operations upon the sea operations upon the sea a study by freiherr von edelsheim in the service of the german general staff in 1901 translated from the german new york the outdoor press 1914 copyright, 1914, by the outdoor press published november, 1914 vail-ballou company binghamton and new york foreword this book is of especial importance at this time, for if germany is to reach the degree of advantage which her military preparedness seemed to prophesy, it is plain that her navy must become increasingly active, and play a far different rôle than that it has assumed in the early stages of the war. covering this phase of the german operations the present volume must appeal as forecasting movements strictly within the bounds of actuality. a literal translation is all that has been attempted, with absolutely no embellishment to make it "popular" or easy reading. with characteristic bluntness this german officer brushes aside non-essentials and goes to the main point in daring fashion. for that very reason it is exceedingly pertinent to present-day discussions. issued as a military study in germany, semi-official in nature, to characterize it mildly, the material herein published for the first time in english reveals the theories of at least a portion of the military arm of the german government, which it is only fair to state may not represent the convictions of the german people. americans, as neutral but extremely interested observers of happenings of the moment, cannot be blamed, however, for making note of revelations that may come from either side in the conflict. beyond that, there are evidences on every hand that the patriotic citizens of this country are waking to the necessity to face more securely the difficulties a peace-loving nation may meet because of its lack of enthusiasm for war. the publishers. preface the purpose of this book is to estimate the value of operation over the sea as demonstrated in modern warfare, to point out the most important factors in its accomplishment, to describe the powerful expedients provided by germany for such an enterprise, and to broaden the sphere of studying these important questions of interest to our fatherland. the author. contents page introduction 13 theoretical views 17 i principles of operations over the sea 19 ii accomplishment of sea transportation 27 preparations during peace 27 preparations at the outbreak of war 39 embarkation 46 sea voyage 56 landing 62 operations 71 reembarkation 75 application 77 i consideration of landing operations against powers that can be reached only by sea 79 ii views on colonial expeditions 93 iii concluding views 106 operations upon the sea introduction within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the sea in connection with wars on land. the war between japan and china, between america and spain, between england and the transvaal, and finally the chinese expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods of transporting troops over the sea. whilst moltke has shown the insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of preparing for and conducting a war across the sea. germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is more efficient, than any other country. the excellent training and readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, germany has the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by england's. finally, the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords additional security in transporting troops. these especially favorable factors make possible a wide field for germany's activity in world politics. it is feasible for us to build strong military forces which will be of great use to the empire in this direction, to secure by fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have attained in europe. in this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic participation in world politics. this shows the advisability of impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to direct attack and that have hitherto held germany in little respect, with the size and strength of our army. that is why we must keep in mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea. these operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war as well as for colonial requirements. all, however, emphasize the problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on land and which make distinct demands for preparation. these newly found difficulties should be carefully examined by germany. theoretical views i. principles of operations over the sea since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. the main difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces must be combined. however, any consequent friction can easily be avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation. it is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned for in advance. there is no prospect of success unless the parts of the complicated mechanism are individually prepared. the selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an important factor in its success. if an unexpected landing could be made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the invasion. hence the preparation of the land operations must be so thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. how difficult and costly this task is has been demonstrated by the united states in its expedition to cuba and by england in transporting its first troops to south africa. the object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the opponents. napoleon's expedition against egypt and the manner in which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example. a landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can muster at a critical time. after a landing a victory at sea by our opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the invasion. therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our german battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's naval forces which they could readily employ. if the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried through. the rule to be followed is to employ for operations over the sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as an escort for the protection of the transports. in no case should the land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the fighting value of the ships. so, for example, the french admiral gauthaunce--1801--in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled to withdraw to toulon before the english fleet because his ships had suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops. only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course, of great value. naturally, the ships should be loaded to a capacity in proportion to the length of the voyage. in cases where the distance is not great the transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. the whole purpose of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive strength of the landing troops. the number of troops to be landed must be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. as they must be able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be sent over. such a combination gives the required fighting value. in spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion, playing a great part in offensive movements and in assisting the field and heavy artillery. the cavalry will also be able to prevent an attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to retrieve. in the crimean war marshal st. arnault was hindered in the pursuit of the routed russians because of the deficiency in the cavalry and artillery in the french army. he had only one hundred troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses, were greatly hampered in their movements. the difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions can be overcome through modern methods. the extent of our merchant marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops, but it must be remembered that on account of our present political position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to dispense with at home, without endangering the country. the management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations. this leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the transport fleet and escorting squadron. it is out of the question to change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. with us the commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. more than one well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. on the other hand, napoleon i, against the advice of his admirals, disembarked his troops in egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing the fate of the fleet. after successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. even the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. for technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an officer of the admiral staff. in a joint attack on a coast city the advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. in the battle on the alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not brought about in unison with the land attack. ii. accomplishment of sea transportation preparations during peace. whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be made during peace. these preparations include first of all the drawing up of plans through the study of political and military relations. then the operations can be carried out under international jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. the possibilities of friction must be given careful thought. first of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. while the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be completed by army officers. the following essential points must be kept in view in searches made by naval officers: i. to determine the naval strength required for protection of the transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home ports. ii. to decide upon proper and specific points on the respective coasts, from a marine standpoint. iii. to investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank. iv. to study the enemy's coast defenses and decide upon the strength required to attack them. the researches of the army officers concern principally the following: i. the aim of the operations is to overcome the obstacles as reported by the naval officers. ii. the number of troops which the opponents can muster against the invasion should be estimated. iii. all questions as to climate, water supply, and equipment necessary should be decided. all this information has been shown to be of distinct value, and perhaps would cause us to alter, within the next year, the disposition of the line of battle in case of war. through a well ordered intelligence department definite plans can be made. regarding operations which require troops fitted for tropical service, capable officers and forces should be reviewed and inspected during times of peace and made note of accordingly. the division would make a suitable unit for large operations and could be formed from different army corps. these divisions should be so equipped that they could operate independently in customary situations. fuller preparations should be made for the sending of heavy artillery, the telegraph and airship divisions. these formations would be important problems during the voyage at sea. an especially skilled staff is needed. to this end, loading transports and landing maneuvers for the heavy artillery and other heavy divisions should take place annually in suitable harbors on coasts that present the right opportunities for the troops. an enlarged command of officers and subordinate officers would show sufficient strength in a relatively short time. incidentally it might be possible to have these maneuvers take place in our foreign possessions, where we could better determine the actual needs of operations of this sort. this training would bring forth the simplest and best means for the adjustment of our merchant marine for transporting troops. all other expedients for the voyage would likewise be shown. some of this needed experience has already been acquired through our expedition to china. just as a detailed plan of mobilization is required for any war on land, a complete plan is necessary for operations over the sea which embraces also the railway trip to the harbor and the rapid execution of the tasks involved in embarking. on account of limited facilities only one division can be handled on a railroad. the necessity for transfer by wagons to the ships requires enlarged railway stations and piers in many places. furthermore, many different supply depots must be built and maintained. in these depots building material should be held in reserve for the alterations that are needed for the transformation of the merchant ships into transports. all other apparatus for successful transporting, such as extra lifting contrivances, flat-bottom boats, gang planks, and so forth, should be stored in advance. usually, these adjuncts are lacking in the merchant marine. light railroad rolling stock for use in the tropics or in difficult land conditions is also recommended. in addition to these supply depots there must be in all harbors large warehouses containing clothing, food and coal. the small requirements of our transport to china did not emphasize sufficiently the value of advance preparations, but it is evident that within a few days over one hundred steamers should be provided with such accommodations. to do this in an emergency would require too much time aside from the difficulty that might be encountered in securing skilled labor. for long distance transportation our large harbors on the north and east seas can be utilized equally well for embarkation. speed is the chief requisite. in order to lessen the distance of transporting, operations toward the west must be conducted from the north sea ports and toward the east from our east sea ports. this does not preclude the possibility of towing the transports from the east sea through the kaiser wilhelm canal to the north sea should it be found desirable, but it would involve a waste of time. the smaller harbors should not be used for embarking for large enterprises because they lack the necessary facilities. they might be utilized to advantage in a smaller way, provided sufficient means were at hand to take care of one division a day. especially suitable harbors on the north sea are emden, wilhelmshaven and bremerhaven, in connection with bremen, and cuxhaven with hamburg and glückstadt. these are the harbors that should have complete preparations made for possible expeditions. bremerhaven is by far the best. in every respect it would take first place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharfs. from this point two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty. cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with hamburg is important. if it were brought up to full development it could take care of two divisions a day which hamburg could well supply. glückstadt is an especially important base because most of our live stock exporting business is carried on there. it is recommended that a short double-track railroad be built from elmshorn to glückstadt, making a connection with the reserve corps frontier. in glückstadt one infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped. in wilhelmshaven all the essential features are at hand, but it is doubtful whether, in view of simultaneous mobilization of the fleet, this place can be chosen for the embarkation of land troops. in any event, it would be necessary to enlarge the harbor buildings. the railroad facilities would also have to be increased. while emden is favorably situated, an examination discloses many drawbacks. it needs better dock facilities and railroads to bring it up to standard and in order to relieve the extensive shipping of troops at wilhelmshaven. under existing circumstances leer and papenburg could be used for transporting purposes, and these two with emden could handle one division. the situation on the baltic sea is peculiarly unfavorable, no harbor, with the exception of kiel, being deep enough to accommodate our larger steamships. at danzig the dredging of navigable waters and extension of docks should be planned, which are of great importance from a military standpoint. the other smaller ports on the baltic are at present not suitable for transporting troops. the kiel harbor could not be utilized for the loading of large transports because of the same conditions that affect wilhelmshaven, namely, the delay that might hinder the rapid mobilizing of the fleet, which would not be permitted. the docks at kiel must therefore be greatly enlarged so that they could thoroughly satisfy simultaneously the demands of the battle and transport fleets. pillau and swinemünde should be authorized to extend their very small docks. on the other hand, the large dry docks in danzig, stettin and kiel should be in a position, within the shortest possible time, to provide the necessary buildings for transporting, if the materials and warehouses are planned correctly. of the greatest importance in operations over the sea is the provision of the proper number of ships. defects in preparations in time of peace would hinder successful execution and would give the enemy time to take the necessary precautions to oppose an invasion. yet it should be stated that england, at the outbreak of the boer, although lacking full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured the required number of ships for the first shipment. the problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the german steamers for military transporting. this commission should also list the foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use in emergencies. through close commercial relations this control can be extended to neighboring foreign ports (amsterdam, rotterdam, copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign steamers. the construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. it would seem advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. this ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. the hamburg-american line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship. the management of the transport depots and the training of the dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to the loading commission. in a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy. preparations at the outbreak of war. actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of time. opponents would receive information through secret channels, which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their forces. the immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. the aim should be to keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly executed operation would take them unawares. an unexpected attack depends largely upon rapidity of movement. incidentally, diplomatic pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking. in connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and troops have been equipped and prepared for action. the methods to be employed by the battleships to carry out the operations would vary and must be left to the discretion of the chosen naval expert. it should be pointed out in this connection, however, that with a small battle fleet like ours it is most necessary to concentrate our full strength for the defense and execution of the land operations. we must endeavor, therefore, in time of peace to get our fleet forces out of foreign waters and keep the battle fleet together. thus the great political questions would be decided only upon the european scene. a rapid mobilization of our sea fighting forces, namely, those which belong to the battle fleet, is of great advantage, but the calling in from foreign waters of such forces would undoubtedly serve to create suspicion. the kaiser wilhelm canal affords us the means to concentrate these forces quickly as may be required either in the north or baltic sea. if the demands for ships and supplies exceed our advance preparations, proper methods should be employed to seize quickly what is needed and immediate reparation made. plans should also be made to secure sufficient reenforcements of troops. in large operations where all our ships are employed, after they are successfully loaded and started on the voyage the transports arriving from foreign waters can be equipped. all ships belonging to hostile nations that are lying in our harbors we would of course seize and utilize for transports. while the distribution of our transport steamers at the various points of embarkation will have been taken care of by the loading commission, various difficulties would be encountered in altering the vessels that by chance are at the disposal of the commission for transports, such as unforeseen defects and inaccurate measurements of the foreign chartered steamers arriving in our ports. the adjustment and equipment of these ships must be expedited so that the troops can be despatched in masses as fast as they arrive. once the ships reach the selected harbors the necessary rearrangements probably can be made simultaneously with the loading, depending upon the advance preparations and the presence of a skilled staff of workmen. the time needed will depend somewhat upon the length of the voyage to be made. in england the steamers for transporting troops to cape town, which is a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry and in seven days for the cavalry and artillery. the consuming of such time, even for a long sea voyage, must be considered poor execution. at the time of our expedition to china we had the ships complete in a short time. for one steamer, the discharge of the cargo, readjustment for transport and reloading, with the exception of the cavalry, not more than two days need be consumed. for short distances, according to english and russian estimates, one day is required for infantry and two to two and one-half days for cavalry and artillery. these periods can be greatly shortened through the efficiency of the building staff, as pointed out previously. the formation of the expedition corps must of course be established in the annual maneuvers. various factors, such as seasons, political aims, present situation of opponents, extent of material for the available ships, all bear witness to the urgency of taking up measures in advance for facilitating the work of mobilization. the speedy concentration of troops and materials at the points of embarkation will make heavy demands upon the railroads, even though the haul is short, and the shipment comparatively small. arrangements should therefore be made with the railroads to have on hand at all times sufficient rolling stock for these purposes, to guarantee the prompt departure of the transports. it is urged that authority be given the loading commission to supervise and direct this work. it must be taken into consideration that part of the troops are inexperienced reserves and good order must be maintained. a high standard of efficiency should prevail, to lessen the burdens of executing orders. numerous machine gun divisions increase the fighting strength and do not require great space or support. the usefulness of a cyclist division depends entirely upon the condition of the roads in the hostile country. for the reasons stated previously, cavalry would not suffer in distribution of strength, which is customary in wars on land. in large over-seas operations it is recommended that a special cavalry division or brigade be formed for reconnoitering purposes. beyond this, the strength of the cavalry division must be sufficient to render possible an independent operation. it would also be of great value to the field artillery, of which an ample supply is on hand. especially important is the method of distributing supply trains, for these require a great deal of space and render landing very difficult. they also hinder the rapid movement of the expedition corps. when the transports do not remain in close communication with the troops after landing, a very large supply of stores is necessary to make the army independent of the vessels. there should be added, therefore, a reserve ammunition column to that already provided. a fixed amount of supplies should be determined upon, taking due consideration of the extent of the voyage. the troops could requisition some materials from the hostile country. embarkation. proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the shipment of materials and men. to make landing effective the necessary supplies should go on the vessels with the troops. a loading plan should be so drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. the length of time consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage. at the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered about forty-eight hours. this is too small an estimate; it should undoubtedly be doubled. the italian general staff estimates the length of a short sea voyage to be five days. besides, to preserve the fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest. the troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity is net ton loading space. the necessary space for us, for a long sea voyage, is set at two tons for each man and six to seven tons for each horse. the english and russian estimates are about the same. but the english transports to cape town accommodated a larger number of troops than was thought possible, and the american transports to cuba were increased by one-third. as for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here, as they have been discussed at length in the press. the stowing of equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed. the ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse figures relatively as about one to five. coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to place all common and machine guns on deck. a certain amount of ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. this is an essential measure to afford the transport protection from some privateer. the guns should be securely placed to prevent their movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on deck. trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this testing will certainly repay us. all rolling stock will be stowed away firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. the material and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships, so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. the airship division should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may be made during the voyage. the shipping of horses is especially difficult. by former methods the horses had to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise. this left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest after arrival. for a war transport, in which is required a rapid and successful offensive, such horses are not useful. because of the important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition. to this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at least three-quarters of an hour for each horse. ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand horses. three ships would accommodate two cavalry brigades. on every large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition to its regular quota of men and supplies. after the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded daily on the lower decks. cleanliness, ventilation and care are the three most important factors for the good health of the horses. every horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure sufficient fresh air. artificial ventilation is to be preferred to natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses' lungs are easily affected. through this cause, for example, the american transport to cuba lost the greater number of their horses. likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of drinking water. it is recommended that each ship be given its own condenser. the provision of only one or two large condensers on special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet, as the americans employed in their expedition to cuba, has not proved practical. for the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch substantially more troops, through germany's geographical position. the strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the operations are to succeed. for short expeditions, the general rule will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. the forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only straw bags and covers. they will keep their whole baggage with them. cooking will be done in large field kettles. if time permits, it is recommended that the same adjustments as for a long journey be made for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. this will prevent heavy losses in case of rough weather. guns and accessories can be disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages. the length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the ships. the latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind and weather. the time required for loading is as follows: fifteen minutes for one hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. in an operation by the russians, 8,000 men, including infantry and cavalry, were embarked in eight hours. in our loading of east asia transports, it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. the speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. it is certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through detailed preparation and training. napoleon i, in the year 1795, had ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put 132,000 men and their materials on shipboard in two hours. it must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must eventually be landed on open coasts. portable flat-bottom boats and building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the transports. special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so forth. a cable-laying ship is also required. we must now consider to what extent germany is able to load forces for the execution of operations which involve only a short voyage, in which success depends so much on speed. for embarkation on the north sea, hamburg and bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four days. with the addition of ships from emden, wilhelmshaven, glückstadt and kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry division. to these must be added several especially large and fast german steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and partly to expedite the return to home waters. a large number of troops can also be shipped from baltic ports. besides this, a repeated trip of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is maintained continuously. for longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering or purchasing ships of foreign nations. still, we are at present in the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present available ships, within ten or twelve days. sea voyage. for transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. all enterprises of this kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore, must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of embarkation. as the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before the transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. also, throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve the same ends of keeping the course clear. the escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough ships to give immediate protection. a large number would increase unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the greatest value. the task of the escorts is only to protect the transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the enemy. our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service, and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used for this purpose. during the assembling of the transports, these boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic between the loading harbors. the departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a quick landing. the loading commission must take appropriate means to expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the central assembling points. as a rule, the transport steamers would sail with the battle fleet; but in the english expedition to south africa and ours to east asia, this rule was not followed. an essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as the loading is complete. they cannot wait for news of the success of the battle fleet. a certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for the transport fleet can always turn back. only an early departure would insure successful, unexpected landing. the shorter the voyage the greater the necessity for a surprise attack. in the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair prospect of success. even the victor in a great naval battle might not be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. an individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to break into the transport fleet. an important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is the weather. for short distances, it is possible to a certain degree to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of scientific forecasts. conditions might be such that a delay would not harm the operations. adverse weather conditions would more seriously affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause abandonment. our vessels must be so improved as to make them independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. for the time of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard, which could probably be increased by towing with tugs. in putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is known only to the home officials. the advance guard of troops will sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected landing. the pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance guard. the ships which have artillery ride on the flank of the troop transports. then follow the ships carrying supplies. the cable ship comes last. the laying of the cable gives a continuous communication with the home country. for extensive voyages, preparations must be made for taking on coal on the open sea. the commander-in-chief of the expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance. on long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be pursued. ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater part of the time of the cavalry. for short sea voyages these features are not so necessary. in general, strict discipline must be exercised to overcome the tediousness of the trip. while the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands of the captain, who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. if this captain has not served in the german navy, a midshipman may be signed as a coordinate officer. it is our policy to provide every transport ship with a naval officer. landing. military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold landing is never successful. the defense must either scatter its forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the same time. a simultaneous landing at different places is hazardous if the opponent can muster considerable strength. an expedition is seldom so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. on the other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the protection of numerous landing places. a division of the forces weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly managing the start of the operations for want of time and means. therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select one central place for landing. for the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the most unfavorable is the open coast. yet a landing on the open coast would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great speed. if the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it would be the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the mass of troops, horses and materials. the occupation of a good harbor will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on the operations. if a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared disembarking contrivances. every transport must be equipped for landing on an open coast. the best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations, which would force the opponents to a decision before they were thoroughly prepared. clear coast regions within range of the ships' guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing site. it is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and fortifications. russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth of this statement. fortifications are effective against landing enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the coast. if the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be ineffective for defense. the best security, however, for the initial landing is its unexpected delivery. reconnoitering of the coast site by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given time for preparations for defense. of great importance for rapid, well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal service of the ships and the telephone service on land, which can be installed advantageously. in anchoring the ships must be the correct distance apart, to avoid crowding. the execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: the advance guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. if the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow should immediately throw up earthworks. the entire disembarking must be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished the less the danger of being disturbed. the most favorable time for attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. as the ships do not carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open coast, special flat-bottom boats should be prepared for unloading horses and heavy material. the english employ collapsible boats for landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the russians have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one complete cannon. it is recommended that we be permitted to try the russian model, which has been well tested. small power boats should be employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. to permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number are sometimes lost. the americans, in their landing in cuba, lost seven per cent. of their horses. for the landing of artillery and heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach, for which prepared material is carried on the transports. the assembling of the troops must not be permitted on the beach, for all space there must be kept for the landing of supplies. if a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast. if all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to draw near. the advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack, through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited number of battleships. earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side. the piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for disembarking. the existing plans for improvising landing bridges and gangways should be extended, in order to expedite the landing. the piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships, should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. the landed troops should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin operations independent of the supply trains. the time required for landing is considerably less than for loading. the natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the time. one writer gives the following data: lord cochran landed 18,000 men on the open coast of america in five hours; in the crimean war the english accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about 100 horses in less than eleven hours. the french are slower on account of their handling of supply trains. the russians, in their landing maneuvers in the black sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six kilometers from the coast. the marine writer degories figures that under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 60 guns in six hours. if the landing can be made in a harbor, this time can be essentially lessened. after the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime strength of the country attacked. if the assailant continues in command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the expedition. if the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters. operations. the operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular conditions under which the forces operate. the well-known marine writer, mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be offensive to succeed. military history shows that after boldly carried out landings at abukir and cape breton, for example, the success of the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. the assembled strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance. defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to receive expected reenforcements. the primary aim of the operations is to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and with the least loss to ourselves. during the progress of the operations the country through which the troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies, but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not be decreased through extended raids. while the distance to the objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. much progress has been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse, which will help to solve the problem of provisions. the army of invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and utilize it as a base of operations. continuous communication with the home country is therefore not absolutely necessary. in a densely populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and supplies. the maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous in that it requires excessive guard duty. when the battle fleet has gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible for the corps of invasion to select new bases. sherman's march to savannah in the civil war has shown the practicability of this plan. after one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for further operations. against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. dearly purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims. if the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification, the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces. battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved at will and so are hard to put out of action. continuous bombardment from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops. it is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as well as the naval forces. small coast defenses of seaport cities could not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. it is certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an energetic attack from the land side. they are more vulnerable than inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from land and water. however, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on land. reembarkation. a reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. in the event of defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites, with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. if the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations for its defense must be made in advance. when the reembarkation is done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as explained in the chapter on "embarkation" must be adhered to. for such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy should not be permitted to interfere with its management. application i. consideration of landing operations against powers that can be reached only by sea the recognized military complication with england and america affords an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures. a conflict with england must be fixed in the eye of germany, for the great german struggle for commerce represents to england just as great a danger as the advance of russia against india. beginning operations with a naval war with england, we could almost foresee the result. england has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to win a decisive victory. only by closing an alliance with russia would the strength of england be injured indeed, but never by a direct threat from these provinces. but an alliance with france would in fact menace england. the latter, however, through her geographical location and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime superiority against this alliance. england's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely, the land army. the english army responds to neither quantity nor quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the extent of the land; therefore england, from convictions, proceeds so that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. these convictions are in no way justified, for while england in developing a powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really weaker sea opponent with its fighting units. these are the measures which germany, in case of a threatened war with england, must adopt and practise: our endeavors must be to engage the fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the english coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's land, where our troops are already superior in quality to england's, and so that a victory for england's powerful naval strength could have but the smallest influence. the army fighting strength of england under the commander-in-chief is composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the yeomanry. in the event of an unexpected invasion, only the commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent, for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the first decisive battle. the volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. also their insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents. the english army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to each corps. a third to a half of these corps is comprised of militia, so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a division. of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are in ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the undertaking of a german invasion through ireland even though it brought about the longed-for freedom. the preparation for defense should also be considered. this might consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up from three army corps. whereas the army strength of an english division is about 10,000 men, a german division carries 16,000 men, hence four german divisions and a cavalry division would have a superiority over the english army. but we are in a position to set over in england, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division. how a well regulated operation against england is to be conducted across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. the passage in moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our north sea harbors. the english coast affords extensive stretches of shore which are suitable for landing troops. the land contains such large resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. on the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the english land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a successful invading force. it is improbable that germany could carry on for very long a well regulated war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. the supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land. maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily be seen to be of importance. it is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in england is their field army, and the second must be london. it is probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed for the protection of london fortifications, so as not to leave the metropolis insufficiently defended. powerful public opinion would demand this for fear that london would fall into the hands of the invaders. but if london is taken by the invading army this would still be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure a base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view to concluding the overthrow of england. operations against the united states of north america must be entirely different. with that country, in particular, political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. however, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in order to combat the encroachment of the united states upon our interests. our main factor here is our fleet. our battle fleet has every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the united states, widely dispersed over the two oceans. it is certain that after the defeat of the united states fleet, the great extension of unprotected coast line and powerful resources of that country would compel them to make peace. there is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of american merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea forces of american ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses, while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the unpacified american colonies. it must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the united states would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster, but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to strike. it is evident, then, that a naval war against the united states cannot be carried on with success without at the same time inaugurating action on land. because of the great extensions of the united states it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the land. it is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on the atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that the government would be willing to treat for peace. if the german invading force were equipped and ready for transporting the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions these corps can begin operations on american soil within at least four weeks. to what extent we will be able to succeed has already been considered. the united states at this time is not in a position to oppose our troops with an army of equal rank. its regular army actually totals 65,000 men, of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend the home country. of these at least 10,000 men are required to guard indian territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so that only a regular army of 20,000 is available for field service. there is also a militia of 100,000 men, the larger number of whom have not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled. if an unexpected invasion of the united states is prevented by the length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a quick invasion. for the continued occupation of as large a territory as the united states, if they can oppose us for any length of time, an important fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and to carry on a successful warfare. an invading operation will be difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops, at such a great distance. it is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land as the united states. the fact that one or two of her provinces are occupied by the invaders would not alone move the americans to sue for peace. to accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful seizure of many of the atlantic seaports in which the threads of the entire wealth of the nation meet. it should be so managed that a line of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply, disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to impose heavy indemnities. for enterprises of this sort small land forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the american garrisons to attempt an attack. their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various recognized landing points on the coast. but there are many other splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the fleet. the land corps can either advance aggressively against the concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and land at a new place. as a matter of fact, germany is the only great power which is in a position to conquer the united states. england could of course carry out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to protect her canadian provinces, with which the americans could compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. none of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to attempt an invasion. ii. views on colonial expeditions all operations for colonial expeditions can be undertaken successfully because of the small forces necessary to transport over the sea to make war upon a country which does not possess modern equipment and trained troops. just such an expedition was unostentatiously carried out in china before our own eyes. the sending of an expedition to east asia affords an interesting example of what can be done. without resistance we have set up governments at a distance from the home country. it is possible with the aid of the fleet to secure similar results. however, there are many obstacles to be overcome. it is imperative that in time of peace we should prepare in every possible way for war in foreign lands which have any commercial value for us. inasmuch as the german army has determined upon larger divisions of troops, the problems of operations on the distant sea falls to the navy. in the future the conducting of such operations will rest with the general staff. it will be necessary to continue the preparations, described fully in the forepart of this book, for the carrying out of operations against such countries as asia, africa and south america. good judgment must be used in the selection of methods. the execution of the first operations would require the constantly combined efforts of the general staff and the admiral staff. our excellent knowledge of east asia has given us the necessary technical preparation in the way of equipment. the chartering of transport ships for service to china should not be difficult in consequence of the large size of the expedition. the expedition corps would require eighteen ships, material and supplies would take five. the greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two large steamship companies, the north german lloyd and the hamburg-american line. the charter of these steamship companies provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this sort. the disadvantages of this arrangement once appeared in the delay through a labor strike, when it was necessary to transport part of the unfinished ships to wilhelmshaven. another drawback is that not enough room is provided in these ships. on the steamers of the hamburg-american line, for example, only sixty-five per cent. of their normal passenger capacity can be utilized for troops which means at the most an approximate displacement of three net tons, so that only one man instead of two can be carried. an adjustment should be reached to the end that the entire freight capacity of the steamers could be counted upon. the interior arrangements of a steamer to be used for troop transport must be planned according to law. fire-extinguishers, life-saving apparatus and other necessities must be provided for; numerous tables and benches which can be drawn up to the ceiling should be in the troops rooms, and should also be found up on deck. hospital arrangements for two and one-half per cent. of the transport strength should be provided. the active troops of the expedition corps are at present drawn from volunteers, the reserve and the militia, and grouped in new formations. through this the home defenses may be benefited, but the expedition corps would not be up to standard, even though the newly formed troops would have sufficient time to concentrate. it is advisable for such an expedition to employ active, well-trained soldiers for the main part, while the balance could be made up of reserves. it is also to be recommended that in the near future we form a fixed body of troops trained for hospital service. such a formation would have great intrinsic worth. a few words should be said about the organizing of a colonial army, which would be called upon to play an essential part in german military operations over the sea. it would be of extraordinary value in preserving order in our colonies and would also be of assistance in commercial aims. the colonial army would constitute a picked body of men, suitable for service in hot climates and uncivilized countries, who would be able to fight effectively against colonies with which we might be at war. there would still remain, however, the need of preparation of our home forces for colonial expeditions. we are not assured at present of the assembling of the necessary number of qualified troops without drawing on our regular army. it requires a good deal of time to procure the equipment for an expedition to east asia. therefore, contracts with capable firms should be made, to make delivery in the shortest possible time. while the equipment of the infantry with up-to-date weapons is easily accomplished, it is noteworthy that only about thirty horses can be loaded by the english system. some effort should be made to solve the horse problem. the purchasing of horses in australia, america and south china has ceased, in consequence of the knowledge that only a small percentage can withstand the change of climate. it would be impossible to employ joint cavalry forces, due to lack of mounts. it is imperative to find the means for forming a mounted infantry, for there is an insufficient number of advanced cavalry troops to meet an emergency. it would be advantageous if large brigades now idle could be moved for operations in eastern china. past experience in china has emphasized the great importance of cavalry for operations in large countries. the losses in newly purchased horses would be greater than if we would send trained horses accustomed to military service. the great loss in transporting horses is no longer to be feared. the experience of the english in transporting horses to cape town proves the worth of their loading system. and it should be pointed out that the prussian horses, through their training, can endure climatic changes and the hardships of sea transportation much better than the english horses. the thirty horses on the transport must be well taken care of to reach east asia. the ships should be fitted out with this aim in view. accidents usually occur in crossing the equator. the red sea and the indian ocean are especially difficult to cross. this could be overcome by sending the transport by way of cape town, where a part of the trip could be made south through the tropic of cancer. it has been demonstrated that horses not older than from ten to sixteen years should be selected for service abroad. no fear need be felt as to the feeding of the horses, for our horses are accustomed to little corn. sometimes feedings of soaked rice with molasses added have given favorable results. a possible help for the outfitting of the artillery would be the purchasing in italy of native mules and loading them at genoa. in english sea-transporting these animals have demonstrated their exceptional powers of resistance. they are preferable to horses because they can endure hardships better and can more easily be accustomed to conditions in east asia. while we have a large variety of artillery, our expedition corps must be equipped with mountain guns which can be carried by beasts of burden. this is often necessary in colonial expeditions. experience shows that it is difficult to move the heavy artillery of the field army over bad roads, and the large guns would not get very far. this is true also of the steel-boat bridge trains. it is surprising that our collapsible boats, universally approved as superior, are not utilized. our military arrangements have not included a suitable hospital service, because the ambulances are too heavy and unwieldy. the french seem to have been afforded very good service by the so-called cacolets--saddle horses with pack saddles for the sick and wounded. these are excellent for use in colonial countries. a light wagon model is generally recommended for supplies, for despite the condition of the roads they must be able to follow the troops. it is a question how the unfavorable conditions of communication with our men-of-war can be improved. once the forces and supplies are in bremen and bremerhaven no difficulties would be found in embarking. for the future a central place is recommended from which the expedition corps can sail. if thorough preparations are made the loading of the transports can be accomplished in two or three days; by the old method of loading it took two days for each ship. to facilitate the work, the loading should be done simultaneously on both sides of the steamer. the greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from bremen to bremerhaven. the troops can consequently embark at quai in about four hours. the vessels, which have been arranged to utilize all available space, can also carry all accouterments, ammunition and supplies. great delay and inconvenience might be caused by not accurately calculating the massive proportions of the military shipment. it is therefore above all argument that the military authorities and not the steamship company should oversee the loading so that it would be done properly from a military standpoint. through a haphazard loading, the detached troops might not go in the same boat with their belongings, and they might not even know where their individual effects were stowed. disembarking would be difficult and delayed, causing the forces to wait a long time for the unloading of their guns and ammunition. with regard to the sea voyage, it is very advantageous for us that the sailing of the joint fleet is not required. the trip by transport would take from forty-two to fifty-seven days. the trip from shanghai to taku can be made successfully with the aid of our battle fleet. the transports should sail without artillery equipment, so that no difficulty would be experienced in getting letters-of-marque; but if they could have on deck even a small amount of the guns which they have on board, they would have nothing to fear from privateers or auxiliary cruisers. upon arrival at taku, considerable difficulties might be encountered, for it is reported that it is practically impossible to procure the extra help needed. considering a landing at tsingtau, it should be noted that there has not been provided a sufficient number of disembarking boats. this situation proves that under all circumstances the troop transport must be equipped independently to land its troops and supplies. experience has taught us that a great deal of preparation is necessary to undertake colonial expeditions and it behooves us now to lay a foundation for future operations over the sea. iii. concluding views many operations of our army, under protection of the fleet, can be conducted in hitherto unexpected directions; many commands which our fleet may not be able to carry out alone can be accomplished by the combination of the land and sea forces. now if the army across the sea is able to resist our strength, it is necessary to prepare in advance to have our battle fleet so strong that it will be in a position to assist materially in any undertaking of our troops. from studies of the strength of our various opponents across the sea whom we must aim at, because their neighboring territory is of great importance to us, it is plain that we must enlarge our fleet to protect our commercial interests. it is essential that the speed of our battle fleets be increased. not the least important thing to realize is the fact that as a rule it is impossible to undertake large operations across the sea, and to carry them out successfully, unless exhaustive preparations are made during times of peace. the end scapa and a camera [illustration: country life] _first published in 1921._ [illustration: "the sure shield of britain and of her empire." (_extract from his majesty the king's message to his navy at the outbreak of war._)] scapa and a camera pictorial impressions of five years spent at the grand fleet base. by c. w. burrows with an introduction by vice-admiral f. s. miller, c.b. rear-admiral scapa flow, 1914-1916 london published at the offices of country life, ltd., 20, tavistock street, covent garden, w.c. 2, and by george newnes, ltd., 8-11, southampton street, strand, w.c. 2 new york: charles scribner's sons mcmxxi dedicated (by permission) to admiral of the fleet earl beatty, o.m., g.c.b., and the officers and men of the grand fleet and auxiliaries preface the author desires to express his indebtedness to the undermentioned, who, by the loan of photographs or in other ways, have assisted in the production of this book: the photographic bureau, imperial war museum. o. baird, esq., admiralty. p. goodyear, esq., senior constructor, admiralty. lieut.-commander n. a. k. money, r.n., o.b.e., admiralty. paymaster-lieut. humphrey joel, r.n.r., h.m.s. "excellent." t. kent, esq., kirkwall. a. h. dominey, esq., late junior army and navy stores, ltd., s.s. "borodino." jas. mackintosh, esq., kirkwall. guibal house, lee, s.e. 12, _march, 1921_. introduction it was my privilege to be in administrative charge of the naval base at scapa from august, 1914, to may, 1916, until relieved by rear-admiral prendergast. the author, mr. c. w. burrows, assumed duty as cashier of the dockyard section at the base in may, 1915, and was so employed until march, 1920, and thus had a long and intimate knowledge of local doings and surroundings. he has compiled a unique and profusely illustrated book, which should prove of surpassing interest, not only to those who only know of scapa by hearsay, but particularly to the thousands of officers and men of the naval, marine, and civil services of the crown, the mercantile marine, and others who were employed in and near scapa flow. to the latter it will serve as a remembrance of the incidents, many joyous and some sad and tragic, associated with their sojourn in the northern mists which shrouded scapa from the public eye. part iv., dealing with the german ships at scapa flow, their dramatic sinking on 21st june, 1919, and the subsequent salvage operations of several of them, is an exceptionally fine pictorial record. owing to the lack of facilities, practically the whole of the base establishment had to be accommodated afloat, and until the arrival of h.m.s. "victorious" in march, 1916, as accommodation ship and workshop for the dockyard staff and workmen, the officers and men experienced considerable discomfort. the men usually found quarters on board the ships upon which they were working, and, owing to the shortness of notice, they were frequently taken to sea. a very marked feature throughout the war was the spirit of loyalty, good comradeship, and emulation which evinced itself among all ranks, ratings, and grades, whether on duty or in recreations. it was this spirit that lightened the discomforts and difficulties which necessarily occurred, maintained the grand fleet and base in a healthy state of efficiency, and brought about the breakdown of the german morale, resulting in the ignominious surrender of the german ships in november, 1918, and their ultimate transfer to scapa flow. the author is to be congratulated in providing such a delightful souvenir of the great war. f. s. miller. long hope, shortheath, farnham, surrey. contents part i page the development of the base 1 part ii scenes around scapa flow 29 part iii the navy at scapa flow 59 part iv the german ships at scapa flow 97 illustrations "the sure shield of britain and of her empire" _frontispiece_ page map of scapa flow and the orkney islands _to face_ xx h.m.s. "cyclops" at long hope 1 st. john's head, hoy 5 drifter net-boom defence at houton 7 sunken ships between st. margaret's hope and burray 7 the grand fleet base at long hope, 1916, looking towards weddel sound 9 closer view of the base ships at long hope 9 h.m.s. "imperieuse" at long hope 11 h.m.s. "victorious" at scapa flow 12 r.f.a. "ruthenia" 13 torpedo sub-depôt ship "sokoto" lying in the inner hope 14 the brough of birsay, off which h.m.s. "hampshire" was lost on 6th june, 1916 14 driving off from the first hole on flotta 15 children's race at long hope sports 16 watching the sports 16 a boxing match on flotta 17 a ship's garden at crockness 18 u.s.s. "new york" leading the 6th battle squadron into scapa after crossing the atlantic 19 harvest festival 20 the "green room" of a battleship; officers making up for a show 21 german battleship "kaiser" entering the boom at scapa flow for internment at dawn on 26th november, 1918 23 the german ships interned at scapa 23 german battle cruiser "derfflinger" four minutes before finally sinking, 2.45 p.m., 21st june, 1919 24 vice-admiral sir r. j. prendergast making his farewell address on h.m.s. "victorious," 15th february, 1920 25 good-bye to scapa! 26 view looking south from houton bay 29 wideford hill and the "peerie sea" 32 loading stores at scapa pier 32 kirkwall harbour from the cathedral tower 33 albert street, kirkwall 34 st. magnus cathedral from the earl's palace 35 old houses in kirkwall 36 stromness from the sea 37 houton bay air station 38 the clestron barrier, stromness 39 the standing stones of stennis 40 the ring of brodgar 40 the tumulus of maeshowe 41 the entrance to maeshowe 41 a winding road in hoy 42 ward hill and graemsay island from the sea 43 ward hill--the road to rackwick 44 ward hill from the east 44 the old man of hoy 45 the dwarfie stone 46 the new stone wall and pier, lyness 47 crofts near lyness 47 excavations at lyness in connection with the building of the wharf 48 the first train in orkney 48 sunset over the martello tower, crockness 49 the martello tower, crockness 49 view looking through the martello tower, crockness, towards long hope 50 melsetter--on the road from lyness to long hope 51 long hope pier and post office 52 long hope hotel 52 kirk hope, south walls 53 cantick lighthouse, south walls 53 digging the peats--hoy 54 carting home the peats 54 horse and ox harrowing 55 loading sea-weed for manure 55 an orkney cart 55 making straw-backed chairs, orkney 56 interior of an orkney cottage 57 spinning 58 battle squadron exercising in the flow 59 admiral of the fleet earl beatty on the quarterdeck of h.m.s. "queen elizabeth" 62 h.m.s. "queen elizabeth" 63 h.m.s. "revenge" and ships of the first battle squadron at scapa 64 h.m.s. "ramillies" 64 h.m.s. "resolution" 64 h.m.s. "royal oak" 64 fourth battle squadron exercising in the flow 65 battleships "orion," "monarch," and "conqueror" in the flow 66 battleships "colossus," "st. vincent," and "bellerophon" exercising in the flow 66 h.m.s. "renown" 67 h.m.s. "tiger": a famous ship of the battle cruiser squadron 67 h.m.s. "emperor of india" 68 h.m.s. "whitshed" 68 h.m.s. "barham" 68 light cruiser "calliope" at scapa 69 "make and mend" on light cruiser "yarmouth" 69 the deck of an aeroplane carrier, h.m.s. "furious" 70 submarine "g 13" alongside h.m.s. "queen elizabeth" 71 submarine "k 16" under way in the flow 71 officers of submarine "k 7" in the conning tower 71 marines drilling on the quarterdeck of a battleship 72 general view of captain's sunday morning inspection 73 "tidying up" for inspection 74 officers and men exercising on the quarterdeck 75 "holystoning" 76 washing down decks 77 stokers at work 78 church service on h.m.s. "queen elizabeth" 79 hospital ships at scapa flow 80 h.m. hospital ship "magic ii.," afterwards renamed "classic" 80 transferring a "cot case" from a battleship to the hospital ship drifter 81 dentist at work on a battleship (h.m.s. "collingwood") 82 h.m.s. "imperieuse" with fleet mail steamer "st. ninian" and mail drifters from the fleet alongside 83 mail boat "st. ola" coming alongside h.m.s. "victorious" 83 sorting mails for the fleet on h.m.s. "imperieuse" 84 distributing newspapers for the fleet (h.m.s. "imperieuse") 85 dockyard workmen leaving h.m.s. "victorious" for work in the fleet 86 repairing a steam pinnace on the slipway at lyness 86 school children's entertainment on h.m.s. "victorious" 87 three of the young orcadian guests 87 "no coupons required" 88 crew of drifter "shalot" 89 lifting chain cables 89 mooring vessel "recovery" at scapa flow 89 u.s.s. "patuxent" and "272" alongside h.m.s. "victorious" for repairs 90 american minesweepers in the floating dock for repairs 90 a damaged british destroyer being repaired in the dock 90 s.s. "borodino," junior army and navy stores' store-ship with the grand fleet 91 interior of shop on s.s. "borodino" 91 a corner of an officer's cabin 92 fishing for sea-trout 93 a ship's picnic 93 a bathing party 93 the naval cemetery at lyness 94 the "hampshire" memorial 94 an interesting stone to the memory of a chinaman who died at scapa 94 the "malaya" memorial 95 the "vanguard" memorial 95 making for home 96 the scuttling of the german ships 97 h.m.s. "lion" entering hoxa boom, scapa flow, at head of german battle cruisers, 25th november, 1918 100 h.m.s. "repulse," "renown," "princess royal," and "tiger" escorting german battle cruisers through hoxa boom, 25th november, 1918 100 german battle cruiser "seydlitz" entering hoxa boom, 25th november, 1918 102 german battle cruiser "von der tann" entering hoxa boom, 25th november, 1918 102 german battle cruiser "moltke" entering hoxa boom, 25th november 1918 103 the interned german ships at scapa 103 german battle cruiser "seydlitz" 104 german battle cruiser "moltke" at scapa flow 105 german battle cruiser "derfflinger" at scapa flow 106 german battle cruiser "hindenburg" at scapa flow 106 german battleship "friedrich der grosse" 107 german battleship "kaiserin" 107 german light cruiser "köln" 108 german destroyers at lyness, with battleships in the distance 108 plan of the anchorage of german ships at scapa flow 110 a party of french officers visiting the german ships 111 german battleship "bayern" sinking by the stern, 2 p.m., 21st june, 1919 112 the final plunge of the "bayern" 113 german destroyers sinking or beached off the island of fara 114 german sailors taking to the boats 115 british boarding party alongside sinking german destroyer 116 general view showing german destroyers sinking on the right and battleships in the distance, at 3.30 p.m., 21st june, 1919 117 german battle cruiser "hindenburg" as she now rests at scapa 118 whaler "ramna" stranded on german battle cruiser "moltke" 23rd june, 1919, taken just before "ramna" refloated 119 german cruiser "nurnberg" immediately after being refloated at 2 p.m. on 3rd july, 1919 120 salvage operations on battleship "baden" and cruiser "frankfurt" beached at smoogroo 121 salvage work on the "baden" 122 pumping out the "frankfurt" 123 cruiser "bremse," which capsized whilst being beached 124 battle cruiser "seydlitz," lying on her starboard side in shallow water 124 hoisting the union jack on a sinking german destroyer 125 on the "seydlitz" 125 "baden" being towed south to invergordon 125 salving german destroyer "g 102" 126 salvage party working on a german destroyer 127 view showing salved ex-german cruisers and destroyers at long hope, october, 1919 128 the salved german cruisers "nurnberg" and "emden" in long hope bay 129 view looking aft from after-control top of "frankfurt" 130 view looking forward from the same position 130 expansion ring marking on 6-inch gun "nurnberg" 131 a humorous effort on the part of one of our sailors 131 the propeller blade of the "seydlitz" 131 range-finder and searchlight platform, "nurnberg" 132 88-mm. guns, "nurnberg" 132 6-inch gun on "nurnberg" after-turret 133 5·9-inch after-breech, "nurnberg" 133 searchlight control platform, "frankfurt" 133 10·5-cm. gun on a german destroyer 134 torpedo tubes on a destroyer 135 engine-room control board, "emden" 136 lower conning tower, "emden" 137 german destroyer being towed south to rosyth, march, 1920 138 blowing up the minefields 140 closer view of mine explosion 140 salvage operations on s.s. "aorangi" 142 sunset over the hills of hoy 144 [illustration: to face p. xx. map of scapa flow and the orkney islands.] part i the development of the base [illustration: h.m.s. "cyclops" at long hope.] scapa and a camera the development of the base some slight apologia seems necessary to-day for the publication of a book of war reminiscences (even though they be mainly photographic), when so many personages, from admirals and generals downwards to the humbler ranks of w.a.a.c.'s and lady typists in government offices, have seen fit to record in print their experiences during the great war. this little album is being published at the suggestion of various friends in the naval service, with whom the writer has come into contact during the five years he has been associated with the royal navy at the grand fleet base at scapa flow, and, it is hoped, may reach a wider circle of those to whom the name "scapa flow" has hitherto conveyed but a hazy notion of islands shrouded in perpetual northern mist--somewhere north of scotland, c/o g.p.o., where for five years the grand fleet kept its monotonous vigil in readiness for "the day," and where finally it had its reward when, in november, 1918, the german fleet was ignominiously escorted into the waters of the flow, whose defences its submarines had more than once endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to penetrate. various writers--_e.g._, "bartimaeus" and the author of "in the northern mists"--have written vivid pen pictures of the everyday life of the navy, and the photographs reproduced in the following pages, besides recalling many monotonous--and some pleasant--times to those who served at scapa during the war, may help to supplement these books by presenting the actual environment and life of those whose "lawful occasions" necessitated so long a sojourn in these northern waters. to many "scapa" is a name (judging from the warmth of their remarks when the subject is mentioned) that they would like to eradicate for ever from their book of remembrance. their feelings are expressed in a parody of a well-known song which appeared in the _orcadian_ of the 5th december, 1918, entitled-scapa flow (a hymn of hate). have you ever heard the story of how scapa got its name? if you haven't then you're slow, because it's earned a world-wide fame. it has caused a lot of howling amongst our tars at sea, so i'll tell to you the story as a sailor told it me: sure a little bit of wastage fell from out the sky one day, and it fell into the ocean in a spot up scotland way. and when the sea lords saw it, sure! it looked so bleak and bare they said, "suppose we start to build a naval base up there." so they dotted it with colliers, to provide the tars with work, with provision boats and oilers, that they dared not dodge or shirk. then they sprinkled it with raindrops, with sleet and hail and snow, and when they had it finished, sure, they called it scapa flow. now the navy's been at scapa ever since we've been at war, and whenever it is over, they won't want to see it more. but for years and years to come, whenever sailors congregate you may bet your life you may hear them sing that scapa hymn of hate. curiously enough, the weather forecast given in the _orcadian_ immediately below read: "showers or drizzling rain; local mist." certainly even the most enthusiastic orcadian has to admit that the islands have few natural features to commend them, and even less of the artificial amenities of civilisation: country practically bare of trees and vegetation, days in winter when the sun hardly seems to rise at all, and a climate that seems to hold the record for rainfall, storms, and unreliability. [illustration: st. john's head, hoy. (the highest cliff in great britain.)] yet, in spite of all the unkindness of nature, to many there hangs a cloud of romance over these far-away northern islands. to those who have the observing eye, they are rich in the remains of a prehistoric past, with a history extending far back into the centuries. they possess a coast of unsurpassed grandeur of form and beauty of colouring, and as they are approached from the south, or seen from one of the hills of hoy on a fair day, appear like some "fairy archipelago set in a summer sea," whilst a distant mirage often heightens the effect of unreality. in few places does one see such wonderful sunsets and cloud effects as in orkney, followed often a little later by the "searchlight" rays of the aurora borealis. but mainly will those who spent long months and years in orkney look back, not without regrets, on the spirit of comradeship which made exile endurable, and which, in face of a common danger, united even the most varied personalities to work in harmony for a common cause. many friendships were made which will long survive the war; many a "cheery night" in the wardroom will recall pleasant memories of those who are now scattered over the seven seas; and few of the many thousands who returned to civil life after serving in the navy during the war but will have some regrets for the days when they took the rough and the smooth together (it was mostly rough) in the northern mists of scapa flow. not a few married into orcadian families, and the writer recalls his embarrassment on one occasion when in stonehouse naval hospital recovering from an operation, in discussing somewhat freely various kirkwall acquaintances with a naval officer invalided from the northern base, he happened to mention a certain lady's name as one of the fairest of the orcadian maidens, whom he understood had married a naval officer. "yes," was the reply, "she is my wife." until quite recently scapa flow and the orkneys were practically unknown to the majority of englishmen, and even to-day very few could point out the exact location of scapa flow on the map. in a well-known london newspaper of 23rd june, 1919 (after the scuttling of the german fleet), scapa flow was marked on a map as north of kirkwall, whereas it will be seen from the map reproduced in this volume that it is actually south of that town. it is recalled also that on one occasion a travelling claim of a certain officer at the base was returned from the admiralty with a query as to the car hire claimed, and the inquiry was made as to why more use had not been made of the railway facilities! [illustration: t. kent. drifter net-boom defence at houton.] scapa flow was used as an exercise ground for the home fleet many years before the war, with headquarters at the north-eastern corner of the flow; but no preparations appear to have been made for its use as a permanent war base prior to 1914, and consequently an enormous amount of pioneer work was needed to render it a safe and efficient harbour for the grand fleet and its auxiliaries. the magic growth of the base from a few ships to many hundreds of vessels of all types--battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, depôt ships, oilers, colliers, store and ammunition ships, hospital ships, etc.--constituting the most powerful fleet ever assembled in one place, was a gradual process, in which many novel situations arose and many difficulties had to be met and contended with. the absence of railway communication, the difficulties of local transport in weather conditions which at times even large vessels could not face, were additional obstacles to the hurried improvisation of arrangements, both ashore and afloat, which were essential to the effectual working of the grand fleet. [illustration: j. phillips. sunken ships between st. margaret's hope and burray.] when admiral jellicoe succeeded sir george callaghan as commander-in-chief of the newly-named "grand fleet" on 4th august, 1914, there were practically no defences whatever on any of the islands, with the exception of a few 12-pounder guns landed from the fleet, whilst there were, of course, no booms or obstructions across the numerous entrances (hoxa, switha, hoy, and holm sounds) to the flow. it was not until the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915 that sunken ships were placed across the narrower channels, such as burra, water, and holm sounds, and that net-boom defence drifters were placed across the larger ones, and 4-inch and 6-inch guns landed at various batteries, which were erected to command these entrances. consequently, during these early months of the war, the grand fleet could not remain in harbour in the flow for more than a very brief period, owing to the danger of submarine attack; indeed, as jellicoe remarks in his book on the grand fleet, it is a wonder that the germans did not make a more determined attack on our fleet during this period. it was on 16th/17th october, 1914, that the "battle of scapa flow" took place, when a report that a submarine was in the flow caused great excitement, and every available type of craft got under way in the endeavour to locate and sink it, firing at anything remotely resembling a periscope, and at night-time sweeping the seas with their searchlights. it was, i believe, never actually ascertained whether a submarine was present, but, as a result, the grand fleet moved further westwards to lough swilly, and did not return to scapa until a few months later when the defences were somewhat more secure. meantime the organisation of the base proceeded apace, and h.m.s. "cyclops" and "assistance," fleet repair ships, were joined by a large and increasing number of vessels, with rear-admiral f. s. miller in command of the base. even so, continued difficulty was felt to accommodate the even more rapidly expanding personnel, and admiral jellicoe writes regarding the "cyclops" at this period: "the manner in which the great demands on her accommodation were met was a standing wonder to me. in the early part of the war, officers on admiral miller's staff and others were obliged to make their sleeping berths as best they could on the deck or on top of their writing-tables, and it was surprising that the overcrowding in all directions did not affect health." [illustration: the grand fleet base at long hope, 1916, looking towards weddel sound.] [illustration: "cyclops." "victorious." "assistance." "imperieuse." "ruthenia." closer view of the base ships at long hope.] towards the end of october, 1914, the base, owing to weather conditions, was moved from scapa bay to long hope, where it remained until april, 1919, when it was transferred to lyness, where a substantial sea-wall was in process of completion, and where the floating dock was moored. here it still remains, though of it "ichabod" must be written, for it retains only a shadow of its former activities. the fleet itself lay north of weddel sound, and the auxiliaries were disposed between long hope and gutter sound (see map). [illustration: h.m.s. "imperieuse" at long hope.] one of the earliest arrivals at the base was h.m.s. "imperieuse" (previously "fisgard i."). she left portsmouth in september, 1914, in company with "fisgard ii.," with a party of dockyardmen who were coming up for work in the grand fleet; unfortunately "fisgard ii." capsized off portland bill with the loss of several lives, but "fisgard i." arrived safely at scapa flow, and was renamed "imperieuse." during the war she discharged many useful and important functions, and there are few naval officers who served any length of time at scapa who did not at some time pass through her. primarily she was the receiving and distributing centre for the mails for the fleet, and some idea of the enormous number of letters, etc., dealt with may be gleaned from the fact that when the fleet was present some 50,000 items were sorted and despatched daily. "imperieuse" was also the headquarters of the staffs of the admiralty port officer (or king's harbour master, as he would be styled at a dockyard port), fleet coaling officer, naval store officer, victualling store officer, naval ordnance officer, cashier, base censor, and also accommodated the dockyard working parties, until at a later stage other vessels arrived which relieved her of some of these functions. in spite of the limited office and cabin accommodation, it was an interesting time: the work and the conditions were novel, and there was always plenty to be done in straightening out the various problems that arose. one could write a small volume on the personalities one met at the base at that time: of a certain genial captain, addicted to forcible but effective speech; of "v.o.s.o.," equally proficient in supplying flour and potatoes, and music; of "n.o.s.o.," who insisted on a duly receipted, countersigned, and approved voucher (in triplicate) before he would part with a minute brass screw; of the "drifter king," whose knowledge of scotch drifter-men and their idiosyncrasies was profound; of a certain officer in charge of water boats, sent to the base by the admiralty as a "gentleman of affairs," whose versatility flowed into such diverse channels as the organisation of a band, sports, the edition of a ship's magazine, the supervision of gifts forwarded by the fresh fruit and vegetables fund, and in numerous other directions; of w---and b---(the "bullion brokers"), who could give you _the_ very latest tip straight from the horse's mouth: these are but a few of those who enlivened the base in 1915-1916. [illustration: h.m.s. "victorious" at scapa flow.] one of the next noteworthy arrivals at the base was that of h.m.s. "victorious," early in 1916. a "dockyard ship" had been awaited for nearly a year to relieve the congestion on "imperieuse," and in september, 1915, the "caribbean," duly fitted out for the purpose, left liverpool for scapa, but, like "fisgard ii.," sank on the journey north off cape wrath. h.m.s. "victorious" was then taken in hand, and reached the base safely in march, 1916. she was well provided with workshops and accommodation--being indeed a miniature "floating dockyard"--and at times over 500 dockyard artisans were accommodated, although these usually lived afloat on the ships of the grand fleet. the presence of such a large body of civilian workmen on a ship officered and manned by service ranks and ratings presented several novel problems, and it was largely due to the tact and consideration of both parties that the experiment, on the whole, was justified by the results. the possession of such a ship at the base, by enabling defects to be adjusted and installations, such as director firing gear, protective deck plating, flying-off platforms, etc., to be fitted by skilled workmen at the base instead of at a southern dockyard, added considerably to the fighting strength of the fleet at a time when ships were badly needed, and when our numerical superiority over the enemy fleet was less marked than at a later period of the war. [illustration: r.f.a. "ruthenia."] early in 1917 the addition of a small floating dock enabled much useful work to be done in carrying out minor refits and emergency repairs, and over 200 keels were docked whilst it remained at scapa. the fleet repair ships, h.m.s. "cyclops" and "assistance," have already been referred to, and they should not be overlooked in this connection; both these vessels carried out, with naval ratings, valuable repairs in connection with the maintenance of the machinery, etc., of the ships of the grand fleet. [illustration: torpedo sub-depôt ship "sokoto" lying in the inner hope.] [illustration: the brough of birsay, off which h.m.s. "hampshire" was lost on 6th june, 1916.] meantime the duties of "imperieuse" were still further relieved by the arrival of other vessels. r.f.a. "ruthenia," previously a dummy battleship, became the storeship and headquarters of the victualling and naval store officers, and the fleet coaling officer took up his quarters in r.f.a. "perthshire" in the secluded waters of pegal bay; whilst the "sokoto" (a depôt ship for the storing and repair of torpedoes) and m.f.a. "zaria" (repair ship for small craft, such as drifters, trawlers, etc.) were already at long hope. [illustration: driving off from the first hole on flotta.] once the early work of organisation was over, life at scapa, especially for the base ships, settled down to a somewhat monotonous routine, varied by spasms of excitement when the grand fleet received orders to proceed to sea, and one wondered if _this_ time it was actually a "stunt," or merely once more "p.z." the summer of 1916 was not, however, without incident. the return of the fleet from jutland, on the morning of 2nd june, was an exciting moment, followed a few days later by the dramatic news that lord kitchener had been lost in h.m.s. "hampshire" off marwick head, and later in the month the king paid a short visit to the fleet. just over a year later, in july, 1917, the battleship "vanguard" blew up with the loss of practically the entire ship's company. the explosion occurred late at night (about eleven o'clock), and the vivid flames which illumined the twilight sky (it was still fairly light) were followed by a dense column of smoke rising about half a mile into the sky. everyone rushed on deck clad in a varied assortment of night attire, every available craft was rushed to the scene of the disaster, and anti-submarine precautions were ordered to be taken. some idea of the force of the explosion may be gathered from the fact the "vanguard's" pinnace was blown clean over the next ship in the line, and landed in the water on the other side, practically undamaged, whilst it was reported that a packet of treasury notes was picked up intact next day on the neighbouring island of flotta. [illustration: children's race at long hope sports.] [illustration: watching the sports.] [illustration: imperial war museum. a boxing match on flotta.] [illustration: a ship's garden at crockness.] towards the end of december, 1917, our fleet was strengthened by the arrival of four u.s. battleships, which were incorporated into the grand fleet as the sixth battle squadron. the presence of the americans contributed some new features into the life of the base, notably in the domain of sport, and baseball became for a time quite a popular game. the importance of games and sport, incidentally, has always been recognised in the navy, and nowhere was the need for recreation more essential for the maintenance of morale and fitness than at scapa. football was played all the year round (there being no summer to speak of in these northern latitudes) on flotta (the playing ground of the grand fleet), and at long hope and lyness by the base ships, whilst two or three rough golf courses were laid out for the use of officers. admiral jellicoe used often to be seen playing a hurried game round the course at flotta in the few moments of relaxation he was able to snatch from his work on the "iron duke." tennis was hardly a possible game, owing to the inclement weather and the continual winds, but one or two ash and gravel courts were made at the shore batteries. sailing and pulling matches were frequently arranged, and the sports of the base ships at long hope became an annual event greatly looked forward to by the local inhabitants as well as by the ships' companies. another annual event of great interest was the grand fleet boxing championship contest, held outside the y.m.c.a. hut at flotta. these competitions were witnessed by as many as 10,000 men, and the writer recalls an inspiring speech made by admiral beatty to this great gathering of sailors in july, 1917, after he had distributed the prizes. prince albert, incidentally, was present on this occasion. [illustration: humphrey joel. u.s.s. "new york" leading the 6th battle squadron into scapa after crossing the atlantic.] [illustration: "harvest festival. "] the work of the y.m.c.a. huts, at flotta and long hope, and of the church army hut later at lyness, was of great value in providing almost the only recreation and social amusement obtainable outside of one's ship, and the ladies who volunteered for service in these lonely islands deserve every praise for the way in which they cared for the comfort and entertainment of the men during the war. [illustration: imperial war museum. the "green room" of a battleship: officers making up for a show.] gardening became at one period quite a popular, as well as profitable, recreation amongst many of the men and officers, and although neither the soil nor the climate was very promising, some remarkably good crops of vegetables were obtained, which were especially welcome in view of the difficulties of obtaining fresh fruit and vegetables on board ship. one enterprising ship actually raised chickens and pigs on one of the islands, although the uncertain movements of the ships made the feeding question a difficult problem at times. a variety of indoor amusements was provided on board ship. the "movies" were always a standing attraction, whilst billiards proved a popular war-time innovation, the movement of the ship adding a fascinating element of uncertainty to the game! some excellent "shows" were organised, and an improvised stage, with the necessary accessories, was rigged up on the frozen meat ship "gourko," which proved an ideal "theatre ship," although it was advisable to come warmly clad, as the auditorium was over the refrigerating room! very little of interest occurred at the base in the early part of 1918, and the grand fleet spent a considerable time in this year at rosyth, where the completion of the boom defences permitted exercises and firing to be carried out with almost the same degree of safety and convenience as at scapa. the progress of the war was, as elsewhere, watched with great excitement towards the end of the year, and the signing of the armistice on the 11th november, 1918, came as a great relief after four years of strain and effort. one of the most welcome of the minor changes effected by the armistice was the removal of the censorship which had been rigorously maintained during the war, and for the first time the general public became aware of the jealously guarded secret of the location of the northern base of the grand fleet. [illustration: the german ships interned at scapa. (battle-cruisers "hindenburg" and "derfflinger" in the foreground.)] [illustration: german battleship "kaiser" entering the boom at scapa flow for internment at dawn on 26th november, 1918.] the entry of the german ships into scapa flow for internment towards the end of the month was a memorable sight, which will not soon be forgotten by those who witnessed it. the vessels came north from rosyth in detachments, and each group of ships entered the flow in the grey dawn of an autumn morning, escorted by our own ships. little groups of spectators who had gathered at points of vantage on the islands identified the various ships as they entered with great interest, and more especially in the case of those who had last met them in action. it was some compensation for those who had spent so many months and years at scapa that "the day" should have culminated in such a dramatic and complete surrender of the german fleet, although it seemed then almost unthinkable that such a surrender should have been made without at least an effort to strike a last blow, or in the last resort to scuttle their ships in port. that some, at any rate, of the officers of the german navy had these feelings was evident from the destruction of one of their submarines just before the armistice in the act of entering the flow, whose outer defences it had indeed penetrated. there seems little doubt that this was a last desperate attempt to sink as many as possible of our fleet before the final and then inevitable surrender, and one cannot but acknowledge the spirit and the bravery of those who took part in such a forlorn hope. [illustration: german battle cruiser "derfflinger" four minutes before finally sinking, 2.45 p.m., 21st june, 1919.] [illustration: vice-admiral sir r. j. prendergast making his farewell address on h.m.s. "victorious," 15th february, 1920.] even more dramatic was the afternoon of saturday, 21st june, 1919, when the large majority of the interned vessels sank beneath the waters of the flow. [illustration: n. a. k. money. good-bye to scapa!] in accordance with the terms of the armistice german crews were allowed to remain on board the interned ships, and after the preliminary inspection, there was practically no communication with our own ships except for essential matters of duty. this rather aided the preparation of the plans made by the germans, and shortly after noon on the 21st the sea-cocks of all the vessels were simultaneously opened, and ensigns, and in some cases the red flag, hoisted. the first battle squadron, which was then at the base, was exercising in the pentland firth at the time, and was not able to return until later in the afternoon, but all available tugs and small craft were immediately ordered to the sinking ships, and as many as possible were run ashore on the surrounding islands. it was a clear afternoon, and probably no more wonderful sight has ever been witnessed than that of these huge vessels on all sides heeling over and plunging headlong--some with their sterns almost vertical above the water, others listing over to port or starboard, with steam and oil and air pouring out of the vents and rising to the surface long after the ships had completely disappeared beneath the water. débris of all sorts, boats, hammocks, lifebelts, chests, etc., littered the sea for miles round. small craft of all descriptions were variously engaged: here a drifter would be seen picking up germans from the water, there a pinnace towing a long string of boats and carley floats full of prisoners to the flagship, whilst other craft were occupied heading off parties of germans who were endeavouring to make for the shore. one or two amusing incidents occurred during the scuttling. one of our water-boats was busily engaged supplying water to one of the ships as she was sinking, and whilst the germans were actually leaving the ship on the other side. some school children from stromness in the tug "flying kestrel" had the unique experience of a trip round the ships in the morning, which on their return journey were sinking or had disappeared. by five or six o'clock the whole of the ships had sunk, except the battleship "baden," which was boarded in time to save her, and three cruisers, which were run ashore or beached. the battle cruisers "hindenburg" and "seydlitz" drifted into shallow water, and with the cruiser "bremse," which turned turtle as she was being beached, are resting on the bottom, and present a spectacle of interest to visitors as they pass in the mail boat to stromness. such was the inglorious end of the german fleet, and with its disappearance the base began slowly to break up. one by one the ships went south, and the acquaintances of many years were severed. on 15th february, 1920, the base reverted to a peace-time status, and the admiral commanding the orkneys and shetlands (vice-admiral sir r. j. prendergast) hauled down his flag. towards the end of the month and during march the salved german cruisers and destroyers were towed south to rosyth for distribution amongst the allied powers, and on 25th march the last of the base ships remaining, h.m.s. "imperieuse" and h.m.s. "victorious," left for rosyth and devonport respectively. to-day not a vessel remains of that vast assemblage of ships which were gathered at the base during the war, and scapa will probably in future be an exercising base only for the fleet as in pre-war times. but, whatever its future, the name of scapa is one that has earned an undying fame in the history of the british empire and of the world, and it will remain as an enduring memory to those who were destined by the chances of war to be exiled in those lonely islands of the north. part ii scenes around scapa flow [illustration: view looking south from houton bay.] scenes around scapa flow kirkwall "voir kirkwall, et mourir," a french naval officer remarked to me when visiting scapa flow. without inquiring too closely as to whether there might not have been some ironical "double-entendre" in his apparent admiration of the capital of the orkneys, it was certainly the orcadian "mecca" of the grand fleet, and never in its history has it known such activity and prosperity as during the five years of war. a sleepy little town of four or five thousand inhabitants, it was suddenly called upon to assist in supplying the needs of a floating population of close on 100,000 men, and its narrow main (and only) street, "where two wheelbarrows tremble when they meet," bustled with unwonted activity--messmen from the ships loading provisions, naval men and officers engaged in an afternoon's shopping and sightseeing, with an occasional motor lorry or car trying to thread its way amongst the traffic. kirkwall, as will be seen from the map, is approached from the flow by way of scapa pier, whence it is a walk or drive of about a mile and a half to the town. the little hamlet of scapa, incidentally, from which the flow takes its name, assumed importance during the war as a seaplane station, and is the scene of an old custom long forgotten, which is related rather amusingly in a volume on orkney by a rev. john brand, dated 1701. he writes: "in scapha about a mile from kirkwal to south-west, it is said there was kept a large and ancient cup, which they say belonged to st. magnus, king of norway, who first instructed them in the principles of the christian religion and founded the church of kirkwal, with which full of some strong drink their bishops at their first landing were presented; which, if he drank it out, they highly praised him, and made themselves to believe, that they should have many good and fruitful years in his time." he adds rather regretfully: "the countrey to this day have the tradition of this, but we did not see the cup; nor could we learn where it was." the fact that the highland park distillery (the most northern distillery in the british isles) is on the upper scapa road rather tends to confirm the legend! [illustration: loading stores at scapa pier.] [illustration: wideford hill and the "peerie sea."] conveyances known locally as "machines" (they do not speak of traps or chars-à-bancs in orkney) are always available to convey one to kirkwall from the pier, and anyone who has travelled over that bumpy road in one of these vehicles will not forget the experience! [illustration: kirkwall harbour from the cathedral tower.] arrived in kirkwall and suitably refreshed (let me recommend the ayre hotel of many pleasant memories), the most striking building which meets the eye, and which dominates the town, is the cathedral of st. magnus. kirkwall, as its name signifies (kirkevaag or kirk voe), is the bay of the church, although the original church from which the town takes its name was not that of st. magnus. founded before the middle of the twelfth century, it is a very fine example of gothic architecture, which, fortunately, owing to its remoteness, escaped the zeal of the reformers, and remains to-day a stately witness of the norse warriors of old, who played such a prominent and adventurous part in the history of orkney. near by are the bishop's and earl's palaces, both also eloquent relics of the days when feasting and fighting were the main preoccupations of the norse jarls, whose exploits are recounted so graphically in the "orkneyinga saga." [illustration: albert street, kirkwall.] [illustration: st. magnus cathedral from the earl's palace.] kirkwall during the war was an examination base, and hundreds of craft of all nationalities passed through the harbour to be searched for contraband of war. later, after the armistice, it became the headquarters of our own and the american mine clearance service, and the advent of four or five thousand american sailors contributed further to the prosperity and enlivenment of the town. baseball, for example, and the "jazz," had not hitherto penetrated so far north as orkney, and dancing soon became almost as great an obsession amongst the fair maidens of kirkwall as it was further south. to-day kirkwall is again outwardly the same quiet town it was prior to 1914, but the infusion of new ideas and modes of life, which was inevitable from contact with so many of our own and american people, has produced many changes of mental and social outlook, and in no town will the years 1914-1919 be remembered for their historical significance more than in the capital of the orkney islands. [illustration: old houses in kirkwall.] stromness stromness, situate at the western extremity of the mainland, is next to kirkwall in size, and is in many respects the rival of the capital. its position did not give it the same importance as kirkwall during the war, although it was a convenient centre for some of the subsidiary activities of the base. for a considerable period it was the headquarters of the western patrol, and the various building operations, including the wharf at lyness and the air stations at houton and scapa, were supervised from the office of the civil engineer at stromness. the accessibility of stromness to the sea through hoy and burra sounds, and the probability of submarine attacks on the fleet through these channels, rendered defensive measures an imperative necessity, and at the time of the armistice a triple series of boom defences, with the additional safeguards of sunken ships and minefields, rendered ingress a practical impossibility. one of the most remarkable of these defences was the clestron barrier between the island of graemsay and clestron. this was constructed of conical frameworks of steel rails, which were placed in position with their bases resting on the bottom of the channel, an operation rendered the more difficult by the tides which sweep around these shores, which give stromness its name (the ness of the "strom" or current). [illustration: stromness from the sea.] stromness is a picturesquely situated little town, with its straggling houses, rising straight from the water's edge, and its rugged coast scenery. the traveller from kirkwall, after traversing fifteen miles of somewhat monotonous road, is suddenly confronted with the quiet town lying below him in a landlocked bay, with the heights of hoy rising beyond and adding grandeur to the beauty of the scene. [illustration: t. kent. houton bay air station.] amongst the quaint houses in its zigzag mile-long street is one of noteworthy interest, being the house in which sir walter scott wrote the notes of his orkney novel, "the pirate," most of the characters in which are drawn from people who actually lived in stromness. [illustration: the clestron barrier, stromness.] stromness was a popular "week-end" resort for those who, during the war and afterwards, were fortunate enough to get leave, there being an excellent and modern hotel, with good fishing in the lochs, and a nine-hole golf course in the near neighbourhood. close at hand, too, are many places of interest to the historian and antiquarian, which are briefly noticed in the following pages. the standing stones of stennis "the standing stones" are the most noteworthy antiquarian relic in the county of orkney, and their origin, like those of stonehenge, is wrapped in obscurity. they were probably erected by the early celtic inhabitants of orkney, possibly as sacrificial spots, and they were undoubtedly standing when the norsemen overran the islands in the ninth century. standing on the narrow little peninsula in the midst of the loch of stennis, and seen as the shadows of evening are falling, they are impressive in their lonely solemnity, and insensibly carry one back to the dawn of history in these islands--to days of sacrificial rites and strange matrimonial ceremonies, to the worship of thor and woden. [illustration: the standing stones of stennis.] [illustration: the ring of brodgar.] [illustration: the tumulus of maeshowe.] [illustration: the entrance to maeshowe.] maeshowe a mile or two from stennis stands the celebrated tumulus of maeshowe. this is a conical-shaped mound rising to a height of about 35 feet, and surrounded by a moat. the interior is approached by a long, narrow passage, leading into a central stone chamber about 15 feet square, from which a number of crypts or cells branch off at the sides. on the walls are inscribed a number of runes, of which, as one humourist observed, "several professors have given as many translations, apparently all different." there is certainly considerable diversity of opinion as to the age and origin of the mound, but it seems to be generally accepted that it was originally the chambered tomb of some chieftain, dating from early celtic times. [illustration: a winding road in hoy. (pegal burn.)] hoy the island of hoy lies on the western side of the flow, and, as most of the base ships were anchored in its vicinity, it was the island which became the most familiar to and frequented by those going to the "beach" for recreation and exercise. the names of long hope, lyness, melsetter, north ness, are as familiar to the many thousands of naval men who spent so long at scapa, as are the strand and charing cross to londoners. fortunately, hoy is perhaps the most interesting and picturesque of the orkney islands, and some of its hill and cliff scenery is amongst the finest in great britain, whilst the sportsman, the botanist, and the geologist can find ample material for their various pursuits. hoy will probably show more permanent evidences of the "naval invasion" of scapa flow than any of the other islands, as it has now become, at lyness, the headquarters of the permanent peace-time naval establishment at scapa flow. at lyness there are the makings of a miniature dockyard, with a wharf accommodating vessels of 30 feet draught, slipway, storesheds, oil, fuel, and petrol depôts, and a reservoir for fresh water supply, which, in the event of war, would be at once available for meeting the requirements of the fleet. such an establishment would have been of immense value at the outbreak of the present war, and, indeed, had been contemplated for some years prior to 1914. [illustration: ward hill and graemsay island from the sea.] ward hill, hoy ward hill is the highest hill in orkney (1,556 feet), and from its summit on a clear day a magnificent panorama of the orkney islands unfolds itself, lying at one's feet like "the scattered fragments of some ingenious and parti-coloured toy map," whilst on the further side of the pentland firth the coast of scotland is clearly defined as far as cape wrath. during the war the whole of the grand fleet could be seen in the flow, and it seemed hard to realise that those small and insignificant specks as they appeared in the distance lay as a "sure shield of empire" between our nation and the domination of the german eagle. [illustration: ward hill: the road to rackwick.] [illustration: ward hill from the east.] [illustration: the old man of hoy.] the old man of hoy the lonely pillar of rock standing well out on the western coast of hoy is one of the best-known "sights" of orkney. it stands 450 feet above the sea (as high as st. paul's cathedral) in one of the most inaccessible parts of the coast, but the scene repays the hard walk over the moors which a visit to the rock entails. the photo happens to show the features of the "old man" quite distinctly. the dwarfie stone the dwarfie stone is one of the strange relics of antiquity which abound in orkney. it is a mass of sandstone about 30 feet in length, 14 feet in breadth, and from 2 to 6 feet in height, and lies in a lonely valley at the foot of ward hill. it has been hollowed out on either side of the entrance door shown in the photo into two chambers, each with a stone bed, with a hole in the roof to serve as a window or chimney. nothing appears to be known of the origin or purpose of the stone, but a rather quaint theory is brought forward in an old book on orkney (1701), as follows: "who hewed this stone, or for what use it was, we could not learn, the common tradition among the people is, that a giant with his wife lived in this isle of hoy, who had this stone for their castle. but i would rather think, seeing it could not accommodate any of a gigantick stature, that it might be for the use of some dwarf, as the name seems to import, or it being remote from any house might be the retired cell of some melancholick hermite. the stone also may be called the dwarfie stone, per antiphrasin or by way of opposition it being so very great." [illustration: the dwarfie stone.] sir walter scott refers to the stone at some length in his novel "the pirate," the scene of which is laid in the orkneys and shetlands, and which will be found of interest to the student of orkney traditions and history. lyness [illustration: the new stone wall and pier, lyness.] [illustration: crofts near lyness.] following the rough road on the east coast of hoy from ward hill, by way of pegal burn, one reaches lyness, in pre-war days a few scattered crofts, and now the naval base in orkney. the stone wharf, built by messrs. kinnear and moodie, of glasgow, is now only just nearing completion, and the other buildings (torpedo and paravane depôts, petrol tanks, store sheds, etc.) were not available in time to be of much value during the war, but they will be ready for the next! some idea of the difficulties with which the contractors had to contend will be realised, when it is remembered that every ton of material had to be brought by rail and sea from the south, during a time when, owing to the submarine menace and the shortage of shipping, it was often months before delivery of stores could be made. the work was frequently completely held up by non-delivery of a machine or replacement, whilst the difficulties of recruiting labour in such a desolate spot as the orkneys were a great handicap. on many days work had to be suspended owing to gales, whilst in winter operations were only practicable during the few hours of daylight available. the works, incidentally, were responsible for the introduction of the first train into orkney! [illustration: excavations at lyness in connection with the building of the wharf.] [illustration: the first train in orkney.] crockness [illustration: sunset over the martello tower, crockness.] crockness lies a little beyond lyness, to the south, and is chiefly noteworthy for its martello tower, which, with that at hackness on the further side of long hope bay, was erected during the napoleonic wars, and completed in 1818 as a protection for the harbour. it was in long hope harbour that merchantmen bound for america and the continent assembled to await convoy, and it is curious that exactly one hundred years later history has repeated itself, and that during the war just concluded the same system of convoy was adopted from kirkwall, into which harbour all neutral vessels were sent for examination and convoy. it is rather characteristic of our nation that both the martello towers and the works at lyness were completed some time after the napoleonic wars and the european war respectively were over! [illustration: the martello tower, crockness.] the towers are very solidly built structures, with gun mountings on top, and underground cellars for stowing ammunition, etc., but they have never apparently been of any practical use. it is related that it was not until the present war that a monthly payment, which originated in 1818, to a crofter family for certain services rendered to the original occupants of the tower, was at length discontinued, when it was discovered that the tower had been disused for some generations! but the accuracy of the story cannot be vouched for. [illustration: view looking through the martello tower, crockness, towards long hope.] long hope continuing by the road from crockness, the village of melsetter is passed on the road to long hope. at melsetter is the very fine residence of mr. and mrs. middlemore, whose hospitality was always open to the many naval officers who used to call there. the visitors' book among many famous names contains those of the king and the prince of wales, and admirals jellicoe and beatty. a william morris tapestry in one of the reception rooms is noteworthy as recording the exploits of "sir gawaine of orkney," one of the knights of the round table. [illustration: melsetter--on the road from lyness to long hope.] long hope bay during the war was the headquarters of the auxiliaries of the grand fleet, and never in its history were so many vessels of such varied types assembled in the harbour. the village of long hope, where there is a good pier, naturally became much frequented by officers and men from the ships, and eventually a commodious y.m.c.a. was erected, which did much useful work. "tea on the beach" was always a pleasant change from ship life (and tinned milk!), and the post office at long hope became a favourite rendezvous for informal tea-parties. (possibly the attractions of the fair postmistress and her sister had something to do with this!) incidentally, a writer on orkney remarks that "there is a considerable celtic element in the population of south walls brought by some seventy-one highlanders, who, evicted from strathnaver to make room for sheep, settled in the parish between 1788 and 1795, and who have thrown in a dash of good looks not so common in other parts of the group." the comment seems hardly fair to the rest of orkney, however true it may be with regard to walls. [illustration: long hope pier and post office.] [illustration: long hope hotel.] the inn at long hope (where the king stayed on one of his visits to the fleet) was transformed into the office of the admiral commanding the orkneys and shetlands, and a wireless station was erected alongside. it has now (1921) reverted to its pre-war condition, much to the gratification of the long hope inhabitants. [illustration: kirk hope, south walls.] [illustration: cantick lighthouse, south walls.] kirk hope and cantick the road from long hope leads past the y.m.c.a. to the lonely little cemetery (shown on the left of the photo above) at kirk hope, and thence to the lighthouse at cantick head. a fine view of the islands is obtained from the lighthouse tower, and the visitors' book contains the names of r. l. stevenson and prince albert, amongst others of interest. peats as there are practically no trees in orkney, wood is not available for fuel, but fortunately peat is very plentiful, and is used almost universally for heating purposes. the peats are cut in the spring, and a peculiar-shaped form of spade, known as a toysker, is employed to cut the turfs, which are stacked on the side of the bank as shown in the photograph. after a few weeks the peats are "raised"--_i.e._, set on end--and arranged in small heaps, so that they may dry more thoroughly. they are then carted home and stacked, each croft possessing its stack for the winter months. [illustration: digging the peats--hoy.] during the war parties of men from the ships could often be seen assisting the crofters in digging the peats--such assistance being very welcome at a time when labour was scarce and there was plenty of work to be done on the land. a day at the peats can be recommended to anyone who wants to know what it is to feel really tired after a hard day's work! [illustration: t. kent. carting home the peats.] primitive methods of agriculture in orkney [illustration: horse and ox harrowing.] [illustration: loading sea-weed for manure.] [illustration: t. kent. an orkney cart.] [illustration: t. kent. making straw-backed chairs, orkney.] the primitive cottages which prevailed in orkney, until a few years ago, are gradually giving way to larger and more substantial dwellings, but some of the crofts are still reminiscent of very early times, consisting only of a "but and a ben," with the beds let into the wall, after the style of the french cupboard beds of brittany, and with the floors made of stone flags. * * * * * orkney has several cottage industries, no doubt due to the long winter evenings and the inclement weather. amongst these is rush plaiting for the famous "orkney chairs," which, with their comfortable rush backs and seats and hoods, are familiar to all who have been in orkney. [illustration: t. kent. interior of an orkney cottage.] spinning spinning is another occupation of the winter evenings, which has been widely revived recently in orkney owing to the high price of wool. the orkneys and shetlands are noted for the softness and quality of their wool, and the various processes of teasing, carding, spinning and dyeing are all carried out on the crofts. [illustration: spinning.] part iii the navy at scapa flow [illustration: battle squadron exercising in the flow.] the navy at scapa flow the photographs which follow depict various aspects of the work and play of the grand fleet and the auxiliaries at scapa, and are more or less self-explanatory. owing to limitations of space, it is not possible to deal adequately with a subject on which so many volumes have been written, but an effort has been made to include as many types as possible of the varied units of the grand fleet, and to depict the various phases of the everyday life and recreations of the personnel of the fleet. owing to the strict photographic censorship during the war, it was not practicable to take many subjects which would otherwise have found a place in this record, but those which are shown in the following pages will give the reader some little idea of how the navy "carried on" during the eventful years 1914-1919. [illustration: humphrey joel. admiral of the fleet earl beatty on the quarterdeck of h.m.s. "queen elizabeth."] [illustration: h.m.s. "queen elizabeth."] [illustration: h.m.s. "revenge" and ships of the first battle squadron at scapa.] [illustration: h.m.s. "ramillies."] [illustration: h.m.s. "resolution."] [illustration: h.m.s. "royal oak."] [illustration: humphrey joel. fourth battle squadron exercising in the flow.] [illustration: humphrey joel. battleships "orion," "monarch," and "conqueror" in the flow.] [illustration: humphrey joel. battleships "colossus," "st. vincent," and "bellerophon" exercising in the flow.] [illustration: h.m.s. "renown." (in which the prince of wales made his recent visit to the colonies.)] [illustration: h.m.s. "tiger": a famous ship of the battle cruiser squadron.] [illustration: h.m.s. "whitshed." (one of our latest type destroyers.)] [illustration: h.m.s. "barham."] [illustration: h.m.s. "emperor of india."] [illustration: humphrey joel. light cruiser "calliope" at scapa.] [illustration: "make and mend" on light cruiser "yarmouth." (note the bins for "bones" and "pig food.")] [illustration: imperial war museum. the deck of an aeroplane carrier, h.m.s. "furious."] [illustration: humphrey joel. submarine "g 13" alongside h.m.s. "queen elizabeth."] [illustration: submarine "k 16" under way in the flow.] [illustration: officers of submarine "k 7" in the conning tower.] [illustration: imperial war museum. marines drilling on the quarterdeck of a battleship.] [illustration: imperial war museum. general view of captain's sunday morning inspection.] [illustration: imperial war museum. "tidying up" for inspection.] [illustration: imperial war museum. officers and men exercising on the quarterdeck.] [illustration: imperial war museum. "holystoning."] [illustration: imperial war museum. washing down decks.] [illustration: imperial war museum. stokers at work. (over 4,000,000 tons of coal were supplied to the fleet at scapa from the outbreak of war to the date of armistice.)] [illustration: imperial war museum. church service on h.m.s. "queen elizabeth."] [illustration: hospital ships at scapa flow.] [illustration: h.m. hospital ship "magic ii.," afterwards renamed "classic."] [illustration: imperial war museum. transferring a "cot case" from a battleship to the hospital ship drifter. (the more serious cases from the fleet were sent to the hospital ships--of which there were generally three or four at scapa one of which, h.m.h.s. "agadir," was set aside for infectious cases only. in addition to the drifter "coryphæna," shown in the photograph, two other drifters were detached for hospital ship duties, named, rather suggestively, the "golden harp" and "elysian dawn!")] [illustration: imperial war museum. dentist at work on a battleship (h.m.s. "collingwood").] [illustration: h.m.s. "imperieuse" with fleet mail steamer "st. ninian" and mail drifters from the fleet alongside.] [illustration: mail boat "st. ola" coming alongside h.m.s. "victorious." (the "st. ola" took the place of the "st. ninian" during the last few months of the war, and mails were then distributed by h.m.s. "victorious.") for the first three months of the war all mails for the fleet were landed and distributed at scapa pier. in november 1914, a branch post office was opened on h.m.s. "imperieuse," where the mails and newspapers were sorted and despatched to the fleet. some idea of the volume of business transacted to the date of the armistice can be gathered from the following figures: 42 million letters and parcels sorted and despatched; 85 million letters and parcels delivered; value of postal stamps sold, £275.500.] [illustration: imperial war museum. sorting mails for the fleet on h.m.s. "imperieuse."] [illustration: imperial war museum. distributing newspapers for the fleet (h.m.s. "imperieuse.")] [illustration: dockyard workmen leaving h.m.s. "victorious" for work in the fleet.] [illustration: repairing a steam pinnace on the slipway at lyness.] [illustration: school children's entertainment on h.m.s. "victorious." (the navy is renowned for its hospitality, and the above shows a group of school children and their teachers who were entertained to a cinema show and tea on board. many of the children had never seen the "movies" before.)] [illustration: three of the young orcadian guests.] [illustration: imperial war museum. "no coupons required." (the work of victualling the navy at scapa was no small task, as the following figures of the monthly fleet requirements indicate: meat, 320 tons; potatoes, 800 tons; flour, 6,000 140-lb. bags; sugar, 1,500 120-lb. bags; bread, 80,000 lbs.)] [illustration: crew of drifter "shalot." (attached to the victualling store officer r.f.a. "ruthenia.")] [illustration: lifting chain cables.] [illustration: mooring vessel "recovery" at scapa flow. (the mooring work of the base was performed under the control of the admiralty port officer, h.m.s. "imperieuse." amongst the mooring vessels which did useful work in laying and lifting moorings for the fleet, in addition to the "recovery" pictured above, should be mentioned the mooring craft "strathmaree," "ben doran," "ben tarbet," and "bullfrog.")] [illustration: u.s.s. "patuxent" and "272" alongside h.m.s. "victorious" for repairs.] [illustration: american minesweeper in the floating dock for repairs.] [illustration: a damaged british destroyer being repaired in the dock.] [illustration: s.s. "borodino" junior army and navy stores' store-ship with the grand fleet.] [illustration: interior of shop on s.s. "borodino." (the junior army and navy stores was one of the most popular "institutions" at scapa, and from 1914 to 1919 it was the great shopping centre of the fleet. almost every variety of article was stocked, from "an elephant to a shirt button," and in addition a hairdressing saloon and a laundry were installed.)] [illustration: a corner of an officer's cabin. (an officer's cabin is his exclusive "sanctum," and in this case the occupant appears to have been determined to keep in mind "the girls he left behind him!")] the lighter side of life at scapa flow [illustration: fishing for sea-trout.] [illustration: a ship's picnic.] [illustration: a bathing party.] [illustration: the naval cemetery at lyness. (the naval cemetery at lyness is situate on some rising ground overlooking the waters of the flow. here lie buried those who died whilst serving at scapa, those who fell in the battle of jutland, and those who perished in the "hampshire," "vanguard" and other vessels. their memory is perpetuated by the memorials which have been erected by their shipmates, some of which are here shown.)] [illustration: the "hampshire" memorial.] [illustration: an interesting stone to the memory of a chinaman who died at scapa.] [illustration: the "malaya" memorial.] [illustration: the "vanguard" memorial.] [illustration: making for home. (h.m.s. "victorious" in the irish sea on the way to devonport, march, 1920.)] part iv the german ships at scapa flow [illustration: the scuttling of the german ships.] the german ships at scapa flow although the association of the grand fleet with scapa flow would of itself have given that hitherto almost unknown spot a peculiar and honourable significance in our naval history, it was undoubtedly the choice of scapa as the place of internment of the german ships and their subsequent dramatic sinking, which made scapa a familiar name, not only in this country but all over the world. the photographs which follow show the various phases of the german "occupation" of scapa from the time that the vessels arrived for internment to the final scenes in march, 1920, when those vessels which had been salved after the scuttling in june, 1919, were finally towed south for distribution amongst the allied powers. the first phase took place on 23rd november, 1918, and the succeeding days, when the surrendered ships were escorted from rosyth to scapa and anchored in the flow, prior to taking up their permanent billets in gutter sound (previously the collier anchorage of the fleet; see map on p. 110). the ships arrived in the following order: -------------+----------------------------+-------------------------- _date._ | _german vessels._ | _british escort._ -------------+----------------------------+-------------------------- saturday, | 20 torpedo-boat destroyers.| torpedo-boat destroyers. 23/11/18 | | | | sunday, | 20 torpedo-boat destroyers.| torpedo-boat destroyers. 24/11/18 | | | | monday, | 5 battle cruisers, 10 | "lion" and first battle 25/11/18 | torpedo-boat destroyers.| cruiser squadron and 10 | | torpedo-boat destroyers. | | tuesday, | 5 battleships and 4 light | 5 ships first battle 26/11/18 | cruisers. | squadron and second | | light cruiser squadron. | | wednesday, | 4 battleships, 3 light | 4 ships first battle 27/11/18 | cruisers. | squadron and third light | | cruiser squadron. -------------+----------------------------+--------------------------the german ships carried full navigating parties, and came north under their own steam. the dense clouds of smoke which will be observed in the photographs on pp. 102 and 103 testify to the poor quality of the coal with which they were supplied. the crews were later reduced to care and maintenance parties only. [illustration: j. f. v. guise. h.m.s. "lion" entering hoxa boom, scapa flow, at head of german battle cruisers, 25th november, 1918.] [illustration: h.m.s. "repulse," "renown," "princess royal," and "tiger" escorting german battle cruisers through hoxa boom, 25th november, 1918.] the complete list of capital ships (apart from destroyers) interned at scapa is shown below. the battleships "könig" and "baden," and cruiser "dresden," were later arrivals. battleships bayern markgraf könig kaiserin kaiser grosser kurfürst kronprinz wilhelm friedrich der grosse könig albert prinzregent luitpold baden battle cruisers hindenburg derfflinger seydlitz von der tann moltke light cruisers brummer bremse dresden köln emden karlsruhe nurnberg frankfurt during the period of their internment, communication between the german ships and our own fleet was restricted to a minimum, and no one from our own ships was allowed on board the interned vessels unless on duty of an urgent nature. the germans were required to victual and store their own ships from germany, coal and water only being supplied locally. as german warships were not constructed for living aboard for long periods (the sailors being mostly accommodated in barracks when in harbour), the crews at scapa must have had a rather unenviable time of it, though there was a certain element of poetic justice in interning them in the region where for so long our own fleet had kept its lonely vigil. as one of their officers remarked in writing home and describing the bleakness and desolation of scapa: "if the english have stood this for four years, they deserve to have won the war." the german ships were patrolled by a number of drifters--a somewhat ignominious guard for the much-vaunted german fleet. the germans' love of music was in evidence even at scapa, and it was somewhat strange and at times rather pathetic to hear the unfamiliar strains of "die wacht am rhein" and "die lorelei" rising from the german ships, some of which still retained their bands. [illustration: german battle cruiser "seydlitz" entering hoxa boom, 25th november, 1918.] [illustration: german battle cruiser "von der tann" entering hoxa boom, 25th november, 1918.] [illustration: german battle cruiser "moltke" entering hoxa boom, 25th november, 1918.] [illustration: the interned german ships at scapa.] the anniversary of jutland (31st may) was not forgotten, and most of the ships displayed bunting, on the pretext of drying their flags, as they were not allowed to fly their ensigns after beatty's signal on the evening of the surrender at rosyth. one of the ships prominently displayed a notice in english: "to-day we celebrate the german victory of the battle of jutland." [illustration: german battle cruiser "seydlitz." (one of the ships which bombarded scarborough.)] it was somewhat difficult, owing to the isolation of the german ships, to form an idea of the discipline which prevailed on board. it was evident that on most of the ships there were representatives of the soldiers' and sailors' councils, as the members could be readily distinguished by their white armlets. indeed, there is probably some truth in the report that when the german ships surrendered, the crews confidently expected that our ships, the crews of which they believed to be on the verge of mutiny and bolshevism, would make common cause with them, and they must have been considerably surprised when admiral beatty refused to negotiate with the council representatives. there were undoubtedly disturbances on some of the german ships whilst they were at scapa, and it appears to have been due to a rather serious case of insubordination that admiral von reuter, who was in command of the german ships, changed his flagship from the "friedrich der grosse" to the "emden." on the other hand, the simultaneous sinking of the german ships on 21st june, 1919, proved conclusively that a certain discipline still prevailed, for the scuttling was undoubtedly organised and carried out with (from the german point of view) very commendable precision and thoroughness. the scuttling of the german ships on 21st june, 1919, has already been briefly referred to in the earlier part of the book, but as the writer was privileged to be an eyewitness of the events of that afternoon, the reader will perhaps pardon the intrusion of the personal element in a more detailed description of the sinkings. [illustration: german battle cruiser "moltke" at scapa flow.] [illustration: german battle cruiser "derfflinger" at scapa flow.] [illustration: german battle cruiser "hindenburg" at scapa flow.] it was at five minutes past noon that the signalmen reported that the german ships had hoisted ensigns and burgees. the excitement which this announcement produced was intensified a short time later when it became apparent that the ships were sinking, and that the crews were taking to the boats. lunch was completely forgotten, and arrangements were hurriedly made to get all available small craft to the ships to ascertain if anything could be done to save any of them. i obtained permission from the admiral to accompany him on an inspection of some of the nearer destroyers, from which it was ascertained that there was no possibility of saving any of the ships other than by beaching them, as the sea-cocks had not been only opened but the valves had been destroyed. our picket-boat happened to come alongside at this stage, so i jumped aboard and proceeded north up gutter sound, where the larger vessels were anchored. our instructions were to board any german vessels which were still afloat, haul down their ensigns, and to take such steps as were necessary to save life and to direct any boats or carley floats of germans to the flagship. our picket-boat followed the course shown in the sketch map on p. 110, and we reached the "seydlitz" at about one o'clock, boarded her and hauled down her colours, and at the same time opened the windlass with a view to parting it and allowing the vessel to drift ashore, but unfortunately it brought up at the slip and held. the "seydlitz" was then beginning to list heavily, so we left her and next boarded the "hindenburg," which was also beginning to list heavily to port. [illustration: german battleship "friedrich der grosse." (admiral von reuter's flagship.)] [illustration: german battleship "kaiserin."] [illustration: german light cruiser "köln."] [illustration: german destroyers at lyness, with battleships in the distance.] we then proceeded past several of the battleships, which were seen to be rapidly settling down. whilst abreast of "könig albert," our picket-boat was hailed from the deck of a trawler by the german admiral, von reuter, who asked us to save the crew of the "bayern," who were in the water. two drifters which were near by were accordingly ordered close to the "bayern" for this purpose, and we proceeded in the same direction, when the photographs on pp. 112 and 113 were taken. immediately afterwards the ship turned over to port, bottom up, and sank, whilst the crews of the boats cheered loudly and waved their caps. we next headed for the "derfflinger," on the way sending back several boats full of germans to the "victorious." the "derfflinger" foundered a few minutes after taking the photograph on p. 24. on the way back we passed the "hindenburg," which had then settled on to an even keel with her masts and funnels showing, whilst the "seydlitz" was then resting in shallow water on her starboard side, with her decks nearly vertical, and her port propeller just showing above the water. meantime a considerable number of the destroyers had been beached by tugs and other small craft, in addition to three cruisers, whilst the "baden," the only battleship saved, was still afloat, though very low in the water. on arrival on the "victorious" we found the ship crowded with germans, who, after examination, were sent to the flagship, h.m.s. "revenge"--which had by this time returned to the flow from the pentland, where the 1st battle squadron had been exercising--from which ship they were sent south. [illustration: plan of the anchorage of german ships at scapa flow.] a large amount of salvage work ensued on the vessels which had been beached, most of them being pumped out and docked in the floating dock, although it was not found possible to get some of the destroyers off, and these still remain as a memento of that eventful day. all the salved ex-german ships have now been towed south, and have been apportioned amongst the allied powers. it is interesting to note that the "baden" and "nurnberg," of which several photographs are shown in the following pages, have been allotted to great britain, whilst the "emden" goes to france, and the "frankfurt" to u.s.a. it appears that most of the salved vessels are to be broken up, thus finally disposing of the remnants of the once great german fleet. [illustration: a party of french officers visiting the german ships.] [illustration: german battleship "bayern" sinking by the stern, 2 p.m., 21st june, 1919.] [illustration: the final plunge of the "bayern."] [illustration: german destroyers sinking or beached off the island of fara.] [illustration: german sailors taking to the boats.] [illustration: british boarding party alongside sinking german destroyer.] [illustration: general view showing german destroyers sinking on the right and battleships in the distance. at 3.30 p.m., 21st june, 1919.] [illustration: german battle cruiser "hindenburg" as she now rests at scapa.] [illustration: whaler "ramna" stranded on german battle cruiser "moltke" 23rd june, 1919, taken just before "ramna" refloated.] [illustration: german cruiser "nurnberg" immediately after being refloated at 2 p.m. on 3rd july, 1919.] [illustration: salvage operations on battleship "baden" and cruiser "frankfurt" beached at smoogroo.] [illustration: salvage work on the "baden."] [illustration: pumping out the "frankfurt."] [illustration: cruiser "bremse," which capsized whilst being beached.] [illustration: battle cruiser "seydlitz," lying on her starboard side in shallow water.] [illustration: hoisting the union jack on a sinking german destroyer.] [illustration: on the "seydlitz."] [illustration: "baden" being towed south to invergordon.] [illustration: salving german destroyer "g 102."] [illustration: salvage party working on a german destroyer.] [illustration: view showing salved ex-german cruisers and destroyers at long hope, october, 1919.] [illustration: the salved german cruisers "nurnberg" and "emden" in long hope bay.] [illustration: view looking aft from after-control top of "frankfurt."] [illustration: view looking forward from the same position.] [illustration: expansion ring marking on 6-inch gun "nurnberg."] [illustration: a humorous effort on the part of one of our sailors.] [illustration: the propeller blade of the "seydlitz."] [illustration: range-finder and searchlight platform, "nurnberg."] [illustration: 88-mm. guns, "nurnberg."] [illustration: 6-inch gun on "nurnberg" after-turret.] [illustration: 5·9-inch after-breech, "nurnberg."] [illustration: searchlight control platform, "frankfurt."] [illustration: 10·5-cm. gun on a german destroyer.] [illustration: torpedo tubes on a destroyer.] [illustration: engine-room control board, "emden."] [illustration: lower conning tower, "emden."] [illustration: german destroyer being towed south to rosyth, march, 1920.] epilogue. march, 1921. [illustration: r. j. towers. blowing up the minefields. group of mines exploded in february, 1919, by the quoyness mining station, flotta island.] [illustration: r. j. towers. closer view of a mine explosion. photograph taken a mile away with a telecentric lens.] epilogue a few notes remain to be added to the preceding pages to complete the story of scapa to the present time. the war necessarily left its aftermath at scapa, as elsewhere, and although much of the "clearing up" has been accomplished, there will remain for many years visible traces of the "naval occupation" of the orkneys. the signing of the armistice in november, 1918, entailed only a cessation of active hostilities, and it was not until the summer of 1919 that the reversion of the base from a war to a peace footing really began. one of the earliest and most important operations to be undertaken after the armistice was the clearance of the north sea mine barrage between the orkneys and norway, which has already been briefly referred to. this entailed a sweep over an area of 6,000 square miles, and the destruction of over 70,000 mines. the american minesweeping detachment, to which the major portion of this task was allotted, arrived in kirkwall in april, 1919, and by the end of september of that year their task had been successfully accomplished, and the northern gateway was open once more to the mercantile traffic of the world. the mines which had been laid in the smaller areas around the entrances to the flow were exploded simultaneously in sections--a very much simpler task, as these were connected electrically to shore stations. the photographs on p. 140 give some idea of the force of the explosions, which were audible for miles around. it is of interest to note that the buoy shown on the left of the photograph on the lower part of p. 140 marks the resting-place of the german submarine which was sunk in this minefield a few days before the armistice. the removal of the booms and the release of the boom defence drifters and trawlers was completed before the end of 1919. the fishermen who formed the crews of these vessels, incidentally, deserve to be recognised for their work during the war, the monotony and isolation of which made their task one of the least enviable at the base. [illustration: salvage operation on s.s. "aorangi" in holm sound. 