to crown all, and he said--"thou art the christ, the son of the living god." for which jesus blessed peter, and promised him the keys of the kingdom of heaven; but they soon fell to quarrelling, when jesus said that he must go unto jerusalem, and suffer many things, and be killed, and be raised again the third day. peter rebuked him, and said it should not be; but jesus turned upon him, and said, "get thee behind me, satan: thou art an offence unto me." it was not very dignified or in good taste after peter had imparted such an important fact to him, which was done by a revelation of his father which is in heaven.. but such was the manner of jesus. when he left galilee, and came into judæa, he resolved to go to jerusalem; and when he was come to the mount of olives, he sent two of his disciples to a village on a very questionable errand. it was to perform no less an act than the appropriation of a donkey and her colt. he told them that, if any one said aught unto them, they were to say, "the lord hath need of them." that kind of answer would scarcely be deemed satisfactory in these days, especially to a policeman. he would very likely reply, if the lord hath need of the ass, the magistrate hath need of thee; and if the instigator of the deed were not the actual thief, he would be charged as an accessory before the fact, and would be provided with board and lodging at the expense of the county for at least twelve months. this was done that another prophecy might be fulfilled, which said, "tell ye the daughter of sion, behold, thy king cometh unto thee, meek, and sitting upon an ass, and a colt the foal of an ass." but this prophet must have been an ass, or he would have known that even the son of man would find it difficult to sit upon two asses of such unequal size at the same time. apart from the absurdity of the story, it is an example of very loose notions indeed of the rights of property, which, if stated of mahomet, of joseph smith the mormon, or any other founder of a religious sect, would be quoted as a proof of his obliquity of moral vision. after this successful exploit of taking unto himself other people's goods, jesus became quite daring; and when he got to jerusalem he went into the temple of god, where he found a number of people carrying on their usual business. he had no more right there than they had--in fact, not so much, as he was a stranger to the city. but, notwithstanding this, he got a rope, and thrashed every one out of the place, upsetting the tables and chairs, and creating such a consternation as only a bedlamite broken loose would be likely to produce. though this was immediately after the appropriation of the two donkeys, upon which he had actually ridden to the temple, he called all the tradespeople dishonest, and accused them of having turned the place into a den of thieves. whatever it might have been before he came, certainly one would think the designation not inappropriate after the arrival of himself and his disciples. he was not arrested on the spot for this act of assault and battery; but what should we think of the city police commissioner if he neglected to order into custody any mad enthusiast who might so conduct himself on the stock exchange? but he would not, and the enthusiast's vagaries and his visit to the police cell would be a very little time apart. it would be no use his alleging that he was about his father's business, and that he was fulfilling prophecy--that would only aggravate the offence. he would be told that if his father did not take better care of him, the county asylum would; and the prophet would very soon be "wanted" who had instigated such folly. jesus did not remain in the city during the night--it was not prudent after such an advent in the morning, but he went and lodged in bethany, a little way out of town. in returning next morning he was hungry, so, when he came to a fig-tree, he looked at it hoping to find some fruit on it, but there was none, as it was not the right season. we should forgive an excited hungry man here if he, in a moment of forgetfulness, looked for apples in winter; but if he began to curse the tree for not bearing fruit out of season, we should think he was mad past doubt. yet this is exactly what jesus did; and not only so, but he withered the tree that it should not bear fruit thenceforward forever. his disciples marvelled at what he had done, as well they might. "jesus answered and said unto them, verily i say unto you, if ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only do this which is done to the fig tree, but also if ye shall say unto this mountain, be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; it shall be done. and all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive." no persons have ever yet had the requisite amount of faith to remove mountains; and the less they try such credulity on fruit trees, the better for our orchards. nobody does or can believe such insane talk. jesus went to the temple again, and whilst he was preaching, the chief priests and elders came and asked him by what authority he did such things. in true quaker style he answered them by asking a question, which had the merit of being impossible of solution. he said--"the baptism of john, whence was it? from heaven, or of men?" they said: "we cannot tell. and he said unto them, neither tell i you by what authority i do these things." that seemed to silence his interrogators, but it did not answer them. it was a favourite way with this messiah; and we remain as much in the dark to this hour as did the chief priests and elders. this method of evasion is also exemplified in the case of the tribute money. when asked whether it was lawful to render tribute unto cæsar, he said, looking at a coin, "whose is this image and superscription?" they said, cæsar's. "then saith he unto them, render therefore unto cæsar the things which are cæsar's, and unto god the things that are god's." rénan says on this point--"to establish as a principle that we must recognise the legitimacy of a power by the inscription on its coins, to proclaim that the perfect man pays tribute with scorn, and without question, was to destroy republicanism in the ancient form, and to favour all tyranny. christianity, in this sense, has contributed much to weaken the sense of duty of the citizen, and to deliver the world into the absolute power of existing circumstances." but we are not surprised that he should so readily teach the payment of tribute, considering how easy he found it to pay tribute himself; for the ludicrous account given in matthew, in the same chapter which describes the transfiguration, shows jesus discharging his own liability and that of peter in the most original manner imaginable. not wishing to offend the tax collectors, he said to peter--"go thou to the sea, and cast an hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up; and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a piece of money: take that, and give unto them for me and thee." if fish of this description swam in rivers now, they would be preserved to the exclusion of the most delicious members of the finny tribe. every man would be an angler, and fishing-tackle making would be the most lucrative trade known. take another instance of evasion. the sadducees did not believe in the resurrection, so they put a question to jesus on that point. they instanced a woman who had been married to seven brothers in succession, all of whom had died. therefore, in the resurrection, they asked whose wife she would be out of the seven when they met again. this was quickly disposed of, for "jesus answered and said onto them, ye do err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the power of god. for in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of god in heaven." if this is so, what becomes of the hope which believers in immortality have that in heaven they will be joined again to those they have lost on earth? this great consolation of the christian is founded on a delusion. jesus also supplemented his statement with this remarkable declaration, "but as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by god, saying, i am the god of abraham, and the god of isaac, and the god of jacob? god is _not_ the god of the _dead_, but of the _living_," what then is the use of catholic prayers for the souls of those in purgatory? what is the utility of our burial service, which goes upon the supposition that god will attend to our requests as touching the dead we are about to consign to the grave? freethinkers and rational thinkers discard the whole ceremony as a mockery. when once dead, the particles which composed our bodies are dissolved, and pass into new combinations--_we_ never live again. after he had done all his preaching, and had thoroughly aroused the ire of the authorities and most of the people of jerusalem against him, he began to fear that he would have to suffer for it, and he told his disciples so. after they had supped together in the house of one of the friends, they departed to the mount of olives outside the city, and jesus said they would all be offended with him because of that night. peter the loquacious declared, that though all men might be offended because of him, he would never be. jesus had no great opinion of peter's steadfastness, and told him, notwithstanding his protestations of attachment, that before the cock crew he would deny him thrice. peter asseverated again: "though i should die with ye, yet will i not deny thee." poor peter's word, like his judgment, however, was not to be relied upon, for the very next day he denied all knowledge of jesus, and when pressed for an answer, he began to curse and to swear that he had never seen him. soon after this the garden of gethsemane, into which they had entered; was surrounded by a multitude with staves and with swords, and jesus was arrested, peter the dauntless did make some resistance, and cut off the ear of malchus, a servant of the high priest; but the loss was only temporary, for we are told that jesus immediately "touched his ear, and healed him," and if this does not mean that he stuck the ear on again, what does it mean? when jesus was arrested in the garden, all the disciples, escaped as quickly as possible, but peter followed at a distance; and when jesus was taken to the house of caiaphas the high priest, peter entered and mixed with the servants. he was soon recognised as a follower of jesus; but when accused of the fact, he stoutly denied it three times, the last with oaths, like the low-bred man he was; for though he had been consorting with jesus a long time, he had not learnt refinement of manners, which is not wonderful, as jesus certainly did not set an example of choiceness of language, his favourite mode of speech being to call people fools, and to launch curses at them. but peter had to fulfil a prophecy--namely, that he would deny his master _thrice_, before the cock crew _twice_, which he did before the cock crew _once_. and so that prophecy was fulfilled! when jesus was first examined on the charge of blasphemy he remained silent, and would not answer any questions put to him. then caiaphas said--"i adjure thee by the living god that thou tell us whether thou be christ, the son of god." jesus at last replied--"thou hast said," which may fairly be interpreted to mean, "you say i am, not i." this is in keeping with his usual evasive mode of answering, as before pointed out. especially as he continued--"nevertheless i say unto you, _hereafter_ shall ye see the son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven." this was declared blasphemous, and we know how excited bigoted people get when that word is pronounced. so they struck the enthusiast, as he had struck others in the temple. in the morning he was bound and led before pilate the governor, who asked him, "art thou the king of the jews?" he again answered, "thou sayest" and when the chief priests and elders repeated their charges, he still refused to answer them, which surprised pilate. however, pilate saw no harm in what he had done, and was anxious to set him at liberty; but the priests, as is usual with them, persisted in their demands of vengeance against one who had offended them. then jesus was delivered over to the soldiers to be crucified, which was a very barbarous mode of execution. he was cruelly treated by the soldiers, who were incited thereto by the priests. he died the death of a malefactor, but his end was brought about by his own wild and extravagant conduct. in these days he would have been confined as a lunatic, but in that barbarous time, and under the influence of priests, he was tortured to death. no one can contemplate his fate, whatever his faults may have been, without feelings of sorrow. but if his death was to fulfil prophecy, and to save a lost and ruined world, we ought to regard it with exultation and great joy, and not only observe good friday as a national holiday, but every friday as a public festival. but who, on calmly reading the narrative, and dismissing from his mind the fables taught him in his childhood, can see anything supernatural in jesus' life and death? he displayed through life all the infirmities and littlenesses of a man, and he died like one who had brought about his own death by his own acts. when on the cross, and no doubt in mortal agony, he exclaimed, in the utterness of despair, like one who had long trusted to a delusion, and when too late had found out his mistake--"my god, my god, why hast thou forsaken me?" the chief priests and elders, the people about, and even the two thieves who were dying with him, jeered him for his folly, saying, "he trusted in god; let him deliver him now, if he will have him: for he said, i am the son of god." but there was no deliverance from heaven for him more than for any other man. jesus had acted so extravagantly from the time he entered on public life that it is not surprising that his followers were infected by his example, and it is to them we are indebted for the re-appearance of jesus after he was dead and buried. he himself said that he was to fulfil the prophecy of jonas, for, as he was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale, so should the son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. yet he never went into the heart of the earth, but was laid in a tomb or cave with a door to it; and he was not even there three days and three nights, but only two nights, and not two days altogether. and so that prophecy was fulfilled! jesus prophesied his own resurrection only, but the earthquake which followed his death was no respecter of persons, for when the veil of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom, and the earth did quake, and the rocks were rent, the graves were opened, and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many. no orthodox, christians doubt for a moment that jesus rose again from the dead, because he was to do so, and he was the son of god; but do they believe these unknown saints revisited the glimpses of the moon, and experienced a resurrection equal to that of jesus, for no purpose at all, and for no merit of their own? yet we have no more authority for the one than the other, and no reason to believe one more than the other. toward the end of the sabbath (that is, saturday evening) came mary magdalene, with the other mary, to see the sepulchre where jesus was laid, and another earthquake took place, and the angel of the lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door, and sat upon it. his countenance was like lightning, and his raiment like snow. he told the women that jesus had risen, and asked them to see the place where the lord lay. but whether they looked or not we are not told, but they ran away with fear and great joy to tell the disciples. and as they went, whom should they meet but jesus himself, who said to them, "all hail." but then there is some little confusion in this infallible narrative. it was not towards the end of saturday, but very early in the morning of sunday, at the rising of the sun, that the women came, and for the purpose of anointing the body. and the stone was still against the door, and they said, who shall roll us away the stone? but when they looked again the stone was away, and on entering the sepulchre they saw a young man dressed in white sitting _inside_, and no angel with a lightning face sitting _outside_. the women fled with terror, but told no man what they had seen; and it isa mystery to this day how that which was never told to any one is known to nearly all the world. jesus did not meet the two marys, but appeared first to mary magdalene, out of whom he had cast seven devils. she went and told the disciples about the resurrection, but they believed her not. he appeared afterwards to two of his disciples, but they did not believe in his resurrection, neither did the eleven disciples, to whom he appeared. if they who knew him intimately did not believe in it after only three days' absence from them, shall we, after a lapse of eighteen hundred years, put faith in this clumsy, impossible, and absurd fable? but perhaps the condition he attached to the belief may have something to do with the faith of so many people in these days. he said, after upbraiding his disciples for their unbelief and hardness of heart--"he that believeth and is baptised shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." that threat, fulminated from thousands of pulpits, has frightened timid and weak people in nearly every age of the christian era. but then again there were not two women but many who went to the sepulchre, and they found the stone away; and when they entered they saw two men in shining garments, and the women did not conceal what they had seen, but went and told all the disciples, but they were not believed. this time the lively peter ran to the tomb to look for himself, and saw nothing but the linen clothes lying by themselves. after that two of the disciples went to emmana, where jesus himself joined them, but they knew him not, and did not believe the story of his resurrection. he then rebuked them in his usual sweet and placid style, by exclaiming, "o fools, and slow of heart," and beginning at moses and all the prophets, "he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself," which must have been a tolerably long discourse for one so recently out of the grave. they asked him to stop with them and have something to eat, which, his appetite being as good as ever, he consented to do; and it was his mode of breaking bread and blessing it that convinced them that he was jesus. and he then vanished out of their sight. they went to jerusalem and told the others what they had seen, and while they were talking jesus stood in the midst of them; but they did not know him again, but took him to be a spirit. he said--"behold my hands and my feet, that it is myself; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." and while they yet believed not for joy and wondered, he said unto them, "have ye here any meat?" he was again hungry, and they gave him a piece of broiled fish and a honeycomb. and he took it, and did eat before them. that was enough to convince them a second time. "and he led them out as far as bethany, and he lifted up his hands and blessed them. and it came to pass, while he blessed them, he was parted from them, and carried up into heaven," with the broiled fish on his stomach, where he entered into joy everlasting. the foregoing will certainly be declared "blasphemous" by all true believers, and will no doubt be pronounced a "caricature" of jesus by even unitarians. but the fault does not lie with us--it is in the text, which we did not make. we are not responsible for the representation, for we have scrupulously followed the inspired delineations of the evangelists. let us briefly sum up this biography. jesus was the son of god, and not the son of his mother's husband, and his mother remained a virgin notwithstanding his conception and birth, although she strangely offered the usual sacrifice when the days of her purification were accomplished. he was descended from the royal line of david, that is, joseph the husband of his mother was so descended; but then joseph was not his father at all. the miraculous boy was to fulfil many prophecies; but although he often purposely acted in order to fulfil them, several given as illustrations are singularly wide of the mark. at twelve years of age he was a match for learned doctors in disputation, and could pertly rebuke his mother for inquiring where he had been for three days and three nights. he was baptised at thirty by john, who taught him rudeness of manners; and though a dove descended direct from heaven, and alighted on his head, he was immediately taken by the spirit into very dangerous places, was kept a remarkably long time without food, and was very strangely tempted by the devil in person. he became a great talker, dealt largely in mystical language, and gathered followers from the poorest, most ignorant, and most credulous of his countrymen. he cured all sorts of diseases and afflictions, though there is no evidence that he ever underwent a medical training. he worked miracles, as became an eastern founder of a sect, but his achievements scarcely rank as high as the tricks of an indian juggler. he was uneducated, and never, so far as the record goes, wrote a line in his life; but as a preacher he was famous, and always succeeded in making his hearers marvel at his strange doctrines--doctrines so contradictory that no sane man can follow them. he was vituperative in his language, austere in his manners, undutiful and repelling to his mother. he appropriated other persons' property, and immediately after violently assaulted a large number of men, whom he charged with being dishonest. when asked questions touching vital points of his own doctrines, he usually gave evasive answers. he promised his disciples all sorts of wonderful powers if they would believe in him, and he promised also to come in a cloud with great glory before that generation passed away; but having risen from the grave, and ascended into heaven, he has not returned in a cloud with glory up to the time of our going to press. he ultimately met the death of a malefactor, and in the last moments of agony his fanaticism was strong upon him, for he promised to the thief who flattered him that he would meet him that day in paradise, though he did not go there himself till about six weeks afterwards. after his death he was brought to life again, thus defying all the laws of physiology. when but just out of the grave, his powers of preaching were as strong as ever, and his appetite as vigorous as though he had returned from a long journey; and after partaking of a singular repast, and before he had had time to digest it, he ascended into the clouds without the aid of a balloon, and was seen no more. all this, with much more of the same incredible nature, is taught as infallible truth by some of the best educated men the universities can produce, and belief in the whole of it is necessary to "respectability" in this life, and to salvation in a life after death. how educated men can believe it, is a mystery which we trust the school boards of the future will be able to unravel; at present we find it as insoluble as all the other sublime mysteries of christianity, for we cannot believe that a university training necessarily makes men hypocrites, and we are loth to believe that on one most important subject it necessarily makes them imbecile. there would be fewer believers if there were more inquirers. the advocates of bible reading in elementary schools must feel that there is danger to the faith lurking in the future if that "precious book" is read and not "expounded." dogmatic teaching is the stronghold of the religion of christendom. the "plain, unvarnished tale" of the four gospels would carry with it its own condemnation, for the best refutation of christianity is a true knowledge of christ. printed and published by c. watts, 17, johnson's court, fleet st, london, e.c. price twopence reminiscences of charles bradlaugh by g. w. foote president of the national secular society and editor of "the freethinker" london: progressive publishing company, 1891. introduction. the following pages are reprinted, with some alterations and additions, from the columns of the _freethinker_. they are neither methodical nor exhaustive. i had the privilege of knowing mr. bradlaugh more or less intimately for twenty years. i have worked with him in the freethought movement and stood by his side on many political platforms. it seemed to me, therefore, that if i jotted down, even in a disjointed manner, some of my recollections of his great personality, i should be easing my own mind and conferring a pleasure on many readers. beyond that i was not ambitious. the time for writing mr. brad-laugh's life is not yet, but when it arrives my jottings may furnish a point or two to his biographer. g. w. foote, march 30, 1891. reminiscences of charles bradlaugh. when i came to london, in january, 1868, i was eighteen years of age. i had plenty of health and very little religion. while in my native town of plymouth i had read and thought for myself, and had gradually passed through various stages of scepticism, until i was dissatisfied even with the advanced unitarianism of a preacher like the rev. j. k. applebee. but i could not find any literature in advance of his position, and there was no one of whom i could inquire. secularism and atheism i had never heard of in any definite way, although i remember, when a little boy, having an atheist pointed out to me in the street, naturally i regarded him as a terrible monster. i did not know what atheism was except in a very vague way; but i inferred from the tones, expressions, and gestures of those who pointed him out to me, that an atheist was a devil in human form. soon after i came to london i found out an old school-fellow, and went to lodge with his family: they were tainted with atheism, and my once pious playmate was as corrupt as the rest of them. they took me one sunday evening to cleveland hall, where i heard mrs. law knock the bible about delightfully. she was not what would be called a woman of culture, but she had what some devotees of "culchaw" do not possess--a great deal of natural ability; and she appeared to know the "blessed book" from cover to cover. her discourse was very different from the unitarian sermons i had heard at plymouth. she spoke in a plain, honest, straightforward manner, and i resolved to visit cleveland hall again. three or four weeks afterwards i heard mr. bradlaugh for the first time. it was a very wet sunday evening, but as 'bus-riding was dearer then than it is now, and my resources were slender, i walked about three miles through the heavy rain, and sat on a backless bench in cleveland hall, for which i think i paid twopence. i was wet through, but i was young, and my health was flawless. nor did i mind the discomfort a bit when mr. bradlaugh began his lecture. fiery natural eloquence of that sort was a novelty in my experience. i kept myself warm with applauding, and at the finish i was pretty nearly as dry outside as inside. from that time i went to hear mr. bradlaugh whenever i had an opportunity. he became the "god" of my young idolatry. i used to think of him charging the hosts of superstition, and wish i could be near him in the fight. but it was rather a dream than any serious expectation of such an honor. when the new hall of science was opened i became a pretty regular attendant. i heard mr. charles watts, who was then as now a capital debater; mr. g. j. holyoake, mr. c. c. cattell, mr. austin holyoake. and perhaps one or two other lecturers whom i have forgotten. mr. austin holyoake frequently took the chair, especially at mr. bradlaugh's lectures, and a capital chairman he was, giving out the notices in a pleasant, graceful manner, and pleading for financial support like a true man. he was working hard for the success of the enterprise himself, and had a right to beg help from others. mr. bradlaugh, however, was the great attraction in my case. perhaps i was more impressionable at that time, but i fancy he was then at his best as an orator. in later life he grew more cautious under a sense of responsibility; he had to think what he should not say as well as what he should. he cultivated the art of persuasion, and he was right in doing so. but at the earlier period i am writing of he gave a full swing to his passionate eloquence. his perorations were marvellously glowing and used to thrill me to the very marrow. gradually i began to make acquaintances at the hall. i got to know mr. austin holyoake and his charming wife, mr. and mrs. bayston, mr. herbert gilham, mr. r. o. smith, and other workers. by and bye i was introduced to mr. bradlaugh and shook hands with him. it was the proudest moment of my young life. i still remember his scrutinising look. it was keen but kindly, and the final expression seemed to say, "we may see more of each other." in 1870 i wrote my first article in the _national reformer_. for a year or two i wrote occasionally, and after that with tolerable frequency. i was also engaged in various efforts at the hall; helping to carry on a secular sunday school, a young men's secular association, etc. naturally i was drawn more and more into mr. bradlaugh's acquaintance, and when he found himself unable to continue the logic class he had started at the hall he asked me to carry it on for him. of course i was proud of the invitation. but the class did not live long. it was not logic, but mr. bradlaugh, that had brought the members together. nor do i think they would have learnt much of the art from mr. bradlaugh, except in an empirical way. he had a very logical cast of mind, but as far as i could see he had little acquaintance with formal logic as it is taught by mill and whately, whom i select as typical masters of induction and deduction, without wishing to depreciate the host of other authorities. mr. bradlaugh really gave his class lessons in metaphysics; his talk was of substance, mode, and attribute, rather than of premises and conclusions. mr. bradlaugh and i were brought into closer acquaintance by the republican agitation in england after the proclamation of the present french republic. i attended the republican conference at birmingham in 1871, when i first met my old friend dr. guest of manchester, mr. r. a. cooper of norwich, mr. daniel baker, mr. ferguson the glasgow home ruler, and other veterans of reform. we held our conference on sunday in the old meeting-place of the secular society, which was approached by very abrupt steps, and being situated over stables, was not devoid of flavor. on monday the conference was continued in one of the rooms under the town hall. a long political programme was concocted. i was elected secretary, and had the honor of speaking at the public meeting in the large hall. it was my first appearance in such a perilous position. i was apprehensive, and i said so. but mr. bradlaugh put his hand on my shoulder and told me not to fear. his kind looks and words were an excellent tonic. when i rose to speak i thought next to nothing about the audience. i thought "mr. bradlaugh is listening, i must do my best." and now as i am writing, i recall his encouraging glance as i looked at him, and the applause he led when i made my first point. he was my leader, and he helped me in an elder-brotherly way. nothing could exceed his considerate generosity. other people did not see it, but i remember it, and it was typical of the man. one incident at the conference is worth noting. it occurred in the afternoon, when mr. r. a. cooper (i think) was in the chair. the question of free education was being discussed. mr. bradlaugh did not quite like it, nor did i. he asked me to go with him into an ante-room and consider an amendment. what it was i can hardly remember, although i recollect that mr. cooper was very sarcastic about it. since then my own opinion has changed, as i dare say mr. bradlaugh's had changed; and the incident would not be worth recalling if it did not throw a light upon mr. bradlaugh's philosophy. he was always in favor of self-help and individual responsibility, and he was naturally hostile to everything that might weaken those precious-elements of english life. during the years immediately after the opening of the hall of science, mr. bradlaugh was there a good deal. sometimes he attended the week-night entertainments and gave a reading from shelley or whittier or some other poet. the audience applauded as a matter of course. they always applauded mr. bradlaugh. but he was no reader. he delivered his lines with that straightforward sincerity which characterised his speeches. he cultivated none of the graces or dexterities of the elocutionist. besides, he was too original to be a successful echo of other men. i think he only did justice to shelley's lines "to the men of england." but this is a piece of simple and vigorous declamation; very fine, no doubt but rather rhetoric than poetry. mr. bradlaugh was anything but a cold man. i should say he was electric. but his tastes, so far as i could discover, did not lie in the direction of poetry. certainly i heard him once, in those old days, read a great part, if not the whole of shelley's "sensitive plant." he loved shelley, however, as an atheist and a republican, and i suppose he took shelley's poetry on trust. but i do not think, though i speak under correction, that he cared very much for poetry _as such_. i could never discover from his conversation or writings that he had read a line of shakespeare--the god of colonel ingersoll. his mind was of the practical order, like oliver cromwell's. he had a genius for public affairs. he was not only a born orator, but a born ruler of men. naturally he had, as the french say, the defects of his qualities. and it may be that the terrible stress of his life tended to repress the poetical side of his nature, and less developed his subtlety than his strength. yet his feelings were deep, and his heart was easily touched. when william o'brien delivered that great speech in the house of commons after his imprisonment by mr. balfour, with all its needless indignities, there were two men who could not restrain their tears. one was an irish member. the other was charles bradlaugh. one who witnessed the scene told me it was infinitely pathetic to see that gigantic man, deemed so hard by an ignorant world, wiping away his tears at the tale of a brave man's unmerited suffering. mr. bradlaugh used to attend the social parties pretty often in those old days. he did not dance and he stood about rather awkwardly. it must have been a great affliction, but he bore it with exemplary fortitude. once or twice i saw mrs. bradlaugh there. she had a full-blown matronly figure. miss alice and miss hypatia came frequently. they were not then living in the enervating air of london, and they looked extremely robust. i also remember the boy charles, of whom mr. bradlaugh seemed very proud. he was a remarkably bright lad, and full of promise. but he was carried off by a fever. only a day or two after the lad's death mr. bradlaugh had to lecture at the hall. i was away, and i wondered whether he would fulfil the engagement. he did fulfil it. a friend wrote to me that mr. bradlaugh walked through the hall and mounted the platform with a face as white and rigid as that of a statue. he made no reference or allusion to his loss, but all could see he carried a bleeding heart. his lecturing in such circumstances was characteristic. weaker men would have indulged their grief; he was made of sterner stuff, and would not let it interfere with what he deemed his duty. splendid as was his eloquence at that time, mr. bradlaugh did not draw the large audiences that flocked around him a few years later. the hall of science was at first but half its present size, the platform standing on the right as you entered, with a small gallery on the opposite side. its holding capacity could not have been more than half what it is at present, yet i have seen the place far from full. but the audiences grew larger and larger, and eventually the hall was increased to its present proportions, although for a long time there was not cash enough to put on a proper roof, and the building was defaced by a huge unsightly beam, on each side of which there was an arch of corrugated iron. those were glorious times. difficulties were great, but there was a spirit at the hall that laughed at them. how the foremost men about the place did work! mr. r. o. smith and mr. trevilion, senior, could a tale unfold. whenever freethinkers are at all dejected they should have a chat with one of those gentleman. perhaps it would make them ashamed of their dejection, and fill them with the spirit of the heroic days. friends have told me with what energy mr. bradlaugh fought the battles of the old reform league. i _know_ with what energy he threw himself into the republican agitation that followed the downfall of napoleon iii. he tried to get to paris but failed. jules favre and his friends did not want him. favre himself was an eloquent historion, and no doubt he felt afraid of a man like mr. bradlaugh. but if mr. bradlaugh could not get to paris he fought hard for france in london. meetings at the hall of science did not suffice. there was money from french sources and st. james's hall was taken for a big demonstration. the positivists shared in the proceedings. their chief man was mr. frederic harrison. mr. bradlaugh and he were a tremendous contrast. in fact a london paper (i think the _echo_) remarked that mr. bradlaugh spoke as well as mr. harrison wrote, and mr. harrison spoke as badly as mr. bradlaugh wrote. there was some truth in this, though like most epigrams it was not all true. mr. bradlaugh was a born orator, but not a born writer. yet he often wrote with a forthright power, naked and unadorned, which could dispense with the aid of literary artifices. during this english agitation on behalf of france, held firmly under german feet, mr. bradlaugh came into contact with a french countess, who, i believe, either supplied or was the channel of supplying the necessary funds. as the lady is mentioned in mr headingley's _life of charles bradlaugh_, which was published with mr. bradlaugh's sanction, there is no reason why i should not refer to her. she came several times to the hall of science, and i was introduced to her. she had been a beauty, and although time was beginning to tell on her, she retained a good deal of charm and distinction, which, like a true frenchwoman, she heightened by the art of dressing. then as now, of course, foul tongues wagged in foolish heads, and mr. bradlaugh's enemies were not slow to point to the french countess with prurient grimaces. unable to understand friendship between man and woman, owing to their puritan training or incurable rankness, they invited the orthodox in religion and politics to note this suspicious connection. something of this malicious folly must have reached mr. brad-laugh's ears, but i imagine he was too proud and self-contained to let it disturb him. after the birmingham meeting, and the founding of the republican league, of which mr. bradlaugh became president, and i secretary, he visited spain on private business, taking with him a message from the conference to senor castelar, the leading spirit of the short-lived spanish republic. i remember writing out the message in a clear, bold hand, and addressing the foolscap envelope in the same way. when mr. bradlaugh fell among the carlists he cursed my caligraphy. happily, however, the officer who scrutinised that envelope could not read at all, and mr. bradlaugh escaped the consequences of being known to carry about letters addressed to the devilish castelar. during mr. bradlaugh's first visit to america i was a frequent contributor to his journal, and i corresponded with him privately. i went down to northampton and delivered a lecture at his request, under the auspices of his electoral committee. the old theatre--a dirty, ramshackle place as i recollect it--was crowded, and i had my first taste of the popularity of mr. bradlaugh in the borough. every mention of his name excited the wildest enthusiasm. while mr. bradlaugh was lecturing in the states a general election took place in england. it was impossible for him to return in time, but his friends looked after his interests. a committee was formed at the hall of science to raise the necessary funds, and mr. charles watts and i went down to northampton to conduct the election. we addressed outdoor meetings in the day, and crowded indoor meetings at night. again i saw what a hold mr. bradlaugh had on his northampton followers. they sang "bradlaugh for northampton" in the circus with all the fervor of scotch covenanters on their hillsides "rolling the psalm to wintry skies." mr. watts and i did not win the seat for mr. bradlaugh, nor did he win it himself at the next election, but we managed to increase his vote, and he expressed his pleasure at the result. soon after the election mr. bradlaugh returned to england. mr. watts and i went down with him to northampton. there was a crowded public meeting, i believe in the circus; and i saw mr. bradlaugh, for the first time, in the presence of his future constituents. they were simply intoxicated with excitement. the shouts of "bradlaugh" and "charley" were deafening. hats and handkerchiefs were waved in the air. the multitude rose to its feet and gave its hero a splendid welcome. then we settled down to speech-making, but all that followed was somewhat tame and flat after that first glorious outburst of popular devotion. the next election came quickly. it resulted in the return of a tory majority for benjamin disraeli, and mr. gladstone went off to sulk in his tent. two tories were returned for radical northampton. mr. bradlaugh let them in. he was determined to have one of the northampton seats. to get it he had to make himself inevitable. he had to prove that if northampton wanted two liberal members, one of them must be charles bradlaugh. it took him thirteen years to demonstrate this, but he succeeded, as he succeeded in most things. at last, in 1880, he ran as official liberal candidate with mr. labouchere, and both were returned. i assisted mr. bradlaugh during his second (1874) election. it was then that i first saw mrs. besant. she had not yet taken to the platform, but she was writing for the _national reformer_, and her pen was active during the contest. mr. watts was also there. another figure i remember was mr. george odger, who labored among the trade unionists of northampton in mr. bradlaugh's interest. george odger was one of the ablest of all the working-class leaders i have ever met. he came from my own county, devonshire, being born at horrabridge, on the road between plymouth and tavistock. he was honest to the heart's core, as well as very able, but he was incurably indolent. you never could be sure of him at a public meeting. he had to be looked up beforehand, or he might forget the engagement and spend his time more agreeably. he was passionately fond of the theatre, and could talk by the hour on famous performances of old actors and actresses. during the daytime at northampton i had long chats with him. he objected to fine hotels, and he objected to walking; so i had to sit with him in the garden of a semi-rural public-house, where our conversation was altogether out of proportion to our liquor. odger liked beer; not much of it, but just enough; it suited his palate and his purse; and as i drank next to nothing, the landlord must have thought us unprofitable customers. mr. bradlaugh had rooms at the george hotel. it was the tory house, but he preferred it, and mrs. besant, mr. watts, and the rest of us, fed and slept there during the election. this gave rise to a good deal of silly talk among mr. bradlaugh's enemies.. one evening we were returning from a town hall meeting, and the tories had been holding a small meeting at the "george." as we reached the foot of the stairs, we encountered a knot of tories. one of them was mr. merewether, the tory candidate. he was nearly of the same height as mr. bradlaugh, and well built. his friends were holding him back, but he broke from them, exclaiming, "hang it! i _will_ have a look at him." he stood at the very foot of the staircase and looked hard at mr. bradlaugh ascending. his expression was one of good-tempered insolence. after a long look at mr. bradlaugh, he returned to his friends, shouting, "well, i'm damned if he's as bad-looking as i thought." i left northampton before the close of the poll, mr. bradlaugh was leaving the same night for america, having barely time to catch the boat at liverpool. i drove round with him before leaving, on a visit to some of the polling stations. he had paid me a modest sum for my services, but he found he had hardly enough to take him across the atlantic, and he asked me to lend him what money i had. i fished seven or nine pounds out of my pocket--i forget which--and handed it to him. it was paid back to me by his order a few weeks subsequently; and the incident would not be worth mentioning if it did not throw a light on the libellous nonsense of mr. bradlaugh's enemies that he was rolling in wealth. while at northampton with mr. bradlaugh, and on other occasions, i saw something of his personal tastes and habits. he struck me as an abstemious man. he was far from a great eater, and i never noticed him drink anything at dinner but claret, which is not an intoxicating beverage. on the whole, i should say, it is less injurious to the stomach and brain than tea or coffee. he was rather fond of a cup of tea seventeen years ago, and latterly his fondness for it developed into something like a passion. more than once i found him at st. john's wood drinking a big cup of pretty strong tea, and was seduced by his genial invitation into joining him in that reckless indulgence. he used to smoke too in the old days, but he afterwards gave up the practice for several years. about seven years ago, however, he resumed it. i do not think he ever attained to the dignity of a pipe. he smoked cigars. some time in april, 1889, i spent an hour with him at the house of commons. he got the speaker's leave to take me into the lower smoke-room, and we "discussed" a cigar and some claret while discussing some freethought business. the claret he seemed indifferent to, but he puffed the cigar with an air of enjoyment. during the northampton election times i used to take a good stiff daily walk. all through my youth i had plenty of exercise in the open air, and i still grow desperately fusty without a brisk tramp at least once in the twenty-four hours. mr. bradlaugh generally took a drive, and i remember telling him with youthful audacity that he ought to walk for his health's sake. of course it was difficult for him to walk in the streets. his stature and bulk made him too noticeable, and mobbing was very unpleasant. but he might have driven out of town and trudged a mile or two on the country roads. my opinion is that his neglect of physical exercise helped to shorten his life. occasional bouts of fishing were very well in their way, but _daily_ exercise is the necessary thing. i do not forget the tremendous labor, physical as well as mental, of lecturing on burning questions to large audiences. all that, however, goes on in hot, crowded rooms, full of vitiated air; and it gives no proper exercise to the legs and loins or the lower vital organs. after one of my remonstrances mr. bradlaugh invited me to play a game of billiards. it was the only time i ever played with him. his style with the cue was spacious and splendid; the balls went flying about the board, and i chaffed him on his flukes. he had not the temperament of a billiard-player. still, i have heard that he played a fair game at st. stephen's; but i can hardly believe it without first-hand testimony. i am willing to believe, however, that he was a good chess-player. certainly he had a head for it but chess is a vile game for a brain-worker, whose recreations should never involve a mental strain. when i first knew mr. bradlaugh he was living at tottenham. i never visited him there, but i often called on him at his later lodgings in turner-street, commercial-road. he occupied the ground floor, consisting of two rooms. the back was his bedroom, and the front his library and workshop. it was what the americans call a one-horse affair. shelves all round the room were filled with books. mr. bradlaugh sat at a desk with his back to the fireplace. on his right was the door communicating with his bedroom facing him the door opening on the passage, and on his right (? left) the street window. the room itself could hardly have been more than twelve or thirteen feet square. i once told him he was too near the fireplace, and he said it was sometimes good to have the poker handy. at that i stared, and he told me the following story. one day a gentleman called on him and was invited to take a chair. he sat down facing mr. bradlaugh, and explained that he wanted advice on a very particular matter. god almighty had told him to kill someone, and he had a difficulty in selecting a victim. mr. bradlaugh put his hand behind him and quietly grasped the poker. the inspired gentleman put the problem as a knotty one, and begged the assistance of the clever iconoclast. "well," said mr. bradlaugh, keeping quite cool, "what do you say to the archbishop of canterbury?" "the very man!" exclaimed the inspired gentleman. he got mr. bradlaugh to give him the archbishop's address, and said, "good-day," with a profusion of thanks. mr. bradlaugh went to the door to look for a policeman, but none was visible, and the inspired gentleman was soon out of sight. "so you see," said mr. bradlaugh, "it's good to have the poker handy. i never saw or heard of the man again, and i knew he couldn't get near the archbishop. there are too many flunkeys in the way." those were my struggling days, and mr. bradlaugh was very kind to me. i remember the sunday evening when i told him i thought of taking to the freethought platform. he pointed out the hard and thorny path i should have to tread, but when he saw i was resolved on the attempt, he put his hand on my shoulder and said, "there is no young man in the movement i would sooner welcome." in the very same room, on another sunday evening a little later, i first saw james thomson. he came down to the hall of science with mr. bradlaugh, in whose employment he then was, and i gave him the article i had brought for the _national reformer_. he shook hands very cordially, and i was delighted to meet one for whose poetry i had a profound admiration. it was also at the hall of science, about the same time, that i met the eccentric mr. turberville, brother to mr. blackmore, the novelist. he was a man of parts with a bee in his bonnet. he claimed kinship with turberville, a minor poet of the sixteenth century, and he loved to talk of poetry. his knowledge of shakespeare was profound and minute. he admired mr. bradlaugh's perorations immensely, as well as his bold defence of freethought. he made out a will in mr. bradlaugh's favor, but he subsequently made another will, and died in circumstances that necessitated an inquest. by agreement, however, mr. bradlaugh obtained â£2,500 from the estate, and the windfall came opportunely, for his struggles and litigations had involved him in considerable debt. i know he often had to borrow money on heavy interest. one day, at turner-street, he told me that a creditor of this species had coolly invited him to dinner. "hang it," he said, "you can't dine with a man who charges you sixty per cent." another recollection i have of mr. bradlaugh is in connexion with the funeral of mr. austin holyoake. the death of this gentleman was a great loss to the freethought cause. he was highly respected by all who knew him. the geniality of his disposition was such that he had many friends and not a single enemy. for some years he was mr. bradlaugh's printer and publisher, and a frequent contributor to his journal. he was foremost in every good work, but he was one of those modest men who never get the credit of their labors. he died at 17 johnson's-court, fleet-street, in an upstairs room above the printing office, where his devoted wife had for many weeks nursed his flickering life. the funeral was a notable event. those of us who could afford it rode in the undertaker's coaches, and the rest walked in procession to highgate cemetery. i can still see mr. bradlaugh in my mind's eye, bustling about on the ground floor, taking everything as usual on his own shoulders. he sorted us in fours for the coaches, my _vis ã  vis_ being james thomson. at the graveside, after the reading of austin holyoake's own funeral service by mr. charles watts, mr. bradlaugh delivered a brief address which he had written for the occasion. on the whole it was too much a composition, but one sentence was true "bradlaugh," and it sounds in my ears still:--"twenty years of friendship lie buried in that grave." how such scenes are impressed on one's memory! as i write i see the set face of charles bradlaugh. i behold the sob-shaken back and bowed head of herbert gilham just in front of me. i hear and feel the cool, rustling wind, like a plaintive requiem over the dead. once again, years afterwards, i saw mr. bradlaugh in the same cemetery, supporting the helpless figure of mrs. ernestine rose as she left the open grave of the dear partner of her long life of labor for the cause of human redemption. owing to circumstances, into which i need not enter, i saw little of mr. bradlaugh between 1875 and 1880. when he was returned for northampton i rejoiced, and when he was committed to the clock tower i saw my duty sun-clear. it was to participate as i could, and might, in the struggle. my contributions to mr. bradlaugh's journal were resumed, and i spoke at meetings in his behalf. in may, 1881, i started the _freethinker_, my oldest living child. mr. bradlaugh acted with his natural generosity. he advertised my bantling gratuitously in his own journal, and gave it every possible facility. this was not known at the time, but i ought to state it now. throughout that long, terrible struggle with the house of commons i was with mr. bradlaugh on every point. if he made a single mistake i have yet to see it indicated. my article in the first number of the _freethinker_ was entitled "mr. bradlaugh's advisers." its object was to show the absurdity of the plentiful advice offered him, and the absolute justice of the course he was pursuing. three weeks afterwards the bigots convened a ticket meeting at exeter hall. the chief promoters were earl percy, sir bartle frere, and butcher varley. mr. bradlaugh was afraid the meeting would have a pre-judicial effect on public opinion in the provinces. the fact of the _tickets_ would be kept back, and the report would go forth that a vote was unanimously passed against him at a big london demonstration. it was necessary, therefore, that the meeting should be _spoiled_. and it _was_. mr. bradlaugh gave me the task of moving an amendment. we had a chat in his library at st. john's wood, and as we parted he said, "i rely on you, foote." he looked at me steadily, holding my eyes as though to read the depths. we got tickets somehow. but the protestant alliance smelt mischief, and mr. bradlaugh's supporters had to fight their way in. two hundred and fifty police were not enough to keep them all out. i was naturally a marked man, and fighting had to be supplemented by diplomacy. when the noble smithson (earl percy), had drivelled for a few minutes as chairman, and the resolution against mr. bradlaugh had been proposed and seconded by sir john kennaway and canon taylor, i rose to move an amendment. but the amendment was refused. the resolution was put, and the christians stood up and voted, while the organ played "god save the queen." then, at a signal, our people jumped on the forms, and rent the air with cheers for "bradlaugh." at another signal they all trooped out, went off to trafalgar-square with the big crowd outside, and passed resolutions in mr. bradlaugh's favor. the bigots' meeting was completely spoiled. they had to barricade the doors and keep out their own people as well as the enemy; the hall was never half full, and their resolution was passed after refusing an amendment, amidst loud execrations. such a lesson was taught the bigots that they never made another attempt. mr. bradlaugh had trusty lieutenants and stern supporters, and the bigots knew he would spoil every _private_ meeting that professed to be _public_. he acted with wisdom and determination, and the result showed he knew the stake he was playing for when he said, "i rely on you," with that steady napoleonic look. ***** mr. bradlaugh's legal exploits, if properly recorded, would fill a good-sized volume. when his life is adequately written, as it will be some day, this department will have to be entrusted to a skilled lawyer. no other person could do anything like justice to a most important part of the career of one whom the tories used to call "that litigious man," when they were trying to ruin him in the law courts and he was only defending himself against their base attacks. those who had only known mr. bradlaugh as a platform orator had some difficulty in recognising him when they first met him in one of our "halls of justice." his whole manner was changed. he was polite, insinuating, and deferential. his attitude towards the judges was admirably calculated to conciliate their favor. i do not mean that _he_ calculated. he had quite a superstitious veneration for judges. it was perfectly sincere and it never wavered. he would not hear a word against them. when he pleaded before them his personal sentiments ran in a line with his best interests; for although judges are above most temptations, their vanity is often sensitive, and mr. bradlaugh's manner was intensely flattering. had he followed the legal profession, mr. bradlaugh would have easily mounted to the top and earned a tremendous income. i have heard some of the cleverest counsel of our time, but i never heard one to be compared with him in grasp, subtlety and agility. he could examine and cross-examine with consummate dexterity. in arguing points of law he had the tenacity of a bull-dog and the keenness of a sleuth-hound. he always fortified himself with a plethora of "cases." the table in front of him groaned with a weight of law. here as elsewhere he was "thorough." an eminent jurisprudist once remarked to me, "there is little gleaning to be done after bradlaugh." as a pleader before juries, however, i doubt whether he would have achieved a great success. he was too much of a born orator. he began well, but he soon forgot the limited audience of twelve, and spoke to a wider circle. this is not the way to humor juries. they like to feel their own importance, and he succeeds best who plays upon their weakness. "remember," their looks say, "you are talking to _us_; the other gentlemen listen accidentally; _we_ make you or damn you." my first recollection of mr. bradlaugh in the law courts is twenty-two years old. how many survivors are there of the friends who filled that dingy old court at westminster where he argued before a full bench of judges in 1869? he was prosecuted for note giving sureties in the sum of â£400 against the appearance of blasphemy or sedition in his paper. the law was resuscitated in his single case to crush him; but he fought, as he said he would, to the bitter end, and the gladstone government was glad to repeal the obsolete enactments. the crown retired from the suit with a _stet processus_, and mr. bradlaugh was left with the laurels--and his costs. i obtained an hour or two's leave from my employment, and heard a portion of mr. bradlaugh's argument it gave me a new conception of his powers. that is the only impression i retain. the details have dropped out of my memory, but there remains as fresh as ever the masterful figure of charles bradlaugh. the best view i ever had of mr. bradlaugh in litigation was in the old court of queen's bench on tuesday and wednesday, july 19 and 20, 1881, when he cross-examined poor mr. newdegate. for a good deal of the time i sat beside him, and could watch _him_ closely as well as the case. by raising the point whether the writ against him for penalties had been issued before or after he gave his vote in the house, he-was able to put all the parties to the prosecution into-the witness-box and make them give an account of themselves. mr. newdegate was one of the victims, and the poor man made confessions that furnished mr. bradlaugh with ground for a successful action against him under the law of maintenance. mr. newdegate was a hard-mouthed witness, but he-was saddled, bridled, and ridden to the winning-post. his lips opened literally, making his mouth like the slit of a pillar-box. getting evidence from him was like extracting a rotten cork from the neck of a bottle but it all came out bit by bit, and the poor man must have left the witness-box feeling that he had delivered himself into the hands of that uncircumcised philistine. his cross-examination lasted three hours. it was like flaying alive. once or twice i felt qualms of pity for the old man, he was such an abject figure in the hands-of that terrible antagonist. every card he held had to-be displayed. finally he had to produce the bond of indemnity he had given the common informer clarke against all the expenses he might incur in the suit; when this came out mr. bradlaugh bent down to me and said, "i have him." and he _did_ have him. despite the common notion that the old law of maintenance was obsolete, mr. bradlaugh pursued him under it triumphantly, and instead of ruining "bradlaugh," poor newdegate was nearly ruined himself. what a contrast to mr. newdegate was mr. bradlaugh! he was the very picture of suppressed fire, of rampant energies held in leash: the nerves of the face playing like the ripple on water, the whole frame quivering, and the eyes ablaze. it was wonderful how he managed to keep his intellect alert and his judgment steady. six hours of such work as he had in court that day were enough to tax the greatest strength. before it was over i saw bodeful blood-rims under his eyes. it did not surprise me, on meeting him at the cobden workmen's club the next evening, to learn that he had been frightfully ill. "mr. bradlaugh," i wrote at the time, "is a wonderfully strong man, but the tories and the bigots are doing their best to kill him, and if this sort of thing is to continue very much longer they may succeed." alas, they _did_ succeed. that terrible struggle killed him. no man ever lived who could have passed through it unbroken. mr. bradlaugh was clearly right on the point raised, but the jury went against him, apparently out of sheer prejudice. when he went out into westminster hall he was loudly cheered by a crowd of sympathisers, who, as the _times_ sneered, "applauded as lustily as though their champion had won." precisely so. their applause would have greeted him in the worst defeat. he was not a champion on whom they had "put their money." he represented their principles, and the _times_ forgot, if it ever knew, that men are devoted to leaders in proportion to the depth of the interests they espouse. conviction "bears it out even to the edge of doom." now let me mention something that shows mr. bradlaugh's tact and consideration. my work on the _freethinker_ brought me no return. i had just read the proof of an article for mr. bradlaugh's paper. while we were waiting for the jury's verdict he referred to the article, and guessing my need he said, "shall i give you the guinea now?" my answer was an expressive shrug and a motion of the eye-brows. taking the two coins out of his pocket, he wrapt them in a piece of paper _under the table_, and presently slipped the packet into my hand. the whole proceeding touches me deeply as i recall it. he might well have thought only of himself in that time of suspense; but he thought of me too, and the precautions he took against being seen to pay me money were expressive of his inbred delicacy. reader do not say the incident is trivial. these little things reveal the man. little did i dream, as i watched mr. bradlaugh fighting bigotry in the law courts, that the time would come when he and i would be included in a common indictment and stand in a criminal dock together. but as the french say, it is always the unexpected that happens. early in july, 1882, i was served with a summons from the lord mayor of london, ordering me to appear at the mansion house on the following tuesday and take my trial on a charge of blasphemy. two other gentlemen were included in the summons, and all three of us duly appeared. we were all members of the national secular society, and mr. bradlaugh attended to render any possible assistance. the case was adjourned to the following monday, by which time a summons had been served on mr. bradlaugh, who took his place beside us in the dock. after an animated day's proceedings we were committed for trial at the old bailey. the object of this prosecution was, of course, to stab mr. bradlaugh in the back. he had fought all the bigots face to face, and held them all at bay; so they put a stiletto into sir hardinge giffard's hands, and paid him his blood-money to attack the hero from behind. mr. bradlaugh had to play the fox again. he wanted to gain time, and he wanted to be tried, if at all, in the court of queen's bench. he always told me that being tried at the old bailey was going like a lamb to the slaughter, and that a verdict of guilty there would certainly mean twelve months' imprisonment. the obvious resource, therefore, was to obtain a writ of _certiorari_ removing our indictment to the superior court. happily it was in the long vacation, and application had to be made to a judge in chambers. by another piece of good luck, it was mr. justice stephen who sat behind the table on the fatal morning when the writ had to be finally granted or refused. it was obtained on july 29, 1882. poor mr. maloney, who represented the prosecution, was no match for mr. bradlaugh, who treated him like a child, and only let him say a word now and then as a special favor. roaming the law courts with mr. bradlaugh, i was able to see his intimate knowledge of legal practice. he threaded the labyrinth with consummate ease and dexterity. we went from office to office, where everything seemed designed to baffle suitors conducting their own cases. our case, too, was somewhat peculiar; obsolete technicalities, only half intelligible even to experts, met us at every turn; and when we got out into the open air i felt that the thing was indeed done, but that it would puzzle omniscience to do it in exactly the same way again. seven pounds was spent on stamps, documents, and other items, and securities for costs had to be given to the extent of six hundred pounds. as i walked home i pondered the great truth that england is a free country. i had seen with my own eyes that _there is_ one law for rich and poor. but i could not help reflecting that only the rich could afford it, and that the poor might as well have no law at all. mr. bradlaugh next moved to quash the indictment. he argued that the public prosecutor's fiat was bad, as it did not name the persons who were to be proceeded against, and thus resembled a general warrant, which in the famous wilkes case the judges had held to be invalid. on this point, however, two judges, one of them being sir james stephen, gave judgment against him. the case was argued on mr. bradlaugh's part, the judges said, with "great power and learning." for my part, i think he showed a greater knowledge of "cases" than both the legal luminaries on the bench, who laid their heads close together over many a knotty point of the argument. beaten on the main issue, mr. bradlaugh was successful, however, on the subsidiary one. two counts were struck out of the indictment. the excision made no difference to me, but a great deal of difference to him. two numbers of the _freethinker_ were thus disposed of bearing the imprint of the freethought publishing company--under which name mr. bradlaugh and mrs. beasant traded--and owing to the lapse of time it was impossible to open a fresh indictment. of course i saw what mr. bradlaugh was driving at, and i could not but admire the way in which he made light of this point, arguing it baldly as a formal matter on which, as their lordships would see at a glance, he was absolutely entitled to a judgment. they would see that he was still open to all the other counts of the indictment, and therefore it might make very little difference, but right was right and law was law. under the spell of his persuasive speech, it was amazing to see the judges smoothing their wrinkled fronts. i fancy they gave him his second point the more readily because they were against him on the first; indeed, they seemed to think it a pity, if not a shame, that all his learning and ability should be displayed for _nothing_. our indictment went into the list of crown cases reserved, and did not come on for trial till the following april. meanwhile i was prosecuted again, and failing to get a writ of _certiorari_, owing to the flagrant bigotry of baron huddleston and justice north, i was tried at the old bailey, and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment like a common thief--as mr. bradlaugh had predicted. during my trouble mr. bradlaugh lent me every assistance, furnishing me with legal books and advice and visiting me in newgate between the first and second trials, while judge north's underlings were preparing a more pliant jury than the one which had declined to return a verdict of guilty. in holloway gaol i lost sight of mr. bradlaugh and everyone else, except persons i had no desire to see. but one morning, early in april, 1883, the governor informed me that mr. bradlaugh was going to pay me a visit, having the home secretary's order to see me on urgent business. the same afternoon i was marched from my cell into one of the governor's offices, where mr. bradlaugh was wailing. compared with the pale prisoners i saw day by day, he looked the very picture of health. fresh, clean-shaven, neatly dressed, he was a most refreshing sight to eyes accustomed to rough faces and the brown convict's garb. and it was a friend too, and i could take his hand and exchange human speech with him. how vivid is my recollection of him at that moment! he seemed in the prime of life, little the worse for his terrible struggles, only the gray a trifle more decided about the temples, but the eyes full of light, and the mobile mouth full of vitality. and now he is dead! dead! it is hard to realise. but i rang the muffled bell as he lay fighting his last battle, and i followed his corpse to the grave; and i know that the worm is busy about those leonine features, and the rain trickles through with a scent of faded flowers. yes, it is true; he _is_ dead. dead like the king and dead like the clown; yet living truly beyond the dust of death in the lives of others, an inextinguishable light, a vivifying fire, a passionate hope, an ardent aspiration. till the future dares forget the past, his fate and fame shall be an echo and a light unto eternity. on the morning of april 10, 1883, i put on my own clothes and was driven in a four-wheeler from holloway gaol to the law courts, in company with warder smith, who superintended the wing of the prison in which a grateful country lodged and boarded me at its own expense. it was lovely spring weather, and i felt like a man new-born. inside the court where the great blasphemy case was to be tried i found mr. bradlaugh with his usual load of law books. the court was crowded with friends of the defendants and legal gentlemen anxious to witness the performance. mr. bradlaugh applied for a separate trial, on the ground that as there was no charge of conspiracy it was unjust to prejudice his case by evidence admitted against his co-defendants; and lord coleridge, who obviously meant to see fair play, granted the application. mr. bradlaugh's position was, in one sense, the most perilous he had ever stood in. just as his long litigation with respect to his seat in parliament was drawing to a close, and as he believed to a _successful_ close, he had to defend himself against a charge which, if he were proved guilty, would entail upon him the penalty of imprisonment. of course it would not have been such imprisonment as i was suffering, for queen's bench prisoners are generally sent to the civil side of holloway gaol. but _any_ imprisonment at such a moment gravely imperilled his prospects of success in the mighty struggle with wealth, bigotry, and political prejudice. a sense of this fact weighed heavily upon him, but it did not impair his energy or intellectual alertness; indeed, he was one of those rare men whose faculties are sharpened by danger. i need not dwell upon the evidence of the prosecution. it was most unsatisfactory, and failed to connect mr. bradlaugh with the _freethinker_. sir hardinge giffard, therefore, almost entirely confined himself to playing upon the prejudices of the jury. mr. bradlaugh was perfection itself in examining and cross-examining, and was soon on the windward side of the judge, but his address to the jury was too boisterous. he _felt_ too much. his adversary was not under this disadvantage, and sir hardinge giffard's address to the jury, considered merely as a tactical display, was better than mr. bradlaugh's. on the second day of the trial (it lasted for three days) there occurred a curious episode. just before the adjournment for luncheon mr. bradlaugh intimated that when the court re-assembled he would call his co-defendants as witnesses. lord coleridge replied in a low, suggestive tone, "do you think it necessary?" mr. bradlaugh rose and for the first time i saw him tremble. "my lord," he said, "you put upon me a grave responsibility." "i put no responsibility upon you," said lord coleridge, "it is for you to decide." and the stately judge glided away in his robes of office. if mr. bradlaugh put his co-defendants in the witness-box, one of two things might happen. they might decline to give evidence, as every answer would tend to criminate themselves; or they might exculpate mr. bradlaugh and procure their own damnation. i do not blame lord coleridge for looking at the matter in this way. but i naturally looked at it in a different light mr. bradlaugh was my general, and i was his lieutenant, and it was clearly my duty to sacrifice myself. i could release him from danger with half a dozen words, and why should i hesitate to say them or he to exact them? i was already in prison, and another conviction could add little to my misfortune, whereas he was still free, and his continued freedom was just then absolutely indispensable to our common cause. for my part, i had not a moment's hesitation. but lord coleridge's words sank into mr. bradlaugh's mind, and after luncheon he announced that he would _not_ call his co-defendants. his lordship looked pleased, but how he frowned when sir hardinge giffard complained that _he_ was deprived of an opportunity! lord coleridge did not say, but he _looked_--"have you no sense of decency?" sir hardinge giffard, however, was thick-skinned. he relied on mr. bradlaugh's sense of honor, and made it the basis of an artificial grievance. he even pretended that mr. bradlaugh was _afraid_ to call his co-defendants. but he overreached himself by this hypocrisy, and obliged mr. bradlaugh to put his co-defendants into the witness-box. we were formally tendered as witnesses, mr. bradlaugh going no further, and leaving sir hardinge giffard to do as he would. of course he was obliged to interrogate us, or look foolish after his braggadocio, and in doing so he ruined his own case by giving us the opportunity! of declaring that mr. bradlaugh was never in any way connected with the _freethinker_. mr. bradlaugh, of course, did not in any sense sacrifice me. it would have been contemptible on my part to let him bear any responsibility for my own deliberate action, in which he was not at all implicated, and if i had not been tendered as a witness i should have tried to tender myself. after half an hour's deliberation the jury found mr. bradlaugh not guilty. standing up for the verdict, with pale set face, the grateful little "not" fell upon his ear, and his rigidity relaxed. tears started to _my_ eyes, and i saw the tears in _his_ eyes as i squeezed his hand in speechless congratulation. my own trial followed mr. bradlaugh's, and i was not found guilty. three members of the jury held out against a verdict that would have disgraced a free country; and as the prosecution despaired of obtaining a verdict while lord coleridge presided at the trial, the attorney-general was asked to allow the abandonment of proceedings. this he granted, the case was struck off the list, and i returned to my prison cell at holloway. let me now go back to the crowning incident of that long struggle between charles bradlaugh and the house of commons. on may 10, 1881, the house passed a resolution authorising the sergeant-at-arms to prevent mr. bradlaugh from entering. on june 20, the jury gave a verdict in mr. newdegate's favor for the â£500 penalty and costs. a motion for a new trial failed, and mr. bradlaugh appealed to the country. enthusiastic meetings were held in his behalf, and he prepared a fresh _coup_. it had to be something striking, and it was. on the morning of august 3 palace yard and westminster hall were thronged with his supporters. every one was armed with a petition, which he had a legal right to take to the house of commons. mr. bradlaugh himself drove up in a hansom cab, and entered the precincts of the house by the private door. he made his way to the door of the house itself and tried to enter by a sudden effort, but he was seized by fourteen officials and stalwart policemen, picked for the work, and thrust back through the private passage into palace yard. not expecting such indignity, he contested every inch of the ground. inspector denning said he never thought that one man could have offered such resistance. the small muscles of both his arms were ruptured, and a subsequent attack of erysipelas put his life in jeopardy. when he was finally thrust on to the pavement in palace yard his coat was torn and the rest of his garments were disarranged. his face was livid with the intense exertion when i saw him a minute afterwards. there he stood, a great mass of panting, valiant manhood, his features set like granite, and his eyes fixed upon the doorway before him. he seemed to see nothing but that doorway. i spoke to him, and he seemed not to hear. i believe a mighty struggle was going on within him, perhaps the greatest struggle of his life. he had suffered a frightful indignity, he must have been tempted to avenge it, and he had but to hold up his hand to bring around and behind him the myriads who stood outside the railings. the action would have been impolitic, but what a temptation he crushed down, and what an effort it necessitated. never was his heroic nature more sorely tried. he justified his mastery of others by his mastery of himself. how small in comparison seemed the mob of his enemies! i never admired him more than at that moment. he was superb, sublime. they had wound their meshes about him, and the lion had burst them. one swift, daring stroke had frustrated all their plans. he who was to be quietly suppressed by resolutions of the house had cut the knot of their policy asunder, made himself the hero of the hour, and fixed the nation's eyes on his splendid audacity. reaction set in after that terrible struggle, and he accepted a chair that was brought him. several members passed as he sat there. one of them was the coward, frank hugh o'donnell. he had a lady on his arm, and he passed with her between himself and mr. bradlaugh, so that her dress trailed over the hero's feet. it was a wretched display of insolence and cowardice. but the lady must be exonerated. she looked annoyed, her cheeks reddened, and her eyelids fell. it is so hard for a woman to resist the attraction of courage, and the coward by her side must have suffered in her estimation. there was a crowded meeting that evening at the hall of science, at which i had the honor of speaking, mr. bradlaugh's greeting was tremendous. two days afterwards he was seriously ill. during that great constitutional struggle i was present at many "bradlaugh" meetings, and i never witnessed such enthusiasm as he excited. no man of my time had such a devoted following. the last "bradlaugh" demonstration i attended was on february 15, 1883, in trafalgar-square. seventy or eighty thousand people were present. there were four speakers, and three of them are dead, joseph arch being the sole survivor. mr. adams, of northampton, lived to see his old friend take his seat and do good work in the house of commons, became himself mayor of northampton, and died universally respected by his fellow-townsmen; william sharman, a brave, true man, is buried at preston; and charles bradlaugh sleeps his long sleep at woking. for another twelve months i attended no public meetings except the silent ones on the exercise ground of holloway gaol, but i saw mr. bradlaugh at several demonstrations on various subjects after my imprisonment, and i could perceive no abatement of his popularity. he had his enemies and detractors, but the spontaneous outburst of feeling at his death proved his hold on the popular heart. i must now leap forward to that dreadful illness which left him a broken man. years before, in 1882, when we were roaming the law courts together, he tapped his chest as he coughed, and seeing my anxious expression he told me that he brought up a good deal of phlegm in the morning, and that strangers who heard him clearing his chest would fancy he was very ill. but he looked so well that i soon dismissed the unpleasant fact, though it returned before his breakdown when i saw he was obliged to cancel engagements. i heard in 1884, though not from himself, that he had some heart trouble. but i was far from prepared for the shattering illness that laid him low in october, 1889. when i called to see him after his partial recovery i was shocked by his appearance. he looked twenty years older, grey, and infirm. i sat down half-dazed. theoretically i knew he was mortal, but i did not realise it as a fact until i saw him thin and pale from the valley of the shadow of death. his mind was clear enough, however; and although everything about him was pathetic he was quite self-collected. one thing he said to me i shall never forget. there had been talk of his wavering in his freethought, and as he referred to this folly he spoke in grave impressive tones. pointing to the humble bed, he said, "when i lay there and all was black the thing that troubled me least was the convictions of my life." words and accents were alike solemn. the cold shadow of death seemed to linger in the room. a moment or two later he said with a broken voice, "the freethought party is a party that i love." the memory of that interview will always be a precious possession. i treasure it with the sacred things of my life. i had seen and touched the naked sincerity of a great soul. when mr. bradlaugh returned from india i called on him, and found him greatly improved by his voyage. i waited for him a few minutes in his library, as he was at lunch, and the doctors attached great importance to regularity in his meals. he came into the room with a most genial smile. his air was fresh and buoyant, and he walked over to me quickly, holding out his hand all the way. i took it heartily, and had a good look at him, which satisfied and yet dissatisfied me. he was certainly better, but i could not help feeling that his constitution was irrecoverably broken. never again could i hope to see the grand bradlaugh of the old fighting days. his mind was as brave and alert as ever, but the body was too obviously disabled. he showed me some of his indian presents, of which he was justly proud, and then we sat down to chat. he was full of his voyage and the kindness he had experienced on every side. his reception in india had exceeded his highest anticipations, and he was looking forward to work in the house of commons on behalf of our great dependency. speaking of his financial prospects, he told me he had received offers of work from several magazine editors. but he added, "one doesn't know how long it will last; 'tis a precarious business." his face clouded for a moment, and i saw he was more troubled than he cared to say. one thing he told me which i had no right to repeat while he lived, but i may repeat it without a breach of confidence now that he is dead. during his brief stay in india he could have had plenty of money if he had been less scrupulous. there was nothing very dishonourable in accepting money from rich hindoos, for he was poor and broken in health, and he was fighting for their best interests. but he was too proud to take it, and when wealthy natives were calling on him, he always took the precaution to have an english friend in the room. "no," he said to me, "i cannot do that. i'll live like the old bradlaugh, or i'll go under." he lived like the old bradlaugh, and he went under. he took to the platform again to earn a livelihood, and it killed him, as his doctors had foreseen. i implored him at the time not to resume the lecturing. he was going to fulfil an old-standing engagement at manchester in the vast st. james's hall, and i begged him to cancel it. he replied that he could not afford to forfeit twenty pounds. "what is that to your life?" i asked. he only smiled grimly. his mind was made up, and he was not to be bent by advice. on sunday morning, february 16, 1890, mr. bradlaugh resigned his presidency of the national secular society, which he had held for so many years. the hall of science was packed with members, chiefly from the london district, but many of them from the provinces. the scene was infinitely pathetic. one sentiment reigned in every heart. the old guard was taking leave of its general. some of them had fought around him for thirty years, and the farewell was a mutilation of their very lives. tears were streaming down strong faces; and they coursed down the strongest face of all, the face of charles bradlaugh, and plashed on the table before him. for a while he let them fall, and then he controlled his grief and rose to speak. but the words would not come. his frame shook with a great sob, and he sat down again. a second time he rose and failed. but the third time his strong will prevailed, and he began to speak in low, trembling tones. never was i so struck with his oratorical powers as on this occasion. without once lifting his voice above the note of conversation, he swayed the meeting for a full half-hour, as easily and universally as the wind billows a cornfield. in resigning the presidency he thought it his duty to nominate a successor, and his choice was ratified by the meeting. he handed me the president's hammer after a solemn, impressive apostrophe, in which he expressed his hope that he might thank me, after many years, for good, loyal work as leader; and when i had acknowledged the lofty honor he rose to vacate the chair. naturally i declined to let him do anything of the kind, and for a moment the two presidents stood together in friendly altercation. but for once he gave way, and charles bradlaugh filled the chair to the last. resigning the presidency did not mean retirement from the national secular society. at his own suggestion mr. bradlaugh was elected a life-member. he was thus a member of the society up to the last moment of his life. nor was he an inactive one. i frequently had occasion to consult him, and one of his last bits of work was the drawing up of a long document for the society on secular burials. months rolled by, and the evening came for the great debate on the eight flours bill between mr. bradlaugh and mr. hyndman. st. james's hall was packed to suffocation. i sat on the platform near my old leader, and i saw how the effort was telling on him. his opponents in the meeting behaved with incredible brutality. some of them laughed aloud when he said, "believe me, this has tried me more than i had thought." but now the hero they laughed at is dead, and they _know_ that he spoke the truth. the last time i saw mr. bradlaugh in public was on wednesday evening, december 10, 1890, when he lectured at the hall of science on behalf of the forder testimonial fund. i believe that was the last lecture he delivered there, if not the last lecture he delivered anywhere. he dealt with the evidences of christianity, in reference to archdeacon watkins' lectures on the fourth gospel, and assuredly he was as firmly sceptical as ever. at the close of the lecture he spoke of his theological position, and declared that he could not conceive of any such change of mind as glib gossipers were asserting of him. the weather was extremely foggy, and mr. bradlaugh was ill. he ought not to have been there at all. after struggling painfully through the lecture, he sat down and waited for discussion. a christian opponent rose, and mr. bradlaugh replied; but, being in the chair, i would not allow a second speech, and i was glad to see him well wrapt-up, and once more in the care of his devoted daughter. ***** having concluded my reminiscences of charles bradlaugh in relation to the _events_ of his life, i shall wind up with a little personal talk of a more general character. i have already referred to mr. bradlaugh's extraordinary knowledge of the law. this was strikingly illustrated after the so-called trafalgar-square riots. the tories made a wanton aggression on the right of public meeting in london, and found a ready instrument of tyranny in sir charles warren. no doubt there is much to be said against promiscuous meetings in trafalgar-square at all hours of the day and night, but it was a high-handed act of brutality to prohibit _all_ meetings directly it was known that the london radicals were convening a sunday demonstration on the irish question. while the radicals were chafing under this insult they held several stormy meetings to discuss their best policy, and at last a committee was appointed to find out, if possible, the legal rights, of the people and the crown. i was a member of that committee, and i am able to state that although we waited on several eminent lawyers, it was only from mr. bradlaugh that we obtained any light. the others talked vaguely about the right of public meeting, and the primary and secondary uses of public thoroughfares, but mr. bradlaugh gave us the _facts_ of the case. trafalgar-square was crown property, its control was vested in the commissioner of works, and at any moment it could be absolutely closed to the british public. this had escaped the other lawyers, who did not find it in the statutes at large, from which the trafalgar-square act, probably as being a private one, had been excluded. nor was it known to the government when sir charles warren issued his first proclamation, as chief commissioner of police he had no authority-over the square, and until he obtained the order of its proper guardians, which he did a week later, his proclamation was only a piece of waste paper, mr. bradlaugh saw this, though he said nothing, when the demonstration committee called upon him a few days before bloody sunday. he told them that he had an engagement in the provinces on that day, but if they would postpone the demonstration until the following sunday he would himself lead it to trafalgar-square. his offer was not accepted, however; for the committee resented the condition he stipulated, namely, that he should have absolute control of the arrangements. they thought he was taking too much upon himself. they did not reflect that if he who takes power without responsibility is a despot, he who takes responsibility without power is a fool. it was their action, and not his, that lost the battle. mr. bradlaugh made no public parade of his brave offer. it was not his way. but it is due to his memory that it should be put on record, so that posterity may know the extent of his generous courage. there can be no doubt, i think, that mr. bradlaugh was less popular with the working-classes in london after he took peaceable possession of his seat in parliament. the london masses love a fighter, and while he was battling for his seat he was, in my opinion, the most popular figure in the metropolis. the radical workmen never tired of his demonstrations. he could bring fifty or a hundred thousand of them together at a few days' notice. and the other speakers were, for the most part, only padding to fill up the time. it was "bradlaugh" the multitude came for. they waited to hear him speak, they applauded him to the skies, and when he had done they dispersed. and on such occasions he was magnificent. no one can conceive the power of the man who never saw him at one of these demonstrations. he stood like a pharos, and the light of his face kindled the crests of the living waves around him. but he was out of sympathy with the socialist movement, which began to spread just as he took his seat; and being assiduous in parliament, he was drawn more and more from "the clubs," where his libellers and detractors wagged their tongues to some purpose. his strong individualism, as well as his practical good sense, made him bitterly hostile to the mildest proposals for putting the people's industrial interests into the hands of government departments. and being a man of most positive quality, it was natural that he should excite the hatred of the more fanatical socialists; a sentiment which, i cannot help thinking, he exasperated by his apparent denial of the generosity of their aims. there are men in the socialist camp (and i say it without being a socialist) who are neither "poets" nor "fools"--though it is no disgrace to be the former; men who have studied with severity and sincerity, who have made sacrifices for conviction, and who were sometimes hurt by his antipathy. but, on the other hand, he was bitterly goaded by socialist adversaries, who denied his honesty, and held him up to undeserved scorn as the hireling of "the classes"--a charge which the more sensitive among them must now repent, for his death has revealed his poverty. mr. bradlaugh was naturally irritable, but the irritability was only on the surface. the waves were easily raised, but there was plenty of quiet sea beneath. though giants are often phlegmatic, his big frame embedded highly-strung nerves. when he was put out he could storm, and he was misunderstood by those who took the mood for the man. had they seen him in the melting mood they would have learnt that charles bradlaugh was a more composite personality than they imagined. during the last year or two of his life he underwent a wonderful softening. a beautiful indian-summer light rested upon him. he was like a granite rock, which the sweet grass has overgrown, and from whose crevices peep lovely wild flowers. ***** as president of the national secular society he did a great work. i do not think he had a pronounced faculty for organisation. but he was a firm, sagacious leader, with the personal magnetism to attract devotion. that he was never overbearing i will not affirm. but it is easy to organise sheep. one good dog will do it. mr. bradlaugh had to hold together a different species, with leaping legs, butting horns, and a less gregarious tendency. he was a splendid chairman to push through a mass of business, but he shone less on ordinary occasions. an ideal chairman, when not promoting his own schemes, should be like a midwife; he should aim at a quick delivery and a safe birth. mr. bradlaugh did not always observe this rule. but every man has the defects of his qualities, and even the sun must be taken with its spots. mr. bradlaugh's speeches at the annual conferences of the national secular society are better reading than his political speeches. being less in the world of practice there, and more in the world of principle, he gave play to his ideal nature, his words took color, and metaphors flashed like jewels in the sword of his orations. it was a signal proof of his power, that after a whole day's exhausting work, both to himself and his audience, he never failed to rouse the wildest enthusiasm. now that mr. bradlaugh is dead i do not hesitate to repeat what i said during his lifetime, that his freethought work was the most fecund and important. even his great battle against the house of commons was for religious freedom against bigotry, and his one great legislative achievement was the act dealing with oaths and affirmation. his staunchest political supporters were his freethought followers. his lectures, his personal influence, and his reputation, leavened the public mind more than his orthodox enemies suspected, and he created a vast quantity of raw material to be utilised by his successors in secular organisation. ***** in the foregoing pages i have attempted no complete sketch of charles bradlaugh. i have written, not a monograph, but a number of rough jottings. yet i hope i have conveyed an impression of the man, in some degree faithful, to those who may have been imperfectly acquainted with him; and i trust the features i have presented, however baldly outlined, will be recognised by those who knew and loved him. when all is said and done, i think the final impression one retains of charles bradlaugh is his _heroism_. his was cast in a great mould of mind and character, as well as body. like every hero the world has ever seen, he had his defects and failings, for it is given to no man to be perfect. but positive excellence, with all its drawbacks, is far above negative merit. "thou shalt" is loftier virtue than "thou shalt not," and the hero is superior to the saint. charles bradlaugh was a colossus of manhood. he was one to design, and dare, and do. the beaten path of mediocrity had no attraction for that potent spirit. he belonged to the heroic type which seeks perilous ways and fresh conquests. like the hero of one of browning's poems, he was "ever a fighter." in stormy times he naturally rose to the top. he was one of the select few, not of those who enrich the world with great discoveries, or new principles, or subtle perceptions of beauty--but those who appeal to the heroism of man's nature, without which he is at best but a splendid beast, and who minister to that sense of dignity which is the supreme necessity of our race. the elements so mixed in him, that nature might stand up and say to all the world, "this was a man!" sentence numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer. a theologico-political treatise part iii chapters xi to xv by baruch spinoza table of contents: chapter xi an inquiry whether the apostles wrote their epistles as apostles and prophets, or merely as teachers, and an explanation of what is meant by apostle. the epistles not in the prophetic style. the apostles not commanded to write or preach in particular places. different methods of teaching adopted by the apostles. chapter xii of the true original of the divine law, and wherefore scripture is called sacred, and the word of god. how that, in so far as it contains the word of god, it has come down to us uncorrupted. chapter xiii it is shown, that scripture teaches only very simple doctrines, such as suffice for right conduct. error in speculative doctrine not impious nor knowledge pious. piety consists in obedience. chapter xiv definitions of faith, the true faith, and the foundations of faith, which is once for all separated from philosophy. danger resulting from the vulgar idea of faith. the only test of faith obedience and good works. as different men are disposed to obedience by different opinions, universal faith can contain only the simplest doctrines. fundamental distinction between faith and philosophy the key-stone of the present treatise. chapter xv theology is shown not to be subservient to reason, nor reason to theology: a definition of the reason which enables us to accept the authority of the bible. theory that scripture must be accommodated to reason maintained by maimonides already refuted in chapter vii. theory that reason must be accommodated to scripture maintained by alpakhar examined. and refuted. scripture and reason independent of one another. certainty, of fundamental faith not mathematical but moral. great utility of revelation. author's endnotes to the treatise. chapter xi an inquiry whether the apostles wrote their epistles as apostles and prophets, or merely as teachers; and an explanation of what is meant by an apostle. (1) no reader of the new testament can doubt that the apostles were prophets; but as a prophet does not always speak by revelation, but only, at rare intervals, as we showed at the end of chap. i., we may fairly inquire whether the apostles wrote their epistles as prophets, by revelation and express mandate, as moses, jeremiah, and others did, or whether only as private individuals or teachers, especially as paul, in corinthians xiv:6, mentions two sorts of preaching. (2) if we examine the style of the epistles, we shall find it totally different from that employed by the prophets. (3) the prophets are continually asserting that they speak by the command of god: "thus saith the lord," "the lord of hosts saith," "the command of the lord," &c.; and this was their habit not only in assemblies of the prophets, but also in their epistles containing revelations, as appears from the epistle of elijah to jehoram, 2 chron. xxi:12, which begins, "thus saith the lord." (4) in the apostolic epistles we find nothing of the sort. (5) contrariwise, in i cor. vii:40 paul speaks according to his own opinion and in many passages we come across doubtful and perplexed phrase; such as, "we think, therefore," rom. iii:28; "now i think," [endnote 24], rom. viii:18, and so on. (6) besides these, other expressions are met with very different from those used by the prophets. (7) for instance, 1 cor. vii:6, "but i speak this by permission, not by commandment;" "i give my judgment as one that hath obtained mercy of the lord to be faithful" (1 cor. vii:25), and so on in many other passages. (8) we must also remark that in the aforesaid chapter the apostle says that when he states that he has or has not the precept or commandment of god, he does not mean the precept or commandment of god revealed to himself, but only the words uttered by christ in his sermon on the mount. (9) furthermore, if we examine the manner in which the apostles give out evangelical doctrine, we shall see that it differs materially from the method adopted by the prophets. (10) the apostles everywhere reason as if they were arguing rather than prophesying; the prophecies, on the other hand, contain only dogmas and commands. (11) god is therein introduced not as speaking to reason, but as issuing decrees by his absolute fiat. (12) the authority of the prophets does not submit to discussion, for whosoever wishes to find rational ground for his arguments, by that very wish submits them to everyone's private judgment. (13) this paul, inasmuch as he uses reason, appears to have done, for he says in 1 cor. x:15, "i speak as to wise men, judge ye what i say." (14) the prophets, as we showed at the end of chapter i., did not perceive what was revealed by virtue of their natural reason, and though there are certain passages in the pentateuch which seem to be appeals to induction, they turn out, on nearer examination, to be nothing but peremptory commands. (15) for instance, when moses says, deut. xxxi:27, "behold, while i am yet alive with you, this day ye have been rebellious against the lord; and how much more after my death," we must by no means conclude that moses wished to convince the israelites by reason that they would necessarily fall away from the worship of the lord after his death; for the argument would have been false, as scripture itself shows: the israelites continued faithful during the lives of joshua and the elders, and afterwards during the time of samuel, david, and solomon. (16) therefore the words of moses are merely a moral injunction, in which he predicts rhetorically the future backsliding of the people so as to impress it vividly on their imagination. (17) i say that moses spoke of himself in order to lend likelihood to his prediction, and not as a prophet by revelation, because in verse 21 of the same chapter we are told that god revealed the same thing to moses in different words, and there was no need to make moses certain by argument of god's prediction and decree; it was only necessary that it should be vividly impressed on his imagination, and this could not be better accomplished than by imagining the existing contumacy of the people, of which he had had frequent experience, as likely to extend into the future. (18) all the arguments employed by moses in the five books are to be understood in a similar manner; they are not drawn from the armoury of reason, but are merely, modes of expression calculated to instil with efficacy, and present vividly to the imagination the commands of god. (19) however, i do not wish absolutely to deny that the prophets ever argued from revelation; i only maintain that the prophets made more legitimate use of argument in proportion as their knowledge approached more nearly to ordinary knowledge, and by this we know that they possessed a knowledge above the ordinary, inasmuch as they proclaimed absolute dogmas, decrees, or judgments. (20) thus moses, the chief of the prophets, never used legitimate argument, and, on the other hand, the long deductions and arguments of paul, such as we find in the epistle to the romans, are in nowise written from supernatural revelation. (21) the modes of expression and discourse adopted by the apostles in the epistles, show very clearly that the latter were not written by revelation and divine command, but merely by the natural powers and judgment of the authors. (22) they consist in brotherly admonitions and courteous expressions such as would never be employed in prophecy, as for instance, paul's excuse in romans xv:15, "i have written the more boldly unto you in some sort, my brethren." (23) we may arrive at the same conclusion from observing that we never read that the apostles were commanded to write, but only that they went everywhere preaching, and confirmed their words with signs. (24) their personal presence and signs were absolutely necessary for the conversion and establishment in religion of the gentiles; as paul himself expressly states in rom. i:11, "but i long to see you, that i may impart to you some spiritual gift, to the end that ye may be established." (25) it may be objected that we might prove in similar fashion that the apostles did not preach as prophets, for they did not go to particular places, as the prophets did, by the command of god. (26) we read in the old testament that jonah went to nineveh to preach, and at the same time that he was expressly sent there, and told that he most preach. (27) so also it is related, at great length, of moses that he went to egypt as the messenger of god, and was told at the same time what he should say to the children of israel and to king pharaoh, and what wonders he should work before them to give credit to his words. (28) isaiah, jeremiah, and ezekiel were expressly commanded to preach to the israelites. lastly, the prophets only preached what we are assured by scripture they had received from god, whereas this is hardly ever said of the apostles in the new testament, when they went about to preach. (29) on the contrary, we find passages expressly implying that the apostles chose the places where they should preach on their own responsibility, for there was a difference amounting to a quarrel between paul and barnabas on the subject (acts xv:37, 38). (30) often they wished to go to a place, but were prevented, as paul writes, rom. i:13, "oftentimes i purposed to come to you, but was let hitherto;" and in i cor. xvi:12, "as touching our brother apollos, i greatly desired him to come unto you with the brethren, but his will was not at all to come at this time: but he will come when he shall have convenient time." (31) from these expressions and differences of opinion among the apostles, and also from the fact that scripture nowhere testifies of them, as of the ancient prophets, that they went by the command of god, one might conclude that they preached as well as wrote in their capacity of teachers, and not as prophets: but the question is easily solved if we observe the difference between the mission of an apostle and that of an old testament prophet. (32) the latter were not called to preach and prophesy to all nations, but to certain specified ones, and therefore an express and peculiar mandate was required for each of them; the apostles, on the other hand, were called to preach to all men absolutely, and to turn all men to religion. (33) therefore, whithersoever they went, they were fulfilling christ's commandment; there was no need to reveal to them beforehand what they should preach, for they were the disciples of christ to whom their master himself said (matt. x:19, 20): "but, when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak, for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak." (34) we therefore conclude that the apostles were only indebted to special revelation in what they orally preached and confirmed by signs (see the beginning of chap. 11.); that which they taught in speaking or writing without any confirmatory signs and wonders they taught from their natural knowledge. (see i cor. xiv:6.) (35) we need not be deterred by the fact that all the epistles begin by citing the imprimatur of the apostleship, for the apostles, as i will shortly show, were granted, not only the faculty of prophecy, but also the authority to teach. (36) we may therefore admit that they wrote their epistles as apostles, and for this cause every one of them began by citing the apostolic imprimatur, possibly with a view to the attention of the reader by asserting that they were the persons who had made such mark among the faithful by their preaching, and had shown by many marvelous works that they were teaching true religion and the way of salvation. (37) i observe that what is said in the epistles with regard to the apostolic vocation and the holy spirit of god which inspired them, has reference to their former preaching, except in those passages where the expressions of the spirit of god and the holy spirit are used to signify a mind pure, upright, and devoted to god. (38) for instance, in 1 cor. vii:40, paul says: but she is happier if she so abide, after my judgment, and i think also that i have the spirit of god." (39) by the spirit of god the apostle here refers to his mind, as we may see from the context: his meaning is as follows: "i account blessed a widow who does not