















[Illustration: ThePocketBooks]

[Illustration: ThePocketBooks]




 THE GERMAN FLEET

 _BEING THE COMPANION VOLUME TO "THE FLEETS AT WAR"
 AND "FROM HELIGOLAND TO KEELING ISLAND."_

 BY
 ARCHIBALD HURD

 AUTHOR (JOINT) OF "GERMAN SEA-POWER, ITS RISE, PROGRESS
 AND ECONOMIC BASIS."

 HODDER AND STOUGHTON
 LONDON      NEW YORK      TORONTO
 MCMXV




CONTENTS


 CHAPTER                                                   PAGE

   INTRODUCTION                                              7

   I. PAST ASCENDENCY                                       19

  II. THE FIRST GERMAN FLEET                                26

 III. GERMANY'S FLEET IN THE LAST CENTURY                   51

  IV. BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE GERMAN NAVY                  80

   V. THE GERMAN NAVY ACTS                                  93

  VI. GERMAN SHIPS, OFFICERS, AND MEN                      142

 VII. WILLIAM II. AND HIS NAVAL MINISTER                   155

 APPENDIX I.--GERMANY'S NAVAL POLICY                       183

 APPENDIX II.--BRITISH AND GERMAN SHIP-BUILDING
 PROGRAMMES                                                189




INTRODUCTION


In the history of nations there is probably no chapter more fascinating
and arresting than that which records the rise and fall and subsequent
resurrection of German sea-power.

In our insular pride, conscious of our glorious naval heritage, we are
apt to forget that Germany had a maritime past, and that long before
the German Empire existed the German people attained pre-eminence in
oversea commerce and created for its protection fleets which exercised
commanding influence in northern waters.

It is an error, therefore, to regard Germany as an up-start naval
Power. The creation of her modern navy represented the revival
of ancient hopes and aspirations. To those ambitions, in their
unaggressive form, her neighbours would have taken little exception;
Germany had become a great commercial Power with colonies overseas, and
it was natural that she should desire to possess a navy corresponding
to her growing maritime interests and the place which she had already
won for herself in the sun.

The more closely the history of German sea-power is studied the more
apparent it must become, that it was not so much Germany's Navy
Acts, as the propaganda by which they were supported and the new and
aggressive spirit which her naval organisation brought into maritime
affairs that caused uneasiness throughout the world and eventually
created that feeling of antagonism which found expression after the
opening of war in August, 1914.

In the early part of 1913 I wrote, in collaboration with a friend who
possessed intimate knowledge of the foundations and the strength of the
German Empire, a history of the German naval movement,[1] particular
emphasis being laid on its economic basis. In the preparation of
the present volume I have drawn upon this former work. It has been
impossible, however, in the necessarily limited compass of one of
the _Daily Telegraph_ War Books, to deal with the economic basis
upon which the German Navy has been created. I believe that the
chapters in "German Sea-Power" with reference to this aspect of German
progress--for which my collaborator was responsible and of which,
therefore, I can speak without reserve--still constitute a unique
presentation of the condition of Germany on the eve of the outbreak of
war.

Much misconception exists as to the staying power of Germany. The
German Empire as an economic unit is not of mushroom growth. Those
readers who are sufficiently interested in the subject of the basis
of German vitality, will realise vividly by reference to "German
Sea-Power" the deep and well-laid foundations upon which not only the
German Navy, but the German Empire rest.

Whether this history should be regarded as the romance of the German
Navy or the tragedy of the German Navy must for the present remain an
open question. In everyday life many romances culminate in tragedy,
and the course of events in the present war suggest that the time may
be at hand when the German people will realise the series of errors
committed by their rulers in the upbuilding of German sea-power. Within
the past fifteen years it is calculated that about £300,000,000 has
been spent in the maintenance and expansion of the German Fleet, the
improvement of its bases, and the enlargement of the Kiel Canal. Much
of this money has been raised by loans. Those loans are still unpaid;
it was believed by a large section of the German people that Great
Britain, hampered by party politics and effete in all warlike pursuits,
would, after defeat, repay them. That hope must now be dead.

The German people, as the memorandum which accompanied the Navy Act
of 1900 reveals, were led to anticipate that the Fleet, created by
the sacrifice of so much treasure, would not only guarantee their
shores against aggression, but would give absolute protection to their
maritime and colonial interests, and would, eventually, pay for itself.
The time will come when they will recognise that from the first they
have been hoodwinked and deceived by those in authority over them. It
may be that German statesmen, and the Emperor himself, were themselves
deceived by the very brilliance of the dreams of world power which they
entertained and by the conception which they had formed of the lack of
virility, sagacity and prescience of those responsible for the fortunes
of other countries, and of Great Britain in particular.

German Navy Acts were passed in full confidence that during the period
when they were being carried into effect the rest of the world would
stand still, lost in admiration of Germany's culture and Germany's
power. The mass of the German people were unwilling converts to the
new gospel. They had to be convinced of the wisdom of the new policy.
For this purpose a Press Bureau was established. Throughout the
German States this organisation fostered, through the official and
semi-official Press, feelings of antagonism and hatred towards other
countries, and towards England and the United States especially,
because these two countries were Germany's most serious rivals in the
commercial markets of the world, and also possessed sea-power superior
to her own.

It is interesting to recall in proof of this dual aim of German policy
the remarks of von Edelsheim, a member of the German General Staff, in
a pamphlet entitled "Operationen Ubersee."[2]

The author, after first pointing out the possibility of invading
England, turned his attention to the United States.[3] His remarks are
so interesting in view of the activity of German agents on the other
side of the Atlantic after the outbreak of war, that it is perhaps
excusable to quote at some length this explanation by a member of the
German General Staff of how the German Fleet was to be used against the
United States as an extension of the power of the huge German Army.

 "The possibility must be taken into account that the fleet of the
 United States will at first not venture into battle, but that it will
 withdraw into fortified harbours, in order to wait for a favourable
 opportunity of achieving minor successes. Therefore it is clear that
 naval action alone will not be decisive against the United States, but
 that combined action of army and navy will be required. Considering
 the great extent of the United States, the conquest of the country
 by an army of invasion is not possible. But there is every reason
 to believe that victorious enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and
 the conquest of the most important arteries through which imports
 and exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs in
 the whole country that the Government will readily offer acceptable
 conditions in order to obtain peace.

 "If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for
 landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our
 harbours, we may conclude that operations on the American soil can
 begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United
 States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army
 equivalent to our own.

 "At present the regular army of the United States amounts to 65,000
 men, of whom only 30,000 could be disposed of. Of these at least
 10,000 are required for watching the Indian territories and for
 guarding the fortifications on the sea coast. Therefore only about
 20,000 men of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about
 100,000 militia are in existence, of whom the larger part did not come
 up when they were called out during the last war. Lastly, the militia
 is not efficient; it is partly armed with muzzle-loaders, and its
 training is worse than its armament.

 "As an operation by surprise against America is impossible, on account
 of the length of time during which transports are on the way, only
 the landing can be affected by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be
 laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably
 facilitate victory against the United States, owing to the absence of
 methodical preparation for mobilization, owing to the inexperience of
 the personnel, and owing to the weakness of the regular army.

 "In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the United
 States, and to protect our lines of operation so as to enable us to
 fight successfully against all the forces which that country, in
 the course of time, can oppose to us, considerable forces would be
 required. Such an operation would be greatly hampered by the fact
 that it would require a second passage of the transport fleet in
 order to ship the necessary troops that long distance. However, it
 seems questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy a great
 stretch of country for a considerable time. The Americans will not
 feel inclined to conclude peace because one or two provinces are
 occupied by an army of invasion, but because of the enormous, material
 losses which the whole country will suffer if the Atlantic harbour
 towns, in which the threads of the whole prosperity of the United
 States are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the other.

 "Therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of
 large landing operations, through which we are able to take several
 of these important and wealthy towns within a brief space of time. By
 interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving
 the State commerce and the defence, by taking away all material for
 war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we
 should be able to inflict damage on the United States.

 "For such enterprises a smaller military force will suffice.
 Nevertheless, the American defence will find it difficult to undertake
 a successful enterprise against that kind of warfare. Though an
 extremely well-developed railway system enables them to concentrate
 troops within a short time on the different points on the coast, the
 concentration of the troops and the time which is lost until it is
 recognised which of the many threatened points of landing will really
 be utilised will, as a rule, make it possible for the army of invasion
 to carry out its operation with success under the co-operation of
 the fleet at the point chosen. The corps landed can either take
 the offensive against gathering hostile forces or withdraw to the
 transports in order to land at another place."

These declarations of German naval and military policy are of interest
as illustrating the character of the propaganda by which the naval
movement was encouraged. _The Navy was to give world-wide length of
reach to the supreme German Army, and enable Germany to dictate peace
to each and every nation, however distantly situated._ An appeal was
made to the lowest instincts of the German people. They were counselled
to create a great naval force on the understanding that the money
expended would by aggressive wars be repaid with interest and that,
as a result of combined naval and military operations, they would
extend the world power of the German Empire, and incidentally promote
Germany's maritime interests in all the oceans of the world.

Those who were responsible for the inflammatory speeches and articles
by which the interest of the German people in the naval movement was
excited, forgot the influence which these ebullitions would have upon
the policy of other Powers and upon their defensive preparations.
It was only after hostilities had broken out that the German people
realised what small results all their sacrifices had produced. By
the words, more than the acts, of those responsible for German naval
policy, the other Powers of the world had been forced to expand and
reorganise their naval forces. Germany had at great cost won for
herself the position of second greatest naval Power in the world, but
in doing so she had unconsciously forced up the strength of the British
Fleet and dragged in her path the United States, France, Italy, Japan,
Russia, and to a limited extent, but only to a limited extent, her
ally, Austria-Hungary. During the years of agitation the other Powers
of the world had not stood still, as it was assumed in Germany they
would do. First, the British people increased their naval expenditure
and more ships were built and more officers and men were entered; and
then the German Navy Act of 1912 was passed.

It had been the practice of the naval Powers to keep about one-half
only of their ships in full sea-going commission. The armed peace,
before Germany began to give expression to her maritime ambitions, was
a yoke which rested easily upon the navies of the world. As a British
naval officer has remarked:--

 "Up to the end of the last century our Navy enjoyed a peace
 routine. We maintained squadrons all over the world, and the pick
 of our personnel was to be found anywhere but in home waters. The
 Mediterranean claimed the pick of both our ships and men. Here naval
 life was one long holiday. The routine was to lay in harbour for nine
 months out of the year. About July the whole fleet would congregate at
 Malta for the summer's cruise. Sometimes it would be east of Malta,
 taking in the Grecian Archipelago and the Holy Land; at others it
 would be west, visiting the French and Italian ports, paying a visit
 to the Rock, and then home to Malta for another long rest.

 "Preparation for war was never thought of. Why should it be? The
 French Navy had no aggressive designs, and was much below our own,
 both in material strength and in personnel, while the Russian Navy
 was partly confined in the Black Sea, the other part being in the
 Baltic. And so we, both officers and men, set out to have a good time.
 Our ships were kept up to yacht-like perfection as regards their
 paintwork, while their bright work shone like gold, and the road to
 promotion lay not through professional efficiency, but the state of
 cleanliness and splendour of one's ship. All kinds of drills and
 evolutions were devised, not because of their war value, but because
 they had a competitive value, and so ship could be pitted against ship
 and an element of sport introduced.

 "There was nothing really wrong in all this. The British Navy was
 there to maintain for us our title of 'Mistress of the Seas,' and as
 no other nation apparently wished to challenge our title, there was
 nothing to do but pass away the time as pleasantly as possible; when
 the Navy was called on to perform any task it carried it through with
 vigour, valour, and efficiency, and immediately settled down again."[4]

This regime came to an end soon after Grand Admiral von Tirpitz
became German Naval Secretary towards the end of the nineteenth
century. He set the navies of the world a new model. He determined to
take advantage of the easy-going spirit which animated the pleasant
relations then existing between the great fleets. There was to be
nothing pleasant about the German Fleet. It was to be a strenuous agent
of Germany's aggressive aims. In the organisation of German sea-power
new principles found expression. In home waters and abroad the German
Navy was always ready instantly for war. The screw was applied
gradually stage by stage. Under the German Navy Act of 1912 this
aggressive sea policy found its ultimate expression: it was proposed
to keep always on a war footing nearly four-fifths of the ships in
northern waters, while at the same time the squadrons abroad were to
be greatly increased in strength. Happily, owing to Lord Fisher's
foresight and strategical ability, the British Navy was enabled step by
step to respond to each and every measure taken by Germany. He created
for us a Grand Fleet and when hostilities broke out that fleet took up
its war stations and denied to the main forces of Germany the use of
any and every sea.

German policy operated as a tonic, though not to the same extent, on
the other great fleets of the world. In the summer of 1914 Germany
discovered that every anticipation upon which her foreign, naval
and military policies had been based had been falsified by events.
In particular, in adding to her strength at sea and on land, she
had rendered herself weak by creating enemies east and west. Her
navy, which was to have engaged in a victorious campaign against the
greatest naval power of the world in isolation--the rest of the world
watching the inevitable downfall of the Mistress of the Seas with
approval--found arrayed against it not the British fleet only, but the
fleets of France and Russia in Europe and the Navy of Japan in the Far
East.

In studying, therefore, the history of the naval development of
Germany, and contrasting the high hopes which inspired the naval
movement with the events which occurred on the outbreak of war, and in
subsequent months, one is led to wonder whether, after all, the romance
of the German Navy will not be regarded in the future, by the German
people at least, rather as a great and costly tragedy.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: "German Sea-Power, Its Rise, Progress and Economic Basis,"
by Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle (1913, London, John Murray, 10s.
6d.).]

[Footnote 2: "Modern Germany" (Smith Elder, 1912).]

[Footnote 3: Germans always assumed that they could attack the United
States without intervention on our part, just as they assumed that
they could engage in war with us without becoming involved with the
United States. They believed that Germany would fight both countries in
turn--and victoriously.]

[Footnote 4: "The British Navy from Within" by "Ex-Royal Navy" (Hodder
& Stoughton).]




THE GERMAN FLEET




CHAPTER I

Past Ascendency


Like the foundations of the Empire in 1870, the formation of the modern
German Fleet is the result of a movement that had its origin among
the people and not among the Princes of the country. And this naval
movement sprang up and reached its greatest vigour in those sea-board
districts that still sedulously keep alive the splendid tradition of
the Hanseatic League, which, as the strongest maritime Power of its
day, for centuries almost monopolized the trade of Northern and Western
Europe, and with the word "sterling," a corruption of "Easterling,"
the name popularly given to its members, has left on Great Britain
the indelible stamp of its former mercantile domination. For the coin
of the Hanse towns, by reason of its unimpeachable quality, was once
universally sought after in England, and thus became the standard of
monetary excellence.

The memories of the Hansa are the "historical foundation" on which
have been based Germany's claims to a leading place among the maritime
nations, and they have played a prominent part in every agitation
for the increase of her fleet. Why, it was asked, should she not
again assume upon the seas that dominating position which she once
undoubtedly held? Why, with her expanding population, trade, and
wealth, should she not reclaim that maritime ascendency which she
forfeited to Holland in the seventeenth century, and which a hundred
years later passed to Great Britain? Why should she not realize that
dream which was in the mind of Friedrich List when he wrote: "How easy
it would have been for the Hanse towns, in the epoch of their rule over
the sea, to attain national unity through the instrumentality of the
imperial power, to unite the whole littoral from Dunkirk to Riga under
one nationality, and thus to win and maintain for the German nation
supremacy in industry, trade, and sea-power!"

It is, moreover, not without significance that the Hansa itself was, in
a sense, democratic, and that, at a time when Germany, as a national
unit, was rendered impotent in the world by her superabundance of
Princes, her citizens were able, on their own initiative, and by their
own energies, to assert their power and capacity as a maritime people.

The story of the Hansa is full of strange anomalies and antitheses.
Historians differ by centuries as to the date at which the existence of
the League commenced, and just as it never had a definite beginning,
so it has never had a formal end, for to this day two of the Hanse
towns--Hamburg and Bremen--have certain institutions in common, such
as their supreme law courts and their diplomatic representation in
Prussia. For hundreds of years the Confederation acted, and was treated
by foreign Governments, as an independent State and a great Power,
but its composition was never certain and always fluctuating. From
first to last the names of no fewer than ninety cities and towns
were entered upon its rolls, but it is impossible to say of each of
them how often and when it joined or left the League. Foreign rulers,
and especially the English monarchs, made repeated attempts to obtain
from the Hansa an official list of its members, but compliance with
their demands was systematically evaded on one pretext or another. The
League's policy was, as far as possible, to assert the claims of its
members, and to disown responsibility for those made against them. This
policy is pretty clearly expressed in the following answer returned
by the League in 1473 to complaints put forward on behalf of English
merchantmen who had suffered through the depredations of the Dantzic
privateer or pirate, Paul Beneke: "The towns of the Hansa are a corpus
in the possession of the privileges they hold in any realms, lands, or
lordships, and when their privileges are infringed, they are accustomed
to meet and consult, and then to issue for all of them ordinances
against all goods from the countries in which their privileges have
been infringed, that they shall not be suffered in the commonalty of
towns. But they were not making war against England; only some of the
towns of the Hansa, which had been injured by England, had determined
upon it at their own venture, win or lose, which did not take place
in the name of the Hanse commonalty." The theory of the Federation
was, in fact, that it existed for the purpose only of taking, and
not of giving, and it refused to imply a corporate responsibility by
publishing its membership rolls.

It is impossible, in the space available, to tell in any detail the
fascinating story of the rise of the Hansa to the position of a great
power, with its guild halls and factories in foreign lands, of which
the oldest and most important was the Steelyard, in London. The history
of this institution is believed to go back to the latter days of the
Roman occupation. When the Hanseatic League was at the height of its
power--from the last quarter of the fourteenth to the first half of
the sixteenth centuries, the Steelyard, in London, closely resembled a
state within a larger state. It occupied a site now covered by Cannon
Street Station, extending from Thames Street to the river, and bounded
to the east and west respectively by All Hallows and Cousins Lane.
The Steelyard had something of the appearance of a fortress and was
stoutly defended against attack. The community within its precincts was
governed with monastic severity. Their affairs were administered by
an alderman with the assistance of two adjuncts and nine counsellers
who took part in all the State and civic pageants of London as a
Corporation.

This great German commercial institution on British soil, and the other
houses established in other countries, reflected the great power which
was wielded by the Hanseatic League in commerce. These German traders,
however, realised that their increasing trade on the seas required
adequate defence. Mainly at the instigation of the merchants of Lübeck,
a considerable navy was created, this German city being dependent for
its prosperity mainly upon the herring fishing and curing industries
of Europe. In process of time the Germans succeeded in driving away
English, French and Spanish rivals, and created a great monopoly of
the herring fisheries of northern Europe, from which they drew immense
wealth and on which depended a number of other industries.

It was mainly for the protection of the Sound herrings that the Hansa
undertook against the Scandinavian States the numerous campaigns by
which it won the keys of the Baltic. The war which culminated with
the peace of Spralsunde in 1370 raised the League to the rank of a
first-class sea Power. Encouraged by its success in crushing and
humiliating Denmark, the Hansa had little hesitation in measuring
itself against England. The towns became associated through the
Victualling Brothers with an active form of corsair warfare on English
shipping.

By its triumph over the Danes, the Hansa secured a practical monopoly
of the shipping and trade of the Baltic and North Sea, which it held
almost unimpaired for nearly two hundred years. In the words of Gustav
Wasa, "the three good (Scandinavian) Crowns remained small wares of
the Hansa up to the sixteenth century," and as long as this was so
the commercial and maritime supremacy of the League was practically
unchallengeable. The manner in which the Easterlings availed themselves
of the ascendency they had now acquired is a classic example of the
ruthless and unscrupulous exploitation of political power for the
purposes of purely material gain, for they were actuated by no national
or ideal aims, but solely by the desire to enrich themselves. Favoured
by the confusion and chaos prevailing in the lands of their potential
rivals, they became the exclusive brokers through whose mediation the
spices of the Orient, the wines of France, the cloth of Flanders, the
tin, wool, hides, and tallow of England, were exchanged for the dried
cod of Norway, the ores of Sweden, the wheat of Prussia, the honey and
wax of Poland, the furs of Russia, and the myriads of herrings which
every summer were caught in the Sound, and salted and packed on the
coast of Scania. What they aimed at, and what for long years they
substantially obtained, was the disappearance of all flags but their
own from the North Sea and the Baltic. Moreover, a great part of the
carrying trade between England and France also fell to their lot.

The conditions were such as rendered warlike operations between
England and the Teutonic order inevitable. It is impossible to trace
in any detail the guerilla tactics which were adopted on both sides.
It is only necessary for our present purpose to convey some idea of
the sea power which the Hansa exercised in order that we may better
understand the ambitions of Germany to which the Emperor William the
Second and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz gave expression in the early years
of the twentieth century. At the outset of its career, its warships
were manned by the burghers themselves, but as the fleet increased
in size--it was quadrupled during the first half of the fifteenth
century--recourse to mercenaries became more and more general. The
commanders of the ships were invariably citizens of the towns which had
equipped them, and were frequently members of the governing council,
while the admiral of a fleet was always a councillor, and usually
a burgomaster. The officers of the land forces, which were raised
as occasion demanded, were principally drawn from the impoverished
nobility, whose members welcomed any opportunity of repairing their
shattered fortunes by martial adventure. Of the naval resources of the
League, some idea can be formed from the fact that, in the war against
the Scandinavian Kingdoms in 1426, it sent out a fleet of 260 ships,
manned by 12,000 sailors and fighting men. For the exhausting, if not
inglorious, seven years' war against Gustav Wasa's successor, Lübeck
alone fitted out 18 men-of-war, of which one, the _Adler_, carried 400
sailors, 500 fighting men, and 150 "constables." Her armament consisted
of 8 carthouns, 6 demi-carthouns, 26 culverins, and many smaller pieces
of ordnance. Among her munitions were 6,000 cannon-balls and 300
hundredweight of powder.




CHAPTER II

The First German Fleet


In one of the window niches on the ground floor of the Military Museum
(Zeughaus) at Berlin lies an old and dilapidated 8-pounder gun. In its
deep and disfiguring coat of rust it is an inconspicuous object, and,
amid that rich and varied collection of artillery from all the ages,
the eye of the casual visitor will not rest upon it for more than a
disparaging moment. And yet few of the treasures of the museum have a
more interesting history to tell, for it is the sole remaining relic
of the first serious experiment in naval and colonial policy ever made
by a German ruler. On an elevation rising from the beach of Cape Three
Points, on the Gold Coast, now British territory, are still to be seen
the crumbling ruins of the fort of Gross-Friedrichsburg, built there
by the Elector of Brandenburg in 1681, and when the German corvette
_Sophie_ visited the spot, with pious purpose, in 1884, this corroded
gun was unearthed from beneath the weeds and brushwood that have
overgrown the decayed ramparts.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, has been exemplary for many of
his successors. Frederick the Great rightly considered him the most
able of the previous Princes of the house of Hohenzollern, while the
present German Emperor has made a special cult of his memory, and
assuredly had a symbolic intention when he appeared at a fancy-dress
ball disguised as the first of his ancestors who equipped a fleet and
founded a colony.

When Frederick William was called to the Brandenburg throne in 1641
at the age of twenty, Germany was still in the throes of the Thirty
Years' War, and no part of the Empire had suffered more than his
Electorate from the consequences of that unspeakable calamity. Of all
the causes which have contributed to impede the normal development
of the painstaking and industrious German race, none had so malign
an influence as that stupendous conflict. It not merely delayed
civilization, but over vast tracts of country positively exterminated
it. At the close of the war many once flourishing towns had absolutely
disappeared from the face of the earth, and where formerly a numerous
peasantry had tilled its fertile fields a howling wilderness extended
in all directions as far as the eye could reach. In North Germany
to-day an apparently purposeless pond, or a detached clump of venerable
trees, still shows where once a village stood, and bears mute witness
to the ruthless barbarity with which the religious partition of Central
Europe was brought about.

When an end was put to the bloodshed and rapine by the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), the population of Germany had been reduced to one
half--in some districts to one tenth--of its former dimensions. Many
portions of the Empire are even to-day not so thickly inhabited as they
were before the war. Industry and commerce had migrated to England,
France, and Holland; and Leipzig and Frankfort were the only German
towns that had retained any trade worthy of mention. The Hansa, with
its fleets of warships and merchantmen, was but a memory of the past.
Königsberg had no longer a ship of its own; the trade of Dantzig and
Stettin was almost entirely carried in foreign bottoms; and even
Hamburg, which directly had been but comparatively little touched by
the thirty years of chaos and turmoil, and had benefited from its
exceptional connection with England, was left commercially crippled.
At a Hanse Parliament held in 1630, only Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen
were represented. Germany had been so drained of money that barter had
generally taken the place of purchase by coin; wages were paid in the
products of labour, grain, ore, and manufactured goods, and even state
officials in some cases received their salaries in kind.

Even before the war broke out, Brandenburg, a country of barren soil
and few natural resources, had stood far below the rest of Germany
both materially and intellectually. In 1600 the twin towns, Berlin
and Cöln, which faced one another from opposite banks of the Spree,
and have since been merged to form the colossal capital of the new
Empire, contained together no more than 14,000 souls. Brandenburg and
Frankfort-on-Oder each had a population of 10,000. Only two other
towns, Stendal and Salzwedel, could boast more than 5,000 inhabitants.
And it was of the mere ruins of this country that Frederick William
formed the foundation-stone of the Prussian Kingdom and of the German
Empire of to-day.

If the Thirty Years' War had produced any form of national
consolidation, if it had increased the authority of the Empire or
resulted in the absorption of the smaller States by the larger, that
would at least have been some compensation to Germany for its long
and terrible ordeal. But exactly the opposite was the case. The war
ceased simply because no one had the will or the strength to continue
it, and a miserable compromise was the result. The only gainers were
the Princes, who, as the wielders of the armed forces, had been able to
enhance their power, and now acquired a larger measure of independence
in their relationships to the Emperor. Their number remained legion.
In the Germany mapped out by the Westphalian negotiators there were
eight electors, sixty-nine spiritual and ninety-six temporal Princes,
sixty-one imperial towns, and a multitude of Counts and Barons
exercising various degrees of sovereign power.

Frederick William's claim to the title "Great," which was bestowed upon
him by his own generation, has been contested, but may be allowed to
pass. As military leader, diplomatist, organizer, and administrator,
he certainly had unusual gifts. Above all, he excelled in duplicity
and treachery. The most eminent living German historian has said
of him that "both in internal and external politics he acted with
an unscrupulousness so manifest that it cannot be palliated," and
can find no better excuse for his many deeds of "faithlessness" and
"double-dealing" than that, in this respect, he was merely "the master
of the diplomatic art of his day." The Elector was actuated solely
by his own personal and dynastic interests, and was utterly devoid
of "German" patriotism, for in return for the liberal subsidies on
which he prospered, he undertook, in a secret treaty, to support
the candidature of the French King or Dauphin for the Imperial
German throne, and he was mainly responsible for the truce which
left Strasburg in French hands for nearly two centuries. During the
incessant wars which filled up most of his reign he fought both with
and against every other belligerent. His sword was always at the
disposal of the highest bidder, either of hard cash or of territorial
extension, and by adroit choice of the moment for changing sides
he generally made a profitable bargain. True, he was obliged to
restore the western portion of Pomerania which he had conquered from
the Swedes, but he obtained a much more important acquisition--the
recognition of his full sovereignty in what is now East Prussia.

That region had been wrested from the Slavs by the German orders of
chivalry, founded at the time of the Crusades, and had subsequently
become an evangelical duchy, ruled by a junior branch of the house of
Hohenzollern, as a fief of the Kingdom of Poland. On the extinction of
the ducal line, it had reverted to the rulers of Brandenburg, and by a
timely sale of his military assistance, first to the Swedes and then
to the Poles, the Great Elector induced both to admit his unrestricted
and unqualified rights of sovereignty in the duchy. His successor
persuaded the Emperor to agree to his assumption of the kingly title
for this territory, and it is an interesting fact--especially in view
of the last development of the German Empire, which in its present
constitutional form and in much else is dependent upon Catholic
support--that this elevation was largely brought about by the
intervention of two Jesuit fathers. It was from the Kingdom of Prussia
which was thus established, and which was a completely independent
State altogether outside the competencies of the Holy Roman Empire,
that arose the Hohenzollern ascendency in Germany, and round it that
the new German Empire crystallized. For this reason the episode is
quite germane to our present purpose.

The Germans excel as diligent pupils and patient imitators, and the
Great Elector was no exception to this rule. From his fourteenth to
his eighteenth year he had been educated under the care of Frederick
Henry, the Statthalter of Holland, then the chief Sea-Power of the
world, from whom he had imbibed many ideas as to the importance
of navies, colonies, and sea-borne trade. His connection with the
Netherlands was maintained and strengthened by his marriage with an
Orange Princess, the aunt of William III. of England, and many Dutchmen
entered his service. Among them was an ex-admiral, Gijsels by name, who
assiduously kept alive the dreams of sea-power which the Elector had
brought back with him from Holland. It was on his prompting that, in
1659, when Frederick William was embroiled with the Swedes, and found
his operations hampered by the lack of a fleet, an enquiry as to the
possibility of remedying this deficiency was ordered by the Elector.
The investigation resulted, for the time being, only in the compilation
of a memorandum as to a "Brandenburg-Imperial admiralty," and some
fruitless attempts to obtain ships in the Netherlands.

But Gijsels' projects went far beyond a mere fleet. All the world
was then discussing the colonizing activity of the western European
States, and Frederick William's predecessor on the Electoral throne
had conceived abortive plans for founding an East Indian trading
company. What the ex-admiral proposed to the Elector in 1660 was, that
Brandenburg, Austria, and Spain should combine for the purpose of
securing a colonial ascendency, which was to be arrived at by playing
off England, France, and Holland against one another. Negotiations to
this end seem actually to have been commenced, but they broke down
over the jealous suspicions of the diplomatists approached, and the
perpetual turning of the European kaleidoscope.