1. t. kent.] [illustration: salvage operation on s.s. "aorangi" in holm sound. 2. t. kent.] the raising of the barrier at clestron (see p. 39) proved a more formidable operation. the ice-breaker "sviagator," early in 1920, made the unique experiment of crushing some of the hurdles to a sufficient depth to allow vessels of medium draught to pass over with safety, but it was not until the summer of 1920 that the removal of the hurdles was undertaken and completed by a salvage company, and the rails shipped south. the raising of the "block" ships, which had been sunk in some of the narrow channels leading into the flow, appears to have presented almost insuperable difficulties, mainly owing to tidal currents, and there does not seem to be much likelihood that the vessels in burra and water sounds will ever be raised. in holm sound, however, one of the sunken ships, s.s. "aorangi," was successfully salved by the east coast wrecking company on 8th september, 1920, and beached near the churchyard at holm. of the temporary shore establishments at scapa very little now remains, and the buildings which are still standing have nearly all been converted to meet peace-time requirements. the "miniature base" at lyness is in the hands of caretakers, and the completion of the wharf (on which £300,000 has been spent) has been stopped, whilst the control of the naval area, which since february, 1920, had been in the hands of captain alan g. bruce, r.n., c.b., d.s.o., was on 1st december, 1920, removed to invergordon. the air stations at houton, smoogro, caldale, and stenness have been closed down or removed, whilst the seaplane station at scapa has been acquired by the orkney county council as a tuberculosis hospital. nearly all the shore batteries have been dismantled, the guns removed, the searchlights withdrawn, and the huts sold or demolished. only at hoy (stromness) are the batteries intact, but these are in charge of a civilian caretaker. the royal marine station at carness (near kirkwall) remains, but as a smallpox hospital under the orkney county council. various schemes have been under consideration for the removal of the sunken german ships, but at present they still remain as they sank on the memorable 21st june, 1919--a constant source of danger to ships passing through the narrow channels where they lie. it remains to be seen whether steps will eventually be taken to remove the more dangerous of these vessels, or whether they will remain as a permanent memorial of one of the most dramatic episodes of naval history. [illustration: sunset over the hills of hoy. (mast of sunken german destroyer showing in foreground.)] printed in great britain by billing and sons, ltd., guildford and esher transcriber's notes. in the text version, italics are denoted by underscores. some place names have been found with alternative spellings. these alternatives may be legitimate and have been left as found. smoogroo, smoogro burra, burray and stennis, stenness. the cruiser nurnberg should be nürnberg. this spelling has been left as found. the spy in black by j. storer clouston author of 'the lunatic at large,' etc. william blackwood and sons edinburgh and london 1917 _all rights reserved_ by the same author. two's two. the lunatic at large. the adventures of m. d'haricot. our lady's inn. gar-miscath. the prodigal father. the peer's progress. his first offence. contents. part i. the narrative of lieutenant von belke (of the german navy). toc i. the landing ii. night in the ruined house iii. behind the wall iv. the nails v. waiting etoc part ii. a few chapters by the editor. toc i. the pleasant stranger ii. the chauffeur iii. on the cliff iv. mr drummond's visitor v. on the mail boat vi. the vanishing governess etoc part iii. lieutenant von belke's narrative resumed. toc i. the meeting ii. tiel's story iii. the plan iv. what happened on sunday v. a mysterious adventure vi. the visitor vii. at night viii. the decision ix. on the shore etoc part iv. lieutenant von belke's narrative concluded. toc i. wednesday ii. thursday iii. thursday night iv. friday etoc part v. a few concluding chapters by the editor, toc i. tiel's journey ii. the lady iii. the empty envelope etoc part i. the narrative of lieutenant von belke (of the german navy) i. the landing. if any one had been watching the bay that august night (which, fortunately for us, there was not), they would have seen up till an hour after midnight as lonely and peaceful a scene as if it had been some inlet in greenland. the war might have been waging on another planet. the segment of a waning moon was just rising, but the sky was covered with clouds, except right overhead where a bevy of stars twinkled, and it was a dim though not a dark night. the sea was as flat and calm as you can ever get on an atlantic coast--a glassy surface, but always a gentle regular bursting of foam upon the beach. in a semicircle the shore rose black, towering at either horn (and especially on the south) into high dark cliffs. i suppose a bird or two may have been crying then as they were a little later, but there was not a light nor a sign of anything human being within a hundred miles. if one of the vikings who used to live in those islands had revisited that particular glimpse of the moon, he could never have guessed that his old haunts had altered a tittle. but if he had waited a while he would have rubbed his eyes and wondered. right between the headlands he would have seen it dimly:--a great thing that was not a fish rising out of the calm water, and then very stealthily creeping in and in towards the southern shore. when we were fairly on the surface i came on deck and gazed over the dark waters to the darker shore, with--i don't mind confessing it now--a rather curious sensation. to tell the truth, i was a little nervous, but i think i showed no sign of it to wiedermann. "you have thought of everything you can possibly need?" he asked in a low voice. "everything, sir, i think," i answered confidently. "no need to give you tips!" he said with a laugh. i felt flattered--but still my heart was beating just a little faster than usual! in we crept closer and closer, with the gentlest pulsation of our engines that could not have been heard above the lapping of the waves on the pebbles. an invisible gull or two wheeled and cried above us, but otherwise there was an almost too perfect stillness. i could not help an uncomfortable suspicion that _someone_ was watching. _someone_ would soon be giving the alarm, _someone_ would presently be playing the devil with my schemes. it was sheer nonsense, but then i had never played the spy before--at least, not in war-time. along the middle of the bay ran a beach of sand and pebbles, with dunes and grass links above, but at the southern end the water was deep close inshore, and there were several convenient ledges of rock between the end of this beach and the beginning of the cliffs. the submarine came in as close as she dared, and then, without an instant's delay, the boat was launched. wiedermann, myself, two sailors, and the motor-bicycle just managed to squeeze in, and we cautiously pulled for the ledges. the tide was just right (we had thought of everything, i must say that), and after a minute or two's groping along the rocks, we found a capital landing. wiedermann and i jumped ashore as easily as if it had been a quay, and my bicycle should have been landed without a hitch. how it happened i know not, but just as the sailors were lifting it out, the boat swayed a little and one of the clumsy fellows let his end of it slip. a splash of spray broke over it; a mere nothing, it seemed at the time, and then i had hold of it and we lifted it on to the ledge. wiedermann spoke sharply to the man, but i assured him no harm had been done, and between us we wheeled the thing over the flat rocks, and pulled it up to the top of the grass bank beyond. "i can manage all right by myself now," i said. "good-bye, sir!" he gave my hand a hard clasp. "this is thursday night," he said. "we shall be back on sunday, monday, and tuesday nights, remember." "the british navy and the weather permitting!" i laughed. "do not fear!" said he. "i shall be here, and we shall get you aboard somehow. come any one of those nights that suits _him_." "that suits him?" i laughed. "say rather that suits providence!" "well," he repeated, "i'll be here anyhow. good luck!" we saluted, and i started on my way, wheeling my bicycle over the grass. i confess, however, that i had not gone many yards before i stopped and looked back. wiedermann had disappeared from the top of the bank, and in a moment i heard the faint sounds of the boat rowing back. very dimly against the grey sea i could just pick out the conning tower and low side of the submarine. the gulls were still crying, but in a more sombre key, i fancied. so here was i, conrad von belke, lieutenant in the german navy, treading british turf underfoot, cut off from any hope of escape for three full days at least! and it was not ordinary british turf either. i was on the holy of holies, actually landed on those sacred, jealously-guarded islands (which, i presume, i must not even name here), where the grand fleet had its lair. as to the mere act of landing, well, you have just seen that there was no insuperable difficulty in stepping ashore from a submarine at certain places, if the conditions were favourable and the moment cunningly chosen; but i proposed to penetrate to the innermost sanctuary, and spend at least three days there--a very different proposition! i had been chosen for this service for three reasons: because i was supposed to be a cool hand in what the english call a "tight place"; because i could talk english not merely fluently, but with the real accent and intonation--like a native, in fact; and i believe because they thought me not quite a fool. as you shall hear, there was to be one much wiser than i to guide me. he was indeed the brain of this desperate enterprise, and i but his messenger and assistant. still, one wants a messenger with certain qualities, and as it is the chief object of this narrative to clear my honour in the eyes of those who sent me, i wish to point out that they deliberately chose me for this job--i did not select myself--and that i did my best. it was my own idea to take a motor-bicycle, but it was an idea cordially approved by those above me. there were several obvious advantages. a motor-cyclist is not an uncommon object on the roads even of those out-of-the-way islands, so that my mere appearance would attract no suspicion; and besides, they would scarcely expect a visitor of my sort to come ashore equipped with such an article. also, i would cover the ground quickly, and, if it came to the worst, might have a chance of evading pursuit. but there was one reason which particularly appealed to me: i could wear my naval uniform underneath a suit of cyclist's overalls, and so if i were caught might make a strong plea to escape the fate of a spy; in fact, i told myself i was not a spy,--simply a venturesome scout. whether the british would take the same view of me was another question! still, the motor-cycle did give me a chance. my first task was to cover the better part of twenty miles before daybreak and join forces with "him" in the very innermost shrine of this sanctuary--or rather, on the shore of it. this seemed a simple enough job; i had plenty of time, the roads, i knew, were good, nobody would be stirring (or anyhow, ought to be) at that hour, and the arrangements for my safe reception were, as you shall hear, remarkably ingenious. if i once struck the hard main road, i really saw nothing that could stop me. the first thing was to strike this road. of course i knew the map by heart, and had a copy in my pocket as a precaution that was almost superfluous, but working by map-memory in the dark is not so easy when one is going across country. the grassy bank fell gently before me as the land sloped down from the cliffs to the beach, and i knew that within a couple of hundred yards i should find a rough road which followed the shore for a short way, and then when it reached the links above the beach, turned at right angles across them to join the highroad. accordingly i bumped my motor-cycle patiently over the rough grass, keeping close to the edge of the bank so as to guide myself, and every now and then making a detour of a few yards inland to see whether the road had begun. the minutes passed, the ground kept falling till i was but a little above the level of the glimmering sea, the road ought to have begun to keep me company long ago, but never a sign of it could i find. twice in my detours i stumbled into what seemed sand-holes, and turned back out of them sharply. and then at last i realised that i had ceased to descend for the last hundred yards or more, and in fact must be on the broad stretch of undulating sea links that fringed the head of the bay. but where was my road? i stopped, bade myself keep quite cool and composed, and peered round me into the night. the moon was farther up and it had become a little lighter, but the clouds still obscured most of the sky and it was not light enough to see much. overhead were the stars; on one hand the pale sea merged into the dark horizon; all around me were low black hummocks that seem to fade into an infinity of shadows. the gulls still cried mournfully, and a strong pungent odour of seaweed filled the night air. i remember that pause very vividly. i should have been reckless enough to light a cigarette had i not feared that our submarine might still be on the surface, and wiedermann might see the flash and dub me an idiot. i certainly needed a smoke very badly and took some credit to myself for refraining (though perhaps i ought really have given it to wiedermann). and then i decided to turn back, slanting, however, a little away from the sea so as to try and cut across the road. a minute or two later i tumbled into a small chasm and came down with the bicycle on top of me. i had found my road. the fact was that the thing, though marked on the large-scale map as a road of the third, fourth, or tenth quality (i forget which), was actually nothing more or less than three parallel crevasses in the turf filled with loose sand. it was into these crevasses that i had twice stumbled already. now with my back to the sea and keeping a yard or two away from this wretched track, but with its white sand to guide me, i pushed my motor-cycle laboriously over the rough turf for what seemed the better part of half an hour. in reality i suppose it was under ten minutes, but with the night passing and that long ride before me, i never want a more patience-testing job. and then suddenly the white sand ceased. i stepped across to see what was the matter, and found myself on a hard highroad. it was a branch of the main road that led towards the shore, and for the moment i had quite forgotten its existence. i could have shouted for joy. "now," i said to myself, "i'm off!" and off i went, phut-phut-phutting through the cool night air, with a heart extraordinarily lightened. that little bit of trouble at the start had made the rest of the whole wild enterprise seem quite simple now that it was safely over. i reached the end of this branch, swung round to the right into the highroad proper and buzzed along like a tornado. the sea by this time had vanished, but i saw the glimmer of a loch on my left, and close at hand low walls and dim vistas of cultivated fields. a dark low building whizzed by, and then a gaunt eerie-looking standing stone, and then came a dip and beyond it a little rise in the ground. as i took this rise there suddenly came upon me a terrible sinking of the heart. phut-phut! went my cycle, loudly and emphatically, and then came a horrible pause. phut! once more; then two or three feeble explosions, and then silence. my way stopped; i threw over my leg and landed on the road. "what the devil!" i muttered. i had cleaned the thing, oiled it, seen that everything was in order; what in heaven's name could be the matter? and then with a dreadful sensation i remembered that wave of salt water. ii. night in the ruined house. you may smile to think of a sailor being dismayed by a splash of salt water; but not if you are a motor-cyclist! several very diabolical consequences may ensue. in the middle of that empty road, in that alien land, under the hostile stars, i took my electric torch and endeavoured to discover what was the matter. from the moment i remembered the probable salt, wet cause of my mishap i had a pretty hopeless feeling. at the end of ten minutes i felt not merely quite hopeless, but utterly helpless. helpless as a child before a charging elephant, hopeless as a man at the bottom of an alpine crevasse. ignition, carburettor, what had been damaged? in good daylight it might take me an hour or two first to discover and then to mend. by the radiance of my torch i would probably spend a night or two, and be none the wiser. and meantime the precious dark hours were slipping away, and scattered all over the miles of country lay foemen sleeping--nothing but foes. i was in a sea-girt isle with but one solitary friend, and he was nearly twenty miles away, and i had the strictest orders not to approach him save under the cover of darkness. enough cause for a few pretty black moments, i think you will allow. and then i took myself by the scruff of the neck and gave myself a hearty shake. had i been picked for this errand because i was a coward or a resourceless fool? no! well, then, i must keep my head and use my wits, and if i could not achieve the best thing, i must try to do the second best. i ran over all the factors in the problem. firstly, to wait in the middle of that road trying to accomplish a job which i knew perfectly well it was a thousand chances to one against my managing, was sheer perverse folly. secondly, to leave my cycle in a ditch and try to cover the distance on my own two legs before daybreak was a physical impossibility. my cycle being one of the modern kind with no pedals, i could not even essay the dreadful task of grinding it along with my feet. therefore i could not reach my haven to-night by any conceivable means. on the other hand, i would still be expected to-morrow night, for our plans were laid to allow something for mischances; so if i could conceal myself and my cycle through the coming day, all might yet be well. therefore i must devise some plan for concealing myself. logic had brought me beautifully so far, but now came the rub--where was i to hide? these islands, you may or may not know, are to all practical purposes treeless and hedgeless. they have many moors and waste places, but of an abominable kind for a fugitive--especially a fugitive with a motor-cycle. the slopes are long and usually gentle and quite exposed; ravines and dells are few and far between and farther still to reach. caves and clefts among the rocks might be found no doubt, but i should probably break my neck looking for them in the dark. conceive of a man with a motor-bicycle looking for a cave by starlight! and then a heaven-sent inspiration visited me. on board we had of course maps with every house marked, however small, and who lived in it, and so on. we do things thoroughly, even though at the moment there may not be any apparent reason for some of the details. i blessed our system now, for suddenly in my mind's eye i saw a certain group of farm buildings marked "ruinous and uninhabited." and now where the devil was it? my own pocket map of course had no such minute details and i had to work my memory hard. and then in a flash i saw the map as distinctly as if it had really been under my eye instead of safely under the atlantic. "i have a chance still!" i said to myself. by the light of my torch i had a careful look at my small map, and then i set forth pushing my lifeless cycle. to get to my refuge i had to turn back and retrace my steps (or perhaps i should rather say my revolutions) part way to the shore till i came to a road branching southwards, roughly parallel to the coast. it ascended continuously and pretty steeply, and i can assure you it was stiff work pushing a motor-cycle up that interminable hill, especially when one was clad for warmth and not for exercise. dimly in the waxing moonlight i could see low farm buildings here and there, but luckily not a light shone nor a dog barked from one of them. glancing over my shoulder i saw the sea, now quite distinct and with a faint sheen upon its surface, widening and widening as i rose. but i merely glanced at it enviously and concentrated my attention on the task of finding my "ruinous and uninhabited" farm. i twice nearly turned off the road too soon, but i did find it at last--a low tumble-down group of little buildings some two hundred yards or so off the road on the right, or seaward side. here the cultivated fields stopped, and beyond them the road ascended through barren moorland. my refuge was, in fact, the very last of the farms as one went up the hill. it lay pretty isolated from the others, and there was a track leading to it that enabled me to push my cycle along fairly comfortably. "i might have come to a much worse place!" i said to myself hopefully. though there was not a sign of life about the place, and not a sound of any kind, i still proceeded warily, as i explored the derelict farm. i dared not even use my torch till i had stooped through an open door, and was safely within one of the buildings. when i flashed it round me i saw then that i stood in a small and absolutely empty room, which might at one time have been anything from a parlour to a byre, but now seemed consecrated to the cultivation of nettles. it had part of a roof overhead, and seemed as likely to suit my purpose as any other of the dilapidated group, so i brought my cycle in, flattened a square yard or two of nettles, and sat down on the floor with my back against the wall. and then i lit a cigarette and meditated. "my young friend," i said to myself, "you are in an awkward position, but, remember, you have been in awkward positions before when there were no such compensating advantages! let us consider these advantages and grow cheerful. you are privileged to render your country such a service as few single germans have been able to render her--if this plan succeeds! if it fails, your sacrifice will not be unknown or unappreciated. whatever happens, you will have climbed a rung or two up the ladder of duty, and perhaps of fame." this eloquence pleased my young friend so much that he lit another cigarette. "consider again," i resumed, "what an opportunity you have been unexpectedly presented with for exhibiting your resourcefulness and your coolness and your nerve! if it had not been for that wave of salt water your task would have been almost too simple. your own share of the enterprise would merely have consisted in a couple of easy rides on a motor-cycle, and perhaps the giving of a few suggestions, or the making of a few objections, which would probably have been brushed aside as worthless. now you have really something to test you!" this oration produced a less exhilarating effect. in fact, it set me to wondering very gravely how i could best justify this implied tribute to my powers of surmounting difficulties. till the day broke all i had to do was to sit still, but after that--what? i pondered for a few minutes, and then i came to the conclusion that an hour or two's sleep would probably freshen my wits. i knew i could count on waking when the sun rose, and so i closed my eyes, and presently was fast asleep. when i awoke, it was broad daylight. looking first through the pane-less window and then through the gap in the roof, i saw that it was a grey, still morning that held promise of a fine day, though whether that was to my advantage or disadvantage i did not feel quite sure. nobody seemed to be stirring yet about the houses or fields, so i had still time for deliberation before fate forced my hand. first of all, i had a look round my immediate surroundings. i was well sheltered, as all the walls were standing, and there was most of a roof over my head (the last being a point of some importance in case any aircraft chanced to make a flight in this direction). it is true that the door was gone, but even here i seemed fortunate, for another small building, also dilapidated-looking but in somewhat better condition, stood right opposite the open doorway and hid it completely. this little building still had a dishevelled door which stood closed, and for a moment i half thought of changing my shelter and taking possession of it; and then i decided that where fate had directed my steps, there should i abide. the next thing obviously was to overhaul my motor-cycle, and this i set about at once, though all the time my thoughts kept working. in the course of an hour or so i had located the trouble in the carburettor and put it right again, and i had also begun to realise a few of the pros and cons of the situation. i now ate a few sandwiches, had a pull at my flask, lit a cigarette, and put the case to myself squarely. "with a motor-cycle, the whole island at my disposal, and daylight in which to search it through, i can surely find a hiding-place a little farther removed from inquisitive neighbours," i said to myself. "so the sooner i am off the better." but then i answered back-"on the other hand it may take me some hours to find a better spot than this, and a man tearing about the country on a motor-cycle is decidedly more conspicuous in the early morning than in the middle of the day or the afternoon when cyclists are natural objects. "but again, if i do think of leaving this place i certainly ought not to be seen in the act of emerging from a ruinous house pushing my cycle--not, at least, if i wish to be considered a normal feature of the landscape. i have a chance of escaping now unobserved; shall i have such a chance later in the day?" finally i decided to compromise. i should stay where i was till the hour when all the farmers had their midday meal. then i might well hope to slip out unobserved, and thereafter scour the country looking for the ideal hiding-place without attracting any particular attention. but whatever merits this scheme may have had were destined never to be tested. from my seat amid the nettles i could see right through the open door, and my eyes all this while were resting on the glimpse of grey building outside. all at once i held my breath, and the hand that was lifting a cigarette to my lips grew rigid. a thin wisp of smoke was rising from the chimney. iii. behind the wall. "ruinous" these farm buildings certainly were; but "uninhabited"--obviously not quite! i rose stealthily and crossed to the door, and just as i reached it the door of the other house began to open. i stepped back and peered round the corner for quite a minute before anything more happened. my neighbour, whoever he was, seemed unconscionably slow in his movements. and then a very old, bent, and withered woman appeared, with a grey shawl about her head. as she looked slowly round her, first to one side and then to the other, i cautiously drew back; but even as i did so i knew it was too late. a wisp of smoke had given us both away. this time it was a trail from my cigarette which i could see quite plainly drifting through the open door. i heard her steps coming towards me, and then her shadow filled the doorway. there was nothing for it but taking the bull by the horns. "good morning!" i said genially. she did not start. she did not speak. she just stared at me out of as unpleasant-looking a pair of old eyes as i have ever looked into. i suspected at once why the old crone lived here by herself; she did not look as if she would be popular among her neighbours. "i think it is going to be a fine day," i continued breezily. she simply continued to stare; and if ever i saw suspicion in human eyes, i saw it in hers. "what do you think yourself?" i inquired with a smile. "i have no doubt you are more weatherwise than i." then at last she spoke, and i thought i had never heard a more sinister remark. "maybe it will be a fine day for some," she replied. "i hope i may be one of them!" i said as cheerfully as possible. she said not one word in reply, and her silence completed the ominous innuendo. it struck me that a word of explanation would be advisable. "my bicycle broke down," i said, "and i took the liberty of bringing it in here to repair it." her baleful gaze turned upon my hapless motor-cycle. "what for did you have to mend it in here?" she inquired; very pertinently, i could not but admit. "it was the most convenient place i could find," i replied carelessly. "to keep it from the rain maybe?" she suggested. "well," i admitted, "a roof has some advantages." "then," said she, "you've been here a long while, for there's been no rain since i wakened up." "but i didn't say i came here for shelter," i said hastily. she stared at me again for a few moments. "you're saying first one thing and then the other," she pronounced. i felt inclined to tell her that she had missed her vocation. what a terrible specimen of the brow-beating, cross-examining lawyer she would have made! however, i decided that my safest line was cheerful politeness. "have it your own way, my good dame!" i said lightly. her evil eyes transfixed me. "you'll be a foreigner," she said. "a foreigner!" i exclaimed; "why on earth should you think that?" "you're using queer words," she replied. "what words?" i demanded. "dame is the german for an old woman," said she. this astonishing philological discovery might have amused me at another time, but at this moment it only showed me too clearly how her thoughts were running. "well," said i, "if it's german, i can only say it is the first word of that beastly language i've ever spoken!" again i was answered by a very ominous silence. it occurred to me very forcibly that the sooner i removed myself from this neighbourhood the better. "well," i said, "my bicycle is mended now, so i had better be off." "you had that," she agreed. "good-bye!" i cried as i led my cycle out, but she never spoke a syllable in reply. "fate has not lost much time in forcing my hand!" i said to myself as i pushed my motor-cycle along the track towards the highroad. i thought it wiser not to look round, but just before i reached the road i glanced over my left shoulder, and there was the old woman crossing the fields at a much brisker pace than i should have given her credit for, and heading straight for the nearest farm. my hand was being forced with a vengeance. instinctively i should liked to have turned uphill and got clear of this district immediately, but i was not sure how my cycle would behave itself, and dared not risk a stiff ascent to begin with. so i set off at top speed down the road i had come the night before, passing the old crone at a little distance off, and noticing more than one labourer in the fields or woman at a house door, staring with interest at this early morning rider. when the news had spread of where he had come from, and with what language he interlarded his speech, they might do something more than stare. there was a telegraph-office not at all far away. as i sped down that hill and swung round away from the sea at the foot, i did a heap of quick thinking. as things had turned out i dared not make for any place of concealment far off the highroads. now that there was a probability of the hue and cry being raised, or at least of a look-out being kept for me, the chances of successfully slipping up the valley of some burn without any one's notice were enormously decreased. i had but to glance round at the openness of the countryside to realise that. no; on the highroads i could at least run away, but up in the moors i should be a mere trapped rat. then i had the bright thought of touring in zigzag fashion round and round the island, stopping every here and there to address an inhabitant and leave a false clue, so as to confuse my possible pursuers. but what about my petrol? i might need every drop if i actually did come to be chased. so i gave up that scheme. finally, i decided upon a plan which really seems to me now to be as promising as any i could think of. about the least likely place to look for me would be a few miles farther along the same road that ran past my last night's refuge, in the opposite direction from that in which people had seen me start. i resolved to make a detour and then work back to that road. i had arrived at this decision by the time i reached the scene of last night's mishap. fortunately my cycle was running like a deer now, and i swept up the little slope in a few seconds and sped round the loch, opening up fresh vistas of round-topped heather hills and wide green or brown valleys every minute. at a lonely bit of the road i jumped off, studied my map afresh, and then dashed on again. presently a side road opened, leading back towards the coast, and round the corner i sped; but even as i did so the utter hopelessness of my performance struck me vividly--that is to say, if a really serious and organised hunt for me were to be set afoot. for the roadside was dotted with houses, often at considerable intervals it is true, but then all of them had such confoundedly wide views over that open country. there was a house or two at the very corner where i turned, and i distinctly saw a face appearing at a window to watch me thunder past. the noise these motor-cycles make is simply infernal! it was then that i fell into the true spirit for such an adventure. since the chances were everywhere against me _if_ my enemies took certain steps, well then, the only thing to do was to hope they did not take them and dismiss that matter from my mind. i was taking the best precautions i could think of, and the cooler i kept and better spirits i was in, the more likely would luck be to follow me. for luck is a discerning lady and likes those who trust her. accordingly, the sun being now out and the morning beautifully fine, i decided to enjoy the scenery and make the most of a day ashore. my first step was to ease up and ride just as slowly as i could, and then i saw at once that i was doing the wisest thing in every way. i made less noise and less dust, and was altogether much less of a phenomenon. and this encouraged me greatly to keep to my new resolution. "if i leave it all to luck, she will advise me well!" i said to myself. i headed coastwards through a wide marshy valley with but few houses about, and in a short time saw the sea widening before me and presently struck the road i was seeking. at the junction i obeyed an impulse, and, jumping off my cycle, paused to survey the scenery. a fertile vale fell from where i stood, down to a small bay between headlands. it was filled with little farms, and all at once there came over me an extraordinary impression of peacefulness and rest. could it actually be that this was a country at war; that naval war, indeed, was very very close at hand, and beneath those shining waters a submarine might even now be stealing or a loose mine drifting? the wide, sunshiny, placid atmosphere of the scene, with its vast expanse of clear blue sky, larks singing high up and sea-birds crying about the shore, soothed my spirits like a magician's wand. i mounted and rode on again in an amazingly pleasant frame of mind for a spy within a hair's-breadth of capture, and very probably of ignominious death. up a long hill my engine gently throbbed, with moorland on either side that seemed to be so desolated by the gales and sea spray that even heather could scarcely flourish. i meant to stop and rest by the wayside, but after a look at the map i thought on the whole i had better put another mile or two between me and the lady with the baleful eyes. at the top i had a very wide prospect of inland country to the left, a treeless northern-looking scene, all green and brown with many lakes reflecting the sunshine. a more hopeless land to hide in i never beheld, and i was confirmed in my reckless resolution. chance alone must protect me. down a still steeper hill i rode, only now amid numberless small farms and with another bay shining ahead. the road ran nearly straight into the water and then bent suddenly and followed the rim of the bay, with nothing but empty sea-links on the landward side. the farms were left behind, a mansion-house by the shore was still a little distance ahead, and there was not a living soul in sight as i came to a small stone-walled enclosure squeezed in between the road and the beach below. i jumped off, led my cycle round this and laid it on the ground, and then seated myself with my back against the low wall of loose stones and my feet almost projecting over the edge of the steep slope of pebbles that fell down to the sand. i was only just out of sight, but unless any one should walk along the beach, out of sight i certainly was, and it struck me forcibly that ever since i had given myself up to luck, every impulse had been an inspiration. if i were conducting the search for myself, would i ever dream of looking for the mysterious runaway behind a wall three feet high within twenty paces of a public road and absolutely exposed to a wide sweep of beach? "no," i told myself, "i certainly should not!" there i sat for hour after hour basking in the sunshine, and yet despite my heavy clothing kept at a bearable temperature by gentle airs of cool breeze off the sea. the tide, which was pretty high when i arrived, crept slowly down the sands, but save for the cruising and running of gulls and little piping shore-birds, that was all the movement on the beach. not a soul appeared below me all that time. the calm shining sea remained absolutely empty except once for quarter of an hour or so when a destroyer was creeping past far out. to the seaward there was not a hint of danger or the least cause for apprehension. on the road behind me i did hear sounds several times, which i confess disturbed my equanimity much more than i meant to let them. once a motor-car buzzed past, and not to hold my breath as the sound swelled so rapidly and formidably was more than i could achieve. the jogging of a horse and trap twice set me wondering, despite myself, whether there were a couple of men with carbines aboard. but the slow prolonged rattling and creaking of carts was perhaps the sound that worried me most. they took such an interminable time to pass! i conceived a very violent distaste for carts. i do take some credit to myself that not once did i yield to the temptation to peep over my wall and see who it was that passed along the road. i did not even turn and try to peer through the chinks in the stones, but simply sat like a limpet till the sounds had died completely away. the only precaution i took was to extinguish my cigarette if i chanced at the moment to be smoking. in the course of my long bask in that sun bath i ate most of my remaining sandwiches and a cake or two of chocolate, but kept the remainder against emergencies. at last as the sun wore round, gradually descending till it shone right into my eyes, and i realised that the afternoon was getting far through, hope began to rise higher and higher. it actually seemed as if i were going to be allowed to remain within twenty yards of a highroad till night fell. "and then let them look for me!" i thought. i don't think my access of optimism caused me to make any incautious movement. i know i was not smoking, in fact it must simply have been luck determined to show me that i was not her only favourite. anyhow, when i first heard a footstep it was on the grass within five yards of me, and the next moment a man came round the corner of the wall and stopped dead short at the sight of me. he was a countryman, a small farmer or hired man, i should judge--a broad-faced, red-bearded, wide-shouldered, pleasant-looking fellow, and he must have been walking for some distance on the grass by the roadside, though what made him step the few yards out of his way to look round the corner of the wall, i have never discovered to this day. possibly he meant to descend to the beach at that point. anyhow there he was, and as we looked into one another's eyes for a moment in silence i could tell as surely as if he had said the words that he had heard the story of the suspicious motor-cyclist. iv. the nails. "a fine afternoon," i remarked, without rising, and i hope without showing any sign of emotion other than pleasure at making an acquaintance. "aye," said he, briefly and warily. this discouraging manner was very ominous, for the man was as good-natured and agreeable-looking a fellow as i ever met. "the weather looks like keeping up," i said. he continued to look at me steadily, and made no answer at all this time. then he turned his back to me very deliberately, lifted his felt hat, and waved it two or three times round his head, evidently to some one in the distance. i saw instantly that mischief was afoot and time precious, yet the fellow was evidently determined and stout-hearted, besides being physically very powerful, and it would never do to rouse his suspicions to the pitch of grappling with me. of course i might use my revolver, but i had no wish to add a civilian's death to the other charge i might have to face before that sun had set. suddenly luck served me well again by putting into my head a well-known english cant phrase. "are you often taken like that?" i inquired with a smile. he turned round again and stared blankly. i imitated the movement of waving a hat, and laughed. "or is it a family custom?" i asked. he was utterly taken aback, and looked rather foolish. i sat still and continued to smile at him. and then he broke into a smile himself. "i was just waving on a friend," he explained, and i could detect a note of apology in his voice. for the moment he was completely hoodwinked. how long it would last heaven knew, but i clearly could not afford to imitate mr asquith, and "wait and see." "oh," i said with a laugh, "i see!" and then i glanced at my wristlet watch, and sprang to my feet with an exclamation. "by jove, i'll be late!" i said, and picking up my cycle wheeled it briskly to the road, remarking genially as i went, "the days are not so long as they were!" i never saw a man more obviously divided in mind. was i the suspicious person he fancied at first? or was i an honest and peaceable gentleman? meanwhile i had cast one brief but sufficient glance along the road. just at the foot of the steep hill down which i had come in the morning a man was mounting a motor-cycle. beside him stood one or two others--country folk, so far as i could judge at the distance, and piecing things together, it seemed plain that my friend had lately been one of the party, and that the man they had been gossiping with was a motor-cyclist in search of me, who had actually paused to make inquiries within little over a quarter of a mile from where i sat. quite possibly he had been there for some time, and almost certainly he would have ridden past without suspecting my presence if it had not been for the diabolical mishap of this chance encounter. i had planted my cycle on the road, and was ready to mount before my friend had made up his mind what to do. even then his procedure luckily lacked decision. "beg pardon, sir--!" he began, making a step towards me. "good evening!" i shouted, and the next instant the engine had started, and i was in my saddle. even then my pursuer had got up so much speed that he must surely have caught me had he not stopped to make inquiry of my late acquaintance. i was rounding a corner at the moment, and so was able to glance over my shoulder and see what was happening. the cyclist was then in the act of remounting, and i noted that he was in very dark clothes. it might or might not have been a uniform, but i fancied it was. anyhow, i felt peculiarly little enthusiasm for making his acquaintance. on i sped, working rapidly up to forty miles an hour, and quite careless now of any little sensation i might cause. i had sensations myself, and did not grudge them to other people. the road quickly left the coast and turned directly inland, and presently it began to wind along the edge of a long reedy stretch of water, with a steep bank above it on the other side. the windings gave me several chances of catching a glimpse of my pursuer, and i saw that i was gaining nothing; in fact, if anything he was overhauling me. "i'll try them!" i said to myself. "them" were nails. wiedermann had done me no more than justice in assuming i had come well provided against possible contingencies. each of my side-pockets had a little packet of large-headed, sharp-pointed nails. i had several times thrown them experimentally on the floor of my cabin, and found that a gratifying number lay point upwards. i devoutly prayed they would behave as reasonably now. this stretch of road was ideal for their use--narrow, and with not a house to give succour or a spectator to witness such a very suspicious performance, i threw a handful behind me, and at the next turn of the road glanced round to see results. the man was still going strong. i threw another handful and then a third, but after that the road ran straight for a space, and it was only when it bent to the right round the head of the loch that i was able to see him again. he had stopped far back, and was examining his tyres. the shadows by this time were growing long, but there were still some hours before darkness would really shelter me, and in the meantime what was i to do with myself, and where to turn? judging from the long time that had elapsed between my discovery in the early morning and the appearance of this cyclist at the very place which i had thought would be the last where they would seek me, the rest of the island had probably been searched and the hue and cry had died down by this time. so for some time i ought to be fairly safe anywhere: until, in fact, my pursuer had reached a telegraph office, and other scouts had then been collected and sent out. and if my man was an average human being, he would certainly waste a lot of precious time in trying to pump up his tyres or mend them before giving it up as a bad job and walking to a telegraph office. that, in fact, was what he did, for in this open country i was able a few minutes later to see him in the far distance still stopping by that loch shore. but though i believe in trusting to chance, i like to give myself as many chances as possible. i knew where all the telegraph offices were, and one was a little nearer him than i quite liked. so half a mile farther on, at a quiet spot on a hill, i jumped off and swarmed up one of the telegraph-posts by the roadside, and then i took out of my pocket another happy inspiration. when i came down again, there was a gap in the wire. there was now quite a good chance that i might retain my freedom till night fell, and if i could hold out so long as that--well, we should see what happened then! but what was to be done in the meantime? a strong temptation assailed me, and i yielded to it. i should get as near to my night's rendezvous as possible, and try to find some secluded spot there. it was not perhaps the very wisest thing to risk being seen there by daylight and bring suspicion on the neighbourhood where i meant to spend two or three days; but you will presently see why i was so strongly tempted. so great, in fact, was the temptation that till i got there i hardly thought of the risk. i rode for a little longer through the same kind of undulating, loch-strewn inland country, and then i came again close to the sea. but it was not the open sea this time. it was a fairly wide sound that led from the ocean into a very important place, and immediately i began to see things. what things they were precisely i may not say, but they had to do with warfare, with making this sound about as easy for a hostile ship to get through, whether above the water or below, as a pane of glass is for a bluebottle. as i rode very leisurely, with my head half turned round all the while, i felt that my time was not wasted if i escaped safely, having seen simply what i now noted. for my eye could put interpretations on features that would convey nothing to the ordinary traveller. gradually up and up a long gentle incline i rode, with the sound falling below me and a mass of high dark hills rising beyond it. behind me the sun was now low, and my shadow stretched long on the empty road ahead. for it was singularly empty, and the country-side was utterly peaceful; only at sea was there life--with death very close beside it. and now and then there rose at intervals a succession of dull, heavy sounds that made the earth quiver. i knew what they meant! then came a dip, and then a very steep long hill through moorland country. and then quite suddenly and abruptly i came to the top. it was a mere knife-edge, with the road instantly beginning to descend steeply on the other side, but i did not descend with the road. i jumped off and stared with bated breath. ahead of me and far below, a wide island-encircled sheet of water lay placid and smiling in the late afternoon sunshine. strung along one side of it were lines of grey ships, with a little smoke rising from most of their funnels, but lying quite still and silent--as still and silent as the farms and fields on shore. those distant patches of grey, with the thin drifts of smoke and the masts encrusted with small grey blobs rising out of their midst, those were the cause of all my country's troubles. but for them peace would have long since been dictated and a mightier german empire would be towering above all other states in the world. how i hated--and yet (being a sailor myself) how i respected them! one solitary monster of this armada was slowly moving across the land-locked basin. parallel to her and far away moved a tiny vessel with a small square thing following her at an even distance, and the sun shining on this showed its colour red. suddenly out of the monster shot a series of long bright flashes. nothing else happened for several seconds, and then almost simultaneously "boom! boom! boom!" hit my ear, and a group of tall white fountains sprang up around the distant red target. the grand fleet of england was preparing for "the day"! i knew the big vessel at a glance; i knew her, at least, as one of a certain four, and for some moments i watched her gunnery practice, too fascinated to stir. i noted how the fall of her shells was spread--in fact i noted several things; and then it occurred to me abruptly that i stood a remarkably good chance of having a wall at my back and a handkerchief over my eyes if i lingered in this open road much longer. and the plea that i was enjoying the excellent gun-practice made by h.m.s. _blank_ would scarcely be accepted as an extenuating circumstance! i glanced quickly round, and then i realised how wonderfully luck was standing by me. at the summit of that hill there were naturally no houses, and as the descending road on either side made a sharp twist almost immediately, i stood quite invisible on my outlook tower. the road, moreover, ran through a kind of neck, with heather rising on either side; and in a moment i had hauled my cycle up the bank on the landward side, and was out of sight over the edge, even should any traveller appear. after a few minutes' laborious dragging of my cycle i found myself in a small depression in the heather, where, by lying down, i could remain quite out of sight unless some one walked right into me--and it seemed improbable that any one should take such a promenade with the good road so close at hand. by raising myself on my knees i could command the same engrossing view i had seen from the road, only i now also saw something of the country that sloped down to the sea; and with a thrill of exultation i realised that this prospect actually included our rendezvous. v. waiting. what i saw when i cautiously peered over the rim of that little hollow was (beginning at the top) a vast expanse of pale-blue sky, with fleecy clouds down near the horizon already tinged with pink reflections from the sunset far off behind my back. then came a shining glimpse of the north sea; then a rim of green islands, rising on the right to high heather hills; then the land-locked waters and the grey ships now getting blurred and less distinct; then some portions of the green land that sloped up to where i lay; and among these fields, and not far away from me, the steep roof and gable-top of a grey, old-fashioned house. it was the parish manse, the pacific abode of the professional exponent and exemplar of peace--the parish minister; and yet, curiously enough, it was that house which my eyes devoured. the single ship had now ceased firing and anchored with her consorts, the fleet had grown too indistinct to note anything of its composition, and there was nothing to distract my attention from the house. i looked at it hard and long and studied the lie of the ground between it and me, and then i lay down on a couch of soft heather and began to think. so far as i could see i had done nothing yet to draw suspicion to this particular spot, for no one at all seemed to have seen me, but it was manifest that there would be a hard and close hunt for the mysterious motor-cyclist on the morrow. i began to half regret that i had cut that telegraph wire and advertised myself so patently for what i was. now it was quite obvious that for some days to come motor-cycling would be an unhealthy pastime in these islands. even at night how many ears would be listening for my "phut-phut-phut," and how many eyes would be scanning the dark roads? a few judiciously placed and very simple barricades--a mere bar on two uprights, with a sentry beside each--and what chance would i have of getting back to that distant bay, especially as i had just been seen so near it? "however," i said to myself, "that is looking too far ahead. it was not my fault i brought this hornet's nest about my ears. just bad luck and a clumsy sailor!" just then i heard something approaching on the road below me, and in a minute or two it became unmistakably the sound of a horse and trap. at one place i could catch a glimpse of this road between the hummocks of heather, and i raised myself again and looked out. in a moment the horse and trap appeared and i got a sensation i shall not soon forget. not that there seemed to the casual passer-by anything in the least sensational about this equipage. he would merely have noticed that it contained, besides the driver, a few articles of luggage and a gentleman in a flat-looking felt hat and an overcoat--both of them black. this gentleman was sitting with his back to me (he was in a small waggonette), but i could scarcely doubt who it was. but only arriving to-night! curiosity and anxiety so devoured me that i ran a little risk. getting out of my hollow, i crawled forward on my hands and knees till i could catch a glimpse of the side road leading to that house; and there i lay flat on my face and watched. down the steep hill the horse proceeded at a walk, and what between my impatience to make sure, and my consciousness of my own rashness in quitting even for a moment my sheltered hollow, i passed a few very uncomfortable minutes. the light by this time was failing fast, but it was quite clear enough to see (or be seen), and at last i caught one more glimpse of that horse and trap--turning off the road just where i expected. and then i was crawling back with more haste than dignity. it was "him"! and he had only arrived to-night. if it had not been for my accident, in what a nice dilemma i should have been landed! never did i bless any one more fervently than that awkward sailor who had let my cycle slip, and as for the wave of salt water which wet it, it seemed to have sprung from the age of miracles. the trouble of my discovery and its possible consequences still remained, but i thought little enough of that now, so thankful did i feel for what had _not_ happened. and then i stretched myself out again on the heather, waiting with all the patience i could muster for the falling of night. part ii. a few chapters by the editor i. the pleasant stranger. it was in july of that same year that the rev. alexander burnett was abashed to find himself inadvertently conspicuous. he had very heartily permitted himself to be photographed in the centre of a small group of lads from his parish who had heard their country's call and were home in their khaki for a last leave-taking. moreover, the excellence of the photograph and the undeniably close resemblance of his own portrait to the reflection he surveyed each morning when shaving, had decidedly pleased him. but the appearance of this group, first as an illustration in a local paper and then in one that enjoyed a very wide circulation indeed, embarrassed him not a little. for he was a modest, publicity-avoiding man, and also he felt he ought to have been in khaki too. not that mr burnett had anything really to reproach himself with, for he was in the forties, some years above military age. but he was a widower without a family, who had already spent fifteen years in a sparsely inhabited parish in the south-east of scotland not very far from the border; and ever since he lost his wife had been uneasy in mind and a little morbid, and anxious for change of scene and fresh experiences. he was to get them, and little though he dreamt it, that group was their beginning. indeed, it would have taken as cunning a brain to scent danger in the trifling incidents with which his strange adventure began as it took to arrange them. and mr burnett was not at all cunning, being a simple, quiet man. in appearance he was rather tall, with a clean-shaven, thoughtful face, and hair beginning to turn grey. a few days later a newspaper arrived by post. he had received several already from well-meaning friends, each with that group in it, and he sighed as he opened this one. it was quite a different paper, however, with no illustrations, but with a certain page indicated in blue pencil, and a blue pencil mark in the margin of that page. what his attention was called to was simply the announcement that the rev. mr maxwell, minister of the parish of myredale, had been appointed to another charge, and that there was now a vacancy there. mr burnett looked at the wrapper, but his name and address had been typewritten and gave him no clue. he wondered who had sent him the paper, and then his thoughts naturally turned to the vacant parish. he knew that it lay in a certain group of northern islands, which we may call here the windy isles, and he presumed that the stipend would not be great. still, it was probably a better living than his own small parish, and as for its remoteness, well, he liked quiet, out-of-the-way places, and it would certainly be a complete change of scene. he let the matter lie in the back of his mind, and there it would very likely have remained but for a curious circumstance on the following sunday. his little parish church was seldom visited by strangers, and when by any chance one did appear, the minister was very quickly conscious of the fact. he always took stock of his congregation during the first psalm, and on this sabbath his experienced eye had noted a stranger before the end of the opening verse. a pleasant-looking gentleman in spectacles he appeared to be, and of a most exemplary and devout habit of mind. in fact, he hardly once seemed to take his spectacled gaze off the minister's face during the whole service; and mr burnett believed in giving his congregation good measure. it was a fine day, and when service was over the minister walked back to his manse at a very leisurely pace, enjoying the sunshine after a week of showery weather. the road he followed crossed the river, and as he approached the bridge he saw the same stranger leaning over the parapet, smoking a cigar, and gazing at the brown stream. near him at the side of the road was drawn up a large dark-green touring car, which apparently the gentleman had driven himself, for there was no sign of a chauffeur. "good day, sir!" said the stranger affably, as the minister came up to him. "lovely weather!" mr burnett, nothing loath to hear a fresh voice, stopped and smiled and agreed that the day was fine. he saw now that the stranger was a middle-sized man with a full fair moustache, jovial eyes behind his gold-rimmed spectacles, and a rosy healthy colour; while his manner was friendliness itself. the minister felt pleasantly impressed with him at once. "any trout in this stream?" inquired the stranger. mr burnett answered that it was famed as a fishing river, at which the stranger seemed vastly interested and pleased, and put several questions regarding the baskets that were caught. then he grew a little more serious and said-"i hope you will pardon me, sir, for thanking you for a very excellent sermon. as i happened to be motoring past just as church was going in i thought i'd look in too. but i assure you i had no suspicion i should hear so good a discourse. i appreciated it highly." though a modest man, mr burnett granted the stranger's pardon very readily. indeed, he became more favourably impressed with him than ever. "i am very pleased to hear you say so," he replied, "for in an out-of-the-way place like this one is apt to get very rusty." "i don't agree with you at all, sir," said the stranger energetically, "if you'll pardon my saying so. in my experience--which is pretty wide, i may add--the best thinking is done in out-of-the-way places. i don't say the showiest, mind you, but the _best_!" again the minister pardoned him without difficulty. "of course, one needs a change now and then, i admit," continued the stranger. "but, my dear sir, whatever you do, don't go and bury yourself in a crowd!" this struck mr burnett as a novel and very interesting way of putting the matter. he forgot all about the dinner awaiting him at the manse, and when the stranger offered him a very promising-looking cigar, he accepted it with pleasure, and leaned over the parapet beside him. there, with his eyes on the running water, he listened and talked for some time. the stranger began to talk about the various charming out-of-the-way places in scotland. it seemed he was a perfervid admirer of everything scottish, and had motored or tramped all over the country from berwick to the pentland firth. in fact, he had even crossed the waters, for he presently burst forth into a eulogy of the windy islands. "the most delightful spot, sir, i have ever visited!" he said enthusiastically. "there is a peacefulness and charm, and at the same time something stimulating in the air i simply can't describe. in body and mind i felt a new man after a week there!" the minister was so clearly struck by this, and his interest so roused, that the stranger pursued the topic and added a number of enticing details. "by the way," he exclaimed presently, "do you happen to know a fellow-clergyman there called maxwell? his parish is--let me see--ah, myredale, that's the name." this struck mr burnett as quite extraordinary. "i don't know him personally," he began. "a very sensible fellow," continued the stranger impetuously. "he told me his parish was as like heaven as anything on this mortal earth!" "he has just left it," said mr burnett. the stranger seemed surprised and interested. "what a chance for some one!" he exclaimed. mr burnett gazed thoughtfully through the smoke of his cigar into the brown water of the river below him. "i have had thoughts of making a change myself," he said slowly. "but of course they might not select me even if i applied for myredale." "in the scottish church the custom is to go to the vacant parish to preach a trial sermon, isn't it?" inquired the stranger. the minister nodded. "a system i disapprove of, i may say," said he. "i quite agree with you," said the stranger sympathetically. "still, so long as that is the system, why not try your luck? mind you, i talk as one who knows the place, and knows mr maxwell and his opinion of it. you'll have an enviable visit, whatever happens." "it is a very long way," said mr burnett. "don't they pay your expenses!" "yes," admitted the minister. "but then i understand that those islands are very difficult for a stranger to enter at present. the naval authorities are extremely strict." the stranger laughed jovially. "my dear sir," he cried, "can you imagine even the british navy standing between a scotch congregation and its sermon! you are the one kind of stranger who will be admitted. all you have to do is to get a passport--and there you are!" "are they difficult to get?" the stranger laughed again. "i know nothing about that kind of thing," said he. "i'm a lancashire lad, and the buzz of machinery is my game; but i can safely say this: that _you_ will have no difficulty in getting a passport." mr burnett again gazed at the water in silence. then he looked up and said with a serious face-"i must really tell you, sir, of a very remarkable coincidence. only a few days ago some unknown friend sent me a copy of a newspaper with a notice of this very vacancy marked in it!" the lancashire lad looked almost thunder-struck by this extraordinary disclosure. "well, i'm hanged!" he cried--adding hurriedly, "if you'll forgive my strong language, sir." "it seems to me to be providential," said mr burnett in a low and very serious voice. with equal solemnity the stranger declared that though not an unusually good man himself, this solution had already struck him forcibly. at this point the minister became conscious of the distant ringing of a bell, and recognised with a start the strident note of his own dinner bell swung with a vigorous arm somewhere in the road ahead. he shook hands cordially with the stranger, thanked him for the very interesting talk he had enjoyed, and hurried off towards his over-cooked roast. the stranger remained for a few moments still leaning against the parapet. his jovial face had been wreathed in smiles throughout the whole conversation; he still smiled now, but with rather a different expression. ii. the chauffeur. mr burnett was somewhat slow in coming to decisions, but once he had taken an idea to do a thing he generally carried it out. in the course of a week or ten days he had presented himself as a candidate for the vacant church of myredale, and made arrangements for appearing in the pulpit there on a certain sunday in august. he was to arrive in the islands on the thursday, spend the week-end in the empty manse, preach on sunday, and return on monday or tuesday. his old friend mr drummond in edinburgh, hearing of the plan, invited him to break his journey at his house, arriving on tuesday afternoon, and going on by the north train on wednesday night. accordingly, he arranged to have a trap at the manse on tuesday afternoon, drive to berwick and catch the scotch express, getting into edinburgh at 6.15. he was a reticent man, and in any case had few neighbours to gossip with, so that as far as he himself knew, the drummonds alone had been informed of all these details. but he had in the manse a very valuable domestic, who added to her more ordinary virtues a passion for conversation. on the saturday afternoon before he was due to start, he was returning from a walk, when he caught a glimpse of a man's figure disappearing into a small pine wood at the back of his house, and when his invaluable mary brought him in his tea, he inquired who her visitor had been. "oh, sic a nice young felly!" said mary enthusiastically. "he's been a soger, wounded at mons he was, and walking to berwick to look for a job." though simple, the minister was not without some sad experience of human nature, particularly the nature of wounded heroes, tramping the country for jobs. "i hope you didn't give him any money," said he. "he never askit for money!" cried mary. "oh, he was not that kind at a'! a maist civil young chap he was, and maist interested to hear where you were gaun, and sic like." the minister shook his head. "you told him when i was leaving, and all about it, i suppose?" "there was nae secret, was there?" demanded mary. mr burnett looked at her seriously. "as like as not," said he; "he just wished to know when the man of the house would be away. mind and keep the doors locked, mary, and if he comes back, don't let him into the kitchen whatever cock-and-bull story he tells." he knew that mary was a sensible enough woman, and having given her this warning, he forgot the whole incident--till later. tuesday was fine and warm, a perfect day on which to start a journey, and about mid-day mr burnett was packing a couple of bags with a sense of pleasant anticipation, when a telegram arrived. this was exactly how it ran:-"my friend taylor motoring to edinburgh to-day. will pick you and luggage up at manse about six, and bring you to my house. don't trouble reply, assume this suits, shall be out till late. drummond." "there's no answer," said mr burnett with a smile. he was delighted with this change in his programme, and at once countermanded his trap, and ordered mary to set about making scones and a currant cake for tea. "this mr taylor will surely be wanting his tea before he starts," said he, "though it's likely he won't want to waste too much time over it, or it will be dark long before we get to edinburgh. so have everything ready, mary, but just the infusing of the tea." then with an easy mind, feeling that there was no hurry now, he sat down to his early dinner. as he dined he studied the telegram more carefully, and it was then that one or two slight peculiarities struck him. they seemed to him very trifling, but they set him wondering and smiling a little to himself. he knew most of the drummonds' friends, and yet never before had he heard of an affluent motor-driving mr taylor among them. still, there was nothing surprising about that, for one may make a new friend any day, and one's old friends never hear of him for long enough. the really unusual features about this telegram were its length and clearness and the elaborate injunctions against troubling to answer it. robert drummond was an excellent and christian man, but he had never been remarkable for profuse expenditure. in fact, he guarded his bawbees very carefully indeed, and among other judicious precautions he never sent telegrams if he could help it, and when fate forced his hand, kept very rigorously within the twelve-word limit. his telegrams in consequence were celebrated more for their conciseness than their clarity. yet here he was sending a telegram thirty-four words long, apart from the address and signature, and spending halfpenny after halfpenny with reckless profusion to make every detail explicit! particularly curious were the three clauses all devoted to saving mr burnett the trouble of replying. never before had mr drummond shown such extraordinary consideration for a friend's purse, and it is a discouraging feature of human nature that even the worthy mr burnett felt more puzzled than touched by his generous thoughtfulness. "robert drummond never wrote out that wire himself," he concluded. "he must just have told some one what he wanted to say, and they must have written it themselves. well, we'll hope they paid for it too, or robert will be terrible annoyed." the afternoon wore on, and as six o'clock drew near, the minister began to look out for mr taylor and his car. but six o'clock passed, and quarter-past six, and still there was no sign of him. the minister began to grow a little worried lest they should have to do most of the journey in the dark, for he was an inexperienced motorist, and such a long drive by night seemed to him a formidable and risky undertaking. at last at half-past six the thrum of a car was heard, and a few minutes later a long, raking, dark-green touring car dashed up to the door of the modest manse. the minister hurried out to welcome his guest, and then stopped dead short in sheer astonishment. mr taylor was none other than the lancashire lad. on his part, mr taylor seemed almost equally surprised. "well, i'm blowed!" he cried jovially. "if this isn't the most extraordinary coincidence! when i got robert drummond's note, and noticed the part of the country you lived in, i wondered if you could possibly be the same minister i'd met; but it really seemed too good to be true! delighted to meet you again!" he laughed loud and cheerfully, and wrung the minister's hand like an old friend. mr burnett, though less demonstrative, felt heartily pleased, and led his guest cordially into the manse parlour. "you'll have some tea before you start, i hope?" he inquired. "ra-ther!" cried mr taylor. "i've a lancashire appetite for tea! ha, ha, ha!" "well, i'll have it in at once," said the minister, ringing the bell, "for i suppose we ought not to postpone our start too long." "no hurry at all, my dear fellow," said mr taylor, throwing himself into the easiest chair the minister possessed. "i mean to have a jolly good tuck in before i start!" at that moment mr burnett remembered that this time he had seen a chauffeur in the car. he went hospitably out of the room and turned towards the front door. but hardly had he turned in that direction when he heard mr taylor call out-"hallo! where are you going?" and the next moment he was after the minister and had him by the arm just as they reached the open front door. mr burnett ever afterwards remembered the curious impression produced on him by the note in mr taylor's voice, and that hurried grip of the arm. suspicion, alarm, a note of anger, all seemed to be blended. "i--i was only going to ask your driver to come and have a cup of tea in the kitchen," stammered the embarrassed minister. "my dear sir, he doesn't want any; i've asked him already!" said mr taylor. "i assure you honestly i have!" mr burnett suffered himself to be led back wondering greatly. he had caught a glimpse of the chauffeur, a clean-shaven, well-turned-out man, sitting back in his seat with his cap far over his eyes, and even in that hurried glance at part of his face he had been struck with something curiously familiar about the man; though whether he had seen him before, or, if not, who he reminded him of, he was quite unable to say. and then there was mr taylor's extraordinary change of manner the very moment he started to see the chauffeur. he could make nothing of it at all, but for some little time afterwards he had a vague sense of disquiet. mr taylor, on his part, had recovered his cheerfulness as quickly as he had lost it. "forgive me, my dear mr burnett," he said earnestly, yet always with the rich jolly note in his voice. "i must have seemed a perfect maniac. the truth is, between ourselves, i had a terrible suspicion you were going to offer my good james whisky!" "oh," said the minister. "is he then--er--an abstainer?" mr taylor laughed pleasantly. "i wish he were! a wee drappie is his one failing; ha, ha! i never allow my chauffeur to touch a drop while i'm on the road, mr burnett--never, sir!" mr burnett was slow to suspect ill of any one, but he was just as slow in getting rid of a suspicion. with all his simplicity, he could not but think that mr taylor jumped extraordinarily quickly to conclusions and got excited on smaller provocation than any one he had ever met. over his first cup of tea he sat very silent. in the meantime the sociable mary had been suffering from a sense of disappointment. surely the beautiful liveried figure in the car would require his tea and eggs like his master? for a little she sat awaiting his arrival in the kitchen, with her cap neatly arranged, and an expectant smile. but gradually disappointment deepened. she considered the matter judicially. clearly, she decided, mr burnett had forgotten the tradition of hospitality associated with that and every other manse. and then she decided that her own duty was plain. she went out of the back door and round the house. there stood the car, with the resplendent figure leaning back in his seat, his cap still over his eyes, and his face now resting on his hand, so that she could barely see more than the tip of his nose. he heard nothing of her approach till she was fairly at his side, and in her high and penetrating voice cried-"will ye not be for a cup of tea and an egg to it, eh?" the chauffeur started, and mary started too. she had seen his face for an instant, though he covered it quickly, but apparently quite naturally, with his hand. "no, thanks," he said brusquely, and turned away his eyes. mary went back to the kitchen divided between annoyance at the rebuff and wonder. the liveried figure might have been the twin-brother of the minister. iii. on the cliff. gradually mr burnett recovered his composure. his guest was so genial and friendly and appreciative of the scones and the currant cake that he began to upbraid himself for churlishness in allowing anything like a suspicion of this pleasant gentleman to linger in his mind. there remained a persistent little shadow which he could not quite drive away, but he conscientiously tried his best. as for mr taylor, there never was a jollier and yet a more thoughtful companion. he seemed to think of every mortal thing that the minister could possibly need for his journey. "got your passport?" he inquired. "yes," said the minister. "i am carrying it in my breast-pocket. it ought to be safe there." "the safest place possible!" said mr taylor cordially. "it's all in order, i presume, eh?" mr burnett took the passport out of his pocket and showed it to him. his guest closely examined the minister's photograph which was attached, went through all the particulars carefully, and pronounced everything in order, as far as an ignorant outsider like himself could judge. "of course," he said, "i'm a business man, mr burnett, and i can tell when a thing looks businesslike, though i know no more about what the authorities require and why they ask for all these particulars than you do. it's all red tape, i suppose." as a further precaution he recommended his host to slip a few letters and a receipted bill or two into his pocket-book, so that he would have a ready means of establishing his identity if any difficulty arose. mr burnett was somewhat surprised, but accepted his guest's word for it, as a shrewd lancashire lad, that these little tips were well worth taking. by this time the evening was falling, and at length mr taylor declared himself ready for the road. he had drunk four cups of tea, and hurried over none of them. for a moment mr burnett half wondered if he had any reason for delaying their start, but immediately reproached himself for harbouring such a thought. indeed, why should he think so? there seemed nothing whatever to be gained by delay, with the dusk falling so fast and a long road ahead. the minister's rug and umbrella and two leather bags were put into the car, he and mr taylor got aboard, and off they went at last. mr burnett had another glance at the chauffeur, and again was haunted by an odd sense of familiarity; but once they had started, the view of his back in the gathering dusk suggested nothing more explicit. presently they passed a corner, and the minister looked round uneasily. "what road are you taking?" he asked. "we're going to join the coast road from berwick," said mr taylor. "isn't that rather roundabout?" mr taylor laughed jovially. "my good james has his own ideas," said he. "as a matter of fact, i fancy he knows the coast road and isn't sure of the other. however, we needn't worry about that. with a car like this the difference in time will be a flea-bite!" he had provided the minister with another excellent cigar, and smoking in comfort behind a glass wind-screen, with the dim country slipping by and the first pale star faintly shining overhead, the pair fell into easy discourse. mr taylor was a remarkably sympathetic talker, the minister found. he kept the conversation entirely on his companion's affairs, putting innumerable questions as to his habits and way of life, and indeed his whole history, and exhibiting a flattering interest in his answers. mr burnett said to himself at last, with a smile, that this inquiring gentleman would soon know as much about him as he knew himself. once or twice the minister wondered how fast they were really going. they did not seem to him to be achieving any very extraordinary speed, but possibly that was only because the big car ran so easily. in fact, when he once questioned his companion, mr taylor assured him that actually was the explanation. it was thus pretty dark when they struck the coast road, and it grew ever darker as they ran northward through a bare, treeless country, with the cliff edge never far away and the north sea glimmering beyond. they had reached an absolutely lonely stretch of road that hugged the shore closely when the car suddenly stopped. "hallo!" exclaimed mr taylor, "what's up?" the chauffeur half-turned round and said in a low voice-"did you see that light, sir?" "which light?" the chauffeur pointed to the dark stretch of turf between them and the edge of the cliffs. "just there, sir. i saw it flash for a second. i got a glimpse of some one moving too, sir." mr taylor became intensely excited. "a spy signalling!" he exclaimed. "looks like it, sir," said the chauffeur. mr taylor turned to the minister with an eager, resolute air. "our duty's clear, mr burnett," said he. "as loyal subjects of king george--god bless him!--we've got to have a look into this!" with that he jumped out and stood by the open door, evidently expecting the minister to follow. for a moment mr burnett hesitated. a vague sense that all was not well suddenly affected him. "do not go!" something seemed to say to him. and yet as a man and a loyal subject how could he possibly decline to assist in an effort to foil the king's enemies? reluctantly he descended from the car, and once he was on the road, mr taylor gave him no time for further debate. "come on!" he whispered eagerly; and then turning to the chauffeur, "come along too, james!" close by there was a gate in the fence, and they all three went through this and quietly crossed the short stretch of grass between the road and the cliffs, mr taylor and the minister walking in front and the chauffeur following close at their heels. now that the car was silent, they could hear the soft lapping of the water at the cliff foot, but that and the fall of their feet on the short crisp turf were the only sounds. mr burnett peered hard into the darkness, but he could see absolutely nothing. all at once he realised that they were getting very close to the brink, and that if there were any one in front they would certainly be silhouetted against the sky. there could not possibly be any use in going further; why then did they continue to advance? at that a clear and terrifying instinct of danger seized him. he turned round sharply, and uttered one loud ringing cry. he was looking straight into the chauffeur's face, and it seemed as though he were looking into his own, distorted by murderous intention. above it the man's hand was already raised. it descended, and the minister fell on the turf with a gasp. he knew no more of that night's adventure. iv. mr drummond's visitor. upon a secluded road in the quiet suburb of trinity stood the residence of mr robert drummond. it was a neat unpretentious little villa graced by a number of trees and a clinging virginia creeper, and mr drummond was a neat unpretentious little gentleman, graced by a number of virtues, and a devoted mrs drummond. from the upper windows of his house you could catch a glimpse of the castled and templed hills of edinburgh on the one side, and the shining forth and green coasts of fife on the other. the forth, in fact, was close at hand, and of late mr drummond had been greatly entertained by observing many interesting movements upon its waters. he had looked forward to exhibiting and expounding these features to his friend mr burnett, and felt considerably disappointed when upon the morning of the day when the minister should have come, a telegram arrived instead. it ran-"unavoidably prevented from coming to stay with you. shall explain later. many regrets. don't trouble reply. leaving home immediately. "burnett." as mr drummond studied this telegram he began to feel not only disappointed but a trifle critical. "alec burnett must have come into a fortune!" he said to himself. "six words--the whole of threepence--wasted in telling me not to reply! as if i'd be spending my money on anything so foolish. i never saw such extravagance!" on the following morning mr drummond was as usual up betimes. he had retired a year or two before from a responsible position in an insurance office, but he still retained his active business habits, and by eight o'clock every morning of the summer was out and busy in his garden. it still wanted ten minutes to eight, and he was just buttoning up his waistcoat when he heard the front-door bell ring. a minute or two later the maid announced that mr topham was desirous of seeing mr drummond immediately. "mr topham?" he asked. "he's a navy officer, sir," said the maid. vaguely perturbed, mr drummond hurried downstairs, and found in his study a purposeful-looking young man, with the two zigzag stripes on his sleeve of a lieutenant in the royal naval reserve. "mr drummond?" he inquired. "the same," said mr drummond, firmly yet cautiously. "you expected a visit from a mr burnett yesterday, i believe?" "i had been expecting him till i got his wire." "his wire!" exclaimed lieutenant topham. "did he telegraph to you?" "yes: he said he couldn't come." "may i see that telegram?" caution had always been mr drummond's most valuable asset. "is it important?" he inquired. "extremely," said the lieutenant a trifle brusquely. mr drummond went to his desk and handed him the telegram. he could see topham's eyebrows rise as he read it. "thank you," he said when he had finished. "may i keep it?" without waiting for permission, he put it in his pocket, and with a grave air said-"i am afraid i have rather serious news to give you about mr burnett." "dear me!" cried mr drummond. "it's not mental trouble, i hope? that was a queer wire he sent me!" "he didn't send you that wire," said lieutenant topham. "what!" exclaimed mr drummond. "really--you don't say so? then who did?" "that's what we've got to find out." the lieutenant glanced at the door, and added-"i think we had better come a little farther away from the door." they moved to the farther end of the room and sat down. "mr burnett has been knocked on the head and then nearly drowned," said the lieutenant. mr drummond cried aloud in horror. topham made a warning gesture. "this is not to be talked about at present," he said in a guarded voice. "the facts simply are that i'm in command of a patrol-boat, and last night we were off the berwickshire coast when we found your friend in the water with a bad wound in his head and a piece of cord tied round his feet." "you mean some one had tried to murder him?" cried mr drummond. "it looked rather like it," said topham drily. "and him a minister too!" gasped mr drummond. "so we found later." "but you'd surely tell that from his clothes!" "he had no clothes when we found him." "no clothes on! then do you mean----" "we took him straight back to the base," continued the lieutenant quickly, "and finally he came round and was able to talk a little. then we learned his name and heard of you, and captain blacklock asked me to run up and let you know he was safe, and also get you to check one or two of his statements. mr burnett is naturally a little light-headed at present." mr drummond was a persistent gentleman. "but do you mean you found him with no clothes on right out at sea?" "no; close under the cliffs." "did you see him fall into the water?" "we heard a cry, and picked him up shortly afterwards," said the lieutenant, rather evasively, mr drummond thought. "however, the main thing is that he will recover all right. you can rest assured he is being well looked after." "i'd like to know more about this," said mr drummond with an air of determination. "so would we," said topham drily, "and i'd just like to ask you one or two questions, if i may. mr burnett was on his way to the windy islands, i believe?" "he was. he had got all his papers and everything ready to start to-night." "you feel sure of that?" "he wrote and told me so himself." lieutenant topham nodded in silence. then he inquired-"do you know a mr taylor?" "taylor? i know a john taylor----" "who comes from lancashire and keeps a motor-car?" "no," said mr drummond. "i don't know that one. why?" "then you didn't send a long telegram to mr burnett yesterday telling him that mr taylor would call for him in his motor-car and drive him to your house?" "certainly not!" cried mr drummond indignantly. "i never sent a long telegram to any one in my life. i tell you i don't know anything about this mr taylor or his motor-car. if mr burnett told you that, he's light-headed indeed!" "those are merely the questions captain blacklock asked me to put," said the lieutenant soothingly. "is he the officer in command of the base?" demanded mr drummond a little fiercely. "no," said topham briefly; "commander blacklock is an officer on special service at present." "commander!" exclaimed mr drummond with a menacing sniff. "but you just called him captain." "commanders get the courtesy title of captain," explained the lieutenant, rising as he spoke. "thank you very much, mr drummond. there's only one thing more i'd like to say----" "ay, but there are several things i'd like to say!" said mr drummond very firmly. "i want to know what's the meaning of this outrage to my friend. what's your theory?" before the war lieutenant topham had been an officer in a passenger liner, but he had already acquired in great perfection the real navy mask. "it seems rather mysterious," he replied--in a most unsuitably light and indifferent tone, mr drummond considered. "but surely you have _some_ ideas!" the lieutenant shook his head. "we'll probably get to the bottom of it sooner or later." "a good deal later than sooner, i'm afraid," said mr drummond severely. "you've informed the police, i presume." "the affair is not in my hands, mr drummond." "then whose hands is it in?" "i have not been consulted on that point." ever since the war broke out mr drummond's views concerning the navy had been in a state of painful flux. sometimes he felt a genuine pride as a taxpayer in having provided himself with such an efficient and heroic service; at other times he sadly suspected that his money had been wasted, and used to urge upon all his acquaintance the strong opinion that the navy should really "do something"--and be quick about it too! lieutenant topham depressed him greatly. there seemed such an extraordinary lack of intelligent interest about the fellow. how differently nelson would have replied! "well, there's one thing i absolutely insist upon getting at the bottom of," he said resolutely. "i am accused of sending a long telegram to mr burnett about a mr taylor. now i want to know the meaning of that!" lieutenant topham smiled, but his smile, instead of soothing, merely provoked the indignant householder. "neither you nor mr burnett are accused of sending telegrams. we only know that you received them." "then who sent them, i'd like to know?" "that, no doubt, will appear in time. i must get back now, mr drummond; but i must first ask you not to mention a word to any one of this--in the meantime anyhow." the householder looked considerably taken aback. he had anticipated making a very pleasant sensation among his friends. "i--er--of course shall use great discretion----" he began. lieutenant topham shook his head. "i am directed to ask you to tell _nobody_." "of course mrs drummond----" "not even mrs drummond." "but this is really very high-handed, sir! mr burnett is a very old friend of mine----" the lieutenant came a step nearer to him, and said very earnestly and persuasively-"you have an opportunity, mr drummond, of doing a service to your country by keeping absolute silence. we can trust you to do that for england, surely?" "for great britain," corrected mr drummond, who was a member of a society for propagating bagpipe music and of another for commemorating bannockburn,--"well, yes, if you put it like that--oh, certainly, certainly. yes, you can trust me, mr topham. but--er--what am i to say to mrs drummond about your visit?" "say that i was sent to ask you to keep your lights obscured," suggested the lieutenant with a smile. "capital!" said the householder. "i've warned her several times about the pantry window. that will kill two birds with one stone!" "good morning, sir. thank you very much," said the lieutenant. mr drummond was left in a very divided state of mind regarding the navy's competence, mr burnett's sanity, and his own judgment. v. on the mail boat. a procession came down the long slope at the head of the bay. each vehicle but one rumbled behind a pair of leisurely horses. that one, a car with a passenger and his luggage, hooted from tail to head of the procession, and vanished in the dust towards the pier. the sea stretched like a sheet of brilliant glass right out across the bay and the firth beyond to the great blue island hills, calm as far as the eye could search it; on the green treeless shores, with their dusty roads and their dykes of flagstones set on edge, there was scarcely enough breeze to stir the grasses. "we shall have a fine crossing," said the passengers in the coaches to one another. they bent round the corner of the bay and passed the little row of houses, pressed close beneath the high grassy bank, and rumbled on to the pier. the sentries and the naval guard eyed the passengers with professional suspicion as they gathered in a cue to show their passports, and then gradually straggled towards the mail boat. but there was one passenger who was particularly eyed; though if all the glances toward her were prompted by suspicion, it was well concealed. she was a girl of anything from twenty-two to twenty-five, lithe, dressed to a miracle, dark-haired, and more than merely pretty. her dark eyebrows nearly meeting, her bright and singularly intelligent eyes, her firm mouth and resolute chin, the mixture of thoughtfulness in her expression and decision in her movements, were not the usual ingredients of prettiness. yet her features were so fine and her complexion so clear, and there was so much charm as well as thought in her expression, that the whole effect of her was delightful. undoubtedly she was beautiful. she was clearly travelling alone, and evidently a stranger to those parts. no one on the pier or steamer touched a hat or greeted her, and from her quick looks of interest it was plain that everything was fresh to her. the string of passengers was blocked for a moment on the narrow deck, and just where she paused stood a tall man who had come aboard a minute or two before. he took his eyes discreetly off her face, and they fell upon her bag. there on the label he could plainly read, "miss eileen holland." then she passed on, and the tall man kept looking after her. having piled her lighter luggage on a seat in a very brisk and business-like fashion, miss holland strolled across the deck and leaned with her back against the railings and her hands in the pockets of her loose tweed coat, studying with a shrewd glance her fellow-passengers. they included a number of soldiers in khaki, on leave apparently; several nondescript and uninteresting people, mostly female; and the tall man. at him she glanced several times. he was very obviously a clergyman of some sort, in the conventional black felt hat and a long dark overcoat; and yet though his face was not at all unclerical, it seemed to her that he was not exactly the usual type. then she saw his eyes turn on her again, and she gazed for some minutes at the pier just above their heads. the cable was cast off and the little steamer backed through the foam of her own wake, and wheeling, set forth for the isles. for a while miss holland watched the green semicircle slowly receding astern and the shining waters opening ahead, and then turned to a more practical matter. other passengers were eyeing the laden deck-seat. "i'm afraid my things are in your way," she said, and crossing the deck took up a bag and looked round where to put it. the clergyman was beside her in a stride. "allow me. i'll stow it away for you," he said. he spoke with a smile, but with an air of complete decision and quiet command, and with a murmur of thanks she yielded the bag almost automatically. as he moved off with it, it struck her that here was a clergyman apparently accustomed to very prompt obedience from his flock. they had been standing just aft of the deck-house, and with the bag in his hand he passed by this to where a pile of lighter luggage had been arranged on the deck. as he went he looked at the bag curiously, and then before putting it down he glanced over his shoulder. the lady was not in sight, and very swiftly but keenly he studied it more closely. it was a suit-case made of an unusual brown, light material. turning one end up quickly he read on a little plate this assurance by the makers, "garantirt echt vulcanfibre." and then slowly, and apparently rather thoughtfully, he strolled back. "you'll find it among the other luggage, just beyond the deck-house," he said, and then with an air of sudden thought added, "perhaps i ought to have put it with your other things, wherever they are." "i have practically nothing else," said she, "except a trunk in the hold." "you are travelling very light," he remarked. "that wasn't a very substantial suit-case." for a moment she seemed to be a little doubtful whether to consider him a somewhat forward stranger. then she said with a frank smile-"no; it was made in germany." as she spoke he glanced at her with a curious sudden intensity, that might have been an ordinary trick of manner. "oh," he said with a smile. "before the war, i presume?" "yes," she answered briefly, and looked round her as though wondering whether she should move. but the clergyman seemed oblivious to the hint. "do you know germany well?" he asked. "yes," she said. "do you?" he nodded. "yes, pretty well--as it was before the war, of course. i had some good friends there at one time." "so had i," she said. "all in the past tense now," said he. "i suppose so," she answered; "yet i sometimes find it hard to believe that they are all as poisoned against england and as ignorant and callous as people think. i can't picture some of my friends like that!" she seemed to have got over her first touch of resentment. there was certainly an air of good-breeding and even of distinction about the man, and after all, his extreme assurance sat very naturally on him. it had an unpremeditated matter-of-course quality that made it difficult to remain offended. "it is hard to picture a good many things," he said thoughtfully. "were you long in germany?" she told him two years, and then questioned him in return; but he seemed to have a gift for conveying exceedingly little information with an air of remarkable finality--as though he had given a complete report and there was an end of it. on the other hand, he had an equal gift for putting questions in a way that made it impossible not to answer without churlishness. for his manner never lacked courtesy, and he showed a flattering interest in each word of her replies. she felt that she had never met a man who had put her more on her mettle and made her instinctively wish more to show herself to advantage. yet she seemed fully capable of holding her own, for after half an hour's conversation it would have been remarkably difficult to essay a biographical sketch of miss eileen holland. she had spent a number of years abroad, and confessed to being a fair linguist; she was going to the islands "to stay with some people"; and she had previously done "a little" war work--so little, apparently, that she had been advised to seek a change of air, as her companion observed with a smile. "anyhow, i have not done enough," she said with a sudden intensity of suppressed feeling in her voice. the keen-faced clergyman glanced at her quickly, but said nothing. a minute or two later he announced that he had some correspondence to look over, and thereupon he left her with the same air of decision instantly acted on with which he had first addressed her. he passed through the door of the deck-house, and she got a glimpse of his head going down the companion. her face remained quite composed, but in her eyes there seemed to be the trace of a suggestion that she was unused to see gentlemen quit her side quite so promptly. a few minutes later she went down herself to the ladies' cabin. coming out, the foot of the companion was immediately opposite, and beyond stretched the saloon. at the far end of this sat the clergyman, and at the sight of him miss holland paused for a moment at the foot of the ladder and looked at him with a face that seemed to show both a little amusement and a little wonder. he sat quite by himself, with a bundle of papers on the table at his elbow. one of these was in his hand, and he was reading it with an air of extraordinary concentration. he had carelessly pushed back his black felt hat, and what arrested her was the odd impression this produced. with his hat thus rakishly tilted, all traces of his clerical profession seemed mysteriously to have vanished. the white dog-collar was there all right, but unaided it seemed singularly incapable of making him into a conventional minister. miss holland went up on deck rather thoughtfully. the little mail boat was now far out in the midst of a waste of waters. the ill-omened tideway was on its best behaviour; but even so, there was a constant gentle roll as the oily swell swung in from the atlantic. ahead, on the starboard bow, loomed the vast island precipices; astern the long scottish coast faded into haze. one other vessel alone was to be seen--a long, low, black ship with a single spike of a mast and several squat funnels behind it. an eccentric vessel this seemed; for she first meandered towards the mail boat and then meandered away again, with no visible business on the waters. the girl moved along the deck till she came to the place where her suit-case had been stowed. close beside it were two leather kit-bags, and as she paused there it was on these that her eyes fell. she looked at them, in fact, very attentively. on each were the initials "a.b.", and on their labels the legend, "the rev. alex. burnett." she came a step nearer and studied them still more closely. a few old luggage-labels were still affixed, and one at least of these bore the word "berwick." miss holland seemed curiously interested by her observations. a little later the clergyman reappeared, and approached her like an old acquaintance. by this time they were running close under the cliffs, and they gazed together up to the dizzy heights a thousand feet above their heads, where dots of sea-birds circled hardly to be distinguished by the eye, and then down to the green swell and bursting foam at the foot of that stupendous wall. in the afternoon sun it glowed like a wall of copper. for a few minutes both were instinctively silent. there was nothing to be said of such a spectacle. then miss holland suddenly asked-"do you live near the sea?" "not very," he answered with his air of finality. but this time she persisted. "what is your part of the country?" "berwickshire," he said briefly. "do you happen to know a minister there--a mr burnett?" she inquired. "that is my own name," he said quietly. "mr alexander burnett?" he nodded. "that is very funny," she said. "there must be two of you. i happen to have stayed in those parts and met the other." there seemed to be no expression at all in his eyes as they met hers; nor did hers reveal anything. then he looked round them quietly. there were several passengers not far away. "it would be rather pleasant in the bows," he suggested. "shall we move along there for a little?" he made the proposal very courteously, and yet it sounded almost as much a command as a suggestion, and he began to move even as he spoke. she started too, and exchanging a casual sentence as they went, they made their way forward till they stood together in the very prow with the bow wave beneath their feet, and the air beating cold upon their faces,--a striking solitary couple. "i'm wondering if yon's a married meenister!" said one of their fellow-passengers--a facetious gentleman. "it's no' his wife, anyhow!" grinned his friend. a little later the wit wondered again. "i'm wondering how long thae two are gaun tae stand there!" he said this time. the cliffs fell and a green sound opened. the mail boat turned into the sound, opening inland prospects all the while. a snug bay followed the sound, with a little grey-gabled town clinging to the very wash of the tide, and a host of little vessels in the midst. into the bay pounded the mail boat and up towards the town, and only then did the gallant minister and his fair acquaintance stroll back from the bows. the wag and his friend looked at them curiously, but they had to admit that such a prolonged flirtation had seldom left fewer visible traces. they might have been brother and sister, they both looked so indifferent. the gangway shot aboard, and with a brief hand-shake the pair parted. a few minutes later miss holland was being greeted by an elderly gentleman in a heavy ulster, whilst the minister was following a porter towards a small waggonette. vi. the vanishing governess. the house of breck was a mansion of tolerable antiquity as mansions went in the islands, and several curious stories had already had time to encrust it, like lichen on an aged wall. but none of them were stranger than the quite up-to-date and literally true story of the vanishing governess. richard craigie, esq., of breck, the popular, and more or less respected, laird of the mansion and estate, was a stout grey-bearded gentleman, with a twinkling blue eye, and one of the easiest-going dispositions probably in europe. his wife, the respected, and more or less popular, mistress of the mansion, was lean and short, and very energetic. their sons were employed at present like everybody else's sons, and do not concern this narrative. but their two daughters, aged fifteen and fourteen, were at home, and do concern it materially. it was only towards the end of july that mrs craigie thought of having a governess for the two girls during the summer holidays. with a letter in her hand, she bustled into mr craigie's smoking-room, and announced that her friend mrs armitage, in kensington, knew a lady who knew a charming and well-educated girl-"and who does she know?" interrupted her husband. "nobody," said mrs craigie. "she is the girl." "oh!" said the laird. "now i thought that she would surely know another girl who knows a woman, who knows a man----" "richard!" said his wife. "kindly listen to me!" it had been her fate to marry a confirmed domestic humourist, but she bore her burden stoically. she told him now simply and firmly that the girl in question required a holiday, and that she proposed to give her one, and in return extract some teaching and supervision for their daughters. "have it your own way, my dear. have it your own way," said he. "it was economy yesterday. it's a governess to-day. have you forced the safe?" "which safe?" demanded the unsuspecting lady. "at the bank. i've no more money of my own, i can tell you. however, send for your governess--get a couple of them as you're at it!" the humourist was clearly so pleased with his jest that no further debate was to be apprehended, and his wife went out to write the letter. mr craigie lit his sixteenth pipe since breakfast and chewed the cud of his wit very happily. a fortnight later he returned one evening in the car, bringing miss eileen holland, with her trunk and her brown suit-case. "my hat, selina!" said he to his wife, as soon as the girls had led miss holland out of hearing, "that's the kind of governess for me! you don't mind my telling her to call me dick, do you? it slipped out when she was squeezing my hand." "i don't mind you're being undignified," replied mrs craigie in a chilly voice, "but i do wish you wouldn't be vulgar." as mr craigie's chief joys in life were entertaining his daughters and getting a rise out of his wife, and as he also had a very genuine admiration for a pretty face, he was in the seventh heaven of happiness, and remained there for the next three days. pipe in mouth, he invaded the schoolroom constantly and unseasonably, and reduced his daughters to a state of incoherent giggling by retailing to miss holland various ingenious schemes for their corporal punishment, airing humorous fragments of a language he called french, and questioning their instructor on suppositious romantic episodes in her career. he thought miss holland hardly laughed as much as she ought; still, she was a fine girl. at table he kept his wife continually scandalised by his jocularities; such as hoarsely whispering, "i've lost my half of the sixpence, miss holland," or repeating, with a thoughtful air, "under the apple-tree when the moon rises--i must try and not forget the hour!" miss holland was even less responsive to these sallies, but he enjoyed them enormously himself, and still maintained she was a fine girl. mrs craigie's opinion of her new acquisition was only freely expressed afterwards, and then she declared that clever though miss holland undoubtedly was, and superior though she seemed, she had always suspected that something was a little wrong somewhere. she and mr craigie had used considerable influence and persuasion to obtain a passport for her, and why should they have been called upon to do this (by a lady whom mrs armitage admitted she had only met twice), simply to give a change of air to a healthy-looking girl? there was something behind _that_. besides, miss holland was just a trifle too good-looking. that type always had a history. "my wife was plain mrs craigie before the thing happened," observed her husband with a twinkle, "but, dash it, she's been mrs solomon ever since!" it was on the fourth morning of miss holland's visit that the telegram came for her. mr craigie himself brought it into the schoolroom and delivered it with much facetious mystery. he noticed that it seemed to contain a message of some importance, and that she failed to laugh at all when he offered waggishly to put "him" up for the night. but she simply put it in her pocket and volunteered no explanation. he went away feeling that he had wasted a happy quip. after lunch mrs craigie and the girls were going out in the car, and miss holland was to have accompanied them. it was then that she made her only reference to the telegram. she had got a wire, she said, and had a long letter to write, and so begged to be excused. accordingly the car went off without her. not five minutes later mr craigie was smoking a pipe and trying to summon up energy to go for a stroll, when miss holland entered the smoking-room. he noticed that she had never looked so smiling and charming. "oh, mr craigie," she said, "i want you to help me. i'm preparing a little surprise!" "for the girls?" "for all of you!" the laird loved a practical jest, and scented happiness at once. "i'm your man!" said he. "what can i do for you?" "i'll come down again in half an hour," said she. "and then i want you to help me to carry something." she gave him a swift bewitching smile that left him entirely helpless, and hurried from the room. mr craigie looked at the clock and decided that he would get his stroll into the half-hour, so he took his stick and sauntered down the drive. on one side of this drive was a line of huddled wind-bent trees, and at the end was a gate opening on the highroad, with the sea close at hand. just as he got to the gate a stranger appeared upon the road, walking very slowly, and up to that moment concealed by the trees. he was a clergyman, tall, clean-shaved, and with what the laird afterwards described as a "hawky kind of look." there was no haughtiness whatever about the laird of breck. he accosted every one he met, and always in the friendliest way. "a fine day!" said he heartily. "grand weather for the crops, if we could just get a wee bit more of rain soon." the clergyman stopped. "yes, sir," said he, "it is fine weather." his manner was polite, but not very hearty, the laird thought. however, he was not easily damped, and proceeded to contribute several more observations, chiefly regarding the weather prospects, and tending to become rapidly humorous. and then he remembered his appointment in the smoking-room. "well," said he, "good day to you! i must be moving, i'm afraid." "good day," said the stranger courteously, and moved off promptly as he spoke. "i wonder who will that minister be?" said mr craigie to himself as he strolled back. "it's funny i never saw the man before. and i wonder, too, where he was going?" and then it occurred to him as an odd circumstance that the minister had started to go back again, not to continue as he had been walking. "that's a funny thing," he thought. he had hardly got back to his smoking-room when miss holland appeared, dressed to go out, in hat and tweed coat, and dragging, of all things, her brown suit-case. it seemed to be heavily laden. she smiled at him confidentially, as one fellow-conspirator at another. "do you mind giving me a hand with this?" said she. "hullo!" cried the laird. "what's this--an elopement? can you not wait till i pack my things too? the minister's in no hurry. i've just been speaking to him." it struck him that miss holland took his jest rather seriously. "the minister?" said she in rather an odd voice. "you've spoken to him?" "he was only asking if i had got the licence," winked mr craigie. the curious look passed from her face, and she laughed as pleasantly as he could wish. "i'll take the bag myself," said the laird. "oh, it's no weight for me. i used to be rather a dab at throwing the hammer in my day. but where am i to take it?" "i'll show you," said she. so out they set, mr craigie carrying the suit-case, and miss holland in the most delightful humour beside him. he felt he could have carried it for a very long way. she led him through the garden and out into a side lane between the wall and a hedge. "just put it down here," she said. "and now i want you to come back for something else, if you don't mind." "mind?" said the laird gallantly. "not me! but i'm wondering what you are driving at." she only smiled, but from her merry eye he felt sure that some very brilliant jest was afoot, and he joked away pleasantly as they returned to the house. "now," she said, "do you mind waiting in the smoking-room for ten minutes or so?" she went out, and mr craigie waited, mystified but happy. he waited for ten minutes; he waited for twenty, he waited for half an hour, and still there was no sign of the fascinating miss holland. and then he sent a servant to look for her. her report gave mr craigie the strongest sensation that had stirred that good-natured humourist for many a day. miss holland was not in her room, and no more, apparently, were her belongings. the toilette table was stripped, the wardrobe was empty; in fact, the only sign of her was her trunk, strapped and locked. moving with exceptional velocity, mr craigie made straight for the lane beyond the garden. the brown suit-case had disappeared. "well, i'm jiggered!" murmured the baffled humourist. very slowly and soberly he returned to the house, lit a fresh pipe, and steadied his nerves with a glass of grog. when mrs craigie returned, she found him sufficiently revived to jest again, though in a minor key. "to think of the girl having the impudence to make me carry her luggage out of the house for her!" said he. "gad, but it was a clever dodge to get clear with no one suspecting her! well, anyhow, my reputation is safe again at last, selina." "your reputation!" replied mrs craigie in a withering voice. "for what? not for common-sense anyhow!" "you're flustered, my dear," said the laird easily. "it's a habit women get into terrible easy. you should learn a lesson from miss eileen holland. dashed if i ever met a cooler hand in my life!" "and what do you mean to do about it?" demanded his wife. "do?" asked mr craigie, mildly surprised. "well, we might leave the pantry window open at night, so that she can get in again if she's wanting to; or----" "it's your duty to inform the authorities, richard!" "duty?" repeated the laird, still more surprised. "fancy me starting to do my duty at my time of life!" "anyhow," cried mrs craigie, "we've still got her trunk!" "ah," said mr craigie, happily at last, "so we have! well, that's all right then." and with a benign expression the philosopher contentedly lit another pipe. part iii. lieutenant von belke's narrative resumed i. the meeting. as the dusk rapidly thickened and i lay in the heather waiting for the signal, i gave myself one last bit of good advice. of "him" i was to meet, i had received officially a pretty accurate description, and unofficially heard one or two curious stories. i had also, of course, had my exact relationship to him officially defined. i was to be under his orders, generally speaking; but in purely naval matters, or at least on matters of naval detail, my judgment would be accepted by him. my last word of advice to myself simply was to be perfectly firm on any such point, and permit no scheme to be set afoot, however tempting, unless it was thoroughly practical from the naval point of view. from the rim of my hollow there on the hillside i could see several of the farms below me, as well as the manse, and i noted one little sign of british efficiency--no glimmer of light shown from any of their windows. at sea a light or two twinkled intermittently, and a searchlight was playing, though fortunately not in my direction. otherwise land and water were alike plunged in darkness. and then at last one single window of the manse glowed red for an instant. a few seconds passed, and it shone red again. finally it showed a brighter yellow light twice in swift succession. i rose and very carefully led my cycle over the heather down to the road, and then, still pushing it, walked quickly down the steep hill to where the side road turned off. there was not a sound save my footfall as i approached the house. a dark mass loomed in front of me, which i saw in a moment to be a garden wall with a few of the low wind-bent island trees showing above it. this side road led right up to an iron gate in the wall, and just as i got close enough to distinguish the bars, i heard a gentle creak and saw them begin to swing open. beyond, the trees overarched the drive, and the darkness was profound. i had passed between the gate-posts before i saw or heard anything more. and then a quiet voice spoke. "it is a dark night," it said in perfect english. "dark as pitch," i answered. "it was darker last night," said the voice. "it is dark enough," i answered. not perhaps a very remarkable conversation, you may think; but i can assure you my fingers were on my revolver, just in case one single word had been different. now i breathed freely at last. "herr tiel?" i inquired. "mr tiel," corrected the invisible man beside me. i saw him then for the first time as he stepped out from the shelter of the trees and closed the gate behind me--a tall dim figure in black. "i'll lead your cycle," he said in a low voice, as he came back to me; "i know the way best." he took it from me, and as we walked side by side towards the house he said-"permit me, mr belke, to give you one little word of caution. while you are here, forget that you can talk german! _think_ in english, if you can. we are walking on a tight-rope, not on the pavement. _no_ precaution is excessive!" "i understand," i said briefly. there was in his voice, perfectly courteous though it was, a note of command which made one instinctively reply briefly--and obediently. i felt disposed to be favourably impressed with my ally. he left me standing for a moment in the drive while he led my motor-cycle round to some shed at the back, and then we entered the house by the front door. "my servant doesn't spend the night here," he explained, "so we are safe enough after dark, as long as we make no sound that can be heard outside." it was pitch-dark inside, and only when he had closed and bolted the front door behind us, did tiel flash his electric torch. then i saw that we stood in a small porch which opened into a little hall, with a staircase facing us, and a passage opening beside it into the back of the house. at either side was a door, and tiel opened that on the right and led me into a pleasant, low, lamp-lit room with a bright peat fire blazing and a table laid for supper. i learned afterwards that the clergyman who had just vacated the parish had left hurriedly, and that his books and furniture had not yet followed him. hence the room, and indeed the whole house, looked habitable and comfortable. "this is the place i have been looking for for a long time!" i cried cheerfully, for indeed it made a pleasant contrast to a ruinous farm or the interior of a submarine. tiel smiled. he had a pleasant smile, but it generally passed from his face very swiftly, and left his expression cool, alert, composed, and a trifle dominating. "you had better take off your overalls and begin," he said. "there is an english warning against conversation between a full man and a fasting. i have had supper already." when i took off my overalls, i noticed that he gave me a quick look of surprise. "in uniform!" he exclaimed. "it may not be much use if i'm caught," i laughed, "but i thought it a precaution worth taking." "excellent!" he agreed, and he seemed genuinely pleased. "it was very well thought of. do you drink whisky-and-soda?" "you have no beer?" he smiled and shook his head. "i am a scottish divine," he said, "and i am afraid my guests must submit to whisky. even in these little details it is well to be correct." for the next half-hour there was little conversation. to tell you the truth i was nearly famished, and had something better to do than talk. tiel on his part opened a newspaper, and now and then read extracts aloud. it was an english newspaper, of course, and i laughed once or twice at its items. he smiled too, but he did not seem much given to laughter. and all the while i took stock of my new acquaintance very carefully. in appearance adolph tiel was just as he had been described to me, and very much as my imagination had filled in the picture: a man tall, though not very tall, clean-shaved, rather thin, decidedly english in his general aspect, distinctly good-looking, with hair beginning to turn grey, and cleverness marked clearly in his face. what i had not been quite prepared for was his air of good-breeding and authority. not that there was any real reason why these qualities should have been absent, but as a naval officer of a country whose military services have pretty strong prejudices, i had scarcely expected to find in a secret-service agent quite this air. also what i had heard of tiel had prepared me to meet a gentleman in whom cleverness was more conspicuous than dignity. even those who professed to know something about him had admitted that he was a bit of a mystery. he was said to come either from alsace or lorraine, and to be of mixed parentage and the most cosmopolitan experience. one story had it that he served at one period of his very diverse career in the navy of a certain south american state, and this story i very soon came to the conclusion was correct, for he showed a considerable knowledge of naval affairs. even when he professed ignorance of certain points, i was inclined to suspect he was simply trying to throw doubt upon the reports which he supposed i had heard, for rumour also said that he had quitted the service of his adopted country under circumstances which reflected more credit on his brains than his honesty. in fact, my informants were agreed that herr tiel's brains were very remarkable indeed, and that his nerve and address were equal to his ability. he was undoubtedly very completely in the confidence of my own government, and i could mention at least two rather serious mishaps that had befallen england which were credited to him by people who certainly ought to have known the facts. looking at him attentively as he sat before the fire studying 'the scotsman' (the latest paper to be obtained in those parts), i thought to myself that here was a man i should a very great deal sooner have on my side than against me. if ever i had seen a wolf in sheep's clothing, it seemed to me that i beheld one now in the person of adolph tiel, attired as a scottish clergyman, reading a solid scottish newspaper over the peat fire of this remote and peaceful manse. and, to complete the picture, there sat i arrayed in a german naval uniform, with the unsuspecting grand fleet on the other side of those shuttered and curtained windows. the piquancy of the whole situation struck me so forcibly that i laughed aloud. tiel looked up and laid down his paper, and his eyebrows rose inquiringly. he was not a man who wasted many words. "we are a nice pair!" i exclaimed. i seemed to read approval of my spirit in his eye. "you seem none the worse of your adventures," he said with a smile. "no thanks to you!" i laughed. again he gave me that keen look of inquiry. "i landed on this infernal island last night!" i explained. "the deuce you did!" said he. "i was afraid you might, but as things turned out i couldn't get here sooner. what did you do with yourself?" "first give me one of those cigars," i said, "and then i'll tell you." he handed me the box of cigars and i drew up an easy-chair on the other side of the fire. and then i told him my adventures, and as i was not unwilling that this redoubtable adventurer should see that he had a not wholly unworthy accomplice, i told them in pretty full detail. he was an excellent listener, i must say that for him. with an amused yet appreciative smile, putting in now and then a question shrewd and to the point, he heard my tale to the end. and then he said in a quiet manner which i already realised detracted nothing from the value of his approval-"you did remarkably well, mr belke. i congratulate you." "thank you, mr tiel," i replied. "and now may i ask you your adventures?" "certainly," said he. "i owe you an explanation." ii. tiel's story. "how much do you know of our scheme?" asked tiel. i shrugged my shoulders. "merely that you were going to impersonate a clergyman who was due to come here and preach this next sunday. how you were going to achieve this feat i wasn't told." he leaned back in his chair and sucked at his pipe, and then he began his story with a curious detached air, as though he were surveying his own handiwork from the point of view of an impartial connoisseur. "the idea was distinctly ingenious," said he, "and i think i may also venture to claim for it a little originality. i won't trouble you with the machinery by which we learn things. it's enough to mention that among the little things we did learn was the fact that the minister of this parish had left for another charge, and that the parishioners were choosing his successor after the scottish custom--by hearing a number of candidates each preach a trial sermon." he broke off and asked, "do you happen to have heard of schumann?" "you don't mean the great schumann?" "i mean a certain gentleman engaged in the same quiet line of business as myself. he is known of course under another name in england, where he is considered a very fine specimen of john bull at his best--a jovial, talkative, commercial gentleman with nice spectacles like mr pickwick, who subscribes to all the war charities and is never tired of telling his friends what he would do with the kaiser if he caught him." i laughed aloud at this happy description of a typical john bull. "well," he continued, "i suggested to schumann the wild idea--as it seemed to us at first--of getting into the islands in the guise of a candidate for the parish of myredale. two days later schumann came to me with his spectacles twinkling with excitement. "'look at this!' said he. "he showed me a photograph in an illustrated paper. it was the portrait of a certain mr alexander burnett, minister of a parish in the south of scotland, and i assure you that if the name 'adolph tiel' had been printed underneath, none of my friends would have questioned its being my own portrait. "'the stars are fighting for us!' said schumann. "'they seem ready to enlist,' i agreed. "'how shall we encourage them?' said he. "'i shall let you know to-morrow,' i said. "i went home and thought over the problem. from the first i was convinced that the only method which gave us a chance of success was for this man burnett to enter voluntarily as a candidate, make all the arrangements himself--including the vital matter of a passport--and finally start actually upon his journey. otherwise, no attempt to impersonate him seemed to me to stand any chance of success. "next day i saw schumann and laid down these conditions, and we set about making preliminary inquiries. they were distinctly promising. burnett's parish was a poor one, and from what we could gather, he had already been thinking for some time past of making a change. "we began by sending him anonymously a paper containing a notice of the vacancy here. that of course was just to set him thinking about it. the next sunday schumann motored down to his parish, saw for himself that the resemblance to me was actually quite remarkable, and then after service made the minister's acquaintance. imagine the good mr burnett's surprise and interest when this pleasant stranger proved to be intimately acquainted with the vacant parish of myredale, and described it as a second garden of eden! before they parted schumann saw that the fish was hooked. "the next problem was how to make the real burnett vanish into space, and substitute the false burnett without raising a trace of suspicion till my visit here was safely over. again luck was with us. we sent an agent down to make inquiries of his servant a few days before he started, and found that he was going to spend a night with a friend in edinburgh on his way north." tiel paused to knock the ashes out of his pipe, and i remarked-"at first sight i confess that seems to me to complicate the problem. you would have to wait till burnett had left edinburgh, wouldn't you?" tiel smiled and shook his head. "that is what we thought ourselves at first," said he, "but our second thoughts were better. what do you think of a wire to burnett from his friend in edinburgh telling him that a mr taylor would call for him in his motor-car: plus a wire to the friend in edinburgh from mr burnett regretting that his visit must be postponed?" "excellent!" i laughed. "each wire, i may add, contained careful injunctions not to reply. and i may also add that the late mr burnett was simplicity itself." i started involuntarily. "the 'late' mr burnett! do you mean----" "what else could one do with him?" asked tiel calmly. "both schumann and i believe in being thorough." of course this worthy pair were but doing their duty. still i was glad to think they had done their dirty work without my assistance, it was with a conscious effort that i was able to ask calmly-"how did you manage it?" "mr taylor, with his car and his chauffeur, called at the manse. the chauffeur remained in the car, keeping his face unostentatiously concealed. mr taylor enjoyed the minister's hospitality till the evening had sufficiently fallen. then we took him to edinburgh by the coast road." tiel paused and looked at me, as though to see how i was enjoying the gruesome tale. i am afraid i made it pretty clear that i was not enjoying it in the least. the idea of first partaking of the wretched man's hospitality, and then coolly murdering him, was a little too much for my stomach. tiel, however, seemed rather amused than otherwise with my attitude. "we knocked him on the head at a quiet part of the road, stripped him of every stitch of clothing, tied a large stone to his feet, and pitched him over the cliff," he said calmly. "and his clothes----," i began, shrinking back a little in my chair. "are these," said tiel, indicating his respectable-looking suit of black. curiously enough this was the only time i heard the man tell a tale of this sort, and in this diabolical, deliberate, almost flippant way. it was in marked contrast to his usually brief, concise manner of speaking. possibly it was my reception of his story that discouraged him from exhibiting this side of his nature again. i certainly made no effort to conceal my distaste now. "thank god, i am not in the secret service!" i said devoutly. "i understand you are in the submarine service," said tiel in a dry voice. "i am--and i am proud of it!" "have you never fired a torpedo at an inoffensive merchant ship?" "that is very different!" i replied hotly. "it is certainly more wholesale," said he. i sprang up. "mr tiel," i said, "kindly understand that a german naval officer is not in the habit of enduring affronts to his service!" "but you think a german secret-service agent should have no such pride?" he inquired. "i decline to discuss the question any further," i said stiffly. for a moment he seemed exceedingly amused. then he saw that i was in no humour for jesting on the subject, and he ceased to smile. "have another cigar?" he said, in a quiet matter-of-fact voice, just as though nothing had happened to ruffle the harmony of the evening. "you quite understand what i said?" i demanded in an icy voice. "i thought the subject was closed," he replied with a smile, and then jumping up he laid his hand on my arm in the friendliest fashion. "my dear belke," said he, "we are going to be shut up together in this house for several days, and if we begin with a quarrel we shall certainly end in murder. let us respect one another's point of view, and say no more about it." "i don't know what you mean by 'one another's point of view,'" i answered politely but coldly. "so far as i am aware there is only one point of view, and i have just stated it. if we both respect that, there will be no danger of our quarrelling." he glanced at me for a moment in an odd way, and then said merely-"well, are you going to have another cigar, or would you like to go to bed?" "with your permission i shall go to bed," i said. he conducted me through the hall and down the passage that led to the back premises. at the end rose a steep and narrow stair. we ascended this, and at the top found a narrow landing with a door at either end of it. "this is your private flat," he explained in a low voice. "the old house, you will see, has been built in two separate instalments, which have separate stairs and no communication with one another on the upper landing. these two rooms are supposed to be locked up and not in use at present, but i have secured their keys." he unlocked one of the doors, and we entered the room. it was square, and of quite a fair size. on two sides the walls sloped attic-wise, in a third was a fireplace and a window, and in the fourth two doors--the second opening into a large cupboard. this room had simple bedroom furniture, and also a small table and a basket chair. when we entered, it was lit only by a good fire, and pervaded by a pleasant aroma of peat smoke. tiel lighted a paraffin lamp and remarked-"you ought to be quite comfortable here." personally, i confess that my breath was fairly taken away. i had anticipated sleeping under the roof in some dark and chilly garret, or perhaps in the straw of an outhouse. "comfortable!" i exclaimed. "mein gott, who would not be on secret service! but are you sure all this is safe? this fire, for instance--the smoke surely will be seen." "i have promised to keep the bedrooms aired while i am staying here," smiled tiel. he then explained in detail the arrangements of our remarkable household. he himself slept in the front part of the house, up the other staircase. the room opposite mine was empty, and so was the room underneath; but below the other was the kitchen, and i was warned to be very quiet in my movements. the single servant arrived early in the morning, and left about nine o'clock at night: she lived, it seemed, at a neighbouring farm; and tiel assured me there was nothing to be feared from her provided i was reasonably careful. i had brought with me a razor, a toothbrush, and a brush and comb, and tiel had very thoughtfully brought a spare sleeping suit and a pair of slippers. i was not at all sure that i was disposed to like the man, but i had to admit that his thoroughness and his consideration for my comfort were highly praiseworthy. in fact, i told him so frankly, and we parted for the night on friendly terms. tiel quietly descended the stairs, while i sat down before my fire and smoked a last cigarette, and then very gratefully turned into my comfortable bed. iii. the plan. i slept like a log, and only awakened when tiel came into my room next morning, bringing my breakfast on a tray. he had sent the servant over to the farm for milk, he explained, and while i ate he sat down beside my bed. "can you talk business now?" i asked. "this afternoon," said he. i made a grimace. "i naturally don't want to waste my time," i observed. "you won't," he assured me. "but why this afternoon rather than this morning? you can send the servant out for a message whenever you choose." "i hope to have a pleasant little surprise for you in the afternoon." i was aware of the fondness of these secret-service agents for a bit of mystery, and i knew i had to humour him. but really it seems a childish kind of vanity. "there is one thing you can do for me," i said. "if i am to kick up my heels in this room all day--and probably for several days--i must have a pen and ink and some foolscap." after his fashion he asked no questions but merely nodded, and presently brought them. the truth was, i had conceived the idea of writing some account of my adventure, and in fact i am writing these lines now in that very bedroom i have described. i am telling a story of which i don't know the last chapter myself. a curious position for an author! if i am caught--well, it will make no difference. i have given nothing away that won't inevitably be discovered if i am arrested. and, mein gott, what a relief it has been! i should have died of boredom otherwise. if only my window looked out to sea! but, unluckily, i am at the back of the house and look, as it were sideways, on to a sloping hillside of green ferns below and brown heather at the top. by opening the window and putting my head right out, i suppose i should catch a glimpse of the sea, but then my neighbours would catch a glimpse of me. i expostulated with tiel as soon as i realised how the room faced, but he points out that the servant may go into any room in the front part of the house, whereas this part is supposed to be closed. i can see that he is right, but it is nevertheless very tantalising. on that saturday afternoon tiel came back to my room some hours later, and under his quiet manner i could see that he bore tidings of importance. no one could come quicker to the point when he chose, and this time he came to it at once. "you remember the affair of the _haileybury_?" he demanded. "the british cruiser which was mined early in the war?" he nodded. "perfectly," i said. "you never at any time came across her captain? his name was ashington." "no," i said, "i have met very few british officers." "i don't know whether you heard that she was supposed to be two miles out of her proper course, contrary to orders, did you?" "was she?" "ashington says 'no.' but he was court-martialled, and now he's in command of a small boat--the _yellowhammer_. before the loss of his ship he was considered one of the most promising officers in the british service; now----!" tiel made an expressive gesture and his eyes smiled at me oddly. i began to understand. "now he is an acquaintance of yours?" tiel nodded. "but has he knowledge? has he special information?" "his younger brother is on the flagship, and he has several very influential friends. i see that _my_ friends obtain knowledge." i looked at him hard. "you are _quite_ sure this is all right? such men are the last to be trusted--even by those who pay them." "do you know many 'such men'?" he inquired. "none, i am thankful to say." "they are queer fish," said tiel in a reminiscent way, "but they generally do the thing pretty thoroughly, especially when one has a firm enough hold of them. ashington is absolutely reliable." "where is he to be seen?" "he went out for a walk this afternoon," said tiel drily, "and happened to call at the manse to see if he could get a cup of tea--a very natural thing to do. come--the coast is clear." he led the way downstairs and i followed him, not a little excited, i confess. how my mission was going to develop, i had no clear idea when i set forth upon it, but though i had imagined several possible developments, i was not quite prepared for this. to have an officer of the grand fleet actually assisting at our councils was decidedly unexpected. i began to realise more and more that adolph tiel was a remarkable person. in the front parlour an officer rose as we entered, and the british and german uniforms bowed to each other under circumstances which were possibly unique. because, though ashingtons do exist and these things sometimes happen, they generally happen in mufti. i looked at our visitor very hard. on his part, he looked at me sharply for a moment, and then averted his eyes. i should certainly have done the same in his place. he was a big burly man, dark, and getting bald. his voice was deep and rich; his skin shone with physical fitness; altogether he was a fine gross animal, and had his spirit been as frank and jovial as his appearance suggested, i could have pictured him the jolliest of company in the ward-room and the life and soul of a desperate enterprise. but he maintained a frowning aspect, and was clearly a man whose sullen temper and sense of injury had led him into my friend's subtle net. however, here he was, and it was manifestly my business not to criticise but to make the most of him. "well, gentlemen," began tiel, "i don't think we need beat about the bush. captain ashington has an idea, and it is for