wish to marry a second husband; such is my opinion, for i have settled to live unmarried, and i think that i am blessed." (40) there are other similar passages which i need not now quote. (41) as we have seen that the apostles wrote their epistles solely by the light of natural reason, we must inquire how they were enabled to teach by natural knowledge matters outside its scope. (42) however, if we bear in mind what we said in chap. vii. of this treatise our difficulty will vanish: for although the contents of the bible entirely surpass our understanding, we may safely discourse of them, provided we assume nothing not told us in scripture: by the same method the apostles, from what they saw and heard, and from what was revealed to them, were enabled to form and elicit many conclusions which they would have been able to teach to men had it been permissible. (43) further, although religion, as preached by the apostles, does not come within the sphere of reason, in so far as it consists in the narration of the life of christ, yet its essence, which is chiefly moral, like the whole of christ's doctrine, can readily, be apprehended by the natural faculties of all. (44) lastly, the apostles had no lack of supernatural illumination for the purpose of adapting the religion they had attested by signs to the understanding of everyone so that it might be readily received; nor for exhortations on the subject: in fact, the object of the epistles is to teach and exhort men to lead that manner of life which each of the apostles judged best for confirming them in religion. (45) we may here repeat our former remark, that the apostles had received not only the faculty of preaching the history, of christ as prophets, and confirming it with signs, but also authority for teaching and exhorting according as each thought best. (46) paul (2 tim. i:11), "whereunto i am appointed a preacher, and an apostle, and a teacher of the gentiles;" and again (i tim. ii:7), "whereunto i am ordained a preacher and an apostle (i speak the truth in christ and lie not), a teacher of the gentiles in faith and verity." (47) these passages, i say, show clearly the stamp both of the apostleship and the teachership: the authority for admonishing whomsoever and wheresoever he pleased is asserted by paul in the epistle to philemon, v:8: "wherefore, though i might be much bold in christ to enjoin thee that which is convenient, yet," &c., where we may remark that if paul had received from god as a prophet what he wished to enjoin philemon, and had been bound to speak in his prophetic capacity, he would not have been able to change the command of god into entreaties. (48) we must therefore understand him to refer to the permission to admonish which he had received as a teacher, and not as a prophet. (49) we have not yet made it quite clear that the apostles might each choose his own way of teaching, but only that by virtue of their apostleship they were teachers as well as prophets; however, if we call reason to our aid we shall clearly see that an authority to teach implies authority to choose the method. (50) it will nevertheless be, perhaps, more satisfactory to draw all our proofs from scripture; we are there plainly told that each apostle chose his particular method (rom. xv: 20): "yea, so have i strived to preach the gospel, not where christ was named, lest i should build upon another man's foundation." (51) if all the apostles had adopted the same method of teaching, and had all built up the christian religion on the same foundation, paul would have had no reason to call the work of a fellow-apostle "another man's foundation," inasmuch as it would have been identical with his own: his calling it another man's proved that each apostle built up his religious instruction on different foundations, thus resembling other teachers who have each their own method, and prefer instructing quite ignorant people who have never learnt under another master, whether the subject be science, languages, or even the indisputable truths of mathematics. (52) furthermore, if we go through the epistles at all attentively, we shall see that the apostles, while agreeing about religion itself, are at variance as to the foundations it rests on. (53) paul, in order to strengthen men's religion, and show them that salvation depends solely on the grace of god, teaches that no one can boast of works, but only of faith, and that no one can be justified by works (rom. iii:27,28); in fact, he preaches the complete doctrine of predestination. (54) james, on the other hand, states that man is justified by works, and not by faith only (see his epistle, ii:24), and omitting all the disputations of paul, confines religion to a very few elements. (55) lastly, it is indisputable that from these different ground; for religion selected by the apostles, many quarrels and schisms distracted the church, even in the earliest times, and doubtless they will continue so to distract it for ever, or at least till religion is separated from philosophical speculations, and reduced to the few simple doctrines taught by christ to his disciples; such a task was impossible for the apostles, because the gospel was then unknown to mankind, and lest its novelty should offend men's ears it had to be adapted to the disposition of contemporaries (2 cor. ix:19, 20), and built up on the groundwork most familiar and accepted at the time. (56) thus none of the apostles philosophized more than did paul, who was called to preach to the gentiles; other apostles preaching to the jews, who despised philosophy, similarly, adapted themselves to the temper of their hearers (see gal. ii. 11), and preached a religion free from all philosophical speculations. (57) how blest would our age be if it could witness a religion freed also from all the trammels of superstition! chapter xii of the true original of the divine law, and wherefore scripture is called sacred, and the word of god. how that, in so far as it contains the word of god, it has come down to us uncorrupted. (1) those who look upon the bible as a message sent down by god from heaven to men, will doubtless cry out that i have committed the sin against the holy ghost because i have asserted that the word of god is faulty, mutilated, tampered with, and inconsistent; that we possess it only in fragments, and that the original of the covenant which god made with the jews has been lost. (2) however, i have no doubt that a little reflection will cause them to desist from their uproar: for not only reason but the expressed opinions of prophets and apostles openly proclaim that god's eternal word and covenant, no less than true religion, is divinely inscribed in human hearts, that is, in the human mind, and that this is the true original of god's covenant, stamped with his own seal, namely, the idea of himself, as it were, with the image of his godhood. (3) religion was imparted to the early hebrews as a law written down, because they were at that time in the condition of children, but afterwards moses (deut. xxx:6) and jeremiah (xxxi:33) predicted a time coming when the lord should write his law in their hearts. (4) thus only the jews, and amongst them chiefly the sadducees, struggled for the law written on tablets; least of all need those who bear it inscribed on their hearts join in the contest. (5) those, therefore, who reflect, will find nothing in what i have written repugnant either to the word of god or to true religion and faith, or calculated to weaken either one or the other: contrariwise, they will see that i have strengthened religion, as i showed at the end of chapter x.; indeed, had it not been so, i should certainly have decided to hold my peace, nay, i would even have asserted as a way out of all difficulties that the bible contains the most profound hidden mysteries; however, as this doctrine has given rise to gross superstition and other pernicious results spoken of at the beginning of chapter v., i have thought such a course unnecessary, especially as religion stands in no need of superstitious adornments, but is, on the contrary, deprived by such trappings of some of her splendour. (6) still, it will be said, though the law of god is written in the heart, the bible is none the less the word of god, and it is no more lawful to say of scripture than of god's word that it is mutilated and corrupted. (7) i fear that such objectors are too anxious to be pious, and that they are in danger of turning religion into superstition, and worshipping paper and ink in place of god's word. (8) i am certified of thus much: i have said nothing unworthy of scripture or god's word, and i have made no assertions which i could not prove by most plain argument to be true. (9) i can, therefore, rest assured that i have advanced nothing which is impious or even savours of impiety. (10) from what i have said, assume a licence to sin, and without any reason, at i confess that some profane men, to whom religion is a burden, may, the simple dictates of their lusts conclude that scripture is everywhere faulty and falsified, and that therefore its authority is null; but such men are beyond the reach of help, for nothing, as the pro verb has it, can be said so rightly that it cannot be twisted into wrong. (11) those who wish to give rein to their lusts are at no loss for an excuse, nor were those men of old who possessed the original scriptures, the ark of the covenant, nay, the prophets and apostles in person among them, any better than the people of to-day. (12) human nature, jew as well as gentile, has always been the same, and in every age virtue has been exceedingly rare. (13) nevertheless, to remove every scruple, i will here show in what sense the bible or any inanimate thing should be called sacred and divine; also wherein the law of god consists, and how it cannot be contained in a certain number of books; and, lastly, i will show that scripture, in so far as it teaches what is necessary for obedience and salvation, cannot have been corrupted. (14) from these considerations everyone will be able to judge that i have neither said anything against the word of god nor given any foothold to impiety. (15) a thing is called sacred and divine when it is designed for promoting piety, and continues sacred so long as it is religiously used: if the users cease to be pious, the thing ceases to be sacred: if it be turned to base uses, that which was formerly sacred becomes unclean and profane. (16) for instance, a certain spot was named by the patriarch jacob the house of god, because he worshipped god there revealed to him: by the prophets the same spot was called the house of iniquity (see amos v:5, and hosea x:5), because the israelites were wont, at the instigation of jeroboam, to sacrifice there to idols. (17) another example puts the matter in the plainest light. (18) words gain their meaning solely from their usage, and if they are arranged according to their accepted signification so as to move those who read them to devotion, they will become sacred, and the book so written will be sacred also. (19) but if their usage afterwards dies out so that the words have no meaning, or the book becomes utterly neglected, whether from unworthy motives, or because it is no longer needed, then the words and the book will lose both their use and their sanctity: lastly, if these same words be otherwise arranged, or if their customary meaning becomes perverted into its opposite, then both the words and the book containing them become, instead of sacred, impure and profane. (20) from this it follows that nothing is in itself absolutely sacred, or profane, and unclean, apart from the mind, but only relatively thereto. (21) thus much is clear from many passages in the bible. (22) jeremiah (to select one case out of many) says (chap. vii:4), that the jews of his time were wrong in calling solomon's temple, the temple of god, for, as he goes on to say in the same chapter, god's name would only be given to the temple so long as it was frequented by men who worshipped him, and defended justice, but that, if it became the resort of murderers, thieves, idolaters, and other wicked persons, it would be turned into a den of malefactors. (23) scripture, curiously enough, nowhere tells us what became of the ark of the covenant, though there is no doubt that it was destroyed, or burnt together with the temple; yet there was nothing which the hebrews considered more sacred, or held in greater reverence. (24) thus scripture is sacred, and its words divine so long as it stirs mankind to devotion towards god: but if it be utterly neglected, as it formerly was by the jews, it becomes nothing but paper and ink, and is left to be desecrated or corrupted: still, though scripture be thus corrupted or destroyed, we must not say that the word of god has suffered in like manner, else we shall be like the jews, who said that the temple which would then be the temple of god had perished in the flames. (25) jeremiah tells us this in respect to the law, for he thus chides the ungodly of his time, "wherefore, say you we are masters, and the law of the lord is with us? (26) surely it has been given in vain, it is in vain that the pen of the scribes" (has been made) that is, you say falsely that the scripture is in your power, and that you possess the law of god; for ye have made it of none effect. (27) so also, when moses broke the first tables of the law, he did not by any means cast the word of god from his hands in anger and shatter it such an action would be inconceivable, either of moses or of god's word he only broke the tables of stone, which, though they had before been holy from containing the covenant wherewith the jews had bound themselves in obedience to god, had entirely lost their sanctity when the covenant had been violated by the worship of the calf, and were, therefore, as liable to perish as the ark of the covenant. (28) it is thus scarcely to be wondered at, that the original documents of moses are no longer extant, nor that the books we possess met with the fate we have described, when we consider that the true original of the divine covenant, the most sacred object of all, has totally perished. (29) let them cease, therefore, who accuse us of impiety, inasmuch as we have said nothing against the word of god, neither have we corrupted it, but let them keep their anger, if they would wreak it justly, for the ancients whose malice desecrated the ark, the temple, and the law of god, and all that was held sacred, subjecting them to corruption. (30) furthermore, if, according to the saying of the apostle in 2 cor. iii:3, they possessed "the epistle of christ, written not with ink, but with the spirit of the living god, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart," let them cease to worship the letter, and be so anxious concerning it. (31) i think i have now sufficiently shown in what respect scripture should be accounted sacred and divine; we may now see what should rightly be understood by the expression, the word of the lord; debar (the hebrew original) signifies word, speech, command, and thing. (32) the causes for which a thing is in hebrew said to be of god, or is referred to him, have been already detailed in chap. i., and we can therefrom easily gather what meaning scripture attaches to the phrases, the word, the speech, the command, or the thing of god. (33) i need not, therefore, repeat what i there said, nor what was shown under the third head in the chapter on miracles. (34) it is enough to mention the repetition for the better understanding of what i am about to say viz., that the word of the lord when it has reference to anyone but god himself, signifies that divine law treated of in chap. iv.; in other words, religion, universal and catholic to the whole human race, as isaiah describes it (chap. i:10), teaching that the true way of life consists, not in ceremonies, but in charity, and a true heart, and calling it indifferently god's law and god's word. (35) the expression is also used metaphorically for the order of nature and destiny (which, indeed, actually depend and follow from the eternal mandate of the divine nature), and especially for such parts of such order as were foreseen by the prophets, for the prophets did not perceive future events as the result of natural causes, but as the fiats and decrees of god. (36) lastly, it is employed for the command of any prophet, in so far as he had perceived it by his peculiar faculty or prophetic gift, and not by the natural light of reason; this use springs chiefly from the usual prophetic conception of god as a legislator, which we remarked in chap. iv. (37) there are, then, three causes for the bible's being called the word of god: because it teaches true religion, of which god is the eternal founder; because it narrates predictions of future events as though they were decrees of god; because its actual authors generally perceived things not by their ordinary natural faculties, but by a power peculiar to themselves, and introduced these things perceived, as told them by god. (37) although scripture contains much that is merely historical and can be perceived by natural reason, yet its name is acquired from its chief subject matter. (38) we can thus easily see how god can be said to be the author of the bible: it is because of the true religion therein contained, and not because he wished to communicate to men a certain number of books. (39) we can also learn from hence the reason for the division into old and new testament. (40) it was made because the prophets who preached religion before christ, preached it as a national law in virtue of the covenant entered into under moses; while the apostles who came after christ, preached it to all men as a universal religion solely in virtue of christ's passion: the cause for the division is not that the two parts are different in doctrine, nor that they were written as originals of the covenant, nor, lastly, that the catholic religion (which is in entire harmony with our nature) was new except in relation to those who had not known it: "it was in the world," as john the evangelist says, "and the world knew it not." (41) thus, even if we had fewer books of the old and new testament than we have, we should still not be deprived of the word of god (which, as we have said, is identical with true religion), even as we do not now hold ourselves to be deprived of it, though we lack many cardinal writings such as the book of the law, which was religiously guarded in the temple as the original of the covenant, also the book of wars, the book of chronicles, and many others, from whence the extant old testament was taken and compiled. (42) the above conclusion may be supported by many reasons. (43) i. because the books of both testaments were not written by express command at one place for all ages, but are a fortuitous collection of the works of men, writing each as his period and disposition dictated. (44) so much is clearly shown by the call of the prophets who were bade to admonish the ungodly of their time, and also by the apostolic epistles. (45) ii. because it is one thing to understand the meaning of scripture and the prophets, and quite another thing to understand the meaning of god, or the actual truth. (46) this follows from what we said in chap. ii. (47) we showed, in chap. vi., that it applied to historic narratives, and to miracles: but it by no means applies to questions concerning true religion and virtue. (48) iii. because the books of the old testament were selected from many, and were collected and sanctioned by a council of the pharisees, as we showed in chap. x. (49) the books of the new testament were also chosen from many by councils which rejected as spurious other books held sacred by many. (50) but these councils, both pharisee and christian, were not composed of prophets, but only of learned men and teachers. (51) still, we must grant that they were guided in their choice by a regard for the word of god; and they must, therefore, have known what the law of god was. (52) iv. because the apostles wrote not as prophets, but as teachers (see last chapter), and chose whatever method they thought best adapted for those whom they addressed: and consequently, there are many things in the epistles (as we showed at the end of the last chapter) which are not necessary to salvation. (53) v. lastly, because there are four evangelists in the new testament, and it is scarcely credible that god can have designed to narrate the life of christ four times over, and to communicate it thus to mankind. (54) for though there are some details related in one gospel which are not in another, and one often helps us to understand another, we cannot thence conclude that all that is set down is of vital importance to us, and that god chose the four evangelists in order that the life of christ might be better understood; for each one preached his gospel in a separate locality, each wrote it down as he preached it, in simple language, in order that the history of christ might be clearly told, not with any view of explaining his fellow-evangelists. (55) if there are some passages which can be better, and more easily understood by comparing the various versions, they are the result of chance, and are not numerous: their continuance in obscurity would have impaired neither the clearness of the narrative nor the blessedness of mankind. (56) we have now shown that scripture can only be called the word of god in so far as it affects religion, or the divine law; we must now point out that, in respect to these questions, it is neither faulty, tampered with, nor corrupt. (57) by faulty, tampered with, and corrupt, i here mean written so incorrectly, that the meaning cannot be arrived at by a study of the language, nor from the authority of scripture. (58) i will not go to such lengths as to say that the bible, in so far as it contains the divine law, has always preserved the same vowel-points, the same letters, or the same words (i leave this to be proved by, the massoretes and other worshippers of the letter), i only, maintain that the meaning by, which alone an utterance is entitled to be called divine, has come down to us uncorrupted, even though the original wording may have been more often changed than we suppose. (59) such alterations, as i have said above, detract nothing from the divinity of the bible, for the bible would have been no less divine had it been written in different words or a different language. (60) that the divine law has in this sense come down to us uncorrupted, is an assertion which admits of no dispute. (61) for from the bible itself we learn, without the smallest difficulty or ambiguity, that its cardinal precept is: to love god above all things, and one's neighbour as one's self. (62) this cannot be a spurious passage, nor due to a hasty and mistaken scribe, for if the bible had ever put forth a different doctrine it would have had to change the whole of its teaching, for this is the corner-stone of religion, without which the whole fabric would fall headlong to the ground. (63) the bible would not be the work we have been examining, but something quite different. (64) we remain, then, unshaken in our belief that this has always been the doctrine of scripture, and, consequently, that no error sufficient to vitiate it can have crept in without being instantly, observed by all; nor can anyone have succeeded in tampering with it and escaped the discovery of his malice. (65) as this corner-stone is intact, we must perforce admit the same of whatever other passages are indisputably dependent on it, and are also fundamental, as, for instance, that a god exists, that he foresees all things, that he is almighty, that by his decree the good prosper and the wicked come to naught, and, finally, that our salvation depends solely on his grace. (66) these are doctrines which scripture plainly teaches throughout, and which it is bound to teach, else all the rest would be empty and baseless; nor can we be less positive about other moral doctrines, which plainly are built upon this universal foundation for instance, to uphold justice, to aid the weak, to do no murder, to covet no man's goods, &c. (67) precepts, i repeat, such as these, human malice and the lapse of ages are alike powerless to destroy, for if any part of them perished, its loss would immediately be supplied from the fundamental principle, especially the doctrine of charity, which is everywhere in both testaments extolled above all others. (68) moreover, though it be true that there is no conceivable crime so heinous that it has never been committed, still there is no one who would attempt in excuse for his crimes to destroy, the law, or introduce an impious doctrine in the place of what is eternal and salutary; men's nature is so constituted that everyone (be he king or subject) who has committed a base action, tries to deck out his conduct with spurious excuses, till he seems to have done nothing but what is just and right. (69) we may conclude, therefore, that the whole divine law, as taught by scripture, has come down to us uncorrupted. (70) besides this there are certain facts which we may be sure have been transmitted in good faith. (71) for instance, the main facts of hebrew history, which were perfectly well known to everyone. (72) the jewish people were accustomed in former times to chant the ancient history of their nation in psalms. (73) the main facts, also, of christ's life and passion were immediately spread abroad through the whole roman empire. (74) it is therefore scarcely credible, unless nearly everybody, consented thereto, which we cannot suppose, that successive generations have handed down the broad outline of the gospel narrative otherwise than as they received it. (74) whatsoever, therefore, is spurious or faulty can only have reference to details some circumstances in one or the other history or prophecy designed to stir the people to greater devotion; or in some miracle, with a view of confounding philosophers; or, lastly, in speculative matters after they had become mixed up with religion, so that some individual might prop up his own inventions with a pretext of divine authority. (75) but such matters have little to do with salvation, whether they be corrupted little or much, as i will show in detail in the next chapter, though i think the question sufficiently plain from what i have said already, especially in chapter ii. chapter xiii it is shown that scripture teaches only very simple doctrines, such as suffice for right conduct. (1) in the second chapter of this treatise we pointed out that the prophets were gifted with extraordinary powers of imagination, but not of understanding; also that god only revealed to them such things as are very simple not philosophic mysteries, and that he adapted his communications to their previous opinions. (2) we further showed in chap. v. that scripture only transmits and teaches truths which can readily be comprehended by all; not deducing and concatenating its conclusions from definitions and axioms, but narrating quite simply, and confirming its statements, with a view to inspiring belief, by an appeal to experience as exemplified in miracles and history, and setting forth its truths in the style and phraseology which would most appeal to the popular mind (cf. chap. vi., third division). (3) lastly, we demonstrated in chap. viii. that the difficulty of understanding scripture lies in the language only, and not in the abstruseness of the argument. (4) to these considerations we may add that the prophets did not preach only to the learned, but to all jews, without exception, while the apostles were wont to teach the gospel doctrine in churches where there were public meetings; whence it follows that scriptural doctrine contains no lofty speculations nor philosophic reasoning, but only very simple matters, such as could be understood by the slowest intelligence. (5) i am consequently lost in wonder at the ingenuity of those whom i have already mentioned, who detect in the bible mysteries so profound that they cannot be explained in human language, and who have introduced so many philosophic speculations into religion that the church seems like an academy, and religion like a science, or rather a dispute. (6) it is not to be wondered at that men, who boast of possessing supernatural intelligence, should be unwilling to yield the palm of knowledge to philosophers who have only their ordinary, faculties; still i should be surprised if i found them teaching any new speculative doctrine, which was not a commonplace to those gentile philosophers whom, in spite of all, they stigmatize as blind; for, if one inquires what these mysteries lurking in scripture may be, one is confronted with nothing but the reflections of plato or aristotle, or the like, which it would often be easier for an ignorant man to dream than for the most accomplished scholar to wrest out of the bible. (7) however, i do not wish to affirm absolutely that scripture contains no doctrines in the sphere of philosophy, for in the last chapter i pointed out some of the kind, as fundamental principles; but i go so far as to say that such doctrines are very few and very simple. (8) their precise nature and definition i will now set forth. (9) the task will be easy, for we know that scripture does not aim at imparting scientific knowledge, and, therefore, it demands from men nothing but obedience, and censures obstinacy, but not ignorance. (10) furthermore, as obedience to god consists solely in love to our neighbour for whosoever loveth his neighbour, as a means of obeying god, hath, as st. paul says (rom. xiii:8), fulfilled the law, it follows that no knowledge is commended in the bible save that which is necessary for enabling all men to obey god in the manner stated, and without which they would become rebellious, or without the discipline of obedience. (11) other speculative questions, which have no direct bearing on this object, or are concerned with the knowledge of natural events, do not affect scripture, and should be entirely separated from religion. (12) now, though everyone, as we have said, is now quite able to see this truth for himself, i should nevertheless wish, considering that the whole of religion depends thereon, to explain the entire question more accurately and clearly. (13) to this end i must first prove that the intellectual or accurate knowledge of god is not a gift, bestowed upon all good men like obedience; and, further, that the knowledge of god, required by him through his prophets from everyone without exception, as needful to be known, is simply a knowledge of his divine justice and charity. (14) both these points are easily proved from scripture. (15) the first plainly follows from exodus vi:2, where god, in order to show the singular grace bestowed upon moses, says to him: "and i appeared unto abraham, unto isaac, and unto jacob by the name of el sadai (a. v. god almighty); but by my name jehovah was i not known to them" for the better understanding of which passage i may remark that el sadai, in hebrew, signifies the god who suffices, in that he gives to every man that which suffices for him; and, although sadai is often used by itself, to signify god, we cannot doubt that the word el (god, {power, might}) is everywhere understood. (16) furthermore, we must note that jehovah is the only word found in scripture with the meaning of the absolute essence of god, without reference to created things. (17) the jews maintain, for this reason, that this is, strictly speaking, the only name of god; that the rest of the words used are merely titles; and, in truth, the other names of god, whether they be substantives or adjectives, are merely attributive, and belong to him, in so far as he is conceived of in relation to created things, or manifested through them. (18) thus el, or eloah, signifies powerful, as is well known, and only applies to god in respect to his supremacy, as when we call paul an apostle; the faculties of his power are set forth in an accompanying adjective, as el, great, awful, just, merciful, &c., or else all are understood at once by the use of el in the plural number, with a singular signification, an expression frequently adopted in scripture. (19) now, as god tells moses that he was not known to the patriarchs by the name of jehovah, it follows that they were not cognizant of any attribute of god which expresses his absolute essence, but only of his deeds and promises that is, of his power, as manifested in visible things. (20) god does not thus speak to moses in order to accuse the patriarchs of infidelity, but, on the contrary, as a means of extolling their belief and faith, inasmuch as, though they possessed no extraordinary knowledge of god (such as moses had), they yet accepted his promises as fixed and certain; whereas moses, though his thoughts about god were more exalted, nevertheless doubted about the divine promises, and complained to god that, instead of the promised deliverance, the prospects of the israelites had darkened. (21) as the patriarchs did not know the distinctive name of god, and as god mentions the fact to moses, in praise of their faith and single-heartedness, and in contrast to the extraordinary grace granted to moses, it follows, as we stated at first, that men are not bound by, decree to have knowledge of the attributes of god, such knowledge being only granted to a few of the faithful: it is hardly worth while to quote further examples from scripture, for everyone must recognize that knowledge of god is not equal among all good men. (22) moreover, a man cannot be ordered to be wise any more than he can be ordered to live and exist. (23) men, women, and children are all alike able to obey by, commandment, but not to be wise. if any tell us that it is not necessary to understand the divine attributes, but that we must believe them simply, without proof, he is plainly, trifling. (24) for what is invisible and can only, be perceived by the mind, cannot be apprehended by any, other means than proofs; if these are absent the object remains ungrasped; the repetition of what has been heard on such subjects no more indicates or attains to their meaning than the words of a parrot or a puppet speaking without sense or signification. (25) before i proceed i ought to explain how it comes that we are often told in genesis that the patriarchs preached in the name of jehovah, this being in plain contradiction to the text above quoted. (26) a reference to what was said in chap. viii. will readily explain the difficulty. (27) it was there shown that the writer of the pentateuch did not always speak of things and places by the names they bore in the times of which he was writing, but by the names best known to his contemporaries. (28) god is thus said in the pentateuch to have been preached by the patriarchs under the name of jehovah, not because such was the name by which the patriarchs knew him, but because this name was the one most reverenced by the jews. (29) this point, i say, must necessarily be noticed, for in exodus it is expressly stated that god was not known to the patriarchs by this name; and in chap. iii:13, it is said that moses desired to know the name of god. (30) now, if this name had been already known it would have been known to moses. (31) we must therefore draw the conclusion indicated, namely, that the faithful patriarchs did not know this name of god, and that the knowledge of god is bestowed and not commanded by the deity. (32) it is now time to pass on to our second point, and show that god through his prophets required from men no other knowledge of himself than is contained in a knowledge of his justice and charity that is, of attributes which a certain manner of life will enable men to imitate. (33) jeremiah states this in so many words (xxii:15, 16): "did not thy father eat, and drink, and do judgment and justice? and then it was well with him. (34) he judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well with him: was not this to know me? saith the lord." (35) the words in chap. ix:24 of the same book are equally, clear. (36) "but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me, that i am the lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth; for in these things i delight, saith the lord." (37) the same doctrine maybe gathered from exod. xxxiv:6, where god revealed to moses only, those of his attributes which display the divine justice and charity. (38) lastly, we may call attention to a passage in john which we shall discuss at more length hereafter; the apostle explains the nature of god (inasmuch as no one has beheld him) through charity only, and concludes that he who possesses charity possesses, and in very, truth knows god. (39) we have thus seen that moses, jeremiah, and john sum up in a very short compass the knowledge of god needful for all, and that they state it to consist in exactly what we said, namely, that god is supremely just, and supremely merciful in other words, the one perfect pattern of the true life. (40) we may add that scripture nowhere gives an express definition of god, and does not point out any other of his attributes which should be apprehended save these, nor does it in set terms praise any others. (41) wherefore we may draw the general conclusion that an intellectual knowledge of god, which takes cognizance of his nature in so far as it actually is, and which cannot by any manner of living be imitated by mankind or followed as an example, has no bearing whatever on true rules of conduct, on faith, or on revealed religion; consequently that men may be in complete error on the subject without incurring the charge of sinfulness. (42) we need now no longer wonder that god adapted himself to the existing opinions and imaginations of the prophets, or that the faithful held different ideas of god, as we showed in chap. ii.; or, again, that the sacred books speak very inaccurately of god, attributing to him hands, feet, eyes, ears, a mind, and motion from one place to another; or that they ascribe to him emotions, such as jealousy, mercy, &c., or, lastly, that they describe him as a judge in heaven sitting on a royal throne with christ on his right hand. (43) such expressions are adapted to the understanding of the multitude, it being the object of the bible to make men not learned but obedient. (44) in spite of this the general run of theologians, when they come upon any of these phrases which they cannot rationally harmonize with the divine nature, maintain that they should be interpreted metaphorically, passages they cannot understand they say should be interpreted literally. (45) but if every expression of this kind in the bible is necessarily to be interpreted and understood metaphorically, scripture must have been written, not for the people and the unlearned masses, but chiefly for accomplished experts and philosophers. (46) if it were indeed a sin to hold piously and simply the ideas about god we have just quoted, the prophets ought to have been strictly on their guard against the use of such expressions, seeing the weak-mindedness of the people, and ought, on the other hand, to have set forth first of all, duly and clearly, those attributes of god which are needful to be understood. (47) this they have nowhere done; we cannot, therefore, think that opinions taken in themselves without respect to actions are either pious or impious, but must maintain that a man is pious or impious in his beliefs only in so far as he is thereby incited to obedience, or derives from them license to sin and rebel. (48) if a man, by believing what is true, becomes rebellious, his creed is impious; if by believing what is false he becomes obedient, his creed is pious; for the true knowledge of god comes not by commandment, but by divine gift. (49) god has required nothing from man but a knowledge of his divine justice and charity, and that not as necessary to scientific accuracy, but to obedience. chapter xiv definitions of faith, the faith, and the foundations of faith, which is once for all separated from philosophy. (1) for a true knowledge of faith it is above all things necessary to understand that the bible was adapted to the intelligence, not only of the prophets, but also of the diverse and fickle jewish multitude. (2) this will be recognized by all who give any thought to the subject, for they will see that a person who accepted promiscuously everything in scripture as being the universal and absolute teaching of god, without accurately defining what was adapted to the popular intelligence, would find it impossible to escape confounding the opinions of the masses with the divine doctrines, praising the judgments and comments of man as the teaching of god, and making a wrong use of scriptural authority. (3) who, i say, does not perceive that this is the chief reason why so many sectaries teach contradictory opinions as divine documents, and support their contentions with numerous scriptural texts, till it has passed in belgium into a proverb, geen ketter sonder letter no heretic without a text? (4) the sacred books were not written by one man, nor for the people of a single period, but by many authors of different temperaments, at times extending from first to last over nearly two thousand years, and perhaps much longer. (5) we will not, however, accuse the sectaries of impiety because they have adapted the words of scripture to their own opinions; it is thus that these words were adapted to the understanding of the masses originally, and everyone is at liberty so to treat them if he sees that he can thus obey god in matters relating to justice and charity with a more full consent: but we do accuse those who will not grant this freedom to their fellows, but who persecute all who differ from them, as god's enemies, however honourable and virtuous be their lives; while, on the other hand, they cherish those who agree with them, however foolish they may be, as god's elect. (6) such conduct is as wicked and dangerous to the state as any that can be conceived. (7) in order, therefore, to establish the limits to which individual freedom should extend, and to decide what persons, in spite of the diversity of their opinions, are to be looked upon as the faithful, we must define faith and its essentials. (8) this task i hope to accomplish in the present chapter, and also to separate faith from philosophy, which is the chief aim of the whole treatise. (9) in order to proceed duly to the demonstration let us recapitulate the chief aim and object of scripture; this will indicate a standard by which we may define faith. (10) we have said in a former chapter that the aim and object of scripture is only to teach obedience. (11) thus much, i think, no one can question. (12) who does not see that both testaments are nothing else but schools for this object, and have neither of them any aim beyond inspiring mankind with a voluntary obedience? (13) for (not to repeat what i said in the last chapter) i will remark that moses did not seek to convince the jews by reason, but bound them by a covenant, by oaths, and by conferring benefits; further, he threatened the people with punishment if they should infringe the law, and promised rewards if they should obey it. (14) all these are not means for teaching knowledge, but for inspiring obedience. (15) the doctrine of the gospels enjoins nothing but simple faith, namely, to believe in god and to honour him, which is the same thing as to obey him. (16) there is no occasion for me to throw further light on a question so plain by citing scriptural texts commending obedience, such as may be found in great numbers in both testaments. (17) moreover, the bible teaches very clearly in a great many passages what everyone ought to do in order to obey god; the whole duty is summed up in love to one's neighbour. (18) it cannot, therefore, be denied that he who by god's command loves his neighbour as himself is truly obedient and blessed according to the law, whereas he who hates his neighbour or neglects him is rebellious and obstinate. (19) lastly, it is plain to everyone that the bible was not written and disseminated only, for the learned, but for men of every age and race; wherefore we may, rest assured that we are not bound by scriptural command to believe anything beyond what is absolutely necessary, for fulfilling its main precept. (20) this precept, then, is the only standard of the whole catholic faith, and by it alone all the dogmas needful to be believed should be determined. (21) so much being abundantly manifest, as is also the fact that all other doctrines of the faith can be legitimately deduced therefrom by reason alone, i leave it to every man to decide for himself how it comes to pass that so many divisions have arisen in the church: can it be from any other cause than those suggested at the beginning of chap. viii.? (22) it is these same causes which compel me to explain the method of determining the dogmas of the faith from the foundation we have discovered, for if i neglected to do so, and put the question on a regular basis, i might justly be said to have promised too lavishly, for that anyone might, by my showing, introduce any doctrine he liked into religion, under the pretext that it was a necessary means to obedience: especially would this be the case in questions respecting the divine attributes. (23) in order, therefore, to set forth the whole matter methodically, i will begin with a definition of faith, which on the principle above given, should be as follows:(24) faith consists in a knowledge of god, without which obedience to him would be impossible, and which the mere fact of obedience to him implies. (25) this definition is so clear, and follows so plainly from what we have already proved, that it needs no explanation. (26) the consequences involved therein i will now briefly show. (27) (i.) faith is not salutary in itself, but only in respect to the obedience it implies, or as james puts it in his epistle, ii:17, "faith without works is dead" (see the whole of the chapter quoted). (28) (ii.) he who is truly obedient necessarily possesses true and saving faith; for if obedience be granted, faith must be granted also, as the same apostle expressly says in these words (ii:18), "show me thy faith without thy works, and i will show thee my faith by my works." (29) so also john, i ep. iv:7: "everyone that loveth is born of god, and knoweth god: he that loveth not, knoweth not god; for god is love." (30) from these texts, i repeat, it follows that we can only judge a man faithful or unfaithful by his works. (31) if his works be good, he is faithful, however much his doctrines may differ from those of the rest of the faithful: if his works be evil, though he may verbally conform, he is unfaithful. (32) for obedience implies faith, and faith without works is dead. (33) john, in the 13th verse of the chapter above quoted, expressly teaches the same doctrine: "hereby," he says, "know we that we dwell in him and he in us, because he hath given us of his spirit," i.e. love. (34) he had said before that god is love, and therefore he concludes (on his own received principles), that whoso possesses love possesses truly the spirit of god. (35) as no one has beheld god he infers that no one has knowledge or consciousness of god, except from love towards his neighbour, and also that no one can have knowledge of any of god's attributes, except this of love, in so far as we participate therein. (36) if these arguments are not conclusive, they, at any rate, show the apostle's meaning, but the words in chap. ii:3, 4, of the same epistle are much clearer, for they state in so many words our precise contention: "and hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments. (37) he that saith, i know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." (38) from all this, i repeat, it follows that they are the true enemies of christ who persecute honourable and justice-loving men because they differ from them, and do not uphold the same religious dogmas as themselves: for whosoever loves justice and charity we know, by that very fact, to be faithful: whosoever persecutes the faithful, is an enemy to christ. (39) lastly, it follows that faith does not demand that dogmas should be true as that they should be pious that is, such as will stir up the heart to obey; though there be many such which contain not a shadow of truth, so long as they be held in good faith, otherwise their adherents are disobedient, for how can anyone, desirous of loving justice and obeying god, adore as divine what he knows to be alien from the divine nature? (40) however, men may err from simplicity of mind, and scripture, as we have seen, does not condemn ignorance, but obstinacy. (41) this is the necessary result of our definition of faith, and all its branches should spring from the universal rule above given, and from the evident aim and object of the bible, unless we choose to mix our own inventions therewith. (42) thus it is not true doctrines which are expressly required by the bible, so much as doctrines necessary for obedience, and to confirm in our hearts the love of our neighbour, wherein (to adopt the words of john) we are in god, and god in us. (43) as, then, each man's faith must be judged pious or impious only in respect of its producing obedience or obstinacy, and not in respect of its truth; and as no one will dispute that men's dispositions are exceedingly varied, that all do not acquiesce in the same things, but are ruled some by one opinion some by another, so that what moves one to devotion moves another to laughter and contempt, it follows that there can be no doctrines in the catholic, or universal, religion, which can give rise to controversy among good men. (44) such doctrines might be pious to some and impious to others, whereas they should be judged solely by their fruits. (45) to the universal religion, then, belong only such dogmas as are absolutely required in order to attain obedience to god, and without which such obedience would be impossible; as for the rest, each man seeing that he is the best judge of his own character should adopt whatever he thinks best adapted to strengthen his love of justice. (46) if this were so, i think there would be no further occasion for controversies in the church. (47) i have now no further fear in enumerating the dogmas of universal faith or the fundamental dogmas of the whole of scripture, inasmuch as they all tend (as may be seen from what has been said) to this one doctrine, namely, that there exists a god, that is, a supreme being, who loves justice and charity, and who must be obeyed by whosoever would be saved; that the worship of this being consists in the practice of justice and love towards one's neighbour, and that they contain nothing beyond the following doctrines:(48) i. that god or a supreme being exists, sovereignly just and merciful, the exemplar of the true life; that whosoever is ignorant of or disbelieves in his existence cannot obey him or know him as a judge. (49) ii. that he is one. (50) nobody will dispute that this doctrine is absolutely necessary for entire devotion, admiration, and love towards god. (51) for devotion, admiration, and love spring from the superiority of one over all else. (52) iii. that he is omnipresent, or that all things are open to him, for if anything could be supposed to be concealed from him, or to be unnoticed by, him, we might doubt or be ignorant of the equity of his judgment as directing all things. (53) iv. that he has supreme right and dominion over all things, and that he does nothing under compulsion, but by his absolute fiat and grace. (54) all things are bound to obey him, he is not bound to obey any. (55) v. that the worship of god consists only in justice and charity, or love towards one's neighbour. (56) vi. that all those, and those only, who obey god by their manner of life are saved; the rest of mankind, who live under the sway of their pleasures, are lost. (57) if we did not believe this, there would be no reason for obeying god rather than pleasure. (58) vii. lastly, that god forgives the sins of those who repent. (59) no one is free from sin, so that without this belief all would despair of salvation, and there would be no reason for believing in the mercy of god. (60) he who firmly believes that god, out of the mercy and grace with which he directs all things, forgives the sins of men, and who feels his love of god kindled thereby, he, i say, does really, know christ according to the spirit, and christ is in him. (61) no one can deny that all these doctrines are before all things necessary, to be believed, in order that every man, without exception, may be able to obey god according to the bidding of the law above explained, for if one of these precepts be disregarded obedience is destroyed. (62) but as to what god, or the exemplar of the true life, may be, whether fire, or spirit, or light, or thought, or what not, this, i say, has nothing to do with faith any more than has the question how he comes to be the exemplar of the true life, whether it be because he has a just and merciful mind, or because all things exist and act through him, and consequently that we understand through him, and through him see what is truly just and good. (63) everyone may think on such questions as he likes. (64) furthermore, faith is not affected, whether we hold that god is omnipresent essentially or potentially; that he directs all things by absolute fiat, or by the necessity of his nature; that he dictates laws like a prince, or that he sets them forth as eternal truths; that man obeys him by virtue of free will, or by virtue of the necessity of the divine decree; lastly, that the reward of the good and the punishment of the wicked is natural or supernatural: these and such like questions have no bearing on faith, except in so far as they are used as means to give us license to sin more, or to obey god less. (65) i will go further, and maintain that every man is bound to adapt these dogmas to his own way of thinking, and to interpret them according as he feels that he can give them his fullest and most unhesitating assent, so that he may the more easily obey god with his whole heart. (66) such was the manner, as we have already pointed out, in which the faith was in old time revealed and written, in accordance with the understanding and opinions of the prophets and people of the period; so, in like fashion, every man is bound to adapt it to his own opinions, so that he may accept it without any hesitation or mental repugnance. (67) we have shown that faith does not so much re quire truth as piety, and that it is only quickening and pious through obedience, consequently no one is faithful save by obedience alone. (68) the best faith is not necessarily possessed by him who displays the best reasons, but by him who displays the best fruits of justice and charity. (69) how salutary and necessary this doctrine is for a state, in order that men may dwell together in peace and concord; and how many and how great causes of disturbance and crime are thereby cut off, i leave everyone to judge for himself! (70) before we go further, i may remark that we can, by means of what we have just proved, easily answer the objections raised in chap. i., when we were discussing god's speaking with the israelites on mount sinai. (71) for, though the voice heard by the israelites could not give those men any philosophical or mathematical certitude of god's existence, it was yet sufficient to thrill them with admiration for god, as they already knew him, and to stir them up to obedience: and such was the object of the display. (72) god did not wish to teach the israelites the absolute attributes of his essence (none of which he then revealed), but to break down their hardness of heart, and to draw them to obedience: therefore he did not appeal to them with reasons, but with the sound of trumpets, thunder, and lightnings. (73) it remains for me to show that between faith or theology, and philosophy, there is no connection, nor affinity. (74) i think no one will dispute the fact who has knowledge of the aim and foundations of the two subjects, for they are as wide apart as the poles. (75) philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith, as we have abundantly proved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety. (76) again, philosophy is based on axioms which must be sought from nature alone: faith is based on history and language, and must be sought for only in scripture and revelation, as we showed in chap. vii. (77) faith, therefore, allows the greatest latitude in philosophic speculation, allowing us without blame to think what we like about anything, and only condemning, as heretics and schismatics, those who teach opinions which tend to produce obstinacy, hatred, strife, and anger; while, on the other hand, only considering as faithful those who persuade us, as far as their reason and faculties will permit, to follow justice and charity. (78) lastly, as what we are now setting forth are the most important subjects of my treatise, i would most urgently beg the reader, before i proceed, to read these two chapters with especial attention, and to take the trouble to weigh them well in his mind: let him take for granted that i have not written with a view to introducing novelties, but in order to do away with abuses, such as i hope i may, at some future time, at last see reformed. chapter xv theology is shown not to be subservient to reason, nor reason to theology: a definition of the reason which enables us to accept the authority of the bible. (1) those who know not that philosophy and reason are distinct, dispute whether scripture should be made subservient to reason, or reason to scripture: that is, whether the meaning of scripture should be made to agreed with reason; or whether reason should be made to agree with scripture: the latter position is assumed by the sceptics who deny the certitude of reason, the former by the dogmatists. (2) both parties are, as i have shown, utterly in the wrong, for either doctrine would require us to tamper with reason or with scripture. (3) we have shown that scripture does not teach philosophy, but merely obedience, and that all it contains has been adapted to the understanding and established opinions of the multitude. (4) those, therefore, who wish to adapt it to philosophy, must needs ascribe to the prophets many ideas which they never even dreamed of, and give an extremely forced interpretation to their words: those on the other hand, who would make reason and philosophy subservient to theology, will be forced to accept as divine utterances the prejudices of the ancient jews, and to fill and confuse their mind therewith. (5) in short, one party will run wild with the aid of reason, and the other will run wild without the aid of reason. (6) the first among the pharisees who openly maintained that scripture should be made to agree with reason, was maimonides, whose opinion we reviewed, and abundantly refuted in chap. viii.: now, although this writer had much authority among his contemporaries, he was deserted on this question by almost all, and the majority went straight over to the opinion of a certain r. jehuda alpakhar, who, in his anxiety to avoid the error of maimonides, fell into another, which was its exact contrary. (7) he held that reason should be made subservient, and entirely give way to scripture. (8) he thought that a passage should not be interpreted metaphorically, simply because it was repugnant to reason, but only in the cases when it is inconsistent with scripture itself that is, with its clear doctrines. (9) therefore he laid down the universal rule, that whatsoever scripture teaches dogmatically, and affirms expressly, must on its own sole authority be admitted as absolutely true: that there is no doctrine in the bible which directly contradicts the general tenour of the whole: but only some which appear to involve a difference, for the phrases of scripture often seem to imply something contrary to what has been expressly taught. (10) such phrases, and such phrases only, we may interpret metaphorically. (11) for instance, scripture clearly teaches the unity of god (see deut. vi:4), nor is there any text distinctly asserting a plurality of gods; but in several passages god speaks of himself, and the prophets speak of him, in the plural number; such phrases are simply a manner of speaking, and do not mean that there actually are several gods: they are to be explained metaphorically, not because a plurality of gods is repugnant to reason, but because scripture distinctly asserts that there is only one. (12) so, again, as scripture asserts (as alpakhar thinks) in deut. iv:15, that god is incorporeal, we are bound, solely by the authority of this text, and not by reason, to believe that god has no body: consequently we must explain metaphorically, on the sole authority of scripture, all those passages which attribute to god hands, feet, &c., and take them merely as figures of speech. (13) such is the opinion of alpakhar. in so far as he seeks to explain scripture by scripture, i praise him, but i marvel that a man gifted with reason should wish to debase that faculty. (14) it is true that scripture should be explained by scripture, so long as we are in difficulties about the meaning and intention of the prophets, but when we have elicited the true meaning, we must of necessity make use of our judgment and reason in order to assent thereto. (15) if reason, however, much as she rebels, is to be entirely subjected to scripture, i ask, are we to effect her submission by her own aid, or without her, and blindly? (16) if the latter, we shall surely act foolishly and injudiciously; if the former, we assent to scripture under the dominion of reason, and should not assent to it without her. (17) moreover, i may ask now, is a man to assent to anything against his reason? (18) what is denial if it be not reason's refusal to assent? (19) in short, i am astonished that anyone should wish to subject reason, the greatest of gifts and a light from on high, to the dead letter which may have been corrupted by human malice; that it should be thought no crime to speak with contempt of mind, the true handwriting of god's word, calling it corrupt, blind, and lost, while it is considered the greatest of crimes to say the same of the letter, which is merely the reflection and image of god's word. (20) men think it pious to trust nothing to reason and their own judgment, and impious to doubt the faith of those who have transmitted to us the sacred books. (21) such conduct is not piety, but mere folly. and, after all, why are they so anxious? what are they afraid of? (22) do they think that faith and religion cannot be upheld unless men purposely keep themselves in ignorance, and turn their backs on reason? (23) if this be so, they have but a timid trust in scripture. (23) however, be it far from me to say that religion should seek to enslave reason, or reason religion, or that both should not be able to keep their sovereignity in perfect harmony. (24) i will revert to this question presently, for i wish now to discuss alpakhar's rule. (26) he requires, as we have stated, that we should accept as true, or reject as false, everything asserted or denied by scripture, and he further states that scripture never expressly asserts or denies anything which contradicts its assertions or negations elsewhere. (27) the rashness of such a requirement and statement can escape no one. (28) for (passing over the fact that he does not notice that scripture consists of different books, written at different times, for different people, by different authors: and also that his requirement is made on his own authority without any corroboration from reason or scripture) he would be bound to show that all passages which are indirectly contradictory of the rest, can be satisfactorily explained metaphorically through the nature of the language and the context: further, that scripture has come down to us untampered with. (29) however, we will go into the matter at length. (30) firstly, i ask what shall we do if reason prove recalcitrant? (31) shall we still be bound to affirm whatever scripture affirms, and to deny whatever scripture denies? (32) perhaps it will be answered that scripture contains nothing repugnant to reason. (33) but i insist that it expressly affirms and teaches that god is jealous (namely, in the decalogue itself, and in exod. xxxiv:14, and in deut. iv:24, and in many other places), and i assert that such a doctrine is repugnant to reason. (34) it must, i suppose, in spite of all, be accepted as true. if there are any passages in scripture which imply that god is not jealous, they must be taken metaphorically as meaning nothing of the kind. (35) so, also, scripture expressly states (exod. xix:20, &c.) that god came down to mount sinai, and it attributes to him other movements from place to place, nowhere directly stating that god does not so move. (36) wherefore, we must take the passage literally, and solomon's words (i kings viii:27), "but will god dwell on the earth? (37) behold the heavens and earth cannot contain thee," inasmuch as they do not expressly state that god does not move from place to place, but only imply it, must be explained away till they have no further semblance of denying locomotion to the deity. (38) so also we must believe that the sky is the habitation and throne of god, for scripture expressly says so; and similarly many passages expressing the opinions of the prophets or the multitude, which reason and philosophy, but not scripture, tell us to be false, must be taken as true if we are to follow the guidance of our author, for according to him, reason has nothing to do with the matter. (39) further, it is untrue that scripture never contradicts itself directly, but only by implication. (40) for moses says, in so many words (deut. iv:24), "the lord thy god is a consuming fire," and elsewhere expressly denies that god has any likeness to visible things. (deut. iv. 12.) (41) if it be decided that the latter passage only contradicts the former by implication, and must be adapted thereto, lest it seem to negative it, let us grant that god is a fire; or rather, lest we should seem to have taken leave of our senses, let us pass the matter over and take another example. (42) samuel expressly denies that god ever repents, "for he is not a man that he should repent" (i sam. xv:29). (43) jeremiah, on the other hand, asserts that god does repent, both of the evil and of the good which he had intended to do (jer. xviii:8-10). (44) what? (45) are not these two texts directly contradictory? (46) which of the two, then, would our author want to explain metaphorically? (47) both statements are general, and each is the opposite of the other what one flatly affirms, the other flatly, denies. (48) so, by his own rule, he would be obliged at once to reject them as false, and to accept them as true. (49) again, what is the point of one passage, not being contradicted by another directly, but only by implication, if the implication is clear, and the nature and context of the passage preclude metaphorical interpretation? (50) there are many such instances in the bible, as we saw in chap. ii. (where we pointed out that the prophets held different and contradictory opinions), and also in chaps. ix. and x., where we drew attention to the contradictions in the historical narratives. (51) there is no need for me to go through them all again, for what i have said sufficiently exposes the absurdities which would follow from an opinion and rule such as we are discussing, and shows the hastiness of its propounder. (52) we may, therefore, put this theory, as well as that of maimonides, entirely out of court; and we may, take it for indisputable that theology is not bound to serve reason, nor reason theology, but that each has her own domain. (53) the sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and wisdom; the sphere of theology, is piety and obedience. (54) the power of reason does not extend so far as to determine for us that men may be blessed through simple obedience, without understanding. (55) theology, tells us nothing else, enjoins on us no command save obedience, and has neither the will nor the power to oppose reason: she defines the dogmas of faith (as we pointed out in the last chapter) only in so far as they may be necessary, for obedience, and leaves reason to determine their precise truth: for reason is the light of the mind, and without her all things are dreams and phantoms. (56) by theology, i here mean, strictly speaking, revelation, in so far as it indicates the object aimed at by scripture namely, the scheme and manner of obedience, or the true dogmas of piety and faith. (57) this may truly be called the word of god, which does not consist in a certain number of books (see chap. xii.). (58) theology thus understood, if we regard its precepts or rules of life, will be found in accordance with reason; and, if we look to its aim and object, will be seen to be in nowise repugnant thereto, wherefore it is universal to all men. (59) as for its bearing on scripture, we have shown in chap. vii. that the meaning of scripture should be gathered from its own history, and not from the history of nature in general, which is the basis of philosophy. (60) we ought not to be hindered if we find that our investigation of the meaning of scripture thus conducted shows us that it is here and there repugnant to reason; for whatever we may find of this sort in the bible, which men may be in ignorance of, without injury to their charity, has, we may be sure, no bearing on theology or the word of god, and may, therefore, without blame, be viewed by every one as he pleases. (61) to sum up, we may draw the absolute conclusion that the bible must not be accommodated to reason, nor reason to the bible. (62) now, inasmuch as the basis of theology the doctrine that man may be saved by obedience alone cannot be proved by reason whether it be true or false, we may be asked, why, then, should we believe it? (63) if we do so without the aid of reason, we accept it blindly, and act foolishly and injudiciously; if, on the other hand, we settle that it can be proved by reason, theology becomes a part of philosophy, and inseparable therefrom. (64) but i make answer that i have absolutely established that this basis of theology cannot be investigated by the natural light of reason, or, at any rate, that no one ever has proved it by such means, and, therefore, revelation was necessary. (65) we should, however, make use of our reason, in order to grasp with moral certainty what is revealed i say, with moral certainty, for we cannot hope to attain greater certainty, than the prophets: yet their certainty was only, moral, as i showed in chap. ii. (66) those, therefore, who attempt to set forth the authority of scripture with mathematical demonstrations are wholly in error: for the authority, of the bible is dependent on the authority of the prophets, and can be supported by no stronger arguments than those employed in old time by the prophets for convincing the people of their own authority. (67) our certainty on the same subject can be founded on no other basis than that which served as foundation for the certainty of the prophets. (68) now the certainty of the prophets consisted (as we pointed out) in these elements:(69) (i.) a distinct and vivid imagination. (70) (ii.) a sign. (71) (iii.) lastly, and chiefly, a mind turned to what is just and good. it was based on no other reasons than these, and consequently they cannot prove their authority by any other reasons, either to the multitude whom they addressed orally, nor to us whom they address in writing. (72) the first of these reasons, namely, the vivid imagination, could be valid only for the prophets; therefore, our certainty concerning revelation must, and ought to be, based on the remaining two namely, the sign and the teaching. (73) such is the express doctrine of moses, for (in deut. xviii.) he bids the people obey the prophet who should give a true sign in the name of the lord, but if he should predict falsely, even though it were in the name of the lord, he should be put to death, as should also he who strives to lead away the people from the true religion, though he confirm his authority with signs and portents. (74) we may compare with the above deut. xiii. (75) whence it follows that a true prophet could be distinguished from a false one, both by his doctrine and by the miracles he wrought, for moses declares such an one to be a true prophet, and bids the people trust him without fear of deceit. (76) he condemns as false, and worthy, of death, those who predict anything falsely even in the name of the lord, or who preach false gods, even though their miracles be real. (77) the only reason, then, which we have for belief in scripture or the writings of the prophets, is the doctrine we find therein, and the signs by which it is confirmed. (78) for as we see that the prophets extol charity and justice above all things, and have no other object, we conclude that they did not write from unworthy motives, but because they really thought that men might become blessed through obedience and faith: further, as we see that they confirmed their teaching with signs and wonders, we become persuaded that they did not speak at random, nor run riot in their prophecies. (79) we are further strengthened in our conclusion by the fact that the morality they teach is in evident agreement with reason, for it is no accidental coincidence that the word of god which we find in the prophets coincides with the word of god written in our hearts. (80) we may, i say, conclude this from the sacred books as certainly as did the jews of old from the living voice of the prophets: for we showed in chap. xii. that scripture has come down to us intact in respect to its doctrine and main narratives. (81) therefore this whole basis of theology and scripture, though it does not admit of mathematical proof, may yet be accepted with the approval of our judgment. (82) it would be folly to refuse to accept what is confirmed by such ample prophetic testimony, and what has proved such a comfort to those whose reason is comparatively weak, and such a benefit to the state; a doctrine, moreover, which we may believe in without the slightest peril or hurt, and should reject simply because it cannot be mathematically proved: it is as though we should admit nothing as true, or as a wise rule of life, which could ever, in any possible way, be called in question; or as though most of our actions were not full of uncertainty and hazards. (83) i admit that those who believe that theology and philosophy are mutually contradictory, and that therefore either one or the other must be thrust from its throne i admit, i say, that such persons are not unreasonable in attempting to put theology on a firm basis, and to demonstrate its truth mathematically. (84) who, unless he were desperate or mad, would wish to bid an incontinent farewell to reason, or to despise the arts and sciences, or to deny reason's certitude? (85) but, in the meanwhile, we cannot wholly absolve them from blame, inasmuch as they invoke the aid of reason for her own defeat, and attempt infallibly to prove her fallible. (86) while they are trying to prove mathematically the authority and truth of theology, and to take away the authority of natural reason, they are in reality only bringing theology under reason's dominion, and proving that her authority has no weight unless natural reason be at the back of it. (87) if they boast that they themselves assent because of the inward testimony of the holy spirit, and that they only invoke the aid of reason because of unbelievers, in order to convince them, not even so can this meet with our approval, for we can easily show that they have spoken either from emotion or vain-glory. (88) it most clearly follows from the last chapter that the holy spirit only gives its testimony in favour of works, called by paul (in gal. v:22) the fruits of the spirit, and is in itself really nothing but the mental acquiescence which follows a good action in our souls. (89) no spirit gives testimony concerning the certitude of matters within the sphere of speculation, save only reason, who is mistress, as we have shown, of the whole realm of truth. (90) if then they assert that they possess this spirit which makes them certain of truth, they speak falsely, and according to the prejudices of the emotions, or else they are in great dread lest they should be vanquished by philosophers and exposed to public ridicule, and therefore they flee, as it were, to the altar; but their refuge is vain, for what altar will shelter a man who has outraged reason? (91) however, i pass such persons over, for i think i have fulfilled my purpose, and shown how philosophy should be separated from theology, and wherein each consists; that neither should be subservient to the other, but that each should keep her unopposed dominion. (92) lastly, as occasion offered, i have pointed out the absurdities, the inconveniences, and the evils following from the extraordinary confusion which has hitherto prevailed between the two subjects, owing to their not being properly distinguished and separated. (93) before i go further i would expressly state (though i have said it before) that i consider the utility and the need for holy scripture or revelation to be very great. (94) for as we cannot perceive by the natural light of reason that simple obedience is the path of salvation [endnote 25], and are taught by revelation only that it is so by the special grace of god, which our reason cannot attain, it follows that the bible has brought a very great consolation to mankind. (95) all are able to obey, whereas there are but very few, compared with the aggregate of humanity, who can acquire the habit of virtue under the unaided guidance of reason. (96) thus if we had not the testimony of scripture, we should doubt of the salvation of nearly all men. end of part 3 chapters xi to xv. author's endnotes to the theologico-political treatise chapter xi. endnote 24. (1) "now i think." (2) the translators render the {greek} word "i infer", and assert that paul uses it as synonymous with {a greek word}. (3) but the former word has, in greek, the same meaning as the hebrew word rendered to think, to esteem, to judge. (4) and this signification would be in entire agreement with the syriac translation. (5) this syriac translation (if it be a translation, which is very doubtful, for we know neither the time of its appearance, nor the translators and syriac was the vernacular of the apostles) renders the text before us in a way well explained by tremellius as "we think, therefore." chapter xv. endnote 25. (1) "that simple obedience is the path of salvation." (2) in other words, it is enough for salvation or blessedness, that we should embrace the divine decrees as laws or commands; there is no need to conceive them as eternal truths. (3) this can be taught us by revelation, not reason, as appears from the demonstrations given in chapter iv. end of part iii chapters xi to xv. version by al haines. on the improvement of the understanding (treatise on the emendation of the intellect) by baruch spinoza [benedict de spinoza] translated by r. h. m. elwes table of contents: 1 on the improvement of the understanding 3 of the ordinary objects of men's desires 12 of the true and final good 17 certain rules of life 19 of the four modes of perception 25 of the best mode of perception 33 of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas 43 answers to objections first part of method: 50 distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas 64 and from false ideas 77 of doubt 81 of memory and forgetfulness 86 mental hindrances from words--and from the popular confusion of ready imagination with distinct understanding. second part of method: 91 its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas 94 its means, good definitions conditions of definition 107 how to define understanding ---------------------------------------------------------------------[notice to the reader.] (this notice to the reader was written by the editors of the opera postuma in 1677. taken from curley, note 3, at end) *this treatise on the emendation of the intellect etc., which we give you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [that is, defective] state, was written by the author many years ago now. he always intended to finish it. but hindered by other occupations, and finally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to the desired conclusion. but since it contains many excellent and useful things, which--we have no doubt--will be of great benefit to anyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you of them. and so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult to excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and unpolished, we wished to warn you of them. farewell.* [1] (1) after experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, i finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness. [2] (1) i say "i finally resolved," for at first sight it seemed unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of something then uncertain. (2) i could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches, and that i should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects, if i seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and new. (3) i perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former i should necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so placed, and i gave them my whole attention, i should equally fail. [3] (1) i therefore debated whether it would not be possible to arrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual plan of my life; with this end in view i made many efforts, in vain. (2) for the ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest good, may be classed under the three heads--riches, fame, and the pleasures of sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed that it has little power to reflect on any different good. [4] (1) by sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed and dulled. (2) the pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the highest good. [5] (1) in the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end to which all actions are directed. (2) further, the attainment of riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and, consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are plunged into the deepest sadness. (3) fame has the further drawback that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and seeking what they usually seek. [6] (1) when i saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new--nay, that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would have to be abandoned, i was forced to inquire which would prove the most useful to me: for, as i say, i seemed to be willingly losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. (6:2) however, after i had reflected on the matter, i came in the first place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and betaking myself to a new quest, i should be leaving a good, uncertain by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for i sought for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment. [7] (1) further reflection convinced me that if i could really get to the root of the matter i should be leaving certain evils for a certain good. (2) i thus perceived that i was in a state of great peril, and i compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. (7:3) all the objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death not seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who are possessed by them. [8] (1) there are many examples of men who have suffered persecution even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have paid away their life as a penalty for their folly. (2) examples are no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation. (3) lastly, are innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through over-indulgence in sensual pleasure. [9] (1) all these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the object which we love. (2) when a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if it is possessed by another--no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances of the mind. (3) all these arise from the love of what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned. [10] (1) but love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our strength. (2) yet it was not at random that i used the words, "if i could go to the root of the matter," for, though what i have urged was perfectly clear to my mind, i could not forthwith lay aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame. [11] (1) one thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle; this state of things was a great comfort to me, for i perceived that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) although these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me, they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after i had recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame, is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means; if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which they are sought, as i will show in due time. [12] (1) i will here only briefly state what i mean by true good, and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) in order that this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view, in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect. (3) nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature. [13] (1) however, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself acquire such a character. (2) thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good. (13:3) the chief good is that he should arrive, together with other individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid character. (4) what that character is we shall show in due time, namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being the mind and the whole of nature. [c] [14] (1) this, then, is the end for which i strive, to attain to such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to it with me. (2) in other words, it is part of my happiness to lend a helping hand, that many others may understand even as i do, so that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own. (3) in order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character, and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least difficulty and danger. [15] (1) we must seek the assistance of moral philosophy [d] and the theory of education; further, as health is no insignificant means for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the science of mechanics must in no way be despised. [16] (1) but before all things, a means must be devised for improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in the best possible way. (2) thus it is apparent to everyone that i wish to direct all science to one end [e] and aim, so that we may attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and, therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote our object will have to be rejected as useless. (3) to sum up the matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to this one end. [17] (1) yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the following:-i. (2) to speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to comply with every general custom that does not hinder the attainment of our purpose. (3) for we can gain from the multitude no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover, we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception of the truth. ii. (17:4) to indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are necessary for preserving health. iii. (5) lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose. [18] (1) having laid down these preliminary rules, i will betake myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. (2) in order to bring this about, the natural order demands that i should here recapitulate all the modes of perception, which i have hitherto employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that i may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own powers and the nature which i wish to perfect. [19] (1) reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge may be reduced to four:-i. (2) perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he please. ii. (3) perception arising from mere experience--that is, form experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains unassailed in our minds. iii. (19:4) perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from some effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general proposition that some property is always present. iv. (5) lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge of its proximate cause. [20] (1) all these kinds of perception i will illustrate by examples. (2) by hearsay i know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other matters about which i have never felt any doubt. (3) by mere experience i know that i shall die, for this i can affirm from having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for the same period, or die by the same disease. (4) i know by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and water of extinguishing it. (5) in the same way i know that a dog is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all the practical knowledge of life. [21] (1) we deduce one thing from another as follows: when we clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we thence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body, and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but we cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the sensation and the union. (2) or, after i have become acquainted with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than when near, i can infer that the sun is larger than it appears, and can draw other conclusions of the same kind. [22] (1) lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence; when, from the fact of knowing something, i know what it is to know that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, i know that it is united to the body. (2) by the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) the things which i have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few. [23] (1) in order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light, i will make use of a single illustration as follows. (2) three numbers are given--it is required to find a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. (23:3) tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters; others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first, the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth number proportional. [24] (1) mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of euclid, what numbers are proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it, they see it not by virtue of euclid's proposition, but intuitively, without going through any process. [25] (1) in order that from these modes of perception the best may be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means necessary for attaining our end. i. (2) to have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general. ii. to collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the oppositions of things. iii. to learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified. iv. to compare this result with the nature and power of man. (4) we shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man is capable of attaining. [26] (1) we shall then be in a position to see which mode of perception we ought to choose. (2) as to the first mode, it is evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain, and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing, as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will hereafter appear. (3) we may, therefore clearly conclude that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its character. (4) for simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way. [27] (1) the second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search. (2) moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite, for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the essence of the things in question be known first. (3) wherefore this mode also must be rejected. [28] (1) of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we aim at. [29] (1) the fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of a thing without danger of error. (2) this mode, therefore, must be the one which we chiefly employ. (3) how, then, should we avail ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) i will proceed to explain. [30] (1) now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known. (2) in order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to commit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity--that is, in order to discover the best method of finding truth, there is no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. (3) by such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. (30:4) the matter stands on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued about in a similar way. (5) for, in order to work iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. (6) we might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working iron. [31] (1) but as men at first made use of the instruments supplied by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection; and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, complicated mechanisms which they now possess. (31:2) so, in like manner, the intellect, by its native strength, [k], makes for itself intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other intellectual operations, [l], and from these operations again fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom. [32] (1) that this is the path pursued by the understanding may be readily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for finding out the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary complex instruments, and for the progress of investigation. i thus proceed with my demonstration. [33] (1) a true idea, [m], (for we possess a true idea) is something different from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle. (2) the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. (3) now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia formalis) is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective essence (essentia objectiva). [33note1] (4) and, again, this second subjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real, capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely. [34] (1) for instance, the man peter is something real; the true idea of peter is the reality of peter represented subjectively, and is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the actual peter. (2) now, as this true idea of peter is in itself something real, and has its own individual existence, it will also be capable of being understood--that is, of being the subject of another idea, which will contain by representation (objective) all that the idea of peter contains actually (formaliter). (3) and, again, this idea of the idea of peter has its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet another idea; and so on, indefinitely. (4) this everyone may make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that he knows that he knows, &c. (34:5) hence it is plain that, in order to understand the actual peter, it is not necessary first to understand the idea of peter, and still less the idea of the idea of peter. (6) this is the same as saying that, in order to know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to know that we know that we know. (7) this is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of a triangle. [n]. (8) but, with these ideas, the contrary is the case: for, in order to know that i know, i must first know. [35] (1) hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty. (2) further, it is also evident that, for the certitude of truth, no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for, as i have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that we know. (3) hence, again, it is clear that no one can know the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing: certainty is identical with such subjective essence. [36] (1) thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being to possess the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them, in order that all doubts may be removed--it follows that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth itself, [o] or the subjective essences of things, or ideas, for all these expressions are synonymous. [37] (1) again, method must necessarily be concerned with reasoning or understanding--i mean, method is not identical with reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it the comprehension of the causes of things: it is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that we may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard, comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down certain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental exertion. [38] (1) whence we may gather that method is nothing else than reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that as there can be no idea of an idea--unless an idea exists previously,--there can be no method without a pre-existent idea. (2) therefore, that will be a good method which shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the standard of the given true idea. (38:3) again, seeing that the ratio existing between two ideas the same as the ratio between the actual realities corresponding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective knowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is more excellent than reflective knowledge concerning other objects--in other words, that method will be most perfect which affords the standard of the given idea of the most perfect being whereby we may direct our mind. [39] (1) we thus easily understand how, in proportion as it acquires new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh instruments for pursuing its inquiries further. (2) for we may gather from what has been said, that a true idea must necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument; and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables us to understand the difference existing between itself and all other perceptions. (3) in this, one part of the method consists. (39:4) now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural objects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the comprehension of a greater number of objects, and that it will be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the absolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof. [40] (1) again, the more things the mind knows, the better does it understand its own strength and the order of nature; by increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless. (2) and this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated. [41] (1) we may add that the idea in the world of thought is in the same case as its correlate in the world of reality. (2) if, therefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection with any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence, which would in every way correspond to the objective reality, the subjective essence would have no connection, [p] with any other ideas--in other words, we could not draw any conclusions with regard to it. (41:3) on the other hand, those things which are connected with others--as all things that exist in nature--will be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities--that is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which will in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments for proceeding with our investigation will increase. (4) this is what we were endeavoring to prove. [42] (1) further, from what has just been said--namely, that an idea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the world of reality,--it is evident that, in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source of other ideas. [43] (1) it may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our mind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should prove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it is not self-evident. (2) we may, therefore, be questioned as to the validity of our reasoning. (3) if our reasoning be sound, we must take as a starting-point a true idea. (4) now, to be certain that our starting-point is really a true idea, we need proof. (5) this first course of reasoning must be supported by a second, the second by a third, and so on to infinity. [44] (1) to this i make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone had adopted this method in his investigations of nature--that is, if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted [q] of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown, makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were, spontaneously towards him. (44:2) but as this never, or rarely, happens, i have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid reasoning i have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure, i seek still to establish it. [45] (1) moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men in their inward meditations. (2) the reasons for its rare employment in investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions, whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy. (3) moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate discernment. (4) lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human life, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable. (5) there are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into. [46] (1) if anyone asks why i have not at the starting-point set forth all the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is self-evident, i reply by warning him not to reject as false any paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on the chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth. (2) this is why i have as above. [47] (1) if there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our primary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth as our standard, he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness either innate or due to misconceptions--that is, to some external influence. (2) such persons are not conscious of themselves. (3) if they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they affirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing. (4) even this they do not affirm absolutely, they are afraid of confessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing; in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing which should smack of truth. [48] (1) lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of sciences: for, in what relates to life and conduct, they are compelled by necessity to suppose that they exist, and seek their own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an oath. (2) if they deny, grant, or gainsay, they know not that they deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they ought to be regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence. [49] (1) let us now return to our proposition. (2) up to the present, we have, first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our thoughts; secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best adapted to aid us in attaining our perfection; thirdly, we have discovered the way which our mind should take, in order to make a good beginning--namely, that it should use every true idea as a standard in pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules. (49:3) now, in order that it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea; thirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor. (49:4) when we became acquainted with this method, we saw that, fourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the absolutely perfect being. (5) this is an observation which should be made at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of such a being more quickly. [50] (1) let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method, which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful. (2) i intend to dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary before the reader's mind, and also because there are some who doubt of true ideas, through not having attended to the distinction between a true perception and all others. (3) such persons are like men who, while they are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake. (4) this state of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking. [51] (1) meanwhile, i give warning that i shall not here give essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate cause. (2) such work lies in the province of philosophy. (3) i shall confine myself to what concerns method--that is, to the character of fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing ourselves therefrom. (4) let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea. [52] (1) every perception has for its object either a thing considered as existing, or solely the essence of a thing. (2) now "fiction" is chiefly occupied with things considered as existing. (3) i will, therefore, consider these first--i mean cases where only the existence of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or assumed to be understood. (4) for instance, i feign that peter, whom i know to have gone home, is gone to see me, [r] or something of that kind. (5) with what is such an idea concerned? (6) it is concerned with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible. [53] (1) i call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a contradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a contradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we feign that it exists. (2) if the necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it; [54] (1) whence it follows that if there be a god, or omniscient being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses. (2) for, as regards ourselves, when i know that i exist, [s] i cannot hypothesize that i exist or do not exist, any more than i can hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle; nor when i know the nature of god, can i hypothesize that he or does not exist. [t] (54:3) the same thing must be said of the chimaera, whereof the nature implies a contradiction. (4) from these considerations, it is plain, as i have already stated, that fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths. [u] [55] (1) but before proceeding further, i must remark, in passing, that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another; therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example, of adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the nature of being, so as to define adam as a being. (2) thus, the more existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object. (55:3) contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed, through negligence of nature's order, to anything save its proper object. (4) this is worthy of remark. [56] (1) we now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not as we imagine it. (2) for instance, i know that the earth is round, but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. (56:3) however, examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it. (4) we can, i repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility. (56:5) thus, when i tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c., i merely recall the error which i perhaps made myself, or which i might have fallen into, and afterwards i hypothesize that the person to whom i tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake. (6) this i say, i can feign so long as i do not perceive any impossibility or necessity; if i truly understood either one or the other i should not be able to feign, and i should be reduced to saying that i had made the attempt. [57] (1) it remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems, which sometimes involve impossibilities. (2) for instance, when we say--let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or, let us assume that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there are no physical objects. (3) such assumptions are freely made, though the last is clearly seen to be impossible. (4) but, though this be so, there is no fiction in the case. (57:5) for, in the first case, i have merely recalled to memory, [x] another candle not burning, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and then i understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out of the question, all that i think of the former. (6) in the second case, i have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects surrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; i can then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no causes for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable, and so on. (7) thus there is here no fiction, but, [y] true and bare assertions. [58] (1) let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences only, or with some reality or existence simultaneously. (2) of these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less. (58:3) for instance, in the same way as we are unable, while we are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so, also, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite fly; or, when we know the nature of the soul, [z] we cannot imagine it as square, though anything may be expressed verbally. (4) but, as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors, something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men and infinite other absurdities of the same kind. [59] (1) some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by fiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after i have formed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will that it exists under a certain form in nature, i am thereby precluded from thinking of it under any other form. (2) for instance, when i have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the nature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this form, i am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example, is infinite; so, when i have hypothesized the essence of the soul, i am not able to think of it as square, &c. [60] (1) but these arguments demand further inquiry. (2) first, their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand anything. if they grant it, then necessarily the same must be said of understanding, as is said of fiction. (3) if they deny it, let us, who know that we do know something, see what they mean. (4) they assert