During the next fifteen years the idea of a Brandenburg navy appears to
have been allowed to sleep. In the meantime a very remarkable book had
been published, which should be mentioned here because it contains the
essential elements of the programme of the most modern naval agitation
in Germany. The author was Johann Becher, by profession a chemist, but
in his leisure a political seer of the type of Friedrich List, whose
great forerunner he was. His work, "Political Discourse on the Causes
of the Rise and Decline of Towns and Countries," was published in 1667.
Becher had travelled much, and he wrote:

 "In Germany there is hardly any longer trade or commerce; all business
 is going to ruin; no money is to be found with either great or small;
 on the other hand look at Holland, how rich she is and how she grows
 richer every day; that could not be if she feared the sea as much as
 our nation of High Germany."

Becher then addressed to his countrymen the following impassioned
exhortation:

 "Up, then, brave German; act so that on the map, besides New Spain,
 New France, New England, there shall in the future be found also
 New Germany. You are as little lacking as other nations in the
 intelligence and resolution to do such things; yea, you have all
 that is necessary; you are soldiers and peasants, alert, laborious,
 diligent, and indefatigable."

Becher had held positions at various German Courts, and it is not
improbable that his appeal fell upon sympathetic ears among the
entourage of the Great Elector. But however that may be, the war of
Denmark and Brandenburg against Sweden, which broke out in 1675,
did actually, for the first time in history, witness a fleet at the
disposal of a member of the dynasty that now occupies the imperial
throne in Germany. True, it was not yet the actual property of the
Elector, but of Benjamin Raule, an enterprising Dutch merchant, who
had migrated to Denmark, and now laid a naval project before the
Brandenburg sovereign. His proposals were readily acceded to, and he
received permission to fit out a flotilla of two frigates and ten
smaller vessels, and to operate with them under the Brandenburg flag
against the Swedes. The Elector merely stipulated that he should
receive 6 per cent. of the value of all prizes captured. Raule's
vessels rendered substantial service in the capture of Stettin, and of
that much-coveted strip of the Pomeranian coast which was so essential
to the realisation of Frederick William's maritime aspirations.

The Elector's hopes were disappointed by the Treaty of St. Germain,
under which he was compelled to restore this precious booty to the
intrusive Scandinavians, but in the meantime his naval plans had taken
a wider scope in fresh contracts with the resourceful Dutchman. In
the first of these, Raule undertook, for a monthly subsidy of 5,000
thalers,[5] to maintain a fleet of eight frigates and a fire-ship,
mounting altogether 182 guns. Shortly afterwards the terms of the
agreement were extended, and at the commencement of the year 1680,
twenty-eight ships of war, with a total of 502 guns, were flying the
red eagle of Brandenburg.

Though robbed by the peace of the coast-line and seaports on which he
had counted as the base of his maritime power and the recruiting ground
for his fleet, the Elector did not allow himself to be discouraged,
and he very soon found fresh work for his little flotilla to do. The
greatest master of German mercenaries at that date, he had, a few
years previously, hired a portion of his army to Spain for use against
the French. As repeated applications for the price of this support
had proved unavailing, he now determined to collect the debt, which
amounted to 1,800,000 thalers, by forcible distraint.

Accordingly six ships, which were followed at an interval of some
months by three others, were sent out to attempt to intercept the
silver fleet on its way to the Spanish Netherlands. The vessels were
almost without exception commanded by Dutchmen, but were mainly manned
by Germans, though the crews included many English, Dutch, Danish and
Norwegian sailors. Naturally the soldiers carried on board were drawn
from the Brandenburg army; and orders were given that they should
be trained in ship's work "because we are disposed to use the same
permanently for the navy."

Though the flotilla did not fulfil either its immediate or its ultimate
purpose, the expedition was notable for two reasons. In the first
place, a large Spanish warship, the _Carolus Secundus_, with a valuable
cargo of lace on board, was captured, and so became the first war
vessel that was actually the property of a Hohenzollern State. In the
second place, the quest of the Spanish silver resulted in a sea-fight,
which, in respect both of the force engaged and the losses sustained,
still heads the record of naval warfare under a Hohenzollern flag.

A detachment of four ships, cruising in the neighbourhood of Cape St.
Vincent, sighted a fleet of a dozen Spanish frigates, which had put
out for the special purpose of chasing the Germans from the sea. The
Brandenburg commander, thinking that this was the anxiously-expected
silver flotilla, bore down upon it, and did not realise his mistake
till it was too late to avoid something of a conflict. Before he could
succeed in manoeuvring his ships out of range of his overwhelmingly
superior enemy, he had lost ten men killed and thirty wounded; and
since that day Germany had fought no more terrible battle on the sea
until the war broke out in 1914.

Another section of the Elector's fleet cruised for several months in
West Indian waters without achieving much result, while the retaliatory
measures adopted by the Spaniards secured a safe passage for the silver
ships and rendered it prudent for Frederick William to abandon his
daring and risky enterprise.

Meanwhile the Elector had allotted his infant navy a task of a
different character. Soon after entering the service of Brandenburg,
Raule had drawn up plans of colonization, and in the same year in
which the fruitless search for the silver convoy began, he obtained
permission to try his luck on the Gold Coast, and got together a
syndicate to finance the undertaking. The Elector was wary, and
declined to risk pecuniary participation, but he ordered that "twenty
good healthy musketeers, together with two non-commissioned officers,"
should be placed under Raule's command. One of the principal objects of
the expedition was to secure a share in the profitable trade in slaves
which was then carried on between the West Coast of Africa and North
America, but modern German historians for the most part ignore this
feature of the enterprise.

The two vessels despatched on this errand reached the Gold Coast in
safety, but aroused the resentment of the Dutch already settled there,
who confiscated one of them, and compelled the other to quit African
waters. However, the leader of the expedition had by that time managed
to conclude what served the purposes of a treaty with certain native
chiefs, who thereby placed themselves under the suzerainty of the
Elector, and consented to the erection of a fort in the district under
their control.

On the strength of this questionable document, an "African Company" for
the "improvement of shipping and commerce wherein the best prosperity
of a country consists," was called into existence in the year 1682.
In the charter of incorporation, the Elector promised to protect
the Company against "all and everyone who may undertake to trouble,
incommode, or to any extent injure the same in its actions in free
places on the coasts of Guinea and Angola"; but both the naval and the
military commanders were charged to keep at a respectful distance from
"all Dutch Company fortresses, as well as those of other potentates,
such as England, France, Denmark, etc." The capital of the Company
was the modest sum of 50,000 thalers. Of this Frederick William
contributed only 8,000, and the Electoral Prince 2,000 thalers, while
almost half of the total was supplied by Raule, who had by now become
"Director-General of the Brandenburg Navy."

The two frigates in which the second Gold Coast expedition shipped
cast anchor off Cape Three Points on December 27th, 1682, but some
difficulty was experienced in finding the chiefs who had "signed" the
provisional treaty and who were each to have received a ratification
engrossed in letters of gold, "a silver-gilt cup, and a portrait of
his Electoral Highness." Frederick William had also issued instructions
that his black allies and their wives were to be entertained on board
the warships.

After a great deal of trouble, some other chieftains of the "Moors,"
as they are called in the official correspondence relating to this
matter, were hunted out and induced to contract a second and definite
treaty; and on January 1st, 1683, with due ceremony and much beating of
drums, blowing of trumpets, and firing of guns, the Brandenburg flag
was hoisted over "the first German colony." The flagstaff had been
planted on a little eminence, which was subsequently, with all speed,
transformed into the fort Gross-Friedrichsburg, and no doubt the rusty
cannon now in the Zeughaus at Berlin is one of the half-dozen which had
been mounted on the hill on the previous day in preparation for the
great occasion.

In the following year the headquarters of the African Company was
removed from Pillau to Emden. This latter town was not situated on
Brandenburg soil, and the manner in which the Elector secured a footing
in it is both instructive and characteristic of his easy methods of
intervening and making a good bargain wherever an opportunity presented
itself. It chanced that at that time the Estates of East Frisia were at
loggerheads with their ruler, and they appealed to Frederick William
for assistance. Nothing loth, he landed a force by night, and by a
surprise attack seized the castle of Greetsiel, which thus became his
naval base. By an agreement with the town of Emden he subsequently
acquired the right to station within its walls a "compagnie de marine"
for the service of the African Corporation. This force, which was
gradually increased to three, and temporarily to four, companies, and
ultimately received the name of the "Marine Battalion," was drawn upon
to man both the ships and the forts in Africa.

The transfer to Emden brought other advantages besides an ice-free
port, a base on the North Sea, and an abbreviation of the route to
Gross-Friedrichsburg, for the East Frisian Estates and the Elector of
Cologne were both persuaded to invest largely in the African Company in
consequence of the change.

In the year of the Emden agreement, the Brandenburg Navy was formally
founded by the establishment of an "Admiralty" at Berlin. The Cabinet
order by which this institution was created shows that the fleet then
in full possession of the State comprised 10 ships, with 240 guns,
while Raule was still under contract to provide 17 further vessels. The
permanent personnel consisted of 1 vice-commodore, 5 naval captains,
3 officers of Marines, 12 mates, and 120 seamen. In 1686, the Elector
took the Company entirely into his own hands, and simultaneously
acquired a station on the island of St. Thomas, in the West Indies,
as a place of call for the ships engaged in the slave traffic. He had
also at that time made preparations for forming an East Indian trading
company (at a much earlier date he had unsuccessfully attempted to
acquire Tranquebar, on the Coromandel Coast, from the Danes) and for
fitting out an expedition to China and Japan. These schemes, however,
came to nothing.

The settlement at Cape Three Points had by no means an easy existence.
Fever made fearful ravages among the garrison, which, when the first
reliefs arrived, after an interval of nearly a year and threequarters,
had been reduced by sickness from ninety to sixteen men. Everything
that was needed for the construction of the fort, even building-stone,
had to be brought thousands of miles across the sea from Germany. The
Dutch traders in the neighbourhood had at once raised objections to
the new colony, and, as their protests were unheeded, stirred up the
natives against its members. It was only after prolonged negotiations
at The Hague that the Elector secured a full recognition of his right
to the settlement. And none the less the Dutch West India Company
continued to harass the German colonists, appropriating their ships,
and turning them out of a couple of subsidiary fortifications which
they had erected at other points along the coast. Gross-Friedrichsburg
and Taccroma, another of the four Brandenburg stations on the Guinea
littoral, for several years maintained themselves only by the menace of
their guns. These untoward events are believed to have preyed upon the
mind of the Great Elector, and to have hastened his end. At the time of
his death, in April, 1688, Brandenburg and Holland were on the brink of
war over the Gold Coast affair.

His successor on the Electoral throne in one very important respect
reaped what Frederick William had sown, for he obtained the title
of King of Prussia, by virtue of which, far more than from any
specifically imperial prerogatives, William II. holds his present
power in Germany. Frederick I. was a vain man, who was more interested
in appearances than in realities, and cared more for the pomp and
ceremonies of Court life than for the solid business of colonisation
and slave-trading. As a source of revenue, with which to defray the
cost of his empty extravagances, the African undertaking was feebly
encouraged to continue its work; but, deprived of the directing brain
and the stimulating enthusiasm of its founder, it soon sickened and
languished. Accada and Taccarary, the two settlements which had been
seized by the Dutch, were delivered up after a lengthy squabble, but
the fortifications of the latter had been destroyed, and they were not
rebuilt.

At first the trade of the colony, which had called into existence a
flourishing shipyard at Havelberg, near the junction of the Navel and
the Elbe, was fairly satisfactory, and the spirit of the Brandenburg
Navy was raised by the successful operations of a couple of its
frigates against French merchantmen, but in 1697 the Company fell upon
evil days. It suffered pecuniary loss, both through the capture of
some of its ships by the French and through the peculations of several
officials, whose multiple dishonesty hints at a scandalous laxity of
control. The invaluable Raule, too, fell into disfavour, and spent
four years in gaol, though he was reinstated in his position on being
liberated. At last the Company was no longer able to send out ships of
its own, and for eight years, during the War of the Spanish Succession,
the garrison of Gross-Friedrichsburg was left entirely to itself.
For a considerable portion of that time five large Brandenburg ships
of war were rotting in the harbours of Emden and Hamburg, when they
might have been much more profitably employed in attempting to keep
up communications with the perishing colonists. When at last reliefs
reached Gross-Friedrichsburg only seven men out of an original force of
1,700 were fit for duty.

What little credit attaches to the last days of the first German
colony is the due of Jan Cuny, a native chief, who had placed himself
under Brandenburg protection, apparently for the purpose of obtaining
support against the English and Dutch settlements of the vicinity,
with both of which he was at feud. It is characteristic of the period
that, while Prussians were fighting shoulder to shoulder with English
and Dutch on the continent of Europe, they were in open conflict with
them on the West Coast of Africa. Frederick I. at one time thought
it necessary to protest, through his Minister at London, against the
difficulties which the English were causing him on the Gold Coast.

All the trouble seems to have arisen out of the demand made by a
Dutch official at Axim for the surrender of a female relative of Cuny
whom he claimed as a slave. Jan was evidently a man of considerable
parts. He led his army with great discretion and resourcefulness, and
no doubt the Prussians at Gross-Friedrichsburg thought it to their
advantage to be on good terms with so formidable a warrior, especially
as he was the sworn foe of their jealous European neighbours. At any
rate, the relations between Cuny and the fort became both cordial and
confiding, and when the last Governor of Gross-Friedrichsburg, Du Bois,
discouraged by the indifference and neglect of the home authorities,
sailed for Emden to enter remonstrances, he entrusted the protection of
the colony to his black ally.

Du Bois arrived in Europe only to find that the doom of
Gross-Friedrichsburg was already irrevocably sealed. The parsimonious
Frederick William I., the father of Frederick the Great, had ascended
the Prussian throne, and his careful mind, completely absorbed by plans
of immediate economy, was incapable of taking such flights into the
distance and the future as were necessary for the appreciation of the
value of colonial policy. The African settlements had been doing badly
and had become unremunerative, and his only thought was to dispose
of them as speedily as possible for hard cash, which could be either
hoarded or spent on his solitary extravagance--seven-foot grenadiers.
Immediately after his accession, he instructed his representative in
London that he was prepared to "transfer his forts on the coast of
Guinea to anyone else upon easy conditions." He was not long in finding
a purchaser in that very Dutch West India Company which had from
the outset been a thorn in the side of the Great Elector's colonial
enterprise. On November 22nd, 1717, Gross-Friedrichsburg and its
dependent territory passed from Hohenzollern rule for the sum of 6,000
ducats and twelve negro boys, of whom it was stipulated that six should
be adorned with golden chains.

The signing of the contract and its execution were, however, two very
different things. The redoubtable Jan Cuny had not been reckoned with,
and when two Dutch vessels arrived to take over the fort they found
him in possession and flying the Prussian flag. The order for the
transfer of the fort was shown to his emissaries, who, after a good
deal of delay, were sent on board the ships, but this he flatly refused
to recognise, declaring that he would yield up his trust only to a
vessel belonging to the King of Prussia. The commander of the Dutch
expedition, Captain van der Hoeven, thought he would make short work
of this insolent chieftain, and landed a body of fifty men to take the
fort by storm. But Cuny once again showed the generalship which had
raised him to the eminence of a Prussian deputy-governor. A force of
1,800 natives fusilladed the landing party from an ambuscade and killed
nearly every one of them. Hoeven was only able to save himself by
swimming back to his ship, with three bullets in his body, and retired
to the nearest Dutch settlement to excogitate a fresh plan of campaign.

Cuny, however, was flushed by his success, and not at all inclined to
give up the prestige which he derived from a fortress bristling with
guns and well furnished with small arms and ammunition. For seven long
years he held out, repulsing the repeated attacks of the Dutch, and it
was only when his supplies were exhausted and an overwhelming force had
been put into the field against him, that he withdrew from his defences
and vanished into the jungle from which he had come.

Simultaneously with Gross-Friedrichsburg, there was transferred from
the Prussian King to the Dutch Company yet another African colony,
of which mention has yet to be made. This was the island of Arguin,
which lies off the coast of what is now French territory to the south
of Cape Blanco, and in some maps is given the ominous name of Agadir.
The islet, which was one of the principal centres of the gum trade,
had been first occupied by the Portuguese in 1441, but had passed by
conquest to Holland, and from the latter to France. After the peace
of Nymegen, in 1678, however, the French Senegal Company found itself
unable to maintain a garrison in Arguin, and obtained permission from
Louis XIV. to blow up the fort which had been erected there. The
island then fell into the hands of the native ruler of Arguin, on the
mainland, and remained subject to him till two ships of the Great
Elector appeared off its coasts in October, 1685.

On the strength of a treaty concluded by the commander of the
expedition with the King of Arguin, Frederick William seems to have
claimed jurisdiction right along the coast of Africa from the Canary
Isles to the Senegal River. These pretensions were not allowed to pass
undisputed, and, towards the end of 1687, a couple of French vessels
appeared off the fort and demanded its evacuation by the Germans.
As this was refused they made an attempt to seize it by force, but,
meeting with a stubborn resistance, abandoned the attack, and, after
an unsuccessful endeavour to assert their rights during the peace
negotiations at Ryswick, the French seemed to reconcile themselves to
the new situation, for they even proposed commercial co-operation with
the occupants of the Arguin fort.

After the death of the Great Elector, Arguin suffered, like
Gross-Friedrichsburg, through the indifference of his successor, and
the difficulty of communication arising from the War of the Spanish
Succession. When a relief ship arrived in 1714, it found that the
Governor had been captured by the natives, with whom he had quarrelled;
and the remnant of the Arguin garrison was in so deplorable a
condition, that "in a few days they must have perished of hunger."

The transfer of Arguin to the Dutch proved as difficult as that of
Gross-Friedrichsburg. In 1717 the French had renewed their claims to
the island, and, a few years later, the Senegal Company, landing 700
men and heavy guns, laid siege to the fort. After holding out for a
few weeks, the commander, Jan Wynen, a Dutchman, withdrew secretly by
night with his force in order to escape the humiliation of a formal
surrender, and when its new owners at last arrived to take possession
of it the colony was actually in French hands. It was in both cases a
foreigner who last kept the flag flying over what were to be the only
German colonies established till the final quarter of the nineteenth
century. With the colonies disappeared the force with which they had
been won, the fleet, and it too had to wait long, though not quite so
long, before it experienced a revival.

It is interesting to reflect how the history of the world might have
been changed if the Great Elector's two immediate successors had
united to his far-reaching schemes of "world-policy" his determination
in carrying them out, and had bequeathed to the greater Frederick
prosperous colonial possessions and a formidable navy. As it was,
the naval episodes of the reign of this gifted monarch only show how
pitifully and completely the dawning sea-power of his grandfather had
passed away.

In the Seven Years' War, the shores of Prussia were continually
ravaged by Swedish frigates, and as nothing could be effected by the
armed fishing boats and coasting vessels which were all that could be
pitted against them, Field-Marshal Lehwald, to whom the protection
of that part of Prussia had been entrusted, appealed for help to the
corporation of merchants at Stettin. That body responded with energy
and promptitude, and, with great haste, a flotilla of four galliots,
four large fishing boats, and four coasting vessels were transformed
into "ships of war." In August, 1759, this improvised fleet ventured
out of the Oder to attack the Swedes, but it was so completely
overthrown after several days' fighting that the experiment was never
repeated.

In the meanwhile Frederick had been inveigled into another maritime
adventure, which was to prove just as barren of positive results. Early
in the war several Englishmen communicated to the King their readiness
to fit out privateers to prey on the commerce of Austria and Sweden,
both of which countries had seized Prussian merchantmen. They protested
in all cases that their principal motive was a desire to serve the
cause of a monarch whom they admired and revered, and who was, as a
matter of fact, at that time the ally of England. But at the same time
they promised him "prodigious profits" from the enterprise, and it was
admittedly the latter consideration which induced the King to listen to
their proposals. Though his own Ministers expressed strong doubts, and
the English Government urged that he would run the risk of embroiling
himself with neutral States, he issued a number of letters of marque.
The advice which had been given him proved to have been only too well
founded. Not only were there no "prodigious profits," but the blunders
of the royal officials and the indiscretions of the ships under his
flag involved the King in voluminous diplomatic correspondence and long
and fruitless litigation.

To accelerate the process of destroying the enemy's trade, a number
of blank letters of marque, ministerially signed and stamped with
the royal seal, were sent out to the Prussian Minister in London,
and he somewhat imprudently lent a couple of these to an interesting
adventurer, named Erskine Douglas, who said that he wished to show
them to shipowners with whom he was in treaty for the equipment
of privateers. Douglas claimed to be a relative of the Prussian
Field-Marshal Keith, who was of Scottish origin, and he brought letters
of introduction from well-known members of the English nobility, so
the Minister may perhaps be excused for entrusting the documents to
him. But his confidence was gravely abused, for Douglas, having come
to an agreement with the firm of Dunbar and Eyre, filled in the forms
on his own responsibility, and two privateers were sent out with these
fraudulent credentials.

Shortly afterwards, one of these ships, the _Lissa_, put into Emden
with a rich Swedish prize. Lying in the harbour was an English
man-of-war, and the captain of this ship, declaring that the English
sailors on board the _Lissa_ were all either deserters or men who had
bound themselves to serve in the British Navy, required that they
should be given up to him. As compliance was refused, he went on board
the _Lissa_ with an armed escort, and, disregarding all the protests of
its captain, took away with him twenty-six members of the crew. This
action was regarded by Frederick as an infraction of Prussian rights
of sovereignty, and representations to that effect were made in London
before it was discovered in how irregular a manner the _Lissa_ had
become possessed of her papers. The matter was then discreetly allowed
to drop. The Swedes, for their part, contested the legality of the
capture, but the Prussian Government ruled that the letter of marque
was valid, although it had not actually been issued by royal authority.
At the same time Prussia advanced the strange view that, in the event
of the owners of the _Lissa_ having had cognizance of the deception
which had been practised, King Frederick was entitled to the whole
value of the prize. Instructions were, however, given that the _Lissa_
should be deprived of her charter, but before they could be executed
she had sailed for England.

Another of Douglas's privateersmen, the _Prince Ferdinand_, under a
Captain Merryfield, had betaken herself to the Mediterranean, where,
in a nine-months' cruise, she captured thirteen prizes, but caused
so much confusion that the King thought it wiser to put a stop to
the whole undertaking. The immediate ground for this step was the
complaints of the Ottoman Government, with which Frederick was
negotiating with a view to obtaining its support in the prosecution
of the war. The appropriation of a couple of female negro slaves
belonging to a pasha, who were on board one of the ships captured by
Merryfield, seems to have had at least as much weight in the Turkish
grievance as the more substantial losses of the merchants of Salonika.
As Prussia had no territory and very little diplomatic representation
on the shores of the Mediterranean, Merryfield was obliged to take
his prizes into neutral harbours and place them in the custody of the
English Consuls. They were the subjects of endless law suits, tedious
international wrangling, and practically no profits. Merryfield's wild
career was terminated by a charge of secretly selling neutral goods
from one of his prizes to his own advantage. At the instance of the
Prussian Government he was flung into gaol at Malta. He remained in
prison five years, and even at the end of that term would not have
regained his liberty if the Grand Master of the Maltese Knights had not
refused to pay for his maintenance any longer.

Hardly less chequered were the fortunes of Captain Wake, the only
regularly accredited Prussian privateer of whom anything is known.
The operations of his ship, the _Embden_, in the Mediterranean also
resulted in ceaseless bickerings, and he was delayed in Cagliari for
two years by disputes of one sort or another. At last, growing weary,
he set off to Berlin to prosecute his claims to a Swedish ship which
he had seized, but of which the authorities at Cagliari would not
permit him to dispose. Four and a half years after the capture, she was
adjudged his good prize; but before he could enter into possession of
her she was sunk at her moorings by a violent storm.

The total gain of the Prussian Government from the activity of these
three privateers was quite negligible; while, on the other hand,
the trouble and annoyance caused by them was immeasurable. The
anticipations that the seas would be swept of Austrian and Swedish
commerce by a swarm of vessels under the Prussian flag proved to
have been quite illusory, and it was a particular disappointment to
Frederick that the German shipowners looked askance at the whole
business, and in no single instance applied for letters of marque.

A noteworthy feature of the episode is that Frederick's Government,
reversing the practice of the Hansa, laid down for its privateers the
rule that a neutral flag covered the enemy's goods, and that neutral
goods were safe from capture even when under the enemy's flag. This, it
is maintained, has ever since been Prussian tradition.

A final word is due to the "Société de Commerce Maritime"--now under
the name "Seehandlung," the State bank of the Kingdom of Prussia--which
was established by Frederick the Great in 1772, "to carry on shipping
under the Prussian flag, and trade with the ports of Spain and all
other places where reasonable and certain prospects of substantial
profits from imports and exports are to be found." It was vessels of
this corporation which, towards the close of the first half of the
nineteenth century, bore a German flag for the first time round the
world, and its foundation shows that the Great Elector's ideas were
only dormant and not dead.

Frederick's immediate purpose was to open up the markets of South
America to Silesian linen, but, in consequence of the rigid
protectionist policy of Spain, it was only possible to do this by
transhipment at Spanish ports. The original capital of the company was
1,200,000 thalers, in shares of 500 thalers each, and of these 2,100
were the property of the King. The Société was granted the exclusive
right of trading in English, French, and Spanish salt, and in Polish
wax, and was also endowed with many other privileges. It did not at
first prove a very profitable venture, and its early days were also
clouded over by the defalcations of one of its managers. In course of
time it became little more than a branch of the Royal Treasury and
the negotiator of State loans, but in the thirties of last century
it passed under the control of a man who determined to restore to
it something of its original character, and laid out a considerable
capital in English-built ships. At that period German merchantmen
seldom ventured beyond Bordeaux and Lisbon; but the vessels of the
Seehandlung repeatedly encircled the globe, showed their flag in the
remotest harbours of Orient and Occident, and established directly
that export to South America of the wares of the Riesengebirge which
Frederick the Great had in his mind when he called the company into
existence.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 5: Thaler then = about 4s. 6d.]




CHAPTER III

Germany's Fleet in the Last Century


Though the sword of Napoleon completed the destruction of the Holy
Roman Empire, which had done so much to hamper the development of the
Teutonic race, the Vienna Congress, rearranging the map of Europe after
his overthrow, left Germany still divided into thirty-nine different
states. There were four kingdoms, one electorate, seven grand duchies,
ten duchies, ten principalities, one landgraviate, and the four free
towns--Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Frankfort-on-Main. These states
were loosely united in the German Confederacy.

The people of Germany, and especially those who had risen against
Napoleon, had expected a more complete unity on a democratic basis,
and the disappointment of their hopes was one of the chief causes of
the revolution which, in 1848, broke out simultaneously in nearly
every one of the federal capitals. This movement took the Governments
by surprise, and so overwhelming was the popular demand for unity,
that they offered but little opposition to the convening of a National
Assembly, which met at Frankfort-on-Main on May 18th, 1848, and
appointed the Austrian Archduke Johann provisional "Administrator of
the Empire." It is generally asserted that the failure of this serious
attempt to weld Germany together was an inevitable consequence of
the jealousy existing between Austria and Prussia, but none can say
with certainty what the sequel might not have been, had not Frederick
William IV., the grand-uncle of the present German Emperor, refused the
imperial crown when it was offered to him by the National Assembly.
It is very well conceivable that, if that monarch had been less fully
persuaded of the divine rights of kings and of the incompetence of
popular representatives to bestow crowns, the work which Bismarck did
in the next twenty years, with so grievous an expenditure of blood and
iron, might have been accomplished by peaceable means, and that the
world might to-day have been confronted with the problem of a much
larger, much richer, and much more united Germany. Those who would
not regard German domination in Europe as an unmixed blessing have
reason to be thankful for Frederick William's archaic theories on the
relationships of Princes to their peoples.

And those who care to amuse themselves by following up the grand
alternatives of history must not forget that 1848 saw the birth of the
modern German Fleet, which was the fruit of a purely popular movement.
Indeed, the patriots of the Frankfort Parliament found in the "imperial
fleet," which they actually founded, the necessary symbol of that
national unity which was the goal of their aspirations.

Strong, spontaneous, and almost universal as was the German naval
movement of 1848, it did not attain its actual dimensions without
an effective external stimulus. In the very month in which the
revolutionaries were defending their barricades in the streets of
Berlin and other German capitals, Frederick VII. had declared his
intention of incorporating Schleswig in Denmark; and, while an informal
convention was arranging the preliminaries for the National Assembly,
the Danish fleet was blockading the coasts of Prussia in retaliation
for the military support afforded by that Kingdom, as the mandatory of
the German Confederation, to the rebellious duchies. Nothing was better
calculated than an incident of this sort to bring home to the German
mind the importance of sea-power. That the ships of a little country
like Denmark should be able, with impunity, to forbid the sea to a
great military Power, seemed to every German who reflected upon it a
grotesque inversion of the natural order of events.

Though the National Assembly, at one of its first sittings, appointed a
permanent committee to grapple with the naval question, the impatient
interest of the public displayed itself in schemes and suggestions
which poured in from every side. In many places committees were formed
to help to raise the funds necessary for the equipment of a fleet.
It is significant of the widespread nature of the movement that the
raftsmen of Gernsbach, in the Black Forest, offered to transport down
the River Murg free of cost the timber required for the building
of Germany's war ships. The seaports, which felt most keenly the
insulting pressure of the Danish blockade, took the leading part in
the agitation. A congress of delegates from the German coast towns
came together at Hamburg and nominated a "naval commission," on which,
in addition to the Governments most immediately concerned, a number
of private committees were represented. This body wasted no time in
talk, but set to work with feverish activity. As warships were not to
be had ready-made, several merchant vessels were purchased and hastily
armed with guns furnished by Hanover; and at the beginning of July,
the Federal Government was notified that these extemporized men-of-war
were ready to put out and attack the enemy. But at the moment the
negotiations with Denmark for a truce had already begun, and for the
time being the squadron remained peacefully at its moorings.