lieutenant von belke to approve of it or not. i know enough myself about naval affairs to see that there are great possibilities in the suggestion, but i don't know enough to advise on it." "what is the suggestion?" i asked in a very dry and non-committal voice. captain ashington, i noticed, cleared his throat before he began. "the fleet is going out one evening next week," he said; "probably on thursday." "how do you know?" i demanded. he looked confidentially at tiel. "mr tiel knows the source of my information," he said. "i should like to know it too," said i. "i can vouch for captain ashington's information," said tiel briefly. there is something extraordinarily decisive and satisfying about tiel when he speaks like that. i knew it must be all right; still, i felt it my duty to make sure. "have you any objections to telling me?" i asked. tiel stepped to my side and whispered-"i told you about his brother." i understood, and did not press my question. whether to respect the man for this remnant of delicacy, or to despise him for not being a more thorough, honest blackguard, i was not quite sure. "well," i said, "suppose we know when they are going out, they will take the usual precautions, i presume?" ashington leaned forward confidentially over the table. "they are going out on a new course," he said in a low voice. i pricked up my ears, but all i said was-"why is that?" "on account of the currents. the old passage hasn't been quite satisfactory. they are going to experiment with a new passage." this certainly sounded all right, for i knew how diabolical the tideways can be round these islands. "do you know the new course at all accurately?" i inquired. captain ashington smiled for the first time, and somehow or other the sight of a smile on his face gave me a strongly increased distaste for the man. "i know it exactly," he said. he took out of his pocket a folded chart and laid it on the table. the three of us bent over it, and at a glance i could see that this was business indeed. all the alterations in the mine-fields were shown and the course precisely laid down. "well," said tiel, "i think this suggests something, belke." by this time i was inwardly burning with excitement. "i hope to have the pleasure of being present just about that spot," i said, pointing to the chart. "or there," suggested ashington. "either would do very nicely, so far as i can judge," said tiel. "how many submarines can you concentrate, and how long will it take you to concentrate them?" i considered the question. "i am afraid there is no use in concentrating more than two or three in such narrow waters," i said. "squadronal handling of submarines of course is impossible except on the surface. and we clearly can't keep on the surface!" captain ashington looked at me in a way i did not at all like. "we run a few risks in the british navy," he said. "d--n it, you'll have a sitting target! i'd crowd in every blank submarine the water would float if i were running this stunt!" "you don't happen to be running it," i said coldly. tiel touched me lightly on the shoulder and gave me a swift smile, pleasant but admonitory. "the happy mean seems to be suggested," he said soothingly. "there's a great deal to be said for both points of view. on the one hand you risk submarines: on the other hand you make the battle-fleet run risks. one has simply to balance those. what about half a dozen submarines?" i shook my head. "too many," i said. "besides, we couldn't concentrate them in the time." "how many could you?" "four," i said; "if i can get back to my boat on monday, we'll have them there on thursday." tiel produced a bottle of whisky and syphons and we sat over the chart discussing details for some time longer. it was finally handed over to me, and captain ashington rose to go. "by the way," i said, "there is one very important preliminary to be arranged. how am i to get back to my boat?" "that will be all right," said tiel confidently; "i have just heard from captain ashington that they have arrested the wrong man on suspicion of being the gentleman who toured the country yesterday. the only thing is that they can't find his cycle. now i think if we could arrange to have your motor-cycle quietly left near his house and discovered by the authorities, they are not likely to watch the roads any longer." "i'll fix that up," said captain ashington promptly. "how will you manage it?" i asked. "trust him," said tiel. "but then how shall i get back?" "i shall drive you over," smiled tiel. "there will probably be a dying woman who desires the consolations of religion in that neighbourhood on monday night." i smiled too, but merely at the cunning of the man, not at the thought of parting with my motor-cycle. however, i saw perfectly well that it would be folly to ride it over, and if i left it behind at the manse--well, i was scarcely likely to call for it again! "now, belke," said tiel, "we had better get you safely back to your turret chamber. you have been away quite as long as is safe." i bowed to captain ashington--i could not bring myself to touch his hand, and we left his great gross figure sipping whisky-and-soda. "what do you think of him?" asked tiel. "he seems extremely competent," i answered candidly. "but what an unspeakable scoundrel!" "we mustn't quarrel with our instruments," said he philosophically. "he is doing germany a good turn. surely that is enough." "i should like to think that germany did not need to stoop to use such characters!" "yes," he agreed, though in a colourless voice, "one would indeed like to think so." i could see that adolph tiel had not many scruples left after his cosmopolitan experiences. iv. what happened on sunday. that evening when we had the house to ourselves, i joined tiel in the parlour, and we had a long talk on naval matters, british and german. he knew less of british naval affairs than i did, but quite enough about german to make him a keen listener and a very suggestive talker. in fact i found him excellent company. i even suspected him at last of being a man of good birth, and quite fitting company for a german officer. but of course he may have acquired his air of breeding from mixing with men like myself. as for his name, that of course gave no guide, for i scarcely supposed that he had been tiel throughout his adventurous career. i threw out one or two "feelers" on the subject, but no oyster could be more secretive than adolph tiel when he chose. that night i heard the wind wandering noisily round the old house, and i wakened in the morning to find the rain beating on the window. tiel came in rather late with my breakfast, and i said to him at once-"i have just remembered that this is sunday. i wish i could come and hear your sermon, tiel!" "i wish you could, too," said he. "it will be a memorable event in the parish." "but are you actually going to do it?" "how can i avoid it?" "you are so ingenious i should have thought you would have hit upon a plan." he looked at me in his curious way. "why should i have tried to get out of it?" i shrugged my shoulders. "personally, i shouldn't feel anxious to make a mock of religion if i could avoid it." "we are such a religious people," said he, "that surely we can count on god forgiving us more readily than other nations." he spoke in his driest voice, and for a moment i looked at him suspiciously. but he was perfectly grave. "still," i replied, "i am glad the navy doesn't have to preach bogus sermons!" "ah," said he, "the german navy has to keep on its pedestal. but the secret service must sometimes creep about in the dust." his eyes suddenly twinkled as he added-"but never fear, i shall give them a beautiful sermon! the text will be the passage about joshua and the spies, and the first hymn will be, 'onward, christian sailors.'" he threw me a humorous glance and went out. i smiled back, but i confess i was not very much amused. neither the irreverence nor the jest about the sailors (since it referred apparently to me) struck me as in the best of taste. that morning was one of the dreariest i ever spent. the wind rose to half a gale, and the fine rain beat in torrents on the panes. i wrote diligently for some time, but after a while i grew tired of that and paced the floor in my stockinged feet (for the sake of quietness) like a caged animal. my one consolation was that to-morrow would see the end of my visit. already i longed for the cramped quarters and perpetual risks of the submarine, and detested these islands even more bitterly than i hated any other part of britain. in the early afternoon i had a pleasant surprise. tiel came in and told me that his servant had gone out for the rest of the day, and that i could safely come down to the parlour. there i had a late luncheon in comparative comfort, and moreover i could look out of the windows on to the sea. and what a dreary prospect i saw! under a heavy sky and with grey showers rolling over it, that open treeless country looked desolation itself. as for the waters, whitecaps chased each other over the wind-whipped expanse of grey, fading into a wet blur of moving rain a few miles out. through this loomed the nearer lines of giant ships, while the farther were blotted clean out. i thought of the long winters when one day of this weather followed another for week after week, month after month; when the northern days were brief and the nights interminable, and this armada lay in these remote isles enduring and waiting. the german navy has had its gloomy and impatient seasons, but not such a prolonged purgatory as that. we have a different arrangement. probably everybody knows what it is--still, one must not say. after lunch, when we had lit our cigars, tiel said-"by the way, you will be pleased to hear that my efforts this morning were so successful that the people want me to give them another dose next sunday." i stared at him. "really?" i exclaimed. he nodded. "but i thought there would be another preacher next sunday." "oh, by no means. there was no one for next sunday, and they were only too glad to have the pulpit filled." "but will you risk it?" he smiled confidently. "if there is any danger, i shall get warning in plenty of time." "to ensure your escape?" "to vanish somehow." "but why should you wait?" he looked at me seriously and said deliberately-"i have other schemes in my head--something even bigger. it is too early to talk yet, but it is worth running a little risk for." i looked at this astonishing man with unconcealed admiration. regulations, authorities, precautions, dangers, he seemed to treat as almost negligible. and i had seen how he could contrive and what he could effect. "i am afraid i shall have to ask you to stay with me for a few days longer," he added. i don't think i ever got a more unpleasant shock. "you mean you wish me _not_ to rejoin my ship to-morrow night?" "i know it is asking a great deal of you; but, my dear belke, duty is duty." "my duty is with my ship," i said quickly. "besides, it is the post of danger--and of honour. think of thursday night!" "do you honestly think you are essential to the success of a torpedo attack?" "every officer will be required." "my dear belke, you didn't answer my question. are you _essential_?"' "my dear tiel," i replied firmly, for i was quite resolved i should not remain cooped up in this infernal house, exposed to hourly risk of being shot as a spy, while my ship was going into action, "i am sorry to seem disobliging; but i am a naval officer, and my first duty is quite clear to me." "pardon me for reminding you that you are at present under my orders," said he. "while this affair is being arranged only." "but i say that i have not yet finished my arrangements." i saw that i was in something of a dilemma, for indeed it was difficult to say exactly how my injunctions met the case. "well," i said, "i shall tell you what i shall do. i shall put it to my superior officer, commander wiedermann, and ask him whether he desires me to absent myself any longer." this was a happy inspiration, for i felt certain what wiedermann would say. "then i shall not know till to-morrow night whether to count on you--and then i shall very probably lose you?" i shrugged my shoulders, but said nothing. suddenly his face cleared. "my dear fellow," he said, "i won't press you. rejoin your ship if you think it your duty." by mutual consent we changed the subject, and discussed the question of submarines _versus_ surface ships, a subject in which tiel showed both interest and acumen, though i had naturally more knowledge, and could contribute much from my own personal experience. i must add that it is a pleasure to discuss such matters with him, for he has a frank and genuine respect for those who really understand what they are talking about. towards evening i went back to my room, and fell to writing this narrative again, but about ten o'clock i had another visit from tiel; and again he disconcerted me, though not so seriously this time. "i had a message from ashington, asking to see me," he explained, "and i have just returned from a meeting with him. he tells me that the date of the fleet's sailing will probably be altered to friday, but he will let me know definitely to-morrow or tuesday." "or tuesday!" i exclaimed. "then i may have to stay here for another night!" "i'm sorry," said he, "but i'm afraid it can't be helped." "but can we ever be sure that the fleet will keep to a programme? i have just been thinking it over, and the question struck me--why are they making this arrangement so far ahead?" "that struck me too," said tiel, "and also ashington. but he has found out now. there is some big scheme on. some think it is heligoland, and some think the baltic. anyhow, there is a definite programme, and they will certainly keep to it. the only uncertain thing is the actual day of sailing." "it is a plan which will be nicely upset if we get our torpedoes into three or four of their super-dreadnoughts!" i exclaimed. he nodded grimly. "and for that, we want to have the timing exact" he said. "be patient, my friend; we shall know by tuesday morning at the latest." i tried to be as philosophical as i could, but it was a dreary evening, with the rain still beating on my window and another day's confinement to look forward to. v. a mysterious adventure. monday morning broke wet and windy, but with every sign of clearing up. tiel looked in for a very few minutes, but he was in his most uncommunicative mood, and merely told me that he would have to be out for the first part of the day, but would be back in the afternoon. i could not help suspecting that he was still a little sore over my refusal to remain with him, and was paying me out by this display of secrecy. such petty affronts to officers from those unfortunate enough to be outside that class are not unknown. i was of course above taking offence, but i admit that it made me feel less anxious to consult his wishes at every turn. in this humour i wrote for a time, and at last got up and stared impatiently out of the window. it had become quite a fine day, and the prospect of gazing for the greater part of it at a few acres of inland landscape, with that fascinating spectacle to be seen from the front windows, irritated me more and more. and then, to add to my annoyance, i heard "boom! boom! boom!" crashing from the seaward side, and shaking the very foundations of the house. i began to feel emphatically that it was my duty to watch the british fleet at gunnery practice. just then two women appeared, walking slowly away from the house. one had an apron and no hat, and though i had only once caught a fleeting glimpse of the back view of our servant, i made quite certain it was she. i watched them till they reached a farm about quarter of a mile away, and turned into the house, and then i said to myself-"there can be no danger now!" and thereupon i unlocked my door, walked boldly downstairs, and went into the front parlour. i saw a vastly different scene from yesterday. a fresh breeze rippled the blue waters, patches of sunshine and cloud-shadow chased each other over sea and land, and distinct and imposing in its hateful majesty lay the british fleet. a light cruiser of an interesting new type was firing her 6-inch guns at a distant target, and for about five minutes i thoroughly enjoyed myself. and then i heard a sound. i turned instantly, to see the door opening; and very hurriedly i stepped back behind the nearest window curtain. and then in came our servant--_not_ the lady i had seen departing from the house, i need scarcely say! i was fully half exposed and i dared not make a movement to draw the curtain round me; in fact, even if i had, my feet would have remained perfectly visible. all i could do was to stand as still as a statue and pray that heaven would blind her. she walked in briskly, a middle-aged capable-looking woman, holding a broom, and glanced all round the room in a purposeful way. among the things she looked at was me, but to my utter astonishment she paid no more attention than if i had been a piece of furniture. for a moment i thought she was blind; but her sharp glances clearly came from no sightless eyes. then i wondered whether she could have such a horrible squint that when she seemed to look at me she was really looking in another direction. but i could see no sign of a cast in those eyes either. and then she picked up an armful of small articles and walked quickly out, leaving the door wide open. what had saved me i had no idea, but i was resolved not to trust to that curtain any longer. in the middle of the room was a square table of moderate size with a cloth over it. without stopping to think twice, i dived under the cloth and crouched upon the floor. the next instant in she came again, and i found that my table-cloth was so scanty that i could follow her movements perfectly. she took some more things out, and then more again, and finally she proceeded to set the furniture piece by piece back against the wall, till the table was left lonely and horribly conspicuous in the middle of the floor. and then she began to sweep out that room. there was small scope for an exhibition of resource, but i was as resourceful as i was able. i very gently pulled the scanty table-cloth first in one direction and then in the other, according to the side of the room she was sweeping, and as noiselessly as possible i crept a foot or two farther away from her each time. and all the while the dust rose in clouds, and the hateful broom came so near me that it sometimes brushed my boots. and yet the extraordinary woman never showed by a single sign that she had any suspicion of my presence! at last when the whole floor had been swept--except of course under the table--she paused, and from the glimpse i could get of her attitude she seemed to be ruminating. and then she stooped, lifted the edge of the cloth, and said in an absolutely matter-of-fact voice-"will you not better get out till i'm through with my sweeping?" too utterly bewildered to speak, i crept out and rose to my feet. "you can get under the table again when i'm finished," she observed as she pulled off the cloth. to such an observation there seemed no adequate reply, or at least i could think of none. i turned in silence and hurried back to my bedroom. and there i sat for a space too dumfounded for coherent thought. gradually i began to recover my wits and ponder over this mysterious affair, and a theory commenced to take shape. clearly she was insane, or at least half-witted, and was quite incapable of drawing reasonable conclusions. and the more i thought it over, the more did several circumstances seem to confirm this view. my fire, for instance, with its smoke coming out of the chimney, and the supply of peat and firewood which tiel or i were constantly bringing up. had she noticed nothing of that? also tiel's frequent ascents of this back staircase to a part of the house supposed to be closed. she must be half-witted. and then i began to recall her brisk eye and capable air, and the idiot theory resolved into space. only one alternative seemed left. she must be spying upon us, and aware of my presence all the time! but if so, what could i do? i felt even more helpless than i did that first night when my motor-cycle broke down. i could only sit and wait, revolver in hand. when i heard tiel's step at last on the stairs, i confess that my nerves were not at their best. "we are betrayed!" i exclaimed. he stared at me very hard. "what do you mean?" he asked quietly, and i am bound to say this of tiel, that there is something very reassuring in his calm voice. i told him hurriedly. he looked at me for a moment, began to smile, and then checked himself. "i owe you an apology, belke," he said. "i ought to have explained that that woman is in my pay." "in your pay?" i cried. "and she has been so all the time?" he nodded. "and yet you never told me, but let me hide up in this room like a rat in a hole?" "the truth is," he replied, "that till i had got to know you pretty well, i was afraid you might be rash--or at least careless, if you knew that woman was one of us." "so you treated me like an infant, mr tiel?" "the life i have lived," said tiel quietly, "has not been conducive to creating a feeling of confidence in my fellowmen's discretion--until i _know_ them. i know you now, and i feel sorry i took this precaution. please accept my apologies." "i accept your apology," i said stiffly; "but in future, mr tiel, things will be pleasanter if you trust me." he bowed slightly and said simply-"i shall." and then in a different voice he said-"we have a visitor coming this afternoon to stay with us." "to stay here!" i exclaimed. "another of _us_," he explained. "another--in these islands? who is he?" as i spoke we heard a bell ring. "ah, here she is," said tiel, going to the door. "come down and be introduced whenever you like." for a moment i stood stock still, lost in doubt and wonder. "she!" i repeated to myself. vi. the visitor. my feelings as i approached the parlour were anything but happy. some voice seemed to warn me that i was in the presence of something sinister, that some unknown peril stalked at my elbow. this third party--this "she"--filled me with forebodings. if ever anybody had a presentiment, i had one, and all i can say now is that within thirty seconds of opening the parlour door, i had ceased to believe in presentiments, entirely and finally. the vision i beheld nearly took my breath away. "let me introduce you to my sister, miss burnett," said tiel. "she is so devoted to her brother that she has insisted on coming to look after him for the few days he is forced to spend in this lonely manse." he said this with a smile, and of course never intended me to believe a word of his statement, yet as he gave her no other name, and as that was the only account of her circulated in the neighbourhood, i shall simply refer to her in the meantime as miss burnett. it is the only name that i have to call her by to her face. as to her appearance, i can only say that she is the most beautiful woman i have ever met in my life. the delicacy and distinction of her features, her dark eyebrows, her entrancing eye, and her thoughtful mouth, so firm and yet so sweet, her delicious figure and graceful carriage--heavens, i have never seen any girl to approach her! what is more, she has a face which i _trust_. i have had some experience of women, and i could feel at the first exchange of glances and of words that here was one of those rare women on whom a man could implicitly rely. "have you just landed upon these islands?" i inquired. "not to-day," she said; and indeed, when i came to think of it, she would not have had time to reach the house in that case. "did you have much difficulty?" i asked. "the minister's sister is always admitted," said tiel with his dry smile. i asked presently if she had travelled far. she shrugged her shoulders, gave a delightful little laugh, and said-"we get so used to travelling that i have forgotten what 'far' is!" meanwhile tea was brought in, and miss burnett sat down and poured it out with the graceful nonchalant air of a charming hostess in her own drawing-room, while tiel talked of the weather and referred carelessly to the lastest news just like any gentleman who might have called casually upon her. i, on my part, tried as best i could to catch the same air, and we all talked away very pleasantly indeed. we spoke english, of course, all the time, and indeed, any one overhearing us and not seeing my uniform would never have dreamt for a moment that we were anything but three devoted subjects of king george. on the other hand, we were surely proceeding on the assumption that nobody was behind a curtain or listening at the keyhole, and that being so, i could not help feeling that the elaborate pretence of being a mere party of ordinary acquaintances was a little unnecessary. at last i could not help saying something of what was in my mind. "is the war over?" i asked suddenly. both the others seemed surprised. "i wish it were, mr belke!" said miss burnett with a sudden and moving change to seriousness. "then if it is not, why are we pretending so religiously that we have no business here but to drink tea, miss burnett?" "i am not pretending; i am drinking it," she smiled. "yes, yes," i said, "but you know what i mean. it seems to me so un-german!" they both looked at me rather hard. "i'm afraid," said miss burnett, "that we of the secret service grow terribly cosmopolitan. our habits are those of no country--or rather of all countries." "i had almost forgotten," said tiel, "that i once thought and felt like mr belke." and then he added this singular opinion: "it is germany's greatest calamity--greater even than the coming in of britain against her, or the battle of the marne--that those who guide her destinies have not forgotten it too." "what do you mean?" i demanded, a little indignantly i must own. "at every tea-party for many years germany has talked about what interested herself--and that was chiefly war. at no tea-party has she tried to learn the thoughts and interests of the other guests. in consequence she does not yet understand the forces against her, why they act as they do, and how strong they are. but her enemies understand too well." "you mean that she has been honest and they dishonest?" "yes," said miss burnett promptly and with a little smile, "my brother means that in order really to deceive people one has to act as we are acting now." i laughed. "but unfortunately now there is no one to deceive!" she laughed too. "but they might suddenly walk in!" tiel was not a frequent laugher, but he condescended to smile. "remember, belke," he said, "i warned you on the first night we met that you must not only talk but think in english. if we don't do that constantly and continually when no one is watching us, how can we count on doing it constantly and continually when some one _may_ be watching us?" "personally i should think it sufficient to wait till some one _was_ watching," i said. "there speaks germany," smiled tiel. "germany disdains to act a part all the time!" i cried. i confess i was nettled by his tone, but his charming "sister" disarmed me instantly. "mr belke means that he wants footlights and an orchestra and an audience before he mutters 'hush! i hear her coming!' he doesn't believe in saying 'hush!' in the corner of every railway carriage or under his umbrella. and i really think it makes him much less alarming company!" "you explain things very happily, eileen," said tiel. i was watching her face (for which there was every excuse!) and i saw that she started ever so slightly when he called her by her first name. this pleased me--i must confess it. it showed that they had not played this farce of brother and sister together before, and already i had begun to dislike a little the idea that they were old and intimate confederates. i also fancied that it showed she did not quite enjoy the familiarity. but she got her own back again instantly. "it is my one desire to enlighten you, alexander," she replied with a very serious air. i could not help laughing aloud, and i must confess that tiel laughed frankly too. the next question that i remember our discussing was one of very immediate and vital interest to us all. it began with a remark by eileen (as i simply must call her behind her back; 'miss burnett' smacks too much of tiel's disguises--and besides it is too british). we were talking of the english, and she said-"well, anyhow they are not a very suspicious people. look at this little party!" "sometimes i feel that they are almost incredibly unsuspicious," i said seriously. "in germany this house would surely be either visited or watched!" tiel shook his head. "in kiel or wilhelmshaven an english party could live just as unmolested," he replied, "provided that not the least trace of suspicion was aroused _at the outset_. that is the whole secret of my profession. one takes advantages of the fact that even the most wary and watchful men take the greater part of their surroundings for granted. the head of any war office--german, french, english, or whatever it may be--doesn't suddenly conceive a suspicion of one of his clerks, unless something in the clerk's conduct calls his attention. if, then, it were possible to enter the war office, looking and behaving exactly like one of the clerks, suspicion would not _begin_. it is the beginning one has to guard against." "why don't you enter the british war office, then?" asked eileen with a smile. "because, unfortunately, they know all the clerks intimately by sight. in this case they expected a minister whom nobody knew. the difficulty of the passport with its photograph was got over by a little ingenuity." (he threw me a quick grim smile.) "thus i was able to appear as a person fully expected, and as long as i don't do anything inconsistent with the character, why should any one throw even so much as an inquisitive glance in my direction. until suspicion _begins_, we are as safe here as in the middle of berlin. once it begins--well, it will be a very different story." "and you don't think my coming will rouse any suspicion?" asked eileen, with, for the first time (i fancied), a faint suggestion of anxiety. "suspicion? certainly not! just think. put yourself in the shoes of the neighbours in the parish, or even of any naval officer who might chance to learn you were here. what is more natural than that the minister who--at the request of the people--is staying a week longer than he intended, should get his sister to look after him? the danger-point in both cases was passed when we got into the islands. we know that there was no suspicion roused in either case." "how do you know?" i interposed. "another quality required for this work," replied tiel with a detached air, "is enough imagination to foresee the precautions that will be required. one wants to establish precaution behind precaution, just as an army establishes a series of defensive positions. in this case i have got our good friend ashington watching closely for the first evidence of doubt or inquiry. so that i _know_ that both my sister and i passed the barrier without raising a question in anybody's mind." "but how do you know that ashington can be absolutely relied on?" i persisted. "yes," put in eileen, "i was wondering too." "because ashington will certainly share my fate--whatever that may be," said tiel grimly. "he knows that; in fact he knows that i have probably taken steps to ensure that happening, in case there might be any loophole for him." "but can't a man turn king's evidence (isn't that the term?) and get pardoned?" asked eileen. "not a naval officer," said tiel. "no," i agreed. "i must say that for the british navy. an officer would have no more chance of pardon in it than in our own navy." "well," smiled eileen, "i feel relieved! don't you, mr belke?" "yes," i said, "i begin to understand the whole situation more clearly. i pray that suspicion may not _begin_!" "in that case," said tiel, "you realise now, perhaps, why we have to keep up acting, whether any one is watching us or not." "yes," i admitted, "i begin to see your reasons a little better. but why didn't you tell me all this before?" "all what?" "well--about ashington, for instance." "i suppose," he said, "the truth is, belke, that you have laid your finger on another instance of people taking things for granted. i assumed you would realise these things. it was my own fault." it was on the tip of my tongue to tell him that the real reason was his love of mystery and his secret service habit of distrusting people, but i realised that eileen had shown a little of the same evasiveness, and i would not have her think that my criticism was directed against her. presently tiel suggested that it would be wiser if i retired to my room, and for a moment there was a sharp, though politely expressed difference of opinion between us. i argued very naturally that since the servant was in our pay there was no danger to be apprehended within the house, and that i was as safe in the parlour as anywhere. in his mystery-making, ultra-cautious way, he insisted that a visitor _might_ appear (he even suggested the police--though he had just previously said they had no suspicion!) and that he was going to run no risks. eileen said a word on his side--though with a very kind look at me--and i consented to go. and then he requested me to stay there for the rest of the evening! again eileen saved a strained situation, and i said farewell stiffly to him and very differently to her; in fact i made a point of accentuating the difference. i reached my room, lit a cigar, and for a time paced the floor in a state of mind which i found hard to analyse. i can only say that my feelings were both mixed and strong, and that at last, to give me relief, i sat down to write my narrative, and by nine o'clock in the evening had brought it up nearly to this point. by that time of course the curtains were drawn and my lamp was lit, and as it was a windy chilly night, my fire was blazing brightly. higher and higher rose the wind till it began to make a very heavy and constant booming in the chimney, like distant salvoes of great guns. apart from the wind the old house was utterly quiet, and when the wooden stair suddenly creaked i dropped my pen and sat up very sharply. more and more distinctly i heard a firm but light tread coming up and up, until at last it ceased on the landing. and then came a gentle tap upon my door. vii. at night. with a curious sense of excitement i crossed the room. i opened the door--and there stood eileen. she had taken off her hat, and without it looked even more beautiful, for what hat could rival her masses of dark hair so artfully arranged and yet with a rippling wave all through them that utterly defied restraint? "may i come in for a little?" she said. she asked in such a friendly smiling way, so modest and yet so unafraid, that even the greatest don juan could not have mistaken her honest intention. "i shall be more than charmed to have your company," i said. "i'm afraid we soon forget the conventionalities in our service," she said simply. "tiel has gone out, and i was getting very tired of my own company." "imagine how tired i have got of mine!" i cried. she gave a little understanding nod. "it must be dreadfully dull for you," she agreed with great sincerity--and she added, as she seated herself in my wicker chair, "i have another excuse for calling on you, and that is, that the more clearly we all three understand what we are doing, the better. don't you think so?" "decidedly! in fact i only wish we all thought the same." she looked at me inquiringly, and yet as though she comprehended quite well. "you mean----?" "well, to be quite frank, i mean tiel. he is very clever, and he knows his work. mein gott, we can teach him nothing! and perhaps he trusts you implicitly and is quite candid. but he certainly tells me no more than he can help." "he tells nobody more than he can help," she said. "you are no worse treated than any one else he works with. but it is a little annoying sometimes." "for instance, do you know what he is doing to-night?" i asked. there was no mistaking the criticism in the little shrug with which she replied-"i half suspect he is walking about in the dark by himself just to make me think he is busy on some mysterious affair!" "do you actually mean that?" i exclaimed. "no, no," she said hastily, "not really quite that! but he sometimes tempts one to say these things." "have you worked with him often before?" "enough to know his little peculiarities." she smiled suddenly. "oh, he is a very wonderful man, is my dear brother!" again i was delighted (i confess it shamelessly!) to hear that unmistakable note of criticism. "'wonderful' may have several meanings," i suggested. "it has in his case," she said frankly. "he really is extraordinarily clever." she added nothing more, but the implication was very clear that the other meanings were not quite so flattering. i felt already that this strange little household was divided into two camps, and that eileen and i were together in one. "but we have talked enough about herr tiel!" she exclaimed in a different voice. "because we really can get no further. it is like discussing what is inside a locked box! we can trust his judgment in this business; i think you will agree to that." "oh yes," i said, "i have seen enough to respect his abilities very thoroughly." "then," said she, "let us talk of something more amusing." "yourself," i said frankly, though perhaps a little too boldly, for she did not respond immediately. i felt that i had better proceed more diplomatically. "i was wondering whether you were a pure german," i added. "my feelings towards germany are as strong as yours, mr belke," she answered. "indeed i don't think any one can be more loyal to their country than i am, but i am not purely german by blood. my mother was irish, hence my name--eileen." "then that is your real name?" i cried, between surprise and delight. "yes, that is the one genuine thing about me," she smiled. "but if you are half english----" "irish," she corrected. "ah!" i cried. "i see--of course! i was going to ask whether your sympathies were not at all divided. but irish is very different. then you hate the english with a double hatred?" "with one or two exceptions--friends i have made--i abhor the whole race i am fighting against quite as much as you could possibly wish me to! indeed, i wish it were fighting and not merely plotting!" there was an earnestness and intensity in her voice and a kindling of her eye as she said this that thrilled and inspired me like a trumpet. "we shall defeat them--never fear!" i cried. "we shall trample on the pride of england. it will be hard to do, but i have no doubt as to the result; have you?" "none," she said, quietly but with absolute confidence. then that quick smile of hers, a little grave but very charming, broke over her face. "but let us get away for a little from war," she said. "you aren't smoking. please do, if you wish to." i lit a cigarette, and offered one to her, but she said she did not smoke. and i liked her all the better. we talked more lightly for a while, or perhaps i should rather say less earnestly, for our situation did not lend itself to frivolity. it did lend itself however to romance,--we two sitting on either side of the peat fire, with a shaded lamp and the friendly flames throwing odd lights and shadows through the low, primitive room with its sloping attic-like walls and its scanty furniture; and the wind all the while tempestuously booming in the chimney and scouring land and sea. and neither on land nor sea was there a single friend; surrounded by enemies who would have given a heavy price to have learned who sat in that room, we talked of many things. at last, all too soon, she rose and wished me good-night. a demon of perversity seized me. "i shall escort you down to mr tiel, and the devil take his precautions!" i exclaimed. "oh no," she protested. "after all he is in command." she really seemed quite concerned at my intention, but i can be very obstinate when i choose. "tuts!" i said. "it is sheer rubbish to pretend that there is any risk at this time of night. probably he is still out, and anyhow he will not have visitors at this hour." she looked at me very hard and quickly as if to see if i were possible to argue with, and then she gave a little laugh and merely said-"you are terribly wilful, mr belke!" and she ran downstairs very quickly, as though to run away from me. i followed fast, but she was some paces ahead of me as we went down the dark passage to the front of the house. and then suddenly i heard guarded voices, and stopped dead. there was a bend in the passage just before it reached the hall, and eileen had passed this while i had not, and so i could see nothing ahead. then i heard the voice of tiel say-"well?" it was a simple word of little significance, but the voice in which it was said filled me with a very unpleasant sensation. the man spoke in such a familiar, confidential way that i suddenly felt i could have shot him cheerfully. for the instant i forgot the problem of the other voice i had heard. "mr belke is with me! he insisted," she cried. at this i knew that the unknown voice could not belong to an enemy, and i advanced again. as i passed the bend in the passage i was just in time to see tiel closing the front door behind a man in a long dark coat with a gleam of brass buttons, and to hear him say, "good-night, ashington." eileen passed into the parlour with a smiling glance for me to follow, and tiel came in after us. i was not in the most pleasant temper. in fact, for some reason i was in a very black humour. "i thought you had gone out," i said to him at once. "i did go out." "but now i understand that the worthy captain ashington has been visiting you here!" "both these remarkable events have occurred," said tiel drily. when i recalled how long eileen had been up in my room, i realised that this was quite possible, but this did not, for some reason, soothe me. "why did he come?" i asked. "the fleet is going out on friday." "aha!" i exclaimed, forgetting my annoyance for the moment. "so that is settled at last," said tiel with a satisfied smile. he happened to turn his smile on eileen also, and my annoyance returned. "you dismissed our dear friend ashington very quickly when you heard me coming," i remarked in no very amiable tone. tiel looked at me gravely. "belke," he said, "you might quite well have done serious mischief by showing your dislike for ashington so palpably the other day. even a man of that sort has feelings. i have soothed them, i am glad to say, but he was not very anxious to meet you again." "so much the better!" said i. "traitors are not the usual company a german officer keeps." "many of us have to mix with strange company nowadays, mr belke," said eileen. her sparkling eye and her grave smile disarmed me instantly. i felt suddenly conscious i was not playing a very judicious part, or showing myself perhaps to great advantage. so i bade them both good-night and returned to my room. but it was not to go to bed. for two mortal hours i paced my floor, and thought and thought, but not about any problem of the war. i kept hearing tiel's "well," spoken in that hatefully intimate way, and then remembering that those two were alone--all night!--in the front part of the house, far out of sound or reach of me. i did not doubt eileen for an instant, but that calm, cool, cosmopolitan adventurer, who could knock an unsuspecting clergyman on the head and throw him over a cliff, and then tell the story with a smile,--what was he not capable of? again and again i asked myself why it concerned me. this was a girl i had only known for hours. but her smile was the last thing i saw before i fell asleep at length about three o'clock in the morning. viii. the decision. in the morning i came down to breakfast without asking anybody's leave, and i looked at those two very hard. to see eileen fresh and calm and smiling gave me the most intense relief, while, as for tiel, he looked as cool and imperturbable as he always did--and i cannot put it stronger than that, for nothing more cool and imperturbable than tiel ever breathed. in fact it could not have breathed, for it would have had to be a graven image. he looked at me critically, but all he said was-"if it wasn't too wet for your nice uniform, belke, we might have had breakfast on the lawn." "you are afraid some one may come and look in at this window?" i asked. "on the whole there is rather more risk of that than of some one climbing up to look in at your bedroom window," said he. "you think a great deal of risks," i observed. "yes," said he. "i am a nervous man." eileen laughed merrily, and i could not but confess that for once he had scored. i resolved not to give him the chance again. he then proceeded to draw the table towards one end of the room, pulled the nearest curtain part way across, and then locked the front door. but i made no comments this time. at breakfast eileen acted as hostess, and so charming and natural was she that the little cloud seemed to blow over, and we all three discussed our coming plan of attack on the fleet fully and quite freely. tiel made several suggestions, which he said he had been discussing with ashington, and, as they seemed extremely sound, i made notes of them and promised to lay them before wiedermann. when we had finished and had a smoke, tiel rose and said he must go out "on parish business." i asked him what he meant, and learned to my amusement that in his capacity of the rev. alexander burnett he had to attend a meeting of what he called the "kirk-session." we both laughed, and wished him good luck, and then before he left he said-"you had better get back to your room, belke. remember we are here on _business_." and with that he put on his black felt hat, and bade us lock the front door after him, and if anybody called, explain that it was to keep the wind from shaking it. i must say he thought of these small points very thoroughly. the suggestion in his last words that i was placing something else before my duty stung me a little. i was not going to let tiel see that they had any effect, but as soon as he had gone i rose and said to eileen-"it is quite clear that i ought to return to my room. i have notes to write up, and several things to do before to-night." "then you are really going to leave us to-night?" said she; "i am very sorry." so was i. indeed, the thought of leaving her--probably for ever--would have been bitter enough in any case, but to leave her alone with tiel was maddening. it had troubled me greatly last night, yet the thought of remaining was one i did not really care to face. "i fear i must," i replied, in a voice which must have revealed something of what i felt. "tiel told me you absolutely refused to listen to him when he wished you to remain." "oh no!" i cried. "that is putting it far too strongly. i offered to put the case to commander wiedermann, and then tiel at once assumed i was going to leave him, and told me to say no more about it." "really! that is somewhat extraordinary!" she exclaimed in rather a low voice, as though she were much struck with this. she had been standing, and she sat as she spoke. i felt that she wished to go further into this matter, and i sat down again too. "what is extraordinary about it?" i asked. "do you mean to say that tiel didn't press you?" "no," i said. "mr belke," she said earnestly, "i know enough of the orders under which we are acting and the plans that tiel has got to further, to be quite certain that you were intended to stay and assist him. it is _most_ important." "you are quite sure of this?" "absolutely." "then why did tiel give up trying to persuade me so readily? why didn't he try to use more authority?" "i wonder," she said in a musing tone, and yet i could see from her eye that she had an idea. "you know!" i exclaimed. "tell me what is in your mind!" already i guessed, but i dared not put it into words. "it is difficult to guess tiel's motives--exactly," she said rather slowly. i felt i had to say it outright. "are you his motive?" i demanded. she looked at me quickly, but quite candidly. "i scarcely like to say--or even think such a thing, but----" she broke off, and i finished her sentence for her. "but you know he admires you, and is not the man to stick at anything in order to get what he wants." "ah! don't be unjust to him," she answered; and then in a different voice added, "but to think of his letting you go like that!" "so it was to get rid of me, and have you alone here with him?" "he must have had some motive," she admitted, "for you _ought_ to stay." "i shall stay!" i said. she gave me her brightest smile. "really? oh, how good of you! or rather--how brave of you, for it is certainly running a risk." if i had been decided before, i was doubly decided now. "it is not the german navy's way to fear risks," i said. "it is my duty to stay--for two reasons--and i am going to stay!" "and commander wiedermann?" "i shall simply tell him i am under higher orders, given me by herr tiel." "if you added that there is a second plan directed against the british navy, and that you are needed to advise on the details, it might help to convince commander wiedermann how essential your presence here is," she suggested. "yes," i agreed, "it would be well to mention that." "also," she said, "you would require to have all the details of this first plan so fully written out that he would not need to keep you to explain anything." "you think of everything!" i cried with an admiration i made no pretence of concealing. "i shall go now and set to work." "do!" she cried, "and when tiel comes in i shall tell him you are going to stay. i wonder what he will say!" "i wonder too," said i. "but do you care what he says?" "no," she replied, "because of course he won't say it. he will only think." "let him think!" i laughed. i went back to my room in a strange state of exhilaration for a man who had just decided to forgo the thing he had most looked forward to, and run a horrible risk instead. for i felt in my bones that uniform or no uniform i should be shot if i were caught. i put little trust in english justice or clemency. but, as i said before, when i am obstinate, i am very obstinate; and i was firmly resolved that if wiedermann wanted me back on board to-night, he would have to call a guard and carry me! however, acting on eileen's suggestions, i had little doubt i should convince him. and thereupon i set to work on my notes. by evening i had everything so fully written out and so clearly explained that i felt i could say with a clear conscience that even my own presence at a council of war could add no further information. in the course of the day i had a talk with tiel, and, just as eileen had anticipated, he left one to guess at what was in his mind. he certainly professed to be glad i had changed my mind, and he thanked me with every appearance of cordiality. "you are doing the right thing, belke," he said. "and, let me tell you, i appreciate your courage." there was a ring of evident sincerity in his voice as he said this, and whatever i might think of the man's moral character, a compliment from tiel on one's courage was not a thing to despise. in the late afternoon he set out to obtain a motor-car for the evening's expedition, but through what ingenious machinery of lies he got it, i was too busy to inquire. finally, about ten o'clock at night we sat down to a little supper, my pockets bulging with my notes, and my cyclist's overalls lying ready to be donned once more. ix. on the shore. soon after eleven o'clock two dark figures slipped unostentatiously out of the back door, and a moment later a third followed them. my heart leapt with joy and surprise at the sight of it, and tiel stopped and turned. "what's the matter?" he asked. "i'm coming too," said eileen. "why?" he demanded in that tone of his which seemed to call upon the questioned to answer with exceeding accuracy. "because i'd like a drive," she answered, with a woman's confidence that her reason is good enough for anybody. "as you please," he said, drily and with unfathomable calm; and then he turned again, and in a voice that betrayed his interest in her, asked, "what have you got on?" "quite enough, thank you." "you are sure? i've lent my spare coat to belke, but i can get another rug." "i am quite sure," she smiled. more than ever i felt glad i was staying beside her. tiel sat in front and drove, and eileen and i got in behind. he offered no objections to this arrangement, though as she seated herself while he was starting the engine, he was certainly not given much choice. and then with a deep purr we rolled off into the night. there would be no moon till getting on towards morning, but the rain had luckily ceased and the wind fallen, and overhead the stars were everywhere breaking through the last wisps of cloud. already they gave light enough to distinguish sea from land quite plainly, and very soon they faintly lit the whole wide treeless countryside. the car was a good one, however tiel had come by it, and the engine was pulling well, and we swept along the lonely roads at a great pace, one bare telegraph post after another flitting swiftly out of the gloom ahead into the gloom behind, and the night air rushing against our faces. at first i looked round me and recognised some features of the way we had come, the steep hill, and the sound that led to the western ocean, and the dark mass of hills beyond, but very soon my thoughts and my eyes alike had ceased to wander out of the car. we said little, just enough to serve as an excuse for my looking constantly at her profile, and, the longer i looked, admiring the more every line and every curve. all at once she leaned towards me and said in a low beseeching voice-"you will come back, won't you?" "i swear it!" i answered fervently, and to give force to my oath i gently took her hand and pressed it. if it did not return the pressure, it at least did not shrink from my clasp. and for the rest of the way i sat holding it. presently i in turn leaned towards her and whispered-"one thing i have been wondering. should i take tiel with me to see wiedermann? it might perhaps be expected." "no!" she replied emphatically. "you feel sure?" for reply she very gently pressed my hand at last. so confident did i feel of her sure judgment that i considered that question settled. "by the way," she said in a moment, "i think perhaps it might be advisable to say nothing to commander wiedermann about me. it is quite unnecessary, and he--well, some men are always suspicious if they think there is a woman in the case. of course i admit they sometimes have enough excuse, but--what do you think?" "i agree with you entirely," i said emphatically. i know wiedermann very intimately, and had been divided in mind whether i should drop a little hint that there were consolations, or whether i had better not. now i saw quite clearly i had better not. "what's that?" said eileen in a moment. it was a tall gaunt monolith close to the roadside, and then, looking round, i saw a loch on the other side, and remembered the spot with a start. it was close by here that my cycle had broken down, and we were almost at the end of our drive. round the corner we swung, straight for the sea, until we stopped where the road ended at the edge of the links. i gave eileen's hand one last swift pressure, and jumped out. "we shall wait for you here," said tiel in a low voice, "but don't be longer than you can help. remember my nerves!" he spoke so cheerily and genially, that for the moment i liked him again. in fact, if it had not been for eileen, and his love of mystery, there was much that was very attractive in tiel. as i set out on my solitary walk down to the shore, i suddenly wondered what made him so cheerful and bright at this particular moment, for it did not strike me as an exhilarating occasion. and then i was reminded of the man i had known most like tiel, a captain i once served under, who was silence and calmness itself at most times, but grew strangely genial on critical occasions--a heaven-sent gift. but from tiel's point of view, what was critical about this moment? the risk he ran at this hour in such an isolated spot was almost negligible, and as to the other circumstances, did it matter much to him whether i stayed or changed my mind and went away? i could scarcely believe it. i kept along by the side of the sandy track, just as i had done before, only this time i did not lose it. the rolling hummocky links were a little darker, but the stars shone in myriads, bright and clear as a winter's night, and i could see my way well enough. as i advanced, i smelt the same pungent seaweed odour, and heard the same gulls crying, disturbed (i hoped) by the same monster in the waters. fortunately the storm had blown from the south-east, and the sea in this westward-facing bay heaved quietly, reflecting the radiance of the stars. it was another perfect night for our purpose. i reached the shore and turned to the left along the rising circumference of the bay, looking hard into the night as i went. something dark lay on the water, i felt certain of it, and presently something else dark and upright loomed ahead. a moment later i had grasped wiedermann by the hand. he spoke but a word of cordial greeting, and then turned to descend to the boat. "we'll get aboard before we talk," said he. the difficult moment had come. frankly, i had dreaded it a little, but it had to be faced and got over. "i am not coming aboard to-night, sir," i replied. he turned and stared at me. "haven't you settled anything?" he demanded. "something," i said, "but there is more to be done." i told him then concisely and clearly what we had arranged, and handed him the chart and all my notes. that he was honestly delighted with my news, and satisfied with my own performance, there could be no doubt. he shook me warmly by the hand and said-"splendid, belke! i knew we could count on you! it's lucky you have a chest broad enough to hold all your decorations! for you will get them--never doubt it. but what is all this about staying on shore? what else are you needed for? and who the devil has given you such orders?" "herr tiel," i said. "i was placed under his orders, as you will remember, sir." "but what does he want you for? and how long does he imagine the british are going to let you stay in this house of yours unsuspected? they are not idiots! it seems to me you have been extraordinarily lucky to have escaped detection so far. surely you are not going to risk a longer stay?" "if it is my duty i must run the risk." "but is it your duty? i am just wondering, belke, whether i can spare you, with this attack coming on, and whether i ought to override herr tiel's orders and damn the consequences!" i knew his independence and resolution, but just at that moment there passed before my mind's eye such a distinct, sweet picture of eileen, that i was filled with a resolution and independence even greater than his. "if it were not my duty, sir," i said firmly, "clearly and strongly pointed out by herr tiel, i should never dream of asking you to spare me for a little longer." "he was then very clear and strong on the question?" "extremely." "and this other scheme of his--do you feel yourself that it is feasible enough to justify you in leaving your ship and running such a terrible risk? remember, you will be a man lost to germany!" i have put down exactly what he said, though it convicts me of having departed a little from the truth when i answered-"yes, it will justify the risk." after all, i had confidence enough in tiel's abilities to feel sure that i was really justified in saying this; but i determined to press him for some details of his plans to-morrow. wiedermann stood silent for a moment; then he held out his hand and said in a sad voice-"good-bye! but my mind misgives me. i fear we may never meet again." "that is nonsense, sir!" i cried as cheerfully as i could. "we shall meet again very soon. and if you wish something to cheer you, just study those plans!" and so we parted, he descending the bank without another word, and i setting out along the path that by now was beginning to feel quite familiar. i did not even pause to look back this time. my boats were burnt and i felt it was better to hurry on without dwelling longer on the parting. besides, there was a meeting awaiting me. when i reached the end of the road, i found that tiel had been spending the time in turning the car, and now he and eileen stood beside it, but apparently not conversing. "all right?" he asked. "yes," i said. "i met wiedermann and gave him all the plans." he merely nodded and went to start the engine. again i was forcibly reminded of my old captain, and the way in which he became calmer and more silent than ever the moment the crisis was passed. but surely this crisis had been mine and not his! anyhow, i felt a singularly strong sense of reaction and seated myself beside eileen without a word. we had gone for a little way on our homeward road before either of us spoke, and then it was to exchange some quite ordinary remark. i put out my hand gently, but hers was nowhere to be found, and this increased my depression. i fell very silent, and then suddenly, when we were nearly back, i exclaimed-"i wonder whether you are really glad that i returned?" "very!" she said, and there was such deep sincerity in her voice that the cloud began to lift at once. yet i was not in high spirits when i re-entered my familiar room. part iv. lieutenant von belke's narrative concluded i. wednesday. i woke on wednesday morning with an outlook so changed that i felt as if some magician must have altered my nature. theoretically i had taken a momentous and dangerous decision at the call of duty, and all my energies ought to have concentrated on the task of carrying it through safely, thoroughly, and warily. i had need of more caution than ever, and of the most constant vigilance--both for the sake of my skin and my country. as a matter of fact i was possessed with the recklessness of a man drifting on a plank down a rapid, where taking thought will not serve him an iota. in vain i preached theoretical caution to myself--exactly how vainly may be judged by my first performance in the morning when i found myself alone with eileen in the parlour. she suggested that for my own sake i had better be getting back to my room. "will you come and sit there with me?" i asked. "i may pay a call upon you perhaps." "after hours of loneliness! and then leave me lonelier than ever! no, thank you, i shall stay down here." "in your uniform?" she asked, opening her eyes a little. "no, no, mr belke!" "well then, get me a suit of mufti!" she looked at me hard. "you will really run that risk?" "it is now worth it," i said with meaning. she looked away, and for a moment i thought she was pained--not displeased, i am sure, but as if something had given her a pang of sorrow. then the look passed, and she cried-"well, if tiel agrees!" "tiel be hanged! i don't care what he says!" she began to smile. "do you propose to wear my clothes?" she inquired. "yours!" i exclaimed. "otherwise," she continued, "you must persuade tiel to agree, for it is only he who can provide you with a suit of mufti." presently tiel came in and i put the demand to him at once. he looked a little surprised, but, somewhat to my surprise, raised no serious objections. his motives are hard to fathom, but i cannot help suspecting that despite his air of self-confidence and authority, he has an instinctive respect for an officer and acknowledges in his heart that i am really his superior. "you mustn't go outside the house, of course," he said, "and if by any evil chance any visitor were to come in unexpectedly, you must have some kind of a story ready." "have you had many visitors yet?" i asked with a touch of sarcasm. "you never know your luck," said he, "and i believe in guarding against all chances. if you are surprised, please remember that your name is mr wilson." "wilson?" i said with some disgust. "am i named in honour of that swine in america?" "you are named wilson," said he, "because it is very like watson and williams and several other common names. the less conspicuous and more easily forgotten a name one takes, the better." there is no doubt about the thoroughness of the man and the cunning with which he lays even the smallest plans, and though i was a little contemptuous of his finesse at the moment, i must confess i was thankful enough for it not so very long afterwards. "as for your business," added tiel, "you are a government inspector." "of what?" i asked. "if you are asked, look deep and say nothing," said he. "the islands are full of people on what they call in the navy 'hush' jobs." "you seem pretty intimately acquainted with the british navy down to its slang," i observed. my nerves were perhaps a little strained this morning, and i meant by this to make a sarcastic allusion to the kind of blackguards he dealt with--such as ashington. i glanced at eileen as i spoke, and i was surprised to see a sudden look, almost of alarm, in her eye. it was turned on tiel, but he appeared absolutely indifferent. i presumed she feared he might take offence and make a row, but she need not have worried. it would take a very pointed insult to rouse that calculating machine. "can you get a suit of mufti for me?" i inquired. "i'll look one out presently," said he. "i presume you keep a few disguises!" i added. "a few," said he with one of his brief smiles. "you had better go up to your room in the meantime, and i'll bring it to you." i fumed at the idea of any delay, and as i went to the door i said-"don't be long about it, please!" more and more the thought of leaving those two alone together, even for a short while, filled me with angry uneasiness, and i paced my bedroom floor impatiently enough. judge then of my relief and delight when within a few minutes eileen knocked at my door and said-"i have come to pay you a morning call if i may." i began to wish then that herr tiel would spend an hour or two in looking out clothes for me, and as a matter of fact he did. eileen explained that he had said he must do some errand in his capacity as parish minister, but what the mystery-monger was really about, heaven knows! "now," said i to eileen, when we were seated and i had lit a cigarette, "i want to ask you something about this new scheme that we three are embarked upon." she began to shake her head at once. "i am very much in the dark," said she. "tiel tells me as little as he tells you." "you must surely know one thing. what is your own part in it? why were you brought into the islands? such risks are not run for nothing." "what is a woman's part in such a plan usually?" she asked in a quiet voice. i was a little taken aback. it was not exactly pleasant to think of--in connection with eileen. "i believe they sometimes act as decoys," i said bluntly. she merely nodded. "then that is your _rã´le_?" "i presume so," she said frankly. "who are you going to decoy?" i asked, and i felt that my voice was harsh. "ask herr tiel," she answered. "not that gross brute ashington surely!" she shook her head emphatically, and i felt a little relieved. "you have seen for yourself that he needs no further decoying," she said. "then it must be some even higher game you're to be flown at." "i wonder!" she said, and smiled a little. i hated to see her smile. "i don't like to think of you doing this," i exclaimed suddenly. "not even for germany?" she asked. i was silenced, but my blood continued to boil at the thought of what might not be asked of her. "would you go to any lengths," i asked abruptly. "for my country i would, to any lengths!" she answered proudly. again i felt rebuked, yet still more savage at the thought. "you would even become some british admiral's mistress?" i asked in a low voice. her colour suddenly rose, and for an instant she seemed to start. then in rather a cool voice she said-"perhaps we are thinking of rather different things." and with that she changed the subject, nor could i induce her to return to it. i admit frankly i was a little puzzled. her reception of my question, perfectly honestly put, had been curiously unlike the candour i should have expected in a girl of her strange profession, especially considering her defiance of all conventionalities in living alone here with two men, and sitting at this moment in the room of one of them. i respected her the more for her hint of affronted dignity. yet i confess i felt bewildered. how long we had talked i know not, when at last tiel appeared, bringing a very presentable tweed suit, and then they both left me, and i did the one thing i had so firmly resolved not to do. i discarded my uniform with what protection it gave me, and made myself liable to be shot without question or doubt. yet my only feeling was gladness that i need no longer stay cooped up in my room while those two spent their hours together downstairs. that afternoon, when we were all three together, i asked tiel for some definite information regarding his scheme, and we had a long, and i must say a very interesting, talk. the details of this plan it would scarcely be safe to put down on paper at present. or rather, i should say, the outline of it, for we have scarcely reached the stage of details yet. it is a bold scheme, as was only to be expected of tiel, and necessitated going very thoroughly into the relative naval strengths of germany and britain, so that most of the time for the rest of the day was taken up with a discussion of facts and figures. and through it all eileen sat listening. i wonder if such a talk ever before had such a charming background? now at last i am in my room, writing this narrative up to this very point. it is long past midnight, but sleep is keeping very far away from me. the weather has changed to a steady drizzle of rain. outside, the night is black as pitch, and mild and windless. it may partly be this close damp air that drives sleep away, but i know it is something else as well. i am actually wondering if i can marry her! she must surrender; that is certain, for i have willed it, and what a german wills with all his soul takes place. it must! as to her heart, i feel sure that her kindness means what a woman's kindness always means--that a man has only to persevere. but marriage? i shall never meet another woman like her; that is certain! yet an adventuress, a paid agent of the secret service, marrying a von belke--is it quite conceivable? on the whole i think _no_. but we can be very happy without that! i never loved a woman so much before--that is my last word for the night! ii. thursday. _friday morning_ (_very early_).--the events of yesterday and last night have left me with more to think about than i seem to have wits to think with. mein gott, if i could see daylight through everything! what is ahead, heaven knows, but here is what is behind. yesterday morning passed as the afternoon before had passed, in further discussion of naval statistics with tiel--with a background of eileen. then we had lunch, and soon afterwards tiel put on an oilskin coat and went out. a thin fine drizzle still filled the air, drifting in clouds before a rising wind and blotting out the view of the sea almost completely. behind it the ships were doing we knew not what; certainly they were not firing, but we could see nothing of them at all. a little later eileen insisted on putting on a waterproof and going out too. as the minister's sister she had to visit a farm, she said. i believed her, of course, though i had ceased to pay much attention to tiel's statements as to his movements. i knew that he knew his own business thoroughly, and i had ceased to mind if he had not the courtesy to take me into his confidence. after all, if i come safely out of this business, i am not likely to meet such as tiel again! left to myself, i picked up a book and had been reading for about a quarter of an hour when i was conscious of a shadow crossing the window and heard a step on the gravel. never doubting that it was either eileen or tiel, i still sat reading until i was roused by the sound of voices in the hall, just outside the parlour door. one i recognised as our servant's, the other was a stranger's. i dropped my book and started hastily to my feet, and as i did so i heard the stranger say-"i tell you i recognise her coat. my good woman, d'ye think i'm blind? i'm coming in to wait for her, i tell you." the door opened, and a very large stout gentleman appeared, talking over his shoulder as he entered. "when miss holland comes in, tell her mr craigie is waiting to see her," said he; and with that he closed the door and became aware of my presence. for a moment we looked at one another. my visitor, i saw, had a grey beard, a large rosy face, and twinkling blue eyes. he looked harmless enough, but i eyed him very warily, as you can readily believe. "it's an awful wet day," said he in a most friendly and affable tone. i agreed that it was detestable. "it's fine for the crops all the same. the oats is looking very well; do you not think so?" i perceived that my friend was an agriculturist, and endeavoured to humour him. "they are looking splendid!" i said with enthusiasm. he sat down, and we exchanged a few more remarks on the weather and the crops, in the course of which he had filled and lit a pipe and made himself entirely at home. "are you staying with the minister?" he inquired presently. "i am visiting him," i replied evasively, "i understand miss holland's here too," said he, with an extra twinkle in his eye. i knew, of course, that he must mean eileen, and i must confess that i was devoured with curiosity. "she is," i said. "do you know her?" "know her? she was my governess! has she not told you the joke of how she left me in the lurch?" it flashed across my mind that it might seem odd if i were to admit that "miss holland" had said nothing about this mysterious adventure. "oh yes, she has told us all about it," i replied with assurance. mr craigie laughed heartily at what was evidently a highly humorous recollection. "i was as near being annoyed at the time as i ever was in my life," said he. "but, man, i've had some proper laughs over it since." he suddenly grew a trifle graver. "mrs craigie isn't laughing, though. between ourselves, it's she that's sent me on this errand to-day." he winked and nodded and relit his pipe, while i endeavoured to see a little light through the extraordinary confusion of ideas which his remarks had caused in my mind. "miss holland came up to the islands as your governess, i understand," i said in as matter-of-fact tone as i could compass. "we got her through a mrs armitage in kensington," said mr craigie. "it seemed all right--and mind you, i'm not saying it isn't all right now! only between you and me, mr----?" "wilson," i said promptly, breathing my thanks to tiel at the same time. "you'll be a relation of the minister's too, perhaps?" "i am on government business," i replied in a suitable tone of grave mystery. "damn it, mr wilson," exclaimed my friend with surprising energy, "every one in the country seems to be on government business nowadays--except myself! and i've got to pay their salaries! we're asked in the catechism what's our business in this weary world, and damn it, i can answer that conundrum now! it's just to pay government officials their wages, and build a dozen or two new dreadnoughts, and send six million peaceable men into the army, and fill a pile of shells with trinitrol-globule-paralysis, or whatever they call the stuff, and all this on the rental of an estate which was just keeping me comfortably in tobacco before this infernal murdering business began! do you know what i'd do with that kaiser if i caught him?" i looked as interested as possible, and begged for information. "i'd give him my wife and my income, and see how he liked the mess he's landed me in!" though mr craigie had spoken with considerable vehemence, he had not looked at all fierce, and now his not usually very intellectual face began to assume a thoughtful expression. "he's an awful fool, yon man!" he observed. "which man?" i inquired. "billy," said he, and with a gasp i recognised my emperor in this brief epithet. "it's just astounding to me how he never learns that hot coals will burn his fingers, and water won't run uphill! he's always trying the silliest things." his eyes suddenly began to twinkle again, and he asked abruptly-"why's the kaiser like my boots?" i gave it up at once. "because he'll be sold again soon!" he chuckled. "that's one of my latest, mr wilson. i've little to do in these weary times but make riddles to amuse my girls and think of dodges for getting a rise out of my wife. i had her beautifully the other day! we've two sons at the front, you must know, and one of them's called bob. well, i got a letter from him, and suddenly i looked awful grave and cried, 'my god, bob's been blown up'--you should have seen mrs craigie jump--'by his colonel!' said i, and i tell you she was nearly as put about to find i'd been pulling her leg as if he'd really been blown to smithereens. women are funny things." i fear i scarcely laughed as much as he expected at this extraordinary instance of woman's obtuseness, but he did not seem to mind. he was already filling another pipe, and having found an audience, was evidently settling down to an afternoon's conversation--or rather an afternoon's monologue, for it was quite clear he was independent of any assistance from me. i was resolved, however, not to forgo this chance of learning something more about eileen. "you were talking about miss holland," i said hurriedly, before he had time to get under way again. "oh, so i was. and that reminds me i've come here just to make some inquiries about the girl." again his blue eyes twinkled furiously. "why's miss holland like our hall clock?" he inquired. "i may mention by the way that it's always going slow." again i gave it up. "because you take her hand and get forward! that was one for my wife's benefit. it made her fairly sick!" "do you mean," i demanded, "that you were actually in the habit of holding miss--er--holland's hand?" "oh, no fears. i'm past that game. but mrs craigie is a great one for p's and q's and not being what she calls vulgar, and a joke like that is a sure draw. i get her every time with my governess riddles. here's a good one now--why's a pretty governess like a----" in spite of the need for caution, my impatience was fast overcoming me. "then you have been sent by mrs craigie to make inquiries about miss holland?" i interrupted a trifle brusquely. mr craigie seemed at least to have the merit of not taking offence readily. "that's the idea," he agreed. "you see, it's this way: my wife's been at me ever since our governess bolted, as she calls it. well now, what's the good in making inquiries about a thing that's happened and finished and come to an end? if it was a case of engaging another governess, that's a different story. i'd take care not to have any german spies next time!" "german spies!" i exclaimed, with i hope well-simulated horror; "you don't mean to suspect miss holland of that surely!" "oh, 'german spy' is just a kind of term nowadays for any one you don't know all about," said mr craigie easily. "every one you haven't seen before is a german spy. i spotted five myself in my own parish at the beginning of the war, and mrs craigie wrote straight off to the naval authorities and reported them all." "and were they actually spies?" i asked a trifle uncomfortably. "not one of them!" laughed he. "the nearest approach was a tinker who'd had german measles! ha, ha! it's no good my wife reporting any more spies, and i just reminded her of that whenever she worried me, and pulled her leg a bit about me and miss holland being in the game together, and so it was all right till she got wind of a girl who was the image of the disappearing governess being here at the manse as mr burnett's sister, and then there was simply no quieting her till i'd taken the car and run over to see what there was in the story. mind you, i didn't think there was a word of truth in it myself; but when i'd got here, by jingo, there i saw miss holland's tweed coat in the hall! now that's a funny kettle of fish, isn't it?" i didn't say so, but i had to admit that he was not so very far wrong. the audacity of the performance was quite worthy of tiel, but its utter recklessness seemed not in the least like him. had the vanishing governess's employer been any one less easy-going than mr craigie, how readily our whole scheme might have been wrecked! even as it was, i saw detection staring me straight in the face. however, i put on as cool and composed a face as i could. "i understood that miss holland's brother had written to you about it," i said brazenly. "oh! he is really her brother, is he?" said he, looking at me very knowingly. "certainly." "he being burnett and she holland, eh?" "you have heard of half-brothers, haven't you?" i inquired with a condescending smile. "oh, i have heard of them," winked mr craigie as good-humouredly as ever; "only i never happened to have heard before of half-sisters running away from a situation they'd taken without a word of warning, just whenever their half-brothers whistled." "did mr burnett whistle?" i inquired, with (i hope) an air of calm and slightly superior amusement. "some one sent her a wire, and i presume it was mr burnett," said he. "by jingo!" he stopped suddenly with an air as nearly approaching excitement as was conceivable in such a gentleman. "what's the matter?" i asked a trifle anxiously. "one might get a good one about how to make a governess explode, the answer being 'burn it!' by jove, i must think that out." before i could recover from my amazement at this extraordinary attitude, he had suddenly resumed his shrewd quizzical look. "are you an old friend of mr burnett?" he inquired. "oh, not very," i said carelessly. "then perhaps you'll not be offended by my saying that he seems a rum kind of bird," he said confidentially. "in what way?" "well, coming up here just for a sunday to preach a sermon, and then not preaching it, but staying on as if he'd taken a lease of the manse--him and his twelve-twenty-fourths of a sister!" "but," i stammered, before i could think what i was saying, "i thought he did preach last sunday!" "not him! oh, people are talking a lot about it." this revelation left me absolutely speechless. tiel had told me distinctly and deliberately that he had gone through the farce of preaching last sunday--and now i learned that this was a lie. what was worse, he had assured me that he was causing no comment, and i now was told that people were "talking." coming straight on top of my discovery of his reckless conduct of eileen's affair, what was i to think of him? it was at this black moment that tiel and eileen entered the room. my heart stood still for an instant at the thought that, in their first surprise, something might be disclosed or some slip made by one of us. but the next instant i saw that they had learned who was here and were perfectly prepared. "how do you do, mr craigie!" cried eileen radiantly. mr craigie seemed distinctly taken aback by the absence of all signs of guilt or confusion. "i'm keeping as well as i can, thank you, considering my anxiety," said he. "about my sister, sir?" inquired tiel with his most brazen effrontery, coming forward and smiling cordially. "surely you got my letter?" i started. the man clearly had been at the key-hole during the latter part of our conversation, or he could hardly have made this remark fit so well into what i had said. "i'm afraid i didn't." "tut, tut!" said tiel, with a marvellously well-assumed air of annoyance. "the local posts seem to have become utterly disorganised. apparently they pay no attention to civilian letters at all." "you're right there," replied mr craigie with feeling. "the only use we are for is just to be taxed." "what must you think of us?" cried eileen, whose acting was fully the equal of tiel's. "however, my brother will explain everything now." "yes," said tiel; "if mr craigie happens to be going--and i'm afraid we've kept him very late already--i'll tell him all about it as we walk back to his car." he gave mr craigie a confidential glance as though to indicate that he had something private for his ear. our visitor, on his part, was obviously reluctant to leave an audience of three, especially as it included his admired governess; but tiel handled the situation with quite extraordinary urbanity and skill. he managed to open the door and all but pushed mr craigie out of the room, without a hint of inhospitality, and solely as though he were seeking only his convenience. i could scarcely believe that this was the man who had made at least two fatal mistakes--mistakes, at all events, which had an ominously fatal appearance. when mr craigie had wished us both a very friendly good-bye and the door had closed behind him, i turned instantly to eileen and cried, perhaps more hotly than politely-"well, i have been nicely deceived!" "by whom?" she asked quietly. "by you a little and by tiel very much!" "how have i deceived you?" i looked at her a trifle foolishly. after all, i ought to have realised that she must have had some curious adventure in getting into the islands. she had never told me she hadn't, and now i had merely found out what it was. "you never told me about your governess adventure--or mr craigie--or that you were called holland," i said rather lamely. she merely laughed. "you never asked me about my adventures, or i should have. they were not very discreditable after all." "well, anyhow," i said, "tiel has deceived me grossly, and i am going to wring an explanation out of him!" she laid her hand beseechingly on my arm. "don't quarrel with him!" she said earnestly. "it will do no good. we may think what we like of some of the things he does, but we have got to trust him!" "trust him! but how can i? he told me he preached last sunday,--i find it was a lie. he said nobody in the parish suspected anything,--in consequence of his not preaching, i find they are all 'talking.' he mismanaged your coming here so badly that if old craigie weren't next door to an imbecile we should all have been arrested days ago. how can i trust him now?" "say nothing to him now," she said in a low voice. "wait till to-morrow! i think he will tell you then very frankly." there was something so significant and yet beseeching in her voice that i consented, though not very graciously. "i can hardly picture herr tiel being very 'frank'!" i replied. "but if you ask me----" i bowed my obedience, and then catching up her hand pressed it to my lips, saying-"i trust you absolutely!" when i looked up i caught a look in her eye that i could make nothing of at all. it was beyond question very kind, yet there seemed to be something sorrowful too. it made her look so ravishing that i think i would have taken her in my arms there and then, had not tiel returned at that moment. "well," asked eileen, "what did you tell mr craigie?" "i said that you were secretly married to mr wilson, whose parents would cut him off without a penny if they suspected the entanglement, and this was the only plan by which you could spend a few days together. of course i swore him to secrecy." for a moment i hesitated whether to resent this liberty, or to feel a little pleased, or to be amused. eileen laughed gaily, and so i laughed too. and that was the end (so far) of my afternoon adventure. iii. thursday night. i went up to my room early in the evening. eileen had been very silent, and about nine o'clock she bade us good-night and left us. to sit alone with tiel, feeling as i did and yet bound by a promise not to upbraid him, was intolerable, and so i left the parlour a few minutes after she did. as i went down the passage to the back, my way lit only by the candle i was carrying, i was struck with a sound i had heard in that house before, only never so loudly. it was the droning of the wind through the crevices of some door, and the whining melancholy note in the stillness of that house of divided plotters and confidences withheld, did nothing to raise my spirits. when i reached my room i realised what had caused the droning. the wind had changed to a new quarter, and as another consequence my chimney was smoking badly and the room was filled with a pungent blue cloud. it is curious how events arise as consequences of trifling and utterly different circumstances. i tried opening my door and then my window, but still the fire smoked and the cloud refused to disperse. then i had an inspiration. i have mentioned a large cupboard. it was so large as almost to be a minute room, and i remembered that it had a skylight in its sloping roof. i opened this, and as the room at once began to clear, i left it open. and then i paced the floor and smoked and thought. what was to be made of these very disquieting events? clearly tiel was either a much less capable and clever man than he was reputed--a bit of a fraud in fact--or else he was carrying his fondness for mystery and for suddenly springing brilliant surprises, like conjuring tricks, upon people, to the most extreme lengths. if he were really carrying out a cunning deliberate policy in not preaching last sunday, good and well, but it was intolerable that he should have deceived me about it. it seemed quite a feasible theory to suppose that he had got out of conducting the service on some excuse in order that he might be asked to stay longer and preach next sunday instead. but then he had deliberately told me he had preached, and that the people had been so pleased that they had invited him to preach again. it sounded like a schoolboy's boastfulness! of course if he were the sort of man who would (like myself) have drawn the line at conducting a bogus religious service, i could quite well understand his getting out of it somehow. but when i remembered his tale of the murder of the real mr burnett, i dismissed that hypothesis. besides, why deceive me in any case? i daresay i should have felt a little anxious as to the result if he had evaded the duty he had professed to come up and perform, but would he care twopence about that? i did not believe it. and then his method of getting eileen into the islands, though ingenious enough (if not very original), had been marred by the most inconceivable recklessness. surely some better scheme could have been devised for getting her out of the craigies' house than a sudden flight without a word of explanation--and a flight, moreover, to another house in the same island where gossip would certainly spread in the course of a very few days. of course mr craigie's extraordinary character gave the scheme a chance it never deserved, but was tiel really so diabolically clever that he actually counted on that? how could he have known so much of craigie's character? indeed, that explanation was inconceivable. and then again, why had eileen consented to such a wild plan? that neither of them should have realised its drawbacks seemed quite extraordinary. there must be some deep cunning about it that escaped me altogether. if it were not so, we were lost indeed! and so i resolved to believe that there was more wisdom in the scheme than i realised, and simply leave it at that. thereupon i sat down and wrote for an hour or two to keep me from thinking further on the subject, and at last about midnight i resolved to go to bed. the want of fresh air had been troubling me greatly, and it struck me that a safe way of getting a little would be to put my head through the open skylight for a few minutes. it was quite dark in the cupboard, so that no light could escape; and i brought a chair along, stood on it, and looked out, with my head projecting from the midst of the sloping slates, and a beautiful cool breeze refreshing my face. so cool was the wind that there was evidently north in it, and this was confirmed by the sky, which literally blazed with stars. i could see dimly but pretty distinctly the outbuildings at the back of the house, and the road that led to the highway, and the dark rim of hills beyond. suddenly i heard the back door gently open, and still as i had stood on my chair before, i became like a statue now. in a moment the figure of tiel appeared, and from a flash of light i saw that he carried his electric torch. he walked slowly towards the highroad till he came to a low wall that divided the fields at the side, and then from behind the wall up jumped the form of a man, illuminated for an instant by a flash from the torch, and then just distinguishable in the gloom. i held my breath and waited for the crack of a pistol-shot, gently withdrawing my head a little, and prepared to rush down and take part in the fray. but there was not a sound save a low murmur of voices, far too distant and too hushed for me to catch a syllable of what they were saying. and then after two or three minutes i saw tiel turn and start to stroll back again. but at that moment my observations ceased, for i stepped hastily down from my chair and stood breathlessly waiting for him to run up to my room. he was quiet almost as a mouse. i had not heard him pass through the house as he went out, and i barely heard a sound now as he returned. but i heard enough to know that he had gone off to bed, and did not propose to pay me a visit. "what in heaven's name did it mean?" i asked myself. a dozen wild and alarming theories flashed through my mind, and then at last i saw a ray of comfort. perhaps this was only a rendezvous with ashington, or some subordinate in his pay. it was not a very brilliant ray, for the more i thought over it, the more unlikely it seemed that a rendezvous should take place at that spot and in that inconvenient fashion, when there was nothing to prevent ashington or his emissary from entering the house by the front door and holding their conversation in the parlour. however, it seemed absolutely the only solution, short of supposing that the house was watched, and so i accepted it for what it was worth in the meantime, and turned into bed. my sleep was very broken, and in the early morning i felt so wide awake, and my thoughts were so restlessly busy, that i jumped up and resolved to have another peep out of the skylight. very quietly i climbed on the chair and put my head through again. there was the man, pacing slowly away from me, from the wall towards the highroad! i studied his back closely, and of two things i felt certain: he was not a sailor of any sort--officer or bluejacket--and yet he walked like a drilled man. a tall, square-shouldered fellow, in dark plain clothes, who walks with a short step and a stiff back--what does that suggest? a policeman of some sort--constable or detective, no doubt about that! at the road he turned, evidently to stroll back again, and down went my head, i did not venture to look out again, nor was there any need. i dressed quickly, and this time put on my uniform. this precaution seemed urgently--and ominously--called for! and then i slipped downstairs, went to the front hall, and up the other stairs, and quietly called "tiel!" for i confess i was not disposed to sit for two or three hours waiting for information. at my second cry he appeared at his bedroom door, prompt as usual. "what's the matter?" he asked. "who did you speak to last night?" i asked point-blank. he looked at me for an instant and then smiled. "good heavens, it wasn't you, was it?" he inquired. "me!" i exclaimed. "i wondered how you knew otherwise." i told him briefly. "and now tell me exactly what happened!" i demanded. "certainly," said he quietly. "i went out, as i often do last thing at night, to see that the coast is clear, and this time i found it wasn't. a man jumped up from behind the wall just as you saw." "who was he?" "i can only suspect. i saw him for an instant by the light of my torch, and then it seemed less suspicious to put it out." "i don't see that," i said. "i am a cautious man," smiled tiel, as easily as though the incident had not been of life and death importance. "and what did he say to you?" i demanded impatiently. "i spoke to him and asked him what he was doing there." "what did he say to that?" "i gave him no chance to answer--because, if the answer was what i feared, he wouldn't make it. i simply told him he would catch cold if he sat there on the grass, and gave him some details about my own misfortune in getting rheumatism through sleeping in damp sheets." "i see," i said; "you simply tried to bluff him by behaving like an ordinary simple-minded honest clergyman?" tiel nodded. "it was the only thing to do--unless i had shot him there and then. and there might have been more men for all i knew." "well," i said, "i can tell you something more about that man. he is patrolling the road at the back at this very moment." tiel looked grave enough now. "it looks as if the house were being watched," he said rather slowly. "looks? it _is_ being watched!" he thought for a moment. "evidently they only suspect so far. they can know nothing, or they wouldn't be content with merely watching. thank you for telling me. we'll talk about it later." still cool as a cucumber he re-entered his room, and i returned to my own. what can be done? nothing! i can only sit and wait and keep myself from worrying by writing. i have made up my fire and my door is locked, so that this manuscript will be in flames before any one can enter, if it comes to the worst. recalling the words of tiel a few days ago, i shiver a little to think of what is ahead. suspicion has _begun_! iv. friday. this is written under very different circumstances--and in a different place. my last words were written with my eyes shut; these are written with them open, but i shall simply tell what happened as calmly as i can. let the events speak; i shall make no comment in the meanwhile. on that friday morning our breakfast was converted into a council of war. we all three discussed the situation gravely and frankly. i felt tempted to say some very bitter words to tiel, for it seemed to me quite obvious that it was simply his gross mismanagement which had brought us to the edge of this precipice; but i am glad now i refrained. i was at no pains, however, to be over-polite. "there is nothing to be done in the meanwhile, i'm afraid," said he. this coolness seemed to me all very well in its proper season, but not at present. "yes, there is," i said urgently. "we might get out of this house and look for some other refuge!" he shook his head. "not by daylight, if it is being watched." "besides," said eileen, "this is the day we have been waiting for. we don't want to be far away, do we?" "personally," i said, "it seems to me that as i cannot be where i ought to be" (and here i looked at tiel somewhat bitterly), "with my brave comrades in their attack on our enemies, i should much prefer to make for a safer place than this--if one can be found." "it can't," said tiel briefly. and that indeed became more and more obvious the longer we talked it over. had our house stood in the midst of a wood, or had a kindly fog blown out of the north sea, we might have made a move. as it was, i had to agree that it would be sheer folly, before nightfall anyhow; and there was nothing for it but waiting. to add to the painfulness of this ordeal, i found myself obliged to remain in my room, now that i had resumed my uniform. this time it did not need tiel to bid me take this precaution. in fact, i was amazed to hear him suggesting that i would be just as safe in the parlour. at the time i naturally failed altogether to understand this departure from his usual caution, and i asked him sarcastically if he wished to precipitate a catastrophe. "we have still a good deal to discuss," said he. "i thought there was nothing more to be said." "i mean in connection with the other scheme." "the devil may take the other scheme!" said i, "anyhow till we escape from this trap. what is the good in planning ahead, with the house watched night and day?" "we only suspect it is watched," said he calmly. "suspect!" i cried. "we are not idiots, and why should we pretend to be?" and so i went up to my room and spent the most miserable and restless day of my life. how slowly the hours passed, no words of mine can give the faintest idea. in my present state of mind writing was impossible, and i tried to distract myself by reading novels; but they were english novels, and every word in them seemed to gall me. i implored eileen to come and keep me company. she came up once for a little, but the devil seemed to have possessed her, for i felt no sympathy coming from her at all; and when at last i tried to be a little affectionate she first repulsed me, saying it was no time for that, and then she left me. with baffled love added to acute anxiety, you can picture my condition! for the first part of that horrible day i kept listening for some sign of the police, and now and then looking out from the skylight at the back, but the watcher was no longer visible, and not a fresh step or voice was to be heard in the house. my door stood locked, my fire was blazing, and my papers lay ready to be consumed, and at moments i positively longed to see them blazing and myself arrested, and get it over, yet nothing happened. in the afternoon the direction of my thoughts began to change as the hour approached when the fleet should sail and my country reap the reward of the enterprise and fidelity which i felt conscious i had shown, and the sacrifice which i feared i should have to make. i began to make brief visits to the parlour to look out of the window and see if i could see any signs of movement in the armada. and then for the second time i saw tiel in a genial cheerful humour, and this time there was no doubt of the cause. he too was in a state of tension, and his mind, like mine, was running on the coming drama. in fact, as the afternoon wore on, his thoughts were so entirely wrapped up in this that he frankly talked of nothing else. was i sure we should have at least four submarines? he asked me; and would they be brought well in and take the risk? indeed, i never heard him ask so many questions, or appear so pleased as he did when i reassured him on all these points. as for eileen, she was quite as excited as either of us, and when tiel was not asking me questions, she was; until once again prudence drove me back to my room. on one of my visits she gave us some tea, but that is the only meal i remember any of us eating between our early and hurried lunch and the evening when the crash came. the one thing i looked for as i gazed out of that window was the rising of smoke from the battle-fleet, and at last i saw it. stream after stream, black or grey, gradually mounted, first from one leviathan and then from another, till the air was darkened hundreds of feet above them, and if our flotilla were in such a position that they could look for this sign, they must have seen it. this time i returned to my room with a heart a little lightened. "i have done my duty," i said to myself, "come what may of it!" and i do not think that any impartial reader will deny that, so far as my own share of this enterprise was concerned, i had done my very utmost to make it succeed. the next time i came down my spirits rose higher still, and for the moment i quite forgot the danger in which i stood. the light cruisers, the advance-guard of the fleet, were beginning to move! this time when i went back to my room i forced myself to read two whole chapters of a futile novel before i again took off the lid and peeped in to see how the stew was cooking. the instant i had finished the second chapter i leapt up and opened the door--and then i stood stock-still and listened. a distant sound of voices reached me, and a laugh rang out that was certainly neither tiel's nor eileen's. i locked my door, slipped back again, and prepared to burn my papers; but though i stood over the fire for minute after minute, there was no sound of approaching steps. very quietly i opened the door and listened once more, and still i heard voices. and thus i lingered and hesitated for more than an hour. by this time the attack had probably been made, and i could stand the suspense no longer, so i went recklessly downstairs, strode along the passage, and opened the parlour door. nothing will ever efface the memory of the scene that met my eyes. tiel, eileen, and ashington sat there, the two men each with a whisky-and-soda, and all three seemingly in the most extraordinarily high spirits. it was ashington's face and voice that suddenly rent the veil from before my eyes. instead of the morose and surly individual i had met before, he sat there the incarnation of the jovial sailor. he was raising his glass to his lips, and as i entered i heard the words-"here's to you again, robin!" what had happened i did not clearly grasp in that first instant, but i _felt_ i was betrayed. my hand went straight to my revolver pocket, but before i could seize it, tiel, who sat nearest, leapt up, grasped my wrist, and with the shock of his charge drove me down into a chair. it was done so suddenly that i could not possibly have resisted. then with a movement like a conjurer he picked the revolver out of my pocket, and said in his infernally cool calm way-"please consider yourself a prisoner of war, mr belke." even then i had not grasped the whole truth. "a prisoner of war!" i exclaimed. "and what the devil are you, herr tiel? a traitor?" "you have got my name a little wrong," said he, with that icy smile of his. "i am commander blacklock of the british navy, so you can surrender either to me or to captain phipps, whichever you choose." "phipps!" i gasped, for i remembered that as the name of a member of jellicoe's staff. "that's me, old man," said the gross person with insufferable familiarity. "the honourable thomas bainbridge ashington would have a fit if he looked in the glass and saw this mug!" "then i understand i am betrayed?" i asked as calmly as i could. "you're nabbed," said captain phipps, with brutal british slang, "and let me tell you that's better than being dead, which you would have been if you'd rejoined your boat." i could not quite control my feelings. "what has happened?" i cried. "we've bagged the whole four--just at the very spot on the chart which you and i arranged!" chuckled the great brute. (at this point lieutenant von belke's comments become a little too acid for publication, and it has been considered advisable that the narrative should be finished by the editor.) part v. a few concluding chapters by the editor i. tiel's journey. for the moment the fortitude of the hapless young lieutenant completely broke down when he heard these tidings. it took him a minute to control his voice, and then he said-"please give me back my revolver. i give you my word of honour not to use it on any of you three." commander blacklock shook his head. "i am sorry we can't oblige you," said he. "poor old chap," said phipps with genial sympathy; "it's rotten bad luck on you, i must admit." these well-meant words seemed only to incense the captive. "i do not wish your damned sympathy!" he cried. "hush, hush! ladies present," said phipps soothingly. von belke turned a lowering eye on miss holland. she had said not a word, and scarcely moved since he came into the room, but her breathing was a little quicker than usual, and her gaze had followed intently each speaker in turn. "ach so!" he said; "the decoy is still present. i had forgot." blacklock's eye blazed dangerously. "mr belke," he said, "captain phipps and i have pleaded very strongly that, in spite of your exceedingly ambiguous position, and the fact that you have not always been wearing uniform, you should not suffer the fate of a spy. but if you make any more remarks like your last, i warn you we shall withdraw this plea." for the first time eileen spoke. "please do not think it matters to me, captain blacklock----" she began. in a whisper phipps interrupted her. "eye-wash!" he said. "it's the only way to treat a hun--show him the stick!" the hint had certainly produced its effect. von belke shrugged his shoulders, and merely remarked-"i am your prisoner. i say nothing more." "that's distinctly wiser," said captain phipps, with a formidable scowl at the captive and a wink at miss holland. for a few moments von belke kept his word, and sat doggedly silent. then suddenly he exclaimed-"but i do not understand all this! how should a german agent be a british officer? my government knew all about tiel--i was told to be under his orders--it is impossible you can be he!" blacklock turned to the other two. "i almost think i owe mr belke an explanation," he said with a smile. "yes," cried eileen eagerly, "do tell him, and then--then he will understand a little better." blacklock filled a pipe and leaned his back against the fireplace, a curious mixture of clergyman in his attire and keen professional sailor in his voice and bearing, now that all need for pretence was gone. "the story i told you of the impersonation and attempted murder of mr alexander burnett," he began, "was simply a repetition of the tale told me by adolph tiel at inverness--where, by the way, he was arrested." von belke started violently. "so!" he cried. "then--then you never were tiel?" "i am thankful to say i never was, for a more complete scoundrel never existed. he and his friend schumann actually did knock mr burnett on the head, tie a stone to his feet, and pitch him over the cliff. unfortunately for them, they made a bad job of the knot and the stone came loose. in consequence, mr burnett floated long enough to be picked up by a patrol boat, which had seen the whole performance outlined against the sky at the top of the cliff above her. by the time they had brought him back to a certain base, mr burnett had revived and was able to tell of his adventure. the affair being in my line, was put into my hands, and it didn't take long to see what the rascals' game was." "no," commented phipps; "i suppose you spotted that pretty quick." "practically at once. a clergyman on his way here--clothes and passport stolen--left for murdered--chauffeur so like him that the minister noticed the resemblance himself in the instant the man was knocking him down,--what was the inference? pretty obvious, you'll agree. well, the first step was simple. the pair had separated; but we got tiel at inverness on his way north, and schumann within twenty-four hours afterwards at liverpool." "good business!" said phipps. "i hadn't heard about schumann before." "well," continued blacklock, "i interviewed mr tiel, and i found i'd struck just about the worst thing in the way of rascals it has ever been my luck to run up against. he began to bargain at once. if his life was spared he would give me certain very valuable information." "mein gott!" cried belke. "did a german actually say that?" "tiel belongs to no country," said blacklock. "he is a cosmopolitan adventurer without patriotism or morals. i told him his skin would be safe if his information really proved valuable; and when i heard his story, i may say that he did save his skin. he gave the whole show away, down to the passwords that were to pass between you when you met." he suddenly turned to phipps and smiled. "it's curious how the idea came to me. i've done a good bit of secret service work myself, and felt in such a funk sometimes that i've realised the temptation to give the show away if i were nailed. well, as i looked at tiel, i said to myself, 'there, but for the grace of god, stands robin blacklock!' and then suddenly it flashed into my mind that we were really not at all unlike one another--same height, and tin-opener nose, and a few streaks of anno domini in our hair, and so on." "i know, old thing," said his friend, "it's the wife-poisoning type. you see 'em by the dozen in the chamber of horrors." their teutonic captive seemed to wax a little impatient. "what happened then?" he demanded. "what happened was that i decided to continue mr tiel's journey for him. the arrest and so on had lost a day, but i knew that the night of your arrival was left open, and i had to risk it. that splash of salt water on your motor bike, and your resource in dodging pursuit, just saved the situation, and we arrived at the house on the same night." "so that was why you were late!" exclaimed von belke. "fool that i was not to have questioned and suspected!" "it might have been rather a nasty bunker," admitted blacklock, "but luckily i got you to lose your temper with me when i reached that delicate part of my story, and you forgot to ask me." "you always were a tactful fellow, robin," murmured phipps. "of course," resumed blacklock, "i was in touch with certain people who advised me what scheme to recommend. my only suggestion was that the officer sent to advise us professionally should be one whose appearance might lead those who did not know him to suspect him capable of treasonable inclinations. my old friend, captain phipps----" "robin!" roared his old friend, "i read your bloomin' message. you asked for the best-looking officer on the staff, and the one with the nicest manners. get on with your story!" these interludes seemed to perplex their captive considerably. "you got a pretended traitor? i see," he said gravely. "exactly. i tried you first with ashington of the _haileybury_--whom i slandered grossly by the way. if you had happened to know him by sight i should have passed on to another captain, till i got one you didn't know. well, i needn't recall what happened at our council of war, but now we come to rather a----" he hesitated and glanced for an instant at miss holland,--"well, rather a delicate point in the story. i think it's only fair to those concerned to tell you pretty fully what happened. i believe i am right in thinking that they would like me to do so." again he glanced at the girl, and this time she gave a little assenting nod. "that night, after you left us, mr belke, captain phipps and i had a long discussion over a very knotty point. how were we to get you back again here after you had delivered your message to your submarine?" "i do not see exactly why you wished me to return?" said von belke. "there were at least three vital reasons, in the first place some one you spoke to might have known too much about tiel and have spotted the fraud. then again, some one might easily have known the real captain ashington, and it would be a little difficult to describe captain phipps in such a way as to confound him with any one else. finally, we wished to extract a little more information from you." von belke leapt from his seat with an exclamation. "what have i not told you!" he cried hoarsely. "mein gott, i had forgotten that! give me that pistol! come, give it to me! why keep me alive?" "i suppose because it is an english custom," replied commander blacklock quietly. "also, you will be exceedingly glad some day to find yourself still alive. please sit down and listen. i am anxious to explain this point fully, for a very good reason." with a groan their captive sat down, but with his head held now between his hands and his eyes cast upon the floor. "we agreed that at all costs this must be managed, and so i tried my hand at exercising my authority over you. i saw that was going to be no good, and gave it up at once for fear you'd smell a rat. and then i thought of miss holland." von belke looked up suddenly. "ah!" he cried, "so that is why this lady appeared--this lady i may not call a decoy!" "that is why," said blacklock. ii. the lady. lieutenant von belke looked for a moment at the lady who had enslaved him, but for some reason he averted his gaze rather quickly. then with an elaborate affectation of sarcastic politeness which served but ill to conceal the pain at his heart and the shock to his pride, he inquired-"may i be permitted to ask what agency supplies ladies so accomplished at a notice so brief?" "providence," said blacklock promptly and simply. "miss holland had never undertaken any such work before, and her name is on the books of no bureau." "i believe you entirely," said von belke ironically. "you taught her her trade then, i presume?" "i did." the german stared at him. "is there really any need to deceive me further?" he inquired. "i am telling you the simple truth," said blacklock unruffled. "i had the great good fortune to make miss holland's acquaintance on the mail-boat crossing to these islands. she was going to visit mr craigie--that intellectual gentleman you met yesterday--under the precise circumstances he described. i noticed miss holland the moment she came aboard the boat." he paused for a moment, and then turned to eileen with a smile. "i have a confession to make to you, miss holland, which i may as well get off my chest now. my mind, naturally enough perhaps, was rather running on spies, and when i discovered that you were travelling with a suit-case of german manufacture i had a few minutes' grave suspicion. i now apologise." eileen laughed. "only a few minutes!" she exclaimed. "it seems to me i got off very easily!" "that was why i was somewhat persistent in my conversation," he continued, still smiling a little, "but it quickly served the purpose of satisfying me absolutely that my guns were on the wrong target. and so i promptly relieved you of my conversation." he turned again to von belke. "then, mr belke, a very curious thing happened, which one of us may perhaps be pardoned for thinking diabolical and the other providential. miss holland happened to have met the real mr burnett and bowled me out. and then i had another lucky inspiration. if miss holland will pardon me for saying so in her presence, i had already been struck with the fact that she was a young lady of very exceptional looks and brains and character--and, moreover, she knew germany and she knew german. it occurred to me that in dealing with a young and probably not unimpressionable man such an ally might conceivably come in useful." "robin," interrupted his old friend, with his rich laugh, "you are the coldest-blooded brute i ever met!" "to plot against a man like that!" agreed von belke with bitter emphasis. "oh, i wasn't thinking of you," said captain phipps, with a gallant glance at the lady. "however, on you go with your yarn." "well, i decided on the spot to take miss holland into my confidence--and i should like to say that confidence was never better justified. she seemed inclined to do what she could for her country." commander blacklock paused for an instant, and added apologetically, "i am putting it very mildly and very badly, but you know what i mean. she was, in fact, ready to do anything i asked her on receipt of a summons from me. i had thought of her even when talking to captain phipps, but i felt a little reluctant to involve her in the business, with all it entailed, unless no other course remained open. and no other course was open. and so i first telegraphed to her and then went over and fetched her. that was how she came to play the part she did, entirely at my request and instigation." "you--you then told her to--to make me admire her?" asked von belke in an unsteady voice. "frankly i did. of course it was not for me to teach a lady how to be attractive, but i may say that we rehearsed several of the scenes very carefully indeed,--i mean in connection with such matters as the things you should say to commander wiedermann, and so on. miss holland placed herself under my orders, and i simply told her what to say. she was in no sense to blame." "blame!" cried captain phipps. "she deserves all the decorations going!" "i was trying to look at it from mr belke's point of view," said blacklock, "as i think miss holland probably desires." she gave him a quick, grateful look, and he continued-"it was i who suggested that she should appear critical of me, and endeavour, as it were, to divide our household into two camps, so that you should feel you were acting against me when you were actually doing what i wished. i tell you this frankly so that you may see who was responsible for the deceit that we were forced to practise." "forced!" cried the young lieutenant bitterly. "who forced you to use a woman? could you not have deceived me alone?" "no," said blacklock candidly, "i couldn't, or i should not have sent for miss holland. it was an extremely difficult problem to get you to risk your life, and stand out against your commanding officer's wishes and your own inclinations and your apparent duty, and come back to this house after the whole plan was arranged and every argument seemed to be in favour of your going aboard your boat again. nobody but a man under the influence of a woman would have taken such a course. those were the facts i had to face, and--well, the thing came off, thanks entirely to miss holland. i have apologised to her twenty times already for making such a use of her, and i apologise again." suddenly the young german broke out. "ah! but were there not consolations?" "what do you mean?" "you and miss holland living by yourselves in this house--is it that you need apologise for?" "miss holland never spent a single night under this roof," said blacklock quietly. "not--not a night," stammered von belke. "then where----?" "she stayed at a house in the neighbourhood." the lieutenant seemed incapable of comment, and captain phipps observed genially, "there seem to have been some rum goings-on behind your back, mr belke!" von belke seemed to be realising this fact himself, and resenting it. "you seem to have amused yourself very much by deceiving me," he remarked. "i assure you i did nothing for fun," said blacklock gravely, yet with a twinkle in his eye. "it was all in the way of business." "the story that you preached, for instance!" "would you have felt quite happy if i had told you i had omitted to do the one thing i had professed to come here for?" von belke gave a little sound that might have meant anything. then he exclaimed-"but your servant who was not supposed to know anything--that was to annoy me, i suppose!" "to isolate you. i didn't want you to speak to a soul but me." the captive sat silent for a moment, and then said-"you had the house watched by the police--i see that now." "a compliment to you, mr belke," smiled the commander; and then he added, "you gave me one or two anxious moments, i may tell you. your demand for mufti necessitated a very hurried interview with the commander of a destroyer, and old craigie's visit very nearly upset the apple-cart. i had to tell him pretty nearly the whole truth when i got him outside. but those incidents came after the chief crisis was over. the nearest squeak was when i thought you were safely engaged with miss holland, and a certain officer was calling on me, who was _not_ captain phipps. in fact, he was an even more exalted person. miss holland saved the situation by crying out that you were coming, or i'm afraid that would have been the end of the submarine attack." "so?" said the young german slowly and with a very wry face, and then he turned to eileen. "then, miss holland, every time you did me the honour to appear kind and visit me you were carrying out one of this gentleman's plans? and every word you spoke was said to entangle me in your net, or to keep me quiet while something was being done behind my back? i hope that some day you may enjoy the recollection as much as i am enjoying it now!" "mr belke," she cried, "i am very deeply sorry for treating even an enemy as i treated you!" she spoke so sincerely and with so much emotion that even captain phipps assumed a certain solemn expression, which was traditionally never seen on his face except when the chaplain was actually officiating, and jumping up she came a step towards the prisoner. there she stood, a graceful and beautiful figure, her eyes glowing with fervour. "all i can say for myself, and all i can ask you to think of when your recollections of me pain you, is only this--if you had a sister, would you have had her hesitate to do one single thing i did in order to defeat her country's enemies?" von belke looked at her for a moment with frowning brow and folded arms. then all he said was-"germany's cause is sacred!" her eyes opened very wide. "then what is right for germany is wrong for her enemies?" "naturally. how can germany both be right--as she is, and yet be wrong?" "i--i don't think you quite understand what i mean," she said with a puzzled look. "germany never will," said blacklock quietly. "that is why we are at war." a tramp of footsteps sounded on the gravel outside, and captain phipps sprang up. "your guard has come for you, mr belke," he said. "i'm sorry to interrupt this conversation, but i'm afraid you must be moving." iii. the empty envelope. commander blacklock closed the front door. "chilly night," he observed. "it is rather," said eileen. the wind droned through a distant keyhole mournfully and continuously. that melancholy piping sound never rose and never fell; monotonous and unvarying it piped on and on. otherwise the house had that peculiar feeling of quiet which houses have when stirring events are over and people have departed. the two remaining inhabitants re-entered the parlour, glanced at one another with a half smile, and then seemed simultaneously to find a little difficulty in knowing what to do next. "well," said blacklock, "our business seems over." he felt he had spoken a little more abruptly than he intended, and would have liked to repeat his observations in a more genial tone. "yes," said she almost as casually, "there is nothing more to be done to-night, i suppose." "i shall have to write up my report of our friend mr belke's life and last words," said he with a half laugh. "and i have got to get over to mrs brown's," she replied, "and so i had better go at once." "oh, there's no such desperate hurry," he said hastily; "i haven't much to write up to-night. we must have some supper first." "yes," she agreed, "i suppose we shall begin to feel hungry soon if we don't. i'll see about it. what would you like?" "the cold ham and a couple of boiled eggs will suit me." she agreed again. "that won't take long, and then you can begin your report." again he protested hastily. "oh, but there's no hurry about that, i assure you. i only wanted to save trouble." while she was away he stood before the fire, gazing absently into space and scarcely moving a muscle. the ham and boiled eggs appeared, and a little more animation became apparent, but it was not a lively feast. she talked for a little in an ordinary, cheerful way, just as though there was no very special subject for conversation; but he seemed too absent-minded and silent to respond even to these overtures, except with a brief smile and a briefer word. they had both been quite silent for about five minutes, when he suddenly said in a constrained manner, but with quite a different intonation-"well, i am afraid our ways part now. what are you going to do next?" "i've been wondering," she said; "and i think if mrs craigie still wants me i ought to go back to her." "back to the craigies!" he exclaimed. "and become--er--a governess again?" "it will be rather dull at first," she laughed; "but one can't have such adventures as this every day, and i really have treated the craigies rather badly. you see you told mr craigie the truth about my desertion of them, and they may forgive me. if they do, and if they still need me, i feel i simply must offer my services." "it's very good of you." she laughed again. "it is at least as much for my own interest as mrs craigie's. i have nowhere else to go to and nothing else to do." "i wish i could offer you another job like this," said he. a sparkle leapt into her eyes. "if you ever do see any chance of making any sort of use of me--i mean of letting me be useful--you will be sure to let me know, won't you?" "rather! but honestly, i'm not likely to have such a bit of luck as this again." "what will you be doing?" "whatever i'm told to do; the sort of thing i was on before--odd jobs of the 'hush' type. but i wish i could think of you doing something more--well, more worthy of your gifts." "one must take one's luck as it comes," she said with an outward air of philosophy, whatever her heart whispered. "exactly," he agreed with emphasis. "still----" he broke off, and pulled a pipe out of his pocket. "i'll leave you to smoke," she said, "and say good-night now." "one moment!" said he, jumping up; "there's something i feel i must say. i've been rather contrite about it. i'm afraid i haven't quite played cricket so far as you are concerned." she looked at him quickly. "what do you mean?" she asked. "it's about belke. i'm afraid phipps was quite right in saying i'm rather cold-blooded when i am keen over a job. perhaps it becomes a little too much of a mere problem. getting you to treat belke as you did, for instance. you were very nice to him to-night--though he was too german to understand how you felt--and it struck me that very possibly you had been seeing a great deal of him, and he's a nice-looking fellow, with a lot of good stuff in him, a brave man, no doubt about it, and--well, perhaps you liked him enough to make you wish i hadn't let you in for such a job. i just wondered." she looked at him for an instant with an expression he did not quite understand; then she looked away and seemed for a moment a little embarrassed, and then she looked at him again, and he thought he had never seen franker eyes. "you're as kind and considerate as--as, well, as you're clever!" she said with a half laugh. "but, if you only knew, if you only even had the least guess how i've longed to do something for my country--something really useful, i mean; how unutterably wretched i felt when the trifling work i was doing was stopped by a miserable neglected cold and i had to have a change, and as i'd no money i had to take this stupid job of teaching; and how i envied the women who were more fortunate and really _were_ doing useful things; oh, then you'd know how grateful i feel to you! if i could make every officer in the german navy--and the army too--fall in love with me, and then hand them over to you, i'd do it fifty times over! don't, please, talk nonsense, or think nonsense! good-night, mr tiel, and perhaps it's good-bye." she laughed as she gave him his _nom-de-guerre_, and held out her hand as frankly as she had spoken. he did not take it, however. "i'm going to escort you over to mrs brown's," he said with a very different expression now in his eyes. "it's very good of you," she said; "you are sure you have time?" "loads!" he assured her. he opened the door for her, but she stopped on the threshold. a young woman was waiting in the hall. "mrs brown has sent her girl to escort me," she said, "so we'll have to"--she corrected herself--"we must say good-night now. is it good-bye, or shall i see you in the morning?" his face had become very long again. "i'm very much afraid not. i've got to report myself with the lark. good-bye." the front door closed behind her, and commander blacklock strode back to the fire and gazed at it for some moments. "well," he said to himself, "i suppose, looking at things as they ought to be looked at, mrs brown's girl has saved me from making a damned fool of myself! now to work: that's my proper stunt." he threw some sheets of foolscap on the table, took out his pen, and sat down to his work. for about five minutes he stared at the foolscap, but the pen never made a movement. then abruptly he jumped up and exclaimed-"dash it, i must!" snatching up an envelope, he thrust it in his pocket, and a moment later was out of the house. * * * * * miss holland and her escort were about fifty yards from mrs brown's house when the girl started and looked back. "there's some one crying on you!" she exclaimed. eileen stopped and peered back into the night. it had clouded over and was very dark. very vaguely something seemed to loom up in the path behind them. "miss holland!" cried a voice. "it's the minister!" said the girl. "the--who?" exclaimed eileen; and added hastily, "oh yes, i know who you mean." a tall figure disengaged itself from the surrounding night. "sorry to trouble you," said the voice in curiously quick and jerky accents, "but i've got a note i want this girl to deliver immediately." he handed her an envelope. "hand that in at the first farm on the other side of the manse," he commanded, pointing backwards into the darkness. "i'll escort miss holland." "which hoose----" began the girl. "the first you come to!" said the commander peremptorily. "quick as you can!" then he looked at eileen, and for a moment said nothing. "what's the matter?" she asked anxiously. "has anything gone wrong?" "yes," he said with a half laugh, "i have. i even forgot to lick down that envelope. how the deuce i'm to explain an empty, unaddressed, unfastened envelope the lord only knows!" his manner suddenly changed and he asked abruptly, "are you in a desperate hurry to get in? i've something to say to you." he paused and looked at her, but she said not a word in reply, not even to inquire what it was. a little jerkily he proceeded-"i'm probably making just as great a fool of myself as belke. but i couldn't let you go without asking--well, whether i am merely making a fool of myself. if you know what i mean and think i am, well, please just tell me you can manage to see yourself safely home--i know it's only about fifty yards--and i'll go and get that wretched envelope back from the girl and tell her another lie." "why should i think you are making a fool of yourself?" she asked in a voice that was very quiet, but not quite as even as she meant. "let's turn back a little way," he suggested quickly. she said nothing, but she turned. "take my arm, won't you," he suggested. in the bitterness of his heart he was conscious that he had rapped out this proposal in his sharpest quarter-deck manner. and he had meant to speak so gently! yet she took his arm, a little timidly it is true, but no wonder, thought he. for a few moments they walked in silence, falling slower and slower with each step; and then they stopped. at that, speech seemed to be jerked out of him at last. "i wonder if it's conceivable that you'd ever look upon me as anything but a calculating machine?" he inquired. "i never thought of you in the least as that!" she exclaimed. the gallant commander evidently regarded this as a charitable exaggeration. he shook his head. "you must sometimes. i know i must have seemed that sort of person." "not to me," she said. he seemed encouraged, but still a little incredulous. "then did you ever really think of me as a human being--as a--as a--" he hesitated painfully--"as a friend?" "yes," she said, "of course i did--always as a friend." "could you possibly--conceivably--think of me as"--he hesitated, and then blurted out--"as, dash it all, head over ears in love with you?" and then suddenly the commander realised that he had not made a fool of himself after all. the empty envelope was duly delivered, but no explanation was required. mrs brown's girl supplied all the information necessary. "of course i knew fine what he was after," said she. printed by william blackwood and sons. william blackwood & sons' popular new books. crown 8vo. 6s. net, ian hay's continued chronicle of a unit of k(l). carrying on-after the first hundred thousand. by the junior sub. 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[illustration: thepocketbooks] [illustration: thepocketbooks] the german fleet _being the companion volume to "the fleets at war" and "from heligoland to keeling island."_ by archibald hurd author (joint) of "german sea-power, its rise, progress and economic basis." hodder and stoughton london new york toronto mcmxv contents chapter page introduction 7 i. past ascendency 19 ii. the first german fleet 26 iii. germany's fleet in the last century 51 iv. british influence on the german navy 80 v. the german navy acts 93 vi. german ships, officers, and men 142 vii. william ii. and his naval minister 155 appendix i.--germany's naval policy 183 appendix ii.--british and german ship-building programmes 189 introduction in the history of nations there is probably no chapter more fascinating and arresting than that which records the rise and fall and subsequent resurrection of german sea-power. in our insular pride, conscious of our glorious naval heritage, we are apt to forget that germany had a maritime past, and that long before the german empire existed the german people attained pre-eminence in oversea commerce and created for its protection fleets which exercised commanding influence in northern waters. it is an error, therefore, to regard germany as an up-start naval power. the creation of her modern navy represented the revival of ancient hopes and aspirations. to those ambitions, in their unaggressive form, her neighbours would have taken little exception; germany had become a great commercial power with colonies overseas, and it was natural that she should desire to possess a navy corresponding to her growing maritime interests and the place which she had already won for herself in the sun. the more closely the history of german sea-power is studied the more apparent it must become, that it was not so much germany's navy acts, as the propaganda by which they were supported and the new and aggressive spirit which her naval organisation brought into maritime affairs that caused uneasiness throughout the world and eventually created that feeling of antagonism which found expression after the opening of war in august, 1914. in the early part of 1913 i wrote, in collaboration with a friend who possessed intimate knowledge of the foundations and the strength of the german empire, a history of the german naval movement,[1] particular emphasis being laid on its economic basis. in the preparation of the present volume i have drawn upon this former work. it has been impossible, however, in the necessarily limited compass of one of the _daily telegraph_ war books, to deal with the economic basis upon which the german navy has been created. i believe that the chapters in "german sea-power" with reference to this aspect of german progress--for which my collaborator was responsible and of which, therefore, i can speak without reserve--still constitute a unique presentation of the condition of germany on the eve of the outbreak of war. much misconception exists as to the staying power of germany. the german empire as an economic unit is not of mushroom growth. those readers who are sufficiently interested in the subject of the basis of german vitality, will realise vividly by reference to "german sea-power" the deep and well-laid foundations upon which not only the german navy, but the german empire rest. whether this history should be regarded as the romance of the german navy or the tragedy of the german navy must for the present remain an open question. in everyday life many romances culminate in tragedy, and the course of events in the present war suggest that the time may be at hand when the german people will realise the series of errors committed by their rulers in the upbuilding of german sea-power. within the past fifteen years it is calculated that about £300,000,000 has been spent in the maintenance and expansion of the german fleet, the improvement of its bases, and the enlargement of the kiel canal. much of this money has been raised by loans. those loans are still unpaid; it was believed by a large section of the german people that great britain, hampered by party politics and effete in all warlike pursuits, would, after defeat, repay them. that hope must now be dead. the german people, as the memorandum which accompanied the navy act of 1900 reveals, were led to anticipate that the fleet, created by the sacrifice of so much treasure, would not only guarantee their shores against aggression, but would give absolute protection to their maritime and colonial interests, and would, eventually, pay for itself. the time will come when they will recognise that from the first they have been hoodwinked and deceived by those in authority over them. it may be that german statesmen, and the emperor himself, were themselves deceived by the very brilliance of the dreams of world power which they entertained and by the conception which they had formed of the lack of virility, sagacity and prescience of those responsible for the fortunes of other countries, and of great britain in particular. german navy acts were passed in full confidence that during the period when they were being carried into effect the rest of the world would stand still, lost in admiration of germany's culture and germany's power. the mass of the german people were unwilling converts to the new gospel. they had to be convinced of the wisdom of the new policy. for this purpose a press bureau was established. throughout the german states this organisation fostered, through the official and semi-official press, feelings of antagonism and hatred towards other countries, and towards england and the united states especially, because these two countries were germany's most serious rivals in the commercial markets of the world, and also possessed sea-power superior to her own. it is interesting to recall in proof of this dual aim of german policy the remarks of von edelsheim, a member of the german general staff, in a pamphlet entitled "operationen ubersee."[2] the author, after first pointing out the possibility of invading england, turned his attention to the united states.