that the soul can be conscious of, and perceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which exist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power, create sensations or ideas unconnected with things. (5) in fact, they regard the soul as a sort of god. (60:6) further, they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain ourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom. (7) for, after it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent thereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is constrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith. (8) our opponents are thus driven to admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which i have just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational refutation. [61] (1) while leaving such persons in their error, we will take care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose, namely, [61a] that the mind, in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and understand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order therefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing hypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention to it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are derivable from it, the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions; in the same way as it would at once discover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it. [62] (1) we need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses, so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved. (2) for, if we were to assert, haply, that men are suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely general, so general that there would be no conception, that is, no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind. (3) if there were such a conception we should at the same time be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place. (4) moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject and the predicate. [63] (1) now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas will gradually subside. (2) further, as a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct. (3) for a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be known altogether or not at all. [64] (1) secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be regarded separately, all confusion will disappear. (2) thirdly, it follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas at once, [64b] and unaccompanied by any mental assent. (64:3) now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct, and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct, and therefore true. (4) for instance, when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things of that kind. [65] (1) let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a fiction. (2) as for the first sort of fiction of which we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to consider the order of nature. (64:3) as for the second sort of fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect, to different confused ideas representing different things and actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner of such action. [66] (1) these matters being thus understood, let us pass on to consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into false perceptions. (2) neither of these tasks will present much difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas. (3) the false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent--that is, as we have already remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude that such representations do not arise from external objects: in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open, or while awake. (67:4) thus, a false idea is concerned with, or (to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in the same way as a fictitious idea. [67] (1) if attributable to the existence of the thing, it is corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar circumstances. (2) if attributable to the essence, it is likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea. (67:3) for if the nature of the thing known implies necessary existence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or impossibility of its existence depends on external causes, then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner. [68] (1) as for false ideas concerned with essences, or even with actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused, being compounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts, and the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about, and speak; that god is deceived, and so on. (68:2) but ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple themselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is, are deduced therefrom. (3) the impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood. [69] (1) as regards that which constitutes the reality of truth, it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one, not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature. (2) if an architect conceives a building properly constructed, though such a building may never have existed, and amy never exist, nevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same, whether it be put into execution or not. (69:3) on the other hand, if anyone asserts, for instance, that peter exists, without knowing whether peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far as its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though peter actually does exist. (4) the assertion that peter exists is true only with regard to him who knows for certain that peter does exist. [70] (1) whence it follows that there is in ideas something real, whereby the true are distinguished from the false. (2) this reality must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth (we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge), and to know the properties of our understanding. (70:3) neither must we say that the difference between true and false arises from the fact, that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge, as i have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no cause, and is known through itself and in itself. [71] (1) wherefore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist in the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does not acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the actual power and nature of the understanding. (2) for, if we suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which has never existed, as some conceive the understanding of god before he created thing (a perception which certainly could not arise any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the power and nature of the understanding. (71:3) thus, that which constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the thought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding. [72] (1) in order to pursue our investigation, let us confront ourselves with some true idea, whose object we know for certain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have nothing corresponding to it in nature. (2) with an idea of this kind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said, be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view. (72:3) for instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere, i invent a cause at my pleasure--namely, a semicircle revolving round its center, and thus producing a sphere. (4) this is indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere. (72:5) we must observe that this perception asserts the rotation of a semicircle--which assertion would be false, if it were not associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause determining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion were isolated. (6) the mind would then only tend to the affirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not contained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion. (72:7) thus falsity consists only in this, that something is affirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the conception we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle. (8) whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than true--e.g., the simple idea of a semicircle, of motion, of rest, of quantity, &c. (72:9) whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept formed, and does not extend further. (10) wherefore we form as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error. [73] (1) it only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind can form true ideas, and how far such power extends. (2) it is certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely. (3) for when we affirm somewhat of a thing, which is not contained in the concept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas. (4) thus we have seen that the notion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when it is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause determining such a motion. (73:5) but if it be the nature of a thinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts--some in their entirety, others in fragments only--constitute our mind. [74] (1) but there is another point to be considered, which was not worth raising in the case of fiction, but which give rise to complete deception--namely, that certain things presented to the imagination also exist in the understanding--in other words, are conceived clearly and distinctly. (2) hence, so long as we do not separate that which is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas. (3) for instance, certain stoics heard, perhaps, the term "soul," and also that the soul is immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imaged, also, and understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are penetrated by none. (74:4) by combining these ideas, and being at the same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these very subtle bodies cannot be divided &c. [75] (1) but we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given true idea. (2) we must take care, as has been said, to separate such perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified experience. (3) moreover, such mistakes arise from things being conceived too much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident that what i conceive as in its true object i cannot apply to anything else. (75:4) lastly, they arise from a want of understanding of the primary elements of nature as a whole; whence we proceed without due order, and confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they be true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound themselves, and pervert the order of nature. (5) however, if we proceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from primary elements--that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back as we can reach,--we need not fear any deceptions of this kind. [76] (1) as far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned, there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions. (2) for when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really existing in nature. (3) again, there are many things in nature, the difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to the understanding; so that it may readily happen that such things are confounded together, if they be conceived abstractedly. (4) but since the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in the understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth. (5) this is, in fact, a being single and infinite [76z]; in other words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being found. [76a] [77] (1) thus far we have treated of the false idea. we have now to investigate the doubtful idea--that is, to inquire what can cause us to doubt, and how doubt may be removed. (2) i speak of real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does not really hesitate. (77:3) the cure of the latter does not fall within the province of method, it belongs rather to inquiries concerning obstinacy and its cure. [78] (1) real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing doubted of. (2) in other words, if there were only one idea in the mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no doubt or certainty present, only a certain sensation. (3) for an idea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation. (4) but doubt will arise through another idea, not clear and distinct enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions with regard to the matter under consideration; that is, the idea which causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct. (5) to take an example. (78:6) supposing that a man has never reflected, taught by experience or by any other means, that our senses sometimes deceive us, he will never doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears. (7) thus rustics are generally astonished when they hear that the sun is much larger than the earth. (8) but from reflection on the deceitfulness of the senses [78a] doubt arises, and if, after doubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the senses, and how things at a distance are represented through their instrumentality, doubt is again removed. [79] (1) hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition that there is a deceitful deity, who leads us astray even in what is most certain. (2) we can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no clear and distinct idea--in other words, until we reflect the knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things, and find that which teaches us that god is not a deceiver, and until we know this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the are equal to two right angles. (3) but if we have a knowledge of god equal to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed. (79:4) in the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some arch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowledge of god under the like condition, and when we have attained to it, it is sufficient, as i said before, to remove every doubt which we can possess concerning clear and distinct ideas. [80] (1) thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due order, inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association, and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to answer them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very certain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in ignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in hand must needs be imperfect. (2) we may, therefore, conclude that doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation. [81] (1) these are the points i promised to discuss in the first part of my treatise on method. (2) however, in order not to omit anything which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its faculties, i will add a few words on the subject of memory and forgetfulness. (81:3) the point most worthy of attention is, that memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding. (4) for the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we forget it. (5) for instance, a number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a narration. [82] (1) the memory is also strengthened without the aid of the understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or the sense called common, is affected by some particular physical object. (2) i say particular, for the imagination is only affected by particular objects. (3) if we read, for instance, a single romantic comedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory (4) if, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another. (82:5) i say also, physical. (6) for the imagination is only affected by physical objects. (7) as, then, the memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding, we may conclude that it is different from the understanding, and that in the latter considered in itself there is neither memory nor forgetfulness. [83] (1) what, then, is memory? (2) it is nothing else than the actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the thought of a definite duration, [83d] of the sensation. (3) this is also shown by reminiscence. (4) for then we think of the sensation, but without the notion of continuous duration; thus the idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation or actual memory. (83:5) whether ideas are or are not subject to corruption will be seen in philosophy. (6) if this seems too absurd to anyone, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in proportion to its singularity, as appears from the example of the comedy just cited. (83:7) further, a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot help remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently intelligible. [84] (1) thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the rest, originate in the imagination--that is, in certain sensations fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body, sleeping or waking, receives various motions. (2) but one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and that the soul is passive with regard to it. (3) the view taken is immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite, with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the understanding. (4) let no one then be astonished that before proving the existence of body, and other necessary things, i speak of imagination of body, and of its composition. (5) the view taken is, i repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite, &c. [85] (1) as regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul correspond to the actual reality of its object. (2) this conclusion is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true proceeds from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as i know, never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton. [86] (1) hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with falsehood and fiction. (2) neither shall we wonder why we understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which agree therewith. (3) we now know that the operations, whereby the effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the mind is entirely passive with regard to them. [87] (1) whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination and the understanding; such as believing that extension must be localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we shall duly show. [88] (1) again, since words are a part of the imagination--that is, since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily conditions,--there is no doubt that words may, equally with the imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we strictly on our guard. [89] (1) moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the imagination, not as existing in the understanding. (2) this is evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c. (3) so, also, many conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice versa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c., inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and, therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names. (89:4) many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not. (5) while we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for truth. [90] (1) let us also beware of another great cause of confusion, which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself. (2) sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand. (3) thus, we put first that which should be last: the true order of progression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn. [91] [91e] (1) now, in order at length to pass on to the second part of this method, i shall first set forth the object aimed at, and next the means for its attainment. (2) the object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions. (3) in order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far as possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as a whole and as parts. [92] (1) as for the first point, it is necessary (as we have said) for our purpose that everything should be conceived, either solely through its essence, or through its proximate cause. (2) if the thing be self-existent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of itself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be not self-existent, but requires a cause for its existence, it must be understood through its proximate cause. (3) for, in reality, the knowledge, [92f] of an effect is nothing else than the acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause. [93] (1) therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in the understanding with that which is in the thing itself. (2) the best basis for drawing a conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and legitimate definition. (93:3) for the understanding cannot descend from universal axioms by themselves to particular things, since axioms are of infinite extent, and do not determine the understanding to contemplate one particular thing more than another. [94] (1) thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts from some given definition. (2) this process will be the more fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing given be better defined. (3) wherefore, the cardinal point of all this second part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions of good definition, and the means of finding them. (4) i will first treat of the conditions of definition. [95] (1) a definition, if it is to be called perfect, must explain the inmost essence of a thing, and must take care not to substitute for this any of its properties. (2) in order to illustrate my meaning, without taking an example which would seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors, i will choose the case of something abstract, the definition of which is of little moment. (95:3) such is a circle. (4) if a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every one can see that such a definition does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its properties. (5) though, as i have said, this is of no importance in the case of figures and other abstractions, it is of great importance in the case of physical beings and realities: for the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are unknown. (6) if the latter be passed over, there is necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas which should reflect the succession of nature, and we go far astray from our object. [96] in order to be free from this fault, the following rules should be observed in definition:-i. (1) if the thing in question be created, the definition must (as we have said) comprehend the proximate cause. (2) for instance, a circle should, according to this rule, be defined as follows: the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free. (3) this definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause. ii. (4) a conception or definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other things, can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the definition given of a circle: for from that it clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal. (5) that this is a necessary characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone, who reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time in proving it, or in showing that, owing to this second condition, every definition should be affirmative. (6) i speak of intellectual affirmation, giving little thought to verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of language, must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though the idea contained is affirmative. [97] the rules for the definition of an uncreated thing are as follows:-i. the exclusion of all idea of cause--that is, the thing must not need explanation by anything outside itself. ii. when the definition of the thing has been given, there must be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not. iii. it must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no substantives which could be put into an adjectival form; in other words, the object defined must not be explained through abstractions. iv. lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties of the thing defined. all these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict attention to the matter. [98] (1) i have also stated that the best basis for drawing a conclusion is a particular affirmative essence. (2) the more specialized the idea is, the more it is distinct, and therefore clear. (3) wherefore a knowledge of particular things should be sought for as diligently as possible. [99] (1) as regards the order of our perceptions, and the manner in which they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that, as soon as is possible and rational, we should inquire whether there be any being (and, if so, what being), that is the cause of all things, so that its essence, represented in thought, may be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the utmost possible extent reflect nature. (2) for it will possess, subjectively, nature's essence, order, and union. (3) thus we can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from physical things--that is, from real entities, proceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of causes, from one real entity to another real entity, never passing to universals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing some real entity from them, or deducing them from some real entity. (4) either of these processes interrupts the true progress of the understanding. [100] (1) but it must be observed that, by the series of causes and real entities, i do not here mean the series of particular and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things. (2) it would be impossible for human infirmity to follow up the series of particular mutable things, both on account their multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same thing, any one of which may be the cause of its existence or non-existence. (3) indeed, their existence has no connection with their essence, or (as we have said already) is not an eternal truth. [101] (1) neither is there any need that we should understand their series, for the essences of particular mutable things are not to be gathered from their series or order of existence, which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic denominations, their relations, or, at most, their circumstances, all of which are very different from their inmost essence. (101:2) this inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in those things as in their true codes, according to which all particular things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable particular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to phrase it) upon the fixed things, that they cannot either be conceived without them. [102] (1) but, though this be so, there seems to be no small difficulty in arriving at the knowledge of these particular things, for to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of the human understanding. (2) the arrangement whereby one thing is understood, before another, as we have stated, should not be sought from their series of existence, nor from eternal things. (3) for the latter are all by nature simultaneous. (4) other aids are therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal things and their laws. (5) however, this is not the place to recount such aids, nor is there any need to do so, until we have acquired a sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws, and until the nature of our senses has become plain to us. [103] (1) before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular things, it will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to teach us the mode of employing our senses, and to make certain experiments under fixed rules and arrangements which may suffice to determine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer what laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain an insight into its inmost nature, as i will duly show. (2) here, to return to my purpose, i will only endeavor to set forth what seems necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things, and to define them under the conditions laid down above. [104] (1) with this end, we must bear in mind what has already been stated, namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so as to examine it, and to deduce therefrom in due order all the legitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the thought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will readily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it. (104:2) this, i say, is necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts may be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation. [105] (1) if, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of all, it will be necessary to supply some foundation which may direct our thoughts thither. (2) further, since method is reflective knowledge, the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be nothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality of truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its properties, and powers. (3) when this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation wherefrom we can deduce our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect, according to its capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things, allowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers. [106] (1) if, as i stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature of thought to form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by the faculties and power of the understanding. (2) the chief part of our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the considerations advanced in the second part of the method) necessarily to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and understanding. [107] (1) but, so far as we have not got any rules for finding definitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules without a previous knowledge of nature, that is without a definition of the understanding and its power, it follows either that the definition of the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we can understand nothing. (2) nevertheless this definition is not absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously, understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its properties, which we know clearly and distinctly. (3) let us, then, enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research which we find innate in us. see [31] [108] (1) the properties of the understanding which i have chiefly remarked, and which i clearly understand, are the following:-i. (2) it involves certainty--in other words, it knows that a thing exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively. ii. (108:3) that it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas absolutely, some ideas from others. (4) thus it forms the idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into consideration the idea of quantity. iii. (108:5) those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other ideas. (6) thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a point. (7) all these are perceptions which do not serve towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining it. (108:8) this is proved by the fact that we conceive them as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived unless the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do unless we had an idea of infinite quantity. iv. (9) the understanding forms positive ideas before forming negative ideas. v. (108:10) it perceives things not so much under the condition of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and quantity. vi. (108:11) the ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused ideas the contrary is the case. (12) they are often formed against our will. vii. (108:13) the mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things, which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance, in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation to a given straight line, angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an infinity of other ways. viii. (108:14) the more ideas express perfection of any object, the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who has planned a splendid temple. [109] (1) i do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred to thought, such as love, joy, &c. (2) they are nothing to our present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the understanding be perceived previously. (3) when perception is removed, all these go with it. [110] (1) false and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about them (as we have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called false or fictitious; they are only considered as such through the defectiveness of knowledge. (2) therefore, false and fictitious ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought; this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated; in other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed, they too vanish with it. the rest of the treatise is wanting. ---------------------------------------------------------------------spinoza's endnotes: marks as per curley, see note 5 above. [a] (1) this might be explained more at large and more clearly: i mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure, or the advancement of science and art. (2) but this subject is reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to investigate the matter more accurately. [b] these considerations should be set forth more precisely. [c] these matters are explained more at length elsewhere. [d] n.b. i do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary for our purpose; i lay no stress on their order. [e] there is for the sciences but one end, to which they should all be directed. [f] (1) in this case we do not understand anything of the cause from the consideration of it in the effect. (2) this is sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only spoken of in very general terms, such as--there exists then something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the that we only express it in a negative manner--it is not or that, &c. (3) in the second case something is ascribed to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an example, but only a property, never an essence. [g] (1) from this example may be clearly seen what i have just drawn attention to. (2) for through this union we understand nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing. [h] (1) a conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error. (2) when things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the imagination. (3) for that which is in itself one, men imagine to be multiplex. (4) to those things which are conceived abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were originally given. [i] i shall here treat a little more in detail of experience, and shall examine the method adopted by the empirics, and by recent philosophers. [k] by native strength, i mean that not bestowed on us by external causes, as i shall afterwards explain in my philosophy. [l] here i term them operations: i shall explain their nature in my philosophy. [m] i shall take care not only to demonstrate what i have just advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly, and other things needful to be known. [33note1] (1) in modern language, "the idea may become the subject of another presentation." (2) objectivus generally corresponds to the modern "subjective," formalis to the modern "objective." [trans.note 1] [n] (1) observe that we are not here inquiring how the first subjective essence is innate in us. (2) this belongs to an investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply explained, and it is shown that without ideas neither affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are possible. [o] the nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy. [p] to be connected with other things is to be produced by them, or to produce them. [q] in the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of our knowledge. [r] see below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies. [s] (1) as a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself, we have need only of an example without further proof. (2) in the same way the contrary has only to be presented to our minds to be recognized as false, as will forthwith appear when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences. [t] observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether god exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else some fiction which they call god: this fiction is not in harmony with god's real nature, as we will duly show. [u] (1) i shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal truths. by an eternal truth, i mean that which being positive could never become negative. (2) thus it is a primary and eternal truth that god exists, but it is not an eternal truth that adam thinks. (3) that the chimaera does not exist is an eternal truth, that adam does not think is not so. [x] (1) afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is concerned with essences, it will be evident that fiction never creates or furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the memory, when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all at once. (2) for instance, we have remembrance of spoken words and of a tree; when the mind directs itself to them confusedly, it forms the notion of a tree speaking. (3) the same may be said of existence, especially when it is conceived quite generally as an entity; it is then readily applied to all things together in the memory. (4) this is specially worthy of remark. [y] we must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena; but from these, when applied to the celestial motions, we any draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas this last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are conceivable which would account for such motions. [z] (1) it often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul, and forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name with the thing itself. (2) i here beg that my readers will not be in a hurry to refute this proposition; they will, i hope, have no mind to do so, if they pay close attention to the examples given and to what follows. [61a] (1) though i seem to deduce this from experience, some may deny its cogency because i have given no formal proof. (2) i therefore append the following for those who may desire it. (3) as there can be nothing in nature contrary to nature's laws, since all things come to pass by fixed laws, so that each thing must irrefragably produce its own proper effect, it follows that the soul, as soon as it possesses the true conception of a thing, proceeds to reproduce in thought that thing's effects. (4) see below, where i speak of the false idea. [64b] (1) observe that fiction regarded in itself, only differs from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the external causes which we perceive through the senses while awake. (2) it has hence been inferred that representations occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external to us. (3) we shall presently see that error is the dreaming of a waking man: if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium. [76z] these are not attributes of god displaying his essence, as i will show in my philosophy. [76a] (1) this has been shown already. (2) for if such a being did not exist it would never be produced; therefore the mind would be able to understand more than nature could furnish; and this has been shown above to be false. [78a] (1) that is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us. (2) but it is only known confusedly, for it is not known how they deceive us. [83d] (1) if the duration be indefinite, the recollection is imperfect; this everyone seems to have learnt from nature. (2) for we often ask, to strengthen our belief in something we hear of, when and where it happened; though ideas themselves have their own duration in the mind, yet, as we are wont to determine duration by the aid of some measure of motion which, again, takes place by aid of imagination, we preserve no memory connected with pure intellect. [91e] the chief rule of this part is, as appears from the first part, to review all the ideas coming to us through pure intellect, so as to distinguish them from such as we imagine: the distinction will be shown through the properties of each, namely, of the imagination and of the understanding. [92f] observe that it is thereby manifest that we cannot understand anything of nature without at the same time increasing our knowledge of the first cause, or god. end of "on the improvement of the understanding." notes by volunteer. 1. used, in part, with kind permission from: http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/spinoza/tie/ 2. the text is that of the translation of the tractatus de intellectus emendatione by r. h. m. elwes, as printed by dover publications (ny):1955), isbn 0-486-20250-x. this text is "an unabridged and unaltered republication of the bohn library edition originally published by george bell and sons in 1883." 3. paragraph numbers, shown thus [1], are from edwin curley's translation in his "the collected works of spinoza", volume 1, 1985, princeton university press; isbn 0-691-07222-1. 4. sentence numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer. 5. spinoza's endnotes are shown thus [a]. the letter is taken from curley, see note 3. 6. search strings are enclosed in square brackets; include brackets. 7. html versions of "on the improvement of the understanding" are published in the books on-line web pages; ttp://www.cs.cmu.edu/books.html and they include: http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/spinoza/tie/ http://www.erols.com/jyselman/teielwes.htm transcribers note: original text in bold is represented by "=", italic text by "_". in paragraph xii, line 4 "myraids" has been replaced by "myriads". "the tyranny of god" by joseph lewis the new and daring book on the philosophy of atheism clarence darrow =eminent lawyer, noted philosopher, and humanitarian, says=: "your book, 'the tyranny of god,' is well done. it is a very clear statement of the question, bold and true beyond dispute. i am glad that you wrote it. it is as plain as the multiplication table, which doesn't mean that everyone will believe it. i thank you for writing it. i wish i were the author." [illustration: joseph lewis] _a special edition of "the tyranny of god," consists of two hundred and fifty copies, printed on utopian paper, bound in limp leather, gilt top, stamped in gold. each copy is autographed and numbered by the author._ second edition, may, 1921 third edition, april, 1922 fourth edition, january, 1928 fifth edition, april, 1930 sixth edition, october, 1939 seventh edition, november, 1943 the tyranny of god the tyranny of god by joseph lewis the freethought press association new york copyrighted, 1921, by freethought press association _all rights reserved_ printed in the united states of america dedicated to fay my dear wife and comrade, whose loyal and devoted companionship has made life livable. foreword go forth, little book, to destroy fear, prejudice and superstition, and help to install reason in the minds of the human race to be its guide in the affairs of life and its living. preface to second edition the most eloquent testimony given this little book is the fact that a second edition is made necessary only a few months after the publication of the first edition. favorable comments and letters of recommendation from men and women eminent in literary and scientific realms, and commendatory reviews in periodicals of high standard are, i think, sufficient cause for the belief that "the tyranny of god" forms a necessary cog in the machinery of intellectual thought and progress. even those who bitterly oppose the book admit that it possesses the power to make its readers think. of the many opposing reviews and adverse criticism of "the tyranny of god," not a single one offers an argument in answer to it. for the most part, their characterization has been that it is "pessimistic." as if by calling it "pessimistic," they refute its claims! if to tell a man the true nature of a disease from which he is suffering, with the hope that he will seek a cure for his malady, is pessimism, then i am a pessimist. is the use of a danger signal at a hazardous crossing, for the purpose of preventing disaster, pessimism? if to literally "hold the mirror up to nature," disclosing nature's utter disregard for the life and feelings of man, as a warning against the extravagant and useless propagating of life, is pessimism, then surely i am a pessimist. if a fervent desire to help man, instead of wasting time in prayer to "god," is pessimism, i am a pessimist. if to think, to investigate, to express one's thoughts courageously in the face of centuries old dogma is pessimism, then i must confess i am a pessimist. if to expose sham, hypocrisy and fraud; if to open the mind and free it from fear; if to stimulate the intellect, and work for the here instead of the "hereafter"--if all these are classified as pessimism, then truly may i be called an arch pessimist. "the tyranny of god" was written to express the truth as i see it--to portray life, not as we would like to have it, but as it actually is. millions are still like frightened children, afraid of their own shadows. fear of the truth is the greatest deterrent to its acceptance. joseph lewis _april 14, 1922_ preface to the fourth edition i am indeed gratified to send forth the fourth edition of "the tyranny of god." i wish, however, to say to the reader that my book deals with life philosophically and not individually. it was from the viewpoint of life in general and the universe as a whole that the sentiments herein were expressed. to love god is not the duty of man and one of the most important tasks to be accomplished for the human race is to destroy the theistic conception of life and the universe. the sentiments i expressed at a memorial meeting in honor of luther burbank last may best illustrate my convictions. i said: "the religious person loves god so vehemently that he has no love left for man." may "the tyranny of god" do much to accomplish the purpose of its author. joseph lewis _january 10, 1928_ introduction _where did we come from? what are we doing here? whither are we going?_ these questions have puzzled thinking people since consciousness first dawned in the brain. many have sought to answer them, so why not i?--with the hope that the reading of this book will arouse in the minds of the readers thoughts that will enable them to answer these questions for themselves. were you suddenly to find yourself living on another planet, and you were a thinking being, one anxious for knowledge, you would naturally investigate the conditions under which you found yourself, and seek, if possible, a solution for your existence there. surely it is equally appropriate, situated as we are on this earth, endowed with brains and possessing senses and nerves, to inquire into and investigate the conditions under which we live, and the purpose, if any, of our existence here. the peculiarity of this existence warrants such analysis. it is certain, from our understanding as well as from all visible scientific facts, that we did not make ourselves, and that we never had a former existence; and we are led to conclude, in view of lack of credible evidence to the contrary, from those who have passed on, that the future, so far as our individual life is concerned, is an eternal void. it is also certain, as science has indubitably shown, that we do not make our offspring, that we are not creators, but are instruments merely in producing life. furthermore, we did not make any portion of the globe which we inhabit and of which we are a part, and, so far as we are able to determine, all the natural conditions and "raw materials" of our environment are something separate and distinct from anything which we ourselves possess sufficient power to accomplish. therefore, since among the organs of my body, there is a _thinking_ portion, i am within the bounds of sanity when i investigate and express such thoughts, opinions and findings as my reason and understanding dictate. no one can truthfully say that he possesses sufficient knowledge to account for or to explain the peculiar and mystifying rules, conditions and surroundings which we are _forced_ to accept, abide by and live under. and, therefore, the result of one person's findings is worthy the same consideration as those of another. upon such basis i submit an honest attempt to express logically my convictions upon this vital and puzzling condition of our existence, and shall endeavor to aid those who read this book to see conditions in what i believe to be their true light, and to stimulate the readers to think for themselves. it is only through the exchange of the results of investigations, and of honest opinions, that we have been able to add improvement to improvement, and make easier the routine of our lives. the conditions and elements that compose nature, for the sake of clearness, i will ofttimes call "god." i shall be more easily understood, and at times the term "god" will express more succinctly the thoughts or ideas i wish to express. the tyranny of god i lest i be misunderstood, i will say at the outset that i do not believe in a god. the belief in a god is still generally accepted, not because of the existence of one, but for the reason that it is the easiest way to account for our condition. but in the light of scientific discoveries and demonstrations, such a belief is unfounded and utterly untenable to-day. yet the word "god," and even the word "nature," must often be used to describe that condition which the brain of man has not yet been able to analyze fully and scientifically. one ridiculous conception of god that is believed by a multitude of people, is that of a massive being, sitting in a marble chamber studded with gold and lighted with glistening crystals. do those who believe in such a creature ever consider him taking a bath--and in what? or of eating his breakfast--and of what it consists? if there were a god, and the world were governed with stern justice, tempered to our feeble intelligence, existence might become tolerable, but as it is, with a so-called god "ruling above," the earth is an abominable place and life a long series of terrifying torments. if i were to advocate a belief, or faith, in a god, i would seek the embodiment of those things diametrically opposite to the attributes of the popular god of to-day. such a creature is not worthy the sacrifice of ourselves and our thoughts. let us examine and investigate the system and arrangement of the world--that is, that portion of which we are a part and which so vitally concerns us. the result of our most extensive study and labor shows us that the earth, after an illimitable duration of time, has gradually attained its present peculiar development. in other words, nature has taken millions of years to produce the earth as it is now formed; and if it were made particularly for human beings it is not yet completed, for we still find spots, aye, vast areas, where human life is incapable of subsisting. the climate is either too hot or too cold; there is too much water or too little moisture; the means of cultivation are too meager or utterly unobtainable. in short, after eons of labor, nature has failed to be able to present to every one of us, for our habitation, a parcel of earth commodious and comfortable enough to be perfectly desirable for life and its living. surely, if the earth were made for our benefit, nature has been not only a very poor provider, but a very thoughtless parent. some say that man is nature's best product, that the earth was made for us, that we are particularly selected by god, and that a certain race is his chosen people. but that is not true. the jews are no more god's chosen people than the jay is his chosen bird, or the mosquito his chosen insect. it is not true that nature particularly works for us--facts prove the contrary. facts prove that we are nothing but an undesirable by-product, to make our way and to live our life as best we can within a cruelly turbulent space, imprisoned by invisible, impenetrable walls of limitation. no, it is not true that our life is favored by nature. after we build our homes, make our cities and add improvements, what happens? nature, with her forceful winds, blows them down; her cruel storms and rising floods wash them away as so much refuse, and a tremor of the earth destroys not only our homes but ourselves also, leaving no traces of our efforts, treasures and sacred ties. even as individuals we "curse god" for the shortcomings with which we are afflicted. the exceedingly stout person, one who is "in his own way" curses god for making him so stout. the thin person has a similar grievance. those who are too large and those who are too small are equally dissatisfied. the shape of an eye, the curve of the mouth, a blemish here, an impediment there, is the direct cause of poignant embarrassment. organs or dimensions too unsightly and unsatisfactory are productive of continual worry and torment throughout our lives. the blind, the deaf, the dumb and the crippled have forever a curse for god upon their lips. we inhabit the air, with a density of fifteen pounds to the square inch, a mixture of dirt and water, in the same manner that the fish inhabits the water and the worm the earth. were we beings of a superior type, nature would have made us so versatile that we should be able to accustom ourselves to any condition, and survive in any climate. but despite all our improvements, despite all man's efforts to avoid and escape the conditions of nature, many of us freeze to death in winter and become prostrate from the heat of summer. if it were true that the earth were purposely made and existing for us there would be "no flowers born to blush unseen and waste their sweetness on the desert air." we, ourselves, scientists tell us, are the result of a long series of evolutionary development. they tell us that nature started with a single cell of protoplasm, a single cell of living organism, and produced the present human species after the life and death of an illimitable number of forms through the stages of countless ages, not exempting those lives from the fear, torture and misery that are still so essential a part of the scheme of life. why impose so cruel and wasteful a condition upon those numberless billions that have lived before us, since nothing but eternal death was gained by their existence? surely, nature is a poor architect and builder, after taking so much material and so much time, to make such an incomplete place for such an outlandish form to rule and occupy. if we were given the same opportunity (that is, you and i), with all the power and resources of nature, to build a habitable place, and mold a living something to inhabit it, our results would be ten thousand times better than that which circles the scope and boundary of our lives, with the incomprehensible physical form with which we breathe and manifest life. truthfully, and without the slightest element of egotism, i should be ashamed of my efforts were i to present as my handiwork nothing better than the level and plane which nature has attained. ii we come into this world a tiny bundle and mass of helpless, feeble flesh, utterly unprepared to meet the requirements and fearful conditions that lie in wait for us. we are in need of immediate, urgent and constant help from those who were responsible for our birth, imperatively so from our mother. the child does not ask to come, and knows absolutely nothing about its welfare. and the mother often does not want to bear it, as she knows absolutely nothing about maternal cares. and yet that mother must go through the "shadow of the valley of death" before she can deliver this tiny bundle and helpless mass of feeble flesh. and how often, aye, only too often, does the mother _enter_ the valley of death when making delivery of this living form, never to see the face of the child that nature imposed upon her to bear! what a despicable arrangement! what an unfair bargain! can you imagine a more outlandish, ridiculous, awkward, complicated, cruel and fearful system of reproduction than that which we are under yoke to pursue? without the elaborate details of the perilous stages of life's development, this is the method of incubation nature imposes upon us. before the birth of a human being, one male and one female--that is, one man and one woman--must have sexual intercourse. whether this intercourse is prompted by all the finer impulses of life or is accomplished by the savageness of rape makes no difference to nature's purpose. to nature the end justifies the means, and she continues to go about her business. the male--that is, the man of this pair--can strut and parade with the utmost freedom from his responsibility for the result of his act that nature has made to be pre-eminent among his desires. but the female--that is, the woman of this pair--_must for nine months_ (just think of it!) carry and develop the germ of this child in the fertile field of her womb, and be subjected to the innumerable terrifying dangers accompanying such a carriage, and then suffer a superhuman torture to make the delivery, through a very meager channel of her body, of this living plant which she has never seen, does not know and quite often does not want, _but must absolutely bear_! provided nature has not made the creature too deformed and mutilated and unable to survive, the mother must, during a period of constant care and _outward carriage_, bear this feeble infant for another period of nine months or more!--suckling at her breast for _food_! so you see that woman is not only a human being, but a fertile ground and pasture. i have not gone into the misery of child bearing and caring, nor of the ingratitude that is so often received. i ask for what reason has nature imposed this terrible penalty upon woman? _why?_ would you, reader, were it in your power, formulate such a method of reproduction? i'll answer for you: no! but that is not all. for years to come, this child that for nine months was carried inwardly and for a much longer period outwardly, by its mother, must now be fed, washed and clothed for an indefinite number of _years_, and guided through a thousand perils and dangers that nature has set before it, with disease as nature's agent, crouching and ready to destroy the child's life, not in open combat, but invisibly concealed by the limitation of our senses. this is one of nature's unspeakable crimes; one of god's despicable impositions. it is not sufficient that a mother should subject herself to such a dangerous and perilous mission, but she must also withstand the cruel savageness, the cold, callous death piercings, of nature's invisible tyrants and destroyers. life holds but one real attraction, one instance that can be classified above all others. without this attraction it would be a blessing to choke the life breath from us all. with it we are helped to bear the _tyranny of god_. there comes a time to some of us when the heart of the one man beats for the one woman, and there alights and resides in their breasts that spark of devotion that we call "love." when there is born to that union a child, even though in nature's stupid way, then a bond is created more precious than anything else in this world. without this little circle of loving joy, the earth is a prison and life a grave injustice for those who must bear it. but think of the damnable rule of nature that strives and delights in working destruction of the only condition worthy of life's living! oh, if only the life of our offspring were more stable, more secure! if only the bosom of our family were guaranteed to us! just think! the child the parents would not harm, nature tortures and god kills! looking back upon the path we have trodden, with its continual fight against disease, its manifold combats with obstacles of life, and with its inevitable portion of sorrow we all must bear, we should think seriously and consider the result of our act before we deliberately bring another human being into this life. you, yourself, do not consider your life worthy of reliving, so why bring a human being here to go through the same, if not more, suffering and misery than you have borne with no resultant good? iii up to this point i have been speaking of human beings only, living under improved conditions that man has made. what must be the horror, darkness and emptiness of those living substances that are "inferior" to us? do you know and realize the suffering that we endure? then let me, in passing, urge this: be also kind and considerate to our less fortunate inhabitants of this earth, the "dumb" animals. their feelings are quite similar to ours. they have gone through the rougher parts of evolution that gave to us our more useful organs and limbs. they are allied to us in much the same manner as the members of our own species. they have their painful aches and periods, their hardships and tortures, their broken family ties and fearful abhorrence of death; their flesh is tender and their skin is as delicate to them as ours is to us. so let us "think twice," dear readers, before we deliberately harm any of our humbler brothers and sisters that must inhabit this cold and callous earth and live their lives under a great deal more tyranny and injustice than we live ours. we deliberately enslave and brutally treat the gentle horse. we tyrannically imprison birds and fishes as "pets." we keep, breed, kill and eat a variety of animals for our own selfish purposes, and yet some persons still have the audacity to say that we are "chosen people," "god's children," "divine beings." bah! you know what painful inconvenience there is in losing an arm or a leg. well, the winged and footed beings that must bear this life suffer a great deal more than we do when one of their limbs becomes dismembered. man has to a degree remedied or replaced his crippled limbs, but i do not think any other of the higher animals have advanced so far, and as a result these creatures must endure their pain and distressing annoyance to the end. recently i watched a common house fly caught upon "fly paper," and studied intently every visible movement of it. immediately upon alighting upon the sticky substance, its first thought, almost instantaneously, was to make an effort to free itself. at once i thought of the fly's instinct of "self-preservation," and contrasted it with the human's. the fly must have had intelligence, since it knew that its life was in danger. and, since nature does not deal in "fly paper," the fly's reasoning power told it of its peril. with unabated determination it vibrated its wings with lightning-like rapidity, and worked its legs unceasingly, _breaking them in the attempt_, in its efforts to pull itself away to freedom! as i watched this fly in its labor, this thought came to me: is the fly unlike the human being in its desire to live? is it afraid of death and of the mystery of dissolution? has it, too, all the agony of fear of passing to the "great beyond"? has it, too, an imaginary god in the form of a big fly? and is it also afraid of that god's supposed wrath? if the fly's desire to live is so great, what interest does it have in life? does it love? does it derive happiness when it is able to labor to make happy its fly juliet? does it want to live because it is ambitious and is trying to excel other flies? does it really think to better its species and solve the problem of its kind? is there a fly family to mourn its death? while watching that fly and asking myself these questions, i was convinced of the following _truths_: that the force that we call life is the same that animates the fly. that it, too, has control of its muscles and nerves in the same proportion as we have control of ours. that it, too, possesses the five senses and adds to its tiny brain more intelligence through its experiences. within the movements and actions of that fly was wrapped up the secret of "whence did i come, and whither am i going?" as i released my attention from that fly, i muttered to myself: "the more i look at insects, the more i think i am one." for what purpose do _we_ arise in the morning, fill our stomachs with food, till the fields, and perform labor in exchange for nourishment, in the evening fall into a sleep from exertion, arise the next day, and perform the same routine, day in and day out, week in and week out, year in and year out, and at the age and in the heyday of physical development seek an outlet in the opposite sex for the strongest impulse that nature has implanted in us? this impulse forces us to commit rape and murder, robbery and assault, and to violate every principle of honor that man has tried to establish for the betterment and advancement of the race. with the dissipation of this mighty sex force, we subside and decline into weakness and decay, only to pass into death and oblivion. what a fearful, wasted effort is this life! iv the system of nourishment that nature has imposed upon the world is not only stupid and malicious, but also of a cannibalistic character. we, as frail human beings, are horrified and shocked to think that our ancestors trafficked in and delighted in eating the flesh of their race, and even to-day we are making a strenuous effort to discourage the barbarous custom of killing animals to eat their flesh, yet it seems a dictate of nature that forces us to uphold that custom. just think of it! nourishment and life-sustaining forces are derived from eating the cooked flesh of a dead animal, the unborn fowl, the bowels of the lamb, and the eggs of the fish! can you imagine the wildness of life in such a jungle of cannibalism? no wonder the savage instinct is so deeply implanted in us. to get a fair idea of the food we eat to sustain life and to please and satisfy our palates, we need but take a casual glance at any of our modern butcher shops. although to-day you will not see human limbs on display and for sale, as they were years ago, you will be impressed with the following morsels put there to tempt your appetite: in our modern butcher shops you will find pigs' feet, calves' brains, ox tongues, breasts and legs of lamb, chicken livers, dogs ground to bits and sold as sausages, live and dead fish of all kinds and varieties and innumerable other portions of animal flesh. fortunately we have got beyond the point where we eat the entrails of these animals, although we use their hoofs to make glue, their bones for powder, and we string our delicate musical instruments with their vitals. the things we consume, in turn consume the living forms that they capture and subdue. the lion, the tiger and the leopard will devour us more quickly, and with less ceremony and with more delight, than we devour other animals. we, being "civilized," boil the animal's flesh and season it with weeds that nature allows to grow, to give it zest and flavor, while our wilder brothers eat us in the raw, natural manner, only removing our civilized clothes. really, if getting nearer to god is getting back to nature, the beasts of the fields have an advantage over us. and we know to-day that even the living things in the vegetable kingdom suffer alike from the fearful tortures and penalties of the world. they follow almost the identical routine of life that we follow. birth, life, reproduction, and death are their lot as well as ours; so that, if man were only to practice the idealism of his cramped and feeble brain he would starve to death! v if the world is the result of an established plan, as some say, it must be the conception of a hideous monster whose three cardinal principles are disease, despair and death. but this much we can say: though god created us a savage, fortunately man is civilizing nature's brute and is making him a man. disease is one of nature's cardinal forces. so, to attain health, we struggle against disease; but health only means the guarding of it through fear. "with all the ills the flesh is heir to," true health is a chimera, an existing state unknown to man. to be "well" is such a precious condition, that nature cautions us against expecting to retain health too long, by instructing us, through experience, to prepare for a siege of illness. thus, disease and illness would seem to be the natural states, and health the artificial condition under which nature permits us to live. no one goes to his grave without suffering the tortures of some disease and paying the penalty of living. no one is exempt from the inflictions nature imposes. the greater portion of our life consists in devising means and medication to relieve us of our states of ill health and disease. sanitation and all the methods we are capable of discovering and inventing are becoming universally applied to kill and to destroy the menacing germs that god causes to inhabit the air, and that breed and multiply in the fertile flesh of our bodies. and finally, we are so utterly ignorant of how even to eat, sleep, walk, breathe, stand or sit, that the slightest infringement of the simplest rules of life can, and does, cause us irreparable harm. if we did not move to help ourselves, nature would have us live in filth and stagnation. we seek, discover, or invent all kinds of methods to build health and to remain perfectly strong throughout our lives, and yet, despite it all, we are puny and sickly beings. in fact, i do not think there is such a thing as perfect health. what we may do to correct, insure or perfect our healthy tissues will have a detrimental effect upon some other part of our body. what we do to build up must also tear down. what we do to produce health will, after a certain point, produce disease. this, it seems, is the law not only of life, but also of the universe. it is regrettable that god did not possess the magnanimity of an ingersoll and make health contagious instead of disease. physical pain and mental suffering are the mysterious sorrows that we must experience and pay to a tyrant god for the existence we bear. it is incontrovertible that no realization is given us by nature of the fearful pains and tortures that we are capable of suffering and still sustain ourselves, only to repeat over and over again the unending torment in exchange for the consciousness of a worthless life. we, with our limited intellects, with our puny strength, with our inability to utilize all the materials in our possession, are still superior to the workmanship and the justice of god. tyrant is no name for such a god, who creates a living organism purposely and maliciously to torment and torture it. a poor creature is a god who makes his suffering playthings more powerful than "he," and compels them to bear their existence under the lash of inexorable laws of sorrow and suffering, pain and penalty. and yet we are satisfied with so little. we ask for a crumb only. we are pleased with the slightest favor. a toy delights us; a little trinket elicits from us warm gratitude; a breath of balmy air is drunken with keen and pleasurable delight; a "fine" day is celebrated with exultation! but what a mockery is life! we writhe in pain and bear the brunt of an arrogant tyranny from whatever force that created and controls us. we must daily bathe our bodies, wash our hair, brush our teeth, change our clothes and perform other necessary physical functions to feel freedom from the filthy conditions that nature imposes upon us and surrounds us with. if nature saw fit to give us eyes, she should have given us perfect ones; not those which, upon the slightest contact with a minute foreign substance, cause unutterable pain and possible loss of sight, in a world where sight is so imperative! if nature saw fit to give us ears, she should have given us perfect ones; not those which are capable of such frightful pain, with the possibility of becoming totally deaf, when it is so necessary to hear! if nature saw fit to give us a nose, she should have given us a perfect one; not one that causes such miserable torture and unbearable suffering from the slightest defect! if nature saw fit to give us a mouth, she should have given us a perfect one; one that would perform all the functions of perfect speech; not one that is so liable to harm and so susceptible to dumbness, when speech is of such paramount importance to life! if nature saw fit to give us teeth, she should have given us perfect ones; not those which ache and pain with such fearful intensity that the mind is almost distracted! if nature saw fit to give us arms, legs, and organs, she should have given us perfect ones; not a body whose tenderness makes it an instrument of such menacing torture; not a body of crippled bones and crippled joints, where suffering results from everything it does! if nature saw fit to give us a brain, she should have given us one strong enough to withstand all the rebuffs of life, and one capable enough to utilize all the forces under command. each person should be a mental hercules capable of solving his own problems and directing all matter to its greatest material uses. instead of the human body being the marvelously constructed instrument we are wont to believe it, we now find it to be nothing but a common machine, imperfectly made, and subject to innumerable changes and radical improvements. every person acquainted with the anatomy of the body can give you a list of imperative improvements that it needs, and without which it will continue to function imperfectly and continue to cause pain and suffering to its possessor. it were a great deal better, after a full summary of life, were we to be created utterly devoid of feeling, equally impervious to joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain. we should be manifestly benefited, for the greater part of our life is now full of sorrow, anxiety, fear, pain, disappointment and worry. a small portion of our life is a matter of indifference. a portion might be termed satisfaction, and a minute balance, an infinitesimal part, termed--if there is such a thing in life--joy. and yet, the joy we may experience to-day will not be present to-morrow to cheer and comfort us, but the pain that we feel to-day will pinch us more strongly to-morrow, and will remain as an ever-poignant memory. joy and pleasure are of a transitory nature only, while pain and sorrow are of a permanent and accumulative character. is _all_ of life worth the sorrow, the agony and fear of death? just think of giving a life so full of grief that those who have it do not want it and quite often destroy it! no wonder that drugs more powerful than our minds, used to numb the pains of life, are so much in demand and so universally used. what a ridiculous assumption it is to think that a soul, separate and distinct from the body, would imprison itself in such a miserable confinement! instead of life's being a privilege, it is a prison, wherein we must suffer fearful pains and still more fearful thoughts. physical pain registers a high degree of intense feverish suffering, but mental torture is fired with the scorch of hell. vi human life is the cheapest thing that god makes! no consideration is given to the feelings, pains and sorrows it must bear and endure. no wonder that ridicule, shame, hatred and other forms of mental suffering cannot be withstood by some frail minds, and cause them to seek relief from their torment. under the red-hot brand of mental torture, the jealous husband sees his wife violate every rule and principle and vow of virtue. he sees her reveling in the arms and embrace of him that he despises, committing trespass upon the one he so loves. the husband suffers more mentally in a few moments of these imaginings, than the actual performance, with his full knowledge, could cause him to suffer. losses, mistakes, discouragements and disappointments scorch with burning blisters the lining of our lives. i once thought it was cowardly to make destruction of oneself, but i must say that more mature thought, supported by actual scenes and experiences, has caused me to alter my view. but before i go farther, let me make my thought clear so as to avoid any misunderstanding. i do not mean that a person should shirk his or her duty in the face of hardship, discouragement or rebuke. on the contrary, the mettle of the man is best tested by such adverse forces, and some of the most inspiring moments of life lie in overcoming these conditions and triumphing over unjust, undue and seemingly impossible odds. what i do mean is, when life no longer holds any attraction, when the ravages of disease have torn and mutilated your body, when pain and torture are raking your mind, and your daily companions are these miseries, with no possible hope of their relief or change, then by all means, by whatever agency you desire to accomplish it, save yourself the terrible agony of living, and defeat one of the tyrant impositions of god. vii the child suffers the sharpest pains, the crudest poignancy that could possibly be inflicted upon its body, through the stupid, frightening and monstrous tales that are continually told to it to make it "good," to make it "obey." to think that a child cannot bear to enter the dark, cannot bear to be alone, cannot bear to be separated from its loving and protecting parents, and yet must suffer in a few moments from a fatal disease--the agony of all this, in the face of death, is the crime of crimes, too damnable and horrible for words. i remember once seeing a little lost child. it cried for its mother. hot tears were streaming down its burning cheeks. its face portrayed the severest form of suffering that life is capable of experiencing. if nature ever made a frail article, it is our tender offspring, so bewildered, so utterly helpless, so agonizingly delusioned, so pitifully searching for some familiar face; something to make it discover its lost self. oh, what power ever made us so tender, so incapable of self-help, as to have us undergo and feel such terrific suffering! it is injustice enough when adults are made to suffer mental and physical ills, without inflicting such a painful decree upon mere infants. at least an adult has some conception of his suffering. he can make provision for some remedy. he can seek others to ask them to render help. he knows, he feels, he understands the situation, and can adjust himself as best he can to obtain some relief. but not so with the child. its mind is not capable of comprehending the condition which makes its suffering so sharp. its little brain is too feeble, hardly strong enough to direct its awkward and bulky body, much less to solve such an incredible predicament as being utterly destitute of help, in a world fashioned upon such an unsatisfactory plan. there is not, nor can there be, a sadder, more distressing sight, than to see a little lost child overcome with fright. if it were in my power to abolish any of nature's cruel laws, i would take from the little child its feeling of pain. let me ask, would man, were it in his power, send a helpless creature, utterly unable to sustain itself, without power of thought, understanding or expression, so dependent upon loving care, kindness, help and comprehension, into a world that is a wilderness, a world reeking with pestilence and populated with shrieking beasts and brutal and savage people? as a passing word regarding the child, let me say this: do not judge your child as an ordinary mechanical instrument, as if he could be wound up to a certain degree and gradually, as if by clockwork, tick away each moment of the day. the child is a combustible force, and, although there are certain rules by which you may obtain the greatest degree of improvement, you cannot rigidly adhere to them. there are numberless instances when the propensity or inclination of the child may appear to you to be aggravating and annoying; nevertheless, you must not let _your_ irritability interfere with the development of that trait preã«minent to the child's character. look upon your child, encourage your boy or girl, to be a pioneer and a soldier in the march of progress. instruct it with the knowledge of the miserable conditions of our past history, and bring it forcibly to understand that efforts only are repaid, and that we must work in order to accomplish. prayers are only wasted words on the desert air. the greatest mental crime ever committed is that of teaching a child, "while still upon its mother's knee," its duty and obedience to god. it would appear that for the amount of suffering it must endure, and in the face of its unconsulted coming, we should at least disregard god for his insolence, and impress upon the child the peculiar conditions of life. we should instruct it, that from time immemorial, nature has been laboring through the most awkward process of reproduction, and has finally brought the child into existence, not to enjoy the benefits, or eat of the fruits of the earth, but to bear a life of continual strife and suffering. not of god should we speak to our child, but of the importance of being prepared to do all in its power to help others to escape the torture, misery and hardships it must so painfully overcome. is it any wonder that we grow up to be serfs and slaves? before we are able to know or understand the very rudest fundamentals of life, our entire mental machinery is corrupted by unshakable fears and dedicated to the vilest and most sickening submission. would that we were left alone, and free to follow the thoughts of our own minds, regarding the great problems of life. what a mighty, unhampered power we would possess to find the proper course of action, and possibly the real solution to the mystery of the _tyranny of god_! to love and to reverence our tormentor is repulsive and despicable, and since we refuse to allow man to tyrannize over man, what degradation it is for the human race to cringe and bow down unconditionally to the imagination in the great realm of uncertainty! do not hurt your child. do not strike it. do not cause it any unnecessary pain. before it is able to walk, before it is able to talk, before it is old enough to tell of its pain and suffering, nature makes it endure enough. remember, the only language of the babe is the cry of pain. imagine yourself under the lash of suffering, utterly speechless and incapable of conveying your wants and feelings to an absolutely strange surrounding, and you will have a slight picture of the growing child in your household. did you ever stop to consider that the child, when born, does not know that you are its parent? it does not know that you are its father, or that you are its mother. it does not know what prompted its birth, or why it must live--and above all, what it has done to be sent to such a miserable prison place as the planet upon which we live. we must demonstrate all this as well as we can to the child. this much we can be sure of: kindness, tenderness and love should forever be our guide in our dealings and contact with children. the child is brought into this world from the insuppressible passion of two people, and surely without its consent, and it is absolute tyranny and barbarity to torment its mind or to punish its body, regardless of the result its action may have upon us. to the little children that have suffered the horrible punishment so generally followed in that cruel and false book--the bible--my heart goes out in pity, since words fail me to describe those savage characters that visit inhuman, tormenting and torturous treatment upon their unwelcome offspring. if we were forced to perform the thousand tyrannies that are directed against the child during the day by cruel and thoughtless parents, the lunatic asylum would soon be our place of refuge. such trivial things as a spot on the shoe, a speck of dirt upon the clothes, a mere tip of the hat, a slight turn of the scarf often give rise to such violent reprimand, and very often brutal punishment, that the savageness of barbarians is mild compared to such displays of temper. my heart again goes out to you, little children, when and wherever you are, that must bear the brunt of brutal actions from stupid and thoughtless parents and guardians. these people seem to classify children in the matter of discipline as grown ups, thinking (or, rather, not thinking) that children's undeveloped minds should be as strong as theirs, when they themselves are unable to practice the self-denial that they expect from mere infants. how often does a child receive a slap in the face from a parent for the asking of only a simple question, when the parent is not in the "humor" to "bother" with him? what a painful and terrifying beating does a child often get for disobeying some arbitrary command uttered by the one over him. to the child, "don't do this," "don't go there," "stand up straight," and "say this" are commands that carry with them court martial and its severe and unrelenting punishment. remember this: the child will respond to kindness and love more readily and directly than to force and unwarranted discipline. it is purely a question of whether your feelings are actuated by these impulses. if you have become mentally strong enough to restrain your impulses to strike your child, do not substitute other means to "punish" him. changing the method of brutally inflicting physical pain upon your child to some other means, though less repulsive, is still obnoxious and harmful. if you are unable to convince your child, by persuasion, example or otherwise, that you are right and that the child should follow your instruction, then by all means, let it become the victor in the contest. fear--fear of pain, fear in every form--controls our lives, and shapes the courses of our puny destinies. viii the mind, through fear of death, is capable of suffering, within a few moments, the tortures of an eternity, although to accomplish death, nature may require only a few minutes. the extent of the mind's capability for suffering is beyond compare. nature has been distinctly conspicuous in imbuing us not only with grave doubts and uncertainties, but also with an unshakable fear regarding death. in the deepest moments of despair, when living has absolutely no attraction and life becomes a burden and a menace, we fight desperately, and without abatement, for this narrow, worthless thread of existence. possibly the fear that we have in the face of death is caused by the fact that we must suffer pain before death is accomplished. and a great deal of the theory of "self-preservation" is due merely to our great horror of pain. the indisputable fact that thousands "take their lives" by choosing the least possible painful method demonstrates, with a firm conviction, my thought that it is the avoidance of pain, rather than the retaining of life, that prompts our efforts to live. it is only too true, and heard from the lips of thousands, that if they "could only lie down and never awake, what a blessing it would be." we speak in terms of "having lived too long," "being tired of living," "life not worth living," etc., as if life were a prison sentence, and, often, rather than continue the servitude, we surmount and overcome the deterrent of pain and destroy the life. very often our desire to keep on living is prompted by our baser impulses. we "live" sometimes to "get even" with someone--to spite someone. we "live" sometimes to be able to "show" what we can or cannot do. were it not for these baser impulses, what an unlimited number of people would refuse to continue this monotonous, painful and non-paying life! the foregoing expressions of life, at one time or another, represent the feelings of all humanity. in the united states alone during the year 1920 it has been conservatively estimated that more than twelve thousand persons committed suicide. these persons were engaged in all kinds of pursuits and came from all walks of life. they ranged from social outcasts to society leaders; from poverty stricken unfortunates to persons of great wealth; from illiterate men and women to editors and college professors; from laborers and layman to physicians and ministers. the youngest suicide was a mere infant of five years, the oldest, a centenarian of 106! among the suicides of last year were two evangelists and twelve clergymen. it would appear that those who had devoted their thoughts and services to god would at least be spared the agony of such suffering as to force them to prefer death and to take their lives. i say with ingersoll, it is a wonder god does not at least protect his friends and defenders. the reluctance we have to die is due in a large degree to the possibility of securing a few more moments of joy from an already too much troubled world, with the hope that a little compensation will be derived from the pain and sorrow we have endured. and yet those things that we may live to enjoy to-day and to-morrow may likewise be present to thrill us at some future date, away and beyond the limitation we are capable of surviving. it is from this desire that we unconsciously "feel" that we would like to "live" always, to get our full measure of return; and since such is neither the lot nor the privilege of our possession, it really makes no difference when we die as far as personal satisfaction is concerned. the fear that possesses us now in the matter of death will likewise and with equal force possess us later, when we actually and without ceremony must submit to the inevitable. the desire that possesses a person to live now will, with equal attraction, obsess him later. our desires and aspirations are never satisfied. what we may cherish to accomplish to-day may be consummated and achieved, yet to-morrow another something will demand our energies to be spent for further desires to be accomplished. when we are babies we desire to walk; when we walk, we desire to talk; when we talk, we desire to grow; after we grow, we want to learn; after we learn, we want to do and to expand--and our performance and expansion are only curtailed by insolent death! ix the only justification there is to live, once conscious of the damnable scheme of life, is the burning desire to do something to help mankind bear the conditions and to make easier the burden of life for those who are here and for those who are to come; for very often the greatest benefactors of the race are so maligned and persecuted in their day that only the future can render a just appreciation of their labor and their value. for without the improvement bestowed on life by the world's benefactors, over the crudity of nature, it were better that we remain in the bosom of our wilder brothers, and hang from the trees by the length and the strength of our tails. aye, back and back and back, down every degree of life until the time before the first cell of protoplasm from an inanimate into an animate state started. why must we be made to suffer such dreadful torment before death, since by eternal decree it is the common lot all must endure? death, puzzling, eternal death, is nature's final stamp upon our fearful struggle through life. and the agony of death is more poignantly mental than physical, since the mind, reviewing the acts of the past, anticipates with anxiety and with picturesque vividness the wrongs, scandals, terrors, fears and injustice of the future. since life is so replete with physical pains, no wonder our picture of death is so horrible. we see upon the lifeless form the cast of its agonizing pain, and augur from that an eternity of sorrow. but fortunately, in reality we can only feel pain as long as we possess "life." in a sense, therefore, death is a blessing. after all, the severest pains of death lie in the brains of the living. the mind is capable of suffering in one moment all that a lifetime can repay with pleasure, and no joy is sufficient in value to compensate you for enduring an irreparable loss. the conditions that existed before our birth are identical with the conditions that will exist at our death. as we knew no life and felt no pain before our birth, we shall know no life and feel no pain after our death. death is no longer the enigma of life. living is its problem. the sting of death has been removed. we know death's destiny, and no longer fear its consequences. the only suffering attached to death now is the injustice of its time of coming, the reluctance of parting with loved ones, and the loss of the opportunity to attain. well might i say with shakespeare, that: "cowards die many times before their death; the valiant never taste of death but once. of all the wonders that i yet have heard, it seems to me most strange that men should fear; seeing that death, a necessary end, will come when it will come." the most despicable characters of human life are those who prey upon credulous persons when in the face of death and shrouded with the fear of its uncertainty, picturing to those persons horrible and frightening tales of an eternity of torture. what unspeakable misery must those whose religious conviction has so terrified death and its aftermath, especially when it is intensified and horrified through the mouthpiece of ignorant priests, suffer in consequence of death. oh, what a fearful sting must be there! just think what this poor, vast, credulous multitude pay, with the sweat of their brows and the bend of their backs, to enrich these moral beasts in exchange for their ignorant and terrifying mumblings, that rob the deluded ones of every fiber of courage and every thought of perfect peace and rest. it is while living that death possesses its sting and anguish. anyone that seeks tribute from the dying, or from the living for services on behalf of the dead, is a damnable moral scoundrel and a cunning rascal. to those whose minds have been poisoned from childhood with this religious conviction, this most awful of beliefs, i cry: "throw off these tyrants of the mind. emancipate yourselves from this fearful ignorance and mental bondage!" what a burden will be lifted from their lives and what a glorious freedom they will experience! if we are to die, let us die in perfect calmness and in perfect peace. let us become firmly convinced that, once we are dead, no thought, no act, can possibly harm us. we are beyond the pale of nature's pangs. we, the individuals that we were, are free from everything. we are at rest, and forever. x but after this life with all our pains and sorrows, what then? what is there to repay us for living? i answer: _nothing!