Meanwhile, even before an Imperial Executive had been got together, the
Frankfort Parliament had voted for naval purposes a sum of 6,000,000
thalers,[6] half of which was to be spent immediately and the remainder
as necessity might arise. Part of the money was to be taken from
the fortress fund of the old Confederacy, and the remainder raised
by levies in due proportion on the various states of the union. The
question of these "matricular contributions," which in some cases were
altogether refused, and in others only paid after much hesitation and
vacillation, was one of the chief reasons for the ultimate dissolution
of the first "German" Navy.

In November an imperial naval authority was constituted under the
control of the Minister of Commerce, who was at the same time deputy
for Bremen. An advisory commission of experts was also appointed,
and the chair in this body was, at the personal request of the
Archduke-Administrator, taken by the man who, in one sense, may be
regarded as the father of the present German Fleet, Prince Adalbert of
Prussia, and to whom, for this reason, more detailed reference must
be made hereafter. The commission submitted a scheme, in which it was
recommended that Germany should, for the present, make no attempt to
gain a place in the ranks of the first-class naval Powers, but content
herself with the protection of her Baltic and North Sea coasts and
her sea-borne trade. These purposes, it was held, could be fulfilled
by a fleet of fifteen sixty-gun sailing frigates--if possible with
auxiliary engines--five steam frigates, twenty steam corvettes, ten
despatch-boats, five schooners, and thirty gun-sloops.

During the winter, officials were despatched to England to purchase
and order ships, and to America to induce the United States Government
to allow some of its naval officers to enter temporarily into the
German service. These latter negotiations at first promised success,
but in the end the Government at Washington declared itself unable
to entertain the request. With the purchase of material the German
emissaries had better luck, and when the truce with Denmark expired
in the spring of 1849, the Navy List already contained the names of
twelve vessels, though, it is true, hardly one of them was yet fit for
action. A Commander-in-Chief had also been found in the person of Karl
Bromme, a native of Leipzig, whose name had been permanently anglicized
into "Brommy" while he was learning seafaring in the American merchant
service. This man, "the first German Admiral," had followed Cochrane
to Greece, where he was successively Flag Captain to Admiral Miaulis,
organizer in the Ministry of Marine, and Commandant of the Military
School at the Piræus. From there he was tempted away to become
"Imperial Commissioner" to the incipient German Navy, and after taking
part in the sittings of the commission of experts, he was sent in that
capacity to Bremerhaven to supervise the formation of the fleet and to
found a naval arsenal.

On June 4th Brommy, with a steam frigate and two steam corvettes,
attacked a Danish frigate which was lying becalmed off Heligoland.
Hardly, however, had the engagement commenced before a signal shot
from the island warned the belligerents that they were within British
territorial waters, and must suspend hostilities. Soon afterwards the
Danish blockading squadron approached the scene, and the German ships
hurried back to their harbour. This was the only opportunity the German
Fleet had of showing its quality. Brommy was promoted to Rear-Admiral
later in the year.

Insignificant as the Heligoland skirmish was in itself, it had a
sequel which has played a great part in all subsequent movements for
increasing the German Fleet. Brommy's ships had fought under the
black-red-and-gold that were to be the colours of the new Empire. But
this Empire had then no legal existence, and, as a matter of fact,
never did have one, and no doubt Palmerston was only giving expression
to recognised principles of international law when he wrote that
vessels committing acts of belligerency under the black-red-and-gold
flag would render themselves liable to be treated as "pirates." The
Frankfort Government, a product of excitement and inexperience,
made many mistakes which the ripe tradition of an old-established
administration would have avoided, and, in its haste to assert
itself on the seas, doubtless did not give sufficient thought to the
restrictions imposed upon it by its own anomalous status. The hoisting
of the black-red-and-gold on a flotilla or warships was undeniably a
questionable proceeding, and one which justified the view propounded
by the British Foreign Minister. At the same time, his words belong to
the category of things which had better have been left unsaid. The word
"pirate" rankled then, and has ever since continued to rankle, and the
Palmerstonian note has been cited ten thousand times, and is still
cited, as the supreme example of the tyrannous arrogance with which
Britain rules the waves.

A fortnight after Brommy's one exploit as a German naval commander,
the remnant of the National Assembly was dispersed by military force
at Stuttgart, where it had taken refuge, and Germany relapsed into
the condition of a loosely-jointed federation of mutually jealous
and suspicious Princes, whose rival claims had to be settled on the
battlefield before the great work of unification could be accomplished.
The infant navy, which had been the work of a popular movement and a
popular Parliament, proved a source of dissension and embarrassment
to the Confederacy Governments. Several of the inland states were
altogether opposed to the idea that Germany needed a navy. A strong
party advocated that one fleet should be provided by Austria for the
Adriatic, a second by Prussia for the Baltic, and a third by the
remaining German states for the North Sea. The last point of this
project was the subject of special negotiations, and at one time there
seemed some chance of Hanover assuming the office of "Federal Admiral."

In the end, however, divergent interests and irreconcilable rivalries
produced the only possible result, and, in February, 1852, the
Confederated Governments decided to cut the Gordian knot. The promising
German Navy was dissolved, Admiral Brommy received his discharge (he
was subsequently employed for some time as Chief of the Technical
Department of the Austrian Admiralty), and an Oldenburg official,
whose unforgettable name has helped to brand his memory with the whole
infamy of a transaction for which he was in nowise responsible, was
appointed "Commissioner of the Germanic Confederation charged with
the regulation of naval affairs." This, at least, is the designation
appended to his signature on the advertisement which, in the German,
English, and French languages, announced to all the world that the
German Navy was forthwith to be knocked down to the highest bidder. It
was the form rather than the fact of the sale which was taken so ill in
Privy Councillor Hannibal Fischer, but it is difficult to see what else
he could have done. He made efforts to dispose of the ships by private
treaty, and actually sold some of them to Prussia and others to English
firms, but a residue remained for which no purchaser could be found in
this way, and there was nothing for it but to put them up to public
auction. There thus came under the hammer two steam frigates, six steam
corvettes, a sailing frigate, and twenty-seven gunboats propelled by
oars. Of the eight steamers three had been built at Bristol, and one
each at Glasgow, Leith, New York, Hamburg, and Bremen. Except in the
case of the American vessel, the engines were all of British make.

Concurrently with the abortive efforts to found a German Navy, Prussia
had taken independent action, and laid the real foundation of the great
fleet which now aspires to contest the British mastery of the seas.
At that time there was not even the slenderest basis for the kingdom
to work upon. The task had to be undertaken from the very beginning.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, it is true, the
advisability of building a navy had more than once been exhaustively
discussed by the Prussian Government. In the general resettlement of
1815, the island of Rügen and the strip of Pomeranian coast opposite
to it had passed from Sweden to Prussia, and included in the transfer
were six gun-sloops and a Swedish officer, Captain Christian Lange,
who was summoned to Berlin to report to the War Ministry on the utility
of the little flotilla. As the result of his representations, he was
commissioned to submit plans and estimates for a war schooner, and
for an armed rowing boat for use on the rivers. These vessels were
eventually built, with the express idea that they were to serve as
experiments and models for the construction of a regular fleet. In
great haste prescriptions as to a naval uniform were issued, and the
questions of dockyards and harbour works were also deliberated. But
the only issue of all this work was the conviction that the national
resources were not yet equal to the financial strain which would have
been entailed by the creation of a navy. Similar investigations and
discussions in the years 1825 and 1832 were, for the same reason,
equally fruitless. At the commencement of the revolutionary year,
the only vessels in the possession of the Prussian Government were a
corvette, which was employed as a Navigation School, a paddle steamer,
which conveyed the mails between Stettin and St. Petersburg, and
which, under the terms of the contract for its construction, was to be
adaptable to the purposes of an "auxiliary cruiser," and a couple of
armed yawls.

By the autumn of 1848 a Prussian flotilla of ten sloops and yawls,
three of which had been built with the funds collected by private
committees, was ready for operations against the Danes. It was placed
under the command of a Dutch ex-naval captain named Schröder. The crews
provided for him--465 men in all--were a strange medley of active
soldiers, reservists, and seamen from the merchant service. For various
reasons, not the least weighty of which was the doubtful status of
the black-red-and-gold flag, the squadron sailed under the Prussian
colours. While it was fitting out, the first steps were taken towards
the establishment of a naval organization and the training of a corps
of officers.

By the following summer the Prussian fleet could already boast two
steamers, one sailing corvette, and twenty-one gun sloops, with a total
complement of thirty-seven officers and 1,521 men, and mounting in
all sixty-seven guns. But only once did this primitive navy have the
satisfaction of taking part in a pitched naval engagement. This was a
duel between a Prussian steamer and a Danish brig, which fought for
five hours off the island of Rügen. The encounter was terminated by the
fall of darkness, and before day broke again another Danish corvette
arrived on the scene and put the Prussians to flight. But, in spite of
a lack of fighting, the presence of Commodore Schröder's force along
the coast undoubtedly did much to relieve the pressure of the blockade.

The peace with Denmark in 1850 ushered in a period of assiduous
and systematic labour at the task of building up a Prussian fleet.
Throughout this important period, the moving spirit was the man who
has already been described as the father of the German Navy, Prince
Adalbert of Prussia. This enthusiastic and indefatigable sailor was a
first cousin of King Frederick William IV., who refused the imperial
crown as a democratic gift, and of the Emperor William I., who finally
won it on the battlefields of France. In his boyhood, Prince Adalbert
had had the doctrine of the vital importance of sea-power implanted in
his mind by a veteran soldier, Field-Marshal Gneisenau, and he never
forgot the lesson. At the age of twenty-one he paid a visit of two
months' duration to England, where he was cordially welcomed into
naval circles, and where his passion for the sea was inflamed by the
conversation of men who had fought under Nelson at Trafalgar. He lost
no opportunity of inspecting war vessels, shipyards, and docks, and
returned to Germany with note-books crammed with information as to
all he had seen and heard. A British admiral is said to have declared
that the Prince knew more about the warships of Great Britain than
many of their own officers, and one of the last acts of this sailor
Hohenzollern was to pay a visit to the English dockyards to familiarize
himself with the latest novelties in naval construction.

Four years after his first journey to England, one of those naval
enquiries already alluded to was held at Berlin, and a commission was
appointed to advise as to the types of vessels to be chosen for the
fleet which the Prussian Government contemplated building at some
indefinite future date. Prince Adalbert was a member of this body,
but when asked for his views on the subject he satisfied himself
with laying before his colleagues the opinion of his friend, Captain
Mingaye, a British naval officer, who advised that the triumph of steam
over sails and oars presented Prussia with a splendid opportunity to
create sea-power which should be "mighty" from the outset. Curiously
enough, the War Minister, von Rauch, inferred from this suggestion
that naval construction was passing through a transition stage of
doubtful issue, and it was used by him as a pretext for postponing
the consideration of the whole question; for, he argued, Prussia
could not afford to squander money on uncertain experiments. In the
succeeding years, the Prince cruised the Mediterranean in an Austrian
ship with his friend the Archduke Johann, afterwards the Imperial
Administrator, and made in Sardinian and British war vessels several
longer voyages, during which he devoted himself with a whole heart to
the study of seamanship and navigation. He also added materially to his
knowledge while on board one of the ships of the British Mediterranean
Squadron, which at the time was engaged in manoeuvres. On his return
home from these experiences, he secured the appointment of Schröder
to the Navigation School ship _Amazon_, always with the idea that the
vessel would be the training-ground of the officers' corps of a future
Prussian Navy. As we have seen, the Prince was chosen as chairman
of the Frankfort advisory committee on naval questions. Some months
previously he had addressed to the National Assembly a "Memorandum as
to the Formation of a German Fleet." This document, which was printed
and published, not only is a remarkable testimony to the author's
insight into the true nature of naval problems, but also contains a
clear enunciation of the principles which have since guided Germany's
naval policy. Pointing to the humiliation of the Danish blockade he
wrote:

 "And this Germany--united Germany--must calmly submit to, precisely
 at the great moment when, after long years, it once more feels itself
 a whole, a Power of forty millions of people. But the Fatherland
 recognises the oppressive nature of its situation; it demands a remedy
 all the more speedy because after these events, it foresees with
 certainty how much more painful its position might some day be if it
 were pitted against one of the great Sea Powers, a Power against which
 the German ships would not be secure even in their own harbours, a
 fleet which could menace our coasts with debarkations on a much more
 extensive scale than is possible to our present foe. United Germany,
 however, wishes to see her territories energetically protected, her
 flag respected, her trade once more flourishing, and in the future to
 have some influence on the sea."

Prince Adalbert then weighed the three alternatives: (_a_) Defensive
coast protection; (_b_) offensive coast protection; and (_c_) an
independent German sea-power; and finally reached the conclusion:

 "Germany must either build no battleships or at once build so many
 that she can act towards her neighbours as an independent Sea-Power.
 Anything intermediate would be a useless expense, an empty pretension,
 and would arouse in the nation expectations which, in the moment of
 danger, our sea-power would not be able to fulfil.

 "If we now ask what would be the smallest number of battleships which
 would allow us to act in European waters as an independent fleet,
 especially against the ever-ready Russian Baltic fleet, I think we
 must take twenty battleships as the minimum that would be able to
 measure itself with it. But such a fleet would make Germany fourth
 among the Sea-Powers of first rank, and place her incontestably in a
 position to play a great rôle on the sea, a rôle which would be worthy
 of her position in Europe. For with her twenty battleships she would
 be able to throw an enormous weight into the scales, turn the balance
 by her adherence to an alliance, and consequently be as much sought
 after as an ally on account of her sea-power as on account of her
 land-power."

The Prince accordingly proposed that the German building programme
should include 20 battleships with auxiliary screws, 10 frigates,
30 steam cruisers, 40 gunboats, and 80 gun-sloops; and that the
construction of these vessels should be spread over a period of ten
years. In this project we have that same principle of the gradual
working up to a fixed standard of strength which has characterised all
modern German naval legislation.

However, the Prince did not manage to persuade the Frankfort
technical commission to adopt his scheme in its entirety, though the
programme approved went a long way towards meeting his views. Why
this programme was never carried out has already been seen. In the
Memorandum just quoted from, Prince Adalbert had written: "The entire
nation unanimously demands a German war fleet, for German, absolutely
German, it must be, a true representative of the new-born unity of the
Fatherland"; and it must have been with a heavy heart that he saw his
vision melt away, and went back to Berlin to employ his gifts in a more
restricted and less promising field.

The difficulties which opposed themselves to the realisation of the
Prince's ideas will be appreciated, when it is stated that the man
who built the first warship of any size which had been launched from
a German yard since the days of the Hanseatic League is still alive.
Wilhelm Schwarm, now ninety-four years of age, was employed as a young
man in Klawitter's shipyard at Dantzig, and at the time when the air
was filled with talk of a future German Navy, the firm very shrewdly
sent him over to the works of Robinson and Russell, on the Thames, to
learn the art of constructing vessels of larger size than were then
built on the Baltic. He brought back with him the plans for a paddle
corvette, which was built under his supervision on the Klawitter slips,
fitted with English engines, and, under the name of _Dantzig_, was an
important addition to the Prussian fleet.

At the time of the Crimean War this vessel showed the Prussian flag
at Constantinople for the first time in history, and it was also with
her that Prince Adalbert experienced a rather grotesque adventure in
the Mediterranean in 1856. In the previous year a German ship had been
plundered by the Riff pirates, and the Prince, happening to be in
those parts with the _Dantzig_, made a reconnaissance, in one of the
ship's boats, of the coast of Cape Tree Forcas, where the outrage had
occurred. The natives, as was their custom, fired on the party from
the shore. Annoyed by this molestation, Prince Adalbert determined to
teach the Arabs a severe lesson. Having manned and armed all his boats,
he stormed the steep and rocky shore and planted the Prussian flag on
the summit of the cliffs. His triumph was, however, a very brief one,
for the enemy immediately returned to the attack, and drove the landing
party back to the boats with the loss of seven killed and twenty-three
wounded. Official panegyrists extol this rash escapade as an "heroic
deed," and declare that it did much to raise the confidence of the
young Prussian Navy. As the Riff pirates were no doubt also exultant
over their victory, the affair must have been one of those rare
encounters with the issue of which both sides were equally satisfied.
The _Dantzig_ was sold a few years later in England, in the belief that
her timbers were unsound, and was then passed on to Japan, where she
was run ashore and burnt by her own crew during an engagement in the
civil war.

The problem of obtaining properly qualified personnel for the corps of
naval officers was not less difficult to solve than that of building
efficient warships. England would have been the natural source on which
to draw for instructors, but for political reasons it was decided
not to seek assistance from that most competent of all quarters, and
the services of three officers of the Swedish Navy were secured. For
similar reasons a Swedish naval constructor was engaged. A few years
later, however, permission was asked and obtained for a number of
cadets to learn their profession on British men-of-war.

The year 1852 brought an event of the utmost importance for the
development of the Prussian Navy--the acquisition of Wilhelmshaven
as a North Sea base. At that time Prussia did not possess an inch
of coast-line on the North Sea, and could obtain access to it only
through the Belt and the Sound, then under the control of the superior
naval power of Denmark. Among the innumerable projects with which the
National Assembly had been deluged, was the scheme of three citizens
of Rendsburg for the construction of a water-way pretty much along the
line subsequently followed by the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. This plan was,
however, based on the false assumption that Schleswig-Holstein would at
once become, and ever afterwards remain, German territory. It had also
been proposed to the Frankfort Government by an Oldenburg official that
the Jade Bay should be chosen as the North Sea base for the fleet, and
this suggestion seems to have fixed the attention of Prince Adalbert
on the inlet which is now the chief naval headquarters of the German
Empire. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg was approached, and he consented
to cede to Prussia the piece of marshly land which has since been
covered by the harbours, docks, shipyards, workshops, barracks, and
fortifications of Wilhelmshaven. Prussia paid a sum of 500,000 thalers
for this invaluable possession, and at the same time took upon herself
the protection of the coast and sea-trade of the duchy.

Herculean efforts and inexhaustible patience were required to adapt
Prussia's acquisition on the Jade to its destined purposes. Years had
to be spent in a careful survey of the bed of the harbour, in order to
ascertain how far the channel was affected by the movements of sand and
mud under the influence of the tide. Further years were consumed by the
task of sinking piles in the treacherous peaty soil to obtain a solid
foundation for dock and harbour walls. Frequently a storm or a spring
tide destroyed in a few hours the fruits of months of strenuous labour.
As Hanover refused to allow the construction of a railway across her
territory, which lay between Prussia and Oldenburg, it was necessary to
convey all the building materials to the spot by the long and tedious
sea-route. At first not even drinking-water was to be had on the
desolate site, and prolonged and costly exertions were needful before
it could be procured in sufficient quantities. Sixteen years elapsed
before the new harbour was formally declared open by the Prussian
King, afterwards the Emperor William I., in the presence of British
ships, the officers of which probably regarded the works with indulgent
curiosity and little guessed the significance which Wilhelmshaven
would one day possess for their own country.

When the second war with Denmark broke out in 1864, Prussia's fleet was
still absurdly inadequate to deal with the naval force opposed to it.
The ship establishment at the close of 1863 was composed as under:

_Steamships with Fighting Value._

 3 corvettes, mounting 27 or 28 guns each.
 1 corvette, mounting 17 guns.

_Steamships with little Fighting Value._

 4 first-class gunboats, mounting 3 guns each.
 17 second-class gunboats, mounting 2 guns each.
 3 despatch-boats, mounting together 8 guns.

_Steamship without Fighting Value._

 1 corvette, mounting 9 guns.

_Sailing Ships with little or no Fighting Value._

 3 frigates, mounting a total of 112 guns.
 3 brigs, mounting a total of 4 guns.
 2 schooners, mounting a total of 4 guns.

_Also without Fighting Value._

 40 rowing-boats, mounting a total of 76 guns.

Denmark, on the other hand, had 31 steam war vessels, among which
were 1 battleship, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, and 4 armoured craft.
Even with the assistance of a number of Austrian ships, which arrived
in the North Sea from the Mediterranean, the Prussian fleet could
contribute nothing decisive towards the issue of the war. At the most
it prevented the Danish blockade of the German coast-line from being
effective. The Prussian Government attempted to reduce its inferiority
by hiring merchant vessels, and hurriedly purchased warships in France
and England. One of these latter, the monitor _Arminius_, which was
of English build, was almost entirely paid for with the voluntary
contributions which had continued to flow in. This fact shows how
steady and keen the interest of a large section of the population in
the development of the navy already was, and how erroneous it is to
ascribe the naval enthusiasm in Germany of recent years entirely to the
official agitation. Peace was concluded before the new ships could be
made ready for sea.

The war of 1864 was one of the great cross-roads of British history.
Difficult as it is to "overlook the cards of Providence," as Bismarck
puts it, there can be little doubt that we took the wrong turning.
The great German Chancellor candidly admitted that the possession of
Kiel and a strategic canal through Holstein were two of the principal
objects which Prussia had in view when she drew the sword. The two
leading members of the British Cabinet were in favour of backing up
Denmark; and one of them, Palmerston, used language in Parliament which
might well have led that country to count upon our support. A strong
body of English public opinion also warmly espoused the Danish cause.
But Queen Victoria, largely influenced by the sympathy for Germany
which she had imbibed from the Prince Consort, threw all the weight of
the Crown into the opposite scale.

There are few more agitated passages to be found in the records of
diplomacy than those letters to Lord Granville in which she argued,
threatened, entreated, and, finally falling back on the last strength
of woman, her weakness, complained that she was "completely exhausted
by anxiety and suspense," and "so tired and unwell she can hardly hold
up her head or hold her pen." Her will prevailed in the end, and she
was able to congratulate herself that, "owing to the determined stand
she had made against her two principal ministers, she had saved the
country from an unnecessary war." When Prussia, completely reversing
her attitude, made those very claims of the Danish King which she
had contested by force of arms her pretext for annexing the two
duchies under the "rights of conquest," the Queen suffered a bitter
disillusionment, and, on her instructions General Grey wrote to Lord
Granville, that "Prussia should at least be made aware of what she and
her Government and every honest man in Europe must think of the gross
and unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that she had
given which Prussia had been guilty of." It will hardly be contended
now that a war which should have left Schleswig-Holstein in the hands
of Denmark would have been anything but exceedingly advantageous,
economical, and opportune for Great Britain.

Even before, in the formal division of the spoils, Prussia had obtained
Austrian recognition of her right to Kiel, she had occupied that port
and transferred her naval headquarters thither from Dantzig. The
construction of the North Sea Baltic Canal was delayed many years,
mainly by the opposition of Count Moltke, who argued that its cost
would be so great that it would, on the whole, be cheaper to build a
second fleet with the money. He further urged that the canal would be
navigable only in the summer, and that in the event of a war the army
would be weakened by the necessity of providing for its defence. But
for the doubts and jealousies of the sister service, the German Navy
might years ago have enjoyed the benefits of that prolongation of the
Canal, contemplated by Bismarck, which would have allowed its ironclads
to steam from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven without putting out into the open
sea.

In the hope that the lessons of the war would have produced the
desirable effect on the public mind, the Prussian Government, in
1865, laid before its Parliament a bill that may be considered as the
definite inauguration of the naval policy which Germany has ever since
pursued. In the Memorandum submitted to the House with the measure, it
was contended that the time had come for Prussia to join the ranks of
the Sea-Powers, in order that she might be in a position to protect
her own and the other German coasts and maritime trade, and, for all
future time, to assert her European position as against such States as
were accessible only by water. "For the present," it was stated, "she
is unable to enter into rivalry with the first-class naval Powers, but
she must occupy a position commanding esteem among those of the second
class."

Accordingly, the Government asked for authority to build 10 armoured
frigates of the highest efficiency, an equal number of armoured
vessels of the cupola or turret type for coast defence, 16 corvettes
for the protection of sea-borne trade, 6 despatch-boats, and at least
4 transports. It was calculated that ten years would be necessary
for the execution of this plan, but rather for the training of the
personnel and the provision of the indispensable harbour works than for
the actual construction of the ships. The cost of the proposed fleet
was estimated at 34,500,000 thalers, that of its annual maintenance
at about 5,000,000 thalers. In recommending the scheme to the Diet,
Bismarck used the following words, which contain very noteworthy
implications: "During the last twenty years no question has so
unanimously interested public opinion in Germany as precisely the naval
question. We have seen associations, the Press, and the Diets give
expression to their sympathy, and this sympathy exercised itself in
the collection of comparatively important sums. The Government and the
Conservative party have been reproached with the slowness and parsimony
with which action has been taken in this direction. It was particularly
the Liberal parties which carried on this agitation. We believe,
therefore, that we are doing you a great pleasure with this Bill."

But the Liberal majority, then exclusively preoccupied with the
constitutional struggle against the masterful and autocratic
Minister-President, threw out the Bill, and modified naval estimates
were given the force of law by royal decree. The attitude of the
Prussian Liberals of that epoch was very similar to that of the
Socialists in recent years.

In the brief war of 1866, the Austrian fleet was tied down to the
Mediterranean by the superior sea-power of Italy, and the operations
of the Prussian ships were confined to a few cheap victories over the
antiquated coast and river fortifications of Hanover. As the result of
the war, Prussia was rounded off by the incorporation of the Kingdom
of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and the old imperial town of
Frankfort-on-Main. She thus secured for herself the entire German North
Sea littoral, with the exception of the coast-line of Oldenburg, which
by treaty was already hers in fact if not in law. Immediately after
the conclusion of peace, all the States to the north of the Main were
closely welded together in the North German Confederation, the first
decisive step towards the creation of the Empire. An article in the
Federal Constitution ran: "The Federal Navy is one and indivisible
under the command of Prussia. Its organization and composition fall
to His Majesty the King of Prussia, who nominates the officials and
officers of the navy, and to whom they, as well as the crews, must take
the oath of fealty. Kiel harbour and the Jade harbour are federal war
harbours. The expenses necessary for the establishment and maintenance
of the fleet and the institutions connected therewith will be borne by
the Federal Treasury."

Two years later a fresh naval programme was submitted to, and approved
by, the North German Reichstag. It laid down that within ten years the
fleet should be brought up to the subjoined strength:

 16 large and small armoured ships.
 20 corvettes.
 8  despatch-boats.
 3  transports.
 22 steam gunboats.
 7  school-ships.

The new vessels actually needed for the attainment of this
establishment were 12 armoured ships, 12 corvettes, 6 despatch-boats,
2 transports, and 1 school-ship. As native ship-builders had so far
had no experience in the construction of ironclads, only one vessel
of this type was placed in Germany, the State yard at Dantzic being
experimentally entrusted with the work, while the rest were purchased
or ordered in England or France. No fact could illustrate more vividly
the tremendous progress which Germany has since made in this respect.

Oddly enough, the great war with France was succeeded by a marked
cooling-off of the popular enthusiasm for the navy in Germany. The
reasons for this appear to have been disappointment with what the
fleet actually accomplished and the complete overthrow of the enemy
without its assistance. Even if all the federal ships had been in
perfect trim and manned by thoroughly trained crews, they were
confronted by so overwhelming a superiority of force that at best they
could have achieved little or nothing. But the outbreak of hostilities
coincided with a series of accidents which temporarily disabled several
of Germany's best war vessels, and at that time there was not a single
dock in the country in which they could be repaired. Officers and crews
were, too, imperfectly trained and insufficiently familiar with both
engines and guns, the harbour equipments were inadequate, and, in fact,
everything was in a state of unpreparedness.

That the French, with their great naval superiority, effected so
little, and did not even make a determined attempt to force the Jade
and destroy the works at Wilhelmshaven, can only be ascribed to their
lack of initiative and the paralyzing operation of their crushing
defeats on land. The only regular engagement fought at sea during
the war was an encounter of uncertain issue between a small German
gunboat and a French despatch-boat off the coast of Cuba. But in spite
of the odds against the federal fleet, public opinion in Germany
protested that it should have shown more dash and enterprise, and in
some way have crowned itself with laurels. Even more prejudicial to
the popularity of an ambitious naval policy was the patent fact that
the hereditary and most formidable foe had been thoroughly and rapidly
humbled by a purely land campaign, and that his superiority on the sea
had availed him practically nothing. To such considerations must be
attributed a large share of the indifference with which many Germans
regarded their navy during the next thirty years.

The prevalent views were reflected in the Memorandum with which, in
1872, the Minister of Marine, Lieutenant-General von Stosch, ushered
in the first naval programme of the new German Empire. This document
stated that in a long war Germany must leave the offensive to her land
force, and that the proper task of her navy was to assert the power of
the Empire where smaller interests were at stake in places to which the
army could not penetrate. An increase in the fleet was, however, stated
to be necessary on the ground of the growth of German sea-borne trade,
and it was proposed that the following vessels should be available by
the year 1882:

 8  armoured  frigates.
 6  armoured  corvettes.
 7  armoured  monitors.
 2  armoured  batteries.
 20 cruisers.
 6  despatch-boats.
 18 gunboats.
 28 torpedo-boats.
 5  school-ships.

The cost of these vessels was estimated at 73,000,000 thalers, that
of their maintenance in the year 1882 at 1,300,000 thalers. The plan,
which was much more modest in its pretensions than its predecessors,
and in principle constituted a retirement from the position formerly
taken up, was approved by the first Parliament of the new Germany.

The first royal review of the German Fleet took place in the Warnemünde
roads in 1875. The ships present were four ironclads, a despatch-boat,
and four school-ships; their total complements 2,862 officers and men.

When the year 1883 arrived, General von Stosch published a Memorandum
on the execution of his plan. It is significant of the change that had
come over public opinion that the Government had not dared to ask the
Reichstag for a substitute for the armoured frigate _Grosser Kurfürst_,
which was lost in collision off Folkestone, and that consequently one
of the eight vessels of her type was lacking. The last of the six
armoured corvettes had yet to be built, and instead of five monitors
thirteen armoured gunboats had been constructed, because it was thought
that the latter class of ship was better suited for the defence of the
Jade, Weser, and Elbe. It had been decided not to build the floating
batteries, which would have been an easy prey to the "fish" torpedo,
introduced as a weapon of naval warfare since they were projected. One
out of the twenty corvettes, and eight large and nine small torpedo
craft were also still wanting. German national vanity had, however,
secured a questionable triumph: the Empire was now entirely independent
of foreigners so far as its warships were concerned. But if Germany had
continued to purchase some of her warships in England while she was
still but a tyro in the art of naval architecture, she would have saved
much money, and made more rapid progress.