[3] his remarks are so interesting in view of the activity of german agents on the other side of the atlantic after the outbreak of war, that it is perhaps excusable to quote at some length this explanation by a member of the german general staff of how the german fleet was to be used against the united states as an extension of the power of the huge german army. "the possibility must be taken into account that the fleet of the united states will at first not venture into battle, but that it will withdraw into fortified harbours, in order to wait for a favourable opportunity of achieving minor successes. therefore it is clear that naval action alone will not be decisive against the united states, but that combined action of army and navy will be required. considering the great extent of the united states, the conquest of the country by an army of invasion is not possible. but there is every reason to believe that victorious enterprises on the atlantic coast, and the conquest of the most important arteries through which imports and exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs in the whole country that the government will readily offer acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace. "if germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our harbours, we may conclude that operations on the american soil can begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the united states will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army equivalent to our own. "at present the regular army of the united states amounts to 65,000 men, of whom only 30,000 could be disposed of. of these at least 10,000 are required for watching the indian territories and for guarding the fortifications on the sea coast. therefore only about 20,000 men of the regular army are ready for war. besides, about 100,000 militia are in existence, of whom the larger part did not come up when they were called out during the last war. lastly, the militia is not efficient; it is partly armed with muzzle-loaders, and its training is worse than its armament. "as an operation by surprise against america is impossible, on account of the length of time during which transports are on the way, only the landing can be affected by surprise. nevertheless, stress must be laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably facilitate victory against the united states, owing to the absence of methodical preparation for mobilization, owing to the inexperience of the personnel, and owing to the weakness of the regular army. "in order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the united states, and to protect our lines of operation so as to enable us to fight successfully against all the forces which that country, in the course of time, can oppose to us, considerable forces would be required. such an operation would be greatly hampered by the fact that it would require a second passage of the transport fleet in order to ship the necessary troops that long distance. however, it seems questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy a great stretch of country for a considerable time. the americans will not feel inclined to conclude peace because one or two provinces are occupied by an army of invasion, but because of the enormous, material losses which the whole country will suffer if the atlantic harbour towns, in which the threads of the whole prosperity of the united states are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the other. "therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of large landing operations, through which we are able to take several of these important and wealthy towns within a brief space of time. by interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving the state commerce and the defence, by taking away all material for war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the united states. "for such enterprises a smaller military force will suffice. nevertheless, the american defence will find it difficult to undertake a successful enterprise against that kind of warfare. though an extremely well-developed railway system enables them to concentrate troops within a short time on the different points on the coast, the concentration of the troops and the time which is lost until it is recognised which of the many threatened points of landing will really be utilised will, as a rule, make it possible for the army of invasion to carry out its operation with success under the co-operation of the fleet at the point chosen. the corps landed can either take the offensive against gathering hostile forces or withdraw to the transports in order to land at another place." these declarations of german naval and military policy are of interest as illustrating the character of the propaganda by which the naval movement was encouraged. _the navy was to give world-wide length of reach to the supreme german army, and enable germany to dictate peace to each and every nation, however distantly situated._ an appeal was made to the lowest instincts of the german people. they were counselled to create a great naval force on the understanding that the money expended would by aggressive wars be repaid with interest and that, as a result of combined naval and military operations, they would extend the world power of the german empire, and incidentally promote germany's maritime interests in all the oceans of the world. those who were responsible for the inflammatory speeches and articles by which the interest of the german people in the naval movement was excited, forgot the influence which these ebullitions would have upon the policy of other powers and upon their defensive preparations. it was only after hostilities had broken out that the german people realised what small results all their sacrifices had produced. by the words, more than the acts, of those responsible for german naval policy, the other powers of the world had been forced to expand and reorganise their naval forces. germany had at great cost won for herself the position of second greatest naval power in the world, but in doing so she had unconsciously forced up the strength of the british fleet and dragged in her path the united states, france, italy, japan, russia, and to a limited extent, but only to a limited extent, her ally, austria-hungary. during the years of agitation the other powers of the world had not stood still, as it was assumed in germany they would do. first, the british people increased their naval expenditure and more ships were built and more officers and men were entered; and then the german navy act of 1912 was passed. it had been the practice of the naval powers to keep about one-half only of their ships in full sea-going commission. the armed peace, before germany began to give expression to her maritime ambitions, was a yoke which rested easily upon the navies of the world. as a british naval officer has remarked:- "up to the end of the last century our navy enjoyed a peace routine. we maintained squadrons all over the world, and the pick of our personnel was to be found anywhere but in home waters. the mediterranean claimed the pick of both our ships and men. here naval life was one long holiday. the routine was to lay in harbour for nine months out of the year. about july the whole fleet would congregate at malta for the summer's cruise. sometimes it would be east of malta, taking in the grecian archipelago and the holy land; at others it would be west, visiting the french and italian ports, paying a visit to the rock, and then home to malta for another long rest. "preparation for war was never thought of. why should it be? the french navy had no aggressive designs, and was much below our own, both in material strength and in personnel, while the russian navy was partly confined in the black sea, the other part being in the baltic. and so we, both officers and men, set out to have a good time. our ships were kept up to yacht-like perfection as regards their paintwork, while their bright work shone like gold, and the road to promotion lay not through professional efficiency, but the state of cleanliness and splendour of one's ship. all kinds of drills and evolutions were devised, not because of their war value, but because they had a competitive value, and so ship could be pitted against ship and an element of sport introduced. "there was nothing really wrong in all this. the british navy was there to maintain for us our title of 'mistress of the seas,' and as no other nation apparently wished to challenge our title, there was nothing to do but pass away the time as pleasantly as possible; when the navy was called on to perform any task it carried it through with vigour, valour, and efficiency, and immediately settled down again."[4] this regime came to an end soon after grand admiral von tirpitz became german naval secretary towards the end of the nineteenth century. he set the navies of the world a new model. he determined to take advantage of the easy-going spirit which animated the pleasant relations then existing between the great fleets. there was to be nothing pleasant about the german fleet. it was to be a strenuous agent of germany's aggressive aims. in the organisation of german sea-power new principles found expression. in home waters and abroad the german navy was always ready instantly for war. the screw was applied gradually stage by stage. under the german navy act of 1912 this aggressive sea policy found its ultimate expression: it was proposed to keep always on a war footing nearly four-fifths of the ships in northern waters, while at the same time the squadrons abroad were to be greatly increased in strength. happily, owing to lord fisher's foresight and strategical ability, the british navy was enabled step by step to respond to each and every measure taken by germany. he created for us a grand fleet and when hostilities broke out that fleet took up its war stations and denied to the main forces of germany the use of any and every sea. german policy operated as a tonic, though not to the same extent, on the other great fleets of the world. in the summer of 1914 germany discovered that every anticipation upon which her foreign, naval and military policies had been based had been falsified by events. in particular, in adding to her strength at sea and on land, she had rendered herself weak by creating enemies east and west. her navy, which was to have engaged in a victorious campaign against the greatest naval power of the world in isolation--the rest of the world watching the inevitable downfall of the mistress of the seas with approval--found arrayed against it not the british fleet only, but the fleets of france and russia in europe and the navy of japan in the far east. in studying, therefore, the history of the naval development of germany, and contrasting the high hopes which inspired the naval movement with the events which occurred on the outbreak of war, and in subsequent months, one is led to wonder whether, after all, the romance of the german navy will not be regarded in the future, by the german people at least, rather as a great and costly tragedy. footnotes: [footnote 1: "german sea-power, its rise, progress and economic basis," by archibald hurd and henry castle (1913, london, john murray, 10s. 6d.).] [footnote 2: "modern germany" (smith elder, 1912).] [footnote 3: germans always assumed that they could attack the united states without intervention on our part, just as they assumed that they could engage in war with us without becoming involved with the united states. they believed that germany would fight both countries in turn--and victoriously.] [footnote 4: "the british navy from within" by "ex-royal navy" (hodder & stoughton).] the german fleet chapter i past ascendency like the foundations of the empire in 1870, the formation of the modern german fleet is the result of a movement that had its origin among the people and not among the princes of the country. and this naval movement sprang up and reached its greatest vigour in those sea-board districts that still sedulously keep alive the splendid tradition of the hanseatic league, which, as the strongest maritime power of its day, for centuries almost monopolized the trade of northern and western europe, and with the word "sterling," a corruption of "easterling," the name popularly given to its members, has left on great britain the indelible stamp of its former mercantile domination. for the coin of the hanse towns, by reason of its unimpeachable quality, was once universally sought after in england, and thus became the standard of monetary excellence. the memories of the hansa are the "historical foundation" on which have been based germany's claims to a leading place among the maritime nations, and they have played a prominent part in every agitation for the increase of her fleet. why, it was asked, should she not again assume upon the seas that dominating position which she once undoubtedly held? why, with her expanding population, trade, and wealth, should she not reclaim that maritime ascendency which she forfeited to holland in the seventeenth century, and which a hundred years later passed to great britain? why should she not realize that dream which was in the mind of friedrich list when he wrote: "how easy it would have been for the hanse towns, in the epoch of their rule over the sea, to attain national unity through the instrumentality of the imperial power, to unite the whole littoral from dunkirk to riga under one nationality, and thus to win and maintain for the german nation supremacy in industry, trade, and sea-power!" it is, moreover, not without significance that the hansa itself was, in a sense, democratic, and that, at a time when germany, as a national unit, was rendered impotent in the world by her superabundance of princes, her citizens were able, on their own initiative, and by their own energies, to assert their power and capacity as a maritime people. the story of the hansa is full of strange anomalies and antitheses. historians differ by centuries as to the date at which the existence of the league commenced, and just as it never had a definite beginning, so it has never had a formal end, for to this day two of the hanse towns--hamburg and bremen--have certain institutions in common, such as their supreme law courts and their diplomatic representation in prussia. for hundreds of years the confederation acted, and was treated by foreign governments, as an independent state and a great power, but its composition was never certain and always fluctuating. from first to last the names of no fewer than ninety cities and towns were entered upon its rolls, but it is impossible to say of each of them how often and when it joined or left the league. foreign rulers, and especially the english monarchs, made repeated attempts to obtain from the hansa an official list of its members, but compliance with their demands was systematically evaded on one pretext or another. the league's policy was, as far as possible, to assert the claims of its members, and to disown responsibility for those made against them. this policy is pretty clearly expressed in the following answer returned by the league in 1473 to complaints put forward on behalf of english merchantmen who had suffered through the depredations of the dantzic privateer or pirate, paul beneke: "the towns of the hansa are a corpus in the possession of the privileges they hold in any realms, lands, or lordships, and when their privileges are infringed, they are accustomed to meet and consult, and then to issue for all of them ordinances against all goods from the countries in which their privileges have been infringed, that they shall not be suffered in the commonalty of towns. but they were not making war against england; only some of the towns of the hansa, which had been injured by england, had determined upon it at their own venture, win or lose, which did not take place in the name of the hanse commonalty." the theory of the federation was, in fact, that it existed for the purpose only of taking, and not of giving, and it refused to imply a corporate responsibility by publishing its membership rolls. it is impossible, in the space available, to tell in any detail the fascinating story of the rise of the hansa to the position of a great power, with its guild halls and factories in foreign lands, of which the oldest and most important was the steelyard, in london. the history of this institution is believed to go back to the latter days of the roman occupation. when the hanseatic league was at the height of its power--from the last quarter of the fourteenth to the first half of the sixteenth centuries, the steelyard, in london, closely resembled a state within a larger state. it occupied a site now covered by cannon street station, extending from thames street to the river, and bounded to the east and west respectively by all hallows and cousins lane. the steelyard had something of the appearance of a fortress and was stoutly defended against attack. the community within its precincts was governed with monastic severity. their affairs were administered by an alderman with the assistance of two adjuncts and nine counsellers who took part in all the state and civic pageants of london as a corporation. this great german commercial institution on british soil, and the other houses established in other countries, reflected the great power which was wielded by the hanseatic league in commerce. these german traders, however, realised that their increasing trade on the seas required adequate defence. mainly at the instigation of the merchants of lübeck, a considerable navy was created, this german city being dependent for its prosperity mainly upon the herring fishing and curing industries of europe. in process of time the germans succeeded in driving away english, french and spanish rivals, and created a great monopoly of the herring fisheries of northern europe, from which they drew immense wealth and on which depended a number of other industries. it was mainly for the protection of the sound herrings that the hansa undertook against the scandinavian states the numerous campaigns by which it won the keys of the baltic. the war which culminated with the peace of spralsunde in 1370 raised the league to the rank of a first-class sea power. encouraged by its success in crushing and humiliating denmark, the hansa had little hesitation in measuring itself against england. the towns became associated through the victualling brothers with an active form of corsair warfare on english shipping. by its triumph over the danes, the hansa secured a practical monopoly of the shipping and trade of the baltic and north sea, which it held almost unimpaired for nearly two hundred years. in the words of gustav wasa, "the three good (scandinavian) crowns remained small wares of the hansa up to the sixteenth century," and as long as this was so the commercial and maritime supremacy of the league was practically unchallengeable. the manner in which the easterlings availed themselves of the ascendency they had now acquired is a classic example of the ruthless and unscrupulous exploitation of political power for the purposes of purely material gain, for they were actuated by no national or ideal aims, but solely by the desire to enrich themselves. favoured by the confusion and chaos prevailing in the lands of their potential rivals, they became the exclusive brokers through whose mediation the spices of the orient, the wines of france, the cloth of flanders, the tin, wool, hides, and tallow of england, were exchanged for the dried cod of norway, the ores of sweden, the wheat of prussia, the honey and wax of poland, the furs of russia, and the myriads of herrings which every summer were caught in the sound, and salted and packed on the coast of scania. what they aimed at, and what for long years they substantially obtained, was the disappearance of all flags but their own from the north sea and the baltic. moreover, a great part of the carrying trade between england and france also fell to their lot. the conditions were such as rendered warlike operations between england and the teutonic order inevitable. it is impossible to trace in any detail the guerilla tactics which were adopted on both sides. it is only necessary for our present purpose to convey some idea of the sea power which the hansa exercised in order that we may better understand the ambitions of germany to which the emperor william the second and grand admiral von tirpitz gave expression in the early years of the twentieth century. at the outset of its career, its warships were manned by the burghers themselves, but as the fleet increased in size--it was quadrupled during the first half of the fifteenth century--recourse to mercenaries became more and more general. the commanders of the ships were invariably citizens of the towns which had equipped them, and were frequently members of the governing council, while the admiral of a fleet was always a councillor, and usually a burgomaster. the officers of the land forces, which were raised as occasion demanded, were principally drawn from the impoverished nobility, whose members welcomed any opportunity of repairing their shattered fortunes by martial adventure. of the naval resources of the league, some idea can be formed from the fact that, in the war against the scandinavian kingdoms in 1426, it sent out a fleet of 260 ships, manned by 12,000 sailors and fighting men. for the exhausting, if not inglorious, seven years' war against gustav wasa's successor, lübeck alone fitted out 18 men-of-war, of which one, the _adler_, carried 400 sailors, 500 fighting men, and 150 "constables." her armament consisted of 8 carthouns, 6 demi-carthouns, 26 culverins, and many smaller pieces of ordnance. among her munitions were 6,000 cannon-balls and 300 hundredweight of powder. chapter ii the first german fleet in one of the window niches on the ground floor of the military museum (zeughaus) at berlin lies an old and dilapidated 8-pounder gun. in its deep and disfiguring coat of rust it is an inconspicuous object, and, amid that rich and varied collection of artillery from all the ages, the eye of the casual visitor will not rest upon it for more than a disparaging moment. and yet few of the treasures of the museum have a more interesting history to tell, for it is the sole remaining relic of the first serious experiment in naval and colonial policy ever made by a german ruler. on an elevation rising from the beach of cape three points, on the gold coast, now british territory, are still to be seen the crumbling ruins of the fort of gross-friedrichsburg, built there by the elector of brandenburg in 1681, and when the german corvette _sophie_ visited the spot, with pious purpose, in 1884, this corroded gun was unearthed from beneath the weeds and brushwood that have overgrown the decayed ramparts. frederick william, the great elector, has been exemplary for many of his successors. frederick the great rightly considered him the most able of the previous princes of the house of hohenzollern, while the present german emperor has made a special cult of his memory, and assuredly had a symbolic intention when he appeared at a fancy-dress ball disguised as the first of his ancestors who equipped a fleet and founded a colony. when frederick william was called to the brandenburg throne in 1641 at the age of twenty, germany was still in the throes of the thirty years' war, and no part of the empire had suffered more than his electorate from the consequences of that unspeakable calamity. of all the causes which have contributed to impede the normal development of the painstaking and industrious german race, none had so malign an influence as that stupendous conflict. it not merely delayed civilization, but over vast tracts of country positively exterminated it. at the close of the war many once flourishing towns had absolutely disappeared from the face of the earth, and where formerly a numerous peasantry had tilled its fertile fields a howling wilderness extended in all directions as far as the eye could reach. in north germany to-day an apparently purposeless pond, or a detached clump of venerable trees, still shows where once a village stood, and bears mute witness to the ruthless barbarity with which the religious partition of central europe was brought about. when an end was put to the bloodshed and rapine by the peace of westphalia (1648), the population of germany had been reduced to one half--in some districts to one tenth--of its former dimensions. many portions of the empire are even to-day not so thickly inhabited as they were before the war. industry and commerce had migrated to england, france, and holland; and leipzig and frankfort were the only german towns that had retained any trade worthy of mention. the hansa, with its fleets of warships and merchantmen, was but a memory of the past. königsberg had no longer a ship of its own; the trade of dantzig and stettin was almost entirely carried in foreign bottoms; and even hamburg, which directly had been but comparatively little touched by the thirty years of chaos and turmoil, and had benefited from its exceptional connection with england, was left commercially crippled. at a hanse parliament held in 1630, only hamburg, lübeck, and bremen were represented. germany had been so drained of money that barter had generally taken the place of purchase by coin; wages were paid in the products of labour, grain, ore, and manufactured goods, and even state officials in some cases received their salaries in kind. even before the war broke out, brandenburg, a country of barren soil and few natural resources, had stood far below the rest of germany both materially and intellectually. in 1600 the twin towns, berlin and cöln, which faced one another from opposite banks of the spree, and have since been merged to form the colossal capital of the new empire, contained together no more than 14,000 souls. brandenburg and frankfort-on-oder each had a population of 10,000. only two other towns, stendal and salzwedel, could boast more than 5,000 inhabitants. and it was of the mere ruins of this country that frederick william formed the foundation-stone of the prussian kingdom and of the german empire of to-day. if the thirty years' war had produced any form of national consolidation, if it had increased the authority of the empire or resulted in the absorption of the smaller states by the larger, that would at least have been some compensation to germany for its long and terrible ordeal. but exactly the opposite was the case. the war ceased simply because no one had the will or the strength to continue it, and a miserable compromise was the result. the only gainers were the princes, who, as the wielders of the armed forces, had been able to enhance their power, and now acquired a larger measure of independence in their relationships to the emperor. their number remained legion. in the germany mapped out by the westphalian negotiators there were eight electors, sixty-nine spiritual and ninety-six temporal princes, sixty-one imperial towns, and a multitude of counts and barons exercising various degrees of sovereign power. frederick william's claim to the title "great," which was bestowed upon him by his own generation, has been contested, but may be allowed to pass. as military leader, diplomatist, organizer, and administrator, he certainly had unusual gifts. above all, he excelled in duplicity and treachery. the most eminent living german historian has said of him that "both in internal and external politics he acted with an unscrupulousness so manifest that it cannot be palliated," and can find no better excuse for his many deeds of "faithlessness" and "double-dealing" than that, in this respect, he was merely "the master of the diplomatic art of his day." the elector was actuated solely by his own personal and dynastic interests, and was utterly devoid of "german" patriotism, for in return for the liberal subsidies on which he prospered, he undertook, in a secret treaty, to support the candidature of the french king or dauphin for the imperial german throne, and he was mainly responsible for the truce which left strasburg in french hands for nearly two centuries. during the incessant wars which filled up most of his reign he fought both with and against every other belligerent. his sword was always at the disposal of the highest bidder, either of hard cash or of territorial extension, and by adroit choice of the moment for changing sides he generally made a profitable bargain. true, he was obliged to restore the western portion of pomerania which he had conquered from the swedes, but he obtained a much more important acquisition--the recognition of his full sovereignty in what is now east prussia. that region had been wrested from the slavs by the german orders of chivalry, founded at the time of the crusades, and had subsequently become an evangelical duchy, ruled by a junior branch of the house of hohenzollern, as a fief of the kingdom of poland. on the extinction of the ducal line, it had reverted to the rulers of brandenburg, and by a timely sale of his military assistance, first to the swedes and then to the poles, the great elector induced both to admit his unrestricted and unqualified rights of sovereignty in the duchy. his successor persuaded the emperor to agree to his assumption of the kingly title for this territory, and it is an interesting fact--especially in view of the last development of the german empire, which in its present constitutional form and in much else is dependent upon catholic support--that this elevation was largely brought about by the intervention of two jesuit fathers. it was from the kingdom of prussia which was thus established, and which was a completely independent state altogether outside the competencies of the holy roman empire, that arose the hohenzollern ascendency in germany, and round it that the new german empire crystallized. for this reason the episode is quite germane to our present purpose. the germans excel as diligent pupils and patient imitators, and the great elector was no exception to this rule. from his fourteenth to his eighteenth year he had been educated under the care of frederick henry, the statthalter of holland, then the chief sea-power of the world, from whom he had imbibed many ideas as to the importance of navies, colonies, and sea-borne trade. his connection with the netherlands was maintained and strengthened by his marriage with an orange princess, the aunt of william iii. of england, and many dutchmen entered his service. among them was an ex-admiral, gijsels by name, who assiduously kept alive the dreams of sea-power which the elector had brought back with him from holland. it was on his prompting that, in 1659, when frederick william was embroiled with the swedes, and found his operations hampered by the lack of a fleet, an enquiry as to the possibility of remedying this deficiency was ordered by the elector. the investigation resulted, for the time being, only in the compilation of a memorandum as to a "brandenburg-imperial admiralty," and some fruitless attempts to obtain ships in the netherlands. but gijsels' projects went far beyond a mere fleet. all the world was then discussing the colonizing activity of the western european states, and frederick william's predecessor on the electoral throne had conceived abortive plans for founding an east indian trading company. what the ex-admiral proposed to the elector in 1660 was, that brandenburg, austria, and spain should combine for the purpose of securing a colonial ascendency, which was to be arrived at by playing off england, france, and holland against one another. negotiations to this end seem actually to have been commenced, but they broke down over the jealous suspicions of the diplomatists approached, and the perpetual turning of the european kaleidoscope. during the next fifteen years the idea of a brandenburg navy appears to have been allowed to sleep. in the meantime a very remarkable book had been published, which should be mentioned here because it contains the essential elements of the programme of the most modern naval agitation in germany. the author was johann becher, by profession a chemist, but in his leisure a political seer of the type of friedrich list, whose great forerunner he was. his work, "political discourse on the causes of the rise and decline of towns and countries," was published in 1667. becher had travelled much, and he wrote: "in germany there is hardly any longer trade or commerce; all business is going to ruin; no money is to be found with either great or small; on the other hand look at holland, how rich she is and how she grows richer every day; that could not be if she feared the sea as much as our nation of high germany." becher then addressed to his countrymen the following impassioned exhortation: "up, then, brave german; act so that on the map, besides new spain, new france, new england, there shall in the future be found also new germany. you are as little lacking as other nations in the intelligence and resolution to do such things; yea, you have all that is necessary; you are soldiers and peasants, alert, laborious, diligent, and indefatigable." becher had held positions at various german courts, and it is not improbable that his appeal fell upon sympathetic ears among the entourage of the great elector. but however that may be, the war of denmark and brandenburg against sweden, which broke out in 1675, did actually, for the first time in history, witness a fleet at the disposal of a member of the dynasty that now occupies the imperial throne in germany. true, it was not yet the actual property of the elector, but of benjamin raule, an enterprising dutch merchant, who had migrated to denmark, and now laid a naval project before the brandenburg sovereign. his proposals were readily acceded to, and he received permission to fit out a flotilla of two frigates and ten smaller vessels, and to operate with them under the brandenburg flag against the swedes. the elector merely stipulated that he should receive 6 per cent. of the value of all prizes captured. raule's vessels rendered substantial service in the capture of stettin, and of that much-coveted strip of the pomeranian coast which was so essential to the realisation of frederick william's maritime aspirations. the elector's hopes were disappointed by the treaty of st. germain, under which he was compelled to restore this precious booty to the intrusive scandinavians, but in the meantime his naval plans had taken a wider scope in fresh contracts with the resourceful dutchman. in the first of these, raule undertook, for a monthly subsidy of 5,000 thalers,[5] to maintain a fleet of eight frigates and a fire-ship, mounting altogether 182 guns. shortly afterwards the terms of the agreement were extended, and at the commencement of the year 1680, twenty-eight ships of war, with a total of 502 guns, were flying the red eagle of brandenburg. though robbed by the peace of the coast-line and seaports on which he had counted as the base of his maritime power and the recruiting ground for his fleet, the elector did not allow himself to be discouraged, and he very soon found fresh work for his little flotilla to do. the greatest master of german mercenaries at that date, he had, a few years previously, hired a portion of his army to spain for use against the french. as repeated applications for the price of this support had proved unavailing, he now determined to collect the debt, which amounted to 1,800,000 thalers, by forcible distraint. accordingly six ships, which were followed at an interval of some months by three others, were sent out to attempt to intercept the silver fleet on its way to the spanish netherlands. the vessels were almost without exception commanded by dutchmen, but were mainly manned by germans, though the crews included many english, dutch, danish and norwegian sailors. naturally the soldiers carried on board were drawn from the brandenburg army; and orders were given that they should be trained in ship's work "because we are disposed to use the same permanently for the navy." though the flotilla did not fulfil either its immediate or its ultimate purpose, the expedition was notable for two reasons. in the first place, a large spanish warship, the _carolus secundus_, with a valuable cargo of lace on board, was captured, and so became the first war vessel that was actually the property of a hohenzollern state. in the second place, the quest of the spanish silver resulted in a sea-fight, which, in respect both of the force engaged and the losses sustained, still heads the record of naval warfare under a hohenzollern flag. a detachment of four ships, cruising in the neighbourhood of cape st. vincent, sighted a fleet of a dozen spanish frigates, which had put out for the special purpose of chasing the germans from the sea. the brandenburg commander, thinking that this was the anxiously-expected silver flotilla, bore down upon it, and did not realise his mistake till it was too late to avoid something of a conflict. before he could succeed in manoeuvring his ships out of range of his overwhelmingly superior enemy, he had lost ten men killed and thirty wounded; and since that day germany had fought no more terrible battle on the sea until the war broke out in 1914. another section of the elector's fleet cruised for several months in west indian waters without achieving much result, while the retaliatory measures adopted by the spaniards secured a safe passage for the silver ships and rendered it prudent for frederick william to abandon his daring and risky enterprise. meanwhile the elector had allotted his infant navy a task of a different character. soon after entering the service of brandenburg, raule had drawn up plans of colonization, and in the same year in which the fruitless search for the silver convoy began, he obtained permission to try his luck on the gold coast, and got together a syndicate to finance the undertaking. the elector was wary, and declined to risk pecuniary participation, but he ordered that "twenty good healthy musketeers, together with two non-commissioned officers," should be placed under raule's command. one of the principal objects of the expedition was to secure a share in the profitable trade in slaves which was then carried on between the west coast of africa and north america, but modern german historians for the most part ignore this feature of the enterprise. the two vessels despatched on this errand reached the gold coast in safety, but aroused the resentment of the dutch already settled there, who confiscated one of them, and compelled the other to quit african waters. however, the leader of the expedition had by that time managed to conclude what served the purposes of a treaty with certain native chiefs, who thereby placed themselves under the suzerainty of the elector, and consented to the erection of a fort in the district under their control. on the strength of this questionable document, an "african company" for the "improvement of shipping and commerce wherein the best prosperity of a country consists," was called into existence in the year 1682. in the charter of incorporation, the elector promised to protect the company against "all and everyone who may undertake to trouble, incommode, or to any extent injure the same in its actions in free places on the coasts of guinea and angola"; but both the naval and the military commanders were charged to keep at a respectful distance from "all dutch company fortresses, as well as those of other potentates, such as england, france, denmark, etc." the capital of the company was the modest sum of 50,000 thalers. of this frederick william contributed only 8,000, and the electoral prince 2,000 thalers, while almost half of the total was supplied by raule, who had by now become "director-general of the brandenburg navy." the two frigates in which the second gold coast expedition shipped cast anchor off cape three points on december 27th, 1682, but some difficulty was experienced in finding the chiefs who had "signed" the provisional treaty and who were each to have received a ratification engrossed in letters of gold, "a silver-gilt cup, and a portrait of his electoral highness." frederick william had also issued instructions that his black allies and their wives were to be entertained on board the warships. after a great deal of trouble, some other chieftains of the "moors," as they are called in the official correspondence relating to this matter, were hunted out and induced to contract a second and definite treaty; and on january 1st, 1683, with due ceremony and much beating of drums, blowing of trumpets, and firing of guns, the brandenburg flag was hoisted over "the first german colony." the flagstaff had been planted on a little eminence, which was subsequently, with all speed, transformed into the fort gross-friedrichsburg, and no doubt the rusty cannon now in the zeughaus at berlin is one of the half-dozen which had been mounted on the hill on the previous day in preparation for the great occasion. in the following year the headquarters of the african company was removed from pillau to emden. this latter town was not situated on brandenburg soil, and the manner in which the elector secured a footing in it is both instructive and characteristic of his easy methods of intervening and making a good bargain wherever an opportunity presented itself. it chanced that at that time the estates of east frisia were at loggerheads with their ruler, and they appealed to frederick william for assistance. nothing loth, he landed a force by night, and by a surprise attack seized the castle of greetsiel, which thus became his naval base. by an agreement with the town of emden he subsequently acquired the right to station within its walls a "compagnie de marine" for the service of the african corporation. this force, which was gradually increased to three, and temporarily to four, companies, and ultimately received the name of the "marine battalion," was drawn upon to man both the ships and the forts in africa. the transfer to emden brought other advantages besides an ice-free port, a base on the north sea, and an abbreviation of the route to gross-friedrichsburg, for the east frisian estates and the elector of cologne were both persuaded to invest largely in the african company in consequence of the change. in the year of the emden agreement, the brandenburg navy was formally founded by the establishment of an "admiralty" at berlin. the cabinet order by which this institution was created shows that the fleet then in full possession of the state comprised 10 ships, with 240 guns, while raule was still under contract to provide 17 further vessels. the permanent personnel consisted of 1 vice-commodore, 5 naval captains, 3 officers of marines, 12 mates, and 120 seamen. in 1686, the elector took the company entirely into his own hands, and simultaneously acquired a station on the island of st. thomas, in the west indies, as a place of call for the ships engaged in the slave traffic. he had also at that time made preparations for forming an east indian trading company (at a much earlier date he had unsuccessfully attempted to acquire tranquebar, on the coromandel coast, from the danes) and for fitting out an expedition to china and japan. these schemes, however, came to nothing. the settlement at cape three points had by no means an easy existence. fever made fearful ravages among the garrison, which, when the first reliefs arrived, after an interval of nearly a year and threequarters, had been reduced by sickness from ninety to sixteen men. everything that was needed for the construction of the fort, even building-stone, had to be brought thousands of miles across the sea from germany. the dutch traders in the neighbourhood had at once raised objections to the new colony, and, as their protests were unheeded, stirred up the natives against its members. it was only after prolonged negotiations at the hague that the elector secured a full recognition of his right to the settlement. and none the less the dutch west india company continued to harass the german colonists, appropriating their ships, and turning them out of a couple of subsidiary fortifications which they had erected at other points along the coast. gross-friedrichsburg and taccroma, another of the four brandenburg stations on the guinea littoral, for several years maintained themselves only by the menace of their guns. these untoward events are believed to have preyed upon the mind of the great elector, and to have hastened his end. at the time of his death, in april, 1688, brandenburg and holland were on the brink of war over the gold coast affair. his successor on the electoral throne in one very important respect reaped what frederick william had sown, for he obtained the title of king of prussia, by virtue of which, far more than from any specifically imperial prerogatives, william ii. holds his present power in germany. frederick i. was a vain man, who was more interested in appearances than in realities, and cared more for the pomp and ceremonies of court life than for the solid business of colonisation and slave-trading. as a source of revenue, with which to defray the cost of his empty extravagances, the african undertaking was feebly encouraged to continue its work; but, deprived of the directing brain and the stimulating enthusiasm of its founder, it soon sickened and languished. accada and taccarary, the two settlements which had been seized by the dutch, were delivered up after a lengthy squabble, but the fortifications of the latter had been destroyed, and they were not rebuilt. at first the trade of the colony, which had called into existence a flourishing shipyard at havelberg, near the junction of the navel and the elbe, was fairly satisfactory, and the spirit of the brandenburg navy was raised by the successful operations of a couple of its frigates against french merchantmen, but in 1697 the company fell upon evil days. it suffered pecuniary loss, both through the capture of some of its ships by the french and through the peculations of several officials, whose multiple dishonesty hints at a scandalous laxity of control. the invaluable raule, too, fell into disfavour, and spent four years in gaol, though he was reinstated in his position on being liberated. at last the company was no longer able to send out ships of its own, and for eight years, during the war of the spanish succession, the garrison of gross-friedrichsburg was left entirely to itself. for a considerable portion of that time five large brandenburg ships of war were rotting in the harbours of emden and hamburg, when they might have been much more profitably employed in attempting to keep up communications with the perishing colonists. when at last reliefs reached gross-friedrichsburg only seven men out of an original force of 1,700 were fit for duty. what little credit attaches to the last days of the first german colony is the due of jan cuny, a native chief, who had placed himself under brandenburg protection, apparently for the purpose of obtaining support against the english and dutch settlements of the vicinity, with both of which he was at feud. it is characteristic of the period that, while prussians were fighting shoulder to shoulder with english and dutch on the continent of europe, they were in open conflict with them on the west coast of africa. frederick i. at one time thought it necessary to protest, through his minister at london, against the difficulties which the english were causing him on the gold coast. all the trouble seems to have arisen out of the demand made by a dutch official at axim for the surrender of a female relative of cuny whom he claimed as a slave. jan was evidently a man of considerable parts. he led his army with great discretion and resourcefulness, and no doubt the prussians at gross-friedrichsburg thought it to their advantage to be on good terms with so formidable a warrior, especially as he was the sworn foe of their jealous european neighbours. at any rate, the relations between cuny and the fort became both cordial and confiding, and when the last governor of gross-friedrichsburg, du bois, discouraged by the indifference and neglect of the home authorities, sailed for emden to enter remonstrances, he entrusted the protection of the colony to his black ally. du bois arrived in europe only to find that the doom of gross-friedrichsburg was already irrevocably sealed. the parsimonious frederick william i., the father of frederick the great, had ascended the prussian throne, and his careful mind, completely absorbed by plans of immediate economy, was incapable of taking such flights into the distance and the future as were necessary for the appreciation of the value of colonial policy. the african settlements had been doing badly and had become unremunerative, and his only thought was to dispose of them as speedily as possible for hard cash, which could be either hoarded or spent on his solitary extravagance--seven-foot grenadiers. immediately after his accession, he instructed his representative in london that he was prepared to "transfer his forts on the coast of guinea to anyone else upon easy conditions." he was not long in finding a purchaser in that very dutch west india company which had from the outset been a thorn in the side of the great elector's colonial enterprise. on november 22nd, 1717, gross-friedrichsburg and its dependent territory passed from hohenzollern rule for the sum of 6,000 ducats and twelve negro boys, of whom it was stipulated that six should be adorned with golden chains. the signing of the contract and its execution were, however, two very different things. the redoubtable jan cuny had not been reckoned with, and when two dutch vessels arrived to take over the fort they found him in possession and flying the prussian flag. the order for the transfer of the fort was shown to his emissaries, who, after a good deal of delay, were sent on board the ships, but this he flatly refused to recognise, declaring that he would yield up his trust only to a vessel belonging to the king of prussia. the commander of the dutch expedition, captain van der hoeven, thought he would make short work of this insolent chieftain, and landed a body of fifty men to take the fort by storm. but cuny once again showed the generalship which had raised him to the eminence of a prussian deputy-governor. a force of 1,800 natives fusilladed the landing party from an ambuscade and killed nearly every one of them. hoeven was only able to save himself by swimming back to his ship, with three bullets in his body, and retired to the nearest dutch settlement to excogitate a fresh plan of campaign. cuny, however, was flushed by his success, and not at all inclined to give up the prestige which he derived from a fortress bristling with guns and well furnished with small arms and ammunition. for seven long years he held out, repulsing the repeated attacks of the dutch, and it was only when his supplies were exhausted and an overwhelming force had been put into the field against him, that he withdrew from his defences and vanished into the jungle from which he had come. simultaneously with gross-friedrichsburg, there was transferred from the prussian king to the dutch company yet another african colony, of which mention has yet to be made. this was the island of arguin, which lies off the coast of what is now french territory to the south of cape blanco, and in some maps is given the ominous name of agadir. the islet, which was one of the principal centres of the gum trade, had been first occupied by the portuguese in 1441, but had passed by conquest to holland, and from the latter to france. after the peace of nymegen, in 1678, however, the french senegal company found itself unable to maintain a garrison in arguin, and obtained permission from louis xiv. to blow up the fort which had been erected there. the island then fell into the hands of the native ruler of arguin, on the mainland, and remained subject to him till two ships of the great elector appeared off its coasts in october, 1685. on the strength of a treaty concluded by the commander of the expedition with the king of arguin, frederick william seems to have claimed jurisdiction right along the coast of africa from the canary isles to the senegal river. these pretensions were not allowed to pass undisputed, and, towards the end of 1687, a couple of french vessels appeared off the fort and demanded its evacuation by the germans. as this was refused they made an attempt to seize it by force, but, meeting with a stubborn resistance, abandoned the attack, and, after an unsuccessful endeavour to assert their rights during the peace negotiations at ryswick, the french seemed to reconcile themselves to the new situation, for they even proposed commercial co-operation with the occupants of the arguin fort. after the death of the great elector, arguin suffered, like gross-friedrichsburg, through the indifference of his successor, and the difficulty of communication arising from the war of the spanish succession. when a relief ship arrived in 1714, it found that the governor had been captured by the natives, with whom he had quarrelled; and the remnant of the arguin garrison was in so deplorable a condition, that "in a few days they must have perished of hunger." the transfer of arguin to the dutch proved as difficult as that of gross-friedrichsburg. in 1717 the french had renewed their claims to the island, and, a few years later, the senegal company, landing 700 men and heavy guns, laid siege to the fort. after holding out for a few weeks, the commander, jan wynen, a dutchman, withdrew secretly by night with his force in order to escape the humiliation of a formal surrender, and when its new owners at last arrived to take possession of it the colony was actually in french hands. it was in both cases a foreigner who last kept the flag flying over what were to be the only german colonies established till the final quarter of the nineteenth century. with the colonies disappeared the force with which they had been won, the fleet, and it too had to wait long, though not quite so long, before it experienced a revival. it is interesting to reflect how the history of the world might have been changed if the great elector's two immediate successors had united to his far-reaching schemes of "world-policy" his determination in carrying them out, and had bequeathed to the greater frederick prosperous colonial possessions and a formidable navy. as it was, the naval episodes of the reign of this gifted monarch only show how pitifully and completely the dawning sea-power of his grandfather had passed away. in the seven years' war, the shores of prussia were continually ravaged by swedish frigates, and as nothing could be effected by the armed fishing boats and coasting vessels which were all that could be pitted against them, field-marshal lehwald, to whom the protection of that part of prussia had been entrusted, appealed for help to the corporation of merchants at stettin. that body responded with energy and promptitude, and, with great haste, a flotilla of four galliots, four large fishing boats, and four coasting vessels were transformed into "ships of war." in august, 1759, this improvised fleet ventured out of the oder to attack the swedes, but it was so completely overthrown after several days' fighting that the experiment was never repeated. in the meanwhile frederick had been inveigled into another maritime adventure, which was to prove just as barren of positive results. early in the war several englishmen communicated to the king their readiness to fit out privateers to prey on the commerce of austria and sweden, both of which countries had seized prussian merchantmen. they protested in all cases that their principal motive was a desire to serve the cause of a monarch whom they admired and revered, and who was, as a matter of fact, at that time the ally of england. but at the same time they promised him "prodigious profits" from the enterprise, and it was admittedly the latter consideration which induced the king to listen to their proposals. though his own ministers expressed strong doubts, and the english government urged that he would run the risk of embroiling himself with neutral states, he issued a number of letters of marque. the advice which had been given him proved to have been only too well founded. not only were there no "prodigious profits," but the blunders of the royal officials and the indiscretions of the ships under his flag involved the king in voluminous diplomatic correspondence and long and fruitless litigation. to accelerate the process of destroying the enemy's trade, a number of blank letters of marque, ministerially signed and stamped with the royal seal, were sent out to the prussian minister in london, and he somewhat imprudently lent a couple of these to an interesting adventurer, named erskine douglas, who said that he wished to show them to shipowners with whom he was in treaty for the equipment of privateers. douglas claimed to be a relative of the prussian field-marshal keith, who was of scottish origin, and he brought letters of introduction from well-known members of the english nobility, so the minister may perhaps be excused for entrusting the documents to him. but his confidence was gravely abused, for douglas, having come to an agreement with the firm of dunbar and eyre, filled in the forms on his own responsibility, and two privateers were sent out with these fraudulent credentials. shortly afterwards, one of these ships, the _lissa_, put into emden with a rich swedish prize. lying in the harbour was an english man-of-war, and the captain of this ship, declaring that the english sailors on board the _lissa_ were all either deserters or men who had bound themselves to serve in the british navy, required that they should be given up to him. as compliance was refused, he went on board the _lissa_ with an armed escort, and, disregarding all the protests of its captain, took away with him twenty-six members of the crew. this action was regarded by frederick as an infraction of prussian rights of sovereignty, and representations to that effect were made in london before it was discovered in how irregular a manner the _lissa_ had become possessed of her papers. the matter was then discreetly allowed to drop. the swedes, for their part, contested the legality of the capture, but the prussian government ruled that the letter of marque was valid, although it had not actually been issued by royal authority. at the same time prussia advanced the strange view that, in the event of the owners of the _lissa_ having had cognizance of the deception which had been practised, king frederick was entitled to the whole value of the prize. instructions were, however, given that the _lissa_ should be deprived of her charter, but before they could be executed she had sailed for england. another of douglas's privateersmen, the _prince ferdinand_, under a captain merryfield, had betaken herself to the mediterranean, where, in a nine-months' cruise, she captured thirteen prizes, but caused so much confusion that the king thought it wiser to put a stop to the whole undertaking. the immediate ground for this step was the complaints of the ottoman government, with which frederick was negotiating with a view to obtaining its support in the prosecution of the war. the appropriation of a couple of female negro slaves belonging to a pasha, who were on board one of the ships captured by merryfield, seems to have had at least as much weight in the turkish grievance as the more substantial losses of the merchants of salonika. as prussia had no territory and very little diplomatic representation on the shores of the mediterranean, merryfield was obliged to take his prizes into neutral harbours and place them in the custody of the english consuls. they were the subjects of endless law suits, tedious international wrangling, and practically no profits. merryfield's wild career was terminated by a charge of secretly selling neutral goods from one of his prizes to his own advantage. at the instance of the prussian government he was flung into gaol at malta. he remained in prison five years, and even at the end of that term would not have regained his liberty if the grand master of the maltese knights had not refused to pay for his maintenance any longer. hardly less chequered were the fortunes of captain wake, the only regularly accredited prussian privateer of whom anything is known. the operations of his ship, the _embden_, in the mediterranean also resulted in ceaseless bickerings, and he was delayed in cagliari for two years by disputes of one sort or another. at last, growing weary, he set off to berlin to prosecute his claims to a swedish ship which he had seized, but of which the authorities at cagliari would not permit him to dispose. four and a half years after the capture, she was adjudged his good prize; but before he could enter into possession of her she was sunk at her moorings by a violent storm. the total gain of the prussian government from the activity of these three privateers was quite negligible; while, on the other hand, the trouble and annoyance caused by them was immeasurable. the anticipations that the seas would be swept of austrian and swedish commerce by a swarm of vessels under the prussian flag proved to have been quite illusory, and it was a particular disappointment to frederick that the german shipowners looked askance at the whole business, and in no single instance applied for letters of marque. a noteworthy feature of the episode is that frederick's government, reversing the practice of the hansa, laid down for its privateers the rule that a neutral flag covered the enemy's goods, and that neutral goods were safe from capture even when under the enemy's flag. this, it is maintained, has ever since been prussian tradition. a final word is due to the "société de commerce maritime"--now under the name "seehandlung," the state bank of the kingdom of prussia--which was established by frederick the great in 1772, "to carry on shipping under the prussian flag, and trade with the ports of spain and all other places where reasonable and certain prospects of substantial profits from imports and exports are to be found." it was vessels of this corporation which, towards the close of the first half of the nineteenth century, bore a german flag for the first time round the world, and its foundation shows that the great elector's ideas were only dormant and not dead. frederick's immediate purpose was to open up the markets of south america to silesian linen, but, in consequence of the rigid protectionist policy of spain, it was only possible to do this by transhipment at spanish ports. the original capital of the company was 1,200,000 thalers, in shares of 500 thalers each, and of these 2,100 were the property of the king. the société was granted the exclusive right of trading in english, french, and spanish salt, and in polish wax, and was also endowed with many other privileges. it did not at first prove a very profitable venture, and its early days were also clouded over by the defalcations of one of its managers. in course of time it became little more than a branch of the royal treasury and the negotiator of state loans, but in the thirties of last century it passed under the control of a man who determined to restore to it something of its original character, and laid out a considerable capital in english-built ships. at that period german merchantmen seldom ventured beyond bordeaux and lisbon; but the vessels of the seehandlung repeatedly encircled the globe, showed their flag in the remotest harbours of orient and occident, and established directly that export to south america of the wares of the riesengebirge which frederick the great had in his mind when he called the company into existence. footnotes: [footnote 5: thaler then = about 4s. 6d.] chapter iii germany's fleet in the last century though the sword of napoleon completed the destruction of the holy roman empire, which had done so much to hamper the development of the teutonic race, the vienna congress, rearranging the map of europe after his overthrow, left germany still divided into thirty-nine different states. there were four kingdoms, one electorate, seven grand duchies, ten duchies, ten principalities, one landgraviate, and the four free towns--hamburg, bremen, lübeck, and frankfort-on-main. these states were loosely united in the german confederacy. the people of germany, and especially those who had risen against napoleon, had expected a more complete unity on a democratic basis, and the disappointment of their hopes was one of the chief causes of the revolution which, in 1848, broke out simultaneously in nearly every one of the federal capitals. this movement took the governments by surprise, and so overwhelming was the popular demand for unity, that they offered but little opposition to the convening of a national assembly, which met at frankfort-on-main on may 18th, 1848, and appointed the austrian archduke johann provisional "administrator of the empire." it is generally asserted that the failure of this serious attempt to weld germany together was an inevitable consequence of the jealousy existing between austria and prussia, but none can say with certainty what the sequel might not have been, had not frederick william iv., the grand-uncle of the present german emperor, refused the imperial crown when it was offered to him by the national assembly. it is very well conceivable that, if that monarch had been less fully persuaded of the divine rights of kings and of the incompetence of popular representatives to bestow crowns, the work which bismarck did in the next twenty years, with so grievous an expenditure of blood and iron, might have been accomplished by peaceable means, and that the world might to-day have been confronted with the problem of a much larger, much richer, and much more united germany. those who would not regard german domination in europe as an unmixed blessing have reason to be thankful for frederick william's archaic theories on the relationships of princes to their peoples. and those who care to amuse themselves by following up the grand alternatives of history must not forget that 1848 saw the birth of the modern german fleet, which was the fruit of a purely popular movement. indeed, the patriots of the frankfort parliament found in the "imperial fleet," which they actually founded, the necessary symbol of that national unity which was the goal of their aspirations. strong, spontaneous, and almost universal as was the german naval movement of 1848, it did not attain its actual dimensions without an effective external stimulus. in the very month in which the revolutionaries were defending their barricades in the streets of berlin and other german capitals, frederick vii. had declared his intention of incorporating schleswig in denmark; and, while an informal convention was arranging the preliminaries for the national assembly, the danish fleet was blockading the coasts of prussia in retaliation for the military support afforded by that kingdom, as the mandatory of the german confederation, to the rebellious duchies. nothing was better calculated than an incident of this sort to bring home to the german mind the importance of sea-power. that the ships of a little country like denmark should be able, with impunity, to forbid the sea to a great military power, seemed to every german who reflected upon it a grotesque inversion of the natural order of events. though the national assembly, at one of its first sittings, appointed a permanent committee to grapple with the naval question, the impatient interest of the public displayed itself in schemes and suggestions which poured in from every side. in many places committees were formed to help to raise the funds necessary for the equipment of a fleet. it is significant of the widespread nature of the movement that the raftsmen of gernsbach, in the black forest, offered to transport down the river murg free of cost the timber required for the building of germany's war ships. the seaports, which felt most keenly the insulting pressure of the danish blockade, took the leading part in the agitation. a congress of delegates from the german coast towns came together at hamburg and nominated a "naval commission," on which, in addition to the governments most immediately concerned, a number of private committees were represented. this body wasted no time in talk, but set to work with feverish activity. as warships were not to be had ready-made, several merchant vessels were purchased and hastily armed with guns furnished by hanover; and at the beginning of july, the federal government was notified that these extemporized men-of-war were ready to put out and attack the enemy. but at the moment the negotiations with denmark for a truce had already begun, and for the time being the squadron remained peacefully at its moorings. meanwhile, even before an imperial executive had been got together, the frankfort parliament had voted for naval purposes a sum of 6,000,000 thalers,[6] half of which was to be spent immediately and the remainder as necessity might arise. part of the money was to be taken from the fortress fund of the old confederacy, and the remainder raised by levies in due proportion on the various states of the union. the question of these "matricular contributions," which in some cases were altogether refused, and in others only paid after much hesitation and vacillation, was one of the chief reasons for the ultimate dissolution of the first "german" navy. in november an imperial naval authority was constituted under the control of the minister of commerce, who was at the same time deputy for bremen. an advisory commission of experts was also appointed, and the chair in this body was, at the personal request of the archduke-administrator, taken by the man who, in one sense, may be regarded as the father of the present german fleet, prince adalbert of prussia, and to whom, for this reason, more detailed reference must be made hereafter. the commission submitted a scheme, in which it was recommended that germany should, for the present, make no attempt to gain a place in the ranks of the first-class naval powers, but content herself with the protection of her baltic and north sea coasts and her sea-borne trade. these purposes, it was held, could be fulfilled by a fleet of fifteen sixty-gun sailing frigates--if possible with auxiliary engines--five steam frigates, twenty steam corvettes, ten despatch-boats, five schooners, and thirty gun-sloops. during the winter, officials were despatched to england to purchase and order ships, and to america to induce the united states government to allow some of its naval officers to enter temporarily into the german service. these latter negotiations at first promised success, but in the end the government at washington declared itself unable to entertain the request. with the purchase of material the german emissaries had better luck, and when the truce with denmark expired in the spring of 1849, the navy list already contained the names of twelve vessels, though, it is true, hardly one of them was yet fit for action. a commander-in-chief had also been found in the person of karl bromme, a native of leipzig, whose name had been permanently anglicized into "brommy" while he was learning seafaring in the american merchant service. this man, "the first german admiral," had followed cochrane to greece, where he was successively flag captain to admiral miaulis, organizer in the ministry of marine, and commandant of the military school at the piræus. from there he was tempted away to become "imperial commissioner" to the incipient german navy, and after taking part in the sittings of the commission of experts, he was sent in that capacity to bremerhaven to supervise the formation of the fleet and to found a naval arsenal. on june 4th brommy, with a steam frigate and two steam corvettes, attacked a danish frigate which was lying becalmed off heligoland. hardly, however, had the engagement commenced before a signal shot from the island warned the belligerents that they were within british territorial waters, and must suspend hostilities. soon afterwards the danish blockading squadron approached the scene, and the german ships hurried back to their harbour. this was the only opportunity the german fleet had of showing its quality. brommy was promoted to rear-admiral later in the year. insignificant as the heligoland skirmish was in itself, it had a sequel which has played a great part in all subsequent movements for increasing the german fleet. brommy's ships had fought under the black-red-and-gold that were to be the colours of the new empire. but this empire had then no legal existence, and, as a matter of fact, never did have one, and no doubt palmerston was only giving expression to recognised principles of international law when he wrote that vessels committing acts of belligerency under the black-red-and-gold flag would render themselves liable to be treated as "pirates." the frankfort government, a product of excitement and inexperience, made many mistakes which the ripe tradition of an old-established administration would have avoided, and, in its haste to assert itself on the seas, doubtless did not give sufficient thought to the restrictions imposed upon it by its own anomalous status. the hoisting of the black-red-and-gold on a flotilla or warships was undeniably a questionable proceeding, and one which justified the view propounded by the british foreign minister. at the same time, his words belong to the category of things which had better have been left unsaid. the word "pirate" rankled then, and has ever since continued to rankle, and the palmerstonian note has been cited ten thousand times, and is still cited, as the supreme example of the tyrannous arrogance with which britain rules the waves. a fortnight after brommy's one exploit as a german naval commander, the remnant of the national assembly was dispersed by military force at stuttgart, where it had taken refuge, and germany relapsed into the condition of a loosely-jointed federation of mutually jealous and suspicious princes, whose rival claims had to be settled on the battlefield before the great work of unification could be accomplished. the infant navy, which had been the work of a popular movement and a popular parliament, proved a source of dissension and embarrassment to the confederacy governments. several of the inland states were altogether opposed to the idea that germany needed a navy. a strong party advocated that one fleet should be provided by austria for the adriatic, a second by prussia for the baltic, and a third by the remaining german states for the north sea. the last point of this project was the subject of special negotiations, and at one time there seemed some chance of hanover assuming the office of "federal admiral." in the end, however, divergent interests and irreconcilable rivalries produced the only possible result, and, in february, 1852, the confederated governments decided to cut the gordian knot. the promising german navy was dissolved, admiral brommy received his discharge (he was subsequently employed for some time as chief of the technical department of the austrian admiralty), and an oldenburg official, whose unforgettable name has helped to brand his memory with the whole infamy of a transaction for which he was in nowise responsible, was appointed "commissioner of the germanic confederation charged with the regulation of naval affairs." this, at least, is the designation appended to his signature on the advertisement which, in the german, english, and french languages, announced to all the world that the german navy was forthwith to be knocked down to the highest bidder. it was the form rather than the fact of the sale which was taken so ill in privy councillor hannibal fischer, but it is difficult to see what else he could have done. he made efforts to dispose of the ships by private treaty, and actually sold some of them to prussia and others to english firms, but a residue remained for which no purchaser could be found in this way, and there was nothing for it but to put them up to public auction. there thus came under the hammer two steam frigates, six steam corvettes, a sailing frigate, and twenty-seven gunboats propelled by oars. of the eight steamers three had been built at bristol, and one each at glasgow, leith, new york, hamburg, and bremen. except in the case of the american vessel, the engines were all of british make. concurrently with the abortive efforts to found a german navy, prussia had taken independent action, and laid the real foundation of the great fleet which now aspires to contest the british mastery of the seas. at that time there was not even the slenderest basis for the kingdom to work upon. the task had to be undertaken from the very beginning. during the first half of the nineteenth century, it is true, the advisability of building a navy had more than once been exhaustively discussed by the prussian government. in the general resettlement of 1815, the island of rügen and the strip of pomeranian coast opposite to it had passed from sweden to prussia, and included in the transfer were six gun-sloops and a swedish officer, captain christian lange, who was summoned to berlin to report to the war ministry on the utility of the little flotilla. as the result of his representations, he was commissioned to submit plans and estimates for a war schooner, and for an armed rowing boat for use on the rivers. these vessels were eventually built, with the express idea that they were to serve as experiments and models for the construction of a regular fleet. in great haste prescriptions as to a naval uniform were issued, and the questions of dockyards and harbour works were also deliberated. but the only issue of all this work was the conviction that the national resources were not yet equal to the financial strain which would have been entailed by the creation of a navy. similar investigations and discussions in the years 1825 and 1832 were, for the same reason, equally fruitless. at the commencement of the revolutionary year, the only vessels in the possession of the prussian government were a corvette, which was employed as a navigation school, a paddle steamer, which conveyed the mails between stettin and st. petersburg, and which, under the terms of the contract for its construction, was to be adaptable to the purposes of an "auxiliary cruiser," and a couple of armed yawls. by the autumn of 1848 a prussian flotilla of ten sloops and yawls, three of which had been built with the funds collected by private committees, was ready for operations against the danes. it was placed under the command of a dutch ex-naval captain named schröder. the crews provided for him--465 men in all--were a strange medley of active soldiers, reservists, and seamen from the merchant service. for various reasons, not the least weighty of which was the doubtful status of the black-red-and-gold flag, the squadron sailed under the prussian colours. while it was fitting out, the first steps were taken towards the establishment of a naval organization and the training of a corps of officers. by the following summer the prussian fleet could already boast two steamers, one sailing corvette, and twenty-one gun sloops, with a total complement of thirty-seven officers and 1,521 men, and mounting in all sixty-seven guns. but only once did this primitive navy have the satisfaction of taking part in a pitched naval engagement. this was a duel between a prussian steamer and a danish brig, which fought for five hours off the island of rügen. the encounter was terminated by the fall of darkness, and before day broke again another danish corvette arrived on the scene and put the prussians to flight. but, in spite of a lack of fighting, the presence of commodore schröder's force along the coast undoubtedly did much to relieve the pressure of the blockade. the peace with denmark in 1850 ushered in a period of assiduous and systematic labour at the task of building up a prussian fleet. throughout this important period, the moving spirit was the man who has already been described as the father of the german navy, prince adalbert of prussia. this enthusiastic and indefatigable sailor was a first cousin of king frederick william iv., who refused the imperial crown as a democratic gift, and of the emperor william i., who finally won it on the battlefields of france. in his boyhood, prince adalbert had had the doctrine of the vital importance of sea-power implanted in his mind by a veteran soldier, field-marshal gneisenau, and he never forgot the lesson. at the age of twenty-one he paid a visit of two months' duration to england, where he was cordially welcomed into naval circles, and where his passion for the sea was inflamed by the conversation of men who had fought under nelson at trafalgar. he lost no opportunity of inspecting war vessels, shipyards, and docks, and returned to germany with note-books crammed with information as to all he had seen and heard. a british admiral is said to have declared that the prince knew more about the warships of great britain than many of their own officers, and one of the last acts of this sailor hohenzollern was to pay a visit to the english dockyards to familiarize himself with the latest novelties in naval construction. four years after his first journey to england, one of those naval enquiries already alluded to was held at berlin, and a commission was appointed to advise as to the types of vessels to be chosen for the fleet which the prussian government contemplated building at some indefinite future date. prince adalbert was a member of this body, but when asked for his views on the subject he satisfied himself with laying before his colleagues the opinion of his friend, captain mingaye, a british naval officer, who advised that the triumph of steam over sails and oars presented prussia with a splendid opportunity to create sea-power which should be "mighty" from the outset. curiously enough, the war minister, von rauch, inferred from this suggestion that naval construction was passing through a transition stage of doubtful issue, and it was used by him as a pretext for postponing the consideration of the whole question; for, he argued, prussia could not afford to squander money on uncertain experiments. in the succeeding years, the prince cruised the mediterranean in an austrian ship with his friend the archduke johann, afterwards the imperial administrator, and made in sardinian and british war vessels several longer voyages, during which he devoted himself with a whole heart to the study of seamanship and navigation. he also added materially to his knowledge while on board one of the ships of the british mediterranean squadron, which at the time was engaged in manoeuvres. on his return home from these experiences, he secured the appointment of schröder to the navigation school ship _amazon_, always with the idea that the vessel would be the training-ground of the officers' corps of a future prussian navy. as we have seen, the prince was chosen as chairman of the frankfort advisory committee on naval questions. some months previously he had addressed to the national assembly a "memorandum as to the formation of a german fleet." this document, which was printed and published, not only is a remarkable testimony to the author's insight into the true nature of naval problems, but also contains a clear enunciation of the principles which have since guided germany's naval policy. pointing to the humiliation of the danish blockade he wrote: "and this germany--united germany--must calmly submit to, precisely at the great moment when, after long years, it once more feels itself a whole, a power of forty millions of people. but the fatherland recognises the oppressive nature of its situation; it demands a remedy all the more speedy because after these events, it foresees with certainty how much more painful its position might some day be if it were pitted against one of the great sea powers, a power against which the german ships would not be secure even in their own harbours, a fleet which could menace our coasts with debarkations on a much more extensive scale than is possible to our present foe. united germany, however, wishes to see her territories energetically protected, her flag respected, her trade once more flourishing, and in the future to have some influence on the sea." prince adalbert then weighed the three alternatives: (_a_) defensive coast protection; (_b_) offensive coast protection; and (_c_) an independent german sea-power; and finally reached the conclusion: "germany must either build no battleships or at once build so many that she can act towards her neighbours as an independent sea-power. anything intermediate would be a useless expense, an empty pretension, and would arouse in the nation expectations which, in the moment of danger, our sea-power would not be able to fulfil. "if we now ask what would be the smallest number of battleships which would allow us to act in european waters as an independent fleet, especially against the ever-ready russian baltic fleet, i think we must take twenty battleships as the minimum that would be able to measure itself with it. but such a fleet would make germany fourth among the sea-powers of first rank, and place her incontestably in a position to play a great rôle on the sea, a rôle which would be worthy of her position in europe. for with her twenty battleships she would be able to throw an enormous weight into the scales, turn the balance by her adherence to an alliance, and consequently be as much sought after as an ally on account of her sea-power as on account of her land-power." the prince accordingly proposed that the german building programme should include 20 battleships with auxiliary screws, 10 frigates, 30 steam cruisers, 40 gunboats, and 80 gun-sloops; and that the construction of these vessels should be spread over a period of ten years. in this project we have that same principle of the gradual working up to a fixed standard of strength which has characterised all modern german naval legislation. however, the prince did not manage to persuade the frankfort technical commission to adopt his scheme in its entirety, though the programme approved went a long way towards meeting his views. why this programme was never carried out has already been seen. in the memorandum just quoted from, prince adalbert had written: "the entire nation unanimously demands a german war fleet, for german, absolutely german, it must be, a true representative of the new-born unity of the fatherland"; and it must have been with a heavy heart that he saw his vision melt away, and went back to berlin to employ his gifts in a more restricted and less promising field. the difficulties which opposed themselves to the realisation of the prince's ideas will be appreciated, when it is stated that the man who built the first warship of any size which had been launched from a german yard since the days of the hanseatic league is still alive. wilhelm schwarm, now ninety-four years of age, was employed as a young man in klawitter's shipyard at dantzig, and at the time when the air was filled with talk of a future german navy, the firm very shrewdly sent him over to the works of robinson and russell, on the thames, to learn the art of constructing vessels of larger size than were then built on the baltic. he brought back with him the plans for a paddle corvette, which was built under his supervision on the klawitter slips, fitted with english engines, and, under the name of _dantzig_, was an important addition to the prussian fleet. at the time of the crimean war this vessel showed the prussian flag at constantinople for the first time in history, and it was also with her that prince adalbert experienced a rather grotesque adventure in the mediterranean in 1856. in the previous year a german ship had been plundered by the riff pirates, and the prince, happening to be in those parts with the _dantzig_, made a reconnaissance, in one of the ship's boats, of the coast of cape tree forcas, where the outrage had occurred. the natives, as was their custom, fired on the party from the shore. annoyed by this molestation, prince adalbert determined to teach the arabs a severe lesson. having manned and armed all his boats, he stormed the steep and rocky shore and planted the prussian flag on the summit of the cliffs. his triumph was, however, a very brief one, for the enemy immediately returned to the attack, and drove the landing party back to the boats with the loss of seven killed and twenty-three wounded. official panegyrists extol this rash escapade as an "heroic deed," and declare that it did much to raise the confidence of the young prussian navy. as the riff pirates were no doubt also exultant over their victory, the affair must have been one of those rare encounters with the issue of which both sides were equally satisfied. the _dantzig_ was sold a few years later in england, in the belief that her timbers were unsound, and was then passed on to japan, where she was run ashore and burnt by her own crew during an engagement in the civil war. the problem of obtaining properly qualified personnel for the corps of naval officers was not less difficult to solve than that of building efficient warships. england would have been the natural source on which to draw for instructors, but for political reasons it was decided not to seek assistance from that most competent of all quarters, and the services of three officers of the swedish navy were secured. for similar reasons a swedish naval constructor was engaged. a few years later, however, permission was asked and obtained for a number of cadets to learn their profession on british men-of-war. the year 1852 brought an event of the utmost importance for the development of the prussian navy--the acquisition of wilhelmshaven as a north sea base. at that time prussia did not possess an inch of coast-line on the north sea, and could obtain access to it only through the belt and the sound, then under the control of the superior naval power of denmark. among the innumerable projects with which the national assembly had been deluged, was the scheme of three citizens of rendsburg for the construction of a water-way pretty much along the line subsequently followed by the kaiser wilhelm canal. this plan was, however, based on the false assumption that schleswig-holstein would at once become, and ever afterwards remain, german territory. it had also been proposed to the frankfort government by an oldenburg official that the jade bay should be chosen as the north sea base for the fleet, and this suggestion seems to have fixed the attention of prince adalbert on the inlet which is now the chief naval headquarters of the german empire. the grand duke of oldenburg was approached, and he consented to cede to prussia the piece of marshly land which has since been covered by the harbours, docks, shipyards, workshops, barracks, and fortifications of wilhelmshaven. prussia paid a sum of 500,000 thalers for this invaluable possession, and at the same time took upon herself the protection of the coast and sea-trade of the duchy. herculean efforts and inexhaustible patience were required to adapt prussia's acquisition on the jade to its destined purposes. years had to be spent in a careful survey of the bed of the harbour, in order to ascertain how far the channel was affected by the movements of sand and mud under the influence of the tide. further years were consumed by the task of sinking piles in the treacherous peaty soil to obtain a solid foundation for dock and harbour walls. frequently a storm or a spring tide destroyed in a few hours the fruits of months of strenuous labour. as hanover refused to allow the construction of a railway across her territory, which lay between prussia and oldenburg, it was necessary to convey all the building materials to the spot by the long and tedious sea-route. at first not even drinking-water was to be had on the desolate site, and prolonged and costly exertions were needful before it could be procured in sufficient quantities. sixteen years elapsed before the new harbour was formally declared open by the prussian king, afterwards the emperor william i., in the presence of british ships, the officers of which probably regarded the works with indulgent curiosity and little guessed the significance which wilhelmshaven would one day possess for their own country. when the second war with denmark broke out in 1864, prussia's fleet was still absurdly inadequate to deal with the naval force opposed to it. the ship establishment at the close of 1863 was composed as under: _steamships with fighting value._ 3 corvettes, mounting 27 or 28 guns each. 1 corvette, mounting 17 guns. _steamships with little fighting value._ 4 first-class gunboats, mounting 3 guns each. 17 second-class gunboats, mounting 2 guns each. 3 despatch-boats, mounting together 8 guns. _steamship without fighting value._ 1 corvette, mounting 9 guns. _sailing ships with little or no fighting value._ 3 frigates, mounting a total of 112 guns. 3 brigs, mounting a total of 4 guns. 2 schooners, mounting a total of 4 guns. _also without fighting value._ 40 rowing-boats, mounting a total of 76 guns. denmark, on the other hand, had 31 steam war vessels, among which were 1 battleship, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, and 4 armoured craft. even with the assistance of a number of austrian ships, which arrived in the north sea from the mediterranean, the prussian fleet could contribute nothing decisive towards the issue of the war. at the most it prevented the danish blockade of the german coast-line from being effective. the prussian government attempted to reduce its inferiority by hiring merchant vessels, and hurriedly purchased warships in france and england. one of these latter, the monitor _arminius_, which was of english build, was almost entirely paid for with the voluntary contributions which had continued to flow in. this fact shows how steady and keen the interest of a large section of the population in the development of the navy already was, and how erroneous it is to ascribe the naval enthusiasm in germany of recent years entirely to the official agitation. peace was concluded before the new ships could be made ready for sea. the war of 1864 was one of the great cross-roads of british history. difficult as it is to "overlook the cards of providence," as bismarck puts it, there can be little doubt that we took the wrong turning. the great german chancellor candidly admitted that the possession of kiel and a strategic canal through holstein were two of the principal objects which prussia had in view when she drew the sword. the two leading members of the british cabinet were in favour of backing up denmark; and one of them, palmerston, used language in parliament which might well have led that country to count upon our support. a strong body of english public opinion also warmly espoused the danish cause. but queen victoria, largely influenced by the sympathy for germany which she had imbibed from the prince consort, threw all the weight of the crown into the opposite scale. there are few more agitated passages to be found in the records of diplomacy than those letters to lord granville in which she argued, threatened, entreated, and, finally falling back on the last strength of woman, her weakness, complained that she was "completely exhausted by anxiety and suspense," and "so tired and unwell she can hardly hold up her head or hold her pen." her will prevailed in the end, and she was able to congratulate herself that, "owing to the determined stand she had made against her two principal ministers, she had saved the country from an unnecessary war." when prussia, completely reversing her attitude, made those very claims of the danish king which she had contested by force of arms her pretext for annexing the two duchies under the "rights of conquest," the queen suffered a bitter disillusionment, and, on her instructions general grey wrote to lord granville, that "prussia should at least be made aware of what she and her government and every honest man in europe must think of the gross and unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that she had given which prussia had been guilty of." it will hardly be contended now that a war which should have left schleswig-holstein in the hands of denmark would have been anything but exceedingly advantageous, economical, and opportune for great britain. even before, in the formal division of the spoils, prussia had obtained austrian recognition of her right to kiel, she had occupied that port and transferred her naval headquarters thither from dantzig. the construction of the north sea baltic canal was delayed many years, mainly by the opposition of count moltke, who argued that its cost would be so great that it would, on the whole, be cheaper to build a second fleet with the money. he further urged that the canal would be navigable only in the summer, and that in the event of a war the army would be weakened by the necessity of providing for its defence. but for the doubts and jealousies of the sister service, the german navy might years ago have enjoyed the benefits of that prolongation of the canal, contemplated by bismarck, which would have allowed its ironclads to steam from kiel to wilhelmshaven without putting out into the open sea. in the hope that the lessons of the war would have produced the desirable effect on the public mind, the prussian government, in 1865, laid before its parliament a bill that may be considered as the definite inauguration of the naval policy which germany has ever since pursued. in the memorandum submitted to the house with the measure, it was contended that the time had come for prussia to join the ranks of the sea-powers, in order that she might be in a position to protect her own and the other german coasts and maritime trade, and, for all future time, to assert her european position as against such states as were accessible only by water. "for the present," it was stated, "she is unable to enter into rivalry with the first-class naval powers, but she must occupy a position commanding esteem among those of the second class." accordingly, the government asked for authority to build 10 armoured frigates of the highest efficiency, an equal number of armoured vessels of the cupola or turret type for coast defence, 16 corvettes for the protection of sea-borne trade, 6 despatch-boats, and at least 4 transports. it was calculated that ten years would be necessary for the execution of this plan, but rather for the training of the personnel and the provision of the indispensable harbour works than for the actual construction of the ships. the cost of the proposed fleet was estimated at 34,500,000 thalers, that of its annual maintenance at about 5,000,000 thalers. in recommending the scheme to the diet, bismarck used the following words, which contain very noteworthy implications: "during the last twenty years no question has so unanimously interested public opinion in germany as precisely the naval question. we have seen associations, the press, and the diets give expression to their sympathy, and this sympathy exercised itself in the collection of comparatively important sums. the government and the conservative party have been reproached with the slowness and parsimony with which action has been taken in this direction. it was particularly the liberal parties which carried on this agitation. we believe, therefore, that we are doing you a great pleasure with this bill." but the liberal majority, then exclusively preoccupied with the constitutional struggle against the masterful and autocratic minister-president, threw out the bill, and modified naval estimates were given the force of law by royal decree. the attitude of the prussian liberals of that epoch was very similar to that of the socialists in recent years. in the brief war of 1866, the austrian fleet was tied down to the mediterranean by the superior sea-power of italy, and the operations of the prussian ships were confined to a few cheap victories over the antiquated coast and river fortifications of hanover. as the result of the war, prussia was rounded off by the incorporation of the kingdom of hanover, electoral hesse, nassau, and the old imperial town of frankfort-on-main. she thus secured for herself the entire german north sea littoral, with the exception of the coast-line of oldenburg, which by treaty was already hers in fact if not in law. immediately after the conclusion of peace, all the states to the north of the main were closely welded together in the north german confederation, the first decisive step towards the creation of the empire. an article in the federal constitution ran: "the federal navy is one and indivisible under the command of prussia. its organization and composition fall to his majesty the king of prussia, who nominates the officials and officers of the navy, and to whom they, as well as the crews, must take the oath of fealty. kiel harbour and the jade harbour are federal war harbours. the expenses necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the fleet and the institutions connected therewith will be borne by the federal treasury." two years later a fresh naval programme was submitted to, and approved by, the north german reichstag. it laid down that within ten years the fleet should be brought up to the subjoined strength: 16 large and small armoured ships. 20 corvettes. 8 despatch-boats. 3 transports. 22 steam gunboats. 7 school-ships. the new vessels actually needed for the attainment of this establishment were 12 armoured ships, 12 corvettes, 6 despatch-boats, 2 transports, and 1 school-ship. as native ship-builders had so far had no experience in the construction of ironclads, only one vessel of this type was placed in germany, the state yard at dantzic being experimentally entrusted with the work, while the rest were purchased or ordered in england or france. no fact could illustrate more vividly the tremendous progress which germany has since made in this respect. oddly enough, the great war with france was succeeded by a marked cooling-off of the popular enthusiasm for the navy in germany. the reasons for this appear to have been disappointment with what the fleet actually accomplished and the complete overthrow of the enemy without its assistance. even if all the federal ships had been in perfect trim and manned by thoroughly trained crews, they were confronted by so overwhelming a superiority of force that at best they could have achieved little or nothing. but the outbreak of hostilities coincided with a series of accidents which temporarily disabled several of germany's best war vessels, and at that time there was not a single dock in the country in which they could be repaired. officers and crews were, too, imperfectly trained and insufficiently familiar with both engines and guns, the harbour equipments were inadequate, and, in fact, everything was in a state of unpreparedness. that the french, with their great naval superiority, effected so little, and did not even make a determined attempt to force the jade and destroy the works at wilhelmshaven, can only be ascribed to their lack of initiative and the paralyzing operation of their crushing defeats on land. the only regular engagement fought at sea during the war was an encounter of uncertain issue between a small german gunboat and a french despatch-boat off the coast of cuba. but in spite of the odds against the federal fleet, public opinion in germany protested that it should have shown more dash and enterprise, and in some way have crowned itself with laurels. even more prejudicial to the popularity of an ambitious naval policy was the patent fact that the hereditary and most formidable foe had been thoroughly and rapidly humbled by a purely land campaign, and that his superiority on the sea had availed him practically nothing. to such considerations must be attributed a large share of the indifference with which many germans regarded their navy during the next thirty years. the prevalent views were reflected in the memorandum with which, in 1872, the minister of marine, lieutenant-general von stosch, ushered in the first naval programme of the new german empire. this document stated that in a long war germany must leave the offensive to her land force, and that the proper task of her navy was to assert the power of the empire where smaller interests were at stake in places to which the army could not penetrate. an increase in the fleet was, however, stated to be necessary on the ground of the growth of german sea-borne trade, and it was proposed that the following vessels should be available by the year 1882: 8 armoured frigates. 6 armoured corvettes. 7 armoured monitors. 2 armoured batteries. 20 cruisers. 6 despatch-boats. 18 gunboats. 28 torpedo-boats. 5 school-ships. the cost of these vessels was estimated at 73,000,000 thalers, that of their maintenance in the year 1882 at 1,300,000 thalers. the plan, which was much more modest in its pretensions than its predecessors, and in principle constituted a retirement from the position formerly taken up, was approved by the first parliament of the new germany. the first royal review of the german fleet took place in the warnemünde roads in 1875. the ships present were four ironclads, a despatch-boat, and four school-ships; their total complements 2,862 officers and men. when the year 1883 arrived, general von stosch published a memorandum on the execution of his plan. it is significant of the change that had come over public opinion that the government had not dared to ask the reichstag for a substitute for the armoured frigate _grosser kurfürst_, which was lost in collision off folkestone, and that consequently one of the eight vessels of her type was lacking. the last of the six armoured corvettes had yet to be built, and instead of five monitors thirteen armoured gunboats had been constructed, because it was thought that the latter class of ship was better suited for the defence of the jade, weser, and elbe. it had been decided not to build the floating batteries, which would have been an easy prey to the "fish" torpedo, introduced as a weapon of naval warfare since they were projected. one out of the twenty corvettes, and eight large and nine small torpedo craft were also still wanting. german national vanity had, however, secured a questionable triumph: the empire was now entirely independent of foreigners so far as its warships were concerned. but if germany had continued to purchase some of her warships in england while she was still but a tyro in the art of naval architecture, she would have saved much money, and made more rapid progress. general von stosch simultaneously presented another memorandum, dealing with the future development of the navy. in it he laid stress on the reasons which could be adduced against the principle hitherto followed, and since readopted, of fixing the building programme in advance for a longer period, and advised that it was inexpedient to look farther ahead than three or four years. while admitting that "the seas are ever more ceasing to separate the nations," and that "the course of history seems ever more to indicate that a state cannot withdraw from the sea if it is striving to maintain for itself a position in the world beyond the immediate future," he laid down the axiom that "naval battles alone seldom decide the destinies of states, and for immeasurable time the decision of every war will for germany lie with her land army." thus, though he admitted the desirability of "a concentrated high sea fleet always ready for action," he considered it best to defer the construction of battleships till further experience had shown whether their functions could not be equally well performed by vessels of a smaller type. the conclusion reached by the memorandum was that it was necessary to add without delay to only one class of vessel--namely, that which served the purposes of coast defence. in this connection the following words were used: "here it is the torpedo-boat, which, especially when used in large numbers at night, will render the carrying through of a blockade almost impossible. every night the blockading ships would be compelled to withdraw to a distance under steam. their coal consumption would thereby be much increased, the tension of the crews, in consequence of the need for unremitting vigilance, would become intolerable, and at night the blockaded harbours would be accessible. even when in motion, the blockading ships would not be safe at night. the torpedo-boats would follow them and recognize their aim by the lights which the enemy would not be able to do without when steaming in squadron formation. the torpedo-boat is a weapon which is of special advantage to the weaker on the sea. a few states already possess a considerable strength in torpedo craft. for the german navy 150 torpedo-boats are considered necessary, and of these thirty-five will be ready for service shortly." it was while the german fleet was still impotent for all serious purposes that the empire acquired the mass of its colonies: south-west africa, togo, the cameroons, german new guinea, the bismarck archipelago, and the marshall islands were all annexed in 1884. the decisive step towards the acquisition of german east africa was taken in the following year. william i. lived just long enough to lay the foundation-stone of the kiel canal, which had been one of the dreams of the frankfort patriots forty years earlier. his death was followed after an interval of three months by that of frederick i., and with the accession of william ii., in 1888, the latest era of german naval policy may be said to have commenced. until, however, admiral tirpitz was put in charge of the ministry of marine, in 1897, practically nothing was done to add to the fighting strength of the fleet. any progress which was made in connection with the navy was confined to developments of organisation, and to the exchange of german rights in zanzibar and witu for the islet of heligoland. this transaction was scoffed at by bismarck, then in retirement, who, however, only contemplated the possibility of a naval war with france, and it was bitterly resented by german public opinion, and especially by that heated section of it which poses as the pioneer on the path of militarism, navalism, and colonism. only during the last three or four years has the conviction gradually begun to gain ground, that perhaps, after all, germany did not make such a bad bargain, and heligoland has simultaneously taken an ever more and more prominent place in the speculations of political prophets as to the probable outcome of an anglo-german war. the keen interest of the emperor william, and his ambition to play the leading part on the stage of the world, would not, in themselves, have sufficed to bring about the change which has been wrought during the past seventeen years. the decisive personal factors here have been the fixed purpose, the steady will, the unflagging energy, the inexhaustible patience, the profound political insight, and the rare diplomatic skill of admiral tirpitz, the nearest approach to a really great man that germany has produced since bismarck. he is the true creator of the german fleet. footnotes: [footnote 6: thaler = about 3s.] chapter iv british influence on the german navy in a very special sense the german navy is the child of the british navy, which is the mother of all the great naval forces of the world to-day. from the very first it has been no secret that the german fleet was definitely planned on the model furnished by the many centuries' development of the british navy, and the emperor william has been one of the principal agencies through which this formative influence has been exerted in more recent years. he came to the throne at a moment when naval sentiment in germany was at its lowest point, and he assisted in the initial revival which occurred before grand admiral von tirpitz came on the scene. old residents of portsmouth still remember a boy whom they occasionally saw walking about the dockyard looking at the ships with admiration and rapt attention. his greatest delight seemed to be to watch the great ironclads moving in and out of spithead. sometimes he would find his way on board vessels of the royal navy. this lad was none other than the present german emperor. as a grandson of queen victoria, he was a frequent visitor in his boyhood and early manhood to his grandmother during the summer months when she was in residence at osborne, and on one occasion his father and mother, then crown prince and princess of germany, rented norris castle, on the outskirts of cowes, and lived there for several months with their children. prince william, who was a great favourite of the late queen, thus not only became an eager spectator of the naval pageants in the solent directly under the windows of osborne house and norris castle, but watched with interest the gay assemblage in cowes roadstead for the regatta from year to year. at this time the newly-created german empire had practically no fleet. during the franco-prussian war the few ships which flew the flag of the north german confederation were so weak that they could take no part in the conflict. the memory of these recent events was still fresh in the mind of the future emperor when he visited england and watched the activities of the british navy, whose far-flung squadrons performed the triple task of protecting the motherland from fear of invasion, safeguarding all her oversea possessions, and defending british ocean-borne commerce. he determined that he, too, would have a great fleet when he succeeded to the throne of the german empire. this is no imaginary picture of the ideas which were taking root in the mind of the ruler of the german empire to-day. years afterwards--in fact, in 1904--addressing king edward, on the occasion of his majesty's visit to the kiel regatta, the emperor paid a tribute to the power and traditions of the british navy, with which, he added, he became acquainted as a youth during visits which he paid to england. he recalled that he had had many a sail in the _dolphin_ and _alberta_, old british yachts, and had seen mighty ironclads constructed which had since served their time and disappeared from the navy list. "when i came to the throne i attempted to reproduce on a scale commensurate with the resources and interests of my own country that which had made such a deep impression on my mind when i saw it as a young man in england." when he first advocated the construction of a big navy, the german people viewed his dreams with indifference and distrust. shackled by a system of conscription in order to provide the empire with its huge army, they asked what it would profit them if to the burden of a great army they added the vast expense of a fleet capable not merely of defending their coasts, but of operating on the offensive in distant seas. at first the emperor made little progress in educating public opinion; but he still nursed those dreams of sea-power--very moderate dreams at that date, before admiral von tirpitz came on the scene--which had first taken shape in his mind when he wandered about portsmouth dockyard, and viewed from the grounds of osborne house the coming and going of mighty british warships. in the early days of the present century he referred with some pride to the persistency with which he had pursued his aims in spite of popular disfavour. at the launch of the _kaiser karl der grosse_ he said: "if the increase in the navy which i had demanded with urgent prayers had not been consistently refused me during the first eight years of my reign--i did not even escape derision and mocking at the time--in how different a manner should we now be able to promote our prosperous commerce and our interests overseas!" he had to wait for many years before he saw his dreams reaching fruition. as the british parliament is the mother of all popular representative institutions, so the british navy is the mother of navies. if the records of most of the great fleets of the world are searched, it will be found that in greater or less degree they owe their birth to the more or less direct assistance of british naval officers, oft times acting with the direct authority of the british admiralty; while in almost every fleet in the world even to-day may be found ships designed by british brains and constructed of british material by the skilled craftsmen of these islands. it was to england that peter the great came to watch the shipbuilding on the thames, and it was with a large body of british mechanics that he returned to russia to create a fleet with which to defend his empire and extend its borders at the point of the gun. the prestige of the russian navy in the seventeenth century was due entirely to the skill and daring of scotsmen. the greigs of four generations, admiral elphinstone, lord duffus gordon, and a number of other scotsmen entered the navy of the czar and did splendid service; and some of the descendants of these pioneers of the russian navy may still be traced in the fleet of to-day. the american navy was, of course, of distinctly british origin; so were the fleets of many of the south american republics; while, as everybody knows, the seeds of sea-power of japan were sown by british naval officers, including first and foremost admiral sir archibald douglas, and her ships were mainly built in england. the excellence to which the chinese navy once attained was also due to british instruction under another scotsman, admiral lang; and one of the principal shipyards of italy, as well as her gun factory, is of british origin, and is still linked with its british parent. the spanish navy is now being recreated under british supervision; turkey never was so nearly a sea power as when she had british naval officers in her service; and under admiral mark kerr the glories of the greek navy are being revived. in the case of the modern german fleet the british admiralty had little part in its upbuilding, but british naval power fired the imagination of the emperor, and it was a kindly present made years before by king william iv. to the then king of prussia which first directed his majesty's thoughts towards the sea. when the present emperor was a boy, one of his favourite recreations was to sail a beautiful model of about 20 tons of a british frigate on the havel lakes near potsdam. this little ship, of excellent workmanship, was sent as a present to the then ruler of prussia early in the last century by our sailor king, and was a never-failing source of pleasure to the present german emperor as a youth. from his earliest years at home and in england the future ruler's aspirations were always towards the sea, and we can now see that his dreams of later years, which have taken such tangible shape, were largely due to those vivid impressions of sea-power which he obtained during his visits to england, and which reached their climax in 1889, when queen victoria, on the occasion of his visit to the cowes regatta, conferred on him, a foreign monarch, the, then, unique rank of admiral of the fleet. though other foreign princes and monarchs have since been made honorary officers of the british navy, the german emperor remained for some years the only person of foreign birth holding supreme rank. the commission conferred upon the kaiser was of course purely honorary, but his majesty never concealed the pride with which he donned the british uniform with its deep gold cuffs and cocked hat, and he could claim that he was the only ruler of a foreign state who ever commanded the british navy in modern times. great britain has boasted of her "splendid isolation," and the german emperor's is the only alien hand which has controlled any of her fleets. in times gone by a british squadron was placed under the orders of peter the great. this incident occurred during the czar's operations against sweden, when he received the assistance of a squadron from these islands and hoisted his flag in command of the allied forces. between that date and the year when the german emperor became an admiral of the fleet the british navy maintained its absolute independence, and british officers were not even permitted to accept foreign decorations. but soon after receiving the honorary rank from queen victoria, the emperor seized the opportunity to emulate the example of peter the great, and he afterwards confessed in a speech he delivered on board the british battleship, _royal sovereign_, that the incident had left an indelible impression upon his mind. "one of the best days of my life," he remarked, "which i shall never forget as long as i live, was the day when i inspected the mediterranean fleet when i was on board the _dreadnought_,[7] and my flag was hoisted for the first time." the emperor at this time was making a cruise in the mediterranean, and visited the piræus to attend the wedding of his sister to the present king of greece. sir anthony hoskins, who was then only a vice-admiral, was in command of the british fleet which had assembled in honour of the royal marriage. the german emperor decided that in his new rôle as a british officer he would exercise command, and consequently the emblem of an admiral of the fleet, which consists of the union flag, was broken at the main on board the old battleship _dreadnought_, and sir anthony hoskins, being a junior officer, was forthwith relieved of the control of the british men-of-war, and nominally, though not of course actually, the german emperor, during the time that his flag was flown, was in command of the greatest of all the fighting squadrons of the british empire. on a subsequent occasion, at malta, his majesty again visited the british fleet. arriving at this great naval base he announced that on the following day he would inspect one of the men-of-war. accordingly, he proceeded on board, and his flag was forthwith hoisted. it was thought that his majesty would formally walk round the decks and then take some light refreshments and return to his yacht. this was not the case, however. no sooner did the emperor reach the quarter-deck, where he was received with naval honours by all the officers, than he took off his coat and intimated that he was ready to go over the ship. his majesty went everywhere, from the turrets to the engine and boiler-rooms, and kept the captain fully occupied in answering a multitude of questions as to the design and equipment of the vessel. with all the impetuosity of his nature he dived into every hole and corner and saw everything, and the captain was kept so busy that he forgot his duty as host and the wines he had laid in for the occasion. at last the inspection ended, the questions ceased, and his majesty prepared, after complimenting the captain on the smartness of his ship, to go down the companion ladder to his lunch. as he did so, he turned to this commanding officer and said: "yours must be the longest ship in the british navy." "i think not, your majesty," replied the captain, "it's only 420 feet long." "oh, you surely are mistaken," added the emperor, and then the captain remembered the naval slang as to "long-ships in the navy"--namely, those with long intervals between refreshments. he forthwith apologised profusely for the oversight, and implored the emperor to return to the cabin. his majesty would not, however, do so, but added: "january 27th is my birthday, and my orders are that on that day you entertain all your brother captains to dinner and drink my health." he then left, pleased at the result of the incident. when the day arrived, the dinner was duly held, and the guests enjoyed themselves immensely. during the evening they despatched the following message to the emperor: "the orders of our admiral of the fleet have been carried out, and we have drunk your majesty's good health. but there is one point on which we cannot agree with your majesty, and that is as to the length of h.m.s. ----." from this the emperor, who is familiar with the language of the navy, was able consequently to infer that on that evening there had been no lack of hospitality. after the lapse of many years during which the progress of the german navy became ever more and more the preoccupation of the british people, it is difficult to realize that when the movement for naval expansion on the other side of the north sea first began to take shape it was regarded with sympathy by the british nation, and the german emperor, wearing his uniform as an honorary british officer, was, of all monarchs, the most popular in this country. the two countries were on terms of growing cordiality when the emperor succeeded his father in 1888. the absence of any reference by the new emperor in his proclamation either to england or to france caused momentary anxiety, but that feeling quickly passed away, and in the following summer the new emperor was the central figure in the great naval pageant at spithead. for the first time in the history of the british fleet naval manoeuvres had been held in 1885, and in the year after william ii.'s accession the young ruler witnessed the greatest display of british sea-power which had ever been organised. the assembly of 1889 far exceeded in numbers and in the suggestion of power the naval review which had marked the celebration of queen victoria's jubilee. it was the most powerful fleet ever brought together in time of peace. the naval defence act, the culmination of a long and vigorous agitation, had been passed in the spring, and it was thought appropriate to mobilize the fleet as a demonstration in the eyes of the world. the german emperor determined to visit this country for the special purpose of joining in this festival of british sea-power. in those days the act of mobilization occupied considerable time; though the ships in reserve were manned in the middle of july it was not until august 1st that the fleet assembled at spithead. it included 20 battleships, 6 coast defence vessels, 29 cruisers, 3 gun vessels, 14 gunboats, and 38 torpedo boats. the great anchorage presented a brave appearance when, on the following day, the emperor arrived, escorted by a squadron of his small navy. this force consisted of the battleships _friedrich der grosse_, _preussen_, _deutschland_, _kaiser_, _sachsen_, _baden_, and _oldenburg_, together with the despatch-vessels _zieten_ and _wacht_; while the training ship for german naval cadets, the _niobe_, was also present together with the corvette _irene_, commanded by the emperor's brother. the german emperor and his ships received an enthusiastic welcome as he passed through the british fleet on board his yacht, the _hohenzollern_. the spectacle was one of the most brilliant and imposing ever witnessed in waters which had often been the scene of naval displays. on the following monday, when the prince of wales, representing queen victoria, inspected the ships, his royal highness was accompanied by his majesty, to whom, subsequently, all the principal officers were presented on board the _victoria and albert_. early on the following day the fleet proceeded to sea, steaming past the german emperor, who watched the evolution from the deck of the _osborne_, moored in sandown bay. thus did the new ruler of germany, on whom queen victoria had just conferred the honorary rank of admiral of the fleet in the british service, gain a unique knowledge of the size and efficiency of the british navy normally maintained on a peace footing in home waters. the contrast in organization and in administration between the british navy and the german army can hardly have failed to impress the young emperor, who had devoted himself with unremitting persistency to the study of the military machine of his own country. looking back with the knowledge which we now possess of the rapidity with which a navy can be raised from a peace footing to a war footing as exemplified by the modern german navy, we can imagine the impression which the british mobilization made upon his majesty. and then, when the time came for the ships to pass out of the anchorage into the channel, the delays and confusion which occurred must have suggested to the young ruler, familiar with the standard of efficiency attained by the german army, that something was lacking. a contemporary account of this evolution records that: "it was at half-past three in the morning that the fleet began to unmoor preparatory to proceeding to sea, but it was not until nearly eleven that sir george tryon--the admiral in supreme command--was able to give the signal for his squadron to weigh anchor. nearly all the delay was caused by trouble and mishaps connected with the anchoring gear of various ships. there is no part of the equipment of a man-of-war which requires more management and experience in handling than the ground tackle. every vessel has peculiarities of her own in this respect, therefore it is due, probably, to the crews being in most cases quite strange to their ships, and to the officers not yet having got the hang of things, that so many shortcomings were made apparent. soon after ten o'clock admiral baird, in command of the other section of the fleet, got impatient of further delay, for it was manifest that if he did not start speedily another review might have to be postponed. so he signalled the ships of his squadron to proceed to sea as soon as ready, and shortly afterwards they began filing out eastward in a long single line. but some ships could not obey the order; and amongst these were the _anson_, _collingwood_, and _inflexible_, still engaged in getting up their anchors." this same writer concluded his account of the spectacle with the remark that "a grander, a more magnificent demonstration of england's fleet it would indeed be difficult to imagine." but behind the seeming of things there stood revealed an organization which, though it had recently been greatly improved, still left much to be desired in rapid and efficient action. moreover, at this time even in the channel fleet, which then consisted of five ships, and was the only fully commissioned force in home waters, the main purpose of sea-power, to shoot straight, was certainly not kept in view. in his interesting book of reminiscences, "the navy as i have known it," admiral the hon. sir edmund fremantle, describing the conditions which existed in the jubilee year, records: "we had large crews and, as all the ships were masted, there was a fair amount of sail drill, while i fear gunnery was little attended to." there is no record of the impressions which the german emperor carried home with him from spithead, but it is more than probable that, while his majesty was impressed by the great display of ships and men, he was not less impressed by the failure to utilize these resources to the best possible advantage. the british navy was living on its past achievements. though it possessed a mass of material and a large personnel, neither was well organized for war. the available resources exceeded anything belonging to any other nation, but the fleet still basked, content, in the glow of the triumphs achieved in the early years of the nineteenth century. the navy was unreformed. steam had taken the place of sails, wood had been superseded, first by iron and then by steel, but the routine of the squadrons, the training of officers and men had undergone little change. the conditions of naval warfare had altered, but the british fleet remained faithful to the old regime, holding fast to the belief that when war occurred there would be a sufficient interval to allow it to complete its arrangements, elaborate its plans, and place all its resources on a war footing. as the british navy in its influence on world policy inspired german ambitions, so german thoroughness in organization, when applied to the growing german fleet, reacted upon the british navy and gave it a new and vigorous life. footnotes: [footnote 7: this ship was, of course, the predecessor of the present _dreadnought_.] chapter v the german navy acts among the political developments of the last quarter of a century there is none more remarkable than the evolution of german naval ambitions as revealed in the legislation passed since 1898. one of the first acts after the emperor ascended the throne was the reorganization of the central navy administration, which had hitherto been presided over by a general officer of the army. this fact in itself indicates the subordinate position which the navy had hitherto occupied in the defensive machinery of the german empire. the fleet itself was of extremely modest proportions. it consisted only of a few small battleships of heavy gun-power, but limited radius of action, whose rôle was the defence of the coasts of germany, and more particularly the baltic littoral, for at this period few men-of-war under any flag cruised in the north sea. the spearhead of the british navy was exposed in the mediterranean, where the latest and most powerful ships were stationed, and the small channel fleet spent most of its time not in the channel, but ringing the changes on vigo and other spanish ports--lisbon, lagos, gibraltar, madeira, and port mahon. this squadron consisted of five obsolescent ships, and the only british vessels permanently in home waters--so complete was the domination of the situation in southern waters--were a number of port and coast-guard ships, half manned and distributed round the coast, and the unmanned vessels in reserve in the dockyards. the distribution of the french fleet was on much the same lines, the majority of the modern ships being concentrated in the mediterranean, while a small force was based upon brest. russia alone was represented in northern waters, and it was consequently in the baltic that the german fleet, such as it was, was trained and drilled. except for a few gunboats, the german naval ensign was entirely unrepresented in distant seas, and public opinion showed no desire to increase the naval votes in order to enable german influence to be exercised beyond home waters. after the emperor's accession to the throne in june, 1888, and after the reorganization of naval administration, an effort was made to obtain an increased grant from the reichstag, but only with partial success. from 1874 to 1889-90 the naval expenditure had increased gradually from £1,950,000 to about £2,750,000. in 1890-91 the estimates had advanced to nearly £3,600,000, and in the following year they rose still further to £4,750,000, and then they began to fall once more under the pressure of the reichstag, which viewed with no sympathy the new naval ambitions which were finding expression in the press. during these years the reichstag repeatedly reduced the votes put forward by admiral von hollmann, the minister of marine. throughout his period of office, from 1890 to 1897, he failed signally to inoculate the parliamentary majority with the new ideas and the new enthusiasm which dominated the marineamt; and at last in 1897, after being repulsed, first by the budget committee and then by the reichstag itself, the marine minister, whose ambitions were really extremely modest, retired from the scene, compelled to admit defeat. he was a sailor and neither a statesman nor an administrator, and his blunt methods were not to the liking of the politicians. no surprise consequently was felt when three months after this final humiliation the admiral resigned his office. one of the pioneers of german sea-power, admiral von hollmann began, under the inspiration of the emperor, the naval movement which, a few years later, under the impulse that the boer war imparted to public opinion, and with the help of an elaborate press bureau, was carried to such lengths by his successor. on the resignation of admiral von hollmann, the emperor appointed as naval secretary a comparatively unknown naval officer named tirpitz. born on march 19th, 1849, at cüstrin, and the son of a judge, alfred tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards at the naval academy from 1874 to 1876. he subsequently devoted much attention to the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly responsible for the torpedo organization and the tactical use of torpedoes in the german navy--a work which british officers regard with admiration. subsequently he became inspector of torpedo service, and was the first flotilla chief of the torpedo flotillas. later he was appointed chief of the staff of the naval station in the baltic and of the supreme command of the german fleet. during these earlier years of his sea career admiral tirpitz made several long voyages. he is regarded as an eminent tactician, and is the author of the rules for german naval tactics as now in use in the navy. in 1895 he was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral, and became vice-admiral in 1899. during 1896 and 1897 he commanded the cruiser squadron in east asia, and was appointed secretary of state of the imperial navy office in january, 1897. in the following year he was made a minister of state, and in 1901 received the hereditary rank of nobility, entitling him to the use of the prefix "von" before his name. with the advent of this officer as marine minister, german naval affairs at once underwent a change. his predecessor, who entertained very modest theories as to the size of the fleet which germany should possess, had attempted to browbeat the politicians, thumping the table in irritation when he could not get his way. the new minister from the first adopted other methods. he devoted himself to the education of the people by means of an elaborate press bureau, and was soon the undisputed master of german naval policy. he met opposition in the reichstag with a smiling reasonableness, and set himself to win the support of opponents by good-tempered argument. in fact, admiral von tirpitz from the first revealed himself as a politician and diplomatist, and from the time that he took office, though now and again slight checks were experienced, naval policy in germany made rapid--indeed, astonishing--progress. in the year after admiral von tirpitz went to the marine office, a navy bill, far more ambitious in its terms than any proposal that had been put forward by admiral von hollmann, was accepted by the reichstag. this measure was believed to embody at any rate the beginnings of a scheme which he had submitted to the emperor some time prior to his appointment. at any rate, it enunciated a new and vital principle. as has been seen, the government, whether prussian or german, had on previous occasions drafted extensive naval programmes for the carrying out of which a period of ten or twelve years was required. not once, however, had the establishment of ships and personnel been fixed by law; and the parliament in each case committed itself to the entire scheme only to the extent of passing the first annual instalment considered necessary by the government as the initial step towards the desired goal. in this way neither diet nor reichstag bound itself or its successors for the future, but left both free to deal with the annual naval estimates as they thought fit. and in practice it had been found that very liberal use was made of the budgetary prerogatives, that standards once approved were not considered binding, and that the fate of the naval estimates depended to a considerable extent on the relations which happened for the moment to exist between the government and the majority parties on questions totally unconnected with the naval requirements of the empire. another disadvantage of the practice of leaving the reichstag free to determine annually the number of vessels which should be laid down in a given year, was, that it gave the shipbuilding, armour-plate, and ordnance industries no sure basis for their plans for the future. the rule that germany must build, engine, arm, and equip her own war vessels had been generally accepted, but the industries which should enable her to do this were still in their infancy, and were almost entirely dependent upon the orders of the home government. if they were ever to be able to supply the demands of a powerful fleet, it was necessary that slips should be multiplied, plant increased, and workshops extended. but so long as the naval policy of the empire was indefinite and subject to violent fluctuations, ship-builders and manufacturers would not endanger their businesses by locking up large amounts of capital in appliances which could be used for the building and arming of warships and for no other purposes. if german industry was ever to be in a position to satisfy the demands of a large and efficient fleet, some guarantee of steady and remunerative orders must, it was urged, be afforded to the trades concerned. and apart altogether from its own needs, the government also hoped that, some day, germany would be able to claim a share in those large profits which great britain appropriated to herself as the world's shipbuilder. it was by such arguments that admiral von tirpitz justified his demand that the strength of the fleet, the date at which it should attain that strength, and the age at which each ship should be automatically replaced by a new one, should be fixed by legal enactment. no portion of his bill was more hotly contested than this. it was objected that, by accepting it, the reichstag would be depriving itself of a considerable portion of that power of the purse which constituted the only effective bulwark of its rights. but in the end the smiling and imperturbable patience of admiral von tirpitz gained the day, and the reichstag satisfied itself with the formal right of drawing the absolutely unavoidable conclusions from its own enactment and passing every year the naval estimates, which could not be rejected without an infraction of the law. the repeated sections in the act of 1898 which appear to reserve the chamber's budget rights, are, in reality, meaningless and valueless--except as a monument to the folly of those who believed they had a meaning and a value. admiral von tirpitz apparently drew from his first legislative experience the perfectly correct conclusion that the reichstag can be made to do almost anything if one only treats it in the right way. in the explanatory memorandum attached to the bill, admiral von tirpitz was able to adduce two convincing reasons why the fleet should at once be considerably augmented. one of these was the fact that germany's naval strength had in recent years actually diminished. in case of mobilization, it was pointed out, she would have had only seven efficient battleships, whereas she had once had fourteen. of the armoured cruisers which had been adopted in other navies for foreign service in times of peace, she did not possess a single example, and their work had to be done by three antiquated battleships. moreover, to the tasks allotted to the fleet in the memorandum of 1873, another of great importance had been added--namely, the defence of germany's newly-acquired colonial empire. further, it was contended that the growth of the empire's population, trade, and industry, the development of her sea-fisheries, and the increasing investment of german capital abroad, had all added to the possibilities of her becoming involved in quarrels with other nations. the fleet which admiral von tirpitz considered necessary to fulfil the old and the new sea requirements of the empire was as under: the battle fleet. 19 battleships (2 as material reserve). 8 armoured coast-defence vessels. 6 large cruisers. 16 small cruisers. foreign service fleet. _large cruisers._ for east asia 2 for central and south america 1 material reserve 3 - total 6 _small cruisers._ for east asia 3 for central and south america 3 for east africa 2 for the south seas 2 material reserve 4 - total 14 1 station ship. the period proposed for the gradual attainment of this strength was seven years, but the reichstag shortened it by a year, and thus it became known as the "sexennat." it was pronounced inexpedient to attempt to fix for some years in advance the empire's requirements in torpedo craft, school-ships, and training ships. that this scheme was intended by its author to be merely a beginning has been shown by the sequel, but admiral von tirpitz himself little dreamed that he would so soon be able to take the next and decisive step, which should bring him to within measurable distance of his goal. early in 1899 he said in the budget committee: "i declare expressly that in no quarter has the intention to submit a new navy plan in any way been manifested; that, on the contrary, in all quarters concerned, the firmest intention exists to carry out the navy law, and to observe the limits therein laid down." in other words, the law was to run its six years' course. nevertheless, before the year was at an end, the bill which was to become the navy law of 1900 had already been announced by the government. in the light of the vast development of germany's colonial and commercial interests the navy act of 1898 was of an unambitious character. the german fleet was at this time still the weakest possessed by any of the great powers of europe, except austria-hungary, which then had no naval pretensions. if only as a matter of historical interest it is interesting to record that, at the moment when this effort towards expansion was made, germany kept in commission only four ships which could be dignified with the description of battleships, together with four smaller armoured vessels. the only modern ships of the line under the german ensign consisted of these four battleships of the worth class, vessels of 9,874 tons displacement in comparison with ships of 15,000 tons which had already been incorporated in the british fleet. the german ships, though nominally battleships, were really only coast-defence vessels, heavily gunned and thickly armoured, but with storage for only 680 tons of coal; whereas contemporary british ships of the majestic class possessed a capacity of 1,850 tons.[8] the four vessels of this class, in addition to the _worth_, were the _weisenburg_, _kurfürst friedrich wilhelm_, and _brandenburg_. they marked a notable advance on the little armoured ships of three to four thousand tons of the siegfried class, which had been built during the early 'nineties, but, owing to their limited fuel capacity, their radius of action was extremely restricted, and they were, in fact, only very powerful coast-defence ships, with a speed on trial of between sixteen and seventeen knots. the design of every armoured ship is a compromise between armament, armour, speed, and coal capacity, and in this german design a predominance then unprecedented in any navy in the world was given to the two first-named characteristics. on paper these ships were vessels of great offensive power, as is revealed by the contrast given on p. 103 between them and the contemporary battleships of the majestic class of the british fleet, which displaced about 15,000 tons and attained a speed of eighteen knots, with 1,850 tons of coal on board. these few details reveal the fundamental differences between the character of the british and german navies at this time and the policy which they represented. the british government, in accordance with precedent, was providing a fleet of the high-seas type, while the german government was content with a small force built specifically for the purpose of coast-defence. these four large german coast-defence ships were at this time supported by the four vessels of the sachsen type of 7,283 tons, already obsolescent; by six old ships--one dating back to 1868; by eight little armoured vessels of the beowulf class, of about 3,500 tons, which had been constructed during the early 'nineties; and the tail of the list was brought up by eleven armoured gunboats each of 1,000 tons displacement. this enumeration of the naval forces of germany indicates conclusively the modest ambitions which hitherto had animated her naval administration. the german fleet, except for the purposes of coast defence, and specifically for the protection of her baltic shores, was a negligible quantity, having no +------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+ | | majestic class. | worth class. | +------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+ |length |over all, 413 ft. |380 ft. 6 in. (354 ft. | | | (390 ft. at water-line). | 3 in. at water-line.) | | | | | |beam |75 ft. |65 ft. 6 in. | |mean draught|27 ft. 6 in. |24 ft. 4 in. | |armour |partial 9-in. harveyed |complete belt, 11·8 to | | | belt, 16 ft. | 15·7 in. (compound | | | broad, and 220 ft. | in earlier, steel in | | | long; bulkheads, | later, ships); barbettes | | | 14 in. (max.); | and conning-tower, | | | barbettes, 14 in.; | 11·8 in.; | | | barbette-shields, | ammunition hoists, | | | 10 in.; casemates | 11·8 in.; gun-hoods, | | | (12), 6 in.; protected | 5 in.; cellulose | | | deck 2·5 to | cofferdam belt; | | | 4 in.; forward | casemate for 4·1-in. | | | conning tower, 14 | guns, 3 in.; steel | | | in.; after conning | deck, 3 in., flat on | | | tower, 3 in. | top of belt. | | | | | |armament |4 12-in. 46-ton |6 11-in. krupp | | | (wire-wound) | breech-loading, | | | breech-loading; | 2 in each | | | 12 6-in. | barbette; 8 4·1 in. | | | quickfirers in casemates;| quickfiring of 30 | | | 16 12-pounder | calibres in a casemate | | | quick-firers; | forward of | | | 2 12-pounder | the centre barbettes; | | | boat-guns; 12 | 8 3·4-in. | | | 3-pounder quick-firing; | quick-firers of 30 | | | 2 maxims; | calibres; 2·23 in. | | | 5 torpedo-tubes | breech-loading | | | (18-in.), 4 submerged, | boat or field guns; | | | 1 above | 12 1-pounder quick-firers;| | | water astern. | 8 machine; | | | | 3 torpedo tubes, | | | | 2 submerged. | +------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+ influence either upon european or world policy. the truth of this statement is conclusively proved by the following table showing the relative strength of the only five navies of the world which were, at that time, of appreciable importance, the fleets of japan and of the united states being then still in their infancy: +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ | |britain.