_ i have no misgivings about the "future." i am firmly convinced that there is no "after life," that when we "breathe our last" we arrive at our eternity. we are "one with yesterday's seven thousand years." we are like the flower which, "once blown, forever dies." i firmly believe that life as now manifested in our bodies is a combustible force identical with that of any other form of life. no less so than the "seed" of the flower is different from the "germ" of the wheat. both are forces! so are we! they may be different manifestations, but fundamentally they are the same. in fact, the very force that manifests itself in a mechanical instrument made by man is the identical substance that rules the organs, and charges the brain of our being. in the same manner that the force dissipates itself in the mechanical instrument made by man, and no longer gives motion to its parts, so the force that animates our being dissipates itself and is no longer capable of giving motion to our parts and organs. as man's instruments are dependent upon many channels for their complete performance, so the human brain and body have their many dependencies that must fully and properly be nourished to maintain their power. each day science draws another veil from the mystery of life. our eye is but a chemical camera, that we have not only reproduced, but even improved upon. our voice is nothing but a vibration, that we have not only reproduced and improved upon, but whose minutest modulations we have recorded in innumerable duplications. our ear is but a drum, that carries and conveys to the brain the vibrations of our voice, and that function we have reproduced and even improved upon by the instrument we call the telephone. the telegraphic system of the human body that communicates to the brain the conditions that the senses perceive, is no other than that which man has even improved upon by the transmission of an intelligible message to a far-distant land without the use of any apparent conductor. with the marvelous instrument, the telephone, man sends his voice around the world. man's greatest inventions, the phonograph, the camera and the telephone, both wire and wireless, make the work of nature, as manifested in our bodies, a simple, childish affair, fit only for the kindergarten of things. when edison invented the incandescent light and reproduced the human voice in the phonograph he pulled aside the veil of secrecy and penetrated the infinite. _he proved and demonstrated man to be greater than god._ our limbs carry our bodies in the direction our brains dictate, and _that_ function we have reproduced and even improved upon in all the means of locomotion that we daily use and which we now consider as a "matter of fact" among the ordinary things of life. "comparisons are odious" when we compare the awkward motion of nature with the rapid locomotion of man. man progresses far too rapidly for the accommodation of nature, and as a result adapts for his use and benefit vital essentials that nature in her laziness has either failed to utilize, or will not utilize. although we have not yet completely discovered all the material and mechanical elements that compose life, we are sure and certain of their origin. we hear ourselves talk; we decide upon our destination and direct our motion; we eat when we are hungry; sleep when we are tired; cry when we are in pain; and laugh when we are tickled. our whole being from start to finish is mechanical, and the element of something "spiritual," something separate and distinct from a purely material sense, is absolutely illogical and ill-founded in view of the illimitable illustrations that are being demonstrated every day. it is a thing easily understood, if we logically, and intelligently, without blindness, preference or prejudice, analyze the problem. it may sound better and more desirable to say that we possess a "soul"--that this life is but a "stepping stone to a higher plane"--but it is not true. we cannot observe the true, actual facts of life by coloring our subject. if we want to determine the _truth_ we must be mentally prepared to accept the _truth_. a painted face, brightened eyes, blackened eyelids, marcelled hair, and a form draped in all the splendor of the finest silks do not make a woman possess the sweetness and charm that all this "dope" is intended to make us believe. as much as man wants to have the end of this life attain certain benefits and destinations, this desire does not make them real. the implicit confidence in a faithless wife does not make her loyal and virtuous. a wife's confidence in a profligate husband does not make him stanch and true. life calls for a cold analysis. it must be stripped of all its artificial colorings and superfluities. it must be measured and weighed for what it actually is, not for what we would like it to be. it must be determined in the unwavering scales of science. the proper study of mankind is not the man in the white starched collar, with trimmed hair, shaven face and polished shoes, but the man recently from the forest, with coarse, grizzly hair upon his back, brutal and violent passion dominating his body, and savageness and hatred in his startled and terrifying eyes. the sooner we come to the realization of this vital fact, the sooner we become acquainted with the basic origin of life, the sooner we shall understand life, with its achievements, with its aspirations and hopes. xi it is an absolute fact and certainty, impossible of refutation, that when animation ceases in the body and no effort is made to revive it, life ceases and the processes of decay and decomposition set in. yet it is permanently established and has been successfully demonstrated innumerable times, that certain methods of artificial stimulation have revivified and resuscitated the delicate organs that cause the heartbeat and give consciousness to the brain. recently my local newspaper contained the following item: "dead" but saw no spirits _oklahoma city, okla._, february 7th--neal dillingham doesn't believe in after-death communication with the living. dillingham was "dead" for twenty minutes recently, and he says he ought to know. doctors said dillingham's blood circulation was stopped by a clot of blood. his heart stopped beating, and he did not breathe. insertion of a saline solution into his artery just above the heart caused the clot to dissolve, and dillingham came back to life. "i did not return to earth after i left it," said dillingham. "i had no knowledge of anything that took place, but i must have been pretty dead, as i do know i didn't recognize several persons i had known all my life, after i was myself again. if i had any talks with anybody while i was 'dead' i don't remember anything about them." believing that the publicity that this case received would make the party known to the postal authorities, i sat down and wrote him a letter, hoping that, if fortunate enough to have a letter delivered to him, he might be kind enough to write me personally of his experience. after a lapse of several days i received from him a letter substantiating in detail all that was mentioned in the newspaper clipping quoted above. in the instance of this man dillingham, he was "dead," so to speak, and as far as his "soul" was concerned it had "left" the body; yet the injection of a material solution, compounded by man, in conjunction with artificial respiration, caused the beating of the heart and gave back to the brain its power of consciousness. if it is the "soul" that causes the functioning of the body, where is it when such an action takes place? if it is the "soul" that gives us "life," how is it that we can materially and mechanically destroy it? we are born and nourished by material means. we live our life by material means. we reproduce our kind by material means. and we can destroy ourselves by material means. everything that touches and concerns our life is purely material, and it should be incumbent upon those who believe in the "soul" or the "spiritual element" of man to produce the proof of their contention. we are nothing but a continual propagating instrument, without spiritual, moral, lasting or ultimate value. we are here to reproduce our kind and for nothing more. what man secures for himself within the narrow circle of his existence here is all that he gains for the life that nature forces him to live. everything man has, man has made. nothing has been given to him by nature. god has been a miser! if man possessed a "soul" the thousand deformities of the brain would not exist. insanity would be impossible, and all the forms of petty vices that so miserably afflict us would be totally unknown. that which gives us the power of life is a combination of the material forces of nature, and the elements that compose the brain are of a chemical substance. the difference between a "live" person and a "dead" one can be summarized by a great many instances about us, and because of their commonplaceness, we do not observe them. there are many apples falling to the ground, but we are not inspired with the knowledge that the actuating force is gravity. one of the best illustrations, to show the difference between a "live" and a "dead" person, can be had from that excellent invention called the "film" or "plate," and which is so remarkably used in the camera. when that sensitive composition of chemicals that forms the "film" and which produces such a vivid and lasting likeness of ourselves is freshly made, it possesses that vital something we call "life." but allow this film to remain unused for a period of time, and it will no longer be able to perform its remarkable work. it will not possess the "life" to take a picture or to record an impression. if a premature "exposure" of the film is made, it loses its vital quality because of the mixture with other elements, or because of the evaporation of its constituent parts. it is not necessary to analyze all the properties of that film to show the principle whereby it performs its wonderful work. the general principle, showing its marvelous use while intact and its utter uselessness when its composition is no longer the same, should be sufficient to illustrate the comparison. this illustration can with force and conviction be applied to the peculiar quality and nature of our "soul" and brain. as long as the brain is incased within our skull, and fully protected from contact with any other substance to alter or to change its integrity, it will perform all that is warranted of it. in the case of our brain, though, besides the importance of keeping it protected from outside chemical action, the vital element concerned in its continuity of life lies in the importance of keeping it constantly nourished and supplied with the remarkable qualities of the vital substance of blood. the moment the blood supply to the brain is stopped, our brain loses its most important constituent, with the ultimate and inevitable result of inertia, decomposition and decay. when this condition happens we are then "dead" and, like the proverbial egg, "all the king's horses and all the king's men cannot put humpty dumpty together again." if we possessed a soul, and it were of a permanent and special quality, it would maintain its impressions and remember its existence. it could pass through innumerable periods and know its many and varied journeys. even memory, so unreliable in our short life, bespeaks the utter impossibility of such a thing as a soul with a permanent and lasting existence. that which we call the "soul" is nothing but a chemical composition, that can and _does_ lose its permanency while we are still alive. we are acquainted with a number of chemical compositions that must remain in a pacific state to maintain their identity, so those chemical forces that compose our "soul" must perforce maintain their equilibrium. if we are stunned, or suffer any of the many conditions that upset chemical compounds and compositions, we, for the time being, suffer either "unconsciousness" or some other form of mental disability. if we are shocked too severely, we become totally and permanently impaired, and suffer violent fits and fearful rages, insanity or imbecility. different shocks, and even forms of disease, result in certain action upon our chemical brain, which causes it to lose only part of its ability. extreme high fever is only one form of illness which causes the brain to lose its stability and run rampant and unbridled. if i were fully cognizant of all forms and degrees of disease, i could recite exactly how they act and in what degree they harm the delicate organism of our brain. in many instances shocks or diseases too powerful for our brain to withstand, cause that portion of our brain that may control our speech, our sight, our hearing, our limbs or other organs to lose its power, with the consequence that we must suffer and be handicapped with what is properly called "a great affliction." science to-day has discovered that great truth, and has not only catalogued the different portions of the brain in their individual departments or capacities, but, by a master stroke of surgery, can correct and remedy those impaired parts, and give back to the human being the use of those valuable organs that the invisible agents of nature had taken away. so, instead of the brain's possessing a "soul," we find it, only in a more delicate degree, a mechanical formation such as we discovered our body to be. but if we possess a soul and it is capable of passing through the many and varied stages that life suffers, what becomes of its impressions? what and where are the benefits of its retention? where is the soul when we are in a state of unconsciousness? surely, if the soul were ever present to guard and maintain life, it would be standing by and using its power when it is most needed. we have no occasion for help when we are not in danger. it is when power can be used and exercised that it should be manifested. even love, the great compelling force of our life, is subject to the variations of our chemical "soul," its attractions and repulsions. if two form the unit of reproduction, and love is the great mating medium of nature, then once it is animated, once it is brought into existence, it should endure permanently, and the possessors should at least enjoy their blissful companionship until the end. but no. nature would entice, and then destroy, this most consuming feeling of life. two persons can start life with the most irresistible attraction and irrepressible love and within a very short time, unless they guard their love with every means and weapon of advanced thought and reason, nature, through her duplicity, will provide searching eyes to alienate their affection, causing a wretchedness unparalleled in the mental miseries of mankind's life. the saddest state of all is when two persons, with the sacred devotion of love, cohabit and the happy result is loving children, and yet while this happy family, free from nature's pitfalls and snares, are living in a peaceful and blissful state, there exists the ever-menacing "devil" who tempts the loving wife and mother to follow the will-o'-the-wisp--and thereby undoes and destroys the greatest kingdom of life. the devoted husband and father, by the flash of an eye, and the charm of a face, can forsake his sacred ties of devotion and become a degenerate and outcast, with death as his only salvation. in either case nature stands by with a sneer upon her lips, and god forgets his obligation to his children. but the final analysis proves beyond doubt that the physical attraction is responsible for this action; and who can deny that it is the chemical attraction of two forces that produced this irresistible desire? xii if the life we live be a kindergarten or infancy of a larger and better life somewhere else, nature defeats her own ends, because myriads pass on, leave here, with the most dwarfed intellects, utterly unprepared to live here, and much less prepared to live in a higher state and on a more lofty plane. were such a condition true, that this is but a transitory existence, we should all have to go through the same schooling of life, and be indelibly impressed with its lesson, with conviction and understanding that the same mistakes would never be repeated, or the acquired knowledge would be constantly and forever used. there would be no deaths in infancy, as each child born would be purposely sent here; neither would there be premature deaths, as no one could leave without "learning his lesson." there would be a fixed standard of knowledge and development that we would be required to attain. knowledge, or whatever condition nature imposed, would be our destiny, and we would devote our entire life to its acquirement. as it is, we bend our efforts and use our strength to avoid and to escape the acquisition of knowledge. if our life were given to us in order to pass through a school of experience, the simplest truths would immediately manifest themselves to our minds, and conviction would be instant and permanent. but how sadly untrue is this premise! for thousands, aye, for millions of years, the people have been stupefied with the most ignorant and foolish superstition. an instance that will present with great force an illustration of the utter folly of the contention that we are living on this planet as a lesson in school, lies in the fact that for thousands of years people not only believed but religiously guarded the belief that the earth was flat. even to-day, with irrefutable demonstrations of the truth, there are some people who either cannot, or will not, accept it. as desirable as this theory of a transitory state may be, it is even contrary to nature herself. the entire scheme of nature seems to be fashioned upon the same principle as our life. the fearful struggle of the elements involved squares identically with our own existence. even the gigantic constellations, flying with an incalculable velocity, leaving destruction and desolation in their tracks, meet in their ignorant and blind journey the same fate as we meet. recent astronomical discoveries speak of a struggle constantly taking place in those areas. the belief of an existence after death is so untenable in the face of many scientific discoveries of to-day, and of the irrefutable facts that are constantly staring us in the face, that an instance or two are all that are necessary to prove the fallacy of such a belief. under many circumstances we are unable to recognize our own blood relations after a lapse of a certain length of time. parents fail to know their children; and children their parents. this is equally true in every comparison and degree of relationship. features and characteristics undergo such a decided change and transformation that recognition is ofttimes even impossible. even the law courts are continually called upon to determine the proper identity of persons, to establish the ownership of property by other means than by personal identification. most remarkable of all, under new conditions, we do not recognize ourselves within the interval of only a few seconds! try this if you would seek proof, and convince yourself that recognition of your own personality is momentarily impossible, and that you must resort to other senses than that of sight to identify yourself. put a wig upon your head, blacken your face, "make up" your features, and when you have finished and are completely unaware of your changed appearance, look into the mirror for your reflection and feel the sensation of the startling fact that you know not yourself. we speak of changes so radical in a person's appearance that we often say we could not recognize him "in a thousand years." what a ridiculous presumption it is, then, to maintain that we live after death when _all_ senses are gone and perception is dead! again, how anyone can say that when we die we go to "heaven" is too childish to consider, because when we die, instead of going up and to heaven, we are put deep into the ground to moulder and to rot away. what a far-fetched conclusion it is to assume that we live after death, minus all the physical characteristics and under conditions utterly incomprehensible to our minds! even if, at death, the body turned into invisible gases it would mean and prove absolutely nothing. if we live after death, by what means can one person communicate with another? we cannot feel, because we have no hands. we cannot see, because we have no eyes. we cannot smell, because we have no nose. we cannot hear, because we have no ears. we cannot taste, because we have no mouth, no stomach. but, with it all, these five mediums of sense are dependent upon a _living brain_. the fact that we suffer the loss of our senses even before death, because of the complications in the make-up of our body, should be sufficient proof of the nonexistence of a soul and the utter impossibility of a life after death. unless we retain and maintain our sacred ties after death, another life is valueless and void, useless and unnecessary. it is a fearful sadness to think that the ones you love are to pass away into nothingness and be no more; that the sparkling eyes will be dim forever; that the rosy cheeks will no longer glow with radiant health; that the ruby lips will fade into a deathly blue, motionless and forever still; that dimpled hands and loving arms will never encircle you again, and the supremacy and tenderness of your love must be crushed with a cold and callous ferocity. but, sad and mournful as it is, with the human heart beating hopelessly against hope for only one more chance to kiss and caress and love the one you so dearly cherish, it is nevertheless only too poignantly true that death ends all. death means nothing to the affairs of the world. to be taken from amid the world in such an ever-living condition as now exists, is like taking a cup of water from an ever-full pail. the gap is immediately filled, and the level of the water simultaneously adjusted, leaving absolutely no trace of what has been withdrawn. only the individual suffers. what a mighty burst of heart there would be if we all could feel and suffer at the same time! nature makes no difference and knows no distinction between the living and the dead. the warm and tender rays of the sun, and its blistering heat, fall alike upon the crying, innocent babe and the lifeless, unfeeling corpse. the sun does not shine to give us its necessary heat, without also bringing to light some new problem and pain for our over-troubled hearts to bear. murder, rape and greed look no different to nature than goodness, virtue and unselfishness. tears were made for the things that god causes, laughter is the result of man's efforts. xiii it is man's labor, man's work, man's achievement, that gives us the little desire that we have to live. how often do we prefer _death_ to living life in our former condition, after our efforts have brought us to a point of vantage and comfort! death is always preferable to the living of a "dog's life!" and yet, with it all, the little improvement we have to-day, with the still remaining cruel conditions of nature left to endure and fight, has not been worth the struggle through the black and bleak past. the price has been entirely too severe for the little that has been gained. god gives man nothing; man gives man everything! what sublime courage it was that made the pathfinders of the past sacrifice their lives, in order that their principles of truth might triumph, so that another link might be made in the chain of progress that is endeavoring to break the spell of a tyrant power. you must be made to know that for whatever desirable condition we have to-day we are indebted to heroic men and women of the past, who, in the days of infant progress, achieved a moral, physical and intellectual triumph. the chair you sit on, the cup you drink from, the fork you eat with, the light you read by, the bed you sleep in, the heat that warms you, the shoes on your feet, the clothes upon your back, the hat upon your head, and every part and particle of improvement that has enriched the world with a little touch of human comfort are the result of the heroic labors of the men and women of the past, who victoriously fought the accursed and chaotic forces of nature, so as to make life and living a little better. but at every step and stage of progress the dogmatists have exerted their influence toward retardation. what these dogmatists were unable to accomplish through fear and suppression, they accomplished through ostracism, and death. human advancement and progress are foreign to the "believing" mind. the dogmatists are concerned only with the "supernatural." they want not the comforts of life here if they can secure those benefits "hereafter." it is the attitude of the religious to belittle anything that is designed for human betterment. their philosophy is, the more you suffer here, the less you will suffer "hereafter." their humility to and fear of this "unseen" power is the most degrading trait in human beings. it is a frame of mind not only despicable and a hindrance in the face of progress, but even antagonistic to and destructive of all things worth while. to them, the insanity of belief is of paramount importance, and is more sacred and holy than human life. aye, human life has been so subordinated to this superstitious belief that it meant death in the past to those who rejected it. rather observe some "holy day" than perform "work" to help some fellow human being in distress. murder, rather than eat meat on a "forbidden day"! this frame of mind is one of the mental mysteries that science has yet to solve. xiv the rotundity of the earth was discussed and its circumference scientifically measured hundreds of years before the supposed birth of christ, and had not the "god believers" been so persistent in forcing their belief upon others, and had not christianity been born, i can see how the discovery of america would have been accomplished about a thousand years before the discovery by columbus; and the incalculable progress which would have been the consequence would have carried mankind beyond the boldest imagination of to-day, and placed us a thousand years nearer civilization. hero, a mathematician, who lived at the time when the greek minds were the marvel of the world, invented a steam engine, which was used in experiments and was rapidly nearing completion and perfection, when, unfortunately, ignorant and destructive religion, that was madly trampling upon everything of value, destroyed the famous alexandrian library wherein was kept a model of this engine. it also swept away the incalculable wealth of knowledge that had required ages to accumulate, and thereby completely annihilated the most priceless possessions that the human race ever owned. but that is not all; it is only a fragment. for history at every stage of life shows the continual strife between the forces of progress and the religious fanatic and god believer. what is that strange form of insanity that prompts people to torture and to destroy those who seek to emancipate them from the _tyranny of god_ and from the deluded belief in a hereafter? the attitude of all, each and every one of us, should ever be the desire and willingness to greet a new idea, to support a new thought, to try a new proposal, to do all in our power to uphold the forces of progress, to lend our help and to devote our energies in any direction that will ultimately lead us from the cruel forces and narrow limitations that are our lot to share. to those who have no thought for these things, who care not what forces and conditions man must face, who take without thought and give only through compulsion, whose self-satisfied condition (made possible only by the heroic work of the martyrs of progress) make of them personal heroes, whose life is wrapped within the flicker of a day, who do not know, do not realize, and do not care about the fearful suffering of the world--i say to them to strut their intoxicated hour and pass away. the sooner they live their lives and the sooner they die, the better for the earth. it needs fertilization. were we as mentally progressive as we are materially advanced, what a wonderful and magnificent improvement over the present living conditions we would be enjoying! every new invention, every new improvement, would be immediately and universally installed, and every old and antiquated instrument and method would be discarded and destroyed. that which now seems only within the command of the households of the immensely wealthy, would be as popularly used and enjoyed as the now commonly used articles in the poorest households. think of existing to-day in a predominant percentage of dwellings for human beings where there is not found the essential bathtub, or the still more essential toilet room! governments are instituted for the people's benefit, and shame upon such a government, in an enlightened age like to-day, that tolerates such a condition, when that government possesses the men, the means, the intellect and the materials to electrify the world! the first and foremost essential in higher development is the comfort and conveniences in a home. these are some of the conditions that the progressive minds of the world are trying to solve and remedy. it is only a question of how much longer the majority of people will pay homage to an imaginary god for imaginary benefits in an imaginary life after death. xv it is the antagonism of the dogmatic world, and the apathy of the rest, that is the cause of the mental progress of the world's not keeping pace with the material progress. better still, the universal application of the material progress has been far in advance of the universal acceptance of mental achievement. the automobile, the gigantic ocean liner, the talking machine, the electric fan, the elevator, the telephone and the other marvelous achievements of man are being used by the greater portion of the people, whose mental status belongs to the wheelbarrow, the simple chair, the ox cart and the tallow candle. slight is the realization by the users and beneficiaries of science's modern methods, of the heroic struggles and battles that the great men and women of the past suffered to make possible these accomplishments. oh, how many suffered torture and death at the hands of the very people they were striving to benefit! this same fate has been met by all the brave and courageous, during the past, who have made any attempt to broaden the life and to ease the pain of the troubled heart of humanity. the unselfish endeavors of man have made it possible to take the dumb matter of earth and mold it so the voices of the present can be heard by the ears of the future; so that several generations may hear and know, with a touch of human affection, the traits, features and characteristics of their ancestors. language gives us their thoughts, the camera gives us their natural, life-like features and the phonograph their actual, living voices! nature never did so much. as far as nature is concerned, bastardy may rule the world! one of the comforts of life is that we live again in actions and scenes, which, although they are apart from our own lives, really belong to the past or future races. but nature sees to it that the births and deaths, the knowledge and acquaintance of each and every generation, are so closely allied that none of us is allowed to escape the suffering of the world and the agony of life and death. no person can avoid the pain and the terrible fear that all must endure. no one person can live, move about and possess the varied improvements of the earth's materials all by himself. he is indebted to others for their accomplishments, and they in turn are indebted to him for the improvements he renders. in short, we are all so closely allied with the actions and lives of one another that there should be a mutual appreciation and a common understanding among all. the farmer may know nothing about manufacturing; the manufacturer may know nothing about farming; the artist, the explorer, the thinker, the inventor and the scientist may know nothing about any field of endeavor other than his own, yet all are inter-dependent. with such a condition existing, and with the uncertainty of life forever staring us in the face, and _no one exempt_ from its terrible enactment, it is a _marvelous_ wonder to me why there exist so tenaciously in the human heart all the petty and aggravating tempers, prejudices and jealousies. what man has done with the forces of nature are inspiring deeds. what progress has been made in opposing the forces of nature is marvelous. what man will accomplish in the future with the arrogant forces of nature stimulates our hearts with the sweet satisfaction of a victory of the first magnitude. but in the final analysis, what does it avail us? geologists tell us that the greater portion of the materials that we have taken from the field of nature consists of the buried bones and bodies of our ancient ancestors, who passed through greater periods of agony, torment, disease and death than we are finally and eventually to meet! what sort of crust in the earth's formation are we to make? what will be the product of the future living forces that will utilize the materials that our bodies will make? what will be the future living forces? it is fearfully sad to contemplate that life must continue and be subject to the miserable laws that now govern it. insect man, with his almost tireless industry, makes clothes to cover his ugly and awkward body; builds houses to shelter him from the winds and the torrents of nature; fashions glittering palaces of amusement to cheer his troubled heart; compounds anã¦sthetics to ease his pain; carves wood to replace his broken limbs; molds metal to take the place of those things that nature has made inadequate for his use. in short, man has improved upon nature to uphold his frail body, to strengthen his weak bones, and to soothe his tender heart. that man, fighting the forces of nature, has been able to accomplish so much is simply glorious, and this progress is an achievement of such wonderful magnitude that we are thrilled at the thought, and bow in grateful recognition for the benefits derived and the relief enjoyed. but why did not god institute all the benefits for the immediate use of man, so they could be enjoyed upon the first manifestation of his understanding? why was it necessary to go through the fearful period of past history and gain, only after a most gigantic struggle, the few things that we now use for our comfort? that these things could have been done is proved by the fact that man has done them. fundamentally they always existed. man has only discovered and applied them. and these things that we have gained to-day, from the struggles of the past, would have been equally enjoyed by those who lived before us, with the same degree of benefit, just as the future will find, use and enjoy those things that we do not possess, and without which we shall be pinched, and pained, through the helter-skelter of this troublesome life. i brand as brutal tyranny this scheme of life, that forces us to be a link in a long series of lives to produce something for the benefit of the far-distant future, that we, ourselves, imperatively need but shall not possess. i cry and denounce and plead, in behalf of future humanity, to circumvent and to defeat this "sorry scheme of life," that uses us as an instrument to produce something that we cannot use, do not know about and have not the understanding to comprehend. xvi "in god we trust," on coins that represent our labor and our endeavor, is an insult to the intelligence, courage and independence of the people, and a stinging rebuke to those responsible for our progress. a motto that more truthfully represents our material progress and intellectual development would be: "in science we trust;" or, "humanity and justice our aim." the more we eliminate god from us, the more we are _one without him_, the better for us all, the better for humanity, the better for all the world. the less we "know" of god, the less god that is "in us," the more _human_ we become. the greatest, most frightful and destructive wars of all time have been those which were started in "defense" of god, as if "he" cared what man says or does. the most frightful and torturous instruments ever conceived by man are those that were made to force people to "believe in" god. the history of religious persecution and torture is the horror of the world. may i ask, where was god, and what did he do, to stop this frightful nightmare of torture committed in "his" name? and may i answer for you, that he was where moses was when the light went out? remember this: there will never be a solution to any of our fundamental problems, and mankind will never, in the full sense of the word, be free, as long as there exists in the human mind the insanity of religious belief. as long as god occupies a portion of our thoughts, mankind must be content to suffer the hatred and antagonism of man. let us make up our minds now, let us resolve now, to stop fighting one another, and fight god by helping one another. let us stop fighting our fellow prisoners and fellow sufferers, and fight god. let us help our fellow prisoners and fellow sufferers. let us cleanse our minds of this superstitious poison of an "after life," and work and labor for the good and welfare of here and now. we possess the knowledge and the means and, within the span of only one day, could bring about the much-longed-for "brotherhood of man." we could eliminate hatred from our hearts, and instill justice as our guide. we could eradicate poverty from our midst and bring happiness to sorrowing mankind. we could blot out tyranny among men and exchange it for the priceless legacy of freedom and make the relation between man and man bear some semblance of humanity. but--and i say this with redoubled conviction, and with all the power, force, energy and vehemence that i possess--if we are nature's best endeavor, if man is nature's best product, if the natural world is incapable of any improvement, and life will forever be made to submit to the tyrannical conditions of nature, then it were better ten thousand times over, that life were never called into existence, and that the universe were null and void! the end edison letter to joseph lewis * * * * * _from the laboratory of thomas a. edison, orange, n.j._ august 18, 1921. mr. joseph lewis, c/o the truth publishing co., 1400 broadway, new york city. dear sir:- i received your book--"the tyranny of god"--and have read it through. i think as you do that death ends all, yet i do not feel certain, because there are many facts that seem to show that the real units of life are not the animal mechanism itself, but groups of millions of small entities living in the visible cells. the animal being their mechanism for navigating the environment, and when the mechanism fails to function, i.e. die, the groups go out into space to go thru another cycle. the entities are each highly organized and perform their allotted task. if there is anything like this we still have a fighting chance. you have doubtless read interviews i have given lately on this subject. they appeared in the scientific monthly for october 30, 1920 and the cosmopolitan for may, 1920. yours very truly, thos a edison famous inventor gives views of death and immortality in correspondence with author of "the tyranny of god." attributed to matthew turner (d. 1788?) and william hammon. transcribed by the freethought archives note: irregularities in orthography and punctuation have been reproduced without emendation from the first edition of 1782. answer to dr. priestley's letters to a philosophical unbeliever. part i. london. mdcclxxxii advertisement. the editor of this publication has more in object to answer dr. priestley than to deliver his own sentiments upon natural religion, which however he has no inclination to disguise: but he does not mean to be answerable for them farther, than as by reason and nature he is at present instructed. the question here handled is not so much, whether a deity and his attributed excellences exist, as whether there is any natural or moral proof of his existence and of those attributes. revealed knowledge is not descanted upon; therefore christians at least need take no offence. doubts upon natural religion have not hitherto been looked upon as attacks upon revelation, but rather as corroborations of it. what the editor believes as a christian (if he is one is therefore another affair, nor does he reckon himself so infallible or incapable of alteration in his sentiments, as not at another time to adopt different ones upon more reflexion and better information; therefore, though he has at present little or no doubt of what he asserts (taken upon the principles laid down) he shall hold himself totally freed from any necessity of defending the contents of this publication if brought into controversy; and as he has no desire of making converts, hopes he shall not himself be marked out as an object of persecution. speculative points have always been esteemed fair matters for a free discussion. the religion established in this country is not the religion of nature, but the religion of moses and jesus, with whom the writer has nothing to do. he trusts therefore he shall not be received as a malevolent disturber of such common opinions as are esteemed to keep in order a set of low wretches so inclinable to be lawless. at least, if he attempts to substitute better foundations for morality, malevolence can be no just charge. truth is his aim; and no professors of religion will allow their system to be false. or if he should be thought too bold a speculator, such of the ecclesiastics as will be his opponents may rather laugh at him than fear him. they have a thousand ways of making their sentiments go down with the bulk of mankind, to one this poor writer has. they are an army ready marshalled for the support of their own thesis; they are in the habit of controversy; pulpits are open to them as well as the press; and while the present author will be looked upon as a miracle of hardiness for daring to put his name to what he publishes, they can without fear or imputation lift up their heads; and should they even be known to transgress the bounds of good sense or politeness, they will only be esteemed as more zealous labourers in their own vocation. prefatory address. dr. priestley, your letters addressed to a philosophical unbeliever i perused, not because i was a philosopher or an unbeliever; it were presumption to give myself the former title, and at that time i certainly did not deserve the latter; but as i was acquainted with another, who in reality, as far as i and others who know him can judge, deserves the title of a philosopher and is neither ashamed nor afraid of that of an unbeliever, i conceived them apt to be sent to my friend, and when i presented them to him, he said he was the person whom he should suppose you meant to address, if you had a particular person in view; but he had too much understanding of the world, though much abstracted from the dregs of it, not to conceive it more probable that you meant your letters to be perused by thinking men in general, believers and unbelievers, to confirm the former in their creed, and to convert the latter from their error. you shall speedily know the effect they have had in both ways. for myself i must inform you that i was brought up a believer from my infancy; a theist, if a christian is such; for i suppose the word will be allowed, though the equivalent term of deist is so generally reprobated by christians; i had before my eyes the example of a most amiable parent; a moral man, a christian undoubtedly; who, when i have been attending upon him, as much from affection as from duty upon a sick and nearly dying bed, has prayed i might be stedfast in the faith he held, in accents still sounding in my intellectual ear; a parent, whom for his virtues and love of his offspring, like a chinese, i am tempted to worship, and i could exclaim with the first of poets, _"erit ille mihi semper deus."_ with such habits of education then, such fervent advice and such reverence for my instructor, what can have turned me from my belief; for i confess i am turned? immorallity it is not; that i assert has not preceded my unbelief, and i trust never will follow it; there has not indeed yet been time for it to follow; whether it is a probable consequence will presently be discussed; but it is _thought_, free thought upon the subject; when i began freely to think i proceeded boldly to doubt; your letters gave me the cause for thinking, and my scepticism was exchanged for conviction; not entirely by the perusal of your letters; for i do not think they would quite have made me an atheist! but by attention to that answer from my friend, which i have his permission to subjoin. in mentioning that doubts arose by reading your very letters, which were written to eradicate all doubts, let me not accuse you of being unequal to the task assumed. i mean no such charge. you have in my opinion been fully equal to the discussion, and have bandied the argument ably, pleasingly and politely. i am certain from the extracts you have made from dr. clarke, the first of other divines, i should have been converted from my superstition by his reasoning, even without perusal of an answer: i pay you however the compliment of having only brought me to doubt, and i find i am not the only person who have been led to disbelieve by reading books expressly written to confirm the believer. stackhouse's comment upon the bible, and leland's view of deistical writers have perhaps made as many renegado's in this country as all the allurements of mahometanism has in others. what can be said to this? they were both undoubtedly men of abilities, and meant well to the cause they had to support. all that i shall observe upon the matter is, that what cannot bear discussion cannot be true. reasoning in other sciences is the way to arrive at truth: the learned for a while may differ, but argument at last finds its force, and the controversy usually ends in general conviction. reasoning upon the science of divinity will equally have its weight, and all men of letters would long ago have got rid of all superstitious notions of a deity, but that men of letters are frequently men of weak nerves; such as dr. johnson is well known to be, that great triumph to religionists; it requires courage as well as sense to break the shackles of a pious education; but if merely a resolve to reason upon their force can break them, what can we observe in conclusion but _"magnus est veritas et prevalebit."_ that religion or belief of a deity cannot bear the force of argument is well known by divines in general, is manifest by their annexing an idea of reproach to the very term of arguing upon the subject. these arguers they call free-thinkers, and this appellation has obtained, in the understanding of pious believers, the most odious disgrace. yet we cannot argue without thinking; nor can we either think or argue to any purpose without freedom. therefore free-thinking, so far from being a disgrace, is a virtue, a most commendable quality. how absurd, and how cruel it is in the professors of divinity, to address the understanding of men on the subject of their belief, and to upbraid those very men who shall exercise their understanding in attending to their arguments! no tyranny is greater than that of ecclesiastics. these chain down our very ideas, other tyrants only confine our limbs. they invite us to the argument, yet damn us to eternal punishment for the use of reason on the subject. they give to man an essence distinct from his corporeal appearance and this they call his soul, a very ray and particle of the divine being; the principal faculty of this soul they allow to be that of reasoning, and yet they call reason a dark lanthorn, an erroneous vapour, a false medium, and at last the very instrument of another fancied being of their own to lead men into their own destruction. _"in the image of himself made he man."_ a favourite text with theologians; but surely they do not mean that this god almighty of theirs has got a face and person like a man. no; that they exclaim against, and, when we push them for the resemblance, they confess it is in the use of reason; it is in the soul. i am aware that i am not here to mix questions of christianity with the general question of a divinity; subjects of a very distinct enquiry, and which in the letters to a philosophical unbeliever are very carefully separated. the subject of revelation is indeed promised afterwards to be taken up, provided the argument in favour of natural religion meets with a good reception. how, dr. priestley, you can judge of that reception i am at a loss to know, otherwise than by the number of editions you publish. it is then in the sum total just as much as if you had said, "provided this book sells well i will write another." yet it may be sold to many such readers as i have been, though you will hardly call such reception good. you that have wrote so much, to whom it is so easy to write more, who profess a belief of revelation, such a laborious enquirer, and so great a master of the art of reasoning, should rather have engaged at once to prove in a subsequent publication the truth of revealed religion in arguments, as candid and as fairly drawn as those you have used in proof of a deity independent of revelation. different as i am in qualifications from you, not very learned, far from industrious, unused to publish, i do now promise that when you shall have brought into light your intended letters in behalf of revelation i will answer them. i hope you will take it as an encouragement to write that you are sure you shall have an answer. i mean you should, and i am sure i shall think myself greatly honoured if you will descend so far as to reply to my present answer. i know you have been used in controversies to have the last word, and in this i shall not baulk your ambition; for notwithstanding any defect of my plea in favour of atheism i mean to join issue upon your replication, and by no means, according to the practice and language of the lawyers, to put in a rejoinder. should your arguments be defectively answered by me, should your learning and your reasoning be more conspicuous than mine, i shall bear your triumph without repining. i declare i am rather pleased there are so few atheists than at all anxious to make more. i triumph in my superior light. i am like the jew or the bramin who equally think themselves privileged in their superior knowledge of the deity. with me and with my friend the comparison holds by way of contrast, for we are so proud in our singularity of being atheists that we will hardly open our lips in company, when the question is started for fear of making converts, and so lessening our own enjoyment by a numerous division of our privilege with others. it has indeed often been disputed, whether there is or ever was such a character in the world as an atheist. that it should be disputed is to me no wonder. every thing may be, and almost every thing has been disputed. there are few or none who will venture openly to acknowledge themselves to be atheists. i know none among my acquaintance, except that one friend, to whom as a philosophical unbeliever i presented your letters, and to whose answer i only mean this address as an introduction. i shall therefore not enter here into the main argument of deity or no deity. my address is only preliminary to the subject; but i do not therefore think myself precluded from entering into some considerations that may be thought incidental to it. i mean such considerations as whether immorality, unhappiness or timidity necessarily do or naturally ought to ensue from a system of atheism. but as to the question whether there is such an existent being as an atheist, to put that out of all manner of doubt, i do declare upon my honour that i am one. be it therefore for the future remembered, that in london in the kingdom of england, in the year of our lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one, a man has publickly declared himself an atheist. when my friend returned me your letters, addressing me with a grave face he said, "i hope, if you have any doubts, these letters will have as good effect upon you as they have had upon me." my countenance brightened up and i replied, "you are then, my friend, convinced ?" "yes, he said, i am convinced; that is, i am most thoroughly convinced there is no such thing as a god." behold then, if we are to be believed, two atheists instead of one. another question has been raised "whether a society of atheists can exist?" in other words "whether honesty sufficient for the purposes of civil society can be insured by other motives than the belief of a deity?" bayle has handled that question well. [footnote: _pensees sur la comete_.] few who know how to reason (and it is in vain to speak or think of those who lay reason out of the case) can fail to be convinced by the arguments of bayle. i shall discuss the question no farther than as it is necessarily included in the discussion of some of those supposed results of atheism, such as i have before mentioned in the instances of immorality, unhappiness and timidity. in my argument upon this subject i shall carefully avoid all abuse and ridicule. controversies are apt to be acrimonious. you, sir, have certainly shewn instances to the contrary. you have charity beyond your fellows in the ecclesiastical line, and your answerers seem not to me to have a right in fair argument to step out of the limits you have prescribed yourself. to dispute with you is a pleasure equal almost to that of agreeing with another person. you have candour enough to allow it possible that an atheist may be a moral man. where is that other ecclesiastic who will allow the same? your answerers ought also to hold themselves precluded from using ridicule in handling this subject. i am no great supporter of lord shaftesbury's doctrine that ridicule is the test of truth. i own truth can never be ridiculous, that is, it can never be worthy of laughter, but still it may be laughed at. to use the other term, i may say, truth can never be worthy of ridicule, but still it may be ridiculed. just ridicule is a sufficient test of truth; but after all we should be driven to an inquiry, upon the principles of reasoning, whether the ridicule were just or not. boldness, which is not incompatible with decency and candour, i do hold to be an absolute requisite in all speech and argument, where truth is the object of inquiry. therefore when i am asked, whether there is a god or no god, i do not mince the matter, but i boldly answer there is none, and give my reason for my disbelief; for i adopt my friend's answer by the publication of it. that mischief may ensue to society by such freedom of discussion is also another argument for me to consider; i do not say to combat, for though i were convinced or could not resist the argument that mischief would ensue to society by such a discussion, yet i should think myself intitled to enter into it. i have a right to truth, and to publish truth, let society suffer or not suffer by it. that society which suffers by truth should be otherwise constituted; and as i cannot well think that truth will hurt any society rightly constituted, so i should rather be inclined to doubt the force of the argument in case atheism being found to be truth should apparently be proved prejudicial to such a society. i come unprejudiced to the question, and when i have promised you an answer to your future letters in support of revelation, i have neither anticipated your argument nor prejudged the cause. i hold myself open to be convinced, and if i am convinced i shall say so, which is equally answering as if i denied the force of your observations. in that sense only i promise an answer. if i believe i shall say, i do; but i shall not believe and tremble, confident as i am, that if i act an honest part in life, whether there be a deity and a future existence or not, whatever reason i may have to rejoice in case such ideas he realised, i can upon such an issue have none to tremble. i look upon myself to have more reason to be temporally afraid than eternally so. dr. priestley or any other doctor can put his name boldly to a book in favour of theism, loudly call the supporters of a contrary doctrine to the argument, and if no answer is produced, assert their own reasoning to be unanswerable. in that sense their sort of reasoning has been frequently unanswerable. here however is an instance of a poor unknown individual, making experience of the candour of the ecclesiastics and the equity of the laws of england, for he ventures to subscribe his publication with his name as well as dr. priestley does his letters, to which this publication is an answer. perhaps he may have cause to repent of his hardiness, but if he has, he is equally resolved to glory in his martyrdom, as to suffer it. whatever advantage religion has had in the enumeration of it's martyrs, the cause of atheism may boast the same. as to the instances of the professors of any particular form of religion, or modification of that form, such as christians or sects of christians, suffering martyrdom for their belief, i shall no more allow them to be martyrs for theism than pagans similarly suffering for their belief, shall i call martyrs for atheism. theism very likely has had it's martyrs. i can instance one i think in socrates, and i shall mention vanini as a martyr for atheism. the conduct of those two great men in their last moments may be worth attending to. the variety of other poor heretical wretches, who have been immolated at the shrine of absurdity for all the possible errors of human credence, let them have their legendary fame. i put them out of the scale in this important inquiry. not that i really think the argument to be much advanced by naming the great supporters of one opinion or of another. in mathematics, mechanics, natural philosophy, in literature, taste, and politics the sentiments of great men of great genius are certainly of weight. there are some subjects capable of demonstration, many indeed which the ingenuity of one man can go farther to illustrate than that of another. the force of high authority is greater in the three former sciences than in the latter. theism and atheism i hold to be neither of them strictly demonstrable. you, dr. priestley, agree with me in that. still i hold the question capable of being illustrated by argument, and i should hold the authority of great men's names to be of more weight in this subject, were i not necessarily forced to consider that all education is strongly calculated to support the idea of a deity; by this education prejudice is introduced, and prejudice is nothing else than a corruption of the understanding. certain principles, call them, if you please, data, must be agreed upon before any reasoning can take place. disputants must at least agree in the ideas which they annex to the language they use. but when prejudice has made a stand, argumentation is set at so wide a distance, through a want of fixt data to proceed upon, that attention is in vain applied to the dispute. besides, the nature of the subject upon which this prejudice takes place, is such, that the finest genius is nearly equally liable to an undue bias with the most vulgar. to question with boldness and indifference, whether an individual, all-forming, all-seeing and all-governing being exists, to whom, if he exists, we may possibly be responsible for our actions, whose intelligence and power must be infinitely superior to our own, requires a great conquest of former habitude, a firmness of nerves, as well as of understanding; it will therefore be no great wonder, if such men as locke and newton can be named among the believers in a deity. they were christians as well as theists, so that their authority goes as far in one respect as in the other. but if the opinions of men of great genius are to have weight, what is to be said of modern men of genius? you, sir, are of opinion that the world is getting wiser as well as better. there is all the reason in the world it should get wiser at least, since wisdom is only a collection of experience, and there must be more experience as the world is older. modern philosophers are nearly all atheists. i take the term atheist here in the popular sense. hume, helvetius, diderot, d'alembert. can they not weigh against locke and newton, and even more than locke and newton, since their store of knowledge and learning was at hand to be added to their own, and among them are those who singly possessed equal science in mathematics as in metaphysics? it is not impossible, perhaps not improbable, from his course of learning and inquiries, that if dr. priestley had not from his first initiation into science been dedicated for what is called the immediate service of god, he himself might have been one of the greatest disprovers of his pretended divinity. in england you think, sir, that atheism is not prevalent among men of free reasoning, though you acknowledge it to be much so in other countries. it is not the first time it has been observed that the greater the superstition of the common people the less is that of men of letters. in the heart of the papal territories perhaps is the greatest number of atheists, and in the reformed countries the greatest number of deists. yet it is a common observation, especially by divines, that deism leads to atheism, and i believe the observation is well founded. i hardly need explain here, that by deism in this sense is meant a belief in the existence of a deity from natural and philosophical principles, and a disbelief in all immediate revelation by the deity of his own existence. such is the force of habit, that it is by degrees only, that even men of sense and firmness shake off one prejudice after another. they begin by getting rid of the absurdities of all popular religions. this leaves them simple deists, but the force of reasoning next carries them a step farther, and whoever trusts to this reasoning, devoid of all fear and prejudice, is very likely to end at last in being an atheist. nor do i admit it to be an argument either for revelation or natural religion, that the same turn for speculation that would convert a christian into a theist, will carry him on to be an atheist, though i know the argument has been often used. if upon sick beds or in dying moments men revert to their old weakness and superstitions, their falling off may afford triumph to religionists; for my part i care not so much for the opinions of sick and dying men, as of those who at the time are strong and healthy. but in the opinion of the one or the other i put no great stress. my faith is in reasoning, for though ridicule is not a complete test of truth, reasoning i hold certainly to be so. i own belief may be imprest on the mind otherwise than by the force of reason. the mind may be diseased. all i shall say is that though i have formerly believed many things without reason, and even many against it, as is very common, i hope i shall never more. my mind (i was going to say, thank god) is sane at present, and i intend to keep it so. i am aware that at the expression just used some will exclaim in triumph, that the poor wretch could not help thinking of his god at the same time he was denying him. the observation would hold good, if it were not that we often speak and write unpremeditately and though what is in this manner unpremeditately expressed upon a revision should be certainly expunged, yet i chuse to leave the expression to shew the force of habit. in fear lies the origin of all fancied deities, whether sole or numberless. _primus in orbe deos fecit timor._ but the great debasement of the human mind is evidenced in the instance of attributing a merit to belief, which has come at last to be stiled a virtue, and is dignified by the name of faith, that most pitiful of all human qualities. when the apostle spoke of faith, hope and charity, he might as well have exclaimed the least of the three is faith, as the greatest is charity. one enthusiast cries out _un roi_ and another _un dieu_. the reality of the king i admit, because i feel his power. against my feeling and my experience i cannot argue, for upon these sensations is built all argument. but not all the wondrous works of the creation, as i hear the visible operations of nature called, convince me in the least of the existence of a deity. by nature i mean to express the whole of what i see and feel, that whole, i call self-existent from all eternity; i admit a principle of intelligence and design, but i deny that principle to be extraneous from itself. my creed in fine is the same with that of the roman poet; _"deus est ubicunque movemur."_ if then i am admitted to explain my deity in this sense, i am not an atheist, nor can any one else in the world be such. the _vis naturae_, the perpetual industry, intelligence and provision of nature must be apparent to all who see, feel or think. i mean to distinguish this active, intelligent and designing principle, inherent as much in matter as the properties of gravity or any elastic, attractive or repulsive power, from any extraneous foreign force and design in an invisible agent, supreme though hidden lord and maker over all effects and appearances that present themselves to us in the course of nature. the last supposition makes the universe and all other organised matter a machine made or contrived by the arbitrary will of another being, which other being is called god; and my theory makes a god of this universe, or admits no other god or designing principle than matter itself and its various organisations. the inquiry is said to be important. but why is it so! all truth is important. it is a question of little importance, merely whether a man had a maker or no, although it is of great importance to disprove the existence of such a deity as theologians wish to establish, because appearances in the world go against it. supposing however that it was granted, that the question, whether there is a deity or not, was as little important as other truths, yet the question becomes important with this reflexion, that other events may follow as deductions; such as a particular providence, or a future state of rewards and punishments; but whether such deductions or either of them necessarily follow may well be queried. as to a particular providence you give up the reality of it, and i give it up too. but i cannot give up the argument, that if there were a god with all his allowed attributes of wisdom, power and justice, there ought to be a particular providence to counteract the general laws of nature, in favour of those who defend the interposition. though the deity should not interfere unless there be a worthy cause, agreeable to the horation rule, _"nec deus interfuit nisi vindice nodus;"_ yet surely from the same principles it should follow that the deity ought to interfere where there is a worthy cause. here however arises another dilemma, for if the deity has really those attributes of power and justice, there would never have been occasion for such temperaneous interpositions. a particular providence must indeed prove one of these two principles, either that god was imperfect in his design, or that inert matter is inimical to the properties of god. if that wished for interposition of the deity is put off to a future existence, i cannot help observing, that future day has been already a long while waited for in vain, and any delay destroys some one attribute or other of the deity. he wants justice, or he wants the power, or the will to do good and be just. that a future state of rewards and punishments may however exist without a deity, you, dr. priestley, allow to be no impossibility. it may indeed be argued with apparent justness, that a principle of reviviscence may as well be admitted as a principle of production in the first instance: and as to rewards and punishments, judgement may be rendered, as well as now, by beings less than deities. for my part i firmly wish for such a future state, and though i cannot firmly believe it, i am resolved to live as if such a state were to ensue. this seems, i own, like doubting, and doubting may be said to be a miserable state of anxiety. "better be confident than unhinged; better confide in ignorance than have no fixed system." so it may be argued; but i think the result will be as people feel. those who do not feel bold enough, to be satisfied with their own thoughts, may abandon them and adopt the thoughts of others. for my part i am content with my own; and not the less so because they do not end in certainty upon matters, from the nature of them, beyond the complete reach of human intelligence. there is nothing in fact important to human nature but happiness, which is or ought to be the end or aim of our being. i mean self-happiness; but fortunately for mankind, such is by nature our construction, that we cannot individually be happy unless we join also in promoting the happiness of others. should immorality, timidity or other base principles arise from atheism it tends immediately, i will own, to the unhappiness of mankind. if it is asked me, "why am i honest and honourable?" i answer, because of the satisfaction i have in being so. "do all people receive that satisfaction?" no, many who are ill educated, ill-exampled and perverted, do not. i do, that is enough for me. in short, i am well constructed, and i feel i can therefore act an honest and honourable part without any religious motive. did i perceive, that belief in a deity produced morality or inspired courage, i might be prompted to confess, that the contrary would ensue from atheism. but the bulk of the world has long believed, or long pretended to believe in a deity, yet morality and every commendable quality seem at a stand. the believer and the unbeliever we often see equally base, equally immoral. superstition is certainly only the excess of religion. that evidently is attended often with immorality and cowardice. i am tempted to say, from observation, that the belief of a deity is apt to drive mankind into vice and baseness; but i check myself in the assertion, upon considering that very few indeed are those who really believe in a deity out of such as pretend to do so. it is impossible for an intellectual being to believe firmly in that of which he can give no account, or of which he can form no conception. i hold the deity, the fancied deity, at least, of whom with all his attributes such pompous descriptions are set forth to the great terror of old women and the amusement of young children, to be an object of which we form (as appears when we scrutinise into our ideas) no conception and therefore can give no account. it is said, after all this, that men do still believe in such a deity, i then do say in return, they do not make use of their intellects. the moment we go into a belief beyond what we feel, see and understand, we might as well believe in will-with-a-whisp as in god. but i would fix morality upon a better basis than belief in a deity. if it has indeed at present no other basis, it is not morality, it is selfishness, it is timidity; it is the hope of reward, it is the dread of punishment. for a great and good man, shew me one who loves virtue because he finds a pleasure in it, who has acquired a taste for that pleasure by considering what and where happiness is, who is not such a fool as to seek misery in preference to happiness, whose honour is his deity, whose conscience is his judge. put such a man in combat against the superstitious son of spain or portugal, it were easy to say who would shew the truest courage. the question might be more voluminously discussed, but i feel already proof of conviction; if you, dr. priestley, do not, perhaps some other readers may. i have nothing to do with men of low minds. they will always have their religion or pretence of it, but i am mistaken if it is not the gallows or the pillory that more govern their morals than the gospel or the pulpit. after all, atheism may be a system only for the learned. the ignorant of all ages have believed in god. the answer of a philosophical unbeliever though written in the vulgar tongue may probably not reach the vulgar. if argument had prevailed they were long converted from their superstitious belief. the sentiments of atheistical philosophers have long been published. if mischief therefore could ensue to society from such free discussions, that mischief society must long have felt. i think truth should never be hid, but few are those who mind it. i will therefore take upon myself but little importance though i have presumed to preface an answer from a philosophical unbeliever to letters which you, dr. priestley have written. if you deem that answer detrimental to the interests of society, you will recollect that you invite the proposal of objections and promise to answer all as well as you can. if you should happen to be exasperated by the freedom of the language or the contrariety of the sentiment, this answer will gain weight in proportion as you lose in the credit of a tolerant divine. therefore if you reply at all, reply with candour and with coolness; heed the matter and not the man, though i subscribe my name, and am reverend sir, your friend, admirer, and humble servant, william hammon. _oxford-street, no._ 418. _jan._ 1, 1782. answer from a philosophical unbeliever. it is the general fashion to believe in a god, the maker of all things, or at least to pretend to such a belief, to define the nature of this existing deity by the attributes which are given to him, to place the foundation of morality on this belief, and in idea at least, to connect the welfare of civil society with the acknowledgement of such a being. few however are those, who being questioned can give any tolerable grounds for their assertions upon this subject, and hardly any two among the learned agree in their manner of proving what each will separately hold to be indisputably clear. the attributes of a deity are more generally agreed upon, though less the subject of proof, than his existence. as to morality, those very people who are moral will not deny, they would be so though there were not a god, and there never yet has been a civil lawgiver, who left crimes to be punished by the author of the universe; not even the profanation of oaths upon the sacredness of which so much is built in society, and which yet is said to be a more immediate offence against the deity than any other that can be named. the method which dr. priestley has taken to prove the existence of a god, is by arguing from _effect_ to _cause_. he explodes that other pretended proof _a priori_ which has so much raised the fame of dr. clarke among other theologians. as to the attributes of the deity, dr. priestley is not quite so confident in his proofs there; and the most amiable one, the most by mortals to be wished for, the _benevolence_ of god he almost gives up, or owns at least there is not so much proof of it as of his other attributes. his observations are divided into several letters, this is one answer given to the whole; for it would be to no purpose to reply to topics upon which the writers are agreed. what therefore is not contradicted here, dr. priestley may in general take to be allowed; but to obviate doubts and to allow his argument every force, it may be fairer perhaps to recite at full length what in this answer is allowed to be true, what is denied as false, what meant to be exposed as absurd, and what rejected as assertions without proof, inadmissible or inconclusive. the conclusion will contain some observations upon the whole. truisms. 1. "effects have their adequate causes." 2. "nothing begins to exist without a cause foreign to itself." 3. "no being could make himself, for that would imply that he existed and did not exist at the same time." 4. if one horse, or one tree, had a cause, all had." 5. something must have existed from all eternity. 6. "atoms cannot be arranged, in a manner expressive of the most exquisite design, without competent intelligence having existed somewhere." 7. "the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing to a virtuous mind, than that of a blind fate and fatherless deserted world." 8. "the condition of mankind is in a state of melioration, as far as misery arises from ignorance, for as the world grows older it must grow wiser, if wisdom arises from experience." 9. "all moral virtue is only a modification of benevolence." 10. "virtue gives a better chance for happiness than vice." 11. "no instance of any revival." 12. "atheists are not to think themselves quite secure with respect to a future life." 13. "thought might as well depend upon the construction of the brain, as upon any invisible substance extraneous to the brain." 14. "if the works of god had a beginning, there must have been a time when he was inactive." 15. "where happiness is wanting in the creation i would rather conclude the author had mist of his design than that he wanted benevolence." false assertions. 1. "a cause needs not be prior to an effect." 2. "if the species of man had no beginning, it would not follow that it had no cause." 3. "a cause may be cotemporary with the effect." 4. "an atheist must believe he was introduced into the world without design." absurdities. 1. "a general mass of sensation consisting of various elements borrowed from the past and the future." 2. "since sensation is made up of past, present, and future, the infant feeling for the moment only, the man recollecting what is past and anticipating the future, and as the present sensation must therefore in time bear a less proportion to the general mass of sensation than it did, so at last all temporary affections, whether of pain or pleasure become wholly inconsiderable." 3. "the great book of nature and the book of revelation both lie open before us." 4. "a conclusion above our comprehension." 5. "a whole eternity already past." 6. "since a finite being cannot be infinitely happy, because he must then be infinite in knowledge and power; and as all limitation of happiness must consist in degree of happiness or mixture of misery, the deity can alone determine which mode of limitation is best." 7. "we have reason to be thankful for our pains and distress." 8. "if the divine being had made man at first as happy as he can be after all the feelings and ideas of a painful and laborious life, it must have been in violation of all general laws and by a constant and momentary interference of the deity." 9. "it is better the divine agency should not be very conspicuous." 10. "if good prevails on the whole, creation being infinite, happiness must be infinite, and god comprehending the whole, will only perceive the balance of good, and that will be happiness unmixed with misery." 11. "if a man is happy in the whole he is infinitely happy in the whole of his existence." 12. "although all things fall alike to all men and no distinction is made between the righteous and the wicked, and even though the wicked derive an advantage from their vices, yet this is consistent with a state of moral government by a being of infinite wisdom and power." 13. "as ploughing is the means of having a harvest, though god has predetermined whether there should be a harvest or not, so prayer is the means of obtaining good from god, although that good is predetermined upon; it is therefore no more absurd to pray than to plough." 14. "notwithstanding happiness is the necessary consequence of health, yet man's happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal feelings." 15. "evil is necessarily connected with and subservient to good, although in the next world there will be all good and no evil." 16. "by reason we can discover the necessary existence of a deity, yet to be a sceptic on that subject is the first step to be a christian, because reason not sufficiently proving it we fly to revealed truth." 17. "the power, which a man has by the comprehensiveness of his mind to enjoy the future, has no apparent limits." 18. "it is of no avail in the argument concerning the existence of a deity, that we have no conception of him, since it does not imply impossibility of his existence that we have no idea at all upon the subject." inadmissible or inconclusive. 1. "the question of the existence of a deity is important." 2. "a theist has a higher sense of personal dignity than an atheist." 3. "the conduct of an atheist must give concern to those who are not so." 4. "an atheist believes himself to be, at his death, for ever excluded from returning life." 5. "there are more atheists than unbelievers in revelation." 6. "men of letters may have the same bias to incredulity as others to credulity, because they are subject to a wrong association of ideas, as well as other persons though in a less degree." 7. "whoever first made a thing, for example a chair or a table, must have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use." 8. "if a table had a designing cause, the tree from whence the wood came, and the man who made the table must have had a designing cause, which comprehended all the powers and properties of trees and men." 9. "all the visible universe, as far as we can judge, bears the marks of being one work, and therefore must have had a cause of infinite power and intelligence." 10. "we might as well say a table had no cause, as that the world had none." 11. "a being originally and necessarily capable of comprehending itself, it is not improper to call infinite, for we can have no idea of any bounds to it's knowledge or power." 12. "a series of finite causes cannot possibly be carried back _ad infinitum_." 13. "our imagination revolts at the idea of an intellectual soul of the universe, that is, of an intelligence resulting from arrangement." 14. "the actual existence of the universe compels us to come at last to an _originally existent and intellectual being_, because if the immediate maker of the universe has not existed from all eternity, he must have derived his being and senses from one who has, and that being we call god." 15. "god must be present to all his works, if we admit no power can act but where it is, he must therefore exist every where, because his works are every where." 16. "as no being can unmake or materially change himself (at least none can annihilate himself) so god is unchangeable, for no being god made can change him and no other being can exist but what god made." 17. "two infinite intelligent beings of the same kind would coincide, therefore there can only be one god." 18. "nothing can be more evident, than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each other from all eternity." 19. "that happiness is the design of the creation because health is designed and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule is as evident as that the design of the mill-wright must have been, that his machine should not be obstructed." 20. "as a state of sickness is comparatively rare with a state of health, happiness the result of health, and the end of the creation happiness, so the end of the creation is already in a great measure answered." 21. "pleasure tends to continue and propagate itself, pain to check and exterminate itself." 22. "as our knowledge and power in respect to shunning pains and procuring pleasures advance with our experience, nothing is wanting to enable us to exterminate all pains, but a continuance of being. 23. "our enjoyments continually increase in real value from infancy to old age." 24. "a future moral distribution is probable, because god is infinitely powerful and wise." 25. "since reverence, gratitude, obedience, confidence are duties to men, so they are to god; and as we pray to men, so we should pray to god." 26. "prescience, predetermination and infinite benevolence are no argument against prayer to the deity." 27. "a wish produced by nature is evidence of the thing wished for, but a future state is wished for, therefore there is evidence of a future state." 28. "as we have no idea how we came originally to be produced, for what we know to the contrary our reproduction may be as much the course of nature as our original production.." 29. "a gloom and melancholy belong more to atheists than to devout people." observations. dr. priestley will hardly doubt, after this collection from his work that it has at least been read before it is attempted to be answered. it is in the writer's power to quote the page and line for each assertion, but it would be stuffing this publication with unnecessary references. dr. priestley will be able to know what are his own sentiments and what not without recurring to his printed letters. there has been also another difficulty in classing the several exceptions under the different heads; what is false, what is absurd, and what is inadmissible bordering so nearly on each other. nice distinctions cannot in such respect be made, but the whole together form the main argument which is to be answered. the first and principal assertion is, that effects have their adequate cause; it is then added, that the universe is an effect, that it therefore must have a cause, and to this cause in the english language is given the name of god. this proposition is true, provided the universe is an effect, but that is a _postulatum_ without concession and without a proof. this _original being_ he advances in another place to be that only something which existed uncaused from all eternity, and which could not have been a being, like a man or a table, incapable of comprehending, itself, for such existences would require another superior being. but if the universe is not adopted as an effect, if it is taken as existing from all eternity, the universe becomes an intelligent being, and there or no where is the deity sought after. such a being we may properly speak of and reason upon. the whole is subjected to our sensations and our experience. but of his own _uncaused being_ dr. p. says we cannot properly speak. is not that alone an argument of there being no such thing? his friend dr. clarke says, we cannot have an idea of an impossible thing. now this discovered deity is allowed to be that of which we can have no idea. so far at least it is allied to the impossible. as to the argument of cause and effect, the latter certainly implies the former; but when we give the name of effect to any thing, we must be certain it is an effect, for we may be so far mistaken perhaps as to call that an effect which is a cause, at least what is an effect to-day may be a cause to-morrow, as in the instance of generation; for though a son does not beget his father, he too has his offspring in which he may be said to live over again, and if we are to argue only from experience, most probably that alone is the resurrection and the life to come. but if it is contended that our experience relates only to finite causes, or causes incapable of comprehending themselves, it must at the same time be allowed, that all our reasoning is founded only on experience. this dr. p. at least allows even while he keeps reasoning about a deity, which he calls an infinite cause capable of comprehending itself, though nobody is capable of comprehending it, and of which we therefore can have no experience. yet he will assert, that _thinking_ persons seldom are convinced by _thinking_. this is odd language for a reasoner. when another philosopher or divine attempts to prove a god in their own way, dr. priestley can readily see his fallacies and absurdities. dr. clarke, the former great champion of god almighty, is made very light of. he thought, foolish man, to prove the existence of a deity merely by our having an idea of that existence, which would go to prove the truth of every unnatural conceit that ever entered into the heart of man; and contended farther that it would be equally absurd to suppose no deity as two and two did not make four. it would indeed be absurd, says dr. priestley provided we agreed that the universe is a _caused_ existence, for god is the name we give for the cause of the universe, which in such case must exist. it is only denying that the universe is a caused existence, and then the absurdity is taken away. dr. priestley, for the sake of making dr. clarke absurd, will readily allow the denial capable of being made; and for the same purpose he seems gravely to have taken upon himself to prove that school-boy's difficulty, that two and two do make four, for he says, that four is the term agreed upon in language to be given to the sum total of two and two, and that to deny the deity is at least not so absurd as to say that two and two do not make four. dr. priestley says he finds no difficulty in excluding every thing from the mind except space and duration. he allows then at least, that there is no manifest absurdity in supposing there is no deity, for nothing can be proved by reasoning if the conclusion can be denied without absurdity, nor can there be a manifest absurdity in denying the existence of what there is no difficulty in excluding from the mind. yet after all he adds (somewhat inconsistently) that we cannot exclude the idea of a deity, if we do not exclude an existent universe. this deity he defines to be a most simple being; simple and infinite; terms which but ill agree together. the infinite or boundless existence of this pretended deity is a property more insisted upon than any other, and whatever other properties are given to him they are all in the infinite degree. the properties alledged to be proved are, eternity, infinite knowledge and power, unchangeableness, unity, omnipotence, action from all eternity, and independence. benevolence and moral government are also ascribed to him but confessedly with a less degree of certainty, though the most desireable of all his given properties. upon the subject of benevolence, dr. priestley only advances, that where it is not proved by the happiness of his creatures to exist, he would rather chuse to conclude he mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that he wanted benevolence. if he means to argue that it is more rational to conclude this deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted benevolence, and because dr. priestley fancies himself to have proved the deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the deity cannot want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his argument is no more a truism. as a wish, that the deity may not want benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. he allows that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the deity, and happiness the contrary. all the proof adduced in favour of benevolence is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant than evil. the infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice, happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions. that lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful being. or grant, that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful being. yet dr. priestley adds that the general benevolence of the deity is unquestionable. how unquestionable? it is questioned by the author himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. after this he asks, who will pretend to dictate to such a being? he might in the same stile conclude that no objection deserved a reply. the whole of this is absurd; but when the doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the rest of the ecclesiastical arguers. they reason themselves into imaginary beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and worship them. god is said to have made man in the image of himself. if he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes god in his own image. much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so differs the god of each devotee. they are all idolaters or anthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not the one or the other. the admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly conclusive against at least a good deity, that it is curious to see how dr. priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty. he partly denies the fact, at least he says there is more good than evil in the world. at last he even turns evil into good, or what ought to be the effects of one, into what ought to be the effects of the other, as he says pain is necessary for happiness. but if pain is, as he says, in this world necessary for happiness, why will it not still be necessary hereafter? he answers, because by that time we shall have experienced pain enough for a future supply of happiness. if it is objected, why have we not had pain enough by the time each of us are twenty or thirty years of age, instead of waiting 'till our deaths at so many different ages? he can only finish his argument by allowing that the ways of god are inscrutable to man, that every thing is for the best and refer us to _candide_ for the rest of his philosophy; nor will he ever resolve the question, "if evil and pain are good and necessary now, why will they not always be so? take a view of human existence, and who can even allow, that there is more happiness than misery in the world? dr. priestley thinks to give the turn of the scale to happiness, by making it depend intirely upon health, notwithstanding he says in another place that human sensations are a mass collected from the past, present and future, and as a man grows up the present goes on to bear a less proportion to the other two. it would indeed be a short but lame way of proving that "happiness is the design of the creation" because health is designed, and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule." many a healthy man has certainly been unhappy, or else had a man better study health than virtue. if the mill-wright make a poor machine he is a poor workman; god in like manner designing health and introducing sickness is but a poor physician. in another place dr. priestley having considered, that he had asserted that human sensations arise from ideas of the past and future as well as the present, finds himself obliged to alter his notions of happiness, so far as to say that happiness is more intellectual than corporeal. but it is rather extraordinary to assert at the same time, that happiness is the necessary consequence of health, and that happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal feelings. surely health, if any thing, is corporeal. another curious fancy about pain and happiness is, that our finite nature not admitting infinite or unlimited happiness we must leave it to the wisdom of the deity to determine which is best for us (since happiness must be diminished) a little pain to be added to it or somewhat of happiness to be taken away. it hardly requires the skill of a benevolent deity to determine which is best for the creatures he has made (and whom he wishes to be as happy as their finite nature will admit) to lessen their degree of happiness or mix therein a proportion of misery. to conclude he asks, "how it is possible to teach children caution, but by feeling pain?" it is easy to allow in answer, that it might not perhaps be possible in us. but he is arguing about the benevolence of a deity. it was possible, he will allow, in him to have given these children knowledge without pain, at least if he continues to him the attribute he allows of omnipotence. next he observes that parents suspend at times their benefits to their offspring, when persuaded they are not for their good; so does the deity. but before this argument holds he must therefore say, it is not for the good of man to be made happy now, and that the deity can be infinitely benevolent without willing either infinite or universal happiness. take the argument any way, it must go against his benevolence or his power; and the same observations hold as to his love of justice, whilst he is so tardy in punishing offenders. after observing that things are in an improving state, dr. priestley allows, that the moral government of the universe is not perfect. from thence he proceeds to assert, that atheists may believe it within the course of nature, that men as moral agents may after death be re-produced, and therefore that there may be a future state though there be no god, because he reasons it may be in the course of nature. this allows that the course of nature may be as it is without a god, and that there is therefore no _natural_ proof of a deity. his farther argument on this head is, that "things usually happen in a state of nature that are proper. a future state is proper. (to carry on the supposed state of melioration and complete the moral government of the universe.) it is therefore probable." this is an argument perhaps more of wish than probability, but let it have such force as belongs to it. it is not the wish of the answerer by supporting atheism to give encouragement to immorality, but should he unwarily or with weak minds do so, the argument of the deity's existence is independent of such considerations. it were better to seek another support for morality than a belief in god; for the moral purpose in believing a deity (an invisible being, maker of all, our moral governor, who will hereafter take cognizance of our conduct,) is not a little checked by considering, that he leaves the proof of his very existence so ambiguous, that even men with a habit of piety upon them cannot but have their doubts, whilst on this existence so much of the moral purpose depends. if this is not an argument against the morality of a deity, it is at all events one against his _infinite_ morality though moral is an attribute to be given to him in the infinite degree as much as any other. it is said, infinite intelligence must have procured a necessary fitness of things, and that this forms morality. "his will could not be biassed by other influence; therefore he must have willed morality, because necessarily fit. then comes infinite power, and yet no morality in the world or a very small portion of it. we cannot to any purpose, do what we will, argue against experience. that it must be, yet that it is not. what must be, will be. if it is not, there is no _must_ in the case. it is next said, that virtue gives a better chance for happiness than vice. this also is but a weak argument for the moral government of the universe, unless it be for a moral government by chance. virtue ought to be the certain and immediate parent of happiness, if a moral governor existed with an uncontrouled dominion. if virtue tends to happiness, or has only a better chance of doing so, it is allowed, that a sensible atheist should hold it right to be virtuous. the latter end of a righteous man is certainly more likely to be happy than that of an unrighteous one. but let an atheist be righteous, and he can be as certain of happiness in his latter end as any other. let another life be desirable, as it certainly is, his doubts upon it will not prevent it. who could wish an end better or more happy than that of mr. hume, who most indubitably was an atheist. but if an atheist be not so good as a theist, dr. priestley perhaps, will allow him to be better than a sceptic, as any principles for systematising nature are better than none at all. a theist is not without his doubts as well as the sceptic; an atheist, once firmly becoming so, will never doubt more; for we may venture to say no miracles or new appearances will present themselves to him to draw his belief aside. still every thing is as god intended it--so asserts dr. priestley; and therefore it cannot by him be denied that crimes and vices, are of his intention. the theist exclaims in triumph, "he that made the eye, must he not see?" but who made the eye? or grant that god made the eye, which can only see in the light, must he necessarily see in the dark? it is again asserted, "the power which formed an eye had something in view as certainly as he that constructed a telescope. if any being formed any eye, grant it. but if the eye exists necessarily as a part of nature; as much as any other matter, or combination of matter, necessarily existed, the result of the argument is intirely different. it is far from being a necessary part of the atheist's creed to exclude design from the universe. he places that design in the energy of nature, which dr. priestley gives to some other extraneous being. it is rather inconsistent also in him to say, that an atheist rightly judging of his own situation upon his own principles, ought not to hold himself quite secure from a future state of responsibility and existences, and yet to say he must in his own ideas hold himself soon to be excluded for ever from life. as to the immutability of the deity, it is difficult to guess how that is proved, except by the argument of _lucus a non lucendo_, because every thing is changing here; therefore the deity never changes; which is neither an argument _a priori_ nor _posteriore_, but _sui generis_, merely applicable to the deity. from the imperial infinite intelligence of the deity an argument is formed of his unity. dr. priestley says, "that two _infinite_ intelligent beings would coincide, and therefore that there can only be one such being." two parallels will never coincide. that is one of the first axioms of euclid, in whom dr. priestley believes as much as in his bible. if the beings are infinite in extent and magnitude they must certainly coincide, but if they are only infinite in intelligence, it does not seem to be necessary that they should. the ubiquity of god is proved in this short way: "god made every thing, god controuls every thing. no power can act but where it is. therefore god is present every where. the workman must certainly be present at his work, but when the work is done he may go about other business. if all the properties of matter, such as gravity, elasticity and other such existed only by the perpetual leave and agency of the deity, it may be argued he is in all places where matter is. space, empty space will still exist without him. in this mode of proof dr. priestley must, contrary to the newtonian system argue for a _plenum_, before he proves the ubiquity. he cannot exclude space from his mind, nor can he exclude gravity from matter. yet can he admit matter as well as space to be eternal, because he will not allow the inactivity of god." "if god's works had a beginning he must have been _for a whole eternity_ inactive." he seems to have an odd notion of eternity, for he there allows it could have an end. the argument would be fairer in concluding "he must have been inactive _or doing something else_." the deity set up, if not the creator of matter, is at least the matter of it, nor will his advocates by any means allow him to be material himself. they see some incongruity in admitting one piece of matter to be so complete a master of another. however dr. priestley and other arguers for a deity would do well to consider, that whatever is not matter, is a space that matter may occupy. therefore if god is not matter, and also is not space, he is nothing. dr. priestley allows matter eternal, and its properties of gravity, elasticity, electricity and others equally eternal. he says directly, that matter cannot exist without it's perpetually corresponding powers. the adjustment of those powers he places in the deity. but as we never see matter without the adjustment of those properties as well as the existence of them, this drives him at last to say, the deity must also have created matter, according to his system eternally created it, cotemporarily with himself. ideas absurd and irreconcileable! discoursing upon the hypothesis of "a fortuitous concourse of atoms" dr. priestley asks, "what reason we have to think that small masses of matter can have power without communication _ab extra_?" let this question be returned, "have we not reason to think so from attraction the most common property in matter." to get rid of this difficulty he will not allow an atom of matter to be possessed originally of the most simple powers, though he is ready to allow matter to have been eternal. a magnet according to this system must sometime have existed without its magnetic power. he concludes there must be some original existent being. he shall be allowed many original existent beings if it pleases him. a man may be an originally existent being, as well as any other. he is superior to other animals in this world. in like manner there may be allowed superior beings to man (as most probably there are) and yet those superior beings not have made man. dr. priestley will have it, that all bodies are moved by external force. that does not seem quite necessary. motion may as well be asserted to be originally a property of matter, or its true natural state and rest a deprivation of that property, as that rest should be its natural state. hume thought so and hume was no great fool, notwithstanding dr. priestley makes so light of him. in fact matter never is, and therefore most probably never was found to be in a state of rest. nor has dr. priestley any reason to suppose gravity, elasticity and electricity to have been imprest on bodies by a superior being, and not originally inherent in matter, unless to favour his own hypothesis of a deity. he absolutely says matter could not have had those powers without a communication from a superior and intelligent being. if matter is perceived in regulated motion, it is added bluntly, that it must be by a mover possessed of a competent intelligence, and that a being therefore of such power and intelligence _must_ exist. whoever finds no difficulty in believing the contrary will find as little difficulty in mr. hume's hypothesis, that motion might as well as other powers and properties have been originally inherent in matter, or at least have been a necessary result of some matter acting upon another. it has always been a doubt with theists, whether they can better prove their god's existence by moral or physical considerations. dr. priestley seems to think the _forte_ of the argument lies in the latter proof, and lays particular stress upon his observation respecting cause and effect, which therefore cannot here be so readily dismissed. he makes great reference to the works of art. theists are always for turning their god into an overgrown man. anthropomorphites has long been a term applied to them. they give him hands and eyes nor can they conceive him otherwise than as a corporeal being. in which, as before has been said, they are very right, for there can only be in the world body and the space which bodies occupy. but granting this great workman to have done so much, is it not quite an incontrovertible proposition, that whoever first made a thing, as, for example, a chair or a table, must have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use. dr. priestley speaks more correctly in another part, by saying, he must have been _capable_ of comprehending it. the nature and use of things are often found out after they are made and by different persons than the makers of them. neither is there any analogy between the works of art, as a table or house, and of nature, as a man or tree. therefore there can be no arguing from one to another by analogy. hume observes that the former works are done by reason and design, and the latter by generation and vegetation, and therefore arguing from effect to causes, it is probable, that the universe is generated or vegetated. at least after all the observations about a table, it may be modestly asked, whether there is not some difference between a table and the world? the doctor will also find some difficulty in explaining the propriety of any argument of analogy between men and metals, which he does not at other times scruple to make? a _gratis_ assertion is first made, that all things we see are effects; then because we see one thing caused, every thing must have been caused. his conclusion of the argument is still more curious, "because every thing was caused there must have been something that was not caused." the cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. the effect is not infinite. why then attribute infinity to the cause? this is hume's argument. priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher. let others judge! but surely, with all this infinity it may be asked, why may not there have been an infinity of causes? another argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any thing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that invisible power is what he calls god. apply this argument to gravity, and the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is god. but if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of nature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible? why necessary to account at all for them? or why may not visible things account for them, although this person or another cannot tell which? if nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material nature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of deities, than one immediate deity. an equality in a plurality of deities might be objectionable. but that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary; and so was the pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one. this universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of another, and so on. where is the absurdity of that? if the universe is applied to the solar system, there is an appearance of its being formed by one design, and in that stile it might be said to be the work of one hand. but this deity is asserted to be infinite, and to have made all other worlds and universes, though it does not appear by any unity of design that all other worlds and universes are one work with this. dr. priestley himself allows that reason would drive us to require a cause of the deity. he is himself obliged to conclude, after all his reasoning, that we must acquiesce in our inability of having any idea on the subject; that is, how god could exist without a prior cause. at the same time he says the deity cannot have a cause, and therefore we cannot reason about him. why then all his own reasoning? we make a deity ourselves, fall down and worship him. it is the molten calf over again. idolatry is still practised. the only difference is that now we worship idols of our imagination; before of our hands. "still we must necessarily rest at a being that is infinite;" that is, when our reason drives us to the admission of an infinite cause we must necessarily stop finitely in our career. not content with this conclusion he adds, that we cannot help perceiving the existence of this cause, though he owns that it is not an object of our conceptions. but even the theist's argument does not necessarily drive us to the admission of an infinite cause. the argument is, "because there is a man, and man has intelligence, we must necessarily admit of a being of infinitely superior intelligence." would it not be nearly as well to argue, "because there is a goose, therefore there must be a man." what is there more which hinders a series of finite causes to be carried back _ad infinitum_, than that the reasoner or contemplator of the course of nature is tired. if this eternal series could not exist, a deity might with some propriety be said to follow. put the argument into a syslogistic form. "the universe shews design;" "it is absurd to suppose an infinite succession of finite causes;" "therefore there is an uncaused intelligent cause of this universe." deny the second assertion and the problem is destroyed. so far from its being difficult to suppose an eternity, it is the most difficult thing in the world to suppose any thing but an eternity. a mind, not afraid to think, will find it the most easy contemplation in the world to dwell upon. it is at least a bold assertion, that _nothing can be more evident_ than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each other by succession from all eternity. surely to this may be answered, that it is more evident that two and two make four. but dr. priestley goes on to say, "that the primary cause of a man cannot be a man, any more than the cause of a sound can be a sound." experience shews us all sound is an effect of a cause. does experience shew us more of a man than that he came from a man and a woman? to allow therefore that all men must have come from a man and a woman is as far as we can argue upon the subject, whilst in reasoning we trust to experience. an argument is well built upon similarity, therefore it is probable if one horse had a cause all horses had. but will not the argument be more consonant to itself, in supposing all horses had the same cause, and as one is seen to be generated from a horse and a mare so all were from all eternity. it were a better argument in favour of a deity or some invisible agent to shew that a new animal came every now and then into life, without any body's knowing how or where. it is allowed by priestley and all other reasoners, that the most capital argument that can be formed in support of any thesis is to be built upon experience, or analogy to experience. yet will many of these reasoners, dr. priestley at least for one, contend at the same time for the probability of a future life, when no instance can be given of any revival whatsoever. the same will contend, that their deity can at pleasure form new species of animals, though in fact we never do see new beings come into existence. we ought only to argue from experience; and experience would teach us, that the species of all animals has eternally existed. grant that we do not know, whether man has been eternal, or from a time, is it therefore because we do not know, that we must say he came from god? that unknown being, as he is sometimes pompously and ridiculously called! the devil is equally an unknown being. the admission of evil under a good deity opens a ready door to the manichean system, which seems much more rational than simple deism. the following chain of reasoning, as used by dr. priestley, is well linked together to prove the weight and force of experience in reasoning, but it proves nothing more. "chairs and tables are made by men or beings of similar powers, because we see them made by men; and we cannot suppose them made by a tree or come into being of themselves, because that is against experience. no one will say one table might make another, or that one man might make another. we see nothing come into being without an adequate cause." yet for this adequate cause we are at the same time referred to a belief in a causeless secret invisible agent, and to our own experience, for a proof of his nature. dr. priestley allows, that what is _visible_ in man may be the feat of all his powers, for it is (as he says,) a rule in philosophy not to multiply causes without necessity. but he affirms that what is _visible_ in the universe cannot be the feat of intelligence. this is breaking the very rule of reasoning which he himself has chosen to adopt; and he gives no other reason for it, than because we do not see the universe think as we do man. sensible of this dilemma, soon afterwards he inclines to allow principle of thought to the universe, for he adds, that if we allow it, yet the universe has so much the appearance of other works of design that we must look out for its author as much as that of a man; and it is allowed that most probably it had the same author. every difficulty vanishes with the energy of nature, or at least is as well accounted for as from an independent deity. it is an usual question to those philosophers, who maintain that the present existence of things is the result of the force and energy of nature acting upon herself, "why this force does not perpetually operate and produce new appearances?" besides that this question may be retorted upon the supporters of a deity, i am thoroughly persuaded, that this force is constantly in action, and that every change which animals and vegetables undergo, whether of dissolution or renovation, is a manifest and undeniable proof of it. man, and the other beings which occupy this terrestrial globe, are evidently suited to its present state, and an alteration in their habitation, such as that of extreme or excessive heat, would inevitably destroy them. this is so certain, that bones of animals have been dug up which appertain to no species now existing, and which must have perished from an alteration in the system of things taking place too considerable for it to endure. whenever the globe shall come to that temperament fit for the life of that lost species, whatever energy in nature produced it originally, if even it had a beginning, will most probably be sufficient to produce it again. is not the reparation of vegitable life the spring equally wonderful now as its first production? yet this is a plain effect of the influence of the sun, whose absence would occasion death by a perpetual winter. so far this question from containing, in my opinion, a formidable difficulty to the epicurean system, i cannot help judging the continual mutability of things as an irrefragable proof of this eternal energy of nature. those who ask, why the great changes in the state of things are not more frequent, would absurdly require them to ensue within the short space of their existence, forgetting that millions of ages are of no importance to the whole mass of matter, though beings of some particular forms may find a wish and an advantage to prolong the term of their duration under that form. if it is said, nature or the energy of nature is another name for the deity, then may dr. priestley and his answerer shake hands; the one is no more an atheist than the other. and if it is observed that the energy of nature having produced men may be capable of re-producing them, so that an atheist is not sure to escape punishment for his crimes, it is easy to say in return, neither is a deist sure. a good atheist has no more reason to be afraid to be re-produced than a good deist or a christian. it may be useful for both of them to be good. if necessary let it again be repeated, that it is not at all meant in this answer to make atheism a plea or protection for immorality. that is a charge long and most unjustly put upon the poor undefended atheist. the knowledge of a god and even the belief of a providence are found but too slight a barrier against human passions, which are apt to fly out as licentiously as they would otherwise have done. all, which this creed can in reality produce, scarce goes beyond some exterior exercises, which are vainly thought to reconcile man to god. it may make men build temples, sacrifice victims, offer up prayers, or perform something of the like nature; but never break a criminal intrigue, restore an ill gotten wealth, or mortify the lust of man. lust being the source of every crime, it is evident (since it reigns as much among idolaters and anthropomorphites, as among atheists) idolaters and anthropomorphites must be as susceptible of all of crimes as atheists, and neither the one set nor the other could form societies, did not a curb, stronger then that of religion, namely human laws, repress their perverseness. if no other remedy were applied to vice than the remonstrances of divines, a great city such as london, would in a fortnight's time, fall into the most horrid disorders. whatever may be the difference of faith, vice predominates alike with the christian and the jew, with the deist and the atheist. so like are they in their actions, that one would think they copied one another. religion may make men follow ceremonies; little is the inconvenience found in them. a great triumph truly for religion to make men baptise or fast? when did it make men do virtuous actions for virtue's sake, or practise fewer inventions to get rich, where riches could not be acquired without poverty to others? the true principle most commonly seen in human actions, and which philosophy will cure sooner than religion, is the natural inclination of man for pleasure, or a taste contracted for certain objects by prejudice and habit. these prevail in whatsoever faith a man is educated, or with whatever knowledge he may store his mind. but it will be said, those who commit crimes are atheists at the time at least they do so. but an atheist cannot be superstitious, and criminals are often so at the very moment of their crimes. religious persuasion men are not doubted to have when they vent their rage upon others of a different way of thinking, when they express a dread of danger or a zeal for ceremonies. these at least are not virtues; and few indeed must be those, who at any time are really theists, if their faith is lost or forgotten every time they have a mind to indulge a vitious passion. to support still the efficacy of religion in making men virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of fact; it is like the philosopher denying motion, and being refuted by one of his scholars walking across the room. if then it is true, as history and the whole course of human life shew it is, that men can still plunge themselves into all sorts of crimes, though they are persuaded of the truth of religion, which is made to inform them that god punishes sin and rewards good actions, it cannot but be suspected that religion even encourages crimes, by the hopes it gives of pardon through the efficacy of prayer; at all events it must be granted, that those who hold up a belief in god as a sufficient proof and character of a good life are most egregiously mistaken. some theists may have lighter sense of personal dignity than some atheists. if the theist thinks himself allied to and connected with the deity he may plume himself upon his station; but how apt are those worshipers of a god, instead of having a high sense of personal dignity, to debase themselves into the most abject beings, dreading even the shadow of their own phantom. an atheist feeling himself to be a link in the grand chain of nature, feels his relative importance and dreads no imaginary being. an atheist, who is so from inattention and without intelligence, may indeed feel himself as much debased as the meanest and most humble theist. another argument against atheists is, that where men are atheists it is generally found that their usual turn of thinking and habits of life have inclined to make them so. is not this to be turned upon theists? but granting that the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing, and that the argument with respect to the existence or non-existence of a god was in _equilibrio_, it is not therefore right to conclude that the mind ought to be determined by this or any other bias. nor is it quite clear if there is no god (by which term let it again be noticed, is meant a being of supreme intelligence, the contriver of the material universe and yet no part of the material system) that the world in which man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted. the wisdom of nature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection of the deity. if the world has so good a mother, a father may well be spared especially such a haughty jealous, and vindictive one as god is most generally represented to be. dr. priestley being clear in his opinion; that the being of a god is capable of being proved by reason, is not so weak as some of his fellow-labourers, who hold the powers of reason in so low estimation as to be incapable of themselves to arrive at almost any truth. he must however allow, if reason proves a deity and his attributes there was less use of revelation to prove them. but the learned advocates of a deity differ greatly among themselves, whether his existence is capable of being ascertained by fixt principles of reason. after such a difference and the instance of so many great men in all ages, from democritus downward, who have confidently denied the being of a god, whose arguments the learned dr. cudworth, in the last century, only by fully and fairly stating, with all the answers in his power to give (though his zeal in religion was never doubted) was thought by other divines to have given a weight to atheism not well to be overturned, it is surprising that it should be the common belief of this day, that an argument in support of atheism cannot stand a moment, and that even no man in his senses can ever hold such a doctrine. all that epicurus and lucretius have so greatly and convincingly said is swept away in a moment by these better reasoners, who yet scruple not to declare, with dr. priestley, that what they reason about is not the subject of human understanding. but let it be asked, is it not absurd to reason with a man about that of which that same man asserts we have no idea at all? yet will dr. priestley argue, and say it is of no importance, whether the person with whom he argues has a conception or not of the subject. "having no ideas includes no impossibility," therefore he goes on with his career of words to argue about an unseen being with another whom he will allow to have no idea of the subject and yet it shall be of no avail in the dispute, whether he has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having any. reason failing, the passions are called upon, and the imagined god is represented at one time, with all the terrors of a revengeful tyrant, at another with all the tenderness of an affectionate parent. shall then such a tremendous being with such a care for the creatures he has made, suffer his own existence to be a perpetual doubt? if the course of nature does not give sufficient proof, why does not the hand divine shew itself by an extraordinary interposition of power? it is allowed miracles ought not to be cheap or plenty. one or two at least every thousand years might be admitted. but this is a perpetual standing miracle, that such a being as the depicted god, the author of nature and all its works, should exist and yet his existence be perpetually in doubt, or require a jesus, a mahomet or a priestley to reveal it. is not the writing of this very answer to the last of those three great luminaries of religion a proof, that no god, or no _such_ god at least, exists. hear the admirable words of the author of "the system of nature;" _comment permet il qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses droits, ses titres, son existence meme?