General von Stosch simultaneously presented another Memorandum, dealing
with the future development of the navy. In it he laid stress on the
reasons which could be adduced against the principle hitherto followed,
and since readopted, of fixing the building programme in advance for
a longer period, and advised that it was inexpedient to look farther
ahead than three or four years. While admitting that "the seas are
ever more ceasing to separate the nations," and that "the course of
history seems ever more to indicate that a State cannot withdraw
from the sea if it is striving to maintain for itself a position in
the world beyond the immediate future," he laid down the axiom that
"naval battles alone seldom decide the destinies of States, and for
immeasurable time the decision of every war will for Germany lie
with her land army." Thus, though he admitted the desirability of "a
concentrated high sea fleet always ready for action," he considered it
best to defer the construction of battleships till further experience
had shown whether their functions could not be equally well performed
by vessels of a smaller type. The conclusion reached by the Memorandum
was that it was necessary to add without delay to only one class of
vessel--namely, that which served the purposes of coast defence. In
this connection the following words were used:

 "Here it is the torpedo-boat, which, especially when used in large
 numbers at night, will render the carrying through of a blockade
 almost impossible. Every night the blockading ships would be compelled
 to withdraw to a distance under steam. Their coal consumption would
 thereby be much increased, the tension of the crews, in consequence of
 the need for unremitting vigilance, would become intolerable, and at
 night the blockaded harbours would be accessible. Even when in motion,
 the blockading ships would not be safe at night. The torpedo-boats
 would follow them and recognize their aim by the lights which the
 enemy would not be able to do without when steaming in squadron
 formation. The torpedo-boat is a weapon which is of special advantage
 to the weaker on the sea. A few States already possess a considerable
 strength in torpedo craft. For the German Navy 150 torpedo-boats
 are considered necessary, and of these thirty-five will be ready for
 service shortly."

It was while the German Fleet was still impotent for all serious
purposes that the Empire acquired the mass of its colonies: South-West
Africa, Togo, the Cameroons, German New Guinea, the Bismarck
Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands were all annexed in 1884. The
decisive step towards the acquisition of German East Africa was taken
in the following year.

William I. lived just long enough to lay the foundation-stone of the
Kiel Canal, which had been one of the dreams of the Frankfort patriots
forty years earlier. His death was followed after an interval of three
months by that of Frederick I., and with the accession of William II.,
in 1888, the latest era of German naval policy may be said to have
commenced. Until, however, Admiral Tirpitz was put in charge of the
Ministry of Marine, in 1897, practically nothing was done to add to
the fighting strength of the fleet. Any progress which was made in
connection with the navy was confined to developments of organisation,
and to the exchange of German rights in Zanzibar and Witu for the islet
of Heligoland. This transaction was scoffed at by Bismarck, then in
retirement, who, however, only contemplated the possibility of a naval
war with France, and it was bitterly resented by German public opinion,
and especially by that heated section of it which poses as the pioneer
on the path of militarism, navalism, and colonism. Only during the last
three or four years has the conviction gradually begun to gain ground,
that perhaps, after all, Germany did not make such a bad bargain, and
Heligoland has simultaneously taken an ever more and more prominent
place in the speculations of political prophets as to the probable
outcome of an Anglo-German war.

The keen interest of the Emperor William, and his ambition to play
the leading part on the stage of the world, would not, in themselves,
have sufficed to bring about the change which has been wrought during
the past seventeen years. The decisive personal factors here have
been the fixed purpose, the steady will, the unflagging energy, the
inexhaustible patience, the profound political insight, and the rare
diplomatic skill of Admiral Tirpitz, the nearest approach to a really
great man that Germany has produced since Bismarck. He is the true
creator of the German fleet.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 6: Thaler = about 3s.]




CHAPTER IV

British Influence on the German Navy


In a very special sense the German Navy is the child of the British
Navy, which is the mother of all the great naval forces of the world
to-day. From the very first it has been no secret that the German Fleet
was definitely planned on the model furnished by the many centuries'
development of the British Navy, and the Emperor William has been
one of the principal agencies through which this formative influence
has been exerted in more recent years. He came to the throne at a
moment when naval sentiment in Germany was at its lowest point, and he
assisted in the initial revival which occurred before Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz came on the scene.

Old residents of Portsmouth still remember a boy whom they occasionally
saw walking about the dockyard looking at the ships with admiration and
rapt attention. His greatest delight seemed to be to watch the great
ironclads moving in and out of Spithead. Sometimes he would find his
way on board vessels of the Royal Navy. This lad was none other than
the present German Emperor. As a grandson of Queen Victoria, he was a
frequent visitor in his boyhood and early manhood to his grandmother
during the summer months when she was in residence at Osborne, and on
one occasion his father and mother, then Crown Prince and Princess
of Germany, rented Norris Castle, on the outskirts of Cowes, and
lived there for several months with their children. Prince William,
who was a great favourite of the late Queen, thus not only became an
eager spectator of the naval pageants in the Solent directly under the
windows of Osborne House and Norris Castle, but watched with interest
the gay assemblage in Cowes roadstead for the regatta from year to year.

At this time the newly-created German Empire had practically no fleet.
During the Franco-Prussian War the few ships which flew the flag of the
North German Confederation were so weak that they could take no part
in the conflict. The memory of these recent events was still fresh in
the mind of the future Emperor when he visited England and watched the
activities of the British Navy, whose far-flung squadrons performed
the triple task of protecting the Motherland from fear of invasion,
safeguarding all her oversea possessions, and defending British
ocean-borne commerce. He determined that he, too, would have a great
fleet when he succeeded to the throne of the German Empire.

This is no imaginary picture of the ideas which were taking root in the
mind of the ruler of the German Empire to-day. Years afterwards--in
fact, in 1904--addressing King Edward, on the occasion of His Majesty's
visit to the Kiel Regatta, the Emperor paid a tribute to the power
and traditions of the British Navy, with which, he added, he became
acquainted as a youth during visits which he paid to England. He
recalled that he had had many a sail in the _Dolphin_ and _Alberta_,
old British yachts, and had seen mighty ironclads constructed which
had since served their time and disappeared from the Navy List. "When
I came to the throne I attempted to reproduce on a scale commensurate
with the resources and interests of my own country that which had made
such a deep impression on my mind when I saw it as a young man in
England."

When he first advocated the construction of a big navy, the German
people viewed his dreams with indifference and distrust. Shackled
by a system of conscription in order to provide the Empire with its
huge army, they asked what it would profit them if to the burden
of a great army they added the vast expense of a fleet capable not
merely of defending their coasts, but of operating on the offensive in
distant seas. At first the Emperor made little progress in educating
public opinion; but he still nursed those dreams of sea-power--very
moderate dreams at that date, before Admiral von Tirpitz came on the
scene--which had first taken shape in his mind when he wandered about
Portsmouth Dockyard, and viewed from the grounds of Osborne House the
coming and going of mighty British warships. In the early days of
the present century he referred with some pride to the persistency
with which he had pursued his aims in spite of popular disfavour. At
the launch of the _Kaiser Karl der Grosse_ he said: "If the increase
in the navy which I had demanded with urgent prayers had not been
consistently refused me during the first eight years of my reign--I did
not even escape derision and mocking at the time--in how different a
manner should we now be able to promote our prosperous commerce and our
interests overseas!" He had to wait for many years before he saw his
dreams reaching fruition.

As the British Parliament is the mother of all popular representative
institutions, so the British Navy is the mother of navies. If the
records of most of the great fleets of the world are searched, it will
be found that in greater or less degree they owe their birth to the
more or less direct assistance of British naval officers, oft times
acting with the direct authority of the British Admiralty; while in
almost every fleet in the world even to-day may be found ships designed
by British brains and constructed of British material by the skilled
craftsmen of these islands. It was to England that Peter the Great came
to watch the shipbuilding on the Thames, and it was with a large body
of British mechanics that he returned to Russia to create a fleet with
which to defend his empire and extend its borders at the point of the
gun. The prestige of the Russian Navy in the seventeenth century was
due entirely to the skill and daring of Scotsmen. The Greigs of four
generations, Admiral Elphinstone, Lord Duffus Gordon, and a number of
other Scotsmen entered the Navy of the Czar and did splendid service;
and some of the descendants of these pioneers of the Russian Navy may
still be traced in the fleet of to-day. The American Navy was, of
course, of distinctly British origin; so were the fleets of many of
the South American Republics; while, as everybody knows, the seeds
of sea-power of Japan were sown by British naval officers, including
first and foremost Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas, and her ships were
mainly built in England. The excellence to which the Chinese Navy once
attained was also due to British instruction under another Scotsman,
Admiral Lang; and one of the principal shipyards of Italy, as well as
her gun factory, is of British origin, and is still linked with its
British parent. The Spanish Navy is now being recreated under British
supervision; Turkey never was so nearly a sea power as when she had
British naval officers in her service; and under Admiral Mark Kerr the
glories of the Greek Navy are being revived.

In the case of the modern German Fleet the British Admiralty had little
part in its upbuilding, but British naval power fired the imagination
of the Emperor, and it was a kindly present made years before by King
William IV. to the then King of Prussia which first directed his
Majesty's thoughts towards the sea. When the present Emperor was a boy,
one of his favourite recreations was to sail a beautiful model of about
20 tons of a British frigate on the Havel lakes near Potsdam. This
little ship, of excellent workmanship, was sent as a present to the
then ruler of Prussia early in the last century by our sailor King, and
was a never-failing source of pleasure to the present German Emperor
as a youth. From his earliest years at home and in England the future
ruler's aspirations were always towards the sea, and we can now see
that his dreams of later years, which have taken such tangible shape,
were largely due to those vivid impressions of sea-power which he
obtained during his visits to England, and which reached their climax
in 1889, when Queen Victoria, on the occasion of his visit to the Cowes
Regatta, conferred on him, a foreign monarch, the, then, unique rank of
Admiral of the Fleet.

Though other foreign princes and monarchs have since been made honorary
officers of the British Navy, the German Emperor remained for some
years the only person of foreign birth holding supreme rank. The
commission conferred upon the Kaiser was of course purely honorary, but
his Majesty never concealed the pride with which he donned the British
uniform with its deep gold cuffs and cocked hat, and he could claim
that he was the only ruler of a foreign State who ever commanded the
British Navy in modern times.

Great Britain has boasted of her "splendid isolation," and the German
Emperor's is the only alien hand which has controlled any of her
fleets. In times gone by a British squadron was placed under the
orders of Peter the Great. This incident occurred during the Czar's
operations against Sweden, when he received the assistance of a
squadron from these islands and hoisted his flag in command of the
allied forces. Between that date and the year when the German Emperor
became an Admiral of the Fleet the British Navy maintained its absolute
independence, and British officers were not even permitted to accept
foreign decorations. But soon after receiving the honorary rank from
Queen Victoria, the Emperor seized the opportunity to emulate the
example of Peter the Great, and he afterwards confessed in a speech he
delivered on board the British battleship, _Royal Sovereign_, that the
incident had left an indelible impression upon his mind. "One of the
best days of my life," he remarked, "which I shall never forget as long
as I live, was the day when I inspected the Mediterranean Fleet when
I was on board the _Dreadnought_,[7] and my flag was hoisted for the
first time."

The Emperor at this time was making a cruise in the Mediterranean, and
visited the Piræus to attend the wedding of his sister to the present
King of Greece. Sir Anthony Hoskins, who was then only a Vice-Admiral,
was in command of the British Fleet which had assembled in honour of
the royal marriage. The German Emperor decided that in his new rôle
as a British officer he would exercise command, and consequently the
emblem of an Admiral of the Fleet, which consists of the Union flag,
was broken at the main on board the old battleship _Dreadnought_, and
Sir Anthony Hoskins, being a junior officer, was forthwith relieved of
the control of the British men-of-war, and nominally, though not of
course actually, the German Emperor, during the time that his flag was
flown, was in command of the greatest of all the fighting squadrons of
the British Empire.

On a subsequent occasion, at Malta, his Majesty again visited the
British Fleet. Arriving at this great naval base he announced that on
the following day he would inspect one of the men-of-war. Accordingly,
he proceeded on board, and his flag was forthwith hoisted. It was
thought that his Majesty would formally walk round the decks and then
take some light refreshments and return to his yacht. This was not
the case, however. No sooner did the Emperor reach the quarter-deck,
where he was received with naval honours by all the officers, than
he took off his coat and intimated that he was ready to go over the
ship. His Majesty went everywhere, from the turrets to the engine
and boiler-rooms, and kept the Captain fully occupied in answering a
multitude of questions as to the design and equipment of the vessel.
With all the impetuosity of his nature he dived into every hole and
corner and saw everything, and the Captain was kept so busy that he
forgot his duty as host and the wines he had laid in for the occasion.
At last the inspection ended, the questions ceased, and his Majesty
prepared, after complimenting the Captain on the smartness of his
ship, to go down the companion ladder to his lunch. As he did so, he
turned to this commanding officer and said: "Yours must be the longest
ship in the British Navy." "I think not, your Majesty," replied the
Captain, "it's only 420 feet long." "Oh, you surely are mistaken,"
added the Emperor, and then the Captain remembered the naval slang as
to "long-ships in the navy"--namely, those with long intervals between
refreshments. He forthwith apologised profusely for the oversight,
and implored the Emperor to return to the cabin. His Majesty would
not, however, do so, but added: "January 27th is my birthday, and my
orders are that on that day you entertain all your brother captains to
dinner and drink my health." He then left, pleased at the result of the
incident.

When the day arrived, the dinner was duly held, and the guests enjoyed
themselves immensely. During the evening they despatched the following
message to the Emperor: "The orders of our Admiral of the Fleet have
been carried out, and we have drunk your Majesty's good health. But
there is one point on which we cannot agree with your Majesty, and that
is as to the length of H.M.S. ----." From this the Emperor, who is
familiar with the language of the navy, was able consequently to infer
that on that evening there had been no lack of hospitality.

After the lapse of many years during which the progress of the German
Navy became ever more and more the preoccupation of the British
people, it is difficult to realize that when the movement for naval
expansion on the other side of the North Sea first began to take shape
it was regarded with sympathy by the British nation, and the German
Emperor, wearing his uniform as an honorary British officer, was, of
all monarchs, the most popular in this country. The two countries were
on terms of growing cordiality when the Emperor succeeded his father
in 1888. The absence of any reference by the new Emperor in his
proclamation either to England or to France caused momentary anxiety,
but that feeling quickly passed away, and in the following summer
the new Emperor was the central figure in the great naval pageant at
Spithead.

For the first time in the history of the British Fleet naval manoeuvres
had been held in 1885, and in the year after William II.'s accession
the young ruler witnessed the greatest display of British sea-power
which had ever been organised. The assembly of 1889 far exceeded in
numbers and in the suggestion of power the Naval Review which had
marked the celebration of Queen Victoria's Jubilee. It was the most
powerful fleet ever brought together in time of peace. The Naval
Defence Act, the culmination of a long and vigorous agitation, had
been passed in the spring, and it was thought appropriate to mobilize
the fleet as a demonstration in the eyes of the world. The German
Emperor determined to visit this country for the special purpose of
joining in this festival of British sea-power. In those days the
act of mobilization occupied considerable time; though the ships in
reserve were manned in the middle of July it was not until August 1st
that the fleet assembled at Spithead. It included 20 battleships, 6
coast defence vessels, 29 cruisers, 3 gun vessels, 14 gunboats, and 38
torpedo boats. The great anchorage presented a brave appearance when,
on the following day, the Emperor arrived, escorted by a squadron of
his small navy. This force consisted of the battleships _Friedrich
der Grosse_, _Preussen_, _Deutschland_, _Kaiser_, _Sachsen_, _Baden_,
and _Oldenburg_, together with the despatch-vessels _Zieten_ and
_Wacht_; while the training ship for German naval cadets, the _Niobe_,
was also present together with the corvette _Irene_, commanded by
the Emperor's brother. The German Emperor and his ships received an
enthusiastic welcome as he passed through the British Fleet on board
his yacht, the _Hohenzollern_. The spectacle was one of the most
brilliant and imposing ever witnessed in waters which had often been
the scene of naval displays. On the following Monday, when the Prince
of Wales, representing Queen Victoria, inspected the ships, his Royal
Highness was accompanied by his Majesty, to whom, subsequently, all the
principal officers were presented on board the _Victoria and Albert_.
Early on the following day the fleet proceeded to sea, steaming past
the German Emperor, who watched the evolution from the deck of the
_Osborne_, moored in Sandown Bay.

Thus did the new ruler of Germany, on whom Queen Victoria had just
conferred the honorary rank of Admiral of the Fleet in the British
service, gain a unique knowledge of the size and efficiency of the
British Navy normally maintained on a peace footing in home waters.
The contrast in organization and in administration between the British
Navy and the German Army can hardly have failed to impress the young
Emperor, who had devoted himself with unremitting persistency to the
study of the military machine of his own country. Looking back with the
knowledge which we now possess of the rapidity with which a navy can
be raised from a peace footing to a war footing as exemplified by the
modern German Navy, we can imagine the impression which the British
mobilization made upon his Majesty. And then, when the time came for
the ships to pass out of the anchorage into the channel, the delays
and confusion which occurred must have suggested to the young ruler,
familiar with the standard of efficiency attained by the German Army,
that something was lacking.

A contemporary account of this evolution records that: "It was
at half-past three in the morning that the fleet began to unmoor
preparatory to proceeding to sea, but it was not until nearly eleven
that Sir George Tryon--the Admiral in supreme command--was able to
give the signal for his squadron to weigh anchor. Nearly all the delay
was caused by trouble and mishaps connected with the anchoring gear of
various ships. There is no part of the equipment of a man-of-war which
requires more management and experience in handling than the ground
tackle. Every vessel has peculiarities of her own in this respect,
therefore it is due, probably, to the crews being in most cases quite
strange to their ships, and to the officers not yet having got the hang
of things, that so many shortcomings were made apparent. Soon after ten
o'clock Admiral Baird, in command of the other section of the fleet,
got impatient of further delay, for it was manifest that if he did
not start speedily another review might have to be postponed. So he
signalled the ships of his squadron to proceed to sea as soon as ready,
and shortly afterwards they began filing out eastward in a long single
line. But some ships could not obey the order; and amongst these were
the _Anson_, _Collingwood_, and _Inflexible_, still engaged in getting
up their anchors."

This same writer concluded his account of the spectacle with the remark
that "A grander, a more magnificent demonstration of England's Fleet it
would indeed be difficult to imagine." But behind the seeming of things
there stood revealed an organization which, though it had recently been
greatly improved, still left much to be desired in rapid and efficient
action. Moreover, at this time even in the Channel Fleet, which then
consisted of five ships, and was the only fully commissioned force in
home waters, the main purpose of sea-power, to shoot straight, was
certainly not kept in view. In his interesting book of reminiscences,
"The Navy as I have Known It," Admiral the Hon. Sir Edmund Fremantle,
describing the conditions which existed in the Jubilee year, records:
"We had large crews and, as all the ships were masted, there was a fair
amount of sail drill, while I fear gunnery was little attended to."

There is no record of the impressions which the German Emperor carried
home with him from Spithead, but it is more than probable that, while
his Majesty was impressed by the great display of ships and men, he was
not less impressed by the failure to utilize these resources to the
best possible advantage.

The British Navy was living on its past achievements. Though it
possessed a mass of material and a large personnel, neither was well
organized for war. The available resources exceeded anything belonging
to any other nation, but the fleet still basked, content, in the glow
of the triumphs achieved in the early years of the nineteenth century.
The Navy was unreformed. Steam had taken the place of sails, wood had
been superseded, first by iron and then by steel, but the routine of
the squadrons, the training of officers and men had undergone little
change. The conditions of naval warfare had altered, but the British
Fleet remained faithful to the old regime, holding fast to the belief
that when war occurred there would be a sufficient interval to allow
it to complete its arrangements, elaborate its plans, and place all
its resources on a war footing. As the British Navy in its influence
on world policy inspired German ambitions, so German thoroughness in
organization, when applied to the growing German Fleet, reacted upon
the British Navy and gave it a new and vigorous life.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 7: This ship was, of course, the predecessor of the present
_Dreadnought_.]




CHAPTER V

The German Navy Acts


Among the political developments of the last quarter of a century there
is none more remarkable than the evolution of German naval ambitions as
revealed in the legislation passed since 1898.

One of the first acts after the Emperor ascended the throne was the
reorganization of the central Navy administration, which had hitherto
been presided over by a general officer of the army. This fact in
itself indicates the subordinate position which the navy had hitherto
occupied in the defensive machinery of the German Empire. The fleet
itself was of extremely modest proportions. It consisted only of
a few small battleships of heavy gun-power, but limited radius of
action, whose rôle was the defence of the coasts of Germany, and more
particularly the Baltic littoral, for at this period few men-of-war
under any flag cruised in the North Sea. The spearhead of the British
Navy was exposed in the Mediterranean, where the latest and most
powerful ships were stationed, and the small Channel Fleet spent
most of its time not in the Channel, but ringing the changes on Vigo
and other Spanish ports--Lisbon, Lagos, Gibraltar, Madeira, and Port
Mahon. This squadron consisted of five obsolescent ships, and the
only British vessels permanently in home waters--so complete was the
domination of the situation in southern waters--were a number of port
and coast-guard ships, half manned and distributed round the coast, and
the unmanned vessels in reserve in the dockyards. The distribution of
the French Fleet was on much the same lines, the majority of the modern
ships being concentrated in the Mediterranean, while a small force was
based upon Brest. Russia alone was represented in northern waters, and
it was consequently in the Baltic that the German Fleet, such as it
was, was trained and drilled. Except for a few gunboats, the German
naval ensign was entirely unrepresented in distant seas, and public
opinion showed no desire to increase the naval votes in order to enable
German influence to be exercised beyond home waters.

After the Emperor's accession to the throne in June, 1888, and after
the reorganization of naval administration, an effort was made to
obtain an increased grant from the Reichstag, but only with partial
success. From 1874 to 1889-90 the naval expenditure had increased
gradually from £1,950,000 to about £2,750,000. In 1890-91 the Estimates
had advanced to nearly £3,600,000, and in the following year they rose
still further to £4,750,000, and then they began to fall once more
under the pressure of the Reichstag, which viewed with no sympathy the
new naval ambitions which were finding expression in the Press. During
these years the Reichstag repeatedly reduced the votes put forward by
Admiral von Hollmann, the Minister of Marine. Throughout his period
of office, from 1890 to 1897, he failed signally to inoculate the
Parliamentary majority with the new ideas and the new enthusiasm which
dominated the Marineamt; and at last in 1897, after being repulsed,
first by the Budget Committee and then by the Reichstag itself, the
Marine Minister, whose ambitions were really extremely modest, retired
from the scene, compelled to admit defeat. He was a sailor and neither
a statesman nor an administrator, and his blunt methods were not to the
liking of the politicians. No surprise consequently was felt when three
months after this final humiliation the Admiral resigned his office.
One of the pioneers of German sea-power, Admiral von Hollmann began,
under the inspiration of the Emperor, the naval movement which, a few
years later, under the impulse that the Boer War imparted to public
opinion, and with the help of an elaborate Press Bureau, was carried to
such lengths by his successor.

On the resignation of Admiral von Hollmann, the Emperor appointed as
Naval Secretary a comparatively unknown naval officer named Tirpitz.
Born on March 19th, 1849, at Cüstrin, and the son of a judge, Alfred
Tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards at the Naval
Academy from 1874 to 1876. He subsequently devoted much attention to
the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly responsible for
the torpedo organization and the tactical use of torpedoes in the
German Navy--a work which British officers regard with admiration.
Subsequently he became Inspector of Torpedo Service, and was the first
Flotilla Chief of the Torpedo Flotillas. Later he was appointed Chief
of the Staff of the naval station in the Baltic and of the Supreme
Command of the German Fleet. During these earlier years of his sea
career Admiral Tirpitz made several long voyages. He is regarded as
an eminent tactician, and is the author of the rules for German naval
tactics as now in use in the Navy. In 1895 he was promoted to the rank
of Rear-Admiral, and became Vice-Admiral in 1899. During 1896 and
1897 he commanded the cruiser squadron in East Asia, and was appointed
Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy Office in January, 1897. In the
following year he was made a Minister of State, and in 1901 received
the hereditary rank of nobility, entitling him to the use of the prefix
"von" before his name.

With the advent of this officer as Marine Minister, German naval
affairs at once underwent a change. His predecessor, who entertained
very modest theories as to the size of the fleet which Germany should
possess, had attempted to browbeat the politicians, thumping the table
in irritation when he could not get his way. The new Minister from
the first adopted other methods. He devoted himself to the education
of the people by means of an elaborate Press Bureau, and was soon
the undisputed master of German naval policy. He met opposition in
the Reichstag with a smiling reasonableness, and set himself to win
the support of opponents by good-tempered argument. In fact, Admiral
von Tirpitz from the first revealed himself as a politician and
diplomatist, and from the time that he took office, though now and
again slight checks were experienced, naval policy in Germany made
rapid--indeed, astonishing--progress.

In the year after Admiral von Tirpitz went to the Marine Office, a Navy
Bill, far more ambitious in its terms than any proposal that had been
put forward by Admiral von Hollmann, was accepted by the Reichstag.

This measure was believed to embody at any rate the beginnings of a
scheme which he had submitted to the Emperor some time prior to his
appointment. At any rate, it enunciated a new and vital principle.
As has been seen, the Government, whether Prussian or German, had on
previous occasions drafted extensive naval programmes for the carrying
out of which a period of ten or twelve years was required. Not once,
however, had the establishment of ships and personnel been fixed by
law; and the Parliament in each case committed itself to the entire
scheme only to the extent of passing the first annual instalment
considered necessary by the Government as the initial step towards
the desired goal. In this way neither Diet nor Reichstag bound itself
or its successors for the future, but left both free to deal with the
annual naval estimates as they thought fit. And in practice it had been
found that very liberal use was made of the budgetary prerogatives,
that standards once approved were not considered binding, and that the
fate of the naval estimates depended to a considerable extent on the
relations which happened for the moment to exist between the Government
and the majority parties on questions totally unconnected with the
naval requirements of the Empire.

Another disadvantage of the practice of leaving the Reichstag free to
determine annually the number of vessels which should be laid down
in a given year, was, that it gave the shipbuilding, armour-plate,
and ordnance industries no sure basis for their plans for the future.
The rule that Germany must build, engine, arm, and equip her own war
vessels had been generally accepted, but the industries which should
enable her to do this were still in their infancy, and were almost
entirely dependent upon the orders of the home Government. If they
were ever to be able to supply the demands of a powerful fleet, it
was necessary that slips should be multiplied, plant increased, and
workshops extended. But so long as the naval policy of the Empire was
indefinite and subject to violent fluctuations, ship-builders and
manufacturers would not endanger their businesses by locking up large
amounts of capital in appliances which could be used for the building
and arming of warships and for no other purposes. If German industry
was ever to be in a position to satisfy the demands of a large and
efficient fleet, some guarantee of steady and remunerative orders must,
it was urged, be afforded to the trades concerned. And apart altogether
from its own needs, the Government also hoped that, some day, Germany
would be able to claim a share in those large profits which Great
Britain appropriated to herself as the world's shipbuilder.

It was by such arguments that Admiral von Tirpitz justified his demand
that the strength of the fleet, the date at which it should attain
that strength, and the age at which each ship should be automatically
replaced by a new one, should be fixed by legal enactment. No portion
of his Bill was more hotly contested than this. It was objected
that, by accepting it, the Reichstag would be depriving itself of a
considerable portion of that power of the purse which constituted the
only effective bulwark of its rights. But in the end the smiling and
imperturbable patience of Admiral von Tirpitz gained the day, and
the Reichstag satisfied itself with the formal right of drawing the
absolutely unavoidable conclusions from its own enactment and passing
every year the naval estimates, which could not be rejected without
an infraction of the law. The repeated sections in the Act of 1898
which appear to reserve the Chamber's Budget rights, are, in reality,
meaningless and valueless--except as a monument to the folly of those
who believed they had a meaning and a value. Admiral von Tirpitz
apparently drew from his first legislative experience the perfectly
correct conclusion that the Reichstag can be made to do almost anything
if one only treats it in the right way.

In the explanatory Memorandum attached to the Bill, Admiral von
Tirpitz was able to adduce two convincing reasons why the fleet should
at once be considerably augmented. One of these was the fact that
Germany's naval strength had in recent years actually diminished. In
case of mobilization, it was pointed out, she would have had only
seven efficient battleships, whereas she had once had fourteen. Of the
armoured cruisers which had been adopted in other navies for foreign
service in times of peace, she did not possess a single example, and
their work had to be done by three antiquated battleships. Moreover,
to the tasks allotted to the fleet in the Memorandum of 1873, another
of great importance had been added--namely, the defence of Germany's
newly-acquired colonial empire. Further, it was contended that the
growth of the Empire's population, trade, and industry, the development
of her sea-fisheries, and the increasing investment of German capital
abroad, had all added to the possibilities of her becoming involved
in quarrels with other nations. The fleet which Admiral von Tirpitz
considered necessary to fulfil the old and the new sea requirements of
the Empire was as under:

 The Battle Fleet.

 19 battleships (2 as material reserve).
  8 armoured coast-defence vessels.
  6 large cruisers.
 16 small cruisers.


Foreign Service Fleet.

_Large Cruisers._

 For East Asia                      2
 For Central and South America      1
 Material reserve                   3
                                   --
           Total                    6


_Small Cruisers._

 For East Asia                      3
 For Central and South America      3
 For East Africa                    2
 For the South Seas                 2
 Material reserve                   4
                                   --
         Total                     14

 1 station ship.