|france.|russia.|italy.|germany.| +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |battleships: | | | | | | | first-class | 29 | 14 | 6 | 8 | 4 | | second-class | 7 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 4 | | third-class | 18 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 6 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ | total battleships| 54 | 29 | 15 | 13 | 14 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |coast-defence ships | 14 | 16 | 13 | - | 18 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |cruisers: | | | | | | | first-class | 23 | 8 | 6 | - | 1 | | second-class | 47 | 13 | 3 | 5 | 3 | | third-class | 34 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 9 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ | total cruisers | 104 | 30 | 10 | 14 | 13 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |torpedo gunboats | 34 | 19 | 8 | 15 | 4 | +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ it must be confessed that at this time the german fleet bore no reasonable relation to germany's growing trade and oversea interests. but the mass of the people of the german empire were still unconscious of any deficiency, and, blinded by the success of their armies during the war with france and the small influence which naval power exerted in that struggle, they had refused for many years to take upon themselves the burden which the new naval ambitions represented. but with the passage of the navy act of 1898, and the widespread agitation carried on by the navy league, under the highest patronage, and--even more important--by the press bureau under admiral von tirpitz, a change immediately occurred; and the success with which the british forces were enabled to conduct their military operations in south africa, while europe was forced to stand by inactive, owing to the supreme control which the british fleet possessed of sea communications, produced a revulsion of feeling. the current of european events, and the reception with which the emperor's speeches met, convinced the government, within a comparatively few months of the passage of the act of 1898, that they might safely abandon this modest measure and replace it by a new bill. what had happened in the meantime? this: the outbreak of the boer war had generated in germany an absolutely unprecedented hostility to great britain, which was afterwards roused to white heat by the seizure of the mail steamer _bundesrat_ and other german vessels on the african coast. admiral von tirpitz had a unique opportunity such as was never likely to present itself to him again. he made prompt and full use of it, and while great britain was in the thick of the embarrassments of the early stages of the south african war, the great navy bill of 1900 was passed into law. the seizure of the german vessels was admitted by the british government to have been a blunder. an apology was tendered to germany on account of it, and promises made that similar incidents should not recur. the action of the british warships did nothing but harm, and would certainly never have been taken if the foreign office in london had been properly informed on the situation in germany by its representatives in berlin, and had itself kept the admiralty fully posted. consequently, in the spring of 1900, the act of 1898 was replaced by a new one, in face of all admiral von tirpitz's protestations of two years before. _this measure set up an establishment of almost twice the size of the former one, and embraced ships intended for battle purposes on the high seas._ during the discussion of the measure in the reichstag the centre party compelled the government to modify their original scheme, and to drop five large and five small cruisers for service on foreign stations, while the reserve of cruisers was reduced by one large and two small vessels. in the course of the debate the naval secretary announced that, while the government were compelled to agree to the amendment of their proposals, they still insisted upon the necessity of providing the original number of ships for duty in foreign seas, but would agree to postpone the final settlement of the question until a subsequent date. in its final form, as it received the approval of the reichstag and of the emperor, and as it was published in the _imperial german gazette_ of june 20th, 1900, the bill set up the following establishment for the fleet: the battle fleet. 2 fleet flagships. 4 squadrons, each of 8 battleships. 8 large cruisers for scouting purposes. 24 small cruisers for scouting purposes. foreign fleet. 3 large cruisers. 10 small cruisers. reserve. 4 battleships. 3 large cruisers. 4 small cruisers. the new act was based upon the same calculation of the effective life of ships as the one of 1898, and provided that, except in the case of total loss, battleships were to be replaced after twenty-five years and cruisers after twenty years. it was provided that the age of ships was to be reckoned from the grant of the first instalment in payment for the ship to be replaced to the passing of the first instalment in payment for the ship to be built as "substitute" (ersatzschiff). it was proposed to keep half the battle squadrons--the first and second--fully manned on a war footing, together with one-half of the torpedo craft and all the school-ships and auxiliary vessels. the third and fourth battle squadrons were to form the reserve fleet, half the ships of which were to be kept in permanent commission. the act also made provision for nucleus crews for the second half of the torpedo-boats, for the requirements of ships serving abroad, and for the needs of the shore establishments. more remarkable, perhaps, than the actual terms of the navy act was the character of the explanatory memorandum put forward by the navy department.[9] in this notable document occurs the following statement of the new naval policy of the german empire: "to protect germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances, there is only one means: germany must have a battle fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world. "for this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the german battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power, because a great naval power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. but even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong german fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet." the memorandum well repays study in the light of subsequent events. almost at the moment of its publication admiral von der goltz, a former chief of the admiralstab, gave a less reserved exposition of german policy, thus reflecting the opinions held by the naval officers responsible for the character of the proposed expansion of the german fleet. "let us consider," he said, "the case of a war against england. in spite of what many people think, there is nothing improbable in such a war, owing to the animosity which exists in our country towards england, and, on the other side, to the sentiments of the british nation towards all continental powers, and in particular against germany. these are not chauvinistic exaggerations, but the opinion of the whole of the people of great britain, who are jealous of our commercial development. if england should ever lose her mercantile supremacy on the seas, the decline of her naval dominion would only be a question of time, and she realizes the fact instinctively. of course the british government will make every effort to prevent the violent explosion of these sentiments, preferring peaceful competition to war. but how long can that last? violence becomes a right to a people which fears for its existence. "the opinion is generally held in this country that any resistance against england at sea would be impossible, and that all our naval preparations are but wasted efforts. it is time that this childish fear, which would put a stop to all our progress, should be pulled up by the roots and destroyed. "at this moment (1900) we are almost defenceless against england at sea, but already we possess the beginnings of a weapon which statesmanship can put to a good use, and our chances of success in a war against england grow more favourable day by day. "the maritime superiority of great britain, overwhelming now, will certainly remain considerable in the future; but she is compelled to scatter her forces all over the world. in the event of war in home waters, the greater part of the foreign squadrons would no doubt be recalled; but that would be a matter of time, and then all the stations oversea could not be abandoned. on the other hand, the german fleet, though much smaller, can remain concentrated in european waters. "with the increases about to be made it will be in a position to measure its strength with the ordinary british naval forces in home waters (then consisting only of the small and inefficiently manned channel squadron); but it should not be forgotten that the question of numbers is far less important at sea than on land. numerical inferiority can be compensated by efficiency, by excellence of material, by the capacity and discipline of the men. careful preparation permitting rapid mobilization can ensure a momentary superiority." with the passage of the navy act of 1900, germany proceeded to develop a high-sea fleet--a naval force capable of going anywhere and doing anything. hitherto her ships had represented in their design the domination of a coast-defence policy. she now entered upon the construction of ships of the first class. naval construction was regularized, and forthwith proceeded with great rapidity. during the five years--1886 to 1890--no ship even nominally of the battleship class was launched. during 1891 to 1895 only four vessels, and between 1890 and 1900 only six vessels, and these all of relatively modest fighting power, were put in the water, but in 1901 no fewer than five first-class battleships were sent afloat. at the time when the navy act of 1900 was passed germany had just completed the five ships of the old kaiser class, with a displacement of about 11,150 tons, and mounting four 9·4-inch guns of 40 calibre as battle weapons in association with a large number of secondary guns--eighteen pieces of 5·9 inches. the technical advisers of the german admiralty at this date pinned their faith to a storm of projectiles from quick-firing guns, and in order that weights might be kept down and the ships might be restricted to dimensions to enable them to navigate the kiel canal, reliance was placed upon the 9·4-inch gun at a moment when in practically all the navies of the world a 12-inch weapon was being mounted. the type of battleship design which was introduced with the passage of the act of 1898, and which was yet in hand when the measure of 1900 was prepared, still combined a weak main armament of four 9·4-inch guns with an exceedingly heavy secondary armament and a complete armoured belt. whereas british ships at this time, such as those of the duncan class, were being given only partial belts, and these only 7 inches thick amidships, tapering off fore and aft, the german vessels received thicker belts extending over the whole length. of this new design--known as the wittelsbach class--five units were building when the 1900 act was passed. they had a maximum coal capacity of 1,770 tons of coal, with 200 tons of oil, and were capable of steaming at a speed of about eighteen knots, thus reflecting the rise of german ambition for something more than a coast-defence fleet. the belts of these ships were 7·5 inches wide, with a thickness amidships of 8·9 inches, while the four 9·4-inch guns were protected with armour 9·8 inches thick, and the secondary turrets and casemates carrying the eighteen 5·9-inch guns were protected with armour 5·9 inches thick. after the passage of the navy act of 1900 the 9·4-inch gun, as the battle weapon, was abandoned in favour of an 11-inch of 40 calibre, and the displacement of the new ships of the deutschland class, as they are generically termed, although there are minor differences in the ten vessels, was nearly 13,000 tons. these ships really represented the entrance of germany upon the high seas as a first-class naval power, possessing vessels fit to lie in the line and to fight the men-of-war under any foreign flag. the new design may be contrasted with advantage with that of the worth class which has already been described: deutschland class. _armour._ krupp, complete belt, about 7 feet wide,[10] 8·9 inches amidships, tapering to 3·9 inches at ends; lower edge amidships, 6·7 inches; lower deck side amidships, 5·5 inches; main turrets and barbettes, 11 inches to 9·8 inches; secondary turrets, 6·7 inches; battery, 5·9 inches; conning-tower, 11·8 inches; s.t.--aft, 5·5 inches; deck, 2·9 inches on slopes, 1·6 inches on flat. _armament._ four 11 inch (40 calibre) in pairs in turrets, fore and aft; 14 6·7 inch (40 calibre), 10 in battery on main deck, 4 singly in turrets on upper deck; 12 3·4 inch (24 pounder); 4 machine; torpedo tubes, 6 (18 inch), 4 submerged, 1 bow, and 1 stern. simultaneously with the construction of these ten battleships, six armoured cruisers, ranging in displacement from 8,800 to about 11,000 tons, were laid down, and in 1906 a single clause amending the act was passed increasing the foreign fleet by five armoured cruisers and the fleet reserve by one armoured cruiser, thus fulfilling in part the original programme of the navy department with which the reichstag had interfered. at about the same date german naval opinion made a complete _volte face_ in regard to the fighting value of the submarine. about the time when the act of 1900 was passed the british admiralty, after a careful study of the progress of submarine navigation in france and america, decided that it could no longer ignore this type of man-of-war. it was forthwith decided to buy an experimental ship from the holland company of the united states, which had already demonstrated the practical value of this particular type of submersible torpedo-boat. the original craft which was purchased under these circumstances was a little ship with a submerged displacement of only 120 tons, and a water-line displacement of 104 tons. she was propelled on the surface by a four-cylinder gasoline engine giving a speed of eight to eight and a half knots, while below the surface she was driven by an electric motor, and was capable of only six or seven knots. the entrance of this little ship into the british service was hailed in germany with something approaching derision, and in the technical papers the futility of the submarine was urged with a wealth of argument. the little holland boat, however, was merely the foundation from which the british authorities proceeded to develop a type of craft in keeping with the offensive rôle of the british navy, and in 1906 submarines were being built for the british fleet mounting two torpedo tubes on a displacement of about 300 tons, and possessing a surface speed of fourteen knots in combination with a submerged speed of ten knots. when it is added that these craft possessed a full speed radius of about 3,000 miles on the surface and were estimated to be able to travel 150 miles under water, it is not surprising that german naval opinion as to the advantages of the submarine underwent a sudden and dramatic change. henceforth the submarine was to be treated by german naval officers with respect. without the formality of any public announcement, either in the reichstag or in the press, an under-water boat was laid down at the germania yard at kiel in 1906, and thenceforward an energetic policy of construction was pursued, although it was not until two years later that legislative provision was made for the building of this type of warship. a very remarkable feature of german policy has been the persistency with which cruisers have been built even at a time when other naval powers, including great britain, were inactive. as a matter of course, during the period when the german government was content to provide a fleet mainly for the purposes of coast defence, great importance was attached to the efficiency and adequacy of the cruiser squadrons. at the time of the passage of the navy act of 1900, for instance, there were eighteen cruisers completed and nearly a dozen others in hand. under the act of that year provision was made to continue this policy while attaining a higher standard of battle strength.[11] even when, in 1908, legislative effect was given to the ambition of the marine office further to expedite battleship construction, in spite of the heavy cost involved by the transition from mixed armament ships to the all-big-gun ships of the dreadnought era, the reichstag was asked to stereotype the cruiser programme. the act made provision for two light cruisers to be laid down annually, and in the measure passed in 1912 an addition of two "small cruisers" was made for the period 1912-1917. a notable contrast is provided by a study of germany's action and the policy of the british admiralty charged with the protection of a vast oversea trade and half the shipping of the world. during the later years of the last century and the first four years of the present century a persistent policy of construction was pursued both in armoured and protected cruisers, and then for several years there was a complete cessation of this form of shipbuilding activity. other countries, germany only excepted, either acting on their own initiative or accepting the lead of the british authorities also desisted from cruiser construction. the advance in the size and cost of large armoured ships threw heavy burdens upon the respective exchequers, and no doubt the saving effected was a welcome relief at a moment when under every flag naval expenditure was advancing at an unparalleled rate. the result of the persistent policy adopted by germany became apparent in 1911, when in modern swift cruisers suitable for scouting the two fleets were practically upon an equality. it was in these circumstances, faced by evidence of german progress in cruiser construction, that the british authorities again decided to embark upon the building of new squadrons of cruisers of small size and high speed--in fact, of considerably smaller size than the ships then in hand in germany. but in battleship construction german policy has necessarily been less continuous and consistent. the war between russia and japan in the far east, and the lessons which it taught to the naval world were destined to upset completely the theories upon which battleship and larger cruiser design in germany had been based in the early years of the present century. the german naval authorities had persisted in attaching primary importance to the secondary gun, still believing in the moral and material effect of a storm of projectiles from numerous quick-firing guns. they were still proceeding with the construction of ships--battleships and large cruisers--embodying these ideas when a new board of admiralty in london, with admiral sir john--now lord--fisher as first sea lord, appointed a committee to reconsider the design of british ships in the light of the information which the gunnery tests of the fleet and the struggle in the far east had supplied. thanks to the british alliance with the japanese, british officers, and british officers only, had been permitted to be present with the japanese fleet during the decisive battles of the war. with the advantage of the information thus obtained the designs of british ships were reconsidered. the report of this committee was treated as confidential. in presenting the navy estimates for 1905 to the house of commons, the earl of selborne, the first lord, contented himself with making the following statement as to the work of this body, and of the new programme of construction: "i may claim that the work of the committee will enable the board to ensure to the navy the immediate benefit of the experience which is to be derived from the naval warfare between russia and japan, and of the resultant studies of the naval intelligence department. i can however hold out no hope that it will be consistent with the interests of the public service to publish either the reference to the committee or its report. "it is proposed to begin during the financial year 1905-06: 1 battleship, 4 armoured cruisers, 5 ocean-going destroyers, 1 ocean-going destroyer of the experimental type, 12 coastal destroyers, 11 submarines.[12] "his majesty has approved that the battleship should be called the _dreadnought_, and the first of the armoured cruisers the _invincible_." it was not until many months later that it gradually became known that the british admiralty were embarking upon the construction of an entirely new type of battleship, and it was even later that information was available as to the character of the "armoured cruisers" mentioned in the first lord's statement. in the following spring a partial revelation of the change in british design was made in the _naval annual_: "the _dreadnought_, officially laid down at portsmouth on october 2nd, 1905, though some material had already been built into her, was launched by his majesty on february 10th, 1906. the admiralty announce that the period of building for armoured vessels is to be reduced to two years, but the _dreadnought_ is to be completed in february, 1907. the rapidity of her construction will therefore out-rival that of the _majestic_ and _magnificent_, which were completed within two years from the date of the laying of their first keel plates. "the _dreadnought_ represents a remarkable development in naval construction, which has been for some time foreshadowed, notably by captain cuniberti, the famous italian naval constructor. the russo-japanese war, more particularly the battle of tsushima, established the fact that naval engagements can, and will, be fought at greater distances than were formerly considered possible. hence the medium armament is held by many authorities to lose much of its value." in the _naval annual_ of that year, it was reported that the japanese contemplated laying down a battleship with an armament of four 12-inch and ten 10-inch guns. it was then announced that the _dreadnought_ was to carry a main armament of ten 12-inch 45 calibre guns, of 50 per cent. greater power than those carried by the _majestic_, while the medium armament was to disappear entirely. the question of protection entered also very largely into the consideration, and _the times_, in describing the new ship, said that it was understood that "she was to be made as nearly unsinkable as possible from the explosion of a torpedo or mine." it was even stated that there would be no openings in the watertight bulkheads, and this proved to be the fact. moreover, this ship was the first large vessel in the world to be fitted with turbines. it was stated unofficially that this new ship of the all-big-gun type rendered obsolescent practically all the battleships of the world with mixed armaments--that is with guns of varying size. the british naval authorities continued to maintain a discreet silence as to the character of the new vessels, and the design, as its main characteristics became known, was assailed with a good deal of criticism. the controversy was at its height when president roosevelt called upon commander sims, the inspector of target practice in the united states navy, to make a report upon the advantages possessed by the all-big-gun ship of high speed and complete armour protection in view of the criticism of the british design of admiral mahan.[13] commander sims, who had made a life-study of gunnery questions, prepared a long report describing the character of the revolution in design, and its influence upon the navies of the world. it is interesting to recall some passages from this report, which in its essential portions appeared in the proceedings of the united states naval institute, particularly as the british admiralty have never considered it wise to enter upon a detailed defence of their policy. commander sims stated: "concerning the advisability of building all-big-gun ships, that is, discarding all smaller guns (except torpedo-defence guns) and designing the ships to carry the maximum number of heavy turret guns, these alone to be used in battle against other ships, i think it could be clearly shown that captain mahan is in error in concluding that it would add more to our naval strength to expend the same amount of money that the big ships would cost, for smaller and slower ships, carrying the usual intermediate guns (6-inch, etc.); and that, as in the question of speed, this error is due to the fact that much important information concerning the new methods of gun-fire was not considered by the author in preparing his article. (note.--unfortunately these methods of gun-fire cannot at present be specifically explained in a published article, as this would involve a discussion of our methods of controlling our ships' batteries, and bringing our ships into action with an enemy.) "i may, however, assure the reader that, from the point of view of the efficiency of gun-fire alone, it would be unwise ever to build a man-of-war of any type whatever, having more than one calibre of gun in her main battery. in other words, it may be stated that the abandonment of mixed-battery ships in favour of the all-big-gun, one-calibre ship was directly caused by the recognition of certain fundamental principles of naval markmanship developed by gunnery officers. "therefore we have but to decide what the calibre for each class of ships should be, a decision which should present no special difficulty, provided it be first determined how we are to defeat the enemy--whether by the destruction of his ships (by sinking them or disabling their guns) or by the destruction or demoralization of their personnel. "in this connection the following facts should first be clearly understood--namely: "1. turrets are now, for the first time, being designed that are practically invulnerable to all except heavy projectiles. instead of having sighting-hoods on the turret roof, where sights, pointers, and officers are exposed to disablement (as frequently happened in the russian ships) there will be prismatic sights, projecting laterally from the gun trunnions, through small holes in the side of the turret, and the gun-ports will be protected by 8-inch armour plates, so arranged that no fragments of shells can enter the turrets. "2. on the proposed all-big-gun ships the heavy armour belt will be about eight feet above the water-line, and extending from end to end. the conning-tower, barbettes, etc., will be of heavy armour; and there being no intermediate battery (which could not be protected by heavy armour, on account of its extent), it follows that in battle all the gunnery personnel, except the small, single fire-control party aloft, will be behind heavy armour, and that, therefore, neither the ship or her personnel can be materially injured by small calibre guns. "considering, therefore, that our object in designing a battleship is that she may be able to meet those of our possible enemies upon at least equal terms, it seems evident that it would be extremely unwise to equip our new ships with a large number of small guns that are incapable of inflicting material damage upon the all-big-gun one-calibre ships of our enemies, or upon the personnel manning their guns." in the same paper commander sims explained the principal tactical qualities that are desirable in a fleet--namely, compactness of the battle formation and the flexibility of the fleet as a unit--that is, its ability to change its formation in the least possible time and space with safety to its units. proceeding to elaborate his views, commander sims stated: "for example, suppose two fleets of eight vessels each, composed of ships that are alike in all respects, and suppose their personnel to be equally skilful, with the exception of the commanders-in-chief, whose difference in energy and ability is such that one fleet has been so drilled as to be able to manoeuvre with precision and safety while maintaining one-half the distance between its units that the other fleet requires. "this is putting an extreme case, but it shows: "1. that the short fleet, being about half the length of the other one, can complete certain important manoeuvres in about one-half the time and one half the space required for similar manoeuvres of the long fleet. "2. that, when ranged alongside each other, the defeat of the long fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return, though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance of gun-fire from the fifth or sixth vessel of the long fleet, the seventh and eighth being too far astern to do much damage, as would also be the case if the long fleet had several vessels astern of these. "it is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with safety under battle conditions--that is, while steaming at full speed, without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that should be used only for preliminary drills. "doubtless some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises in manoeuvring, may succeed in attaining an interval between ships that is less by 15 or 20 per cent. than that attained by others; but manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships depends upon their lengths and manoeuvring qualities. for example, the german interval is 300 metres from centre to centre, while larger ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and those between 450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards. "if we accept captain mahan's advice and build comparatively small, low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift, all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire--the loss of these advantages to be fully realised twenty-five years hence, when our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our present size." * * * * * finally, this officer added: "if it be claimed that it would be better to reduce the speed of the large vessel to sixteen knots and put the weight saved into guns, it may be replied that the heavy turret guns cannot be mounted to advantage (so as to increase the hitting capacity of the vessel) without very considerably increasing the size of the ship, because the number of heavy turrets that can be placed to advantage is governed largely by the length of the ship--which increases slowly with the displacement. this point is fully discussed in a recent article in a german publication. i do not remember the displacement used by the author to illustrate the principle, but, supposing the ones quoted below to be correct, he shows that if it requires a displacement of 20,000 tons to obtain a broadside fire of, say, eight 12-inch turret guns, you could not advantageously mount any additional turrets on 21,000 or 22,000 tons, but would have to go to 25,000 or 26,000 tons to obtain the necessary space. and, conversely, if you design a 20,000-ton battleship for sixteen instead of twenty knots, you cannot utilise the weight saved to increase the gun-power by adding 12-inch turrets, as you could by adding a number of intermediate guns. "it is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets (by which the number of guns could be doubled, if the weights permitted) does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the ship as a whole, because of the 'interference' caused by having four guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets. "captain mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to increase the size of the new battleships (from about 15,000 to about 20,000 tons) as a 'wilful premature antiquating of good vessels' ... 'a growing and wanton evil.' if these words are intended in their true meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. i can understand an individual being wilful and wanton, but i cannot believe that the naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly and uniformly inspired in this manner. on the contrary, it seems to me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that is believed to justify the demand. "this common cause is undoubtedly a common belief that the same amount of money expended for large war vessels will add more to a nation's naval power than the same amount expended for small vessels, for it cannot reasonably be assumed that the tax-ridden nations of europe expend their great naval budgets wilfully and wantonly. undoubtedly each nation earnestly strives to expend these sums as to derive the greatest increase of naval power. the same is true in reference to their armies. as the mechanical arts improve each nation endeavours to improve its war material. when a nation adopts new rifles, it is not a wilful premature antiquating of several million excellent ones, it is a case of _force majeure_--it must adopt them or suffer a relative loss of military efficiency, and it must make no mistake as to the relative efficiency of its weapons. in 1870 the french suffered a humiliating defeat as a direct result of the colossal conceit which rendered them incapable of accepting conclusive evidence that the german field artillery was greatly superior to theirs. "the same law--that of necessity--governs the evolution of battleships. as might have been expected, this evolution has, as a rule, been gradual as regards increased displacement. the exception is the sudden recent increase (4,000 to 5,000 tons) in displacement. this exception therefore needs explanation.... it was due to a complete change of opinion as to the _hitting capacity_ of guns of various calibres. this is now well understood by all officers who have recently been intimately associated with the new methods of gunnery training. these methods have demonstrated this point in such a manner as to leave no doubt in our minds as to the correctness of our conclusions. the rapidity of hitting of the heaviest guns has been increased several thousand per cent., and that of smaller guns about in proportion to their calibre. " ... the inception of the epoch-making principles of the new methods of training belongs exclusively to captain (now rear-admiral) percy scott, director of naval practice of the british navy, who has, i believe, done more in this respect to improve naval marksmanship than all of the naval officers who have given their attention to this matter since the first introduction of the rifled cannon on men-of-war; nor should we forget that this degree of improvement was rendered possible by the introduction of telescope sights, the successful application of which to naval guns was made by commander b.a. fiske, u.s. navy, as early as 1892. as soon as the above facts gained general acceptance in great britain and the united states, the evolution of the all-big-gun one-calibre battleship became a foregone conclusion; and the reason for the great increase in displacement, as i understand it, is simply that you cannot build an efficient ship of this class on less than about 20,000 tons, because you cannot mount more than two 12-inch turrets to advantage upon a battleship of much less displacement, because the length and breadth are not sufficient." the dreadnought design and all that it meant threw the german admiralty into confusion. at the moment they were still engaged in the construction of the vessels of the deutschland class, of about 13,000 tons, in which primary importance was given to the secondary gun--fourteen 6·7-inch weapons--to the sacrifice of the big gun--four 11-inch pieces--and speed; whereas the new british design ignored the secondary gun in order to mount no fewer than ten big guns, and develop the speed to the extent of three or four knots above battleships then building. before the _dreadnought_ of the british programme of 1905 had been laid down at portsmouth, two german battleships of the familiar design with mixed armament had been begun--the _schleswig holstein_ in the germania yard and the _schlesien_ at dantzic. so completely were the german authorities unprepared for the revolution initiated by the british admiralty, that from the summer of 1905 until july, 1907, the keel of not a single further battleship was laid in germany. in the meantime, while british yards were busy with vessels of the new type, the design of the german ships was reconsidered. after an interval of two years the keels of two vessels of the _dreadnought_ type were laid down, and two more keels were placed in position a month later--that is, in august, 1907. these four ships--the nassau class--inaugurated the dreadnought policy in germany. two were completed in may, 1910, and two in september following. these ships embody the all-big-gun principle in association with a powerful secondary armament, consisting of a dozen 5·9-inch guns and sixteen 24-pounders. moreover, whereas the british dreadnought had been provided with only ten big guns, which was held by the british gunnery experts to be the maximum number which could be carried with advantage on the displacement then considered advisable, the german vessels were given twelve guns, not of the 12-inch but of the 11-inch type. each of these ships displaces 18,600 tons, and has a nominal speed of twenty knots. their normal coal capacity is 885 tons, with a maximum storage of 2,655 tons. on the other hand, the early british _dreadnought_, with about the same displacement and coal-carrying capacity, attained a speed of one or two knots more, owing to the use of turbines in place of reciprocating engines. the contrast between the armour and armament of the british and german ships, comparing the four nassaus of the german fleet[14] with the superb class of the british navy, is given in the table on p. 129. by energetic action the british admiralty had obtained a lead in the new type of battleship.[15] moreover, even after the character of the dreadnought became known, the german authorities remained ignorant of the fact that the "armoured cruisers" of the invincible class were really swift battleships carrying the same type of battle gun as the _dreadnought_, in association with a speed exceeding twenty-five knots, and an armour belt not inferior to that placed on the latest pre-dreadnought german battleships. by this decisive move, the british authorities had depressed the value of all mixed armament battleships, in which the british fleet was becoming weak in face of foreign--and particularly german--rivalry, and had started the competition of armaments on an entirely new basis upon terms of advantage. no sooner was the true inwardness of the dreadnought policy realized than the german authorities began the preparation of a new german navy act. it was eventually decided that the best +--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | | superb class. | nassau class. | +--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ |armour |krupp: complete |krupp: complete | | | belt, about 16 ft. | belt, 12 in. amidships, | | | wide (narrower | tapering | | | aft), 11 in. amidships, | to 3·9 in. forward, | | | tapering to | and 3·9 in. aft; | | | 6 in. forward and | lower deck side, | | | 4 in. aft; turrets, | 7·9 in. amidships, | | | 8 in.; barbettes, | 3·9 in. narrow | | | 12 in.; forward | belt at ends; turrets | | | conning-tower, 12 | and barbettes, | | | in.; after conning-tower,| 11 in.; battery, | | | 8 in.; deck, | 6·1 in.; conning-tower, | | | sloping, 2·7 in. | 11·8 in.; | | | | deck, sloping, 2·9 in. | |armament|10 12-in. (45 calibres) |12 11-in. (45 calibres) | | | in pairs in turrets, | in pairs in turrets, | | | 1 forward, 1 on | 1 forward, 1 aft, | | | each beam, 2 aft | and 2 on each | | | on centre line; | beam; 12 5·9 in. | | | 16 4-in. (50 calibres), | (45 calibres) in battery;| | | 2 on each | 16 3·4 in. | | | turret (except no. | (24-pounder); torpedo | | | 4), 8 in superstructure; | tubes, 6 18-in., | | | 5 machine; | submerged, bow, | | | torpedo tubes, 5 | stern, and broadside. | | | 18-in., submerged, | | | | broadside, and | | | | stern. | | +--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ means of accomplishing the end in view--namely, the construction of a larger number of ships of the armoured classes in the next few years than was provided in the act of 1900, was to reduce the nominal effective age, and legislate for the replacement of all battleships and large cruisers within twenty years. accordingly, attached to the new act passed early in 1908, which was over two years after the laying down of the dreadnought, was a schedule setting forth that four large armoured ships should be laid down annually between 1908 and 1911, both inclusive, and that in 1911 onwards to 1917, two keels annually should be placed in position. by means of this single clause measure, which became law on april 6th, 1908, the construction of ships of the dreadnought type was accelerated, and whereas the british admiralty had definitely abandoned the construction of large cruisers of the armoured class--as the german authorities knew by this time--the marine office decided that each of the "large cruisers" specified in the act of 1900 should be swift dreadnoughts. this point is an important one. between 1897 and 1904, great britain laid down 27 battleships and 35 armoured cruisers--a total of 62 armoured ships in eight years, or an average of 7·75 ships a year. in this period germany built 16 battleships and 5 armoured cruisers, or 21 armoured ships--equal to an average of 2·62 ships a year. in 1905 the admiralty determined to cease building armoured cruisers. in that year they laid down 4 "capital ships"--all of them dreadnoughts; in the next two years 3 annually, and in 1908, 2 ships only. while the british authorities abandoned the building of armoured cruisers, germany decided to accelerate her battleship construction, and she also decided that all the "large cruisers" specified in her law should be swift dreadnoughts, and thus from 38 battleships and 20 armoured cruisers, she rose to an establishment of 58 battleships. at the end of 1911, when it was imagined that the german programme would fall from 4 large ships annually to 2 ships, a new navy bill was produced.[16] incidentally this measure added to the establishment 3 battleships and 2 unarmoured cruisers, and made provision for the construction of a maximum of 72 submarines. the significance of the successive changes in shipbuilding policy in germany, reflecting in an ascending scale the naval ambitions of the marineamt, may be realised from the following summary, showing the establishment of large armoured ships fixed under successive measures: +-----+----------------------------+ | act.| establishment of ships | | | adopted. | | +------------+---------------+ | |battleships.|large cruisers.| +-----+------------+---------------+ |1898 | 17 | 8 | |1900 | 38 | 14 | |1906 | 38 | 20 | | | | | | +----------------------------+ | | dreadnoughts. | |1908 | 58 | |1912 | 61 | +-----+----------------------------+ under the operation of german naval legislation, it was determined to provide sixty-one large armoured ships of maximum power, all of them less than twenty years old. the act did not specify the character of the vessels of the various classes to be laid down. it was elastic in this respect. it left to the marine office complete freedom in the matter of design; but, on the other hand, it tied effectually the hands of the reichstag, and it could not, except it repealed the navy law, reduce in any year the number of keels to be laid down. there could be no reduction in the output of naval material until a new navy law had been passed. this is a point which was frequently forgotten in england. but the notable feature of the navy act passed by the reichstag in 1912 was not the additions to the shipbuilding programme, though these were notable, but the steps taken to increase the instant readiness of the fleet for war. prior to the passage of this measure it had been the practice in the british navy to maintain only about half the men-of-war of various classes on a war footing, relegating the remainder to reserves representing various stages of preparedness for action. the german navy act of 1912 set up an entirely new standard with a view to obtaining the maximum advantage from a conscript service, where the pay is low, in competition with a voluntary service, such as obtains in the british fleet, with very much higher rates of pay. in the speech which he delivered in committee in the house of commons on july 22nd, 1912, mr. winston churchill, the first lord of the admiralty, gave a lucid explanation of the essential features of this german navy act. he said: "the main feature of that law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is an important feature. the main feature is the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be available, immediately available, at all seasons of the year. a third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle-fleet. whereas, according to the unamended law, the active battle-fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers; in the near future that active fleet will consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers; and, whereas at present owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in germany, the german fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. "ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers--or torpedo-boats, as they are called in germany--instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144. three-quarters of a million pounds had already been taken in the general estimate for the year for the building of submarines. the new law adds a quarter of a million to this, and that is a provision which, so far as we can judge from a study of the finances, would appear to be repeated in subsequent years. seventy-two new submarines will be built within the currency of the law, and of those it is apparently proposed to maintain fifty-four with full permanent crews. "taking a general view, the effect of this law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire german navy will be maintained in full permanent commission--that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war. such a proportion is remarkable, and so far as i am aware, finds no example in the previous practice of modern naval powers. so great a change and development in the german fleet involves, of course, important additions to their personnel. in 1898 the officers and men of the german navy amounted to 25,000. to-day that figure has reached 66,000. "under the previous laws and various amendments which have preceded this one, the germans have been working up to a total in 1920, according to our calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they have been approaching that total by increments of, approximately, an addition of 3,500 a year. the new law adds a total of 15,000 officers and men, and makes the total in 1920 of 101,500.[17] the new average annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of all ranks, but for the next three years by special provision 500 extra are to be added. from 1912 to 1914 500 are to be added, and in the last three years of the currency of the law 500 less will be taken. this makes a total rate of increase of the german navy personnel of about 5,700 men a year. "the new construction under the law prescribes for the building of three additional battleships--one to be begun next year (1913), one in 1916, and two small cruisers of which the date has not yet been fixed. the date of the third battleship has not been fixed. it has been presumed to be later than the six years which we have in view. "the cost of these increases in men and in material during the next six years is estimated as £10,500,000 above the previous estimates spread over that period. i should like to point out to the committee that this is a cumulative increase which follows upon other increases of a very important character. the law of 1898 was practically doubled by the law of 1900, and if the expenditure contemplated by the law of 1900 had been followed the german estimates of to-day would be about £11,000,000. but owing to the amendments of 1906 and 1908, and now of 1912, that expenditure is very nearly £23,000,000. but the fact that the personnel plays such a large part in this new amendment, and that personnel is more cheaply obtained in germany than in this country, makes the money go farther there than it would do over here. "the ultimate scale of the new german fleet, as contemplated by the latest navy law, will be 41 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 40 small cruisers, besides a proper proportion--an ample proportion--of flotillas of torpedo-boat destroyers and submarines, by 1920. this is not on paper a great advance on the figures prescribed by the previous law, which gave 38 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 38 small cruisers. that is not a great advance on the total scale. in fact, however, there is a remarkable expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. the number of battleships and large armoured cruisers alone which will be kept constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the law from twenty-one, the present figure, to thirty-three--that is to say, an addition of twelve, or an increase of about 57 per cent. the new fleet will in the beginning include about twenty battleships and large cruisers of the older types, but gradually, as new vessels are built, the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely of modern vessels. "this new scale of the german fleet--organized in five battle squadrons, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds, and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines, more than three-fourths--nearly four-fifths, maintained in full permanent commission--the aspect and scale of this fleet is, i say, extremely formidable. such a fleet will be about as numerous to look at as the fleet which was gathered at spithead for the recent parliamentary visit, but, of course, when completed it will be far superior in actual strength. this full development will only be realized step by step. but already in 1914 two squadrons will, so far as we can ascertain, be entirely composed of dreadnoughts, or what are called dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the deutschlands and the braunschweigs,[18] together with five dreadnought battle-cruisers. it remains to be noted that this new law is the fifth in fourteen years of the large successive increases made in german naval strength, that it encountered no effective opposition in its passage through the reichstag, and that, though it has been severely criticized in germany since its passage, the criticisms have been directed towards its inadequacy." such is the evolution which german naval ambitions have undergone since the reichstag in the early years of the emperor's reign refused to believe that four relatively small battleships in full commission, with the same number of ineffective coast-defence ships of small size, did not represent the maximum naval power which germany need provide, and that an expenditure of two and three-quarter millions sterling was not sufficient burden to impose annually upon the teutonic peoples over and above the cost in money and service of the predominant army. nothing reveals the statesmanship of admiral von tirpitz so strikingly as the character of the naval legislation for which he has been responsible, and the manner in which he has bent every influence in germany and every occurrence abroad to promote his ends. prior to the introduction of the navy act of 1898, the only example of a continuous naval policy was the naval defence act of 1889, under which seventy ships of various types were added to the british navy during a period of four years. of these vessels only ten were of the armoured classes. this measure was confined to shipbuilding, and it made no provision for increasing the personnel or for setting up a fixed standard of commissioning. it merely provided a certain number of ships and left it to parliament to provide or not to provide crews with which to man them, and, as a matter of fact, parliament did not provide the necessary officers and men until long after the ships were at sea. admiral von tirpitz was not satisfied with so unmethodical and unstatesman-like a measure of procedure when he went to the marineamt in 1897. he presented to the reichstag a complete scheme of naval expansion, making provision not only for the construction of ships in specified numbers over a period of six years, but providing also for the due expansion of the personnel and for the attainment of a fixed establishment of ships first in full commission, secondly with nucleus crews, and thirdly in reserve. in obtaining the assent of the reichstag to this measure, which to a great extent removed the naval expansion movement from the control which it had hitherto exercised annually on the presentation of the estimates, the minister of marine achieved his first great triumph. this act was to have remained in operation for a period of six years, and was represented as an embodiment of german needs, quite independent of the naval preparations then being made by other powers. during the next two years no development occurred in the naval programmes either of great britain or other foreign countries, but an anglophobe wave passed over the continent as a result of the south african war. german sympathies in particular were aroused, and admiral von tirpitz at once seized the opportunity to repeal the fixed and immutable fleet law of 1898, and to replace it by a new enactment providing a battle fleet of roughly twice the strength of that legalized in the establishment of the former measure. this measure was to have remained in force until 1917. six years later--a liberal government, intent on disarmament, having assumed office in the united kingdom--an amendment representing another expansion was passed; two years after that the fourth fleet law became operative, and in 1912 another measure was adopted by the reichstag under the influence of a renewed anglophobe movement in germany. experience has shown that german fleet laws are regarded as immutable and fixed when proposals in the direction of a limitation of armaments are made, but as flexible as though no fleet law existed when political circumstances are favourable for making a further effort towards a higher standard of naval power. nor does this study exhaust the remarkable features of this naval legislation. an ordinary statesman, ignorant of naval matters, might have so framed the successive naval laws as seriously to tie the hands of the naval authorities in the development of the fleet, whereas admiral von tirpitz, with great skill, restricted the powers of interference on the part of the reichstag, while leaving the marine office with almost complete freedom in shaping the naval machine in the process of expansion. this double end was achieved by the use of generic naval terms in the loose manner adopted by those unfamiliar with their significance. admiral von tirpitz made up his "paper" establishment in the fleet laws by styling every ship of slow speed but carrying an armoured belt "a battleship," and then, under the terms of the law, he made provision for these dummy vessels to be replaced by veritable battleships of maximum power. thus ships of 4,000 tons displacement have been replaced by dreadnoughts of 25,000 tons, carrying the heaviest guns, and protected by thick armour. the establishment fixed by the reichstag has not been exceeded, but by a simple process of conjuring, small coast-defence ships have been quietly converted into first class sea-going battleships, ranking in strategical and tactical qualities with the most formidable ships in the british fleet. the naval authorities have by this means been able to prove to the uninitiated when challenged that they have kept within the four corners of the law, that the number of battleships has remained fixed according to the establishment between the periods of each enactment, and at the same time they have been in a position to follow an active shipbuilding policy, while raising from year to year the necessary personnel for manning the new vessels. this in another notable feature of admiral von tirpitz's policy. the legislation has been so elastic as to enable him to raise the necessary number of officers and men to suit the requirements of the fleet. when a dreadnought, requiring 1,106 officers and men, has been completed for sea to take the place of a ship of the hagen class, with a crew of only 306, the additional personnel has been instantly ready. the same process has been adopted in increasing the cruiser squadrons of the german navy. the law has specified that a certain number of "large cruisers" shall be built, and it has been left to the discretion of the naval authorities to interpret this elastic term in tons, guns, armour, knots of speed, and personnel. in accordance with the law, admiral von tirpitz has thus been able to replace cruisers of negligible fighting value and of small size by dreadnought battle cruisers mounting guns of immense power and attaining speeds hitherto without precedent. similarly, small torpedo-boats have given way in the establishment of the navy to torpedo-boat destroyers of large size, and step by step the naval strength of germany has been increased by a process, the cleverness and ingenuity of which even the german people themselves have not realized. germany has immensely increased her resources of ships and men, but she has done more than that: she has forced other powers to organize and train their squadrons on a standard of efficiency never attempted in the past. she has increased the strain and stress of peace until it resembles closely the actual conditions of war, and having determined year in and year out to keep nearly four-fifths of her fleet always on a war footing, always instantly ready for action, she has compelled other countries, in accordance with the dictates of ordinary foresight, to take similar action, however onerous the financial burden. it is on great britain and the united states that the weight of this burden has borne most heavily, for in those states alone is reliance placed on a voluntary system of manning, which is necessarily very costly. footnotes: [footnote 8: it is interesting to note, however, that even at this early date the german admiralty made provision for the storage of oil in order to supplement the coal supply.] [footnote 9: _cf._ appendix i.] [footnote 10: the five later ships were given a belt with a thickness of 9·4 inches amidships, but otherwise their protection and armament closely resembled those laid down at an earlier date.] [footnote 11: see appendix ii.] [footnote 12: one of these "armoured cruisers" was not built.] [footnote 13: it has since become known that the americans had designed an all-big-gun ship before the british dreadnought was laid down.] [footnote 14: british naval opinion held from the first that these ships of the nassau type vitiated the dreadnought principle of simplicity of armament, and were so over-gunned as to be ineffective units. sea-service has tended to confirm this view.] [footnote 15: in the three succeeding years, in accordance with the british government's policy of a limitation of naval armaments, and as an example to other powers, this advantage was partially lost, and hence the large programme of 1909-10.] [footnote 16: _cf._ appendix ii.] [footnote 17: in his speech in the house of commons on march 26th, 1913, the first lord corrected this figure. he stated that the maximum to be attained under the new fleet law in 1920 was 107,000, apart from reserves.] [footnote 18: these two groups of ships are of practically the same design.] chapter vi german ships, officers, and men in material, in the art of constructing and equipping ships of war, germany at the beginning of the war ranked far above most of the great powers, and she was little, if anything, behind even great britain in workmanship, rapidity and cheapness. her personnel also stood high, for she had succeeded in translating into naval terms the professional and disciplinary codes which have raised the german army to a position of pre-eminence. above all she had succeeded, in a degree never before attempted by any country, in keeping ships and men in constant association. the german naval authorities recognized that, while a conscriptive system of manning a fleet brings into the organization certain grave and ineradicable disadvantages, it did at least enable large numbers of officers and men to be borne for service at a relatively small annual cost. realising this economic benefit of conscription, the marineamt had no hesitation in increasing its personnel rapidly from year to year. the expansion of this element of naval power kept pace with the activity of the shipyards. this policy of simultaneous increase of ships and of men, accompanied as it was by the expansion of her shipbuilding and allied industries and of her dockyards, has been the secret of the rapid rise of germany as a maritime power wielding world-wide influence. within the memory of the present generation german ships of war, if not built in england, were constructed in germany with materials obtained entirely or in part from england. her earliest armoured ships of any account--the _deutschland_, the _kaiser_ and the _konig wilhelm_--were all constructed on the banks of the thames at the old samuda yard. the great industry which germany and other foreign nations helped to support is now dead, and on the other side of the north sea is to be seen an activity more intense and on a far larger scale than the thames establishments could boast even in the day of their greatest prosperity. though there are many shipbuilding yards and engine-making establishments in germany, the naval authorities depend exclusively upon the vast establishment of krupp for armour and guns, and the repute of the firm in both respects stands high. the vast establishment which supplies the german and many other governments was founded in 1810 by friedrich krupp, who bought a small forge and devoted himself, with little commercial success, to the manufacture of cast steel. in this he was ahead of germany's requirements, but on the basis thus laid by the father, the son built; and in 1851 a solid steel ingot which he exhibited at the great exhibition in london completely took the metallurgic world by surprise, and his fortune was made. he turned his energy and knowledge to the making of guns, armour, weldless steel rails, and other manufactures; and the modest works at essen continued to expand until to-day they and the associated establishments give employment to about 70,000 men, not all of whom, of course, always are engaged on the manipulation of armaments. for many years the krupp process of armour manufacture was adopted in every country of the world, but later on the british admiralty, it is common knowledge, adopted a superior process which produces a plate of greater resisting power, and the german cemented type of armour no longer holds the premier position which it occupied when its advantages over the harvey plate were demonstrated. on the other hand, the krupp firm still claim that their ordnance is not equalled by any in the world, and on the strength of this claim they have obtained most valuable orders, extending over a long series of years, from foreign governments. british guns are made on the wire-wound system--that is, steel ribbon is wound under great pressure round the gun, and over this is placed an outer hoop; krupp's, on the other hand, still remain faithful to the solid steel tube to resist the gas pressures exerted, arguing that their method of steel manufacture enables them to submit it to strains which other steel might not stand. there has been endless controversy as to the merits of the two systems; and the subject was again discussed as recently as the end of 1912, when the italian minister of marine laid a report before the italian parliament with reference to the armaments of the principal fleets. according to this statement the british, italian, and japanese are the only navies to mount wire-wound guns; the probable life of the italian and japanese 12-inch guns was given at 80 rounds, whereas the english gun was good for only 60 rounds. on the other hand, the austrian and german guns were given from 200 to 220 rounds, and the american 14-inch gun was estimated to have a probable life of 150 rounds. particulars with reference to british and german guns were given as follows: +---------------------+-------------+--------------------+ | | british. | german. | +---------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ |calibre in inches | 12| 13.5| 12| 14| 15| |length in calibres | 50| 45| 45| 50| 50| |weight in tons | 69| 80| 53| 83| 102| |weight of projectile | | | | | | | in pounds | 850| 1,240| 850| 1,360| 1,650| |initial velocity | 2,950| 2,800| 3,000| 3,000| 3,000| |energy at muzzle in | | | | | | | metric tons |16,540|22,150|17,520|27,650|33,910| |energy per kilogramme| | | | | | | in kilometres | 240| 277| 330| 330| 330| |probable life in | | | | | | | rounds | 60| 60| 200| 200| 200| +---------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ the attention of the first lord of the admiralty was directed to these statements in the house of commons, and he reiterated the assurance of former ministers that the expert advisers were satisfied as to the wisdom of retaining the wire-wound system. he gave no data as to the foundation of this confidence, and in the german technical press--no doubt with an eye to foreign orders--the superiority of the german gun over the british was repeated with at least equal assurance. the great advantage of the wire-wound system, it has always been claimed, is that after much use, when the rifling is worn, the gun can be given a new inner tube, a comparatively simple and cheap operation which results in practically a new gun being made available for sea service in a short time. all that can be said as to the two systems from practical experience is that the japanese found the british-made weapons give eminently satisfactory results during the war with russia, while the krupp artillery guns used by the turkish army in the balkan war of 1912 did not realize expectations. probably in naval material--in ships, their armour, armament, and engineering equipment--there is little difference as between the leading navies. one may be thought to have an advantage in some particular respect, but this may possibly be counterbalanced by the rival's superiority in another. generally, the british ships mount fewer guns but of larger calibre, and to the experienced eye they look very workman-like; while the german ships carry smaller guns in greater number and have a crowded appearance which does not appeal to british naval opinion in its desire for simplicity of design and plenty of working room. virtually, all the instruments for exerting naval power as they exist to-day are experimental, based upon the empirical knowledge. when the war between the united states and spain occurred, it was anticipated that it would throw light upon these problems, but these anticipations were not realized, and even the struggle between russia and japan failed to satisfy fully the natural curiosity of the naval constructor and the naval officer owing to the inefficiency with which the russian ships were handled, and the deplorable slackness of the administration. it is the fashion to calculate the relative strength of fleets in tons and guns, but the probability is that on the day of trial in a great battle at sea these nice paper computations will be entirely upset by the course of events. morale, as napoleon observed, dominates war. this dictum is no less true to-day than it was in the past. man is still greater than the instruments of his creation, and the experience of war on a grand scale will certainly confirm the teaching of history--that the important element in naval power is men rather than ships. on the eve of the battle of st. vincent, when jervis, in command of fifteen ships, was pacing the quarter-deck of his flag-ship and the spanish fleet was entering the field of vision, the numbers of the enemy were reported by the captain of the fleet to the commander-in-chief as they were counted. "there are eight sail of the line, sir john," "very well, sir," answered the admiral. "there are twenty sail of the line, sir john." "very well, sir," jervis responded. "there are twenty-five sail of the line, sir john." "very well, sir," the admiral again replied imperturbably. "there are twenty-seven sail of the line, sir john," the captain of the fleet at length reported, and when he had the temerity to remark on the great disparity between the british and spanish fleets, the admiral, confident in the efficiency of his small fleet, replied: "the die is cast, and if there be fifty sail, i will go through them." we may be sure that the victor of the battle of st. vincent, who by stern but wisely directed measures created the fleet which nelson used with such dramatic effect at trafalgar, would have scorned and ridiculed an entire reliance on mere paper calculations of guns and tons, realizing that victory or defeat depends mainly upon the personal element and morale. it is in respect of officers and men that there is the greatest contrast between the british fleet and the navies of the continent of europe. the british service is organized on a voluntary system, while the continental fleets are manned mainly by conscripts; the former serve for many years, while the latter for the most part submit to only the short period of duty required by law and then pass into the reserve. in the matter of officers, however, the german fleet is certainly not worse served than the british navy; though the cadets begin their training at a somewhat later age, a thoroughly good sea officer is produced. the marked distinction between the two services is that, whereas under the white ensign special duties are assigned to special classes of officers--gunnery, torpedo, navigation, signalling and physical training--in the german navy no hard-and-fast lines are drawn. it is held that the british system would entail a larger number of officers than are available on the other side of the north sea. however this may be, the german authorities can certainly pride themselves upon a corps of executive officers which in many respects is not excelled in any country. as in the british service, special lines of officers are trained for engineering, medical, and accountant duties and these have no executive standing. the method of training executive officers for the german fleet differs in some important respects from that which obtains in england. in the british service the cadets, who enter when they are, on the average, thirteen and a half years of age, have not completed their general education, and consequently spend four years at the naval colleges at osborne and dartmouth respectively before they go afloat in a training ship. the german naval officer receives much the same general education as any other boy before he enters the navy, whereas the british cadet, after entering, is submitted to an educational course specially devised with a view to his future naval career; his studies embrace physical science and practical engineering, and emphasis is laid upon athletics and as much sea experience as can be obtained in small craft. when the four years ashore are completed he goes afloat at about the same age as the average german cadet and makes a six months' cruise. which is the better system? who shall say? this is certain, however, that british naval officers have always held that lads for the sea service cannot be caught, broken in, and inoculated, so to speak, too early. throughout the years of naval expansion the german authorities have been struggling to eliminate as far as possible the disadvantages of conscription in its application to naval conditions. the war department is responsible for putting in force the conscription law, and periodically the navy sends in its requisition, stating the number of recruits who will be needed, and where and when they are to join. the men selected are passed direct into the fleet without preliminary training each october. under the british system boys are entered at about sixteen years of age, and receive a short training first in one of the shore or stationary sea establishments, and are subsequently drafted into one of the ships of the training squadron, thence joining the sea-going fleet. a certain number of youths are also entered at an average age of about seventeen and a half years, and these recruits dispense with the preliminary course, but are also drafted to the training squadron before joining the fleet. nearly all the men of the fleet sign on for twelve years' active service, and the best of these are permitted to re-engage for another ten years in order to earn pensions. a relatively small number of men, not boys, join the british navy for a term of only five years, with the obligation to remain in the reserve for seven years. five years, consequently, is the minimum in the british navy, and applies to only a relatively small number of men; but three years is the maximum period of german conscripts, and during this time the officers and warrant officers have to do their best to transform the raw material provided by the state into skilled seamen. it is easy to imagine the difficulties which assail the administration in germany in these circumstances. every year one-third of the naval conscripts complete their period of active service and are passed into the reserve, and their places are taken by an equivalent batch of raw recruits. the result is that in the winter months the officers and petty officers of the fleet are occupied in licking into shape these embryo sailors, and from october until may the fighting ships of the empire become practically training vessels. if this were a complete representation of the conditions in the german fleet its efficiency would be of a low order. the navy is, however, stiffened by a proportion of conscripts who re-engage voluntarily, and by a certain number of volunteers who enter as boys. these lads engage at ages ranging from fifteen to eighteen years. they agree to undergo an apprenticeship of two years followed by seven years of active fleet service. volunteers are not trained ashore or in fixed naval establishments as in the united kingdom, but are drafted to sea-going training ships, which cruise in home waters during the summer months and pass into the mediterranean during the winter. by these two expedients the german naval authorities have been able to secure about 25 per cent. of the german personnel on what passes in germany for a long-service system. the boy volunteers and the conscripts who re-engage constitute the class from which petty officers are drawn, and these men are the backbone of the naval organization ashore and afloat, and it is to their efforts that the high standard of efficiency which germany's navy has attained may in a large measure be traced. year by year, in order to provide crews for the larger number of ships passed into the fleet, the marine office has been compelled to increase the number of conscripts required for sea service, and thus the task of training the navy has been increased in advance of the expansion of the material, because men must begin training before their ships are ready for sea. the officers and petty officers have had not only to train raw recruits embarked to take the place of conscripts at the end of their three years' term, but to find means also of training additional recruits entered as net additions to the naval strength. when it is added that in 1894 the number of officers and men in the navy was less than 21,000, whereas it is now nearly 80,000, and under the navy act of 1912 is to be raised to 107,000, some conception may be formed of the character of the problem which has presented itself, not only to the central administration ashore, but to the officers afloat, intent upon attaining the highest standard of efficiency at sea. admission of these difficulties was made by admiral von tirpitz in the explanatory memorandum which accompanied the last navy bill presented to the reichstag and which directed attention to "two serious defects" in the organization of the fleet: "the one defect consists in the fact that in the autumn of every year the time-expired men--_i.e._ almost one-third of the crew in all ships of the battle fleet, are discharged and replaced mainly by recruits from the _inland population_. owing to this, the readiness of the battle fleet for war is considerably impaired for a prolonged period." when it is recalled that the maritime population of germany amounts only to 80,000, and that compulsory service in the active fleet lasts for only three years, it will be realized that most of the recruits taken for the german navy must necessarily be landsmen. the personnel in 1914 numbered roughly over 70,000, after deducting from the total the executive officers, engineers, cadets, and accountants. if approximately 17,000 of these are regarded as long-service men there remain roughly 54,000 conscripts, one-third of whom pass annually into the reserve, and are replaced by raw hands. under the new navy law it was intended to strengthen the personnel in the next few years by 6,400 annually. while the average period of service in the british navy, including the relatively small number of five years' men entered for short service, is about ten years, the average in the german fleet does not amount to as much as half this period. it is possible to attach too much importance to the fact that the german navy is recruited "mainly by recruits from the inland population." the inherited sea habit counts for less to-day than at any time since men attempted to navigate the seas. ships of war have become vast complicated boxes of machinery, and naval life requires the exercise of qualities different from those it demanded in the sail era. then brute courage, endurance, and familiarity with the moods of the sea were the main attributes of sailors, but to-day a large proportion of the crews must be experts in the handling of complicated mechanical appliances. in these changed conditions the compulsory system of education in germany has proved of the greatest advantage in providing recruits of a high standard of intelligence, who probably acquire in six months as complete a familiarity with their work as it would have taken a seaman of the old school as many years to attain. at the same time, while resisting the temptation to place too great importance upon the inherited sea habit, it would be no less a mistake to ignore entirely its influence upon naval efficiency. familiarity breeds contempt for the terrors of the sea and for the horrors of a naval action, and it is reasonable to expect that in the hour of trial the long-service men of the british navy will exhibit a moral standard when projectiles are falling fast and thick far higher than that of the conscript. a modern dreadnought is intended to fire its guns in broadsides and not in succession, and when it is borne in mind that at one discharge these guns will deliver on an enemy's ship, if they are fired accurately, between five and six tons of metal, it will be realized that at such a moment the calibre of men will count more than the calibre of guns. when the act of 1900 was introduced the reichstag was informed by admiral von tirpitz in a memorandum that "as, even after the projected increase has been carried out, the number of vessels in the german navy will still be more or less inferior to that of other individual great powers, our endeavours must be directed towards compensating this superiority by the individual training of the crews and by tactical training by practice in larger bodies.... economy as regards commissioning of vessels in peace time means jeopardizing the efficiency of the fleet in case of war." never since navies existed have a body of officers and men been worked at higher pressure than those of germany; drill has never ceased; no effort has been spared to obtain the last ounce of value out of every one on board the ships. the promotion of officers rests with the emperor, and he is unsparing in his punishment of anything like slackness; an officer who is not enthusiastic, alert, and competent, stands no chance of rising in rank. the german navy has no use for anything but the best which the empire can provide, and in order that the highest expression of the _esprit de corps_ which has contributed to german influence on shore may be instilled into the navy, no officer, however influential or brilliant, can enter either the executive or engineering branch unless his claims are endorsed by all his contemporaries; one black ball--if the term may be used--is sufficient to disqualify an aspirant, though he may have passed all the prescribed examinations brilliantly. the german fleet has its limitations, but within those limitations it probably has no superior in the world: the ships are well built, the officers are capable sailors, and the men are raised to the highest pitch of efficiency possible under a short-service system. chapter vii william ii. and his naval minister the german fleet, as it is to-day, may be regarded as the work of two men--the emperor william ii. and admiral von tirpitz. even for those who have lived long in germany, it is difficult to form a judgment as to the aims and motives of the emperor william's naval policy, and of the part which he has played in its carrying out. with regard to their sovereign, germans are inclined to fly to one of two extremes; according to the class to which they belong, they represent him either as a heaven-born genius of universal gifts, or as a busybody whose meddlesomeness is rendered specially mischievous by mediæval delusions as to the functions of monarchs and their relations to the deity. everything that he does or says is set down as quite right by the one party and as quite wrong by the other. moreover, the opinions of those brought into closest contact with him are vitiated by the prevalence of a type of sycophancy which is fortunately becoming extinct in other countries. the patriotic german, who is familiar with his country's history, knows that, five or six hundred years ago, his forefathers monopolized the markets and policed the seas of northern and western europe. he realizes keenly that germany's maritime and industrial progress was first checked, and then retarded for centuries, by political division and internecine and foreign wars. possibly he still remembers that great crescendo of victory in which prussia smothered denmark, then overthrew austria in a single battle, and finally, at the head of the kindred teutonic states, humbled france in the dust, and welded germany together in one indivisible whole. even if he does not remember it as part of his own personal experience, all its vivid and stimulating episodes have been a thousand times impressed upon his mind by schoolmaster, politician, historian, and journalist. that after this tremendous martial achievement he should regard his country as the mistress of the continent of europe is no matter for surprise. but he sees, too, that the germany of luther and goethe, of ranke, liebig, helmholz, and mommsen, of bismarck and moltke, has become also the germany of krupp, siemens, rathenau, ballin, and gwinner; that the products of german industry, the fruits of an unexampled application of the discoveries of science to the processes of manufacture, have been carried by german ships to the remotest ends of the earth; that the material prosperity of his country has been advancing in every direction by leaps and bounds. and he thus believes germany to be strong, wise, and wealthy, and in every way fitted to stand at the head of mankind. but in one respect he has felt, to his bitter mortification, that she is powerless. wherever he goes on the world's oceans, he is confronted by those iron walls of great britain, which mean that he is there only by the sufferance of one who is immeasurably stronger than himself. the german patriot has never realized that no efforts on the part of germany could materially alter the balance of sea-power to her advantage as against great britain, and that she would be compelled to fight for her pretensions long before she was in a position to give battle on anything like equal terms. he has believed that the british nation is unnerved and effete, that it has lost both its martial and industrial vigour, that its energies have been sapped by too much wealth and prosperity, and that it is rapidly following the downward path. finally, he is convinced that the british parliament, under the influence of an aggressive democracy, exclusively concerned with its own immediate material needs, is losing the capacity to realize and grapple with the larger problems of international politics, and that the cabinets proceeding from it will, in timorous anxiety, procrastinate and vacillate till it is too late to strike. in this idea he has been only confirmed by the pacifist movement in great britain, by the british agitation for disarmament by international agreement, and by the well-meant but unfortunate attempt of sir henry campbell-bannerman to effect by example what much amiable precept had done nothing to accomplish. these phenomena he has looked upon not as evidence of good-will and peaceableness, but as symptoms of physical, moral, and financial exhaustion. such was the view of many in germany to whom we cannot fairly deny the name of "patriot" if we are to claim it for an analogous disposition among ourselves. it was the view almost universally held by the officers of the german army and navy, and, with certain qualifications and reservations, it may be said to have been the view of the emperor william. this will be evident if, with the help of his many spoken and written utterances, we attempt to follow the main lines which, with many sudden and violent deviations, his thought has taken on this subject. he has, for example, in his speeches repeatedly dwelt on the power and renown of the hanse league--"one of the mightiest undertakings that the world has ever seen," which "was able to raise fleets such as the broad back of the sea had probably never borne up to that time," which "won such high prestige for the german name abroad," which "created markets for the german industrial regions," and which "only failed because it lacked the support of a strong united empire obedient to a single will." at hamburg, in june, 1911, he used these words: "i have only acted historically, for i said to myself on my accession, that the tasks which the hansa attempted to solve by itself, and which it could not solve because the strong empire was not at its back, and the defensive and executive power of the empire did not exist, must unquestionably at once fall on the shoulders of the newly-arisen german empire; and it was simply the obligations of old traditions that had to be resumed." it was in one former hanse town that the emperor spoke the familiar words, "our future lies on the water"; in another that he declared "the trident should be in our hand"; in a third that he uttered the appeal, "we have bitter need of a strong german fleet." again, he has repeatedly extolled the great elector--"the one among my ancestors for whom i have the most enthusiasm, who has from my earliest youth shone before me as a bright example," who, "looking far ahead, carried on politics on a large scale, as they are carried on to-day." in his great speech at bremen in 1905, the emperor said: "when as a youth i stood before the model of brommy's ship, i felt with burning indignation the outrage that was then done to our fleet and our flag"; and these words undoubtedly referred to the injudiciously-phrased note in which palmerston threatened that vessels which undertook belligerent operations under the colours of that greater german empire, which then was not and was never to be, would render themselves liable to be treated as "pirates." the present realities of sea-power had been early revealed to him when, as he told the officers on board a british flag-ship in the mediterranean, he "was running about portsmouth dockyard as a boy"; and, as he said in a speech made during the visit of king edward to kiel in 1904, "the stupendous activity on the sea at the headquarters of the greatest navy in the world impressed itself indelibly on his youthful mind," and made him, "as regent, endeavour to realize on a scale corresponding to the conditions of his country what he had seen as a young man in england." how far the emperor has helped to realize his own naval ambitions, and how far his efforts have actually told against them, it is very difficult to determine with anything like exactitude. his agitation for a bigger fleet has been open and unwearying, and outside germany the idea is very prevalent that he not only contrived the naval policy of the empire, but also, almost single-handed, generated the degree of popular support without which it could not have been carried out. this idea will be seen to be erroneous. the emperor's influence upon his own people is very greatly overrated in other countries, and even the crisis of 1908, in which the storm of discontent which had long been gathering burst with full force upon his head, does not seem to have been properly understood outside germany. on that occasion, the imperial parliament listened without a protest, without a murmur, as a liberal deputy, slowly, deliberately, and with dramatic emphasis, spoke the following words: "in the german reichstag not a single member has come forward to defend the actions of the german emperor." the incident was without a parallel in the history of parliaments. even the conservative party, which has always gloried in being the chief prop of the throne, passed and published a resolution expressing the wish that the emperor should "in future exercise a greater reserve in his utterances," and declaring that "arrangements must be made to prevent with certainty a recurrence of such improper proceedings." it may be remarked, in passing, that this blow fell upon william ii. because he had confessed to having had anglophile sentiments, and to having performed friendly services to great britain, at a time when the general feeling of the german people was one of hostility to this country. nor was it without significance that when, after holding aloof from public affairs for several weeks, he at last emerged from the solitude of his palace at potsdam, it was in england that he sought the recuperation and rest of which he stood in need. the dismissal of bismarck and the subsequent attempts of the emperor to depreciate the life-work of the man to whom he owed the imperial crown, were, of course, the principal causes of the spirit of opposition which flared up with such startling suddenness in 1908. the popularity of william i. was in no small measure due to his absolute trust and confidence in his chancellor, and the abrupt ejection of this incomparable statesman from his office will never be forgotten or forgiven till the generation of his contemporaries has passed away. these things go far to explain why it was that, in spite of the vigorous naval agitation of the emperor, the german fleet, as was pointed out in the memorandum attached to the bill of 1898, became weaker instead of stronger during the first ten years of his reign. from the day of his accession he had lost no opportunity of manifesting his interest in the fleet and his desire that it should be largely increased. among his earliest acts as monarch was his unheralded appearance in admiral's uniform at a parliamentary luncheon given by bismarck, to decorate one of the guests who had displayed sympathies and wishes with regard to the navy similar to his own. year after year, tables of diagrams, showing the disparity between the fleet of germany and those of the leading naval powers, and prepared, it is said, by the emperor's own hand, were sent out over his signature to the reichstag, the government departments, and all public institutions where it was thought they might meet the gaze of appreciative eyes. at a soirée given at the new palace at potsdam in 1895, he assembled round him a group of members of the majority parties of the reichstag, and lectured them for two-and-a-half hours on germany's need of sea-power. bismarck's eightieth birthday was then approaching, and the emperor concluded his remarks by urging upon his hearers that they should seize the opportunity of "doing the founder of our colonial policy the pleasure of passing the sum absolutely required for the navy." a couple of years later, he delivered a similar address after a dinner given to members of the reichstag by the finance minister, von miquel, illustrating his arguments with the diagrams of warships mentioned above. about the same time, an english illustrated paper published a picture of the foreign war vessels on the east asian station. among them, as the sole representative of germany, was a small gunboat, which, as was pointed out in the accompanying text, was "under sail only." against these words the emperor wrote, "what mockery lies therein," and the picture, with this comment, was laid before the budget commission of the reichstag, then engaged in the discussion of the naval estimates. moreover, the monarch had himself recourse to the paint-brush, and exhibited in the berlin academy of arts a picture of an attack by a flotilla of torpedo craft on a squadron of ironclads. no doubt he hoped in this way to arouse sympathy for his ideas in some who were not accessible to the ordinary methods of political persuasion. the "song to aegir," the scandinavian neptune, of which he composed the music, was probably also intended to have a similar operation. but all these pleas and cajoleries had little or no positive result. indeed, taken in conjunction with other phrases of the imperial activity, they seem rather to have excited opposition in the breasts of the members of the reichstag, who possibly considered themselves just as well qualified as the monarch to estimate the degree and appreciate the needs of germany's maritime interests, and at any rate half-suspected that his efforts directly to influence their deliberations involved an encroachment on their constitutional privileges. the first naval estimates submitted in the new reign, which provided for the laying down of the unusually large number of four battleships, were got through the reichstag without much difficulty, but when admiral von hollmann became minister of marine in the following year, he found that quite a different temper had taken possession of the parliament. it was not only that the emperor's general governmental acts had begun to stir up opposition; his oratorical flights in praise of sea-power and world-empire had also generated strong suspicions that he was urging germany along a path which would lead her to ruin at home and disaster abroad. hollmann's by no means exorbitant demands were branded both in the reichstag and the press as "unconscionable," his programme as "boundless," and on every side were heard contemptuous and impatient references to "the awful fleet." for a decade the naval estimates were ruthlessly and recklessly cut down to, on an average, not far short of half their original figure, and finally, in 1897, the ministerial career of hollmann was terminated by the unceremonious rejection of three out of the four cruisers which, in a special memorandum, he had sought to prove were indispensable for the protection of the empire's stake on the seas. and all this time the emperor had never ceased to agitate, by word and deed, for the ideas which he had so much at heart and to which the reichstag nevertheless showed itself so completely indifferent, if not actually hostile. the change that came with the appointment of admiral von tirpitz to the ministry of marine was as complete as it was sudden, and it is to this very able man that we must look if we wish to find not only the intellectual author of german naval legislation, but the statesman who devised and directed the means by which it was popularized and passed through the reichstag. the transformation which he effected was one both of policy and of method. the three rejected vessels which brought about hollmann's fall represented a principle--that of "cruiser warfare." at that time the imperfectly-thought-out strategy of the german naval ministry was based on the two ideas of coastal defence and commerce destruction. pitched battles between ships of the line on the high seas played a very secondary part in its calculations. in the programme which he submitted to the reichstag, hollmann laid it down that fifteen battleships would be sufficient for germany's purposes, and those who are best qualified to form a judgment of the empire's naval policy at that epoch are of opinion that this number was intended to be not merely a provisional, but a final estimate of the country's requirements in this type of vessel. there are good reasons for supposing that in the hollmann era no clear idea existed as to the problems with which germany might be confronted in a naval war, and that his programmes were the product rather of vague general principles than of calculated odds and chances. in fact, one of his main difficulties with the reichstag was his inability to justify his estimates by numerical demonstrations. on the other hand, admiral von tirpitz's strength always lay chiefly in this, that he knew exactly what he wanted and why he wanted it. when he came into office, it was generally stated that he had years previously already laid before the emperor a memorandum embodying his conception of germany's maritime needs, and how they could be satisfied, and it is certain that the main outlines of his policy were at any rate clearly sketched out in his head long before he was given an opportunity of carrying it out. he was recalled from the command of the east asian squadron to take charge of the naval ministry, and he seems to have employed his leisure on the homeward voyage in drafting a programme, which he had worked out in all its details before he took over his portfolio. in its very fundamental principles it was a reversal of that of his predecessor, for it was based on the idea, probably adopted from mahan, that battleships alone are the decisive factors in naval warfare. as he himself put it in the reichstag: "if we have a strong battle fleet, the enemy will have to defeat it before he can blockade our coasts. but in such circumstances he will, before he declares war on germany, consider very carefully whether the business will cover its expenses and justify the risk." it was this principle of risk which he took as his standard of the empire's naval requirements. from the literature which he inspired it is evident that he was one of those who believe that germany was destined to occupy the position on the seas which now belongs to great britain. it was, however, impossible for a minister of state to argue this belief in public, for the open confession of it would have at once produced incalculable complications in international affairs which would certainly not have contributed to its realization. besides, the consummation which he wished for could in any case only be reached by gradual stages over a long period of years. the defensive formula which he invented was quite as effective for his immediate domestic purposes, and, as the sequel showed, was not appreciated abroad in its true and full significance. it was that "the german fleet must be so strong that not even the greatest naval power will be able to enter upon a war with it without imperilling its position in the world." it was only after a good deal of hesitation, and some resistance, in high quarters that admiral von tirpitz was able to make his view prevail. even courtly panegyrists admit that at the commencement of his term of office deep-seated differences of opinion existed between him and the emperor on cardinal points of naval policy. the monarch was then a firm adherent of the cruiser-war theory, and no doubt had been responsible for its adoption by his ministry of marine. it may be regarded as his most substantial contribution to the present strength of the german fleet that he finally yielded to admiral von tirpitz's arguments. in one other very essential respect the new minister revolutionized the policy of his predecessor. in the memorandum already referred to, hollmann defined the needs of the navy only for the three succeeding years, and in the course of the debate on the estimates, he used these words: "neither the federated governments nor the reichstag will ever agree to be bound to a formal programme for years in advance. that is quite impossible, and even if both factors desired it, impossible, for the very simple reason that the art of war is changeable on sea just as it is on land, and that to-day no naval ministry can prophesy what we shall need ten years hence. it can only tell you what are our immediate requirements, and if the circumstances change, then our demands will change too. as to that there is no doubt whatever." here again, admiral von tirpitz not merely modified, but diametrically reversed the policy of his predecessor, and, it may be added, of the emperor. starting from the conclusion that the main types of war vessel and their respective functions remain unaltered in principle throughout the ages, he induced the reichstag to commit itself statutorily to a fixed warship establishment, a building programme of nearly twenty years' duration, and an automatic renewal of the units of the fleet when they had reached a prescribed age. this is the one absolutely new feature of german naval legislation, and it was undoubtedly the idea of the new minister. admiral von tirpitz has, in fact, been the bismarck of german naval policy, and just as the iron chancellor fulfilled the hopes of the men of the frankfort national assembly, so the smiling and urbane minister of marine has gone far towards realizing the dreams of friedrich list and prince adalbert of prussia. it may be questioned whether he would not have done this work quite as effectually without the emperor's loud and tempestuous advocacy of his schemes on the open stage of the world. the trumpet tones in which william ii. proclaimed his dreams of world-wide rule and maritime dictatorship, not only exercised a disquieting effect in foreign countries, but conjured up in the minds of many germans unpleasant visions of provocative and perilous adventure. other nations were anything but delighted at the prospects of being swallowed up in a universal teutonic empire, however peaceful its conquests and however beneficent its rule, and they took steps by which the successive moves of german naval policy were successively counteracted. if we may judge from the discretion which he has shown by keeping as far as possible in the background, admiral von tirpitz would, if left to himself, have built up the german fleet with the same silent and systematic persistency with which bismarck, roon, and moltke prepared to crush france, and to some extent he combines in his character the qualities of these three. he is at any rate the adroitest politician, the ablest organizer, and the most far-sighted strategist in the imperial service. long before he was thought of as naval minister, he had won for himself among his colleagues, by the skill and thoroughness with which he grappled with every problem allotted to him, the title of "the master." it was he who, against the ignorant protests of the older school of naval officers, chiefly concerned for the smartness of their paint, the cleanness of their decks, and the brightness of their brasswork, forced the torpedo upon them, and brought the service of this weapon up to the high pitch of efficiency which it has to-day attained in the german fleet. as chief of the staff to the general command of the navy, he evolved fresh rules of strategy and new tactical formations, and insisted upon manoeuvres being carried out in such a way as to test the value of both. he has been no less successful as statesman, politician, and diplomatist. here, too, he deserves the name of "master" among his contemporaries, for what he has done has been the greatest ministerial achievement of our day. it is true that he was favoured by an extraordinary run of luck that was vouchsafed to none of his forerunners, and that he would never have been able to drive his machine but for the energy generated by a series of international dissensions, but at the same time it must be conceded that he took advantage of his opportunities with rare promptitude and address. he at once took the measure of the reichstag, and saw how he could make it obedient to his will. it is traditional in the higher ranks of the german official hierarchy to despise popular assemblies, and to treat them with an air of pedagogic superciliousness. hollmann had become so impatient at the continual mutilation of his estimates that at last he thumped his fist menacingly on the table. that precipitate action sealed his fate. admiral von tirpitz recognized that it would be better for him if he disguised his contempt, and smothered his anger in his beard. in one of rostand's plays, a lady is asked how she passed the sentries who were posted round a jealously guarded camp, and she replies: "i smiled at them." if the naval minister were to be asked how he induced the parties who had been so obdurate to his predecessor's demands to pass his own so much more expensive projects, he, too, might have replied: "i smiled at them." completely breaking with the tradition of schoolmasterly superiority, he was all complacency and urbanity to the ignorant mediocrities who had it in their power to frustrate his designs. his beaming rubicund countenance was ever the brightest and most ingratiating feature in the debates on his bills and estimates. his good humour was inexhaustible, his courtesy unflagging, his patience undisconcertable. he knew exactly what he wanted, and thought only of that. his mind was not clouded, like those of so many of his ministerial colleagues, by religious or political prejudices. he was ready to accept ships from the hands of catholics or socialists. whether they ranked the pope above the emperor, or preferred a republic to a monarchy, was quite indifferent to him, if only they would grant him the ships and the men he asked for. in one of his many veiled conflicts with the foreign office, admiral von tirpitz is understood to have exclaimed: "politics are your affair--i build ships!" and it was precisely because he attended strictly and conscientiously to his own business that he was able to do it so well. it was incumbent upon him as administrator of the navy to make it as strong and efficient as possible, and it lay with the chancellors to decide whether the line he was following was consistent with the general policy of the empire. that, against their own convictions and what they conceived to be germany's foreign interests, they allowed him to have his own way, only proved their weakness and his strength. while he was amiable and polite to all parties and persons who could assist him in the carrying out of his ideas, flattered their vanity by pretended confidences from the region of high politics, took them for cruises in war vessels, and had them deferentially escorted round imperial shipyards, the admiral was quick to appreciate the importance of winning the good graces of the catholics, without whose favour, as party relationships stood and were likely to stand, he could hope to effect little. young and active members of the centre party, who showed a particular interest in the details of naval policy, were singled out for special attention, and soon were numbered among his most devoted champions. he likewise realized the value of popular support, and this was secured through the instrumentality of the press bureau of the ministry of marine. this institution was administered in the same spirit which gained the admiral his parliamentary triumphs. the naval officers by whom it is manned have always received all journalists, domestic and foreign, with open arms, and, according to the objects and nationality of their visitors, furnished them with ideas, information and directions. no german writer on naval affairs could afford to dispense with official assistance so profusely and willingly supplied. the press bureau placed at his disposal all the historical and statistical data which could be used to demonstrate germany's need of a big fleet, all the articles from the foreign press which were likely to have a stimulating effect upon his readers, all the details of ship and gun types which could safely be made public, all the rules of naval strategy and tactics which might be of service to him in the formulation of his themes. if diffidence or a spirit of independence prevented him from coming to the press bureau, the press bureau went to him, as will be seen from the following document which found its way into print: "imperial ministry of marine, "news office. "berlin, "----, 1907. "it has become known here that, some time ago, you published in --- articles of a maritime nature. for this reason the news office gladly takes the opportunity of enquiring whether you would care to receive occasional batches of service material and press comments for possible use in further articles. in view of the impending navy bill, your support in the press might be particularly valuable in the immediate future. "your most obedient servant, "boy-ed." by such means the admiral succeeded in obtaining a control, gentle, persuasive, and veiled, but none the less effective, over practically the entire body of writers on naval topics in the german press. the unanimity of view on naval subjects which the bureau imported into the german press was naturally most effective. when the simple citizen found that all the papers to which he had access spoke with one voice, simultaneously adopting an identical attitude to a fresh situation or propounding a novel theory, he could only assume that they must be in the right. the proposal that great britain should abandon her two-power standard and accept in its stead a ratio of three to two, which appeared almost at the same moment in a score of different papers while the 1912 navy bill was under process of dilution, is an instance in point. up till then all naval writers in germany had been unanimous in protesting that agreements to fix a naval ratio between two countries were in their very nature impossible, and the suddenness and simultaneity of their conversion must have been due to the intervention either of providence or the marine minister. indeed, the minister's statement a year later in the reichstag budget commission definitely set at rest any doubt that might have existed as to the original source of the proposal. since bismarck, no one has shown such adroitness as admiral von tirpitz in the management of the press. in addition to controlling the naval views of independent publications, the press bureau also makes important direct contributions of its own to periodical literature with the annual _nauticus_ and the monthly magazine _die marine rundschau_. both these publications are further testimonies to the energy with which the admiral performs the duties of his office. but with all his cleverness, perseverance, and patience, admiral tirpitz would never have reached his goal had not germany been swept by successive waves of anglophobia. both speeches in the reichstag and articles in the press make it quite evident that the motive uppermost in the minds of most deputies when they voted for the navy bills was the desire to impress, annoy, or terrify great britain. the truth is that, but for the boer war, the bill of 1900 could never have been so much as introduced; but for the perpetual international friction over morocco and the fantastic legend of king edward's designs against germany, the bills of 1906 and 1908 would have had but small chance of acceptance; and but for mr. lloyd george's speech and captain faber's indiscretions--and, it should be added, the misrepresentations of both of them by admiral von tirpitz's press--the ministry of marine would never have been able to win its last victory against the opposition of the treasury and the misgivings of the chancellor. the lesson of 1848 cannot be too thoroughly learnt. the naval movement of that year was almost entirely popular in its character. it arose out of a sense of wounded dignity, and fits of national temper, blind to all the prudential considerations of domestic and international politics, have given germany to-day the second largest fleet and the largest socialist party in the world. it may seem almost like a contradiction in terms to suggest that a national sentiment has contributed to swell german socialism to its present dimensions. but this is--for germany, at any rate--no paradox, for in no other country does so small a proportion of the population constitute what is in practice and in effect the "will of the people." it should have become clear that the part which the emperor william has played in the formulation and carrying out of germany's naval policy has been quite insignificant in comparison with that played by his minister. the really effective work which the monarch has done for his fleet has been that of which the wider public has heard least. the emperor's brain is not an originating or creative one, but it is keenly apprehensive, appreciative, and assimilative, and its owner was quick to perceive the value of many of the forces and institutions which have made the british fleet supreme, not only in numerical strength but also in _esprit de corps_ and organization. from his visits to england he took back much useful information as to the construction and handling of ships, and in many other respects he found british models which he considered worthy of imitation in his own country. thus the institution of naval architects was provided with a german counterpart in the schiffbau-technische gesellschaft, the ideals of self-discipline of sport were fostered in the imperial navy, and when the temperance movement in the british fleet had developed sufficient strength to attract attention, the emperor inaugurated a similar propaganda among his crews. as has already been seen, william ii. has generously admitted the debt of the german fleet to its british sister, and beyond all doubt he has done more than anyone else to incur it. the emperor has also been able to do a good deal towards the propagation of his naval ideas through his autocratic control over the official machinery of prussia, which constitutes more than three-fifths of the area, and nearly that proportion of the population of germany. in a country where the tentacles of the central authority reach to the remotest village this control means a great deal. in particular, through the ministry of education, the rising generation has been initiated into the mysteries of "world-policy" and sea-power. the teaching of history and geography has been used to impress upon susceptible minds the importance of colonies and fleets, and to suggest with more or less precision and emphasis that great britain is the jealous rival who chiefly obstructs germany's path to that "place in the sun" which is her due. the process, commenced in the schools, has been continued at the universities. indeed, here as elsewhere, germany's professors have been the pioneers of her progress, and were putting forward her claim to sea-power long before the emperor was born. friedrich list, the father of german economics, urged, in 1840, that denmark and holland should be taken into the germanic confederation, which "would then obtain what it at present lacks--namely, fisheries and sea-power, ocean-borne trade, and colonies." in another passage he said: "what intelligent citizens of those seaports (hamburg and bremen) can rejoice over the continual increase of their tonnage, when he reflects that a couple of frigates, putting out from heligoland, could destroy inside twenty-four hours the work of a quarter of a century." list also maintained that germany was "called by nature to place herself at the head of the colonizing and civilizing nations," and "that the time had come for the formation of a continental alliance against the naval supremacy of england." treitschke, writing of the european situation in the later thirties, said: "against so absolutely ruthless a commercial policy, inciting and making mischief all over the world, all other civilized nations seemed natural allies. england was the stronghold of barbarism in international law. to england alone was it due that, to the shame of humanity, naval warfare still remained organized piracy. it was the common duty of all nations to restore on the seas that balance of power, long existing on the continent, that healthy equipoise which permitted no state to do exactly as it liked, and consequently assured to all a humane international law. the civilization of the human race demanded that the manifold magnificence of the world's history, which had once commenced with the rule of monosyllabic chinese, should not end in a vicious circle with the empire of the monosyllabic britons. as soon as the eastern question was reopened a far-sighted statesmanship was bound to attempt at least to restrict the oppressive foreign rule which the english fleet maintained from gibraltar, malta, and corfu, and to restore the mediterranean to the mediterranean peoples." at the same time the professor was teaching his students at the berlin university that "the settlement with england will be the most difficult of all," and that "the result of our next war must be, if possible, the acquisition of some colony." the modern schoolmasters and professors of germany have worked to produce a race inspired with the ambitions of list and the rancours of treitschke, and imbued with the idea that an unexampled destiny awaits their nation. that the emperor william early recognized what schools and universities might be made to do in this direction is clear from the speech with which he opened the educational conference convened by him in 1890, and in which he complained that the traditional curriculum "lacked a patriotic basis." "we should," he exclaimed, "rear patriotic germans and not young greeks and romans." it was also with a political purpose that he recommended a reversal of the usual order in which history was taught--that is to say, that the most recent periods should be taken first, and the student led back step by step to the events of antiquity. while the emperor is not omnipotent in legislation, he is, in prussia, at any rate, practically unfettered in administration--that more extensive and equally important branch of government--and so the impulsions of his will can be forced down through the reticulations of the bureaucratic system till they are felt by the humblest official. he thus has at his disposal a large body of zealous co-operators anxious to comply with his desires even if they should have no direct relation to their official duties. to appreciate the operation of this force, it is only necessary to turn over the pages of the german navy league handbook and notice how prominent a part the provincial agents of the central authority and subordinate members of the official body have played in the propaganda of that organization. it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, wherever difficulty has been experienced in forming a local branch of the league, gentle pressure has been brought to bear on the stationmaster, postmaster, or gymnasium-director of the town, and has compelled him to take the initiative. in numerous cases such persons have, of course, come forward and founded branches of the league without any prompting, knowing well that their zeal would be in accordance with the "wishes of the emperor," and would be rewarded by preferment when a suitable opportunity arose. the navy league is the only instrument the emperor possesses for systematically and persistently propagating his ideas on world-policy and sea-power among the german people as a whole. it was founded in 1898, at his personal instance, but in all probability at admiral von tirpitz's suggestion, with the assistance of funds principally furnished by the krupp family, which, as the chief material beneficiary from any increase in the german fleet, could well afford to invest a little money in this way. even in bismarck's time the head of the krupp firm had been induced to start a number of newspapers to advocate the augmentation of those armaments from which he had derived a considerable proportion of his vast wealth, and it is one of the least edifying features of modern germany that those of its citizens who show the most bellicose spirit have a direct personal interest in the waging of war. the financial founders of the navy league included other prosperous manufacturers who were anxious to deserve decorations or titles, and who, in some instances, went so far as to compel their employees to join the organization and so help to swell its membership. three weeks before the league was constituted, the first navy bill had already received the emperor's signature, and the order of these events is a plain demonstration that even then the measure was intended to be merely the thin end of the wedge. it is an interesting and significant fact that almost all the ruling houses of germany have been induced to identify themselves with the league, though it is nominally an absolutely independent and unofficial organization. the emperor's brother, prince henry of prussia, has assumed the general protectorate, and among the protectors of the affiliated state federations are prince george of bavaria, the kings of saxony and württemberg, the grand dukes of baden, hesse, the two mecklenburgs, oldenburg, and saxe-weimar, the dukes of anhalt, saxe-altenburg, and saxe-coburg-gotha, the princes of the two lippes, waldeck-pyrmont, and the two reusses, the statthalter of alsace-lorraine, the regent of brunswick, and the burgomasters of hamburg and bremen. thus the state governments have a direct interest in the league, are under a moral obligation to promote its work, and, it may be added, bear a certain amount of responsibility for the manner in which its agitation is carried on. the purposes of the organization are defined in the statutes as follows: "the german navy league regards a strong german fleet as necessary--principally in order to ensure the sea frontiers of germany against the danger of war, to maintain the position of germany among the great powers of the world, and to support the general interests and commercial communications of germany as well as the safety of her citizens at work in oversea countries. accordingly, it is the aim of the german navy league to awaken, cultivate, and strengthen the interest of the german people for the importance and functions of the fleet." the members of the league are divided into two classes--"individual" and "corporative." the latter are members of branches of other societies which enrol themselves in the league _en masse_. the most fruitful sources of support of this kind are those kindred bodies, the pangerman federation and the colonial association. on december 31st, 1911, the corporative members numbered 756,000, the individual members 298,000. the qualifications for individual membership are the attainment of the sixteenth year and a money contribution, which, if not fixed by the branch, is left for the member to determine for him or herself. the pecuniary contribution of a corporation joining the league is fixed by special arrangement in each case. from the accounts published it would appear that the average annual member's subscription falls a good deal short of sixpence. a considerable number of the members are young persons of both sexes who send in their names because it is a cheap and easy method of gratifying the association instinct, so strong in germans, or for the sake of the dances and other purely social entertainments which are arranged by the branches. a monthly paper, _die flotte_, which is published in an edition of 350,000 copies, is the league's chief organ in the press, but the central office also issues immense quantities of pamphlets and leaflets. these are largely distributed with newspapers owned or controlled by the iron and steel and shipbuilding industries--what the socialists call the "armour-plate press"--but naturally find their way to all quarters to which government influence can give them access. under the name of "communications," items of naval news and controversial paragraphs are sent out about once a week to all the papers, and though little notice is taken of them in the metropolitan press, struggling provincial journals are very glad to have their columns filled up with topical matter by expert and authoritative pens. the league also publishes a profusely illustrated _naval album_, of which the emperor every year buys 600 copies for distribution as prizes in the schools of prussia--a typical example of the inter-action of the wheels of the naval agitation and the government machine. lecturing, too, occupies a prominent place in the league's activity, and the central office keeps a stock of magic-lanterns and slides, which it lends out free of charge to the local branches. it also supplies uniforms, badges, and bunting for local festivities. by far the most effective department of the league's activity is, however, the excursions to the german naval ports, which it arranges for the benefit of schoolmasters and their classes. the participants in these outings are, as far as possible, selected from the inland states and districts, in which it is most difficult to arouse enthusiasm for the sea and the fleet. they are taken to kiel or wilhelmshaven, received with effusive courtesy by the naval officers delegated to look after them, and escorted through the streets by a ship's band to the dockyards of war vessels, over which they are conducted by amiable guides, who supply them with all the information likely to stimulate their interest in what they have seen. if the distance they have travelled makes it impossible for them to return home the same day, naval barracks or storehouses which happen for the moment to be vacant are placed at their disposal as night quarters. so much official complaisance and amenity, especially in a country where neither of these qualities is particularly common in the public services, arouses in those on whom it is expended a flattering sense of their own and their national importance, and schoolmasters thus captivated naturally, in due time, convey their impressions to their pupils. though the numbers of persons thus dealt with are inevitably somewhat limited, the league unquestionably gains more ground in this way than it can hope to win by pamphlets which are read and lectures which are listened to mainly by the already convinced. the emperor is the real director of the navy league, and it puts forward no demand that has not already received his approval, in principle if not in detail. the league is, in short, little more than a government department, the function of which is to carry on an agitation for more warships. it must, however, always be remembered that the league's demands represent not what the government desires or expects to get, but what it wants to be asked for. in order that it may keep up the pretence that it is an unofficial and independent organization, the league must naturally avoid too close a correspondence between its own programme and that of the ministry of marine, and it is also guided by the principle that it is necessary to ask much in order to get little. occasionally it makes a show of hurrying and worrying the naval minister, and of being positively objectionable to the government, but no one suffers less than admiral von tirpitz from these "attacks" upon him. appendix i germany's naval policy the key to the naval policy of germany is to be found in the memorandum which was appended to the navy act of 1900. it is the most illuminating of state documents and is of peculiar interest in view of the war at sea which opened on august 4th, 1914. only the more salient passages of this memorandum need be recalled to illustrate how far the performances of the german fleet have fallen short of the high hopes which were entertained for it. in the opening passages of the memorandum, it was explained why "the german empire needs peace at sea": for the german empire of to-day the security of its economic development, and especially of its world-trade, is a life question. for this purpose the german empire needs not only peace on land but also peace at sea--not, however, peace at any price, but peace with honour, which satisfies its just requirements. a naval war for economic interests, particularly for commercial interests, will probably be of long duration, for the aim of a superior opponent will be all the more completely reached the longer the war lasts. to this must be added that a naval war which, after the destruction or shutting-up of the german sea fighting force, was confined to the blockade of the coasts and the capture of merchant ships, would cost the opponent little; indeed he would, on the contrary, amply cover the expenses of the war by the simultaneous improvement of his own trade. an unsuccessful naval war of the duration of even only a year would destroy germany's sea trade, and would thereby bring about the most disastrous conditions, first in her economic, and then, as an immediate consequence of that, in her social life. quite apart from the consequences of the possible peace conditions, the destruction of our sea trade during the war could not, even at the close of it, be made good within measurable time, and would thus add to the sacrifices of the war a serious economic depression. the memorandum then proceeded to justify the abandonment of the navy law passed as recently as 1898: the navy law (of 1898) does not make allowance for the possibility of a naval war with a great naval power, because, when it was drafted in the summer of 1897, the first consideration was to secure the carrying out in modern ship material of the 1873 plan for the founding of the fleet, limiting the increase to the small number of battleships which was necessary to establish, at least for a double squadron, the organization demanded by tactical exigencies. the justificatory memorandum to the navy law (of 1898) left no doubt as to the military significance of the battle fleet. it is therein expressly stated: "against greater sea-powers the battle fleet would have importance merely as a sortie fleet." that is to say, the fleet would have to withdraw into the harbour and there wait for a favourable opportunity for making a sortie. even if it should obtain a success in such a sortie, it would nevertheless, like the enemy, suffer considerable loss of ships. the stronger enemy could make good his losses, we could not. in war with a substantially superior sea-power, the battle fleet provided for by the navy law would render a blockade more difficult, especially in the first phase of the war, but would never be able to prevent it. to subdue it, or, after it had been considerably weakened, to confine it in its own harbour would always be merely a question of time. so soon as this had happened, no great state could be more easily cut off than germany from all sea intercourse worthy of the name--of her own ships as also of the ships of neutral powers. to effect this it would not be necessary to control long stretches of coast, but merely to blockade the few big seaports. in the same way as the traffic to the home ports, the german mercantile ships on all the seas of the world would be left to the mercy of an enemy who was more powerful on the sea. hostile cruisers on the main trade-routes, in the skager-rack, in the english channel, off the north of scotland, in the straits of gibraltar, at the entrance to the suez canal, and at the cape of good hope, would render german shipping practically impossible. also with regard to this the justificatory memorandum to the naval law (of 1898) speaks unambiguously. in it is observed: "protection of sea trade on all the seas would occur principally in time of peace. in case of war it would be the task of the foreign service cruisers to afford their own mercantile ships the 'utmost possible protection.'" that is to say, the ships would do the "utmost possible." what would be possible in this respect is clear when it is realized that the navy law provides altogether for forty-two cruisers, whilst the greatest naval power, for example, to-day already possesses 206 cruisers (finished or under construction), and, moreover, has at its disposal bases and coaling stations on all the chief trade-routes. to protect germany's sea trade and colonies in the existing circumstances there is only one means--germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world. for this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the german battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power, for a great naval power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. but even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong german fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet. in order to attain the goal which has been set, the protection of our sea trade and of our colonies by ensuring a peace with honour, germany requires, according to the standard of the strength-relationships of the great sea-powers, and having regard to our tactical formations, two double squadrons of efficient battleships, with the necessary cruisers, torpedo-boats, and so on, pertaining thereto. as the navy law (of 1898) provides for only two squadrons, the building of a third and fourth squadron is contemplated. of these four squadrons two will form a fleet. the second fleet is to be organized in its tactical composition in the same way as the first fleet provided for in the navy law. for the scope of the maintenance in commission in time of peace the following consideration has been decisive: as the ship-establishment of the german navy, even after the carrying out of the projected increase, will still be more or less inferior to the ship-establishments of some other great powers, compensation must be sought in the training of the personnel and in tactical training in the larger combinations. a trustworthy training of the separate ships' crews, as well as an adequate training in the larger tactical combinations, can be ensured only by permanent maintenance in commission in time of peace. to economize in commissioning in time of peace would mean to jeopardize the efficiency of the fleet for the event of war. the minimum of commissioning is the permanent formation of that fleet which comprises the newest and best ships as an active combination--that is to say, a combination in which all battleships and cruisers are in commission. this fleet would form the school for tactical training in double squadron, and in case of war would bear the first shock. for the second fleet, which will comprise the older battleships, it must suffice if only half of the ships are permanently in commission.[19] for training in the larger combination some further ships must then, it is true, be placed temporarily in commission during the manoeuvres. in case of war this second fleet--the reserve battle fleet--will have to make up its arrears in the training of the separate ships' crews and the deficiency of training in the larger combination behind the protection afforded by the active battle fleet. if germany possesses four squadrons of efficient battleships, a coast squadron composed of small armoured ships is less important. besides the increase of the home battle fleet, an increase of the foreign service ships is also necessary. in consequence of the occupation of kiauchow and the great enhancement of our oversea interests in the last two years, it has already become necessary, at the cost of the scouting ships of the battle fleet, to send abroad two large ships more than were provided for by the plan of the navy law. indeed, for an effective representation of our interests it would have been necessary to send out even more ships, if such had only been available. in order to form a judgment of the importance of an increase of the foreign service ships, it must be realized that they are the representatives abroad of the german defence forces, and that the task often falls to them of gathering in the fruits which the maritime potency created for the empire by the home battle fleet has permitted to ripen. moreover, an adequate representation on the spot, supported on a strong home battle fleet, in many cases averts differences, and so contributes to maintain peace while fully upholding german honour and german interests. a numerical demonstration of the additional requirements cannot be given for a considerable time in advance in the same manner as for the battle fleet, which rests upon an organic foundation. if the demand is made that the foreign service fleet shall be in a position (1) energetically to uphold german interests everywhere in time of peace, (2) to be adequate for warlike conflicts with oversea states without navies deserving of the name, an increase of at least five large and five small cruisers, as well as of one large and two small cruisers as material reserve, seems called for. the navy law foresees as ready for use three large and ten small cruisers, and as material reserve three large and four small cruisers. a distribution of the foreign service fleet among the foreign stations cannot be given, as this distribution depends upon the political circumstances, and these can only be estimated from case to case. footnotes: [footnote 19: this principle was abandoned under the law of 1912, and a standard of greater instant readiness for war was substituted, with three squadrons fully manned and two with nucleus crews.] appendix ii british and german shipbuilding programmes. the following table shows the british and german ships laid down between 1897 and 1914 and the programmes of subsequent years--the british figures for 1915-18 being based on the admiralty forecast, and the german on the latest german fleet law: +-------------------+----------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | | great britain. | germany. | | +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+ | |battle|armoured |protected|destroyers.|torpedo|battle|armoured |protected|destroyers.| | |ships.|cruisers.|cruisers.| |boats. |ships.|cruisers.|cruisers.