_ dr. clarke, mr. hume and helvetius, are writers whose arguments for and against a godhead dr. priestley has much noted. the former says, "the deity must have been infinite, if self-existent, because all things in the universe are made by him." are all things in the universe infinite? why an infinite maker of a finite work? it is juster to argue, that whatever is self-existent must have been eternal. nor is there any great objection to the converse of the proposition properly taken, that whatever is not self-existent must have been created and therefore cannot have been eternal. if this is fair arguing, matter cannot according to dr. priestley's system have been created and be eternal also. but dr. priestley has no inclination to reconcile his opinions with those of dr. clarke. he has chosen a fairer method, and that is, to refute the arguments of former asserters of a deity as well as to establish his own. dr. clarke he most effectually exposes where he enters upon the subject of space. it seems as if dr. clarke, having asserted that the deity necessarily existed, had a mind that nothing else should necessarily exist but the deity; and conscious that space at least also necessarily existed, he makes universal space an attribute of the deity. with this reverie in his head he raises a syllogism of complete nonsense (_vide priestley's letters_, p. 170.) where he supposes space to be nothing though he also supposes it to be an attribute of the deity. making it therefore an attribute of the deity and knowing that space is eternal and unmeasurable he takes upon himself thereby also clearly to have proved that the deity is so. exclude the deity, space will still exist and still be eternal and immense. dr. priestley knew well that dr. clarke's argument in this respect was all a fallacy, and therefore he shews his sense in not adopting it. it is in fact an abuse of terms unworthy of a scientific reasoner. the only argument attempted by dr. clarke, why the deity must have had no cause, is, because it is necessary he should have none. dr. clarke says roundly that necessity is the cause of the existence of the deity. this is very near the language of the ancients, who held that fate controuled the gods. necessity is therefore the first god. why then any other god than necessity? what more has helvetius said than that? it is an old and unanswerable argument that, granting a god and his power infinite, whatever he wills is executed; but man and other animals are unhappy, therefore he does not will they should be happy. or take the argument the other way and it will equally conclude against his power. with regard to mr. hume's famous observations upon the evidence of miracles, dr. priestley thinks to make a short havock of them by observing that new, and therefore miraculous appearances, are continually presenting themselves; but although such new appearances may be instanced, they are not contrary to former experience, only in addition to it. with this allusion to natural philosophy, dr. priestley thinks himself in one short sentence to have discussed all mr. hume's observations upon miracles. _"which is more likely, that the relater of a miracle should have lied or been deceived, or that the thing related should have existed contrary to experience prior and subsequent?"_ let the force of this observation be considered and believe in the history of miracles who can! to give a finishing stroke to poor mr. hume, dr. priestley observes that literary fame was hume's only motive and consolation, as he said himself, in all his laborious enquiries and enlightened writings. at this he exclaims, "what gloomy prospect and poor comfort he must have had at his death!" if so, how much was he the greater man so well to have gone through that last scene! the honour which dr. priestley gives to helvetius, the author of that ingenious and satisfactory work intitled "the system of nature," does credit to his own candour. he applauds him for speaking out, he ought therefore to applaud this answer for the same reason. it is true he seems to have discovered one incongruity in the reasoning of helvetius. the words he imputes to him are, "that nature has no object, because nature acts necessarily; man has an object; yet man also acts necessarily." in the same way nature might have an object though it acted necessarily. but helvetius adds, that the object which man has is a necessary object. the best defence of helvetius (not in behalf of that passage, but of his general system) is to let him speak at large for himself; and the following quotation dr. priestley and the reader may accept as a specimen of the strength and justice of his argument, and as the conclusion of this answer. "theologians tell us, that the disorder and evil, which is seen in the world, is not absolute and real, but relatively and apparently such, and does not disprove the divine wisdom and goodness. but may not one reply, that the goodness and wonderful order which they so much extol, and on which they found their notions of those qualities in god, are in a similar way only relative and apparent. if it be only our co-existence with the causes which surround us, and our manner of perceiving them, that constitute the order of nature for us, and authorise us to attribute wisdom and goodness to the maker of what surround us, should not also our mode of existence and perception authorise us to call what is hurtful to us disorder, and to attribute impotence, ignorance, or malice, to that being which we would suppose to actuate nature. some pretend that the supremely wise god can derive goodness and happiness to us from the midst of those ills which he permits us to undergo in this world. are these men privy counsellors of the divinity, or on what do they found their romantic hopes? they will doubtless say, that they judge of god's conduct by analogy, and that from the present appearance of his wisdom and goodness, they have a right to infer his future wisdom and goodness. but do not the present appearances of his want of wisdom or goodness justify us in concluding, that he will always want them? if they are so often manifestly deficient in this world, what can assure us that they will abound more in the next? this kind of language therefore rests upon no other basis than a prejudiced imagination, and signifies, that some men, having without examination, adopted an opinion that god is good, cannot admit that he will consent to let his creatures remain constantly unhappy. yet this grand hypothesis, of the unalterable felicity of mankind hereafter, is insufficient to justify the divinity in permitting the present sleeting and transitory marks of injustice and disorder. if god can have been unjust for a moment, he has derogated, during that moment at least, from his divine perfection, and is not unchangeably good; his justice then is liable to temporary alteration, and, if this be the case, who can give security for his justice and goodness continuing unalterable in a future life, the notion of which is set up only to exculpate his deviation from those qualities in this? in spite of the experience, which every instant gives the lie to that beneficence which men suppose in god, they continue to call him good. when we bewail the miserable victims of those disorders and calamities that so often overwhelm our species, we are confidently told that these ills are but apparent, and that if our short-sighted mind could fathom the depths of divine wisdom, we should always behold the greatest blessings result from what we denominate evil. how despicable is so frivolous an answer! if we can find no good but in such things as affect us in a manner which is agreeable and pleasing to our actual existence, we shall be obliged to confess that those things which affect us, even but for a time, in, a painful manner, are as certainly evil to us. to vindicate god's visiting mankind with these evils some tell us, that he is just, and that they, are chastisements inflicted on mankind to punish the wrongs he has received from men. thus a feeble mortal has the power to irritate and injure the almighty and eternal being who created this world. to offend any one is, to afflict him, to diminish in some degree his happiness, to make him feel a painful sensation. how can man possibly disturb the felicity of the all-powerful sovereign of nature! how can a frail creature, who has received from god his being and his temper, act against the inclinations of an irresistable force which never consents to sin and disorder? besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can have of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due. but theologians constantly preach that god owes us nothing, that the good things he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and that without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures as his choice or caprice may impel him. in this doctrine i see not the smallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking abuse of power. in fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into an abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under the empire of this god whose justice is so much extalled? "this misery, say you, is but for a time." very well, sirs, but your god is unjust for a time. "he chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own benefit." but if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at all? "he does it, perhaps to try them" but, if he knows all things, what occasion is there for him to try any? if he is omnipotent, why need he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him? omnipotence ought to be exempt from any such passions, as having neither equals nor rivals. but if this god is jealous of his glory, his titles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to offend him? why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which his pride expects? _why am i a feeble mortal permitted to attack his titles, his attributes, and even his existence?_ is this permission of punishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour? he should never have permitted me to abuse them. or the grace he bestowed should have been efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking. "but, say you, he makes man free." alas? why did he present him with a gift of which he must have foreseen the abuse? is this faculty of free agency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of his worshippers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a present worthy of his infinite goodness? in consequence of the pretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good god ought not to have bestowed on beings capable of abusing it, everlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory crimes of a being made liable to commit them. would that father be called good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and dangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom he before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder of his life for cutting himself with it? would that prince be called just and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the offence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of vengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly offended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him, especially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk? should we consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were in such confusion and disorder, that, except a small number obedient servants, all his subjects were every instant despising his laws, defeating his will and insulting his person? let ecclesiastics then acknowledge, that their god is an assemblage of incompatible qualities, as incomprehensible to their understanding as to mine. no: they say, in reply to these difficulties, that wisdom and justice in god, are qualities so much above or so unlike those qualities in us, that they bear no relation or affinity towards human wisdom and justice. but, pray how am i to form to myself an idea of the divine perfection, unless it has some resemblance to those virtues which i observe in my fellow creatures and feel in myself? if the justice of god is not the same with human justice, why lastly do any men pretend to announce it, comprehend and explain it to others?" postscript. previous to this publication the editor sent the following letter to dr. priestley. "reverend sir, had you thought it impossible for man to hold different sentiments respecting natural religion and the proof of the existence of a god than you do, the letters to a philosophical unbeliever would not have appeared, much less would you have invited an answer by promising a reply to every objection. differing from you in sentiment i am the man who enter with you in the lists; but i find myself upon consultation with my friends under more difficulties than you were, and more to stand in need of courage in taking up the glove, than you needed to have in throwing it down. for this dispute is not like others in philosophy, where the vanquished can only dread ridicule, contempt and disappointment; here, whether victor or vanquished, your opponent has to dread, beside ecclesiastical censure, the scourges, chains and pillories of the courts of law. i accuse you not of laying a trap for an unguarded author, but i ask your friendly opinion, whether i can, with temporal safety at least, maintain the contrary of your arguments in proof of a deity and his attributes. if i cannot, no wonder the theist cries _victoria!_ but then it is a little ungenerous to ask for objections. of you, i may certainly expect, that you will promise to use your influence, as well with lawyers as ecclesiastics, not to stir up a persecution against a poor atheist in case there should be one found in the kingdom, which people in general will not admit to be possible; or, if a persecution could ensue, that you and your friends, favourers of free enquiry, will at least bear the expences of it. i am, reverend sir, your most humble obedient servant, william hammon. oct. 23. 1781. _to the reverend dr. priestley._ to this letter dr. priestley sent no answer; or no answer ever came to hand. the end. the mistakes of jesus by william floyd _author of "social progress," "people vs. wall street," "our gods on trial," "war resistance."_ _new york_ the freethought press association. copyright 1932 by the freethought press assn., inc. to devotees of truth transcriber's note: minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. archaic spellings have been retained. paragraph spacing has been normalised. a table of contents, though not present in the original publication, has been provided below: foreword face the facts. the true jesus. scriptures unauthentic. faith in jesus. documentary evidence. retain the good. christianity must go. antiquated theology the virgin birth. the jewish messiah. eternal damnation. the atonement. angels and devils. false impressions jonah and the whale. end of the world. miracles. eternal life. raising lazarus. god's protection. belief in prayer. obscure teachings witnesses and judge. cannibalism. religion only for children. difficult or easy? charity. the scriptures upheld. illogical. parables deceptive. deficient instructions labor. usury. economics. punishment for debts. healing. peace. marriage. celibacy. adultery. divorce. faulty judgment. unconvincing. prohibition. lack of experience. an inferior prototype cursing nature. forgiveness. vituperation. destruction of property. egotism. lack of courtesy. unethical advice. sermon on the mount. inconsistency. fear. failure. conclusion jesus a myth. judged by his works. ethical evolution. gains, not losses. code of living foreword the tradition regarding jesus is so glamorous that it is difficult to review his life and character with an unbiased mind. while fundamentalists and modernists differ regarding the divinity of christ, all christians and many non-christians still cling to preconceived notions of the perfection of jesus. he alone among men is revered as all-loving, omniscient, faultless--an unparalleled model for mankind. this convention of the impeccability of jesus is so firmly established that any insinuation of error on his part is deemed a blasphemy. doubting jesus is more impious than mocking god almighty. jehovah may be exposed to some extent with impunity; a god who destroyed 70,000 of his chosen people because their king took a census[1] is too illogical for any but theologians to worship. but the son of god, or son of man, is sacrosanct. jesus is reverenced as the one man who has lived unspotted by the world, free from human foibles, able to redeem mankind by his example. respect for the principles of jesus is so inbred in american people of all faiths that an attempt to disparage his worth is denounced as bad taste. the detractor is suspected of being an immoral person, no matter how convincing may be the proof which he presents. a conspiracy of silence is directed against any system of ethics advanced as superior to the sermon on the mount. in popular opinion jesus never made a mistake; all his teachings were infallible; no other view is tolerated. _face the facts_ this unwillingness to acknowledge the shortcomings of jesus is partially due to fear of sustaining a great loss. the familiar answer to heretical arguments is that faith should not be destroyed unless something can be put in its place--ignoring the fact that something always may be substituted for beliefs destroyed. that substitute is faith in the world as it really is. and our modern world, with all its shortcomings, is infinitely preferable to the earth, or even the heaven, of the first century. we now know that man can do more to eradicate sorrow than jesus ever thought of. we can have greater confidence in the world as revealed today than in the doubtful traditions of biblical times. but suppose there were nothing to substitute for the myth destroyed, should that deter the truthseeker from continuing his investigation? scientists do not hesitate in their research because the result of a new discovery may be disastrous. they seek the facts regardless of consequences; they want to know the truth about the physical world. ethicists should have a similar desire concerning the metaphysical world. they should have confidence that the supreme intelligence (as edison called it) will lead on to better things. _the true jesus_ if jesus was what his followers believe, no arguments will destroy their faith in him; but if jesus was not perfect, according to modern standards, it is important that his status as god, or man, should be revised. loss of confidence in an erring idol is not loss of a true ideal. when an iconoclast asserts that jesus lacked supreme intelligence, the natural question is, "how do you know that you are right in your appraisal, 'lest haply ye be found even to fight against god'?" the answer is that we do not claim omniscience, but merely request everyone to use his or her own judgment, with intellectual honesty, examining each act or saying of jesus without regard to presupposed ideas or tradition. _scriptures unauthentic_ the consensus of scholarship has rejected the creation of the universe in six days in 4004 b.c., science having proved the existence of the world for millions of years. higher critics refuse to credit the book of genesis, according to the first chapter of which the trees, beasts and fowls were created before man, but according to the second chapter after man. it is not assuming too much for the humblest writer to say that moses was mistaken concerning many things he described in the pentateuch. it follows that if one important portion of the bible is untrustworthy, other parts of that same book may not be the infallible word of god. the new testament, as well as the old, may be examined critically, and if the gospels contain numerous contradictions, the statements of the authors on any point, including the life of jesus, are open to question. a conscientious person should reach conclusions based upon the best knowledge obtainable from all sources. if anyone is convinced that jesus made mistakes, he is not necessarily compelled to become an atheist. all other gods that have been worshipped by men have been found imperfect. the oft exposed errors of jehovah do not prevent christians and jews from professing belief in god. those who require support from outside themselves cling to the symbol of deity though not thoroughly crediting any personality ever described in any sacred scriptures. except jesus. an evolutionist passes beyond the negative denial of god to the construction of a new philosophy in which truth is his guide, truth being the nearest approximation to reality obtainable with our present knowledge. belief in the world as it is now, and as it is going to be, is a sufficient creed. _faith in jesus_ with jesus entrenched in popular opinion, there is small probability that faith in him will be shaken unless there is a preponderance of evidence against his divinity. no one need abandon faith in jesus until convinced that something better has been found. no one should even expose himself to heretical arguments unless he is a devotee of truth. then only can he rejoice at a revelation of error in confidence that the more nearly the universe is understood the better can man adjust himself to his surroundings. a worshipper of truth fears no destruction of false gods, nor any facts that may cause him to throw over treasured superstitions. he is willing to prove all things and hold fast to that which is true. he rejoices when his idol is shattered, knowing that he is approaching nearer to the true way of living, a way that jesus did not adequately explain. any attempt to censure the character of jesus will meet with the ridicule it deserves unless substantiated by documentary evidence. the mere improbability of events contrary to natural laws does not destroy the ethical value of the teachings of the nazarene. anything might have happened in the eerie days of old; the critic must do more than deny the historicity of jesus and the inspiration of the bible. to be convincing he must derive from the scriptures in which christians believe whatever proof can be deduced to unveil the superstition of a redeeming savior. _documentary evidence_ the documents most generally accepted by christians are those collected in the king james version of the bible. the apocrypha and other early manuscripts are unreliable. none of the thirty or more writers who described events around jerusalem in jesus' time gives any account of his teachings. the only life of jesus is found in the four gospels; the numerous biographers of christ have had no other reliable source of information. it is deceptive for the publishers of revised editions of the bible to claim that "original manuscripts" have been consulted. not one of the original manuscripts is in existence, the earliest extant dating from the fourth century a.d., while the most ancient portion of the new testament in any museum was transcribed in the sixth century. accepting, therefore, the king james version of the new testament as the most reliable source of information, the question arises as to what portion of the chapters therein may be considered authentic. scholars have rejected the entire gospel of john as less reliable than the synoptic gospels; and the sixteenth chapter of mark as an addition after the original papyrus had broken off. modernists, being confronted, in spite of these deletions, with inconsistencies in the gospels of matthew, mark and luke, have assumed the further privilege of rejecting any verses which appear at variance with their beliefs. liberals of this class contend that the supernatural side of jesus may be disregarded and yet that jesus will remain our lord. they reject certain evangelistic passages that conflict with modern thought, but accept other statements by the same authors as authoritative. as the christian churches have not accepted any abbreviation of the bible as a substitute for the king james version, it seems proper for the critic to have recourse to that translation as the most authentic description of the life and teachings of jesus. he is justified, moreover, in considering every word in the supposedly inspired gospels as equally reliable. his only concern should be to interpret each verse as nearly as possible as the original writers intended their words to be understood, allowing for eastern hyperbole and the custom of the times. _retain the good_ in preparing a critical analysis of the character of jesus, it is freely admitted that many of the thoughts attributed to the son of mary are superlatively fine. they will live forever whether the personality of jesus be rejected as a divinity or not. that these beautiful preachments are ignored here is not due to any desire to belittle admirable sentiments or to disparage right living. the loving side of jesus has been emphasized again and again and will be borne in mind by the reader when other less admirable traits are criticized. the intent of this criticism is not to destroy idealism but to assist the spirit of true progress. _christianity must go_ the significance of this investigation lies in the changes that would have to be made in religious thought if it should be found that jesus was not perfect. if jesus was in error concerning conditions of his own time and exhibited no knowledge of our modern problems, his authority will be lessened. searchers after the true way of life will not continue to worship a person whose conception of the physical and spiritual world was erroneous. if jesus made mistakes, he is neither the son of god nor an infallible man. so long as people feel compelled to worship what has been proved imperfect, or to evade important doctrines of their creeds for fear of losing faith in old traditions, their minds will not be receptive to changes in social conditions that require abandonment of established customs. christians are imbued with a psychology derived from a completed revelation. the firmer their belief in jesus, the greater their resistance to new ideas. catholics are more reluctant to join progressive movements than modernists and modernists than evolutionists. religious people are apt to be afraid of the new world; they doubt the possibility of eliminating war, poverty and injustice--customs as deeply rooted in the social world as belief in jesus is in the religious world. if the chief reactionary bulwark of the past is abandoned, there will be greater possibility of accepting new revelations. what would happen if christians should discover that their leader was not an incomparable guide? absolutely nothing at first. those accustomed to lead a moral life would continue to do so. members of christian churches are the very people who most wish to do what is right. they will not lose their character because jesus has lost his fictitious divinity. on the contrary, they will search for the most elevating principles to substitute for the personality that has been found deficient. it is difficult for people to be superior to their gods. these same church-going individuals, when freed from the fetters of antiquated supernaturalism, will gradually learn to serve mankind with the same devotion they now render to a misunderstood god. they will no longer be limited by the defects of their paragon in their efforts to make the most of life. they will seek to solve modern problems in a rational way instead of deciding such matters as birth control, divorce, war and prohibition by reference to the scriptures, as they do now. for the first time they will make their decisions according to the best knowledge obtainable today. jesus was in advance of his time. he declared that such revengeful theories as an eye for an eye must be supplanted by forgiveness. but as the world has evolved, jesus has stood still. his teachings, superior as they were to those of the ancient israelites, are now found to be inferior to the best ethics culled from the wisdom of the ages, brought down to date. it is heartening to feel that we can appropriate the superlative principles of all time instead of worshipping a deified personality who was limited to the best that men of his own generation could conceive. this examination of the life and character of jesus will be based upon the accounts in the new testament. each passage will be construed as appears to the writer to have been originally intended. the reader may substitute his own interpretation, but should in no instance pass lightly over a situation as immaterial. every word or action of jesus is an important link in the chain of his divinity, or of his exalted position as a moral guide. each argument should be met by acceptance or rejection, never with indifference. no reader of the following pages should ever say, "what difference does it make?" everything concerning jesus is of vast consequence in determining whether he is or is not a divine savior, or a perfect guide. footnotes: [1] chron. xxi. antiquated theology the first event in the life of jesus, the gospel story of his birth, is now considered unauthentic by many scholars and some theologians. the birth of a virgin, the visitation of an angel, the star in the east are phenomena contrary to natural laws and rest on insufficient authority for acceptance as credible. the probabilities are against exceptions in the laws of the universe. _the virgin birth_ the original evidence for the virgin birth is found only in the gospels of matthew and luke, two unknown historians, and both these evangelists implicitly deny their own tale when they trace the descent of jesus from david through joseph.[1] the slaughter of the children by herod, in fear of jesus as a rival, probably never took place. mark, luke and john do not mention it; josephus, who dwelt on the crimes of herod, knew nothing of this massacre. according to luke, mary and joseph took jesus to jerusalem openly soon after the supposed decree.[2] there is dispute as to whether jesus was born in bethlehem or nazareth, and the date of his birth has been placed anywhere from 4 b.c. to 7 a.d. matthew says that jesus was born "in the days of herod", while luke says it was "when cyrenius was governor of syria." herod died in 4 b.c., while cyrenius did not become governor of syria until 7 a.d. the romantic story of the christ-child is not corroborated by the historians of the time and is in opposition to the theory of evolution by natural processes. and yet it is still one of the main sources of jesus' fame, being repeated at christmas-tide in the churches, thus connecting jesus with god in a superhuman manner. the consensus of scholarship is in practical agreement that the theory of the virgin birth as a link between jesus and god is a mistake; but whose mistake was it? jesus never referred to his miraculous birth. if he was merely a man and never heard of the rumor about his conception, he was not to blame for the spread of this misleading story throughout christendom. while jesus did not refer to his divine paternity in a physical sense, he did endeavor to convince his hearers that he was more directly connected with god than other men. "i and my father are one."[3] "no man knoweth the son but the father; neither knoweth any man the father, save the son, and he to whomsoever the son will reveal him."[4] jesus thus proclaimed himself identical with the lord god of the old testament who called himself jehovah. this is entirely in keeping with the whole christian theory, for the _raison d'ãªtre_ of jesus derived from the act of god soon after the creation. adam and eve ate of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil which god had commanded them not to touch, and for this disobedience, this fall of man from grace, god cursed mankind. jesus came to earth to save man from the wrath of almighty god. but this claim of jesus to oneness with god renders him liable to censure for the acts of jehovah which represented a standard of ethics inferior to that preached by the son of god. according to the scriptures, which anyone may freely search, god advised or countenanced deception[5]; stealing[6], selfishness[7], conquest by force[8], indiscriminate slaughter[9], murder[10], cannibalism[11], killing of witches[12], slavery[13], capital punishment for rebellious sons or for seeking false gods[14], sacrifices of animals[15] and other acts representing the concepts of primitive men.[16] while jesus could read[17] and was familiar with the scriptures, it is possible that he was not acquainted with the system of dictatorship formerly employed by his father. occasionally jesus denounced the ethics of "them of old time", but he always referred to his father as perfect. the dilemma is that jesus must be condemned either for claiming identity with jehovah (to whom he was really superior), or for accepting with only slight improvements the tyranny of god as described in the bible, the word of god. of course if the bible is not the word of god, the whole system of christian theology falls to the ground. _the jewish messiah_ jesus claimed to be the messiah expected by the jews. "and the high priest answered and said unto him, i adjure thee by the living god, that thou tell us whether thou be the christ, the son of god. jesus saith unto him, thou hast said."[18] "again the high priest asked him, and said unto him, art thou the christ, the son of the blessed? and jesus said, i am."[19] "then said they all, art thou then the son of god? and he said unto them, ye say that i am."[20] "the woman saith unto him, i know that messias cometh, which is called christ: when he is come he will tell us all things. jesus saith unto her, i that speak unto thee am he."[21] these acknowledgments by jesus that he was the messiah are important, for if he claimed divinity when he was merely mortal, either under false pretences or being self-deceived, he made a mistake of the most serious character. his claim was not recognized by his own people, and many of his followers today deny that he was the jewish messiah. jesus said that he came from god to save the jews. either he was truly the predicted messiah or he made an inexcusable error. in this as in other instances to be cited, fundamentalists will not admit any mistake, for they believe in the supernatural events connected with the son of god. but modernists, who reject the anointed christ while clinging to the human jesus, may be at a loss to reconcile jesus' claim to messiahship with their rejection of his divinity. jesus stressed his mission to save the world, saying "for god so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."[22] _eternal damnation_ whether jesus was mistaken or not in his estimate of his close relationship with god is for each person to decide; but his theory of the disasters that would follow unbelief in his divinity leads to serious difficulties if accepted literally. for not only was jesus in error when he insisted that salvation depended upon belief, he was also reconciled to eternal suffering for unbelievers. note some of his expressions: "if ye believe not that i am he, ye shall die in your sins."[23] "depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels ... and these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal."[24] "whosoever shall blaspheme against the holy ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation."[25] "except ye repent ye shall perish."[26] "if thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched."[27] "how can ye escape the damnation of hell?"[28] "he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned."[29] it is evident from these quotations that jesus not only preached belief in his divinity as essential to salvation, but endeavored to terrify people into belief by threats of eternal torment. jesus was responsible for the theological conception of a fiery hell. if he was mistaken, if there never was a place of torment for the wicked after death, is it not an act of constructive criticism to expose the person most responsible for the false doctrine that has caused so much fear and mental suffering? must we not deplore this mistake of jesus and recast our entire opinion of him as a religious teacher? are we not justified in stating positively that jesus made a mistake when he taught a physical hell and condemned people to spend eternity in torment for the doubtful sin of disbelief? _the atonement_ the doctrine of the atonement was taught by jesus. "for this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins."[30] whether this sacrifice of the innocent jesus to save sinful man was ordered by god or was voluntary on the part of jesus, it represents a theory of reprieve from punishment long since abandoned as unethical. if sin must be punished, there is no justice in relieving the sinner and placing the burden upon the righteous. moreover, the atonement appears to have been ineffective, for in spite of the sacrifice that jesus made, few were to be saved under his scheme of salvation. "many are called but few are chosen."[31] "strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."[32] "strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many, i say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able."[33] if the theory of atonement for sin by the sacrifice of the innocent was not ethical and if jesus taught that doctrine, he was in error, was he not? the sacrifice of jesus was not so great as often made by men. jesus was sustained with the thought that he was saving the world; his physical suffering was not long continued; on the night of his crucifixion he was in paradise.[34] he endured a few hours of pain compared to weeks of suffering by wounded soldiers, or years spent in prison by the proponents of an ideal. jesus not only claimed the power to remit sins but also said to his disciples: "whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained."[35] is that true? surely it is proper to ask that blunt question. here is a definite statement concerning the power of certain men to remit sins. if those men did not have the power deputed to them, must we not doubt the accuracy of jesus? jesus made a distinction between himself and the comforter: "it is expedient for you that i go away: for if i go not away, the comforter will not come unto you; but if i depart i will send him unto you ... and i will pray the father, and he shall give you another comforter, that he may abide with you forever."[36] it must surprise some christians that the comforter could not be present at the same time with jesus. _angels and devils_ jesus believed in angels and devils, often referring to these imaginary supernatural beings as if they existed. "thinkest thou that i cannot now pray to my father and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?"[37] "so shall it be at the end of the world: the angels shall come forth."[38] the devils were among the first to recognize christ's divinity: "what have we to do with thee, jesus, thou son of god?"[39] "let us alone, thou jesus of nazareth; art thou come to destroy us? i know thee, who thou art, the holy one of god."[40] "and unclean spirits when they saw him, fell down before him, and cried, saying, thou art the son of god."[41] jesus believed in demoniacal possession, casting out devils on several occasions. jesus frequently referred to heaven as a place above the earth: "and then shall they see the son of man coming in the clouds with great power and glory."[42] "and ye shall see the son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven."[43] "verily, verily, i say unto you, hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of god ascending and descending on the son of man."[44] when jesus was transfigured and talked with moses and elias, he charged his disciples, saying, "tell the vision to no man, until the son of man be risen again from the dead."[45] according to the creeds based upon the bible, jesus rose from the dead, descended into hell, and ascended bodily into heaven. according to the gospels he stilled the storm, walked on the water and told peter to do so and to find money in a fish's mouth and catch a large draught of fishes. these and other miracles connected jesus with god and were part of his theology. every fair-minded person should re-read the gospels and refresh his memory regarding the theology of jesus. then a decision must be reached as to the correctness of the views expressed. either conditions on earth were different in the first century from those of the twentieth, or jesus was mistaken in his conception of god, heaven, hell, angels, devils and himself. footnotes: [1] matt. i; luke iii. [2] luke ii, 22. [3] john x, 30. [4] matt. xi, 27. [5] ezek. xiv, 9; num. xiv, 30-34. [6] ex. iii, 21-22. [7] deut. xiv, 21. [8] num. xxxi et al. [9] ex. xxxii, 27. [10] deut. vii, 16 et al. [11] jer. xix, 9 et al. [12] ex. xxii, 18. [13] lev. xxv, 44-46. [14] deut. xxi, 18-21; xiii, 6-9. [15] lev. i, 14-15. [16] see the old testament. [17] luke iv, 16. [18] matt. xxvi, 63-64. [19] mark xv, 61-62. [20] luke xxii, 70. [21] john iv, 25-26. [22] john iii, 16. [23] john viii, 24. [24] matt. xxv, 31-46. [25] mark iii, 29. [26] luke xiii, 3. [27] mark ix, 43. [28] matt. xxiii, 33. [29] mark xvi, 16. [30] matt. xxvi, 28. [31] matt. xxii, 14. [32] matt. vii, 14. [33] luke xiii, 24. [34] luke xxiii, 43. [35] john xx, 23. [36] john xiv, 16. [37] matt. xxvi, 53. [38] matt. xiii, 49. [39] matt. viii, 29. [40] luke iv, 34. [41] mark iii, 11. [42] mark xiii, 26. [43] mark xiv, 62. [44] john i, 51. [45] matt. xvii, 9. false impressions jesus not only held mistaken ideas about theology, as anyone but a fundamentalist must admit, but he often gave impressions about earthly affairs that were unreliable to say the least. occasionally his statements were actual misrepresentations of fact. _jonah and the whale_ "for as jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly; so shall the son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth."[1] evidently jesus believed the story of jonah and the whale, as well as the tale of noah's ark[2] both of which are now generally discredited. moreover, his prophecy regarding his entombment was inaccurate, for he was only two nights and one day in the heart of the earth, from friday night to sunday morning. _end of the world_ jesus was decidedly mistaken in his theory of the approaching end of the world. "repent: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."[3] "ye shall not have gone over the cities of israel, till the son of man be come."[4] "there be some standing here which shall not taste of death, till they see the son of man coming in his kingdom."[5] "and this gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations; and then shall the end come ... verily i say unto you, this generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled."[6] "the time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of god is at hand."[7] "so ye in like manner, when ye shall see these things come to pass, know that it is nigh, even at the doors. verily i say unto you, that this generation shall not pass, till all these things be done."[8] "the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation."[9] jesus was confident that the day of judgment was coming in the first century, but it has not come yet, nineteen hundred years later. this erroneous belief in the imminent end of the world had an important bearing upon his entire philosophy; for if the end of the world was so near it was far more important to prepare for life hereafter than to be concerned over mundane affairs. may we not view with doubt any of jesus' teachings that depended upon his mistaken conception of the duration of the world? _miracles_ jesus is reported to have fed 5,000 people with five loaves and two fishes, and again 4,000 with seven loaves and a few small fishes. he walked on the water, calmed the seas, raised three persons from the dead and performed other miracles contrary to natural laws. these wondrous acts were depended upon by him to convince the people that he was the expected messiah: "go and shew john again those things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them."[10] jesus assured his disciples that they too would be able to perform miracles: "and these signs shall follow them that believe; in my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover."[11] "he that believeth on me, the works that i do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do."[12] jesus set great store by these marvels that only magicians attempt nowadays. ministers of the apostolic succession cannot cast out devils or take up serpents, and they are affected by deadly drinks the same as others. jesus had a primitive idea of the value of such magic. either he sought to deceive the gullible, or, as is more likely, was himself overcredulous. it is important to remember that jesus stressed the value of enchantment and advised his successors to conjure in his name. if the miraculous had not been connected with the name of jesus, it is probable that he never would have been heard of. his ethical teachings alone would not have won for him the exalted position that has come from the stories of his miraculous birth, life and ascension. in other words, his fame rests upon the supernatural side of his life that is now discredited by many of his followers. _eternal life_ the remarks of jesus on the subject of death were not accurate. "if a man keep my saying, he shall never see death."[13] "whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die."[14] apparently jesus referred to natural death, in which case he was utterly mistaken; but if he meant that believers in him should live forever in heaven, even so he gave a false impression; for there is no evidence that life after death is assured to christians more than to others. unbelievers were also to have eternal life, though in torment. _raising lazarus_ jesus took advantage of opportunities, even of death, to create dramatic effects. the eleventh chapter of john shows that when lazarus was reported ill, jesus said, "this sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of god, that the son of god might be glorified thereby." so jesus let lazarus, one of the believers whom he loved, die[15] in order that he might have the triumph of raising him from the dead. "then said jesus unto them plainly, lazarus is dead. and i am glad for your sakes that i was not there, to the intent ye may believe." the confusion between earthly death and loss of eternal life was shown in the remark of jesus to martha: "i am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live." this might be construed to mean that believers should have eternal life hereafter, but jesus evidently had reference to life on earth for he proceeded to raise lazarus from the dead and cause him to live again on earth with his sisters. when martha reminded jesus that lazarus had been dead four days, jesus replied, "said i not unto thee, that, if thou wouldest believe, thou shouldest see the glory of god?" but jesus himself had doubts of his ability to bring back lazarus to life, as shown by his spontaneous prayer of thanks: "father, i thank thee that thou hast heard me." then he revealed again his desire to dramatize the occasion, saying, "and i knew that thou hearest me always: but because of the people which stand by i said it, that they may believe that thou hast sent me." "then many of the jews which came to mary, and had seen the things which jesus did, believed on him." do the followers of jesus, who claim that he made no mistakes, believe on him? if so, they must believe that he raised lazarus from the dead as he claimed to have done. do they believe that they can also raise people from the dead? jesus so assured them when he promised that believers could do greater works than he performed. no, jesus gave a false impression of his power. _god's protection_ jesus continued his deception of the world by promising protection that has never been accorded. "are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your father. but the very hairs of your head are all numbered. fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows."[16] these sayings may properly be taken as symbolical or allegorical; but the evident intention was to assure his followers that god would protect them in their daily life. safety was promised for believers, a safety that has been lacking for everyone. there is no evidence that god does protect believers any more than unbelievers. when the titanic went down, those who perished were not solely the wicked persons; there was no distinction in the terrible disaster between believers and unbelievers. jesus created in the minds of his hearers and his followers the idea that god was watching each individual to save him from danger, but this, unfortunately, is not a fact. it sounds comforting; it makes people feel nearer to god; but experience proves that no such close relationship exists. jesus gave a false impression of god's loving care for men. _belief in prayer_ modern religious people may still consistently believe in prayer as a form of inward aspiration, but it is difficult to take literally the assurance given by jesus of practical accomplishments by means of prayer in his name. jesus did not confine himself to promising spiritual results from prayer, but distinctly gave it to be understood that the physical world would respond to petitions to jehovah. "again i say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my father which is in heaven."[17] "if ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only do this which is done to the fig tree, but also if ye shall say unto this mountain, be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; it shall be done. and all things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive."[18] "what things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them."[19] "if ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove: and nothing shall be impossible unto you."[20] these promises have not been fulfilled. bishops, priests and deacons with strong faith have been unable to obtain, by means of the most sincere prayer, results similar to those indicated. they have followed jesus in vain. no man living dare put his faith to the test by a public demonstration of prayer for physical changes. christian prayers for rain are conventional, not being offered with confidence that rain will follow. jesus has misled us. footnotes: [1] matt. xii, 40. [2] luke xvii, 27; matt. xxv, 38. [3] matt. iv, 17. [4] matt. x, 23. [5] matt. xvi, 28; mark ix, 1. [6] matt. xxiv, 14-34; luke xxi, 32. [7] mark i, 15. [8] mark xiii, 29-30. [9] john v, 28-29. [10] matt. xi, 4-5. [11] mark xvi, 17-18. [12] john xiv, 12. [13] john viii, 51. [14] john xi, 26. [15] john xi, 6. [16] matt. x, 29-31. [17] matt. xviii, 19. [18] matt. xxi, 21-22. [19] mark xi, 24. [20] matt. xvii, 20. obscure teachings many of the sayings of jesus lacked clarity. various interpretations have been put upon them by scholars of distinction. no one is sure what was meant. according to the gospels, jesus was descended from david, but jesus mystified his hearers on this descent, saying: "if david then call him lord, how is he his son?"[1] _witnesses and judge_ on the subject of witnesses there is great confusion. "if i bear witness of myself, my witness is not true."[2] "though i bear record of myself, yet my record is true."[3] "it is also written in your law, that the testimony of two men is true. i am one that bear witness of myself, and the father that sent me beareth witness of me."[4] "i and my father are one."[5] "my father is greater than i."[6] this and the following instruction regarding judicial procedure are far from clear. jesus acknowledged the principle of law requiring more than one witness but said that in his case the only other witness necessary was his father, although he and his father were one. jesus is supposed to be the judge of the world, but his statement of the case leaves the issue ambiguous. "for the father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the son."[7] "i judge no man. and yet if i judge, my judgment is true."[8] "and if any man hear my words, and believe not, i judge him not: for i came not to judge the world, but to save the world."[9] "for judgment i am come into this world, that they which see not might see; and that they which see might be made blind."[10] the quality of reasoning employed in these instances has naturally led to theological quibbling. if jesus can argue in that fashion, so can his followers, at the expense of intellectual honesty. _cannibalism_ the jews could not understand what jesus meant when he said: "except ye eat the flesh of the son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life."[11] _religion only for children_ nor are these sayings clear: "i thank thee, o father, lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes."[12] "whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of god as a little child, he shall not enter therein."[13] this train of thought implies that education is of no importance where belief is concerned. _difficult or easy?_ after enumerating the many hardships that must be endured by his followers, jesus contradicted himself by saying, "for my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."[14] _charity_ there are apparent contradictions in his instructions regarding charity: "let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your father which is in heaven."[15] "take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward of your father which is in heaven."[16] _the scriptures upheld_ jesus reverenced the hebrew old testament. "think not that i am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: i am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. for verily i say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."[17] and yet jesus was the reformer, overthrowing ancient customs, renouncing the old principle of a tooth for a tooth, improving upon the mosaic law. he was inconsistent. _illogical_ the logic of jesus is often difficult to follow. "and when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment: of sin because they believe not on me; of righteousness, because i go to my father, and ye see me no more; of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged."[18] jesus admitted his obscurity: "these things have i spoken unto you in proverbs: but the time cometh, when i shall no more speak unto you in proverbs, but i shall shew you plainly of the father."[19] that time has never come. _parables deceptive_ jesus explained his obscurity in this way: "unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of god: but to others in parables; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand."[20] "but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them."[21] in other words, jesus, who said he came to save the world, concealed his meaning for fear some of his hearers should be converted and their sins be forgiven--which is exactly what he sought to bring about. obscurity in a teacher is a great defect, especially when he glories in his ambiguity. if any christians wish that jesus had been more clear, then jesus does not appear perfect to them, and they should admit his imperfections. footnotes: [1] matt. xxii, 41-45. [2] john v, 31. [3] john viii, 14. [4] john viii, 17-18. [5] john x, 30. [6] john xiv, 28. [7] john v, 22. [8] john viii, 16. [9] john xii, 47. [10] john x, 39. [11] john vi, 53-58. [12] matt. xi, 25. [13] mark x, 15. [14] matt. xi, 30. [15] matt. v, 16. [16] matt. vi, 1. [17] matt. v, 17-18. [18] john xvi, 8-11. [19] john xvi, 25. [20] luke viii, 10. [21] mark iv, 11-12. deficient instructions in a number of instances the teachings of jesus are so incomplete, or so inappropriate, as to render no assistance in meeting similar situations in modern life. either his meaning is not clear, or his instructions are too primitive to be applicable to our civilization. _labor_ the relation between employer and employee is one that requires practical guidance. let us see what information jesus gave on this important subject. the parable of the laborers[1] relates that an employer hired men to work in his vineyard for twelve hours for a penny, and that he paid the same wage to other workers who toiled only nine, six, three and one hour. when those who had worked longest resented this treatment, as modern strikers would, the employer answered, apparently with jesus' approval: "friend, i do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me for a penny? take that thine is, and go thy way: i will give unto this last, even as unto thee. is it not lawful for me to do what i will with mine own? is thine eye evil, because i am good? so the last shall be first, and the first last." this parable may be a comfort to autocratic employers, sustaining them in their determination to dominate labor, but the principles enunciated are lacking in social vision. equal pay for unequal work is approved, and the employer is vindicated in regulating wages and hours as he sees fit without regard for justice or the needs of the workers. in the manner of modern employers, the "goodman" calls his worker "friend" but treats him with contempt. jesus taught that the workers were wrong in demanding justice, that the employer was justified in acting erratically, as the money paid was his. he presented the issues between capital and labor and sided with capital. he stated the fact that the first shall be last, but said nothing to remedy that unfortunate situation. he did not explain how workers could obtain proper compensation for their labor. jesus assumed a fair attitude when he said, "the labourer is worthy of his hire", and, "it is enough for the disciple to be as his master, and the servant as his lord", but he continued with doubtful logic: "if they have called the master of the house beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of his household", implying that if an employer is worldly-minded his servants will be even worse. little respect is shown for employees in the remark, "the hireling fleeth, because he is an hireling, and careth not for the sheep."[2] probably in those days as now many an employee stuck to his post nobly to do his duty. the meaning is obscure in his other comment upon an employer who told his tired servant to serve his master first, ending with the enigma, "we are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do."[3] _usury_ in the parable of the talents the servant who did not put his money out at usury to make profits was condemned: "and cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth."[4] punishment was to be severe in jesus' program; the disobedient servant "shall be beaten with many stripes." jesus did not advise leniency in such instances except that "he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes."[5] in his estimation the servant was a slave to be punished corporeally by his master, even if ignorant of his wrong-doing. a dr. taylor, former yale college theologian, is reported to have said: "i have no doubt that if jesus christ were now on earth he would, under certain circumstances, become a slaveholder." a southern divine in 1860 could well maintain that slavery was approved in both old and new testaments, but no christian would now impute slaveholding to jesus. the standard of human relationships has improved since slaveholding days in america. the modern attitude toward servants, though by no means perfect, is superior to the relationships between master and servants accepted by jesus. slavery was the custom of the times and jesus did not rise above it. in the parable of the unmerciful servant[6] jesus taught the duty of forgiveness. he rightly rebuked the servant who oppressed his subordinates after being well treated by his lord. but the punishment suggested by jesus for the abominable conduct was extremely harsh: "and his lord was wroth and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due unto him." torture for criminals was thus taught by jesus. jesus, apprenticed to his father in his youth, never did any practical work so far as we know. he lived on the charity of others, setting an example that would bring trouble to anyone who followed in his train. if anything, he was an agitator, a peripatetic propagandist, teaching what he believed right but not working to support himself and therefore not being a good example for the workaday world today. _economics_ nothing in the teachings of jesus was more definite than his denunciation of riches. "lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth ... a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven ... it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of god ... the rich man also died, and was buried; and in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torments ... woe unto you that are rich." these strictures upon the rich appear somewhat severe, and jesus went much farther, condemning even ordinary thrift and precaution.[7] according to acts ii, 44-45 and iv, 32, "all that believed were together and had all things common; and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need ... neither said any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common." it is to be presumed that the disciples practiced this communism at the instruction of jesus. if jesus approved of communism was he right or wrong? "blessed be ye poor."[8] poverty is not a blessing but a curse. jesus taught the theory that the poor would be rich hereafter while the rich would be in hell. _punishment for debts_ we have seen that jesus expected an unjust servant to be tormented until he paid in full. there are also other evidences that he approved of imprisonment for debt. "agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. verily i say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing."[9] a legislator who patterned his life after jesus would be justified in enacting laws imprisoning for debt and scourging for misdemeanors. some may say that the sentiments expressed by jesus were not mistakes but merely presented the customs of his day. possibly he did not intend to advise all that he seemed to approve; but if jesus was a practical and prophetic guide he should have made it clear that he did not sanction the actions he apparently commended. in the parable of the pounds the nobleman, seemingly with the approval of jesus, denounced the servant as wicked who did not put his lord's money in the bank to draw interest.[10] and in the parable of the talents the lord rewarded those who had made 100 per cent profit through speculation.[11] another contradiction of his theory of the blessedness of poverty was his promise that those who followed him "shall receive a hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life."[12] finally, jesus stated the unfortunate truth, "whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken even that he hath."[13] if jesus did not approve of that worldly method of distribution, he could have denounced its injustice instead of leaving the comment as if it expressed his own policy. _healing_ many christians value jesus most for his healing powers, but jesus looked upon disease almost as he did upon demoniacal possession, as something evil that could be cast out. "but that ye may know that the son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins (then saith he to the sick of the palsy) arise, take up thy bed, and go into thine house."[14] there was confusion in his mind between sin and sickness. jesus healed leprosy and palsy by touching the sick person; he healed the servant of the centurion by absent treatment, and restored sight by spitting on the eyes[15] or anointing them with clay made with spittle[16], or by requiring faith.[17] he healed a withered hand, cured impediments in speech and deafness, all without medical applications, even replacing an ear severed by a sword.[18] christian scientists practice the same methods with confidence in success, but medical and surgical treatment are the most reliable means of effecting cures, disappointing as they are. if jesus could cure disease, it was remiss of him not to instruct men definitely in his methods so that the suffering from illness that has afflicted the world could have been averted. jesus did not isolate the germ of leprosy, or establish any practicable method of preventing disease. he has been of less value to the world as a healer than pasteur, lister, koch, or walter reed. some christians will say that jesus did not tell us how to avoid illness because man needs to be chastened by pain. if that is correct, if pain and disease are sent by god and are consciously permitted by jesus, sick people should be allowed to suffer instead of trying to heal them. _peace_ jesus has been called the prince of peace, but the weight of his testimony is not on the side of absolute pacifism. with his view of rendering unto caesar the things that are caesar's, it is possible that he would have advised young men to obey the state and enlist, or accept the draft, whenever their country called. on november 12, 1931, rev. dr. t. andrew caraker said at a banquet of the american legion in baltimore that if jesus christ had lived in 1917 he would have been the first to volunteer in the american army, the first to wear a gas mask, shoulder a rifle and enter the trenches. other ministers derive from the same gospels the belief that jesus would not have stabbed germans with a bayonet. nor would jesus have advised others to fight if he had been unwilling to fight himself. most of the sayings of jesus regarding violence or non-resistance were intended to apply chiefly to personal relationships; he said little of international strife. what he did say showed placid acceptance of the war system: "and ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars: see that ye be not troubled: for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet. for nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom."[19] "and when ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars, be ye not troubled: for such things must needs be; but the end shall not be yet. for nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom."[20] "but when ye shall hear of wars and commotions, be not terrified: for these things must first come to pass; but the end is not by and by. then said he unto them, nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom."[21] these verses have a more direct bearing on war as we now know it than any of his other sayings. they show his belief in the inevitability of war. apparently he did not feel himself competent to counteract general mass militarism. he offered no program for arbitration of international disputes, no substitute for war between nations, no policy of war resistance. when jesus advised non-resistance, saying to his follower, "put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword,"[22] he was merely stating the danger of using violence, not the immorality of employing force. in fact, he commanded his disciples to take the very sword which he later told them to sheathe: "he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one ... and they said, lord, behold, here are two swords. and he said unto them, it is enough."[23] thus jesus, the supposed non-resistant, prepared his followers with swords. these swords were for defense, and when the time came he repudiated even that use of the weapons, but, nevertheless, he armed his disciples instead of adhering to his principle of non-resistance. he did not set a positive example of disarmament. jesus said: "blessed are the peacemakers ... love your enemies ... have peace one with another ... on earth peace, good will toward men ... peace i leave with you, my peace i give unto you ... these things have i spoken unto you that in me ye might have peace ... resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." other remarks of jesus favored violence: "think not that i am come to send peace on earth: i came not to send peace, but a sword."[24] "suppose ye that i am come to give peace on earth? i tell you, nay; but rather division."[25] "but those mine enemies, which would not that i should reign over them, bring hither, and slay them before me."[26] "my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews."[27] "when a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace: but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils."[28] "and when he had made a scourge of small cords, he drove them all out of the temple."[29] in determining whether or not jesus was a promoter of peace it is only reasonable to review everything that he said or did relating to the use of violence, giving equal weight to every verse. we cannot accept one statement and reject the others. the conclusion reached must be that jesus was inconsistent in advocating both non-resistance and the use of force. he took diametrically opposed positions, the use of swords and scourges and non-resistance being mutually exclusive. jesus preached non-resistance and at the same time armed his retainers with two swords. he advocated turning the other cheek but did not criticize war. therefore, pacifists and militarists, with their opposite philosophies, should both admit that at times jesus was mistaken. _marriage_ jesus occasionally eulogized marriage: "for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh ... what therefore god hath joined together, let not man put asunder."[30] _celibacy_ on other occasions he made remarks which indicated his preference for celibacy as the higher state, the one he adopted for himself. "in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of god in heaven."[31] "the children of this world marry, and are given in marriage: but they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage."[32] "i say unto you, that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart."[33] "there are some eunuchs which were so born from their mother's womb: and there are some eunuchs, which were made eunuchs of men: and there be eunuchs, which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. he that is able to receive it, let him receive it."[34] "there is no man that hath left ... wife, or children for the kingdom of god's sake, who shall not receive manifold more in this present time, and in the world to come life everlasting."[35] jesus referred to the absence of marriage in heaven, the ideal realm. paul's testimony adds to the evidence that jesus considered celibacy preferable to any form of sex expression, even marriage. _adultery_ on the other hand, jesus was tolerant of sex offenses. he chatted in a friendly manner with the woman of samaria, saying: "thou hast had five husbands; and he whom thou now hast is not thy husband."[36] and about the woman taken in adultery he said: "he that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her ... neither do i condemn thee: go and sin no more."[37] "the harlots go into the kingdom of god before you."[38] _divorce_ jesus sanctioned divorce. his followers are so annoyed at this fact that they frequently quote the verse on the subject with the offensive clause omitted. the text reads: "it hath been said, whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: but i say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery."[39] again in matthew xix, 9, he makes the same exception. it is evident, therefore, that jesus permitted divorce for one cause. if the wife was unfaithful the husband could divorce her, but otherwise no matter how unhappy the couple might be, they must remain married. the admirable leniency of jesus toward sex offenders, and his permission to divorce, must seem like mistakes to churchmen who consider extramarital sex relations the unforgivable sin. and everyone must see the danger of having our judges adopt as a principle of justice the dismissal of offenders on the ground that the prosecutors have also sinned. a christian girl of today would not be encouraged by the most zealous religious parents to marry a man exactly like jesus. _faulty judgment_ jesus selected judas to be the treasurer of the apostles' joint funds, but later admitted his error, saying: "have i not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? he spake of judas iscariot the son of simon: for it was he that should betray him, being one of the twelve."[40] jesus erroneously supposed that "salvation is of the jews."[41] "go not into the way of the gentiles, and into any city of the samaritans enter ye not: but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of israel."[42] a nationalistic and partial spirit is expressed in these sentences, a spirit that has been followed to the extent that jesus would not be permitted to enter america if he applied for a visa. _unconvincing_ jesus failed in his mission to save the world. he made the supreme sacrifice in vain. his method of proving his divinity did not convince his hearers: "but though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him."[43] "for neither did his brethren believe in him."[44] after he had healed many, cast out unclean spirits and appointed his twelve apostles to do likewise, his friends "went out to lay hold on him: for they said, he is beside himself."[45] jesus admitted his impotence as a human being when he said, "i can of mine own self do nothing."[46] even with the assistance of his father he did not accomplish what he set out to do. _prohibition_ the miracle of turning water into wine, providing one hundred gallons of wine after the people at the party had "well drunk", must appear to prohibitionists like a mistake on the part of jesus. many methodists and baptists would have preferred to have him turn the wine into water; yet they will not admit that jesus made a mistake. _lack of experience_ so far as the gospels relate, jesus never had any experience with three of the chief difficulties of human life--sex, earning a living and illness. he was therefore less able to explain those relationships than one who has struggled through in the customary manner of mankind. to take the inexperienced jesus as our guide in practical living would be like a traveller who was planning a trip over perilous mountains and engaged as a guide a man who had never crossed the mountains. as jesus believed that the end of the world was approaching, and as he revealed no information about the future, his teachings should be taken as applying solely to his own time. a divinity living now would preach far differently from the inadequate doctrines of jesus. * * * * * the abandonment of reliance upon a jesus who has not changed in nineteen hundred years, in favor of an evolutionary philosophy that requires constant change, leads to a new conception of the world and its possibilities for man. a person who has thought himself out of antiquated theology may be expected to have an open mind towards the betterment of human customs. every improvement in human relationships originates secularly and is adopted by the church only after a bitter struggle. faith in jesus is a reactionary force. the christian opposes change in the creations of god; the evolutionist seeks to alter every unsatisfactory condition. the evolutionist is more responsive than the orthodox christian to proposals for promoting the happiness of the human race. many liberals have abandoned conservatism because they saw the hypocrisy in christianity. footnotes: [1] matt. xx, 1-16. [2] john x, 13. [3] luke xvii, 10. [4] matt. xxv, 30. [5] luke xii, 47-48. [6] matt. xviii, 23-34. [7] matt. vi, 25-31, discussed under the sermon on the mount. [8] luke vi, 20. [9] matt. v, 25-26. [10] luke xix, 23. [11] matt. xxv, 20. [12] mark x, 30. [13] matt. xiii, 12. [14] matt. ix, 6. [15] mark viii, 23. [16] john ix, 6. [17] mark x, 52. [18] luke xxii, 51. [19] matt. xxiv, 6-7. [20] mark xiii, 7-8. [21] luke xxi, 9-10. [22] matt. xxvi, 52. [23] luke xxii, 36-38. [24] matt. x, 34. [25] luke xii, 51. [26] luke xix, 27. [27] john xviii, 36. [28] luke xi, 21-22. [29] john ii, 15. [30] matt. xix, 5-6. [31] matt. xxii, 30. [32] luke xx, 34-35. [33] matt. v, 28. [34] matt. xix, 12. [35] luke xviii, 29-30. [36] john iv, 18. [37] john viii, 7-11. [38] matt. xxi, 31. [39] matt. v, 31-32. [40] john vi, 70-71. [41] john iv, 22. [42] matt. x, 5-6. [43] john xii, 37. [44] john vii, 5. [45] mark iii, 21. [46] john v, 30. an inferior prototype orthodox christians accept both old and new testaments as authority for their actions, whereas modernists are not much concerned with the commands of jehovah but maintain that jesus is the pattern for their lives. religious liberals feel that the troubles of the world come largely from failure to follow the teachings of the nazarene. they look upon him as the perfect example of what a man should be. in their opinion, if everyone would act as jesus did all would be well. on december 7, 1931, dr. henry van dyke preached at the brick presbyterian church, new york city, that the way to end the financial depression was to act as jesus would: "we can judge only by what he did and said in the first century, an age not so different from our own, an age of unsettlement, violence, drunkenness and license. christ would tell us not to yield to panic.... christ would not tell us to join any political party or social group...." such a sermon sounds encouraging but, as a matter of fact, jesus has not shown any of his ministers how to end the depression. to trust him for guidance in our modern world is to pin faith on an incompetent instructor. we can learn how to end the depression by examining the records of our own time and by correcting the errors that have been made. it is not safe to rely upon a person who had no knowledge of america's practical needs and whose acts and advice regarding worldly affairs in jerusalem fell short of the best ethical values. in this treatise it has been shown that jesus made mistakes. every instance cited may not appeal to all readers as worthy of criticism, but there can be no doubt in the mind of any honest thinker that several at least of jesus' ideas were erroneous. his theology was filled with superstitions, his cosmology was that of the pre-scientific era, he expected the end of the world within a generation, his conception of sin was theological rather than ethical, he failed to convince his hearers by his oratory, he exaggerated the results from prayer and he related parables that gave a false sense of values. now we shall turn to his personal character and teachings to see if he was always the meek, gentle soul portrayed by the conventional christ. _cursing nature_ the act in jesus' life that has been most difficult for theologians to explain was the cursing of the fig tree. the tree was created to bear fruit in the summer, but when jesus found it without fruit in the spring, he cursed it so that it withered away. "now in the morning, as he returned into the city, and when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, let no fruit grow on thee henceforth for ever. and presently the fig tree withered away."[1] "for the time of figs was not yet."[2] this episode involves several mistakes--ignorance of the seasons; destruction of a profitable food-producing tree; exhibition of temper when thwarted, and giving false information regarding man's power to effect physical changes by a curse.[3] if jesus acted unwisely in this one instance and was right in all others, he is neither an infallible god nor a perfect pattern for mankind. _forgiveness_ the conventional jesus is emblematic of supreme kindness and forgiveness, but in reality he was far from lenient in many instances, nor did he advocate forgiveness for certain offenses. "moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee ... tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican."[4] in the parable of dives and lazarus, abraham was represented as justified in not forgiving the rich man tortured in hell, or even in saving the rich man's brothers as requested by the victim of jesus' policy of punishment. again jesus said: "whosoever shall deny me before men, him will i also deny before my father."[5] "whosoever shall blaspheme against the holy ghost hath never forgiveness."[6] all the wicked were condemned by jesus to eternal punishment with no chance of forgiveness. _vituperation_ jesus was often vehement in his language to an extent hardly compatible with gentleness of character. "o generation of vipers! how can ye, being evil, speak good things?"[7] "woe unto you, hypocrites, for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him two-fold more the child of hell than yourselves."[8] "ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell?"[9] "if i should say i know him not, i shall be a liar like unto you."[10] "all that ever came before me are thieves and robbers."[11] "ye fools and blind."[12] this language may have been necessary, in jesus' opinion, to convince his hearers of their sins, but such vituperation does not become a modern ethical teacher. _destruction of property_ two acts of jesus, consistent with his disregard of worldly goods, were destructive in character. "and there was a good way off from them a herd of many swine feeding. so the devils besought him, saying, if thou cast us out, suffer us to go away into the herd of swine. and he said unto them, go. and when they were come out, they went into the herd of swine: and, behold, the whole herd of swine ran violently down a steep place into the sea, and perished in the waters."[13] jesus did what the devils requested, cruelly killing two thousand inoffensive valuable animals that belonged to other people. "jesus went up to jerusalem, and found in the temple those that sold oxen and sheep and doves, and the changers of money sitting: and when he had made a scourge of small cords, he drove them all out of the temple, and the sheep and the oxen; and poured out the changers' money, and overthrew the tables." jesus has been defended for other acts on the ground that he was living in less civilized times than our own, but here he is seen offending both ancient and modern sensibilities. the destruction of the swine and the routing of the merchants were sensational and erratic exhibitions. if reformers today should destroy herds of animals, except to protect public health by due process of law, or overthrow banks, they would be liable to arrest in any city of christendom. therefore the consensus of opinion denies exoneration to jesus for his spasmodic resort to direct action. _egotism_ if jesus was not god, but merely the ideal man, his estimate of himself was excessive. in addition to his remarks already quoted there are many other instances of an exaggerated ego. "if any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."[14] "whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die."[15] "if ye believe not that i am he, ye shall die in your sins."[16] "i am the light of the world."[17] "i am the son of god."[18] "i am the resurrection and the life."[19] if jesus was correct in claiming that he was the messiah, if he could control the elements and send people to heaven or hell, he was justified in any extreme remarks; but not if he were merely a man. every person is entitled to have as good an opinion of himself as his character and ability warrant, but expressions of his own worth are unseemly even if true, and are inexcusable if exaggerated. as jesus himself said (though this authority is only for believers) testimony about oneself is unreliable. jesus not only claimed to be more than a man, he threatened his hearers with death if they did not agree with him. all of which might be permissible if he were god, but was an egotistical illusion if he was merely human. _lack of courtesy_ jesus did not always exhibit the courtesy one would expect of a gentleman, or even of a nature's nobleman. the first instance of lack of consideration was when he slipped away from his parents, causing them unnecessary anxiety: "son, why hast thou thus dealt with us? behold thy father and i have sought thee sorrowing."[20] he had remained behind to study hebrew theology and did not tell his parents, presumably because he thought they would not have permitted the venture. another instance was found in his daily life: "a certain pharisee besought him to dine with him: and he went in, and sat down to meat. and when the pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he had not first washed before dinner. and the lord said unto him, now do ye pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter; but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness. ye fools ..."[21] jesus had not only failed to wash as was expected of a guest, but defended his uncleanliness and abused his host. at another time jesus was discourteous to his mother: "and when they wanted wine, the mother of jesus saith unto him, they have no wine. jesus saith unto her, woman, what have i to do with thee?"[22] jesus was apparently annoyed at his mother's interference, though he followed her suggestion. he did not set a good example for children in addressing their mothers. when the syrophenician woman asked him to help her daughter, "jesus saith unto her, let the children first be filled: for it is not meet to take the children's bread, and to cast it unto the dogs. and she answered and said unto him, yes, lord: yet the dogs under the table eat of the children's crumbs. and he said unto her, for this saying go thy way; the devil is gone out of thy daughter."[23] jesus practically admitted that he had made a mistake in speaking unkindly to a gentile. her clever answer induced him to change his decision. a physician who called a stranger's child a dog would now be considered brutal even in a free hospital. "and another of his disciples said unto him, lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father. but jesus said unto him, follow me; and let the dead bury their dead."[24] jesus could have allowed the man to attend his father's funeral and follow him later. would not that have set a better precedent? when peter intervened to protect jesus, the latter "turned, and said unto peter, get thee behind me, satan: thou art an offence unto me."[25] even though jesus was determined to go on with the sacrifice, he could have been more appreciative of his best friend's suggestion. _unethical advice_ when the unjust steward cheated his employer, jesus gave the following remarkable advice: "and the lord commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely: for the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light. and i say unto you, make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness; that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations."[26] this passage should be read again before deciding whether jesus advised opportunism rather than morality. the words must be taken as they are; no interpretation can be based upon the assumption that jesus was always right and therefore meant something different from what he said. _sermon on the mount_ many christians say that they care nothing for theology; that the sermon on the mount contains all that is necessary for a religious life, being a perfect system of ethics. the sermon on the mount does contain many admirable principles, but also some that are inferior to present standards. few of the people who praise this sermon would think it proper to abide by all the teachings therein. christian parents do not wish their children to follow either the letter or the spirit of this famous preachment. it begins in the fifth chapter of matthew. "blessed are the poor in spirit." is it better to be poor in spirit than rich and eager in spirit? being poor in spirit is to be faint of heart. this is bad advice, is it not? "blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." this means that those who mourn on earth will be comforted in heaven; but now that life on earth has assumed greater importance, so far as our daily conduct is concerned, than life in heaven, the philosophy of gloom is unfortunate. jesus preached acceptance of unhappiness as the common lot of man; he should not therefore be credited with providing happiness on earth. his urge to rejoice was usually in anticipation of good things to come in the next world. he preached sorrow for all here rather than the greater happiness for the greater number. "there shall be famines, and pestilences, and earthquakes in divers places. all these are the beginning of sorrows. then shall they deliver you up to be afflicted, and shall kill you: and ye shall be hated of all nations for my name's sake ... and because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. but he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved."[27] "blessed are ye that weep now: for ye shall laugh."[28] the beatitude, "blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth" is of doubtful accuracy or value. the commands to pluck out an eye or cut off a hand may not have been intended literally, although it does appear as if jesus referred to the physical body, and men have often so interpreted these doubtful instructions. jesus said that "whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery", which is no longer true. those who permit remarriage after divorce should admit an error on jesus' part. "but i say unto you, that ye resist not evil." this instruction should be reversed, should it not? evil should be resisted in every possible way that does not involve evil in itself. what modern ethical teacher will say that evil should not be resisted, or that this advice of jesus was perfection? if his instruction was intended to refer to physical resistance, then no righteous person should fight in any war, no police should be delegated to arrest criminals. if the phrase has merely a spiritual meaning, it is certainly unsound advice, for evil should be overcome by good. a fanatical attitude towards the law was recommended when jesus said: "if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also." extreme generosity and non-resistance are taught, but the illustration was not well thought out, for if the man had already won his suit and taken the coat, it is evident that the owner of the coat had put up a legal fight instead of giving away his coat and cloak as jesus implies he should. yielding more than a legal opponent wins in court is not compatible with defending the suit, nor is it a principle that would meet the approval of most of jesus' followers today. "be ye therefore perfect, even as your father which is in heaven is perfect." if jesus referred to jehovah as his father in heaven, the standard of perfection advocated was very low, for jehovah was, as thomas jefferson put it, "cruel, vindictive, capricious and unjust." the lord's prayer is not the simple, clear, devotional petition that is usually supposed. take it literally, as was undoubtedly intended, and its irrelevance to actual life is at once apparent. "our father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. thy kingdom come. thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." this is a proper invocation only if there is a heaven in which god's will is done. none such has been discovered. "give us this day our daily bread" indicates that god would not give our daily sustenance without being asked, whereas there is no apparent distinction in actual living between those who pray for bread and those who do not. "and forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors" intimates that divine forgiveness is not to be superior to that of men. "and lead us not into temptation"--as if god were anxious to lead us there and would be deterred by our prayer. it may seem like petty cavil to criticize the prayer that has been acclaimed for many centuries as ideal, but, seriously, what valuable principle for guidance through life does the lord's prayer contain? do its requests represent the best modern conception of prayer as an inward aspiration rather than as petitionary? is it not vain repetition to recite it again and again? the general idea of offering prayer in order to obtain various needs presents the difficulty of reconciling the conception of an omnipotent, all-foreseeing god with the contradictory theory of a father who requires prayer before caring for his children, an almighty god who will be turned from his course by human petitions. man can do wonders in the way of conquering nature, but he has not been able to alter natural laws, nor is there any evidence that such laws have been changed at any time in answer to prayer. if the lord's prayer is not essential for man's welfare in the world, we may conclude that jesus over-emphasized its importance. one of the most important portions of the sermon on the mount is the advice regarding worldly possessions. nothing in the teaching of jesus is more definite than his instructions regarding wealth. he strikes an admirable note when he says, "what is a man profited if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? ... a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." this general principle is sadly needed in the modern money-seeking world, but the teachings of jesus on economics go much further, far beyond anything the best people of today are willing to follow. "take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on ... take therefore no thought for the morrow."[29] these commands, taken literally as jesus intended, would lead to infinite trouble. men are obliged to take thought for the morrow; if they do not they will fail to survive. in jesus' plan provision for the earthly future was of no importance because of the imminence of eternal life, but now it is considered one's duty to provide for old age. this mistake of jesus cannot be explained away by saying that jesus was right and that man falls short of the counsel of perfection given by the master. no, there are few indeed who will say that it would be right to shape their financial life as jesus advised. if they do not believe it right to follow his instructions, definite as they are on this subject, they must admit that he was wrong. either thrift is now unrighteous, or jesus is not a dependable guide for modern life. the following instructions have little meaning now except for roman catholics. "but thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy face, that thou appear not unto men to fast, but unto thy father which is in secret: and thy father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." another portion of the sermon holds out false hopes that cannot be substantiated: "for everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth." is there any virtue in thus deceiving the people regarding the possibilities of prayer? "therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." this is the famous golden rule that has been heralded as one of the most original portions of jesus' teachings. but jesus admitted that he did not first state this rule when he said, "for this is the law and the prophets."[30] confucius, born in 551 b.c., several times announced the rule, "what you do not like when done to yourself, do not to others." this negative statement is less effective than the jewish rule, but both are admirable regardless of who first formulated them. the golden rule is as valuable coming from the hebrew fathers as if jesus had originated it. the golden rule, however, is not perfect. it is one of the best rules of the ancients, showing the desirability of reciprocity, but it does not demand that our desires be always just, nor does it insure that what we want done to ourselves will always be what others most need. it would be consistent with the golden rule for a convivial man to entertain his prohibition friends at a speakeasy, or for a catholic to take his atheist guests to daily mass. possibly an even better rule than judging others by ourselves would be to do unto others what best pleases them. _inconsistency_ "the son of man goeth as it is written of him: but woe unto that man by whom the son of man is betrayed! it had been good for that man if he had not been born."[31] apparently the arrangement between jehovah and jesus was that jesus should not give himself up as a sacrifice voluntarily but should be betrayed by someone else; and yet, although the betrayal was desired, the man who assisted was to be condemned. the sacrificial plan for salvation was continued to the end in order that "the scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled."[32] the scriptures were jewish, so this is additional proof that jesus, rejected by the jews, considered himself the predicted jewish messiah. while the jews expected a messiah, there is no clear prediction of jesus in the old testament. _fear_ jesus said, "be not afraid of them that kill the body"; but when threatened with bodily injury himself, he was afraid. "then took they up stones to cast at him: but jesus hid himself."[33] "then the pharisees went out, and held a council against him, how they might destroy him. but when jesus knew it, he withdrew himself from thence."[34] this avoidance of physical injury may have been due to a desire to postpone his end until the proper time, as indicated by "mine hour is not yet come", but when the time did come, jesus did not bear his approaching death bravely, as socrates did when about to drink the cup of hemlock. jesus was much afraid, "and prayed, saying, father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless, not my will but thine be done."[35] he was resolved to go through with the painful experience at any cost but was much more frightened than many a mortal man, though he had a greater cause to sustain him than martyrs who have suffered uncomplainingly; for he believed that his sacrifice would save the world: "and there appeared an angel unto him from heaven, strengthening him. and being in an agony he prayed more earnestly: and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground."[36] after saying, "the hour is come, that the son of man should be glorified ... he that loveth his life shall lose it", he again showed terror: "now is my soul troubled; and what shall i say? father, save me from this hour, but for this cause came i unto this hour."[37] it is to be noted that god did not answer the prayer of jesus, though jesus had said that god would always answer prayers in his name. jesus recognized his failure to obtain the answer, saying on the cross, "my god, my god, why hast thou forsaken me?"[38] _failure_ many a good man is a failure from a worldly point of view, but failure is not what one would wish to copy. jesus sought to save the world. surely no one looking at the world today can say that he succeeded. his plan of salvation was a failure; it did not work out as jehovah and jesus intended. an ideal teacher is needed now almost as much as two thousand years ago. if the world is gradually improving, as seems probable, it is in spite of the superstitions of the past, not because of them. at one time jesus denied his own perfection, saying: "why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, god."[39] christian parents who hold jesus up to their children as a paragon would not wish their sons to grow up to be just like jesus. he is not an acceptable prototype. jesus did not provide the knowledge so much needed by man to enable him to shape his course through life. no one knows how to live correctly, how best to meet each situation, what action is suited to the occasion. jesus did not tell us what to do. his sayings are interpreted in many different ways. he failed to predict the needs of the future. jesus did not explain relations between man and wife, nor between employer and employee, nor how to educate children, nor how to preserve health, nor how to make a living, nor how to prevent war, poverty and suffering. jesus gave little practical information, and his spiritual advice was not clearly enough expressed to enable man to apply it to modern conditions. jesus neglected to instruct people how to live. his knowledge of the world was less than that of the average american citizen. footnotes: [1] matt. xxi, 18-19. [2] mark xi, 13. [3] mark xi, 20-23. [4] matt. xviii, 15-17. [5] matt. x, 33. [6] mark iii, 29. [7] matt. xii, 34. [8] matt. xxiii, 15. [9] matt. xxiii, 33. [10] john viii, 55. [11] john x, 8. [12] matt. xxiii, 17. [13] matt. viii, 28-34; mark v, 13; luke viii, 26-34. [14] luke xiv, 26. [15] john xi, 26. [16] john viii, 24. [17] john viii, 12. [18] john x, 36. [19] john xi, 25. [20] luke ii, 48. [21] luke xi, 37-40. [22] john ii, 4. [23] mark vii, 25-29. [24] matt. viii, 21-22. [25] matt. xvi, 23. [26] luke xvi, 1-9. [27] matt. xxiv, 7-13. [28] luke vi, 21. [29] matt. vi, 25-34. [30] matt. vii, 12. [31] matt. xxvi, 24. [32] matt. xxvi, 56. [33] john viii, 59. [34] matt. xii, 14-15. [35] luke xxii, 42. [36] luke xxii, 44. [37] john xii, 23-27. [38] mark xv, 34. [39] matt. xix, 17. conclusion the historicity of jesus has been discussed in many books and pamphlets. whether jesus lived or not depends upon what is meant by that phrase. if one is satisfied that there was a peripatetic philosopher named jesus who was the son of a woman named mary and who lived and taught around jerusalem, uttering some, but not all, of the words attributed to him, then jesus may be said to have lived. there can be no serious objection to the acceptance of that jesus as an actual personage even though he was ignored by secular historians and though the time and place of his birth and death are in doubt. on the other hand, if there never was such a person as the jesus described in the new testament--a man born of a virgin, superior to natural laws, able to walk on the water, and change the course of nature, performing miracles, casting out devils, a man who never erred, who was crucified, rose from the dead and ascended bodily into heaven where he now sits to judge the world--if there was no such man-god as the jesus of the gospels, some may hesitate to say that jesus ever lived. _jesus a myth_ sincere evolutionists who discredit miracles, must needs consider the gospel jesus as a myth. this does not mean that jesus had no reality, but that the original facts have been so enlarged upon that the principal features of his life are more fanciful than real. if you eliminate from the life of jesus as unhistorical his birth, his miracles, his theological teachings, his resurrection, ascension and messianic mission, the christ no longer exists. jesus would have attracted no attention were it not for the very circumstances which modernists admit were mythical. _judged by his works_ whether jesus was god, or man, or myth, he can be judged by his works, as he himself recommended. if he is found to be perfect in word and deed, it makes little difference whether he lived or not. as a symbol he can be revered and copied. but if jesus is now seen to be the product of his times, representing the virtues and defects of his biographers, with no vision beyond their ken, his authority is gone. not only will the divinity of jesus be discredited if he was found to have been occasionally in error, but his value as a guide to life will be impaired. what will be the result of this radical change? none of the beautiful ideals or sound ethical principles attributed to jesus will be lost. not one saying or counsel of valuable advice need go. not one evil thought need take the place of that which was good. in fact, the finest qualities of existence will be more vital in our lives when their realization becomes of primary importance instead of being subordinate to worship of the supernatural. principles are superior to persons. a dead personality remains unchanged; live ethical principles can be developed by more complete knowledge of evolutionary processes. _ethical evolution_ evolution has been progressing along ethical as well as physical lines. to the teachings of jesus, once considered perfection, have been added many newly discovered principles of value, for knowledge is cumulative. all the best thoughts of the ages are ours forever, no matter who first originated or expressed them. whatever the plan of the universe may be, it is more nearly comprehended now than in jesus' time. twentieth century events are more dependable in forming our philosophy of life than those of the first century. the failure to grasp this fact is the death knell of orthodox religion. every existing religious sect has founded its spirituality upon events supposed to have occurred in the past. christianity depends upon the direct creation, fall of man and life of an atoning savior, all physical in character. our new metaphysics will be based upon conditions existing today and that will be revealed by science in the future. the geologists, embryologists, biologists and astronomers of 1932 have more information about nature than jesus had. on that knowledge can be founded a system of living superior to the sermon on the mount. our own time is the most dependable era of revelation. we can safely accept whatever stands accredited after thorough examination, including all teachings of jesus that are admirable. a modern person with religious zeal has confidence that the world is ordered along consistent lines and will respond favorably to man's best efforts to solve the true way of living. the scientific mind and the religious spirit are complementary. religion, instead of being a system of handed-down sanctity, may become an inspired revelation to each individual--a religion of the spirit of the modern world. as the spirit derived from truth is superior to that based upon credulity, the new doctrines that supplant the old may be expected to excel any that have preceded them. anyone may be as spiritual as the proved facts permit. if the world has been improving physically and ethically, we can have confidence that whatever knowledge is necessary for our salvation is available to each of us now. no living god has died; no great principle has been lost. instead of depending upon jesus in an unthinking manner, we must seek the truth wherever it is found and follow wherever it may lead regardless of consequences. this requires more courage than professing jesus, whose teachings can be construed to mean whatever the reader desires. while the majority regard jesus as an ascetic, a reformer, opposed to business and joviality, bruce barton has convinced thousands that jesus was the great business man, rotarian and advertiser. _gains, not losses_ among the compensations that may supplant the loss of jesus as an ideal are the thrill at being a pioneer in striving for the welfare of the human race rather than for individual salvation; the satisfaction at having a consistent creed that can be maintained against all criticism without hypocrisy or evasion; emancipation from inhibitions required by a supposedly divine teacher. every pleasure is not a sin, but rejection of theology does not imply indifference to evil. science warns against excess as strongly as any ancient command. the fear of natural or man-decreed punishment in this world is as potent as the dread of eternal torment threatened by jesus. if jesus really was the sort of personage described in the bible; if he really was born of a virgin, controlled the elements and had power to condemn unbelievers to eternal damnation, all people should obey his every word. he should be followed literally; we should sell all our possessions and take no thought for the morrow. but if jesus was not that sort of a person; if he was neither a supernatural god nor an infallible man, he should not be worshipped as a redeeming savior nor be followed as a true guide for human conduct. our faith shifts with careful examination of the scriptures from belief in jesus to confidence that the world is a far pleasanter abode than jesus imagined. without reliance upon the authority of jesus we can adopt a code which will prove comparatively effective in leading towards a wholesome life. code of living 1. keep the body strong that the most efficient work may be done, the greatest happiness obtained during life and a wholesome inheritance passed on to future generations. 2. cultivate the mind, learning as many important facts as possible, striving to become expert in some particular field of endeavor. 3. develop a scientific spirit, the essential characteristic of which is a search for truth in the light of evidence and reason. do not deceive yourself or others. 4. base your spiritual concepts on the latest developments of evolution. be prepared to change your philosophy to conform to the consensus of scientific opinion. 5. conduct all human relationships in a spirit of tolerance and love, having proper consideration for others, not presuming to control their lives. 6. treat the opposite sex honorably, respecting their complementary qualities, with due regard for succeeding generations. 7. endeavor to embody in the laws of the community the spirit of equity and progress. 8. strive for an economic system under which each individual shall be rewarded according to his or her value to society. 9. avoid the use of physical force for personal revenge or national aggrandizement, having learned from experience that reason triumphs while brutality degrades. 