The period proposed for the gradual attainment of this strength was
seven years, but the Reichstag shortened it by a year, and thus it
became known as the "Sexennat." It was pronounced inexpedient to
attempt to fix for some years in advance the Empire's requirements in
torpedo craft, school-ships, and training ships.

That this scheme was intended by its author to be merely a beginning
has been shown by the sequel, but Admiral von Tirpitz himself little
dreamed that he would so soon be able to take the next and decisive
step, which should bring him to within measurable distance of his goal.
Early in 1899 he said in the Budget Committee: "I declare expressly
that in no quarter has the intention to submit a new navy plan in any
way been manifested; that, on the contrary, in all quarters concerned,
the firmest intention exists to carry out the Navy Law, and to observe
the limits therein laid down." In other words, the law was to run its
six years' course.

Nevertheless, before the year was at an end, the Bill which was
to become the Navy Law of 1900 had already been announced by the
Government.

In the light of the vast development of Germany's colonial and
commercial interests the Navy Act of 1898 was of an unambitious
character. The German Fleet was at this time still the weakest
possessed by any of the Great Powers of Europe, except Austria-Hungary,
which then had no naval pretensions. If only as a matter of historical
interest it is interesting to record that, at the moment when this
effort towards expansion was made, Germany kept in commission only four
ships which could be dignified with the description of battleships,
together with four smaller armoured vessels. The only modern ships of
the line under the German ensign consisted of these four battleships
of the Worth class, vessels of 9,874 tons displacement in comparison
with ships of 15,000 tons which had already been incorporated in the
British Fleet. The German ships, though nominally battleships, were
really only coast-defence vessels, heavily gunned and thickly armoured,
but with storage for only 680 tons of coal; whereas contemporary
British ships of the Majestic class possessed a capacity of 1,850
tons.[8] The four vessels of this class, in addition to the _Worth_,
were the _Weisenburg_, _Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm_, and _Brandenburg_.
They marked a notable advance on the little armoured ships of three
to four thousand tons of the Siegfried class, which had been built
during the early 'nineties, but, owing to their limited fuel capacity,
their radius of action was extremely restricted, and they were, in
fact, only very powerful coast-defence ships, with a speed on trial of
between sixteen and seventeen knots. The design of every armoured ship
is a compromise between armament, armour, speed, and coal capacity,
and in this German design a predominance then unprecedented in any
navy in the world was given to the two first-named characteristics. On
paper these ships were vessels of great offensive power, as is revealed
by the contrast given on p. 103 between them and the contemporary
battleships of the Majestic class of the British Fleet, which displaced
about 15,000 tons and attained a speed of eighteen knots, with 1,850
tons of coal on board.

These few details reveal the fundamental differences between the
character of the British and German Navies at this time and the policy
which they represented. The British Government, in accordance with
precedent, was providing a fleet of the high-seas type, while the
German Government was content with a small force built specifically for
the purpose of coast-defence. These four large German coast-defence
ships were at this time supported by the four vessels of the Sachsen
type of 7,283 tons, already obsolescent; by six old ships--one dating
back to 1868; by eight little armoured vessels of the Beowulf class,
of about 3,500 tons, which had been constructed during the early
'nineties; and the tail of the list was brought up by eleven armoured
gunboats each of 1,000 tons displacement. This enumeration of the naval
forces of Germany indicates conclusively the modest ambitions which
hitherto had animated her naval administration.

The German Fleet, except for the purposes of coast defence, and
specifically for the protection of her Baltic shores, was a negligible
quantity, having no


 +------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
 |            |     Majestic Class.       |        Worth Class.        |
 +------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
 |Length      |Over all, 413 ft.          |380 ft. 6 in. (354 ft.      |
 |            |  (390 ft. at water-line). |  3 in. at water-line.)     |
 |            |                           |                            |
 |Beam        |75 ft.                     |65 ft. 6 in.                |
 |Mean draught|27 ft. 6 in.               |24 ft. 4 in.                |
 |Armour      |Partial 9-in. Harveyed     |Complete belt, 11·8 to      |
 |            |  belt, 16 ft.             |  15·7 in. (compound        |
 |            |  broad, and 220 ft.       |  in earlier, steel in      |
 |            |  long; bulkheads,         |  later, ships); barbettes  |
 |            |  14 in. (max.);           |  and conning-tower,        |
 |            |  barbettes, 14 in.;       |  11·8 in.;                 |
 |            |  barbette-shields,        |  ammunition hoists,        |
 |            |  10 in.; casemates        |  11·8 in.; gun-hoods,      |
 |            |  (12), 6 in.; protected   |  5 in.; cellulose          |
 |            |  deck 2·5 to              |  cofferdam belt;           |
 |            |  4 in.; forward           |  casemate for 4·1-in.      |
 |            |  conning tower, 14        |  guns, 3 in.; steel        |
 |            |  in.; after conning       |  deck, 3 in., flat on      |
 |            |  tower, 3 in.             |  top of belt.              |
 |            |                           |                            |
 |Armament    |4 12-in. 46-ton            |6 11-in. Krupp              |
 |            |  (wire-wound)             |  breech-loading,           |
 |            |  breech-loading;          |  2 in each                 |
 |            |  12 6-in.                 |  barbette; 8 4·1 in.       |
 |            |  quickfirers in casemates;|  quickfiring of 30         |
 |            |  16 12-pounder            |  calibres in a casemate    |
 |            |  quick-firers;            |  forward of                |
 |            |  2 12-pounder             |  the centre barbettes;     |
 |            |  boat-guns; 12            |  8 3·4-in.                 |
 |            |  3-pounder quick-firing;  |  quick-firers of 30        |
 |            |  2 Maxims;                |  calibres; 2·23 in.        |
 |            |  5 torpedo-tubes          |  breech-loading            |
 |            |  (18-in.), 4 submerged,   |  boat or field guns;       |
 |            |  1 above                  |  12 1-pounder quick-firers;|
 |            |  water astern.            |  8 machine;                |
 |            |                           |  3 torpedo tubes,          |
 |            |                           |  2 submerged.              |
 +------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+

influence either upon European or world policy. The truth of this
statement is conclusively proved by the following table showing the
relative strength of the only five navies of the world which were, at
that time, of appreciable importance, the fleets of Japan and of the
United States being then still in their infancy:

 +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
 |                     |Britain.|France.|Russia.|Italy.|Germany.|
 +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
 |Battleships:         |        |       |       |      |        |
 |  First-class        |    29  |   14  |    6  |   8  |    4   |
 |  Second-class       |     7  |    8  |    4  |   2  |    4   |
 |  Third-class        |    18  |    7  |    5  |   3  |    6   |
 |                     +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
 |    Total battleships|    54  |   29  |   15  |  13  |   14   |
 |                     +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
 |Coast-defence ships  |    14  |   16  |   13  |  --  |   18   |
 |                     +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
 |Cruisers:            |        |       |       |      |        |
 |  First-class        |    23  |    8  |    6  |  --  |    1   |
 |  Second-class       |    47  |   13  |    3  |   5  |    3   |
 |  Third-class        |    34  |    9  |    1  |   9  |    9   |
 |                     +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
 |    Total cruisers   |   104  |   30  |   10  |  14  |   13   |
 |                     +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
 |Torpedo gunboats     |    34  |   19  |    8  |  15  |    4   |
 +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+

It must be confessed that at this time the German Fleet bore no
reasonable relation to Germany's growing trade and oversea interests.
But the mass of the people of the German Empire were still unconscious
of any deficiency, and, blinded by the success of their armies during
the war with France and the small influence which naval power exerted
in that struggle, they had refused for many years to take upon
themselves the burden which the new naval ambitions represented.

But with the passage of the Navy Act of 1898, and the widespread
agitation carried on by the Navy League, under the highest patronage,
and--even more important--by the Press Bureau under Admiral von
Tirpitz, a change immediately occurred; and the success with which
the British forces were enabled to conduct their military operations
in South Africa, while Europe was forced to stand by inactive,
owing to the supreme control which the British Fleet possessed of
sea communications, produced a revulsion of feeling. The current of
European events, and the reception with which the Emperor's speeches
met, convinced the Government, within a comparatively few months of the
passage of the Act of 1898, that they might safely abandon this modest
measure and replace it by a new Bill.

What had happened in the meantime? This: the outbreak of the Boer War
had generated in Germany an absolutely unprecedented hostility to Great
Britain, which was afterwards roused to white heat by the seizure of
the mail steamer _Bundesrat_ and other German vessels on the African
coast. Admiral von Tirpitz had a unique opportunity such as was never
likely to present itself to him again. He made prompt and full use of
it, and while Great Britain was in the thick of the embarrassments of
the early stages of the South African War, the great Navy Bill of 1900
was passed into law.

The seizure of the German vessels was admitted by the British
Government to have been a blunder. An apology was tendered to Germany
on account of it, and promises made that similar incidents should
not recur. The action of the British warships did nothing but harm,
and would certainly never have been taken if the Foreign Office in
London had been properly informed on the situation in Germany by its
representatives in Berlin, and had itself kept the Admiralty fully
posted.

Consequently, in the spring of 1900, the Act of 1898 was replaced by
a new one, in face of all Admiral von Tirpitz's protestations of two
years before. _This measure set up an establishment of almost twice
the size of the former one, and embraced ships intended for battle
purposes on the high seas._ During the discussion of the measure in the
Reichstag the Centre Party compelled the Government to modify their
original scheme, and to drop five large and five small cruisers for
service on foreign stations, while the reserve of cruisers was reduced
by one large and two small vessels. In the course of the debate the
Naval Secretary announced that, while the Government were compelled to
agree to the amendment of their proposals, they still insisted upon the
necessity of providing the original number of ships for duty in foreign
seas, but would agree to postpone the final settlement of the question
until a subsequent date.

In its final form, as it received the approval of the Reichstag and of
the Emperor, and as it was published in the _Imperial German Gazette_
of June 20th, 1900, the Bill set up the following establishment for the
Fleet:

The Battle Fleet.

  2 fleet flagships.
  4 squadrons, each of 8 battleships.
  8 large cruisers for scouting purposes.
 24 small cruisers for scouting purposes.

Foreign Fleet.

  3 large cruisers.
 10 small cruisers.

Reserve.

 4  battleships.
 3  large cruisers.
 4  small cruisers.

The new Act was based upon the same calculation of the effective life
of ships as the one of 1898, and provided that, except in the case of
total loss, battleships were to be replaced after twenty-five years
and cruisers after twenty years. It was provided that the age of ships
was to be reckoned from the grant of the first instalment in payment
for the ship to be replaced to the passing of the first instalment in
payment for the ship to be built as "substitute" (Ersatzschiff). It was
proposed to keep half the battle squadrons--the First and Second--fully
manned on a war footing, together with one-half of the torpedo craft
and all the school-ships and auxiliary vessels. The Third and Fourth
battle squadrons were to form the Reserve Fleet, half the ships of
which were to be kept in permanent commission. The Act also made
provision for nucleus crews for the second half of the torpedo-boats,
for the requirements of ships serving abroad, and for the needs of the
shore establishments.

More remarkable, perhaps, than the actual terms of the Navy Act was
the character of the explanatory Memorandum put forward by the Navy
Department.[9] In this notable document occurs the following statement
of the new naval policy of the German Empire:

 "To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing
 circumstances, there is only one means: Germany must have a battle
 fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest
 sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil
 his position in the world.

 "For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German
 battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power,
 because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to
 concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should
 succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the
 defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the
 enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own
 position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet."

The Memorandum well repays study in the light of subsequent events.
Almost at the moment of its publication Admiral von der Goltz, a
former Chief of the Admiralstab, gave a less reserved exposition of
German policy, thus reflecting the opinions held by the naval officers
responsible for the character of the proposed expansion of the German
Fleet.

 "Let us consider," he said, "the case of a war against England. In
 spite of what many people think, there is nothing improbable in such
 a war, owing to the animosity which exists in our country towards
 England, and, on the other side, to the sentiments of the British
 nation towards all Continental Powers, and in particular against
 Germany. These are not Chauvinistic exaggerations, but the opinion
 of the whole of the people of Great Britain, who are jealous of our
 commercial development. If England should ever lose her mercantile
 supremacy on the seas, the decline of her naval dominion would only be
 a question of time, and she realizes the fact instinctively. Of course
 the British Government will make every effort to prevent the violent
 explosion of these sentiments, preferring peaceful competition to
 war. But how long can that last? Violence becomes a right to a people
 which fears for its existence.

 "The opinion is generally held in this country that any resistance
 against England at sea would be impossible, and that all our naval
 preparations are but wasted efforts. It is time that this childish
 fear, which would put a stop to all our progress, should be pulled up
 by the roots and destroyed.

 "At this moment (1900) we are almost defenceless against England
 at sea, but already we possess the beginnings of a weapon which
 statesmanship can put to a good use, and our chances of success in a
 war against England grow more favourable day by day.

 "The maritime superiority of Great Britain, overwhelming now, will
 certainly remain considerable in the future; but she is compelled to
 scatter her forces all over the world. In the event of war in home
 waters, the greater part of the foreign squadrons would no doubt
 be recalled; but that would be a matter of time, and then all the
 stations oversea could not be abandoned. On the other hand, the German
 Fleet, though much smaller, can remain concentrated in European waters.

 "With the increases about to be made it will be in a position to
 measure its strength with the ordinary British naval forces in home
 waters (then consisting only of the small and inefficiently manned
 Channel squadron); but it should not be forgotten that the question
 of numbers is far less important at sea than on land. Numerical
 inferiority can be compensated by efficiency, by excellence of
 material, by the capacity and discipline of the men. Careful
 preparation permitting rapid mobilization can ensure a momentary
 superiority."

With the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, Germany proceeded to
develop a High-Sea Fleet--a naval force capable of going anywhere and
doing anything. Hitherto her ships had represented in their design
the domination of a coast-defence policy. She now entered upon the
construction of ships of the first class. Naval construction was
regularized, and forthwith proceeded with great rapidity. During the
five years--1886 to 1890--no ship even nominally of the battleship
class was launched. During 1891 to 1895 only four vessels, and between
1890 and 1900 only six vessels, and these all of relatively modest
fighting power, were put in the water, but in 1901 no fewer than five
first-class battleships were sent afloat.

At the time when the Navy Act of 1900 was passed Germany had just
completed the five ships of the old Kaiser class, with a displacement
of about 11,150 tons, and mounting four 9·4-inch guns of 40 calibre
as battle weapons in association with a large number of secondary
guns--eighteen pieces of 5·9 inches. The technical advisers of the
German Admiralty at this date pinned their faith to a storm of
projectiles from quick-firing guns, and in order that weights might be
kept down and the ships might be restricted to dimensions to enable
them to navigate the Kiel Canal, reliance was placed upon the 9·4-inch
gun at a moment when in practically all the navies of the world a
12-inch weapon was being mounted.

The type of battleship design which was introduced with the passage
of the Act of 1898, and which was yet in hand when the measure of 1900
was prepared, still combined a weak main armament of four 9·4-inch
guns with an exceedingly heavy secondary armament and a complete
armoured belt. Whereas British ships at this time, such as those of the
Duncan class, were being given only partial belts, and these only 7
inches thick amidships, tapering off fore and aft, the German vessels
received thicker belts extending over the whole length. Of this new
design--known as the Wittelsbach class--five units were building when
the 1900 Act was passed. They had a maximum coal capacity of 1,770 tons
of coal, with 200 tons of oil, and were capable of steaming at a speed
of about eighteen knots, thus reflecting the rise of German ambition
for something more than a coast-defence fleet. The belts of these ships
were 7·5 inches wide, with a thickness amidships of 8·9 inches, while
the four 9·4-inch guns were protected with armour 9·8 inches thick, and
the secondary turrets and casemates carrying the eighteen 5·9-inch guns
were protected with armour 5·9 inches thick.

After the passage of the Navy Act of 1900 the 9·4-inch gun, as the
battle weapon, was abandoned in favour of an 11-inch of 40 calibre, and
the displacement of the new ships of the Deutschland class, as they are
generically termed, although there are minor differences in the ten
vessels, was nearly 13,000 tons. These ships really represented the
entrance of Germany upon the high seas as a first-class naval Power,
possessing vessels fit to lie in the line and to fight the men-of-war
under any foreign flag. The new design may be contrasted with advantage
with that of the Worth class which has already been described:


Deutschland Class.

_Armour._

 Krupp, complete belt, about 7 feet wide,[10] 8·9 inches amidships,
 tapering to 3·9 inches at ends; lower edge amidships, 6·7 inches;
 lower deck side amidships, 5·5 inches; main turrets and barbettes,
 11 inches to 9·8 inches; secondary turrets, 6·7 inches; battery, 5·9
 inches; conning-tower, 11·8 inches; s.t.--aft, 5·5 inches; deck, 2·9
 inches on slopes, 1·6 inches on flat.

_Armament._

 Four 11 inch (40 calibre) in pairs in turrets, fore and aft; 14 6·7
 inch (40 calibre), 10 in battery on main deck, 4 singly in turrets on
 upper deck; 12 3·4 inch (24 pounder); 4 machine; torpedo tubes, 6 (18
 inch), 4 submerged, 1 bow, and 1 stern.

Simultaneously with the construction of these ten battleships, six
armoured cruisers, ranging in displacement from 8,800 to about 11,000
tons, were laid down, and in 1906 a single clause amending the Act was
passed increasing the foreign fleet by five armoured cruisers and the
fleet reserve by one armoured cruiser, thus fulfilling in part the
original programme of the Navy Department with which the Reichstag had
interfered.

At about the same date German naval opinion made a complete _volte
face_ in regard to the fighting value of the submarine. About the time
when the Act of 1900 was passed the British Admiralty, after a careful
study of the progress of submarine navigation in France and America,
decided that it could no longer ignore this type of man-of-war. It
was forthwith decided to buy an experimental ship from the Holland
Company of the United States, which had already demonstrated the
practical value of this particular type of submersible torpedo-boat.
The original craft which was purchased under these circumstances was
a little ship with a submerged displacement of only 120 tons, and a
water-line displacement of 104 tons. She was propelled on the surface
by a four-cylinder gasoline engine giving a speed of eight to eight and
a half knots, while below the surface she was driven by an electric
motor, and was capable of only six or seven knots.

The entrance of this little ship into the British service was hailed
in Germany with something approaching derision, and in the technical
papers the futility of the submarine was urged with a wealth of
argument. The little Holland boat, however, was merely the foundation
from which the British authorities proceeded to develop a type of craft
in keeping with the offensive rôle of the British Navy, and in 1906
submarines were being built for the British Fleet mounting two torpedo
tubes on a displacement of about 300 tons, and possessing a surface
speed of fourteen knots in combination with a submerged speed of ten
knots. When it is added that these craft possessed a full speed radius
of about 3,000 miles on the surface and were estimated to be able to
travel 150 miles under water, it is not surprising that German naval
opinion as to the advantages of the submarine underwent a sudden and
dramatic change. Henceforth the submarine was to be treated by German
naval officers with respect. Without the formality of any public
announcement, either in the Reichstag or in the Press, an under-water
boat was laid down at the Germania Yard at Kiel in 1906, and
thenceforward an energetic policy of construction was pursued, although
it was not until two years later that legislative provision was made
for the building of this type of warship.

A very remarkable feature of German policy has been the persistency
with which cruisers have been built even at a time when other naval
Powers, including Great Britain, were inactive. As a matter of course,
during the period when the German Government was content to provide
a fleet mainly for the purposes of coast defence, great importance
was attached to the efficiency and adequacy of the cruiser squadrons.
At the time of the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, for instance,
there were eighteen cruisers completed and nearly a dozen others in
hand. Under the Act of that year provision was made to continue this
policy while attaining a higher standard of battle strength.[11] Even
when, in 1908, legislative effect was given to the ambition of the
Marine Office further to expedite battleship construction, in spite of
the heavy cost involved by the transition from mixed armament ships
to the all-big-gun ships of the Dreadnought era, the Reichstag was
asked to stereotype the cruiser programme. The Act made provision
for two light cruisers to be laid down annually, and in the measure
passed in 1912 an addition of two "small cruisers" was made for
the period 1912-1917. A notable contrast is provided by a study of
Germany's action and the policy of the British Admiralty charged with
the protection of a vast oversea trade and half the shipping of the
world. During the later years of the last century and the first four
years of the present century a persistent policy of construction was
pursued both in armoured and protected cruisers, and then for several
years there was a complete cessation of this form of shipbuilding
activity. Other countries, Germany only excepted, either acting on
their own initiative or accepting the lead of the British authorities
also desisted from cruiser construction. The advance in the size and
cost of large armoured ships threw heavy burdens upon the respective
Exchequers, and no doubt the saving effected was a welcome relief at
a moment when under every flag naval expenditure was advancing at an
unparalleled rate. The result of the persistent policy adopted by
Germany became apparent in 1911, when in modern swift cruisers suitable
for scouting the two fleets were practically upon an equality. It was
in these circumstances, faced by evidence of German progress in cruiser
construction, that the British authorities again decided to embark
upon the building of new squadrons of cruisers of small size and high
speed--in fact, of considerably smaller size than the ships then in
hand in Germany.

But in battleship construction German policy has necessarily been
less continuous and consistent. The war between Russia and Japan in
the Far East, and the lessons which it taught to the naval world were
destined to upset completely the theories upon which battleship and
larger cruiser design in Germany had been based in the early years of
the present century. The German naval authorities had persisted in
attaching primary importance to the secondary gun, still believing in
the moral and material effect of a storm of projectiles from numerous
quick-firing guns. They were still proceeding with the construction of
ships--battleships and large cruisers--embodying these ideas when a new
Board of Admiralty in London, with Admiral Sir John--now Lord--Fisher
as First Sea Lord, appointed a Committee to reconsider the design of
British ships in the light of the information which the gunnery tests
of the fleet and the struggle in the Far East had supplied.

Thanks to the British alliance with the Japanese, British officers,
and British officers only, had been permitted to be present with
the Japanese Fleet during the decisive battles of the war. With the
advantage of the information thus obtained the designs of British
ships were reconsidered. The report of this Committee was treated as
confidential. In presenting the Navy Estimates for 1905 to the House of
Commons, the Earl of Selborne, the First Lord, contented himself with
making the following statement as to the work of this body, and of the
new programme of construction:

 "I may claim that the work of the Committee will enable the Board to
 ensure to the Navy the immediate benefit of the experience which is to
 be derived from the naval warfare between Russia and Japan, and of the
 resultant studies of the Naval Intelligence Department. I can however
 hold out no hope that it will be consistent with the interests of the
 public service to publish either the reference to the Committee or its
 report.

 "It is proposed to begin during the financial year 1905-06: 1
 battleship, 4 armoured cruisers, 5 ocean-going destroyers, 1
 ocean-going destroyer of the experimental type, 12 coastal destroyers,
 11 submarines.[12]

 "His Majesty has approved that the battleship should be called
 the _Dreadnought_, and the first of the armoured cruisers the
 _Invincible_."

It was not until many months later that it gradually became known
that the British Admiralty were embarking upon the construction of an
entirely new type of battleship, and it was even later that information
was available as to the character of the "armoured cruisers" mentioned
in the First Lord's statement. In the following spring a partial
revelation of the change in British design was made in the _Naval
Annual_:

 "The _Dreadnought_, officially laid down at Portsmouth on October
 2nd, 1905, though some material had already been built into her, was
 launched by His Majesty on February 10th, 1906. The Admiralty announce
 that the period of building for armoured vessels is to be reduced to
 two years, but the _Dreadnought_ is to be completed in February, 1907.
 The rapidity of her construction will therefore out-rival that of the
 _Majestic_ and _Magnificent_, which were completed within two years
 from the date of the laying of their first keel plates.

 "The _Dreadnought_ represents a remarkable development in naval
 construction, which has been for some time foreshadowed, notably
 by Captain Cuniberti, the famous Italian naval constructor. The
 Russo-Japanese War, more particularly the Battle of Tsushima,
 established the fact that naval engagements can, and will, be fought
 at greater distances than were formerly considered possible. Hence the
 medium armament is held by many authorities to lose much of its value."

In the _Naval Annual_ of that year, it was reported that the Japanese
contemplated laying down a battleship with an armament of four 12-inch
and ten 10-inch guns. It was then announced that the _Dreadnought_ was
to carry a main armament of ten 12-inch 45 calibre guns, of 50 per
cent. greater power than those carried by the _Majestic_, while the
medium armament was to disappear entirely.

The question of protection entered also very largely into the
consideration, and _The Times_, in describing the new ship, said that
it was understood that "she was to be made as nearly unsinkable as
possible from the explosion of a torpedo or mine." It was even stated
that there would be no openings in the watertight bulkheads, and this
proved to be the fact. Moreover, this ship was the first large vessel
in the world to be fitted with turbines.

It was stated unofficially that this new ship of the all-big-gun
type rendered obsolescent practically all the battleships of the
world with mixed armaments--that is with guns of varying size. The
British naval authorities continued to maintain a discreet silence
as to the character of the new vessels, and the design, as its main
characteristics became known, was assailed with a good deal of
criticism. The controversy was at its height when President Roosevelt
called upon Commander Sims, the Inspector of Target Practice in the
United States Navy, to make a report upon the advantages possessed
by the all-big-gun ship of high speed and complete armour protection
in view of the criticism of the British design of Admiral Mahan.[13]
Commander Sims, who had made a life-study of gunnery questions,
prepared a long report describing the character of the revolution
in design, and its influence upon the navies of the world. It is
interesting to recall some passages from this report, which in its
essential portions appeared in the proceedings of the United States
Naval Institute, particularly as the British Admiralty have never
considered it wise to enter upon a detailed defence of their policy.
Commander Sims stated:

 "Concerning the advisability of building all-big-gun ships, that
 is, discarding all smaller guns (except torpedo-defence guns) and
 designing the ships to carry the maximum number of heavy turret guns,
 these alone to be used in battle against other ships, I think it
 could be clearly shown that Captain Mahan is in error in concluding
 that it would add more to our naval strength to expend the same
 amount of money that the big ships would cost, for smaller and
 slower ships, carrying the usual intermediate guns (6-inch, etc.);
 and that, as in the question of speed, this error is due to the
 fact that much important information concerning the new methods of
 gun-fire was not considered by the author in preparing his article.
 (Note.--Unfortunately these methods of gun-fire cannot at present be
 specifically explained in a published article, as this would involve
 a discussion of our methods of controlling our ships' batteries, and
 bringing our ships into action with an enemy.)

 "I may, however, assure the reader that, from the point of view of
 the efficiency of gun-fire alone, it would be unwise ever to build
 a man-of-war of any type whatever, having more than one calibre of
 gun in her main battery. In other words, it may be stated that the
 abandonment of mixed-battery ships in favour of the all-big-gun,
 one-calibre ship was directly caused by the recognition of certain
 fundamental principles of naval markmanship developed by gunnery
 officers.

 "Therefore we have but to decide what the calibre for each class
 of ships should be, a decision which should present no special
 difficulty, provided it be first determined how we are to defeat the
 enemy--whether by the destruction of his ships (by sinking them or
 disabling their guns) or by the destruction or demoralization of their
 personnel.

 "In this connection the following facts should first be clearly
 understood--namely:

 "1. Turrets are now, for the first time, being designed that are
 practically invulnerable to all except heavy projectiles. Instead of
 having sighting-hoods on the turret roof, where sights, pointers, and
 officers are exposed to disablement (as frequently happened in the
 Russian ships) there will be prismatic sights, projecting laterally
 from the gun trunnions, through small holes in the side of the turret,
 and the gun-ports will be protected by 8-inch armour plates, so
 arranged that no fragments of shells can enter the turrets.

 "2. On the proposed all-big-gun ships the heavy armour belt will be
 about eight feet above the water-line, and extending from end to end.
 The conning-tower, barbettes, etc., will be of heavy armour; and there
 being no intermediate battery (which could not be protected by heavy
 armour, on account of its extent), it follows that in battle all the
 gunnery personnel, except the small, single fire-control party aloft,
 will be behind heavy armour, and that, therefore, neither the ship or
 her personnel can be materially injured by small calibre guns.

 "Considering, therefore, that our object in designing a battleship
 is that she may be able to meet those of our possible enemies upon
 at least equal terms, it seems evident that it would be extremely
 unwise to equip our new ships with a large number of small guns that
 are incapable of inflicting material damage upon the all-big-gun
 one-calibre ships of our enemies, or upon the personnel manning their
 guns."

In the same paper Commander Sims explained the principal tactical
qualities that are desirable in a fleet--namely, compactness of the
battle formation and the flexibility of the fleet as a unit--that is,
its ability to change its formation in the least possible time and
space with safety to its units. Proceeding to elaborate his views,
Commander Sims stated:

 "For example, suppose two fleets of eight vessels each, composed of
 ships that are alike in all respects, and suppose their personnel to
 be equally skilful, with the exception of the Commanders-in-Chief,
 whose difference in energy and ability is such that one fleet has been
 so drilled as to be able to manoeuvre with precision and safety while
 maintaining one-half the distance between its units that the other
 fleet requires.

 "This is putting an extreme case, but it shows:

 "1. That the short fleet, being about half the length of the other
 one, can complete certain important manoeuvres in about one-half the
 time and one half the space required for similar manoeuvres of the
 long fleet.

 "2. That, when ranged alongside each other, the defeat of the long
 fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual
 units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of
 the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return,
 though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance
 of gun-fire from the fifth or sixth vessel of the long fleet, the
 seventh and eighth being too far astern to do much damage, as would
 also be the case if the long fleet had several vessels astern of these.

 "It is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant
 effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between
 the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with
 safety under battle conditions--that is, while steaming at full speed,
 without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that
 should be used only for preliminary drills.

 "Doubtless some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises
 in manoeuvring, may succeed in attaining an interval between ships
 that is less by 15 or 20 per cent. than that attained by others; but
 manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement
 in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships
 depends upon their lengths and manoeuvring qualities. For example,
 the German interval is 300 metres from centre to centre, while larger
 ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and those between
 450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards.