| | +-------------------+------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+ | {1897-1898| 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | - | 1 | - | - | - | | {1898-1899| 7 | 8 | 1 | 12 | - | 2 | 1 | 2 | 6 | |mixed {1899-1900| 2 | 2 | 1 | - | 2 | 3 | - | 2 | 6 | |armament {1900-1901| 2 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | 6 | |period {1901-1902| 3 | 6 | 2 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | | {1902-1903| 2 | 2 | 6[20]| 9 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | | {1903-1904| 5 | 4 | 4[20]| 15 | - | 2 | 1 | 2 | 6 | | {1904-1905| 2 | 3 | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | | {1905-1906| - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | | +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+ | totals | 27 | 35 | 18 | 57 | 13 | 18 | 6 | 20 | 48 | | +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+ | {1905-1906| 4 | - | - | 6 | 12[21]| - | - | - | - | | {1906-1907| 3 | - | - | 2 | 12[21]| 2 | 1 | 2 | 12 | |dread {1907-1908| 3 | - | 1 | 5 | 12[21]| 3 | - | 2 | 12 | |nought {1908-1909| 2 | - | 6 | 16 | - | 4 | - | 2 | 12 | |period {1909-1910| 8 | - | 6 | 20 | - | 4 | - | 2 | 12 | | {1910-1911| 5 | - | 5 | 20 | - | 4 | - | 2 | 12 | | {1911-1912| 5 | - | 4 | 20 | - | 4 | - | 2 | 12 | | {1912-1913| 4 | - | 8[22]| 20 | - | 2 | - | 2 | 12 | | {1913-1914| 5 | - | 8 | 16 | - | 3 | - | 2 | 12 | | {1914-1915| 4 | - | 4 | 12 | - | 2 | - | 2 | 12 | | +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+ | {1915-1916| 4 | - | --[23]| --[23]| --[23]| 2 | - | 2 | 12 | | {1916-1917| 4 | - | --[23]| --[23]| --[23]| 3 | - | 2 | 12 | | {1917-1918| 4 | - | --[23]| --[23]| --[23]| 2 | - | 2 | 12 | | +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+ |totals authorised | | | | | | | | | | | (1905-1914) | | | | | | | | | | | (dreadnought | | | | | | | | | | | period) | 43 | - | 42 | 137 | 36 | 28 | 1 | 18 | 108 | +-------------------+------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+ as is explained elsewhere, germany has remained faithful to the policy outlined in the memorandum, but by successive navy acts she greatly increased the means for giving effect to it--one legislative measure succeeding another in quick succession, always making an increase in the naval establishment. footnotes: [footnote 20: included in these two figures are eight scouts--small cruisers--which were laid down in 1902 and 1903.] [footnote 21: the cruisers of 1912-14 were designated "light armoured cruisers."] [footnote 22: these thirty-six craft are small destroyers, and were built as such.] [footnote 23: no programme of british cruisers or torpedo craft announced. the forty-three british battleships exclude the two colonial vessels--_australia_ and _new zealand_--and the battleship given by the federated malay states, and ordered early in 1913. with these the number of dreadnought vessels is increased to forty-six.] end. germany and the next war by general friedrich von bernhardi translated by allen h. powles 1912 all the patriotic sections of the german people were greatly excited during the summer and autumn of 1911. the conviction lay heavy on all hearts that in the settlement of the morocco dispute no mere commercial or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that the honour and future of the german nation were at stake. a deep rift had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action of the government. public opinion, which was clearly in favour of asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have demanded. i cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation. haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of the german reichstag in modern berlin as it was in medieval regensburg. these conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages, which were partly written some time ago. nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and political development. at such times it is necessary to be absolutely clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made. the task i have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. it is obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view. our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past, have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must, and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness of my german heart that i have recorded my convictions. i believe that thus i shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers' hearts, and strengthen the national purpose. the author. _october, 1911_ contents preface introduction power of the peace idea--causes of the love of peace in germany- german consciousness of strength--lack of definite political aims --perilous situation of germany and the conditions of successful self-assertion--need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to explain the tasks and aims of germany in the light of history chapter i the right to make war pacific ideals and arbitration--the biological necessity of war--the duty of self-assertion--the right of conquest--the struggle for employment--war a moral obligation--beneficent results of war --war from the christian and from the materialist standpoints- arbitration and international law--destructiveness and immorality of peace aspirations--real and utopian humanity--dangerous results of peace aspirations in germany--the duty of the state chapter ii the duty to make war bismarck and the justification of war--the duty to fight--the teaching of history--war only justifiable on adequate grounds--the foundations of political morality--political and individual morality --the grounds for making war--the decision to make war--the responsibility of the statesman chapter iii a brief survey of germany's historical development the ways of providence in history--christianity and the germans- the empire and the papacy--breach between the german world empire and the revived spiritual power--rise of the great states of europe and political downfall of germany after the thirty years' war--rise of the prussian state--the epoch of the revolution and the war of liberation--intellectual supremacy of germany--after the war of liberation--germany under william i. and bismarck--change in the conception of the state and the principle of nationality--new economic developments and the world power of england--rise of other world powers- socialism, and how to overcome it--german science and art- internal disintegration of germany and her latent strength chapter iv germany's historical mission grounds of the intellectual supremacy of germany--germany's role as spiritual and intellectual leader--conquest of religious and social obstacles--inadequacy of our present political position- to secure what we have won our first duty--necessity of increasing our political power--necessity of colonial expansion- menace to our aspirations from hostile powers chapter v world power or downfall points of view for judging of the political situation--the states of the triple alliance--the political interests of france and russia- the russo-french alliance--the policy of great britain- america and the rising world powers of the far east--the importance of turkey--spain and the minor states of europe--perilous position of germany--world power or downfall--increase of political power: how to obtain it--german colonial policy--the principle of the balance of power in europe--neutral states--the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states--germany and the rules of international politics --the foundations of our internal strength chapter vi the social and political significance of army for war its necessity--its twofold aspect--the educational importance of military efficiency--different military systems--change in the nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization- variety of methods of preparation for war--the armaments of minor states--the armaments of the great powers--harmonious development of all elements of strength--influence on armaments of different conceptions of the duties of the state--permanent factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness- statecraft in this connection chapter vii the character of our next war our opponents--the french army--the military power of russia- the land forces of england--the military power of germany and austria; of italy--the turkish army--the smaller balkan states --the roumanian army--the armies of the lesser states of central europe--greece and spain--the fleets of the principal naval powers--the enmity of france--the hostility of england- russia's probable behaviour in a war against germany--the military situation of germany--her isolation--what will be at stake in our next war--preparation for war chapter viii the next naval war england's preparations for a naval war against germany--germany's first measures against england--england and the neutrality of the small neighbouring states--the importance of denmark--commercial mobilization--the two kinds of blockade: the close blockade and the extended blockade--england's attack on our coasts--co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--the decisive battle and its importance--participation of france and russia in a german-english war chapter ix the crucial question reciprocal relations of land and sea power--the governing points of view in respect of war preparations--carrying out of universal military service--the value of intellectual superiority--masses, weapons, and transport in modern war--tactical efficiency and the quality of the troops--the advantage of the offensive--points to be kept in view in war preparations--refutation of the prevailing restricted notions on this head--the _ersatzreserve_--new formations--employment of the troops of the line and the new formations--strengthening of the standing army--the importance of personality chapter x army organization not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further development--fighting power and tactical efficiency--strength of the peace establishment--number of officers and n.c.o.'s, especially in the infantry--relations of the different arms to each other--distribution of machine guns--proportion between infantry and artillery--lessons to be learned from recent wars with regard to this--superiority at the decisive point--the strength of the artillery and tactical efficiency--tactical efficiency of modern armies--tactical efficiency and the marching depth of an army corps--importance of the internal organization of tactical units--organization and distribution of field artillery; of heavy field howitzers--field pioneers and fortress pioneers--tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--increase of the cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--tactical organization of the cavalry--development of the air-fleet--summary of the necessary requirements--different ways of carrying them out--importance of governing points of view for war preparations chapter xi training and education the spirit of training--self-dependence and the employment of masses- education in self-dependence--defects in our training for war on the grand scale--need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to the training of our commanders--practical training of the artillery- training in tactical efficiency--practice in marching under war conditions--training of the train officers and column leaders- control of the general staff by the higher commanders--value of manoeuvres: how to arrange them--preliminary theoretical training of the higher commanders--training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the pioneers and commissariat troops--promotion of intellectual development in the army--training in the military academy chapter xii preparation for the naval war the position of a world power implies naval strength--development of german naval ideals--the task of the german fleet; its strength --importance of coast defences--necessity of accelerating our naval armaments--the building of the fleet--the institution of the air-fleet--preliminary measures for a war on commerce- mobilization--general points of view with regard to preparations for the naval war--lost opportunities in the past chapter xiii the army and popular education the universal importance of national education--its value for the army--hurtful influences at work on it--duties of the state with regard to national health--work and sport--the importance of the school--the inadequacy of our national schools--military education and education in the national schools--methods of instruction in the latter--necessity for their reform--continuation schools--influence of national education on the russo-japanese war--other means of national education--the propaganda of action chapter xiv financial and political preparation for war duties of the state in regard to war preparations--the state and national credit--the financial capacity of germany--necessity of new sources of revenue--the imperial right of inheritance--policy of interests and alliances--moulding and exploitation of the political situation--the laws of political conduct--interaction of military and political war preparations--political preparations for our next war--governing factors in the conduct of german policy epilogue the latest political events--conduct of the german imperial government --the arrangement with france--anglo-french relations and the attitude of england--the requirements of the situation germany and the next war introduction the value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of states by undermining the warlike spirit of the people. such ideas are widely disseminated in germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. with the increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a solution at the present time. we have been capable of soaring upwards. mighty deeds raised germany from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of european nations. but we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to advance along the path of development in politics and culture. we tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from us. yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our glorious past. how rightly fichte once judged his countrymen when he said the german can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always wish for its contrary also. the germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike nation of europe. for a long time they have proved themselves to be the ruling people of the continent by the power of their arms and the loftiness of their ideas. germans have bled and conquered on countless battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. in striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. a rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their military strength. this strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes. it springs first from the good-natured character of the german people, which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. it is connected with another characteristic of the german nature. our aim is to be just, and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange relations share this aim. we are always ready to consider the peaceful assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign press to be no less genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never from ideal aims of philanthropy. "justice," goethe says aptly, "is a quality and a phantom of the germans." we are always inclined to assume that disputes between states can find a peaceful solution on the basis of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is. an additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted in the very soul of the german people, is the wish not to be disturbed in commercial life. the germans are born business men, more than any others in the world. even before the beginning of the thirty years' war, germany was perhaps the greatest trading power in the world, and in the last forty years germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion of her political power. notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line, we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great industrial states of the earth. german trading-houses are established all over the world; german merchants traverse every quarter of the globe; a part, indeed, of english wholesale trade is in the hands of germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. under these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides. our trade and our industries--owners no less than employés--do not want this development to be interrupted. they believe that peace is the essential condition of commerce. they assume that free competition will be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce. universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. all families and all classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. finally comes the effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold in peace. under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old german empire received with "astonishment and indignation" from frederick the great, that "the rights of states can only be asserted by the living power"; that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we germans, cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. we regard our warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the special duty of the german reichstag to lighten so far as possible. we seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige. we are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the german people. the agelong dream of the german nation was realized in the political union of the greater part of the german races and in the founding of the german empire. since then there lives in the hearts of all (i would not exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased political power. this consciousness is supported by the fixed determination never to abandon these acquisitions. the conviction is universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. we all wish, indeed, to be able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict, and we live in the belief that the power of our state will steadily increase without our needing to fight for it. we do not at the bottom of our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow. every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. not merely in the north, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the south also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the german stock live in the heart of the people. here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness await their awakening. thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. it fritters itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. we no longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity of action. such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the yearnings for german unity, for the fulfilment of the barbarossa legend. a great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this danger. extreme tension exists between the great powers, notwithstanding all peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific settlement. in this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable, our german nation is beset on all sides. this is primarily a result of our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual upstarts, between the states which have earlier gained their place, and now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. we have thus injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. it must be reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces brought into play against them. on the other hand, the issue of this struggle will be decisive of germany's whole future as state and nation. we have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. we shall be beset by the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry through a seven years' war for our position as a world power, if we gain a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops, but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for all their dearest possessions. these were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great tasks of the present and the future which providence has set before the german people as the greatest civilized people known to history. from this standpoint i must first of all examine the aspirations for peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of the german people, according to their true moral significance. i must try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality. i must endeavour to develop from the history of the german past in its connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. the historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic obligations. no one need passively submit to the pressure of circumstances; even states stand, like the hercules of legend, at the parting of the ways. they can choose the road to progress or to decadence. "a favoured position in the world will only become effective in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." it seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light i may on the different paths which are open to our people. a nation must fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and, looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any sacrifices which the present or future may demand. these sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what germany is called upon to strive for and attain in the present and the future. only those who share my conception of the duties and obligations of the german people, and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial demands which spring out of it. it is only in their logical connection with the entire development, political and moral, of the state that the military requirements find their motive and their justification. chapter i the right to make war since 1795, when immanuel kant published in his old age his treatise on "perpetual peace," many have considered it an established fact that war is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. in spite of all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is credited with a power to which war must yield. but, undisturbed by such human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its destructive as well as creative and purifying power. it has not succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. long periods of war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from the political intercourse of nations. this wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. the maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship should aim. this unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a quite peculiar power over men's spirits. this aspiration finds its public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the press of every country and of every party opens its columns to it. the current in this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of governments profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all governments exert themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the conflagration. pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action. they usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote their own political aims. this was the real position of affairs at the hague congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the united states of america, who in recent times have earnestly tried to conclude treaties for the establishment of arbitration courts, first and foremost with england, but also with japan, france, and germany. no practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved. we can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts. this is shown by the fact that precisely those powers which, as the weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest need of international protection, have been completely passed over in the american proposals for arbitration courts. it must consequently be assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the americans, with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced "perfidious albion" to accede to the proposals. we may suppose that england intended to protect her rear in event of a war with germany, but that america wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of sovereignty in central america without hindrance, and to carry out her plans regarding the panama canal in the exclusive interests of america. both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for themselves. theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts of president taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace, and enthusiastically agree with him. even the minister for foreign affairs in england, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of the united states an era in the history of mankind. this desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been shown by a race of epigoni. "it has always been," h. von treitschke tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played with the dream of perpetual peace." everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war entails are justifiable. it is an incontestable fact that war temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the primitive brutality of man. it is therefore a most desirable consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible, and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature of war. all that the hague peace congress has accomplished in this limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war, universal acknowledgment. but it is quite another matter if the object is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in historical development. this aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws which rule all life. war is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization. "war is the father of all things." [a] the sages of antiquity long before darwin recognized this. [footnote a: (heraclitus of ephesus).] the struggle for existence is, in the life of nature, the basis of all healthy development. all existing things show themselves to be the result of contesting forces. so in the life of man the struggle is not merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "to supplant or to be supplanted is the essence of life," says goethe, and the strong life gains the upper hand. the law of the stronger holds good everywhere. those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy of nature. the weaker succumb. this struggle is regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and by the interplay of opposite forces. in the plant world and the animal world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. in the human race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances. the man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of right. the life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined, doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour, envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. still more often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment. there can be no doubt on this point. the nation is made up of individuals, the state of communities. the motive which influences each member is prominent in the whole body. it is a persistent struggle for possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only as it is compatible with advantage. so long as there are men who have human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests come into being and occasions for making war arise. "the natural law, to which all laws of nature can be reduced, is the law of struggle. all intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. the extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external development of societies, nations, and races, is war. the internal development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. the outward development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of nations--war. in what does the creative power of this struggle consist? in growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat of the other! this struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [b] [footnote b: clauss wagner, "der krieg als schaffendes weltprinzip."] that social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial struggle. in the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral, material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend itself. war will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions, enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which render possible a general progressive development. they confer victory because the elements of progress are latent in them. without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "war," says a. w. von schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in nature." now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist between peoples and states, like that between the fellow-members of a society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not always degenerate into war. struggle and war are not identical. this rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results. above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the state stands the law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the right shall prevail. behind the law stands the state, armed with power, which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. but there is no impartial power that stands above the rivalry of states to restrain injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the highest ends of mankind. between states the only check on injustice is force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own part and promote its own ends and ideals. if in doing so it comes into conflict with the ideals and views of other states, it must either submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or state, or appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of war--in order to make its own views prevail. no power exists which can judge between states, and makes its judgments prevail. nothing, in fact, is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay. it will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is stronger. this attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more intensive vitality will prevail. the allied opponents have the seeds of corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over numerical superiority. the history of germany is an eloquent example of this truth. struggle is, therefore, a universal law of nature, and the instinct of self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a natural condition of existence. "man is a fighter." self-sacrifice is a renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in the life of states, which are agglomerations of individuals. the first and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence. by self-assertion alone can the state maintain the conditions of life for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is entitled to claim from it. this duty of self-assertion is by no means satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the whole body of the nation embraced by the state. strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. from a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. the right of conquest is universally acknowledged. at first the procedure is pacific. over-populated countries pour a stream of emigrants into other states and territories. these submit to the legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants, with whom they compete. this amounts to conquest. the right of colonization is also recognized. vast territories inhabited by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized states, and made subject to their rule. higher civilization and the correspondingly greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. this right is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. the impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international relations has been the cause of many wars. the subjugated nation does not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence. this situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of civilization have changed in the course of time. the subject nation has, perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the difference in civilization has consequently lessened. such a state of things is growing ripe in british india. lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. it may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races, and yet the state wishes to retain the surplus population which the mother-country can no longer feed. then the only course left is to acquire the necessary territory by war. thus the instinct of self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign soil. it is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right. the threatened people will see the point of goethe's lines: "that which them didst inherit from thy sires, in order to possess it, must be won." the procedure of italy in tripoli furnishes an example of such conditions, while germany in the morocco question could not rouse herself to a similar resolution.[c] [footnote c: this does not imply that germany could and ought to have occupied part of morocco. on more than one ground i think that it was imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this state on the basis of the algeçiras convention. among other advantages, which need not be discussed here, germany would have had the country secured to her as a possible sphere of colonization. that would have set up justifiable claims for the future.] in such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. war gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things. just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the same result. in america, england, germany, to mention only the chief commercial countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the population. the native population cannot consume all the products of this work. the industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. work and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country. but this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. we find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer for itself or win fresh ones. it is an embittered struggle which rages in the market of the world. it has already often assumed definite hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify this struggle. great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods cheaper than those imported from the old industrial states. these latter will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory conditions of life to its workers. such a state runs the danger not only of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political world through diminishing production and lessened profits. in this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. we cannot reject the possibility that a state, under the necessity of providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war. if more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake in morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, germany would hardly have conceded to france the most favourable position in the morocco market without a struggle. england, doubtless, would not shrink from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the south african goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world sovereignty. the knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from international relations must be demonstrably untenable. but it is not only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an indispensable factor in civilization. the attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected with the view of life generally. if we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible diminution of all bodily suffering. the state will be regarded as a sort of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. we must endorse the view which wilhelm von humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits of the activity of the state.[d] the compulsory functions of the state must be limited to the assurance of property and life. the state will be considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun war as the greatest conceivable evil. [footnote d: w. von humboldt, "ideen zu einem versuch, die grenzen der wirksamkelt des staates zu bestimmen."] if, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of states as merely a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers, and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the chequered conditions of life, the task of the state will appear in a very different light. the state will not be to us merely a legal and social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the combined progress of humanity. we shall see in the state, as fichte taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to put into practice the moral duty on earth. "the state," says treitschke, "is a moral community. it is called upon to educate the human race by positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for nation and individuals, the highest moral task." this highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. man can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. he must be in a family, in a society, in the state, which draws the individual out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. the state alone, so schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest degree of life.[e] [footnote e: to expand the idea of the state into that of humanity, and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. any action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the state and nationality is impossible. such conceptions belong to the wide domain of utopias.] war, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. as human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it. if we grasp the conception of the state from this higher aspect, we shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its political power increases. the higher object at which it aims is closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. it is only the state which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most splendid perfection. the development of all the best human capabilities and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which power creates. but when the state renounces all extension of power, and recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. the efforts of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost. this is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small states, and every great power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the same curse. all petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a long period of peace. selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury obliterates idealism. money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable power, and character does not obtain due respect: "man is stunted by peaceful days, in idle repose his courage decays. law is the weakling's game. law makes the world the same. but in war man's strength is seen, war ennobles all that is mean; even the coward belies his name." schiller: _braut v. messina_. "wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the state from social petrifaction and stagnation. it is well that the transitoriness of the goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience. war alone teaches this lesson." [f] [footnote f: kuno fischer, "hegel," i., p. 737.] war, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to expand national power than any other means known to history. it certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. this is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded not merely as the affair of sovereigns and governments, but as the expression of the united will of a whole nation. all petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave decision which a war involves. the common danger unites all in a common effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly spurned. this union contains a liberating power which produces happy and permanent results in the national life. we need only recall the uniting power of the war of liberation or the franco-german war and their historical consequences. the brutal incidents inseparable from every war vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. all the sham reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are unmasked. great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth, and honour come to the front and are put into play. "a thousand touching traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war awakes in noble nations." [g] [footnote g: treitschke, "deutsche geschichte," i., p. 482.] frederick the great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "war," he said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it; every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues." "at the moment when the state cries out that its very life is at stake, social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. the individual must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body. he should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with the welfare of the community. war is elevating, because the individual disappears before the great conception of the state. the devotion of the members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly conspicuous as in war.... what a perversion of morality to wish to abolish heroism among men!" [h] [footnote h: treitschke, "politik" i., p. 74.] even defeat may bear a rich harvest. it often, indeed, passes an irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous constitution. "i recognize in the effect of war upon national character," said wilhelm von humboldt, "one of the most salutary elements in the moulding of the human race." the individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to personal morality. similarly, nations and states can achieve no loftier consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their independence, their honour, and their reputation. such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. the possibility of war is required to give the national character that stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the fullest development of their moral forces. an intellectual and vigorous nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a phaecian existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace. from this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics. the states which from various considerations are always active in this direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. the united states of america, e.g., in june, 1911, championed the ideas of universal peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with england or japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the national character is impossible. if they advance farther on this road, they will one day pay dearly for such a policy. again, from the christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion. christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "love god above all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." this law can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. the love which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen. such a system of politics must inevitably lead men astray. christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature cannot be political. its object is to promote morality of the individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the interests of the community. it tells us to love our individual enemies, but does not remove the conception of enmity. christ himself said: "i am not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." his teaching can never be adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. there never was a religion which was more combative than christianity. combat, moral combat, is its very essence. if we transfer the ideas of christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power of the state--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made which a war demands. thus, according to christianity, we cannot disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally and historically. again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. the individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour, since it may cost him life and prosperity. the state, however, as such can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved. the loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness, the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the minority in their own interests. thus, those who from the materialistic standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from motives of self-interest. reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but that it is justifiable from every point of view. the practical methods which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective. it is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various countries by arbitration courts, and so to render war impossible. the politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted. two questions in this connection are at once suggested: on what right is the finding of this arbitration court based? and what sanctions insure that the parties will accept this finding? to the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and cannot, exist. the conception of right is twofold. it signifies, firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the state, either written or sanctioned by tradition. in its first meaning it is an indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is variable and capable of development. the right determined by law is only an attempt to secure a right in itself. in this sense right is the system of social aims secured by compulsion. it is therefore impossible that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular case. the application of the legal right must always be qualified in order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. a certain freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the administration of justice. the established law, within a given and restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just. the conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. a quite different consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and frequently in opposition to, the established law. in christian countries murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a crime. it is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of right. there is yet another cause of uncertainty. the moral consciousness of the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and schools of philosophy. the established law can seldom keep pace with this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags behind. a condition of things arises where the living moral consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and mephistopheles' scoffing words are true: "laws are transmitted, as one sees, just like inherited disease. they're handed down from race to race, and noiseless glide from place to place. reason they turn to nonsense; worse, they make beneficence a curse! ah me! that you're a grandson you as long as you're alive shall rue." _faust_ (translation by sir t. martin). thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the same ideas in their private and social intercourse. the conception of the constitutional state in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and would lead to an intolerable state of things. the hard and fast principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of self-help allowed by the community. if sometimes between individuals the duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated relations between nations and states! each nation evolves its own conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical life. these various views bear in themselves their living justification, and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. there never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. here and there particular relations can be brought under definite international laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification. even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of right to it. by so doing it would renounce its highest ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an injustice, and thus dishonour itself. arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in the civilized world. every arbitration court must originate in a certain political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. in this way every progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the expansion of the young and vigorous state in favour of one which is sinking in the scale of civilization. these considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question: how can the judgment of the arbitration court be enforced if any state refuses to submit to it? where does the power reside which insures the execution of this judgment when pronounced? in america, elihu root, formerly secretary of state, declared in 1908 that the high court of international justice established by the second hague conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. the present leaders of the american peace movement seem to share this idea. with a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that public opinion must represent the view which the american plutocrats think most profitable to themselves. they have no notion that the widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material prosperity, commerce, and money-making. as a matter of fact, public opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided. we can imagine a court of arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the separate tributary countries when an empire like the roman empire existed. such an empire never can or will arise again. even if it did, it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the unchecked rivalry of different groups. so long as we live under such a state system as at present, the german imperial chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared, in his speech in the reichstag on march 30, 1911, that treaties for arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. such a treaty merely proved that between the two contracting states no serious inducement to break the peace could be imagined. it therefore only confirmed the relations already existing. "if these relations change, if differences develop between the two nations which affect their national existence, which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke." it must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an arbitration court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike decision, even as regards the state in whose favour it is pronounced. if we imagine, for example, that silesia had fallen to frederick the great by the finding of a court of arbitration, and not by a war of unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been equally important for prussia and for germany? no one will maintain this. the material increase in power which accrued to frederick's country by the acquisition of silesia is not to be underestimated. but far more important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered by the strongest european coalition, and that it vindicated its position as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. it was war which laid the foundations of prussia's power, which amassed a heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. war forged that prussia, hard as steel, on which the new germany could grow up as a mighty european state and a world power of the future. here once more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of history we shall see the same result again and again. if we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race. to what does the whole question amount? it is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. it is proposed to obviate the great quarrels between nations and states by courts of arbitration--that is, by arrangements. a one-sided, restricted, formal law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. the weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. the whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally. with the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration. so, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for the maintenance of national character and political independence; for the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and abroad is only a question of time. history speaks with no uncertain voice on this subject. it shows that valour is a necessary condition of progress. where with growing civilization and increasing material prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own politically or racially. "a people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political world when national character and military tradition act and react upon each." these are the words of clausewitz, the great philosopher of war, and he is incontestably right. these efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in nature where the struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging and unnerving effect. the apostles of peace draw large sections of a nation into the spell of their utopian efforts, and they thus introduce an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own weakness. they thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just as the prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in 1805 and 1806, and brought the state to the brink of destruction. the functions of true humanity are twofold. on the one hand there is the promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and of the community. it seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the suppression of war with those of the social democratic labour party, which goes hand in hand with them. the aims of both parties are utopian. the organized labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. until this is the case the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages. the nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its position in the international market in competition with nations who work longer hours and at lower rates. want of employment and extreme misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. on the other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of products and a profound demoralization of the working population. the case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. its execution, as we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. a state which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours. we can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most countries. "god will see to it," says treitschke,[i] "that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!" [footnote i: treitschke, "politik," i., p. 76.] nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in germany no inconsiderable danger. we germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical dreams. "the accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal attribute with us, as in france." [j] we lack the true feeling for political exigencies. a deep social and religious gulf divides the german people into different political groups, which are bitterly antagonistic to each other. the traditional feuds in the political world still endure. the agitation for peace introduces a new element of weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national and party life. [footnote j: treitschke, "politik," i., p. 81.] it is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the general good is being advanced by them. equally true is it, however, that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish political projects. its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its danger. every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary schemes. they must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an unhealthy and feeble utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. our people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy_. the policy of a great state has positive aims. it will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is possible and profitable. it must not only be conscious that in momentous questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation, the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the state, but it must keep this conviction fresh in the national consciousness. the inevitableness, the idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. the apostles of the peace idea must be confronted with goethe's manly words: "dreams of a peaceful day? let him dream who may! 'war' is our rallying cry, onward to victory!" chapter ii the duty to make war prince bismarck repeatedly declared before the german reichstag that no one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of intentionally bringing about a war. it could not, he said, be foreseen what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation, and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. in his "thoughts and reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect: "even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a nation, and we cannot see the cards held by providence so closely as to anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [a] [footnote a: "gedanken und erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.] we need not discuss whether prince bismarck wished this dictum to be regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out for so long. it is difficult to gauge its true import. the notion of forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. we must not think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. a war may seem to be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the pressure of the whole political situation. prince bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own initiative. the thought which he expresses in his later utterances cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle of political conduct. if we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only run counter to the ideas of our greatest german prince, but we exclude from politics that independence of action which is the true motive force. the greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. it does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable position affords prospect of a successful issue. in this way statecraft becomes a tool of providence, which employs the human will to attain its ends. "men make history," [b] as bismarck's actions clearly show. [footnote b: treitschke, "deutsche geschichte," i., p. 28.] no doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of a peaceful solution. the death of some one man, the setting of some great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change it fundamentally. but the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot be settled so simply. the man who wished to bring the question to a decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels, and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable interests. with the death of king edward vii. of england the policy of isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against germany, has broken down. the antagonism of germany and england, based on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of germany. it is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should depend on indefinite possibilities. a completely vague factor would be thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less dependent on chance. it may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a weak cause. only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated should determine political action. for the moral justification of the political decision we must not look to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and sincerity of the considerations which led to action. its practical value is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness of decision. if the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country the proud privilege of such initiative. if a war, on which a minister cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment. in the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never to be brought about falls to the ground. and yet this theory has in our day found many supporters, especially in germany. even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be postponed so long as possible.[c] [footnote c: speech of the imperial chancellor, v. bethmann-hollweg, on march 30, 1911. in his speech of november 9, 1911, the imperial chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of prince bismarck in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the morocco question.] those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as the supporters of the peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing importance. according to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and justifiable aspirations by force of arms. such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the chief duty, of any policy. to such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring about a war. wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the happiest results, both politically and socially. a feeble policy has always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter. our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most striking examples of this. the great elector laid the foundations of prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. frederick the great followed in the steps of his glorious ancestor. "he noticed how his state occupied an untenable middle position between the petty states and the great powers, and showed his determination to give a definite character (_décider cet être_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge the territory of the state and _corriger la figure de la prusse_, if prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name of 'kingdom.'" [d] the king made allowance for this political necessity, and took the bold determination of challenging austria to fight. none of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. he had always determined to be the aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself favourable prospects of success. we all know what he achieved. the whole history of the growth of the european nations and of mankind generally would have been changed had the king lacked that heroic power of decision which he showed. [footnote d treitschke, "deutsche geschichte," i., p. 51.] we see a quite different development under the reign of frederick william iii., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our nation cannot be too often reminded. it was manifest that war with napoleon could not permanently be avoided. nevertheless, in spite of the french breach of neutrality, the prussian government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied russians and austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great moral cost. according to all human calculation, the participation of prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the allies a decisive superiority. the adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and would have meant the final overthrow of prussia as a state had not the moral qualities still existed there which frederick the great had ingrained on her by his wars. at the darkest moment of defeat they shone most brightly. in spite of the political downfall, the effects of frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired his state and his people. this is clearly seen in the quite different attitude of the prussian people and the other germans under the degrading yoke of the napoleonic tyranny. the power which had been acquired by the prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible the heroic revival of 1813. the german wars of unification also belong to the category of wars which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest. the instability and political weakness which the prussian government showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of olmütz in 1850, had deeply shaken the political and national importance of prussia. on the other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more her duties as a nation, when king william i. and bismarck were at the helm, was soon abundantly manifest. bismarck, by bringing about our wars of unification in order to improve radically an untenable position and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the long-felt wish of the german people, and raised germany to the undisputed rank of a first-class european power. the military successes and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an unparalleled material prosperity. it is difficult to imagine how pitiable the progress of the german people would have been had not these wars been brought about by a deliberate policy. the most recent history tells the same story. if we judge the japanese standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally justifiable. it was immensely daring to challenge the russian giant, but the purely military conditions were favourable, and the japanese nation, which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open new channels for her superabundant activities. japan, from her own point of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in eastern asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of russia. the japanese statesmen were justified by the result. the victorious campaign created wider conditions of life for the japanese people and state, and at one blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics, and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great material advancement. if this war had been avoided from weakness or philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would have taken a very different turn. the growing power of russia in the amur district and in korea would have repelled or at least hindered the japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political foresight. the appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has always led to happy results. even an unsuccessfully waged war may sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital interests without a blow. we find an example of this in the recent heroic struggle of the small boer states against the british empire. in this struggle they were inevitably defeated. it was easy to foresee that an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of england and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could not bear heavy losses. but yet--if all indications are not misleading--the blood shed by the boer people will yield a free and prosperous future. in spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic; men like president stein, botha, and de wett, with their gallant followers, performed many great military feats. the whole nation combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which byron sings: "for freedom's battle once begun, bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, though baffled oft, is ever won." inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later developments, have been won by this struggle. the boers have maintained their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves superior to the english. it was only after many glorious victories that they yielded to a crushingly superior force. they accumulated a store of fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a power to be reckoned with. the result of this development is that the boers are now the foremost people in south africa, and that england preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their continual hostility. this laid the foundation for the united free states of south africa.[e] [footnote e: "war and the arme blanche," by erskine childers: "the truth came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215). "to ... aim at so cowing the boer national spirit, as to gain a permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond our power to achieve. peaceable political fusion under our own flag was the utmost we could secure. that means a conditional surrender, or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). lord roberts wrote a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest against the opinions expressed in it.] president kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not cecil rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of south africa, who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance. the lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results. war, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery. he who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility. it is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing conditions which have created national armies. absolute clearness of vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken, and what political aims justify the use of armed force. this question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of the state. if this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral education of the human race, then the state's own acts must necessarily conform to the moral laws. but the acts of the state cannot be judged by the standard of individual morality. if the state wished to conform to this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own particular duties. the morality of the state must be developed out of its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the personality of the man and his duties towards society. the morality of the state must be judged by the nature and _raison d'être_ of the state, and not of the individual citizen. but the end-all and be-all of a state is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle in politics." [f] [footnote f: treitschke, "politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy was the advancement of power. this term, however, has acquired, since the german reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd florentine. to him power was desirable in itself; for us "the state is not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being applied for the greatest good of mankind." [g] [footnote g: treitschke, "politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] the criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [h] if the same standard is applied to the state, then "its highest moral duty is to increase its power. the individual must sacrifice himself for the higher community of which he is a member; but the state is itself the highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. the christian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the state, for there is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to something higher. when a state sees its downfall staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. a sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a state." [i] [footnote h: _ibid._] [footnote i: _ibid_., i., p 3.] i have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political morality better than in the words of our great national historian. but we can reach the same conclusions by another road. the individual is responsible only for himself. if, either from weakness or from moral reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the consequences of his actions recoil only on him. the situation is quite different in the case of a state. it represents the ramifying and often conflicting interests of a community. should it from any reason neglect the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal personality, but it injures also the body of private interests which it represents. this incalculably far-reaching detriment affects not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of individuals and the community. accordingly it is a moral duty of the state to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and promoter of all higher interests. this duty it cannot fulfil unless it possesses the needful power. the increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first and foremost duty of the state. this aspect of the question supplies a fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the state can be estimated. the crucial question is, how far has the state performed this duty, and thus served the interests of the community? and this not merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the state, and thus indirectly its higher aims. it is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be erroneous. nevertheless the advancement of the power of the state must be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy. "among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the holy ghost." [j] this argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads logically to the jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means; that, according to it, to increase the power of the state all measures are permissible. [footnote j: treitschke, "politik," i., p 3.] a most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. so far as i know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and i do not feel bound to attempt one at this point. war, with which i am dealing at present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the seriousness of warlike measures. i must deviate here a little from my main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of political morality. the gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is generally assumed. the power of the state does not rest exclusively on the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth, and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements, which are reciprocally related to the material. the energy with which a state promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its citizens in foreign states, the determination which it displays to support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves to let things come to a crisis in a like case. similarly a reliable and honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies as well as with foes. a statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive deliberately. he can from the political standpoint avoid all negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will thereby serve the reputation and power of his state no less than when he holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and renounces all political formulas and phrases. in antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[k] at the present day political murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political morality. the same holds good of preconcerted political deception. a state which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute. the man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims, since he denies it by his actions. it is not, of course, necessary that a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point. but it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty deceptions. a fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of great statesmen. subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of diplomacy. [footnote k: mariana, "de rege et regis institutione." toledo, 1598.] finally, the relations between two states must often be termed a latent war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. such a position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties are determined to employ them. i believe after all that a conflict between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately moral nature of that end. recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action. but these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. there are conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the infringement of the right appears morally justified. york's decision to conclude the convention of tauroggen was indisputably a violation of right, but it was a moral act, for the franco-prussian alliance was made under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the prussian state; it was essentially untrue and immoral. now it is always justifiable to terminate an immoral situation. as regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument shows that it becomes the duty of a state to make use of the _ultima ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other states the power of the particular state is threatened, and peaceful methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. this power, as we saw, rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. war therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is not threatened, the moral influence of the state (and this is the ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. thus apparently trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the state, and consequently its moral prestige, are endangered. this prestige is an essential part of its power. an antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword must be drawn to do so. in deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the power of the state to justify the determination to fight; whether the inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict greater injury on the interests of the state than the disadvantages which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not declared. a further point to be considered is whether the general position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military success. with these considerations of expediency certain other weighty aspects of the question must also be faced. it must always be kept in mind that a state is not justified in looking only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of the existing generation. such policy would be opposed to all that constitutes the essential nature of the state. its conduct must be guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the future. "the true greatness of the state is that it links the past with the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to regard the state as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [l] [footnote l: treitschke, "politik," i., p 3.] the law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "i cannot conceive," zelter once wrote to goethe, "how any right deed can be performed without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite of what is desirable." a second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that which zelter rightly emphasizes. a great end cannot be attained except by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty of success can ever be anticipated. every undertaking implies a greater or less venture. the daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely estimated. in questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a satisfactory status. the solution of such problems is the sphere of diplomatic activity. the state of things is quite different when vital questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party. then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen to act. men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the solemn decision of war. in such questions any reluctance to face the opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the state, the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations. not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a case. the mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. this intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations without arms are like music-books without instruments," as frederick the great said. it is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which the opponent's purpose yields. when, therefore, the threat of war is insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin; the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the _duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike. finally, there is a third point to be considered. cases may occur where war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no prospect of success. the responsibility of this has also to be borne. so at least frederick the great thought. his brother henry, after the battle of kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the marquise de pompadour in order to purchase a peace with france. again, after the battle of kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but the king absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. he knew better what suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. president roosevelt, in his message to the congress of the united states of america on december 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "it must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran, "that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. a just war is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice.... it must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than not to have fought at all." to sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in itself morally justifiable. such decision is rendered more easy by the consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and military situation. it must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only heightens the power of the state in foreign affairs, but adds to the reputation of the government at home, and thus enables it better to fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties. no one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the state to employ war as a political means. so long as all human progress and all natural development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible. when a state is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival states must gradually acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the state towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable. when, on the other hand, the hostile states are weakened or hampered by affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to promote its own political aims. the danger of a war may be faced the more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be obtained with comparatively small sacrifices. these obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and concentrate all the living forces of the state, conscious of the truth of schiller's lines: "the chance that once thou hast refused will never through the centuries recur." the verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the future to the present need of peace. it is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist which justify the determination to make war. the difficulty is all the greater because the historical significance of the act must be considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its justification. war is not always the final judgment of heaven. there are successes which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries. the ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long epochs.[m] [footnote m: treitschke, "politik," i., p 2.] 54 the man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a great state must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries; but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical imperative, the teaching of kant: "act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [n] [footnote n: kant, "kritik der praktischen vernuft," p. 30.] he must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the state, and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. he can in no other way settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of political morality. he must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his hands. he must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the fixed goal of statesmanship. when he is absolutely clear upon this point he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true interests of the state; then only can he act systematically in the definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which luther once described in blunt, bold language: "it is very true that men write and say often what a curse war is. but they ought to consider how much greater is that curse which is averted by war. briefly, in the business of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to save the whole body. thus we must look at the business of war or the sword with the eyes of men, asking, why these murders and horrors? it will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[o] [footnote o: luther, "whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."] thus in order to decide what paths german policy must take in order to further the interests of the german people, and what possibilities of war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of state and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political purposes correspond to these problems. chapter iii a brief survey of germany's historical development the life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. the same holds good of nations and states. they are, as it were, personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious purposes in the great evolution of human existence. such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation to-day. according to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become conscious. it denies the difference between the empiric and the intelligible ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom. this philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. it seems everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the insufficient human intelligence. the existence of the universe is opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and time. the essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. we recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our understanding. a systematic explanation of the universe is quite impossible from the human standpoint. so much seems clear--although no demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual change. even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden moral law. at any rate we recognize in the growing spread of civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and higher forms of life. it is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too limited and anomalous. but within the limitations of our knowledge of things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to understand in broad outlines the ways of providence, which we may also term the principles of development. we shall thus obtain useful guidance for our further investigation and procedure. the agency and will of providence are most clearly seen in the history of the growth of species and races, of peoples and states. "what is true," goethe once said in a letter to zelter, "can but be raised and supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by its history." the formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of states, the laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. we are here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget that states are personalities endowed with very different human attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of states as a whole. impulses and influences exercise a very different effect on the separate national individualities. we must endeavour to grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the naturalist. each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we wish to learn the general trend of its development. we must study the history of the german people in its connection with that of the other european states, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto followed, and what guidance the past gives for our future policy. from the time of their first appearance in history the germans showed themselves a first-class civilized people. when the roman empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians there were two main elements which shaped the future of the west, christianity and the germans. the christian teaching preached equal rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the grave as the true goal of existence. it made the value of man as man, and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. it thus gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose morality rested solely on the relations with the state. simultaneously with this, hordes of germans from the thickly-populated north poured victoriously in broad streams over the roman empire and the decaying nations of the ancient world. these masses could not keep their nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. the states which they founded were short-lived. even then men recognized how difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a higher. the germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. the german element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and offered new opportunities for growth. the stronger the admixture of german blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did the growing nations appear. in the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world. the latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the germans with the roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated itself from the germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the alps and in the districts of scandinavia. at the same time the idea of the universal empire, which the ancient world had embraced, continued to flourish. in the east the byzantine empire lasted until a.d. 1453. in the west, however, the last roman emperor had been deposed by odoacer in 476. italy had fallen into the hands of the east goths and lombards successively. the visigoths had established their dominion in spain, and the franks and burgundians in gaul. a new empire rose from the latter quarter. charles the great, with his powerful hand, extended the frankish empire far beyond the boundaries of gaul. by the subjugation of the saxons he became lord of the country between the rhine and the elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in italy by the conquest of the lombards, and finally sought to restore the western roman empire. he was crowned emperor in rome in the year 800. his successors clung to this claim; but the frankish empire soon fell to pieces. in its partition the western half formed what afterwards became france, and the east frankish part of the empire became the later germany. while the germans in the west frankish empire, in italy and spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually amalgamated with the romans, the inhabitants of the east frankish empire, especially the saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained their germanic characteristics, language, and customs. a powerful german [a] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of charles the great to the western roman empire. otto the great was the first _german_ king who took this momentous step. it involved him and his successors in a quarrel with the bishops of rome, who wished to be not only heads of the church, but lords of italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in order to prove their pretended title to that country. [footnote a: german (deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular," opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the latin church dialect. it was first used as the name of a people, in the tenth century a.d.] the popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. living in rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way of the idea of universal imperium. the notion was one of the boldest creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers. naturally these papal pretensions led to feuds with the empire. the freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual dominion. in the portentous struggle of the two powers for the supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the german empire, the imperial cause was worsted. it was unable to mould the widely different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the estates. the last staufer died on the scaffold at naples under the axe of charles of anjou, who was a vassal of the church. the great days of the german-roman empire were over. the german power lay on the ground in fragments. a period of almost complete anarchy followed. dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad characteristics of the german people, contributed to extend this destruction to the economic sphere. the intellectual life of the german people deteriorated equally. at the time when the imperial power was budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted staufers, german poetry was passing through a first classical period. every german country was ringing with song; the depth of german sentiment found universal expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and german idealism inspired the minnesingers. but with the disappearance of the empire every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. the material prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the hanseatic league bore its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great trade-routes, which linked the west and orient, led from venice and genoa through germany. but the earlier political power was never again attained. nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the breasts of that german people, which had submitted to the papacy, and was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in the spiritual domain. as she grew more and more worldly, the church had lost much of her influence on men's minds. on the other hand, a refining movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to the church. it found enthusiastic response in germany, and was joined by everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. ulrich von hutten's battle-cry, "i have dared the deed," rang loud through the districts of germany. humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the reformation, which conceived in the innermost heart of the german people, shook europe to her foundations. once more it was the german people which, as formerly in the struggle between the arian goths and the orthodox church, shed it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for national independence also. no struggle more pregnant with consequences for the development of humanity had been fought out since the persian wars. in this cause the german people nearly disappeared, and lost all political importance. large sections of the empire were abandoned to foreign states. germany became a desert. but this time the church did not remain victorious as she did against the arian goths and the staufers. it is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself. politically the catholic states, under spanish leadership, won an undisputed supremacy. but, on the other hand, the right to spiritual freedom was established. this most important element of civilization was retained for humanity in the reformed churches, and has become ever since the palladium of all progress, though even after the peace of westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious freedom. the states of the latin race on their side now put forward strong claims to the universal imperium in order to suppress the german ideas of freedom. spain first, then france: the two soon quarrelled among themselves about the predominance. at the same time, in germanized england a firs-class protestant power was being developed, and the age of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the reformation and the thirty years' war, opened new and unsuspected paths to human intellect and human energy. political life also acquired a fresh stimulus. gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the newly-discovered districts of america, the northern part of which fell to the lot of the germanic and the southern part to that of the latin race. thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and consequently, of world politics. germany remained excluded from this great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes and religious wars. on the other hand, in combination with england, the low countries and austria, which latter had at the same time to repel the inroad of turks from the east, she successfully curbed the french ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. england by these wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world. germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in political power. she broke up into numerous feeble separate states, which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the german cause. but this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. a centre of protestant power was established in the north--i.e., prussia. after centuries of struggle the germans had succeeded in driving back the slavs, who poured in from the east, in wrestling large tracts from them, and in completely germanizing them. this struggle, like that with the niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which extended its power to the coasts of the baltic, and successfully planted germanic culture in the far north. the german nation was finally victorious also against swedes, who disputed the command of the baltic. in that war the great elector had laid the foundations of a strong political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an influential force in germany. the headship of protestant germany devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to catholic austria grew up. this latter state had developed out of germany into an independent great power, resting its supremacy not only on a german population, but also on hungarians and slavs. in the seven years' war prussia broke away from catholic austria and the empire, and confronted france and russia as an independent protestant state. but yet another dark hour was in store for germany, as she once more slowly struggled upwards. in france the monarchy has exhausted the resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. the motto of the monarchy, _l'état c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous revolution of 1789, and everywhere in europe, and more specially in germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism. the german empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary states survived, among which prussia alone showed any real power. france once again under napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and bore her victorious eagles to italy, egypt, syria, germany, and spain, and even to the inhospitable plains of russia, which by a gradual political absorption of the slavonic east, and a slow expansion of power in wars with poland, sweden, turkey, and prussia, had risen to an important place among the european nations. austria, which had become more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the mighty corsican. prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught. but the german spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest humiliation. the purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the protestant north. the wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm, won back the possibilities of political existence for prussia and for germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical developments. while the french people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another quite different revolution was working in prussia--the revolution of _duty_. the assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the state. immanuel kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and scharnhorst grasped the idea of universal military service. by calling upon each individual to sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the clearest expression to the idea of the state, and created a sound basis on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in prussia. while measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus being adopted in the state on which the future fate of germany was to depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a german empire of the first rank, the empire of intellect, grew up in the domain of art and science, where german character and endeavour found the deepest and fullest expression. a great change had been effected in this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year 1750. a literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and deeply rooted in the moral teaching of protestantism, had raised their minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and superiority of the german spirit. "thus the new poetry and science became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this dismembered people, and decided the victory of protestantism in german life." [b] [footnote b: treitschke, "deutsche geschichte", i., p. 88.] germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she developed the root-idea of the reformation into the right of unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [c] moral obligations, such as no nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the philosophy of kant and fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs of her poets. the intense effect of these spiritual agencies was realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "thus our classical literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as the political work of the prussian monarchy", [d] and of those men of action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin. [footnote c: _ibid.,_ i., p. 90.] [footnote d: _ibid._] the meeting of napoleon and goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event in the world's history. on one side the scourge of god, the great annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last abortion of the revolution--a "part of the power that still produces good, while still devising ill"; on the other, the serenely grave olympian who uttered the words, "let man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect, and all movements of the german mind, and thus roused his people to consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the german brain; a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify to the divinity in man. the great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to whom was to fall the victory of the future. the mightiest potentate of the latin race faced the great germanic who stood in the forefront of humanity. truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation could give birth to men like fichte, scharnhorst, stein, schiller, and goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny. we must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and weakness of its sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed the german people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure enthusiasm. the deep disappointment of that generation found expression in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of thousands to the free country of north america, where the germans took a prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to their mother-country. the prussian monarchy grovelled before austria and russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties. nevertheless in the centre of the prussian state there was springing up from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. two men came to the front, king william i. and the hero of the saxon forest. resolutely they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the popular representatives. a victorious campaign settled matters with austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in germany, and left the german imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a great power. france was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the vast majority of the german peoples united under the imperial crown which the king of prussia wore; the old idea of the german empire was revived in a federal shape by the triple alliance of germany, austria, and italy. the german idea, as bismarck fancied it, ruled from the north sea to the adriatic and the mediterranean. like a phoenix from the ashes, the german giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old german confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs. it was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of germany vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the economic and political power. hostile combinations threatened us on all sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. hemmed in between france and russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed to gather the full fruits of our victories. the short-sightedness and party feuds of the newly-formed reichstag--the old hereditary failings of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. the intense love of peace, which the nation and government felt, made us fall behind in the race with other countries. in the most recent partition of the earth, that of africa, victorious germany came off badly. france, her defeated opponent, was able to found the second largest colonial empire in the world; england appropriated the most important portions; even small and neutral belgium claimed a comparatively large and valuable share; germany was forced to be content with some modest strips of territory. in addition to, and in connection with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward. under the influence of the constitutional ideas of frederick the great, and the crop of new ideas borne by the french revolution, the conception of the state has completely changed since the turn of the century. the patrimonial state of the middle ages was the hereditary possession of the sovereign. hence sprung the modern state, which represents the reverse of this relation, in which the sovereign is the first servant of the state, and the interest of the state, and not of the ruler, is the key to the policy of the government. with this altered conception of the state the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the tendency is as follows: historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and the nations combined into a political whole; the state will thus acquire a uniform national character and common national interests. this new order of things entirely altered the basis of international relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. commerce and trade also developed on wholly new lines. after 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade restrictions--were gradually removed. landed property ceased to be a monopoly. commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "england introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton. there came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in the widest sense, the exploitation of india, the extension of colonization over polynesia, etc." england at the same time girdled the earth with her cables and fleets. she thus attained to a sort of world-sovereignty. she has tried to found a new universal empire; not, indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like pope and emperor in bygone days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests dependent on herself. facing her, between the atlantic and pacific oceans, linking the west and the east, the united states of north america have risen to be an industrial and commercial power of the first rank. supported by exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing character of her inhabitants, this mighty empire aims at a suitable recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy. russia has not only strengthened her position in europe, but has extended her power over the entire north of asia, and is pressing farther into the centre of that continent. she has already crossed swords with the states of the mongolian race. this vast population, which fills the east of the asiatic continent, has, after thousands of years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and categorically claims its share in international life. the entrance of japan into the circle of the great world powers means a call to arms. "asia for the asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. the new great power has emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a european foe. china, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. a mighty movement is thrilling asia--the awakening of a new epoch. dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the civilized countries of europe, are threatening from asia, the old cradle of the nations. but even in the heart of the european nations, forces which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. the persisting ideas of the french revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a consciousness of their importance and their social power. the workers, originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern state, and seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. they do not wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically recognized state, but they wish to substitute for it a new state, in which they themselves are the rulers. by this aspiration they not only perpetually menace state and society, but endanger in the separate countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. even in germany this movement has affected large sections of the population. until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of german industries. since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in connection with the rapid growth of the german merchant navy, trade has marvellously increased. germany has become an industrial and trading nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds work and employment in this sphere. agriculture has more and more lost its leading position in the economic life of the people. the artisan class has thus become a power in our state. it is organized in trade unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the international social democracy. it is hostile to the national class distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of the state. it is evident that the state cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. the law of self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. the citizen may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly devotes his powers. he is entitled to demand that the state should grant this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of capital. two means of attaining such an object are open to the state: first, it may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age, or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from working. the economical prosperity of germany as the visible result of three victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the state. german labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a market for itself. on the other hand, the german state has intervened with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. as scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of man, so the emperor william i. recognized the duty of the state towards those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. the position of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social legislation. no excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now existed. a vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing state and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and progress. this task is by no means completed. the question still is, how to win back the working class to the ideals of state and country? willing workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny. germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of all progress in culture. german science has held its place in the world. germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things. the achievements of germany in the sphere of science and literature are attested by the fact that the annual export of german books to foreign countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that of france, england, and america combined. it is only in the domain of the exact sciences that germany has often been compelled to give precedence to foreign countries. german art also has failed to win a leading position. it shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions, and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. the german empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. not only are the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between north and south has prevented the population from growing into a completely united body. so stands germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science, industries, and trade. and now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future? what duties are enforced on us by the past? it is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the german state answers this question, depend not only our own further development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of the world. chapter iv germany's historical mission let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the empire of central europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds of intellectual and moral development were sown by the german intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the entire development of the human race is ascribable to this german people. this conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on the freedom and the universality of the german spirit, which have ever and again been shown in the course of its history. there is no nation whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as the german, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free and natural development. the germans have thus always been the standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. they have often been worsted in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best heart's blood in the cause. intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled the germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth century. but the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. the inevitable need of a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into world-historical importance. thus two great movements were born from the german intellectual life, on which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must rest: the reformation and the critical philosophy. the reformation, which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the church, which checked all free progress; and the critique of pure reason, which put a stop to the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. on this substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. torn this way and that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress. reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion, and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results of natural philosophy. the german nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. we are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot shrink. we must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human efforts. our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special qualities. no nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it received. it has "enriched the store of traditional european culture with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "depth of conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all nations and ages--this has at all times been the german characteristic; this has been extolled as the prerogative of german culture." [a] to no nation, except the german, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self "that which is given to mankind as a whole." we often see in other nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same capacity for generalization and absorption. it is this quality which specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position. [footnote a: treitschke, "deutsche geschichte," i., p. 95.] there are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge our highest duty. they form the necessary platform from which we can mount to the highest goal. these duties lie in the domains of science and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results of scientific inquiry. first and foremost it is german science which must regain its superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate our birthright. on the one hand, we must extend the theory of the perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more useful and remunerative. we must endeavour to find scientific solutions of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. we need not restrict ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can find its expression. it is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition not only our future development, but the higher life generally. these problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and permanently than our own. yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in germany. the german nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which works slowly in opposition to the different movements. the germans thus seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of evolution. we have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the community and the working class itself. we must not spare any efforts to find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class with healthy and patriotic ambitions. it is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty, requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation, and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity which is lamentably deficient to-day. no attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. the old antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in germany. it will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. at present there appears small probability of attaining this end. the dogmatism of protestant orthodoxy and the jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of the catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement can be contemplated. but no german statesman can disregard this aspect of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is rooted exclusively on protestantism. legally and socially all denominations enjoy equal rights, but the german state must never renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. to do so would mean loss of prestige. duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human civilization have thus been transmitted to the german nation, as heir of a great and glorious past. it is faced with problems of no less significance in the sphere of its international relations. these problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of germany in the world. the german empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms and struggles of the past. the germany of to-day, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the german peoples. a large number of german fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other states, or live in political independence, like the dutch, who have developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national customs cannot deny their german ancestry. germany has been robbed of her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most characteristically german stream, the much lauded german rhine, lie outside the german territory. on the eastern frontier, too, where the strength of the modern german empire grew up in centuries of war against the slavs, the possessions of germany are menaced. the slavonic waves are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that germanism, which seems to have lost its old victorious strength. signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the overflow of the strength of the german nation has poured into foreign countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. even to-day the german empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a german way of living. this is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or corresponds to the greatness of the german nation and its intellectual importance. at an earlier epoch, to be sure, when germans had in the course of centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this insufficiency. even during the age of our classical literature the patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of german genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [b] [footnote b: treitschke, "deutsche geschichte," i., p. 195.] schiller, in 1797, could write the lines: "german majesty and honour fall not with the princes' crown; when amid the flames of war german empire crashes down, german greatness stands unscathed." [c] [footnote c: fragment of a poem on "german greatness," published in 1905 by bernhard suphan.] the nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds different sentiments to-day. we attach a higher value to the influence of the german spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since we must now take into consideration the immense development of germany in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old importance of our classical literature. again, we have learnt from the vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political federation of our nation. the dominion of german thought can only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties towards the human race. our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding the territories of germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a foot's breadth of german soil to foreign nationalities. on the west the ambitious schemes of the latin race have been checked, and it is hard to imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched again from our hands. on the south-east the turks, who formerly threatened the civilized countries of europe, have been completely repulsed. they now take a very different position in european politics from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance westwards. their power on the mediterranean is entirely destroyed. on the other hand, the slavs have become a formidable power. vast regions which were once under german influence are now once more subject to slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. the present russian baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of german culture. the german element in austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the slavs; germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of slavonic workmen. many poles are firmly established in the heart of westphalia. only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this slavonic flood. and yet to check this onrush of slavism is not merely an obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of self-preservation and european civilization. it cannot yet be determined whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. it is not improbable that the question of germanic or slavonic supremacy will be once more decided by the sword. the probability of such a conflict grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and show less determination to protect the german soil at all costs. the further duty of supporting the germans in foreign countries in their struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot withdraw. the isolated groups of germans abroad greatly benefit our trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from germany; but they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in america. the american-germans have formed a political alliance with the irish, and thus united, constitute a power in the state, with which the government must reckon. finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to preserve the german spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of universal culture. even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the east and west, and in preserving the german nationality in its present form throughout the world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the great competition with the other powers, if we are contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. if we wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. lord rosebery, speaking at the royal colonial institute on march 1, 1893, expressed himself as follows: "it is said that our empire is already large enough and does not need expansion.... we shall have to consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... we have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should receive the anglo-saxon and not another character." [d] [footnote d: this passage is quoted in the book of the french ex-minister hanotaux, "fashoda et le partage de l'afrique."] that is a great and proud thought which the englishman then expressed. if we count the nations who speak english at the present day, and if we survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of england, we must admit that he is justified from the english point of view. he does not here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of the english spirit is proclaimed in plain language. england has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. all the colonies which are directly subject to english rule are primarily exploited in the interest of english industries and english capital. the work of civilization, which england undeniably has carried out among them, has always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent culture of their own. with regard to those colonies which enjoy self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as canada, australia, south africa, it is very questionable whether they will permanently retain any trace of the english spirit. they are not only growing states, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the present time whether england will be able to include them permanently in the empire, to make them serviceable to english industries, or even to secure that the national character is english. nevertheless, it is a great and proud ambition that is expressed in lord rosebery's words, and it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence. the french regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by them in the last forty years. in 1909 the former french minister, hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "ten years ago the work of founding our colonial empire was finished. france has claimed her rank among the four great powers. she is at home in every quarter of the globe. french is spoken, and will continue to be spoken, in africa, asia, america, oceania. seeds of sovereignty are sown in all parts of the world. they will prosper under the protection of heaven." [e] [footnote e: hanotaux, "fashoda et le partage de l'afrique."] the same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the german policy: "it will be for history to decide what has been the leading thought of germany and her government during the complicated disputes under which the partition of africa and the last phase of french colonial policy were ended. we may assume that at first the adherents to bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how france embarked on distant and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of the country and its government for long years to come. nevertheless, it is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, since germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, tried to make up for lost time. if that country deliberately abandoned colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have obtained the best shares." this french criticism is not altogether unfair. it must be admitted with mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in algeria, has yet created the second largest colonial empire in the world, and prides herself on being a world power, while the conqueror of gravelotte and sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of france in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy alike of the dignity and the interests of germany. the openly declared claims of england and france are the more worthy of attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. in the face of these claims the german nation, from the standpoint of its importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place in the sun, as prince bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of influence. but we can only reach this goal, by so amply securing our position in europe, that it can never again be questioned. then only we need no longer fear that we shall be opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international politics. we shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair rivalry with the other world powers, and secure to german nationality and german spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to them. such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity. the fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of great prosperity has set in, and that german industries have been widely extended and german trade has kept pace with them. the extraordinary capacity of the german nation for trade and navigation has once more brilliantly asserted itself. the days of the hanseatic league have returned. the labour resources of our nation increase continuously. the increase of the population in the german empire alone amounts yearly to a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative industrial occupation. there is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid development. we are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale of our own manufactures. we even obtain a part of our necessaries of life from abroad. then, again, we have not the assured markets which england possesses in her colonies. our own colonies are unable to take much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to close their doors to outsiders, especially germans, in order to encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of other countries. the livelihood of our working classes directly depends on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. it is a question of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. we shall very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population means of life other than industrial employment. it is out of the question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of population. agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and home settlements may afford some relief. but no remunerative occupation will ever be found within the borders of the existing german empire for the whole population, however favourable our international relations. we shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a home in our own german colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland. there is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. if the unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from building a colonial empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile powers, may keep our sea communications open. we have long underestimated the importance of colonies. colonial possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are only used for economic ends, while the owner-state does not think of colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and immoral, and can never be held permanently. "but that colonization which retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance for the future of the world. it will determine the degree in which each nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. it is quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count among the european great powers, however powerful it may otherwise be." [f] [footnote f: treitschke, "politik," i., section 8.] we are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our requirements. they would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our growing working population, but would supply raw materials and foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying unproductive in germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. we find throughout the countries of the world german merchants, engineers, and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign masters, because german colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, do not exist. in the future, however, the importance of germany will depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world speak german? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the german empire? these are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its present condition as regards the future. we must be quite clear on this point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and hostility as ours. this is due to the many restrictions of our political relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course of our history. it was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to political paralysis at the time when the great european states built themselves up, and sometimes expanded into world powers. we did not enter the circle of the powers, whose decision carried weight in politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long concluded. all which other nations attained in centuries of natural development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. what we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior force of hostile interests and powers. it is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the straight road of our intended development. the difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an advantage. by keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension, it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. it has forced us to stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword. chapter v world power or downfall in discussing the duties which fall to the german nation from its history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the great powers of europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, must be the basis of our future development. the political questions thus raised intimately concern all international relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. we must not aim at the impossible. a reckless policy would be foreign to our national character and our high aims and duties. but we must aspire to the possible, even at the risk of war. this policy we have seen to be both our right and our duty. the longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it will be to make up the start which the other powers have gained on us. "the man of sense will by the forelock clutch whatever lies within his power, stick fast to it, and neither shirk, nor from his enterprise be thrust, but, having once begun to work, go working on because he must." _faust_ (translated by sir theodore martin). the sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the hostile intentions of the other world powers, by the existing territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of both. our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of these conditions. we must accurately, and without bias or timidity, examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which concern us are weighed one against the other. these considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the states allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. we must try to realize this grouping. the shifting aims of the politics of the day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. we must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions of the individual states, which are based on the nature of things, and therefore will continually make their importance felt. the broad lines of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. policy is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and often divert it from the path of true national interests. such digressions must not be ignored. the statesman who seizes his opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. but the student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. we must therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense clear, so far as it concerns germany's power and ambitions. we see the european great powers divided into two great camps. on the one side germany, austria, and italy have concluded a defensive alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. in this alliance the two first-named states form the solid, probably unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately connected. the geographical conditions force this result. the two states combined form a compact series of territories from the adriatic to the north sea and the baltic. their close union is due also to historical national and political conditions. austrians have fought shoulder to shoulder with prussians and germans of the empire on a hundred battlefields; germans are the backbone of the austrian dominions, the bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the empire. austria, more than germany, must guard against the inroads of slavism, since numerous slavonic races are comprised in her territories. there has been no conflict of interests between the two states since the struggle for the supremacy in germany was decided. the maritime and commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those of the other to the north. any feebleness in the one must react detrimentally on the political relations of the other. a quarrel between germany and austria would leave both states at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful enemies. the possibility of each maintaining its political position depends on their standing by each other. it may be assumed that the relations uniting the two states will be permanent so long as germans and magyars are the leading nationalities in the danubian monarchy. it was one of the master-strokes of bismarck's policy to have recognized the community of austro-german interests even during the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered such an alliance possible. the weakness of the austrian empire lies in the strong admixture of slavonic elements, which are hostile to the german population, and show many signs of pan-slavism. it is not at present, however, strong enough to influence the political position of the empire. italy, also, is bound to the triple alliance by her true interests. the antagonism to austria, which has run through italian history, will diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by italy. neither condition is impossible. irredentism will then lose its political significance, for the position, which belongs to italy from her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with austria. it is the position of a leading political and commercial mediterranean power. that is the natural heritage which she can claim. neither germany nor austria is a rival in this claim, but france, since she has taken up a permanent position on the coast of north africa, and especially in tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural colony for italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by italians. it would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with france, to protest against this annexation, and to preserve the territory of carthage for italy. we should have considerably strengthened italy's position on the mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between italy and france that would have added to the security of the triple alliance. the weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive character. it offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential interests. it is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. prince bismarck, in his "thoughts and reminiscences," pointed out that this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the future. since italy found the triple alliance did not aid her mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with england and france, and accordingly retired from the triple alliance. the results of this policy are manifest to-day. italy, under an undisguised arrangement with england and france, but in direct opposition to the interests of the triple alliance, attacked turkey, in order to conquer, in tripoli, the required colonial territory. this undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with austria, which, as the supreme power in the balkan peninsula, can never tolerate the encroachment of italy into those regions. the triple alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has suffered a rude shock. the ultimate reason for this result is found in the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to the vital needs of the members of the league. the alliance will not regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied armies, each of the three states can satisfy its political needs. we must therefore be solicitous to promote austria's position in the balkans, and italy's interests on the mediterranean. only then can we calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own political endeavours. since, however, it is against all our interests to strengthen italy at the cost of turkey, which is, as we shall see, an essential member of the triple alliance, we must repair the errors of the past, and in the next great war win back tunis for italy. only then will bismarck's great conception of the triple alliance reveal its real meaning. but the triple alliance, so long as it only aims at negative results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with sterility. on the surface, italy's mediterranean interests do not concern us closely. but their real importance for us is shown by the consideration that the withdrawal of italy from the triple alliance, or, indeed, its secession to an anglo-franco-russian _entente,_ would probably be the signal for a great european war against us and austria. such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of france. such a contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of italy, we must not disregard her relations with england as well as with france. england is clearly a hindrance in the way of italy's justifiable efforts to win a prominent position in the mediterranean. she possesses in gibraltar, malta, cyprus, egypt, and aden a chain of strong bases, which secure the sea-route to india, and she has an unqualified interest in commanding this great road through the mediterranean. england's mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in combination with the french mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the coasts of italy, should that country be entangled in a war against england _and_ france. italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. she is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of the triple alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. it is our interest to reconcile italy and turkey so far as we can. france and russia have united in opposition to the central european triple alliance. france's european policy is overshadowed by the idea of _revanche_. for that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against england and the humiliation of fashoda. she wishes first to take vengeance for the defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over germany, and, if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of europe which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune smiles on her arms, to reconquer alsace and lorraine. but she feels too weak for an attack on germany. her whole foreign policy, in spite of all protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for this attack. her alliance with russia, her _entente_ with england, are inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this latter nation are traceable to the fact that the french policy hoped, and with good reason, for more active help from england's hostility to germany than from russia. the colonial policy of france pursues primarily the object of acquiring a material, and, if possible, military superiority over germany. the establishment of a native african army, the contemplated introduction of a modified system of conscription in algeria, and the political annexation of morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible illusion as to its extent and meaning. since france has succeeded in bringing her military strength to approximately the same level as germany, since she has acquired in her north african empire the possibility of considerably increasing that strength, since she has completely outstripped germany in the sphere of colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the french sympathies of alsace and lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: france will not abandon the paths of an anti-german policy, but will do her best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart german interests in every quarter of the globe. when she came to an understanding with the italians, that she should be given a free hand in morocco if she allowed them to occupy tripoli, a wedge was driven into the triple alliance which threatens to split it. it may be regarded as highly improbable that she will maintain honourably and with no _arrière-pensée_ the obligations undertaken in the interests of german commerce in morocco. the suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the french morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-german. the french policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on the hostility of france in the future. it must be regarded as a quite unthinkable proposition that an agreement between france and germany can be negotiated before the question between them has been once more decided by arms. such an agreement is the less likely now that france sides with england, to whose interest it is to repress germany but strengthen france. another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the east, where the giant russian empire towers above all others. the empire of the czar, in consequence of its defeat in manchuria, and of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is following apparently a policy of recuperation. it has tried to come to an understanding with japan in the far east, and with england in central asia; in the balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status quo_. so far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with germany. the potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any aggressive policy on russia's part. the ministry of kokowzew seems likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more reason for doing so, as the murder of stolypin with its accompanying events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. it is improbable, therefore, that russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention in favour of france. the russo-french alliance is not, indeed, swept away, and there is no doubt that russia would, if the necessity arose, meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and an improvement in the russo-german relations has been effected, although this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions of germany in north persia. it is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which russia is adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. the requirements of the mighty empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether in the far east, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the direction of the mediterranean, where the crescent still glitters on the dome of st. sophia. after a successful war, russia would hardly hesitate to seize the mouth of the vistula, at the possession of which she has long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the baltic. supremacy in the balkan peninsula, free entrance into the mediterranean, and a strong position on the baltic, are the goals to which the european policy of russia has naturally long been directed. she feels herself, also, the leading power of the slavonic races, and has for many years been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into central europe. pan-slavism is still hard at work. it is hard to foresee how soon russia will come out from her retirement and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. her present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the present emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong monarchical state, such as germany is, and also on the character of the internal development of the mighty empire. the whole body of the nation is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a healthy condition. even the agrarian policy of the present government has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed expectations. the possibility thus has always existed that, under the stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad. time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in the far east or in the west. on the one side japan, and possibly china, must be encountered; on the other, germany, austria, and, possibly, turkey. doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the franco-russian alliance. the interests of the two allies are not identical. while france aims solely at crushing germany by an aggressive war, russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. she wished to secure herself against any interference by the powers of central europe in the execution of her political plans in the south and east, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on advantageous terms in france, the loans which were so much needed. russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with germany or to take part in one. of course, every further increase of the german power militates against the russian interests. we shall therefore always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths. england has recently associated herself with the franco-russian alliance. she has made an arrangement in asia with russia by which the spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with france she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing germany under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. the actually existing conflict of russian and english interests in the heart of asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. so, also, no natural community of interests exists between england and france. a strong french fleet may be as great a menace to england as to any other power. for the present, however, we may reckon on an anglo--french _entente_. this union is cemented by the common hostility to germany. no other reason for the political combination of the two states is forthcoming. there is not even a credible pretext, which might mask the real objects. this policy of england is, on superficial examination, not very comprehensible. of course, german industries and trade have lately made astounding progress, and the german navy is growing to a strength which commands respect. we are certainly a hindrance to the plans which england is prosecuting in asiatic turkey and central africa. this may well be distasteful to the english from economic as well as political and military aspects. but, on the other hand, the american competition in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the german. the american navy is at the present moment stronger than the german, and will henceforth maintain this precedence. even the french are on the point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial empire, so far as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. yet, in spite of all these considerations, the hostility of the english is primarily directed against us. it is necessary to adopt the english standpoint in order to understand the line of thought which guides the english politicians. i believe that the solution of the problem is to be found in the wide ramifications of english interests in every part of the world. since england committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the southern states in the american war of secession, a rival to england's world-wide empire has appeared on the other side of the atlantic in the form of the united states of north america, which are a grave menace to england's fortunes. the keenest competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. the annexation of the philippines by america, and england's treaty with japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two nations. the trade and industries of america can no longer be checked, and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the union are so prodigious that a naval war with america, in view of the vast distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. england accordingly has always diplomatically conceded the claims of america, as quite recently in the negotiations about fortifying the panama canal; the object clearly is to avoid any collision with the united states, from fearing the consequences of such collision. the american competition in trade and industries, and the growth of the american navy, are tolerated as inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. in this sense, according to the english point of view, must be understood the treaty by which a court of arbitration between the two countries was established. england wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with america. the natural opposition of the two rival states may, however, in the further development of things, be so accentuated that england will be forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action. the relations of the two countries to canada may easily become strained to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the arbitration treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the american people does not consider that the present political relations of the two nations are permanent. there is another danger which concerns england more closely and directly threatens her vitality. this is due to the nationalist movement in india and egypt, to the growing power of islam, to the agitation for independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the low-german element in south africa. turkey is the only state which might seriously threaten the english position in egypt by land. this contingency gives to the national movement in egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it clearly shows that england intensely fears every pan-islamitic movement. she is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine the growing power of turkey, which she officially pretends to support, and is endeavouring to create in arabia a new religious centre in opposition to the caliphate. the same views are partially responsible for the policy in india, where some seventy millions of moslems live under the english rule. england, so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has attempted to play off the mohammedan against the hindu population. but now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that pan-islamism, thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of bengal. the co-operation of these elements might create a very grave danger, capable of shaking the foundations of england's high position in the world. while so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and abroad, english imperialism has failed to link the vast empire together, either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. mr. chamberlain's dream of the british imperial customs union has definitely been abandoned. no attempt was made at the imperial conference in 1911 to go back to it. "a centrifugal policy predominated. .... when the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was rejected which wished to assure to great britain the help of the oversea dominions in every imaginable eventuality." the great self-ruled colonies represent allies, who will stand by england in the hour of need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not approve." [a] there are clear indications that the policy of the dominions, though not yet planning a separation from england, is contemplating the future prospect of doing so. canada, south africa, and australia are developing, as mentioned in chapter iv., into independent nations and states, and will, when their time comes, claim formal independence. [footnote a: th. schiemann in the _kreuzzeitung_ of july 5, 1911.] all these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of england's empire, and these dangers largely influence england's attitude towards germany. england may have to tolerate the rivalry of north america in her imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of germany must be stopped. if england is forced to fight america, the german fleet must not be in a position to help the americans. therefore it must be destroyed. a similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great english colonial war, which would engage england's fleets in far distant parts of the world. england knows the german needs and capabilities of expansion, and may well fear that a german empire with a strong fleet might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory which england grudges. we may thus explain the apparent indifference of england to the french schemes of aggrandizement. france's capability of expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. she can no longer be dangerous to england as a nation, and would soon fall victim to english lust of empire, if only germany were conquered. the wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the german quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer a prospect of crippling the german overseas commerce without any excessive efforts. the comparative weakness of the german fleet, contrasted with the vast superiority of the english navy, allows a correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the french fleet co-operates. the possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable means of placing the naval power of england on a firm footing for years to come, of annihilating german commerce and of checking the importance of german interests in africa and northern asia. the hostility to germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. it has always been england's object to maintain a certain balance of power between the continental nations of europe, and to prevent any one of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. while these states crippled and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's stage, england acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes undisturbed, and of founding that world empire which she now holds. this policy she still continues, for so long as the powers of europe tie each other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. it follows directly from this that england's aim must be to repress germany, but strengthen france; for germany at the present moment is the only european state which threatens to win a commanding position; but france is her born rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the east, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. thus the hostility to germany, from this aspect also, is based on england's most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and self-evident. the argument is often adduced that england by a war with germany would chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the german market, which is the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of the very considerable german import trade. i fear that from the english point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. england would hope to acquire, in place of the lost german market, a large part of those markets which had been supplied by germany before the war, and the want of german imports would be a great stimulus, and to some extent a great benefit, to english industries. after all, it is from the english aspect of the question quite comprehensible that the english government strains every nerve to check the growing power of germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in large circles of the english nation to destroy the german fleet which is building, and attack the objectionable neighbour. english policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt to come to terms with germany instead of fighting. this would be the most desirable course for us. a triple alliance--germany, england, and america--has been suggested.