10. hold yourself in readiness to accept new revelations. * * * * * luther burbank wrote concerning the above code on november 11, 1925: "_i am greatly pleased with your code of living ... the false ancient theology has past or is rapidly passing with intelligent people at the present time. it is not applicable to our conditions and is of no more value than a worn-out suit of clothes._" heresy: its utility and morality a plea and a justification by charles bradlaugh london: austin & co., 17, johnson's court, fleet street, e.c. price ninepence. heresy: its morality & utility a plea and a justification. chapter i. introduction what is heresy that it should be so heavily punished? why is it that society will condone many offences, pardon many vicious practices, and yet have such scant mercy for the open heretic, who is treated as though he were some horrid monster to be feared and hated? most religionists, instead of endeavouring with kindly thought to provide some solution for the difficulties propounded by their heretical brethren, indiscriminately confound all inquirers "in one common category of censure; their views are dismissed with ridicule as sophistical and fallacious, abused as infinitely dangerous, themselves denounced as heretics and infidels, and libelled as scoffers and atheists." with some religonists all heretics are atheists. with the pope of rome, garibaldi and mazzini are atheists. with the religious tract society, voltaire and paine were atheists. yet in neither of the above-named cases is the allegation true. voltaire and paine were heretics, but both were theists. garibaldi and mazzini are heretics, but neither of them is an atheist. with few exceptions, the heretics of one generation become the revered saints of a period less than twenty generations later. lord bacon, in his own age, was charged with atheism, sir isaac newton with socinianism, the famous tillotson was actually charged with atheism, and dr. burnet wrote against the commonly received traditions of the fall and deluge. there are but few men of the past of whom the church boasts to-day, who have not at some time been pointed at as heretics by orthodox antagonists excited by party rancour. heresy is in itself neither atheism nor theism, neither the rejection of the church of rome, nor of canterbury, nor of constantinople; heresy is not necessarily of any ist or ism. the heretic is one who has selected his own opinions, or whose opinions are the result of some mental effort; and he differs from others who are orthodox in this:--they hold opinions which are often only the bequest of an earlier generation unquestioningly accepted; he has escaped from the customary grooves of conventional acquiescence, and sought truth outside the channels sanctified by habit. men and women who are orthodox are generally so for the same reason that they are english or french--they were born in england or france, and cannot help the good or ill fortune of their birth-place. their orthodoxy is no higher virtue than their nationality. men are good and true of every nation and of every faith; but there are more good and true men in nations where civilisation has made progress, and amongst faiths which have been modified by high humanising influences. men are good not because of their orthodoxy, but in spite of it; their goodness is the outgrowth of their humanity, not of their orthodoxy. heresy is necessary to progress; heresy in religion always precedes an endeavour for political freedom. you cannot have effectual political progress without wide-spread heretical thought. every grand political change in which the people have played an important part, has been preceded by the popularisation of heresy in the immediately earlier generations. fortunately, ignorant men cannot be real heretics, so that education must be the hand-maiden to heresy. ignorance and superstition are twin sisters. belief too often means nothing more than prostration of the intellect on the threshold of the unknown. heresy is the pioneer, erect and manly, striding over the forbidden line in his search for truth. heterodoxy develops the intellect, orthodoxy smothers it. heresy is the star twinkle in the night, orthodoxy the cloud which hides this faint gleam of light from the weary travellers on life's encumbered pathway. orthodoxy is well exemplified in the dark middle ages, when the mass of men and women believed much and knew little, when miracles were common and schools were rare, and when the monasteries on the hill tops held the literature of europe. heresy speaks for itself in this nineteenth century, with the gas and electric light, with cheap newspapers, with a thousand lecture rooms, with innumerable libraries, and at least a majority of the people able to read the thoughts the dead have left, as well as to listen to the words the living utter. the word heretic ought to be a term of honour; for honest, clearly uttered heresy is always virtuous, and this whether truth or error; yet it is not difficult to understand how the charge of heresy has been generally used as a means of exciting bad feeling. the greek word [------] which is in fact our word heresy, signifies simply, selection or choice. the he etiq philosopher was the one who had searched and found, who, not content with the beaten paths, had selected a new road, chosen a new fashion of travelling in the inarch for that happiness all humankind are seeking. heretics are usually called "infidels," but no word could be more unfairly applied, if by it is meant anything more than that the heretic does not conform to the state faith. if it meant those who do not profess the faith, then there would be no objection, but it is more often used of those who are unfaithful, and then it is generally a libel. mahomedans and christians both call jews infidels, and mahomedans and christians call each other infidels. each religionist is thus an infidel to all sects but his own; there is but one degree of heresy between him and the heretic who rejects all churches. each ordinary orthodox man is a heretic to every religion in the world except one, but he is heretic from the accident of birth without the virtue of true heresy. in our own country heresy is not confined to the extreme platform adopted as a standing point by such a man as myself. it is rife even in the state-sustained church of england, and to show this one does not need to be content with such illustrations as are afforded by the essayists and reviewers, who discover the sources of the world's education rather in greece and italy than in judea, who reject the alleged prophecies as evidence of the messianic character of jesus; who admit that in nature and from nature, by science and by reason, we neither have, nor can possibly have any evidence of a deity working miracles; but declare that for that we must go out of nature and beyond science, and in effect avow that gospel miracles are always _objects_, not _evidences_, of faith; who deny the necessity of faith in jesus as saviour to peoples who could never have such faith; and who reject the notion that all mankind are individually involved in the curse and perdition of adam's sin; or even by the rev. charles voysey, who declines to preach "the god of the bible," and who will not teach that every word of the old and new testament is the word of god; or by the rev. dunbar heath, who in defiance of the bible doctrine, that man has only existed on the earth about 6,000 years, teaches that unnumbered chiliads have passed away since the human family commenced to play at nations on our earth; or by bishop colenso, who in his impeachment of the pentateuch, his denial of the literal truth of the narratives of the creation, fall, and deluge, actually impugns the whole scheme of christianity (if the foundation be false, the superstructure cannot be true); or by the rev. baden powell, who declared "that the whole tenor of geology is in entire contradiction to the cosmogony delivered from mount sinai," and who denied a "local heaven above and a local hell beneath the earth;" or by the rev. dr. giles, who, not content with preceding dr. colenso in his assaults on the text of the pentateuch, also wrote as vigorously against the text of the new testament; or by the rev. dr. wall, who, unsatisfied with arguments against the admittedly incorrect authorised translation of the bible, actually wrote to prove that a new and corrected hebrew text was necessary, the hebrew itself being corrupt; or by the rev. dr. irons, who teaches that not only are the gospel writers unknown, but that the very language in which jesus taught is yet to be discovered, who declares that prior to the esraic period the literal history of the old testament is lost, who does not find the trinity taught in scripture, and who declares that the gospel dees not teach the doctrine of the atonement; or by the late archbishop whately, to whom is attributed a latin pamphlet raising strong objections against the truth of the alleged confusion of tongues at babel. we may fairly allege, that amongst thinking clergymen of the church of england, heresy is the rule and not the exception. so soon as a minister begins to preach sermons which he does not buy ready lithographed--sermons which are the work of his brain--so soon heresy more or less buds out, now in the rejection of some church doctrine or article of minor importance, now in some bold declaration at variance with major and more essential tenets. even bishop watson's so famous for his bible apology, declared that the church articles and creeds were not binding on any man. "they may be true, they may be false," he wrote. today scores of church of england clergymen openly protest against, or groan in silence under the enforced subscription of thirty-nine unbelievable articles. sir william hamilton declares that the heads of colleges at oxford well knew that the man preparing for the church "will subscribe thirty-nine articles which he cannot believe, who swears to do and to have done a hundred articles which he cannot or does not perform." in scientific circles the heresy of the most efficient members is startlingly apparent. against members of the anthropological society charges of atheism are freely levelled, and although such a charge does not seem to be justified by any reports of their meetings, or by their printed publications, it is clear that not only out of doors, but even amongst their own circle it is felt that their researches conflict seriously with the hebrew writ. the society has been preached against and prayed against, and yet it is simply a society for discovering everything possible about man, prehistoric as well as modern. it has, however, an unpardonable vice in the eyes of the orthodox--it encourages the utterance of facts without regard to their effect on faiths. the ethnological society is kindred to the last named in many of its objects, and hence some of its most active members have been direct assailants of the hebrew chronology, which, limits man's existence to the short space of 6,000 years; they have been deniers(sp.) of the origin of the human race from one pair, of the confusion of tongues at babel, and of the reduction of the human race to one family by the noachian deluge. geological science has a crowd of heretics amongst its professors, men who deny the sudden origin of fauna and flora; who trace the gradual development of the vegetable and animal kingdoms through vast periods of time; and who find no resting place in a beginning of existence, but are obliged to halt in face of a measureless past, inconceivable in its grandeur. geology, to quote the words of dr. kalisch, declares "the utter impossibility of a creation of even the earth alone in six days." mr. goodwin says in the "essays and reviews:" "the school-books of the present day, while they teach the child that the earth moves, yet assure him that it is a little less than six thousand years old, and that it was made in six days. on the other hand, geologists of all religious creeds are agreed that the earth has existed for an immense series of years--to be counted by millions rather than by thousands; and that indubitably more than six days elapsed from its first creation to the appearance of man upon its surface." astronomy has in the ranks of its professors many of its most able minds who do not believe in the sun and moon as two great lights, who cannot accept the myriad stars as fixed in the firmament solely to give light upon the earth, who refuse to believe in the heaven as a fixed firmament to divide the waters above from the waters beneath, who cannot by their telescopes discover the local heaven above or the local hell beneath, although their science marks each faint nebulosity crossing, or crossed by the range of the watcher's vision. to quote again from mr. goodwin:--"on the revival of science in the sixteenth century, some of the earliest conclusions at which philosophers arrived, were found to be at variance with popular and long established belief. the ptolemaic system of astronomy, which had then full possession of the minds of men, contemplated the whole visible universe from the earth as the immovable centre of things. copernicus changed the point of view, and placing the beholder in the sun, at once reduced the earth to an inconspicuous globule, a merely subordinate member of a family of planets; which the terrestrials had, until then, fondly imagined to be but pendants and ornaments of their own habitation. the church, naturally, took a lively interest in the disputes which arose between the philosophers ot the new school, and those who adhered to the old doctrines, inasmuch as the hebrew records, the basis of religious faith, manifestly countenanced the opinion of the earth's immobility, and certain other views of the universe, very incompatible with those propounded by copernicus. hence arose the official proceedings against galileo, in consequence of which he submitted to sign his celebrated recantation, acknowledging that 'the proposition that the sun is the centre of the world and immovable from its place, is absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to the scripture;' and that 'the proposition that the earth is not the centre of the world, nor immovable, but that it moves, and also with a diurnal motion, is absurd, philosophically false, and at least erroneous in faith.'" why is it that society is so severe on heresy? three hundred years ago it burned heretics, till thirty years ago it sent them to jail; even in england and america to-day it is content to harass, annoy, and slander them. in the united states a candidate for the governorship of a state, although otherwise admittedly eligible, was assailed bitterly for his suspected socinianism. sir sidney waterlow, standing for a scotch seat, was sharply catechised as to when he had last been inside the unitarian chapel, and only saved his seat by not too boldly avowing his opinions. lord amberley, who was "unwise" enough to be honest in some of his answers, did not obtain his seat for south devon in consequence of the suspicion of heresy excited against him. it is chiefly to the _odium theologicum_ that mr. mill may attribute his rejection at westminster; and it is supposed to have also damaged sir john lubbock in west kent. i only refrain from enlarging on my own case, because i learn from the press that it is chiefly the vulgarity and coarseness of my heresy with which they are indignant. to reply that i have sought to avoid being coarse and vulgar is worse than useless, i am judged untried, condemned unheard; evidence is unnecessary in the case of a man who thus puts himself outside the pale. sir william drummond says, "early associations are generally the strongest in the human mind, and what we have been taught to credit as children we are seldom, disposed to question as men. called away from speculative inquiries by the common business of life, men in general possess neither the inclination, nor the leisure to examine _what_ they believe or _why_ they believe. a powerful prejudice remains in the mind; ensures conviction without the trouble of thinking; and repels doubt without the aid or authority of reason. the multitude then is not very likely to applaud an author, who calls upon it to consider what it had hitherto neglected, and to stop where it had been accustomed to pass on. it may also happen that there is a learned and formidable body, which, having given its general sanction to the literal interpretation of the holy scriptures, may be offended at the presumption of an unhallowed layman, who ventures to hold, that the language of those scriptures is often symbolical and allegorical, even in passages which both the church and the synagogue consider as nothing else than a plain statement of fact. a writer who had sufficient boldness to encounter such obstacles, and to make an appeal to the public, would only expose himself to the invectives of offended bigotry, and to the misrepresentations of interested malice. the press would be made to ring with declamations against him, and neither learning, nor argument, nor reason, nor moderation on his side, would protect him from the literary assassination which awaited him. in vain would he put on the heaven-tempered panoply of truth. the weapons which could neither pierce his buckler nor break his casque, might be made to pass with envenomed points through the joints of his armour. every trivial error which he might commit, would be magnified into a flagrant fault; and every insignificant mistake into which he might fall, would be represented by the bigotted, or by the hireling critics of the day as an ignorant, or as a perverse deviation from the truth." both by the statute law and common law, heresy is punishable, and many are punished for it even in the second half of the nineteenth century. a man who has been educated in, or made profession of christianity, and who shall then deny any of the thirty-nine articles, is liable to indictment and imprisonment, but this course is seldom pursued; the more common practice is for the christian to avail himself of the heretic's want of belief in order to object to his competency as a witness. repeated instances have occurred recently in which the proposed witness has been rejected as untrustworthy, because he was too honest to pretend to hold a faith he in truth denied. besides such open persecution, there is the constant, unceasing, paltry, petty persecuting spirit which refuses to trade with the heretic; which declines to eat with him; which will not employ him; which feels justified in slandering him, which seeks to set his wife's mind against him, and to take away the affection of his children from him. for those who do not believe this, i will instance two clergymen of the church of england: one (who as my teacher when a boy) set a kind father's heart against me, and drove me further in heresy than i then dreamed of marching; and the other, who in cruel wickedness tried to wound me as a man through the feelings of my wife and children, whom he most vilely and basely slandered. the first is yet unpunished, the second escaped condign punishment only by writing himself down libeller, and praying pardon for the slanderous coinage of his brain. and yet this latter church of england clergyman, who had written a strong letter thanking me for my generous forbearance, and who from his own pulpit pretended to express his sorrow, is actually the first and only man in my neighbourhood to cry "atheist" against me, when i mingle in political life, and he thinks the phrase may wound and injure me. chapter ii. the sixteenth century it requires a more practised pen than mine to even faintly sketch the progress of heresy during the past three centuries, but i trust to say enough to give the reader an idea of its rapid growth and wide extension. i say of the past three centuries, because it is only during the past three hundred years that heresy has made the majority of its converts amongst the mass of the people. in earlier times heretics were not only few, but they talked to the few, and wrote to the few, in the language of the few; and indeed it may be fairly said, that it is only during the last hundred years that the greatest men have sought to make heresy "vulgar;" that is, to make it common. one of our leading scientific men admitted recently that he had been reproved by some of his more orthodox friends, for not confining to the latin language such of his geological opinions as were supposed to be most dangerous to the hebrew records. the starting-point of the real era of popular heresy may be placed at the early part of the sixteenth century, when the memories of huss and ziska (who had really inoculated the mass with some spirit of heretical resistance a century before) aided luther in resisting rome. martin luther, born at eisleben in saxony, in 1483, was one of the heretics who sought popular endorsement for his heresy, and who following the example of the ulrich zuingle, of zurich, preached to the people in rough plain words. while others were limited to latin, he rang out in plain german his opposition to tetzel and his protectors. i know that to-day, martin luther is spoken of by orthodox protestants as if he were a saint without blemish, and indeed i do not want to deprive the christian church of the honour of his adherence; he is hardly good enough and true enough for a first-class heretic. yet in justification of my ranking him even so temporarily amongst the heretics of the sixteenth century, it will be sufficient to mention that he regarded "the books of the kings as more worthy of credit than the books of the chronicles," that he wrote as follows:--"the book of esdras i toss into the elbe." "i am so an enemy to the book of esther i would it did not exist." "job spake not therefore as it stands written in his book." "it is a sheer _argumentum fabulã¦_" "the book of the proverbs of solomon has been pieced together by others," of ecclesiastes "there is too much of broken matter in it; it has neither boots nor spurs, but rides only in socks." "isaiah hath borrowed his whole art and knowledge from david." "the history of jonah is so monstrous that it is absolutely incredible." "the epistle to the hebrews is not by st. paul, nor indeed by any apostle." "the epistle of james 1 account the writing of no apostle," and "is truly an epistle of sham." the epistle of jude "allegeth sayings or stories which have no place in scripture," "of revelation i can discover no trace that it is established by the holy spirit." if martin luther were alive to-day, the established church of england, which pretends to revere him, would prosecute him in the english ecclesiastical courts if he ventured to repeat the foregoing phrases from her pulpits. what would the writers who attack me for coarseness, say of the following passage, which occurs with reference to melancthon, whom luther boasts that he raised miraculously from the dead? "melancthon," says sir william hamilton, to whose essay i am indebted for the extracts here given, "had fallen ill at weimar from contrition and fear for the part he had been led to take in the landgrave's polygamy: his life was even in danger." "then and there," said luther, "i made our lord god to smart for it. for i threw down the sack before the door, and rubbed his ears with all his promises of hearing prayer, which i knew how to recapitulate from holy writ, so that he could not but hearken to me, should i ever again place any reliance on his promises." martin luther, with his absolute denial of free-will, and with his double code of morality for princes and peasants--easy for one and harsh for the other--may be fairly left now with those who desire to vaunt his orthodoxy; here his name is used only to illustrate the popular impetus given to nonconformity by his quarrel with the papal authorities. luther protested against the romish church, but established by the very fact the right for some more advanced man than doctor martin to protest in turn against the lutheran church. the only consistent church in christendom is the romish church, for it claims the right to think for all its followers. the whole of the protestant churches are inconsistent, for they claim the right to think and judge against rome, but deny extremer nonconformists the right to think and judge against themselves. goethe, says froude, declares that luther threw back the intellectual progress of mankind by using the passions of the multitude to decide subjects which should have been left to the learned. i do not believe this to be wholly true, for the multitude once having their ears fairly opened, listened to more than the appeal to their passions, and examined for themselves propositions which otherwise they would have accepted or rejected from habit and without inquiry. martin luther's public discussions with pen and tongue, in wittemberg, augsburg, liebenwerd, and lichtenberg, and the protest he encouraged against rome, were the commencement of a vigorous controversy, in which the public (who heard for the first time sharp controversial sermons preached publicly in the various pulpits by lutheran preachers on free-will and necessity, election and predestination, &c.) began to take real part and interest; and which is still going on, and will in fact never end until the unholy alliance of church and state is everywhere annulled, and each religion is left to sustain itself by its own truth, or to fall from its own weakness, no man being molested under the law on account of his opinions on religious matters. while luther undoubtedly gave an impetus to the growth of rationalism by his own appeal to reason and his reliance on reason for himself, it is not true that he contended for the right of general freedom of inquiry, nor would he have left unlimited the privileges of individual judgment for others. he could be furious in his denunciations of reason when a freer thinker than himself dared to use it against his superstitions. it is somewhat remarkable that while on the one hand one man, luther, was detaching from the church of rome a large number of minds, another man, loyola, was about the same time engaged in founding that powerful society (the society of jesuits), which has done so much to check free inquiry and maintain the priestly domination over the human intellect. that which luther commenced in germany roughly, inefficiently, and perhaps more from personal feeling for the privileges of the special order to which he belonged than from desire for popular progress, was aided in its permanent effect by descartes, in england by bacon, in france by montaigne, and in italy by bruno. francis bacon, lord verulam, was born on the 22nd january, 1561, and died 1626. his mother, anne, daughter of sir anthony cooke, was a woman of high education, and certainly with some inclinations favourable to freethought, for she had herself translated into english some of the sermons on fate and free-will of bernard ochino, or bernardin ochinus, an italian reforming heretic, alike repudiated by the powers at rome, geneva, wittemberg, and zurich. ochino, in his famous disquisition "touching the freedom or bondage of the human will, and the foreknowledge, predestination, and liberty of god," after discussing, with great acuteness, and from different points of view, these important topics, comes to the conclusion that there is no outlet to the mazes of thought in which the honest speculator plunges in the endeavour to solve these problems. although, like other writers of that and earlier periods, many of bacon's works were published in latin, he wrote and published also in english, and if i am right in numbering him as one of the heretics of the sixteenth century, he must be also counted a vulgar heretic--i.e., one who wrote in the vulgar tongue, who preached his heresy in the language which the mass understood. lewes says, "bacon and descartes are generally recognised as the fathers of modern philosophy, although they themselves were carried along by the rapidly-swelling current of their age, then decisively setting in the direction of science. it is their glory to have seen visions of the coming greatness, to have expressed in terms of splendid power, the thoughts which were dimly stirring the age, and to have sanctioned the new movement by their authoritative genius." bacon was the populariser of that method of reasoning known as the inductive, that method which seeks to trace back from the phenomena of the moment to the eternal noumenon or noumena--from the conditioned to the absolute. nearly two thousand years before, the same method had been taught by aristotle in opposition to plato, and probably long thousands of years before the grand greek, pre-historic schoolmen had used the method; it is natural to the human mind. the stagirite was the founder of a school, bacon the teacher and populariser for a nation. aristotle's greek was known to few, bacon's eloquent english opened out the subject to the many whom he impregnated with his own confidence in the grand progressiveness of human thought. lewes says; "the spirit of his philosophy was antagonistic to theology, for it was a spirit of doubt and search; and its search was for visible and tangible results." bacon himself, in his essay on superstition, says: "atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men: therefore atheism did never perturb states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further; and we see the times inclined to atheism, as the time of augustus caesar were civil times; but superstition hath been the confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new _primum mobile_ (the first motive cause), that ravisheth all the spheres of government." it is true that he also wrote against atheism, and this in strong language, but his philosophy was not used for the purpose of proving theological propositions. he said: "true philosophy is that which is the faithful echo of the voice of the world, which is written in some sort under the dictation of things, which adds nothing of itself, which is only the rebound, the reflection of reality." it has been well said that the words "utility and progress" give the keynotes of bacon's teachings. with one other extract we leave his writings. "crafty men," he says, "contemn studies, simple men admire them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested. reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man; and therefore, if a man write little, he need have a great memory; if he confer little, he need have a present wit; and if he read little, he had need have much cunning, to seem to know that he doth not. histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtle; natural philosophy deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend." he was the father of experimental philosophy. in one of his suggestions as to the force of attraction of gravitation may be found the first aid to sir isaac newton's later demonstrations on this head; another of his suggestions, worked out by torricelli, ended in demonstrating the gravity of the atmosphere. but to the method he so popularised may be attributed the grandest discoveries of modern times. it is to be deplored that the memory of his moral weakness should remain to spoil the praise of his grand intellect. lord macaulay, in the _edinburgh review_, after contrasting at some length the philosophy of plato with that of bacon, said;--"to sum up the whole: we should say that the aim of the platonic philosophy was to exalt man into a god. the aim of the baconian philosophy was to provide man with what he requires while he continues to be man. the aim of the platonic philosophy was to raise us far above vulgar wants. the aim of the baconian philosophy was to supply our vulgar wants. the former aim was noble; but the latter was attainable. plato drew a good bow; but, like acestes in virgil, he aimed at the stars; and therefore, though there was no want of strength or skill, the shot was thrown away. his arrow was indeed followed by a track of dazzling radiance, but it struck nothing. bacon fixed his eye on a mark which was placed on the earth and within bowshot, and hit it in the white. the philosophy of plato began in words and ended in words--noble words in deed-words such as were to be expected from the finest of human intellects exercising boundless dominion over the finest of human languages. the philosophy of bacon began in observations and ended in arts." in france the political heresy of jean bodin--who challenged the divine right of rulers; who proclaimed the right of resistance against oppressive decrees of monarchs; who had words of laudation for tyrannicide, and yet had no conception that the multitude were entitled to use political power, but on the contrary wrote against them--was very imperfect, the conception of individual right was confounded in the habit of obedience to monarchical authority. bodin is classed by mosheim amongst the writers who sowed the seeds of scepticism in france; but although he was far from an orthodox man, it is doubtful if bodin ever intended his views to be shared beyond the class to which he belonged. to the partial glimpse of individual right in the works of bodin add the doctrine of political fraternity taught by la boetie, and then this political heresy becomes dangerous in becoming popular. the most decided heretic and doubter of the sixteenth century was one sanchez, by birth a portuguese, and practising as a physician at toulouse; but the impetus which ultimately led to the spread and popularity of sceptical opinions in relation to politics and theology, is chiefly due to the satirical romances of rabelais and the essays of montaigne. "what rabelais was to the supporters of theology," says buckle, "that was montaigne to the theology itself. the writings of rabelais were only directed against the clergy, but the writings of montaigne were directed against the system of which the clergy were the offspring." montaigne was born at bordeaux 1533, died 1592. louis blanc says of his words, "et ce ne sont pas simples discours d'un philosophe ã  des philosophes. montaigne s'addresse ã  tous." montaigne's words were not those of a philosopher talking only to his own order, he addressed himself to mankind at large, and he wrote in language the majority could easily comprehend. voltaire points out that montaigne as a philosopher was the exception in france to his class; he having succeeded in escaping that persecution which fell so heavily on others. montaigne's thoughts were like sharp instruments scattered broadcast, and intended for the destruction of many of the old social and conventional bonds; he was the advocate of individualism, and placed each man as above society, rather than society as more important than each man. montaigne mocked the reasoners who contradicted each other, and derided that fallibility of mind which regarded the opinion of the moment as infallibly true, and which was yet always temporarily changed by an attack of fever or a draught of strong drink, and often permanently modified by some new discovery. less fortunate than montaigne, godfrey a valle was burned for heresy in paris in 1572, his chief offence having been that of issuing a work entitled "de arte nihil credendi." heresy thus championed in france, germany, and england, had in italy its sixteenth century soldiers in pomponatius of mantua, giordano bruno, and telesio, both of naples, and in campanella of calabria, a gallant band, who were nearly all met with the cry of "atheist," and were either answered with exile, the prison, or the faggot. pomponatius, who was born 1486 and died 1525, wrote a treatise on the soul, which was so much deemed an attack on the doctrine of immortality despite a profession of reverence for the dogmas of the church, that the work was publicly burned at venice, a special bull of leo x. being directed against the doctrine. bernard telesio was born at naples in 1508, and founded there a school in which mathematics and philosophy were given the first place. during his lifetime he had the good fortune to escape persecution, but sites his death his works were proscribed by the church; telesio was chiefly useful in educating the minds of some of the neapolitans for more advanced thinking than his own. this was well illustrated in the case of thomas campanella, born 1568, who, attracted by the teachings of telesio, wrote vigorously against the old schoolmen and in favor of the new philosophy. despite an affected reverence for the church of rome, campanella spent twenty-seven years of his life in prison. campanella has been, as is usually the case with eminent writers, charged with atheism, but there seems to be no fair foundation for the charges he was a true heretic, for he not only opposed aristotle; but even his own teacher telesio. none of these men, however, yet strove to reach the people, they wrote to and of one another, not to or of the masses. it is said that campanella was fifty times arrested and seven times tortured for his heresy. one andrew de bena, a profound scholar and eminent preacher of the church of rome, carried away by the spirit of the time, came out into the reformed party; but his mind once set free from the old trammels, found no rest in luther's narrow church, and a poetic pantheism was the result. jerome cardan, a mathematician of considerable ability, born at pavia 1601, has been fiercely accused of atheism. his chief offence seems to have been rather in an opposite direction; astrology was with him a favourite subject. while the strange views put forward in some of his works served good purpose by provoking inquiry, we can hardly class cardan otherwise than as a man whose undoubted genius and erudition were more than counterbalanced by his excessively superstitious folly. giordano bruno was born near naples about 1550. he was burned at rome for heresy on the 17th february, 1600. bruno was burned for alleged atheism, but appears rather, to have been a pantheist. his most prominent avowal of heresy was the disbelief in eternal torment and rejection, of the common orthodox ideas of the devil. he wrote chiefly in italian, his vulgar tongue, and thus effectively aided the grand march of heresy by familiarising the eyes of the people with newer and truer forms of thought. bruno used the tongue as fluently as the pen. he spoke in italy until he had roused an opposition rendering flight the only possibly escape from death. at geneva he found no resting place, the fierce spirit of zuingle and calvin was there too mighty; at paris he might have found favour, with the king, and at the sorbonne, but he refused to attend mass, and delivered a series of popular lectures, which won many admirers; from paris he went to england, where we find him publicly debating at oxford and lecturing on theology, until he excited an antagonism which induced his return to paris, where he actually publicly discussed for three days some of the grand problems of existence. paris orthodoxy could not permit his onslaughts on established opinions, and this time it was to germany bruno turned for hospitality; where, after visiting many of the different states, lecturing freely but with general success, he drew upon himself a sentence of excommunication at helmstadt. at last he returned to italy and spoke at padua, but had at once to fly thence from the inquisition; at venice he found a resting place in prison, whence after six years of dungeon, and after the tender mercy of the rack, he was led out to receive the final refutation of the faggot. there is a grand heroism in the manner in which he received his sentence and bore his fiery punishment. no cry of despair, no prayer for escape, no flinching at the moment of death. bruno's martyrdom may favourably contrast with the highest example christianity gives us. it was in the latter half of the sixteenth century, that unitarianism or socinianism assumed a front rank position in europe, having its chief strength in poland, with considerable force in holland and england. in 1524, one lewis hetzer had been publicly burned at constance, for denying the divinity of jesus; but hetzer was more connected with the anabaptists than with the unitarians. about the same time a man named claudius openly argued amongst the swiss people, against the doctrine of the trinity, and one john campanus contended at wittemberg, and other places, against the usually inculcated doctrines of the church, as to the father, son, and holy ghost. in 1566, valentine gentilis, a neapolitan, was put to death at rome, for teaching the superiority of god the father, over the son and the holy ghost. modern unitarianism appears to have had as its founders or chief promoters, lã¦lius socinus, and his nephew faustus socinus; the first having the better brain and higher genius, but marred by a timid and irresolute character; the second having a more active nature and bolder temperament. from cracow and racow, during the latter half of this century, the unitarians (who drew into their ranks many men of advanced minds.) issued a large number of books and pamphlets, which were circulated amongst the people with considerable zeal and industry. unitarianism was carried from poland into transylvania by a physician, george blandrata, and a preacher francis david, or davides, who obtained the support and countenance of the then ruler of the country. davides, unfortunately for himself, became too unitarian for the unitarians; he adopted the extreme views of one simon budnffius, who, in lithuania, entirely repudiated any sort, of religious worship in reference to jesus. budnã¦us was excommunicated by the unitarians themselves, and davides was imprisoned for the rest of his life. as the unitarians were persecuted by the old romish and new lutheran churches, so they in turn persecuted seceders from and opposers of their own movement. each man's history involved the widening out of public thought; each act of persecution illustrated a vain endeavour to check the progress of heresy; each new sect marked a step towards the destruction of the old obstructive faiths. about the close of the sixteenth century, ernestius sonerus, of nuremberg, wrote against the doctrine of eternal torment, and also against the divinity of jesus, but his works were never very widely circulated. amongst the distinguished europeans of the sixteenth century whom dr. j. f. smith mentions as either atheists or favouring atheism, were paul jovius, peter aretin, and muretus. rumour has even enrolled leo x. himself in the atheistical ranks. how far some of these men had warranted the charge other than by being promoters of literature and lovers of philosophy, it is now difficult to say. a determined resistance was offered to the spread of heretical opinions in the south of europe by the roman church, and it is alleged that some thousands of persons were burned or otherwise punished in spain, portugal, and naples during the sixteenth century. the inquisition or holy office was in spain and portugal the most prominent and active persecutor, but persecution was carried on vigorously in other parts of europe by the seceders from rome. zuingle, luther, and calvin, were as harsh as the pope towards those with whom they differed. michael servetus, or servede, was a native of arragon, by profession a physician; he wrote against the ordinary doctrines of the trinity, but was far from ordinary unitarianism. he was burned at geneva, at the instance of calvin. calvin was rather fond of burning heretical opponents; to the name of servetus might be added that of gruet, who also was burned at the instance of calvin, for denying the divinity of the christian religion, and for arguing against the immortality of the soul. it is worth notice that while heresy in this sixteenth century began to branch out openly, and to strike its roots down firmly amongst the people, ecclesiastical historians are compelled to record improvement in the condition of society. mosheim says, "in this century the arts and sciences were carried to a pitch unknown to preceding ages, and from this happy renovation of learning, the european churches derived the most signal and inestimable advantages." "the benign influence of true science, and its tendency to improve both the form of religion and the institutions of civil policy, were perceived by many of the states." the love of literature is the most remarkable and characteristic form of advancing civilisation. instead of being the absorbing passion of the learned few, it becomes gradually the delight and occupation of increasing numbers. this cultivation of literary pursuits by the mass is only possible when enough of heresy has been obtained to render their scope of study wide enough to be useful. rotterdam gave life to the polished erasmus, valentia to ludovico vivez, picardy to le fevre, and france to rabelais. in the latter half of this century, giants in literature grew out, giants who wrote for the people. william shakespeare wrote even for those who could not read, but who might learn while looking and listening. his comedies and tragedies are at the same time pictures for the people of diverse phases of english life and character, with a thereunto added universality of pourtrayal and breadth in philosophy, which it is hardly too much to say, that no other dramatist has ever equalled. italy boasts its torquato tasso, whose "jerusalem delivered," the grand work of a great poet, marks, like a mighty monument, the age capable of finding even in a priest-ridden country, an audience amongst the lowest as well as the highest, ready to read and sing, and finally permeated with the poet's outpourings. in astronomy, the name of tycho brahã© stands out in the sixteenth century like one of the first magnitude stars whose existence he catalogued. chapter iii. the seventeenth century the seeds of inquiry sown in the sixteenth century resulted in a fruitful display of advanced opinions during the next age. in the page of seventeenth century history, more names of men, either avowedly heretics, or charged by the orthodox with heresy, or whose labours can be shown to have tended to the growth of heresy, may probably be recorded than can be found during the whole of the previously long period during which the christian church assumed to dominate and control european thought. the seventeenth century muster-roll of heresy is indeed a grand one, and gloriously filled. one of its early martyrs was julius caesar vanini, who was burned at toulouse, in the year 1619, aged 34, as "an impious and obstinate atheist." was he atheist, or was he not? this is a question, in answering which the few remains of his works give little ground for sharing the opinion of his persecutors. yet many writers agree in writing as if his atheism were of indisputable notoriety. he was a poor neapolitan priest, he preached a sort of pantheism; unfortunately for himself, he believed in the utility of public discussion on theological questions, and thus brought upon his head the charge of seeking to convert the world to atheism. in 1611, two men, named legat and whitman, were burned in england for heresy. "but," says buckle, "this was the last gasp of expiring bigotry; and since that memorable day, the soil of england has never been stained by the blood of a man who has suffered for his religious creed." peter charron, of paris, ought perhaps to have been included in the sixteenth century list, for he died in 1603, but his only known work, "la sagesse," belongs to the seventeenth century, in which it circulated and obtained reputation. he urged that religion is the accidental result of birth and education, and that therefore variety of creed should not be cause of quarrel between men, as such variety is the result of circumstances over which the men themselves have had no control; and he urges that as each sect claims to be the only true one, we ought to rise superior to all sects, and without being terrified by the fear of future punishment, or allured by the hope of future happiness, "be content with such practical religion as consists in performing the duties of life." buckle, who speaks in high terms of charron, says, "the sorbonne went so far as to condemn charron's great work, but could not succeed in having it prohibited." renã© descartes duperron, a few years later than bacon (he was born in 1596, at la haye, in touraine, died 1650, at stockholm) established the foundations of the deductive method of reasoning, and applied it in a manner which bacon had apparently carefully avoided. both descartes and bacon addressed themselves to the task of substituting for the old systems, a more comprehensive and useful spirit of philosophy; but while bacon sought to accomplish this by persuading men to experiment and observation, descartes commenced with the search for a first and self-evident ground of all knowledge. this, to him, is found in consciousness. the existence of deity was a point which bacon left untouched by reason, yet with descartes it was the first proposition he sought to prove. he says, "i have always thought that the two questions of the existence of god and the nature of the soul, were the chief of those which ought to be demonstrated rather by philosophy than by theology, for although it is sufficient for us, the faithful, to believe in god, and that the soul does not perish with the body, it does not seem possible ever to persuade the infidels to any religion unless we first prove to them these two things by natural reason." to prove this existence of god and the immortality of the soul, descartes needed a firm starting point, one which no doubt could touch, one which no argument could shake. he found this point in the fact of his own existence. he could doubt everything else, but he could not doubt that he, the thinking doubter, existed. his own existence was the primal fact, the indubitable certainty, which served as the base for all other reasonings, hence his famous "cogito ergo sum:" i think, therefore i am. and although it has been fairly objected that descartes did not exist because he thought, but existed and thought; it is nevertheless clear that it is only in the thinking that descartes had the consciousness of his existence. the fact of descartes' existence was, to him, one above and beyond all logic, evidence could not add to the certitude, no scepticism could impeach it. whether or not we agree with the cartesian philosophy, or the reasonings used to sustain it, we must admire the following four rules which he has given us, and which, with the view of consciousness in which we do not entirely concur, are the essential features of the basis of a considerable portion of descartes' system;-"1. never to accept anything as true but what is evidently so; to admit nothing but what so clearly and distinctly presents itself as true, that there can be no reason to doubt it. "2. to divide every question into as many separate parts as possible, that each part being more easily conceived, the whole may be more intelligible. "3. to conduct the examination with order, beginning by that of objects the most simple, and therefore the easiest to be known, and ascending little by little up to knowledge of the most complex. "4. to make such exact calculations, and such circumspections as to be confident that nothing essential has been omitted." "consciousness being the basis of all certitude, everything of which you are clearly and distinctly conscious must be true: everything which you clearly and distinctly conceive, exists, if the idea involve existence." it should be remarked that consciousness being a state of condition of the mind, is by no means an infallible guide? men may fancy they have clear ideas, when their consciousness, if carefully examined, would prove to have been treacherous. descartes argued for three classes of ideas--acquired, compounded, and innate. it is in his assumption of innate ideas that you have one of the radical weaknesses of his system. sir william hamilton points out that the use of the word idea by descartes, to express the object of memory, imagination, and sense, was quite a new usage, only one other writer, david buchanan, having previously used the word idea with this signification. descartes did not write for the mass, and his philosophy would have been limited to a much narrower circle had its spread rested on his own efforts. but the age was one for new thought, and the contemporaries and successors of descartes carried the cartesian logic to extremes he had perhaps avoided, and they taught the new philosophy to the world in a fearless spirit, with a boldness for which descartes could have given them no example. descartes, who in early life had travelled much more than was then the custom, had probably made the personal acquaintance of most of the leading thinkers of europe then living; it would be otherwise difficult to account for the very ready reception given by them to his first work. fortunately for descartes, he was born with a fair fortune, and escaped such difficulties as poorer philosophers must needs submit to. there is perhaps a _per contra_ side. it is more than possible that if the needs of life had compelled him, descartes' scientific predilections might have resulted in more immediate advantage to society. his philosophy is often pedantic to weariness, and his scientific theories are often sterile. the fear of poverty might have quickened some of his speculations into a more practical utterance. buckle reminds us that descartes "was the first who successfully applied algebra to geometry; that he pointed out the important law of the sines; that in an age in which optical instruments were extremely imperfect, he discovered the changes to which light is subjected in the eye by the crystalline lens; that he directed attention to the consequences resulting from the weight of the atmosphere, and that he detected the causes of the rainbow." "descartes," says saintes, "throwing off the swaddling clothes of scholasticism, resolved to owe to himself alone the acquisition of the truth which he so earnestly desired to possess. for what else is the methodical doubt which he established as the starting point in his philosophy, than an energetic protest of the human mind against all external authority? having thus placed all science on a philosophical basis, no matter what, he freed philosophy herself from her long servitude, and proclaimed her queen of the intellect. hence every one who has wished to account to himself for his existence, every one who has desired to know himself to know nature, and to rise to its author; in a word, all who have wished to make a wise use of their intellectual faculties, to apply them, not to hollow speculations which border on nonentity, but to sensible and practical inquiries, have taken and followed some direction from descartes." it is almost amusing when philosophers criticise their predecessors. mons. henri bitter denies to descartes any originality of method or even of illustration, while hegel describes him as the founder of modern philosophy, whose influence upon his own age and on modern times it is impossible to exaggerate. to attempt to deal fully and truly with descartes in the few lines which can be spared here, is impossible; all that is sought is to as it were catalogue his name in the seventeenth century list. whether originator or imitator, whether founder or disciple, it is certain that descartes gave a sharp spur to european thought, and mightily hastened the progress of heresy. it is not the object or duty of the present writer to examine or refute any of the extraordinary views entertained by descartes as to vortices. descartes himself is reported to have said "my theory of vortices is a philosophical romance." science in the last three centuries has travelled even more rapidly than philosophy; and most of the physical speculations of descartes are relegated to the region of grandly curious blunderings. there is one point of error held by descartes sufficiently entertained even to-day--although most often without a distinct appreciation of the position--to justify a few words upon it. descartes denied mental faculties to all the animal kingdom except mankind. all the brute kingdom he regarded as machines without intelligence. in this he was logical, even in error, for he accorded a soul to man which he denied to the brute. soul and mind with him are identified, and thought is the fundamental attribute of mind. to admit that a dog, horse, or elephant can think, that it can remember what happened yesterday, that it can reason ever so incompletely, would be to admit that that dog, horse, or elephant, has some kind of soul; to avoid this he reduces all animals outside the human family to the position of machines. to-day science admits in animals, more or less according to their organisation, perception, memory, judgment, and even some sort of reason. yet orthodoxy still claims a soul for man even if he be a madman from his birth, and denies it to the sagacious elephant, the intelligent horse, the faithful dog, and the cunning monkey. his proof of the existence of deity is thus stated by lewes:--"interrogating his consciousness, he found that he had the idea of god, understanding by god, a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent. this, to him, was as certain a truth as the truth of his own existence. i exist: not only do i exist, but exist as a miserably imperfect finite being, subject to change, greatly ignorant, and incapable of creating anything. in this, my consciousness, i find by my finitude that i am not the all; by my imperfection, that i am not perfect. yet an infinite and perfect being must exist, because infinity and perfection are implied as correlatives in my ideas of imperfection and finitude. god therefore exists: his existence is clearly proclaimed in my consciousness, and can no more be a matter of doubt, when fairly considered, than my own existence. the conception of an infinite being proves his real existence; for if there is not really such a being, i must have made the conception; but if i could make it, i can also unmake it, which evidently is not true; therefore there must be, externally to myself an archetype from which the conception was derived. all that we clearly and distinctly conceive as contained in anything, is true of that thing. now we conceive, clearly and distinctly, that the existence of god is contained in the idea we have of him--_ergo_, god exists." it may not be out of place to note at this demonstration, that the jesuit writer, father hardouin, in his "atheists unmasked," as a recompense for this demonstration of the existence of deity, places descartes and his disciples, le grand and regis, in the first rank of atheistical teachers. voltaire, commenting on this, remarks, "the man who had devoted all the acuteness of his extraordinary intellect to the discovery of new proofs of the existence of a god, was most absurdly charged with denying him altogether." speaking of the proof of the existence of deity, "demonstrations of this kind," says froude, "were the characteristics of the period. descartes had set the example of constructing them, and was followed by cudworth, clarke, berkeley, and many others besides spinoza. the inconclusiveness of the method may perhaps be observed most readily in the strangely opposite conceptions formed by all these writers of the nature of that being whose existence they nevertheless agreed, by the same process, to gather each out of their ideas. it is important, however, to examine it carefully, for it is the very keystone of the pantheistic system. as stated by descartes, the argument stands something as follows:--god is an all-perfect being, perfection is the idea which we form of him, existence is a mode of perfection, and therefore god exists. the sophism, we are told, is only apparent, existence is part of the idea--as much involved in it as the equality of all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference of a circle is involved in the idea of a circle. a non-existent all-perfect being is as inconceivable as a quadrilateral triangle. it is sometimes answered that in this way we may prove the existence of anything, titans, chimaeras, or the olympian gods; we have but to define them as existing, and the proof is complete. but this objection is summarily set aside; none of these beings are by hypothesis absolutely perfect, and, therefore, of their existence we can conclude nothing. with greater justice, however, we may say, that of such terms as perfection and existence we know too little to speculate. existence may be an imperfection for all we can tell, we know nothing about the matter. such arguments are but endless _petitiones principii_--like the self-devouring serpent, resolving themselves into nothing. we wander round and round them, in the hope of finding some tangible point at which we can seize their meaning; but we are presented everywhere with the same impracticable surface, from which our grasp glides off ineffectual." thomas hobbes, of malmesbury, is one of those men more often freely abused than carefully read; he was born april 5th, 1588, died 1679. he was "the subtlest dialectician of his time," and one of the earliest english advocates of the materialistic limitation of mind; he denies the possibility of any knowledge other than as resulting from sensation; his doctrine is in direct negation of descartes' theory of innate ideas, and would be fatal to the orthodox dogma of mind as spiritual. "whatever we imagine," he says, "is finite. therefore, there is no idea, no conception of anything we call infinite." in a brief pamphlet on his own views, published in 1680, in reply to attacks upon him, he writes, "besides the creation of the world there is no argument to prove a deity," and "that it cannot be decided by any argument that the world had a beginning;" but he professes to admit the authority of the magistrate and the scriptures to override argument. he says that he does not "believe that the safety of the state depends upon the safety of the church." some of hobbes' pieces were only in latin, others were issued in english. in one of those on heresy, he mentions that by the statute of 1 edward vi. cap 12, there is provision for the repeal of all former acts of parliament "made to punish any manner of doctrine concerning religion." in the following extracts the reader will find the prominent features of that sensationalism which to-day has so many adherents:--"concerning the thoughts of man, i will consider them first singly, and afterwards in a train or dependence upon one another. singly they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body, and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances. the original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first totally or by parts been begotten upon the organs of sense. the rest are derived from that original." the effect of this is to deny any possible knowledge other than as results from the activity of the sensative faculties, and is also fatal to the doctrine of a soul. "according," says hobbes, "to the two principal parts of man, i divide his faculties into two sorts--faculties of the body, and faculties of the mind. since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the body is nothing necessary to the present purpose, i will only sum them up in these three heads--power nutritive, power generative, and power motive, of the powers of the mind there be two sorts--cognitive, imaginative, or conceptive, and motive. for the understanding of what i mean by the power cognitive, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us. this imagery and representation of the qualities of the things without, is that which we call our conception, imagination, ideas, notice, or knowledge of them; and the faculty, or power by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that i here call cognitive power, or conceptive, the power of knowing or conceiving." all the qualities called sensible are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth on our organs diversely. neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion. because the image in vision, consisting of colour and shape, is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the objects of that sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion that the same colour and shape are the very qualities themselves, and for the same cause that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell or of the air. and this opinion hath been so long received that the contrary must needs appear a great paradox, and yet the introduction of species visible and intelligible (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion) passing to and fro from the object is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. i shall therefore endeavour to make plain these points. that the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen. that there is nothing without us (really) which we call an image or colour. that the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head. that as in visions, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inference is not the object but the sentient. strange to say hobbes was protected from his clerical antagonists by the favour of charles ii., who had the portrait of the philosopher of malmesbury hung on the walls of his private room at whitehall. lord herbert, of cherbury (one of the friends of hobbes) born 1581, died 1648, is remarkable for having written a book "de veritate," in favour of natural--and against any necessity for revealed--religion; and yet at the same time pleading a sort of special sign or revelation to himself in favour of its publication. peter gassendi, a native of provence, born 1592, died 1655, was one of the opponents of descartes and of lord herbert, and was an admirer of hobbes; he advocated the old philosophy of epicurus, professing to reject "from it everything contrary to christianity." "but," asks cousin, "how could he succeed in this? principles, processes, results, everything in epicurus is sensualism, materialism, atheism." gassendi's works were characterised by great learning and ability, but being confined to the latin tongue, and written avowedly with the intent of avoiding any conflict with the church, they gave but little immediate impetus to the great heretical movement. arnauld charges gassendi with overturning the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, in his discussion with descartes, and leibnitz charges gassendi with corrupting and injuring the whole system of natural religion by the wavering nature of his opinions. buckle says, "the rapid increase of heresy in the middle of the seventeenth century is very remarkable, and it greatly aided civilisation in england by encouraging habits of independent thought." in february 1646, boyle writes from london, "there are few days pass here, that may not justly be accused of the brewing or broaching of some new opinion. if any man have lost his religion, let him repair to london, and i'll warrant him he shall find it: i had almost said too, and if any man has a religion, let him but come hither now and he shall go near to lose it." about 1655, one isaac la peyrere wrote two small treatises to prove that the world was peopled before adam, but being arrested at brussels, and threatened with the stake, he, to escape the fiery refutation, made a full recantation of his views, and restored to the world its dearly prized stain of natural depravity, and to adam his position as the first man. la peyrere's forced recantation is almost forgotten, the opinions he recanted are now amongst common truths. baruch d'espinoza or benedict spinoza, was born nov. 24,1632, in amsterdam; an apt scholar, he, at the early age of fourteen, had mastered the ordinary tasks set him by his teacher, the babbi morteira, and at fifteen puzzled and affrighted the grave heads of the synagogue, by attempting the solution of problems which they themselves were well content to pass by. as he grew older his reason took more daring flights, and after attempts had been made to bribe him into submissive silence, when threats had failed to check or modify him, and when even the knife had no effect, then the fury of disappointed fanaticism found vent in the bitter curse of excommunication, and when about twenty-four years of age, spinoza found himself outcast and anathematised. having no private means or rich patrons, and differing in this from nearly every one whose name we have yet given our hero subsisted as a polisher of glasses, microscopes, &c., devoting his leisure to the study of languages and philosophy. there are few men as to whom modern writers have so widely differed in the description of their views, few who have been so thoroughly misrepresented. bayle speaks of him as a systematic atheist. saintes says that he laid the foundations of a pantheism as destructive to scholastic philosophy as to all revealed religion. voltaire repeatedly writes of spinoza as an atheist and teacher of atheism. samuel taylor coleridge speaks of spinoza as an atheist, and prefaces this opinion with the following passage, which we commend to more orthodox, and less acute writers:--"little do these men know what atheism is. not one man in a thousand has either strength of mind, or goodness of heart to be an atheist. i repeat it--not one man in a thousand has either goodness of heart, or strength of mind, to be, an atheist." "and yet," says froude, "both in friend and enemy alike, there has been a reluctance to see spinoza as he really was. the herder and schleiermacher school have claimed him as a christian, a position which no little disguise was necessary to make tenable; the orthodox protestants and catholics have called him an atheist, which is still more extravagant; and even a man like novalis, who, it might have been expected, would have said something reasonable, could find no better name for him than a 'gott trunkener mann,' a god intoxicated man; an expression which has been quoted by everybody who has since written on the subject, and which is about as inapplicable as those laboriously pregnant sayings usually are. with due allowance for exaggeration, such a name would describe tolerably the transcendental mystics, a toler, a boehmen, or a swedenborg; but with what justice can it be applied to the cautious, methodical spinoza, who carried his thoughts about with him for twenty years, deliberately shaping them, and who gave them at last to the world in a form more severe than with such subjects had ever been so much as attempted before? with him, as with all great men, there was no effort after sublime emotions. he was a plain, practical person; his object in philosophy, was only to find a rule by which to govern his own actions and his own judgment; and his treatises contain no more than the conclusions at which he arrived in this purely personal search, with the grounds on which he rested them." spinoza, who was wise enough to know that it was utterly useless to expect an unfettered examination of philosophical problems by men who are bound to accept as an infallible arbiter any particular book, and who knew that reasonings must be of a very limited character which took the alleged hebrew revelation as the centre and starting point for all inquiry, and also as the circling, limitation line for all investigation--devoted himself to the task of examining how far the ordinary orthodox doctrines as to the infallibility of the old testament were fairly maintainable. it was for this reason he penned his "tractatus theologico-politicus," wherein he says--"we see that they who are most under the influence of superstitious feelings, and who covet uncertainties without stint or measure, more especially when they fall into difficulty or danger, cannot help themselves, are the persons, who, with vows and prayers and womanly tears, implore the divine assistance; who call reason, blind, and human wisdom vain; and all, forsooth, because they cannot find an assured way to the vanities they desire." "the mainspring of superstition is fear; by fear too is superstition sustained and nourished." "men are chiefly assailed by superstition when suffering from fear, and all they then do in the name of a vain religion is, in fact, but the vaporous product of a sorrowful spirit, the delirium of a mind overpowered by terror." he proceeds, "i have often wondered that men who boast of the great advantage they enjoy under the christian dispensation--the peace, the joy they experience, the brotherly love they feel towards all in its exercise--should nevertheless contend with so much acrimony, and show such intolerance and unappeasable hatred towards one another. if faith had to be inferred from action rather than profession, it would indeed be impossible to say to what sect or creed the majority of mankind belong." he laid down that "no one is bound by natural law to live according to the pleasure of another, but that every one is by natural title the rightful asserter of his own independence," and that "he or they govern best who concede to every one the privilege of thinking as he pleases, and of saying what he thinks." criticising the hebrew prophets, he points out that "god used no particular style in making his communications; but in the same measure as the prophet possessed learning and ability, his communications were either concise and clear, or on the contrary, they were rude, prolix, and obscure." the representations of zechariah, as we learn from the accounts themselves, were so obscure that without an explanation they could not be understood by himself; and those of daniel were so dark, that even when explained, they were still unintelligible, not to others only, but also to the prophet himself. he argues entirely against miracles, as either contrary to nature or above nature, declaring any such to be "a sheer absurdity," "_merum esse absurdum_" of the scriptures themselves he points out that the ancient hebrew is entirely lost. "of the authors, or, if you please, writers, of many books, we either know almost nothing, or we entertain grave doubts as to the correctness with which the several books are ascribed to the parties whose names they bear." "then we neither know on what occasion, nor at what time those books were indited, the writers of which are unknown to us. further, we know nothing of the hands into which the books fell; nor of the codices which have furnished such a variety of readings, nor whether, perchance, there were not many other variations in other copies." voltaire says of spinoza, "not only in the character of a jew he attacks the new testament, but in the character of a scholar he ruins the old." the logic of spinoza was directed to the demonstration of one substance with infinite attributes, for which one substance with infinite attributes he had as equivalent the name "god." some who have since followed spinoza, have agreed in his one substance, but have denied the possibility of infinite attributes. attributes or qualities, they urge, are attributes of the finite or conditioned, and that you cannot have attributes of substance except as attributes of its modes. you have in this distinction the division line between spinozism and atheism. spinoza recognises infinite intelligence, but atheism cannot conceive intelligence except in relation as quality of the conditioned, and not as the essence of the absolute. spinoza denied the doctrine of freewill, as with him all phenomena are of god, so he rejects the ordinary notions of good and evil. the popular views of spinoza in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were chiefly derived from the volumes of his antagonists; men learned his name because priests abused him, few had perused his works for themselves. to-day we may fairly say that spinoza's logic and his biblical criticisms gave a vigour and force to the heresy of the latter half of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century; a directness and effectiveness theretofore wanting. as for the bible, there was no longer an affected reverence for every yod or comma, church traditions were ignored wherever inconsistent with reason, and the law itself was boldly challenged when its letter was against the spirit of human progress. one of the greatest promoters of heresy in england was ralph cudworth, born 1617, died 1688. he wrote to combat the atheistical tenets which were then commencing to obtain popularity in england, and was a controversialist so fair and candid in the statement of the opinions of his antagonists, that he was actually charged with heresy himself, and the epithets of arian, socinian, deist, and even atheist were freely levelled against him. "he has raised," says dryden, "such strong objections against the being of a god and providence, that many think he has not answered them." the clamour of bigotry seems to have discouraged cudworth, and he left many of his works unprinted. cousin describes him as "a platonist, of a firm and profound mind, who bends somewhat under the weight of his erudition." thomas burnet, born 1635, died 1715, a clergyman of the church of england, who, though high in favour with king william and the famous archbishop tillotson, is said to have been shut out from preferment in the church chiefly, if not entirely, on account of his many heterodox views. he did not accept the orthodox notions on the mosaic account of the creation, fall, and deluge. regarding the account of the fall as allegorical, he argued for the ultimate salvation of everyone, and of course denied the doctrine of eternal torment. in a curious passage relating to the equivocations of a large number of the clergy in openly taking the oath of allegiance to william iii., while secretly supporting james as king, burnet says, "the prevarication of too many in so sacred a matter contributed not a little to fortify the growing atheism of the time." as descartes and spinoza had been foremost on the continent, so was locke in england, and no sketch of the progress of heresy during the seventeenth century would be deserving serious regard which did not accord a prominent place to john locke, whom g. h. lewes calls "one of the wisest of englishmen," and of whom buckle speaks as "an innovator in his philosophy, and an unitarian in his creed." he was born in 1632, and died 1704. locke, according to his own fashion, was a sincere and earnest christian; but this has not saved him from being furiously assailed for the materialistic character of his philosophy, and many have been ready to assert that locke's principles "lead to atheism." in politics locke laid down, that unjust and unlawful force on the part of the government might and ought to be resisted by force on the part of the citizens. he urged that on questions of theology there ought to be no penalties consequent upon the reception or rejection of any particular religious opinion. how far those were right who regarded locke's metaphysical reasoning as; dangerous to orthodoxy may be, judged by the following extract on the origin of ideas:--: "follow a child from its birth and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. after some time, it begins to know the objects, which being most familiar with it, have made lasting impressions. thus it comes, by degrees, to know the persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it; and so we may observe, how the mind, by degrees improves in these, and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these. "if it shall be demanded then, when a man begins to have any ideas? i think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. for since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the senses have conveyed any in, i conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation; which is such an impression or emotion, made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. it is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects, that the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c. "in time, the mind comes to reflect on its own operations, about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which i call ideas of reflection. these are the impressions that are made on our senses by outward objects, that are extrinsical to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself, which, when reflected on by itself, becoming also objects of its contemplation, are, as i have said, the original of all knowledge. thus the first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses, by outward objects, or by its own operations, when it reflects on them. this is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world. all those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation. "in this part, the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings, and, as it were, materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. for the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no; and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them. no man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. these simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce. as the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions, and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them." the distinction pointed out by lewes between locke and hobbes and gassendi, is that the two latter taught that all our ideas were derived from sensations, while locke said there were two sources, not one source, and these two were sensation and reflection. locke was in style a more popular writer than hobbes, and the heretical effect of the doctrines on the mind not being so immediately perceived in consequence of locke's repeated declarations in favour of christianity, his metaphysical productions were more widely read than those of hobbes; but locke really teaches the same doctrine as that laid down by robert owen in his views on the formation of character; and his views on sensation, as the primary source of ideas, are fatal to all notions of innate ideas and of freewill. voltaire, speaking of locke, says:--"'we shall, perhaps, never be capable of knowing whether a being purely material thinks or not.' this judicious and guarded observation was considered by more than one divine, as neither more nor less than a scandalous and impious declaration, that the soul is material and mortal. some english devotees, after their usual manner, sounded the alarm. the superstitious are in society what poltroons are in an army--they both feel and excite causeless terror. the cry was, that mr. locke wished to overturn religion; the subject, however, had nothing to do with religion at all; it was purely a philosophical question, and perfectly independent of faith and revelation." one clergyman, the rev. william carrol, wrote, charging atheism as the result of locke's teachings. the famous sir isaac newton even grew so alarmed with the materialistic tendency of locke's philosophy, that when john locke was reported sick and unlikely to live, it is credibly stated that newton went so far as to say that it would be well if the author of the essay on the understanding were already dead. in 1689, one cassimer leszynski, a polish knight, was burned at warsaw for denying the being and providence of a god; but there are no easy means of learning whether the charge arose from prejudice on the part of his accusers, or whether this unfortunate gentleman really held atheistic views. peter bayle, born at carlat, in foix, 1647, died in holland, 1706, was a writer of great power and brilliancy and wide learning. without standing avowedly on the side of scepticism, he did much to promote sceptical views amongst the rapidly growing class of men of letters. he declared that it was better to be an atheist, than to have a false or unworthy idea of god; that a man can be at the same time an atheist and an honest man, and that a people without a religion is capable of good order. bayle's writings grew more heretical towards the latter part of his career, and he suffered considerable persecution at the hands of the church, for having spoken too plainly of the character of david. he said that "if david was the man after god's own heart, it must have been by his penitence, not by his crimes." bayle might have added, that the record ot david's penitence is not easily discoverable in any part of the narrative of his life. matthew tindal, born 1656, died 1733, was, though the son of a clergyman of the established church, one of the first amongst the school of deistical writers who became so prominent in the beginning of the eighteenth century. dr. pye smith catalogues him as "an atheist," but we know no ground for this. he was a zealous controversialist, and commencing by attacking priests, he continued his attack against the revelation they preached. he was a frequent writer, but his "christianity as old as the creation" is his chief work, and the one which has provoked the greatest amount of discussion. it was published nearly at the close of his life, and after he had seen others of his writings burned by the common hangman. dr. matthew tindal helped much to shake belief in the bible, those who wrote against him did much more; if no one had replied to tindal, his attacks on; revelation would have been read by few, but in answering the heretic, bishop waterland and his _confreres_ gave wider circulation to tindal's heresy. john toland was born nov. 30,1670, at londonderry, but was educated in scotland. he died 1722. his publications were all about the close of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth centuries, and the ability of his contributions to popular instruction may be judged by the abusive epithets heaped upon him by his opponents. while severely attacking the bulk of the clergy as misleaders of the people, and while also assailing some of the chief orthodox notions, he yet, either in order to escape the law, or from the effect of his religious education, professed a respect for what he was pleased to call true christianity, but which we should be inclined to consider, at the least, somewhat advanced unitarianism. at last, however, his works were ordered to be burned by the common hangman, and to escape arrest and prosecution he had to flee to the continent. dr. j. pye smith describes toland as a pantheist, and calls his pantheisticon "an atheistic liturgy." in one of toland's essays he laments "how hard it is to come to a truth yourself, and how dangerous a thing to publish to others." the publications ot toland were none of them very bulky although numerous, and as most of them were fiercely assailed by the orthodox clergy, they helped to excite popular interest in england, in the critical examination of the scriptures and the doctrines therein taught. besides the few authors to whom attention is here drawn, there were numerous men who--each for a little while, and often coming out from the lower ranks of the people themselves--stirred the hitherto almost stagnant pool of popular thought with some daring utterance or extravagant statement. fanatics some, mystics some, alchemists some, materialists some, but all crude and imperfect in their grasp of the subject they advocated, they nevertheless all helped to agitate the human mind, to render it more restless and inquiring, and thus they all promoted the march of heresy. one feature of the history of the seventeenth century shows how much philosophy had gained ground, and how deep its roots were striking throughout the european world--viz., that nearly all the writers wrote in the vulgar tongue of their country, or there were published editions of their works in that tongue. a century earlier, and but few escaped from the narrow bonds of learned latin: two centuries before, and none got outside the latin folios; but in this century theology, metaphysics, philosophy, and politics are discussed in french, german, english, and italian. the commonest reader may peruse the most learned author, for the writing is in a language which he cannot help knowing. there were in this century a large number of writers in england and throughout europe, who, taking the bible as a starting-point and limitation for their philosophy, broached wonderful theories as to creation, &c, in which reason and revelation were sought to be made harmonious. enfield, a most orthodox writer, in his "history of philosophy" says, "who does not perceive, from the particulars which have been related concerning these scriptural philosophers, that their labours, however well intended, have been of little benefit to philosophy? their fundamental error has consisted in supposing that the sacred scriptures were intended, not only to instruct men in all things necessary to their salvation, but to teach the true principles of physical and metaphysical science." how pregnant the admission that revelation and science cannot be expected to accord--an admission which in truth declares that in all philosophical research it is necessary to go beyond the bible, if not to go against it--an admission which involves the declaration, that so long as men are bound by the letter of the bible, so long all philosophical progress is impossible. in this century the english church lost much of the political power it had hitherto wielded. it was in 1625, that william, bishop of lincoln, was dismissed from the office of lord keeper, and since his day no ecclesiastic has held the great seal of england, and to-day who even in the church itself would dream of trying to make a bishop lord chancellor? the church lost ground in the conflict with charles, but this it might perhaps have recovered, but it suffered irretrievably loss of prestige in its struggle with william. chapter iv. the eighteenth century the eighteenth century deserves that the penman who touches its records shall have some virility; for these records contain, not only the narrative of the rapid growth of the new philosophy in france, england, and germany, where its roots had been firmly struck in the previous century, but they also give the history of a glorious endeavour on the part of a down-trodden and long-suffering people, weakened and degraded by generations of starvation and oppression, to break the yoke of tyranny and superstition. eighteenth century historians can write how the men of france, after having been cursed by a long race of kings, who never dreamed of identifying their interests with those of the people; after enduring centuries of tyranny from priests, whose only gods were power, pleasure, and mammon, and at the hands of nobles, who denied civil rights to their serfs; at last, could endure no longer, but electrified into life by eighteenth century heresy, "spurned under foot the idols of tyranny and superstition," and sought "by the influence of reason to erect on the ruins of arbitrary power the glorious edifice of civil and religious liberty." why frenchmen then failed in giving permanent success to their heroic endeavour, and why france, despite the wonderful recent progress in thought, is even yet cursed with corrupt imperialism and state superstition, is not difficult to explain, when we consider that every tyranny in europe united against that young republic to which the monarchy had bequeathed a legacy of a wretched pauper people, a people whose minds had been hitherto wholly in the hands of the priests, whose passions had revolted against wrong, but whose brains were yet too weak for the permanent enjoyment of the freedom temporarily resulting from physical effort. eighteenth century heresy is especially noticeable for its immediate connection with political change. for the first time in european history, the great mass commenced to yearn for the assertion in government of democratic principles. the french republican revolution which overthrew louis xvi. and the bastile, was only possible because the heretical teachers who preceded it, had weakened the divine right of kingcraft; and it was ultimately unsuccessful, only because an overwhelming majority of the people were as yet not sufficiently released from the thraldom of the church, and therefore fell before the allied despotisms of europe, who were aided by the catholic priests, who naturally plotted against the spirit which seemed likely to make men too independent to be pious. in germany the liberation of the masses from the dominion of the church of rome was effected with the, at first, active believing concurrence of the nation; in england this was not so, protestantism here was the result rather of the influence and interests of the king and court, and of the indifference of the great body of the people. the reformed church of england, sustained by the crown and aristocracy, has generally left the people to find their own way to heaven or hell, and has only required abstinence from avowed denial of, or active opposition to, its tenets. its ministers have usually preached with the same force to a few worshippers scattered over their grand cathedrals and numerous churches as to a thronging crowd, but in each these there has been a lack of vitality in the sermon. it is only when the material interests of the church have been apparently threatened that vigour has been shown on the part of its teachers. it is a curious fact, and one for comment hereafter, that while in the modern struggle for the progress of heresy, its sixteenth century pages present many most prominent italian names, when we come to the eighteenth century, there are but few such names worthy special notice; it is no longer from the extreme south, but from france, germany, and england that you have the great array of freethinking warriors. those whom italy boasts too are now nearly all in the idealistic ranks. we commenced the list by a brief reference to bernard mandeville, a dutch physician, born at dordrecht in 1670 and who died in 1733; a writer with great power as a satirist, whose fable of the "bees, or private vices made public benefits," not only served as source for much of helvetius, but had the double honour of an indictment at the middlesex session, and an answer from the pen of bishop berkeley. one of the early, and perhaps one of the most important promoters of heresy in the united kingdom, was george berkeley, an irishman by birth. he was born on the 12th of march, 1684, at kilcrin, and died at oxford in 1753. it was this writer to whom pope assigned "every virtue under heaven," and of whom byron wrote:- "when bishop berkeley said 'there was no matter,' and proved it--'twas no matter what he said: they say his system 'tis in vain to batter, too subtle for the airiest human head; and yet who can believe it?" a writer in the _encyclopedia metropolitana_ describes him as "the one, perhaps, whose heart was most free from scepticism, and whose understanding was most prone to it." berkeley is here dealt with as one specially contributing to the growth of sceptical thought, and not as an idealist only. arthur collier published, about the same time as berkeley, several works in which absolute idealim is advocated. collier and berkeley were mouthpieces for the expression of an effort at resistance against the growing spinozistic school. they wrote against substance assumed as the "noumenon lying underneath all phenomena--the substratum supporting all qualities--the something in which all accidents inhere." collier and his writings are almost unknown; berkeley's name has become famous, and his arguments have served to excite far wider scepticism than have those of any other englishman of his age. most religious men who read him misunderstand him, and nearly all misrepresent his theory. hume, speaking of berkeley, says, "most of the writings of that very ingenious philosopher form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found, either among the ancient or modern philosophers, bayle not excepted. he professes, however, in his title page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics, as well as against the atheists and freethinkers. but that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are in reality merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction," berkeley wrote for those who "want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of god, or the natural immortality of the soul," and his philosophy was intended to check materialism. the key-note ot his works may be found in his declaration, "the only thing whose existence i deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance." the definition given by berkeley of matter is one which no materialist will be ready to accept, i.e.f "an inert, senseless substance in which extension, figure, and motion do actually exist." the "principles of human knowledge" is the work in which berkeley's idealism is chiefly set forth, and many have been the volumes and pamphlets written in reply. whatever might have been berkeley's intention as to refuting scepticism, the result of his labours was to increase it in no ordinary degree; dr. pye smith thug summarises berkeley's views:--"he denied the existence of matter as a cause of our perceptions, but firmly maintained the existence of created and dependent spirits, of which every man is one; that to suppose the existence of sensible qualities and of a material world, is an erroneous deduction from the fact of our perceptions; that those perceptions are-nothing but ideas and thoughts in our minds; that these are produced in perfect uniformity, order, and consistency in all minds, so that their occurrence is according to fixed rules which may be called the laws of nature; that that deity is either the immediate or the mediate cause of these perceptions, by his universal operation on created minds; and that the created mind has a power of managing these perceptions, so that volitions arise, and all the phenomena of moral action and responsibility. the great reply to this is, that it is a hypothesis which cannot be proved, which is highly improbable, and which seems to put upon the deity the inflicting on man a perpetual delusion." the weakness of berkeley's system as a mere question of logic is, that while he requires the most rigorous demonstration of the existence of what he defines as matter, he assumes an eternal spirit with various attributes, and also creates spirits of various sorts. he creates the states of mind resulting from the sensation of surrounding phenomena into ideas, existing independent of the _ego_, when in truth, man's ideas are not in addition to man's mind; but the aggregate of sensative ability, and the result of its exercise is the mind, just as the aggregate of functional ability and activity is life. the foundation of berkeley's faith in the invisible "eternal spirit" in angels as "created spirits," is difficult to discover, when you accept his argument for the rejection of visible phenomena. he in truth should have rejected everything save his own mind, for the mental processes are clearly not always reliable. in dreams, in delirium, in insanity, in temporary disease of particular nerves of sensation, in some phases of magnetic influence, the ideas which berkeley sustains so forcibly are admittedly delusions. as in george berkeley, so we have in bishop butler, an illustration of the endeavour to check the rapidly enlarging scepticism of this century. joseph butler was born in 1692, died 1752, and will be long known by his famous work on the "analogy of religion" to the course of nature. in this place it is not our duty to do more than point out a few features of the argument, observing that this elaborate piece of special pleading for natural and revealed religion, is evidence that danger was apprehended by the clergy, from the spread of freethought views amongst the masses. a popular reply was written to provide against the growing popular objection; bishop butler argues that "we know that we are endued with certain capacities of action, of happiness and misery; for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and of suffering pain. now that we have these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through, and after death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers." it may be fairly submitted in reply, that here the argument from analogy is as utterly faulty, as if in the spring season a traveller should say of a wayside pool, it is here before the summer sun shines upon it, and will be here during and after the summer drought, when ordinary experience would teach him that as the pool is only gathered during the rainy season in the hollow ground, so in the dry hot summer days, it will be gradually evaporated under the blazing rays of the july sun. as to the human capacities, experience teaches us that they have changed with the condition of the body; emotional feelings and animal passions, the gratification of which ensured temporary pleasure or pain, have varied, have been newly felt, and have died out in different periods and conditions of our lives, and the presumption is against the complete endurance of all these "capacities for action," &c., even during the whole life, and much more strongly, therefore, against their endurance after death. besides which--continuing the argument from analogy--my "capacities" having only been manifested since my body has existed, and in proportion to my physical ability, the presumption is rather that the manifestation which commenced with the body, will finish as the body finishes. further, it is fair to presume that "death is the destruction of those living powers," for death is the cessation of organic functional activity; a cessation consequent on some change or destruction of organisation. of course, the word "destruction" is not here used in any sense of annihilation of substance, but as meaning such a change of condition that vital phenomena are no longer manifested. but, says butler, "we know not at all what death is in itself, but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones, and these effects do in nowise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent." here, perhaps, there is an unjustifiable assumption in the words "living agent," for if by living agent is only meant the animal which dies, then the destruction of flesh, skin, and bones does fairly imply the destruction of the living agent, but if by living agent is intended more than this, then the argument is speciously and unfairly worded. but beyond this, if bishop butler's argument has any value, it proves too much. he says--"nor can we find anything throughout the whole analogy of nature, to afford us even the slightest presumption that animals ever lose their living powers.... by death." that is, bishop butler applies his argument for a future state of existence, not only to man, but to the whole animal kingdom; and it may be fairly conceded that there is as much ground to presume that man will live again, as there is that the worm will live again, which, being impaled upon a hook, is eaten by the gudgeon, or that the gudgeon will live again which, threaded as a bait, is torn and mangled to death by a ravenous pike, or that the pike will live again after it has been kept out of water till rigid, then gutted, scaled, stuffed with savoury condiments, broiled, and ultimately eaten by piscator and his family. bishop butler's argument, that because pleasure or pain is uniformly found to follow the acting or not acting in some particular manner, there is presumptive analogy in favour of future rewards and punishments by deity, appears weak in the extreme. according to butler, god is the author of nature. nature's laws are such, that punishment, immediate or remote, follows non-observance, and reward, more or less immediate, is the result of observance; and because god is by butler's argument, assumed as the author of nature, and has therefore already punished or rewarded once; we are following butler, to presume that he will after death punish or reward again for an action upon which he has already adjudicated. in his chapter on the moral government of god, butler says, "as the manifold appearances of design and of final causes in the constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his government--what may be called his natural government of creatures endowed with sense and reason." but taking bishop butler's own position, what sort of government is demonstrated by this argument from analogy? god, according to bishop butler's reasoning, designed the whale to swallow the clio borealis, which latter he designed to be so swallowed, but which he nevertheless invested with some 300,000 suckers, to enable it in its turn to seize the minute animalcule on which it lives. god designed brutus to kill caesar, orsini to be beheaded by louis napoleon. these, according to butler, would be all under the special control of god's government. deity would guide the clio borealis into the mouth of the whale, guide the dagger of brutus, and arrange for the enjoyment of the cancan by princes of the blood royal. bishop butler's theory that our present life is a state of trial and probation, is met by the difficulty, that while he assumes the justice and benevolence of god as moral governor, he has the fact, that many exist with organisations and capacities so originally different, that it is manifestly most unfair to put one and the same reward, or one and this same publishment for all. the esquimaux or negro is not on a level at the outset of life with the caucasian races. how from analogy can any one argue in favour of the doctrine that an impartial judge who had started them in the race of life unfairly matched, would put the same prize before all, none of the starters being handicapped? bishop butler's argument on the doctrine of necessity, is that which one might expect to find from a hired _nisi prius_ advocate, but which is read with regret coming from the pen of a gentleman, who ought to be striving to convince his erring brethren by the words of truth alone. he says, suppose a child to be educated from his earliest youth in the principles of "fatalism," what then? the reply is, that a necessitarian knowing that a certain education of the human mind was most conducive to human happiness, would strive to impart to his children education of that character. that a worse "fatalism" is inculcated in the doctrine of a fore-ordaining and ever-directing providence, planning and controlling every one of the child's actions, than ever was taught in necessitarian essays. that the child would be taught the laws of existence, and would be shown how certain conduct resulted in pleasure, and certain other conduct was during life attended with pain, and that the result of such teaching would be far more efficacious in its moral results, than the inculcation of a present responsibility, and an ultimate heaven and hell, in which latter doctrine, nearly all christians profess to believe, but nearly all act as if it were not of the slightest consequence whether any such paradise or infernal region exists. henry st. john, lord bolingbroke, born october 1,1672, died november 15,1751, may be taken as one of the school of polished deistical writers, who, though comparatively few, fairly enough represent the religious opinions of the large majority of the journalists of the present day. in the course of bolingbroke's "letters on the study of history," a strong sceptical spirit is manifested, and he speaks in one of "the share which the divines of all religions have taken in the corruption of history." in another he thus deals with the question of the bible:--"it has been said by abbadie, and others, 'that the accidents which have happened to alter the texts of the bible, and to disfigure, if i may say so, the scriptures in many respects, could not have been prevented without a perpetual standing miracle, and that a perpetual standing miracle is not in the order of providence.' now i can by no means subscribe to this opinion. it seems evident to my reason that the very contrary must be true; if we suppose that god acts towards men according to the moral fitness of things; and if we suppose that he acts arbitrarily, we can form no opinion at all. i think these accidents would not have happened, or that the scriptures would have been preserved entirely in their genuine purity notwithstanding these accidents, if they had been entirely dictated by the holy ghost: and the proof of this probable proposition, according to our clearest and most distinct ideas of wisdom and moral fitness, is obvious and easy. but these scriptures are not so come down to us: they are come down broken and confused, full of additions, interpolations; and transpositions, made we neither know when, nor by whom; and such, in short, as never appeared on the face of any other book, on whose authority men have agreed to rely. this being so, my lord, what hypothesis shall we follow? shall we adhere to some such distinction as i have mentioned? shall we say, for instance, that the scriptures were originally written by the authors to whom they are vulgarly ascribed, but that these authors writ nothing by inspiration, except the legal, the doctrinal, and the prophetical parts, and that in every other respect their authority is purely human, and therefore fallible? or shall we say that these histories are nothing more than compilations of old traditions, and abridgements of old records, made in later times, as they appear to every one who reads them without prepossession and with attention?" it has been alleged that pope's verse is but another rendering of bolingbroke's views without his "aristocratic nonchalance," and that some passages of pope regarded as hostile to revealed religion, were specially due to the influence of bolingbroke; and more than one critic has professed to trace identities of thought and expression in order to show that pope was largely indebted to the published works of st. john. david hume was born at edinburgh, 26th april, 1711, and died 1776. he created a new school of freethinkers, and is to-day one of the most esteemed amongst sceptical authors. he was a profound thinker, and an easy, elegant writer, who did much to give a force and solidity to extreme heretical reasonings, which they had hitherto been regarded as lacking. his heretical essays have had a far wider circulation since his death, than they enjoyed during his life. many volumes have been issued in the fruitless endeavour to refute him, and all these have contributed to widen the circle of his readers. he adopted and advocated the utilitarian and necessitarian theory of morals, and wrote of ordinary theism and religion, as arising from personification of unknown causes, for general or special phenomena. he held and advanced the idea, which buckle so fully states, and endeavours to prove in his "history of civilisation"--viz., that general laws operate amongst peoples, and influence and determine their so-called moral conduct, much as other laws do the orbits of planets, the occurrences of eclipses, &c. his arguments against miracles, as evidences for revealed religion, remain unrefuted, although they have been made the subject of many attacks. he contends, in effect, that in each account of a miraculous occurrence, there is always more _prima facie_ probability of error, or bad faith on the part of the narrator, than of interference with those invariable sequences known as natural laws, and there was really no reply in the conclusion of dr. campbell, to the effect that we have equally to trust human testimony for an account of the laws of nature and for the narratives of miracles, for in truth you never have the same character of human testimony for the latter as for the former. and, further, while in the case of human testimony as to natural events, it is evidence which you may test and compare with your own experience. this is not so as to miracles, declared at once to be out of the range of all ordinary experience. "men," he says, "are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses. when they follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images presented to the senses to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representatives of the other. but this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception. so far, then, we are necessitated by reasoning to contradict the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. but here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. she can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature, for that led us to quite a different system, which is acknowledged fallible, and even erroneous, and to justify this pretended philosophical system by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity. do you follow the instinct and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of the senses? but these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object--(idealism.) do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? you here depart from your natural propensities, and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with external objects--(scepticism.)" charles de secondat baron de montesquieu, born in 1689 near bordeaux, died at paris 1755, who earned considerable fame by his "lettres persanes," is more famous for his oft-referred to work "l'esprit des lois." victor cousin describes him as "the man of our country who has best comprehended history, and who first gave an example of true historic method." in the publication of certain of his ideas on history, montesquieu was the layer of the foundation-stone for an edifice which buckle would probably have gloriously crowned had his life been longer. voltaire, who sharply criticises montesquieu, declares that he has earned the eternal gratitude of europe by his grand views and his bold attacks on tyranny, superstition, and grinding taxation. montesquieu urged that virtue is the true essence of republicanism, but misled by the mistaken notions of honour held by his predecessors and contemporaries, he declared honour to be the principle of monarchical institutions. voltaire reminds him that "it is in courts that men, devoid of honour, often attain to the highest dignities; and it is in republics that a known dishonourable citizen is seldom trusted by the people with public concerns." montesquieu wrote in favour of a constitutional monarchy such as then existed in england, and his work shadowed forth a future for the middle class in france. francois marie arouet voltaire, born 20th february, 1694, at chatenay, died 30th may, 1778, may be fairly written of as the man to whose fertile brain and active pen, to