 "If we accept Captain Mahan's advice and build comparatively small,
 low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift,
 all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous
 advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect
 of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire--the loss of
 these advantages to be fully realised twenty-five years hence, when
 our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our
 present size."

       *       *       *       *       *

Finally, this officer added:

 "If it be claimed that it would be better to reduce the speed of the
 large vessel to sixteen knots and put the weight saved into guns,
 it may be replied that the heavy turret guns cannot be mounted to
 advantage (so as to increase the hitting capacity of the vessel)
 without very considerably increasing the size of the ship, because the
 number of heavy turrets that can be placed to advantage is governed
 largely by the length of the ship--which increases slowly with the
 displacement. This point is fully discussed in a recent article in a
 German publication. I do not remember the displacement used by the
 author to illustrate the principle, but, supposing the ones quoted
 below to be correct, he shows that if it requires a displacement of
 20,000 tons to obtain a broadside fire of, say, eight 12-inch turret
 guns, you could not advantageously mount any additional turrets on
 21,000 or 22,000 tons, but would have to go to 25,000 or 26,000
 tons to obtain the necessary space. And, conversely, if you design a
 20,000-ton battleship for sixteen instead of twenty knots, you cannot
 utilise the weight saved to increase the gun-power by adding 12-inch
 turrets, as you could by adding a number of intermediate guns.

 "It is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets
 (by which the number of guns could be doubled, if the weights
 permitted) does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the
 ship as a whole, because of the 'interference' caused by having four
 guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power
 by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets.

 "Captain Mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to
 increase the size of the new battleships (from about 15,000 to about
 20,000 tons) as a 'wilful premature antiquating of good vessels' ...
 'a growing and wanton evil.' If these words are intended in their true
 meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. I can understand
 an individual being wilful and wanton, but I cannot believe that the
 naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly
 and uniformly inspired in this manner. On the contrary, it seems to
 me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large
 vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that
 is believed to justify the demand.

 "This common cause is undoubtedly a common belief that the same amount
 of money expended for large war vessels will add more to a nation's
 naval power than the same amount expended for small vessels, for it
 cannot reasonably be assumed that the tax-ridden nations of Europe
 expend their great naval budgets wilfully and wantonly. Undoubtedly
 each nation earnestly strives to expend these sums as to derive the
 greatest increase of naval power. The same is true in reference to
 their armies. As the mechanical arts improve each nation endeavours to
 improve its war material. When a nation adopts new rifles, it is not
 a wilful premature antiquating of several million excellent ones, it
 is a case of _force majeure_--it must adopt them or suffer a relative
 loss of military efficiency, and it must make no mistake as to the
 relative efficiency of its weapons. In 1870 the French suffered a
 humiliating defeat as a direct result of the colossal conceit which
 rendered them incapable of accepting conclusive evidence that the
 German field artillery was greatly superior to theirs.

 "The same law--that of necessity--governs the evolution of
 battleships. As might have been expected, this evolution has, as a
 rule, been gradual as regards increased displacement. The exception
 is the sudden recent increase (4,000 to 5,000 tons) in displacement.
 This exception therefore needs explanation.... It was due to a
 complete change of opinion as to the _hitting capacity_ of guns of
 various calibres. This is now well understood by all officers who
 have recently been intimately associated with the new methods of
 gunnery training. These methods have demonstrated this point in such
 a manner as to leave no doubt in our minds as to the correctness of
 our conclusions. The rapidity of hitting of the heaviest guns has been
 increased several thousand per cent., and that of smaller guns about
 in proportion to their calibre.

 " ... The inception of the epoch-making principles of the new methods
 of training belongs exclusively to Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Percy
 Scott, Director of Naval Practice of the British Navy, who has, I
 believe, done more in this respect to improve naval marksmanship
 than all of the naval officers who have given their attention to
 this matter since the first introduction of the rifled cannon on
 men-of-war; nor should we forget that this degree of improvement
 was rendered possible by the introduction of telescope sights, the
 successful application of which to naval guns was made by Commander
 B.A. Fiske, U.S. Navy, as early as 1892. As soon as the above facts
 gained general acceptance in Great Britain and the United States, the
 evolution of the all-big-gun one-calibre battleship became a foregone
 conclusion; and the reason for the great increase in displacement, as
 I understand it, is simply that you cannot build an efficient ship of
 this class on less than about 20,000 tons, because you cannot mount
 more than two 12-inch turrets to advantage upon a battleship of much
 less displacement, because the length and breadth are not sufficient."

The Dreadnought design and all that it meant threw the German
Admiralty into confusion. At the moment they were still engaged in
the construction of the vessels of the Deutschland class, of about
13,000 tons, in which primary importance was given to the secondary
gun--fourteen 6·7-inch weapons--to the sacrifice of the big gun--four
11-inch pieces--and speed; whereas the new British design ignored the
secondary gun in order to mount no fewer than ten big guns, and develop
the speed to the extent of three or four knots above battleships then
building. Before the _Dreadnought_ of the British programme of 1905 had
been laid down at Portsmouth, two German battleships of the familiar
design with mixed armament had been begun--the _Schleswig Holstein_ in
the Germania Yard and the _Schlesien_ at Dantzic. So completely were
the German authorities unprepared for the revolution initiated by the
British Admiralty, that from the summer of 1905 until July, 1907, the
keel of not a single further battleship was laid in Germany. In the
meantime, while British yards were busy with vessels of the new type,
the design of the German ships was reconsidered. After an interval of
two years the keels of two vessels of the _Dreadnought_ type were laid
down, and two more keels were placed in position a month later--that
is, in August, 1907. These four ships--the Nassau class--inaugurated
the Dreadnought policy in Germany. Two were completed in May, 1910, and
two in September following.

These ships embody the all-big-gun principle in association with a
powerful secondary armament, consisting of a dozen 5·9-inch guns and
sixteen 24-pounders. Moreover, whereas the British Dreadnought had been
provided with only ten big guns, which was held by the British gunnery
experts to be the maximum number which could be carried with advantage
on the displacement then considered advisable, the German vessels were
given twelve guns, not of the 12-inch but of the 11-inch type. Each of
these ships displaces 18,600 tons, and has a nominal speed of twenty
knots. Their normal coal capacity is 885 tons, with a maximum storage
of 2,655 tons. On the other hand, the early British _Dreadnought_, with
about the same displacement and coal-carrying capacity, attained a
speed of one or two knots more, owing to the use of turbines in place
of reciprocating engines. The contrast between the armour and armament
of the British and German ships, comparing the four Nassaus of the
German Fleet[14] with the Superb class of the British Navy, is given in
the table on p. 129.

By energetic action the British Admiralty had obtained a lead in the
new type of battleship.[15] Moreover, even after the character of the
Dreadnought became known, the German authorities remained ignorant of
the fact that the "armoured cruisers" of the Invincible class were
really swift battleships carrying the same type of battle gun as the
_Dreadnought_, in association with a speed exceeding twenty-five
knots, and an armour belt not inferior to that placed on the latest
pre-Dreadnought German battleships. By this decisive move, the British
authorities had depressed the value of all mixed armament battleships,
in which the British Fleet was becoming weak in face of foreign--and
particularly German--rivalry, and had started the competition of
armaments on an entirely new basis upon terms of advantage.

No sooner was the true inwardness of the Dreadnought policy realized
than the German authorities began the preparation of a new German Navy
Act. It was eventually decided that the best

 +--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+
 |        |       Superb Class.       |       Nassau Class.       |
 +--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+
 |Armour  |Krupp: Complete            |Krupp: Complete            |
 |        |  belt, about 16 ft.       |  belt, 12 in. amidships,  |
 |        |  wide (narrower           |  tapering                 |
 |        |  aft), 11 in. amidships,  |  to 3·9 in. forward,      |
 |        |  tapering to              |  and 3·9 in. aft;         |
 |        |  6 in. forward and        |  lower deck side,         |
 |        |  4 in. aft; turrets,      |  7·9 in. amidships,       |
 |        |  8 in.; barbettes,        |  3·9 in. narrow           |
 |        |  12 in.; forward          |  belt at ends; turrets    |
 |        |  conning-tower, 12        |  and barbettes,           |
 |        |  in.; after conning-tower,|  11 in.; battery,         |
 |        |  8 in.; deck,             |  6·1 in.; conning-tower,  |
 |        |  sloping, 2·7 in.         |  11·8 in.;                |
 |        |                           |  deck, sloping, 2·9 in.   |
 |Armament|10 12-in. (45 calibres)    |12 11-in. (45 calibres)    |
 |        |  in pairs in turrets,     |  in pairs in turrets,     |
 |        |  1 forward, 1 on          |  1 forward, 1 aft,        |
 |        |  each beam, 2 aft         |  and 2 on each            |
 |        |  on centre line;          |  beam; 12 5·9 in.         |
 |        |  16 4-in. (50 calibres),  |  (45 calibres) in battery;|
 |        |  2 on each                |  16 3·4 in.               |
 |        |  turret (except No.       |  (24-pounder); torpedo    |
 |        |  4), 8 in superstructure; |  tubes, 6 18-in.,         |
 |        |  5 machine;               |  submerged, bow,          |
 |        |  torpedo tubes, 5         |  stern, and broadside.    |
 |        |  18-in., submerged,       |                           |
 |        |  broadside, and           |                           |
 |        |  stern.                   |                           |
 +--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+

means of accomplishing the end in view--namely, the construction of
a larger number of ships of the armoured classes in the next few
years than was provided in the Act of 1900, was to reduce the nominal
effective age, and legislate for the replacement of all battleships
and large cruisers within twenty years. Accordingly, attached to the
new Act passed early in 1908, which was over two years after the laying
down of the Dreadnought, was a schedule setting forth that four large
armoured ships should be laid down annually between 1908 and 1911,
both inclusive, and that in 1911 onwards to 1917, two keels annually
should be placed in position. By means of this single clause measure,
which became law on April 6th, 1908, the construction of ships of the
Dreadnought type was accelerated, and whereas the British Admiralty had
definitely abandoned the construction of large cruisers of the armoured
class--as the German authorities knew by this time--the Marine Office
decided that each of the "large cruisers" specified in the Act of 1900
should be swift Dreadnoughts.

This point is an important one. Between 1897 and 1904, Great Britain
laid down 27 battleships and 35 armoured cruisers--a total of 62
armoured ships in eight years, or an average of 7·75 ships a year. In
this period Germany built 16 battleships and 5 armoured cruisers, or
21 armoured ships--equal to an average of 2·62 ships a year. In 1905
the Admiralty determined to cease building armoured cruisers. In that
year they laid down 4 "capital ships"--all of them Dreadnoughts; in the
next two years 3 annually, and in 1908, 2 ships only. While the British
authorities abandoned the building of armoured cruisers, Germany
decided to accelerate her battleship construction, and she also decided
that all the "large cruisers" specified in her Law should be swift
Dreadnoughts, and thus from 38 battleships and 20 armoured cruisers,
she rose to an establishment of 58 battleships.

At the end of 1911, when it was imagined that the German programme
would fall from 4 large ships annually to 2 ships, a new Navy Bill was
produced.[16] Incidentally this measure added to the establishment
3 battleships and 2 unarmoured cruisers, and made provision for the
construction of a maximum of 72 submarines.

The significance of the successive changes in shipbuilding policy in
Germany, reflecting in an ascending scale the naval ambitions of the
Marineamt, may be realised from the following summary, showing the
establishment of large armoured ships fixed under successive measures:

 +-----+----------------------------+
 | Act.|   Establishment of Ships   |
 |     |         Adopted.           |
 |     +------------+---------------+
 |     |Battleships.|Large Cruisers.|
 +-----+------------+---------------+
 |1898 |    17      |       8       |
 |1900 |    38      |      14       |
 |1906 |    38      |      20       |
 |     |            |               |
 |     +----------------------------+
 |     |       Dreadnoughts.        |
 |1908 |           58               |
 |1912 |           61               |
 +-----+----------------------------+

Under the operation of German naval legislation, it was determined to
provide sixty-one large armoured ships of maximum power, all of them
less than twenty years old. The Act did not specify the character of
the vessels of the various classes to be laid down. It was elastic in
this respect. It left to the Marine Office complete freedom in the
matter of design; but, on the other hand, it tied effectually the
hands of the Reichstag, and it could not, except it repealed the Navy
Law, reduce in any year the number of keels to be laid down. There
could be no reduction in the output of naval material until a new Navy
Law had been passed. This is a point which was frequently forgotten in
England.

But the notable feature of the Navy Act passed by the Reichstag in 1912
was not the additions to the shipbuilding programme, though these were
notable, but the steps taken to increase the instant readiness of the
fleet for war. Prior to the passage of this measure it had been the
practice in the British Navy to maintain only about half the men-of-war
of various classes on a war footing, relegating the remainder to
reserves representing various stages of preparedness for action. The
German Navy Act of 1912 set up an entirely new standard with a view to
obtaining the maximum advantage from a conscript service, where the pay
is low, in competition with a voluntary service, such as obtains in the
British Fleet, with very much higher rates of pay. In the speech which
he delivered in Committee in the House of Commons on July 22nd, 1912,
Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, gave a lucid
explanation of the essential features of this German Navy Act. He said:

 "The main feature of that Law is not the increase in the new
 construction of capital ships, though that is an important feature.
 The main feature is the increase in the striking force of ships of all
 classes which will be available, immediately available, at all seasons
 of the year. A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and
 maintained in full commission as part of the active battle-fleet.
 Whereas, according to the unamended Law, the active battle-fleet
 consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and
 12 small cruisers; in the near future that active fleet will consist
 of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small
 cruisers; and, whereas at present owing to the system of recruitment
 which prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile
 during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the
 operation of this Law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered
 much more readily available.

 "Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers--or torpedo-boats, as they
 are called in Germany--instead of 66, will be maintained in full
 commission out of a total of 144. Three-quarters of a million pounds
 had already been taken in the general estimate for the year for the
 building of submarines. The new Law adds a quarter of a million to
 this, and that is a provision which, so far as we can judge from a
 study of the finances, would appear to be repeated in subsequent
 years. Seventy-two new submarines will be built within the currency of
 the Law, and of those it is apparently proposed to maintain fifty-four
 with full permanent crews.

 "Taking a general view, the effect of this Law will be that nearly
 four-fifths of the entire German Navy will be maintained in full
 permanent commission--that is to say, instantly and constantly ready
 for war. Such a proportion is remarkable, and so far as I am aware,
 finds no example in the previous practice of modern naval Powers.
 So great a change and development in the German Fleet involves, of
 course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers
 and men of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has
 reached 66,000.

 "Under the previous Laws and various amendments which have preceded
 this one, the Germans have been working up to a total in 1920,
 according to our calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they
 have been approaching that total by increments of, approximately, an
 addition of 3,500 a year. The new law adds a total of 15,000 officers
 and men, and makes the total in 1920 of 101,500.[17] The new average
 annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of all ranks, but for the
 next three years by special provision 500 extra are to be added. From
 1912 to 1914 500 are to be added, and in the last three years of the
 currency of the Law 500 less will be taken. This makes a total rate of
 increase of the German Navy personnel of about 5,700 men a year.

 "The new construction under the Law prescribes for the building of
 three additional battleships--one to be begun next year (1913), one in
 1916, and two small cruisers of which the date has not yet been fixed.
 The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been
 presumed to be later than the six years which we have in view.

 "The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next
 six years is estimated as £10,500,000 above the previous estimates
 spread over that period. I should like to point out to the Committee
 that this is a cumulative increase which follows upon other increases
 of a very important character. The Law of 1898 was practically doubled
 by the Law of 1900, and if the expenditure contemplated by the Law of
 1900 had been followed the German estimates of to-day would be about
 £11,000,000. But owing to the amendments of 1906 and 1908, and now of
 1912, that expenditure is very nearly £23,000,000. But the fact that
 the personnel plays such a large part in this new amendment, and that
 personnel is more cheaply obtained in Germany than in this country,
 makes the money go farther there than it would do over here.

 "The ultimate scale of the new German Fleet, as contemplated by the
 latest Navy Law, will be 41 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured
 cruisers, and 40 small cruisers, besides a proper proportion--an ample
 proportion--of flotillas of torpedo-boat destroyers and submarines, by
 1920. This is not on paper a great advance on the figures prescribed
 by the previous Law, which gave 38 battleships, 20 battle or large
 armoured cruisers, and 38 small cruisers. That is not a great
 advance on the total scale. In fact, however, there is a remarkable
 expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength
 and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of
 battleships and large armoured cruisers alone which will be kept
 constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the Law
 from twenty-one, the present figure, to thirty-three--that is to say,
 an addition of twelve, or an increase of about 57 per cent. The new
 fleet will in the beginning include about twenty battleships and large
 cruisers of the older types, but gradually, as new vessels are built,
 the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will
 consist completely of modern vessels.

 "This new scale of the German Fleet--organized in five battle
 squadrons, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron,
 complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds, and
 accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines, more
 than three-fourths--nearly four-fifths, maintained in full permanent
 commission--the aspect and scale of this fleet is, I say, extremely
 formidable. Such a fleet will be about as numerous to look at as the
 fleet which was gathered at Spithead for the recent Parliamentary
 visit, but, of course, when completed it will be far superior in
 actual strength. This full development will only be realized step
 by step. But already in 1914 two squadrons will, so far as we can
 ascertain, be entirely composed of Dreadnoughts, or what are called
 Dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the
 Deutschlands and the Braunschweigs,[18] together with five Dreadnought
 battle-cruisers. It remains to be noted that this new Law is the fifth
 in fourteen years of the large successive increases made in German
 naval strength, that it encountered no effective opposition in its
 passage through the Reichstag, and that, though it has been severely
 criticized in Germany since its passage, the criticisms have been
 directed towards its inadequacy."

Such is the evolution which German naval ambitions have undergone since
the Reichstag in the early years of the Emperor's reign refused to
believe that four relatively small battleships in full commission, with
the same number of ineffective coast-defence ships of small size, did
not represent the maximum naval power which Germany need provide, and
that an expenditure of two and three-quarter millions sterling was not
sufficient burden to impose annually upon the Teutonic peoples over and
above the cost in money and service of the predominant army.

Nothing reveals the statesmanship of Admiral von Tirpitz so strikingly
as the character of the naval legislation for which he has been
responsible, and the manner in which he has bent every influence
in Germany and every occurrence abroad to promote his ends. Prior
to the introduction of the Navy Act of 1898, the only example of a
continuous naval policy was the Naval Defence Act of 1889, under
which seventy ships of various types were added to the British Navy
during a period of four years. Of these vessels only ten were of the
armoured classes. This measure was confined to shipbuilding, and it
made no provision for increasing the personnel or for setting up a
fixed standard of commissioning. It merely provided a certain number
of ships and left it to Parliament to provide or not to provide crews
with which to man them, and, as a matter of fact, Parliament did not
provide the necessary officers and men until long after the ships were
at sea. Admiral von Tirpitz was not satisfied with so unmethodical and
unstatesman-like a measure of procedure when he went to the Marineamt
in 1897. He presented to the Reichstag a complete scheme of naval
expansion, making provision not only for the construction of ships in
specified numbers over a period of six years, but providing also for
the due expansion of the personnel and for the attainment of a fixed
establishment of ships first in full commission, secondly with nucleus
crews, and thirdly in reserve. In obtaining the assent of the Reichstag
to this measure, which to a great extent removed the naval expansion
movement from the control which it had hitherto exercised annually on
the presentation of the Estimates, the Minister of Marine achieved his
first great triumph.

This Act was to have remained in operation for a period of six years,
and was represented as an embodiment of German needs, quite independent
of the naval preparations then being made by other Powers. During the
next two years no development occurred in the naval programmes either
of Great Britain or other foreign countries, but an Anglophobe wave
passed over the Continent as a result of the South African War. German
sympathies in particular were aroused, and Admiral von Tirpitz at once
seized the opportunity to repeal the fixed and immutable Fleet Law of
1898, and to replace it by a new enactment providing a Battle Fleet of
roughly twice the strength of that legalized in the establishment of
the former measure. This measure was to have remained in force until
1917. Six years later--a Liberal Government, intent on disarmament,
having assumed office in the United Kingdom--an amendment representing
another expansion was passed; two years after that the fourth Fleet
Law became operative, and in 1912 another measure was adopted by the
Reichstag under the influence of a renewed Anglophobe movement in
Germany. Experience has shown that German Fleet Laws are regarded as
immutable and fixed when proposals in the direction of a limitation
of armaments are made, but as flexible as though no Fleet Law existed
when political circumstances are favourable for making a further effort
towards a higher standard of naval power.

Nor does this study exhaust the remarkable features of this naval
legislation. An ordinary statesman, ignorant of naval matters, might
have so framed the successive Naval Laws as seriously to tie the hands
of the naval authorities in the development of the fleet, whereas
Admiral von Tirpitz, with great skill, restricted the powers of
interference on the part of the Reichstag, while leaving the Marine
Office with almost complete freedom in shaping the naval machine in
the process of expansion. This double end was achieved by the use of
generic naval terms in the loose manner adopted by those unfamiliar
with their significance. Admiral von Tirpitz made up his "paper"
establishment in the Fleet Laws by styling every ship of slow speed
but carrying an armoured belt "a battleship," and then, under the
terms of the Law, he made provision for these dummy vessels to be
replaced by veritable battleships of maximum power. Thus ships of
4,000 tons displacement have been replaced by Dreadnoughts of 25,000
tons, carrying the heaviest guns, and protected by thick armour. The
establishment fixed by the Reichstag has not been exceeded, but by
a simple process of conjuring, small coast-defence ships have been
quietly converted into first class sea-going battleships, ranking in
strategical and tactical qualities with the most formidable ships in
the British Fleet. The naval authorities have by this means been
able to prove to the uninitiated when challenged that they have kept
within the four corners of the Law, that the number of battleships has
remained fixed according to the establishment between the periods of
each enactment, and at the same time they have been in a position to
follow an active shipbuilding policy, while raising from year to year
the necessary personnel for manning the new vessels. This in another
notable feature of Admiral von Tirpitz's policy. The legislation
has been so elastic as to enable him to raise the necessary number
of officers and men to suit the requirements of the Fleet. When a
Dreadnought, requiring 1,106 officers and men, has been completed for
sea to take the place of a ship of the Hagen class, with a crew of only
306, the additional personnel has been instantly ready.

The same process has been adopted in increasing the cruiser squadrons
of the German Navy. The Law has specified that a certain number of
"large cruisers" shall be built, and it has been left to the discretion
of the naval authorities to interpret this elastic term in tons,
guns, armour, knots of speed, and personnel. In accordance with the
Law, Admiral von Tirpitz has thus been able to replace cruisers of
negligible fighting value and of small size by Dreadnought battle
cruisers mounting guns of immense power and attaining speeds hitherto
without precedent. Similarly, small torpedo-boats have given way in the
establishment of the Navy to torpedo-boat destroyers of large size,
and step by step the naval strength of Germany has been increased by a
process, the cleverness and ingenuity of which even the German people
themselves have not realized.

Germany has immensely increased her resources of ships and men, but
she has done more than that: she has forced other Powers to organize
and train their squadrons on a standard of efficiency never attempted
in the past. She has increased the strain and stress of peace until it
resembles closely the actual conditions of war, and having determined
year in and year out to keep nearly four-fifths of her fleet always on
a war footing, always instantly ready for action, she has compelled
other countries, in accordance with the dictates of ordinary foresight,
to take similar action, however onerous the financial burden. It is on
Great Britain and the United States that the weight of this burden has
borne most heavily, for in those States alone is reliance placed on a
voluntary system of manning, which is necessarily very costly.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 8: It is interesting to note, however, that even at this
early date the German Admiralty made provision for the storage of oil
in order to supplement the coal supply.]

[Footnote 9: _Cf._ Appendix I.]

[Footnote 10: The five later ships were given a belt with a thickness
of 9·4 inches amidships, but otherwise their protection and armament
closely resembled those laid down at an earlier date.]

[Footnote 11: See Appendix II.]

[Footnote 12: One of these "armoured cruisers" was not built.]

[Footnote 13: It has since become known that the Americans had designed
an all-big-gun ship before the British Dreadnought was laid down.]

[Footnote 14: British naval opinion held from the first that these
ships of the Nassau type vitiated the Dreadnought principle of
simplicity of armament, and were so over-gunned as to be ineffective
units. Sea-service has tended to confirm this view.]

[Footnote 15: In the three succeeding years, in accordance with the
British Government's policy of a limitation of naval armaments, and
as an example to other Powers, this advantage was partially lost, and
hence the large programme of 1909-10.]

[Footnote 16: _Cf._ Appendix II.]

[Footnote 17: In his speech in the House of Commons on March 26th,
1913, the First Lord corrected this figure. He stated that the maximum
to be attained under the new Fleet Law in 1920 was 107,000, apart from
reserves.]

[Footnote 18: These two groups of ships are of practically the same
design.]




CHAPTER VI

German Ships, Officers, and Men


In material, in the art of constructing and equipping ships of war,
Germany at the beginning of the war ranked far above most of the
Great Powers, and she was little, if anything, behind even Great
Britain in workmanship, rapidity and cheapness. Her personnel also
stood high, for she had succeeded in translating into naval terms
the professional and disciplinary codes which have raised the German
Army to a position of pre-eminence. Above all she had succeeded, in
a degree never before attempted by any country, in keeping ships and
men in constant association. The German naval authorities recognized
that, while a conscriptive system of manning a fleet brings into the
organization certain grave and ineradicable disadvantages, it did at
least enable large numbers of officers and men to be borne for service
at a relatively small annual cost. Realising this economic benefit
of conscription, the Marineamt had no hesitation in increasing its
personnel rapidly from year to year. The expansion of this element of
naval power kept pace with the activity of the shipyards. This policy
of simultaneous increase of ships and of men, accompanied as it was
by the expansion of her shipbuilding and allied industries and of
her dockyards, has been the secret of the rapid rise of Germany as a
maritime Power wielding world-wide influence.

Within the memory of the present generation German ships of war, if not
built in England, were constructed in Germany with materials obtained
entirely or in part from England. Her earliest armoured ships of any
account--the _Deutschland_, the _Kaiser_ and the _Konig Wilhelm_--were
all constructed on the banks of the Thames at the old Samuda Yard.
The great industry which Germany and other foreign nations helped to
support is now dead, and on the other side of the North Sea is to be
seen an activity more intense and on a far larger scale than the Thames
establishments could boast even in the day of their greatest prosperity.

Though there are many shipbuilding yards and engine-making
establishments in Germany, the naval authorities depend exclusively
upon the vast establishment of Krupp for armour and guns, and the
repute of the firm in both respects stands high. The vast establishment
which supplies the German and many other Governments was founded in
1810 by Friedrich Krupp, who bought a small forge and devoted himself,
with little commercial success, to the manufacture of cast steel. In
this he was ahead of Germany's requirements, but on the basis thus
laid by the father, the son built; and in 1851 a solid steel ingot
which he exhibited at the Great Exhibition in London completely took
the metallurgic world by surprise, and his fortune was made. He turned
his energy and knowledge to the making of guns, armour, weldless steel
rails, and other manufactures; and the modest works at Essen continued
to expand until to-day they and the associated establishments give
employment to about 70,000 men, not all of whom, of course, always are
engaged on the manipulation of armaments.

For many years the Krupp process of armour manufacture was adopted in
every country of the world, but later on the British Admiralty, it is
common knowledge, adopted a superior process which produces a plate
of greater resisting power, and the German cemented type of armour no
longer holds the premier position which it occupied when its advantages
over the Harvey plate were demonstrated. On the other hand, the Krupp
firm still claim that their ordnance is not equalled by any in the
world, and on the strength of this claim they have obtained most
valuable orders, extending over a long series of years, from foreign
Governments. British guns are made on the wire-wound system--that
is, steel ribbon is wound under great pressure round the gun, and
over this is placed an outer hoop; Krupp's, on the other hand, still
remain faithful to the solid steel tube to resist the gas pressures
exerted, arguing that their method of steel manufacture enables them
to submit it to strains which other steel might not stand. There has
been endless controversy as to the merits of the two systems; and the
subject was again discussed as recently as the end of 1912, when the
Italian Minister of Marine laid a report before the Italian Parliament
with reference to the armaments of the principal fleets. According to
this statement the British, Italian, and Japanese are the only Navies
to mount wire-wound guns; the probable life of the Italian and Japanese
12-inch guns was given at 80 rounds, whereas the English gun was good
for only 60 rounds. On the other hand, the Austrian and German guns
were given from 200 to 220 rounds, and the American 14-inch gun was
estimated to have a probable life of 150 rounds. Particulars with
reference to British and German guns were given as follows:

 +---------------------+-------------+--------------------+
 |                     |   British.  |       German.      |
 +---------------------+------+------+------+------+------+
 |Calibre in inches    |    12|  13.5|    12|    14|    15|
 |Length in calibres   |    50|    45|    45|    50|    50|
 |Weight in tons       |    69|    80|    53|    83|   102|
 |Weight of projectile |      |      |      |      |      |
 |  in pounds          |   850| 1,240|   850| 1,360| 1,650|
 |Initial velocity     | 2,950| 2,800| 3,000| 3,000| 3,000|
 |Energy at muzzle in  |      |      |      |      |      |
 |  metric tons        |16,540|22,150|17,520|27,650|33,910|
 |Energy per kilogramme|      |      |      |      |      |
 |  in kilometres      |   240|   277|   330|   330|   330|
 |Probable life in     |      |      |      |      |      |
 |  rounds             |    60|    60|   200|   200|   200|
 +---------------------+------+------+------+------+------+

The attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty was directed to these
statements in the House of Commons, and he reiterated the assurance
of former Ministers that the expert advisers were satisfied as to the
wisdom of retaining the wire-wound system. He gave no data as to the
foundation of this confidence, and in the German technical Press--no
doubt with an eye to foreign orders--the superiority of the German gun
over the British was repeated with at least equal assurance.