[b] but for such a union with germany to be possible, england must have resolved to give a free course to german development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial and industrial competition. she must, therefore, have renounced her traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the great powers in the world. [footnote b: "the united states and the war cloud in europe," by th. schiemann, _mcclure's magazine_, june, 1910.] it cannot be assumed that english pride and self-interest will consent to that. the continuous agitation against germany, under the tacit approval of the government, which is kept up not only by the majority of the press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements of english politicians, the military preparations in the north sea, and the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable indications that england intends to persist in her anti-german policy. the uncompromising hostility of england and her efforts to hinder every expansion of germany's power were openly shown in the very recent morocco question. those who think themselves capable of impressing on the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp. a pacific agreement with england is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which no serious german statesman would trouble to follow. we must always keep the possibility of war with england before our eyes, and arrange our political and military plans accordingly. we need not concern ourselves with any pacific protestations of english politicians, publicists, and utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter the real basis of affairs. when the unionists, with their greater fixity of purpose, replace the liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a vigorous assertion of power by the island empire. on the other hand, america, which indisputably plays a decisive part in english policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. while, on the one side, she insists on the monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own arms towards asia and africa, in order to find bases for her fleets. the united states aim at the economic and, where possible, the political command of the american continent, and at the naval supremacy in the pacific. their interests, both economic and political, notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically with those of japan and england. no arbitration treaties could alter this. no similar opposition to germany, based on the nature of things, has at present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in the sphere of politics. so far as can be seen, an understanding with germany ought to further the interests of america. it is unlikely that the americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of england. but such would be the case if great britain succeeded in inflicting a political and military defeat on germany. for a time it seemed as if the anglo-american negotiations about arbitration courts would definitely end in an alliance against germany. there has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us in the united states. the americans of german and irish stock resolutely opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-german movement in the united states was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the nature of things. in the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen competition between the two countries, especially in south america; there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political complications. japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only in her influence on the affairs of russia, america, england, and china. in the far east, since japan has formed an alliance with england, and seems recently to have effected an arrangement with russia, we have to count more on japanese hostility than japanese friendship. her attitude to china may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions in east asia. if the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an independent position between them. the political rivalry between the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. if they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with europe, and thus enable the european powers to retain their possessions in asia. while the aspiring great powers of the far east cannot at present directly influence our policy, turkey--the predominant power of the near east--is of paramount importance to us. she is our natural ally; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. the wisest course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the triple alliance, and so to have prevented the turco-italian war, which threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against russia and against england--the two states, that is, with whose hostility we have to reckon. turkey, also, is the only power which can threaten england's position in egypt, and thus menace the short sea-route and the land communications to india. we ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with england or russia. turkey's interests are ours. it is also to the obvious advantage of italy that turkey maintain her commanding position on the bosphorus and at the dardanelles, that this important key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong to russia or england. if russia gained the access to the mediterranean, to which she has so long aspired, she would soon become a prominent power in its eastern basin, and thus greatly damage the italian projects in those waters. since the english interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a development, the english fleet in the mediterranean would certainly be strengthened. between england, france, and russia it would be quite impossible for italy to attain an independent or commanding position, while the opposition of russia and turkey leaves the field open to her. from this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the turco-italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of italy at the cost of france, after the next war, it may be. spain alone of the remaining european powers has any independent importance. she has developed a certain antagonism to france by her morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in german policy. the petty states, on the contrary, form no independent centres of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means negligible importance: the small balkan states for austria and turkey; denmark, holland, belgium, and switzerland, and eventually sweden, for germany. switzerland and belgium count as neutral. the former was declared neutral at the congress of vienna on november 20, 1815, under the collective guarantee [c] of the signatory powers; belgium, in the treaties of london of november 15,1831, and of april 19,1839, on the part of the five great powers, the netherlands, and belgium itself. [footnote c: by a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the contracting powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all agree that it is menaced. each individual power has the _right_ to interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.] if we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the continent of europe the power of the central european triple alliance and that of the states united against it by alliance and agreement balance each other, provided that italy belongs to the league. if we take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the triple alliance. on the other hand, england indisputably rules the sea. in consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with france, and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to germany by cutting off her maritime trade. there is also a not inconsiderable army available for a continental war. when all considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political superiority not to be underestimated. if france succeeds in strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong english landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. if italy really withdraws from the triple alliance, very distinctly superior forces will be united against germany and austria. under these conditions the position of germany is extraordinarily difficult. we not only require for the full material development of our nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our growing industries. but at every step which we take in this direction england will resolutely oppose us. english policy may not yet have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further expansion of german international influence and of german maritime power. the recognized political aims of england and the attitude of the english government leave no doubt on this point. but if we were involved in a struggle with england, we can be quite sure that france would not neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. italy, with her extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the triple alliance, will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off the attacks of the anglo-french mediterranean fleet, and would thus be only able to employ weaker forces against france. austria would be paralyzed by russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces in the east. we should thus have to fight out the struggle against france and england practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps with some support from italy. it is in this double menace by sea and on the mainland of europe that the grave danger to our political position lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion barred. since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may. indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. on the one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with which the rival states are fighting each other in every region where their interests clash. with these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but not without considerable loss of power and prestige. this apparently peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of the german nation. we have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our position among the powers of _europe_; we now must decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a _world empire_, and procure for german spirit and german ideas that fit recognition which has been hitherto withheld from them. have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? are we prepared to make the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower in our economic, political, and national importance? that is what is involved in our decision. "to be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day, disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official peace-aspirations of all the states; but by the logic of history inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region of realities. there is no standing still in the world's history. all is growth and development. it is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. no true statesman will ever seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events. he will use such diplomatic means only as inferior tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the powers of a continuous development. we must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with our present place among the nations of europe, while all our rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power. the process of our decay would set in gradually and advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to continue to exist in peace and comfort. but should a war be forced upon us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and we should rapidly sink down. the future of german nationality would be sacrificed, an independent german civilization would not long exist, and the blessings for which german blood has flowed in streams--spiritual and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of german thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind. if, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at the risk of a war with numerically superior foes. under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by acquiring territory in europe. the region in the east, where german colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual incitement to renewed wars. so, again, the reannexation of the former south prussia, which was united to prussia on the second partition of poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the polish population. under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our political power in other ways. in the first place, our political position would be considerably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that france will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. in one way or another _we must square our account with france_ if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. this is the first and foremost condition of a sound german policy, and since the hostility of france once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. france must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path. further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political power of our allies. we have already followed such a policy in the case of austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with armed intervention, the final annexation of bosnia and herzegovina by our ally on the danube. our policy towards italy must follow the same lines, especially if in any franco-german war an opportunity should be presented of doing her a really valuable service. it is equally good policy in every way to support turkey, whose importance for germany and the triple alliance has already been discussed. our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the turco-italian war all that we can do at first is to use our influence as mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the balkan peninsula. it cannot be decided at this moment whether further intervention will be necessary. finally, as regards our own position in europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their independence and their interests are bound up with germany, and are best secured under the protection of the german arms. this conviction might eventually lead to an enlargement of the triple alliance into a central european federation. our military strength in central europe would by this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be essentially improved in case of war. such a federation would be the expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of the political community based on it. we must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our population. very recent events have shown that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in equatorial africa by pacific negotiations. a financial or political crash in portugal might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the portuguese colonies. we may assume that some understanding exists between england and germany which contemplates a division of the portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_. it cannot, indeed, be certain that england, if the contingency arrives, would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually exists. she might find ways and means to invalidate it. it has even been often said, although disputed in other quarters, that great britain, after coming to an agreement with germany about the partition of the portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed portugal the possession of _all_ her colonies. other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our african territory would be possible. these need not be discussed here more particularly. if necessary, they must be obtained as the result of a successful european war. in all these possible acquisitions of territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require countries which are climatically suited to german settlers. now, there are even in central africa large regions which are adapted to the settlement of german farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our overflow population might be diverted to those parts. but, generally speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the growth of the raw materials which our industries require. this represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization. a part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of the german empire. measures must be taken to the extent at least of providing that the german element is not split up in the world, but remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our exports, and centres for the diffusion of german culture. an intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity. it has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. this notion is only justified in a certain sense. in the first place, such a policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. it secures to all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means competition under equal conditions. on the contrary, the political power which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the economic relations. the principle of the open door prevails everywhere--in egypt, manchuria, in the congo state, in morocco--and everywhere the politically dominant power controls the commerce: in manchuria japan, in egypt england, in the congo state belgium, and in morocco france. the reason is plain. all state concessions fall naturally to that state which is practically dominant; its products are bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of the state, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be evaded in various ways. a "policy of the open door" must at best be regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial policy. the essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets lie. our german world policy must be guided by these considerations. the execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional european policy. in the first place, the principle of the balance of power in europe, which has, since the congress of vienna, led an almost sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely disregarded. the idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling that states do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for the advancement of culture. christianity, which leads man beyond the limits of the state to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence in this respect. practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory of balance of power. when it was understood that the state was a power, and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. the conviction was thus gradually established that every state had a close community of interests with the other states, with which it entered into political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort of understanding with them. thus the idea grew up in europe of a state-system, which was formed after the fall of napoleon by the five great powers--england, france, russia, austria, and prussia, which latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866 italy joined it as the sixth great power. "such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among the nations." "all theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[d] this condition does not exist between the european nations. england by herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of germans cannot allow themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of french. an attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by special alliances. one result only has been obtained--the hindrance of the free development of the nations in general, and of germany in particular. this is an unsound condition. a european balance of power can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of rendering the forces of the continental european states mutually ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers which stand outside that charmed circle. it has always been england's policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental states, and to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and the sovereignty of the world. [footnote d: treitschke.] we must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. in its present distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. the idea of a state system which has common interests in civilization must not, of course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just basis. it is now not a question of a european state system, but of one embracing all the states in the world, in which the equilibrium is established on real factors of power. we must endeavour to obtain in this system our merited position at the head of a federation of central european states, and thus reduce the imaginary european equilibrium, in one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase our own power. a further question, suggested by the present political position, is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a different conception of what constitutes a state--can, or ought to be, permanently observed. when belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of africa. it may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a state from which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has no right to enter into political competition with the other states. this argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of germany against france and england, the two last mentioned states would try to unite their forces in belgium. lastly, the neutrality of the congo state [e] must be termed more than problematic, since belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral country. the conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states. its complete development presupposes such competition. [footnote e: the congo state was proclaimed neutral, but without guarantees, by acts of february 26, 1885.] again, the principle that no state can ever interfere in the internal affairs of another state is repugnant to the highest rights of the state. this principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and powerful states have never refrained from a higher-handed interference in the internal affairs of smaller ones. we daily witness instances of such conduct. indeed, england quite lately attempted to interfere in the private affairs of germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval preparations. it is, however, accepted as a principle of international intercourse that between the states of one and the same political system a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. the unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to political intercourse under all conditions involves serious difficulties. it is the doctrine of the liberals, which was first preached in france in 1830, and of which the english ministry of lord palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. equally false is the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the states of the holy alliance at troppau in 1820. no fixed principles for international politics can be laid down. after all, the relation of states to each other is that of individuals; and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the state. above the individual, however, stands the authority of the state, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. but no one stands above the state, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. but no one stands above the state; it is sovereign and must itself decide whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its own existence or interests. in no case, therefore, may a sovereign state renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other states, should circumstances demand. cases may occur at any time, when the party disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat to the existence of a state. "it can only be asserted that every state acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of another state, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an interference may become." on the other hand, it must be remembered that the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international right, but simply and solely on power and expediency. i have gone closely into these questions of international policy because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and may give rise to hostile complications. then it becomes essential that we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. we must remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions possible. "no man," so wrote frederick the great to pitt on july 3, 1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position." if we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts. the political and national development of the german people has always, so far back as german history extends, been hampered and hindered by the hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of the individual races and states, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. even to-day it is painful to see how the forces of the german nation, which are so restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in fruitless quarrels among themselves. our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, consistent development of our power. it must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and social life arising from the like variety of the german nationality and political system offers valuable advantages. it presents countless centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development. but we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics. above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal forces of the german nature--the common system of defence of our country by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong national empire. no people is so little qualified as the german to direct its own destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. a glance at the reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which is forced on us by a study of german history, holds good to-day. the german people has always been incapable of great acts for the common interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions, as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to stir the german spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality, and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union. we must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends through and for our people. within these limits, it is in harmony with the national german character to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific, and artistic aims. "every extension of the activities of the state is beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and stunts the independence of free men." [f] this independence of the individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the state, forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our social conditions. [footnote f: treitschke, "politik," i., section 2.] we must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in the interests of the common welfare. then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a world power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the german spirit. if, on the contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will be heard: "o germany, thy oaks still stand, but thou art fallen, glorious land!" körner. chapter vi the social and political significance of arming for war germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by formidable enmities. if we realize this, we shall see that it will be impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future without an appeal to arms. knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible for this war. the times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to battle. the armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of need. although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of the situation demands. every military proposal is bitterly contested in the reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country) cannot for an instant be compared. a victorious war, on the other hand, brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. the fact is often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. nor can it be ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to discharge. i propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are passing demands from us. first, however, it will be profitable to consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect; we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true interests of the country better than by improving its military capabilities. preparation for war has a double task to discharge. firstly, it must maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the war and supply the requisite means. this capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in national development. as in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of victory--so in the rivalry of nations and states victory rests with the people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is capable of wielding the sword with success. military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the occupations of peace. it educates a man to the full mastery of his body, to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work. it is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service deprives economic life of forces which could have been more appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. these forces are not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life. military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. it is therefore the moral duty of the state to train as many of its countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. the sums which the state applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations. military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must complete and assist the other. but a people which does not willingly bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are one-sided and evanescent. it is the duty, therefore, of every state, conscious of its obligations towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. the method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power can be practically carried out admits of great variety. it depends largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently ranges between very wide extremes. in the boer states, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military training was almost exclusively left to the individual. that was sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to hard bodily exertions. the higher requirements of combination, subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the conduct of the war. in switzerland and other states an attempt is made to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account of political possibilities. the great european states maintain standing armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or shorter period of military training. england alone keeps up a mercenary army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled by volunteers. in these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency. when criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always changing. the duties expected from the roman legionary or the soldiers who fought in line under frederick the great were quite different from those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. not merely have the physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities expected from the fighting man are altered. this applies to the individual soldier as much as to the whole army. the character of warfare has continually been changing. to fight in the middle ages or in the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. the preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized state from those in countries, standing on a lower level of civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war is fought under relatively simple conditions. the crushing superiority of civilized states over people with a less developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form of military efficiency. it was thus that japan succeeded in raising herself in a brief space to the supremacy in eastern asia. she now reaps in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and educational aspects, of military efficiency. our own country, by employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development. when we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself. a great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard to the immediate preparations for war. this is primarily expressed in the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other ways. we see the individual states--according to their geographical position, their relations to other states and the military strength of their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater or less importance in the political system of the world--making their military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and expenditure. when we consider the complex movements of the life of civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is everywhere affected by these considerations. war is only a _means_ of attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength. thus, if england attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify her policy. if, on the other hand, england develops her land forces only with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied power in a continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. as a matter of fact, england can never be involved in a great continental european war against her will. so switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties, and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the security afforded by her own mountains. the united states of america, again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval power. no enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the continent of america; they need not fear the invasion of any considerable forces. on the other hand, they are threatened by oversea conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly with their great trade rival england, which has, indeed, often made concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her position in the world. while in some states a restriction of armaments is natural and justifiable, it is easily understood that france must strain every nerve to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of europe. her glorious past history has fostered in her great political pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they are no longer justified by the size of her population and her international importance. france affords a conspicuous example of self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral duties. in the other european states, as in france, external political conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own justification. a state may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and political schemes in defiance of other nations. another state may be deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all opposition. there is a vast difference between these two cases. a state like the latter is always more or less dependent on the friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international conventions. if it is attacked on one side, it must count on support from the other. whether it shall continue to exist as a state and under what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own sphere of power. this being the case, the question may well be put whether such a state is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary expenditure. it will certainly have to share the contest in which it is itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the largest possible military force at its disposal. but there is another aspect of the question which is at least arguable. the fighting power of such a state may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison with the millions of a modern army. on the other hand, where appreciable military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision will rest. such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a real factor of strength. it must give the probable allies that effective addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist. the ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary state. the forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain influence on the armament of the state, in combination with the local conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of the country. it is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such is, in fact, the case. in the mountain stronghold of switzerland, which has to reckon with the political and military circumstances of germany, france, and italy, preparations for war take a different shape from those of holland, situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of germany and the navy of england. the conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on its own power. the power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will have a certain importance for it, and its government will in its plans and military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes; but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations alone. the necessity for a strong military force is permanent and unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless, and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed. the military power of an independent state in the true sense must guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of development. if from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object thereby to be gained. this object--of which each individual must be conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of the state as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen. a civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in international competition. this is also an essential condition for the unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. where the natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external circumstances, nation and state are stunted and individual growth is set back. increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by every phase of history. the wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force of arms in the last resort. thus the first and most essential duty of every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale commensurate with its political needs. even the superiority of the enemy cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. on the contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for the eventuality of a decisive campaign. mere numbers count for less than ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very important factor of the total strength. but, within certain limits, which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a small, well-led and self-devoting army. the russo-japanese war has proved this once more. granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of every state, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert _power_, it does not follow that the state must spend the total of its personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the narrower sense of army and navy. that is neither feasible nor profitable. the military power of a people is not exclusively determined by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military elements of strength. the highest and most effective military system cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. it needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. in the manchurian war at the critical moment, when the japanese attacking strength seemed spent, the russian military system broke down, because its foundation was unstable; the state had fallen into political and moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas. the social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the state's duties are. thus, in germany the most violent disputes burst out whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of the state and of the army. it is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties of the state that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. the social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the duty of the state in a quite different light from the political _dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing of things clear to himself, or from the sober statesman who looks to the welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons on the horizon of the future. certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and experienced thinkers. first, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in the present political world, even though all the elements for it are present. although the german empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to 40,000,000 of french, this excess in population represents merely so much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is set up for their organization. the assumption that these masses would be available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. it would not mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on active service. bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from such measures. owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the highest military values. allusion has already been made to this at the beginning of this chapter. it takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre cannon. if it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been ordered long beforehand. years will pass before the full effect of the strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the rolls of the reserve and the landwehr. the recruit who begins his service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier. with the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. we must not regard the present only, but provide for the future. the same argument applies to the political conditions. the man who makes the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is sinning against his country. the moment does not decide; the great political aspirations, oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of things--these turn the scale. when king william at the beginning of the sixties of the last century undertook the reorganization of the prussian army, no political tension existed. the crisis of 1859 had just subsided. but the king had perceived that the prussian armament was insufficient to meet the requirements of the future. after a bitter struggle he extorted from his people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations without which the glorious progress of our state would never have begun. in the same true spirit of statesmanship the emperor william ii. has powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and accorded with traditional german sentiment. while the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the political influences of the day, the military power of the probable opponents marks a limit below which the state cannot sink without jeopardizing the national safety. further, the state is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. it is an obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by every means which science and mechanical skill supply. further, the army must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be attained. finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree regulated by the political position of the state. if the state has satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive character. states, on the other hand, which are still desirous of expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must adopt a predominantly offensive military system. preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where the discussion includes the positive duties of the state, which may lead to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. in this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that the majority of the nation accept his view. there are always and everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own, and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses. every englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the population in case of war, depend on it. no sacrifice for the fleet is too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets public opinion. the whole of france, except a few anti-military circles, feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the state, which was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary unanimity. even in neutral switzerland the feeling that political independence rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. in germany, also, it should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great duties of the state, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects of our policy. to be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion, as king william i. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray too easily by the most varied influences. this danger is particularly great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as germany. he who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of inflicting immense harm on the interests of state and people. one of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct disadvantages. the statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully in view. so long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. but where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in order to create the forces which the state needs, or will need, in order to maintain its vitality. one of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon. policy and strategy touch in this sphere. policy has a strategic duty to perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit. it would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily available. "no expenditure without security," runs the formula in which this policy clothes itself. it is justified only when the security is fixed by the expenditure. in a great civilized state it is the duties which must be fulfilled--as treitschke, our great historian and national politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great finance minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that the state revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. he can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the ministers for commerce, agriculture, industries, and colonies, in order to break down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create favourable conditions for profitable business. a great impulse must thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the state, if the duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled. thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the entire social and political life of the people and on the financial policy of the state. chapter vii the character of our next war the social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend itself, the political claims which the state puts forward, the strength of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which determine the conditions of preparation for war. i have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres of policy and progress which our history and our national character impose on us. my next task is to observe the possible military combinations which we must be prepared to face. in this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political intentions. a thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and this war will decide our future. it is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable efficiency of oar enemies. the hostility which we must anticipate is determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions clash, and by the opposition in national character. our opinion as to the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data available. if we begin by looking at the forces of the individual states and groups of states which may be hostile to us, we have the following results: according to the recent communications of the french finance minister klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in issoudan), the strength of the french army on a peace footing in the year 1910 amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. this included the "colonial corps," stationed in france itself, which, in case of war, belongs to the field army in the european theatre of war, and the "service auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in for service without arms. the entire war establishment, according to the information of the same minister, including field army and reserves, consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. a reduction from this number must be made in event of mobilization, which french sources put down at 20 per cent. the whole strength of the french field army and reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000. to this must be added, as i rather from the same source, 1,700,000 territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made. if it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength of separate arms, which the budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the 2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers, 70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical service, etc.), 90,000. no further increase in these figures is possible, since in france 90 per cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the birth-rate is steadily sinking. while in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. recourse already has been had to the expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves. under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born algerians and tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the european army with them in event of war. at the same time negroes, who are excellent and trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in west africa. a limited conscription, such as exists in tunis, is to be introduced into algeria. the black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. these black troops are in the first place to garrison algeria and tunis, to release the troops stationed there for service in europe, and to protect the white settlers against the natives. since the negroes raised for military service are heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the mohammedan natives. it has been proved that negro troops stand the climate of north africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. the two black battalions stationed in the schauja, who took part in the march to fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. there can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with every prospect of success. it is so far in an early stage. legislative proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native algerians and the west african negroes have not yet been laid before parliament by the government. it cannot yet be seen to what extent the native and black troops will be increased. the former minister of war, messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native algerians. an annual muster is made of the algerian males of eighteen years of age available for military service. the commission appointed for the purpose reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in the army and the reserve, there would be in algeria and tunisia combined some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. they could also be employed in europe, and are thus intended to strengthen the rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the formation of reserves. as regards the black troops, the matter is different. france, in her west african possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops available. as the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000, these figures may be considerably raised. since may, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of senegalese sharp-shooters in southern algeria, and in the draft war budget for 1912 a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of senegalese to algeria. the conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black troops in larger numbers to algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. there is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being transported to north africa, since there are not at present a sufficient number of trained men available. the senegalese regiments 1, 2 and 3, stationed in senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the senegalese troops quartered in the other african colonies of france. although there is no doubt that france is in a position to raise a strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be available for a european war is still remote. but it cannot be questioned that they will be so some day. still less is any immediate employment of native moroccan troops in europe contemplated. morocco possesses very good native warriors, but the sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the territory termed "morocco." there cannot be, therefore, for years to come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. the french and moroccan governments are for the moment occupied in organizing a serviceable sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the command of the country and to release the french troops in morocco. the annexation of morocco may for the time being mean no great addition to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and france will certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in military matters. for the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the reinforcements of the french european army which can be obtained from algeria and tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is universally adopted there. this will supply a minimum of 120,000 men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of weissenburg and wörth. at least one strong division of turcos is already available. next to the french army, we are chiefly concerned with the military power of russia. since the peace and war establishments are not published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service, but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. according to the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of cossacks and frontier guards. infantry and sharp-shooters are formed into 37 army corps (1 guards, 1 grenadiers, and 25 army corps in europe; 3 caucasian, 2 turkistanian, and 5 siberian corps). the cavalry is divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent regiments. in war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures 42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength of 20,000. each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry divisions about 4,500 strong. on the basis of these numbers, we arrive at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions, sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. to this must be added unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000. this grand total is not all available in a european theatre of war. the siberian and turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. for the maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to leave the troops in finland, the guards at st. petersburg, at least one division at moscow, and the caucasian army corps in the caucasus. this would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army, 1,454,000 men strong. to this must be added about 100 regiments of cossacks of the second and third ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men, and the reserve and empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case of war. for the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank for each corps respectively. these troops, if each division is assumed to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. of course, a certain reduction must be made in these figures. also it is not known which of these formations would be really raised in event of mobilization. in any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be put into movement for a great war. after deducting all the forces which must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could easily be organized in europe. it cannot be stated for certain whether arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in sufficient quantity. but it will be best not to undervalue an empire like russia in this respect. quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to england, the third member of the triple entente. the british empire is divided from the military point of view into two divisions: into the united kingdom itself with the colonies governed by the english cabinet, and the self-governing colonies. these latter have at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of formation. they can be completely ignored so far as concerns any european theatre of war. the army of the parts of the empire administered by the english cabinet divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the native troops, commanded by english officers, and the territorial army, a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total of 300,000. it is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for home defence. its military value cannot at present be ranked very highly. for a continental european war it may be left out of account. we have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular english army. this is some 250,000 strong. the men serve twelve years, of which seven are with the colours and five in the reserve. the annual supply of recruits is 35,000. the regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. there is also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the figure of 200,000. of the regular english army, 134,000 men are stationed in england, 74,500 in india (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they form the anglo-indian army), and about 39,000 in different stations--gibraltar, malta, egypt, aden, south africa, and the other colonies and protectorates. in this connection the conditions in egypt are the most interesting: 6,000 english are stationed there, while in the native egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong) one-fifth of the officers are englishmen. it may be supposed that, in view of the great excitement in the moslem world, the position of the english is precarious. the 11,000 troops now stationed in south africa are to be transferred as soon as possible to mediterranean garrisons. in event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there. for a war in continental europe, we have only to take into account the regular army stationed in england. when mobilized, it forms the "regular field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and trains. the regular troops in the united kingdom which do not form part of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. they consist of a very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. these troops, with some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the home army, under whose protection the territorial field army is completing its organization. months must certainly elapse before portions of this army can strengthen the regular field army. at the most 150,000 men may be reckoned upon for an english expeditionary force. these troops compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. this constitutes the weak point in the british armament. england can employ her regular army in a continental war so long only as all is quiet in the colonies. this fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war break out, to threaten england in her colonial possessions, and especially in egypt. against the powerful hosts which the powers of the triple entente can put into the field, germany can command an active army of 589,705 men (on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about 25,500 officers; while austria has an army which on a peace footing is 361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. the combined war strength of the two states may be estimated as follows: in germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. this gives a total of 3,926,575 men. if we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we have 2,944,931 trained men left. by adding the peace establishment to it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the french can match with about the same figures. the annual enlistment in austria amounts to some 135,000. liability to serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the landsturm. deducting the three years of active service, this gives a total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent., 911,250 men. to this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to 911,250. the addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in europe. in what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available for field formations in germany and austria is not known, and it would be undesirable to state. it depends partly on the forces available, partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion. however high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never reach the figures which the combined forces of france and russia present. we must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. even the addition of the italian army to the forces of germany and austria would not, so far as i know, restore numerical equality in the field. in france it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must be left on the italian frontier. modern french writers [a] are already reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of italy from the triple alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the field against italy, but consider that the entire forces of france are available against germany. [footnote a: colonel boucher, "l'offensive contre l'allemagne."] the peace establishment of the italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000 men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. the infantry, in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 alpine regiments in 78 companies. the cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are united in 3 cavalry divisions. the artillery has a strength of 24 field artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193 field and 8 mounted batteries. besides this there are 27 mountain batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies. lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment and an airship battalion. the gendarmerie contains 28,000 men. on a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. some 70,000 men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. the militia is some 390,000 strong. the strength of the reserves who might be mobilized is not known. the field army is divided into 3 armies of 9 army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions. as to colonial troops, italy can command in benadir the services of 48 officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of italian birth, and 3,500 native soldiers; in eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned officers and privates of italian birth, and 3,800 natives. italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is questionable whether the south italian troops have much tactical value. it is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, while the protection of tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a powerful army if it is to be held against france. the turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined the coalition of central european powers or its opponents. the regular peace establishment of the turkish army amounts to 275,000 men. in the year 1910 there were three divisions of it: i. the active army (nizam): infantry 133,000 cavalry 26,000 artillery 43,000 pioneers 4,500 special troops 7,500 train formations 3,000 mechanics 3,000 a total, that is, of 220,000 men. 2. the redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. within this limit, according to the redif law, men are enlisted in turns for short trainings. 3. officers in the nizam and redif troops, military employés, officials, and others, more than 30,000. the entire war strength of the turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. we need only to take into consideration the troops from europe, anatolia, armenia, and syria. all these troops even are not available in a european theatre of war. on the other hand, the "mustafiz" may be regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. to raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in europe is the simplest process. from the high military qualities of the turkish soldiers, the turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. turkey thus is a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins. the smaller balkan states are also able to put considerable armies into the field. montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and home duties. servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing; this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. the war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000 rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and 228 machine guns available. lastly come the reserve formations (third line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the militia, an uncertain quantity. the bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. it is not known how they are distributed among the various branches of the service. on a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine guns, and 6,500 sabres. the entire army, inclusive of the reserves and national militia, which latter is only available for home service and comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be 400,000 strong. rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power in herself. there is in rumania, besides the troops who according to their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia cavalry called "calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods. in peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. the infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent cavalry (rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery 14,000 men with 700 officers. for war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000 men, with 550 cannons. of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry, 7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. the cavalry is therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part of the calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. inclusive of reserves and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. there are 650,000 trained men available for service. although the balkan states, from a military point of view, chiefly concern austria, turkey, and russia, and only indirectly come into relations with germany, yet the armies of the smaller central european states may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a european war. of our western neighbours, switzerland and holland come first under consideration, and then belgium. switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men. the expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a total of 141,000 men. the landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36 12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. it has a total strength of 69,000 men. the landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000 men. the dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which varies much owing to the short period of service. there are generally available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400 garrison artillery, and i,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport troops. the field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000 infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 artillery, and goo engineers. it is formed into 4 army divisions each of 15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. there is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active and 48 landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 landwehr foot artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, including landwehr. the dutch coast also is fortified. at holder, ymuiden, hook of holland, at völkerack and haringvliet there are various outworks, while the fortifications at flushing are at present unimportant. amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications in the new dutch water-line (fort holland). holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an english landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. it would easily yield to a german invasion, if it sided against us. belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows: 26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service. on a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising 74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry divisions. the latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. in addition there is a garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde civique_, antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as a very strong fortress. besides this, on the line of the maas, there are the fortified towns of liege, huy, and namur. there are no coast fortifications. denmark, as commanding the approaches to the baltic, is of great military importance to us. copenhagen, the capital, is a strong fortress. the army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. this state maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, 2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. in war-time an army of 62,000 men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special arms. sweden can command eight classes of the first ban, which comprises units from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as well as four classes of the second ban, with a strength of 90,000, which is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. there are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age. the eight classes of the landsturm are 165,000 men strong. it can, accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case of war. the entire first ban certainly comes under this head. in greece, which does not signify much for a european war, but might in combination with the small balkan states prove very troublesome to turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the landwehr and 63,000 men in the landsturm. spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently stationed in africa. in war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). the mobilization is so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could at most be put into the field. as regards the naval forces of the states which concern us to-day, the accompanying table, which is taken from the _nauticus_ of 1911, affords a comparative epitome, which applies to may, 1911. it shows that, numerically, the english fleet is more than double as strong as ours. this superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of really modern ships are compared. in may we possessed only four battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the english have ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned battleships. the new ships do not materially alter this proportion. the comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. it may be noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be counted as battleships. france, too, was a little ahead of us in the number of battleships in may, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known about the french fleet, it cannot be compared with the german in respect of good material and trained crews. it would, however, be an important factor if allied with the english. |battle |armoured |armoured| armoured |protected |number |n s nation. |ships |coast |gunboats| cruisers |cruisers |of |u u |above |defence |and | | |torpedo |m b |5,000 |vessels |armoured| | |vessels |b m |tons. |from |ships | | | |e a | |3000 tons|under | | | |r r | |to 5,000 |3,000 | | | | i | |tons |tons | | | | i +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n |no|displ. |no|displ.|no|displ|no|displ. |no|displ. | |from|f e | | | | | | | | | | |200+|80| s | | | | | | | | | | |tons| 200| | | | | | | | | | | | |tons| ---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--germany: | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --|10|114,590|33|122,130| 117| 70| 12 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building|12| --| -| --| -| --| 4| --| 7| --| 14| -| - | | | | | | | | | | | | | england: | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready |50|793,260| -| --| -| --|38|484,970|66|333,540| 223| 36| 53 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building|12|286,640| -| --| -| --| 6|145,320|20|101,320| 51| -| 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | | france: | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready |22|314,930| -| --| -| --|22|214,670|10| 50,780| 71| 191| 52 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| 93,880| -| --| -| --| -| --| -| --| 13| -| 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | | italy: | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready | 8| 96,980| -| --| -| --|10| 79,530| 4| 10,040| 53| 39| 7 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| 84,000| -| --| -| --| -| --| 3| 10,200| 14| 28| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | austria| | | | | | | | | | | | | hungary | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready |11|102,620| -| --| -| --| 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590| 18| 66| 7 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 5| 94,500| -| --| -| --| -| --| 3| --| 6| -| - | | | | | | | | | | | | | russia: | | | | | | | | | | | | | baltic | | | | | | | | | | | | | fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready | 4| 62,300| -| --| 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270| 60| 19| 13 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 8| --| -| --| -| --| -| --| -| --| 1| -| 1 black sea| | | | | | | | | | | | | fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready | 6| 72,640| -| --| -| --| -| --| 3| 13,620| 17| 10| 4 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| --| -| --| -| --| -| --| -| --| 14| -| 7 siberian | | | | | | | | | | | | | fleet |--| --| -| --| -| --| -| --| 2| 9,180| 20| 7| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | united | | | | | | | | | | | | | states: | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --|14|181,260|16| 65,270| 40| 28| 19 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 7|190,000| -| --| -| --| -| --| -| --| 14| -| 20 | | | | | | | | | | | | | japan: | | | | | | | | | | | | | ready |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --|13|139,830|12| 49,170| 59| 49| 12 voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 3| --| -| --| -| --| 4|107,120| 3| 15,000| 2| -| 1 ---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--let us assume that in event of war england as well as france must leave a certain naval force in the mediterranean, which need not be stronger than the combined italian and austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in event of a change in the grouping of the states; let us further assume that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-european stations--the fact, however, remains that england and france together can collect against germany in the north sea a fleet of battleships alone three times as strong as that of germany, and will be supported by a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. if russia joins the alliance of these powers, that would signify another addition to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since the baltic fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships, and the baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our coasts and to check the free access to the baltic. in one way or the other we must get even with that fleet. the auxiliary cruiser fleet of the allies, to which england can send a large contingent, would also be superior to us. as regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is distinctly superior to the french and russian, but that england is our equal in that respect. our ships' cannons will probably show a superiority over the english, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up some of the numerical disadvantage. it remains to be seen whether these advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of an experienced and celebrated fleet like the english. reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in this respect is growing worse, since the states of the triple entente can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time. if we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of the separate states which may take part in the next war against germany, we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are very different. if we look at france first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member of a coalition. the tactical value of the french troops is, of course, very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. the french army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united spirit which characterizes the german army, the tenacious strength of the german race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. france, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to double our forces. these are the conditions now existing. but if the french succeed in making a large african army available for a european theatre, the estimate of strength of the french army as compared with ours will be quite different. this possibility must be borne in mind, for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may safely assume that france will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if only for a time, a military superiority over germany. she knows well that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by the exercise of extraordinary efforts. it is certain that france will not only try to develop her own military power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself desperately if attacked by germany; on the other hand, she will probably not act on the offensive against germany unless she has increased her own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured the military supremacy by the help of active allies. the stakes are too high to play under unfavourable conditions. but if france thinks she has all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. we must expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. should the triple alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have struck.[b] if the war then declared be waged against us in combination with england, it may be assumed that the allied great powers would attempt to turn our strategical right flank through belgium and holland, and penetrate into the heart of germany through the great gap in the fortresses between wesel and flushing. this operation would have the considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the rhine and threatening our naval bases from the land side. from the superiority of the combined anglo-french fleet, the army of invasion could without difficulty have its base on our coasts. such an operation would enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would enable the french to push a victorious advance onward to the rhine, after investing metz and diedenhofen. [footnote b: written in october, 1911.] england, with whose hostility, as well with that of the french, we must reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of an ally who would lead the main attack. england's troops would only serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign. english interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not coincident with those of france. the main issue for england is to annihilate our navy and oversea commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any further expansion of our power. but it is not her interest to destroy our position as a continental power, or to help france to attain the supremacy in europe. english interests demand a certain equilibrium between the continental states. england only wishes to use france in order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the private advantage of her ally. these principles will characterize her plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war against us. if england, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. in the first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely compacted world empire might be set in movement, and the colonies might consult their own separate interests, should england have her hands tied by a great war. it is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in india and egypt, if england's forces were long occupied with a european war. again, the states not originally taking part in the war might interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. it was important for us in 1870-71 to take paris quickly, in order to forestall any interference of neutrals. similar conditions might arise in the case of england. we must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial centres. it is also not only possible, but probable, that england will throw troops on the continent, in order to secure the co-operation of her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of english policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. on the other hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval bases. the english would be the less disposed to do more than this because the german auxiliaries, who have so often fought england's battles, would not be forthcoming. the greatest exertions of the nation will be limited to the naval war. the land war will be waged with a definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. it is very questionable whether the english army is capable of effectively acting on the offensive against continental european troops. in south africa the english regiments for the most part fought very bravely and stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the generalship was equally deficient. the last manoeuvres on a large scale, held in ireland, under the direction of general french, did not, according to available information, show the english army in a favourable light so far as strategical ability went. if we now turn our attention to the east, in order to forecast russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a russian standpoint, a war in the west holds out better prospects of success than a renewed war with japan, and possibly with china. the empire of the czar finds in the west powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to join in an attack on germany. the geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in manchuria. public opinion, in which hatred of germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory over germany and austria would not only open the road to constantinople, but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of russia in western europe. such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats in asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected on the far-distant eastern frontiers of the empire. should russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an offensive war in the west, the struggle would probably assume a quite different character from that, for example, of a franco-german war. russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against complete subjugation. in case of defeat her centre of gravity is not shifted. a russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such a struggle entails. the inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. throughout the vast empire the social and also political education, especially among the peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy seems quite out of the question. the sections of the people who have acquired a little superficial learning in the defective russian schools have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their interests. the former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the russo-japanese war. under the circumstances, there can be little idea of a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive war to be carried on with persistent vigour. there has been an extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. should russia to-day be involved in a western war with germany and austria, she could never bring her whole forces into play. in the first place, the revolutionary elements in the heart of the state would avail themselves of every weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the community. secondly, in the far east, japan or china would seize the moment when russia's forces in the west were fully occupied to carry out their political intentions towards the empire of the czar by force of arms. forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we have already mentioned. although russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole power to bear against germany and austria, and must also always leave a certain force on her european southern frontier, she is less affected by defeats than other states. neither the crimean war nor the greater exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the turks, nor the heavy defeats by the japanese, have seriously shaken russia's political prestige. beaten in the east or south, she turns to another sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her losses on another frontier. such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. russia will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. in the wars against turkey and japan the internal affairs of the empire prevented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a european war the same conditions would, in all probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. in a war against russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coûte_. if the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile forces which would cripple the conduct of the war. so far as the efficiency of the russian army goes, the russo-japanese war proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. the struggle showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest losses were often borne with courage. on the other hand, the russian army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals. the method of conducting the war was quite wrong; indecision and irresolution characterized the russian officers of every grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above mediocrity. it can hardly be presumed that the spirit of russian generalship has completely changed since the defeats in manchuria, and that striking personalities have come on the stage. this army must therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack. when we contrast these conditions with the position of germany, we cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel successfully the attack of our opponents. in the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our country are very unfavourable. our open eastern frontier offers no opportunity for continued defence, and berlin, the centre of the government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. our western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north through belgium and holland. no natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper bulwark. so in the south, the barrier of the rhine can easily be turned through switzerland. there, of course, the character of the country offers considerable difficulties, and if the swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. their army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in their mountains they would fight as they did at sempach and murten. the natural approaches from the north sea to the baltic, the sound and the great belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a prey to our enemies. the narrow coast with which we face to the north sea forms in itself a strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through holland. england is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire oversea commerce can be easily blocked. in the south and south-east alone are we secured by austria from direct invasion. otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. we may have to face attacks on three sides. this circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan. if we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. england, france, and russia have a common interest in breaking down our power. this interest will sooner or later be asserted by arms. it is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase germany's power. if we wish to attain an extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by the sword against vastly superior foes. our alliances are defensive, not merely in form, but essentially so. i have already shown that this is a cause of their weakness. neither austria nor italy are in any way bound to support by armed force a german policy directed towards an increase of power. we are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct of italy at the conference of algeçiras sufficiently demonstrated. it even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always reckon on the support of the members of the triple alliance in a defensive war. the recent _rapprochement_ of italy with france and england goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." if we consider how difficult italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with france, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we think how the annexation of tripoli has created a new possession, which is not easily defended against france and england, we may fairly doubt whether italy would take part in a war in which england and france were allied against us. austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. her interests are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards austria. nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate state like austria, which contains numerous slavonic elements, patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the government to fight to the death with russia, were the latter to defeat us. the occurrence of such an event is not improbable. when enumerating the possibilities that might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration. we shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once frederick the great stood, when he was basely deserted by england in the middle of the struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own resolution for victory. such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our political and national existence. this must be so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and by sea. if the victory is only half won, they would have to expect continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their interests. they know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and obstinacy. if, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of desperation. a war fought and lost under such circumstances would destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would shake the influence of german thought in the civilized world, and thus check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for which a flourishing germany is the essential condition. our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. this will invest it with importance in the world's history. "world power or downfall!" will be our rallying cry. keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the end, come what may. we must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted campaign. we must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last is won. it is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical equality with our opponents. on the contrary, we must strive to call up the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great decision which impends. we must try also to gain a certain superiority over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. we must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. only by continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future makes on us. a nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be conquered. but it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be attained by the exertion and development of all her powers. chapter viii the next naval war in the next european land war we shall probably face our foes with austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day against any opposing forces. in a naval war we shall be thrown on our own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the superior forces which will certainly press us hard. there can be no doubt that this war will be waged with england, for, although we cannot contemplate attacking england, as such an attack would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking our political power. it will therefore, under certain conditions, attack _us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid france. the english have, besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should always be held before our eyes. they talk so much of a possible german attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question is from the opposite point of view. again, the preparations which they are making in the north sea show clearly that they certainly have contemplated an attack on germany. these preparations are like a strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves no doubt as to their meaning. the great military harbour of rosyth is admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with germany, and can mean nothing else. harwich has also been recently made into an especially strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of scapa flow in the orkney isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. these are measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand an inquiry into the military position thus created. the english have only considered the possibility of a german war since 1902. before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time. this fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the circumstance that the english preparations for war are exclusively directed against germany. we must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with england, and shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. it will be so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the offensive against the english fleet. but we must contemplate the possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning the freedom of the seas, if england attacks us. we shall now discuss this possibility. on this matter i am expressing my personal views only, which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. i shall not betray any secrets of the admiralty, since i do not know any. but i consider it expedient that the german people should clearly understand what dangers threaten from england, and how they can be met. in the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question remains, what are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to become its master? the plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the war as the japanese did before port arthur. in this way the english fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective blockade delayed at least for a short time. it is not unthinkable that such an attempt will be made. such an undertaking, however, does not seem to me to promise any great success. the english have secured themselves against such attacks by comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. it seems dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings. even the war against the english commerce holds out less prospects than formerly. as soon as a state of political tension sets in, the english merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. under such circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of these ships will certainly be a difficult task. the war against the english commerce must none the less be boldly and energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. the prizes which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will usually be impossible, owing to the great english superiority and the few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing our vessels to great risks. the sharpest measures must be taken against neutral ships laden with contraband. nevertheless, no very valuable results can be expected from a war against england's trade. on the contrary, england, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. we must be ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. it is not england's custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests are at stake. under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to english vessels. mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they can be defended. but they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has no knowledge of their existence. it would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications will be completely cut off by the english. the simplest and cheapest way would be if we obtained foreign goods through holland or perhaps neutral belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the great dutch and flemish harbours. new commercial routes might be discovered through denmark. our own oversea commerce would remain suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of trade. it is, however, very unlikely that england would tolerate such communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect of her war on our trade would be much reduced. the attempt to block these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the states in question would have to face the momentous question, whether they would conform to england's will, and thus incur germany's enmity, or would prefer that adhesion to the german empire which geography dictates. they would have the choice between a naval war with england and a continental war with their german neighbours--two possibilities, each of which contains great dangers. that england would pay much attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was at issue is hardly credible. the ultimate decision of the individual neutral states cannot be foreseen. it would probably depend on the general political position and the attitude of the other world powers to the anglo-german contest. the policy adopted by france and russia would be an important factor. one can easily understand under these circumstances that the dutch are seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea side. they are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which obviously would be threatened by a german attack so soon as they sided with our enemies. i shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities which might arise if holland, belgium, and denmark were driven to a sympathetic understanding by the war. i will only point out how widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the continental war and on the political relations generally. the attitude of denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the baltic must mainly depend on her. it is vital to us that these communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this. the open door through the belt and the sound can become highly important for the conduct of the war. free commerce with sweden is essential for us, since our industries will depend more and more on the swedish iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted. it will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. we cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the danish islands. complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus raised by an anglo-german war. our trade would in any case suffer greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. let us assume that france and russia seal our land frontiers, then the only trade route left open to us is through switzerland and austria--a condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. in any case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial products. such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. they must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the government must be responsible for these preparations. the ministry of commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which our commerce must follow in case of war. there must be a sort of commercial mobilization. these suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us in the eventuality of a war with england. we should at first carry on a defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable english attack. such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. england can blockade closely our north sea coast, and at the same time bar the danish straits, so as to cut off communications with our baltic ports; or she can seal up on the one side the channel between england and the continent, on the other side the open sea between the north of scotland and norway, on the peterhead-ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea commerce and also control the belgo-dutch, danish, and swedish shipping. a close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of the english fleet. according to the view of english experts, if a blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. since all the english naval ports are considerably farther than this from our coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously increased. that appears to be the reason why the estuary at harwich has recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. it is considered the best harbourage on the english coast, and is hardly 300 nautical miles from the german coast. it offers good possibilities of fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. the distance from the german ports is not, however, very material for purposes of blockade. the english, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the dutch coast. our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means. not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as heligoland, borkum, and sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. this task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on board. such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy, if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive operations. such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. we must endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as possible. we must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces, for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the enemy's guns. an engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end. and appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold attack on him is made. it is only possible under exceptionally favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy losses. it might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring, to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place or another. blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the high seas in full strength. the forces of the defending party, however, lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight. such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party. we may therefore fairly assume that the english would decide in favour of the second kind. at all events, the harbour constructions, partly building, partly projected, at rosyth and scapa flow, were chosen with an eye to this line of blockade. it would entail in the north the barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible from the military aspect. only a small force is required to seal up the channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. in addition to all this, the great english naval depots--dover, portsmouth, portland, and plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately behind it. besides, every advance against this line from the north is flanked by sheerness and harwich, so that a retreat to the german coast might be barred. the conditions for the northern line of blockade will be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. the blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the orkney isles. every attacking fleet from the german north coast will be unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from rosyth and sheerness, and cut off from its line of retreat. it is thus almost impossible, owing to the english superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. here we should have a tolerably secure retreat. this accentuates once more the supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage through the sound and the great belt. the command of these straits will not only secure the baltic basin for us, but also keep open the sally-ports for our offensive operations against the english blockading fleet. in spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade offers to the english, there are two objections against it which are well worth considering from the english point of view. firstly, it prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed by the north sea and the baltic, since they are included in the blockade; secondly, it compels england to break up her fleet into two or three divisions. as to the first objection, we have hinted that england will scarcely let herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests of weaker third parties. it is also conceivable that some satisfactory arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the states affected. as regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous conditions are thereby produced. it is easy to reunite the temporarily divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the superiority of the separate divisions over the german forces at sea. nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be deceived and surprised by prompt action. the demonstrations which are the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled. this blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. but it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet more severely. we should not only have to venture on attacks in far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the threatened flank of our attacking fleet. after all, it is improbable that the english would have recourse to a mere blockade. the reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision of the war have been already explained. it was shown that, in the event of their fighting in alliance with france, they would probably attempt to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. they could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our naval bases--wilhelmshaven, heligoland, the mouth of the elbe, and kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea. it is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate against the english attempts at landing, and that they would afford extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the communications with the hinterland. the success of the english attack will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast fortifications. such a war will clearly show their value both as purely defensive and as offensive works. our whole future history may turn upon the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. our ships, it must be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast fortifications hold out. no proof is required that a good intelligence system is essential to a defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows. such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers. the numerical superiority of the english cruisers is so great that we shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy "scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. the importance of the air-fleet must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by attacking them directly. if it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior english force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing forces. these possibilities are, however, vague. the ships are protected to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a balloon. but the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in mind. so far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for, starting from the german coast, our airships and flying-machines would be able to operate against the english attacking fleet more successfully than the english airships against our forts and vessels, since they would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant english coast. such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the science of naval construction and fortification can supply. this is the only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea. in this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a world power by the side of, and in spite of, england. this victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of germany. we shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "this was the great aim of russia under the empress catherine ii., of france under napoleon i., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her history; and the great republic of the united states of north america strives for it with intense energy. it is the development of the right of nations for which every people craves." [a] [footnote a: schiemann.] in such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which, in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy, has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the unscrupulous suppression of her rivals. if the french fleet--as we may expect--combines with the english and takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage than a war with england alone. france's blue-water fleet would hold our allies in the mediterranean in check, and england could bring all her forces to bear upon us. it would be possible that combined fleets of the two powers might appear both in the mediterranean and in the north sea, since england could hardly leave the protection of her mediterranean interests to france alone. the prospect of any ultimately successful issue would thus shrink into the background. but we need not even then despair. on the contrary, we must fight the french fleet, so to speak, on land--i.e., we must defeat france so decisively that she would be compelled to renounce her alliance with england and withdraw her fleet to save herself from total destruction. just as in 1870-71 we marched to the shores of the atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an absolute conquest, in order to capture the french naval ports and destroy the french naval depots. it would be a war to the knife with france, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the french position as a great power. if france, with her falling birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her place in the first rank of european nations, and sinking into permanent political subservience. those are the stakes. the participation of russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. that is the less dangerous, since the russian baltic fleet is at present still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the english with the french. we could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the baltic by means of the kaiser-wilhelm canal; we could attack the russian ships in vastly superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the north sea. for these operations it is of the first importance that the danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. if they fell into the hands of the english, all free operations in the baltic would be almost impossible, and our baltic coast would then be abandoned to the passive protection of our coast batteries. chapter ix the crucial question i have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some detail, because i thought that our general political and military position can only be properly estimated by considering the various phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on our coasts and land frontiers. in this way only can the direction be decided in which our preparations for war ought to move. the considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war with england and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from a hostile attack by sea. they also proved that we cannot count on an ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. if an anglo-french army invaded north germany through holland, and threatened our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by sea. the same argument applies to the eastern theatre. if russian armies advance victoriously along the baltic and co-operate with a combined fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land. we know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the continent of europe. this position must be made absolutely safe before we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy based on naval power. so long as rome was threatened by hannibal in italy there could be no possible idea of empire. she did not begin her triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own country. but our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by the naval war. if the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing with strong detachments on the north sea coast, large forces of the land army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting the progress of the war on the land frontiers. it is therefore vitally necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled. at the same time the consideration of the political position presses the conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample scope for activity in the sphere of culture. the crucial point is to put aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole future of our politics and our civilization. the consideration of the broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the individual states showed that the position of affairs everywhere is critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as a world power or our downfall. the internal disruption of the triple alliance, as shown clearly by the action of italy towards turkey, threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. the period which destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. we must use it, if we wish to be mindful of the warning of the great elector, that we are germans. this is the point of view from which we must carry out our preparations for war by sea and land. thus only can we be true to our national duty. i do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated merely for the exigencies of the moment. all that we undertake in the cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the future. but we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour something of what we have lost in the last years. since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on the continent of europe, we must first of all face the serious problem of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great numerical superiority of our enemies. such superiority will certainly exist if italy ceases to be an active member of the triple alliance, whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to irredentism. the preparations for the naval war are of secondary importance. the first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make universal service an existing fact. the system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and has brought us victory upon victory in the german wars of unification. its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed in a separate chapter. the german empire would to-day have a mighty political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our greatness was founded. france has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; russia in europe, with poland and the caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000. contrasted with this, germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. but since the russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are also deficient in military value, a german army which corresponded to the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the inner line, even though england took part in the war. disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued to carry it out effectively. the country where universal service exists is now france. with us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the able-bodied are called up for training. in particular, very little use has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army. in this direction some reorganization is required which will energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army, such as we have not at the present time. unless we satisfy this demand, we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile powers. although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make up our deficiencies. our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by 150,000 men. the necessary training staff and equipment would not be forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could not all at once be incurred. the full effectiveness of an increased army only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and landwehr is correspondingly raised. we can therefore only slowly recur to the reinforcement of universal service. the note struck by the new five years act cannot be justified on any grounds. but although we wish to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the superior forces of our opponents. we must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. these means can only be found in the spiritual domain. history teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[a] in most cases it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment, greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. rome conquered the world with inferior forces; frederick the great with inferior forces withstood the allied armies of europe. recent history shows us the victory of the numerically weaker japanese army over a crushingly superior opponent. we cannot count on seeing a great commander at our head; a second frederick the great will hardly appear. nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the hostile forces. but we can try to learn what will be the decisive factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory or defeat. if we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. should we then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a considerable numerical superiority. [footnote a: _cf_. v. bernhardi, "vom heutigen kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.] the essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships, and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast with the enemy in all material domains. this idea leads to a certain spiritual servility and inferiority. rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which the ultimate decision turns. the duty of our war department is to prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of superiority. this must secure for us the spiritual and so the material advantage over our enemies. otherwise we run the danger of being crushed by their weight of numbers. we cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by uninspired rivalry in arming. we must trace out with clear insight the probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. new goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress, in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. the spiritual capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action, are the soil in which great successes ripen. it would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas which will prove decisive in it. these questions have been thoroughly ventilated in a book recently published by me, "vom heutigen kriege" ("the war of to-day"). in this place i will only condense the results of my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration of the essential questions of the future. in a future european war "masses" will be employed to an extent unprecedented in any previous one. weapons will be used whose deadliness will exceed all previous experience. more effective and varied means of communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. these three momentous factors will mark the war of the future. "masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain elements of weakness as well. the larger they are and the less they can be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical efficiency diminishes. the less they are able to live on the country during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower and less mobile they become. owing to the great space which they require for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into effective action simultaneously. they are also far more accessible to morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions. the increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. the danger zone begins sooner than formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. the soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. the quick firing which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious movement. all branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances. shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. in short, while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands made on them have become considerably greater. improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign, aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their use, and the commanders counted upon them. the direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists. the commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy, and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the field. since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare. in an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action. inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a superior force against his surprised opponent. the initiative, which is the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place which is very profitable in operations and tactics. the attacked party can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold out promise of success. the more rapidly, therefore, the attacking general strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature guarantees. this superiority increases with the size of the masses. if the advancing armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take proper measures against a surprise attack. on the other hand, the prospects of success of the attacking general will be very favourable, especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at his disposal. finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all the more so the greater the masses engaged. in most cases it is impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and completely into action. a victory, therefore, in the decisive direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations. if the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory over the arithmetically stronger army. in conformity to this law, frederick the great, through superior tactical capability and striking strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in mere numbers. no further proof is required that the superiority of the attack increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. hence the possibility of concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very appreciable. we arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it is incumbent on us: first, during the period of preparation to raise the tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be superior in the decisive directions. above all, a state which has objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. it must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods. this principle holds good pre-eminently for germany. the points which i have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face the future with confidence. all our measures must be calculated to raise the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else must give way. we shall thus have a central point on which all our measures can be focussed. we can make them all serve one purpose, and thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of a collective whole. much of our previous omissions and commissions would have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying principle. the requirements which i have described as the most essential are somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age. the larger the armies by which one state tries to outbid another, the smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as such. huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "they will be suffocated by their own fat," said general v. brandenstein, the great organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of the french. the complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his own movements. the necessary attention has never been paid in the course of military training to this latter duty. finally, the tactical efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it certainly will prove in the wars of the future. a mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained, and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. it would be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached on them. this essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military service. opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less, and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a good trial to the system. one of these methods is the _ersatzreserve_, which is once more being frequently proposed. but the situation is by no means helped by the very brief training which these units at best receive. this system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity for serious military operations. such an institution would be a heavy strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be indirectly detrimental to it as well. nor would any strengthening of the field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. this mass would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to some degree the task of making good the losses. a similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops. every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on mobilization. the tactical value of these latter varies much according to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much inferior to that of the regular troops. the landwehr formations, which were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this, notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new french formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. the sphere of activity of such troops is the second line. in an offensive war their duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. in fact, they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the field army. in a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. by acting at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be. nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive operations may be entrusted to them. reserves and regulars are treated as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some are less effective than others. a great danger lies in this mechanical conception. for operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks for which they are inadequate. we must have the courage to attack, if necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever before. the decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are placed at their side on mobilization. the commander who acts on this principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his army by want of efficiency. the mass of reserves must, therefore, be employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as much as possible from all minor duties. thus used, a superiority in the numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the actual war. it follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their _personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to them. this aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered. our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. an increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. it is supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the establishment. the stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality, not quantity. concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. if we wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. this step is the more necessary because the present available cadres are insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide for their thorough training. the gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. we shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be improved by organization, equipment, and training. i must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt original action--i mean the importance of personality. from the commander-in-chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune, and the brigadier, who must act independently according to a given general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other age, personality dominates all else. the effect of mass tactics has abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left to himself. the direct influence of the superior has lessened. in the strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. even in the artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly emphasized than previously. the battlefields and area of operations have increased with the masses employed. the commander-in-chief is far less able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates. these conditions are very prominent in attacking operations. when on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the reserves. on the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. even the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing touch with the main body. the offensive makes very varied calls on the commander's qualities. ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy, deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from him. he must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. all this puts a heavy strain on personality. it is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct advantage. this object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. and this object can be attained. personality can be developed, especially in the sphere of spiritual activity. the reflective and critical powers can be improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp. self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune are produced by knowledge. this is shown everywhere. we see the awkward and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same process is often traced among the higher commands. but where the mental development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the personality fails at the moment of action. the elegant guardsman bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. general chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute determination in the midst of defeat. thus one of the essential tasks of the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. especially is it essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in high command. in a long military life ideas all too early grow stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. the danger of such development cannot be shut out. the stiff and uniform composition of the army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. something akin to this was seen in germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en masse_. united will and action are essential to give force its greatest value. they must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and solving new problems by original methods. it has often been said that one man is as good as another; that personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is erroneous. in time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is enough. but in war, personality turns the scale. responsibility and danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross. that army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. this is the only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and success. it redounds to the lasting credit of william i. that for the highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. this is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action, appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of the stern reality of war that the truth of goethe's lines is proved: "folk and thrall and victor can witness bear in every zone: fortune's greatest gift to man is personality alone." chapter x army organization i now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. i shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. it will be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially noteworthy or require some explanation. i shall obviously come into opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further from my purpose than to criticize them. my views are based on theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. it is, in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent historical verdict. but the further expansion of our army belongs to the future, and its course can be directed. it can follow well-defined lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most important that this object should be realized. therefore i shall not look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future. the guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as i have already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position to carry on an offensive war successfully. what follows will, therefore, fall naturally under these two heads. fighting strength rests partly, as already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops, and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of their peace establishment. it was shown in the previous chapter how essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in war-time. the efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of the troops. they are the professional supporters of discipline, decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the troops, they determine their intellectual standard. the number of permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the demands made of them on mobilization. if we reflect how many officers and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing _personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. this applies mainly to the infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. all the more important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. this latter is a question of training, and does not come into the present discussion. the task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a sense, a financial question. the amount of the pay and the prospects which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary advantages. even for the building up of the corps of officers, the financial question is all-important. the career of the officer offers to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as they now are. the infantry officer especially must have a better position. granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. it would be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm more attractive. there is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for which there is a plethora of candidates. these arms will always be well supplied with officers. their greater attractiveness must be counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service. by no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the chief arm. if the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical proportion of the arms to each other. disregarding provisionally the cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the proportion which artillery must bear to infantry. with regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent replace infantry is quite erroneous. machine guns are primarily weapons of defence. in attack they can only be employed under very favourable conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. hence, this auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into large units. machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching columns. the relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance. infantry is the decisive arm. other arms are exclusively there to smooth their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly. this relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting instruments in the whole army. if we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the result. infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to modern weapons. the attack requires, therefore, a far greater superiority than ever before. in addition to this, the breadth of front in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire. this refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as before. this assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in a limited sense. in attack the opposite will probably be the case. the troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en échelon _than in the last wars. now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate the allotment of artillery to infantry. no definite proportion can be settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will most probably prove appropriate. no more than this can be expected in the domain of military science. if we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the artillery. actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path between these two extremes. if the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or, better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is reduced to a covering line for the artillery. in forming this opinion we must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. if we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. such infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions, requires greater numbers and depth than before. in this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of the franco-german war, and the boer war, as well as the manchurian campaign. some of the german infantry had in the first-named period extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not rare. the artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original strength. the consequences naturally was that the powers of the germans on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so decisive as in the first part of the war. this condition would have shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the contest with the loosely-compacted, raw french levies. in the former case the offensive would have been impracticable. the strong artillery, under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched enemy. this is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of infantry were needed at wörth and st. privat, for instance, in spite of the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker enemy of equal class. again, in south africa, the overwhelming superiority of the english in artillery was never able to force a victory. in manchuria the state of things was very instructive. numerically the russian artillery was extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the russian field guns was longer than that of the japanese; nevertheless, the japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also, because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the russian artillery was scattered along the whole of their broad front. the lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be appropriately determined. the requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and corps against corps! superiority at the decisive point is the crucial test. this superiority is attained by means of an unexpected concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way. if by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. if it is assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. since the japanese were tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical superiority of the russian army as a whole. if we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful. in this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the artillery. the conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of the army are thereby prejudiced. this is the decisive point. any excess in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to victory. it is far more important to be able to unite superior forces for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces along the whole front. if we observe this principle, we shall often be weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a position. it becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. this victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere. the operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the columns of the operating troops. under the modern system of colossal armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from the rear. railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies; but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead. since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught animals, which can move independently of the roads. the waggons of provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily, must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of food. this is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the night's rest. the fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry with them. if the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. if unusually lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. thus the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. a careful calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25 kilometres this consideration determines the depth of the army corps on the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps. this calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and rations should be carefully organized. the restoration of any destroyed railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. in order to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample stock of tinned rations. this stock should, in consideration of the necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. care must be taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. this would be best done by special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by forced or night marches. there is naturally some reluctance to increase the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. it is further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other provisions compressed into the smallest space. an immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps, and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army with its millions. this is absolutely necessary, since without it the troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. it is far more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent. however careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out. everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within these limits. our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army corresponds roughly to this requirement. but should it be lengthened by a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the necessary advance-guard distance be included. since, also, the infantry is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the artillery. in addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division is very important for its tactical efficiency. this must be such as to permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units. this requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been drawn up by competent officers. the army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two infantry brigades. all the brigades consist of two regiments. the formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his own judgment. it is always necessary to break up some body when a reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of some detachment to inactivity. of course, a certain centre of gravity for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. but this procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible, even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the brunt of the battle will be. that depends largely on the measures taken by the enemy and the course of the battle. napoleon's saying, "_je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. the division of cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. it has not been realized that the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry these duties out. this bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts the most generally accepted military principles. the most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as is found in an infantry regiment. this system permits the separate divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the subdivisions in lines _(treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. finally, it is the best formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result there. a special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. these latter can, of course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not always required. their place in the organization, however, is precisely the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ them as their particular character demands. the object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately according to numbers among the divisions. this secured, besides, the undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders of the commanders of the troops. but, in return, it robbed the commanding general of the last means secured by the organization of enforcing his tactical aims. he is now forced to form a reserve for himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one division at least of half its artillery. if he has the natural desire to withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one division only, the same division must always be subjected to this reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether this result always fits in with the tactical position. it seems at least worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each division. the distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous question. it would be in accordance with the principles that guide the whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. this arrangement would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. they can also, however, be combined under the command of the general-in-chief, and attached to the second line of the army. the first arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the indispensable property of tactical efficiency. both alternatives are inadmissible. on the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line by a night march. besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army corps temporarily. there is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the spot in every engagement. they have even been known to stray into the advance guard. i do not approve of this idea. the enemy's field artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers. it seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their effectiveness doubtful. no doubt the japanese, who throughout the war continually increased their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort to every division. the experiences of that war must not, however, be overestimated or generalized. the conditions were quite _sui generis_. the japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns. it should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective 12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as i can gather, assigned them all to the army of general nogi, whose duty was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at mukden. the japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs, the question of concentration seems to me very important for us. under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the heavy batteries in the hand of the commander-in-chief. they thus best serve his scheme of offence. he can mass them at the place which he wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. his heavy batteries will be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional general. there, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the deciding struggle of the day. every man, down to the last private, knows that. i will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. the batteries which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed under the orders of the corps commanders _(truppenführer)_ if they are to become an organic part of the whole. at present the heavy artillery of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres. it thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does not feel itself an integral part of the whole. a clear distinction between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical. this view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the commander-in-chief. as the armies do not exist in peace-time, and manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. this disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned permanently to each army corps. this would not prevent it being united in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. on the contrary, they would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies. the operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more effective if it has control of the railways and roads. that implies not merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. we were taught the lesson in 1870-71 in france how far defective railway communications hindered all operations. it is, therefore, of vital importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the discharge of these necessary functions. until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them. the demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years' service. the chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on fortified places. the most important part of the fortress pioneer's duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the actual storm. the army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation. starting from this point of view, general v. beseler, the late inspector-general of fortresses and pioneers, who has done inestimable service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. this follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training for their special duties. we must continue on these lines, and develop more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better proportion to its value. in connection with the requirements already discussed, which are directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly serve the same purpose. these diminish the tactical efficiency of the enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. i refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet. the cavalry's duties are twofold. on the one hand, they must carry out reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility. every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned them in war, is lamentably weak. this disproportion is clearly seen if we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited efficiency. popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal. there is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and 1870-71. it cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is misleading. on the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly antiquated system. it was, consequently, not armed for independent movements. what they then did must not be compared with what will be required from them in the future. in wars in which mounted forces were really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived notions (as in the american war of secession and the boer war), their employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in africa, notwithstanding all modern weapons. these are the wars which must be studied in order to form a fair opinion. they will convince us that an increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. it will, of course, only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate independently. the effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the fulfilment of this condition. it is also imperatively necessary, when the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. this is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if cavalry and cyclists combine. again, an increased strength of cavalry is undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of the enemy. besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful service. brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as i have repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted. the brigades must in war be three regiments strong. the strength of the divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time being. just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in a high degree elastic. there can, besides, be no doubt on the point that the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue. i might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that the division with its three parts would have the control of three batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each brigade. that is an old suggestion which the emperor william i. once made, but it has never yet been considered. it is not with cavalry usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. there can obviously, therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the artillery. such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when it is important to make a decisive attack. the reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed by the air-fleet. here we are dealing with something which does not yet exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of military science will play in future wars.[a] it is therefore necessary to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration from the technical side. [footnote a: the efficiency and success of the italian aviators in tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. there were no opponents in the air.] the first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers. the power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the technical effectiveness. these reciprocal relations must be borne in mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our opponents. if the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve the efficiency of our army. the whole organization must be such that the column length of the army corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots. in case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition must be observed. the infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially strengthened. the artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up the units. the cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so organized as to insure their efficiency in war. the formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained. the air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy. finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in the decisive field war. the fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be carried out. it is impossible to imagine a german reichstag which, without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition. the temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. they comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often surpassed all expectations. but even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is necessary, yet the war department must be asked to do their utmost to achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to public opinion. when the future of a great and noble nation is at stake there is no room for cowardice or inaction. nothing must be done, as unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the principles of a sound military organization. the threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in various ways. very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive consideration. i will make a few proposals just by way of illustration. one way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous intermediate system of brigades. another proposal would be to form in every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the jäger battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the hands of the commanding general. this last arrangement could be carried out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within the brigades and divisions. the most sweeping reform, that of dividing the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more ways. the relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the enforcement of universal service. the assignment of a fifth brigade to each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present. but so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this means. it will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited, without, however, reducing their total. care must be taken that only the quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. all that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a battle is in prospect. the certainty of being able to feed the troops and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of ammunition close at hand during the advance. the soldiers will be inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. then, however, the required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought forward by stages in good time. a suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. the light field howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the formations of the division. the strength of the artillery must be regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. the heavy field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the orders of the general commanding, and in event of war be combined as "army" artillery. it would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent in war as "army" cavalry. the regiments necessary for service with the infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. on the other hand, it is, i know, often alleged that the _truppenführer_ are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders; but this objection does not seem very pertinent. another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under the commanding general. in event of mobilization, one regiment would be withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. the regiment intended for divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. if the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only be able to receive two squadrons. in this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it; but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. the blame for such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. the whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. if it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the arm. this would have to be adapted to the new conditions. there are various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry can be guaranteed. the absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make appropriate use of this important arm. since the cyclists are restricted to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which require to be surmounted. the views which i have here tried to sketch as aspects of the organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. in military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual factors lead to very different results. i believe, however, that my opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect of affairs. it is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by question of detail. each special requirement must be regarded as part of that general combination of things which only really comes into view in actual warfare. the special standpoint of a particular arm must be rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced. care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient account of the spiritual and moral factors. our age, which has made such progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which they employ. a profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out; under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way or that. the only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the importance of the separate co-operating factors. "for he who grasps the problem as a whole has calmed the storm that rages in his soul" chapter xi training and education our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the german army into the most effective tool of german policy, and into a school of health and strength for our nation. we must also try to get ahead of our rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and strengthening their loyal german feelings. diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. if we wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as well as on the officers. it is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from the introduction of these means of war. but if we survey the sphere of training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to an extent hitherto unknown. the necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle; in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct orders. wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare, we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge hosts. in battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of action can only be attained at the present time by independent co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme. the employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving and feeding the troops. it is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps 200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been destroyed by modern explosives. in the first case the military empiric may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a scientifically educated general and a staff who have also studied and mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. the problems of the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision. the necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally recognized. to be sure, the old traditions die slowly. here and there an undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more than is justified by its value. the cavalry is not yet completely awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were still the old arm which napoleon or frederick the great commanded. even the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions; technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. even in theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. many conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. obsolete ideas have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and self-reliance must be encouraged. in this respect the army is on the right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the highest results will be attained, provided that competent military criticism has been equally encouraged. in this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have completely changed. although in the next war men will have to be handled by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern conditions. our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. most of the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great decisive campaigns of the future. from time to time--financial grounds unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of "masses." sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for combined training under veteran generals, who soon afterwards leave the service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which they may have gained. it cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of armies in modern warfare. even the so-called "imperial manoeuvres" only correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war, since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would be essential in real warfare. a glance at the imperial manoeuvres of 1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under the conditions of war. it is an absolute necessity that our officers should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. in theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the divisions. that they would in reality all have to circulate with a pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome, and so are very seldom considered. in great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; i should almost doubt whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine feeding" has ever been entertained. even smaller opportunities of being acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a large army and to master the subject efficiently. the friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things cannot be learnt from books. these conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations, but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. when, in 1870, some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the advance to sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war and the deficient attacking powers of the french allowed the operations to succeed, although a man like moltke was at the head of the army. all these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our general staff, but the theoretical labours of the general staff are by no means the common property of the army. on all these grounds i believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. the troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency, and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two pivots. but the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. the paths we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal. all methods of training and education must be in accordance with these views. i do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and cavalry in this place, since i have already discussed the question at length in special treatises.[a] in the case of the artillery alone, some remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm seem necessary. [footnote a: v. bernhardi: "taktik und ausbildung der infanterie," 1910 "unsere kavallerie im nächsten krieg," 1899; "reiterdienst," 1910.] the demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or infantry at the decisive point. this principle is universally acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice. the artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical requirements subservient to this idea. the ever-recurring tendency to fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. on the defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible, from masked positions. the principle of keeping the artillery divisions close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one direction, must not be carried to an extreme. the artillery certainly must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving to them the duty of carrying it out. accordingly, it is important that the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is indispensable. the great extent of the battlefields and the natural endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the tactically most important objective. this result is hard to attain by a centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent action of tactically trained subordinates. this is not the place to enter into technical details, and i will only mention some points which appear especially important. the bz shell _(granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its use should not form part of the training. it requires, in order to attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as is very seldom possible in actual warfare. no very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. it seems to be retained in france and to have shown satisfactory results with us; but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the shooting-range directly to serious warfare. no doubt its use, if successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. in any case, practice with az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance. the az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations. care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and complications of strategy and devices. only the simplest methods can be successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten. the important point in the general training of the artillery is that text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should be given a more prominent position. in this way only can the artillery do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not be neglected in the reports. that would mean rejecting the good and the evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient must be distinctly opposed. under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. they must, in my opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks. they lead to pronounced tactics of position _(stellungstaktik)_ which are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on these manoeuvres. they could be made more instructive if the tactical limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive arm--cannot be thus remedied. the usual result is that favourable artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to under some tactical pretence. after all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them into line with modern conditions. if, however, the troops are to be educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground must be broken, on which, i am convinced, great results and an undoubted superiority over our opponents can be attained. considerable difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties are not, in my opinion, insurmountable. there are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more thorough education of the chief commanders. as regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as i know, has never yet been attempted. but if we consider, firstly, how valuable more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage over our supposed antagonist. the preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally also be carried out in smaller formation. it is, moreover, very important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them. training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25 kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to the daily needs of real warfare. should it not be possible to assemble two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed. this does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare, but it is useful as a makeshift. the waggons for the troops would have to be hired, as on manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save expense. the supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which would represent the pioneer convoys _(verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would regulate their pace accordingly. marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued for several days. it is naturally not enough to undertake these manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army. finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns, sometimes in army formation. the flank marches of separate columns will, of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought up to the troops at the close of the march. flank marches in army formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. but this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them and furnish the supplies. i also consider that operative movements in army formation extending over several days are desirable. practice must be given in moving backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear being blocked when necessary. then only can all the difficulties which occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where the lever must be applied in order to remove them. in this way alone can the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a hostile attack. an army so disciplined would, i imagine, acquire a pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments in such operations in actual war. the major strategic movements on both sides in the franco-german war of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that. i recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically one after the other. i wished, however, to ventilate the subject, firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do; secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry out in practice one or other of them--at the imperial manoeuvres, for example, or on some other occasion. how much could be saved in money alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? from reasons of economy all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed on such manoeuvres. it would be useful, however, if, in addition to one detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the kitchen waggon. it would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable experience. it is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out, and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions; but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters which are really essential. they would, at any rate, be far more valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of training under active service conditions. all that does not directly promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a time when the highest values are at stake. even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the troops. it must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must also be worked out beforehand theoretically. it is not at all sufficient that the officers on the general staff and the intendants have a mastery of these subjects. the rank and file must be well up in them; but especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column commanders. the practical service in the transport battalions and the duties performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object. they learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the system as a whole. it would therefore be advisable that all these officers should go through a special preliminary course for this service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be explained to them by the officers of the general staff and the higher transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. this would be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. the technical driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be able, when occasion arises, to act independently. while, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained, is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. i have shown elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative capabilities of the army depend on this system. its nature, however, cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter. the transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary importance in the general system of modern warfare. it should be appreciated accordingly. every active transport service officer ought, after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. if these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay. the results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore impossible to be met. they should therefore be obliged to undergo a thorough education in the practical duties of the general staff, and not merely in leading troops in action. this reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how, generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a view to the training. the essential contradiction between our obsolete method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era appears here with peculiar distinctness. a large part of our superior commanders pass through the general staff, while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long become out of date. the continuation school is missing. it can be replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient time for this, and often a lack of interest. the daily duties of training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own scientific education. the result is, that comparatively few of our superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great scale. this would cost dearly in real war. experience shows that it is not enough that the officers of the general staff attached to the leader are competent to fill up this gap. the leader, if he cannot himself grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes he is directing and is himself being directed. this is a far from healthy condition. our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned, only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. the minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. the minor manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. the commanders learn to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions of warfare. brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely encourage wrong ideas. all that the soldiers learn from them--that is, fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds. divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders. the principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. the great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual warfare, be distinctly brought home. this is a most weighty consideration. the superior officers must have clearly brought before their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations. the requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this direction. we must subject all our resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. we must subject all our resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. if the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional manoeuvres could be carried out on them. the money saved by this change could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. one thing is certain: a great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word. it seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to educate serviceable commanders for the great war. the manoeuvres can only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part in them have already had a competent training in theory. to encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. these must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and their subordinates for leadership in the great war. strategic war games on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the commanding generals, and in the army-inspections by the inspectors, seem to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. all superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency in superior commands. the threads of all this training will meet in the hands of the chief of the general army staff as the strategically responsible authority. it seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for their posts. the circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of a division, or as general in command maintains discipline in his army corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of an army. military history supplies many instances of this. no proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. the possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree dependent on their activity. i have for years pointed out the absolute necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their profession, and i can only repeat the demand that our cavalry riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific education. i will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. these exercises do not correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry division on manoeuvres. the centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. the perpetual subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. any unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be regarded as a serious preparation for war. it is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which _always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself, but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only rarely necessary in war. this clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and antiquated methods of all our training. practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry. co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an integral factor of army organization. the airship division and the cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command, especially for screening purposes, which are all-important. the methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to modern requirements have been pointed out by general v. beseler. this arm need only be developed further in the direction which this distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the next war. in the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the construction of similar positions. tactical requirements must, however, be insisted upon in this connection. the whole training must be guided by considerations of tactics. this is the main point. as regards sieges, especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery. the duties of the army service corps[b] are clear. they must, on the one hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. the rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the duties for which these troops must be trained. a thorough knowledge and mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable qualifications in their case also. they can only meet their many-sided and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods and system of army movements on every scale. it is highly important, therefore, that the officers of the army service corps should be thoroughly trained in military science. [footnote b: _verkehrstruppen_.] thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the close connection of the multifarious duties of war. this appreciation is requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some degree the non-commissioned officers also. it will bear good fruit in the training of the men. the higher the stage on which the teacher stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect which are the firmest foundations of discipline. all the means employed to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service on every other field of practical activity. intellectual exercise gives tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. the effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers' corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards, and must find its expression in a school of military education of a higher class than exists at present. a military academy as such was contemplated by scharnhorst. to-day it assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the general staff. instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its former importance. the instruction in military history was entirely divested of its scientific character by the method of application employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. in this way the meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day, so far as i know, the lectures on military history primarily serve purposes of directly professional education. i cannot say how far the language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. at any rate, it culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a directly practical end. this development was in a certain sense necessary. a quite specifically professional education of the officers of the general staff is essential under present conditions. i will not decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly academical character of the institution. in any case, we need in the army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. i believe that the military academy could be developed into such an institution, without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the officers for service on the general staff. by the side of the military sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission should be free. in similar lectures the great military problems might be discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint. limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture, intended not only to educate officers of the general staff, but to train men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational institution of the german army. chapter xii preparation for the naval war "germany's future lies on the sea." a proud saying, which contains a great truth. if the german people wish to attain a distinguished future and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy and act as a world power. this task can only be performed if they are supported by an adequate sea power. our fleet must be so strong at least that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his position as a world power. now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on a world policy if our political and military superiority on the continent of europe be immovably established. this goal is not yet reached, and must be our first objective. nevertheless, we must now take steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our pretensions. it is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the full security of our continental position that we guard our coasts and repel oversea attacks. on the other hand, it is an absolute economic necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and this, again, requires a large import trade. the political greatness of germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea trade. the maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. our efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined ultimately to support this world policy. unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first ventured on the open sea. much valuable time was wasted in striving for limited and insufficient objects. the emperor william ii. was destined to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's history, and to treat it accordingly. all our earlier naval activity must be set down as fruitless. we have been busied for years in building a fleet. most varied considerations guided our policy. a clear, definite programme was first drawn up by the great naval act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906, and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. it is, of course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. the needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard for the naval forces which a state may require: that depends on the claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations. at first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the coasts on which we traded. the first duty of the fleet was to safeguard this commerce. opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the government, which they stigmatized as boundless. another party was content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places. this view was not long maintained. all discerning persons were convinced of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high seas. it was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the aggressor would have them at his disposal. but this policy, it was thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. the so-called _ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank. this standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a large number of torpedo-boats. these, in spite of their small fighting capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed torpedoes. it was soon realized that this theory rested on a fallacy--that a country like the german empire, which depends on an extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and on its coasts. at last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded with actual needs. the different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard for our coasts. we have at last come to see that the protection of our commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an instrument for carrying out the political ends of the state and supporting its justifiable ambitions. there can be no question of such limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. a few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, destroy the hostile fleet. a direct protection of all trade lines is obviously impossible. commerce can only be protected indirectly by the defeat of the enemy. a passive defence of the coast can never count on permanent success. the american war of secession, amongst others, showed that sufficiently. the object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies. it is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for defence, and must be built with that view. it is intended to meet our political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success; on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained in this way. at the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the great powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. we must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale. the strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. it is obvious that we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all circumstances. our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing reasons. if he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses. this conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that the english fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the necessary size of our naval preparations. a war with england is probably that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of victoriously repelling an english attack must be the guiding principle for our naval preparations; and if the english continuously increase their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even beyond the limits of our present naval estimates. we must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for many years to attack on the open sea the far superior english fleet. we may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown in the chapter on the next naval war. the enemy must be wearied out and exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast; our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. these are the lines that our preparation for war must follow. a strong coast fortress as a base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for this class of war. without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. mines alone cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. for this purpose permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow mines to be placed. i cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the north sea is concentrated in heligoland and borkum, corresponds to these requirements. if it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our naval operations. this is a national duty which we dare not evade, although it demands great sacrifices from us. even the further development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only action against the english fleet which holds out any prospect of success presupposes the existence of some such fortress. but the question must be looked at from another aspect. the morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the unmistakable hostility of england to us. they showed that england is determined to hinder by force any real expansion of germany's power. only the fear of the possible intervention of england deterred us from claiming a sphere of interests of our own in morocco, and, nevertheless, the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in north africa provoked menacing utterances from various english statesmen. if we consider this behaviour in connection with england's military preparations, there can be no doubt that england seriously contemplates attacking germany should the occasion arise. the concentration of the english naval forces in the north sea, the feverish haste to increase the english fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly intended for action against germany, of which we have already spoken; the english _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the german coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and to isolate us in europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as a course of preparation for an aggressive war. at any rate, it is quite impossible to regard the english preparations as defensive and protective measures only; for the english government knows perfectly well that germany cannot think of attacking england: such an attempt would be objectless from the first. since the destruction of the german naval power lies in the distinct interests of england and her schemes for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an english attack. we must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able to postpone this attack as we wish. it has been already mentioned that the recent attitude of italy may precipitate a european crisis; we must make up our minds, then, that england will attack us on some pretext or other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very favourable for england, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage. especially, if the unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon upon a strong english imperial policy which may easily bring about war. under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical principles. on the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. it would be justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of existence. let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who live on our export trade. this consideration by itself shows the absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the decisive campaign with equanimity. even the circumstance that we cannot, perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case. the rapid completion of the kaiser-wilhelm canal is of great importance, in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the baltic or in the north sea. but it does not meet all military requirements. it is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the ems, the bay of jahde, and the mouth of the elbe, in order to afford our fleet more possibilities of concentration. all three waters form a sally-port in the north sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. i cannot give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. if it is feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. such a canal might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict heavy losses upon him. as regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and the usual complement of large cruisers. it does not possess in its present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. there can be no doubt on this point. five of the ships of the line, of the kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the wittelsbach class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. we are in a worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. the five ships of the hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the prince class (_adalbert, friedrich karl, heinrich_) fulfil their purpose neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. even the armoured cruisers _fürst bismarck, roon, york, gneisenau,_ and _scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements. if we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by new and thoroughly effective ships. anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon will admit this necessity. the english may storm and protest ever so strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and all financial considerations. we must create new types of battleships, which may be superior to the english in speed and fighting qualities. that is no light task, for the most modern english ships of the line have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest english cruisers are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. but superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made to do, at any rate, what is most essential. since the krupp guns possess a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the english heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and to equip our ships with superior attacking power. a more powerful artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or straight ahead. besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part in strategic offence and defence alike. the torpedo-fleet, therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of england--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because, so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of superiority in them. in torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of construction, ahead of all other navies. we must endeavour to keep this position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. we must also devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these vessels more effective in attack. if we succeed in developing this branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on the enemy's squadrons. a superior efficiency in this field would be extraordinarily advantageous to us. last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the development of aviation for naval purposes. if it were possible to make airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes, they might render essential services to the fleet. the air-fleet would then, as already explained in chapter viii., be able to report successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the approach of the enemy in superior force. it would also be able to prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. again, it could repulse or frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. if our airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the english coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when fighting against the superior force of the enemy. it can hardly be doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to perform such services. a pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over the english would contribute largely to equalize the difference in strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. it should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can compete for the palm of victory on equal terms. besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be especially effective in a struggle against england, as that country needs imports more than any other. consequently great results would follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing his navigation. the difficulties of such an undertaking have been discussed in a previous chapter. it is all the more imperative to organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. the auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so. a rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace. history tells us what to expect from the english on this head. in the middle of peace they bombarded copenhagen from september 2 to september 5, 1807, and carried off the danish fleet. four hundred houses were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were killed. if some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of england is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and in the equally ruthless acts of napoleon, still the occurrence shows distinctly of what measures england is capable if her command of the seas is endangered. and this practice has not been forgotten. on july 11 and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, alexandria was similarly bombarded in peace-time, and egypt occupied by the english under the hypocritical pretext that arabi pasha had ordered a massacre of the foreigners. the language of such historical facts is clear. it is well not to forget them. the russo-japanese war also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also italy, with her political and military attack on turkey. turkish ships, suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the italians. now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as was adopted by japan and italy may be justified under certain conditions. the interests of the state may turn the scale. the brutal violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the above-described english procedure, has nothing in common with a course of action politically justifiable. a surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first place only on the armed forces of the hostile state, not on peaceful inhabitants. a further necessary preliminary condition is that the tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. otherwise the attack becomes a treacherous crime. if the required preliminary conditions are granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable carelessness of the opponent. a definite principle of right can never be formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties concerned. history alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of states. but in no case can a formal rule of right in such cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it, as was literally the fact in the manchurian war as regards japan--limit the undoubted right of the state. if japan had not obtained from the very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with russia would have been hopeless. she was justified, therefore, in employing the most extreme measures. no such interests were at stake for england either in 1807 or 1882, and italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful from the standpoint of political morality. these examples, however, show what we may expect from england, and we must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right. our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the reservists. public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. under all circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension. the mines must also be prepared for action without delay. the whole _matériel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for instant use. so, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the mouths of our rivers and in the kaiser wilhelm canal must be put in force directly the situation becomes strained. this is a mere simple precept of self-protection. we must also attach as much importance to the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as is done in england. when we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are required for the maintenance of our place among the great powers by the navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the resources of our people. these weigh the heavier for the moment, since the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic preparations on land. if we do not possess the strength or the self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our requirements. any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be provisionally dropped. in opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in case of the reserve fleet. this view starts from the presupposition that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the naval act contemplates for germany, england would never resolve to declare war on us. it is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships. i cannot myself, however, endorse this view. on the one hand, it is to be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, i believe that the general situation makes war with england inevitable, even if our naval force in the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war. my view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid foundation without which any successful action against the superior forces of the enemy is unthinkable. should the coast fortifications fail to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible. it is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. though this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for the navy admits of no doubt. if we do not to-day stake everything on strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we must renounce for many years to come any place among the world powers. under these circumstances, no one who cherishes german sentiments and german hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. on the contrary, we must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the naval act will be met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion. the difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness for war, is due to two causes in the past. it has been produced in the first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the long years since the founding of the german empire neglected to define and strengthen our place among the powers of europe, and to win a free hand in world politics, while around us the other powers were growing more and more threatening. it was, in my opinion, the most serious mistake in german policy that a final settling of accounts with france was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was favourable and success might confidently have been expected. there has, indeed, been no lack of opportunities. we have only our policy of peace and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against numerically superior enemies. this policy somewhat resembles the supineness for which england has herself to blame, when she refused her assistance to the southern states in the american war of secession, and thus allowed a power to arise in the form of the united states of north america, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, threatens england's own position as a world power. but the consequences of our peace policy hit us harder than england has suffered under her former american policy. the place of great britain as a great power is far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. it is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we might not succeed in conquering france as effectually as we would have wished. this uncertainty is inseparable from every war. neither in 1866 nor in 1870 could bismarck foresee the degree of success which would fall to him, but he dared to fight. the greatness of the statesman is shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best course. just fate decides the issue. the second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that we started to build our fleet too late. the chief mistake which we have made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters concerning the fleet. we have also begun far too late to develop systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it. this experience must be a lesson to us in the future. we must never let the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views which must determine our world policy. we must always adopt in good time those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even though they make heavy financial calls on our resources. this is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our naval armament. even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for lost time. it will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty devotedly. chapter xiii the army and popular education the policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which we can only assert our place among the great powers and secure the conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. we shall be compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our enemies--i mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the army. we must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide for the future. apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also the political power of the state ultimately rest. we must maintain the physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and demands of existence. while it is the duty of the state to guide her citizens to the highest moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the state. only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the state achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. her duty and her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest sense true to it. it is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. for while the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction, the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in very great numbers possible. thus the full consummation of military training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments worthy of the honourable profession of arms. we have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent material. this fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which modern war will make on the individual fighter. in order to meet these demands fully, the people must be properly educated. each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. in the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources; he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the losses among his superiors are heavy. the artilleryman will have to work his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left beyond his own professional knowledge and determination. but not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. this change is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater efficiency of the firearms. all movements in large masses are more exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments, since they are never carried out so smoothly. the shelter and food of great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. the increased range of modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination with the larger fronts, necessitates wide détours whenever the troops attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the battlefield. in the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army has been enormously increased. the state, however, has done little to prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very detrimental influence on their education. i specially refer to the ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development. this result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. at the present day, out of all the german-born military units, over 6.14 per cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population between town and country is quite different. according to the census of 1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of inhabitants. the proportion has probably changed since that year still more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have increased in population. these figures clearly show the physical deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect and compact unity of the nation. the rural population forms part and parcel of the army. a thousand bonds unite the troops and the families of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. the interest felt in the soldier's life is intense. it is the same spirit, transmitted from one to another. the relation of the army to the population of the great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their sons into the army is quite different. a certain opposition exists between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who, from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation. similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened, and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely hostile to the service. it is in the direct interests of the state to raise the physical health of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect of military training more extensively to bear on the town population, and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. nothing promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military service. so far as i can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. apart from many forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health, the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. this latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great city, produces far more harmful results. it is therefore the unmistakable duty of the state, first, to fight alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of amusements. in munich, bavarian officers have recently made a praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past the age of attendance at school with health-producing military exercises. the young men's clubs which field-marshal v.d. goltz is trying to establish aim at similar objects. such undertakings ought to be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the state, from purely physical as well as social considerations. the gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others, the system of universal service should have been made an effective reality. it is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of military service on the physical development of the recruits. the authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than hitherto. on the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport with an exaggerated value for the national health. as already pointed out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial. the wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete miscomprehension of the real value of work. it is in itself the greatest blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a livelihood and paying for amusements. strenuous labour alone produces men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality. so long as the dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now, when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars, their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a part in the struggle of the civilized nations. in germany that stock which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the rhine or the danube, but on the sterile sands of the march. we must preserve the stern, industrious, old-prussian feeling, and carry the rest of germany with us to kant's conception of life; we must continuously steel our strength by great political and economic endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained, or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the world. where nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of pleasure rather than of work, society and the state must vie in taking care that work does not become play, or play work. it is work, regarded as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. sport, which is spreading more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation, not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. we must never forget this. hard, laborious work has made germany great; in england, on the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of serious work it has greatly injured the english nation. the english nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the english trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it may well be asked whether, under these conditions, england will show herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in the future. if, further, the political rivalry with the great and ambitious republic in america be removed by an arbitration treaty, this circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop physique. the physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while, if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations, the result must be injurious in the long-run. we must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to promote their spiritual development in every way. the means for doing so is the school. military education under the present-day conditions, which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material. the national school is not sufficient for this requirement. the general regulations which settle the national school system in prussia date from the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. it is only natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the essentials of military education. present-day military education requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. this is directly prescribed by the rules. in the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior officers. in a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as many as 120 children are divided into two classes. a separation of the sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. as a rule, therefore, the instruction is given in common. it is certain that, under such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is possible. all that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys and girls, still less of individuals. such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military education. the principles which regulate the teaching in the two places are quite different. that is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction. the military education aims at training the moral personality to independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic feelings among the men. instruction in a sense of duty and in our national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional teaching. great attention is given to educate each individual in logical reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts. in the national school these views are completely relegated to the background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as the practical result of the conditions. the chief stress in such a school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. the so-called _realign_ (history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into the background. only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are devoted to all the _realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. there is no idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. not a word in the general regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this; and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. as for influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it altogether out of the question. while the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given, especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. beginning with the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years), stories not only from the new testament, but also from the old testament are drummed into the heads of the scholars. similarly every saturday the portions of scripture appointed for the next sunday are read out and explained to all the children. instruction in the catechism begins also in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. it is a significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid "the memorizing of the general confession and other parts of the liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the pericopes." on the other hand, the institution of public worship is to be explained to the children. this illustrates the spirit in which this instruction has to be imparted according to the regulations. it is really amazing to read these regulations. the object of evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the comprehension of the holy scriptures and to the creed of the congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the scriptures independently and to take an active part both in the life and the religious worship of the congregation." requirements are laid down which entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. not a word, however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into prominence. the teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral influence. a real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their confirmation to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. nor does the instruction for confirmation do much to alter that, for it is usually conceived in the same spirit. all other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. it is the more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real service to the country. it is quite refreshing to read in the new regulations for middle schools of february 10,1910, that by religious instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the fatherland." the method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. religious instruction can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. to make it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. even the missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to them subtle religious ideas. yet every saturday the appointed passages of scripture (the pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children. religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. up to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the simplest ideas of the deity, but in other respects to endeavour to awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp loftier conceptions. the national school stands in total contradiction to this intellectual development. this is in conformity to regulations, for the same children who read the bible independently are only to be led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily around them." in the course of eight years they learn a smattering of reading, writing, and ciphering.[a] it is significant of the knowledge of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three recruits of one company to whom the question was put who bismarck was, not a single one could answer. that the scholars acquire even a general idea of their duties to the country and the state is quite out of the question. it is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in common. one thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of girls; and, although i consider it important that patriotic feelings should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different way from the boys. when the instruction is common to both, the treatment of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. it is quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field. this pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that frederick the great set up. he declared that the duty of the state was "to educate the young generation to independent thinking and self-devoted love of country." [footnote a: recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified to the office of a head forester. he showed that he could not copy correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.] our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education, but for life generally. it sends children out into the world with undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. as a matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction as a recruit. it is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform. i will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier. first and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. the number of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars diminished. it is worth while considering in this connection the feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years. then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. finally, the _realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion should be more prominent than the formal contents. the training of the national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. at present it absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and feelings of their pupils. it must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves and on any chance influences. in the interval between school life and military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt, perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a lack of counteracting ideals. a compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of the age. it is also urgently required from the military standpoint. such a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and sense of citizenship. to do this, it is necessary to explain to him the relation of the state to the individual, and to explain, by reference to our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to the state. the duties of the individual to the state should be placed in the foreground. this instruction must be inspired by the spirit which animated schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of prussia, and culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the love for the fatherland and for the state, which is a haven for every faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose. only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great deeds spring. what can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have learnt from the history of the war of liberation, that never-failing source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools. we can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the russo-japanese war. "the education of the whole japanese people, beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and warlike spirit. that education, combined with the rapidly acquired successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the japanese a marvellous confidence in their own strength. they served with pride in the ranks of the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... all the thoughts of the nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a powerful army and a strong fleet."[b] this was the spirit that led the japanese to victory. "the day when the young japanese enlisted was observed as a festival in his family."[b] in russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that "patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable trade."[b] thus the russian army marched to battle without any enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." already eaten up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent. [footnote b: "the work of the russian general staff," from the russian by freiheu v. tettau.] i have examined these conditions closely because i attach great importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means to the military education of our people. i am convinced that only the army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really great. i understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means if we wish to accomplish something great. the direct influence of school ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first make itself felt very gradually. later generations will reap the fruits of its sowing. its efficiency must be aided by other influences which will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout their lives. now, there are two means available which can work upon public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation; one is the press, the other is a policy of action. if the government wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and national press, through which it must present its views and aims vigorously and openly. the government will never be able to count upon a well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being systematically undermined by the press and a feeble peace policy preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the object of all policy. it must rather do everything to foster a military spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an imperial policy. it must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to state and country. a parliamentary government, which always represents merely a temporary majority, may leave the party press to defend and back its views; but a government like the german, which traces its justification to the fact that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. its point of view does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course, conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. it must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as widely understood as possible. i regard it, therefore, as one of the most important duties of a government like ours to use the press freely and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. i do not mean that a few large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well supplied with news, but that the views of the government should find comprehensive expression in the local press. it would be an advantage, in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain announcements of the government, in order that the reader might not have such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party press supplies. it would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health. epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old europe more dangerous and damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the state to preserve the moral healthiness of the nation. more important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the press is the _propaganda of action._ nothing controls the spirit of the multitude so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. such education by a powerful policy is an absolute necessity for the german people. this nation possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. in addition to this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and religious unity of the nation created in the system of small states and in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. yet the heart of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though such aims can only be attended by danger. we must not be misled in this respect by the press, which often represents a most one-sided, self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even anti-german lines rather than national. the soul of our nation is not reflected in that part of the press with its continual dwelling on the necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. on the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the powers and for manly action fills our nation. every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the government, finds in the soul of the people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their forces. in a great part of the national press this feeling has again and again found noble expression. but the statesman who could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the clamour of parties and the party press, would carry all spirits with him. he is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of national psychology; bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a master-hand. true, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to all--the sincere wish for german unification and the german empire; but the german nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead to the realization of this idea. only under compulsion and after a hard struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which the great statesman was so surely leading it. success was the foundation on which bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the german empire. even in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve his own great aims. he, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and the motto _homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him; but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the soul of his people. this knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the great elector, frederick the incomparable, scharnhorst and blücher; for even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at the congress of vienna. the statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions. such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to great military achievements. when their spirits are turned towards high aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to prepare their minds to it: "the man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims." we may learn something from japan on this head. her eyes were fixed on the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices. we germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization to perform than the great asiatic power. we, like the japanese, can only fulfil it by the sword. shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military duty? such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the strength and honour of the german people. chapter xiv financial and political preparation for war from the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that the political conduct of the state, while affecting the mental attitude of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself. but, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of the state. in the first place, financial preparations for war must be made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the national finances must be so treated that the state can bear the tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. further, as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the material and industrial needs of the country. finally, preparations for war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come. if that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in whom confidence can be reposed should war break out. i am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the commercial and financial side of the question. in the sphere of commercial policy especially i cannot even suggest the way in which the desired end can be obtained. joint action on the part of the government and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. as regards finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national household in order, but to maintain the credit of the state, so that, on the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions. the credit of state depends essentially on a regulated financial economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the current incomings. other factors are the national wealth, the indebtedness of the state, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive and military capabilities. as regards the first point, i have already pointed out that in a great civilized world state the balancing of the accounts must never be brought about in the petty-state fashion by striking out expenditure for necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general progress. the incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion to the real needs. but, especially in a state which is so wholly based on war as the german empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the effeminate philosophy of the day. fichte taught us that there is only one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one vice--to think of self. ultimately the state is the transmitter of all culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the individual for itself.[a] these ideas, which led us out of the deepest gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of the last century. the peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the government. among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to the great change of times. in the same way many germans to-day look contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties imposed upon us by it. even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity and energy."[b] [footnote a: treitschke.] [footnote: b treitschke, "deutsche geschichte."] under conditions like the present the state is not only entitled, but is bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens, since it is vital questions that are at stake. it is equally important, however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities. this property is to a certain extent determined by the natural productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. but these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced. here, then, the state can profitably step in. it can protect and secure labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate german trade by vigorous political representation of german interests abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits from international commerce;[c] it can increase agricultural production by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on foreign countries for our food. the encouragement of deep-sea fishery would add to this.[d] [footnote: c england earns some 70 millions sterling by international commerce, germany about 15 millions sterling.] [footnote d: we buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from foreign countries.] from the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. home production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95 per cent, of the meat required. to maintain this proportion, the production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two double-centners per hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two million tons. a vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. the less we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards, [e] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the state will improve. [footnote e: we obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of copper, etc.] if the state can thus contribute directly to the increase of national productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial position. but payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays. the gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very easily be lost again on the other. even from the financial aspect it is a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to improve the financial position. the experiences of history leave no doubt on that point. military power is the strongest pillar of a nation's credit. if it is weakened, financial security at once is shaken. a disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the state creditors may easily become losers by it. but a state whose army holds out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its creditors far better security than a weaker military power. if our credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened political position is chiefly to blame. if we chose to neglect our army and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible liquidation of our debt. we have a twofold duty before us: first to improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go. the question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task. it is inconceivable that the german people has reached the limits of possible taxation. the taxes of prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and 1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from 20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same proportion may hold in the rest of germany. on the other hand, there is a huge increase in the national wealth. this amounts, in the german empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per head of the population. in france the wealth, calculated on the same basis, is no higher, and yet in france annually 20 marks, in germany only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and navy. in england, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in germany and france, the outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. thus our most probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger politically. attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase of wealth in germany continues to be on an ascending scale. trades and industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again. the advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the empire, is extraordinary. "the total of imports and exports has increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14 1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. of these, the value of the imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... the value of the import of raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in 1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. the import of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. the value of the import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3 milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food remained at about the same figure. the mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in germany during the last thirty years. the amount of coal raised amounted in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2 million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. the quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in 1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35 million to 170 million marks. the output of iron-ore has increased from 6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119 million marks.... from 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in germany has increased by 127 per cent.; in england only by about 59 per cent. the raw iron obtained has increased in germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172 per cent.; in england there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[f] [footnote f: professor dr. wade, berlin.] similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. the financial position of the empire has considerably improved since the imperial finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the budget may very soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent. it was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive capitalization. such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked extent. from the year 1892-1905 in prussia alone an increase of national wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. the number of taxpayers and of property in the property tax class of 6,000 to 100,000 marks has in prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. in these classes, therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater proportion in the large fortunes. in the property tax class of 100,000 to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. in the class of 500,000 marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually, it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. this means per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year. we see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and annually increasing growth, which the prussian finance minister has estimated for prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole empire 5 milliards yearly in the same period. wages have risen everywhere. to give some instances, i will mention that among the workmen at krupp's factory at essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent., the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the annual earnings in the dortmund district of the chief mining office from 1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. this increase in earnings is also shown by the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement in prosperity is perceptible. it can also be regarded as a sign of a healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment are considerably diminished in germany. in 1908 only 20,000 emigrants left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from great britain and 10 per cent. (in france it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of workmen's unions were unemployed. against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national debt, both in the empire and in the separate states. the german empire in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the national debt of the separate states on april 1, 1910, reached in- marks prussia 9,421,770,800 bavaria 2,165,942,900 saxony 893,042,600 würtemberg 606,042,800 baden 557,859,000 hesse 428,664,400 alsace-lorraine 31,758,100 hamburg 684,891,200 lübeck 666,888,400 bremen 263,431,400 against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains, forests, mines, and railways. the stock capital of the state railways reached, on march 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in- marks, prussia (hesse) 9,888 bavaria 1,694 saxony 1,035 würtemburg 685 baden 727 alsace-lorraine 724 --a grand total, including the smaller state systems, of 15,062 milliard marks. this sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of 1911 for prussia alone 11,050 milliards. nevertheless, the national debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in debt. the debt of the prussian towns and country communes of 10,000 inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the whole empire to some 5,000 million marks. this means that interest yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions, are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or even 400 per cent. the taxes also are not at all equally distributed according to capacity to pay them. the main burden rests on the middle class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. some sources of wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on the stock exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into property. nevertheless, the german nation is quite in a position to pay for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization, so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on the altar of patriotism. the dispute about the so-called imperial finance reform has shown how party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial sacrifices. it must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. but a considerable and rapid rise of the imperial revenue is required if we wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of our country without a blow. under these conditions i see no other effectual measure but the speedy introduction of the _reichserbrecht_ (imperial right of succession), in order to satisfy the urgent necessity. this source of revenue would oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to diminish our burden of debt. if the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters, depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the state stepped in as heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based on official material, could be counted upon. this is not the place to examine this calculation more closely. even if it is put at too high a figure, which i doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large under any circumstances. since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to paying off debts. otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a private gentleman who lives on his capital. this idea is also to be recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable to fluctuations. it would be advisable to devote the proceeds principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely important. this fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on land and sea. there are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be urged against this right of the state or the empire to inherit. it is argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth, that the state would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course of time capital would be united in the hand of the state, that the independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the ideal of socialism would be realized. secondly, the requirement that relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will, is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "according to our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his fortune must do some positive act. he must make a will, in which he bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to any other object. it is thus brought before his mind that his natural heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he wishes to exclude his legal heirs. it is impressed upon him that he is interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things, that he is wilfully altering it. the imperial right of succession is based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual than his family. this is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait. the socialistic state, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of this sort."[f] [footnote f: bolko v. katte, in the _kreuzzeitung_ of november 18, 1910.] both objections are unconvincing. so long as the state uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the state is directly beneficial to all members of the state, because they have to pay less taxes. legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in the hands of the state, since, if such results followed, this right of succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the state be prevented in other ways. the science of finance could unquestionably arrange that. there is no necessity to push the scheme to its extreme logical conclusion. the so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. if a true sense of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. if such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof in life. indeed, the crown's right of inheritance would produce probably the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties would actually be strengthened. the "primitive german sense of law," which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual than the state, has so far borne the most mischievous results. it is the root from which the disruption of germany, the particularism and the defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. it is well that in the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and that the significance of the state for the individual, no less than for the family, should be thoroughly understood. these more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this imperial right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help and the whole future of germany is at stake. if, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our sorely-pressed country. help is urgently needed, and there would be good prospects of such law being passed in the reichstag if the government does not disguise the true state of the political position. political preparations are not less essential than financial. we see that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. efforts are also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other states, so as to have a free hand for private schemes. this is the policy on which england has built up her power in europe, in order to continue her world policy undisturbed. she cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has built up a mighty empire, which is the object of all policy, and has secured to the english people the possibility of the most ambitious careers. we must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this english policy. we must realize to ourselves that it is guided exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill. there must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit reservation. every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really benefited. this is a political principle that cannot be disputed. nothing can compel a state to act counter to its own interests, on which those of its citizens depend. this consideration, however, imposes on the honest state the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. conditions may arise which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. the country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical sense--must then turn the scale. "frederick the great was all his life long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[a] the great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. such an alliance is, as i have shown in another place, the austro-german. the two states, from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the happiest way complements of each other. the german theatre of war in the east will be protected by austria from any attempt to turn our flank on the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of austria and outflank any russian attack on galicia. alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a permanent political system. "there is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." these are the words of frederick the great, our foremost political teacher _pace_ bismarck. we must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable attitude of the other states by reference to their own interests. bismarck tells us that "illusions are the greatest danger to the diplomatist. he must take for granted that the other, like himself, seeks nothing but his own advantage." it will prove waste labour to attempt to force a great state by diplomatic arrangements to actions or an attitude which oppose its real interests. when a crisis arises, the weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale. when napoleon iii. planned war against prussia, he tried to effect an alliance with austria and italy, and archduke albert was actually in paris to conclude the military negotiations.[b] these probably were going on, as the french general lebrun was in vienna on the same errand. both countries left france in the lurch so soon as the first prussian flag flew victoriously on the heights of the geisberg. a statesman less biassed than napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither austria nor italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war under unfavourable conditions. [footnote b: when colonel stoffel, the well-known french military attaché in berlin, returned to paris, and was received by the emperor, and pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of prussia's war preparations, the emperor declared that he was better informed. he proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the conditions of the prussian army apparently sent to him by archduke albert, which came to quite different conclusions. the emperor had made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military calculations. (communications of colonel stoffel to the former minister of war, v. verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)] france, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests, unscrupulously brushed aside the conventions of algeciras, which did not satisfy her. she will equally disregard all further diplomatic arrangements intended to safeguard germany's commercial interests in morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her interest to be undisputed master in morocco and to exploit that country for herself. france, when she no longer fears the german arms, will not allow any official document in the world to guarantee german commerce and german enterprise any scope in morocco; and from the french standpoint she is right. the political behaviour of a state is governed only by its own interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different great powers must be judged by that standard. there is no doubt, however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the state with which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its opponents. a policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone and of being left isolated in the hour of danger. a successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking chances and facing risks. it must be conscious of its goal, and keep this goal steadily in view. it must press every change of circumstances and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. above all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under favourable conditions. "the great art of policy," writes frederick the great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to one's own profit. it consists rather in deriving advantage from favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." even in his rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered all his life: "wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but boldness alone can acquire." "i give you a problem to solve," he said to his councillors when the death of emperor charles vi. was announced. "when you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?" definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws of political and military success. the political preparation for war is included in them. he who is blinded by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success. "the braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more despised than by the great prussian king," so h. v. treitschke tells us. "old fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss the golden opportunity. it is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist policy. that title can only be given to the policy which sets up personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures, as napoleon did in mexico, and italy in abyssinia. a policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these great duties of the state, which are an historical legacy and are based on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the possibility of a war. this is at once apparent if one considers the result to the state when war is forced on it under disadvantageous circumstances. i need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of prussia led. in this respect the russo-japanese war speaks a clear language. japan had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with england and assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of america and china. her policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment of her political ends. russia was not prepared in either respect. she had been forced into a hostile position with germany from her alliance with france, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to place sufficient forces in the far east. internal conditions, moreover, compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of the empire. a large proportion of the troops put into the field against japan were therefore only inferior reserves. none of the preparations required by the political position had been made, although the conflict had long been seen to be inevitable. thus the war began with disastrous retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. there is no doubt that things would have run a different course had russia made resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the campaign by the offensive. england, too, was politically surprised by the boer war, and consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to her aims or suited to give weight to political demands. two points stand out clearly from this consideration. first of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and political preparations for war. proper political preparations for war are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing which he cannot carry through by arms. at the same time the army must be developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. the obligation imposed on the general to stand aloof from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. the war minister and the head of the general staff must be kept _au courant_ with the all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military situation is peculiarly favourable. at the same time the minister who conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by war. a veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the opponent to give in. where this means is renounced, a policy of compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one, but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to end in political and moral defeat. the second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always creates an unfavourable military position. history, as well as theory, tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy, which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts favourably on the military situation. in this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution join hands. if we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next war which germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion: the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions are to be created for the inevitably threatening war. so long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two fronts against france and russia, and could count on help in this war from all the three parties to the triple alliance, the position was comparatively simple. there were, then, of course, a series of various strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the other, or, if the austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive action on both sides. to-day the situation is different. we must consider england, as well as france and russia. we must expect not only an attack by sea on our north sea coasts, but a landing of english forces on the continent of europe and a violation of belgo-dutch neutrality by our enemies. it is also not inconceivable that england may land troops in schleswig or jutland, and try to force denmark into war with us. it seems further questionable whether austria will be in a position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and south-east frontiers. an attack by france through switzerland is also increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of the european states is effected. finally, we should be seriously menaced in the baltic if russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet. all these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the military aspect. the military situation thus created is very unfavourable. if under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure, and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must count. the strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one also. a series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and all necessary steps could be considered. until that moment the troops of the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. on the same principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many different lines of march as possible. previous arrangements for unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the most various political prospects. we should in any case be forced to adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent an invasion by one or other of our enemies. no proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good prospects of success. the very bravest army must succumb if led against a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. a military investigation of the situation shows that a plan of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents, under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind. the disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. on this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of frederick the great. we must look this truth boldly in the face. of course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which the franco-russian alliance would be brought into activity. if we attacked france or russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help, and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy to fight. let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by france, for then there would be reasonable prospect that russia for a time would remain neutral. this view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. neither france nor russia nor england need to attack in order to further their interests. so long as we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, as the upshot of the morocco negotiations shows. if we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy which, without attacking france, will so prejudice her interests or those of england, that both these states would feel themselves compelled to attack us. opportunities for such procedure are offered both in africa and in europe, and anyone who has attentively studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on this point. in opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to struggle hard for. unfortunately such politicians always forget to state clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. such political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid foundation. we must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great results. it is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous to germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. this requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic position which i do not possess. one thing only can be justly said: beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as time goes on. italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons emigrated from italy in 1908), can never combine with france and england to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the mediterranean, since both these states themselves claim this place. the effort to break up the triple alliance has momentarily favoured the italian policy of expansion. but this incident does not alter in the least the fact that the true interest of italy demands adherence to the triple alliance, which alone can procure her tunis and biserta. the importance of these considerations will continue to be felt. turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with england, france, and russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of present-day turkey. islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in england and russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the central european alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder of abandoning her in morocco. there is no true community of interests between russia and england; in central asia, in persia, as in the mediterranean, their ambitions clash in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in japan and china is forcing on a crisis which is vital to russian interests and to some degree ties her hands. all these matters open out a wide vista to german statesmanship, if it is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than recent political events seemed to indicate. and, then, our policy can count on a factor of strength such as no other state possesses--on an army whose military efficiency, i am convinced, cannot be sufficiently valued. not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. we have amply shown the contrary. but the spirit which animates the troops, the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst them, justify the highest expectations. i am certain that if they are soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world, provided only that they are led with skill and determination. the german nation, too--of this i am equally convinced--will rise to the height of its great duty. a mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in its soul. whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will achieve a truly magnificent result. in the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces, and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger, our government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future; but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of germany unless it wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the brave words of goethe: "bid defiance to every power! ever valiant, never cower! to the brave soldier open flies the golden gate of paradise." epilogue after i had practically finished the preceding pages, the franco-german convention as to morocco and the congo compensation were published; the turko-italian war broke out; the revolution in china assumed dimensions which point to the probability of new disorders in eastern asia; and, lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between france and england. such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently between the two states, but clearly every possibility of war has been foreseen and provided for. i have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the anglo-french conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks. the german government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed, have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a collision with england or france at any cost. it has accomplished this object by the arrangement with france, and it may be, of course, assumed that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was determined not to fight at present. only from this aspect can the attitude of the government towards france and england be considered correct. it is quite evident from her whole attitude that great britain was resolved to take the chance of a war. her immediate preparations for war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of english high finance on the foremost german banking establishments, which took place at this crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. we have probably obtained the concessions made by france only because she thought the favourable moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. probably she will wait until, on the one hand, the triple alliance is still more loosened and russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the other hand, her own african army has been so far strengthened that it can actively support the rhine army. this idea may sufficiently explain the morocco policy of the government, but there can be no doubt, if the convention with france be examined, that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes. it will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as regards morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of territory in the french congo has a certain and perhaps not inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in obtaining the spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the possession really valuable. on the other hand, what we obtained can never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were compelled to abandon. i have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial concessions which france has made are valuable only so long as our armed force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the congo region must, as the imperial chancellor announced in his speech of november 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from this precise point of view very inferior to morocco, for there can be no doubt that in the future morocco will be a far more valuable possession for france than the congo region for germany, especially if that spanish _enclave_ cannot be obtained. the access to the ubangi and the congo has at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case of war with us by a few companies of senegalese. it would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial arrangement which we have effected with france the paving of the way for a better understanding with this state generally. it certainly cannot be assumed that france will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a moment when she is sure of being supported by england, merely because she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a desolate corner of africa. no importance can be attached to this idea, in spite of the views expounded by the imperial chancellor, v. bethmann-hollweg, in his speech of november 9, 1911. we need not, therefore, regard this convention as definitive. it is as liable to revision as the algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with france. the acquisition of territory in the congo region means at first an actual loss of power to germany; it can only be made useful by the expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position. but, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its entirety. from this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the sovereignty of morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent infraction of the algeciras convention by france, although we had weighty interests at stake. if in the text of the morocco treaty such action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front. an additional political disadvantage is that our relations with islam have changed for the worse by the abandonment of morocco. i cannot, of course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with turkey have suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in the whole mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance for us. it is also a reasonable assumption that the morocco convention precipitated the action of italy in tripoli, and thus shook profoundly the solidity of the triple alliance. the increase of power which france obtained through the acquisition of morocco made the italians realize the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the mediterranean. the worst result of our morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep rift which has been formed in consequence between the government and the mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in spite of their regular opposition to the government, had heartily supported it as the representative of the empire abroad. in this weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the press and in the reichstag (although some slight change for the better has followed the latest declarations of the government), lies the great disadvantage of the franco-german understanding; for in the critical times which we shall have to face, the government of the german empire must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to ride the storm. the unveiling of the anglo-french agreement as to war removes all further doubt on this point. the existence of such relations between england and france confirms the view of the political situation which i have tried to bring out in the various chapters of this book. they show that we are confronted by a firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder any further expansion of germany's power. with this object, they have done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the triple alliance, and they will not shrink from a war. the english ministers have left no doubt on this point.[a] [footnote a: cf. speech of sir e. grey on november 27, 1911.] the official statements of the english statesmen have, in spite of all pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of english policy lead in the direction which i have indicated. the warning against aggressive intentions issued to germany, and the assurance that england would support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the limits that germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with england. the meaning of the english minister's utterances is not altered by his declaration that england would raise no protest against new acquisitions by germany in africa. england knows too well that every new colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to germany, and that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. they form objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. meanwhile a clear commentary on the minister's speech may be found in the fact that once more the budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates. in this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count on any change in english policy. even english attempts at a _rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. we may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success. if the imperial government was of the opinion that it was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world or renounce such position once and for all. we must not in any case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide that the hour of attack has come. we must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike preparation, according to the principles which i have already laid down. all national parties must rally round the government, which has to represent our dearest interests abroad. the willing devotion of the people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to military and political success, without carrying still further the disastrous consequences of the morocco policy by unfruitful and frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between government and people. we may expect from the government that it will prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any conventional scruples distract it from this object. repeal of the five years act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation calls for. new and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it to the happy goal. the political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever. england, too, is in a most difficult position. the conflict of her interests with russia's in persia and in the newly arisen dardanelles question, as well as the power of islam in the most important parts of her colonial empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in great britain. attention has already been called to the significance and difficulty of her relations with north america. france also has considerable obstacles still to surmount in her african empire, before it can yield its full fruits. the disturbances in the far east will probably fetter russia's forces, and england's interests will suffer in sympathy. these are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted german policy can utilize in order to influence the general political situation in the interests of our fatherland. if people and government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the future of our country and our state, we can face approaching events with confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to fight for our position in the world, but we may, with ernst moritz arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to god: "from the height of the starry sky may thy ringing sword flash bright; let every craven cry be silenced by thy might!" 