whose great genius, fierce irony, and thorough humanity, we owe much more of the rapid change of popular thought in europe during the last century than to any other man. his wit, like the electric flash, spared nothing; his love for his kind would have made him the protector of everything weak, his desire to protect himself from the consequences of his truest utterances, often dims the hero-halo with which his name is surrounded. born and trained amongst a corrupt and selfish class, it is not wonderful that we find some of their pernicious habits clinging to parts of his career. on the contrary, it is more wonderful to find that he has shaken off so much of the consequences of his education. neither in politics nor in theology was he so very extreme in his utterances as many deemed him, for while he occasionally severely handled individual monarchs, we do not find him the preacher of republicanism. on the contrary, he is often severe against some of the advanced political views of jean jacques rousseau. he nevertheless suggests that it might have been "the art of working metals which originally made kings, and the art of casting cannons which now maintains them," and as a commentary on kingly conduct in the matter of taxation, declares that "a shepherd ought to shear his sheep, and not to flay them." in theological controversy he wrote as a theist, and declares "atheism and fanaticism" to be "two monsters which may tear society in pieces, but the atheist preserves his reason, which checks his propensity to mischief, while the fanatic is under the influence of a madness constantly urging him on." for the ancient jews, and for the hebrew records, voltaire entertained so thorough a feeling of contemptuous detestation, that in his "defense de mon oncle," and his articles and letters on the jews, we find utter disbelief in them as a chosen people, and the strongest abhorrence of their brutal habits, heightened in expression by the scathing satire of his phrases. to the more modern descendants of abraham he said: "we have repeatedly driven you away through avarice; we have recalled you through avarice and stupidity; we still, in more towns than one, make you pay for liberty to breathe the air; we have, in more kingdoms than one, sacrificed you to god; we have burned you as holocausts--for i will not follow your example, and dissemble that we have offered up sacrifices of human blood; all the difference is, that our priests, content with applying your money to their own use, have had you burned by laymen; while your priests always immolated their human victims with their own sacred hands. you were monsters of cruelty and fanaticism in palestine; we have been so in europe." writing on miracles, voltaire asks: "for what purpose would god perform a miracle? to accomplish some particular design upon living beings? he would then, in reality, be supposed to say--i have not been able to effect by my construction of the universe, by my divine decrees, by my eternal laws, a particular object; i am now going to change my eternal ideas and immutable laws, to endeavour to accomplish what i have not been able to do by means of them. this would be an avowal of his weakness, not of his power; it would appear in such a being an inconceivable contradiction. accordingly, therefore, to dare to ascribe miracles to god is, if man can in reality insult god, actually offering him that insult. it is saying to him--you are a weak and inconsistent being. it is therefore absurd to believe in miracles; it is, in fact, dishonouring the divinity." those who are inclined to attack the character of voltaire, should read the account of his endeavours for the calas family. how, when old calas had been broken alive on the wheel at toulouse, and his family were ruined, voltaire took up their case, aided them with means, spared no effort of his pen or brain, and ultimately achieved the great victory of reversing the unjust sentence, and obtaining compensation for the family. it, then, these voltaire-haters have not learned to love this great heretic, let them study the narrative of his even more successful endeavours on behalf of the sirvens; more successful, because in this case he took up the fight before an unjust judgment could be delivered, and thus prevented the repetition of such an iniquitous execution as had taken place in the galas case. the cowardly slanders as to his conduct when dying are not worth notice; those spit on the grave of the dead who would not have dared to look in the face of the living. claud adrian helvetius was born at paris 1715, and died december 1771. his best known works are "de l'esprit," published 1758; "essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines," 1746; "traite des systemes," 1749; "traite des sensations," 1758. rousseau wrote in reply to helvetius, but when the parliament of paris condemned the work "de l'esprit," and it was in consequence burned by the common hangman, rousseau withdrew his refutatory volume. helvetius argues that any religion, of which the chiefs are intolerant, and the conduct of which is expensive to the state, "cannot long be the religion of an enlightened and well governed nation. the people that submit to it will labour only to maintain the ease and luxury of the priesthood; each of its inhabitants will be nothing more than a slave to the sacerdotal power. a religion to be good should be tolerant and little expensive. its clergy should have no authority over the people. a dread of the priest debases the mind and the soul, makes the one brutish and the other slavish. must the ministers of the altar always be armed with the sword of the state? can the barbarities committed by their intolerance ever be forgotten? the earth is yet drenched with the blood they have spilled. civil tolerance alone is not sufficient to secure the peace of nations. every dogma is a seed of discord and injustice sown amongst mankind." "why do you make the supreme being resemble an eastern tyrant? why make him punish slight faults with eternal torment? why thus put the name of the divinity at the bottom of the portrait of the devil? why oppress the soul with a load of fear, break its springs, and of a worshipper of jesus make a vile, pusillanimous slave? it is the malignant who paint a malignant g-od. what is their devotion? a veil for their crimes." "let not the rewards of heaven be made the price of trifling religious operations, which convey a diminutive idea of the eternal and a false conception of virtue; its rewards should never be assigned to fasting, haircloth, a blind submission, and self-castigation. the man who places these operations among the virtues, might as well place those of leaping, dancing, and tumbling on the rope." "humility may be held in veneration by the dwellers in a monastery or a convent, it favours the meanness and idleness of a monastic life. but ought the humility to be regarded as the virtue of the people? no." speaking of the pagan systems, helvetius says, "all the fables of mythology were mere emblems of certain principles of nature." baron d'holbach, a native of the palatinate, born january 1723, died 21st january, 1789, deserves special notice, as being the man whose house was the gathering place of the knot of writers and thinkers, who struck light and life into the dark and deadened brain of france. he is generally reputed to have been the author of that well-known work, the "system of nature," which was issued as if by mirabaud. this work, although it was fiercely assailed at the time, by the pen of voltaire, and by the _plaidorie_ of the prosecuting avocat-general, and has since been attacked by hundreds who have never read it, yet remains a wonderfully popular exposition of the power-gathering heresy of the century, and, as far as we are aware, has never received efficient reply. probably next to paine's works, it had in england during the second quarter of this century, the widest circulation of any anti-theological book, and this circulation extending through the manufacturing ranks. in the eighteenth century mirabaud could, in england, only be found in the hands of the few, but fifty years had wondrously multiplied the number of readers. joseph priestley was born near leeds, 13th march, 1733, and being towards the latter part of his life driven out of england, by the persecuting spirit evinced towards him, and which had been specially excited by his republican tendencies, he died at northumberland, pennsylvania, on the 6th feb., 1804. originally a church of england clergyman, his first notable inclination to heterodoxy manifested itself in hesitation as to the doctrine of the atonement. he ultimately rejected the immortality and immateriality of the soul, argued for necessitarianism, and earned considerable unpopularity by the boldness of some of his sentiments on political as well as theological matters. priestley was one of the rapidly multiplying instances of heresy alike in religion and politics, but he provoked the most bitter antagonism. his works were burned by the common hangman, his house, library, and scientific instruments were destroyed by an infuriate and pious mob. despite all this, his heresy, according to his own view of it, was not of a very outrageous character, for he believed in deity, in revealed religion, and in christianity, rather putting the blame on misconduct of alleged christians. he said: "the wretched forms under which christianity has long been generally exhibited, and its degrading alliance with, or rather its subjection to a power wholly heterogeneous to it, and which has employed it for the most unworthy purposes, has made it contemptible and odious in the eyes of all sensible men, who are now everywhere casting off the very profession and every badge of it. enlightened christians must themselves, in some measure, join with unbelievers in exposing whatever will not bear examination in or about religion." his writings on scientific topics were most voluminous; his most heretical volumes are those on "matter and spirit." edward gibbon was born at putney, the 27th april, 1737, and died 16th january, 1794. he was a polished and painstaking writer, aristocratic in his tendencies and associations, who had educated himself into a disbelief in the principal dogmas of christianity, but who loved the peace and quietude of an easy life too much to enter the lists as an active antagonist of the church. his works, especially the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of "the decline and fall of the roman empire," have been regarded as infidel in their tendency, rather from what has been left unsaid than from the direct statements against christianity. the sneer at the evidence of prophecy, or the doubt of the reality of miraculous evidences, is guardedly expressed. it is only when gibbon can couch his lance against some reckless and impudent forger of christian evidences, such as eusebius, that you have anything like a bold condemnation. a prophecy or a miracle is treated tenderly, and if killed, it is rather with over-affectionate courtesy than by rough handling. in some parts of his vindications of the attacked passages, gibbon's scepticism finds vent in the collection and quotation of unpleasantly heretical views of others, but he carefully avoids committing himself to very distinct personal declarations of disbelief; he claims to be the unbiassed historian recording fact, and leaving others to form their own conclusions. it would perhaps be most appropriate to express his convictions as to the religions of the world, in nearly the same words as he used to characterise the various modes of worship at rome, "all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful." pierre john george cabanis, born at conac, near breves, 6th june, 1757, died 6th may, 1808, following condillac in many respects, was one of those whose physiological investigations have opened out wide fields of knowledge in psychology, and who did much to promote the establishment in france, america, and england, of a new school of freethinkers. "subject to the action of external bodies," he says, "man finds in the impressions these bodies make on his organs, at once his knowledge and the causes of his continued existence, for to live is to feel; and in that admirable chain of phenomena which constitute his existence, every want depends on the development of some faculty; every faculty by its very development satisfies some want, and the faculties grow by exercise, as the wants extend with the facility of satisfying them. by the continual action of external bodies on the senses of man, results the most remarkable part of his existence. but is it true that the nervous centres only receive and combine the impressions which reach them from the bodies? is it true that no image or idea is formed in the brain, and that no determination of the sensitive organ takes place, other than by virtue of these same impressions on the senses strictly so-called? the faculty of feeling and of spontaneous movement forms the character of animal nature. the faculty of feeling consists in the property possessed by the nervous system of being warned by the impressions produced on its different parts, and notably on its extremities. these impressions are internal or external. external impressions, when perception is distinct, are called sensations. internal impressions are very often vague and confused, and the animal is then only warned by their effects, and does not clearly distinguish their connection with the causes. the former result from the application of external objects to the organs of sense, and on them ideas depend. the latter result from the development of the regular functions, or from the maladies to which each organ is subject; and from these issue those determinations which bear the name of instincts. feeling and movement are linked together. every movement is determined by an impression, and the nerves, as the organs of feeling, animate and direct the motor organs. in feeling, the nervous organ reacts on itself. in movement it reacts on other parts, to which it communicates the contractile faculty, the simple and fecund principle of all animal movement. finally, the vital functions can exercise themselves by the influence of some nervous ramifications, isolated from the system--the distinctive faculties can develope themselves, even when the brain is almost wholly destroyed, and when it seems wholly inactive. but for the formation of thoughts, it is necessary that the brain should exist, and be in a healthy condition; it is the special organ of thought." thomas paine, the most famous deist of modern times, was born at thetford on the 29th january, 1737, and died 8th june, 1809. it will hardly be untrue to say that the famous "rebellious needleman" has been the most popular writer in great britain and america against revealed religion, and that his works, from their plain, clear language, have in those countries had, and still have, a far wider circulation than those of any other modern sceptical author. his anti-theology was allied to his republicanism; he warred alike against church and throne, and his impeachment of each was couched in the plainest anglo-saxon. his name became at the same time a word of terror to the aristocracy and to the clergy. in england numerous prosecutions were commenced against the vendors of his political and theological works, and against persons suspected of giving currency to his views. the peace-officers searched poor men's houses to discover his dreaded works. lancashire and yorkshire artisans read him by stealth, and assembled in corners of fields that they might discuss the "age of reason," and yet be safe from surprise by the authorities. heavy sentences were passed upon men convicted of promulgating his opinions; but all without effect, the forbidden fruit found eager gatherers. paine appears to have been tinged with scepticism from his early boyhood, but it was as a democratic writer that he first achieved literary fame. his "age of reason" was the culminating blow which the dying eighteenth century aimed at the hebrew and christian records. theretofore scholarly philosophers, metaphysicians, and critics had written for their fellows, and whether or not any of the mass read and understood, the authors cared but little. now the people were addressed by one of themselves in language startling in its plainness. paine was not a deep examiner of metaphysical problems, but he was terribly in earnest in his rejection of an impossible creed. charles prangois dupuis was born near chaumont, in france, the 16th oct., 1742, died 29th sept., 1809. he played a prominent part in the great revolutionary movement, and was secretary to the national convention. his famous work, "l'origine de tous les cultes," is one of the grand heresy marks of the eighteenth century. himself a pantheist, he searched through the mythic traditions of the greeks, the egyptians, the hindoos, and the hebrews, and as a result, sought to demonstrate a common origin for all religions. dr. john pye smith classes dupuis as an atheist, but this is most certainly an incorrect classification. he did not believe in creation, nor could he go outside the universe to search for its cause, but he regarded god as "la force universelle et eternellement active" and which permeated and animated everything. dupuis was an example of a new and rapidly increasing class of freethinking writers--i.e., those who, not content with doubting the divine origin of the religions they attacked, sought to explain the source and progress of the various systems. he urges that all religions find their base in the attempts at personification of some one or other, or of the whole of the forces of the universe, and shows what an important part the sun and moon have been made to play in the egyptian, greek, and hindoo mythologies. he argues that the fabulous biographies of hercules, bacchus, osiris, mithra, and jesus, find their common origin in the sun-worship, thus cloaked and hidden from the vulgar in each country. he does not attack the hebrew records as simply inaccurate, but endeavours to show clear sabaistic foundation for many of the most important narratives. the works of dupuis and dulaure should be read together; they contain the most complete amongst the many attempts to trace out the common origins of the various mythologies of the world. in the ninth chapter of dupuis' great work, he deals with the "fable made upon the sun adored under the name of christ," "_un dieu qui ait mange autrefois sur la terre, et qu'on y mange aujourd'hui,_" and unquestionably urges strange points of coincidence. it is only astrologically that the 25th of december can be fixed, he argues, as the birthday of mithra and of jesus, then born of the celestial virgin. our easter festivities for the resurrection of jesus, are but another form of the more ancient rejoicings at that season for adonis, the sun-god, restored to the world after his descent into the lower regions. he recalls that the ancient druidic worship recognised the virgin suckling the child, and gathers together many illustrations favourable to his theory. here we do no more than point out that while reason was rapidly releasing itself from priestly thraldom, heretics were not content to deny the divine origin of christianity, but sought to trace its mundane or celestial source, and strip it of its fabulous plumage. constantine francis chassebeuuf count volney, born at craon in anjou, february 3rd, 1757, died 1820. he was a deist. in his two great works, "the ruins of empires," and "new researches on ancient history," he advances many of the views brought forward by dupuis, from whom he quotes, but his volumes are much more readable than those of the author of the "origin of all religions." volney appears to have been one of the first to popularise many of spinoza's biblical criticisms. he denied the mosaic authorship of the pentateuch. he wrote most vigorously against kingcraft as well as priestcraft, regarding all systems of monarchy and religion as founded on the ignorance and servility, the superstition and weakness of the people. he puts the following into the mouth of ma-hommedan priests replying to christian preachers: "we maintain that your gospel morality is by no means characterised by the perfection you ascribe to it. it is not true that it has introduced into the world new and unknown virtues; for example, the equality of mankind in the eyes of god, and the fraternity and benevolence which are the consequence of this equality, were tenets formerly professed by the sect of hermetics and samaneans, from whom you have your descent. as to forgiveness of injuries, it had been taught by the pagans themselves; but in the latitude you give to it, it ceases to be a virtue, and becomes an immorality and a crime. your boasted precept, to him that strikes thee on thy right cheek turn the other also, is not only contrary to the feelings of man, but a flagrant violation of every principle of justice; it emboldens the wicked by impunity, degrades the virtuous by the servility to which it subjects them; delivers up the world to disorder and tyranny, and dissolves the bands of society--such is the true spirit of your doctrine. the precepts and parables of your gospel also never represent god other than as a despot, acting by no rule of equity; than as a partial father treating a debauched and prodigal son with greater favour than his obedient and virtuous children; than as a capricious master giving the same wages to him who has wrought but one hour, as to those who have borne the burthen and heat of the day, and preferring the last comers to the first. in short, your morality throughout is unfriendly to human intercourse; a code of misanthropy calculated to give men a disgust for life and society, and attach them to solitude and celibacy. with respect to the manner in which you have practised your boasted doctrine, we in our turn appeal to the testimony of fact, and ask, was it your evangelical meekness and forbearance which excited those endless wars among your sectaries, those atrocious persecutions of what you call heretics, those crusades against the arians, the manichseans, and the protestants, not to mention those which you have committed against us, nor the sacrilegious associations still subsisting among you, formed of men who have sworn to perpetuate them?* was it the charity of your gospel that led you to exterminate whole nations in america, and to destroy the empires of mexico and peru; that makes you still desolate africa, the inhabitants of which you sell like cattle, notwithstanding the abolition of slavery that you pretend your religion has effected; that makes you ravage india whose domain you usurp; in short, is it charity that has prompted you for three centuries past to disturb the peaceful inhabitants of three continents, the most prudent of whom, those of japan and china, have been constrained to banish you from their country, that they might escape your chains and recover their domestic tranquillity?" * the oath taken by the knights of the order of malta is to kill, or make the mahometans prisoners, for the glory of god. during the early part of the eighteenth century, magazines and other periodicals began to grow apace, and pamphlets multiplied exceedingly in this country. addison, steele, defoe, and dean swift all helped in the work of popular education, and often in a manner probably unanticipated by themselves. dean swifts satire against scepticism was fiercely powerful; but his onslaughts against roman catholics and presbyterians made far more sceptics than his other writings had made churchmen. during the latter portion of the eighteenth century, a new phase of popular progress was exhibited in the comparatively lively interest taken in political questions by the great body of the people inhabiting large towns. in america, france, and england, this was strongly marked; it is however in this country that we find special evidences of the connection between heresy and progress, as contradistinguished from orthodoxy and obstructiveness manifested in the struggle for the liberty of the press and platform; a struggle in which some of the boldest efforts were made by poor and heretical self-taught men. the dying eighteenth century witnessed, in england, repeated instances of state prosecutions, in which the charge of entertaining or advocating the views of the republican heretic, paine, formed a prominent feature, and there is little doubt that the efforts of the london corresponding society (which the government of the day made strenuous endeavours to repress) to give circulation to some of paine's political opinions in yorkshire, lancashire, and the north, had for result the familiarising many men with views they would have otherwise feared to investigate. the step from the "rights of man" to the "age of reason" was but a short stride for an advancing inquirer. in france the end of the eighteenth century was marked by a frightful convulsion. a people starved and degraded for generations, rose in the very desperation of despair, and with a mighty force broke the yoke of traditional feudalism and habitual monarchic reverence; but in the case of france, the revolution was too sudden to be immediately beneficial or enduring, the people were as a mass too poor, and therefore too ignorant to wield the power so rapidly wrested from the class who had so long monopolised it. it is far better to grow out of a creed by the sure and gradual consciousness of the truths of existence, than to dash off a religious garb simply from abhorrence of the shameful practices of its professors, or sudden conviction of the falsity of many of the testimonies in its favour. so it is a more permanent and more complete revolution which is effectuated by educating men to a sense of the majesty and worth of true manhood, than is any mere sudden overturning a rotten or cruel usurpation. monarchies are most thoroughly and entirely destroyed--not by pulling down the throne, or by decapitating the king, but by educating and building up with a knowledge of political duty, each individual citizen amongst the people. it is here that heresy has its great advantage. christianity says, "the powers that be are ordained of god, he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of god." heresy challenges the divine right of the governor, and declares that government should be the best contrivance of national wisdom to promote the national weal, to provide against national want, and alleviate-national suffering--that government which is only a costly machinery for conserving class privileges, and preventing popular freedom, is a tyrannical usurpation of power,which it is the duty of true men to destroy. i have briefly and imperfectly alluded to a few of the men who stand out as the sign-posts of heretical progress during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; in some future publication of wider scope fairer tribute may be paid to the memories of some of these mighty warriors in the freethought army. my object is to show that the civilisation of the masses is in proportion to the spread of heresy amongst them, that its effect is seen in an exhibition of manly dignity and self-reliant effort which is utterly unattainable amongst a superstitious people. look at the lazzaroni of the neapolitan states, or the peasant of the campagna, and you have at once the fearful illustration of demoralisation by faith in the beggar, brigand, and believer. it is sometimes pretended that such advantages of education and position as the people may boast in england, their civil rights and social advancement, are owing to their christianity, but in point of fact the reverse is the case. for centuries christianity had done little but fetter tightly the masses to church and crown, to priest and baron; the enfranchisement is comparatively modern. even in this very day, in the districts where the people are entirely in the hands of the clergy of the established church, there they are as a mass the most depraved. take the agricultural counties and the agricultural labourers: there are no heretical books or papers to be seen in their cottages, no heretical speakers come amongst them to disturb their contentment; the deputy-lieutenant, the squire, and the rector wield supreme authority--the parish church has no rival. but what are the people as a mass? they are not men, they are not women, they lack men's and women's thoughts and aspirations: they are diggers and weeders, hedgers and ditchers, ploughmen and carters; they are taught to be content with the state of life, in which it has pleased god to place them. my plea is, that modern heresy, from spinoza to mill, has given brain-strength and dignity to every one it has permeated--that the popular propagandists of this heresy, from bruno to carlile, have been the true redeemers and saviours, the true educators of the people. the redemption is yet only at its commencement, the education only lately begun, but the change is traceable already; as witness the power to speak and write, and the ability to listen and read, which have grown amongst the masses during the last 100 years. and if to-day we write with higher hope, it is because the right to speak and the right to print has been partly freed from the fetters forged through long generations of intellect-prostration, and almost entirely freed from the statutory limitations which, under pretence of checking blasphemy and sedition, have really gagged honest speech against pope and emperor, against church and throne. attributed to evil spirits�origin of the priesthood�temptation of christ�innate ideas�divine interference�special providence�the crane and the fish�cancer as a proof of design�matter and force�miracle�passing the hat for just one fact�sir william hamilton on cause and effect�the phenomena of mind�necessity and free will�the dark ages�the originality of repetition�of what use have the gods been to man?�paley and design�make good health contagious�periodicity of the universe and the commencement of intellectual freedom�lesson of the ineffectual attempt to rescue the tomb of christ from the mohammedans�the cemetery of the gods�taking away crutches�imperial reason humboldt. (1869.) the universe is governed by law�the self-made man�poverty generally an advantage�humboldt's birth-place�his desire for travel�on what humboldt's fame depends�his companions and friends�investigations in the new world�a picture�subjects of his addresses�victory of the church over philosophy�influence of the discovery that the world is governed by law�on the term law�copernicus�astronomy�aryabhatta� descartes�condition of the world and man when the morning of science dawned�reasons for honoring humboldt�the world his monument thomas paine. (1870.) with his name left out the history of liberty cannot be written�paine's origin and condition�his arrival in america with a letter of introduction by franklin�condition of the colonies�"common sense"�a new nation born�paine the best of political writers�the "crisis"�war not to the interest of a trading nation�paine's standing at the close of the revolution�close of the eighteenth century in france-the "rights of man"�paine prosecuted in england�"the world is my country"�elected to the french assembly�votes against the death of the king�imprisoned�a look behind the altar�the "age of reason"�his argument against the bible as a revelation�christianity of paine's day�a blasphemy law in force in maryland�the scotch "kirk"�hanging of thomas aikenhead for denying the inspiration of the scriptures�"cathedrals and domes, and chimes and chants"�science�"he died in the land his genius defended," individuality. (1873.) "his soul was like a star and dwelt apart"�disobedience one of the conditions of progress.�magellan�the monarch and the hermit-why the church hates a thinker�the argument from grandeur and prosperity-travelers and guide-boards�a degrading saying�theological education�scotts, henrys and mcknights�the church the great robber�corrupting the reason of children�monotony of acquiescence: for god's sake, say no�protestant intolerance: luther and calvin�assertion of individual independence a step toward infidelity�salute to jupiter�the atheistic bug-little religious liberty in america�god in the constitution, man out�decision of the supreme court of illinois that an unbeliever could not testify in any court�dissimulation�nobody in this bed�the dignity of a unit heretics and heresies. (1874.) liberty, a word without which all other words are vain�the church, the bible, and persecution�over the wild waves of war rose and fell the banner of jesus christ�highest type of the orthodox christian�heretics' tongues and why they should be removed before burning�the inquisition established�forms of torture�act of henry viii for abolishing diversity of opinion�what a good christian was obliged to believe�the church has carried the black flag�for what men and women have been burned�john calvin's advent into the world�his infamous acts�michael servetus�castalio�spread of presbyterianism�indictment of a presbyterian minister in illinois for heresy�specifications�the real bible the ghosts. (1877.) dedication to ebon c. ingersoll�preface�mendacity of the religious press�"materialism"�ways of pleasing the ghosts�the idea of immortality not born of any book�witchcraft and demon-ology�witch trial before sir matthew hale�john wesley a firm believer in ghosts�"witch-spots"�lycanthropy�animals tried and convicted�the governor of minnesota and the grasshoppers�a papal bull against witchcraft�victims of the delusion�sir william blackstone's affirmation�trials in belgium�incubi and succubi�a bishop personated by the devil�the doctrine that diseases are caused by ghosts�treatment�timothy dwight against vaccination�ghosts as historians�the language of eden�leibnitz, founder of the science of language�cosmas on astronomy�vagaries of kepler and tycho brahe�discovery of printing, powder, and america�thanks to the inventors�the catholic murderer and the meat�let the ghosts go the liberty of man, woman, and child. (1877.) liberty sustains the same relation to mind that space does to matter�the history of man a history of slavery�the infidel our fathers in the good old time�the iron arguments that christians used�instruments of torture�a vision of the inquisition�models of man's inventions�weapons, armor, musical instruments, paintings, books, skulls�the gentleman in the dug-out�homage to genius and intellect�abraham lincoln�what i mean by liberty�the man who cannot afford to speak his thought is a certificate of the meanness of the community in which he resides�liberty of woman�marriage and the family�ornaments the souvenirs of bondage-the story of the garden of eden�adami and heva�equality of the sexes-the word "boss"�the cross man-the stingy man�wives who are beggars�how to spend money�by the tomb of the old napoleon�the woman you love will never grow old�liberty of children�when your child tells a lie�disowning children�beating your own flesh and blood�make home pleasant�sunday when i was a boy�the laugh of a child�the doctrine of eternal punishment�jonathan edwards on the happiness of believing husbands whose wives are in hell�the liberty of eating and sleeping�water in fever�soil and climate necessary to the production of genius�against annexing santo domingo�descent of man�conclusion about farming in illinois. (1877.) to plow is to pray; to plant is to prophesy, and the harvest answers and fulfills�the old way of farming�cooking an unknown art-houses, fuel, and crops�the farmer's boy�what a farmer should sell�beautifying the home�advantages of illinois as a farming state�advantages of the farmer over the mechanic�farm life too lonely-on early rising�sleep the best doctor�fashion�patriotism and boarding houses�the farmer and the railroads�money and confidence�demonetization of silver-area of illinois�mortgages and interest�kindness to wives and children�how a beefsteak should be cooked�decorations and comfort�let the children sleep�old age what must we do to be saved? (1880.) preface�the synoptic gospels�only mark knew of the necessity of belief�three christs described�the jewish gentleman and the piece of bacon�who wrote the new testament?�why christ and the apostles wrote nothing�infinite respect for the man christ�different feeling for the theological christ�saved from what?�chapter on the gospel of matthew�what this gospel says we must do to be saved�jesus and the children�john calvin and jonathan edwards conceived of as dimpled darlings�christ and the man who inquired what good thing he should do that he might have eternal life�nothing said about belief�an interpolation�chapter on the gospel of mark�the believe or be damned passage, and why it was written�the last conversation of christ with his disciples�the signs that follow them that believe�chapter on the gospel of luke�substantial agreement with matthew and mark�how zaccheus achieved salvation�the two thieves on the cross�chapter on the gospel of john�the doctrine of regeneration, or the new birth�shall we love our enemies while god damns his?�chapter on the catholics�communication with heaven through decayed saints�nuns and nunneries�penitentiaries of god should be investigated�the athanasian creed expounded�the trinity and its members�chapter on the episcopalians�origin of the episcopal church�apostolic succession an imported article�episcopal creed like the catholic, with a few additional absurdities�chapter on the methodists�wesley and whitfield�their quarrel about predestination�much preaching for little money�adapted to new countries�chapter on the presbyterians�john calvin, murderer�meeting between calvin and knox�the infamy of calvinism�division in the church�the young presbyterian's resignation to the fate of his mother�a frightful, hideous, and hellish creed�chapter on the evangelical alliance�jeremy taylor's opinion of baptists�orthodoxy not dead�creed of the alliance�total depravity, eternal damnation�what do you propose?�the gospel of good-fellowship, cheerfulness, health, good living, justice�no forgiveness�god's forgiveness does not pay my debt to smith�gospel of liberty, of intelligence, of humanity�one world at a time�"upon that rock i stand" volume ii.--lectures detailed contents of volume ii. preface. some mistakes of moses. some reasons why orthodoxy. myth and miracle. detailed contents of volume ii. some mistakes of moses. (1879.) preface�i. he who endeavors to control the mind by force is a tyrant, and he who submits is a slave�all i ask�when a religion is founded�freedom for the orthodox clergy�every minister an attorney�submission to the orthodox and the dead�bounden duty of the ministry�the minister factory at andover�ii. free schools�no sectarian sciences�religion and the schools�scientific hypocrites�iii. the politicians and the churches�iv. man and woman the highest possible titles�belief dependent on surroundings�worship of ancestors�blindness necessary to keeping the narrow path�the bible the chain that binds�a bible of the middle ages and the awe it inspired�v. the pentateuch�moses not the author�belief out of which grew religious ceremonies�egypt the source of the information of moses�vi. monday�nothing, in the light of raw material�the story of creation begun�the same story, substantially, found in the records of babylon, egypt, and india�inspiration unnecessary to the truth�usefulness of miracles to fit lies to facts�division of darkness and light�vii. tuesday�the firmament and some biblical notions about it�laws of evaporation unknown to the inspired writer�viii. wednesday�the waters gathered into seas�fruit and nothing to eat it�five epochs in the organic history of the earth�balance between the total amounts of animal and vegetable life�vegetation prior to the appearance of the sun�ix. thursday�sun and moon manufactured�magnitude of the solar orb�dimensions of some of the planets�moses' guess at the size of sun and moon�joshua's control of the heavenly bodies�a hypothesis urged by ministers�the theory of "refraction"�rev. henry morey�astronomical knowledge of chinese savants�the motion of the earth reversed by jehovah for the reassurance of ahaz�"errors" renounced by button�x. "he made the stars also"�distance of the nearest star�xi. friday�whales and other living creatures produced�xii. saturday�reproduction inaugurated�xiii. "let us make man"�human beings created in the physical image and likeness of god�inquiry as to the process adopted�development of living forms according to evolution�how were adam and eve created?�the rib story�age of man upon the earth�a statue apparently made before the world�xiv. sunday�sacredness of the sabbath destroyed by the theory of vast "periods"�reflections on the sabbath�xv. the necessity for a good memory�the two accounts of the creation in genesis i and ii�order of creation in the first account�order of creation in the second account�fastidiousness of adam in the choice of a helpmeet�dr. adam clark's commentary�dr. scott's guess�dr. matthew henry's admission�the blonde and brunette problem�the result of unbelief and the reward of faith�"give him a harp"�xvi. the garden�location of eden�the four rivers�the tree of knowledge�andover appealed to�xvii. the fall�the serpent�dr. adam clark gives a zoological explanation�dr. henry dissents�whence this serpent?�xviii. dampness�a race of giants�wickedness of mankind�an ark constructed�a universal flood indicated�animals probably admitted to the ark�how did they get there?�problem of food and service�a shoreless sea covered with innumerable dead�drs. clark and henry on the situation�the ark takes ground�new difficulties�noah's sacrifice�the rainbow as a memorandum�babylonian, egyptian, and indian legends of a flood�xix. bacchus and babel�interest attaching to noah�where did our first parents and the serpent acquire a common language?�babel and the confusion of tongues�xx. faith in filth�immodesty of biblical diction�xxi. the hebrews�god's promises to abraham�the sojourning of israel in egypt�marvelous increase�moses and aaron�xxii. the plagues�competitive miracle working�defeat of the local magicians�xxiii. the flight out of egypt�three million people in a desert�destruction of pharaoh ana his host�manna�a superfluity of quails�rev. alexander cruden's commentary�hornets as allies of the israelites�durability of the clothing of the jewish people�an ointment monopoly�consecration of priests�the crime of becoming a mother�the ten commandments�medical ideas of jehovah�character of the god of the pentateuch�xxiv. confess and avoid�xxv. "inspired" slavery�xxvi. "inspired" marriage-xxvii. "inspired" war-xxviii. "inspired" religious liberty�xxix. conclusion. some reasons why. (1881.) i�religion makes enemies�hatred in the name of universal benevolence�no respect for the rights of barbarians�literal fulfillment of a new testament prophecy�ii. duties to god�can we assist god?�an infinite personality an infinite impossibility-ill. inspiration�what it really is�indication of clams�multitudinous laughter of the sea�horace greeley and the mammoth trees�a landscape compared to a table-cloth�the supernatural is the deformed�inspiration in the man as well as in the book�our inspired bible�iv. god's experiment with the jews�miracles of one religion never astonish the priests of another�"i am a liar myself"�v. civilized countries�crimes once regarded as divine institutions�what the believer in the inspiration of the bible is compelled to say�passages apparently written by the devil�vi. a comparison of books�advancing a cannibal from missionary to mutton�contrast between the utterances of jehovah and those of reputable heathen�epictetus, cicero, zeno, seneca�the hindu, antoninus, marcus aurelius�the avesta�vii. monotheism�egyptians before moses taught there was but one god and married but one wife�persians and hindoos had a single supreme deity�rights of roman women�marvels of art achieved without the assistance of heaven�probable action of the jewish jehovah incarnated as man�viii. the new testament�doctrine of eternal pain brought to light�discrepancies�human weaknesses cannot be predicated of divine wisdom�why there are four gospels according to irenæus�the atonement�remission of sins under the mosaic dispensation�christians say, "charge it"�god's forgiveness does not repair an injury�suffering of innocence for the guilty�salvation made possible by jehovah's failure to civilize the jews�necessity of belief not taught in the synoptic gospels�non-resistance the offspring of weakness�ix. christ's mission�all the virtues had been taught before his advent�perfect and beautiful thoughts of his pagan predecessors�st. paul contrasted with heathen writers�"the quality of mercy"�x. eternal pain�an illustration of eternal punishment�captain kreuger of the barque tiger�xi. civilizing influence of the bible�its effects on the jews�if christ was god, did he not, in his crucifixion, reap what he had sown?�nothing can add to the misery of a nation whose king is jehovah orthodoxy. (1884.) orthodox religion dying out�religious deaths and births�the religion of reciprocity�every language has a cemetery�orthodox institutions survive through the money invested in them�"let us tell our real names"�the blows that have shattered the shield and shivered the lance of superstition�mohammed's successful defence of the sepulchre of christ�the destruction of art�the discovery of america�although he made it himself, the holy ghost was ignorant of the form of this earth�copernicus and kepler�special providence�the man and the ship he did not take�a thanksgiving proclamation contradicted�charles darwin�henry ward beecher�the creeds�the latest creed�god as a governor�the love of god�the fall of man�we are bound by representatives without a chance to vote against them�the atonement�the doctrine of depravity a libel on the human race�the second birth�a unitarian universalist�inspiration of the scriptures�god a victim of his own tyranny�in the new testament trouble commences at death�the reign of truth and love�the old spaniard who died without an enemy�the wars it brought�consolation should be denied to murderers�at the rate at which heathen are being converted, how long will it take to establish christ's kingdom on earth?�the resurrection�the judgment day�pious evasions�"we shall not die, but we shall all be hanged"�"no bible, no civilization" miracles of the new testament�nothing written by christ or his contemporaries�genealogy of jesus�more miracles�a master of death�improbable that he would be crucified�the loaves and fishes�how did it happen that the miracles convinced so few?�the resurrection�the ascension�was the body spiritual�parting from the disciples�casting out devils�necessity of belief�god should be consistent in the matter of forgiving enemies�eternal punishment�some good men who are damned�another objection�love the only bow on life's dark cloud�"now is the accepted time"�rather than this doctrine of eternal punishment should be true�i would rather that every planet should in its orbit wheel a barren star�what i believe�immortality�it existed long before moses�consolation�the promises are so far away, and the dead are so near�death a wall or a door�a fable�orpheus and eurydice. myth and miracle. (1885.) i. happiness the true end and aim of life�spiritual people and their literature�shakespeare's clowns superior to inspired writers�beethoven's sixth symphony preferred to the five books of moses�venus of milo more pleasing than the presbyterian creed�ii. religions naturally produced�poets the myth-makers�the sleeping beauty�orpheus and eurydice�red riding hood�the golden age�elysian fields�the flood myth�myths of the seasons�iii. the sun-god�jonah, buddha, chrisnna, horus, zoroaster�december 25th as a birthday of gods�christ a sun-god�the cross a symbol of the life to come�when nature rocked the cradle of the infant world�iv. difference between a myth and a miracle�raising the dead, past and present�miracles of jehovah�miracles of christ�everything told except the truth�the mistake of the world�v. beginning of investigation�the stars as witnesses against superstition�martyrdom of bruno�geology�steam and electricity�nature forever the same�persistence of force�cathedral, mosque, and joss house have the same foundation�science the providence of man�vi. to soften the heart of god�martyrs�the god was silent�credulity a vice�develop the imagination�"the skylark" and "the daisy"�vii. how are we to civilize the world?�put theology out of religion�divorce of church and state�secular education�godless schools�viii. the new jerusalem�knowledge of the supernatural possessed by savages�beliefs of primitive peoples�science is modest�theology arrogant�torque-mada and bruno on the day of judgment�ix. poison of superstition in the mother's milk�ability of mistakes to take care of themselves�longevity of religious lies�mother's religion pleaded by the cannibal�the religion of freedom�o liberty, thou art the god of my idolatry volume iii--lectures detailed contents of volume iii. shakespeare robert burns.* abraham lincoln voltaire. liberty in literature. the great infidels.* conclusion. which way? about the holy bible. detailed contents of volume iii. shakespeare (1891.) i. the greatest genius of our world�not of supernatural origin or of royal blood�illiteracy of his parents�education�his father�his mother a great woman�stratford unconscious of the immortal child�social position of shakespeare�of his personal peculiarities�birth, marriage, and death�what we know of him�no line written by him to be found�the absurd epitaph�ii. contemporaries by whom he was mentioned�iii. no direct mention of any of his contemporaries in the plays�events and personages of his time�iv. position of the actor in shakespeare's time�fortunately he was not educated at oxford�an idealist�his indifference to stage-carpentry and plot�he belonged to all lands�knew the brain and heart of man�an intellectual spendthrift�v. the baconian theory�vi. dramatists before and during the time of shakespeare�dramatic incidents illustrated in passages from "macbeth" and "julius cæsar"�vii. his use of the work of others�the pontic sea�a passage from "lear"�viii. extravagance that touches the infinite�the greatest compliment�"let me not live after my flame lacks oil"�where pathos almost touches the grotesque�ix. an innovator and iconoclast�disregard of the "unities"�nature forgets�violation of the classic model�x. types�the secret of shakespeare�characters who act from reason and motive�what they say not the opinion of shakespeare�xi. the procession that issued from shakespeare's brain�his great women�lovable clowns�his men�talent and genius�xii. the greatest of all philosophers�master of the human heart�love�xiii. in the realm of comparison�xiv. definitions: suicide, drama, death, memory, the body, life, echo, the world, rumor�the confidant of nature�xv. humor and pathos�illustrations�xvi. not a physician, lawyer, or botanist�he was a man of imagination�he lived the life of all�the imagination had a stage in shakespeare's brain. robert burns. (1878.) poetry and poets�milton, dante, petrarch�old-time poetry in scotland�influence of scenery on literature�lives that are poems�birth of burns�early life and education�scotland emerging from the gloom of calvinism�a metaphysical peasantry�power of the scotch preacher�famous scotch names�john barleycorn vs. calvinism�why robert burns is loved�his reading�made goddesses of women�poet of love: his "vision," "bonnie doon," "to mary in heaven"�poet of home: "cotter's saturday night," "john anderson, my jo"�friendship: "auld lang-syne"�scotch drink: "willie brew'd a peck o' maut"�burns the artist: the "brook," "tam o'shanter"�a real democrat: "a man's a man for a' that"�his theology: the dogma of eternal pain, "morality," "hypocrisy," "holy willie's prayer"�on the bible�a statement of his religion�contrasted with tennyson�from cradle to coffin�his last words�lines on the birth-place of burns. abraham lincoln. (1894.) i. simultaneous birth of lincoln and darwin�heroes of every generation�slavery�principle sacrificed to success�lincoln's childhood�his first speech�a candidate for the senate against douglass�ii. a crisis in the affairs of the republic�the south not alone responsible for slavery�lincoln's prophetic words�nominated for president and elected in spite of his fitness�iii. secession and civil war�the thought uppermost in his mind�iv. a crisis in the north�proposition to purchase the slaves�v. the proclamation of emancipation�his letter to horace greeley�waited on by clergymen�vi. surrounded by enemies�hostile attitude of gladstone, salisbury, louis napoleon, and the vatican�vii. slavery the perpetual stumbling-block�confiscation�viii. his letter to a republican meeting in illinois�its effect�ix. the power of his personality�the embodiment of mercy�use of the pardoning power�x. the vallandigham affair�the horace greeley incident�triumphs of humor�xi. promotion of general hooker�a prophecy and its fulfillment�xii.�states rights vs. territorial integrity�xiii. his military genius�the foremost man in all the world: and then the horror came�xiv. strange mingling of mirth and tears�deformation of great historic characters�washington now only a steel engraving�lincoln not a type�virtues necessary in a new country�laws of cultivated society�in the country is the idea of home�lincoln always a pupil�a great lawyer�many-sided�wit and humor�as an orator�his speech at gettysburg contrasted with the oration of edward everett�apologetic in his kindness�no official robes�the gentlest memory of our world. voltaire. (1894.) i. changes wrought by time�throne and altar twin vultures�the king and the priest�what is greatness?�effect of voltaire's name on clergyman and priest�born and baptized�state of france in 1694�the church at the head�efficacy of prayers and dead saints�bells and holy water�prevalence of belief in witches, devils, and fiends�seeds of the revolution scattered by noble and priest�condition in england�the inquisition in full control in spain�portugal and germany burning women�italy prostrate beneath the priests, the puritans in america persecuting quakers, and stealing children�ii. the days of youth�his education�chooses literature as a profession and becomes a diplomat�in love and disinherited�unsuccessful poem competition�jansenists and molinists�the bull unigenitus�exiled to tulle�sent to the bastile�exiled to england�acquaintances made there�iii. the morn of manhood�his attention turned to the history of the church�the "triumphant beast" attacked�europe filled with the product of his brain�what he mocked�the weapon of ridicule�his theology�his "retractions"�what goethe said of voltaire�iv. the scheme of nature�his belief in the optimism of pope destroyed by the lisbon earthquake�v. his humanity�case of jean calas�the sirven family�the espenasse case�case of chevalier de la barre and d'etallonde�voltaire abandons france�a friend of education�an abolitionist�not a saint�vi. the return�his reception�his death�burial at romilli-on-the-seine�vii. the death-bed argument�serene demise of the infamous�god has no time to defend the good and protect the pure�eloquence of the clergy on the death-bed subject�the second return�throned upon the bastile�the grave desecrated by priests�voltaire. a testimonial to walt whitman�let us put wreaths on the brows of the living�literary ideals of the american people in 1855�"leaves of grass"�its reception by the provincial prudes�the religion of the body�appeal to manhood and womanhood�books written for the market�the index expurgatorius�whitman a believer in democracy�individuality�humanity�an old-time sea-fight�what is poetry?�rhyme a hindrance to expression�rhythm the comrade of the poetic�whitman's attitude toward religion�philosophy�the two poems�"a word out of the sea"�"when lilacs last in the door"�"a chant for death"� the history of intellectual progress is written in the lives of infidels�the king and the priest�the origin of god and heaven, of the devil and hell�the idea of hell born of ignorance, brutality, cowardice, and revenge�the limitations of our ancestors�the devil and god�egotism of barbarians�the doctrine of hell not an exclusive possession of christianity�the appeal to the cemetery�religion and wealth, christ and poverty�the "great" not on the side of christ and his disciples�epitaphs as battle-cries�some great men in favor of almost every sect�mistakes and superstitions of eminent men�sacred books�the claim that all moral laws came from god through the jews�fear�martyrdom�god's ways toward men�the emperor constantine�the death test�theological comity between protestants and catholics�julian�a childish fable still believed�bruno�his crime, his imprisonment and liberty in literature. (1890.) "old age"�"leaves of grass" the great infidels. (1881.) martyrdom�the first to die for truth without expectation of reward�the church in the time of voltaire�voltaire�diderot�david hume�benedict spinoza�our infidels�thomas paine�conclusion. which way? (1884.) i. the natural and the supernatural�living for the benefit of your fellow-man and living for ghosts�the beginning of doubt�two philosophies of life�two theories of government�ii. is our god superior to the gods of the heathen?�what our god has done�iii. two theories about the cause and cure of disease�the first physician�the bones of st. anne exhibited in new york�archbishop corrigan and cardinal gibbons countenance a theological fraud�a japanese story�the monk and the miraculous cures performed by the bones of a donkey represented as those of a saint�iv.�two ways of accounting for sacred books and religions�v-two theories about morals�nothing miraculous about morality�the test of all actions�vi. search for the impossible�alchemy�"perpetual motion"�astrology�fountain of perpetual youth�vii. "great men" and the superstitions in which they have believed�viii. follies and imbecilities of great men�we do not know what they thought, only what they said�names of great unbelievers�most men controlled by their surroundings�ix. living for god in switzerland, scotland, new england�in the dark ages�let us live for man�x. the narrow road of superstition�the wide and ample way�let us squeeze the orange dry�this was, this is, this shall be. about the holy bible. (1894.) the truth about the bible ought to be told�i. the origin of the bible�establishment of the mosaic code�moses not the author of the pentateuch�some old testament books of unknown origin�ii. is the old testament inspired?�what an inspired book ought to be�what the bible is�admission of orthodox christians that it is not inspired as to science�the enemy of art�iii. the ten commandments�omissions and redundancies�the story of achan�the story of elisha�the story of daniel�the story of joseph�iv. what is it all worth?�not true, and contradictory�its myths older than the pentateuch�other accounts of the creation, the fall, etc.�books of the old testament named and characterized�v. was jehovah a god of love?�vi. jehovah's administration�vii. the new testament�many other gospels besides our four�disagreements�belief in devils�raising of the dead�other miracles�would a real miracle-worker have been crucified?�viii. the philosophy of christ�love of enemies�improvidence�self-mutilation�the earth as a footstool�justice�a bringer of war�division of families�ix. is christ our example?�x. why should we place christ at the top and summit of the human race?�how did he surpass other teachers?�what he left unsaid, and why�inspiration�rejected books of the new testament�the bible and the crimes it has caused. volume iv.--lectures detailed contents of volume iv. why i am an agnostic. the truth. how to reform mankind. a thanksgiving sermon. a lay sermon. the foundations of faith. superstition. the devil. progress. what is religion? detailed contents of volume iv. why i am an agnostic. (1896.) i. influence of birth in determining religious belief�scotch, irish, english, and americans inherit their faith�religions of nations not suddenly changed�people who knew�what they were certain about�revivals�character of sermons preached�effect of conversion�a vermont farmer for whom perdition had no terrors�the man and his dog�backsliding and re-birth�ministers who were sincere�a free will baptist on the rich man and lazarus�ii. the orthodox god�the two dispensations�the infinite horror�iii. religious books�the commentators�paley's watch argument�milton, young, and pollok�iv. studying astronomy�geology�denial and evasion by the clergy�v. the poems of robert burns�byron, shelley, keats, and shakespeare�vi. volney, gibbon, and thomas paine�voltaire's services to liberty�pagans compared with patriarchs�vii. other gods and other religions�dogmas, myths, and symbols of christianity older than our era�viii. the men of science, humboldt, darwin, spencer, huxley, haeckel�ix. matter and force indestructible and uncreatable�the theory of design�x. god an impossible being�the panorama of the past�xi. free from sanctified mistakes and holy lies. the truth. (1897.) i. the martyrdom of man�how is truth to be found�every man should be mentally honest�he should be intellectually hospitable�geologists, chemists, mechanics, and professional men are seeking for the truth�ii. those who say that slavery is better than liberty�promises are not evidence�horace greeley and the cold stove�iii. "the science of theology" the only dishonest science�moses and brigham young�minds poisoned and paralyzed in youth�sunday schools and theological seminaries�orthodox slanderers of scientists�religion has nothing to do with charity�hospitals built in self-defence�what good has the church accomplished?�of what use are the orthodox ministers, and what are they doing for the good of mankind�the harm they are doing�delusions they teach�truths they should tell about the bible�conclusions�our christs and our miracles. how to reform mankind. (1896.) i. "there is no darkness but ignorance"�false notions concerning all departments of life�changed ideas about science, government and morals�ii. how can we reform the world?�intellectual light the first necessity�avoid waste of wealth in war�iii. another waste�vast amount of money spent on the church�iv. plow can we lessen crime?�frightful laws for the punishment of minor crimes�a penitentiary should be a school�professional criminals should not be allowed to populate the earth�v. homes for all-make a nation of householders�marriage and divorce-vi. the labor question�employers cannot govern prices�railroads should pay pensions�what has been accomplished for the improvement of the condition of labor�vii. educate the children�useless knowledge�liberty cannot be sacrificed for the sake of anything�false worship of wealth�viii. we must work and wait. a thanksgiving sermon. (1897.) i. our fathers ages ago�from savagery to civilization�for the blessings we enjoy, whom should we thank?�what good has the church done?-did christ add to the sum of useful knowledge�the saints�what have the councils and synods done?�what they gave us, and what they did not�shall we thank them for the hell here and for the hell of the future?�ii. what does god do?�the infinite juggler and his puppets�what the puppets have done�shall we thank these gods?�shall we thank nature?�iii. men who deserve our thanks�the infidels, philanthropists and scientists�the discoverers and inventors�magellan�copernicus�bruno�galileo�kepler, herschel, newton, and laplace�lyell�what the worldly have done�origin and vicissitudes of the bible�the septuagint�investigating the phenomena of nature�iv. we thank the good men and good women of the past�the poets, dramatists, and artists�the statesmen�paine, jefferson, ericsson, lincoln. grant�voltaire, humboldt, darwin. a lay sermon. (1886.) prayer of king lear�when honesty wears a rag and rascality a robe-the nonsense of "free moral agency "�doing right is not self-denial-wealth often a gilded hell�the log house�insanity of getting more�great wealth the mother of crime�separation of rich and poor�emulation�invention of machines to save labor�production and destitution�the remedy a division of the land�evils of tenement houses�ownership and use�the great weapon is the ballot�sewing women�strikes and boycotts of no avail�anarchy, communism, and socialism�the children of the rich a punishment for wealth�workingmen not a danger�the criminals a necessary product�society's right to punish�the efficacy of kindness�labor is honorable�mental independence. the foundations of faith. (1895.) i. the old testament�story of the creation�age of the earth and of man�astronomical calculations of the egyptians�the flood�the firmament a fiction�israelites who went into egypt�battles of the jews�area of palestine�gold collected by david for the temple�ii. the new testament�discrepancies about the birth of christ�herod and the wise men�the murder of the babes of bethlehem�when was christ born�cyrenius and the census of the world�genealogy of christ according to matthew and luke�the slaying of zacharias�appearance of the saints at the crucifixion�the death of judas iscariot�did christ wish to be convicted?�iii. jehovah�iv. the trinity�the incarnation�was christ god?�the trinity expounded�"let us pray"�v. the theological christ�sayings of a contradictory character�christ a devout jew�an ascetic�his philosophy�the ascension�the best that can be said about christ�the part that is beautiful and glorious�the other side�vi. the scheme of redemption�vii. belief�eternal pain�no hope in hell, pity in heaven, or mercy in the heart of god�viii. conclusion. superstition. (1898.) i. what is superstition?�popular beliefs about the significance of signs, lucky and unlucky numbers, days, accidents, jewels, etc.�eclipses, earthquakes, and cyclones as omens�signs and wonders of the heavens�efficacy of bones and rags of saints�diseases and devils�ii. witchcraft�necromancers�what is a miracle?�the uniformity of nature�iii. belief in the existence of good spirits or angels�god and the devil�when everything was done by the supernatural�iv. all these beliefs now rejected by men of intelligence�the devil's success made the coming of christ a necessity�"thou shalt not suffer a witch to live"�some biblical angels�vanished visions�v. where are heaven and hell?�prayers never answered�the doctrine of design�why worship our ignorance?�would god lead us into temptation?�president mckinley's thanks giving for the santiago victory�vi. what harm does superstition do?�the heart hardens and the brain softens�what superstition has done and taught�fate of spain�of portugal, austria, germany�vii. inspired books�mysteries added to by the explanations of theologians�the inspired bible the greatest curse of christendom�viii. modifications of jehovah�changing the bible�ix. centuries of darkness�the church triumphant�when men began to think�x. possibly these superstitions are true, but we have no evidence�we believe in the natural�science is the real redeemer. the devil. (1899.) i. if the devil should die, would god make another?�how was the idea of a devil produced�other devils than ours�natural origin of these monsters�ii. the atlas of christianity is the devil�the devil of the old testament�the serpent in eden�"personifications" of evil�satan and job�satan and david�iii. take the devil from the drama of christianity and the plot is gone�jesus tempted by the evil one�demoniac possession�mary magdalene�satan and judas�incubi and succubi�the apostles believed in miracles and magic�the pool of bethesda�iv. the evidence of the church�the devil was forced to father the failures of god�belief of the fathers of the church in devils�exorcism at the baptism of an infant in the sixteenth century�belief in devils made the universe a madhouse presided over by an insane god�v. personifications of the devil�the orthodox ostrich thrusts his head into the sand�if devils are personifications so are all the other characters of the bible�vi. some queries about the devil, his place of residence, his manner of living, and his object in life�interrogatories to the clergy�vii. the man of straw the master of the orthodox ministers�his recent accomplishments�viii. keep the devils out of children�ix. conclusion.�declaration of the free. progress. (1860-64.) the prosperity of the world depends upon its workers�veneration for the ancient�credulity and faith of the middle ages�penalty for reading the scripture in the mother tongue�unjust, bloody, and cruel laws�the reformers too were persecutors�bigotry of luther and knox�persecution of castalio�montaigne against torture in france�"witchcraft" (chapter on)�confessed wizards�a case before sir matthew hale�belief in lycanthropy�animals tried and executed�animals received as witnesses�the corsned or morsel of execution�kepler an astrologer�luther's encounter with the devil�mathematician stoefflers, astronomical prediction of a flood�histories filled with falsehood�legend about the daughter of pharaoh invading scotland and giving the country her name�a story about mohammed�a history of the britains written by archdeacons�ingenuous remark of eusebius�progress in the mechanic arts�england at the beginning of the eighteenth century�barbarous punishments�queen elizabeth's order concerning clergymen and servant girls�inventions of watt, arkwright, and others�solomon's deprivations�language (chapter on)�belief that the hebrew was of paradise�geography (chapter on)�the works of cosmas�printing invented�church's opposition to books�the inquisition�the reformation�"slavery" (chapter on)�voltaire's remark on slavery as a contract�white slaves in greece, rome, england, scotland, and france�free minds make free bodies�causes of the abolition of white slavery in europe�the french revolution�the african slave trade, its beginning and end�liberty triumphed (chapter head)�abolition of chattel slavery�conclusion. what is religion? (1899.) i. belief in god and sacrifice�did an infinite god create the children of men and is he the governor of the universe?�ii. if this god exists, how do we know he is good?�should both the inferior and the superior thank god for their condition?�iii. the power that works for righteousness�what is this power?�the accumulated experience of the world is a power working for good?�love the commencement of the higher virtues�iv. what has our religion done?�would christians have been worse had they adopted another faith?�v. how can mankind be reformed without religion?�vi. the four corner-stones of my theory�vii. matter and force eternal�links in the chain of evolution�viii. reform�the gutter as a nursery�can we prevent the unfit from filling the world with their children?�science must make woman the owner and mistress of herself�morality born of intelligence�ix. real religion and real worship. volume v.--discussions detailed contents of volume v. preface. ingersoll's interviews on talmage. first interview. second interview. third interview. fourth interview. fifth interview, sixth interview. the talmagian catechism. a vindication of thomas paine. conclusion. the observer's second attack ingersoll's second reply. contents of volume v. ingersoll's six interviews on talmage. (1882.) preface�first interview: great men as witnesses to the truth of the gospel�no man should quote the words of another unless he is willing to accept all the opinions of that man�reasons of more weight than reputations�would a general acceptance of unbelief fill the penitentiaries?� my creed�most criminals orthodox�relig-ion and morality not necessarily associates�on the creation of the universe out of omnipotence�mr. talmage's theory about the pro-duction of light prior to the creation of the sun�the deluge and the ark�mr. talmage's tendency to belittle the bible miracles�his chemical, geological, and agricultural views�his disregard of good manners -second interview: an insulting text�god's design in creating guiteau to be the assassin of garfield�mr. talmage brings the charge of blasphemy�some real blasphemers�the tabernacle pastor tells the exact opposite of the truth about col. ingersoll's attitude toward the circulation of immoral books�"assassinating" god�mr. talmage finds nearly all the invention of modern times mentioned in the bible�the reverend gentleman corrects the translators of the bible in the matter of the rib story�denies that polygamy is permitted by the old testament�his de-fence of queen victoria and violation of the grave of george eliot�exhibits a christian spirit�third interview: mr. talmage's partiality in the bestowal of his love�denies the right of laymen to examine the scriptures�thinks the infidels victims of bibliophobia �he explains the stopping of the sun and moon at the command of joshua� instances a dark day in the early part of the century�charges that holy things are made light of�reaffirms his confidence in the whale and jonah story�the commandment which forbids the making of graven images�affirmation that the bible is the friend of woman�the present condition of woman�fourth interview: colonel ingersoll compared by mr. talmage tojehoiakim, who consigned writings of jeremiah to the flames�an intimation that infidels wish to have all copies of the bible destroyed by fire�laughter deprecated�col. ingersoll accused of denouncing his father�mr. talmage holds that a man may be perfectly happy in heaven with his mother in hell -challenges the infidel to read a chapter from st. john�on the "chief solace of the world"�dis covers an attempt is being made to put out the light-houses of the farther shore�affirms our debt to christianity for schools, hospitals, etc.�denies that infidels have ever done any good� fifth interview: inquiries if men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles, and is answered in the negative�resents the charge that the bible is a cruel book�demands to know where the cruelty of the bible crops out in the lives of christians� col. ingersoll accused of saying that the bible is a collection of polluted writings�mr. talmage asserts the orchestral harmony of the scriptures from genesis to revelation, and repudiates the theory of contradictions�his view of mankind indicated in quotations from his confession of faith�he insists that the bible is scientific� traces the new testament to its source with st. john�pledges his word that no man ever died for a lie cheerfully and triumphantly�as to prophecies and predictions�alleged "prophetic" fate of the jewish people�sixth interview: dr. talmage takes the ground that the unrivalled circulation of the bible proves that it is inspired�forgets' that a scientific fact does not depend on the vote of numbers�names some christian millions�his arguments characterized as the poor-est, weakest, and best possible in support of the doctrine of inspira-tion�will god, in judging a man, take into consideration the cir-cumstances of that man's life?�satisfactory reasons for not believ ing that the bible is inspired. the talmagian catechism. the pith and marrow of what mr. talmage has been pleased to say, set forth in the form of a shorter catechism. a vindication of thomas paine. (1877.) letter to the new york observer�an offer to pay one thousand dollars in gold for proof that thomas paine or voltaire died in terror because of any religious opinions either had expressed� proposition to create a tribunal to hear the evidence�the ob-server, after having called upon col. ingersoll to deposit the money, and characterized his talk as "infidel 'buncombe,'" denies its own words, but attempts to prove them� its memory refreshed by col. ingersoll and the slander refuted�proof that paine did not recant -testimony of thomas nixon, daniel pelton, mr. jarvis, b. f. has-kin, dr. manley, amasa woodsworth, gilbert vale, philip graves, m. d., willet hicks, a. c. hankinson, john hogeboom, w. j. hilton, tames cheetham, revs. milledollar and cunningham, mrs. hedden, andrew a. dean, william carver,�the statements of mary roscoe and mary hindsdale examined�william cobbett's account of a call upon mary hinsdale�did thomas paine live the life of a drunken beast, and did he die a drunken, cowardly, and beastly death?�grant thorbum's charges examined�statement of the rev. j. d. wickham, d.d., shown to be utterly false�false witness of the rev. charles hawley, d.d.�w. h. ladd, james cheetham, and mary hinsdale�paine's note to cheetham�mr-staple, mr. purdy, col. john fellows, james wilburn, walter morton, clio rickman, judge herttell, h. margary, elihu palmer, mr. xv lovett, all these testified that paine was a temperate man�washington's letter to paine� thomas jefferson's�adams and washing-ton on "common sense"�-james monroe's tribute� quotations from paine�paine's estate and his will�the observer's second attack (p. 492): statements of elkana watson, william carver, rev. e. f. hatfield, d.d., james cheetham, dr. j. w. francis, dr. manley, bishop fenwick�ingersoll's second reply (p. 516): testimony garbled by the editor of the observer�mary roscoeand mary hins dale the same person�her reputation for veracity -letter from rev. a. w. cornell�grant thorburn exposed by james parton�the observer's admission that paine did not recant�affidavit of william b. barnes. volume vi.--discussions detailed contents of volume vi. the christian religion; ingersoll's opening paper the christian religion, by jeremiah s. black. the christian religion, by robert g. ingersoll. faith or agnosticism. the field-ingersoll discussion. a reply to the rev. henry m. field, d.d. a last word to robert g. ingersoll letter to dr. field. controversy on christianty col. ingersoll to mr. gladstone. rome or reason. the church its own witness, by cardinal manning. rome or reason: a reply to cardinal manning. is divorce wrong? divorce. is corporal punishment degrading? detailed contents of volume vi. the christian religion; ingersoll's opening paper (1881.) i. col. ingersoll's opening paper�statement of the fundamental truths of christianity�reasons for thinking that portions of the old testament are the product of a barbarous people�passages upholding slavery, polygamy, war, and religious persecution not evidences of inspiration�if the words are not inspired, what is?�commands of jehovah compared with the precepts of pagans and stoics�epictetus, cicero, zeno, seneca, brahma�ii. the new testament�why were four gospels necessary?�salvation by belief�the doctrine of the atonement�the jewish system culminating in the sacrifice of christ�except for the crucifixion of her son, the virgin mary would be among the lost�what christ must have known would follow the acceptance of his teachings�the wars of sects, the inquisition, the fields of death�why did he not forbid it all?�the little that he revealed�the dogma of eternal punishment�upon love's breast the church has placed the eternal asp�iii. the "inspired" writers�why did not god furnish every nation with a bible? ii. judge black's reply�his duty that of a policeman�the church not in danger�classes who break out into articulate blasphemy�the sciolist�personal remarks about col. ingersoll�chief-justice gibson of pennsylvania quoted�we have no jurisdiction or capacity to rejudge the justice of god�the moral code of the bible�civil government of the jews�no standard of justice without belief in a god�punishments for blasphemy and idolatry defended�wars of conquest�allusion to col. ingersoll's war record�slavery among the jews�polygamy discouraged by the mosaic constitution�jesus of nazareth and the establishment of his religion�acceptance of christianity and adjudication upon its divinity�the evangelists and their depositions�the fundamental truths of christianity�persecution and triumph of the church�ingersoll's propositions compressed and the compressions answered�salvation as a reward of belief�punishment of unbelief�the second birth, atonement, redemption, non-resistance, excessive punishment of sinners, christ and persecution, christianity and freedom of thought, sufficiency of the gospel, miracles, moral effect of christianity. iii. col. ingersoll's rejoinder�how this discussion came about�natural law�the design argument�the right to rejudge the justice even of a god�violation of the commandments by jehovah�religious intolerance of the old testament�judge black's justification of wars of extermination�his defence of slavery�polygamy not "discouraged" by the old testament�position of woman under the jewish system and under that of the ancients�a "policeman's" view of god�slavery under jehovah and in egypt�the admission that jehovah gave no commandment against polygamy�the learned and wise crawl back in cribs�alleged harmony of old and new testaments�on the assertion that the spread of christianity proves the supernatural origin of the gospel�the argument applicable to all religions�communications from angels ana gods�authenticity of the statements of the evangelists�three important manuscripts�rise of mormonism�ascension of christ�the great public events alleged as fundamental truths of christianity�judge black's system of "compression"�"a metaphysical question"�right and wrong�justice�christianity and freedom of thought�heaven and hell�production of god and the devil�inspiration of the bible dependent on the credulity of the reader�doubt of miracles�the world before christ's advent�respect for the man christ�the dark ages�institutions of mercy�civil law. the field-ingersoll discussion. (1887.) an open letter to robert g. ingersoll�superstitions�basis of religion�napoleon's question about the stars�the idea of god�crushing out hope�atonement, regeneration, and future retribution�socrates and jesus�the language of col. ingersoll characterized as too sweeping�the sabbath�but a step from sneering at religion to sneering at morality. a reply to the rev. henry m. field, d. d.�honest differences of opinion�charles darwin�dr. field's distinction between superstition and religion�the presbyterian god an infinite torquemada�napoleon's sensitiveness to the divine influence�the preference of agassiz�the mysterious as an explanation�the certainty that god is not what he is thought to be�self-preservation the fibre of society�did the assassination of lincoln illustrate the justice of god's judgments?�immortality�hope and the presbyterian creed�to a mother at the grave of her son�theological teaching of forgiveness�on eternal retribution�jesus and mohammed�attacking the religion of others�ananias and sapphira�the pilgrims and freedom to worship�the orthodox sabbath�natural restraints on conduct�religion and morality�the efficacy of prayer�respect for belief of father and mother�the "power behind nature"�survival of the fittest�the saddest fact�"sober second thought." a last word to robert g. ingersoll, by dr. field�god not a presbyterian�why col. ingersoll's attacks on religion are resented�god is more merciful than man�theories about the future life�retribution a necessary part of the divine law�the case of robinson crusoe�irresistible proof of design�col. ingersoll's view of immortality�an almighty friend. letter to dr. field�the presbyterian god�what the presbyterians claim�the "incurably bad"�responsibility for not seeing things clearly�good deeds should follow even atheists�no credit in belief�design argument that devours itself�belief as a foundation of social order�no consolation in orthodox religion�the "almighty friend" and the slave mother�a hindu prayer�calvinism�christ not the supreme benefactor of the race. colonel ingersoll on christianity. (1888.) some remarks on his reply to dr. field by the hon. wm. e. gladstone�external triumph and prosperity of the church�a truth half stated�col. ingersoll's tumultuous method and lack of reverential calm�jephthah's sacrifice�hebrews xii expounded�the case of abraham�darwinism and the scriptures�why god demands sacrifices of man�problems admitted to be insoluble�relation of human genius to human greatness�shakespeare and others�christ and the family relation�inaccuracy of reference in the reply�ananias and sapphira�the idea of immortality�immunity of error in belief from moral responsibility�on dishonesty in the formation of opinion�a plausibility of the shallowest kind�the system of thuggism�persecution for opinion's sake�riding an unbroken horse. col. ingersoll to mr. gladstone�on the "impaired" state of the human constitution�unbelief not due to degeneracy�objections to the scheme of redemption�does man deserve only punishment?�"reverential calm"�the deity of the ancient jews�jephthah and abraham�relation between darwinism and the inspiration of the scriptures�sacrifices to the infinite�what is common sense?�an argument that will defend every superstition�the greatness of shakespeare�the absolute indissolubility of marriage�is the religion of christ for this age?�as to ananias and sapphira�immortality and people of low intellectual development�can we control our thought?�dishonest opinions cannot be formed�some compensations for riding an "unbroken horse." rome or reason. (1888.) "the church its own witness," by cardinal manning�evidence that christianity is of divine origin�the universality of the church�natural causes not sufficient to account for the catholic church�-the world in which christianity arose�birth of christ�from st peter to leo xiii.�the first effect of christianity�domestic life's second visible effect�redemption of woman from traditional degradation�change wrought by christianity upon the social, political and international relations of the world�proof that christianity is of divine origin and presence�st. john and the christian fathers�sanctity of the church not affected by human sins. a reply to cardinal manning�i. success not a demonstration of either divine origin or supernatural aid�cardinal manning's argument more forcible in the mouth of a mohammedan�why churches rise and flourish�mormonism�alleged universality of the catholic church�its "inexhaustible fruitfulness" in good things�the inquisition and persecution�not invincible�its sword used by spain�its unity not unbroken�the state of the world when christianity was established�the vicar of christ�a selection from draper's "history of the intellectual development of europe"�some infamous popes�part ii. how the pope speaks�religions older than catholicism and having the same rites and sacraments�is intellectual stagnation a demonstration of divine origin?�integration and disintegration�the condition of the world 300 years ago�the creed of catholicism�the "one true god" with a knowledge of whom catholicism has "filled the world"�did the catholic church overthrow idolatry?�marriage�celibacy�human passions�the cardinal's explanation of jehovah's abandonment of the children of men for four thousand years�catholicism tested by paganism�canon law and convictions had under it�rival popes�importance of a greek "inflection"�the cardinal witnesses. is divorce wrong? (1889.) preface by the editor of the north american review�introduction, by the rev. s. w. dike, ll. d.�a catholic view by cardinal gibbons�divorce as regarded by the episcopal church, by bishop, henry c. potter�four questions answered, by robert g. ingersoll. divorce. reply to cardinal gibbons�indissolubility of marriage a reaction from polygamy�biblical marriage�polygamy simultaneous and successive�marriage and divorce in the light of experience�reply to bishop potter�reply to mr. gladstone�justice bradley�senator dolph�the argument continued in colloquial form�dialogue between cardinal gibbons and a maltreated wife�she asks the advice of mr. gladstone�the priest who violated his vow�absurdity of the divorce laws of some states. reply to dr. lyman abbott. (1890) dr. abbott's equivocations�crimes punishable by death under mosaic and english law�severity of moses accounted for by dr. abbott�the necessity for the acceptance of christianity�christians should be glad to know that the bible is only the work of man and that the new testament life of christ is untrue�all the good commandments, known to the world thousands of years before moses�human happiness of more consequence than the truth about god�the appeal to great names�gladstone not the greatest statesman�what the agnostic says�the magnificent mistakes of genesis�the story of joseph�abraham as a "self-exile for conscience's sake." reply to archdeacon farrar. (1890.) revelation as an appeal to man's "spirit"�what is spirit and what is "spiritual intuition"?�the archdeacon in conflict with st. paul�ii. the obligation to believe without evidence�iii. ignorant credulity�iv. a definition of orthodoxy�v. fear not necessarily cowardice�prejudice is honest�the ola has the advantage in an argument�st. augustine�jerome�the appeal to charlemagne�roger bacon�lord bacon a defender of the copernican system�the difficulty of finding out what great men believed�names irrelevantly cited�bancroft on the hessians�original manuscripts of the bible�vi. an infinite personality a contradiction in terms�vii. a beginningless being�viii. the cruelties of nature not to be harmonized with the goodness of a deity�sayings from the indian�origen, st. augustine, dante, aquinas. is corporal punishment degrading? (1890.) a reply to the dean of st. paul�growing confidence in the power of kindness�crimes against soldiers and sailors�misfortunes punished as crimes�the dean's voice raised in favor of the brutalities of the past�beating of children�of wives�dictum of solomon. volume vii.--discussions detailed contents of volume vii. my reviewers reviewed. my chicago bible class. to the indianapolis clergy. the brooklyn divines. the limitations of toleration. a christmas sermon. suicide of judge normile. is suicide a sin? is avarice triumphant? a reply to the cincinnati gazette and catholic telegraph. an interview on chief justice comegys. a reply to rev. drs. thomas and lorimer. a reply to rev. john hall and warner van norden. a reply to the rev. dr. plumb. a reply to the new york clergy on superstition. detailed contents of volume vii. my reviewers reviewed. (1877.) answer to san francisco clergymen�definition of liberty, physical and mental�the right to compel belief�woman the equal of man�the ghosts�immortality�slavery�witchcraft�aristocracy of the air�unfairness of clerical critics�force and matter�doctrine of negation�confident deaths of murderers�childhood scenes returned to by the dying�death-bed of voltaire�thomas paine�the first sectarians were heretics�reply to rev. mr. guard�slaughter of the canaanites�reply to rev. samuel robinson�protestant persecutions�toleration�infidelity and progress�the occident�calvinism�religious editors�reply to the rev. mr. ijams�does the bible teach man to enslave his brothers?�reply to california christian advocate�self-government of french people at and since the revolution�on the site of the bastile�french peasant's cheers for jesus christ�was the world created in six days�geology�what is the astronomy of the bible?�the earth the centre of the universe�joshua's miracle�change of motion into heat�geography and astronomy of cosmas�does the bible teach the existence of that impossible crime called witchcraft?�saul and the woman of endor�familiar spirits�demonology of the new testament�temptation of jesus�possession by devils�gadarene swine story�test of belief�bible idea of the rights of children�punishment of the rebellious son�jephthah's vow and sacrifice�persecution of job�the gallantry of god�bible idea of the rights of women�paul's instructions to wives�permission given to steal wives�does the bible sanction polygamy and concubinage?�does the bible uphold and justify political tyranny?�powers that be ordained of god�religious liberty of god�sun-worship punishable with death�unbelievers to be damned�does the bible describe a god of mercy?�massacre commanded�eternal punishment taught in the new testament�the plan of salvation�fall and atonement moral bankruptcy�other religions�parsee sect�brahmins�confucians�heretics and orthodox. my chicago bible class. (1879.) rev. robert collyer�inspiration of the scriptures�rev. dr. thomas�formation of the old testament�rev. dr. kohler�rev. mr. herford�prof. swing�rev. dr. ryder. to the indianapolis clergy. (1882.) rev. david walk�character of jesus�two or three christs described in the gospels�christ's change of opinions�gospels later than the epistles�divine parentage of christ a late belief�the man christ probably a historical character�jesus belittled by his worshipers�he never claimed to be divine�christ's omissions�difference between christian and other modern civilizations�civilization not promoted by religion�inventors�french and american civilization: how produced�intemperance and slavery in christian nations�advance due to inventions and discoveries�missionaries�christian nations preserved by bayonet and ball�dr. t. b. taylor�origin of life on this planet�sir william thomson�origin of things undiscoverable�existence after death�spiritualists�if the dead return�our calendar�christ and christmas-the existence of pain�plato's theory of evil�will god do better in another world than he does in this?�consolation�life not a probationary stage�rev. d.o'donaghue�the case of archibald armstrong and jonathan newgate�inequalities of life�can criminals live a contented life?�justice of the orthodox god illustrated. the brooklyn divines. (1883.) are the books of atheistic or infidel writers extensively read?�increase in the number of infidels�spread of scientific literature�rev. dr. eddy�rev. dr. hawkins�rev. dr. haynes�rev. mr. pullman�rev. mr. foote�rev. mr. wells�rev. dr. van dyke�rev. carpenter�rev. mr. reed�rev. dr. mcclelland�ministers opposed to discussion�whipping children�worldliness as a foe of the church�the drama�human love�fires, cyclones, and other afflictions as promoters of spirituality�class distinctions�rich and poor�aristocracies�the right to choose one's associates�churches social affairs�progress of the roman catholic church�substitutes for the churches�henry ward beecher�how far education is favored by the sects�rivals of the pulpit�christianity now and one hundred years ago�french revolution produced by the priests�why the revolution was a failure�infidelity of one hundred years ago�ministers not more intellectual than a century ago�great preachers of the past�new readings of old texts�clerical answerers of infidelity�rev. dr. baker�father fransiola�faith and reason�democracy of kindness�moral instruction�morality born of human needs�the conditions of happiness�the chief end of man. the limitations of toleration. (1888.) discussion between col. robert g. ingersoll, hon. frederic r. coudert, and ex-gov. stewart l. woodford before the nineteenth century club of new york�propositions�toleration not a disclaimer but a waiver of the right to persecute�remarks of courtlandt palmer�no responsibility for thought�intellectual hospitality�right of free speech�origin of the term "toleration"�slander and false witness�nobody can control his own mind: anecdote�remarks of mr. coudert�voltaire, rousseau, hugo, and ingersoll�general woodford's speech�reply by colonel ingersoll�a catholic compelled to pay a compliment to voltaire�responsibility for thoughts�the mexican unbeliever and his reception in the other country. a christmas sermon. (1891.) christianity's message of grief�christmas a pagan festival�reply to dr. buckley�charges by the editor of the christian advocate�the tidings of christianity�in what the message of grief consists�fear and flame�an everlasting siberia�dr. buckley's proposal to boycott the telegram�reply to rev. j. m. king and rev. thomas dixon, jr. cana day be blasphemed?�hurting christian feelings�for revenue only what is blasphemy?�balaam's ass wiser than the prophet�the universalists�can god do nothing for this world?�the universe a blunder if christianity is true�the duty of a newspaper�facts not sectarian�the rev. mr. peters�what infidelity has done�public school system not christian�orthodox universities�bruno on oxford�as to public morals�no rewards or punishments in the universe�the atonement immoral�as to sciences and art�bruno, humboldt, darwin�scientific writers opposed by the church�as to the liberation of slaves�as to the reclamation of inebriates�rum and religion�the humanity of infidelity�what infidelity says to the dying�the battle continued�morality not assailed by an attack on christianity�the inquisition and religious persecution�human nature derided by christianity�dr. dacosta�"human brotherhood" as exemplified by the history of the church�the church and science, art and learning��astronomy's revenge�galileo and kepler�mrs. browning: science thrust into the brain of europe�our numerals�christianity and literature�institution's of learning�stephen girard�james lick�our chronology�historians�natural philosophy�philology�metaphysical research�intelligence, hindoo, egyptian�inventions�john ericsson�emancipators�rev. mr. ballou�the right of goa to punish�rev. dr. hillier�rev. mr. haldeman�george a. locey�the "great physician"�rev. mr. talmage�rev. j. benson hamilton�how voltaire died�the death-bed of thomas paine�rev. mr. holloway�original sin�rev. dr. tyler�the good samaritan a heathen�hospitals and asylums�christian treatment of the insane�rev. dr. buckley�the north american review discussion�judge black, dr. field, mr. gladstone�circulation of obscene literature�eulogy of whiskey�eulogy of tobacco�human stupidity that defies the gods�rev. charles deems�jesus a believer in a personal devil�the man christ. suicide of judge normile. (1892.) reply to the western watchman�henry d'arcy�peter's prevarication-some excellent pagans-heartlessness of a catholic�wishes do not affect the judgment�devout robbers�penitent murderers�reverential drunkards�luther's distich�judge normile�self-destruction. is suicide a sin? (1894.) col. ingersoll's first letter in the new york world�under what circumstances a man has the right to take his own life�medicine and the decrees of god�case of the betrayed girl�suicides not cowards�suicide under roman law�many suicides insane�insanity caused by religion�the law against suicide cruel and idiotic�natural and sufficient cause for self-destruction�christ's death a suicide�col. ingersoll's reply to his critics�is suffering the work of god?�it is not man's duty to endure hopeless suffering�when suicide is justifiable�the inquisition�alleged cowardice of suicides�propositions demonstrated�suicide the foundation of the christian religion�redemption and atonement�the clergy on infidelity and suicide�morality and unbelief�better injure yourself than another�misquotation by opponents�cheerful view the best�the wonder is that men endure�suicide a sin (interview in the new york journal)�causes of suicide�col. ingersoll does not advise suicide�suicides with tracts or bibles in their pockets�suicide a sin (interview in the new york herald)�comments on rev. alerle st. croix wright's sermon�suicide and sanity (interview in the york world)�as to the cowardice of suicide�germany and the prevalence of suicide�killing of idiots and defective infants�virtue, morality, and religion. is avarice triumphant? (1891.) reply to general rush hawkins' article, "brutality and avarice triumphant"�croakers and prophets of evil�medical treatment for believers in universal evil�alleged fraud in army contracts�congressional extravagance�railroad "wreckers"�how stockholders in some roads lost their money�the star-route trials�timber and public lands�watering stock�the formation of trusts�unsafe hotels: european game and singing birds�seal fisheries�cruelty to animals�our indians�sensible and manly patriotism�days of brutality�defence of slavery by the websters, bentons, and clays�thirty years' accomplishment�ennobling influence of war for the right�the lady ana the brakeman�american esteem of honesty in business�republics do not tend to official corruption�this the best country in the world. a reply to the cincinnati gazette and catholic telegraph. (1878.) defence of the lecture on moses�how biblical miracles are sought to be proved�some non sequiturs�a grammatical criticism�christianity destructive of manners�cuvier and agassiz on mosaic cosmogony�clerical advance agents�christian threats and warnings�catholicism the upas tree�hebrew scholarship as a qualification for deciding probababilities �contradictions and mistranslations of the bible�number of errors in the scriptures�the sunday question. an interview on chief justice comegys. (1881.) charged with blasphemy in the state of delaware�can a conditionless deity be injured?�injustice the only blasphemy�the lecture in delaware�laws of that state�all sects in turn charged with blasphemy�heresy consists in making god better than he is thought to be�a fatal biblical passage�judge comegys�wilmington preachers�states with laws against blasphemy�no danger of infidel mobs�no attack on the state of delaware contemplated�comegys a resurrection�grand jury's refusal to indict�advice about the cutting out of heretics' tongues�objections to the whipping-post�mr. bergh's bill�one remedy for wife-beating. a reply to rev. drs. thomas and lorimer. (1882.) solemnity�charged with being insincere�irreverence�old testament better than the new�"why hurt our feelings?"�involuntary action of the brain�source of our conceptions of space�good and bad�right and wrong�the minister, the horse and the lord's prayer�men responsible for their actions�the "gradual" theory not applicable to the omniscient�prayer powerless to alter results�religious persecution�orthodox ministers made ashamed of their creed�purgatory�infidelity and baptism contrasted�modern conception of the universe�the golden bridge of life�"the only salutation"�the test for admission to heaven�"scurrility." a reply to rev. john hall and warner van norden. (1892.) dr. hall has no time to discuss the subject of starving workers�cloakmakers' strike�warner van norden of the church extension society�the uncharitableness of organized charity�defence of the cloakmakers�life of the underpaid�on the assertion that assistance encourages idleness and crime�the man without pity an intellectual beast�tendency of prosperity to breed selfishness�thousands idle without fault�egotism of riches�van norden's idea of happiness�the worthy poor. a reply to the rev. dr. plumb. (1898.) interview in a boston paper�why should a minister call this a "poor" world?�would an infinite god make people who need a redeemer?�gospel gossip�christ's sayings repetitions�the philosophy of confucius�rev. mr. mills�the charge of "robbery"�the divine plan. a reply to the new york clergy on superstition. (1898.) interview in the new york journal�rev. roberts. macarthur�a personal devil�devils who held conversations with christ not simply personifications of evil�the temptation�the "man of straw"�christ's mission authenticated by the casting out of devils�spain�god responsible for the actions of man�rev. dr. j. lewis parks�rev. dr. e. f. moldehnke�patience amidst the misfortunes of others�yellow fever as a divine agent�the doctrine that all is for the best�rev. mr. hamlin�why did god create a successful rival?�a compliment by the rev. mr. belcher�rev. w. c. buchanan�no argument old until it is answered�why should god create sentient beings to be damned?�rev. j. w. campbell�rev. henry frank�rev. e. c.j. kraeling on christ and the devil�would he make a world like this? volume viii.--interviews interviews the bible and a future life mrs. van cott, the revivalist european trip and greenback question the pre-millennial conference. the solid south and resumption. the sunday laws of pittsburg.* political and religious. politics and gen. grant politics, religion and thomas paine. reply to chicago critics. the republican victory. ingersoll and beecher.* political. religion in politics. miracles and immortality. the political outlook. mr. beecher, moses and the negro. hades, delaware and freethought. a reply to the rev. mr. lansing.* beaconsfield, lent and revivals. answering the new york ministers.* guiteau and his crime.* district suffrage. funeral of john g. mills and immortality.* star route and politics.* the interviewer. politics and prohibition. the republican defeat in ohio. the civil rights bill. justice harlan and the civil rights bill. politics and theology. morality and immortality. politics, mormonism and mr. beecher free trade and christianity. the oath question. wendell phillips, fitz john porter and bismarck. general subjects. reply to kansas city clergy. swearing and affirming. reply to a buffalo critic. blasphemy.* politics and british columbia. ingersoll catechised. blaine's defeat. blaine's defeat. plagiarism and politics. religious prejudice. cleveland and his cabinet. religion, prohibition, and gen. grant. hell or sheol and other subjects. interviewing, politics and spiritualism. my belief. some live topics. the president and senate. atheism and citizenship. the labor question. railroads and politics. prohibition. henry george and labor. labor question and socialism. henry george and socialism. reply to the rev. b. f. morse.* ingersoll on mcglynn. trial of the chicago anarchists. the stage and the pulpit. roscoe conkling. the church and the stage. protection and free trade. labor, and tariff reform. cleveland and thurman. the republican platform of 1888. james g. blaine and politics. the mills bill. society and its criminals* woman's right to divorce. secularism. summer recreation�mr. gladstone. prohibition. robert elsmere. working girls. protection for american actors. liberals and liberalism. pope leo xiii. the sacredness of the sabbath. the west and south. the westminster creed and other subjects. shakespeare and bacon. growing old gracefully, and presbyterianism. creeds. the tendency of modern thought. woman suffrage, horse racing, and money. missionaries. my belief and unbelief.* must religion go? word painting and college education. personal magnetism and the sunday question. authors. inebriety.* miracles, theosophy and spiritualism. tolstoy and literature. woman in politics. spiritualism. plays and players. woman. strikes, expansion and other subjects. sunday a day of pleasure. the parliament of religions. cleveland's hawaiian policy. orators and oratory.* catholicism and protestantism. the pope, the a. p. a., agnosticism woman and her domain. professor swing. senator sherman and his book.* reply to the christian endeavorers. spiritualism. a little of everything. is life worth living�christian science and politics. vivisection. divorce. music, newspapers, lynching and arbitration. a visit to shaw's garden. the venezuelan boundary discussion and the whipping-post. colonel shepard's stage horses.* a reply to the rev. l. a. banks. cuba�zola and theosophy. how to become an orator. john russell young and expansion. psychical research and the bible.* this century's glories. capital punishment and the whipping-post. expansion and trusts.* volume ix.--political detailed contents of volume ix. an address to the colored people. speech at indianapolis. centennial oration. bangor speech. cooper union speech, new york. indianapolis speech. chicago speech. eight to seven address. hard times and the way out. suffrage address. wall street speech. brooklyn speech. address to the 86th illinois regiment. decoration day oration. decoration day address. ratification speech. reunion address. the chicago and new york gold speech. detailed contents of volume ix. an address to the colored people. (1867.) slavery and its justification by law and religion�its destructive influence upon nations�inauguration of the modern slave trade by the portuguese gonzales�planted upon american soil�the abolitionists, clarkson, wilberforce, and others�the struggle in england�pioneers in san domingo, oge and chevannes�early op-posers of slavery in america�william lloyd garrison�wendell phillips, charles sumner, john brown�the fugitive slave law�the emancipation proclamation�dread of education in the south�advice to the colored people. indianapolis speech. (1868.) suspension of the writ of habeas corpus�precedent established by the revolutionary fathers�committees of safety appointed by the continental congress�arrest of disaffected persons in pennsylvania and delaware�interference with elections�resolution of continental congress with respect to citizens who opposed the sending of deputies to the convention of new york�penalty for refusing to take continental money or pray for the american cause�habeas corpus suspended during the revolution�interference with freedom of the press�negroes freed and allowed to fight in the continental army�crispus attacks�an abolition document issued by andrew jackson�majority rule�slavery and the rebellion�tribute to general grant. speech nominating blaine. (1876.) note descriptive of the occasion�demand of the republicans of the united states�resumption�the plumed knight. centennial oration. (1876.) one hundred years ago, our fathers retired the gods from politics�the declaration of independence�meaning of the declaration�the old idea of the source of political power�our fathers educated by their surroundings�the puritans�universal religious toleration declared by the catholics of maryland�roger williams�not all of our fathers in favor of independence�fortunate difference in religious views�secular government�authority derived from the people�the declaration and the beginning of the war�what they fought for�slavery�results of a hundred years of freedom�the declaration carried out in letter and spirit. bangor speech. (1876.) the hayes campaign�reasons for voting the republican ticket�abolition of slavery�preservation of the union�reasons for not trusting the democratic party�record of the republican party�democrats assisted the south�paper money�enfranchisement of the negroes�samuel j. tilden�his essay on finance. cooper union speech, new york. (1876.) all citizens stockholders in the united states of america�the democratic party a hungry organization�political parties contrasted�the fugitive slave law a disgrace to hell in its palmiest days�feelings of the democracy hurt on the subject of religion�defence of slavery in a resolution of the presbyterians, south�state of the union at the time the republican party was born�jacob thompson�the national debt�protection of citizens abroad�tammany hall: its relation to the penitentiary�the democratic party of new york city�"what hands!"�free schools. indianapolis speech. (1876.) address to the veteran soldiers of the rebellion�objections to the democratic party�the men who have been democrats�why i am a republican�free labor and free thought�a vision of war�democratic slander of the greenback�shall the people who saved the country rule it?