The great advantage of the wire-wound system, it has always been
claimed, is that after much use, when the rifling is worn, the gun can
be given a new inner tube, a comparatively simple and cheap operation
which results in practically a new gun being made available for sea
service in a short time. All that can be said as to the two systems
from practical experience is that the Japanese found the British-made
weapons give eminently satisfactory results during the war with Russia,
while the Krupp artillery guns used by the Turkish Army in the Balkan
War of 1912 did not realize expectations.

Probably in naval material--in ships, their armour, armament, and
engineering equipment--there is little difference as between the
leading navies. One may be thought to have an advantage in some
particular respect, but this may possibly be counterbalanced by the
rival's superiority in another. Generally, the British ships mount
fewer guns but of larger calibre, and to the experienced eye they
look very workman-like; while the German ships carry smaller guns in
greater number and have a crowded appearance which does not appeal to
British naval opinion in its desire for simplicity of design and plenty
of working room. Virtually, all the instruments for exerting naval
power as they exist to-day are experimental, based upon the empirical
knowledge. When the war between the United States and Spain occurred,
it was anticipated that it would throw light upon these problems, but
these anticipations were not realized, and even the struggle between
Russia and Japan failed to satisfy fully the natural curiosity of the
naval constructor and the naval officer owing to the inefficiency with
which the Russian ships were handled, and the deplorable slackness of
the administration.

It is the fashion to calculate the relative strength of fleets in tons
and guns, but the probability is that on the day of trial in a great
battle at sea these nice paper computations will be entirely upset by
the course of events. Morale, as Napoleon observed, dominates war. This
dictum is no less true to-day than it was in the past. Man is still
greater than the instruments of his creation, and the experience of war
on a grand scale will certainly confirm the teaching of history--that
the important element in naval power is men rather than ships. On the
eve of the Battle of St. Vincent, when Jervis, in command of fifteen
ships, was pacing the quarter-deck of his flag-ship and the Spanish
Fleet was entering the field of vision, the numbers of the enemy were
reported by the Captain of the Fleet to the Commander-in-Chief as they
were counted. "There are eight sail of the line, Sir John," "Very
well, sir," answered the Admiral. "There are twenty sail of the line,
Sir John." "Very well, sir," Jervis responded. "There are twenty-five
sail of the line, Sir John." "Very well, sir," the Admiral again
replied imperturbably. "There are twenty-seven sail of the line, Sir
John," the Captain of the Fleet at length reported, and when he had
the temerity to remark on the great disparity between the British and
Spanish Fleets, the Admiral, confident in the efficiency of his small
fleet, replied: "The die is cast, and if there be fifty sail, I will
go through them." We may be sure that the victor of the Battle of St.
Vincent, who by stern but wisely directed measures created the fleet
which Nelson used with such dramatic effect at Trafalgar, would have
scorned and ridiculed an entire reliance on mere paper calculations of
guns and tons, realizing that victory or defeat depends mainly upon the
personal element and morale.

It is in respect of officers and men that there is the greatest
contrast between the British Fleet and the Navies of the Continent
of Europe. The British service is organized on a voluntary system,
while the Continental fleets are manned mainly by conscripts; the
former serve for many years, while the latter for the most part submit
to only the short period of duty required by law and then pass into
the reserve. In the matter of officers, however, the German Fleet is
certainly not worse served than the British Navy; though the cadets
begin their training at a somewhat later age, a thoroughly good sea
officer is produced. The marked distinction between the two services
is that, whereas under the White Ensign special duties are assigned to
special classes of officers--gunnery, torpedo, navigation, signalling
and physical training--in the German Navy no hard-and-fast lines
are drawn. It is held that the British system would entail a larger
number of officers than are available on the other side of the North
Sea. However this may be, the German authorities can certainly pride
themselves upon a corps of executive officers which in many respects is
not excelled in any country. As in the British service, special lines
of officers are trained for engineering, medical, and accountant duties
and these have no executive standing.

The method of training executive officers for the German Fleet differs
in some important respects from that which obtains in England. In the
British service the cadets, who enter when they are, on the average,
thirteen and a half years of age, have not completed their general
education, and consequently spend four years at the Naval Colleges at
Osborne and Dartmouth respectively before they go afloat in a training
ship. The German naval officer receives much the same general education
as any other boy before he enters the navy, whereas the British cadet,
after entering, is submitted to an educational course specially devised
with a view to his future naval career; his studies embrace physical
science and practical engineering, and emphasis is laid upon athletics
and as much sea experience as can be obtained in small craft. When the
four years ashore are completed he goes afloat at about the same age as
the average German cadet and makes a six months' cruise. Which is the
better system? Who shall say? This is certain, however, that British
naval officers have always held that lads for the sea service cannot
be caught, broken in, and inoculated, so to speak, too early.

Throughout the years of naval expansion the German authorities have
been struggling to eliminate as far as possible the disadvantages
of conscription in its application to naval conditions. The War
Department is responsible for putting in force the conscription law,
and periodically the navy sends in its requisition, stating the number
of recruits who will be needed, and where and when they are to join.
The men selected are passed direct into the fleet without preliminary
training each October. Under the British system boys are entered at
about sixteen years of age, and receive a short training first in one
of the shore or stationary sea establishments, and are subsequently
drafted into one of the ships of the Training Squadron, thence joining
the sea-going fleet. A certain number of youths are also entered at an
average age of about seventeen and a half years, and these recruits
dispense with the preliminary course, but are also drafted to the
Training Squadron before joining the fleet. Nearly all the men of the
fleet sign on for twelve years' active service, and the best of these
are permitted to re-engage for another ten years in order to earn
pensions. A relatively small number of men, not boys, join the British
Navy for a term of only five years, with the obligation to remain in
the Reserve for seven years. Five years, consequently, is the minimum
in the British Navy, and applies to only a relatively small number of
men; but three years is the maximum period of German conscripts, and
during this time the officers and warrant officers have to do their
best to transform the raw material provided by the State into skilled
seamen.

It is easy to imagine the difficulties which assail the administration
in Germany in these circumstances. Every year one-third of the naval
conscripts complete their period of active service and are passed into
the Reserve, and their places are taken by an equivalent batch of raw
recruits. The result is that in the winter months the officers and
petty officers of the fleet are occupied in licking into shape these
embryo sailors, and from October until May the fighting ships of the
Empire become practically training vessels.

If this were a complete representation of the conditions in the German
Fleet its efficiency would be of a low order. The Navy is, however,
stiffened by a proportion of conscripts who re-engage voluntarily,
and by a certain number of volunteers who enter as boys. These lads
engage at ages ranging from fifteen to eighteen years. They agree to
undergo an apprenticeship of two years followed by seven years of
active fleet service. Volunteers are not trained ashore or in fixed
naval establishments as in the United Kingdom, but are drafted to
sea-going training ships, which cruise in home waters during the summer
months and pass into the Mediterranean during the winter. By these
two expedients the German naval authorities have been able to secure
about 25 per cent. of the German personnel on what passes in Germany
for a long-service system. The boy volunteers and the conscripts who
re-engage constitute the class from which petty officers are drawn, and
these men are the backbone of the naval organization ashore and afloat,
and it is to their efforts that the high standard of efficiency which
Germany's Navy has attained may in a large measure be traced.

Year by year, in order to provide crews for the larger number of
ships passed into the fleet, the Marine Office has been compelled to
increase the number of conscripts required for sea service, and thus
the task of training the Navy has been increased in advance of the
expansion of the material, because men must begin training before their
ships are ready for sea. The officers and petty officers have had not
only to train raw recruits embarked to take the place of conscripts at
the end of their three years' term, but to find means also of training
additional recruits entered as net additions to the naval strength.
When it is added that in 1894 the number of officers and men in the
Navy was less than 21,000, whereas it is now nearly 80,000, and under
the Navy Act of 1912 is to be raised to 107,000, some conception may be
formed of the character of the problem which has presented itself, not
only to the central administration ashore, but to the officers afloat,
intent upon attaining the highest standard of efficiency at sea.
Admission of these difficulties was made by Admiral von Tirpitz in the
explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the last Navy Bill presented
to the Reichstag and which directed attention to "two serious defects"
in the organization of the fleet:

 "The one defect consists in the fact that in the
 autumn of every year the time-expired men--_i.e._
 almost one-third of the crew in all ships of the
 battle fleet, are discharged and replaced mainly
 by recruits from the _inland population_. Owing
 to this, the readiness of the battle fleet for war
 is considerably impaired for a prolonged period."

When it is recalled that the maritime population of Germany amounts
only to 80,000, and that compulsory service in the active fleet lasts
for only three years, it will be realized that most of the recruits
taken for the German Navy must necessarily be landsmen. The personnel
in 1914 numbered roughly over 70,000, after deducting from the total
the executive officers, engineers, cadets, and accountants. If
approximately 17,000 of these are regarded as long-service men there
remain roughly 54,000 conscripts, one-third of whom pass annually into
the Reserve, and are replaced by raw hands. Under the new Navy Law it
was intended to strengthen the personnel in the next few years by 6,400
annually. While the average period of service in the British Navy,
including the relatively small number of five years' men entered for
short service, is about ten years, the average in the German Fleet does
not amount to as much as half this period.

It is possible to attach too much importance to the fact that
the German Navy is recruited "mainly by recruits from the inland
population." The inherited sea habit counts for less to-day than at
any time since men attempted to navigate the seas. Ships of war have
become vast complicated boxes of machinery, and naval life requires
the exercise of qualities different from those it demanded in the sail
era. Then brute courage, endurance, and familiarity with the moods
of the sea were the main attributes of sailors, but to-day a large
proportion of the crews must be experts in the handling of complicated
mechanical appliances. In these changed conditions the compulsory
system of education in Germany has proved of the greatest advantage in
providing recruits of a high standard of intelligence, who probably
acquire in six months as complete a familiarity with their work as it
would have taken a seaman of the old school as many years to attain.
At the same time, while resisting the temptation to place too great
importance upon the inherited sea habit, it would be no less a mistake
to ignore entirely its influence upon naval efficiency. Familiarity
breeds contempt for the terrors of the sea and for the horrors of a
naval action, and it is reasonable to expect that in the hour of trial
the long-service men of the British Navy will exhibit a moral standard
when projectiles are falling fast and thick far higher than that of
the conscript. A modern Dreadnought is intended to fire its guns in
broadsides and not in succession, and when it is borne in mind that
at one discharge these guns will deliver on an enemy's ship, if they
are fired accurately, between five and six tons of metal, it will be
realized that at such a moment the calibre of men will count more than
the calibre of guns.

When the Act of 1900 was introduced the Reichstag was informed
by Admiral von Tirpitz in a Memorandum that "as, even after the
projected increase has been carried out, the number of vessels in
the German Navy will still be more or less inferior to that of other
individual Great Powers, our endeavours must be directed towards
compensating this superiority by the individual training of the crews
and by tactical training by practice in larger bodies.... Economy as
regards commissioning of vessels in peace time means jeopardizing the
efficiency of the fleet in case of war." Never since navies existed
have a body of officers and men been worked at higher pressure than
those of Germany; drill has never ceased; no effort has been spared to
obtain the last ounce of value out of every one on board the ships.
The promotion of officers rests with the Emperor, and he is unsparing
in his punishment of anything like slackness; an officer who is not
enthusiastic, alert, and competent, stands no chance of rising in
rank. The German Navy has no use for anything but the best which the
Empire can provide, and in order that the highest expression of the
_esprit de corps_ which has contributed to German influence on shore
may be instilled into the Navy, no officer, however influential or
brilliant, can enter either the executive or engineering branch unless
his claims are endorsed by all his contemporaries; one black ball--if
the term may be used--is sufficient to disqualify an aspirant, though
he may have passed all the prescribed examinations brilliantly.

The German Fleet has its limitations, but within those limitations it
probably has no superior in the world: the ships are well built, the
officers are capable sailors, and the men are raised to the highest
pitch of efficiency possible under a short-service system.




CHAPTER VII

William II. and his Naval Minister


The German Fleet, as it is to-day, may be regarded as the work of two
men--the Emperor William II. and Admiral von Tirpitz.

Even for those who have lived long in Germany, it is difficult to form
a judgment as to the aims and motives of the Emperor William's naval
policy, and of the part which he has played in its carrying out. With
regard to their sovereign, Germans are inclined to fly to one of two
extremes; according to the class to which they belong, they represent
him either as a heaven-born genius of universal gifts, or as a busybody
whose meddlesomeness is rendered specially mischievous by mediæval
delusions as to the functions of monarchs and their relations to the
Deity. Everything that he does or says is set down as quite right by
the one party and as quite wrong by the other. Moreover, the opinions
of those brought into closest contact with him are vitiated by the
prevalence of a type of sycophancy which is fortunately becoming
extinct in other countries.

The patriotic German, who is familiar with his country's history,
knows that, five or six hundred years ago, his forefathers monopolized
the markets and policed the seas of Northern and Western Europe. He
realizes keenly that Germany's maritime and industrial progress was
first checked, and then retarded for centuries, by political division
and internecine and foreign wars. Possibly he still remembers that
great crescendo of victory in which Prussia smothered Denmark, then
overthrew Austria in a single battle, and finally, at the head of the
kindred Teutonic States, humbled France in the dust, and welded Germany
together in one indivisible whole. Even if he does not remember it as
part of his own personal experience, all its vivid and stimulating
episodes have been a thousand times impressed upon his mind by
schoolmaster, politician, historian, and journalist. That after this
tremendous martial achievement he should regard his country as the
mistress of the continent of Europe is no matter for surprise. But he
sees, too, that the Germany of Luther and Goethe, of Ranke, Liebig,
Helmholz, and Mommsen, of Bismarck and Moltke, has become also the
Germany of Krupp, Siemens, Rathenau, Ballin, and Gwinner; that the
products of German industry, the fruits of an unexampled application
of the discoveries of science to the processes of manufacture, have
been carried by German ships to the remotest ends of the earth;
that the material prosperity of his country has been advancing in
every direction by leaps and bounds. And he thus believes Germany to
be strong, wise, and wealthy, and in every way fitted to stand at
the head of mankind. But in one respect he has felt, to his bitter
mortification, that she is powerless. Wherever he goes on the world's
oceans, he is confronted by those iron walls of Great Britain, which
mean that he is there only by the sufferance of one who is immeasurably
stronger than himself.

The German patriot has never realized that no efforts on the part
of Germany could materially alter the balance of sea-power to her
advantage as against Great Britain, and that she would be compelled to
fight for her pretensions long before she was in a position to give
battle on anything like equal terms. He has believed that the British
nation is unnerved and effete, that it has lost both its martial and
industrial vigour, that its energies have been sapped by too much
wealth and prosperity, and that it is rapidly following the downward
path. Finally, he is convinced that the British Parliament, under
the influence of an aggressive democracy, exclusively concerned with
its own immediate material needs, is losing the capacity to realize
and grapple with the larger problems of international politics, and
that the Cabinets proceeding from it will, in timorous anxiety,
procrastinate and vacillate till it is too late to strike. In this
idea he has been only confirmed by the pacifist movement in Great
Britain, by the British agitation for disarmament by international
agreement, and by the well-meant but unfortunate attempt of Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman to effect by example what much amiable precept had
done nothing to accomplish. These phenomena he has looked upon not as
evidence of good-will and peaceableness, but as symptoms of physical,
moral, and financial exhaustion.

Such was the view of many in Germany to whom we cannot fairly deny the
name of "patriot" if we are to claim it for an analogous disposition
among ourselves. It was the view almost universally held by the
officers of the German Army and Navy, and, with certain qualifications
and reservations, it may be said to have been the view of the Emperor
William. This will be evident if, with the help of his many spoken
and written utterances, we attempt to follow the main lines which,
with many sudden and violent deviations, his thought has taken on
this subject. He has, for example, in his speeches repeatedly dwelt
on the power and renown of the Hanse League--"one of the mightiest
undertakings that the world has ever seen," which "was able to raise
fleets such as the broad back of the sea had probably never borne
up to that time," which "won such high prestige for the German name
abroad," which "created markets for the German industrial regions," and
which "only failed because it lacked the support of a strong united
Empire obedient to a single will." At Hamburg, in June, 1911, he used
these words: "I have only acted historically, for I said to myself on
my accession, that the tasks which the Hansa attempted to solve by
itself, and which it could not solve because the strong Empire was
not at its back, and the defensive and executive power of the Empire
did not exist, must unquestionably at once fall on the shoulders of
the newly-arisen German Empire; and it was simply the obligations of
old traditions that had to be resumed." It was in one former Hanse
town that the Emperor spoke the familiar words, "Our future lies on
the water"; in another that he declared "The trident should be in our
hand"; in a third that he uttered the appeal, "We have bitter need of a
strong German Fleet."

Again, he has repeatedly extolled the Great Elector--"the one among my
ancestors for whom I have the most enthusiasm, who has from my earliest
youth shone before me as a bright example," who, "looking far ahead,
carried on politics on a large scale, as they are carried on to-day."
In his great speech at Bremen in 1905, the Emperor said: "When as a
youth I stood before the model of Brommy's ship, I felt with burning
indignation the outrage that was then done to our fleet and our flag";
and these words undoubtedly referred to the injudiciously-phrased note
in which Palmerston threatened that vessels which undertook belligerent
operations under the colours of that greater German Empire, which
then was not and was never to be, would render themselves liable to
be treated as "pirates." The present realities of sea-power had been
early revealed to him when, as he told the officers on board a British
flag-ship in the Mediterranean, he "was running about Portsmouth
Dockyard as a boy"; and, as he said in a speech made during the visit
of King Edward to Kiel in 1904, "the stupendous activity on the sea at
the headquarters of the greatest navy in the world impressed itself
indelibly on his youthful mind," and made him, "as Regent, endeavour to
realize on a scale corresponding to the conditions of his country what
he had seen as a young man in England."

How far the Emperor has helped to realize his own naval ambitions,
and how far his efforts have actually told against them, it is very
difficult to determine with anything like exactitude. His agitation
for a bigger fleet has been open and unwearying, and outside Germany
the idea is very prevalent that he not only contrived the naval policy
of the Empire, but also, almost single-handed, generated the degree
of popular support without which it could not have been carried out.
This idea will be seen to be erroneous. The Emperor's influence upon
his own people is very greatly overrated in other countries, and even
the crisis of 1908, in which the storm of discontent which had long
been gathering burst with full force upon his head, does not seem to
have been properly understood outside Germany. On that occasion, the
Imperial Parliament listened without a protest, without a murmur, as
a Liberal deputy, slowly, deliberately, and with dramatic emphasis,
spoke the following words: "In the German Reichstag not a single member
has come forward to defend the actions of the German Emperor." The
incident was without a parallel in the history of parliaments. Even
the Conservative party, which has always gloried in being the chief
prop of the throne, passed and published a resolution expressing the
wish that the Emperor should "in future exercise a greater reserve
in his utterances," and declaring that "arrangements must be made to
prevent with certainty a recurrence of such improper proceedings."
It may be remarked, in passing, that this blow fell upon William II.
because he had confessed to having had Anglophile sentiments, and to
having performed friendly services to Great Britain, at a time when
the general feeling of the German people was one of hostility to this
country. Nor was it without significance that when, after holding aloof
from public affairs for several weeks, he at last emerged from the
solitude of his palace at Potsdam, it was in England that he sought the
recuperation and rest of which he stood in need.

The dismissal of Bismarck and the subsequent attempts of the Emperor
to depreciate the life-work of the man to whom he owed the Imperial
crown, were, of course, the principal causes of the spirit of
opposition which flared up with such startling suddenness in 1908. The
popularity of William I. was in no small measure due to his absolute
trust and confidence in his Chancellor, and the abrupt ejection of
this incomparable statesman from his office will never be forgotten or
forgiven till the generation of his contemporaries has passed away.

These things go far to explain why it was that, in spite of the
vigorous naval agitation of the Emperor, the German Fleet, as was
pointed out in the Memorandum attached to the Bill of 1898, became
weaker instead of stronger during the first ten years of his reign.
From the day of his accession he had lost no opportunity of manifesting
his interest in the fleet and his desire that it should be largely
increased. Among his earliest acts as monarch was his unheralded
appearance in admiral's uniform at a parliamentary luncheon given by
Bismarck, to decorate one of the guests who had displayed sympathies
and wishes with regard to the Navy similar to his own. Year after
year, tables of diagrams, showing the disparity between the fleet of
Germany and those of the leading naval Powers, and prepared, it is
said, by the Emperor's own hand, were sent out over his signature to
the Reichstag, the Government departments, and all public institutions
where it was thought they might meet the gaze of appreciative eyes. At
a soirée given at the New Palace at Potsdam in 1895, he assembled round
him a group of members of the majority parties of the Reichstag, and
lectured them for two-and-a-half hours on Germany's need of sea-power.
Bismarck's eightieth birthday was then approaching, and the Emperor
concluded his remarks by urging upon his hearers that they should
seize the opportunity of "doing the founder of our colonial policy
the pleasure of passing the sum absolutely required for the Navy." A
couple of years later, he delivered a similar address after a dinner
given to members of the Reichstag by the Finance Minister, von Miquel,
illustrating his arguments with the diagrams of warships mentioned
above. About the same time, an English illustrated paper published a
picture of the foreign war vessels on the East Asian station. Among
them, as the sole representative of Germany, was a small gunboat,
which, as was pointed out in the accompanying text, was "under sail
only." Against these words the Emperor wrote, "What mockery lies
therein," and the picture, with this comment, was laid before the
Budget Commission of the Reichstag, then engaged in the discussion of
the naval estimates. Moreover, the monarch had himself recourse to the
paint-brush, and exhibited in the Berlin Academy of Arts a picture of
an attack by a flotilla of torpedo craft on a squadron of ironclads. No
doubt he hoped in this way to arouse sympathy for his ideas in some who
were not accessible to the ordinary methods of political persuasion.
The "Song to Aegir," the Scandinavian Neptune, of which he composed the
music, was probably also intended to have a similar operation.

But all these pleas and cajoleries had little or no positive result.
Indeed, taken in conjunction with other phrases of the Imperial
activity, they seem rather to have excited opposition in the breasts
of the members of the Reichstag, who possibly considered themselves
just as well qualified as the monarch to estimate the degree and
appreciate the needs of Germany's maritime interests, and at any
rate half-suspected that his efforts directly to influence their
deliberations involved an encroachment on their constitutional
privileges. The first naval estimates submitted in the new reign,
which provided for the laying down of the unusually large number
of four battleships, were got through the Reichstag without much
difficulty, but when Admiral von Hollmann became Minister of Marine
in the following year, he found that quite a different temper had
taken possession of the Parliament. It was not only that the Emperor's
general governmental acts had begun to stir up opposition; his
oratorical flights in praise of sea-power and world-empire had also
generated strong suspicions that he was urging Germany along a path
which would lead her to ruin at home and disaster abroad. Hollmann's by
no means exorbitant demands were branded both in the Reichstag and the
press as "unconscionable," his programme as "boundless," and on every
side were heard contemptuous and impatient references to "the awful
fleet." For a decade the naval estimates were ruthlessly and recklessly
cut down to, on an average, not far short of half their original
figure, and finally, in 1897, the ministerial career of Hollmann was
terminated by the unceremonious rejection of three out of the four
cruisers which, in a special Memorandum, he had sought to prove were
indispensable for the protection of the Empire's stake on the seas.
And all this time the Emperor had never ceased to agitate, by word and
deed, for the ideas which he had so much at heart and to which the
Reichstag nevertheless showed itself so completely indifferent, if not
actually hostile.

The change that came with the appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz to
the Ministry of Marine was as complete as it was sudden, and it is to
this very able man that we must look if we wish to find not only the
intellectual author of German naval legislation, but the statesman
who devised and directed the means by which it was popularized and
passed through the Reichstag. The transformation which he effected was
one both of policy and of method. The three rejected vessels which
brought about Hollmann's fall represented a principle--that of "cruiser
warfare." At that time the imperfectly-thought-out strategy of the
German Naval Ministry was based on the two ideas of coastal defence
and commerce destruction. Pitched battles between ships of the line on
the high seas played a very secondary part in its calculations. In the
programme which he submitted to the Reichstag, Hollmann laid it down
that fifteen battleships would be sufficient for Germany's purposes,
and those who are best qualified to form a judgment of the Empire's
naval policy at that epoch are of opinion that this number was intended
to be not merely a provisional, but a final estimate of the country's
requirements in this type of vessel.

There are good reasons for supposing that in the Hollmann era no clear
idea existed as to the problems with which Germany might be confronted
in a naval war, and that his programmes were the product rather of
vague general principles than of calculated odds and chances. In fact,
one of his main difficulties with the Reichstag was his inability to
justify his estimates by numerical demonstrations.

On the other hand, Admiral von Tirpitz's strength always lay chiefly in
this, that he knew exactly what he wanted and why he wanted it. When he
came into office, it was generally stated that he had years previously
already laid before the Emperor a Memorandum embodying his conception
of Germany's maritime needs, and how they could be satisfied, and it is
certain that the main outlines of his policy were at any rate clearly
sketched out in his head long before he was given an opportunity of
carrying it out. He was recalled from the command of the East Asian
Squadron to take charge of the Naval Ministry, and he seems to have
employed his leisure on the homeward voyage in drafting a programme,
which he had worked out in all its details before he took over his
portfolio. In its very fundamental principles it was a reversal of that
of his predecessor, for it was based on the idea, probably adopted
from Mahan, that battleships alone are the decisive factors in naval
warfare. As he himself put it in the Reichstag: "If we have a strong
battle fleet, the enemy will have to defeat it before he can blockade
our coasts. But in such circumstances he will, before he declares war
on Germany, consider very carefully whether the business will cover its
expenses and justify the risk." It was this principle of risk which
he took as his standard of the Empire's naval requirements. From the
literature which he inspired it is evident that he was one of those
who believe that Germany was destined to occupy the position on the
seas which now belongs to Great Britain. It was, however, impossible
for a Minister of State to argue this belief in public, for the open
confession of it would have at once produced incalculable complications
in international affairs which would certainly not have contributed to
its realization. Besides, the consummation which he wished for could
in any case only be reached by gradual stages over a long period of
years. The defensive formula which he invented was quite as effective
for his immediate domestic purposes, and, as the sequel showed, was
not appreciated abroad in its true and full significance. It was that
"the German Fleet must be so strong that not even the greatest naval
Power will be able to enter upon a war with it without imperilling its
position in the world."

It was only after a good deal of hesitation, and some resistance,
in high quarters that Admiral von Tirpitz was able to make his view
prevail. Even courtly panegyrists admit that at the commencement of
his term of office deep-seated differences of opinion existed between
him and the Emperor on cardinal points of naval policy. The monarch
was then a firm adherent of the cruiser-war theory, and no doubt had
been responsible for its adoption by his Ministry of Marine. It may be
regarded as his most substantial contribution to the present strength
of the German Fleet that he finally yielded to Admiral von Tirpitz's
arguments.

In one other very essential respect the new Minister revolutionized
the policy of his predecessor. In the Memorandum already referred to,
Hollmann defined the needs of the navy only for the three succeeding
years, and in the course of the debate on the estimates, he used these
words: "Neither the Federated Governments nor the Reichstag will ever
agree to be bound to a formal programme for years in advance. That is
quite impossible, and even if both factors desired it, impossible, for
the very simple reason that the art of war is changeable on sea just as
it is on land, and that to-day no Naval Ministry can prophesy what we
shall need ten years hence. It can only tell you what are our immediate
requirements, and if the circumstances change, then our demands will
change too. As to that there is no doubt whatever." Here again,
Admiral von Tirpitz not merely modified, but diametrically reversed
the policy of his predecessor, and, it may be added, of the Emperor.
Starting from the conclusion that the main types of war vessel and
their respective functions remain unaltered in principle throughout the
ages, he induced the Reichstag to commit itself statutorily to a fixed
warship establishment, a building programme of nearly twenty years'
duration, and an automatic renewal of the units of the fleet when they
had reached a prescribed age. This is the one absolutely new feature
of German naval legislation, and it was undoubtedly the idea of the new
Minister.

Admiral von Tirpitz has, in fact, been the Bismarck of German naval
policy, and just as the Iron Chancellor fulfilled the hopes of the men
of the Frankfort National Assembly, so the smiling and urbane Minister
of Marine has gone far towards realizing the dreams of Friedrich List
and Prince Adalbert of Prussia. It may be questioned whether he would
not have done this work quite as effectually without the Emperor's
loud and tempestuous advocacy of his schemes on the open stage of the
world. The trumpet tones in which William II. proclaimed his dreams
of world-wide rule and maritime dictatorship, not only exercised
a disquieting effect in foreign countries, but conjured up in the
minds of many Germans unpleasant visions of provocative and perilous
adventure. Other nations were anything but delighted at the prospects
of being swallowed up in a universal Teutonic Empire, however peaceful
its conquests and however beneficent its rule, and they took steps by
which the successive moves of German naval policy were successively
counteracted.

If we may judge from the discretion which he has shown by keeping as
far as possible in the background, Admiral von Tirpitz would, if left
to himself, have built up the German Fleet with the same silent and
systematic persistency with which Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke prepared
to crush France, and to some extent he combines in his character the
qualities of these three. He is at any rate the adroitest politician,
the ablest organizer, and the most far-sighted strategist in the
Imperial service. Long before he was thought of as Naval Minister,
he had won for himself among his colleagues, by the skill and
thoroughness with which he grappled with every problem allotted to
him, the title of "The Master." It was he who, against the ignorant
protests of the older school of naval officers, chiefly concerned
for the smartness of their paint, the cleanness of their decks, and
the brightness of their brasswork, forced the torpedo upon them, and
brought the service of this weapon up to the high pitch of efficiency
which it has to-day attained in the German Fleet. As Chief of the Staff
to the General Command of the Navy, he evolved fresh rules of strategy
and new tactical formations, and insisted upon Manoeuvres being carried
out in such a way as to test the value of both. He has been no less
successful as statesman, politician, and diplomatist. Here, too, he
deserves the name of "Master" among his contemporaries, for what he
has done has been the greatest ministerial achievement of our day. It
is true that he was favoured by an extraordinary run of luck that was
vouchsafed to none of his forerunners, and that he would never have
been able to drive his machine but for the energy generated by a series
of international dissensions, but at the same time it must be conceded
that he took advantage of his opportunities with rare promptitude and
address.

He at once took the measure of the Reichstag, and saw how he could
make it obedient to his will. It is traditional in the higher ranks
of the German official hierarchy to despise popular assemblies, and
to treat them with an air of pedagogic superciliousness. Hollmann had
become so impatient at the continual mutilation of his estimates that
at last he thumped his fist menacingly on the table. That precipitate
action sealed his fate. Admiral von Tirpitz recognized that it would
be better for him if he disguised his contempt, and smothered his anger
in his beard. In one of Rostand's plays, a lady is asked how she passed
the sentries who were posted round a jealously guarded camp, and she
replies: "I smiled at them." If the Naval Minister were to be asked how
he induced the parties who had been so obdurate to his predecessor's
demands to pass his own so much more expensive projects, he, too,
might have replied: "I smiled at them." Completely breaking with the
tradition of schoolmasterly superiority, he was all complacency and
urbanity to the ignorant mediocrities who had it in their power to
frustrate his designs. His beaming rubicund countenance was ever the
brightest and most ingratiating feature in the debates on his bills and
estimates. His good humour was inexhaustible, his courtesy unflagging,
his patience undisconcertable. He knew exactly what he wanted, and
thought only of that. His mind was not clouded, like those of so many
of his ministerial colleagues, by religious or political prejudices. He
was ready to accept ships from the hands of Catholics or Socialists.
Whether they ranked the Pope above the Emperor, or preferred a republic
to a monarchy, was quite indifferent to him, if only they would grant
him the ships and the men he asked for.

In one of his many veiled conflicts with the Foreign Office, Admiral
von Tirpitz is understood to have exclaimed: "Politics are your
affair--I build ships!" and it was precisely because he attended
strictly and conscientiously to his own business that he was able to
do it so well. It was incumbent upon him as administrator of the Navy
to make it as strong and efficient as possible, and it lay with the
Chancellors to decide whether the line he was following was consistent
with the general policy of the Empire. That, against their own
convictions and what they conceived to be Germany's foreign interests,
they allowed him to have his own way, only proved their weakness and
his strength.

While he was amiable and polite to all parties and persons who could
assist him in the carrying out of his ideas, flattered their vanity
by pretended confidences from the region of high politics, took them
for cruises in war vessels, and had them deferentially escorted round
Imperial shipyards, the Admiral was quick to appreciate the importance
of winning the good graces of the Catholics, without whose favour, as
party relationships stood and were likely to stand, he could hope to
effect little. Young and active members of the Centre party, who showed
a particular interest in the details of naval policy, were singled out
for special attention, and soon were numbered among his most devoted
champions. He likewise realized the value of popular support, and
this was secured through the instrumentality of the Press Bureau of
the Ministry of Marine. This institution was administered in the same
spirit which gained the Admiral his parliamentary triumphs. The naval
officers by whom it is manned have always received all journalists,
domestic and foreign, with open arms, and, according to the objects and
nationality of their visitors, furnished them with ideas, information
and directions. No German writer on naval affairs could afford to
dispense with official assistance so profusely and willingly supplied.
The Press Bureau placed at his disposal all the historical and
statistical data which could be used to demonstrate Germany's need of
a big fleet, all the articles from the foreign press which were likely
to have a stimulating effect upon his readers, all the details of
ship and gun types which could safely be made public, all the rules
of naval strategy and tactics which might be of service to him in the
formulation of his themes. If diffidence or a spirit of independence
prevented him from coming to the Press Bureau, the Press Bureau went to
him, as will be seen from the following document which found its way
into print:

 "Imperial Ministry of Marine,
 "News Office.

 "Berlin,

 "----, 1907.

 "It has become known here that, some time ago, you published in ----
 articles of a maritime nature. For this reason the News Office gladly
 takes the opportunity of enquiring whether you would care to receive
 occasional batches of service material and press comments for possible
 use in further articles. In view of the impending Navy Bill, your
 support in the Press might be particularly valuable in the immediate
 future.

 "Your most obedient servant,
 "Boy-Ed."

By such means the Admiral succeeded in obtaining a control, gentle,
persuasive, and veiled, but none the less effective, over practically
the entire body of writers on naval topics in the German Press.

The unanimity of view on naval subjects which the Bureau imported into
the German Press was naturally most effective. When the simple citizen
found that all the papers to which he had access spoke with one voice,
simultaneously adopting an identical attitude to a fresh situation
or propounding a novel theory, he could only assume that they must
be in the right. The proposal that Great Britain should abandon her
Two-Power standard and accept in its stead a ratio of three to two,
which appeared almost at the same moment in a score of different papers
while the 1912 Navy Bill was under process of dilution, is an instance
in point. Up till then all naval writers in Germany had been unanimous
in protesting that agreements to fix a naval ratio between two
countries were in their very nature impossible, and the suddenness and
simultaneity of their conversion must have been due to the intervention
either of Providence or the Marine Minister. Indeed, the Minister's
statement a year later in the Reichstag Budget Commission definitely
set at rest any doubt that might have existed as to the original source
of the proposal. Since Bismarck, no one has shown such adroitness as
Admiral von Tirpitz in the management of the Press.

In addition to controlling the naval views of independent publications,
the Press Bureau also makes important direct contributions of its own
to periodical literature with the annual _Nauticus_ and the monthly
magazine _Die Marine Rundschau_. Both these publications are further
testimonies to the energy with which the Admiral performs the duties of
his office.

But with all his cleverness, perseverance, and patience, Admiral
Tirpitz would never have reached his goal had not Germany been swept
by successive waves of Anglophobia. Both speeches in the Reichstag and
articles in the Press make it quite evident that the motive uppermost
in the minds of most deputies when they voted for the Navy Bills was
the desire to impress, annoy, or terrify Great Britain. The truth is
that, but for the Boer War, the Bill of 1900 could never have been
so much as introduced; but for the perpetual international friction
over Morocco and the fantastic legend of King Edward's designs against
Germany, the Bills of 1906 and 1908 would have had but small chance of
acceptance; and but for Mr. Lloyd George's speech and Captain Faber's
indiscretions--and, it should be added, the misrepresentations of both
of them by Admiral von Tirpitz's Press--the Ministry of Marine would
never have been able to win its last victory against the opposition
of the Treasury and the misgivings of the Chancellor. The lesson of
1848 cannot be too thoroughly learnt. The naval movement of that year
was almost entirely popular in its character. It arose out of a sense
of wounded dignity, and fits of national temper, blind to all the
prudential considerations of domestic and international politics, have
given Germany to-day the second largest fleet and the largest Socialist
party in the world. It may seem almost like a contradiction in terms
to suggest that a national sentiment has contributed to swell German
Socialism to its present dimensions. But this is--for Germany, at any
rate--no paradox, for in no other country does so small a proportion of
the population constitute what is in practice and in effect the "will
of the people."

It should have become clear that the part which the Emperor William
has played in the formulation and carrying out of Germany's naval
policy has been quite insignificant in comparison with that played by
his Minister. The really effective work which the monarch has done for
his fleet has been that of which the wider public has heard least. The
Emperor's brain is not an originating or creative one, but it is keenly
apprehensive, appreciative, and assimilative, and its owner was quick
to perceive the value of many of the forces and institutions which
have made the British Fleet supreme, not only in numerical strength
but also in _esprit de corps_ and organization. From his visits to
England he took back much useful information as to the construction and
handling of ships, and in many other respects he found British models
which he considered worthy of imitation in his own country. Thus the
Institution of Naval Architects was provided with a German counterpart
in the Schiffbau-technische Gesellschaft, the ideals of self-discipline
of sport were fostered in the Imperial Navy, and when the temperance
movement in the British Fleet had developed sufficient strength to
attract attention, the Emperor inaugurated a similar propaganda among
his crews. As has already been seen, William II. has generously
admitted the debt of the German Fleet to its British sister, and beyond
all doubt he has done more than anyone else to incur it.

The Emperor has also been able to do a good deal towards the
propagation of his naval ideas through his autocratic control
over the official machinery of Prussia, which constitutes more
than three-fifths of the area, and nearly that proportion of the
population of Germany. In a country where the tentacles of the central
authority reach to the remotest village this control means a great
deal. In particular, through the Ministry of Education, the rising
generation has been initiated into the mysteries of "world-policy"
and sea-power. The teaching of history and geography has been used to
impress upon susceptible minds the importance of colonies and fleets,
and to suggest with more or less precision and emphasis that Great
Britain is the jealous rival who chiefly obstructs Germany's path
to that "place in the sun" which is her due. The process, commenced
in the schools, has been continued at the universities. Indeed,
here as elsewhere, Germany's professors have been the pioneers of
her progress, and were putting forward her claim to sea-power long
before the Emperor was born. Friedrich List, the father of German
economics, urged, in 1840, that Denmark and Holland should be taken
into the Germanic Confederation, which "would then obtain what it at
present lacks--namely, fisheries and sea-power, ocean-borne trade, and
colonies." In another passage he said:

 "What intelligent citizens of those seaports (Hamburg and Bremen) can
 rejoice over the continual increase of their tonnage, when he reflects
 that a couple of frigates, putting out from Heligoland, could destroy
 inside twenty-four hours the work of a quarter of a century."

List also maintained that Germany was "called by nature to place
herself at the head of the colonizing and civilizing nations," and
"that the time had come for the formation of a Continental alliance
against the naval supremacy of England." Treitschke, writing of the
European situation in the later thirties, said:

 "Against so absolutely ruthless a commercial policy, inciting and
 making mischief all over the world, all other civilized nations
 seemed natural allies. England was the stronghold of barbarism in
 international law. To England alone was it due that, to the shame of
 humanity, naval warfare still remained organized piracy. It was the
 common duty of all nations to restore on the seas that balance of
 power, long existing on the Continent, that healthy equipoise which
 permitted no State to do exactly as it liked, and consequently assured
 to all a humane international law. The civilization of the human race
 demanded that the manifold magnificence of the world's history, which
 had once commenced with the rule of monosyllabic Chinese, should
 not end in a vicious circle with the empire of the monosyllabic
 Britons. As soon as the Eastern Question was reopened a far-sighted
 statesmanship was bound to attempt at least to restrict the oppressive
 foreign rule which the English Fleet maintained from Gibraltar, Malta,
 and Corfu, and to restore the Mediterranean to the Mediterranean
 peoples."

At the same time the Professor was teaching his students at the Berlin
University that "the settlement with England will be the most difficult
of all," and that "the result of our next war must be, if possible, the
acquisition of some colony."

The modern schoolmasters and professors of Germany have worked to
produce a race inspired with the ambitions of List and the rancours of
Treitschke, and imbued with the idea that an unexampled destiny awaits
their nation. That the Emperor William early recognized what schools
and universities might be made to do in this direction is clear from
the speech with which he opened the Educational Conference convened by
him in 1890, and in which he complained that the traditional curriculum
"lacked a patriotic basis." "We should," he exclaimed, "rear patriotic
Germans and not young Greeks and Romans." It was also with a political
purpose that he recommended a reversal of the usual order in which
history was taught--that is to say, that the most recent periods should
be taken first, and the student led back step by step to the events of
antiquity.

While the Emperor is not omnipotent in legislation, he is, in Prussia,
at any rate, practically unfettered in administration--that more
extensive and equally important branch of government--and so the
impulsions of his will can be forced down through the reticulations of
the bureaucratic system till they are felt by the humblest official. He
thus has at his disposal a large body of zealous co-operators anxious
to comply with his desires even if they should have no direct relation
to their official duties.

To appreciate the operation of this force, it is only necessary to
turn over the pages of the German Navy League Handbook and notice how
prominent a part the provincial agents of the central authority and
subordinate members of the official body have played in the propaganda
of that organization. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion
that, wherever difficulty has been experienced in forming a local
branch of the League, gentle pressure has been brought to bear on
the stationmaster, postmaster, or gymnasium-director of the town,
and has compelled him to take the initiative. In numerous cases such
persons have, of course, come forward and founded branches of the
League without any prompting, knowing well that their zeal would be in
accordance with the "wishes of the Emperor," and would be rewarded by
preferment when a suitable opportunity arose.

The Navy League is the only instrument the Emperor possesses for
systematically and persistently propagating his ideas on world-policy
and sea-power among the German people as a whole. It was founded in
1898, at his personal instance, but in all probability at Admiral
von Tirpitz's suggestion, with the assistance of funds principally
furnished by the Krupp family, which, as the chief material beneficiary
from any increase in the German Fleet, could well afford to invest
a little money in this way. Even in Bismarck's time the head of
the Krupp firm had been induced to start a number of newspapers to
advocate the augmentation of those armaments from which he had derived
a considerable proportion of his vast wealth, and it is one of the
least edifying features of modern Germany that those of its citizens
who show the most bellicose spirit have a direct personal interest in
the waging of war. The financial founders of the Navy League included
other prosperous manufacturers who were anxious to deserve decorations
or titles, and who, in some instances, went so far as to compel their
employees to join the organization and so help to swell its membership.

Three weeks before the League was constituted, the first Navy Bill had
already received the Emperor's signature, and the order of these events
is a plain demonstration that even then the measure was intended to be
merely the thin end of the wedge. It is an interesting and significant
fact that almost all the ruling houses of Germany have been induced
to identify themselves with the League, though it is nominally an
absolutely independent and unofficial organization. The Emperor's
brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, has assumed the general protectorate,
and among the protectors of the affiliated State federations are Prince
George of Bavaria, the Kings of Saxony and Württemberg, the Grand Dukes
of Baden, Hesse, the two Mecklenburgs, Oldenburg, and Saxe-Weimar, the
Dukes of Anhalt, Saxe-Altenburg, and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the Princes of
the two Lippes, Waldeck-Pyrmont, and the two Reusses, the Statthalter
of Alsace-Lorraine, the Regent of Brunswick, and the Burgomasters of
Hamburg and Bremen. Thus the State governments have a direct interest
in the League, are under a moral obligation to promote its work, and,
it may be added, bear a certain amount of responsibility for the manner
in which its agitation is carried on. The purposes of the organization
are defined in the statutes as follows:

 "The German Navy League regards a strong German Fleet as
 necessary--principally in order to ensure the sea frontiers of Germany
 against the danger of war, to maintain the position of Germany among
 the Great Powers of the world, and to support the general interests
 and commercial communications of Germany as well as the safety of her
 citizens at work in oversea countries. Accordingly, it is the aim
 of the German Navy League to awaken, cultivate, and strengthen the
 interest of the German people for the importance and functions of the
 fleet."

The members of the League are divided into two classes--"individual"
and "corporative." The latter are members of branches of other
societies which enrol themselves in the League _en masse_. The most
fruitful sources of support of this kind are those kindred bodies,
the Pangerman Federation and the Colonial Association. On December
31st, 1911, the corporative members numbered 756,000, the individual
members 298,000. The qualifications for individual membership are the
attainment of the sixteenth year and a money contribution, which, if
not fixed by the branch, is left for the member to determine for him
or herself. The pecuniary contribution of a corporation joining the
League is fixed by special arrangement in each case. From the accounts
published it would appear that the average annual member's subscription
falls a good deal short of sixpence. A considerable number of the
members are young persons of both sexes who send in their names because
it is a cheap and easy method of gratifying the association instinct,
so strong in Germans, or for the sake of the dances and other purely
social entertainments which are arranged by the branches.

A monthly paper, _Die Flotte_, which is published in an edition
of 350,000 copies, is the League's chief organ in the Press, but
the Central Office also issues immense quantities of pamphlets and
leaflets. These are largely distributed with newspapers owned or
controlled by the iron and steel and shipbuilding industries--what
the Socialists call the "armour-plate Press"--but naturally find
their way to all quarters to which Government influence can give them
access. Under the name of "Communications," items of naval news and
controversial paragraphs are sent out about once a week to all the
papers, and though little notice is taken of them in the metropolitan
Press, struggling provincial journals are very glad to have their
columns filled up with topical matter by expert and authoritative pens.
The League also publishes a profusely illustrated _Naval Album_, of
which the Emperor every year buys 600 copies for distribution as prizes
in the schools of Prussia--a typical example of the inter-action of the
wheels of the naval agitation and the Government machine. Lecturing,
too, occupies a prominent place in the League's activity, and the
Central Office keeps a stock of magic-lanterns and slides, which
it lends out free of charge to the local branches. It also supplies
uniforms, badges, and bunting for local festivities.

By far the most effective department of the League's activity is,
however, the excursions to the German naval ports, which it arranges
for the benefit of schoolmasters and their classes. The participants in
these outings are, as far as possible, selected from the inland states
and districts, in which it is most difficult to arouse enthusiasm
for the sea and the fleet. They are taken to Kiel or Wilhelmshaven,
received with effusive courtesy by the naval officers delegated to
look after them, and escorted through the streets by a ship's band
to the dockyards of war vessels, over which they are conducted by
amiable guides, who supply them with all the information likely to
stimulate their interest in what they have seen. If the distance they
have travelled makes it impossible for them to return home the same
day, naval barracks or storehouses which happen for the moment to be
vacant are placed at their disposal as night quarters. So much official
complaisance and amenity, especially in a country where neither of
these qualities is particularly common in the public services, arouses
in those on whom it is expended a flattering sense of their own and
their national importance, and schoolmasters thus captivated naturally,
in due time, convey their impressions to their pupils. Though the
numbers of persons thus dealt with are inevitably somewhat limited, the
League unquestionably gains more ground in this way than it can hope
to win by pamphlets which are read and lectures which are listened to
mainly by the already convinced.

The Emperor is the real director of the Navy League, and it puts
forward no demand that has not already received his approval, in
principle if not in detail. The League is, in short, little more
than a Government department, the function of which is to carry
on an agitation for more warships. It must, however, always be
remembered that the League's demands represent not what the Government
desires or expects to get, but what it wants to be asked for. In
order that it may keep up the pretence that it is an unofficial and
independent organization, the League must naturally avoid too close a
correspondence between its own programme and that of the Ministry of
Marine, and it is also guided by the principle that it is necessary
to ask much in order to get little. Occasionally it makes a show of
hurrying and worrying the Naval Minister, and of being positively
objectionable to the Government, but no one suffers less than Admiral
von Tirpitz from these "attacks" upon him.




APPENDIX I

Germany's Naval Policy


The key to the naval policy of Germany is to be found in the Memorandum
which was appended to the Navy Act of 1900. It is the most illuminating
of State documents and is of peculiar interest in view of the war at
sea which opened on August 4th, 1914.

Only the more salient passages of this Memorandum need be recalled to
illustrate how far the performances of the German Fleet have fallen
short of the high hopes which were entertained for it.

In the opening passages of the Memorandum, it was explained why "the
German Empire needs peace at sea":

For the German Empire of to-day the security of its economic
development, and especially of its world-trade, is a life question. For
this purpose the German Empire needs not only peace on land but also
peace at sea--not, however, peace at any price, but peace with honour,
which satisfies its just requirements.

A naval war for economic interests, particularly for commercial
interests, will probably be of long duration, for the aim of a
superior opponent will be all the more completely reached the longer
the war lasts. To this must be added that a naval war which, after
the destruction or shutting-up of the German sea fighting force, was
confined to the blockade of the coasts and the capture of merchant
ships, would cost the opponent little; indeed he would, on the
contrary, amply cover the expenses of the war by the simultaneous
improvement of his own trade.

An unsuccessful naval war of the duration of even only a year would
destroy Germany's sea trade, and would thereby bring about the most
disastrous conditions, first in her economic, and then, as an immediate
consequence of that, in her social life.

Quite apart from the consequences of the possible peace conditions,
the destruction of our sea trade during the war could not, even at the
close of it, be made good within measurable time, and would thus add to
the sacrifices of the war a serious economic depression.

The Memorandum then proceeded to justify the abandonment of the Navy
Law passed as recently as 1898:

The Navy Law (of 1898) does not make allowance for the possibility of
a naval war with a great naval Power, because, when it was drafted in
the summer of 1897, the first consideration was to secure the carrying
out in modern ship material of the 1873 plan for the founding of
the fleet, limiting the increase to the small number of battleships
which was necessary to establish, at least for a double squadron, the
organization demanded by tactical exigencies.

The Justificatory Memorandum to the Navy Law (of 1898) left no doubt
as to the military significance of the Battle Fleet. It is therein
expressly stated:

 "Against greater sea-powers the Battle Fleet would have importance
 merely as a sortie fleet."

That is to say, the fleet would have to withdraw into the harbour and
there wait for a favourable opportunity for making a sortie. Even if
it should obtain a success in such a sortie, it would nevertheless,
like the enemy, suffer considerable loss of ships. The stronger enemy
could make good his losses, we could not. In war with a substantially
superior sea-power, the Battle Fleet provided for by the Navy Law would
render a blockade more difficult, especially in the first phase of the
war, but would never be able to prevent it. To subdue it, or, after it
had been considerably weakened, to confine it in its own harbour would
always be merely a question of time. So soon as this had happened, no
great State could be more easily cut off than Germany from all sea
intercourse worthy of the name--of her own ships as also of the ships
of neutral Powers. To effect this it would not be necessary to control
long stretches of coast, but merely to blockade the few big seaports.

In the same way as the traffic to the home ports, the German mercantile
ships on all the seas of the world would be left to the mercy of an
enemy who was more powerful on the sea. Hostile cruisers on the main
trade-routes, in the Skager-Rack, in the English Channel, off the
north of Scotland, in the Straits of Gibraltar, at the entrance to the
Suez Canal, and at the Cape of Good Hope, would render German shipping
practically impossible.

Also with regard to this the Justificatory Memorandum to the Naval Law
(of 1898) speaks unambiguously. In it is observed:

 "Protection of sea trade on all the seas would occur principally in
 time of peace. In case of war it would be the task of the foreign
 service cruisers to afford their own mercantile ships the 'utmost
 possible protection.'"

That is to say, the ships would do the "utmost possible." What would be
possible in this respect is clear when it is realized that the Navy Law
provides altogether for forty-two cruisers, whilst the greatest Naval
Power, for example, to-day already possesses 206 cruisers (finished
or under construction), and, moreover, has at its disposal bases and
coaling stations on all the chief trade-routes.

To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies in the existing
circumstances there is only one means--Germany must have a battle fleet
so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power a
war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in
the world.

For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Battle
Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for a
great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate
all its striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in
meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a
strong German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in
spite of the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the
world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.

In order to attain the goal which has been set, the protection of our
sea trade and of our colonies by ensuring a peace with honour, Germany
requires, according to the standard of the strength-relationships of
the great Sea-Powers, and having regard to our tactical formations, two
double squadrons of efficient battleships, with the necessary cruisers,
torpedo-boats, and so on, pertaining thereto. As the Navy Law (of 1898)
provides for only two squadrons, the building of a third and fourth
squadron is contemplated. Of these four squadrons two will form a
fleet. The second fleet is to be organized in its tactical composition
in the same way as the first fleet provided for in the Navy Law.

For the scope of the maintenance in commission in time of peace the
following consideration has been decisive: As the ship-establishment of
the German Navy, even after the carrying out of the projected increase,
will still be more or less inferior to the ship-establishments of some
other great Powers, compensation must be sought in the training of the
personnel and in tactical training in the larger combinations.

A trustworthy training of the separate ships' crews, as well as an
adequate training in the larger tactical combinations, can be ensured
only by permanent maintenance in commission in time of peace. To
economize in commissioning in time of peace would mean to jeopardize
the efficiency of the fleet for the event of war.

The minimum of commissioning is the permanent formation of that
fleet which comprises the newest and best ships as an active
combination--that is to say, a combination in which all battleships
and cruisers are in commission. This fleet would form the school for
tactical training in double squadron, and in case of war would bear
the first shock. For the second fleet, which will comprise the older
battleships, it must suffice if only half of the ships are permanently
in commission.[19] For training in the larger combination some further
ships must then, it is true, be placed temporarily in commission during
the manoeuvres. In case of war this second fleet--the Reserve Battle
Fleet--will have to make up its arrears in the training of the separate
ships' crews and the deficiency of training in the larger combination
behind the protection afforded by the Active Battle Fleet.

If Germany possesses four squadrons of efficient battleships, a coast
squadron composed of small armoured ships is less important.

Besides the increase of the home Battle Fleet, an increase of the
foreign service ships is also necessary. In consequence of the
occupation of Kiauchow and the great enhancement of our oversea
interests in the last two years, it has already become necessary, at
the cost of the scouting ships of the Battle Fleet, to send abroad
two large ships more than were provided for by the plan of the Navy
Law. Indeed, for an effective representation of our interests it would
have been necessary to send out even more ships, if such had only been
available. In order to form a judgment of the importance of an increase
of the foreign service ships, it must be realized that they are the
representatives abroad of the German defence forces, and that the
task often falls to them of gathering in the fruits which the maritime
potency created for the Empire by the home Battle Fleet has permitted
to ripen.

Moreover, an adequate representation on the spot, supported on a strong
home Battle Fleet, in many cases averts differences, and so contributes
to maintain peace while fully upholding German honour and German
interests.

A numerical demonstration of the additional requirements cannot be
given for a considerable time in advance in the same manner as for the
Battle Fleet, which rests upon an organic foundation.

If the demand is made that the foreign service fleet shall be in a
position (1) energetically to uphold German interests everywhere in
time of peace, (2) to be adequate for warlike conflicts with oversea
States without navies deserving of the name, an increase of at least
five large and five small cruisers, as well as of one large and two
small cruisers as material reserve, seems called for. The Navy Law
foresees as ready for use three large and ten small cruisers, and as
material reserve three large and four small cruisers.

A distribution of the foreign service fleet among the foreign stations
cannot be given, as this distribution depends upon the political
circumstances, and these can only be estimated from case to case.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 19: This principle was abandoned under the Law of 1912, and
a standard of greater instant readiness for war was substituted, with
three squadrons fully manned and two with nucleus crews.]




APPENDIX II

British and German Shipbuilding Programmes.


The following table shows the British and German ships laid down
between 1897 and 1914 and the programmes of subsequent years--the
British figures for 1915-18 being based on the Admiralty forecast, and
the German on the latest German Fleet Law:

 +-------------------+----------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+
 |                   |                Great Britain.                |              Germany.                |
 |                   +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+
 |                   |Battle|Armoured |Protected|Destroyers.|Torpedo|Battle|Armoured |Protected|Destroyers.|
 |                   |ships.|Cruisers.|Cruisers.|           |Boats. |ships.|Cruisers.|Cruisers.|           |
 +-------------------+------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+
 |         {1897-1898|   4  |     4   |    3    |      6    |  --   |   1  |    --   |    --   |     --    |
 |         {1898-1899|   7  |     8   |    1    |     12    |  --   |   2  |     1   |     2   |      6    |
 |Mixed    {1899-1900|   2  |     2   |    1    |     --    |   2   |   3  |    --   |     2   |      6    |
 |armament {1900-1901|   2  |     6   |    1    |      5    |   2   |   2  |    --   |     2   |      6    |
 |period   {1901-1902|   3  |     6   |    2    |     10    |   5   |   2  |     1   |     3   |      6    |
 |         {1902-1903|   2  |     2   |    6[20]|      9    |   4   |   2  |     1   |     3   |      6    |
 |         {1903-1904|   5  |     4   |    4[20]|     15    |  --   |   2  |     1   |     2   |      6    |
 |         {1904-1905|   2  |     3   |   --    |     --    |  --   |   2  |     1   |     3   |      6    |
 |         {1905-1906|  --  |    --   |   --    |     --    |  --   |   2  |     1   |     3   |      6    |
 |                   +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+
 |       Totals      |  27  |    35   |   18    |     57    |  13   |  18  |     6   |    20   |     48    |
 |                   +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+
 |         {1905-1906|   4  |    --   |    --   |      6    | 12[21]|  --  |    --   |    --   |     --    |
 |         {1906-1907|   3  |    --   |    --   |      2    | 12[21]|   2  |     1   |     2   |     12    |
 |Dread-   {1907-1908|   3  |    --   |    1    |      5    | 12[21]|   3  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |nought   {1908-1909|   2  |    --   |    6    |     16    |  --   |   4  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |period   {1909-1910|   8  |    --   |    6    |     20    |  --   |   4  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |         {1910-1911|   5  |    --   |    5    |     20    |  --   |   4  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |         {1911-1912|   5  |    --   |    4    |     20    |  --   |   4  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |         {1912-1913|   4  |    --   |    8[22]|     20    |  --   |   2  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |         {1913-1914|   5  |    --   |    8    |     16    |  --   |   3  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |         {1914-1915|   4  |    --   |    4    |     12    |  --   |   2  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |                   +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+
 |         {1915-1916|   4  |    --   |   --[23]|     --[23]| --[23]|   2  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |         {1916-1917|   4  |    --   |   --[23]|     --[23]| --[23]|   3  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |         {1917-1918|   4  |    --   |   --[23]|     --[23]| --[23]|   2  |    --   |     2   |     12    |
 |                   +------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+
 |Totals authorised  |      |         |         |           |       |      |         |         |           |
 | (1905-1914)       |      |         |         |           |       |      |         |         |           |
 | (Dreadnought      |      |         |         |           |       |      |         |         |           |
 | period)           |  43  |    --   |   42    |    137    | 36    |  28  |     1   |    18   |    108    |
 +-------------------+------+---------+---------+-----------+-------+------+---------+---------+-----------+


As is explained elsewhere, Germany has remained faithful to the policy
outlined in the Memorandum, but by successive Navy Acts she greatly
increased the means for giving effect to it--one legislative measure
succeeding another in quick succession, always making an increase in
the naval establishment.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 20: Included in these two figures are eight scouts--small
cruisers--which were laid down in 1902 and 1903.]

[Footnote 21: The cruisers of 1912-14 were designated "light armoured
cruisers."]

[Footnote 22: These thirty-six craft are small destroyers, and were
built as such.]

[Footnote 23: No programme of British cruisers or torpedo craft
announced.

The forty-three British battleships exclude the two Colonial
vessels--_Australia_ and _New Zealand_--and the battleship given by
the Federated Malay States, and ordered early in 1913. With these the
number of Dreadnought vessels is increased to forty-six.]

END.