�on finance�government cannot create money�the greenback dollar a mortgage upon the country�guarantees that the debt will be paid-'the thoroughbred and the mule�the column of july, paris�the misleading guide board, the dismantled mill, and the place where there had been a hotel, chicago speech. (1876.) the plea of "let bygones be bygones"�passport of the democratic party�right of the general government to send troops into southern states for the protection of colored people�abram s. hewitt's congratulatory letter to the negroes�the demand for inflation of the currency�record of rutherford b. hayes�contrasted with samuel j. tilden�merits of the republican party�negro and southern white�the superior man�"no nation founded upon injustice can permanently stand." eight to seven address. (1877.) on the electoral commission�reminiscences of the hayes-tilden camp� constitution of the electoral college�characteristics of the members� frauds at the ballot box poisoning the fountain of power�reforms suggested�elections too frequent�the professional office-seeker�a letter on civil service reform�young men advised against government clerkships�too many legislators and too much legislation�defect in the constitution as to the mode of electing a president�protection of citizens by state and general governments�the dual government in south carolina�ex-rebel key in the president's cabinet�implacables and bourbons south and north�"i extend to you each and all the olive branch of peace." hard times and the way out. (1878.) capital and labor�what is a capitalist?�the idle and the industrious artisans�no conflict between capital and labor�a period of inflation and speculation�life and fire insurance agents�business done on credit�the crash, failure, and bankruptcy�fall in the price of real estate a form of resumption�coming back to reality�definitions of money examined�not gold and silver but intelligent labor the measure of value�government cannot by law create wealth�a bill of fare not a dinner�fiat money�american honor pledged to the maintenance of the greenbacks�the cry against holders of bonds�criminals and vagabonds to be supported�duty of government to facilitate enterprise�more men must cultivate the soil�government aid for the overcoming of obstacles too great for individual enterprise�the palace builders the friends of labor�extravagance the best form of charity�useless to boost a man who is not climbing�the reasonable price for labor�the vagrant and his strange and winding path�what to tell the working men. suffrage address. (1880.) the right to vote�all women who desire the suffrage should have it�shall the people of the district of columbia manage their own affairs�their right to a representative in congress and an electoral vote�anomalous state of affairs at the capital of the republic�not the wealthy and educated alone should govern�the poor as trustworthy as the rich�strict registration laws needed. wall street speech. (1880.) obligation of new york to protect the best interests of the country�treason and forgery of the democratic party in its appeal to sword and pen�the one republican in the penitentiary of maine�the doctrine of state sovereignty�protection for american brain and muscle�hancock on the tariff�a forgery (the morey letter) committed and upheld�the character of james a. garfield. brooklyn speech. (1880.) introduced by henry ward beecher (note)�some patriotic democrats�freedom of speech north and south�an honest ballot� address to the 86th illinois regiment. decoration day oration. decoration day address. ratification speech. reunion address. the chicago and new york gold speech. volume x.--legal detailed contents of volume x. address to the jury in the munn trial. closing address to the jury in the first star route trial. opening address to the jury in the second star route trial. closing address in second star route trial address to the jury in the davis will case. argument before the vice-chancellor in the russell case. detailed contents of volume x. address to the jury in the munn trial. demoralization caused by alcohol�note from the chicago times�prejudice�review of the testimony of jacob rehm�perjury characterized�the defendant and the offence charged (p. 21)�testimony of golsen reviewed�rehm's testimony before the grand jury�good character (p. 29)�suspicion not evidence. closing address to the jury in the first star route trial. note from the washington capital�the assertion denied that we are a demoralized country and that our country is distinguished among the nations only for corruption�duties of jurors and duties of lawyers�section under which the indictment is found�cases cited to show that overt acts charged and also the crime itself must be proved as described�routes upon which indictments are based and overt acts charged (pp. 54-76)�routes on which the making of false claims is alleged�authorities on proofs of conspiracy (pp. 91-94)�examination of the evidence against stephen w. and john w. dorsey (pp. 96-117)�the corpus delicti in a case of conspiracy and the acts necessary to be done in order to establish conspiracy (pp. 120-123)�testimony of walsh and the confession of rerdell�extravagance in mail carrying (p. 128)�productiveness of mail routes (p. 131)�hypothesis of guilt and law of evidence�dangerous influence of suspicion�terrorizing the jury�the woman at her husband's side. opening address to the jury in the second star route trial. juries the bulwark of civil liberty�suspicion not evidence�brief statement of the case�john m. peck, john w. dorsey, stephen w. dorsey, john r. miner, mr. (a. e. ) boone (p.p. 150-156)�the clendenning bonds�miner's, peck's, and dorsey's bids�why they bid on cheap routes�number of routes upon which there are indictments�the arrangement between stephen w. dorsey and john r. miner�appearance of mr. vaile in the contracts�partnership formed�the routes divided�senator dorsey's course after getting the routes�his routes turned over to james w. bosler�profits of the business (p. 181)�the petitions for more mails�productive and unproductive post-offices�men who add to the wealth of the world�where the idea of the productiveness of post routes was hatched�cost of letters to recipients in 1843�the overland mail (p. 190)�loss in distributing the mail in the district of columbia and other territories�post-office the only evidence of national beneficence�profit and loss of mail carrying�orders antedated, and why�routes increased and expedited�additional bonds for additional trips�the charge that pay was received when the mail was not carried�fining on shares�subcontracts for less than the original contracts�pay on discontinued routes�alleged false affidavits�right of petition�reviewing the ground. closing address to the jury in the second star route trial. scheme of the indictment�story of the case�what constitutes fraudulent bidding�how a conspiracy must be proved�the hypothesis of guilt and law of evidence�conversation unsatisfactory evidence�fallibility of memory�proposition to produce mr. dorsey's books�interruption of the court to decide that primary evidence, having once been refused, can not afterwards be introduced to contradict secondary evidence�a defendant may not be presumed into the penitentiary�a decision by justice field�the right of petition�was there a conspiracy?�dorsey's benevolence (p. 250)�the chico springs letter�evidence of moore reviewed�mr. ker's defective memory�the informer system�testimony of rerdell reviewed�his letter to dorsey (p. 304)�the affidavit of rerdell and dorsey�petitions for faster time�uncertainty regarding handwriting�government should be incapable of deceit�rerdell's withdrawal of the plea of not guilty (p. 362)�informers, their immunity and evidence�nailing down the lid of rerdell's coffin�mistakes of messrs. ker and merrick and the court�letter of h. m. vaile to the sixth auditor�miner's letter to carey�miner, peck & co. to frank a. tuttle�answering points raised by mr. bliss (396 et seq.)�evidence regarding the payment of money by dorsey to brady�a. e. boone's testimony reviewed�secrecy of contractors regarding the amount of their bids�boone's partnership agreement with dorsey�explanation of bids in different names�omission of instructions from proposals (p. 450)�accusation that senator mitchell was the paid agent of the defendants�alleged sneers at things held sacred�what is a conspiracy?�the theory that there was a conspiracy�dorsey's alleged interest�the two affidavits in evidence�inquiry of general miles�why the defendant's books were not produced�tames w. bosler's testimony read (p. 500)�the court shown to be mistaken regarding a decision previously made (pp. 496-502)�no logic in abuse�charges against john w. miner�testimony of a. w. moore reviewed-the verdict predicted�the defendants in the case�what is left for the jury to say�remarks of messrs. henkle and davidge�the verdict. address to the jury in the davis will case. note from the anaconda standard�senator sander's warning to the jury not to be enticed by sinners�evidence, based on quality of handwriting, that davis did not write the will�evidence of the spelling�assertion that the will was forged�peculiarities of eddy's handwriting�holes in sconce's signature and reputation�his memory�business sagacity of davis�his alleged children�date of his death�testimony of mr. knight�ink used in writing the will�expert evidence�speechlessness of john a. davis�eddy's failure to take the stand�testimony of carruthers�relatives of sconce�mary ann davis's connections�the family tree�the signature of the will�what the evidence shows�duty and opportunity of the jury. argument before the vice-chancellor in the russell case. antenuptial waiving of dower by women�a case from illinois�at what age men and women cease to feel the tender flame�russell's bargain with mrs. russell�antenuptial contract and parole agreement�definition of "liberal provision "�the woman not bound by a contract made in ignorance of the facts�contract destroyed by deception. volume xi.--miscellany detailed contents of volume xi. address on the civil rights act. trial of c. b. reynolds for blasphemy. god in the constitution. a reply to bishop spalding. crimes against criminals. a wooden god. some interrogation points. art and morality. the divided household of faith. why am i an agnostic? huxley and agnosticism. ernest renan. tolstoï and "the kreutzer sonata." thomas paine. the three philanthropists. should the chinese be excluded? a word about education. what i want for christmas. fool friends. inspiration the truth of history. how to edit a liberal paper. secularism. criticism of "robert elsmere," "john ward, preacher," and "an african farm." the libel laws rev. dr. newton's sermon on a new religion. an essay on christmas. has freethought a constructive side? the improved man. eight hours must come. the jews. crumbling creeds. our schools. vivisection. the census enumerator's official catechism. the agnostic christmas spirituality. sumter's gun. what infidels have done. cruelty in the elmira reformatory. law's delay. the bigotry of colleges. a young man's chances to-day. science and sentiment. sowing and reaping. should infidels send their children to sunday school? what would you substitute for the bible as a moral guide? governor rollins' fast-day proclamation. a look backward and a prophecy. political morality. a few reasons for doubting the inspiration of the bible. detailed contents of volume xi. address on the civil rights act. introduction by frederick douglass("abou ben adhem")�decision of the united states supreme court pronouncing the civil rights act unconstitutional�limitations of judges�illusion destroyed by the decision in the dred scott case�mistake of our fathers in adopting the common law of england�the 13th amendment to the constitution quoted�the clause of the constitution upholding slavery�effect of this clause�definitions of a state by justice wilson and chief justice chase�effect of the thirteenth amendment�justice field on involuntary servitude�civil rights act quoted�definition of the word servitude by the supreme court�obvious purpose of the amendment�justice miller on the 14th amendment�citizens created by this amendment�opinion of justice field�rights and immunities guaranteed by the constitution�opinion delivered by chief-justice waite�further opinions of courts on the question of citizenship�effect of the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments�"corrective" legislation by congress�denial of equal "social" privileges�is a state responsible for the action of its agent when acting contrary to law?�the word "state" must include the people of the state as well as the officers of the state�the louisiana civil rights law, and a case tried under it�uniformity of duties essential to the carrier�congress left powerless to protect rights conferred by the constitution�definition of "appropriate legislation"�propositions laid down regarding the sovereignty of the state, the powers of the general government, etc.�a tribute to justice harlan�a denial that property exists by virtue of law�civil rights not a question of social equality�considerations upon which social equality depends�liberty not a question of social equality�the superior man�inconsistencies of the past�no reason why we should hate the colored people�the issues that are upon us. trial of c. b. reynolds for blasphemy. address to the jury. report of the case from the new york times (note)�the right to express opinions�attempts to rule the minds of men by force�liberty the greatest good�intellectual hospitality defined�when the catholic church had power�advent of the protestants�the puritans, quakers. unitarians, universalists�what is blasphemy?�why this trial should not have taken place�argument cannot be put in jail�the constitution of new jersey�a higher law than men can make�the blasphemy statute quoted and discussed�is the statute constitutional?�the harm done by blasphemy laws�the meaning of this persecution�religions are ephemeral�let us judge each other by our actions�men who have braved public opinion should be honored�the blasphemy law if enforced would rob the world of the results of scientific research�it declares the great men of to-day to be criminals�the indictment read and commented upon�laws that go to sleep�obsolete dogmas the denial of which was once punished by death�blasphemy characterized�on the argument that blasphemy endangers the public peace�a definition of real blasphemy�trials for blasphemy in england�the case of abner kneeland�true worship, prayer, and religion�what is holy and sacred�what is claimed in this case�for the honor of the state�the word liberty�result of the trial (note). god in the constitution. the feudal system�office and purpose of our constitution�which god shall we select?�the existence of any god a matter of opinion�what is entailed by a recognition of a god in the constitution�can the infinite be flattered with a constitutional amendment?�this government is secular�the government of god a failure�the difference between the theological and the secular spirit�a nation neither christian nor infidel�the priest no longer a necessity�progress of science and the development of the mind. a reply to bishop spalding. on god in the constitution�why the constitutional convention ignored the question of religion�the fathers misrepresented�reasons why the attributes of god should not form an organic part of the law of the land�the effect of a clause recognizing god. crimes against criminals. the three pests of a community�i. forms of punishment and torture�more crimes committed than prevented by governments�ii. are not vices transmitted by nature?�111. is it possible for all people to be honest?�children of vice as the natural product of society�statistics: the relation between insanity, pauperism, and crime�iv. the martyrs of vice�franklin's interest in the treatment of prisoners�v. kindness as a remedy�condition of the discharged prisoner�vi. compensation for convicts�vii. professional criminals�shall the nation take life?�influence of public executions on the spectators�lynchers for the most part criminals at heart�viii. the poverty of the many a perpetual menace�limitations of land-holding.�ix. defective education by our schools�hands should be educated as well as head�conduct improved by a clearer perception of consequences�x. the discipline of the average prison hardening and degrading�while society cringes before great thieves there will be little ones to fill the jails�xi. our ignorance should make us hesitate. a wooden god. on christian and chinese worship�report of the select committee on chinese immigration�the only true god as contrasted with joss�sacrifices to the "living god"�messrs. wright, dickey, o'connor and murch on the "religious system" of the american union�how to prove that christians are better than heathens�injustice in the name of god�an honest merchant the best missionary�a few extracts from confucius�the report proves that the wise men of china who predicted that christians could not be trusted were not only philosophers but prophets. some interrogation points. a new party and its purpose�the classes that exist in every country�effect of education on the common people�wants increased by intelligence�the dream of 1776�the monopolist and the competitor�the war between the gould and mackay cables�competition between monopolies�all advance in legislation made by repealing laws�wages and values not to be fixed by law�men and machines�the specific of the capitalist: economy�the poor man and woman devoured by their fellow-men�socialism one of the worst possible forms of slavery�liberty not to be exchanged for comfort�will the workers always give their earnings for the useless?�priests, successful frauds, and robed impostors. art and morality. the origin of man's thoughts�the imaginative man�"medicinal view" of poetry�rhyme and religion�the theological poets and their purpose in writing�moral poets and their "unwelcome truths"�the really passionate are the virtuous�difference between the nude and the naked�morality the melody of conduct�the inculcation of moral lessons not contemplated by artists or great novelists�mistaken reformers�art not a sermon�language a multitude of pictures�great pictures and great statues painted and chiseled with words�mediocrity moral from a necessity which it calls virtue�why art civilizes�the nude�the venus de milo�this is art. the divided household of faith. the way in which theological seminaries were endowed�religious guide-boards�vast interests interwoven with creeds�pretensions of christianity�kepler's discovery of his three great laws�equivocations and evasions of the church�nature's testimony against the bible�the age of man on the earth�"inspired" morality of the bible�miracles�christian dogmas�what the church has been compelled to abandon�the appeal to epithets, hatred and punishment�"spirituality" the last resource of the orthodox�what is it to be spiritual?�two questions for the defenders of orthodox creeds. why am i an agnostic? part i. inharmony of nature and the lot of man with the goodness and wisdom of a supposed deity�why a creator is imagined�difficulty of the act of creation�belief in supernatural beings�belief and worship among savages�questions of origin and destiny�progress impossible without change of belief�circumstances determining belief�how may the true religion be ascertained?�prosperity of nations nor virtue of individuals dependent on religions or gods�uninspired books superior�part ii. the christian religion�credulity�miracles cannot be established�effect of testimony�miraculous qualities of all religions�theists and naturalists�the miracle of inspiration�how can the alleged fact of inspiration be established?�god's work and man's�rewards for falsehood offered by the church. huxley and agnosticism. statement by the principal of king's college�on the irrelevancy of a lack of scientific knowledge�difference between the agnostic and the christian not in knowledge but in credulity�the real name of an agnostic said to be "infidel"�what an infidel is�"unpleasant" significance of the word�belief in christ�"our lord and his apostles" possibly honest men�their character not invoked�possession by evil spirits�professor huxley's candor and clearness�the splendid dream of auguste comte�statement of the positive philosophy�huxley and harrison. ernest renan. his rearing and his anticipated biography�the complex character of the christ of the gospels�regarded as a man by renan�the sin against the holy ghost�renan on the gospels�no evidence that they were written by the men whose names they bear�written long after the events they describe�metaphysics of the church found in the gospel of john�not apparent why four gospels should have been written�regarded as legendary biographies�in "flagrant contradiction one with another"�the divine origin of christ an after-growth�improbable that he intended to form a church�renan's limitations�hebrew scholarship�his "people of israel"�his banter and blasphemy. tolstoy and "the kreutzer sonata." tolstoy's belief and philosophy�his asceticism�his view of human love�purpose of "the kreutzer sonata"�profound difference between the love of men and that of women�tolstoy cannot now found a religion, but may create the necessity for another asylum�the emotions�the curious opinion dried apples have of fruit upon the tree�impracticability of selling all and giving to the poor�love and obedience�unhappiness in the marriage relation not the fault of marriage. thomas paine. life by moncure d. conway�early advocacy of reforms against dueling and cruelty to animals�the first to write "the united states of america"�washington's sentiment against separation from great britain�paine's thoughts in the declaration of independence�author of the first proclamation of emancipation in america�establishment of a fund for the relief of the army�h's "farewell address"�the "rights of man"�elected to the french convention�efforts to save the life of the king�his thoughts on religion�arrested�the "age of reason" and the weapons it has furnished "advanced theologians"�neglect by gouverneur morris and washington�james monroe's letter to paine and to the committee of general safety�the vaunted religious liberty of colonial maryland�orthodox christianity at the beginning of the 19th century�new definitions of god�the funeral of paine. the three philanthropists. i. mr. a., the professional philanthropist, who established a colony for the enslavement of the poor who could not take care of themselves, amassed a large fortune thereby, built several churches, and earned the epitaph, "he was the providence of the poor"�ii. mr. b., the manufacturer, who enriched himself by taking advantage of the necessities of the poor, paid the lowest rate of wages, considered himself one of god's stewards, endowed the "b asylum" and the "b college," never lost a dollar, and of whom it was recorded, "he lived for others." iii. mr. c., who divided his profits with the people who had earned it, established no public institutions, suppressed nobody; and those who have worked for him said, "he allowed others to live for themselves." should the chinese be excluded? trampling on the rights of inferiors�rise of the irish and germans to power�the burlingame treaty�character of chinese laborers�their enemies in the pacific states�violation of treaties�the geary law�the chinese hated for their virtues�more piety than principle among the people's representatives�shall we go back to barbarism? a word about education. what the educated man knows�necessity of finding out the facts of nature�"scholars" not always educated men; from necessaries to luxuries; who may be called educated; mental misers; the first duty of man; university education not necessary to usefulness, no advantage in learning useless facts. what i want for christmas. would have the kings and emperors resign, the nobility drop their titles, the professors agree to teach only what they know, the politicians changed to statesmen, the editors print only the truth�would like to see drunkenness and prohibition abolished, corporal punishment done away with, and the whole world free. fool friends. the fool friend believes every story against you, never denies a lie unless it is in your favor, regards your reputation as common prey, forgets his principles to gratify your enemies, and is so friendly that you cannot kick him. inspiration. nature tells a different story to all eyes and ears�horace greeley and the big trees�the man who "always did like rolling land"�what the snow looked like to the german�shakespeare's different story for each reader�as with nature so with the bible. the truth of history. people who live by lying�a case in point�h. hodson rugg's account of the conversion of ingersoll and 5,000 of his followers�the "identity of lost israel with the british nation"�old falsehoods about infidels�the new york observer and thomas paine�a rascally english editor�the charge that ingersoll's son had been converted�the fecundity of falsehood. how to edit a liberal paper. the editor should not narrow his horizon so that he can see only one thing�to know the defects of the bible is but the beginning of wisdom�the liberal paper should not discuss theological questions alone�a column for children�candor and kindness�nothing should be asserted that is not known�above all, teach the absolute freedom of the mind. secularism. the religion of humanity; what it embraces and what it advocates�a protest against ecclesiastical tyranny�believes in building a home here�means food and fireside�the right to express your thought�its advice to every human being�a religion without mysteries, miracles, or persecutions. criticism of "robert elsmere," "john ward, preacher," and "an african farm." religion unsoftened by infidelity�the orthodox minister whose wife has a heart�honesty of opinion not a mitigating circumstance�repulsiveness of an orthodox life�john ward an object of pity�lyndall of the "african farm"�the story of the hunter�death of waldo�women the caryatides of the church�attitude of christianity toward other religions�egotism of the ancient jews. the libel laws. all articles appearing in a newspaper should be signed by the writer�the law if changed should throw greater safeguards around the reputation of the citizen�pains should be taken to give prominence to retractions�the libel laws like a bayonet in war. rev. dr. newton's sermon on a new religion. mr. newton not regarded as a sceptic�new meanings given to old words�the vanishing picture of hell�the atonement�confidence being lost in the morality of the gospel�exclusiveness of the churches�the hope of immortality and belief in god have nothing to do with real religion�special providence a mistake. an essay on christmas. the day regarded as a holiday�a festival far older than christianity�relics of sun-worship in christian ceremonies�christianity furnished new steam for an old engine�pagan festivals correspond to ours�why holidays are popular�they must be for the benefit of the people. has freethought a constructive side? the object of freethought�what the religionist calls "affirmative and positive"�the positive side of freethought�constructive work of christianity. the improved man. he will be in favor of universal liberty, neither master nor slave; of equality and education; will develop in the direction of the beautiful; will believe only in the religion of this world�his motto�will not endeavor to change the mind of the "infinite"�will have no bells or censers�will be satisfied that the supernatural does not exist�will be self-poised, independent, candid and free. eight hours must come. the working people should be protected by law�life of no particular importance to the man who gets up before daylight and works till after dark�a revolution probable in the relations between labor and capital�working people becoming educated and more independent�the government can aid by means of good laws�women the worst paid�there should be no resort to force by either labor or capital. the jews. much like people of other religions�teaching given christian children about those who die in the faith of abraham�dr. john hall on the persecution of the jews in russia as the fulfillment of prophecy�hostility of orthodox early christians excited by jewish witnesses against the faith�an infamous chapter of history�good and bad men of every faith�jews should outgrow their own superstitions�what the intelligent jew knows. crumbling creeds. the common people called upon to decide as between the universities and the synods�modern medicine, law, literature and pictures as against the old�creeds agree with the sciences of their day�apology the prelude to retreat�the presbyterian creed infamous, but no worse than the catholic�progress begins when expression of opinion is allowed�examining the religions of other countries�the pulpit's position lost�the dogma of eternal pain the cause of the orthodox creeds losing popularity�every church teaching this infinite lie must fall. our schools. education the only lever capable of raising mankind�the school-house more important than the church�criticism of new york's school-buildings�the kindergarten system recommended�poor pay of teachers�the great danger to the republic is ignorance. vivisection. the hell of science�brutal curiosity of vivisectors�the pretence that they are working for the good of man�have these scientific assassins added to useful knowledge?�no good to the race to be accomplished by torture�the tendency to produce a race of intelligent wild beasts. the census enumerator's official catechism. right of the government to ask questions and of the citizen to refuse to answer them�matters which the government has no right to pry into�exposing the debtor's financial condition�a man might decline to tell whether he has a chronic disease or not. the agnostic christmas. natural phenomena and myths celebrated�the great day of the first religion, sun-worship�a god that knew no hatred nor sought revenge�the festival of light. spirituality. a much-abused word�the early christians too spiritual to be civilized�calvin and knox�paine, voltaire and humboldt not spiritual�darwin also lacking�what it is to be really spiritual�no connection with superstition. sumter's gun. what were thereby blown into rags and ravelings�the birth of a new epoch announced�lincoln made the most commanding figure of the century�story of its echoes. what infidels have done. what might have been asked of a christian 100 years after christ�hospitals and asylums not all built for charity�girard college�lick observatory�carnegie not an orthodox christian�christian colleges�give us time. cruelty in the elmira reformatory. brockway a savage�the lash will neither develop the brain nor cultivate the heart�brutality a failure�bishop potter's apostolical remark. law's delay. the object of a trial�justice can afford to wait�the right of appeal�case of mrs. maybrick�life imprisonment for murderers�american courts better than the english. bigotry of colleges. universities naturally conservative�kansas state university's objection to ingersoll as a commencement orator�comment by mr. depew (note)�action of cornell and the university of missouri. a young man's chances to-day. the chances a few years ago�capital now required�increasing competition in civilized life�independence the first object�if he has something to say, there will be plenty to listen. science and sentiment. science goes hand in hand with imagination�artistic and ethical development�science destroys superstition, not true religion�education preferable to legislation�our obligation to our children. "sowing and reaping." moody's belief accounted for�a dishonest and corrupting doctrine�a want of philosophy and sense�have souls in heaven no regrets?�mr. moody should read some useful books. should infidels send their children to sunday school? teachings of orthodox sunday schools�the ferocious god of the bible�miracles�a christian in constantinople would not send his child to a mosque�advice to all agnostics�strangle the serpent of superstition. what would you substitute for the bible as a moral guide? character of the bible�men and women not virtuous because of any book�the commandments both good and bad�books that do not help morality�jehovah not a moral god�what is morality?�intelligence the only moral guide. governor rollins' fast-day proclamation. decline of the christian religion in new hampshire�outgrown beliefs�present-day views of christ and the holy ghost�abandoned notions about the atonement�salvation for credulity�the miracles of the new testament�the bible "not true but inspired"�the "higher critics" riding two horses�infidelity in the pulpit�the "restraining influences of religion" as illustrated by spain and portugal�thinking, working and praying�the kind of faith that has departed. a look backward and a prophecy. the truth seeker congratulated on its twenty-fifth birthday�teachings of twenty-five years ago�dodging and evading�the clerical assault on darwin�draper, buckle, hegel, spencer, emerson�comparison of prejudices�vanished belief in the devil�matter and force�contradictions dwelling in unity�substitutes for jehovah�a prophecy. political morality. argument in the contested election case of strobach against herbert�the importance of honest elections�poisoning the source of justice�the fraudulent voter a traitor to his sovereign, the will of the people�political morality imperative. a few reasons for doubting the inspiration of the bible. date and manner of composing the old testament�other books not now in existence, and disagreements about the canon�composite character of certain books�various versions�why was god's message given to the jews alone?�the story of the creation, of the flood, of the tower, and of lot's wife�moses and aaron and the plagues of egypt�laws of slavery�instructions by jehovah calculated to excite astonishment and mirth�sacrifices and the scapegoat�passages showing that the laws of moses were made after the jews had left the desert�jehovah's dealings with his people�the sabbath law�prodigies�joshua's miracle�damned ignorance and infamy�jephthah's sacrifice�incredible stories�the woman of endor and the temptation of david�elijah and elisha�loss of the pentateuch from moses to josiah�the jews before and after being abandoned by jehovah�wealth of solomon and other marvels. volume xii.--miscellany prof. van buren denslow's "modern thinkers." preface to dr. edgar c. beall's "the brain and the bible." preface to "men, women and gods." preface to "for her daily bread." preface to "agnosticism and other essays." preface to "faith or fact." the grant banquet. thirteen club dinner. robson and crane dinner. the police captains' dinner. general grant's birthday dinner lotos club dinner, twentieth anniversary. manhattan athletic club dinner. the liederkranz club, seidl-stanton banquet. the frank b. carpenter dinner. unitarian club dinner. western society of the army of the potomac banquet. lotos club dinner in honor of anton seidl. lotos club dinner in honor of rear admiral schley. address to the actors' fund of america. the children of the stage. address to the press club. the circulation of obscene literature. convention of the national liberal league. convention of the american secular union. the religious belief of abraham lincoln. organized charities. spain and the spaniards. our new possessions. a few fragments on expansion. is it ever right for husband or wife to kill rival? professor briggs. fragments. effect of the world's fair on the human race. sabbath superstition. a tribute to george jacob holyoake. at the grave of benjamin w. parker. a tribute to ebon c. ingersoll a tribute to the rev. alexander clark. at a child's grave. a tribute to john g. mills. a tribute to elizur wright. a tribute to mrs. ida whiting knowles. a tribute to henry ward beecher. a tribute to roscoe conkling. a tribute to richard h. whiting. a tribute to courtlandt palmer. a tribute to mrs. mary h. fiske. a tribute to horace seaver. a tribute to lawrence barrett. a tribute to walt whitman. a tribute to philo d. beckwith. a tribute to anton seidl. a tribute to dr. thomas seton robertson. a tribute to thomas corwin. a tribute to isaac h. bailey. jesus christ. life. sentence numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer. a theologico-political treatise part iv of iv chapters xvi to xx by baruch spinoza table of contents: search strings are shown thus [16:x]. search forward and back with the same string. [16:0] chapter xvi of the foundations of a state; of the natural and civil rights of individuals; and of the rights of the sovereign power. [16:1] in nature right co-extensive with power. [16:2] this principle applies to mankind in the state of nature. [16:3] how a transition from this state to a civil state is possible. [16:4] subjects not slaves. [16:5] definition of private civil right and wrong. [16:6] of alliance. [16:7] of treason. [16:8] in what sense sovereigns are bound by divine law. [16:9] civil government not inconsistent with religion. [17:0] chapter xvii.it is shown, that no one can or need transfer all his rights to the sovereign power. of the hebrew republic, as it was during the lifetime of moses, and after his death till the foundation of the monarchy; and of its excellence. lastly, of the causes why the theocratic republic fell, and why it could hardly have continued without dissension. [17:1] the absolute theory, of sovereignty ideal no one can in fact transfer all his rights to the sovereign power. evidence of this. [17:2] the greatest danger in all states from within, not without. [17:3] original independence of the jews after the exodus. [17:4] changed first to a pure democratic theocracy. [17:5] then to subjection to moses. [17:6] then to a theocracy with the power divided between the high priest and the captains. [17:7] the tribes confederate states. [17:8] restraints on the civil power. [17:9] restraints on the people. [17:a] causes of decay involved in the constitution of the levitical priesthood. [18:0] chapter xviii.from the commonwealth of the hebrews and their history certain lessons are deduced. [18:1] the hebrew constitution no longer possible or desirable, yet lessons may be derived from its history. [18:2] as the danger of entrusting any authority in politics to ecclesiastics the danger of identifying religion with dogma. [18:3] the necessity of keeping all judicial power with the sovereign the danger of changes in the form of a state. [18:4] this last danger illustrated from the history of england of rome. [18:5] and of holland. [19:0] chapter xix it is shown that the right over matters spiritual lies wholly with the sovereign, and that the outward forms of religion should be in accordance with public peace, if we would worship god aright. [19:1] difference between external and inward religion. [19:2] positive law established only by agreement. [19:3] piety furthered by peace and obedience. [19:4] position of the apostles exceptional. [19:5] why christian states, unlike the hebrew, suffer from disputes between the civil and ecclesiastical powers. [19:6] absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers. [20:0] chapter xx that in a free state every man may think what he likes, and say what he thinks. [20:1] the mind not subject to state authority. [20:2] therefore in general language should not be. [20:3] a man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse opinion to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in accordance with the law, deserves well of the state. [20:4] that liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from the history of amsterdam. [20:5] danger to the state of withholding it. submission of the author to the judgment of his country's rulers. [author's endnotes] to the treatise. [16:0] chapter xvi of the foundations of a state; of the natural and civil rights of individuals; and of the rights of the sovereign power. (1) hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology, and to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to both. (2) it is now time to determine the limits to which such freedom of thought and discussion may extend itself in the ideal state. (3) for the due consideration of this question we must examine the foundations of a state, first turning our attention to the natural rights of individuals, and afterwards to religion and the state as a whole. (16:4) by the right and ordinance of nature, i merely mean those natural laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by nature, so as to live and act in a given way. (5) for instance, fishes are naturally conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural right. [16:1] (6) for it is certain that nature, taken in the abstract, has sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other words, her right is co-extensive with her power. (7) the power of nature is the power of god, which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in other words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned. (8) now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural conditions. (9) we do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind and other individual natural entities, nor between men endowed with reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and sane men. (10) whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise. [16:2] (11) wherefore among men, so long as they are considered as living under the sway of nature, he who does not yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason. (16:12) that is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire. (13) this is identical with the teaching of paul, who acknowledges that previous to the law that is, so long as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature, there is no sin. (16:14) the natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by sound reason, but by desire and power. (15) all are not naturally conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life, even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. (16) nevertheless, they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. (17) nature has given them no other guide, and has denied them the present power of living according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by the dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the nature of a lion. (16:18) whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who hinders the accomplishment of his purpose. (16:19) it follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means suggested by desire. (16:20) this we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of this alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular way. (21) if anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers evil, is not evil in respect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to the laws of our reason. (16:22) nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, they have men's true good for their object. (23) moreover, everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would be quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. [16:3] (24) when we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live most miserably, as we clearly proved in chap. v., we shall plainly see that men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the whole body. (25) this end they will be unable to attain if desire be their only guide (for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different direction); they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's rights as their own. (16:26) how such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and established, we will now inquire. (27) now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater good. (28) that is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two evils, that which he thinks the least. (29) i say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right. (30) this law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal truths and axioms. (16:31) as a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things [endnote 26], and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. (32) an example will make the matter clearer. (33) suppose that a robber forces me to promise that i will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. (34) it is plain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as i have shown, co-extensive with my power) that if i can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting to his demands, i have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to accept his conditions. (35) or again, suppose i have genuinely promised someone that for the space of twenty days i will not taste food or any nourishment; and suppose i afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself; as i am bound by natural law and right to choose the least of two evils, i have complete right to break my compact, and act as if my promise had never been uttered. (36) i say that i should have perfect natural right to do so, whether i was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether i was actuated by mere opinion in thinking i had promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or false, i should be in fear of a greater evil, which, by the ordinance of nature, i should strive to avoid by every means in my power. (16:37) we may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its utility, without which it becomes null and void. (38) it is, therefore, foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we also endeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the violator more harm than good. (39) this consideration should have very great weight in forming a state. (40) however, if all men could be easily led by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for everyone would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the chief good, namely, the shield and buckler of the commonwealth. (41) however, it is far from being the case that all men can always be easily led by reason alone; everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that, reason has no place therein. (42) hence, though men make promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another man's promise unless there is something behind it. (43) everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil. (16:44) however, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that the sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him. (16:45) in this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept that is, if each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is, it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. (46) a body politic of this kind is called a democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields all its power as a whole. (47) the sovereign power is not restrained by any laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all their power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right. (48) for if they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they ought to have taken precautions for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so, and indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies, and will act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty. (49) for reason bids us choose the least of two evils. (16:50) furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it: if such power be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed it and can keep it. (51) thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own interests, and retain their power by consulting the public good and acting according to the dictates of reason, as seneca says, "violenta imperia nemo continuit diu." (52) no one can long retain a tyrant's sway. (16:53) in a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they may live in peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin. (16:54) such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of subjects is, as i have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no right save that which it sanctions. [16:4] (55) it will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire guidance of reason. (16:56) action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends on the object of the action. (57) if the object of the action be the good of the state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject. (58) therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free [endnote 27]; that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason. (16:59) children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look generally to the children's benefit. (60) we must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. (61) a slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely in the master's interest: a son is one who obeys his father's orders, given in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power, given for the common interest, wherein he is included. (16:62) i think i have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy: i have especially desired to do so, for i believe it to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty. (63) in it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of a society, whereof he is a unit. thus all men remain as they were in the state of nature, equals. (16:64) this is the only form of government which i have treated of at length, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of freedom in a state. (65) i may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of government, for we may gather from what has been said whence their right arises without going into its origin. (66) the possessor of sovereign power, whether he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign right of imposing any commands he pleases: and he who has either voluntarily, or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to another, has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore bound to obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will be bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer. (67) i need add no more. [16:5] (68) the bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall readily be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and injustice, with their relations to the state; and also to determine what constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason. (16:69) by private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when a man has transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of self-defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to him entirely for his defence. (70) wrong takes place when a citizen, or subject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction to the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power. (16:71) wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to do what he likes. (72) it can only arise, therefore, between private persons, who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. (73) justice consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due: injustice consists in depriving a man, under the pretence of legality, of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. (74) these last are also called equity and iniquity, because those who administer the laws are bound to show no respect of persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend every man's right equally, neither envying the rich nor despising the poor. [16:6](75) the men of two states become allies, when for the sake of avoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each retaining his independence. (76) such a covenant is valid so long as its basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has been abundantly shown by experience. (77) for although different states make treaties not to harm one another, they always take every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the stronger party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it. (78) otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and aware of the right of the sovereign power, would trust in the promises of one who has the will and the power to do what he likes, and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion? (79) moreover, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are most solemnly bound. (80) an enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as an ally. it is not hatred which makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the state. (81) the rights of the state are the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any compact the state authority, as they are against him who has done the state an injury: it has the right to force him as best it can, either to submit, or to contract an alliance. [16:7] (82) lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the state: a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to place it in different hands. (83) i say, has attempted, for if punishment were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already. (16:84) i also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, and i recognize no difference whether such an attempt should be followed by public loss or public gain. (85) whatever be his reason for acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned: in war, everyone would admit the justice of his sentence. (86) if a man does not keep to his post, but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his commander, whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own motion, even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he is rightly put to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed the rights of his commander. (87) that all citizens are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is not so generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience are in both cases identical. (88) the state must be preserved and directed by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and right have been accorded by universal consent to him alone: if, therefore, anyone else attempts, without his consent, to execute any public enterprise, even though the state might (as we said) reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed the sovereigns right, and would be rightly punished for treason. (16:89) in order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the inquiry, whether our former assertion that everyone who has not the practice of reason, may, in the state of nature, live by sovereign natural right, according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct opposition to the law and right of god as revealed. (90) for as all men absolutely (whether they be less endowed with reason or more) are equally bound by the divine command to love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that they cannot, without wrong, do injury to anyone, or live according to their desires. (16:91) this objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned, can be easily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature and in time, prior to religion. (92) no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to god [endnote 28], nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason, but solely by revelation confirmed by signs. (93) therefore, previous to revelation, no one is bound by a divine law and right of which he is necessarily in ignorance. (94) the state of nature must by no means be confounded with a state of religion, but must be conceived as without either religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong: this is how we have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of paul. (95) it is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of nature as prior to, and lacking the divine revealed law and right; but in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed. (16:96) if men were naturally bound by the divine law and right, or if the divine law and right were a natural necessity, there would have been no need for god to make a covenant with mankind, and to bind them thereto with an oath and agreement. (16:97) we must, then, fully grant that the divine law and right originated at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey god in all things, and ceded, as it were, their natural freedom, transferring their rights to god in the manner described in speaking of the formation of a state. (98) however, i will treat of these matters more at length presently. [16:8] (99) it may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the divine law as subjects: whereas we have asserted that they retain their natural rights, and may do whatever they like. (16:100) in order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises rather concerning the natural right than the natural state, i maintain that everyone is bound, in the state of nature, to live according to divine law, in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, and necessary for his salvation; but, if he will not so live, he may do otherwise at his own risk. (101) he is thus bound to live according to his own laws, not according to anyone else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a superior in religion. (102) such, in my opinion, is the position of a sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow-men, but he is not bound to recognize any as a judge, nor anyone besides himself as an arbitrator on any question of right, unless it be a prophet sent expressly by god and attesting his mission by indisputable signs. (103) even then he does not recognize a man, but god himself as his judge. [16:9] (104) if a sovereign refuses to obey god as revealed in his law, he does so at his own risk and loss, but without violating any civil or natural right. (105) for the civil right is dependent on his own decree; and natural right is dependent on the laws of nature, which latter are not adapted to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but to the order of nature that is, to god's eternal decree unknown to us. (16:106) this truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by those who maintain that men can sin against god's revelation, but not against the eternal decree by which he has ordained all things. (107) we may be asked, what should we do if the sovereign commands anything contrary to religion, and the obedience which we have expressly vowed to god? should we obey the divine law or the human law? (108) i shall treat of this question at length hereafter, and will therefore merely say now, that god should be obeyed before all else, when we have a certain and indisputable revelation of his will: but men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and, according to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as experience more than sufficiently attests, so that if no one were bound to obey the state in matters which, in his own opinion concern religion, the rights of the state would be dependent on every man's judgment and passions. (109) no one would consider himself bound to obey laws framed against his faith or superstition; and on this pretext he might assume unbounded license. (110) in this way, the rights of the civil authorities would be utterly set at nought, so that we must conclude that the sovereign power, which alone is bound both by divine and natural right to preserve and guard the laws of the state, should have supreme authority for making any laws about religion which it thinks fit; all are bound to obey its behests on the subject in accordance with their promise which god bids them to keep. (16:111) however, if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either enter into no engagements therewith, and yield up our lives sooner than transfer to it any of our rights; or, if the engagement be made, and our rights transferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have ourselves transferred the right of defending ourselves and our religion) be bound to obey them, and to keep our word: we might even rightly be bound so to do, except in those cases where god, by indisputable revelation, has promised his special aid against tyranny, or given us special exemption from obedience. (112) thus we see that, of all the jews in babylon, there were only three youths who were certain of the help of god, and, therefore, refused to obey nebuchadnezzar. (113) all the rest, with the sole exception of daniel, who was beloved by the king, were doubtless compelled by right to obey, perhaps thinking that they had been delivered up by god into the hands of the king, and that the king had obtained and preserved his dominion by god's design. (114) on the other hand, eleazar, before his country had utterly fallen, wished to give a proof of his constancy to his compatriots, in order that they might follow in his footsteps, and go to any lengths, rather than allow their right and power to be transferred to the greeks, or brave any torture rather than swear allegiance to the heathen. (115) instances are occurring every day in confirmation of what i here advance. (116) the rulers of christian kingdoms do not hesitate, with a view to strengthening their dominion, to make treaties with turks and heathen, and to give orders to their subjects who settle among such peoples not to assume more freedom, either in things secular or religious, than is set down in the treaty, or allowed by the foreign government. (117) we may see this exemplified in the dutch treaty with the japanese, which i have already mentioned. [17:0] chapter xvii it is shown that no one can, or need, transfer all his rights to the sovereign power. of the hebrew republic, as it was during the lifetime of moses, and after his death, till the foundation of the monarchy; and of its excellence. lastly, of the causes why the theocratic republic fell, and why it could hardly have continued without dissension. [17:1] (1) the theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal rights of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights of the individual transferred thereto, though it corresponds in many respects with actual practice, and though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more and more, must nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal. (2) no one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently, his rights, as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish. (3) it will always be vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage, or to love what brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults, or not to wish to be free from fear, or a hundred other things of the sort, which necessarily follow from the laws of human nature. (4) so much, i think, is abundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far ceded their power as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power and right; and dominions have always been in as much danger from their own subjects as from external enemies. (5) if it were really the case, that men could be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any further influence on affairs [endnote 29], except with the permission of the holders of sovereign right, it would then be possible to maintain with impunity the most violent tyranny, which, i suppose, no one would for an instant admit. (17:6) we must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his right, in dependence on his own decision, and no one else's. (7) however, in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's right and power, we must take notice that it does not cover only those actions to which it can compel men by fear, but absolutely every action which it can induce men to perform: for it is the fact of obedience, not the motive for obedience, which makes a man a subject. (17:8) whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the sovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country, or any other emotion the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself, and nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders. (9) we must not, therefore, assert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are done in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign: as a matter of fact, all actions spring from a man's deliberation with himself, whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment; therefore, either dominion does not exist, and has no rights over its subjects, or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on men to decide to obey it. (10) consequently, every action which a subject performs in accordance with the commands of the sovereign, whether such action springs from love, or fear, or (as is more frequently the case) from hope and fear together, or from reverence, compounded of fear and admiration, or, indeed, any motive whatever, is performed in virtue of his submission to the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own authority. (17:11) this point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person obeying; so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his whole heart determines to obey another's commands; and consequently the firmest dominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds of his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion, the firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant, for they are always greatly feared by their ruler. (12) furthermore, though it is impossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue, nevertheless minds are, to a certain extent, under the control of the sovereign, for he can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects should follow his wishes in their beliefs, their loves, and their hates. (13) though such emotions do not arise at the express command of the sovereign they often result (as experience shows) from the authority of his power, and from his direction; in other words, in virtue of his right; we may, therefore, without doing violence to our understanding, conceive men who follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs, their loves, their hates, their contempt, and all other emotions whatsoever. (17:14) though the powers of government, as thus conceived, are sufficiently ample, they can never become large enough to execute every possible wish of their possessors. (15) this, i think, i have already shown clearly enough. (16) the method of forming a dominion which should prove lasting i do not, as i have said, intend to discuss, but in order to arrive at the object i have in view, i will touch on the teaching of divine revelation to moses in this respect, and we will consider the history and the success of the jews, gathering therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by sovereigns to their subjects with a view to the security and increase of their dominion. [17:2] (17) that the preservation of a state chiefly depends on the subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive, is most clearly taught both by reason and experience; how subjects ought to be guided so as best to preserve their fidelity and virtue is not so obvious. (18) all, both rulers and ruled, are men, and prone to follow after their lusts. (19) the fickle disposition of the multitude almost reduces those who have experience of it to despair, for it is governed solely by emotions, not by reason: it rushes headlong into every enterprise, and is easily corrupted either by avarice or luxury: everyone thinks himself omniscient and wishes to fashion all things to his liking, judging a thing to be just or unjust, lawful or unlawful, according as he thinks it will bring him profit or loss: vanity leads him to despise his equals, and refuse their guidance: envy of superior fame or fortune (for such gifts are never equally distributed) leads him to desire and rejoice in his neighbour's downfall. (20) i need not go through the whole list, everyone knows already how much crime. results from disgust at the present desire for change, headlong anger, and contempt for poverty and how men's minds are engrossed and kept in turmoil thereby. (17:21) to guard against all these evils, and form a dominion where no room is left for deceit; to frame our institutions so that every man, whatever his disposition, may prefer public right to private advantage, this is the task and this the toil. (22) necessity is often the mother of invention, but she has never yet succeeded in framing a dominion that was in less danger from its own citizens than from open enemies, or whose rulers did not fear the latter less than the former. (23) witness the state of rome, invincible by her enemies, but many times conquered and sorely oppressed by her own citizens, especially in the war between vespasian and vitellius. (24) (see tacitus, hist. bk. iv. for a description of the pitiable state of the city.) (17:25) alexander thought prestige abroad more easy to acquire than prestige at home, and believed that his greatness could be destroyed by his own followers. (26) fearing such a disaster, he thus addressed his friends: "keep me safe from internal treachery and domestic plots, and i will front without fear the dangers of battle and of war. (27) philip was more secure in the battle array than in the theatre: he often escaped from the hands of the enemy, he could not escape from his own subjects. (28) if you think over the deaths of kings, you will count up more who have died by the assassin than by the open foe." (q. curtius, chap. vi.) (17:29) for the sake of making themselves secure, kings who seized the throne in ancient times used to try to spread the idea that they were descended from the immortal gods, thinking that if their subjects and the rest of mankind did not look on them as equals, but believed them to be gods, they would willingly submit to their rule, and obey their commands. (30) thus augustus persuaded the romans that he was descended from aeneas, who was the son of venus, and numbered among the gods. (31) "he wished himself to be worshipped in temples, like the gods, with flamens and priests." (tacitus, ann. i. 10.) (17:32) alexander wished to be saluted as the son of jupiter, not from motives of pride but of policy, as he showed by his answer to the invective of hermolaus: "it is almost laughable," said he, that hermolaus asked me to contradict jupiter, by whose oracle i am recognized. (33) am i responsible for the answers of the gods? (34) it offered me the name of son; acquiescence was by no means foreign to my present designs. (35) would that the indians also would believe me to be a god! (36) wars are carried through by prestige, falsehoods that are believed often gain the force of truth." (curtius, viii,. para. 8.) (37) in these few words he cleverly contrives to palm off a fiction on the ignorant, and at the same time hints at the motive for the deception. (17:38) cleon, in his speech persuading the macedonians to obey their king, adopted a similar device: for after going through the praises of alexander with admiration, and recalling his merits, he proceeds, "the persians are not only pious, but prudent in worshipping their kings as gods: for kingship is the shield of public safety," and he ends thus, "i, myself, when the king enters a banquet hall, should prostrate my body on the ground; other men should do the like, especially those who are wise" (curtius, viii. para. 66). (39) however, the macedonians were more prudent indeed, it is only complete barbarians who can be so openly cajoled, and can suffer themselves to be turned from subjects into slaves without interests of their own. (40) others, notwithstanding, have been able more easily to spread the belief that kingship is sacred, and plays the part of god on the earth, that it has been instituted by god, not by the suffrage and consent of men; and that it is preserved and guarded by divine special providence and aid. (41) similar fictions have been promulgated by monarchs, with the object of strengthening their dominion, but these i will pass over, and in order to arrive at my main purpose, will merely recall and discuss the teaching on the subject of divine revelation to moses in ancient times. [17:3] (42) we have said in chap. v. that after the hebrews came up out of egypt they were not bound by the law and right of any other nation, but were at liberty to institute any new rites at their pleasure, and to occupy whatever territory they chose. (43) after their liberation from the intolerable bondage of the egyptians, they were bound by no covenant to any man; and, therefore, every man entered into his natural right, and was free to retain it or to give it up, and transfer it to another. (44) being, then, in the state of nature, they followed the advice of moses, in whom they chiefly trusted, and decided to transfer their right to no human being, but only to god; without further delay they all, with one voice, promised to obey all the commands of the deity, and to acknowledge no right that he did not proclaim as such by prophetic revelation. (45) this promise, or transference of right to god, was effected in the same manner as we have conceived it to have been in ordinary societies, when men agree to divest themselves of their natural rights. (46) it is, in fact, in virtue of a set covenant, and an oath (see exod. xxxiv:10), that the jews freely, and not under compulsion or threats, surrendered their rights and transferred them to god. (47) moreover, in order that this covenant might be ratified and settled, and might be free from all suspicion of deceit, god did not enter into it till the jews had had experience of his wonderful power by which alone they had been, or could be, preserved in a state of prosperity (exod. xix:4, 5). (48) it is because they believed that nothing but god's power could preserve them that they surrendered to god the natural power of self-preservation, which they formerly, perhaps, thought they possessed, and consequently they surrendered at the same time all their natural right. [17:4] (49) god alone, therefore, held dominion over the hebrews, whose state was in virtue of the covenant called god's kingdom, and god was said to be their king; consequently the enemies of the jews were said to be the enemies of god, and the citizens who tried to seize the dominion were guilty of treason against god; and, lastly, the laws of the state were called the laws and commandments of god. (50) thus in the hebrew state the civil and religious authority, each consisting solely of obedience to god, were one and the same. (51) the dogmas of religion were not precepts, but laws and ordinances; piety was regarded as the same as loyalty, impiety as the same as disaffection. (52) everyone who fell away from religion ceased to be a citizen, and was, on that ground alone, accounted an enemy: those who died for the sake of religion, were held to have died for their country; in fact, between civil and religious law and right there was no distinction whatever. {in biblical hebrew, there was no word for what we call religion." modern hebrew has selected a word whose root is "knowledge."} (53) for this reason the government could be called a theocracy, inasmuch as the citizens were not bound by anything save the revelations of god. (17:54) however, this state of things existed rather in theory than in practice, for it will appear from what we are about to say, that the hebrews, as a matter of fact, retained absolutely in their own hands the right of sovereignty: this is shown by the method and plan by which the government was carried on, as i will now explain. (17:55) inasmuch as the hebrews did not transfer their rights to any other person but, as in a democracy, all surrendered their rights equally, and cried out with one voice, "whatsoever god shall speak (no mediator or mouthpiece being named) that will we do," it follows that all were equally bound by the covenant, and that all had an equal right to consult the deity, to accept and to interpret his laws, so that all had an exactly equal share in the government. [17:5] (56) thus at first they all approached god together, so that they might learn his commands, but in this first salutation, they were so thoroughly terrified and so astounded to hear god speaking, that they thought their last hour was at hand: full of fear, therefore, they went afresh to moses, and said, "lo, we have heard god speaking in the fire, and there is no cause why we should wish to die: surely this great fire will consume us: if we hear again the voice of god, we shall surely die. (57) thou, therefore, go near, and hear all the words of our god, and thou (not god) shalt speak with us: all that god shall tell us, that will we hearken to and perform." (17:58) they thus clearly abrogated their former covenant, and absolutely transferred to moses their right to consult god and interpret his commands: for they do not here promise obedience to all that god shall tell them, but to all that god shall tell moses (see deut. v:20 after the decalogue, and chap. xviii:15, 16). (59) moses, therefore, remained the sole promulgator and interpreter of the divine laws, and consequently also the sovereign judge, who could not be arraigned himself, and who acted among the hebrews the part, of god; in other words, held the sovereign kingship: he alone had the right to consult god, to give the divine answers to the people, and to see that they were carried out. (60) i say he alone, for if anyone during the life of moses was desirous of preaching anything in the name of the lord, he was, even if a true prophet, considered guilty and a usurper of the sovereign right (numb. xi:28) [endnote 30]. (61) we may here notice, that though the people had elected moses, they could not rightfully elect moses's successor; for having transferred to moses their right of consulting god, and absolutely promised to regard him as a divine oracle, they had plainly forfeited the whole of their right, and were bound to accept as chosen by god anyone proclaimed by moses as his successor. (62) if moses had so chosen his successor, who like him should wield the sole right of government, possessing the sole right of consulting god, and consequently of making and abrogating laws, of deciding on peace or war, of sending ambassadors, appointing judges in fact, discharging all the functions of a sovereign, the state would have become simply a monarchy, only differing from other monarchies in the fact, that the latter are, or should be, carried on in accordance with god's decree, unknown even to the monarch, whereas the hebrew monarch would have been the only person to whom the decree was revealed. (63) a difference which increases, rather than diminishes the monarch's authority. (64) as far as the people in both cases are concerned, each would be equally subject, and equally ignorant of the divine decree, for each would be dependent on the monarch's words, and would learn from him alone, what was lawful or unlawful: nor would the fact that the people believed that the monarch was only issuing commands in accordance with god's decree revealed to him, make it less in subjection, but rather more. [17:6] (65) however, moses elected no such successor, but left the dominion to those who came after him in a condition which could not be called a popular government, nor an aristocracy, nor a monarchy, but a theocracy. (66) for the right of interpreting laws was vested in one man, while the right and power of administering the state according to the laws thus interpreted, was vested in another man (see numb. xxvii:21) [endnote 31]. (17:67) in order that the question may be thoroughly understood, i will duly set forth the administration of the whole state. (68) first, the people were commanded to build a tabernacle, which should be, as it were, the dwelling of god that is, of the sovereign authority of the state. (69) this tabernacle was to be erected at the cost of the whole people, not of one man, in order that the place where god was consulted might be public property. (70) the levites were chosen as courtiers and administrators of this royal abode; while aaron, the brother of moses, was chosen to be their chief and second, as it were, to god their king, being succeeded in the office by his legitimate sons. (17:71) he, as the nearest to god, was the sovereign interpreter of the divine laws; he communicated the answers of the divine oracle to the people, and entreated god's favour for them. (72) if, in addition to these privileges, he had possessed the right of ruling, he would have been neither more nor less than an absolute monarch; but, in respect to government, he was only a private citizen: the whole tribe of levi was so completely divested of governing rights that it did not even take its share with the others in the partition of territory. (73) moses provided for its support by inspiring the common people with great reverence for it, as the only tribe dedicated to god. (17:74) further, the army, formed from the remaining twelve tribes, was commanded to invade the land of canaan, to divide it into twelve portions, and to distribute it among the tribes by lot. (75) for this task twelve captains were chosen, one from every tribe, and were, together with joshua and eleazar, the high priest, empowered to divide the land into twelve equal parts, and distribute it by lot. (76) joshua was chosen for the chief command of the army, inasmuch as none but he had the right to consult god in emergencies, not like moses, alone in his tent, or in the tabernacle, but through the high priest, to whom only the answers of god were revealed. (77) furthermore, he was empowered to execute, and cause the people to obey god's commands, transmitted through the high priests; to find, and to make use of, means for carrying them out; to choose as many, army captains as he liked; to make whatever choice he thought best; to send ambassadors in his own name; and, in short, to have the entire control of the war. (78) to his office there was no rightful successor indeed, the post was only filled by the direct order of the deity, on occasions of public emergency. (79) in ordinary times, all the management of peace and war was vested in the captains of the tribes, as i will shortly point out. (80) lastly, all men between the ages of twenty and sixty were ordered to bear arms, and form a citizen army, owing allegiance, not to its general-in-chief, nor to the high priest, but to religion and to god. (81) the army, or the hosts, were called the army of god, or the hosts of god. (82) for this reason god was called by the hebrews the god of armies; and the ark of the covenant was borne in the midst of the army in important battles, when the safety or destruction of the whole people hung upon the issue, so that the people might, as it were, see their king among them, and put forth all their strength. (17:83) from these directions, left by moses to his successors, we plainly see that he chose administrators, rather than despots, to come after him; for he invested no one with the power of consulting god, where he liked and alone, consequently, no one had the power possessed by himself of ordaining and abrogating laws, of deciding on war or peace, of choosing men to fill offices both religious and secular: all these are the prerogatives of a sovereign. (84) the high priest, indeed, had the right of interpreting laws, and communicating the answers of god, but he could not do so when he liked, as moses could, but only when he was asked by the general-in-chief of the army, the council, or some similar authority. (85) the general-in-chief and the council could consult god when they liked, but could only receive his answers through the high priest; so that the utterances of god, as reported by the high priest, were not decrees, as they were when reported by moses, but only answers; they were accepted by joshua and the council, and only then had the force of commands and decrees {like the separation of powers in the united states of america.} (17:86) the high priest, both in the case of aaron and of his son eleazar, was chosen by moses; nor had anyone, after moses' death, a right to elect to the office, which became hereditary. (87) the general-in-chief of the army was also chosen by moses, and assumed his functions in virtue of the commands, not of the high priest, but of moses: indeed, after the death of joshua, the high priest did not appoint anyone in his place, and the captains did not consult god afresh about a general-in-chief, but each retained joshua's power in respect to the contingent of his own tribe, and all retained it collectively, in respect to the whole army. (88) there seems to have been no need of a general-in-chief, except when they were obliged to unite their forces against a common enemy. (89) this occurred most frequently during the time of joshua, when they had no fixed dwelling. place, and possessed all things in common. [17:7] (90) after all the tribes had gained their territories by right of conquest, and had divided their allotted gains, they, became separated, having no longer their possessions in common, so that the need for a single commander ceased, for the different tribes should be considered rather in the light of confederated states than of bodies of fellow-citizens. (91) in respect to their god and their religion, they, were fellow-citizens; but, in respect to the rights which one possessed with regard to another, they were only confederated: they, were, in fact, in much the same position (if one excepts the temple common to all) as the united states of the netherlands {or united states of america}. (92) the division of property, held in common is only another phrase for the possession of his share by each of the owners singly, and the surrender by the others of their rights over such share. (93) this is why moses elected captains of the tribes namely, that when the dominion was divided, each might take care of his own part; consulting god through the high priest on the affairs of his tribe, ruling over his army, building and fortifying cities, appointing judges, attacking the enemies of his own dominion, and having complete control over all civil and military affairs. (94) he was not bound to acknowledge any superior judge save god [endnote 32], or a prophet whom god should expressly send. (95) if he departed from the worship of god, the rest of the tribes did not arraign him as a subject, but attacked him as an enemy. (95) of this we have examples in scripture. (96) when joshua was dead, the children of israel (not a fresh general-in-chief) consulted god; it being decided that the tribe of judah should be the first to attack its enemies, the tribe in question contracted a single alliance with the tribe of simeon, for uniting their forces, and attacking their common enemy, the rest of the tribes not being included in the alliance (judges i:1, 2, 3). (97) each tribe separately made war against its own enemies, and, according to its pleasure, received them as subjects or allies, though it had been commanded not to spare them on any conditions, but to destroy them utterly. (98) such disobedience met with reproof from the rest of the tribes, but did not cause the offending tribe to be arraigned: it was not considered a sufficient reason for proclaiming a civil war, or interfering in one another's affairs. (99) but when the tribe of benjamin offended against the others, and so loosened the bonds of peace that none of the confederated tribes could find refuge within its borders, they attacked it as an enemy, and gaining the victory over it after three battles, put to death both guilty and innocent, according to the laws of war: an act which they subsequently bewailed with tardy repentance. (17:100) these examples plainly confirm what we have said concerning the rights of each tribe. (101) perhaps we shall be asked who elected the successors to the captains of each tribe; on this point i can gather no positive information in scripture, but i conjecture that as the tribes were divided into families, each headed by its senior member, the senior of all these heads of families succeeded by right to the office of captain, for moses chose from among these seniors his seventy coadjutors, who formed with himself the supreme council. (102) those who administered the government after the death of joshua were called elders, and elder is a very common hebrew expression in the sense of judge, as i suppose everyone knows; however, it is not very important for us to make up our minds on this point. (103) it is enough to have shown that after the death of moses no one man wielded all the power of a sovereign; as affairs were not all managed by one man, nor by a single council, nor by the popular vote, but partly by one tribe, partly by the rest in equal shares, it is most evident that the government, after the death of moses, was neither monarchic, nor aristocratic, nor popular, but, as we have said, theocratic. (104) the reasons for applying this name are: (17:105) i. because the royal seat of government was the temple, and in respect to it alone, as we have shown, all the tribes were fellow-citizens. (106) ii. because all the people owed allegiance to god, their supreme judge, to whom only they had promised implicit obedience in all things. (17:107) iii. because the general-in-chief or dictator, when there was need of such, was elected by none save god alone. (108) this was expressly commanded by moses in the name of god (deut. xix:15), and witnessed by the actual choice of gideon, of samson, and of samuel; wherefrom we may conclude that the other faithful leaders were chosen in the same manner, though it is not expressly told us. (17:109) these preliminaries being stated, it is now time to inquire the effects of forming a dominion on this plan, and to see whether it so effectually kept within bounds both rulers and ruled, that the former were never tyrannical and the latter never rebellious. (17:110) those who administer or possess governing power, always try to surround their high-handed actions with a cloak of legality, and to persuade the people that they act from good motives; this they are easily able to effect when they are the sole interpreters of the law; for it is evident that they are thus able to assume a far greater freedom to carry out their wishes and desires than if the interpretation if the law is vested in someone else, or if the laws were so self-evident that no one could be in doubt as to their meaning. [17:8] (111) we thus see that the power of evil-doing was greatly curtailed for the hebrew captains by the fact that the whole interpretation of the law was vested in the levites (deut. xxi:5), who, on their part, had no share in the government, and depended for all their support and consideration on a correct interpretation of the laws entrusted to them. (112) moreover, the whole people was commanded to come together at a certain place every seven years and be instructed in the law by the high-priest; further, each individual was bidden to read the book of the law through and through continually with scrupulous care. (deut. xxxi:9, 10, and vi:7.) (113) the captains were thus for their own sakes bound to take great care to administer everything according to the laws laid down, and well known to all, if they, wished to be held in high honour by, the people, who would regard them as the administrators of god's dominion, and as god's vicegerents; otherwise they could not have escaped all the virulence of theological hatred. (114) there was another very important check on the unbridled license of the captains, in the fact, that the army was formed from the whole body, of the citizens, between the ages of twenty and sixty, without exception, and that the captains were not able to hire any foreign soldiery. (115) this i say was very, important, for it is well known that princes can oppress their peoples with the single aid of the soldiery in their pay; while there is nothing more formidable to them than the freedom of citizen soldiers, who have established the freedom and glory of their country, by their valour, their toil, and their blood. (116) thus alexander, when he was about to make wax on darius, a second time, after hearing the advice of parmenio, did not chide him who gave the advice, but polysperchon, who was standing by. (117) for, as curtius says (iv. para. 13), he did not venture to reproach parmenio again after having shortly, before reproved him too sharply. (118) this freedom of the macedonians, which he so dreaded, he was not able to subdue till after the number of captives enlisted in the army, surpassed that of his own people: then, but not till then, he gave rein to his anger so long checked by, the independence of his chief fellow-countrymen. (17:119) if this independence of citizen soldiers can restrain the princes of ordinary states who are wont to usurp the whole glory of victories, it must have been still more effectual against the hebrew captains, whose soldiers were fighting, not for the glory of a prince, but for the glory of god, and who did not go forth to battle till the divine assent had been given. (17:120) we must also remember that the hebrew captains were associated only by the bonds of religion: therefore, if any one of them had transgressed, and begun to violate the divine right, he might have been treated by the rest as an enemy and lawfully subdued. (17:121) an additional check may be found in the fear of a new prophet arising, for if a man of unblemished life could show by certain signs that he was really a prophet, he ipso facto obtained the sovereign right to rule, which was given to him, as to moses formerly, in the name of god, as revealed to himself alone; not merely through the high priest, as in the case of the captains. (122) there is no doubt that such an one would easily be able to enlist an oppressed people in his cause, and by trifling signs persuade them of anything he wished: on the other hand, if affairs were well ordered, the captain would be able to make provision in time; that the prophet should be submitted to his approval, and be examined whether he were really of unblemished life, and possessed indisputable signs of his mission: also, whether the teaching he proposed to set forth in the name of the lord agreed with received doctrines, and the general laws of the country; if his credentials were insufficient, or his doctrines new, he could lawfully be put to death, or else received on the captain's sole responsibility and authority. (17:123) again, the captains were not superior to the others in nobility or birth, but only administered the government in virtue of their age and personal qualities. (124) lastly, neither captains nor army had any reason for preferring war to peace. (125) the army, as we have stated, consisted entirely of citizens, so that affairs were managed by the same persons both in peace and war. (126) the man who was a soldier in the camp was a citizen in the market-place, he who was a leader in the camp was a judge in the law courts, he who was a general in the camp was a ruler in the state. (127) thus no one could desire war for its own sake, but only for the sake of preserving peace and liberty; possibly the captains avoided change as far as possible, so as not to be obliged to consult the high priest and submit to the indignity of standing in his presence. (17:128) so much for the precautions for keeping the captains within bounds. [17:9] (129) we must now look for the restraints upon the people: these, however, are very clearly indicated in the very groundwork of the social fabric. (17:130) anyone who gives the subject the slightest attention, will see that the state was so ordered as to inspire the most ardent patriotism in the hearts of the citizens, so that the latter would be very hard to persuade to betray their country, and be ready to endure anything rather than submit to a foreign yoke. (131) after they had transferred their right to god, they thought that their kingdom belonged to god, and that they themselves were god's children. (132) other nations they looked upon as god's enemies, and regarded with intense hatred (which they took to be piety, see psalm cxxxix:21, 22): nothing would have been more abhorrent to them than swearing allegiance to a foreigner, and promising him obedience: nor could they conceive any greater or more execrable crime than the betrayal of their country, the kingdom of the god whom they adored. (17:133) it was considered wicked for anyone to settle outside of the country, inasmuch as the worship of god by which they were bound could not be carried on elsewhere: their own land alone was considered holy, the rest of the earth unclean and profane. (17:134) david, who was forced to live in exile, complained before saul as follows: "but if they be the children of men who have stirred thee up against me, cursed be they before the lord; for they have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance of the lord, saying, go, serve other gods." (i sam. xxvi:19.) (135) for the same reason no citizen, as we should especially remark, was ever sent into exile: he who sinned was liable to punishment, but not to disgrace. (17:136) thus the love of the hebrews for their country was not only patriotism, but also piety, and was cherished and nurtured by daily rites till, like their hatred of other nations, it must have passed into their nature. (137) their daily worship was not only different from that of other nations (as it might well be, considering that they were a peculiar people and entirely apart from the rest), it was absolutely contrary. (138) such daily reprobation naturally gave rise to a lasting hatred, deeply implanted in the heart: for of all hatreds none is more deep and tenacious than that which springs from extreme devoutness or piety, and is itself cherished as pious. (139) nor was a general cause lacking for inflaming such hatred more and more, inasmuch as it was reciprocated; the surrounding nations regarding the jews with a hatred just as intense. (17:140) how great was the effect of all these causes, namely, freedom from man's dominion; devotion to their country; absolute rights over all other men; a hatred not only permitted but pious; a contempt for their fellow-men; the singularity of their customs and religious rites; the effect, i repeat, of all these causes in strengthening the hearts of the jews to bear all things for their country, with extraordinary constancy and valour, will at once be discerned by reason and attested by experience. (141) never, so long as the city was standing, could they endure to remain under foreign dominion; and therefore they called jerusalem "a rebellious city" (ezra iv:12). (142) their state after its reestablishment (which was a mere shadow of the first, for the high priests had usurped the rights of the tribal captains) was, with great difficulty, destroyed by the romans, as tacitus bears witness (hist. ii:4):"vespasian had closed the war against the jews, abandoning the siege of jerusalem as an enterprise difficult and arduous rather from the character of the people and the obstinacy of their superstition, than from the strength left to the besieged for meeting their necessities." (143) but besides these characteristics, which are merely ascribed by an individual opinion, there was one feature peculiar to this state and of great importance in retaining the affections of the citizens, and checking all thoughts of desertion, or abandonment of the country: namely, self-interest, the strength and life of all human action. (144) this was peculiarly engaged in the hebrew state, for nowhere else did citizens possess their goods so securely, as did the subjects of this community, for the latter possessed as large a share in the land and the fields as did their chiefs, and were owners of their plots of ground in perpetuity; for if any man was compelled by poverty to sell his farm or his pasture, he received it back again intact at the year of jubilee: there were other similar enactments against the possibility of alienating real property. (17:145) again, poverty w as nowhere more endurable than in a country where duty towards one's neighbour, that is, one's fellow-citizen, was practised with the utmost piety, as a means of gaining the favour of god the king. (146) thus the hebrew citizens would nowhere be so well off as in their own country; outside its limits they met with nothing but loss and disgrace. (17:147) the following considerations were of weight, not only in keeping them at home, but also in preventing civil war and removing causes of strife; no one was bound to serve his equal, but only to serve god, while charity and love towards fellow-citizens was accounted the highest piety; this last feeling was not a little fostered by the general hatred with which they regarded foreign nations and were regarded by them. (148) furthermore, the strict discipline of obedience in which they were brought up, was a very important factor; for they were bound to carry on all their actions according to the set rules of the law: a man might not plough when he liked, but only at certain times, in certain years, and with one sort of beast at a time; so, too, he might only sow and reap in a certain method and season in fact, his whole life was one long school of obedience (see chap. v. on the use of ceremonies); such a habit was thus engendered, that conformity seemed freedom instead of servitude, and men desired what was commanded rather than what was forbidden. (149) this result was not a little aided by the fact that the people were bound, at certain seasons of the year, to give themselves up to rest and rejoicing, not for their own pleasure, but in order that they might worship god cheerfully. (17:150) three times in the year they feasted before the lord; on the seventh day of every week they were bidden to abstain from all work and to rest; besides these, there were other occasions when innocent rejoicing and feasting were not only allowed but enjoined. (151) i do not think any better means of influencing men's minds could be devised; for there is no more powerful attraction than joy springing from devotion, a mixture of admiration and love. (152) it was not easy to be wearied by constant repetition, for the rites on the various festivals were varied and recurred seldom. (153) we may add the deep reverence for the temple which all most religiously fostered, on account of the peculiar rites and duties that they were obliged to perform before approaching thither. (154) even now, jews cannot read without horror of the crime of manasseh, who dared to place an idol in the temple. (155) the laws, scrupulously preserved in the inmost sanctuary, were objects of equal reverence to the people. (156) popular reports and misconceptions were, therefore, very little to be feared in this quarter, for no one dared decide on sacred matters, but all felt bound to obey, without consulting their reason, all the commands given by the answers of god received in the temple, and all the laws which god had ordained. (17:157) i think i have now explained clearly, though briefly, the main features of the hebrew commonwealth. (158) i must now inquire into the causes which led the people so often to fall away from the law, which brought about their frequent subjection, and, finally, the complete destruction of their dominion. (159) perhaps i shall be told that it sprang from their hardness of heart; but this is childish, for why should this people be more hard of heart than others; was it by nature? [17:a] (160) but nature forms individuals, not peoples; the latter are only distinguishable by the difference of their language, their customs, and their laws; while from the two last i.e., customs and laws, it may arise that they have a peculiar disposition, a peculiar manner of life, and peculiar prejudices. (161) if, then, the hebrews were harder of heart than other nations, the fault lay with their laws or customs. (17:162) this is certainly true, in the sense that, if god had wished their dominion to be more lasting, he would have given them other rites and laws, and would have instituted a different form of government. (163) we can, therefore, only say that their god was angry with them, not only, as jeremiah says, from the building of the city, but even from the founding of their laws. (17:164) this is borne witness to by ezekiel xx:25: "wherefore i gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live; and i polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb; that i might make them desolate, to the end that they might know that i am the lord." (17:165) in order that we may understand these words, and the destruction of the hebrew commonwealth, we must bear in mind that it had at first been intended to entrust the whole duties of the priesthood to the firstborn, and not to the levites (see numb. viii:17). (166) it was only when all the tribes, except the levites, worshipped the golden calf, that the firstborn were rejected and defiled, and the levites chosen in their stead (deut. x:8). (167) when i reflect on this change, i feel disposed to break forth with the words of tacitus. (168) god's object at that time was not the safety of the jews, but vengeance. (169) i am greatly astonished that the celestial mind was so inflamed with anger that it ordained laws, which always are supposed to promote the honour, well-being, and security of a people, with the purpose of vengeance, for the sake of punishment; so that the laws do not seem so much laws that is, the safeguard of the people as pains and penalties. (17:170) the gifts which the people were obliged to bestow on the levites and priests the redemption of the firstborn, the poll-tax due to the levites, the privilege possessed by the latter of the sole performance of sacred rites all these, i say, were a continual reproach to the people, a continual reminder of their defilement and rejection. (171) moreover, we may be sure that the levites were for ever heaping reproaches upon them: for among so many thousands there must have been many importunate dabblers in theology. (172) hence the people got into the way of watching the acts of the levites, who were but human; of accusing the whole body of the faults of one member, and continually murmuring. (17:173) besides this, there was the obligation to keep in idleness men hateful to them, and connected by no ties of blood. (174) especially would this seem grievous when provisions were dear. what wonder, then, if in times of peace, when striking miracles had ceased, and no men of paramount authority were forthcoming, the irritable and greedy temper of the people began to wax cold, and at length to fall away from a worship, which, though divine, was also humiliating, and even hostile, and to seek after something fresh; or can we be surprised that the captains, who always adopt the popular course, in order to gain the sovereign power for themselves by enlisting the sympathies of the people, and alienating the high priest, should have yielded to their demands, and introduced a new worship? (175) if the state had been formed according to the original intention, the rights and honour of all the tribes would have been equal, and everything would have rested on a firm basis. (176) who is there who would willingly violate the religious rights of his kindred? (177) what could a man desire more than to support his own brothers and parents, thus fulfilling the duties of religion? (178) who would not rejoice in being taught by them the interpretation of the laws, and receiving through them the answers of god? (17:179) the tribes would thus have been united by a far closer bond, if all alike had possessed the right to the priesthood. (180) all danger would have been obviated, if the choice of the levites had not been dictated by anger and revenge. (181) but, as we have said, the hebrews had offended their god, who, as ezekiel says, polluted them in their own gifts by rejecting all that openeth the womb, so that he might destroy them. (17:182) this passage is also confirmed by their history. as soon as the people in the wilderness began to live in ease and plenty, certain men of no mean birth began to rebel against the choice of the levites, and to make it a cause for believing that moses had not acted by the commands of god, but for his own good pleasure, inasmuch as he had chosen his own tribe before all the rest, and had bestowed the high priesthood in perpetuity on his own brother. (183) they, therefore, stirred up a tumult, and came to him, crying out that all men were equally sacred, and that he had exalted himself above his fellows wrongfully. (184) moses was not able to pacify them with reasons; but by the intervention of a miracle in proof of the faith, they all perished. (185) a fresh sedition then arose among the whole people, who believed that their champions had not been put to death by the judgment of god, but by the device of moses. (186) after a great slaughter, or pestilence, the rising subsided from inanition, but in such a manner that all preferred death to life under such conditions. (17:187) we should rather say that sedition ceased than that harmony was re-established. (188) this is witnessed by scripture (deut. xxxi:21), where god, after predicting to moses that the people after his death will fall away from the divine worship, speaks thus: "for i know their imagination which they go about, even now before i have brought them into the land which i sware;" and, a little while after (xxxi:27), moses says: for i know thy rebellion and thy stiff neck: behold while i am yet alive with you this day, ye have been rebellious against the lord; and how much more after my death!" (17:189) indeed, it happened according to his words, as we all know. (190) great changes, extreme license, luxury, and hardness of heart grew up; things went from bad to worse, till at last the people, after being frequently conquered, came to an open rupture with the divine right, and wished for a mortal king, so that the seat of government might be the court, instead of the temple, and that the tribes might remain fellow-citizens in respect to their king, instead of in respect to divine right and the high priesthood. (17:191) a vast material for new seditions was thus produced, eventually resulting in the ruin of the entire state. kings are above all things jealous of a precarious rule, and can in nowise brook a dominion within their own. (192) the first monarchs, being chosen from the ranks of private citizens, were content with the amount of dignity to which they had risen; but their sons, who obtained the throne by right of inheritance, began gradually to introduce changes, so as to get all the sovereign rights into their own hands. (193) this they were generally unable to accomplish, so long as the right of legislation did not rest with them, but with the high priest, who kept the laws in the sanctuary, and interpreted them to the people. (194) the kings were thus bound to obey the laws as much as were the subjects, and were unable to abrogate them, or to ordain new laws of equal authority; moreover, they were prevented by the levites from administering the affairs of religion, king and subject being alike unclean. (195) lastly, the whole safety of their dominion depended on the will of one man, if that man appeared to be a prophet; and of this they had seen an example, namely, how completely samuel had been able to command saul, and how easily, because of a single disobedience, he had been able to transfer the right of sovereignty to david. (196) thus the kings found a dominion within their own, and wielded a precarious sovereignty. (17:197) in order to surmount these difficulties, they allowed other temples to be dedicated to the gods, so that there might be no further need of consulting the levites; they also sought out many who prophesied in the name of god, so that they might have creatures of their own to oppose to the true prophets. (198) however, in spite of all their attempts, they never attained their end. (199) for the prophets, prepared a